In this paper the authors survey the literature surrounding the changing role of faculty in governing academic institutions and controlling their own welfare. The review of materials goes back to 1920, documenting the concern of the professoriate for achieving some form of participative governance in higher education generally, but junior college faculty are differentiated from higher education faculty as to attitudes toward school governance. It was noted that by 1965, new external forces entered the domain of higher education, modifying the heretofore relatively passive behavior of faculty toward their involvement in the decision making process, particularly in junior colleges. The new forces were characterized as unionization, collective bargaining, and strikes. To test the effect of these new forces on the structure and status of the groups involved, a purposeful selection of six Michigan community colleges was conducted. Eight respondents from each school were selected representing varying views towards unionization and collective bargaining. Four major findings were reported: (1) changes in decision making related to faculty welfare have occurred since 1965, (2) few changes in decision making related to academic affairs have been taken place, (3) size or structure of an organization or group has little relationship to its internal political characteristics, and (4) in many instances, a more tightly structured bureaucracy has resulted from faculty pressures in collective negotiations. (AL)
CHANGES IN FACULTY GOVERNANCE AND FACULTY WELFARE:
SOME EMPIRICAL CONSEQUENCES OF COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS

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CHANGES IN FACULTY GOVERNANCE AND FACULTY WELFARE:
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No uncertainties exist with respect to where the professoriate stands on the issue of faculty participation in the governance of their colleges and universities. In 1920, the first report of Committee T urged a reversal from the declining involvement of faculty in academic governance (AAUP Bulletin 1920, pp. 17-47). The arguments for a significant faculty role were advanced on several grounds, the two most frequent being efficiency and ethics. In 1947, Moore outlined the efficiency argument:

Faculty participation in administration... should...
enhance mutual understanding and sympathy so as to encourage, if not insure, something close to a harmonious, working partnership among faculty, administration, and board of control.

... Democratic procedures encourage more broadly based and, in the long run, more effective decisions...
Wide discussion is almost bound to bring out weaknesses or dangers which would escape the eyes of the keenest mind and the most benevolent of despots.

Faculty participation in administration tends to restore
the proper balance between the academic and the
business aspects of our institutions of higher learning...
(1947, pp. 286-287)

Moore extended his case on ethical grounds, arguing that an autocratic university organization can produce undesirable types in universities -- tyrants, those seeking preferential treatment as well as those suffering from indifference, defiant and frustrated individuals.

There is less certainty with respect to how leading administrators and experts on higher education view faculty participation in academic governance.

For example, speaking with regard to four year institutions, Corson writes:

Faculty influence... in contributing to such decisions is limited by the lack of analytical data on which to base objective and considered decisions, the limited interest of many faculty members in higher education, their tendency to think about and act about specific courses or requirements rather than policies, and their primary concern with their individual subject-matter fields (1960, p. 47).
On the other side, Henderson, writing in the same year, states:

A typical weakness of administrators is to make important decisions of policy without full discussion with their faculties (1960, p. 239).

When examining the historical literature on two year colleges, agreement on faculty participation in governance runs high. The unanimity, however, is diametrically opposed to the professorial stance cited at the outset. Three widely read books on the junior/community college from 1950 to 1966 even failed to recognize that a faculty could participate in the governance of an institution. (Bogue 1950; Thornton 1960; Hilway 1966). More recently, Finkin, expressed the similar view of little or no faculty participation in governance. Citing Jencks and Riesman (1968, pp. 483-444) for corroboration, Finkin writes:

These institutions [2 year colleges] have not typically shared in the traditions of institutional government which have grown up in the mature universities and liberal arts colleges... (1971, pp. 150-151).

