This paper clarifies the development of moral judgement and the means by which educators can stimulate this development. Moral teaching is defined as the process of open discussion aimed at stimulating the child to move to the next step in his development. Research evidence shows that internalized principles of moral judgement cannot be taught, but their development can be encouraged. The main conclusions are (a) the definition of "good behavior" should not be relative only to the standards or biases of the teacher; (b) the teacher's initial task is to understand, from the child's viewpoint, what is good and bad about a given behavior; (c) since the child's judgement follows a developmental sequence, some thinking can be defined as more morally mature than others; (d) it is psychologically and ethically legitimate to encourage the child to act in accordance with his highest level of judgement; and (e) insofar as discrepancies between judgement and action reflect a form of cognitive conflict that may serve to promote development, encouraging correspondence between judgement and behavior will be a stimulus to further development as well as to changes in overt behavior. The teacher must be concerned about the child's moral judgements rather than about conformity with the beliefs and judgements of the teacher. (MBM)
PREPARING SCHOOL PERSONNEL RELATIVE TO VALUES: A LOOK AT MORAL EDUCATION IN THE SCHOOLS

by
Lawrence Kohlberg
Robert L. Selman

Published by
ERIC Clearinghouse on Teacher Education
Number One Dupont Circle, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Sponsored by: American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education (fiscal agent); Association of Teacher Educators, national affiliate of the National Education Association; Council on Instruction and Professional Development, National Education Association

January 1972

SP 005 422
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FOREWORD

School personnel cannot be intellectual, social, or moral eunuchs. Vital learning can be stimulated by school personnel with convictions strongly expressed and lived. Such people provide models of concerned, committed, and competent citizens living in a world in constant flux. Preservice and inservice personnel need to develop maturity-inducing value experiences, to learn implications of value-laden situations in the teaching-learning context, and to grow in ability to help children and youth in their selection of personally meaningful values from the many alternatives available in a democratic society.

This paper deals with the teacher's dilemmas and alternatives in helping young citizens develop values. It provides a concise, yet systematic analysis. The subject was identified by a subcommittee of the Committee on Studies, American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education. We acknowledge the subcommittee's assistance as well as that of Dr. Mark Smith, former AACTE associate director, who had staff responsibility for working with the Committee on Studies. Recognition is due Mrs. Margaret Donley, Clearinghouse publications coordinator; Mrs. Lorraine Polianoff, senior information analyst; and Miss Christine Pazak, publications assistant, for their work in preparing the manuscript for publication.

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Joel L. Burdin
Director

January 1972
PREPARING SCHOOL PERSONNEL RELATIVE TO VALUES:  
A LOOK AT MORAL EDUCATION IN THE SCHOOLS

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INTRODUCTION

The development of moral thinking in our young people is an area of great concern today in American education. And yet despite the importance we attach to the subject, there is little consensus as to how a teacher should deal with this confusing area. The purposes of this section are to familiarize the American teacher with recent psychological and philosophical work on the problem of moral education and to present a model for understanding and teaching morality. Teachers constantly act as moral educators: they tell children what to do, make evaluations of children's behavior, and direct children's relations in the classrooms. Although teachers sometimes engage in these daily activities without being aware that they are engaging in moral education, the children are aware of it. For example, a second grader announced that he did not want to be one of the bad boys in school. When asked who were the bad boys he replied, "The ones who don't put their books back where they belong and get yelled at." His teacher would have been surprised to know that her concerns with classroom management defined for her students what she and her school thought were basic moral values.

Typically, teachers are sensitive to moral education issues but are uncertain of their functions and authority in this area. In particular, they are uncertain about whether their own moral opinions should be presented as "moral truths," should be expressed merely as personal opinion, or should be omitted from classroom discussion entirely. As an example, an experienced junior high school teacher told us that his class deals with morality and right and wrong quite a bit. He doesn't expect each student to agree with him; each has to satisfy himself according to his own convictions, as long as he is sincere and thinks he is pursuing what is right. The teacher discusses cheating this way but always get defeated, because the students still argue cheating is all right. For after accepting the idea that a student has the right to build a position with logical arguments, one must accept what the student comes out with, even though one disagrees.

This teacher's confusion is apparent. She believes everyone should "have his own ideas" and yet she is most unhappy if some of these ideas include the notion, "It's all right to cheat." This teacher's dilemma is a widespread one: she is trapped between her own personal beliefs and the idea that she has no right to expect others to accept them because all values are relative. This concept of morality, ethical relativity, stigmatizes any moral education as arbitrary indoctrination. In Future Shock, (Toffler, 1970) an alarming but telling sociological study on man's adapting to his future in a time of accelerating change, Alvin Toffler describes the widespread moral "opting out" of ethical relativity in the schools.
In pre-industrial societies, where values are relatively stable, there is little question about the right of the older generation to impose its values on the young. Education concerns itself as much with the inculcation of moral values as with the transmission of skills. Even during early industrialism, Herbert Spencer maintained that "Education has for its object the formation of character" which, freely translated, means the seduction or terrorization of the young into the value systems of the old.

As the shock waves of the industrial revolution rattled the ancient architecture of values and new conditions demanded new values, educators backed off. As a reaction against clerical education, teaching facts and "letting the student make up his own mind" came to be regarded as a progressive virtue. Cultural relativism and an appearance of scientific neutrality displaced the insistence on traditional values. Education clung to the rhetoric of character formation, but educators fled from the very idea of valid inculcation, deluding themselves into believing that they were not in the value business at all.

Today it embarrasses many teachers to be reminded that all sorts of values are transmitted to students, if not by their textbooks then by the informal curriculum—seating arrangements, the school bell, age segregation, social class distinctions, the authority of the teacher, the very fact that students are in a school instead of the community itself. All such arrangements send unspoken messages to the student, shaping his attitudes and outlook. Yet the formal curriculum continues to be presented as though it were value-free. Ideas, events, and phenomena are stripped of all value implications, disembodied from moral reality.

Worse yet, students are seldom encouraged to analyze their own values and those of their teachers and peers. Millions pass through the education system without once having been forced to search out the contradictions in their own value systems, to probe their own life goals deeply, or even to discuss these matters candidly with adults and peers.

Nothing could be better calculated to produce people uncertain of their goals, people incapable of effective decision-making under conditions of overchoice (pp. 367-70).

In this paper we plan to explore the teaching dilemmas caused by ethical relativity and then to show there is a more valid, workable, and moral way to deal with moral education.

**MORALITY IN THE CLASSROOM: DILEMMAS OF ETHICAL RELATIVITY**

To suggest to the teacher that he be a moral philosopher and a moral psychologist is to suggest that some careful thinking is necessary in an area which is ordinarily not intellectualized. It might be appealing to say that morality can be avoided in the classroom, but it is fairly well agreed that it cannot. In practice, the problems of moral education usually come to the teacher in the form of immediate behavior problems in the classroom, not in the form of a curriculum he can quietly work out in the abstract. For this reason, the daily practice of moral education has
been considered part of the "hidden" or "unstudied" curriculum by educational psychologists and sociologists (Jackson, 1970). It seems clear that teachers cannot avoid morality in the classroom, and that to refuse to consider moral philosophy or psychology results in some kind of "accidental" moral education at best. Most teachers probably realize this and try to deal with the problem. We raise the issue of the relativity of values in this context because the words moral, positive, and values are interpreted by each teacher in a different way, depending upon the teacher's own values and standards. Most teachers are more or less aware of the problem of ethical relativity and work out various compromises to deal with it. The teacher who, in a haphazard way, labeled those who did not put books away as bad took the easiest, but most inconsistent and unjustifiable, position toward the issue: she had no assurance about universal ethical principles to be transmitted to children but could not be completely ethically neutral either. The result was to focus moralizing on the trivial and immediate rather than on the universal and important, because it required less elaborate justification.

Most teachers are more thoughtful than this about imposing arbitrary values on children. They agree with the junior high school teacher mentioned earlier, who said, "I don't expect all of them to agree with me, each has to satisfy himself according to his own convictions." Teachers with this more relativistic view tend to avoid head-on moral collision, but even such avoidance raises serious problems. An example comes from an observation of an enlightened and effective young fourth-grade teacher in a school in a low-income area. The teacher was in the back of the room working with a project group while the rest of the class read their workbooks. In the front row, a boy said something to his neighbor who then retaliated by quietly spitting in the first boy's face. Equally quietly, the first boy hit the other without leaving his seat, by which time the teacher noted the disturbance. She said calmly, "Stop that and get back to your workbooks." The boy who had done the hitting said, "Teacher, I hit him because he spit in my face." The teacher replied, "That wasn't polite, it was rude, now get back to work, you're supposed to be doing your workbooks." As they went back to work, with a grin, the boy who had done the spitting said to his opponent, "I will grant you that, it was rude."

A later discussion with this teacher about her general views on moral education clarified her handling of the situation. The topic for her master's thesis had been a review of theory and research on middle-class values in education and their application to the disadvantaged child. She said that her paper had made her realize that she was transmitting middle-class values which were neither appropriate to, nor accepted by, the lower-class culture. Nevertheless, she said, politeness was very important to her, and she was bent on transmitting it to her students. She had absorbed from educational sociology the conflictive concept that all values are relative and had resolved the conflict by supporting the middle-class value of politeness which was emotionally central to her. As a result, although attempting to avoid it, when she finally did moralize, she perceived the moral issue in terms of the superficial value of politeness rather than the deeper and more universal value of human dignity. That the boys themselves were aware of some deeper value can be seen from the smiling reply,
"I'll grant you that, it was rude." Although we do not presume to advise what the teacher should have said in this situation, it is clear that for moral education to be carried out meaningfully, the issue of ethical relativity must be resolved more systematically.

Some teachers accept the premise of ethical relativity, yet see a need for moral education. Therefore, they seek a systematic way of discussing values. One solution which recommends itself to teachers holding these relativistic beliefs is that of teaching value clarification and methods of decision making. The value-clarification approach is based on the assumptions that in the consideration of values there are no single, correct answers and that it is very important for students to have clear views about their own values. While the basic premise of this approach is that everyone has his own values, it is further advocated that children can and should learn (a) to be more aware of their own values and how they relate to their decisions, (b) to make their values consistent and order them in hierarchies for decisions, (c) to be more aware of the divergencies between their value hierarchies and those of others, and (d) to learn to tolerate those divergencies. That is, although values are regarded as arbitrary and relative, there may be universal, rational strategies for making decisions which maximize these values. If, in truth, moral values are relative, it should be the part of the rational decision-maker to know it. Within this set of premises, it is logical to teach that values are relative as part of the overall school program.

Acceptance of the idea that all values are relative does, logically, lead to the conclusion that the teacher should not attempt to teach any particular moral values. Such a position can present problems for the teacher. The students of a teacher who has been successful in communicating moral relativism will believe, like the teacher, that "everyone has his own bag" and that "everyone should do his own thing." Let us suppose that one of these students has an opportunity to steal some money that has been left in the classroom. He takes the money, is found out, and brought to task by his teacher. If he has learned his lesson well, the student will argue that he did nothing wrong and that he should be allowed to keep the money. The basis of his argument will be that his own hierarchy of values, which may be different from that of the teacher, made it right for him to steal. While he recognizes that other people believe that stealing is wrong, he himself holds the value that one should steal money when the opportunity presents itself. If the teacher wants to be consistent and retain his relativistic beliefs, he would have to concede that there were no universally valid criteria for judging the student's act as right or wrong.

We are not arguing here that clarification of values is not a very useful component of moral education; we believe it is (Kohlberg and Lockwood, 1970). We are arguing, however, that restriction of moral education to value clarification is not an adequate solution to the problems of moral education. Not only does it leave unsolved problems, but a firm restriction to value clarification merges into an actual teaching that ethical relativity is true. As we shall show in a later section, ethical relativity is not a scientifically or logically valid belief; it is confused with, at best, a partial-truth component. Accordingly, one can hardly advocate indoctrinating children toward this view.
Before attempting to show that ethical relativity is itself an invalid belief, we need to consider three unsatisfactory modes of resolving the relativity dilemma. In attempting to resolve conflicts over relativity, teachers use a variety of methods of moral education. We have already mentioned the value-clarification approach (accepting absolute relativity) as one means of dealing with relativism. We will also consider these three modes of resolution of the problem of value education: (a) defining moral education in terms of virtues and vices; (b) defining moral education in terms of respect for authority, rules, and community values because these are agreed upon (social relativity); and (c) avoiding moral education in favor of promoting the mental health of the child. In the remaining sections, we present our proposed alternative approach to moral education—an approach which avoids the problems of ethical relativity.

