This paper develops a basic conceptual framework of values and the valuing process. Section 1, Values and Value Claims, discusses the four different types of value claims (personal, market, real, and implicit) and their relationships. The second section considers the process of rational evaluation as a method of arriving at and supporting value claims. As this discussion points out, the process of rational evaluation is basically one of comparing alternative means to our ends, and this means/end model must be seen as operating not with initially fixed means and ends, but with the task of developing, clarifying, and combining means and ends. A number of different skills are involved in this process, and it is worthwhile encouraging students to identify these skills during these discussions. The third and final section, Foundations of Morality and Democracy, discusses the place and function of ultimate values in discussions of values in general, and democratic values in particular. The author concludes with a remark about the difference between education and indoctrination: In moral education, we should be saying nothing that is unchallengeable, and we should be concentrating on providing students with the cognitive and affective skills they need in order to do the challenging of our past assumptions, and to develop new value conclusions for new situations. (Author/JLB)
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VALUES AND THE VALUING PROCESS.
Section 0.

It is impossible for the teacher to adequately handle the kinds of difficulty that face us as individuals or as teachers when we begin to talk about the war and peace field unless we have a clear understanding of the conceptual framework of values and the valuing process. Ultimately, such an understanding requires a degree of familiarity with some of the discussions that have been carried on in the philosophical subject called ethics. But for the most part one can avoid technical philosophy, and stay with the issues provided that you have a good grasp of a limited number of basic points which are covered in the following. (If somebody wants a relatively non-technical discussion of the subject matter of philosophical ethics, it might be worth looking at the chapter on morality in Primary Philosophy by Michael Scriven, McGraw Hill, 1966).

Section 1. Values and Value Claims — Different Types and Their Relationships.

It's useful to distinguish four types of value, which are commonly referred to in value claims or value assertions. (It would be natural to call these value judgments, but that term has come to have a prejudiced meaning. It has come to mean "mere matters of opinion" and of course that assumes that there cannot be objective judgments of value. Since it is the purpose of this discussion to show how we do indeed come to objective value conclusions, it is confusing to use a term which is frequently taken to commit one to the opposite position. So, for the most part, we'll just use the term value as a claim.)

These four types will be called here personal values, market values, real values, and implicit values. They will be taken in the order just given because they can be seen as developing out of each other in that sequence.

A. Personal values or value claims. What we call matters of taste are good examples of personal values (such as are expressed in statements like "I like pistachio-flavored ice cream") but personal values include anything else which
can be put at the end of a sentence beginning, "I value...." It's important to see, however, that the values business begins with personal values, since we come into the world with some of them. We don't come into the world valuing democracy or judicial due process, but we do come into the world valuing food and we develop without any social pressure a valuation for certain temperature ranges, kinds of surface on which to sit, etc. None of these values are immutable. We may come to value other things more highly than life or food, as one can see from the individual who goes on a hunger strike in support of what he believes to be a just political cause, or from the individual who gives up his life to save that of another. But even though these do not give us an unchangeable fixed point in our value system, they do give us what is historically a starting point for developing one. They give us a point to the whole process of evaluation, although that process may lead us to developing values which transcend the starting point values.

Note that personal values are not the same as matters of personal opinion. Tastes are not opinions. Do not confuse, "I personally believe that... is good" with "I personally like ...." The first of these two is a modest way of putting a real value claim (type 3 below). The second of these is a simple type 1 value claim. The first of these is arguable, debatable, and a matter for intersubjective testing; the second of these does not refer to any matter of public dispute, but only to a personal preference. There are borderline areas, where people attempt to persuade others that the language of real value claims is appropriate, though others remain sceptical and think that only a matter of taste is involved; a good example of this is the aesthetic domain, or the rhelm of oenology (winetasting). The transition from "I like this wine" to "This wine really is good" is a very significant one because the second claim carries implications for what others should think (if they have good taste) whereas the first does not. In the whole area of values and the valuing process no transition is more important for the teacher to be sensitive about than the transition from the mere expression of a personal feeling to a commitment to the objective worth of something.

Now, when somebody says "I personally think that ...." he is, in a certain sense,
just telling you about what he feels. And you might say that the truth and falsity of that claim depends only on whether he really does feel that. But there is more to it than this; for you can also read the preamble ("I personally feel") as a kind of diffident introduction to a statement about what's really true. And what the speaker is claiming to be really true is something about the real value or worth of a particular entity or alternative. But when somebody says, "I personally prefer tea to coffee" he cannot possibly be construed as implying that all intelligent, right thinking, rational, thoughtful, well-informed people will have the same commitment. And that is just the difference between matters of opinion and matters of taste. Matters of opinion are issues where the possibility of the opinion being right or wrong exists; matters of taste are not. As usual with these distinctions, there are some borderline cases, where questions about good taste come up. Someone might say that some matters of taste are matters where there is a right and wrong, because there is such a thing as good taste (which would be right) and bad taste (which would be wrong). But to be straightforward about it, as soon as we can really establish standards of right and wrong, then we no longer talk about issues regarding that are centered on these matters as being matters of taste. There are of course differences of opinion amongst physicists about the merits of different theories in quantum mechanics, for example. But we don't speak of these as being matters of taste.

