The amount of violent behavior in a society is determined by a number of social indicators which influence members of that society to condemn or justify violence. To develop a technology for the implementation of appropriate social action, therefore, one must have a thorough understanding of the nature of such social indicators. In order to achieve this understanding, a survey was conducted to assess attitudes and values regarding violence. Level of violence found justifiable was expressed in terms of 2 indexes: violence for social control and violence for social change. In general, American men were found to be prepared to justify substantial amounts of violence by police, and yet were fairly open to social change. Their answers were analyzed according to 7 major categories of variables: early and later background, values, identifications, definitions, beliefs about social issues, and perception of others. None of these variables, individually, proved a strong predictor of either violence for social change or for social control, but combined, they proved to have significant explanatory power. The results are discussed in detail and recommendations made for utilization of the findings in effecting social change.
The Justification of Violence: Social Problems and Social Solutions

Presidential Address

delivered by

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Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues

79th Annual Convention of the
American Psychological Association

September 4, 1971
Washington, D. C.
Introduction

I would like to begin by explaining my choice of title for this address: The Justification of Violence. It does not imply that I find violence justifiable. My own predilections are on the pacific side, and most violent behavior that I have seen or studied seems to me neither justifiable nor productive. I believe, however, that individuals, communities, and nations differ in the levels of violence they find justifiable, as they differ in the violence that they actually commit. Moreover, I believe that these two classes of phenomena—justification and violent behavior—are related, and for at least two reasons. No doubt people tend to justify their violent actions, as they do their other behaviors. More important, however, I believe that the values and attitudes, beliefs and norms which justify or condemn violence in a society are among the factors that determine the amount of violent behavior in that society.

The truth of this latter assertion remains to be fully demonstrated, although it is supported by the fragmentary data thus far available on the linkage between violent behavior and the attitudes that justify it. To the extent that such attitudes predict violent behavior or its likelihood, they deserve to be among the social indicators in which we invest on a national basis, to which we look for encouragement or warning, and from which we develop social and economic policy. One measure of the quality of life in a society, I would propose, is the level of violence that people are prepared to justify.

I want to devote the rest of our time today to enlarging on that proposition, first by discussing the idea of social indicators, and second by considering the results of our current research on the justification of violence in relation to the criteria for social indicators.

The Idea of Social Indicators

There is a current surge of interest in social indicators; the phrase has become popular and will probably show the short life line of popular phrases.
By some name, however, the idea of social indicators will remain; its time has come. It is now possible to develop procedures that will measure with some adequacy the quality of life in a society and record over time the various gains and losses in that quality. This is an old ambition of many social scientists, some policy-makers, and a few philosophers. Moreover, some series of data that convey such information have long been available—homicide and accident rates, infant mortality, literacy, and unemployment rates, for example. But these are fragments. Proposals to develop a comprehensive set of measures of the quality of life, and to use those measures nationally on a continuing basis, are new indeed. Four of the best known—Bauer's *Social Indicators*, Sheldon and Moore's *Indicators of Social Change*, Cohen's *Toward a Social Report*, and Duncan's *Toward Social Reporting: Next Steps*—carry publication dates of 1967, 1968, 1969, and 1970, respectively.

Despite substantial differences in purpose and scope, these four documents show important similarities: all describe and interpret attributes of American society that are already measured and all mention additional attributes that we should measure. The latter point is of course extremely controversial and difficult to resolve. It raises the whole question of statistical relevance—measurement for what?

I would propose to answer that question partly in terms of the criterion of social action. Any datum that is to be taken as a social indicator is presumably to be taken also as a guide to action, to response in the language of policy and administrative practice. The linkage from social indicator to social policy and administration, however, is by no means obvious. It involves at least four elements: the indicators themselves; a set of demonstrated relationships that explain and define the underlying social processes of which the indicators are signs; a set of social values or goals that define preferred states on the
dimensions identified as indicators; and an apparatus or technology for bringing about change on the relevant dimensions. These can be labelled more briefly in terms of the functions they serve: description; explanation; valuation; and utilization.

Each of these four elements in the linkage of social measurement to social policy requires substantial and methodological development, and that process is proceeding unevenly. By far the greatest progress has been made in the collecting of descriptive measures, spotty and inadequate as they are in relation to present social needs. Sampling techniques are already well-developed, and the estimation of errors due to sampling is correspondingly sophisticated. Techniques of data collection remain more of an art than an applied science, but the concept of response error has become widely known, and attempts to estimate and control it are becoming more common.

