The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between political education and social studies curriculum and the political orientations of students in the United States, Italy, Sweden, Germany, and England. A review of psychological research indicates that conventional, or conformist, moral and legal orientations develop early in life, are universally modal, and typically persist. Traditional schooling does not attempt to facilitate development of a more autonomous orientation. Three dimensions of political orientation are presented as being parallel to moral and legal orientations and their developmental stages: efficacy, legitimacy, and dissent. The study is based on 1968-69 test results of an average of 355 9-20 year old students in each country. Exposure to formal political education and social studies subjects are the independent variables. It is tentatively concluded that the courses, in general, have a meager effect on political orientation. And, the course content is redundant because it does not present the student with stimuli sufficiently different from what he has received earlier in life. (Author/DJB)
POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND EDUCATIONAL STIMULI--
A CROSS-NATIONAL CASE OF REDUNDANCY

by

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No Segment of this Paper Should be Quoted
Without the Express Permission of the Author
INTRODUCTION*

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between political education and social studies curriculum and student political orientations. A personality development-situational stimuli model will serve as a hypothetical vehicle in explaining the findings derived from a five nation survey of students.

The main hypotheses employed here are as follows:

(1). Individuals move through discernable stages in the development of their political orientations.

(2). Political orientation developmental stages are a product of (a) unfolding personality characteristics, i.e., cognitive positions, and (b) situational stimuli, i.e., societal political events and institutions.

(3). Considerable variation occurs in (1) depending upon the development of (2a) and the impact of (2b).

*The author wishes to acknowledge the professional advice and assistance in this research received from Seigfried George, Justus Liebig - Universität, Abt. fur Erziehungswissenschaften, Giessen, West Germany; Sixten Marklund, Director, Bureau of Research and Development, National Board of Education, Stockholm, Sweden; Leslie A. Smith, Director of the Consultative Service, University of London Goldsmiths' College Curriculum Laboratory, London, England; Ray Whittaker, College of Education, Norwich, England; and Maria Laura Martini, Johns Hopkins University, Bologna Center, Bologna, Italy. A graduate fellowship at the Educational Testing Service, Princeton, New Jersey, in 1967, enabled me to begin work on the survey. I acknowledge also the financial assistance given by the National Science Foundation to the George Peabody College Computer Center which made possible my computations. The costs of administration were defrayed by a faculty research grant from George Peabody College. The American Political Science Association and the National Science Foundation awarded me a travel grant to West Germany in 1970.
A positive significant relationship between (a) political education and social studies curriculum (these are situational stimuli or external stimuli—2b above) and (b) student political orientations is likely when (4a) is non-redundant of the developmental stage of (4b).

Moral-Legal Development. Before examining political orientations data, let us turn to moral-legal developmental data in order to illustrate a model that is hypothetically applicable to political orientations development. The reader is cautioned that the moral-legal data and the political orientations data are based on different methodological approaches. In other words the studies are not isomorphic and comparisons should be considered as suggestive, not as conclusive.

The recent work of Tapp and Kohlberg on moral-legal development implies that the individual moves through a consistent development in his orientations toward both the moral-social order and the legal order. Reduced to skeletal form the stages may be illustrated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MORAL DEVELOPMENT</th>
<th>LEGAL DEVELOPMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Preconventional Level:</td>
<td>I. Laws prevent violence and crime since punishment ensues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morality is interpreted in terms of specific punishments and rewards.</td>
<td>Obedience is a by-product of deprivation evasion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Conventional Level:</td>
<td>II. Laws are valued because they maintain the social order. Anarchy, disorder, and chaos would ensue if laws did not exist and/or were not obeyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral behavior is determined by perceptions of duty toward majority approved societal values. There is conformity to stereotypical ideas pertaining to family, group, or national rules.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
III. Post-Conventional Level

Autonomous moral principles are valued apart from perceived group rules. A comprehensive, universal and consistent orientation toward personal behavior is adopted. Among these principles is the concept "justice."

