This volume is one of a series of handbooks designed to be useful to military, and other personnel who need a convenient compilation of basic facts about the social, economic, political, and military institutions and practices of various countries. The emphasis is on objective description of the nation's present society and the kinds of possible or probable changes that might be expected in the future. This book is based on a sampling of many published sources, cited in a 40 page bibliography. Also appended is a glossary of Afrikaans and English terms. Another appendix, on South West Africa (Namibia), is included because the Republic of South Africa continues to treat it as a province although its League of Nations mandate was terminated by the United Nations. (Author/DJB)
FOREWORD

This volume is one of a series of handbooks prepared by Foreign Area Studies (FAS) of The American University, designed to be useful to military and other personnel who need a convenient compilation of basic facts about the social, economic, political, and military institutions and practices of various countries. The emphasis is on objective description of the nation’s present society and the kinds of possible or probable changes that might be expected in the future. The handbook seeks to present as full and as balanced an integrated exposition as limitations on space and research time permit. It was compiled from information available in openly published material. An extensive bibliography is provided to permit recourse to other published sources for more detailed information. There has been no attempt to express any specific point of view or to make policy recommendations. The contents of the handbook represent the work of the authors and FAS and do not represent the official view of the United States government.

An effort has been made to make the handbook as comprehensive as possible. It can be expected, however, that the material, interpretations, and conclusions are subject to modification in the light of new information and developments. Such corrections, additions, and suggestions for factual, interpretive, or other change as readers may have will be welcomed for use in future revisions. Comments may be addressed to:

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Foreign Area Studies
The American University
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Washington, D.C. 10016
PREFACE

In economic and military terms, the Republic of South Africa is the most powerful state in sub-Saharan Africa. Its location in southernmost Africa with coasts on the Atlantic and Indian oceans gives it considerable strategic importance, and its role as the source of most of the Western world's gold gives it substantial economic significance.

The Republic's insistence on maintaining a society in which a white minority dominates a nonwhite—largely African—majority has set it apart, isolated it (where it has not been excluded) in the councils of many international organizations, and earned the officially expressed disapproval of a large number of other states. The South African government, in turn, seeks to explain and justify its policies.

In these circumstances, descriptions and analyses of South African society often conflict and are characterized by varying degrees of distortion. This book, based on a wide sampling of the many published sources, attempts to provide in compact, convenient, and balanced form an exposition and analysis of the dominant social, political, and economic features of South African society.

South Africa has two official languages—Afrikaans and English. All laws and other government documents are published in both. This book has generally used the English version of official usage. In the case of nongovernmental institutions (for example, churches or economic organizations), Afrikaans has been used if the institution is of Afrikaner origin and English if it is of English origin. Names or special terms of this kind are rarely translated in South Africa but are used in the original form regardless of the native language of the speaker.

A variety of terms, official and unofficial, for different segments of South Africa's heterogeneous population have come into use. Wherever possible, the preference of the group named has been ascertained and used even if it is not the official term. Thus, the word African, rather than the official word Bantu, has been used for the indigenous black population of the country. On the other hand, when a term has become thoroughly entrenched in the language, it has been used for convenience even if scholars do not now consider it accurate. Thus, Hottentot is employed instead of the term Khoikhoi for these people.
An appendix on South West Africa (Namibia), formerly a League of Nations mandate under South Africa, is included because it continues to be treated by the Republic as a province for all practical purposes. South West Africa, however, is considered by the United Nations to be a territory under its administration, a position to which the United States subscribes.
COUNTRY SUMMARY

1. COUNTRY: Republic of South Africa; short form name, South Africa; formerly Union of South Africa; date of independence, May 31, 1910; Republic established May 31, 1961; administrative capital, Pretoria; legislative capital, Cape Town.

2. GOVERNMENT: Unitary republic with president as titular head of central government; formal executive and legislative powers vested in bicameral Parliament elected by whites over eighteen years of age; independent judiciary. Nationalist Party based on Afrikaner segment of white population has dominated government since 1948. Executive council (cabinet) of prime minister and eighteen cabinet members. Regional government by provincial councils; provincial administrators appointed by central government. Varied local government units for whites have considerable power. Special system for nonwhites and African Reserves. Highest status that of Transkei, with limited executive and legislative authority vested in partially elected Legislative Assembly, chief minister, and cabinet ministers, but with real power remaining in national government. African citizens of Transkei can vote at age twenty-one or, if taxpayers, at eighteen.