In the United States, the decennial census provides the most venerable example of descriptive statistics that can be taken as social indicators. Decennial population statistics are available for a period of almost 200 years. Some kinds of occupational data can be compared over period of 100 years, if one accepts various adjustments for altered definitions and techniques; and for the last 30 years the Current Population Survey has provided monthly estimates of employment and unemployment. Some health and accident data and some criminological data are also available in extended series, and the number of one-time, special-purpose descriptive surveys is almost beyond calculating.

Any attempt to use these data makes it clear that descriptive statistics become tremendously more useful when they are collected repeatedly on a uniform and representative basis. Descriptive data collected once tell us the state of some system, with respect to some characteristic, at some point in time. If the descriptive process is repeated at regular intervals, it is still only
descriptive, but the description becomes dynamic rather than static; we are told the direction and rate of change in the system with respect to the measured characteristics.

The theoretical and pragmatic implications of dynamic description as compared to static one-time description are very great. The development of astronomy provides a uniquely good example of the dependence of theory on accurate description over time, but the pragmatic power of trend data can easily be illustrated with social data. Consider as an example hours of work, a social characteristic easier to measure and harder to dispute than such matters as violence and its justification. If we learn that the average hours worked per week in American factories are 41, we may take that as casual and rather obvious confirmation of the fact that the 40-hour work week is the norm in the United States, sanctioned by law, by union contract, and by usage. If we are given the additional descriptive datum that the factory work week in 1900 was 59 hours, we can draw additional conclusions about the trend toward increased leisure and the tendency to take productivity gains in free time as well as increased goods. But what if we are told that the work week was already reduced to 44 hours in 1929, and that in 1940 it was only 38? Now new questions arise: Is there something particularly appropriate about the work routine of the eight-hour day? Have we seen the end of the downward trend? Will the new leisure, if there is to be such, be taken in terms of alterations in the pattern of work -- long vacations, non-academic sabbaticals, and the like?

The point is not that the answers to such complex questions can be provided from such meager data, but that the questions themselves emerge only because of the existence of trend data -- description over time.

The second kind of information needed to guide policy-making I have called explanatory, which in its most elementary form means relational.
What we call explanation consists in demonstrating that one thing is related to another, and then proceeding to elaborate the set of things so related. As the elaboration continues, we are able to speak of causal sequences, of predictions and consequences, of models and theories.

The term social indicator brings to mind descriptive data, but both descriptive and explanatory data are indispensable for the construction and implementation of social policy. Likert has illustrated this point by the example of the practicing physician. To diagnose and treat his patient, the doctor depends upon both descriptive and explanatory information. The descriptive data may begin in a particular case with the familiar measures of temperature, blood pressure, and pulse rate. These the physician obtains directly and immediately from the patient, and he may then decide on more complex measures -- blood chemistry, radiological examination, and innumerable other procedures.

But to interpret these descriptive data, and to have chosen in the first place which of such data should be obtained for the patient, the doctor required information of a different kind, the kind I have called explanatory. He must know, for example, what state of health or illness and what other characteristics of the patient are indicated by different degrees of body temperature or blood pressure or pulse rate. He must know the properties to which his descriptive measures are related.

Such information is not developed quickly, nor is it likely to be developed from the particular case being described. On the contrary, explanatory relationships are developed from extensive research and long accumulation relating symptoms to causes, building gradually from discrete sets of such relationships to large explanatory networks of the nature of illness, health, and human life. The doctor is effective because he is the beneficiary and the user of explanatory information that has been accumulated and winnowed over
centuries of practice and research. Increasingly, he knows what his indicators indicate.

There is a further advantage that is conferred by knowing the explanatory chain of causes and effects that leads to and from a particular social indicator, the advantage of time. As patients we submit to the doctor's diagnostic procedures not only to discover what may already have gone wrong, but to anticipate problems before they become serious. We want blood pressure readings (and appropriate action) before an unmanageable hypertension has developed; we want to prevent or avoid the possibility of stroke, not merely record it. Causal sequences are temporal sequences; by choosing an indicator early in the sequence, once we have discovered it, we increase the possibility of influencing its course.