DEALING WITH ETHICAL RELATIVITY: THE BAG OF VIRTUES

One common strategy for dealing with the problem of relativity in moral education is to define moral value in terms of a bag of virtues, i.e., a set of moral character traits generally considered to be positive. Defining the aims of moral education in terms of a set of virtues is as old as Aristotle [translated Thompson, 1955], who said,

> Virtue is of two kinds, intellectual and moral. While intellectual virtue owes its birth and growth to teaching, moral virtue comes about as a result of habit. The moral virtues we get by first exercising them; we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts [pp. 55-56].

The attraction of such an arbitrary approach is evident. Although it is true that people often cannot agree on details of right and wrong or even on fundamental moral principles, we all think such traits as honesty and responsibility are good things. By adding enough traits to the virtue bag, we eventually get a list which contains something to suit everyone.

This approach to moral education was widely prevalent in the public schools in the 1920's and 1930's and was called character education. The first problem raised by this approach is that of obtaining agreement on which virtues are to be included in the virtue bag. For Hartshorne and May (1928) these traits included honesty, service (willingness to sacrifice something for a group or charitable goal), and self-control (persistence in assigned tasks). For Havighurst and Taba (1949), they included honesty, loyalty, responsibility, moral courage, and friendliness. As noted, Aristotle's early bag of virtues included temperance, liberality, pride, good temper, truthfulness, and justice. The Boy Scout list is well-known—a Scout should be honest, loyal, reverent, clean, and brave. As can be seen from the different lists of virtues mentioned, everyone seems to have his own bag. Is cleanliness really next to Godliness, as the Boy Scout bag suggests? Is reverence or respect for deity or authority a virtue or not? Is there, or can there be, a consensus on the composition of such a list?
The problem, however, runs deeper than the composition of a given list of virtues and vices. While it may be true that the idea of teaching virtues, such as honesty or integrity, arouses little controversy in some quarters, it is also true that a vague consensus on the goodness of these terms conceals a great deal of actual disagreement over their definitions. What is one man's integrity is another man's stubbornness; what is one man's honesty in expressing his true feelings is another man's insensitivity to the feelings of others. This is sometimes quite evident in controversial fields of adult behavior. Those sympathetic with a social movement view the behavior of those supporting it as reflecting the virtues of altruism, idealism, awareness, and courage. Those in opposition to a movement regard the same behavior as reflecting the vices of irresponsibility and disrespect for law and order. Although this difficulty can be recognized fairly clearly with regard to adult behavior, it is considerably easier for teachers to think that their judgments of children (in terms of the bag of virtues) are noncontroversial, objective, and independent of their own value biases.

The nature of the disagreement over the meaning of virtues can be seen in the results of a recent National Opinion Research Center (1966) survey of a representative sample of American adults. The respondents were asked to make judgments of right and wrong in situations involving honesty. While, in general, dishonest behavior was said to be wrong; lying, stealing, or cheating in certain specific situations was said to be all right or not dishonest by very sizable proportions of the population. A majority believe it is right to lie to spare another's feelings, a substantial minority believe it is right to steal in order to obtain expensive medical treatment for one's wife if it were otherwise unobtainable, a considerable minority believe it is all right to take hotel ashtrays and towels, et cetera. As soon as one leaves vague stereotypical terms and attempts to specify concrete moral actions, it becomes very difficult to establish empirically a consensus concerning moral values. Does 51 percent agreement represent moral consensus, does 75 percent, or does 100 percent? If we accept something close to 100 percent agreement as representing consensus, then no moral consensus exists in our society. The problem is even more acute with regard to virtues or character traits other than honesty, such as altruism or courage.

Our criticism of the "bag of virtues" approach is partially that it is impossible to define vices and virtues in terms of factual majority consensus. Application of "good values" is equally disagreed upon. For example, though the majority may agree upon the value of cleanliness and proper dress, this does not answer the question of whether it is legitimate moral education for a school principal to expel boys whose families allow them to wear long hair. Even if one were willing to accept a majority opinion as defining moral education, the great lack of consensus about specific actions and values still causes confusion. A parent will agree with a teacher that cooperation is a virtue but will not agree that a child's specific failure to obey an unreasonable request by the teacher was wrong, even if the teacher calls the act uncooperative.

The reason we do not find consensus on the definition of terms like honesty and other virtues is not merely that people disagree but that these virtue-terms do not reflect the way children or adults organize
their own moral decisions or actions. Using precise experimental tech-
niques, psychologists have been unable to apply these virtue-terms to
children in ways which aid prediction or explanation of their behavior.
The most definitive experimental study of children's moral character yet
carried out was that of Hartshorne and May (1928). Focusing one part of
their study on honesty—one virtue from their bag—which they defined as
resistance to cheating and stealing in experimental situations, they
found the following:

1. The world cannot be divided into honest and dishonest people. Almost
everyone cheats some of the time. Cheating is distributed around an average level of moderate cheating, with only few people never cheating or cheating at almost every oppor-
tunity.

2. If a person cheats in one situation, it does not mean he will cheat in another. There is very little correlation among cheating tests in different situations. In other words, it is not a character-trait of dishonesty which makes a child cheat in a given situation. If it were, it would be possible to pre-
dict that he would cheat in a second situation if he did in the first situation.

3. People's verbal moral values about honesty have nothing to do with how they act. People who cheat express as much or more moral disapproval of cheating as those who don't cheat.

4. There is little correlation between teachers' ratings of honesty and actual experimental measures of honesty.

5. The decision to cheat or not is largely determined by expediency. The tendency to cheat depended upon the degree of risk of detection and the effort required to cheat. Children who cheated in more risky situations also tended to cheat in less risky situations. Thus, non-cheaters appeared to be primarily more cautious, rather than more honest, than cheaters.

6. Even when honest behavior is not dictated by concern about punishment or detection, it is largely determined by immediate situational factors of group approval and example (as opposed to being determined by internal moral values). Some classrooms showed a high tendency to cheat, while other classrooms in the same school, seemingly of identical composition, showed little tendency to cheat.

7. Where honesty is determined by cultural value-forces, these values are relative or specific to the child's social class and group. Rather than being a universal ideal, honest behavior was more characteristic of the middle-class and seemed less relevant to the lower-class child.

The findings obtained by Hartshorne and May were not restricted to honesty. Exactly the same results were obtained for altruism (or service) and self-control. More recent researchers, studying moral behavior under the terms moral internalization, conscience, or resistance to temptation, have obtained essentially the same results.

These experimental findings seem to support the moral relativist's contention that moral character and the set of virtues it prescribes are only another relative value and that moral behavior must be understood in
the same way as any other behavior, i.e., as the result of the child's needs, group pressures, and the demands of the situation. Furthermore, the relativist would point out that virtues and vices are labels by which people award praise or blame to others, but that the ways people use praise or blame toward others do not reflect the ways in which they think when making moral decisions themselves. We would contend that whereas Hartshorne and May's findings certainly do support our feeling that moral virtues and vices are vague and inconsistent in definition and application, they are by no means proof of the truth of ethical relativity just because they fail to refute it. (In fact, their failure to refute ethical relativity is a function of their explicit "bag of virtues" approach.)

In summary, then, we cannot take the virtues and vices of common-sensical language as providing a clear, usable concept of moral character which will surmount the problems of ethical relativity. Moral character terms are noncontroversial only because they are vague.

DEALING WITH ETHICAL RELATIVITY: TRADITIONAL MORAL EDUCATION AS SOCIAL RELATIVITY

We have argued that moral character terms do not solve the problems of the vagueness and relativity of moral values. Behind the moral values and character traits we have considered lies another moral reality: the existence of the larger society with its rules and laws, as well as the smaller society of the school with rules of its own. Another form of moral education has been for the teacher to represent to the child society's authority and rules.

In its democratic version, this form of moral education means that the teacher attempts to maintain by her authority a set of rules agreed upon by the class. This means of resolving the ethical relativity dilemma was used by the teacher mentioned earlier who had written a thesis on social-class differences in values. On the basis of suggestions made by members of the class, she posted a moral code in the back of the classroom. The code had the following commandments:

1. Be a good citizen,
2. Be generous by helping our friends,
3. Mind your own business,
4. Work quietly,
5. No fighting,
6. Play nicely and fairly,
7. Be neat and clean,
8. Be prepared,
9. Raise your hand, and
10. Be polite.

Although the content of these commandments may leave much to be desired, the argument in their favor would be that they had been decided upon by the persons involved. This strategy would be quite appropriate for non-moral group decisions because it is based on the democratic principle that policies should be decided in consideration of the rights and intents of all parties involved. As used to establish moral principles or values, however, this view rests not on democratic moral principles.
themselves, but on the assumption of social relativity. The assumption is that though the moral values of the individual teacher are relative and arbitrary, whatever values are agreed upon by a group (such as the class, the school, or the nation) are valid by virtue of their being agreed upon or shared.

Such an equation of morality with group majority values has been made by many contemporary psychologists and sociologists in their discussions of the development of moral values in the child. They assume that there are no universal, non-arbitrary moral principles and that each individual acquires his own values from the external culture.

While some teachers who are bothered by ethical relativity end up enforcing somewhat arbitrary and haphazard rules (emanating from the classroom or school group) others may look for a moral code at a more general social level and accept the code of our larger society instead of the code of the smaller classroom group. (It should be noted that the code of the larger social group is still basically seen as relative, limited in applicability not to one person or class, but to one society.) In so doing, teachers accept what might be termed traditional moral education, i.e., teaching respect for the school's authority and rules on the grounds that such respect will generalize to respect for society and its rules. The clearest rationale for this traditional approach is that of the great French sociologist, Emile Durkheim (1961):

The child must learn respect for the rule; he must learn to do his duty because it is his duty, because he feels obliged to do so even though the task may not seem an easy one. Such an apprenticeship must devolve upon the school.

Too often, it is true, people conceive of school discipline so as to preclude endowing it with such an important moral function. Some see it in a simple way of guaranteeing superficial peace and order in the class. Under such conditions, one can quite reasonably come to view these imperative requirements as barbarous--as tyranny of complicated rules. In reality, however... [school discipline] is not a simple device for securing superficial peace in the classroom... It is the morality of the classroom... [as] a small society [pp. 146-48].

[In addition to respect for rules, we must] commit ourselves to collective ends, we must have above all a feeling and affection for the collectivity... [The only way] to instill the inclination to collective life... is to get hold of the child when he leaves his family and enters school... We will succeed the more easily because in certain respect he is much more amenable... to this joining of minds in a common consciousness... than [is] the adult. To achieve this tonic effect on the child, the class must really share in a collective life... Such phrases as "the class," "the spirit of the class," and "honor of the class" must become something more than abstract expressions in the student's mind [pp. 230, 238-41].

Durkheim's analysis makes it clear that the traditional mode of moral education, with its emphasis on respect for rules for their own sake, is ultimately collectivistic in its assumptions. It is assumed that the
group and its rules are always right and, thus, the child should be taught that the school is always right, i.e., the school is an object of respect and loyalty for its own sake. This, of course, is the assumption of Soviet education, which conceives of character education as making a good Soviet citizen who will sacrifice for the collective and observe its rules without surveillance (Bronfenbrenner, 1962). Although American moral education does not carry it to the Soviet extremes, the aims of the approach of teaching accepted social values are not that different. The procedures used in Russia may seem alien even to those who accept the notion of traditional moral education. The alien quality, however, comes only from carrying to its logical conclusion the assumption that the aim of moral education is to teach respect for and loyalty to society and its values.

A teacher who believes that values are relative and faces a dilemma when appealing to personal opinion, ultimately faces the same dilemma in appealing to the code of society or the code of the group. The fact that a value is shared by a group does not in itself give it a less arbitrary quality or greater moral status than it has when it is not shared. Most of us recognize this in extreme cases. We recognize that the killing of certain types of people did not become any more of a moral principle when the Nazi community adopted it as a value. If this is the case for extremes, we are not better off in appealing to the group as justification for the validity of any moral rules. The teacher who believes that values are relative cannot, in good faith, impose values on the students. To educate, a teacher must believe that some moral values are valid, whether or not they are accepted by her students.

DEALING WITH ETHICAL RELATIVITY BY NOT DEALING WITH IT

We have seen traditional moral education, i.e., education for conformity to society's code, fails to offer an adequate escape from the problem of moral relativity. As a reaction to this failure, some educators have decided to try to avoid moral terms and moral education completely and instead, to do no moral educating or to see moral educating as synonymous with adjustment, mental health, or growth of the child. (Indeed, as new ideas about moral education filtered down to educational ideology and practice, they were confused with notions of meeting the child's needs, promoting social adjustment, and promoting mental health and healthy personality development.) It is our contention that leaving the moral dimension implicit and refusing to acknowledge moral education can only result in contradiction, confusion, and hidden moral indoctrination. One example of such confusion has already been cited: the teacher who attempted to treat spitting in the face as a mere disruption of classroom routine. Another example comes from a junior high school teacher who explicitly accepts relativism by both upholding the child's right to his own opinion and claiming that there is no non-relative right. According to this teacher, each student has to make up his own mind as to what was right or wrong in class moral discussions; there are no right answers, what is right at one moment is not of necessity right. Since the demands of classroom life continue to exist, this teacher falls back on what she calls "the old power play" when confronted with arguments about cheating. The students admit she is the leader; she tells them...
that as long as they are with her, they are requested to respect her
right of interpretation; that when they become adults and have thought
things through, they can state their own positions, but that, of course,
she doesn't have to associate with them. She hardly avoids moralizing
here, nor does she solve the ethical dilemma she is involved in.