You might put this by saying that it's important to distinguish between the "modesty" function of beginning a sentence with "I think" and the "introspective" function of the same phrase. In the modesty function, this isn't really a report on one's thinking processes, but a way of expressing a belief rather modestly; it is the belief that is the crucial element. In the "introspective" function of "I think...", the crucial element is the reporter's state of mind; he really is telling you what he's thinking about. Once you see the difference between these two uses of the same phrase, you can see the difference between a matter of opinion and a personal value claim. A matter of opinion is usually expressed in "I think...." language, or should be so expressed, but this is just a case of the "modesty" use of the opening phrase. It's quite different from a personal value statement where somebody is reporting on
their own attitudes or feelings, for example when they say "I think tea tastes better than coffee." They're not modestly claiming that everyone should think this, they're simply telling you that that's their value preference. Another way of looking at this point, which turns out to be helpful in the classroom, consists in pushing pretty hard to find out just how general a claim the person is making. Is he recommending a point of view which he believes everybody should have, or is he just telling you something about the way he is. If a man says "I think violence is never justified," you might take this to mean that he's giving you an introspective report on his own attitudes or values; and he is certainly doing at least this. But usually he means to go beyond this and express a matter of opinion on an issue where he thinks there is a right and a wrong opinion. You can easily find out whether this is the case by asking him: does he think that people with a different view of this are wrong? Sometimes he'll deny that, because he's been brought up to believe that it's improper to reject the views of others. But further questioning will show you that he actually is committed to this. For example, you might ask him whether he thinks he has any reasons for supposing that violence is wrong or whether he just happens to feel that way. Often he will say yes there are some reasons for this, and give one or two. Of course if these are reasons for that conclusion, then they're being ignored by the people who have the other conclusion and that shows the others to be less reasonable. If he was to say that there are also reasons against it, and perhaps his opponents have those in mind, then you must ask him whether he's taken these other reasons into account and has decided which are the most powerful. To this he will normally say that he has and he doesn't think they're so powerful, which means of course that in his judgment the case is stronger for his point of view, and therefore weaker for the others, and therefore the others are making a less sound judgment and are in error. None of this will happen if what he has put forward in the first place is merely a feeling or a matter of taste. He isn't going to argue that everybody ought to like the taste of tea better than the taste of coffee, or like history better than geography, etc.

So, the identification of personal value claims and the distinction between them and a person's statement of opinion about a general value issue, is a most important
first step. It is almost always confused in social studies methods texts, and once one is confused about this, the ball game is essentially over with respect to more complicated cases. Remember that the existence of borderline cases does not show that a distinction is unreal. There are people whom one couldn't describe as either bald or having a full head of hair, but that doesn't mean you can't make a distinction that's very clear between people who are bald and those who have a full head of hair. (Denying this is sometimes called the black and white fallacy, for obvious reasons.) We do use value-words like "good" to express both matters of taste and matters of opinion; "This tastes good" is a matter of taste claim, whereas "This is a really good hamburger" goes a little beyond this towards the matter of opinion categories. But it would be foolish to fight over the difference between these two, which is quite slight, indeed so slight that one may be used as essentially synonymous with the other. But that doesn't alter the fact that there is an immense difference between saying that you personally like something and saying that something is intrinsically superior to something else. You usually can't justify the last kind of talk about the area of taste, but you certainly can about the area of performances by craftsmen or by appliances. Personal value judgments refer only to matters of taste.

B. Market values / if a group of people exist who have some common elements in their personal value "profiles" as we call them, they create a market. And we can refer to the results of their common attitudes by talking about the value in this market of certain objects. For example, one might say that at a particular stage in the mortgage cycle swings of the last few years, a particular house had a market value of $37,000. This is an abstraction from personal value claims, because it doesn't tell you that any particular person values it this much at this stage. It's a kind of packaged prediction that somebody is going to come along who does value it this much, but we have developed the language of market value to avoid committing ourselves too much to the predictions. For example, the market might change quite quickly and nobody ever does show up who is prepared to pay this. That doesn't show we were wrong to say that the market value was that. For the content of a market value statement is like the content of a statement about theoretical
entities in science, in that it can't be simply reduced to statements about a more easily observable level. Statements about electrons are not simply the same as statements about what you can see in cloud chambers, etc. And statements about market value are not simply reducible to statements about what somebody will pay here and now. But they do generate the probability of such states of affairs, and that's their value (1) to us. In fact we're prepared to pay somebody quite a substantial fee to come in and give us an estimate of the market value of residential property and we regard it as a considerable skill to be able to do this well. Hence it's clear we're involved in a domain where some objectivity is obtainable, just as it's clear that we can with some objectivity determine the personal values of an individual, partly by asking him, but partly also by making inferences from observations of his behavior and his relations to others. In the same way we determine the market value of a property by studying its characteristics and their relationship to other properties which have recently been sold in the market or have failed to sell at a price which may now appear to be too high.

So when somebody says "The value of ... is ...," he may well be making a market value claim, one which is wholly related to the economic realities and not at all related to ideals. Sometimes a person will utter a protesting remark, when someone has purchased an object after very close bidding at an auction; they may say "Oh it wasn't worth that!" You can't tell by looking at it whether they mean by this that its market value was less, i.e. that the pressure of an auction succeeded in driving the price up too far, or whether they mean that the market is foolish or represents a fundamentally wrong type of value with respect to this type of object. If they mean the former they can be investigated in a particular way (e.g. by looking to see how the price of these objects looks at other auctions or in regular retail outlets); if they mean the latter they are talking about a "real-value" claim, which is the next type for us to investigate.

You can see that value-claims have to be looked at very carefully and you often have to ask the person who makes them exactly what they mean by them, before you can decide how to go about checking on their truth. But nothing could be more naive than to identify all value claims as either mere matters of opinion or mere matters of taste. Not only are those two things quite different, but when a man responds to
your request to tell him what the market value of a particular Greek coin is, you can hardly accuse him of having expressed a mere opinion, when he is reporting on twenty or thirty transactions that have occurred in the past few days, when nothing has changed about the market for coins, and when he is perfectly willing to give you exactly that price and to guarantee that nobody would give you any more, to support his market value claim. That's about as objective a claim as you can get, and it isn't a "mere matter of opinion," and it has absolutely nothing to do with a mere expression of taste. It isn't just that he prefers these things, indeed he may not like them at all himself; he is telling you something about the disposition of a large group of people who do have some liking for these things to pay money for them in order to obtain them. And that's as objective a statement about that group of people as it is to say that their average income is so and so.