In the realm of social causes and effects, the quality and extent of description, modest as it is, far surpasses the quality and extent of explanatory data. For example, we count and categorize delinquent acts but we know very little about the nature and causes of juvenile delinquency. We know within narrow limits the number of homicides and major riots, but we are quickly reduced to partisan arguments when questions of prediction and control are raised. Moreover, as these examples suggest, we tend to collect data only about terminal or crisis events in complex and unmapped sequences. This must change; prediction and control call for understanding as well as observation, for explanation as well as description.

The third element in the linkage of social indicators to social policy is values. In this connection one need not think of lofty sentiments or abstractions. It is easy to get agreement about the desirability of such remote notions as the welfare of mankind, but the agreement is only apparent and dissolves when the conversation becomes more specific. I would propose instead that the issues of value be treated in exactly the same terms as the social
indicators themselves, in other words, that value choices be made explicit with respect to each dimension proposed as a social indicator.

Two kinds of value-judgments are implicated for each such indicator-dimension, however simple. Let us take as examples two indexes developed in the course of the present research—the level of violence considered justifiable for social control and the level of violence considered justifiable for social change. If these indexes were to be used in recurrent national surveys, which I hope they may be, that investment of effort and resources would reflect a value-judgment about their importance. The "justification-level" of violence would have been judged worth measuring, and by implication more valuable than any of the unspecified alternative data that could have been assembled with the same expenditure of resources.

That much is obvious. It is perhaps less obvious that any action to be taken on the basis of such data implies and requires a second scale, a scale of values—ranging, let us say, from very bad to very good—coordinated to the scale of "justified violence." Such value differentiation among the alternative positions on the violence scale is an absolute necessity for social action. If we considered it equally good for a person or a community to advocate high or low levels of force in the conduct of human affairs, then description of the present facts would lead to no action whatsoever. Action implies goals, implies a preference for some states rather than others, implies and requires an expression of values.

Even these three elements—description, explanation, and valuation—do not suffice for bringing about change. Although they tell us the present state of things, some antecedents and consequences of that state, and some state that would be preferred, they leave us with the most difficult question in the linkage from description to utilization: how to bring about desired changes.
The answers to such questions are numerous but inadequate. They include the whole range of influence attempts, from individual persuasion to institutional change.

The means of achieving such changes have been the preoccupation of governors and would-be governors, reformers and revolutionaries since the beginning of history; they are in one form or another among the central problems of the social sciences, especially psychology and political science. Moreover, they have become in recent years the core of a new discipline, not quite respectable nor yet wholly deserving of respect, but identifiable by such key words and phrases as research utilization, long-range planning, organizational development, and the like.

Let me summarize the argument thus far: I have asserted that the idea of social indicators implies social action, and that the requirements for appropriate social action include static and dynamic description, explanation, value choice, and a technology for implementation. On each dimension we deem sufficiently important, we must know where we stand and what rate and direction of movement is taking place, what causes and consequences are associated with these facts, what attainable state we consider preferable, and what action should be taken at what point in the causal linkage in order to bring about the desired change. With this in mind, let us turn to the study of violence, its findings, and some proposals for their use.

The Justification of Violence as a Social Indicator

Rap Brown once said that violence is as American as apple pie. It is a peculiarly disturbing statement, hostile and exaggerated but with the insight that sometimes accompanies those characteristics. Within the past few years three major commissions -- the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, the President's Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, and the President's Commission on Campus Unrest -- have expressed the deepest concern
over problems of domestic violence. The first of these spoke of "division into two unequal societies," the second found the level of violence "dangerous to our society," and the third stated that "a nation driven to using the weapons of war upon its youth is a nation on the edge of chaos."

These views are by no means general, however. There is apparent majority support for violent police action under provocative circumstances. (National surveys reported such support for the Chicago police at the time of the 1968 convention of the Democratic party, for example.3) There are minority groups, radical and anti-radical, that are explicit in their justification of extra-legal violent action. There is also a persistent argument, fed by scientific extrapolation and science-fiction, that people are instinctively violent and that the use of injurious force is the natural and inevitable mode of human conduct.

Our own views, two years ago and now, were that violence deserved quantitative as well as clinical study, that the level of violence people were prepared to justify in social life should be measured and established as one defining dimension of the quality of life in this society, and that social policies should be designed to make such violence unrewarding and unnecessary. To serve these purposes we conducted a survey of attitudes and values regarding violence. The data were collected by interview with a sample of about 1,400 American men, chosen on a stratified random basis, but with a sampling rate among blacks twice that among whites.