Ethical, autonomous acting men could be guided by universal principles. Laws that violate fundamental individual rights and universal moral principles could be legitimately broken.

The above moral development levels were derived through examination of cross-cultural longitudinal studies of development of moral reasoning in Mexico, Taiwan, Turkey, and the United States. The legal reasoning data came from a quasilongitudinal study including respondents from Denmark, Greece, India, Italy, Japan and the United States. The stages developed in a similar progression across the cultures represented, suggesting universal moral and legal development.

The conventional level (II) was shown to be modal for most cultures and only small minorities reached the post-conventional level (III) of legal development. High correlations between moral maturity scores at ages 13 and 16 and the mid-twenties indicate that the moral development modal level (and by inference the modal legal development level) is reached early in life and persists throughout the life cycle, although increased consistency and integration occurs during later years. This age trend analysis suggests the pattern presented in Figure 1.

In shifting our attention to the situational-stimuli, it is posited by Tapp and Kohlberg that the role of educational institutions, for example, should be to facilitate or stimulate students to higher cognitive positions on the stages enabling them to
FIGURE 1

ASSUMED MODAL PATTERN OF MORAL-LEGAL DEVELOPMENT THROUGH LIFE CYCLE

Post-Conventional III

Conventional II

Preconventional I

Early Childhood Middle Years Adult Years

develop more sophisticated orientations in relation to moral-legal values. They maintain that traditional social education has "typically" urged compliance with the predominant adult rules and attitudes of the particular social system (i.e., level II development). The moral-legal developmental trends presented by Tapp and Kohlberg clearly conform to the political orientations hypotheses presented in the introduction.

Let us now focus on the cross-national political attitudes survey. By first examining the relationship between political education and social studies curriculum and student political orientations, and then probing age trend analyses, one may discover whether or not the hypotheses fit the political attitudes data.

THE CROSS-NATIONAL POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS SURVEY

The Samples. Nearly 1800 students from 9-20 years of age were surveyed during the latter part of 1968 and throughout 1969 in five nations. The size of the samples varied from 421 in the
United States, to 336 in Germany and Sweden, and 347 in Italy and England.

Students and schools were selected on the basis of what is called a judgement sample. That is, these students generally represented the major characteristics in which the researchers were interested with respect to age, sex, rural and suburban location, and so forth. Only the West German sample was taken from one locale in that nation—the city and suburbs of Frankfurt. In Sweden, students were sampled in Stockholm, the nearby suburb of Nynäshamn and the northern Swedish city of Skellefteå. The American sample was taken from all sections of the nation with a somewhat higher proportion coming from Southern and Border states. The English sample came from rural and urban areas of Reading, Coventry, Norwich, and London. The Italian sample is widely distributed as to urban and rural characteristics with student samplings in Agrigento, Bologna, Napoli, Milano, Roma, Trieste, Padoa, and Pieve di Soligo.

In this survey the fathers' occupations of the respondents were compared with the fathers' occupations results of a national probability student sample survey. The comparison demonstrated that the four European non-random survey results corresponded favorably with the national random sample results. The United States sample was shown to be slightly skewed toward the lower occupational levels.

In addition to the above sample information, the frequency distribution of the extent to which students included in the survey have not/are not or have/are taking formal political education and
social studies courses and/or related curricula conformed very closely to the estimates of educational authorities, thus giving reasonable assurance that the responses to the main educational variables were accurate.

The Survey Instrument. The survey instrument, a paper-and-pencil questionnaire, contained twenty background items, some of which pertained to the respondent's exposure to formal political education and social studies subjects (as distinct from the traditional history subjects), and a twenty-two item attitude battery containing three scales measuring sense of political efficacy, tolerance for political dissent and opposition, and sense of political legitimacy. In selecting the dependent variables (the three scales) three themes prominent in current analysis of democratic political systems were chosen. It appeared that the degree of exposure to formal political education and/or social studies courses should positively affect student performance on these variables if such exposure was to be proved effective.