In addition, the absence of articles prior to 1964 in the *Junior College Journal* indicates that faculty participation in governance before this time was virtually nonexistent. When the role of faculty in governance was discussed anywhere, the rationale advanced was that because of the complexity
and size of the junior/community college, faculty members are unable to make intelligent decisions. In part, so one group of experts believe, faculty ignorance arises because faculty should and must concentrate on teaching (Blocker, Plummer, and Richardson 1965). The authors advanced additional justifications for faculty non-participation:

There are some even more pervasive reasons to question strong faculty control of the two-year college. If one accepts the thesis that the two-year college is a unique institution devoted to the changing needs of society, he must face the fact that faculties tend to be conservative and resistant to innovations. If the college was created by society to care for its necessary routines and to provide for its basic needs, faculty resistance to necessary changes might well endanger the status of the institution and society might find it necessary to create another parallel institution to perform the functions needed for a rapidly changing social and economical order (1965, pp. 189-190).

Why there has been such a paucity of faculty participation in two-year colleges, or even pressure to secure a voice, has not been empirically established. However, some speculation is possible.

The absence of participation may arise from the unique position junior/
community colleges hold, located as they are with the secondary schools on one side and the four-year and graduate schools on the other. The majority of their faculty have been recruited from the high schools rather than directly from graduate school departments. Thus the ideology these faculty bring with them with respect to the running of an institution is much more likely to be that from the elementary and secondary level than it is from the university. For most of the faculty the move to the junior college is a significant career change, an increase in status. They are pleased, and hence have no great drive to acquire a decision making role, at least at the onset on their new career.

A second reason can stem from the historical model on which junior/community colleges were founded. At least prior to 1965, the organizational plan of a community college resembled a loosely structured bureaucracy (Blocker, Plummer, and Richardson 1965). The models described for community colleges are hierarchical structures in which faculty are not involved in any area of governance. Faculty general rights and duties are discussed as a division of labor based on functional specialization. Qualifications for hiring and other areas of organized life are also dealt with in a way that strongly depicts the community college as a loosely structure bureaucracy. There is no indication that faculty participate even in matters of curriculum -- to say nothing of admissions, degree and/or certificate requirements, promotions, appointments,
and college objectives.

New Events: Conflicts of Opinion

Circa 1965 a new external force entered the domain of higher education. Collective bargaining by faculties was initiated. In some instances, the phenomenon was triggered by legislation. For example, in Michigan, the Hutchinson Act permitted public employees to organize for the first time in history.

They did.

They bargained.

They even went on strike.

Simultaneously, a change in the literature appears. Garrison (1965) and the American Association for Higher Education (1967) speak of the primary and growing concern of faculty members in junior/community colleges about their lack of participation in the governance of their institutions. At this same time, spokesmen for faculty associations such as AAUP, AFT, NFA, and AAHE reported that one of the major goals of faculty members in their organization was to obtain a greater voice in the locus of decision-making (Junior College Journal, 1969, pp. 10-17).
faculty unionization movement stated that faculty members in community colleges in Michigan had three major demands. In order of importance, these were: "1. A greater voice in the decision-making process, 2. Greater professional security, and 3. Money (Keck 1968)."

However, by no means has there been unanimity of opinion on the virtues of collective bargaining. Contingent upon one's particular allegiance to faculty or administration, collective negotiations have evinced concern (Livingston 1967), displeasure (Davis 1968; Kadish 1968), and approval (Marmion 1968).

Many of those associated with colleges and universities deplore the event of collective negotiations as an affront to professionalism. For example, Bierstedt and Machlup (1966) take issue with AAUP's decision to engage local chapters as bargaining units in extreme circumstances. They feel that this approach will result in a loss of academic freedom and the sacrifice of professional status for employee status. Similarly, Heim (1968), Kadish (1968), and Livingston (1967) bemoan the implications for professionalism. On the other hand, Day and Fisher (1967), Marmion (1968), and Kugler (1968) feel that in the long run the professoriate must embrace collective negotiations. They cite the inability of AAUP to persuade the administrative echelon to afford more democracy in college and university governance.
Within the junior/community college ranks the concern tends to be less upon whether one accepts collective bargaining but rather upon how one is to live with it. Those associated with the California scene (where the existing statutes are somewhat circumspective, and perhaps concerned that they not be altered) press for more faculty involvement in governance. Thus Priest (1964), but more particularly Lombardi (1966), call for less lip-service by administrators with respect to faculty participation in governance and for more creativity and initiative toward that end. Partially supporting this view is Howe (1966). He sees collective bargaining as evolutionary, appropriate, and logical. Frankie and Howe (1968) question the apparent eschewing of the abstract, theoretical, and academic considerations for the emotional. Furthermore, they are concerned with the failure to date of collective bargaining to provide a approach to the solution of problems.