C. Real-values and

Now we come to the type of value claim that most of the fighting is about! Sometimes when somebody says that a particular entity is worth more, or is better, or is superior, more meritorious, etc. than another, he is not in any way referring to the market value. Indeed there may be no market for these entities, for example if they happen to be abstract ideas, or he may be completely disdaining the market's rather crude methods of assessment. When a man says "Give me freedom or give me death!" he's telling you something about his personal value system. But when he says "Freedom is worth the lives of many," he's making a claim about the real value of freedom, whether or not people are willing to give up their lives for it. It is the mystery of how to make sense out of real value claims that has led many scientifically-minded people to reject the whole domain of value claims as subjective and irrational. But one never wants to be deterred in one's practical aims by philosophical difficulties until they can be shown to have practical consequences. For example, it's extremely difficult to define knowledge in a way that is satisfactory — it has never been done in the history of philosophy to this date. But this doesn't mean that we don't know anything, or that we ought to be more cautious about asserting that we do know things. That may be true, on other grounds, but it certainly doesn't follow from the difficulty in formulating an abstract conception of knowledge. Similarly with the concept of real values. We know very well what
our spouse means when he or she says that some little luxury item on which we
spend a good deal simply isn't worth it. He (or she) is not usually — though of
course this may be the case sometimes — saying that we could have got it more
cheaply somewhere else. The content of the criticism is that that kind of thing
just isn't worth that much money and the way to make this stick is by pointing out
the other kinds of things that can be bought with that money which have more lasting
or generally useful value for us. So we know very well what the practical sig-
nificance of real value talk is, even if we can't give a general formula for making
sense out of it.

Take another example: supposing somebody says that security regulations that
prevent the publication of scientific research when it is done under classified con-
tracts, do more harm than good. Of course they don't mean that this is the common
opinion (i.e. this is not a market value fact). They may in fact be attempting to
change the opinion of essentially everyone else. Is there something tremendously
mysterious about this claim, or something essentially subjective, or something
fantastic untestable? No, though that's not to say that it's easy to test it or set
out its exact contents. But, roughly speaking, we know what he means — he means
that the gains, which refer to keeping new discoveries from the enemy and thereby
avoiding having spent our tax funds to advance his weapons-related sophistication
are not enough to offset the great advantages in the civil as well as the military
field or avoiding the reduplication of research and encouraging the cross-disciplinary
stimulation that often results from publications in relatively remote areas from
one's own field of research. Now we know how to go about checking on a claim like
this, and we also know that it isn't going to be a simple head-counting matter. We'll
have to make some kind of an estimate of the social value of various discoveries
that were made as a result of the publication of material that would under the present
regulations be kept secret, and we'll have to make some estimate of the damage
that is done in the opposite kind of case (offsetting against this the fact that a good
deal of classified work is in fact transferred to "the enemy, whoever he may be," by means of his intelligence network anyway). And on the side we have to make some
kind of a calculation of the absolute cost of running the security system, which is
very great, and the serious problems of prestige and recognition that arise for a professional researcher whose work cannot be published, problems that may well affect his motivation significantly and hence his further contributions.

So we have a pretty fair sense of how to operate with various types of "real-value" claims. In the next section we'll talk some more about the process of evaluation that leads to this most important kind of value claims.

D. Implicit/Value Claims. We might call these by other names; for example, we might call them value-impregnated claims, or contextual value claims. This class of values or value claims is a very confusing one and leads to much of the sloppy use of the term "value judgment." There are circumstances in which the assertion that somebody is intelligent or that he is strong, for example, quite obviously are not meant to be taken as purely descriptive, but as recommendations as well. These are circumstances in which it is clear from the context that intelligence or strength, etc. are valuable for the purposes that are our concern in this context. If it's clear from the context that \(X\) is a valuable property, then the assertion that a particular entity has the property \(X\) carries with it, has implicit in it a connotation of value. Consequently, these perfectly straightforward factual claims, in these contexts, get treated as if they were value claims. They are not value claims, explicitly, but in the terminology of this subsection we will call them implicit value claims. It's very important to see that if you are challenged on them, you have no need to get into the vocabulary of worth and merit and value at all. If you are challenged on the claim that somebody is intelligent, then you should produce the evidence for that in just the same way as you might produce the evidence for the claim that he is a relatively fast reader or a relatively slow runner by comparison with the norms of his age groups. Because there has been so much controversy about the concept of intelligence, it's very easy to slip into the idea that there is always something debatable about the assertion that somebody is intelligent. But that's the black and white fallacy. The identification of I.Q. with intelligence may indeed be debatable, though the fact that it is widely debated doesn't show this, it usually only shows that some people are willing to argue even when extremely ignorant. But the claim that somebody is intelligent goes back a long way
before the creation of the I.Q. test, and it's about as objective as any other claim about a person's abilities. Which is to say, not immune to bias, not always easy to check, but sometimes clear enough. Now there will be times when a particular student is said to be intelligent by one of his teachers and this will be denied by another who knows him equally well. On the face of it, this is a good situation in which to say that it's now a matter of opinion whether he's intelligent. (Notice that it's nothing like a matter of taste.) We may be able to settle it — we may not. In that respect it's like many another factual matter, such as claims about the surface of Venus. It is in no way to be supposed that because it is debatable it is a value judgment. The only reason for saying it's a value judgment is that intelligence is implicitly valued in many contexts. But we should be clear that intelligence is implicitly disvalued in other contexts, for example when picking people for extremely routine tasks, or as wives for extremely stupid men, etc. (Whether or not the theory behind such matching is sound, it is clear that a number of people hold those theories.) So the value can be "split-off" from the property which is — in one context — implicitly valued. And that is the crucial test for identifying type 4 value claims. They are not necessarily imputations of worth or merit. You can make sense of the claim that someone is intelligent and therefore no good (for a certain task).