Ethically relative teachers (or schools) who try to ban moral terms
in the interests of liberty and healthy spontaneous growth end up relying
on power and authority to make their own relative values triumph over
those of the students. An example of this is provided by A. S. Neill
(1960) of the Summerhill school. Neill, in general, takes the view that
the school should foster free healthy growth and not engage in moral
education.

We set out to make a school in which we should allow children
freedom to be themselves. To do this we had to renounce all dis-
cipline, all direction, all moral training. We have been called
brave but it did not require courage, just a complete belief in the
child as a good, not an evil, being. A child is innately wise and
realistic. If left to himself without adult suggestion of any kind,
he will develop as far as he is capable of developing. I believe
that it is moral instruction that makes the child bad, not good
[p. 4].

Even at Summerhill moral problems arise. Neill says:

Some years ago we had two pupils arrive at the same time, a boy of
seventeen and a girl of sixteen. They fell in love with each other
and were always together. I met them late one night and spotted
them, "I don't know what you two are doing," I said, "and morally I
don't care for it isn't a moral question at all. But economically,
I do care. If you, Kate, have a kid my school will be ruined.
You
have just come to Summerhill. To you it means freedom to do what
you like. Naturally, you have no special feeling for the school.
If you had been here from the age of seven, I'd never have had to
mention the matter. You would have such a strong attachment to the
school that you would think of the consequences to Summerhill" [pp.
57-58].

It is clear that Neill wants to avoid moral teaching about sex, but
that he still must make regulations about sexual behavior if only, as he
says, because economically, he does care. To enforce these regulations,
he appeals to school loyalty, implying that it has somehow shameful of
the boy and girl not to have considered the school's welfare before their
own sexual impulses. In the end, he behaves like all other schoolmasters
who treat the welfare and rules of the school as sacred. Furthermore,
he hardly succeeds in avoiding "all moral training" as he proposed to do.

A more blatant equation of morality and mental health is made by
Bettelheim (1970) whose definition of morality is directly based on
psychoanalytic constructs. The mature morality of the middle class is
the ability to delay gratification and to be future oriented, two psy-
chological attitudes which are functions of the mature ego and are based
on the reality principle. For Bettelheim the super-ego, formed at age 5, is necessary to maintain "good behavior" (internalize parental morality) until the ego grows strong enough to take over the moral function (to see the value of morality in terms of reality).

According to Sizer and Sizer (1970):

All education is based in a middle-class morality that finds its psychoanalytic equivalent in a powerfully developed reality principle which insists that we must largely forego present pleasure for greater powers in the future [p. 90].

However, this approach, like many of the others, is based on the assumption that morality resides in society (and is thereby relative) and it is the child's job to internalize it. Bettelheim, like all the others we have discussed refuses to face the issue of whether or not universal underlying philosophical and psychological foundations of moral conduct exist.

Neither trying to avoid morality nor trying to see it as mental health or social learning really avoids or solves the problems of ethical relativity and moral education.

FAILURE OF ETHICAL RELATIVITY AND OF ATTEMPTS TO DEAL WITH IT

In summary of the foregoing sections, we have discussed ethical relativity as a way of viewing morality and moral education. This view has been found inadequate in several ways. The first and most obvious failure occurs time and again when the teacher tries to reconcile belief in moral relativity with the day-to-day events of the classroom. What do you say to a junior high school student who "reasons" that stealing or cheating is fine with him? Can you judge him? Is it a good solution to label spitting in a friend's face merely rude? And it is clear that there is no avoiding some kind of moral communicating if it is only that "bad kids don't put away their books."

Acceptance of ethical relativity is common, and so is awareness of its weaknesses. However, many ways of attempting to deal with it are unsuccessful. One such attempt is that of "character-education," which is founded on a conception of moral character as composing a "bag of virtues," i.e., a set of approved traits such as honesty, responsibility, friendliness, service, and other values. These virtues are to be taught to children by sermonizing, by giving opportunities for practice, and by rewarding their expression. Unfortunately, even if a set of virtues can be agreed upon, these virtues themselves become relative, depending upon who is defining them, and even more vague in their application. Furthermore, these lists become impossible to live up to. (In fact, in the 1930's, such approaches to moral education fell out of favor because they apparently did not work. Experimental research [Hartshorne and May, 1928-1930; Jones, 1936] showed that character-education classes in the schools or attendance at Sunday school or Boy Scout meetings had no appreciable effect in raising the child's level of actual honesty or altruism in experimental replicas of life situations).
A second approach, which is by no means any more effective, is that of teaching the values of the group, the "traditional moral education" of Emile Durkheim. Two problems are especially evident here. One is that no matter which group one chooses as a source of one's code (the classroom: "mind your own business" or "no fighting," or the society at large: racial discrimination should be illegal or minority genocide is a lawful national goal) these values still remain relative, specific, and arbitrary. The problem of relativity is by no means solved or avoided. The other problem referred to is that by logical extension, traditional moral education, as in the Soviet approach, though more effective, is so only because authority and group conformity are developed in much more powerful ways than in the traditional American system. We would argue that to make traditional moral education effective is to make transparent its undemocratic and unconstitutional nature.

The third approach, that of carefully avoiding moralizing for the sake of some vague notion of mental health, has been shown to be impossible to carry through. Educators ultimately have to resort to "power play" or force techniques to implement their own values--a solution which is perhaps the least productive of all.

THE COGNITIVE-DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH: A NEW WAY TO UNDERSTAND MORALITY AND APPROACH MORAL EDUCATION

We have presented a rather extensive discussion on ethical relativity and attempts to deal with it because each teacher must seriously consider whether or not he has the right to attempt to transmit values if they are relative. If, upon consideration, the teacher concludes that all values are relative, he must then determine how to proceed from this point. Our claim has been that a simple acceptance of the premises that (a) all values are relative and, therefore, (b) the teacher should not engage in moral education is not satisfactory because it provides no positive stance toward the moral problems that inevitably arise in the classroom. While relativity is unsatisfactory, we have pointed out that the usual methods for circumventing it are not successful. We must face relativity head-on. Although classroom problems arise from such a position, it is not legitimate to deny the doctrine of relativity if it does, indeed, represent scientific truth. In the following sections, however, we will present evidence indicating that ethical relativity does not represent scientific truth. The starting point for this argument must be an explanation of a differing view not only of the moral development but of all the mental development of the child. This view, referred to as cognitive-developmental, stems from the philosophy and psychology of John Dewey (1959) and of Jean Piaget (1965) and differs from other views primarily in that it sees the child as taking an active, spontaneous, unique part in this own mental growth rather than as being a passive recipient of external influences and teachings. Most mental growth is seen as progressing through a series of organized steps, each of which is gone through in the same order by all individuals. No step is skipped, but some individuals progress slower or stop earlier in a given sequence of development. These steps are not "taught," but environmental conditions can facilitate development. This paper presents the cognitive-developmental perspective on moral development. One basis of this approach is the fact that children have their own ways of thinking about values just as teachers or adults do, and therefore the correct way
to view the child is as a moral philosopher. In referring to the child as a moral philosopher, we mean that children spontaneously formulate moral ideas that form organized patterns of thought, that these organized patterns do not come directly from the culture, and that these patterns go through a series of qualitative transformations as the child develops. If the child is a moral philosopher, the teacher must be also. The teacher must be (a) a moral philosopher who considers the moral implications of his own actions and values and (b) a moral psychologist who understands the child's patterns of thinking and the way the moral meaning of the teacher's action is perceived by the child.

The origins of our position are to be found in the writings of John Dewey, who in works like *Moral Principles in Education* (1959), first presented a progressive or developmental conception of moral education. Proposing that intellectual education is the stimulation of the child to develop an active organization of his own experience, Dewey also stressed the central role of thinking or active organization in morality. Further, he stressed that development is the critical aim of moral education and that this development takes place in stages.

In *What Psychology Can Do for the Teacher*, Dewey summarizes as follows:

Summing up, we may say that every teacher requires a sound knowledge of ethical and psychological principles. . . . Only psychology and ethics can take education out of the rule-of-thumb stage and elevate the school to a vital, effective institution in the greatest of all constructions--the building of a free and powerful character. The only solid ground of assurance that the educator is not setting up impossible or artificial aims, that he is not using ineffective and perverting methods, is a clear and definite knowledge of the normal end and focus of mental action. Only knowledge of the order and connection of the stages in the development of the psychical functions can, negatively, guard against these evils or, positively, insure the full maturing and free, yet orderly, exercises of the psychical powers. Education is precisely the work of supplying the conditions which will enable the psychical functions as they successively arise, to mature and pass into higher functions in the freest and fullest manner. This result can be secured only by a knowledge of the process of development, that is only by a knowledge of psychology [in Archambault, 1964; pp. 202,207-08].

Dewey, held however, that while human health, happiness, and development are the ultimate criteria of education, this does not mean that education can dispense with definite conceptions of moral principles, moral character, and methods for the development of moral character. According to Archambault (1964), Dewey said in 1909 that "all the aims and values which are desirable in education are themselves moral. . . . We must take the child as a member of society in the broadest sense and demand whatever is necessary to enable the child to recognize all his social relations and to carry them out [p. 112]."
This cognitive-developmental approach to moral education, first presented by Dewey, has in two generations been elaborated upon by psychological theory and research, chiefly by Piaget (1932) and by his followers (e.g., Kohlberg, 1971; Turicel, 1969). Recently we have been obtaining more detailed knowledge of stages in the child's moral development which makes approach concrete and practical as a guide to questions about moral education. Our research has resulted in the formulation of the seven stages of moral development summarized in Table 1.

Table 1
DEFINITION OF MORAL STAGES

STAGE 0: PREMORAL LEVEL

The child neither understands rules nor judges good or bad in terms of rules and authority. Good is what is pleasant or exciting, bad is what is painful or fearful. He has no idea of "obligation," "should," or "have to," even in terms of external authority, but is guided only by "can do," and "want to do."

STAGES 1 AND 2: PRECONVENTIONAL LEVEL

At this level the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right and wrong, but he interprets these labels either in terms of the physical and the hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors) or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels. The level is divided into two stages, Stage 1 and Stage 2.

Stage 1 is defined as punishment and obedience orientation. The physical consequences of action determine its goodness or badness regardless of the human meaning or value of these consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning deference to power are an underlying moral order supported by punishment and authority (the latter being Stage 4).

Stage 2 is instrumental relativist orientation. Right action consists of that which instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others. Human relations are viewed in terms of those of the market place. Elements of fairness, reciprocity, and equal sharing are present, but they are always interpreted in a physical or pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours," not of loyalty, gratitude, or justice.

STAGES 3 AND 4: CONVENTIONAL LEVEL

At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's family, group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude is not only one of conformity to personal expectations and social order but of being loyal to, actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order and identifying
with the persons or group involved in it. At this level are Stage 3 and Stage 4.

Stage 3 is defined as interpersonal concordance or "good boy-nice girl" orientation. Good behavior is that which pleases or helps others and is approved by them. There is much conformity to stereotypical images of what is the behavior of the majority of "natural" behavior. Behavior is frequently judged by intention: "he means well" becomes important for the first time. One earns approval by being "nice."

Stage 4 is law and order orientation. There is orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social order. Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order for its own sake.

STAGES 5 AND 6: POST-CONVENTIONAL, AUTONOMOUS, OR PRINCIPLED LEVEL

At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral values and principles which have validity and applications apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding these principles and apart from the individual's own identification with these groups. This level also has two stages: Stage 5 and Stage 6.

Stage 5 is defined as social-contract legalistic orientation, generally with utilitarian overtones. Right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights and in terms of standards which have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society. There is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opinion and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching consensus. Aside from what is constitutionally and democratically agreed upon, the right is a matter of personal values and opinion. The result is an emphasis upon the legal point of view, but with an emphasis upon the possibility of changing the law in terms of rational considerations of social utility (rather than rigidly maintaining it in terms of Stage 4 law and order). Outside the legal realm, free agreement and contract is the binding element of obligation. This is the "official" morality of the American government and Constitution.