From the vantage point of a legal analysis, Finkin has given a careful appraisal of the relationship of governance to collective bargaining, restricting his focus to four-year institutions (1971). However, he errors on occasion. When his analysis builds on the presumption that the ideals presented by the AAUP Statement are modus operandi in most institutions, false inferences are drawn.\(^1\) Administrative proclamations to the

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1. Administrator
contrary, at best benevolent despotism pervades the vast majority of higher education. The exceptions are a handful of prestigious liberal arts colleges and universities.

For example, Finkin believes it would be the senior faculty at emerging universities who will lead the movement toward unionization (1971, pp. 151-152, p. 161). They would organize, he says, to protect the gains they have achieved. Our pilot surveys show just the opposite. It is the young, not the senior, faculty who are pushing for unionization. The senior men are firm resistors. As the oligarchy, they do not want to abandon the privileges they have secured over a long tenure, a direct line to the aristocracy on the top. Unionization means equality of faculty, separation from the administration, and the loss of favoritism. An old guard advancing the cause of bargaining is committing suicide.

Furthermore, it is doubtful that even our universities who are the paragons of Academe, the ones at the very tip of the serpentine's tongue, have approached what the Statement envisages. Rarely have faculty affected long-range planning or the allocation of resources. Almost never have they had access to budget decisions. Besides, in times of stress -- such as today's financial exigencies, faculty "power" quickly slips from their tenuous grasp and skyrocket's to the top. "No funds for this position. No resources for that innovation. No..." is the message faculty receive from
deans and vice-presidents. As academic men, they are helpless to counter. The administration shares less and less.

Thus, as remarked earlier, issues associated with collective negotiations suffer not at all from a paucity of viewpoints. Opinions pieces on collective negotiations far outnumber empirical studies. No doubt they will continue to do so for sometime. This is quite understandable for it is extremely difficult to conduct research on the process. Even determination of outcomes presents obstacles. Complexities strain attempts at control. Generalizations from unique situations are risky.

None the less, studies must begin if fact is to be separated from fiction. As with freshly excavated ore, contaminants need to be refined out, slag skimmed off, impurities removed. It is not a vein of unsullied lode we are mining. The task is neither simple nor guaranteed to produce an untainted gem. But extraction must begin.

The study described below was conducted by one of the authors (Rylsma 1969). It is based upon the now seven year old experiences of a group of two-year colleges. The examination of Finkin's critique suggests that its applicability may well extend beyond its immediate boundaries. Actual faculty participation in governance in community colleges may be typical of the many, not either of the few or as a special case.
The Theoretical Framework, the Setting, and the Methodology

From sociological theory it follows that social change will alter the structure and status of the groups that are affected. By organizing and bargaining collectively, faculties in some community colleges have created changes in their college as an organization. By definition, faculties who have gained a voice in places where they previously had little or none have democratized their institutions, at least in those areas (Bloch and Prince 1967, p. 30).

At the same time, changes towards democratization can serve to move the organizational structure of the community college in the direction of tightened or more formalized bureaucracy. As delineated by Blau (1956) and by Broom and Selznick (1968, p. 46), the basic characteristics of bureaucracy are: specialization, a system of rules and regulations, impersonality, and some form of hierarchy. When an organization is moving in the direction of a more bureaucratic form of structure, then the expectation is that each of the above characteristics becomes more pronounced.

Movement can be due to what Katz and Kahn refer to as the "maximization principle", the growth and expansion of parts of the organization (1967 pp. 99-107). If the organizational structure of the community college already resembled a bureaucracy before collective negotiations, as was
shown above, then bargaining should have a similar effect, the production of a more formal and tightened structure. According to Blau, new structures can arise from "the emergence of special administrative problems (1956, p. 37). There is little doubt that faculties who are demanding a greater share in decision-making, and hence a democratization of their institutions, constitute a "special problem." Thus theory deduces that movement of the community college as an organization toward a more structured bureaucracy can be expected as democratization occurs.