In addition to assessing the levels of violence considered justifiable under various circumstances, the interview included questions about several hypothesized predictors of violence-justification -- background factors, values, identification patterns, and semantic or definitional factors. These categories of variables define the analytic model, and are shown in Figure 1. That figure also shows that the level of violence found justifiable is expressed in terms of two indexes--violence for social control and violence for social change.
The relationship of these two indexes is of interest in itself. If people differed only on the general justifiability of violence in human affairs, the two indexes would be one. The sub-population of pacifists would judge violence unnecessary and wrong; the sub-population of warriors (I suppose they would call themselves realists) would insist that violence was inevitable, at least. There are indeed such sub-populations, but they are minorities. Larger numbers of people consider violence necessary for some purposes but not others, and the empirical result is two indexes, essentially uncorrelated, one reflecting the level of violence deemed necessary for social change and the other for social control. Our research results begin with the description of these data and end with their explanation in terms of the other variables shown in Figure 1.

Description

Violence for Social Control

To measure the amount of force or violence a person considered justifiable for social control, we asked how the police should handle three kinds of situations, each described as involving property damage and disturbance but not personal injury. The actors in the first situation were a gang of hoodlums, in the second blacks in a ghetto riot, and in the third white students in an unspecified campus disturbance. In each case, the respondent was asked to say what the police should do, in terms of five alternatives: "let it go, not do anything; make arrests without using clubs or guns; use clubs but not guns; shoot but not to kill; shoot to kill." The respondent could qualify his answer further in terms of four levels of frequency: almost always, sometimes, hardly ever, and never.

About two out of three American men say that in handling hoodlums the police should shoot but not to kill "almost always or sometimes." Almost as large a proportion (61 per cent) say the police should shoot but not to kill in handling ghetto riots. And almost half of all men (48 per cent) say that the police should shoot but not to kill in the event of disturbances by white students.
The advice to "shoot to kill" is a minority sentiment, but it is given by a sizable minority; about one-third in the case of hoodlum disturbances, almost that many in the case of ghetto riots, and about one-fifth in the case of student disturbances.

Whether one agrees or disagrees with these sentiments, the data are unambiguous; American men are prepared to justify very substantial amounts of force and injury by the police for the sake of social control, and there is no requirement that the precipitating events have initiated personal violence. It is provocation enough if they are "disturbances" and involve property damage.

Violence for Social Change

The level of violence considered justifiable for social change was measured in similar fashion. The respondent was given a card on which were printed five alternative statements about the costs of social change: They ranged from "Changes can be made fast enough without action involving property damage or injury" to "Protest in which some people are killed is necessary before changes will take place fast enough." Intermediate alternatives referred to some property damage and some people being hurt. As with the question of force for social control, the respondent was asked to answer separately regarding three kinds of changes -- those advocated by students, those advocated by blacks, and those advocated by proponents of change identified only as "some people."

Two facts dominate the response pattern to these questions. First, people show some openness to the idea of social change. Ninety-three per cent expressed agreement with students that some changes might be needed, and 91 per cent with blacks. Second, people are overwhelmingly of the opinion that changes can be brought about "fast enough" without property damage or personal injury. More than four out of five agree with this statement, and disagree a great deal
with the statement that "protest in which some people are killed is necessary before changes will take place fast enough." A majority of people disagree a great deal with statements that protest involving any injury or property damage is necessary to bring about changes fast enough.

It can be argued, however, that minority responses to such questions are important, and that the proper social goal is zero response. In fact, about 20 per cent of all American men say that some property damage or personal injury is necessary for social change, and about 10 per cent say that protest involving extensive damage and some death will be required. This is prediction rather than advocacy, but it is sobering prediction and it is the belief of about five million men.

For the remainder of our analysis and discussion, we have combined the responses to these many questions into two indexes -- violence for social control and violence for social change. These indexes, as I have already said, are the criterion variables of the present research, and it is the variance in them that is to be explained in terms of background, values, semantics, and patterns of identification. Before we turn to that explanatory task, however, I want to add a few descriptive facts to round out the picture of public opinion regarding violence.

When people are asked to mention the things that worry and concern them, about two-thirds mention one or more violence-related events -- war, riot, protest, and the like. When people are asked explicitly about problems of violence, they mention racial problems, civil disturbances, student protest, and crime. Only 10 per cent mention war, and only 2 per cent mention police violence; apparently neither of these fits the popular definition of the term violence.