3. POPULATION: Latest census, 1960; mid-1968 estimate, 19.17 million; estimated annual growth rate, 2 to 3 percent. About 68 percent of total population African, 19 percent white, 10 percent Coloured, and 3 percent Asian. African population comprises eight officially recognized Bantu-speaking groups, each consisting of tribal clusters, tribes, and subtribes; whites composed of Afrikaners (about 60 percent) and English speakers; Coloureds are persons of mixed blood; Asians consist chiefly of Indians but include other South and East Asians.

4. SIZE: 472,500 square miles.

5. TOPOGRAPHY: Broad interior plateau surrounded by steep semicircular escarpment overlooking narrow belt of foothills and coastal lowlands on east, south, and west. Coastline of about 1,900 miles formed by South Atlantic and Indian oceans.

6. CLIMATE: Variations governed by topography, latitude, and ocean currents. Southwestern Cape has Mediterranean climate; northwest, arid; interior, semiarid; and eastern coastal regions, subtropical. Summer: December–May, winter: June–August. Mean annual temperature about 60°F.; generally sunny days, cool nights. Average annual rainfall of 17.5 inches, seasonal and unevenly dis-
tributed. Heaviest rains in eastern half of country during summer, most at higher altitudes. Water resource shortage recognized as national problem.

7. LANGUAGES: Two official national languages, English and Afrikaans; used for official documents and most newspapers. Most Africans also speak Bantu languages as mother tongues; pidgin languages sometimes used by those in domestic labor and in mines. Among Asians, five Indian languages, but English widely used. Most Coloureds speak Afrikaans; some speak English.

8. RELIGION: Primarily Protestant Christian, including most whites and Coloureds and more than half of Africans; Asians mainly Hindu and Muslim. Various Dutch Reformed churches predominant among Afrikaners, other Protestant groups among English speakers; Dutch Reformed and various Evangelical denominations among Coloureds; and Methodist or independent African churches among Africans. Some Africans belong to traditional tribal religions. Catholic minorities exist in all racial groups; Jews among whites; and Muslims among Coloureds.

9. EDUCATION: About 3.6 million in primary and secondary schools in 1967; more than 75,000 attending sixteen universities in mid-1968; approximately 95,000 teachers. School attendance compulsory for whites aged seven to sixteen; African education at primary level emphasized by government for development of mass literacy. Primary and secondary education for whites, Coloureds, and Asians financed by government; for Africans, by government and African taxes. Separate systems for four officially defined areas.

10. HEALTH: Modern private and government-sponsored medical services available to most of population; high rates of tuberculosis, kwashiorkor, and other diet-associated illnesses among Africans and others of lower income groups; government-sponsored research and health programs control all former endemic diseases except bilharzia; high incidence of coronary heart disease among whites.

11. JUSTICE: Law is a locally modified derivation of Roman-Dutch, English law. Highest court is Appellate Division of Supreme Court; has only appellate jurisdiction. Supreme Court also has five provincial divisions, having both original and appellate jurisdictions, and several local divisions, all but one having only original jurisdiction. About 300 magistrates combine administrative and judicial functions and have limited civil and criminal jurisdiction; regional magistrates' courts have wider criminal jurisdiction. In cases involving Africans, modified customary law may be applied at discretion of special courts staffed by civil servants. Other juridical bodies include specialized superior courts (such as water courts and income tax appeals courts) and special ad hoc criminal courts.

12. ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS: Four provinces of Cape,
Orange Free State, Natal, and Transvaal; 300 magisterial districts; one self-governing Bantustan, Transkei.

13. ECONOMY: About 35 percent of active males occupied in agriculture; 40 percent of total population is rural; fairly large underdeveloped sector of subsistence agriculture, chiefly within African Reserves. Most of active population employed in manufacturing, trade, and services, originating about three-fourths of gross domestic product. Gold and diamond mining provide nucleus for industrial development; manufacturing surpasses mining in contribution to domestic product. Economic participation stratified by race; wide disparity between white and nonwhite incomes. Ownership and management largely in private hands; government plays pervasive role in managing economy and restricting participation.