A purposeful selection of six Michigan community colleges which had undertaken collective negotiations almost at the onset of the opportunity in 1965 were chosen so as to control for possible intervening variables — size (that is, the enrollment in the institution), the type of bargaining agent (AFT, NEA, or Independent), and the structure of the local unit (separate community college board or else combined with and part of the elementary and secondary schools). The colleges were selected so that the setting in each instance was roughly the same. The colleges studied were neither from the very largest urban area nor from smaller, more rural communities.

Eight respondents were chosen from each institution. Each had had continuous employment at the institution, dating back to before collective negotiations. Two were administrators, one always being the president;
two were union activists; two were union members, but non-activists; and two were anti-unionist or non-union members. The classification of respondents in each category was accomplished partially by an individual's position in the institution and partially by established reputational methods.

An interview schedule was constructed and pre-tested. One section called for general changes in organizational and faculty influence and was composed of twelve statements each having four parts. Each statement determined if the institution had shown any movement toward or away from a formalized bureaucratic type of structure since 1965. A second section of the instrument had ten statements for ascertaining attitudes of desirability or undesirability on the part of the respondents regarding the direction of movement as they perceived it. A third section determined the role the faculty organization had played in effecting any change. Finally, a fourth part acquired attitudes of the respondents in reference to the role or lack of role of the faculty organization in effecting any change or lack of change. Institutional documents (faculty handbooks, negotiated contracts, and the like) were collected to corroborate the interview data. Appropriate statistical analyses were run.
The Research Findings

1. Changes in decision-making have occurred since 1965 in areas relating to faculty welfare (salary, class size, academic calendar, continuing contracts, work load, and time assignments, i.e., the times of day and days of the week a faculty member is assigned classes). This is every item investigated. These changes are in the direction of greater faculty participation in decision-making. All were statistically significant. The locus of decision making in most welfare areas has shifted from almost complete administrative domination to co-equality. That is, faculty and administration now equally share in decision-making with respect to the factors just mentioned.

2. In the nine areas investigated relating to academic affairs (text selection, admissions policies, college objectives, departmental objectives, curriculum, degree requirements, faculty appointments, course assignments, and administrative appointments), a change in decision-making was found in only two. According to the respondents, faculties now have a voice in the selection of new faculty and in the appointment of administrators. Prior to 1965, decisions made in this area were administratively dominated. Although in all institutions there was a slight movement in the direction of shared decision-making in academic matters, unlike those in welfare the majority of the changes were not statistically significant.²

² See Bylsma for extended treatment of the findings (1970).
These two sets of findings suggest that the major push of faculty members in Michigan since 1965 primarily have been for increased decision-making in areas relating to their own welfare. This outcome is contrary to those who have argued that shared decision making in academic areas is the real motive behind collective bargaining. Of course, the findings of this study do not repudiate this claim. Faculty organizations may have tried to gain more of a share in decision-making in the academic arena but as yet have not had marked success.

3. The data analysis relating to changes in decision-making and the nature of bureaucratic structure indicates that the size of the institution, the affiliation of the bargaining unit, and the structure of the bargaining unit have little or no effect on change in either democratization or bureaucracy. Whether large or small, colleges, whether NEA, AFT, or Independent unions, and whether a part of a K-12 system or a separate bargaining unit are all unrelated to the changes which occurred.

4. Several outcomes support the notion that a more tightly structured bureaucracy has resulted from faculty pressures in collective negotiations. More specific definitions and rules for both administrators and faculty is one change that has taken place since 1965. Contracts proposed by faculty groups are highly specific rules in these two matters. Also, impersonality in faculty-administrative relations is now greater than it
was before 1965, again a bureaucratic indice. A third statistically significant bureaucratic change occurred with respect to increased specialization for decision-making groups. There was a change to less arbitrariness in the dismissal of faculty, but it was not statistically significant. An increase in the administrator to faculty ratio also approached the .05 level.