Stage 6 is the universal ethical principle orientation. Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles which appeal to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative) and are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons.
Data supporting the existence of these stages for all children is based on detailed examinations of the ways in which children in different cultures make moral judgments and the transformations in their thinking that occur with increasing age. The basis of the cognitive-developmental approach to morality is that children do have their own ways of thinking and that moral education must be based on a knowledge of stages of moral development. Often, teachers and parents try to instill their own morality into children, without listening to the judgments the child makes on his own. If the child merely repeats back a few of the adult's clichés and behaves himself, most parents think he has adopted or internalized parental standards. Both teachers and psychologists make this assumption—but this is an assumption that can be made only if we do not listen to the kinds of moral judgments children actually make. When we examine children's moral judgments, we find that they have many standards that do not come, in any obvious way, from parents, peers, or teachers. We find instead, that the child has a morality of his own in that he thinks about right and wrong in an organized manner.

The universality of these stages, i.e., that they are found in all children and adults in all cultures, is documented by our findings in villages and cities in the United States, Great Britain, Taiwan, Israel, Yucatan, and Turkey. In all of these cultures we find the same basic seven stages, through which moral values and judgments progress. We shall examine the data supporting the universal existence of this moral thinking after a more detailed look at what the stages themselves mean and how they work.

First, a general point about what the stages mean. They look at the form, or structure, of children's reasoning rather than at the content alone. An example of an early form of moral judgment was provided by the son of one of the authors. At the age of 4 he joined the pacifist and vegetarian movement and refused to eat meat because he said it was bad to kill animals. The content here, the "what" of the judgment, looks fairly morally mature, i.e., it's bad to kill animals. But further examination of his views shows that the structure, rationale, or explanation—the "why" of the judgment—remains primitive and persistent. In spite of his parents' attempts to dissuade him by arguing about the difference between justified and unjustified killing, he remained a vegetarian for 6 months. However, he did recognize that some forms of killing were legitimate. One night his father read to him from a book about Eskimo life which included a description of a seal-killing expedition. While listening to the story, the boy became angry and said, "You know, there is one kind of meat I would eat, Eskimo meat. It's bad to kill animals so it's all right to eat them." Here we see clearly that though content appears sophisticated and mature (killing animals is bad), the thinking behind it, the structure, is immature and inconsistent (it is all right to eat Eskimos because they kill seals).

This episode also illustrates that children often generate their own moral values and maintain them in the face of cultural training. This child was not taught by parents or other societal influences that killing animals was bad and was by no means ever instructed that if so, eating Eskimos was legitimate. These judgments, albeit primitive, were spontaneous, original, and persistent. These values also have universal roots.
Every child believes it is bad to kill because regard for the lives of others or for pain at death is a natural empathic response, though it is not necessarily universally and consistently maintained. In this example, the value of life led both to vegetarianism and to the desire to kill Eskimos. This latter desire comes also from a universal value tendency: a belief in reciprocity, that one bad (or good) act deserves another.

This example also illustrates that moral development is largely a process of restructuring universal human tendencies of empathy (concern for the welfare of others) and of justice (concern for equality and reciprocity) into more adequate forms. This restructuring process is also a key feature of the view.

Our studies show not only that the same basic moral concepts are used in every culture but also that the stages of their development are the same in every culture. Furthermore, our experimental work has demonstrated that children always move through these stages in the same order. As noted, developmental change means that movement is forward in the sequence and no steps are skipped. The basic notion of the stage concept is that a series of stages form an invariant developmental sequence. The sequence is invariant because each stage stems from the previous stage and prepares the way for the subsequent stage. Of course, children may move through these stages at varying speeds and may be found half in and half out of a particular stage. An individual may stop at any given stage and at any age, but if he continues to progress, he must move in accord with these steps. Moral reasoning of the conventional type (Stage 3-4) never occurs before the preconventional Stage 1 and 2 thought has taken place. No adult in Stage 4 has gone through Stage 6, but all adults in Stage 6 have gone through Stage 4.

A description of the step-by-step movement of two boys in our longitudinal study will clarify this point, as well as the earlier points on restructuring, persistence of primitive views, and the distinction between content and structure. The example we will consider concerns their ideas about the value of life.

The drug didn't work, and there was no other treatment known to medicine which could save Heinz's wife, so the doctor knew that she had only about 6 months to live. She was in terrible pain, but she was so weak that a good dose of pain-killer like ether or morphine would make her die sooner. She was delirious and almost crazy with pain, and in her calm periods, she would ask the doctor to give her enough ether to kill her. She said she couldn't stand the pain and that she was going to die in a few months anyway.

Should the doctor do what she asks and give her the drug that will make her die? Why?

Now suppose this dilemma were presented to a group of children. What would constitute a mature concept of life's value? Certainly not our 4-year-old vegetarian's response, which equated the lives of seals and people. Yet we find that Tommy, a bright boy of 10, is still making judgments based
on a similar confusion. Such confusion becomes apparent when he is asked, "Is it better to save the life of one important person or a lot of unimportant people?" He answers:

All the people that aren't important, because one man has just one house, maybe a lot of furniture, but a whole bunch of people have an awful lot of furniture and some of these poor people might have a lot of money and it doesn't look it.

While Tommy is concerned with the value of life, he confuses its value with that of furniture. It is typical of thinking in Stage 1 to confuse the value of life with the value of material objects or power. A few years later when Tommy moved to Stage 2, he was able to distinguish between the value of material objects and the needs and wants of individual desires or pleasure. At the age of 13 Tommy said about mercy killing:

But the husband wouldn't want his wife to die; it's not like an animal. If a pet dies you can get along without it—it isn't something you really need. Well, you can get a new wife, but it's not really the same.

Tommy's answer is at Stage 2 because, in part, the value of the woman's life is contingent on its instrumental value to her husband, who can't replace her as easily as he can a pet.

When Tommy was 16 years old, he answered the same question in the following way:

It might be best for her, but her husband—it's a human life—not like an animal. It just doesn't have the same relationship that a human being does to a family. You can become attached to a dog, but nothing like a human you know.

Tommy had then moved from a Stage 2 instrumental view to a Stage 3 view based on the husband's distinctively human empathy and love for someone in his family. At Stage 3 we see the beginning of a regard for rules and conventional expectations. As we can see from Tommy's Stage 3 response however, this type of thinking lacks any basis for a universal human value of the woman's life, which would hold if she had no husband or if her husband didn't love her.

Tommy, then, has moved step-by-step through three stages during the ages 10 to 16. Although bright (IQ-120) Tommy is a slow developer in moral judgment. Let us consider another boy, Richard, to exemplify sequential movement through the remaining three steps. At age 13, Richard said about this mercy killing: "If she requests it, it's really up to her. She is in such terrible pain, just the same as people are always putting animals out of their pain." In general, his responses showed a mixture of Stage 2 and Stage 3 concepts concerning the value of life. At age 16, he said: "It's not a right or privilege of man to decide who shall live and who should die. God put life into everybody on earth and you're taking away something from that person that came directly from God. . . . It's almost destroying a part of God when you kill a person."
Richard displays a Stage 4 concept of life as sacred in terms of its place in a categorical moral or religious order. The value of human life is universal. However, it is still dependent upon something else, upon respect for God and God's authority; it is not an autonomous human value. At this stage, moral value is defined by a conventional order that is maintained by fixed rules, laws, and authority.

While Richard confuses the value of life with authority at Stage 4, he begins to make distinctions as he gets older. This can be seen in the response he gives at age 20:

It's her own choice. I think there are certain rights and privileges that go along with being a human being. I am a human being and have certain desires for life, and I think everybody else does too. You have a world of which you are the center, and everybody else does too, and in that sense we're all equal.

Richard's response is clearly at Stage 5, in that the value of life is defined in terms of equal and universal human rights in a context of relativity and in that he has a concern for utility or welfare consequences. At age 24, Richard says:

A human life, whoever it is, takes precedence over any other moral or legal value. A human life has inherent value whether or not it is valued by a particular individual. The worth of the individual human being is central where the principles of justice and love are normative for all human relationships.

This young man's thinking is at Stage 6; he conceptualizes the value of human life as absolute in a universal and equal respect for the human being as an individual. He has moved step-by-step through a sequence culminating in a definition of human life as centrally valuable rather than derived from, or dependent upon, social or divine authority.

Richard's development over 12 years, from Stage 2 to Stage 6, shows how content and structure differ, how development of more mature morality is a question of restructuring view not just of finding new views. Richard at Stage 2 and Stage 6, valued life, as did our 4-year-old Eskimo-eater for that matter, but in a vastly different way at structurally and morally more mature levels.

The studies we have conducted in various cultures indicate that the stages of moral development are universal. Our findings from these cultures are presented in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 shows the age trends for middle-class urban boys in the United States, Taiwan, and Mexico.
Middle-class urban boys in the U.S., Taiwan and Mexico (above). At age 10 the stages are used according to difficulty. At age 13, Stage 3 is most used by all three groups. At age 16 U.S. boys have reversed the order of age 10 stages (with the exception of 6). In Taiwan and Mexico, conventional (3-4) stages prevail at age 16, with Stage 5 also little used.

At age 10 in each country, the stages are used in the order of their difficulty or maturity. In the United States, by age 16 the order is the reverse, from the highest to the lowest, except that Stage 6 is still little used. At age 13, Stage 3 (the good-boy middle stage) is most used. The results in Mexico and Taiwan are the same, except that development is a little slower. The most conspicuous feature is that Stage 5 thinking is much more salient in the United States than in Mexico or Taiwan at age 16. Nevertheless, it is present in the other countries, so we know that it is not purely an American democratic construct. Figure 2 shows similar patterns in two isolated villages, one in Yucatan and one in Turkey.
Two isolated villages, one in Turkey, the other in Yucatan, show similar patterns in moral thinking. There is no reversal of order, and preconventional (1-2) thought does not gain a clear ascendancy over conventional stages at age 16.

While conventional moral thought (Stages 3 and 4) increases steadily from age 10 to 16, at 16 it still has not achieved a clear ascendancy over preconventional thought (Stages 1 and 2). Stages 5 and 6 are totally absent in this group. Trends for lower-class urban groups are intermediate in rate of development between those for the middle-class boys and the village boys.

We also have found that the sequence is not dependent upon holding the beliefs of a particular religion or upon holding any religious beliefs at all: no significant differences appear in the development of moral thinking among Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Buddhists, Moslems, and atheists. Children's moral values in the religious area seem to go through the same stages as their general moral values. For instance, a child at Stage 2 is likely to say, "Be good to God and He'll be good to you."
In considering the issues of ethical relativity and universality, it is necessary to distinguish between basic moral and nonmoral values that are held by individuals or societies. For instance, an anthropologist looking at the responses of the Taiwanese and American boys might conclude that they provide evidence for the proposition that our values are different because we come from different cultural environments. The anthropologist might point to the Taiwanese boy who said that a husband should steal a drug (that he can get no other way) to save his dying wife, "because if she dies he'll have to pay for her funeral and that costs a lot." American boys do not respond this way. Tommy, when he was 10, recommended stealing the drug because "she might be an important lady like Betsy Ross, she made the flag." Recall that Tommy also said it is better to save the lives of many over one important person "because one man has just one house, but a whole bunch of people have an awful lot of furniture."

The anthropologist might say that the Taiwanese boy's thinking reflects the distinctive Chinese value of "elaborate funerals," while the American boy combines the great American values of "flag," "mother," and "furniture." From the point of view of moral development, these cultural differences in values are trivial differences in specific content only. The basic moral reality is that all the boys reduce the value of the woman's life to concrete cash or some other material value. Such pragmatism, frequently taken as a distinctively American value-tendency, is a universal mode of moral thinking, our second stage of moral judgment.

Most observations used to support ethical relativism have generally been of superficial or specific values, e.g., differences in valuing ornate funerals (in Taiwan) as opposed to ornate furniture (in America). Put in slightly different terms, differences in basic moral values have been inferred from observation of specific differences in customs. However, variety of custom tells us nothing directly about differences in basic moral values. In order to investigate moral values one must talk to people in various cultures and see what values they use to guide and justify particular customary behavior patterns. Our own studies represent a systematic cross-cultural effort to do this and yield a universal answer. If we consider general moral values, in the sense of how and why people make moral judgments, rather than the content of moral reasoning, we find the same forms of reasoning in every culture.

In summary, then, there are universal human modes or principles of moral thinking which progress through an invariant order. In addition, there are differences in more specific moral beliefs which are culturally or individually determined and are, therefore, relative in content. Differences which can be seen in the basic structure of moral thinking are differences in maturity or development.