14. PRINCIPAL EXPORTS: Newly mined gold constitutes 35 to 40 percent of exports. Other leading exports: diamonds, raw wool, citrus and deciduous fruits, subsidized feed maize (corn), numerous minerals, and other crude or semiprocessed materials. Principal markets: United Kingdom, other African countries, Japan, United States, and West Germany.

15. PRINCIPAL IMPORTS: Industrial machinery, motor vehicles, chemicals, petroleum and its byproducts, finished manufactures, and semimanufactured articles. Principal suppliers: United Kingdom, United States, and West Germany.

16. CURRENCY: Monetary unit is South African rand (1 rand equals US$1.40) divided into 100 South African cents.

17. COMMUNICATIONS: Radio, telephone, and telegraph facilities controlled and administered by government; exception is local telephone service in Durban area. About 1.24 million telephones in 1968, or 45 percent of all telephones in Africa; automatic dialing throughout country expected in 1970's. Internal telegraph services provided by 3,360 telegraph offices; overseas telecommunications by 360-channel submarine coaxial telephone cable, providing high-grade, reliable telephone, telex, and data circuits to Europe, United States, United Kingdom, India, Australia, and most other developed countries; direct radio communication service to fourteen overseas and African nations. Automatic international telephone exchanges in Cape Town and Pretoria enable telex subscribers to dial United Kingdom direct and to communicate with eighty-five foreign countries. Sixty-seven radio-broadcasting stations, including Radio South Africa; mediumwave, shortwave, and very high frequency/frequency modulation (VHF/FM) services to domestic and international listeners; in 1969, about 3.1 million radio receivers in use; no television in early 1970.

18. RAILROADS: State-owned South African Railways has most extensive, highly developed rail system in Africa; 13,700 route-miles.
19. INLAND WATERWAYS: Orange, Tugela, Vaal, Fish rivers navigable only for short distances; none developed for transportation use.

20. PORTS: Major commercial ports on Indian Ocean at Durban, East London, Port Elizabeth, Mosselbaai, Table Bay (Cape Town), and Walvis Bay on Atlantic Ocean. Largest, busiest port is Durban; largest drydock in Southern Hemisphere at Cape Town.

21. ROADS: About 6,200 miles of national roads; 5,500 miles surfaced for all-weather travel. Provincial system includes 13,000 miles of asphalt, 39,000 miles of gravel, and 150,000 miles of unsurfaced minor roads. National roads of high standard, well maintained; gravel roads usually good; minor roads subject to hazards of weather; all traffic proceeds on left side of roadway.

22. CIVIL AVIATION: State-owned South African Airways (SAA) provides domestic service to all major cities of South Africa and South West Africa (Namibia); regional service to Rhodesia, Botswana, and Mozambique; international service to European capitals, Rio de Janeiro, and New York. Small, independent TREK Airways offers infrequent service from Johannesburg to Luxembourg. Fourteen major international airlines provide service to Europe, Middle East, Australia, and the Americas. About 400 civil airports throughout country, including eight national; international airports at Johannesburg and Cape Town.

23. INTERNATIONAL MEMBERSHIPS: United Nations and some of its specialized agencies.

24. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND TREATIES: Customs union with Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland; labor and transport treaties with Mozambique; agreements permitting operation of French and United States space-tracking stations in South Africa; naval agreement with United Kingdom permitting British military overflights and use of naval facilities at Simonstown.

25. ARMED FORCES: Standing strength between 40,000 and 45,000; could be increased to 85,000 in two days. Army, 30,000; air force, 8,000; and navy, 4,000. South African Defense Force (SADF) backed by 55,000 paramilitary commandos, 60,000 trained Citizen Force, and large reserves. South African police (SAP): 34,000 regulars and 19,000 trained reservists. Military service limited to whites and small number of unarmed, noncombatant Coloureds. All whites aged between seventeen and sixty-five liable for wartime service; all white males between sixteen and twenty-five subject to conscription for peacetime training. Country virtually self-sufficient in all military items except heavy equipment; defense expenditure about 21.2 percent of total government budget and 3.2 percent of gross domestic product.
# THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

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Figure 1. The Republic of South Africa.
SECTION I. SOCIAL