Selected Survey Results. Before presenting the results of course exposure effect on the dependent variables, it should be mentioned that in Sweden a uniform curriculum exists in the comprehensive school and most children are exposed to civics (the European counterpart to political education) throughout their academic careers rather than through particular courses. In England and Italy, on the other hand, few students have taken formal political education courses although an increasing number are now encountering formal social studies courses. Response patterns indicate that English and Italian students are often
confused when asked whether or not they are now studying and/or have previously studied courses or subjects dealing with government or politics. Consequently, sizeable majorities in these two nations left unanswered the question pertaining to their formal exposure to political studies. This pattern occurred neither in the social studies nor on the political education questions in the other three nations. Of course, these findings will be relevant in determining the meaning of curriculum or course impact on political orientations. In moving from the course exposure data to the relationship between courses and scale performance we see that (except for some statistically significant and positive correlations in England) course or subject exposure generally does not affect legitimacy, dissent/opposition, and efficacy scores. (See Tables I-IV)

Appreciable differences in results on these measures for Swedish students were not anticipated, since nearly all of them have been exposed to the national civics curriculum. However,

| TABLE I |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|
|                | Efficacy (r)    | Dissent/Opposition (r) | Legitimacy (r) | N |
| England        | +.07            | +.26             | +.15           | 299              |
| Italy          | -.06            | +.14             | +.16           | 222              |
| Sweden         | +.13            | +.04             | +.12           | 221              |
| United States  | +.14            | +.01             | +.02           | 262              |
| West Germany   | +.01            | +.14             | +.05           | 249              |
### TABLE II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Efficacy (r)</th>
<th>Dissent/Opposition (r)</th>
<th>Legitimacy (r)</th>
<th>N</th>
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<tr>
<td>England</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>+.07</td>
<td>221</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>-.04</td>
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<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
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### TABLE III

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<th>Legitimacy (r)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>+.17</td>
<td>+.31</td>
<td>+.20</td>
<td>299</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>+.15</td>
<td>+.08</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>+.18</td>
<td>+.10</td>
<td>+.14</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>+.07</td>
<td>+.03</td>
<td>+.05</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>+.11</td>
<td>+.08</td>
<td>249</td>
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</table>

### TABLE IV

<table>
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<th>Legitimacy (r)</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>+.13</td>
<td>+.05</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>+.07</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>+.07</td>
<td>+.10</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>+.04</td>
<td>+.10</td>
<td>+.09</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
as a result of the higher levels of exposure to civic education content compared to the other nations, Swedish student scale performance relative to them could be expected to be higher. This clearly was not the case (as demonstrated by the overall scale performance rank order—not shown here).

The data presented here find support in several within-nation surveys; although the dependent variables are not always similar. They essentially corroborate the Langton-Jennings findings related to American students and the high school formal political education curriculum. The Langton-Jennings survey is based on the results of a national probability sample of high school seniors and is the most extensive study conducted in the United States comparing the effects of students with formal political education to those without this special training.¹²

An analysis of Frankfurt University students concerning their secondary school civics courses disclosed a situation similar to that which is found in the cross-national student survey—students completing these courses do not differ noticeably from those students who have not taken civics instruction. In this survey the students taking civics were more interested in politics; however, neither in their political knowledge, their attitude toward the political system, nor in their propensity to become involved in politics could any fundamental differences be found when they were compared with students without formal political education in the schools.¹³
Current studies also indicate difficulties for political instruction in Sweden. One such inquiry involved a random sample of 1,958 students in elementary school, grade 7 and junior secondary school, forms 4 and 5. The survey disclosed that the students had a low level of interest in the political education courses to which they were exposed. Further analysis indicated that the subject matter covered "a little about everything" and that the time spent on individual subject matter items was too short to allow a high level of pupil interest. The conclusion that low student interest may be caused by the course itself was substantiated by comparing the students' interest in politics with the results of a similar survey of working adults' attitudes. Politics was a subject to which the adults showed a positive attitude and about which they tried to increase their knowledge.¹⁴