There's a special category of claims that at first sight look very like implicit value claims. One might well say that there isn't much difference between saying that somebody is a fast runner and saying that they're a good runner. Therefore, it might be said the first type of claim — along with other claims about a person's intelligence, etc. — should really be seen as a real value claim, and not just an implicit value claim. Most types of performance claims, it might be said, involve some kind of comparison with the norms of performance and whenever anybody is described as having a certain ability to any significant degree, he is really being described as being meritorious with respect to this ability, which means we're making a value claim. So one might argue that there really isn't any difference between implicit value claims and real value claims.

There's a good point here, but it is a little overstated at the end of the last paragraph. Supposing I say of somebody that he's unusually tall. This certainly
implies a comparison with the norms of height, and suggests that he's outstanding with respect to these norms. But it certainly doesn't imply — necessarily — that he is meritorious in any dimension. One really isn't meritorious with respect to height, one is either tall or short. Now with respect to intelligence, the same argument applies. To say that a man is intelligent is simply to say that he is significantly above the average in intelligence. That doesn't mean that he's meritorious with respect to anything, unless you wish to ascribe merit to intelligence, which you are likely to do in some contexts but not all. So it still makes pretty good sense to say that claims about intelligence, etc. are only — if at all — implicit value claims. (Notice that there may be contexts in which they are not intended to be value claims at all, implicitly or otherwise.) Now when you say somebody is a good runner, or even when you say something more specialized such as he's a good hundred meter man, or a good miler, you certainly are making an explicit value claim. Moreover, it's usually not just a market value claim, but a real value claim. The proof of this is in the fact that you might be willing to argue that someone was a good miler though in fact he hasn't done very well in the races he's run so far, and even though he's not thought well of in the market for athletes. This might be because you know a lot about his personal circumstances which leads you to think there were special explanations for his bad performance previously, and that it is this bad performance which has controlled his market value. So the real value claim is once again a more complicated and 'deeper' claim than the simple performance claim or even the loaded 'or unloaded' performance claim, i.e. the implicit value claim. It's a little harder to explicate (that is, make clear) but on the other hand it's also a very important way to communicate very important material to us. When a man says that a particular car isn't worth much on the market but it's a tremendous value, he's drawing a contrast between two types of value, and calling your attention to the fact that it is the second that 'really' matters. And we all know how he might well have good evidence for what he says. So, be on the watch for real value claims that go beyond market value claims and be on the watch for implicit value claims that may look as if they're quite value-free, but actually be used in a way that suggests they are being treated as if they were value claims.
Moral and non-moral value claims. Moral value claims are not a separate category from the above. There are just four types of value claims, and moral value claims are simply one type of real value claim. When someone is telling you about his personal likes and dislikes, he is not telling you about morality. When someone is telling you about what people like and dislike (the market), he is not telling you about morality. When someone is telling you about certain qualities which may in particular contexts be regarded as meritorious, but in other contexts might not be so regarded, he is not talking about morality. Morality is a special subject matter area within which real value claims can be made. They can also be made within other subject matter areas. For example, there are methodological real value claims — such as, "The theory of special relativity is still probably the best account of the red shift." There are practical value claims such as most of the ones that you find in Consumer Reports: "The best glue to use for joining cork to cork: is Brand X." The domain of morality is simply the domain which is concerned with assessments of actions, attitudes and, in general, any behavior that may affect other people, judged from a particular point of view. This point of view is not the point of view of the self-interest of the actor, or the victim, nor the point of view of the government, or a particular church; it is simply the point of view of all involved, treated alike. To make it a little more precise, the moral point of view is the point of view according to which everybody has prima facie equal rights. "Equal rights" means that their welfare, insofar as it is affected by the matter under evaluation, should be taken into account, in the first place, equally. But this notion of "in the first place" needs some qualification and that's the function of the term "prima facie." To say that everybody has prima facie equal rights when matters are being considered morally is to say that they have equal rights unless it can be shown that they should be accorded more or less than equal consideration according to a general principle which can be supported by showing that it can be supported by appeal to everybody's welfare, considered equally. A simple example is the following: Where somebody sues somebody else for breach of contract, they come before the court with equal rights. The court then appeals to general principles of law, whose justification is that they are the best system we can work out for solving problems like these, which anyone might get into. Now when we come to apply this
set of laws, whose justification is based upon equal consideration of everybody's possible use for them, to this particular case we may finish up treating the two litigants in a very unequal way. We may find that one of them is guilty and punish him and find that the other is innocent and award him damages. Thus inequality comes out of equality in a perfectly rational way. And it is this procedure for reconciling equality of rights with inequality of treatment that lies behind the notion of "prima facie" equal rights. Democracy is not called upon to arrange that everybody be treated equally, only that everybody be treated equally in the first place (prima facie), that is, that everybody's welfare be given equal consideration in drawing up, revising, and applying the system of laws and practices embodied in the democracy. It may be in everybody's interest to reward initiative and industry, by providing tax relief to those who have been especially successful in the export drive—as has been done in France, for example. We may judge that generating maximum gross national product is desirable from the point of view of all, and hence we may take steps involving differential rewards for differential quantities of output that will increase the incentive to produce and hence increase the gross national product. There's nothing undemocratic about this, since it is based upon a concern for the welfare of all treated equally. That doesn't mean a concern for treating everybody equally, regardless of the welfare of all! Treating people equally is not the only kind of reward that we are concerned with, although it's a very important one. Morality is concerned with the analysis of institutions, attitudes and actions in order to see whether they are based upon an ultimate concern with the equality of rights of those whom they affect.