CHAPTER 1

GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE SOCIETY

When South Africa declared itself a republic in 1961, it had been an essentially independent state for more than fifty years—since the establishment in 1910 of the Union of South Africa as a British dominion. Since 1652, when representatives of the Dutch East India Company established a station at the Cape of Good Hope, South Africa had been the scene of conflict of one kind or another between whites and indigenous peoples and, with the establishment of formal British rule in the early nineteenth century, between different segments of the white population. By the time of the Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902, the indigenous, largely Bantu-speaking population had already been subjected to white rule, and the struggle was one between the Boers (now known as Afrikaners), then rooted in South Africa for nearly 250 years, and the English-speaking people, of whom some officially represented the British Empire and some were permanently settled in a country where they largely controlled the production of gold and diamonds. The British won the war, but the union was a compromise that was to result eventually in Afrikaner political dominance (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

Considerations of relations among the races and of the allocation in racial terms of access to economic, social, and political status pervade every aspect of South African life from the right to vote to participation in sports. Matters of race have even influenced South Africa’s foreign policy and posture because its social system has evoked official statements of moral disapproval from many states and substantial hostility from some, particularly African, countries (see ch. 16, Foreign Relations).

Custom and law defined race relations and established white social, economic, and political dominance long before the Afrikaner-based Nationalist Party came to power in 1948 (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Most whites, whatever their language or origin, accepted the prevailing pattern. Until that time, however, there were occasional gaps in the structure of rules, written and unwritten, limiting the rights and opportunities of nonwhites and the relations
between members of the different races (see ch. 6, Social Structure). In 1948 the Nationalist Party, supported by most Afrikaners and actively opposed by only a few whites, began a systematic effort to organize the relations, rights, and privileges of the races as officially defined through a series of parliamentary acts and administrative regulations. The Nationalist government of the late 1940's and early 1950's gave its policy a name—apartheid (literally, separation).

Government policy and its implementation after 1948 led Africans and other nonwhites into various forms of protest ranging from passive resistance to the formation of organized political movements (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 15, Political Dynamics; ch. 18, Political Values and Attitudes). By the early 1960's such actions and organizations had been made illegal, and Africans turned to more violent activities, which were, however, largely thwarted by police action.

The country in which this system has developed was inhabited in early 1970 by nearly 20 million people, of whom less than 20 percent were white. Roughly 60 percent of the whites were Afrikaners, chiefly of Dutch descent but with an early infusion of French Huguenots who were soon assimilated; most of the rest were English-speakers, although not all were of British origin. Africans (the official term is Bantu) speaking a number of Bantu languages constituted more than two-thirds of the population. Coloureds (persons of mixed ancestry) made up roughly 10 percent. Asians (officially Asiatics), chiefly Indians, were the fourth clearly defined group.

The country was one of the richest in Africa and certainly the most developed economically, although some of its African population still relied heavily on subsistence agriculture and herding. South Africa's economic growth had been based on its diamonds and, particularly, gold. Beginning before World War II, however, and at a more rapid rate during and after the war, industry, both heavy and light, was developed. With the growth of industry has come the growth of urban centers, the gradual shift of the formerly rural Afrikaner to the towns, and an increasing demand for African labor (see ch. 4, Population; ch. 19, Character and Structure of the Economy; ch. 21, Industry; ch. 22, Labor).

The fact of economic growth and the demand for labor and markets that such growth would seem to entail have led some white South Africans and others to question whether apartheid, in its sense of maximum geographic and social separation, can or should be implemented. In this view, the system of laws and regulations designed to lead to separate development and to restrict the participation of nonwhites in the economy is incompatible with continued growth. It is argued further that the costs to whites and to the white econ-
omy of full implementation of multinational development—as the government began to call apartheid in early 1970—are such that it has not been, and cannot be, carried out (see ch. 15, Political Dynamics; ch. 19, Character and Structure of the Economy).

White South Africans who take this position—often major figures in the industrial and financial world—rarely suggest general equality or integration as an alternative to apartheid but offer a conception of increased participation by nonwhites, particularly Africans, at higher levels in the economy. They acknowledge that this may require the permanent residence of greater numbers of Africans in the towns in the so-called white areas, adjustments in the educational system and, perhaps eventually, some participation in the national political system.