A cross-national survey of civic education in Europe (which included among other nations: England, Italy, Sweden, and West Germany) arrived at the conclusion that students regarded the subject as a useless addition to their intellectual baggage. The lack of appeal of the civics courses and inadequate teacher preparation were cited as the two basic sources for the problems encountered by civic education.¹⁵

England provides an example of higher magnitude correlations between political education and social studies course exposure and student political orientations on the dissent/opposition and legitimacy scales. These positive results found between having had formal political education and dissent/opposition scale performance might be open to misinterpretation. Although sixty-four percent of the English respondents left the "previously studied politics"
option blank, no students omitted whether or not they had taken social studies courses (including the numbers of such courses taken). This possible confusion about the political education option might mean that the few students stating that they took these courses were mistaken, thus making the single positive result quite meaningless. However, it is known from English correspondents that the students in this sample were then actually taking social studies courses. So let us now focus on the positive correlations found for this independent variable.

At the present time the English school system is undergoing a gradual change in its social studies curriculum. Since the early 1960's "Interdisciplinary Enquiry" courses, based in sociology, anthropology and psychology (as yet not in "political science"), are being field tested. A number of students in our sample were exposed to this experimental curriculum and they possibly account for the positive correlations. The following is an example of the core of an enquiry based curriculum now being used in some English schools: the viewpoint of sociology; culture; personality; social stratification; deviant behavior and social problems; crowd behavior; population problems; formation of public opinion and propaganda; and religion and ethical ideals.

Under other conditions the absence of appreciable findings in Italy, Sweden, the United States, and West Germany might change. For example, Langton and Jennings found course impact varied according to racial subsample and socioeconomic breakdowns (i.e., course taking did have a significant impact on certain dependent variables for their black subsample). This outcome did not occur in their analysis of the white subsample. Racial
or ethnic background was not requested in the five-nation survey for fear that the question might result in non-acceptance of the questionnaire.

Another illustration of alteration of non-significant findings is the work of Ehman. He found results similar to those of Langton and Jennings (using similar dependent variables) when he examined the data relating to numbers of social studies courses reported. Course exposure had a very low magnitude effect on the dependent variables. However, when Ehman analyzed his data pertaining to the hypothesis "that exposure to social studies courses and to controversial issues is most effective in producing positive attitude changes when these experiences are perceived by students to have occurred in an intellectually open climate," significant impact was demonstrated. He introduced "qualitative measures" (i.e., classroom climate) as distinct from "quantitative variables" (i.e., numbers of courses taken) and detected that the former had an impact on course exposure and controversial issue exposure as intervening variables ("open" classroom climate and "closed" classroom climate). Measures could also have been used to discern the effect of school climate and school-district educational quality on certain dependent variables.

AGE TREND ANALYSIS AND POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS—DEVELOPMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS

Let us now superimpose our original hypotheses on the political attitude survey results presented above. Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate that students move through an upward progression in terms of the student mean scale score responses (except Italy on the
Mean Score

DISSENT/OPPosition
AGE TREND ANALYSIS
MEAN SCALE SCORE

United States
Sweden
West Germany
England
Italy

Age
9-11
12-14
15-20

United States
2.66
2.80
2.81

Sweden
2.59
2.67
2.86

West Germany
2.22
2.74
2.88

England
2.44
2.52
2.75

Italy
2.42
2.65
2.74

FIGURE 2
LEGITIMACY
AGE TREND ANALYSIS
MEAN SCALE SCORE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Age 9-11</th>
<th>Age 12-14</th>
<th>Age 15-20</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>2.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>2.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>2.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>2.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>2.59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Efficacy Age Trend Analysis
Mean Scale Score

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>West Germany</th>
<th>England</th>
<th>Italy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9-11</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>2.05</td>
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<td>2.34</td>
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<tr>
<td>12-14</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>2.56</td>
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<td>2.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-20</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4
legitimacy scale, a stabilization between the age groupings 9-11 and 12-14 in Sweden and between age groups 12-14 and 15-20 in the United States. Furthermore, the within-nation patterns are roughly similar on Figures 2 and 3, i.e., West German Students are lowest at age 9-11 and are highest at the age 15-20 classification tending to confirm hypothesis (1). In Figure 4 we see that the pattern for efficacy begins at a lower level, but, with the exceptions of Italy, Sweden and West Germany, an upward progression for English respondents and a stabilization between the United States age groupings 12-14 and 15-20 is discernable.