Now, that definition of morality isn't one that everybody would accept, but it's one that is consistent with almost all and almost everybody's practice. No matter what one considers to be the ultimate foundation of morality, whether intuition, love of mankind, religion, or practical considerations, you will find in the moral systems built upon these approaches a recognition in one form or another of the principle which is used in the previous paragraph to define morality. That principle may crop up in the Golden Rule, in the admonition to love thy neighbor as thyself, or in the preamble to a bill of rights which asserts that we are all created equal (meaning, of course, equal in our rights, not in our height, weight or capacities).
In all systems of morality, as in systems of law you will find concern for justice as a key value, and justice is precisely the commitment to treating people as having equal rights. Taking this as the definition of morality has the advantages of simplicity, generality (it reasonably represents moral systems that actually exist), and neutrality (with respect to the controversial and incompatible claims about the "true" foundations of morality). Moreover, as we shall see later, it provides us with a moral system which can be given a justification. Notice that there is nothing subjective or relativistic about this conception of morality. It tells us how to go about discovering what is moral, and it makes no identification between what is moral and what is thought to be moral, or what serves the interest of any group of the society.

Section 2. The Process of Rational Evaluation

Let us now consider the way in which we support, or arrive at value claims. Psychologically speaking, this may be by any of a wide variety of routes. We come into the world with certain personal values, and we acquire a belief in others and in real value claims by means of indoctrination, introjection of our parents' values, rejection of our parents' values, etc., etc. Our concern here is with the domain of rational evaluation, which is not the whole domain of evaluation, nor should it be. But where it is applicable, it is of the greatest importance that reason be brought to bear upon value issues, because reason has the special merits of being accessible to everybody and hence making possible general agreement, and of providing us with a solution that is most likely to be true. You can be reasonable and get to the wrong answer, but you can be sure that by being reasonable you will in the long run get to the right answer more frequently than by any other route. Because, of course, if there is another route that gets there more reliably, then it's reasonable to adopt it! Reason operates on the principle, "if you can't lick them join them" and is not to be contrasted with intuition or feeling, since in many circumstances the most reasonable guide to the right answer is one's feelings or intuition. But there are many other circumstances in which one's feelings or intuitions are dominated by considerations other than the likelihood of being right, for example when
they are influenced by prejudices of various kinds, and in those circumstances it is important to be able to rise above our initial emotional reactions to a situation.

The process of rational evaluation is basically the process of comparing alternative means to our ends. That just means analyzing the alternatives in terms of their nature and consequences for whatever we value. Although that's a useful formula to remember, because it tells you that there's nothing more mysterious about the logic of evaluation than there is about any procedure of means/ends reasoning on which most of our practical life is based, the most important fact about the formula is that it is "open-ended." That is, in order to apply it you have got to know what you value (or what is really valuable) and know what the alternatives are, and learning how to do that is the better part of the skill of rational evaluation. The idea of the formula being open-ended should convey to you the idea that when we turn to the question of what values we should use in the formula, we shall then turn to another situation in which those values are themselves the means to attain yet further values and thus the formula can be applied at a second level where what was previously a set of goals now becomes a set of means. To give a practical example: We might be interested in trying to decide whether it would be a good idea to provide the United Nations with substantial armed services. Very well, applying the means/ends approach, we first ask ourselves what it is we seek to obtain by this means. One might reply by saying that one seeks to attain peace in the world. Now somebody might ask whether that is really the most important goal. In order to answer this we would then look for yet further values in terms of which we might be able to say that peace is the best means to attain these more ultimate values. For example, we might say that happiness could only be obtained as long as there is no war; or we might say that fulfillment of our obligations to the underprivileged in the world is only possible in a peaceful world because of the diversion of resources that war requires. As we begin to look at the matter in this way, we may notice some difficulties; for example, some of the most peaceful nations are ruthless dictatorships where peace is maintained at the expense of the welfare and rights of the citizens. So we might want to say that peace with justice is the goal in which we are interested, not just peace alone. And if we say that, we may find it necessary to incorporate the world court into the United Nations and make
the implementation of justice one of the tasks of the United Nations armed forces. Of course that means interfering in the internal affairs of some nations, which is contrary to another value and so on and so on. What you must see from this is the way in which the rational process of evaluation spreads out as it is applied to its own ingredients; we begin with a kind of first hypothesis about the relevant goals and the relevant alternatives from which our means/end model might enable us to form a value judgment such as, "It would be a good idea to arm the United Nations" (we could put the same point by saying, "We should arm the U.N."). And then as we begin to work at the question of justifying those goals in turn we discover that a more complicated network of values is involved.

Exactly the same kind of ramification goes on when we begin to focus our attention on the alternatives. Our first inclination in considering a suggestion like this is to concern ourselves only with the alternative of the innovation itself and compare its merits with the present state of affairs. But this is a less-than-ideal way of going about the rational process of evaluation; we should also start thinking about whether there are better alternatives than the one proposed, even though nobody has mentioned them in this discussion so far. Thus we might want to consider providing the U.N. with forces that will be adequate for enforcing an extremely ruthless mutual disarmament pact, according to which all nations agree to abandon all armed forces and weapon pools whatsoever, above the level of a modest ordinary civilian police force. Now that alternative will require very modest services for the United Nations, with a consequent very large saving in cost, and it will eliminate the cost of the separate armed forces of the various nations, so it has some important things going for it. On the other hand, it may be impractical for political reasons, something we would have to look into.

Thus, the means/end model must be seen as operating, not with initially fixed means and ends, but with the task of developing, clarifying, and combining various means with various ends that are relevant to the problem at hand.