Concern about violence, however, is widespread, and the causes of violence are seen as social problems rather than individual pathology or
criminality—lack of understanding and communication, discrimination and dissatisfaction, changes not happening fast enough. These were mentioned spontaneously, and they were reiterated by most men when they were asked to indicate agreement or disagreement with a number of hypothetical causes of violence. Nine out of ten agreed that discrimination caused violence, and about three out of four agreed that poverty, lack of good jobs, and poor education were among the causes of violence.

There is much less consensus about the cures for violence, however, and more emphasis on threat and punishment, along with economic and social change. Among the preventive measures proposed most frequently were more police, guardsmen, gas, guns, and other forms of force, more punitive laws and stricter enforcement of them. With this background of description, let us turn to the task of explanation, addressing ourselves primarily to the two criterion indexes: violence for social control and violence for social change.

**Explanation**

The extent to which we can explain violence for social control and violence for social change can best be reviewed in terms of the analytic model. It includes seven major categories of variables—early and later background, values, identifications, definitions, beliefs about social issues, and perception of others. Results for each are expressed as percentages of variance explained and as multiple correlations. These seven panels of variables are made up of 27 more specific variables. None of these variables is in itself a strong predictor of either violence for social control or for social change. The explanatory power of the study emerges only as predictor variables are combined into panels or sets, and is enhanced as the sets themselves are combined.
Violence for Social Control

Background Characteristics

People with higher education advocate less violent police action; so do young people, blacks, men who were foreign-born or whose parents were, and men who were born outside the South and Border States. But none of these factors accounts for more than 3 per cent of the variance, and all together account for only 10.

Later background characteristics are less important, even military experience, which has been urged as a factor of importance. Together the characteristics of adult background account for 5 per cent of the variance in violence for social control.

In combination the nine background characteristics measured in this study show a multiple correlation of .35 with violence for social control, explaining 12 per cent of the variance.

Psychological Characteristics

Values - Five values were measured in this study—retributive justice, kindness, self-defense, person/property priority, and humanism. In combination they show a correlation of .41 with violence for social control and account for 17 per cent of the variance in that index. Self-defense is the most powerful of these, measured in terms of the belief that it is justifiable to commit murder in defense of self, family, or home. People who believe that are more likely to endorse violence for social control, as are people who believe in retributive justice, the ancient principle of eye for eye and tooth for tooth. Clearly the use of police force means punishment as well as prevention. People who score toward the materialistic end of the humanism scale also show a significant tendency to endorse violence for social control. The other values have only trivial effects, a fact which seems surprising and in some respects
unfortunate. Thus the value of kindness, measured partly in terms of statements echoing the Golden Rule, does virtually nothing to differentiate between men who want the police to use neither clubs nor guns and those who want them to handle protest situations by shooting.

Identification - The major actors in the brief scenarios presented to respondents are described as police, white student demonstrators, and black protesters. The pattern of respondent identification with these groups shows a multiple correlation of .45 with the index of violence for social control, and explains about 20 per cent of the variance in that index. Men who see the police as helpful and trustworthy, who think that policemen do not dislike them, and that their own lives will be better if the police achieve their goals advocate the use of force by the police in protest situations. To the extent that men identify negatively with the protesters, their advocacy of police force increases.

These effects of identification are neither obvious nor inevitable. Identification with teachers and parents, for example, would not be predictably associated with the advocacy of corporal punishment. Somehow the idea of punishment rather than restraint, and the idea of retribution rather than correction have entered largely into contemporary views of social control in general and of the police role in particular.

Semantics - One of the problems in studying violence is that people are not agreed on its definition, or at least on what acts deserve to be labelled violent. There is agreement that violence is bad, and we therefore find that calling something violent both condemns it and excuses forceful retaliation. Men who consider sit-ins and draft-card burning violence are more apt to advocate the use of clubs and guns by the police, and the tendency is increased if they consider as non-violence such police activities as shooting looters and beating students. Most men believe, by the way, that looting, burglary, draft-card
burning, and beating students are violent acts; most men do not believe that sit-ins and student protest are violence, nor do they believe that it is violent for the police to shoot looters. Violence, to a considerable extent, is in the eye of the beholder; its meaning is not comprehended by the dictionary definition of force and injury. In combination, the semantics of protest and police acts correlate .40 with violence for social control, and explain 16 per cent of the variance in this index.

**Perception of social issues** - Perception of current social issues also correlates about .40 with violence for social control, but this is not a generalized effect of social philosophy. It is a reflection of highly specific views about the police and the courts. Men who think the police need more power and that the Supreme Court is making it more difficult to punish criminals are in favor of greater use of force by the police. But the perception that violence stems from social problems or that the judicial system is faulty has little effect on one's advocacy of police force.