The efficacy performance might be below legitimacy and dissent/opposition orientations because the perception of political effectiveness develops later than the other two orientations. Cognitively, the student does not readily become aware of the question of effectiveness vis-a-vis the political system. On the other hand the concept of legitimacy is brought out early in parental, school, and other socialization agency attempts to inculcate political values. The notion of dissent would also appear early since the student vis-a-vis parent–peer group–school authorities dissonance is part of the maturation process. The question of whether or not dissent was actually effective or not (an efficacy orientation) would appear to be a more in-depth, sophisticated concept that the child would develop later than the more salient legitimacy and political dissent/opposition concepts.

Factors suggested in hypothesis (2b) might account for the extreme downward efficacy progression shown, for example, in the case of the Italian students. It was suggested in a recent survey of children in the United Kingdom, Italy, West Germany, and the United States that the high position of Italians in relation to
the other nations on an efficacy measure was due to a phenomenon unique to the Italian political culture. The authors hypothesized that the efficacy results related to an expressive involvement in politics rather than a more direct behavioral one. In other words, Italians often discuss politics; however, they do not link their political discussion with political effectiveness, in fact they do not feel politically effective in terms of participation in the Italian political system. What might be occurring on the scale results presented in Figure 4 is a cognitive juncture separating political from expressive efficacy. The questions asked of the respondents clearly refer to effectiveness vis-à-vis the national government and it may be that younger students do not adequately understand this orientation.

Hypothetical models representing the developmental stages are as follows:

**Legitimacy.**

I. During the early years of the life cycle legitimacy is meaningless since the concept of "nation" is not usually cognitively perceived. The "nation," when perceived, will be considered morally legitimate because of the likely non-approval ensuing from a position of non-acceptance.

II. The child develops an awareness of the value placed on favorable orientations toward his nation by members of his society. Nationalistic feelings at this stage may become chauvinistic and the superpatriot image might emerge.

III. His nation is favorably valued; however, the individual perceives the goals, cultures, and so forth of other nations as viable and legitimate. Consequently, a position of impartiality and affective understanding is assumed in relation to these other national entities.
Dissent/Opposition. I. Dissent is perceived as a punishment producing behavior early in life and therefore might not be valued. The concept of political opposition would not appear to be salient, however, contemporary mass media developments presage a grasping of governmental opposition earlier in life. Conditions undoubtedly will exist where the child is allowed a wide latitude of dissent. Under these conditions it will be favorably internalized.

II. Later, dissent/opposition is seen as part of the democratic political process. It is perceived as a duty and obligation to voice one's dissenting opinion, but the crucial factor in stage II is the belief that dissent/opposition must cease once a majority and/or the government has decided upon a policy.

III. Dissent/opposition is a concept linked with a socio-political democratic philosophy and is seen to be a personal and social obligation and right. Civil disobedience might occur when majority and/or governmental policy is perceived to be unjust.

Efficacy. I. Early in life the notion of being efficacious or non-efficacious is not perceived by the individual. In fact, it might be possible for an individual to move through the entire life cycle and actually never question whether or not he is effective vis-a-vis the political system. Efficacy would appear to be inextricably bound-up with the effectiveness or non-effectiveness of dissent/opposition. Consciously or unconsciously a child's efficacy orientations would relate to whether or not his dissent activities were punished. Of course, in an open family decision making situation, where the child was consulted and participated without his involvement being one of dissent, the child would develop efficacious orientations.
II. Political efficacy is related to political participation. The non-efficacious will tend not to get involved in politics. Political participation is a hallmark of the democratic philosophy and is consequently highly valued in a democratic society. However, in reality many individuals (those at level II) perceive their participation, other than voting, as being useless vis-a-vis the entire political system. Therefore, only a few individuals (political elites) move into stage III.