There's a tendency to feel lost in the maze as you begin to develop the complex strands of means and ends involved in any process of rational evaluation with respect to a certain problem. The first step towards being able to keep your feet in the apparent quicksand is to see that there is a great deal of difference and importance
attached to the different ends that turn out to be relevant. And one must employ some notation to signify this. For example, if you're setting this out on a blackboard or an overhead projector transparency, you can use different colors or a different number of underlinings to indicate the most important ends. These degrees of importance themselves, of course, are one of the variables that you have to be willing to discuss; but there isn't any doubt that people will generally agree on the greater importance of considerations of justice over luxury. Similarly, with respect to the factual questions such as the political possibility of getting nations to agree to disarmament in stages, we have to be able to indicate differences in our degree of confidence about the factual claims. The rational process of evaluation is not just able to handle uncertain cases, but is designed to do so. And it does so by providing some kind of response for each of the main possibilities, in just the same way that we take out insurance to cover ourselves against a possibility which we certainly hope won't happen. In the example we've been discussing, for example, we might want to begin with a United Nations force that was big enough to take on almost any nation's independent forces, even though this would be an expensive way to begin, just because it does provide us with insurance against the possibility of a ruthless dictatorship nation taking over.

So the first procedure to keep in mind is that not all these ends or alternative possible means are equally important. Our obligation is to make sure we deal with the most important and then take care of as many others as we can, but without diverting most of our resources to them.

The other crucial insight that helps one to keep one's head in the process of rational evaluation is the recognition that all we're looking for are tentative solutions that are the best bets in the light of the evidence we have. Nobody can do better than that, and we don't have to be able to reject the possibility of error.

Now it wouldn't be any use at all to discuss the matter at this abstract a level if your educational goal was to get students to acquire the skills of value inquiry. The real learning goes on in the attempt to handle actual cases. And it's not going to take place if the cases that you give them are of no interest to them, because there will not be any motivation. Hence the necessity for realistic and interesting cases in class. They have to be realistic or the skill that is acquired
will not be one that can be transferred to real world situations. And they have to be interesting in order to keep the students' attention. Now that doesn't mean that you begin with problems about the United Nations, because their importance is far more apparent to adults than it is to most students. Of course you hope to work up to such examples, but you begin with examples that bear on their own world, and a very good source of these are examples about the rules and regulations and attitudes which surround them. Pick any one of these, for example some rule about behavior in the corridors, or a dress rule, and start in on the process of tracking down the goals which it is supposed to serve and the alternatives to it. Leave space so that you can get into the further question of whether the goals that it is supposed to serve are themselves supportable, i.e. means to get further and more basic goals, and space to list other alternatives. Very soon you begin to get a degree of system into the process of rational evaluation that greatly assists coming to a defensible conclusion.

As you stand back and look at what we've been doing, you will notice that a number of different skills are involved and it's worthwhile encouraging the students to identify these as they are practiced in the discussions.

We have analyzed the process of giving reasons as frequently boiling down to the process of finding further goals which will be served by whatever it is that we are trying to defend. This is itself quite a skill, the identification of potential justifications. It is closely related to the skill of identifying the consequences of proposed actions or attitudes. When we begin to search for a satisfactory solution, the cognitive skill of identifying inconsistencies becomes relevant. As we begin to consider the options, the imaginative skill of creating novel alternatives that may well maximize the relevant values to a degree not possible with the previous alternatives becomes a crucial one. Throughout, we find a constant drawing on straight factual knowledge about either the actual known consequences of certain alternative possibilities, or the known values of some of the people involved whose attitudes must be considered. And that leads gradually into something considerably more like an affective goal, namely the capacity to empathize with those holding a very different value position. Empathy does not mean agreement, but it does mean a perception from the inside, an insight, without which it is very unlikely that an adequate representation of the alien viewpoint will be possible, and hence it is very
unlikely that a realistic solution can be proposed. Empathy can frequently be increased by the deliberate encouragement of role-playing activities in the classroom. The imaginative skill in identifying new alternatives or compromises is also very closely linked with this, and should be focussed on explicitly; the solutions proposed by Solomon, and those proposed by labor arbitrators should be brought up as being just as much examples of inventiveness and creativity as the usual paradigms of those things in the sciences and the arts.

It can't be emphasized too strongly that in teaching the process of rational evaluation the slogan "practice what you preach" is very nearly an absolute commandment. If the learning environment does not have implicit in it the values which are being explicitly espoused by the teacher, then, as we all know, you might as well save your breath to cool your porridge. The student learns by osmosis from the surroundings far more readily than he does from verbal input. Keep making your classroom, and the way you run it, and the way the students behave in it, one of the topics for evaluative discussions. Lead them into it gradually, because they won't feel like criticising it freely at first; perhaps by discussing other classrooms from their experience or hypothetical arrangements in the classroom. But if you don't ever get to it, they'll never make the connections, and you'll probably never notice the extent to which correction is in order. What are your procedures for getting suggestions and criticisms from the students? Is it that "you are always willing to listen?" Any such approach shows poor empathy with the values of the student. The risks and rewards structure for him in voicing a complaint explicitly is likely not to lead to much success with this procedure, except with a minority. Make each of these considerations, and procedures like the use of buzz groups and the election of representatives, etc. subject to evaluative analysis by the class. What do they think of the use of anonymous letters for this purpose. What ends does it serve, what bad consequences might it have, how does it compare with the other alternatives. Values education begins at home, and home is where the class is, some of the time.

If they begin to feel oppressed by the pressure, convey to them your full and free recognition of the primacy of the pre-rational, both historically and — in one
sense — logically. Hume put it by saying, "Reason is the slave of the passions" and by this he's normally taken to mean that reason can only be brought to bear to decide on the best way to get to some end which you must have before reason can be brought to bear. As we have seen from the above cases, by the time we get to rational evaluation of something in the midst of our very complex form of life, then you can trace back the chains of justification quite a long way using reason. But eventually you come to a point where you're referring to a personal value, one which cannot be regarded as a product of reason but cannot be criticized for that either. Reason always has a monitoring role, with respect to our evaluations, but it doesn't always have a justifying role. We can't say flatly that it's just as reasonable to like chocolate malted milks as vanilla malted milks, and that this kind of reference is always immune to reason, because we may discover that one of these flavors has harmful side effects. Reason is always standing on the sidelines ready to bring to bear such considerations on our tastes — this is the monitoring role. But it isn't a sponsoring role, however, because by reason alone you can't come to one of these preferences over the other when there isn't any evidence about harmful side effects. If a boy finds a girl attractive, he doesn't have to get an o.k. from reason about this; but of course if he wants to marry her, this is a pretty complicated social contract and he will have to do some thinking about the complex consequences of such an action and in short, get into the rational evaluation business. If he didn't find her attractive, then one of the main reasons for marrying her would be missing, but that reason itself doesn't have to be given rational support.