**Combinations** - Each of the psychological factors we have reviewed -- values, identification patterns, definitions, and social issues -- accounts for 16-20 per cent of the variance in the index of violence for social control. In combination they generate a multiple correlation of .56 with that index, accounting for 31 per cent of the variance. Among certain sub-populations the correlations are considerably higher. This is true for blacks and for the college-educated. Men with college training show a response pattern that could be described as more integrated: for example, their views on the use of police force reflect more closely their values, identifications, and their views of social issues.

Background factors, as we expected, operate through the psychological variables rather than independent of them. With the addition of background variables our correlations with violence for social control are .58 for the
population at large, .67 for blacks, and .73 for college-educated men.

We can summarize this analysis by sketching the characteristics of a man likely to endorse above-average levels of violence for social control: He believes that his life will change for the worse if black protesters and student demonstrators get the things they want, but not if the police get the things they want. He also thinks that few policemen dislike people like himself. He believes in retribution and in the right of a man to defend himself and his home, by killing if necessary. He thinks that many forms of protest (burning draft cards, for example) are violence. He thinks that looting is also violent, but that shooting looters is not. He is less likely than most Americans to see any connection between violence and such social problems as poverty and discrimination, poor education, and lack of jobs. He is probably convinced that the courts treat everyone fairly, rich and poor, black and white, but that the Supreme Court has made it difficult to deal with criminals properly and that the police need more power. He is native-born and of native-born parents, probably has not been to college. He could be living anywhere, but his views are a bit more common in the southern and border states than elsewhere.

Violence for Social Change

Background Characteristics

Of the early background characteristics—age, region, education, and race—only race makes a substantial difference in the amount of violence seen necessary for social change. There is not a generational or regional gap in this matter, but there is a racial gap; race alone explains 12 per cent of the variance in the social change index, all early background factors together only 15 per cent (multiple correlation = .39). Moreover, while the apparent effect of college education among whites is to reduce the belief in violence for social
change, blacks with a college education are more likely to consider violence necessary for social change than blacks who have not been to college.

Later background characteristics are only slightly related to the perceived necessity of violence for social change. Low income and urban residence are more conducive to this view than prosperity and small-town life, but five characteristics of later background in combination correlate only .28 with the index of violence for social change. A combination of all background factors, early and late, correlates .42 with that index, explaining 18 per cent of its variance.

Psychological Characteristics

Values - In the general population, values are unrelated to violence for social change, a fact that argues either the compartmentalization of values or the ineffectiveness of measures. Among blacks, however, values correlate about .5 with the social change index. Blacks who believe in retributive justice and self-defense are more likely to see violence as necessary for social change; blacks who score high on kindness are less likely to see violence as necessary. It is a sad commentary that among whites a strong belief in retributive justice is expressed in terms of police action against protesters, that is, as punishment of those who offend the established order; among blacks, belief in retributive justice is expressed in terms of opposition to that order.

Identification - Patterns of identification correlate .47 with the index of violence for social change, and for blacks and college-educated men the correlations are considerably higher, .51 and .66 respectively. Men who feel that white demonstrators and black protesters are trying to be helpful and that their success will improve life for the respondents themselves are more likely to score high on the index of violence for social change. Identification with the police has the opposite effect.
Semantics - Differences in definitions of violence correlate .4 with the index of violence for social change in the general population, and higher for blacks and the college-educated. There is a certain redundancy in this; the semantic differential scales of good-bad and necessary-unnecessary are very close to some of the questions that make up the index of violence for social change. The perception of forceful police acts as violence is also related positively to the index of violence for social change, perhaps because that perception makes counter-violence either necessary or justifiable.

Social Issues - Perceptions of social issues explain only a modest amount of the variance in the index of violence for social change; the correlation is .30 in the general population and .44 among the college-educated. For most men the crucial issue is the relationship of the courts to the police, especially the actions of the Supreme Court. Among black men, however, the crucial issue is the fairness or unfairness of the courts themselves. It is logical that men who see the institutions of justice as unjust themselves also consider that force will be necessary in order to bring about social change.