III. The individual believes that he is highly effective politically. This perception may be a result of a moral orientation, i.e. a citizen ought to participate and/or a product of how politically successful the individual actually is in relation to the political system.

CONCLUSION

The two independent variables, exposure to formal political education and social studies subjects, fall under hypothesis (2b) situational stimuli. The reason we find negligible independent variable (2b) impact (hypothesis 4) in four of the nations analyzed is that the content of these courses is parallel with stage II on the legitimacy and dissent/opposition scales and almost non-existent in the curriculum in relation to efficacy development.

The curriculum in the schools usually supports conformity when majority or governmental positions are established. Political system support is a major objective of the so-called citizenship training in schools and the course content is rarely sensitive to the goals of other nations. The concept "am I successful in attempts to exert pressure on the system" is taught only on a simplistic
level involving the idea that the people ultimately control the government. The point emerging here is that this subject content cannot appreciably affect students during the years they normally take them—the student is already at or beyond the curriculum oriented stage.

The English social studies experimental materials might account for the significant course impact because new concepts pertaining to societal conflict and how to manage it confront the students with genuinely different cognitive and affective learning materials. (hypothesis 4).27

This presentation should in no way be interpreted as definitive. The author has attempted to present analytic hypotheses based on the developmental research of Piaget, Tapp and Kohlberg. The conclusions reached by these authors supposedly were achieved by an inductive process of in-depth probing using semi-projective and projective interviewing techniques. The political orientations models, therefore, have been deduced from extant psychological models and might have oversimplified a complex socialization process (as might the psychological models). The results, then, should be viewed as having seminal, heuristic value only.

The findings presented above do give tentative support to the original hypotheses (1), (2a–b), (3), and (4a–b). The models presented help us to explain the disclosure that measures like formal political education and social studies course exposure in most instances are having only a meager effect on political orientations. This appears to be the case because the courses generally do not present the student with stimuli sufficiently different than those already received earlier in life. Therefore, we conclude that the courses are redundant.
FOOTNOTES


2. Ibid., pp. 70-71.

3. Ibid., pp. 70 and 84.

4. Ibid., p. 71.

5. Figure 1 is a revised form of an assumed pattern of development of political attitudes and behavior presented by M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi. See "Patterns of Political Learning," Harvard Educational Review, 38 (Summer, 1968), pp. 443-467. Jennings and Niemi assert that many types of political attitudes are formed early in the socialization process and persist throughout the life cycle. Their research shows, however, that changes can and do occur on numerous political variables depending on age and other factors.


7. Torsten Husén, ed., International Study of Achievement in Mathematics: A Comparison of Twelve Countries, I (Stockholm: Almquist and Wiksell, 1967). The occupational categories used in this study were those employed in the Husén survey. The West German sample was not a national random sample. Project participants in the two Länder (Hessen and Schleswig-Holstein) took the view that it was likely that if the schools were selected by a random process many of them would prove uncooperative, and that it was therefore better to draw a judgment sample from schools known to be cooperative. Italy was not included in the twelve nation mathematics survey, therefore general occupational estimates were extrapolated from rankings of the other nations (e.g. Italy ranks below the other four nations in per capita income and could reasonably be expected to rank slightly below them in terms of fathers' occupations of students).