If you can get clear about the way in which reason does and does not relate to our valuing processes, to values of the four types mentioned above, then you will be in an excellent position to clarify most of the value disputes that arise in the classroom or the commonroom.

Section 3. The Foundations of Morality and Democracy.

In many of the discussions that come up, one doesn't have to go back very far in order to find the sort of values that — for the purposes of this discussion — are not in dispute. But one always has to be willing to face the situation when someone challenges these "ultimate values." What gets called an ultimate value depends
very much on the context. Tolerance of others, or justice for all, or treating violence as a last resort, may all be regarded as being ultimate for certain purposes. In terms of the system of morality which we're setting up here, which is about the simplest possible, the defining value of a moral system is equality of rights and hence this will be the ultimate value in any moral discussion. But than there are a set of values that fall within the system rather being involved in defining it which are more commonly referred to as "ultimate." These include such things as tolerance for the viewpoint of others, which we'll discuss in a few moments. But in a sense there are even more ultimate values, because we can, of course, raise questions about why we should bother with morality at all, why we should treat others as having prima facie equal rights. And such a question cannot be answered in moral terms since it is a question about morality itself. If you want to justify morality, you have to go outside morality. The "should" in Why should we accept moral principles?" is not a moral should.

In exactly the same way, political arguments can push back to the "ultimate value" of the universal franchise, or they can go back beyond that to morality, depending on what's at stake. There are always some people who, for the love of argument, always challenge everything that gets put up. But this is actually a move towards destroying argument, because argument is a means to an end and not an end in itself — except as a game — and playing games isn't what most people are about when they're engaged in serious political or moral discussions. Nevertheless there comes a time when someone wants to know, really wants to know and it's the main issue at the moment with them, why we should bother about morality. And the best way to handle that seems to be to discuss alternative ways of viewing other people. You can either really view them as deserving equal consideration with yourself or as deserving less or as deserving more, and we can look carefully into the sort of social system we'll get under these three different circumstances, and maybe decide which we prefer. Doing this systematically is a pretty tough job and this isn't the place to try and review the steps. The main point is that one should be willing to do it, and perhaps go back and look at some of the classical or more recent discussions of this (one of these is mentioned above).
As a matter of political expediency, it's really important that the way morality is being defined here makes it coincide with the usual formulation of the fundamental principle of democracy, the equality of rights of man. This means that there's nothing controversial about the approach to values education discussed here — it is just an explication, a working out of the values to which we're committed as members of this society.

Now if somebody wants to argue that we are attacking his religion because one of the conclusions we come to is incompatible with one that is held within that religion, e.g. about abortion or dancing or drinking, then we have to be willing to trace the steps of our argument so that we really can show that it doesn't depend on any smuggled values other than the equality of rights of the citizenry. If we can show that, then it follows that his position represents one that smuggled in further moral premises and that it is he who is acting inconsistently with the commitments of a democracy and not us. Democracy is a moral position, and citizenship education involves unpacking that moral commitment with respect to the major issues of our times and our personal lives.

Nevertheless the time does come when the crucial issue becomes that of justifying democracy. If democracy is defined as a political system which accords equal rights to all the men and women it affects, then there is no problem about justifying it since it is the same as morality. But unfortunately there are no such democracies in practice. Even the classic democracies, such as the Greek one, accorded equal rights only to those who were in the category identified as citizens, which excluded a number of people living in the country and directly affected by the laws, quite apart from those who were affected by the foreign policy of Greece. If we define democracy in terms of the apparatus of government, then the definition may well be applicable, but it may not be justifiable. If, for example, we define it as a system of government involving the universal adult franchise, then it's easy to decide when this system exists, but very hard to say that it's particularly good. For example, the franchise may exist, but the selection of candidates may be extremely restricted, or the powers may be extremely restricted, in which case we wouldn't think of it as a democracy. Or even these conditions may not occur, but freedom of the press does
not exist in which case facts about the alternative policies, platforms and candidates are not available, so that the possibility of a rational choice is absent, and so on. It is really better to ask the more limited question given the situation in our country at our time, what is the best form of government? or what is wrong with our present form of government?

Now one of the most crucial perspectives that one has to get upon moral discussion relates to this kind of question which we have just been discussing, a question reaching out for the ultimate grounds of justification for particular systems of government, etc. We've earlier discussed the way in which men's wishes and preferences can be a kind of ultimate basis — no particular one of them can be said to be forever immune to rational criticism, but rational criticism is only possible as long as some of them are accepted, and hence their existence is necessary for and in this sense more fundamental than reason. There are other "ultimate bases! Sometimes an argument may terminate when we're able to produce a definition which provides our ultimate source of value; for example, "a good wristwatch must keep fairly good time" would be close to a definitional statement and maybe be the crucial basis for our evaluation of the relative merits of a number of wristwatches. Another way of putting the matter is to say that we never need an ultimate basis, all we need is to be able to go back far enough to find a basis for agreement for the time being, i.e. a basis which is not under immediate dispute in the way that the immediate point at issue is. One can put this by saying that the means/end model for moral decision is all right because it can be applied to every end and hence there is no need for any ultimate end.