THE COGNITIVE-DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH TO MORALITY: HOW CHANGE OCCURS

We have described the way in which we feel morality develops in stages, and we have reviewed research which supports the universality of these stages and thereby refutes the "scientific truth" of ethical relativity. We also subscribe to the following general points on moral development:
1. We often make different decisions and yet have the same basic moral values.
2. Our values tend to originate inside ourselves as we process our social experience.
3. In every culture and subculture of the world the same basic moral values are found, and the same steps toward moral maturity are found. While social environments directly produce different specific beliefs (e.g., smoking is wrong, eating pork is wrong), they do not engender different basic moral principles (e.g., consider the welfare, treat other people equally).
4. Insofar as basic values are different, it is largely because we are at different levels of maturity in thinking about basic moral and social issues and concepts. Exposure to others more mature than ourselves helps stimulate maturity in our own value processes. We are, however, selective in our response to others and do not automatically incorporate the values of elders or authorities important to us.

We will now review further research which explores exactly how moral reasoning functions and how change occurs, which makes clearer this picture of development.

The first principle requiring clarification is that education for development is not achieved through direct teaching and instruction. Having defined mature morality as Stage 5 and Stage 6 principles of justice, it might seem that the more effective educational approach would be to teach such principles to a child directly. Our research evidence indicates, however, that principles of moral reasoning cannot be taught directly. The evidence supports the view that the child employs thinking that is self-generated and that changes gradually. First, an individual moves through the stages in a step-by-step sequential fashion, so that Stages 5 and 6 cannot be reached without first passing through the previous stages. Secondly, when a stage is attained, an individual cannot be taught a higher stage directly because he must generate it himself; the task of the teacher is to facilitate such a process.

Several studies (Rest, 1971; Rest and others, 1969; Selman, 1917b) suggest that it is not even possible to get children to comprehend, much less to use spontaneously, stages much higher than their own. In these studies, children were first interviewed to determine their own moral stage (or mixture of adjoining stages). Statements representing each of the six stages were then presented, and the children were asked to put into their own words the moral reasoning the statements reflected. All children were able to represent correctly all stages below, as well as at, their own level. Some children were able to do this for the stage directly above their own, but almost none of the children were able to comprehend or translate reasoning two or more stages above their own. (In fact, those children able to comprehend higher stages also showed some spontaneous use of these stages in the pretest interview. Comprehension of a higher stage, therefore, reflected the fact that the child was already naturally moving toward this next stage.)

When the children who failed to comprehend a higher stage of reasoning tried to put it into their own words, they would inadvertently translate it into the ideas of their own stage. A subject at Stage 2 selected
a Stage 6 statement involving principles of conscience and blithely translated it to Stage 2, saying, "The husband should follow his conscience; if he likes his wife, he should steal; if he doesn't like his wife he shouldn't."

The nature of the difficulties involved in getting children to comprehend moral principles above their own stage may be illustrated by a study (Selman, 1971) testing children (ages 10 to 16) on comprehension of the Golden Rule. Almost all of the children in the study were able to repeat the Golden Rule as the formula "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you." They were then asked, "Why is it a good rule?" and "What would it tell you to do if someone just came up and hit you on the street?" To the latter question, most of the 10-year-olds said, "Hit him back, do unto others as they do unto you." They interpreted the Golden Rule in terms of Stage 2 reciprocity of actual exchange or revenge, instead of in terms of Stage 3 ideal reciprocity involving a consideration of what you wish if you were in the other's place. Furthermore, they would justify the Golden Rule in Stage 2 terms: "If you follow the Golden Rule other people will be nice to you." Only children at Stage 3 or above on the moral-judgment scale were able to interpret the Golden Rule correctly. The intellectually active effort required for an understanding of the formula is indicated in the following response by a 10-year-old boy at Stage 3: "Well, the Golden Rule is the best rule because like if you were rich, you might dream like that you were poor and how it felt and then the dream would go back in your own head and you would remember and you would help make the laws that way."

From these examples, it can be seen that the studies focusing on comprehension have shown that children do not comprehend reasoning at more than one stage above their own. Therefore, success in stimulating change to a higher stage requires (a) helping children understand a higher stage of reasoning and (b) facilitating their acceptance of that reasoning as their own, with the spontaneous use of it in new situations.

Another series of studies indicated that it is only possible to induce change in a child's thinking to the stage directly above his own. The first of these experiments (Turiel, 1966) was begun by determining the moral stages of seventh-grade boys from their responses to several hypothetical dilemmas used in the moral-judgment interview. These children

1We have indicated that failure to comprehend higher stages of thought reflects cognitive difficulty. However, the issue of cognitive difficulty in moral understanding is not merely a matter of the child's age and general intelligence. Intelligence scores are poor predictors of both initial moral judgment maturity scores (Kohlberg, 1969) and scores in moral judgment after teaching programs (Blatt, 1971). For example, understanding conventional morality at the Stage 3 level requires a certain minimum level of cognitive maturity in a 10-year-old. This maturity is reflected first in IQ performance and secondly in ability on intellectual role-taking tasks (Selman, 1971a). However, such intellectual ability is necessary but not sufficient for moral judgment. Many children who passed the intellectual tasks failed to reach a conventional stage of moral judgment.
were assigned either to one of three experimental groups or to a control group. All of the children (with the exception of those in the control group) then role-played and discussed three additional moral-judgment stories with the experimenter. In this context, the experimenter first presented advice supporting one alternative in the dilemma (e.g., the husband should steal the drug) and then presented advice supporting the other alternative (e.g., the husband should not steal the drug). For one group, the experimenter's advice (supporting each alternative) utilized moral reasoning one stage above the child's dominant stage of functioning. For a second group, the moral reasoning was two stages above the child's own. For the third group, reasoning was one stage below the child's own. All of the children were later reinterviewed in order to determine the degree to which they absorbed or assimilated the reasoning presented in the experimental exposure.

As would be predicted by the comprehension studies, the children exposed to moral judgments at one stage above their own showed the most usage of that stage on the retest. Those exposed to reasoning one stage below their own showed some usage of that stage, but they were not influenced as much as those exposed to the stage one above. The children exposed to reasoning two stages above their own were not influenced.

This experiment demonstrates that to promote the child's movement to a more advanced level, it is best to present reasoning that is at the next higher level. Since the child moves through the sequence in step-by-step fashion, without skipping any stages or moving backwards, the efficacy of environmental influences depends largely upon the match between the level of reasoning presented and the child's own level. Conventional moral education has had little impact on children's moral judgments because it has disregarded the problem of developmental match and has generally involved only an attempt at transmitting a set of adult moral clichés. These are often meaningless to the child because they are at the same time too abstract and too concrete. That is, such clichés include reasoning too far beyond the child's level of comprehension, yet they are presented in a patronizing manner by talking down to the child. In other words, much of the failure of communication about values between teachers and children results not from value differences or value relativity but from discrepancies of developmental level between the structure and reasoning and ideas of the teacher and those of children.

If moral communications are to be effective, the developmental level of the teacher's verbalizations should ideally be one step above the level of the child. The teacher must, therefore, do much more than listen passively to the child's words. The teacher must listen carefully in order to understand the meaning of the moral judgments made by the child. There must also be a sensitivity to differences in reasoning between the teacher and the child, as well as between different children. In sum, a knowledge of the child's thinking and level of comprehension is necessary in order to know how reasoning presented by others is being understood and assimilated.

As research results suggest, when a teacher's communication of moral judgments is at a level below the child's own, the child will understand what is being said to him but he will still reject the judgment as an inadequate way of thinking. Earlier we referred to an observation in which
a teacher told a pupil that it was rude to spit in another boy's face. The pupil, in saying to his adversary, "I will grant you, it was rude," seemed to indicate that he felt his teacher's explanation of why it is wrong to spit in someone's face was somehow shallow, somehow missed the point in judging the act. Certainly, this teacher was not challenging the child's moral conceptions by using reasoning which was probably below his own.

Moral reasoning below the child's level is, therefore, not very likely to be educative (in the sense of stimulating the development of his judgmental processes), nor is it very likely to influence behavior. It is frequently necessary to show children the wrongness of particular actions. However, when the admonition is coupled with lower-level reasoning, the child may be reinforced in his behavior because he can reject the reasoning on which the judgment is based. That children do not assimilate lower-level moral statements, even though they are easily comprehended, can be clearly seen in the reasons they gave in our experiments for judging statements as "bad" advice. For instance, children at Stage 2 (instrumental need and exchange orientation) tend to reject Stage 1 (punishment and obedience orientation) advice because it produces fear and is instrumentally irrational, regardless of whether advice is "pro" or "con"; i.e., immature structure is rejected as inadequate regardless of content.

We can follow this process of rejection of lower-level advice along a developmental scale. While children at Stage 2 tend to reject Stage 1 advice because it is fearful and foolish, children at Stage 3 (empathy- and approval-oriented) tend to reject Stage 2 advice (based on exchange and instrumental needs) because it is egotistical and ignores moral feelings. One child at Stage 3 rejected Stage 2 advice (to keep quiet and not tattle on a brother because one might want a favor from him one day) by saying, "I don't like the idea that 'if you do this, then I'll do that.' You should not make a decision because you'll be paid off." Another child at Stage 3 said that Stage 2 advice was bad "because it is making him think just of himself and that's not right." Children at Stage 4 (rules- and authority-oriented), in turn, tend to reject Stage 3 advice because it is based on personal feelings and relationships rather than upon moral rules. One child at Stage 4 justified his rejection of Stage 3 advice (to keep quiet about the brother) as follows: "It's stupid not to do right because you're afraid of losing your brother's friendship or because you're afraid of what your father might think."

These examples show that children do make active judgments about the reasoning they encounter, and it should not be assumed that morality can be dictated to children solely on the basis of the authority carried by the teacher. Although a teacher's authority may have some influence, ultimately it is the reasoning contained in the communications that determines whether or not the student's moral development will be furthered.

The foregoing research on comprehension indicates children do not comprehend stages more than one above their own and reject stages below their own. The research on actual change in moral reasoning shows that reasoning one stage above a child's own is the most effective in stimulating growth.
THE COGNITIVE-DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH TO MORALITY: STIMULATING CHANGE IN THE CLASSROOM

We have said that to be most effective, reasoning should be at a level one stage above the child's own. However, we have also said that moral judgment cannot be taught directly, which implies that the mere presentation of reasoning at the stage above is not sufficient to stimulate change. What, then, can the teacher do to stimulate developmental progress?

In considering this question, it should be made clear that the notion that moral reasoning cannot be taught is based on the premise that with each developmental change in mode of thought the child is making a discovery on his own. New ways of moral thinking develop from within and cannot be imposed upon the child. Change is based on the child's active reorganization of his experience and is stimulated by experiencing social and cognitive conflicts. When he feels undecided and unsure about a moral decision or judgment, the child's experience of conflict stimulates testing and exploration of new solutions and reasoning and makes a moral judgment truly a self-constructed process of discovery. Therefore, the teacher's primary task is to help the child (a) focus on genuine moral conflicts, (b) think about the reasoning he uses in solving such conflicts, (c) see inconsistencies and inadequacies in his way of thinking, and (d) find means of resolving such inconsistencies and inadequacies. Indeed, our research (Turiel, 1969) indicates that if the child is challenged so as to perceive the contradictions in his own thinking, he will try to generate new and better solutions to moral problems. Thus, teachers' discussions must be provocative and must deal with important issues in order to facilitate the child's experience or genuine conflict.

To stimulate change toward the spontaneous use of the next stage, the first step is, as we have said, to help the child experience and understand the inadequacies of his own way of thinking. In attempting to do this, the teacher must focus on the reasoning used in children's moral judgments, rather than on the content of their moral choices. The traditional effort to produce change has involved telling the child about the wrongness in content of his actions or attitudes (or the rightness of one's own). In contrast, as our experiments demonstrate, it is necessary to introduce a sense of contradiction and discrepancy by discussing the reasoning itself. One of the methods used to induce conflict is to provide sets of statements (at a given stage) which support opposite alternatives in a moral dilemma. Whatever the methods used, communications at the stage directly above the child's own induce the greatest conflict and are the most successful in stimulating change.

In summary, to be effective, the teacher must (a) have knowledge of the child's level of thought, (b) match the child's level by communicating at the level directly above, (c) focus on reasoning, and (d) help the child experience the type of conflict that leads to an awareness of the greater adequacy of the next stage.

An example of the application of these principles in the classroom is provided by Blatt's (1971) program of moral education. The first step
in his program was to pretest all of the children in the class. The pretests showed the children in this class ranged from Stage 2 to Stage 4. During the 12-week program the members of the class discussed and argued a series of moral dilemmas different from those used in the pretest. Since the children were not all functioning at the same stages, the arguments they used with each other were on different levels. In the course of these discussions among the students, the teacher supported and clarified those arguments which were one stage above the majority of the children. When it seemed that these arguments were understood by the students, the teacher then challenged that stage (through discussion of new situations) and clarified the arguments one stage above the previous one.

At the end of the 12 weeks all of the children were retested in order to assess the immediate effects of the discussions; a year later the children were tested once again to determine the long-term effects of the program. A majority of the children in the class had moved ahead almost one full stage. Those who had advanced after the 12 weeks retained the advance 1 year later.