8. Although financial considerations made it impossible to depart from a paper-and-pencil format, other precautions were taken to insure against unreliable results. All tests were translated and reviewed by bilingual colleagues in Italy, Sweden, and West Germany and were inspected by several other academicians in England and the United States to insure comparability. Scale questions were phrased positively and
negatively so as to minimize any possible response set bias. There were five options: Strongly Agree, Agree, Do Not Know, Disagree, and Strongly Disagree. "Do Not Know" responses to all scale items were coded as the midpoint. Each of the scales was subjected to several statistical tests. These analyses indicated that the items (several were discarded) produced three distinct scales composed of questions which were highly intercorrelated within scales and, with slightly different results within each nation, were generally more highly internally correlated than with each scale used as an external criterion. The dissent/opposition scores using Cronbach's alpha ranged from .61 (Italy) to .76 (West Germany); the legitimacy scale from .59 (Italy) to .71 (West Germany); and the efficacy scale from .48 (West Germany) to .67 (United States). All but three (out of fifteen) of the alphas in the scales were above .60.

9. The overall results for this five-nation survey of political orientations demonstrate that significant "between nations" differences exist as checked by a one-way analysis of variance run for each nation in relation to the nation scoring highest on each scale. English and Italian respondents consistently ranked below Swedish, American and West German respondents. However, when the findings are checked according to a low, medium and high trichotomization few students in all nations fall into the low category. In this respect the nations are more alike than the significance results demonstrate, cautioning the researcher not to depend heavily on such tests in postulating cross-national differences and similarities (overall student performance by nation is not presented in this paper). These findings are partially corroborated in Jack Dennis, Leon Lindberg, Donald McCrone, and Rodney Stiefbold, "Political Socialization to Democratic Orientations in Four Western Systems," Comparative Political Studies, 1 (April, 1968), pp. 71-101. For data indicating possible changes in the English political system refer to the article by Dennis, Lindberg and McCrone, "Support for Nation and Government among English Children," British Journal of Political Science, 1 (January, 1971), pp. 25-48.

10. The students were separated into two age groupings, 9-11 and 12-20, the latter being the most likely years the students would take a formal political science or social studies course. The exception to this rule is found in Italy where the time allotment devoted to political education decreases as the student moves from the scuola elementare to the scuola media and beyond. Another breakdown separating students into a 15-20 age category, produced similar results.

11. Since the samples used in this survey are not national probability samples the use of statistical significance measures may be questioned. In response to this charge one
could reply that in cross-national survey research it may not be possible to draw valid samples for comparison since too many unknown, uncontrolled and/or significant variables in the particular culture of each nation may affect the results. Even if the sampling frame was a random national sample and accounted for a sufficient number of these influential variables, statistical significance should not be accepted without question. The statistical significance level is only one element in a possible array of empirical evidence that could or could not demonstrate that observed differences are significant. The corroboratory studies presented in this report are supportive (but by no means definitive) evidence of the accuracy of the results as herein presented. The magnitude of the correlation, instead of a statistical significance test, is the dominant criterion used to analyse these data. However, it should be clear that statistical significance tests can be useful aids in determining whether or not high magnitude correlations are meaningful, especially if the sample is small (i.e., with a sample of 100, .19 is statistically significant at the .05 level and with a sample of 22, .42 is statistically significant at the same level). For elucidation of the problems of significance tests see Hannan C. Selvin, "A Critique of Tests of Significance in Survey Research," American Sociological Review, 22 (October, 1957), pp. 519-527.


16. The English summarily state that they do not teach politics in their schools. This assertion is valid if one is discussing "formal" political education, but if it is meant to convey the message that no political education occurs in the English educational system the "hidden curriculum" indicates otherwise. See Paul R. Abramson, "Political Socialization in English and American Secondary Schools," The High School Journal, 54 (November, 1970), pp. 68-75, and "The Differential Political Socialization of English Secondary School Students," Sociology of Education, 40 (Summer, 1967), pp. 246-269.
17. Although general course information was elicited from the respondents, data on precise types of courses were not gathered. Data on types of courses may have contributed to pinpointing the higher magnitude positive correlations found in the English sample. In other words, if students in experimental courses could have been separated into a subcategory, extremely high correlations for this group might have been produced, indicating high course impact (presuming that other relevant variables such as sex, father's occupation and so forth did not appear to influence the findings substantially).