Interpersonal Perception - The perception that violence is necessary for social change is not an affirmation of faith in people; it is related to negative perceptions of others. Men who score high on that violence index tend to be more resentful and suspicious of others and to trust them less. To what extent this reflects problems of personality and a limited repertoire of coping styles is difficult to say; there are class differences in this response pattern, and it may therefore reflect some of the social realities of poverty.

Combinations

In summary, we can say that for the population at large, their views of the necessity of violence for social change depend primarily on their patterns of identification with the protagonists (blacks, students, police) and
secondarily on the (partly semantic) question of who initiates the violence, police or protesters. Both factors operate even more strongly for blacks and for the college educated, and for these two groups values are also an explanatory factor. In combination the psychological factors studied — values, identification patterns, definitions, social issues, and interpersonal perceptions — correlate .57 with violence for social change in the general population, and .73 in such sub-populations as blacks and college-educated men. The effects of background factors are felt primarily through these psychological variables, but a joint consideration of background and psychological factors raises the multiple correlation to .60 in the general population and .75 and .78 for blacks and college-educated men.

Again, we can summarize these data by attempting a profile of a man who feels that damage to property or persons will be necessary in order to bring about social changes fast enough. He is likely to feel that his goals have much in common with those of white student demonstrators and black protesters, and he is likely to be somewhat critical of the police. He will feel disapproval and consider it violence when the police shoot looters, beat students, and perhaps when they stop people to frisk them. He sees the sources of violence in social problems, feels that the courts are unfair to poor people and blacks, and that the police-court system has too much power. He is deviant in his views and aware that his ideas about violence for social change differ from those of his friends. He is more likely than the average man to be resentful, suspicious, and untrusting of others. He probably lives in an urban area and is below average in income and education.

Utilization

To use well these data on the justification of violence poses massive problems of communication and influence, interpersonal and institutional change.
It is tempting to leave these issues with a brief recapitulation of findings, a graceful awarding of the application problem to policy-makers, and a strained expression of hope. That familiar stance is one reason why most research ironically mislabelled "applied" remains forever unapplied, but it is a stance that protects the researcher from the threatening question of whether his work is merely unapplied or whether it is really inapplicable.

I propose that we separate the utilization problem into two somewhat more manageable questions:

1. Can we, as a result of this research, specify changes that would lower the level of violence considered justifiable for social control and social change?

   If we cannot, we may still claim some descriptive merit for the research, but our understanding and explanation of violence justification is probably limited.

2. If we can specify some violence-reducing changes, a second question arises: Can we stipulate the means by which those changes can be brought about?

   It is one thing to identify the levers of change; it is another to know how to operate them.

The present research says a good deal that bears on the first of these questions. It would probably lower the level of violence-justification if we were to increase education, especially at the college level and beyond. Increase income, especially at the lower levels. Inculcate humanistic values as contrasted to materialistic; reduce the commitment to the value of retributive justice and to homicidal defense of property and person. Enlarge the range of experience and identification patterns to include blacks, students, and young people. Teach the semantic dangers of labelling people and events on the basis of affect rather than relevant and observable properties and actions. Each of these changes would
be predicted to lower the levels of violence people consider justifiable for social control and social change. In combination they should move us nearer to becoming a non-violent society.

But how are such changes to be brought about? Some of them are scarcely less difficult than the advice to lower the justification level itself. What should be done that can realistically be done, that takes account of the politics and formalities of change as well as the needs and goals? What specific and available remedies do we advocate or what new ones have we invented?

Policy-makers and administrators are forever impatient for answers in such terms and ever disappointed that social science refuses to speak in this language. Social scientists, confronted by such demands in person or in prospect, usually retreat to reiterating their data or, as I have just done, advocating changes that stop short of policy invention.

There are severe problems in attempting to go further, and they have been well summarized in the Brim and BASS reports. There is the problem of fragmentation, social scientists producing fragments of knowledge that must be joined with other fragments to produce a program of action, and that lie around, as John Gardner put it, like loose bricks in a brickyard until something is built with them.

There is the social scientist's insistence on speaking in his special language and his unwillingness to learn that (or return to that) of laymen. And there is the social scientist's characteristic response to uncertain and partial answers—more research, an answer eminently appropriate for the research role but one that often ignores the constraints and time demands of social action.

These are familiar; the Commission on the Social Sciences identified five other obstacles to the use of social science, all of which have relevance for our research on the justification of violence; I will take time only
to list them without comment:

**Lack of clients:** There is no particular institution or agency which has asked for or which has a special responsibility for taking up and using new information about violence.