These procedures did serve to stimulate persisting developmental change. The measured changes in stages represented genuine stimulation of development, rather than the memorization of a set of new moral statements. The children who showed change were able to apply judgments to situations that were different from those used in the classroom. In addition, development always occurred in step-by-step fashion. Although all of the children were exposed to the same discussions, changes were relative to the child's stage. Children at Stage 2 changed to some Stage 3 thinking; children at Stage 3 showed more Stage 4 thinking. We would expect that those students who changed substantially were the ones experiencing the challenge of the moral conflicts and the need for a reanalysis of their own approach to such problems.

At the end of the 12 weeks, all of the students were asked what they thought of the program and of the teaching. Some students showed little or no interest in the classes, while others expressed high interest in the intellectually provocative nature of the situation. Children showing little interest changed very little, while those who showed considerable change experienced the classroom situations as challenging, were actively involved, and participated in disagreements. Indeed, it was those students showing the most change who expressed what appeared to be the greatest experience of conflict.

This approach has the advantage of allowing the students to clarify their own judgments through active attempts at finding solutions to moral conflicts, rather than passive "learning" of others' solutions. In addition, by having the children discuss the situations among themselves, with the teacher supporting those arguments one stage above the majority, it becomes easier to capitalize on the advantages of matching at the stage above. Such a procedure, therefore, provides a built-in method for matching moral levels.

This classroom discussion program is but one example of how the cognitive-developmental approach can be applied in the school. (Its
application to the teaching of the new social studies is described elsewhere; see Kohlberg and Lockwood, 1970.) A basic value of such a program is that it provides children with the opportunity for active involvement in moral decisions. It must be noted, though, that these procedures should not be seen as constituting a full-fledged program of moral education. Methods emphasizing a rational discussion approach should be part of a broader, more enduring involvement of students in the social and moral functioning of the school. In the first place, morality should be a more explicit concern in the school curriculum. Moreover, students should participate through action in the moral decisions of the school. Rather than attempting to inculcate a predetermined and unquestioned set of values, students should be challenged with the moral issues faced by the school community as problems to be solved, not merely situations in which rules are to be mechanically applied. There is also a need to engage students in contemporary moral problems, such as war and civil rights. In sum, there is a need to create an atmosphere in which justice is a pervasive concern.

We have proposed as the aim of moral education the step-by-step stimulation of development toward mature moral judgment and reasoning, to culminate in a clear understanding of universal principles of justice. While continuing our discussion of the stimulation of moral development, we must also point out that it is not our aim to make morally precocious children by accelerating development. Rather, our aim is to ensure the optimal level of development of the child, to ensure that ultimately every child will reach a mature level of thought and action. In describing moral development and its stimulation in the classroom, it is also important to consider what effect the school can, should, or does have on the child. Our research suggests that those children who have failed to develop for a number of years are more likely to become "locked in" or fixated at the level at which they have stopped. Thus, a 16-year-old at Stage 2 is relatively immovable in comparison to a 10-year-old at Stage 2. As children remain at a given stage of development, they develop stronger screens or defenses against perception of those features in their social world which do not fit their level and which earlier stimulate growth. A slum child at Stage 2 is likely to perceive much of his social world in terms of instrumental egoism and exchange, and the world of middle-class authorities may be perceived to be an even "lower" world of Stage 1 obedience and punishment. The more he elaborates relatively well-fitting Stage 2 interpretations of his social environment, the more solidified will his Stage 2 thinking be. Accordingly, the aim of developmental moral education is to stimulate transition to the next stage of development before the child gets locked in at a lower stage.

There appear to be certain age periods during which such transitions are most easily made by American city children. The first is the preadolescent period (ages 10 to 13) at which time the transition from preconventional (Stages 1 and 2) to conventional (Stages 3 and 4) morality most commonly occurs. From our longitudinal studies we have found that while the level of morality at age 10 does not indicate the level that will be attained in adulthood, it appears that those who do not reach solid Stage 3 or 4 thinking by age 13 are unlikely to attain principled thinking in adulthood. The second transitional period appears to be late adolescence, ages
15 to 19. Our results suggest that those who do not use some (at least 20 percent) principled thinking by the end of high school are unlikely to develop principled thinking in adulthood.

These findings on the predictability over time of moral judgments mean that children who lag behind in these critical periods do not fully recover the loss and do not attain the highest levels in adulthood. We do not interpret these findings as indicating that either moral character is biological or fixed by the home in early childhood. Neither of these conclusions is fully supported and either would be pessimistic in terms of the feasibility of moral education in the school. In contrast, we view these findings as suggesting the need to focus on preventing retardation or fixation in these children who are beginning to lag behind. Since the level of moral development is not fixed by the time adolescence is reached, moral educational influences during this period may have lifelong positive effects.

In the past, many psychologists have claimed that only the home could have a significant effect on the child's moral development. In part, their conclusion derives from the Hartsborne and May (1928-1930) studies in which it was found that conventional character education (whether it be in the school, the Sunday school, or the Boy Scouts) had no enduring effect on moral conduct. (These negative findings have already been explained in an earlier section.) In part, their conclusion also derives from psychoanalytic and neo-psychoanalytic theories and case reports which claimed that conscience, superego, or moral character is formed in early childhood as a result of the child's identification and emotional relationship with the parents. Recent data indicate that these conclusions must be carefully reconsidered (Kohlberg, 1963a, 1964, 1969). In questioning the findings from research on the influence of early family experiences on moral development, we are not suggesting that the home is unimportant for moral development. Rather, we are proposing that the teacher and the school cannot deny their responsibility for the child's moral development on the grounds that it is all determined in the home. While it may be comforting to teachers to think that the child's moral problems are due solely to his home background, this belief is neither objectively supported by the data nor is it constructive.

The schools' potential for positive influence on moral development is indicated by a variety of evidence. Perhaps the most dramatic evidence for the effect of a nonfamilial environment comes from a pilot study conducted in Israel (Bar-Yam and Kohlberg, 1971). Disadvantaged adolescents (usually with a North African cultural background and with a poor and often broken family pattern) were interviewed in a kibbutz or collective-settlement high school. A control group of disadvantaged adolescents in the city was also tested in moral judgment. Like slum-dwelling American adolescents, a substantial proportion of the control group was still at the preconventional stages of moral judgment. In contrast, none of the children who had spent their high school years on the kibbutz was below the conventional level, and some were at the principled level. The kibbutz-placed disadvantaged adolescents, then, seemed to have matured morally during a period in which they had little direct contact with their own parents.
It appears that a total educational environment such as a kibbutz can influence moral development. The series of studies by Blatt (1971) discussed earlier indicate that more restricted educational efforts to stimulate moral development can also have a significant effect on children. This discussion of conflict procedure was also replicated in a public school setting with a class of black children and a class of white children at each of two ages (11 and 15). All the classes showed significant increases as compared to control groups which had no discussion sessions and control groups which discussed moral dilemmas on their own, without a teacher conducting the discussion (Blatt and Kohlberg, 1971).

These studies suggest that by using procedures which are little different from those available to any teacher, it is possible to raise children's moral levels significantly and in a way that is sustained over time.

To review this and previous sections, not only have the moral judgment stages been validated by longitudinal and cross-cultural study, their implications for education have been examined in a series of experimental investigations. Granted that moral development does indeed pass through this natural sequence of stages, our approach defines the aim of moral education as the stimulation of the next step of development rather than indoctrination into the fixed conventions of the school, the church, or the nation. Facilitating the child's movement to the next step of development involves (a) exposure to the next higher level of thought and (b) experiences of conflict in the application of the child's current level of thought to hypothetical situations.

In contrast to traditional moral education, then, our approach stresses (a) knowledge of the child's stage of functioning, (b) arousal among children of genuine moral conflict and disagreement about problematic situations (in contrast, traditional moral education has stressed adult "right answers" and reinforcement of the belief that virtue always is rewarded), and (c) the presentation of modes of thought one stage above the child's own. (In contrast, conventional moral education tends to shift between appeals to adult abstractions far above the child's level and appeals to punishment and prudence liable to rejection because they are below the child's level.)

We have described how certain ages may be crucial for development. Certainly one important issue remains to be dealt with. If lasting gains in moral reasoning can be stimulated, does this in fact affect behavior?

MORAL REASONING AND MORAL BEHAVIOR

In our discussions with teachers and principals we are frequently told that "All this talk about moral reasoning is fine, but we are concerned with how children actually act." Usually such comments stem from the busy teacher's impatience with psychological analysis of thoughts and feelings when he is faced with a class of 30 active children and needs specific suggestions and techniques which will help maintain an orderly and productive classroom. Such concern is understandable and legitimate, since certain classroom management problems need to be solved before one can engage in either moral or intellectual education. However, successful classroom management does not in itself alone constitute successful moral education. The standard of classroom conduct is only a prerequisite to the stimulating of moral maturity in judgment and action.
Evidence indicates that immediate behavior change in the school setting is not necessarily related to moral behavior in later life. Psychologists have developed techniques which are specifically designed to change overt behavior through reinforcement or reward of desirable behaviors. These techniques of behavior modification, operant conditioning, or social reinforcement are applied irrespective of the motives or judgments behind the child's behavior. If success is defined in terms of those changes in classroom behavior that solve classroom management problems (e.g., orderliness, attendance, attention, and task and homework completion), then it can be said that such behavior-modification programs have been used with considerable success in preschools, high schools, and reform schools. However, these classroom behavior changes do not necessarily affect behavior in later life. As an example of the discrepancy between criteria of management and criteria of education or re-education, experimental changes in reformatories which have markedly reduced violence, riots, and rule violations (indices of successful behavior management) have not reduced the proportion of return to prison after release (one index of successful moral re-education). Thus, while classroom management is a real concern, and one that can be solved successfully, such success is only temporary and cannot be construed as constituting "effective moral education."

While the foregoing comments suggest that immediate behavior change is not a valid criterion of effective moral education, in establishing valid criteria one cannot ignore the issue of behavioral outcomes. One cannot, for example, accept as justifiable the assumed goal of facilitating moral development if the acquisition of more mature forms of moral reasoning have no relationship to how a person acts. In other words, in order to substantiate our approach to moral education we must show that how a person thinks does relate to how he acts. The research cited in this section supports this contention and suggests that reasoning and behavior are linked because mature action requires mature forms of moral thought as prerequisites. A particular kind of moral behavior becomes relevant only in the range of development in which the child can have a reason or idea adequate to support moral action. If this is indeed the case, then if we know a child's moral judgment level we should be able to predict a good deal of his moral behavior.

We will begin by examining the relationship between the stages of moral reasoning and cheating behavior. Much research on moral behavior has focused on cheating because it is easy to study, although one frequent objection to such research is the contention that overt cheating behavior is an inadequate portrayal of the deeper battles of conscience and moral dilemmas which children and adults face. It is not readily apparent that we would discover much about the way a man handles ultimate moral decisions --such as whether or not to obey the order of a higher-ranking officer to shoot civilians--by knowing whether or not he cheats on his income tax. However, even if cheating behavior seems of questionable significance in terms of predicting moral behavior, it is worthy of consideration and attempts at clarification.

Teachers differ in their reactions to cheating behavior. Some teachers are very upset by such behavior, seeing it as a pattern of responding which will persist through life, while others take such cheating very casually.
viewing such behavior as a natural foible without great significance for moral behavior in later life. Our discussion of the research in cheating will clarify the sense in which both these views are valid under different circumstances, depending upon the child's level of moral judgment.

If we examine the Hartsborne and May (1928-1930) findings, we find support for the teacher who considers cheating as having little to do with stable patterns of behavior: almost every adolescent cheated sometimes, and frequency of cheating was due primarily to the situation. While these findings lead us to conclude that cheating is a trivial matter, we will now present findings which indicate that cheating behavior is predictive of later moral behavior only in the negative (or non-cheating) case. That is, we cannot predict the later moral behavior of the adolescent who does cheat, but we can predict quite a lot about the moral behavior of the adolescent who does not cheat. The adolescent who consistently refrains from cheating on every available opportunity has acted upon mature moral judgment. In other words, he had assimilated reasons not to cheat, which indicates that he has reached an advanced level of moral maturity. This conclusion is supported by findings in studies by Krebs (1971) and Brown and others (1969). Krebs found that 75 percent of the conventional and preconventional children (Stage 4 or below) cheated on at least one of four experimental cheating tests while only 20 percent of the principled (Stage 5) children did so. Similar results were obtained by Brown and others in a college population: approximately half of the conventional-level college students cheated as compared to 11 percent of the principled-level students.