In other areas, no statistically significant changes were found on measures of a more tightly structured bureaucracy. For example, the adoption of standard sets of qualifications, a decline in favoritism shown by administrators, an increase in the closeness of supervision of faculty and an increase in the number of rules are matters on which no significant change occurred.

At the same time, information presented relating to changes in decision making indicates a movement towards a representative bureaucracy. Faculty are now more involved in decision making than they were prior to 1965. In this general way, the theory which directed this inquiry has been supported by the findings.

**Discussions and Implications**

Two additional matters require ramification. One falls in the domain of needed research. The other reminds the reader that gains and losses
are contingent upon values and goals, upon current status and realistic prospects.

As for the former, obviously much remains to be learned from research. Several studies have recently been completed or are now in progress. For example, Creal (1969) found in Michigan that the impasse factors in the negotiation process were appreciably mitigated when those on both sides of the table were knowledgeable about colleges, held to agreed upon deadlines, and entered the process with positive attitudes regarding outcome. In Illinois junior colleges, Gianopulos (1970a; 1970b) examined the emerging role of the president as a middle man, a meditator between faculty and board. Lane (1967) studied a faculty of a Western state college and their stand toward unionization. In comparing those favorably disposed versus those opposed, he uncovered no differences between the two groups with respect to their formal education, rank (age held constant), value they hold on teaching versus research, publication record, and membership in professional organizations. However, "unionists" are younger and have a much less favorable assessment of administrators — department heads and, especially, deans. They rather intensely distrust and dislike them.

Of those inquiries in progress, Gram (1971) is studying economic factors with respect to gains in costs after contracts have been negotiated.
in a community college system. McCarthy (1971) is comparing presidential satisfaction in community/junior colleges which have undergone collective bargaining with those that have not.

As yet, however, no study has addressed itself to the operation of the union *qua* union, a most important topic. Clearly the union is a new organization within the extant structure. Like other organizations, one goal it has is its own survival. Even just maintenance (to say nothing of growth and increased status) requires energy. Understandably, unions want to be successful, too.

While probably more imprecise than should be the case, the dollar input related to collective negotiations is comparatively easy to count -- for lawyers, publications, etc. But how much additional community college operating funds are redirected from programs x, y, and z to a newly acquired legal staff, grievance officers, and the like is more difficult to uncover. In any event, a new organization operates at a direct expense to its members and at an indirect expense to those dealing with it.

In addition, even if there were not a zero-sum game operating with respect to dollars, there is with faculty energy. Academic men already work so large a number of hours per week that time cannot really be
extended, only reallocated. Thus if faculty leaders are faculty leaders no matter what the cause, then the best guess is that those academics who manned the Senate and championed curricular reform or student involvement are now contributing heavily to the union. Thus other matters for the good of the total organization must fall in priority and in attention received.

Other consequences of newly and highly active suborganizations come quickly to mind. Short versus long run gains, faculty-student relations, for example. But, as was said at the outset, research needs to replace speculation on the nature of the union.

Turning to the matter of losses versus gains, even though a fair amount of slag has been removed, a final assay of unionisation still hinges upon the metal being refined. If it is an ore of inferior quality, a faculty with essentially no control of its work environment and little prospect of a metamorphosis without volcanic eruptions, then gains from the collective bargaining process probably are the most effective available to give some kind of lustre to a tarnished condition. This, too, is one of Finkin's conclusions. He states:

Should the history of the institution reflect a pattern of autocratic administration, it is doubtful that the faculty could lose much in the way of participation
[if they engaged in collective bargaining] (AAUP, p. 161).

On the other hand, if the lode is already rather precious, increased hammering can dull the fine edges. While galvinization may yield a new product of increased value, the gain may be but momentary, a novelty that tarnishes quickly. In balance, the permanent alteration -- it is unrealistic to consider faculty unionization as a reversible process -- may not possess the beauty of the natural stone, one refined by trials over a long period of time.

In sum, a faculty must carefully examine its foundations and its prospects before selecting a means to alter its present condition. Similarly, an administration and a Board must assiduously survey the total terrain. When it finds it has rich ores already on hand, then avoid strip mining. Treat the faculty as the gems they are. Society will benefit when a setting is fostered which permits all to enjoy their splendor.
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