22. Students were scored and placed into low, medium and high scale score categories. For an overall scale score analysis see Russell F. Farnen and Dan B. German, "Political Socialization and Political Education: A Five Nation Study," in Byron Massialas, ed., Political Youth: Traditional Schools (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972, in press).

23. See Dennis, Lindberg, McCrone, and Stiefbold, op. cit., p. 82. The Dennis, et al. four nation survey is the only cross national study of children in Western Europe and the United States in which children were asked questions roughly similar to those used in this five nation survey. The surveys partially corroborate one another; however, the methodological approaches vary considerably. The United States efficacy scale score results presented here are very similar to those found on a survey of over 12,000 elementary school children in the United States. See David Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy," American Political Science Review, Vol. LXI (March, 1967), pp. 25-38. Although the overall scale score results are not included here, they are partially supported by the above mentioned Dennis, et al. study and in the article by Dennis, Lindberg and McCrone, loc. cit. In addition to the above, the Italian legitimacy scale performance presented here and Italian political
realities tend to confirm the efficacy scale results. If the children do not perceive themselves effective in relation to governmental machinery one could expect to witness a concomitant drop in legitimating orientations—this is the case as demonstrated on Figure 3. Furthermore, current political studies disclose that many Italian adults are not supportive of their political system. See Dante Germino and Stefano Passigli, The Government and Politics of Contemporary Italy (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), pp. 84-109; and Joseph LaPalombara, "Italy: Fragmentation, Isolation, Alienation," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 282-329.

24. The legitimacy categories in part are derived from J. Piaget, "The Development in Children of the Idea of the Homeland and of Relations with Other Countries," International Social Science Bulletin, 3 (1951), pp. 561-578. The legitimacy levels questions included in this survey only pertain to legitimacy I and II, although response patterns might indicate that some students have moved to stage III. The items are as follows:

If we have a great deal of trouble in making a living (like an economic depression), we should put one strong leader (a dictator) in charge of everything.
Less democracy would make our country a better place in which to live.
Democracy is the best form of government for our nation. The national government in our country usually makes very serious mistakes.
Our national government usually meets the important needs of the people.
A dictator (one-man ruler) might be all right if he would help our country.

25. Dissent/Opposition Scale

It would be best for our country if the political parties had the same ideas.
It would be best for our country if all the newspapers said the same thing about what was right for the government to do.
When people in our national government argue about public policy, it hurts our country.
Once the national government decides something, people should always support these decisions without question.
Citizens must always be free to criticize the national government.
We should let people make speeches against our national government.
26. Efficacy Scale

Government decisions are like the weather. There is very little people can do about them. There are some big powerful men in the national government who are running the whole thing. They care very little about the opinions of ordinary people like my parents. Our national government really cares about what the people think and say. People like my family can know very little about what the government is doing because it is so big and far away. Americans have a chance to say what they think about running the national government.

27. The presence of a more substantial course impact in England might be due to the possible intervening variable of lower level of parent-child interrelations found there as compared to the other nations surveyed. This relative lack of communication between parents and their children suggests that socialization agencies other than the family might play a larger role in the development of children's orientations vis-a-vis the political system and society in general. Under these circumstances school courses, among other socialization agencies, could influence children to a greater degree than in the other nations where the more pervasive influence of the family might "block-out" the socialization impact of other agencies. The work of Urie Bronfenbrenner and others suggests that English parents show less affection, offer less companionship and intervene less frequently in the lives of their children than in half a dozen other Western and Eastern nations observed. See Urie Bronfenbrenner, Two Worlds of Childhood: U.S. and U.S.S.R. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970), p. 116; and Edward C. Devereux, Jr., Urie Bronfenbrenner and Robert R. Rogers, "Child Rearing in England and the United States, a Cross-National Comparison," Journal of Marriage and the Family, XXXI, No. 2 (1969).