These studies demonstrate a strong relation between moral judgment and behavior. The findings also show that most children and adults say cheating is wrong, but nevertheless do cheat—and do not really disapprove of themselves or others for it. A certain amount of cheating is conventional in that it is accepted behavior for most children and adults. It is only at the highest, or post-conventional range of development, that we can expect a relation between moral judgment and cheating behavior, since at this level the child can formulate a good reason for not cheating. To refrain from cheating when neither the authority nor the group cares demands an element of principle. As conceptualized at the principled level, the critical issues of justice involved in cheating are: (a) the recognition of the element of contract and agreement implicit in the situation; (b) the recognition that while it does not seem so bad if one person cheats, what holds for all must hold for one; and (c) the recognition that in cheating, one is taking advantage of those who do not cheat.

In summary, the research on cheating indicates that while the conventional level of moral judgment is a guarantee of social conformity to external authority, it is no guarantee of conformity to internal moral norms in the absence of explicit sanctions, observation, and group disapproval. In regard to cheating, we hypothesized a relationship between level of judgment and action such that attainment of the principled level of judgment (Stages 5 and 6) is a prerequisite to consistent action in the absence of social pressures toward conformity. The research on cheating supports this hypothesis.
In the case of cheating, justice and expectations of conventional authority both dictate the same behavior: honesty. But what happens when the moral considerations of justice are opposed by pressures from authority? An experimental investigation by Milgram (1963) involved such an opposition. In the guise of a learning experiment, college students were ordered by an experimenter to administer punishment to a student (a confederate of the experimenter) in the form of increasingly more severe electric shock. The majority of the students obeyed and shocked to the simulated danger point. Resistance to authority in this situation required more than a Stage 5 social contract orientation. In this case, Stage 5 principles did not clearly prescribe a decision (as it did for cheating) because (a) the "victim" had voluntarily agreed to participate in the experiment and (b) the subject himself had contractually committed himself to perform the experiment. Only Stage 6 principled thinking clearly defined the situation as one in which the experimenter did not have the moral right to ask the participants to inflict pain on another person. Accordingly, 75 percent of the Stage 6 subjects quit or refused to shock the victim as compared to only 13 percent of all the subjects at lower stages. This is fairly dramatic support of the connection between mature thought and moral behavior.

A study of students at the University of California at Berkeley replicated these findings in real-life situation of civil disobedience (Haan, 1971). In 1964, Berkeley students were faced with making a decision on whether or not to stage a sit-in at the Administration Building to preserve the rights of political free speech on the campus. In this situation also, willingness to violate authority for civil rights required Stage 6 principled thinking. Again, as in the Milgram situation, a Stage 5 social contract interpretation of justice (which was held by the university administration) did not lead to a clear decision; a contractual position could be held that a student came to Berkeley voluntarily, with foreknowledge of the rules, and could go elsewhere if he did not like them. Only a Stage 6 interpretation clearly defined civil disobedience as just. Accordingly, about half of the Stage 5 subjects sat in, while 80 percent of the Stage 6 subjects sat in. For students at the conventional levels--Stages 3 and 4--such civil disobedience was viewed as a violation of authority and only 10 percent of them sat in.

At this point perhaps it is relevant to insert a brief discussion of the need for development of principled Stage 5 and 6 moral thinking. (It seems desirable if morality is to be stimulated in its development and behavior tends to correlate with development.) The discussion that follows deals with a specific example of the value of life, as in the two cases of Tommy and Richard, discussed earlier. The need for the development of concepts about life to a principled level (Stage 5 or 6) seems somewhat abstract, since personal feelings and social customs or conventions are usually sufficient motivations for respect for life. However, individuals frequently do face complex moral dilemmas that are not adequately solved by conventional Stage 3 and Stage 4 definitions of equality and the value of life. The reader is probably aware of many situations in which conventional definitions have been inadequate. One such example is the sanctioning by the German population of the extermination of millions of civilians during World War II. A very recent example is the alleged massacre of large numbers of civilians by American soldiers at the village of My Lai in
South Vietnam. We have interviewed the one man who refused to shoot any civilians during the massacre. His reasoning about both the My Lai situation and about other moral conflicts showed principled Stage 5 and 6 thinking. The public statements of other soldiers involved indicate that they were at the conventional Stage 3 and 4 level of moral judgment. They reasoned that it was necessary to obey the order to shoot given by their commanding officers.

We have also discussed the My Lai massacre with high school students whose thinking is either at the conventional or at the principled stages. Many of the students at the conventional stages felt that it was not wrong for the soldiers to kill unarmed civilians because they were ordered to do so, because they wanted vengeance for their slain buddies, and because it was done in the context of their country’s war with an enemy. The high school students who were at the principled stages believed that it is wrong to kill innocent, unarmed civilians under any circumstances, even when ordered to do so by authorities. They believed that everyone has the right and the obligation to defy an order that violates a moral principle. Here we see clearly by example the need for higher morality; conventional morality can fail to prevent mass murder.

To return to the research on the relation between moral behavior and thinking, what implications do these findings have for the practical assessment and encouragement of moral development in school children? We have said that a particular kind of moral behavior becomes relevant only in the range of development in which the child can have a reason or idea adequate to support moral action. In the case of cheating, having such ideas presupposes the principled level of moral judgment. Accordingly, a teacher can expect consistent resistance to cheating only at the upper range of moral maturity and cannot expect consistent nondeception from 7- or 8-year-old children or others who have not reached the upper levels of moral judgment.

We should not, however, conclude that the child has adequate reasons for all moral behavior only at the principled level, and hence that moral behavior can be expected only within this maturity range. The child has relatively adequate reasons for not stealing or engaging in one-sided aggression at the conventional and even the preconventional levels. Accordingly, repetitive stealing or bullying are possible indicators of moral immaturity in children as young as 7 or 8, while generalized dishonesty is not. Although childhood honesty (or deception) measures are not predictive of later behavior, early theft and severe aggression is predictive of adult maladjustment, delinquency, and anti-social behavior (Kohlberg and others [in press]). The probable reason for this is that even the young child objects to being hurt or having his belongings stolen and condemns another child who is a thief or bully. However, to be cheated or lied to is not as basic or obvious an abuse, and the young child who engages in these behaviors is rarely ostracized by his peers.

We have contrasted repetitive theft and repetitive cheating as roughly corresponding to different levels of maturity, as well as corresponding to commonsensical judgments of seriousness. We can generalize from these particular behaviors to the conclusion that we may expect a typical child
to have reached a conventional level of moral judgment (Stages 3 and 4) by early preadolescence and to reflect this level in behavior consistently showing a decent regard for the expectations and approval of parents, peers, and outside authorities. Children at this level usually question the need to be "goody-goodies" who always do what teacher or mother wants, but they clearly accept the basic expectations, basic laws, and basic rules of authorities and peers which are not matters of personal arbitrary whim.

In general, a preadolescent or adolescent who acts repetitively or obviously in ways that violate such basic expectations has failed to reach the conventional level of judgment. Teachers rate almost all preadolescent and adolescent children who engage fairly consistently and openly in disapproved behavior as being at the preconventional level (though not all preconventional children engage in disapproved behavior) (Kohlberg, 1958). Delinquency is the most extreme form of consistent disregard of approved behavior. In this connection, it has been found that the large majority (83 percent) of 15- to 17-year-old working-class delinquents are preconventional, whereas only a minority (23 percent) of working-class adolescents who are not delinquents are preconventional (Freundlich and Kohlberg, 1971).

Earlier, we pointed out that cheating itself is not a sign of low maturity of judgment but consistent noncheating is a sign of high maturity. The reverse is the case for delinquency or gross infractions of basic group rules and expectations. Delinquency is a sign of low or preconventional moral judgment, but nondelinquency is a sign of having reached the conventional level. (Many preconventional adolescents avoid delinquency out of fear, expediency, lack of opportunity, and similar reasons.) In addition to being preconventional in moral level, the repetitive adolescent delinquent is not only likely to come from a delinquency-prone neighborhood but also is likely to come from a family with severe problems (Kohlberg and others [in press]). In other words, delinquency requires sociological and psychological factors beyond immature moral judgments for its understanding, although it does indicate immature moral development.

Although more research needs to be conducted, existing evidence clearly supports a positive relationship between stage of reasoning and moral behavior. The goal of facilitating more mature forms of moral thinking, then, is certainly important to the long-range goal of promoting moral action.

CONCLUSION

This paper has been devoted to clarifying the development of moral judgment and the means by which educators can stimulate this development. From the perspective of a universal sequence of stages in the development of moral judgment we have been able to propose a goal of moral education that is free of the charge of arbitrary, culturally relative indoctrination. We have defined moral teaching as a process of open discussion which is aimed at stimulating the child to move to the next step in his development.

The research evidence shows that we cannot really teach internalized principles of moral judgment: we can only stimulate development. It is, however, both possible and desirable to encourage the child's thoughtful consideration of moral conflicts and their integration at a higher stage.
of development. We have argued that the teacher's focus should be on the way the child makes moral judgments (i.e., the structure of his judgment) and not upon the child's agreement with the content of the teacher's views. Fortunately, the eventual goal of stimulating the development of structure or level of moral reasoning is consistent with enlightened views on the moral content we would like our future adults to have. The attainment of the structural capacity for principled reasoning means understanding and acceptance of the principles of justice and human welfare which are the foundations of our constitutional democratic society. Indeed, moral education devoted to the non-indoctrinating stimulation of development is alone compatible with concepts of civil liberties and justice, which are the sole principles a constitutional public school system may legitimately teach.

In a previous section, we considered moral development in terms of the relation between thought and action. We proposed that moral action was best conceived not merely as "good behavior" but as behavior in accordance with mature moral judgment. We indicated that an emphasis on behavior modification by means of reward and punishment does not directly lead to the development of moral character and does not seem to have long-range and general, positive effects. We also noted earlier that cultivating "good behavior" from the perspective of a "bag-of-virtues" conception of moral character is unjustified both logically and in terms of experimental data.

To summarize several main points, then, it can be stated that (a) the fundamental defect of focusing directly upon "good behavior" is that the definition of such a notion may be relative only to the standards and biases of the teacher or judge; (b) the teacher's initial task is to understand, from the child's viewpoint, what is good or bad about a given behavior; (c) since the child's judgments of good and bad comprise a natural developmental sequence, it is plausible to conceive of some thinking as being more morally mature than others; (d) it is both psychologically and ethically legitimate to encourage the child to act in accordance with his highest level of judgment, an aim quite different from attempting to make him act in compliance with the teacher's standards of behavior; and (e) insofar as discrepancies between judgment and action reflect a form of cognitive conflict that may serve to promote development, encouraging correspondence between judgment and behavior will be a stimulus to further development as well as to changes in overt behavior.

Encouraging the correspondence of judgment and action involves very different techniques than the persuasive, coercive, or disciplinary means usually used to promote "good behavior." Primarily, it means stimulating the child to apply his own moral judgment (not the teacher's) to his own actions. For example, in our developmental view, the tactic of forcing a child to agree that his act of cheating is bad when he does not really believe it may be effective only in promoting morally immature tendencies toward expedient, outward compliance. Our developmental approach to self-evaluation entails helping the child to examine the pros and cons of his conduct in his own terms (as well as introducing more developmentally advanced considerations.) In other words, the developmental goal of stimulating the child to apply his highest level of judgment to his behavior is often very different from the goal of training the child to do or say what the teacher thinks is right.
The most promising opportunities for stimulating the correspondence between judgment and behavior are similar to those for stimulating the development of moral judgment itself: situations in which the child himself feels conflict or uncertainty about what he has done or what he is about to do and in which the teacher maintains a relatively neutral position, rather than being the enforcer of conformity to school rules. Very often, such situations involve conflicts among children themselves. These occasions provide an opportunity for the teacher to play a different, more stimulating and open role as a moral guide. Making use of situations like these requires a sensitivity to classroom peer relations, as well as considerable thought and effort. Teachers may tend to neglect them because of the obvious pressure to focus upon behaviors which are either clearly negative from the teacher's perspective or prohibited by school authorities. As mentioned earlier, this narrow perspective very often leads to a repetition of arbitrary classroom routines. Such a limitation is unfortunate, not only because it misses the best opportunities for moral education, but, perhaps more importantly, it serves to distort positive moral education efforts. If the teacher insists on behavioral conformity to routine demands and shows less concern for matters of greater relevance to the child's (and the society's) basic moral values, the child will simply assume that this moral values have no relevance to his conduct in the classroom.

The teacher can minimize this mismatch between classroom practicalities and the goals of moral education in at least two ways. The first is to insure that the teacher does communicate some of his values with regard to broader and more genuinely moral issues than those of classroom management. The second is to treat administrative issues as such and to distinguish them from basic moral considerations involving judgment of the child's worth or moral sanctions. In other words, the teacher should clearly distinguish between his moral demands and his more general conformity and management demands. Good teachers typically do uphold arbitrary rules (at times even with threats) but treat those rules with grace, humor, and flexibility. In so doing, they make it easier for children to accept the arbitrariness of management rules. Teachers can thus save their moral capital for instances in which moral issues are truly at stake.