So you never need to be distressed by statements like, "How can you be certain of this -- after all, it all rests on other value commitments." Yes, it does, but then every claim we ever make in science or in commonsense discussions has this same feature and yet it's perfectly appropriate to say that we can attain levels of practical certainty there, levels that are good enough to bet one's life on. And the same can be said of the field of morality. You don't have to say that life is absolutely sacrosanct in order to say that it's a good reason against driving while drunk that you'll probably kill somebody. It might happen to be a condemned criminal who deserves the death penalty (assuming that any such exists) but then it might
not, and so far as you know it's more likely that the person you kill will be an
innocent person who doesn't deserve it. And that provides us with an excellent
ground for not doing something which may involve such a death. Why should we
accept the value of life as a basis for our obligations? Because we value it in our-
selves and the moral system requires us to treat others -- whom we know also
value it -- as worthy of equal consideration. Why should we adopt the moral sys-
tem? Because other systems of regarding our fellow men lead to frustration of
our life plans, misery and death than this system. But it is usually unnecessary
to go this far when you're trying to support the claim that somebody shouldn't
drive when drunk. Ultimate justifications are sometimes very important, but the
absence of ultimate justifications for mathematics and quantum physics doesn't
mean we don't know anything in them.

And now we come to two final comments. The first concerns tolerance for
others' points of view, something to which we said earlier we would return. Whether
it arises because of a difference in their ultimate values or not, it's quite clear
that there are some pretty fundamental differences of opinion on moral matters in
our society. It is a tradition to which we pay a good deal of lip service in this
society that we should treat these opinions of others with some respect. This is
loosely referred to as the doctrine of pluralism. But unfortunately, in the way in
which it is normally expressed, it actually amounts to a version of relativism, and
relativism castrates any moral point of view whatsoever. So if you think your moral
point of view is any good, you cannot think that others who hold contradictory points
of view are just as well justified in holding them as you are in holding yours. If
you do think that you are not entitled to maintain your point of view as if it were in
fact true. It is simply one of several candidates which are all equally well supported,
and of course you can't act on the basis of one of these chosen at random or for
aesthetic reasons. If you really mean that others are as well justified in their
moral beliefs as you, then you're putting yourself in a position where you say I'm
going to act on the basis of this because I happen to have been brought up the way
that I was which led me to believe this rather than something else: But only these
accidents of upbringing and birth lead me to these conclusions, and I know those
accidents have no status as good reasons, so I agree that the other person's point of view is just as legitimate as mine." To have said that is to have eliminated the basis for rational action. Such action is justified only on the basis of a position which is preferable, superior to, the alternative. Now let's see if we can handle this tension between pluralism and relativism in a satisfactory way. Pluralism does not need a special treatment in the area of values by comparison with its treatment in the area of disagreements in science. No scientist, and no rational person, can believe himself to be absolutely free from bias. Consequently, even if he believes he's in possession of good reasons for the position he holds, he must concede the possibility of error. Hence he must concede the possibility that others are correct and that he is incorrect. Hence he must take steps towards resolving the disagreement before acting upon his view, to the extent that this is possible at all. Such steps include further examination of the arguments of the others, further research on the facts which they claim to support their position and the use of third parties to examine the case for each of the two alternative views. This is part of the standard procedures of scientific progress. The same should hold in morality. The tendency to think sloppily about the difference between matters of opinion and matters of taste and to think of value judgments as being just the same as all of these leads to the view that since everybody is entitled to their own taste, they are entitled to act on their own feelings — however casual, poorly researched and poorly examined — on the most serious values issues of our time. Pluralism in religion certainly involves tolerance of everybody's right to worship his own god in his own way, but only up to the point where this ceases to be a matter of aesthetic or religious preference and becomes a basis for social action that imposes these values on others by means of legislative pressure, etc. The justification for imposing one's values on others can only be the existence of a proof of such clarity that any rational person with enough training to comprehend it can see its truth. Such proofs are not easily found within the complex mazes of dogmatic religion, attempting to justify moral legislation on the basis of obscure textual interpretation, etc. The proper attitude towards the position of others is the same whether the domain happens to be common-sense or science or morality. It is respect in proportion to the qualifications and
industry that the other brings to bear on the issue, and willingness to work out a compromise/compromise joint action is necessary. It does not at all mean a real commitment to the likelihood that both views are right, since this is a contradiction if there is any such thing as truth in the domain in question. People are most certainly not justified in working for repressive legislation on the basis of their religious or moral beliefs when those religious or moral beliefs cannot be given the kind of support that would lead any open-minded rational individual to endorse them. Pluralism, i.e. tolerance yes! Relativism, i.e. triviality, no!

And finally a remark about the difference between education and indoctrination. The analogy here with the teaching of science is absolutely precise. It is not satisfactory to teach science students to memorize all the facts that are presently available and call that science education; that does not give them the skills for discovering the truth in new circumstances, and you know from past experience that many of the "facts" which you have given them will turn out to be false, and that they will have to discover new truths to replace them. In moral education, we should be saying nothing whatsoever that is unchallengeable, and we should be concentrating upon providing them with the cognitive and affective skills that they need in order to do the challenging of our past assumptions, and to develop new value conclusions in the face of new situations. Anything less than this is failing to equip them for the kind of life they will be involved in and indeed are already involved in; anything more than this is proselytising or brainwashing.

The experienced teacher will of course realize that there are certain ways in which the teacher subliminally indoctrinates, by example or by hint, and will tend to feel the preceding advice is unrealistic. On the contrary, it is precisely what one must aim to do, it is the definition of the goal of moral education, and this is perfectly consistent with the fact that we will not all always succeed in attaining it fully. We certainly can succeed in attaining it more closely than we do now, and we certainly can succeed in attaining it to a degree that makes what we're doing immune to serious criticism of the kind that has been increasingly common in recent years and increasingly well justified as we turn up more and more evidence about it.