**Separate role requirements of social scientist and policy-maker:** Description and prediction, as we have said, do not in themselves provide a practical solution to the problem described. We must acknowledge this limitation in the present research.

**Implications that threaten the status quo:** We have proposed that the social tendency toward violence and its justification can be reduced by substantial enlargement of opportunity for higher education, by systematic teaching of values that contradict much in the popular culture of achievement and possession, and by substantial increases in income. These changes, however, imply such alterations in present laws, curricula, and institutional arrangements that effective large-scale political action would be required to initiate them.

**Financial limitations and competition:** Resources are by definition limited, and every resource-using proposal must compete with others. The changes we have suggested to reduce violence-justification are expensive and ask taxpayers to allocate resources for the immediate benefit of others.

**Special requirements of political process:** Moreover, as the foregoing obstacles imply, the processes of change are in part political. When social science advocates programs that involve only values already widely shared, the political controversy may be minimal. But as Brim points out and as the present research reminds us, "when social science knowledge suggests that values should change, or that implicit values should be examined and made explicit, political controversy will almost surely arise." And, we may add, social action will be opposed and doubtful.
Infinite regression: To this formidable list of obstacles, we might add what can be called the problem of infinite regression, that is, the tendency for each of the variables in the social scientist's causal sequence to be almost as difficult to manipulate as the one which follows it. Thus the finding that reducing poverty may also reduce the level of violence considered justifiable for social change exchanges one difficult-to-change variable for another. Small wonder that clients ask for, and consultants often provide, standard remedies, nostrums, panaceas.

As Hilgard and his colleagues conclude in the BASS report, to advance the art of solving social problems, social scientists must take the role of contributors rather than sole problem-solvers. Their research findings do not replace public debate and political process, but supplement them—by added information, rational evaluation, substitution of verified findings for conventional wisdom, and by the systematic testing of "common knowledge." Social scientists, when they take on these functions, will find themselves engaged in negotiating, inventing, phrasing and rephrasing, and competing for time and resources with other advocates.

Nevertheless, on the basis of the present research on violence, I will venture three recommendations— one pertaining to policy, one to research, and one to the justifiers of violence.

Our policy recommendation, based on the current research, would emphasize economics and education— the elimination of poverty and near-poverty, the raising of educational levels, and the teaching of non-violent values and coping styles, especially in early public school curricula.

Our research recommendation, which we offer with a good deal more confidence, is that the tendency to violence and its justification shall be treated as a social indicator and made the subject of regular national study, perhaps on a triennial basis. As ancillary research efforts, we would want to see
Effectual studies of programs designed to enlarge non-violent coping styles or teach non-violent values. Such studies would be appropriate on the community scale as well as on the more conventional basis of laboratory or classroom.

And finally, a message of good intent to the majority and the minority defined by the issues of this research. Our message to the majority can be stated in terms of two propositions and an inference:

1. The vast majority of American men are willing to consider the need for social change, including some of the changes proposed by students and blacks, and they are convinced that such changes can be made fast enough without violence.

2. A small minority of all American men and a much larger minority of blacks are skeptical that such changes will be made, are angry at their delay, and are ready to justify the violence of property damage and personal injury for their attainment.

3. Therefore, it can be argued that the majority must convince the minority, not by rhetoric but by good works. They must convince the minority that they acknowledge the existence of social problems and the requirement of their solution. Although there is less than consensus on these matters, support for action exists; people believe that the causes of violence include poverty, lack of good jobs, poor education, and discrimination.

A complementary message can be offered to the minority that considers social change unlikely without property damage and personal injury:

1. Most people in the United States are not pessimistic about the likelihood of social change, nor do they believe that violence is necessary to achieve it.

2. Moreover, the vast majority of American men endorse the use of violence by the police to put down minority protest that involves property damage
or injury, and they are quick to read threats of such violence into protest actions. Any minority that uses violence in an attempt to produce social change may well face a majority-supported response of counter-violence, and at an escalated level of destructiveness.

3. Therefore, it can be argued that minorities must find non-violent ways to appeal to the conscience of the majority. It is not easily roused, but it is there. Moreover, the resort to violence is likely to wreak disproportionate havoc among those who seek change.

Such messages are over-simplifications, of course. It remains for future studies to improve the completeness and validity of these recommendations by improving the description and deepening the understanding of violence. We hope that those future studies of violence for social change and social control will find both concepts increasingly alien to American life.
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**Figure 1. Analytic model.**
NOTES


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