We have thus far suggested two aspects of open situations for development of maturity of moral action: the child himself is in conflict and the teacher is in a neutral position rather than being the enforcer of demands. We constrained these open situations with the classroom management situations usually focused upon by the teachers. We also suggested that in the course of maintaining classroom routine the teacher should distinguish his management demands from moral demands by making clear a difference in the seriousness and fixedness of his concern about the two.

There is a third consideration important to the teacher's role in stimulating moral development. Although many obvious occasions for relating judgment to conduct occur after a child's misbehavior, it is often difficult to react at the time with anything but defensive judgments. A solution to this problem is to put more emphasis upon good conduct situations as a means of stimulating moral judgments of greater maturity.
We have stated that focusing upon open situations is the best means for promoting judgment-action correspondence. Basically, this entails making use of situations which constitute a developmental challenge for the child. Having developed a new moral obligation, the child is usually motivated to test his capacity to live up to the challenge and meet this obligation. If he is encouraged to do this and succeeds, he has built a foundation for further moral action.

We would further suggest that in thinking about the action component of moral education the teacher will find it helpful to consider the similarities between the problems of moral education and those of political or civic education. In a recent study (Lockwood, 1971) it was demonstrated that high school students use moral reasoning to solve political as well as moral dilemmas and that generally students were at the same stage in their thinking about the two kinds of dilemmas. Other studies (Haan, 1971) have demonstrated that college students' action choices in political dilemmas (involving student activism and draft resistance) are related to their stage of moral judgment. While political behavior is heavily influenced by moral judgment, no one in a free society would advocate a program of political education based on encouraging or persuading students to engage in specific "good" political acts. However, maturity of reasoned political evaluation, as well as of reasoning about political facts, may be stimulated; the educator may legitimately stimulate the student to engage in behavior consistent with his political judgments and evaluations. Therefore, when a student expresses concern about a political issue, opportunities to engage in relevant action may be pointed out to him. To be an active member of a democratic society means understanding the principles of a constitutional democracy with justice for all (i.e., Stage 5 in political thinking) and becoming engaged in political efforts consistent with such principles.

In sum, the educator can legitimately deal with political behavior by encouraging general participation in the political process and by encouraging consistency between the student's political action and his own modes of political judgment. However, such encouragement obviously requires great caution and thoughtfulness. In this regard moral education is no different and requires an equal degree of care and thoughtfulness.

There is another very important point about the action component of moral education. Educationally, the aim of stimulating mature moral reasoning is the development of a sense of justice, which eventually means the creation of just schools in which children participate fully. Therefore, in addition to promoting open participation in classroom moral discussions, it is necessary to consider the total atmosphere of the school.

The creation of just schools and the stimulation of optimal moral development is more than just an appealing whim or a nice idea: it is crucial to our adequate preparation of individuals for participation in a rapidly changing society, as described by Toffler in Future Shock. He sees the rejection of ethical relativity and the refocusing on morality as crucial to coping with life now and in the future.
In conclusion, promoting mature moral action is difficult, and it is not achieved by inspirational sermons or by classroom management tricks. It requires, first, moral conviction on the part of the teacher. It implies, secondly, clarity about those aspects of moral development the teacher should encourage in children at given developmental levels as well as clarity in regard to appropriate methods of moral communication with these children. Most important, moral education implies that the teacher listen carefully to the child's moral communications. The teacher must be concerned about the child's moral judgments (and the relation of the child's behavior to these judgments) rather than about the conformity between the child's behavior or judgments and the teacher's.
**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


Citations marked with an asterisk (*) are annotated in a second section.


Aronfreed, through a social learning approach to the study of ethical values, thoroughly reviews the recent psychological research on the socialization of the child and its relation to the child's acquisition of internalized control over behavior. Unlike most learning theorists, Aronfreed posits an internal evaluative (cognitive) structure which mediates the acquisition process of socialization (modeling, imitation, reinforcement). Nevertheless, he remains closer to the empiricist tradition than to the constructivist (Piagetian, cognitive-developmental) in his belief that the source of social information resides in the structure of the environment. This is a highly technical book which demands a thorough grasp of theoretical issues of experimental learning theory.


Although this book can be read as an essay on the socialization and moral education of communally raised children, Bettelheim sees as his emphasis the analysis of the mental health of the child, adolescent, and adult of the Israeli kibbutz. He concludes that subordinating individual needs to group values and concerns is a powerful and efficient way to inculcate the group values of the older generation, but he expresses doubt about the form and depth of adult relationships which result from these educational practices. In essence, Bettelheim phrases the question of values in mental health terminology. His value commitment is to adult interpersonal adjustment, and his criteria are defined by psychoanalytic principles.

Reviewing a method of moral education, Bettelheim admits kibbutz education and socialization to be an ethical success by the behavioral criteria of minimal delinquency and minimal server emotional disturbance. Internalization of superordinate group values is a more qualified success. Because the kibbutz itself has grown more secure, the young are less concerned with survival and more with self-interest. However, these points are peripheral for Bettelheim; his real critique is psychoanalytic: because of the lack of intimacy in early childhood between parent and child, the kibbutz-raised adult is limited in ability to develop deep interpersonal relationships.


This is a clearly written, non-technical, and fascinating analysis of socialization in two giant industrial countries with similar technological problems but different child-rearing practices. Drawing upon recent research in social learning theory, Bronfenbrenner tries to show how Soviets institute, in practice, procedures that American research psychology would predict to be effective in socialization (modeling, social reinforcement). However, as a social learning theorist interested in character development...
In two cultures, Bronfenbrenner sidesteps that philosophical issue of what are justifiable and appropriate moral values that a society should encourage for its children. From the cognitive-developmental perspective, Bronfenbrenner also ignores empirical evidence that modeling and social reinforcement cannot explain—the evidence for qualitative stages of development in social or moral thinking.


The main point of this short classic is that traditional conceptions of moral education are narrow, formal, and pathological. Dewey believes that moral principles are real and that moral education is the development in the child of moral ideas, not necessarily ideas about morality (ethics). For Dewey, the best moral education is participation in social life. Accordingly, this should be the curricular emphasis of the schools.

Although this text was written in 1909, the reader will be struck by the relevance of this highly readable book for contemporary concerns of ethical education.


In a classic discussion of moral education, Durkheim attempts to derive a clearcut educational policy from an explicit moral philosophy. This moral philosophy, largely based on Durkheim's sociological perspective, contains three elements: discipline (which consists of regularity of conduct and authority), attachment to or identification with the group, and autonomy. Because Durkheim places such a strong emphasis on conformity to the moral rules of society, he sees the school—the primary representative of the greater social collective—as playing a critical role in moral education. If one accepts his major premise that morality is first a sociological phenomenon, and then an individual one, the book represents the first clearly drawn set of implications for the role and techniques of the teacher, e.g., the function of punishment. This volume is moderately difficult to read without a background in either sociology or philosophy. However, there are many fascinating discussions, historical as well as theoretical, which make it worthwhile.


From 1928 to 1930, Hartshorne and May carried out a set of definitive studies of children's moral character. Their approach was first to define the various virtues which they felt, taken as a whole, defined character and then to operationalize terms so that children's behavior representative of these virtues could be measured. For example, honesty was defined as resistance to cheating and to stealing in experimental situations. Their results indicated no relationship between behavioral tests
of honesty or altruism and exposure to traditional types of character education. Nor did they find any significant correlation between resistance to cheating and statements about the goodness or badness of cheating. Such negative results have been used to point out the lack of consistent relation between moral verbalization and moral behavior. However, the relation between moral judgment and moral action cannot be readily examined by research such as this, which assumes morality can be defined by a collection of virtue terms.


Jones reports the rationale, design, and results of a large scale, 1-year study of the effectiveness of three types of moral training techniques (a first-hand experience group, a discussion group, and an experience plus discussion group) as measured by experimental tests of cheating behavior and honesty and by teacher ratings.

This work is prototypical of work in the 1930's which tried to use behavioral cheating measures as psychological criteria of character training in the schools. Jones' confused results are also prototypical of research in moral education which tries to spell out the goals of such education as internalization of cultural norms. However, those who have felt that past curricula in ethical education was uninviting and dull will be surprised by Jones' use of films and everyday dilemmas as part of his moral methodology.


This book serves two purposes: (a) it is a summary of the recent empirical work which has derived from and added to Kohlberg's stage theory of moral judgment, and (b) it is a review of the present state of the cognitive-developmental approach to morality and the distinction between it and Piaget's earlier work in this area. Research in the following areas are presented and discussed: (a) the relation of moral thought to formal cognitive development, (b) the interrelation between moral judgment and moral action, (c) the relation of moral development to levels of personality and ego development in a range of populations (delinquents, et cetera), and (d) the implications of the cognitive-developmental approach for education.

Kohlberg's moral judgment measure has received much recent popularization (sometimes leading to misinterpretation and misapplication). This book reports and interprets the more thoughtful research derived from theory and helps to clarify some common misconceptions. Whereas the research reports are of interest primarily to psychological researchers, the authors' interpretations are of interest to the general public.


This small handbook is a fascinating account of the author's educational policy applied in a "reformatory" setting in the 1920's and 1930's in
Soviet Russia. Makarenko's approach is a combination of the teaching of specific virtues and the socialization to group political values. He notes that people feel that the primary role of a reform commune is character education, but he adds that Marxist education does not separate physical, mental, moral, and aesthetic education. Soviet education is definitely education for living in a Soviet society; Makarenko's moral theory in a context of this attitude is clear: (a) each pupil must understand that discipline is a form enabling the whole collective to best attain its aim, (b) discipline places each individual in a secure yet free position, and (c) the interests of the collective take precedence over the interests of the individual. This book is a fascinating yet simple exposition of a philosophy quite different from any contemporary American educational view.


A recent characterization of moral education has been to consider it part of the "hidden" or "unstudied" curriculum. Depending on individual perspective, the educational psychologists and sociologists in this volume claim that moralizing in the interests of classroom management and maintenance of the school as a social system may perform anything from a hidden service in helping children adapt to society to a great disservice in alienating the young from the parental generation by way of coercive demands viewed by students as basically irrelevant to their lives. This book presents thinking on a wide variety of psychological and sociological ideas which are relevant to the values, motives, and attitudes prevalent in the classroom.


One of Piaget's earlier works, The Moral Judgment of the Child does not have the theoretical rigor of his recent explorations of cognitive development and epistemology. Nevertheless, it is clear that even in 1932, Piaget saw that the developmental approach to the analysis of the child's morality would help clarify the nature of adult morality.

Piaget analyzes the development of the child's distinction between right and wrong using two variations of his "clinical method." First he looks at children's conceptions about rules and practices in a variety of common games. Secondly, he uses hypothetical dilemmas to analyze ideas of cheating, punishment, and justice. Piaget theorizes two age-related phases of moral thought, the heteronomous and the autonomous. The first phase derives from primitive cognitive development coupled with absolute respect for adult authority. The second phase results from advanced cognition and cooperation stemming from greater peer interaction.

This brilliant fundamental work on moral judgment is deceptively easy to read. As with most of his writings, the ideas involved are far more complex than might be suspected at first glance. The work in this volume has been greatly amplified and clarified by the theoretical and empirical work on moral development of Kohlberg and his followers.

The five essays presented in this book stem from a series of lectures given in the spring of 1968 at Harvard University's Graduate School of Education. Based on different philosophies and traditions, the five essays emphasize that moral education, as Sizer notes, is "embedded in all formal education." The limitation of this format is that the essayists must pare their ideas down to their basic essentials, and this can lead to oversimplification and misinterpretation of fundamental ideas. However, the book is a good place to start for the reader newly interested in moral education. The essays provide introductions to the speakers' thinking: J. Gustafson's Christian ethics, L. Kohlberg's developmental psychology, R. S. Peters' philosophy, B. Bettelheim's psychoanalysis, and K. Keniston's social psychiatry.


The Farmington Trust, Oxford, England, is funding a 10-year research project in the area of moral education. Wilson heads an interdisciplinary staff of moral philosophers, such as himself, and moral psychologists and sociologists such as Williams and Sugarman. This book, the first publication of the research unit, is an attempt to articulate comprehensive guidelines for research in moral education. The book is divided into four sections: in the first three sections, each of the authors delineates the problem from the perspective of his own discipline; in the final section, Wilson sets forth the implications for research of the interdisciplinary approach to moral education.

The awareness of the necessity to integrate social science and philosophy marks an important step toward more meaningful moral education. However, judging from the book, the unit has been less successful in practice than in theory. To date, their integration appears to be little more than a collection of issues from each of the disciplines rather than a synthesis. Their attempt to quantify sociological, psychological, and philosophical aspects of "moral conduct" seems to bear an unfortunate resemblance to the old "character education" of the 1930's, these couched in more sophisticated social science terms.
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