The Nationalist government, however, insists that it has gone ahead with separate development and that it will continue to do so. It recognizes and values South Africa's economic development, particularly as the government and many Afrikaners in their private capacity have increasingly enjoyed the benefits of that development. But it is not prepared to welcome the notion of larger numbers of permanently resident Africans in the white areas, for it was in part the Afrikaners' fear that they might be overwhelmed by blacks, as well as their acute conception of their own national apartness, that led them from the older and still significant concept of baasskap (white dominance) to that of apartheid (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 6, Social Structure; ch. 12, Social Values; ch. 18, Political Values and Attitudes).

In principle, the major locus and absolute source of governmental power is the national Parliament, particularly its House of Assembly, chosen by an entirely white electorate. The upper house, the Senate, was intended at the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 to be above the political considerations affecting the lower house and to exercise a kind of review power or check on the acts of that body. Even before the establishment of the Republic in 1961, however, the Senate was divided by party and, like the House of Assembly, was subject to party discipline. To the extent that parliamentary debate was significant in policy formation, it generally took place in the lower house.

The state president, elected by both houses acting jointly, is head of state and head of the executive. He is given certain prerogatives by the Constitution Act of 1961. In effect, however, he exercises all his powers on behalf of the real executive and the real locus of government, the Executive Council (cabinet).

The cabinet comprises the prime minister and all other ministers who head one or more departments. Ministers must be, or must become, members of either house of Parliament. The cabinet must have the support of a majority of the House of Assembly in a vote
of confidence, but it is not required that the government resign after defeat on an ordinary issue.

In effect, party discipline, particularly in the Nationalist Party since its coming to power in 1948, has been such that matters of this kind have not arisen. For the most part, policy and all significant decisions related to the implementation of policy are made in the Executive Council.

Following the British model, relations between the Nationalist Party and other parties in Parliament are seen as those between government and opposition. On any issue, members vote along party lines. Given Nationalist Party dominance and strict party discipline, the opposition does not try to convince government members to change their votes. It seeks instead to criticize the government position, particularly in the formal question period when ministers must respond to queries and comments by members of Parliament, and to use the exchange to convince the voters of the government's errors and inadequacies.

In the late 1960's and early 1970, the opposition consisted chiefly of the United Party, which had not held power for more than twenty years. In South African politics it has long been thought of as the English party, despite the fact that its best known leader, Jan Christian Smuts, as well as a number of others, were Afrikaners. The Progressive Party, liberal in South African terms, represented a relatively small number of prosperous, well-educated urban whites of diverse ethnic backgrounds—Afrikaner, English, and Jewish. I had one member in the lower house.

Party leaders and members have explicitly seen the Nationalist Party as a movement expressing the character, needs, and hopes of the Afrikaner people. In the late 1960's, however, some of its leaders, including Prime Minister B. J. Vorster, decided that many English-speaking whites shared enough of the Nationalist view of the problems and prospects of South African society to warrant their voting for the Nationalists if they were made welcome. These leaders, therefore, were willing to make minor adjustments in certain aspects of policy or its implementation to attract non-Afrikaners. This approach and these adjustments led to the emergence of the verkramptes (literally, the cramped ones), adamantly fundamentalist Afrikaners (see ch. 15, Political Dynamics; ch. 18, Political Values and Attitudes).

The verkramptes opposed the less intransigent position of the verligtes (literally, the enlightened ones) led by Vorster, and some of them broke off to form another party—the Herstigte National Party—in late 1969. The distinction between the two groups of Afrikaner leaders does not signify major differences in outlook. Differences of a similar sort have arisen in Afrikaner politics before, and the more conservative faction usually acts as a brake on the pragmatism of those in power.
Of at least equal significance is the disaffection, on quite other grounds, of a still small number of leaders of the Dutch Reformed churches, particularly of the largest of the three, the Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk. The near identity of Afrikaner nationalism and the Dutch Reformed churches has been of great historical importance (see ch. 11, Religion). It may be of some significance, therefore, that some leaders have begun to question the scriptural foundation for racial discrimination and separation as they did in early 1970. An even larger number of clergy and laymen have criticized the government on the grounds that apartheid in practice is destructive of the family life, mortality, and health of Africans and have urged that the government speed up the process of separate development, even if it should prove to involve greater cost to the whites. Neither position has been supported by substantial numbers of Afrikaners, and the government has suggested that the clerics are exceeding their competence (see ch. 11, Religion; ch. 12, Social Values).

Although South Africa is the richest country on the continent in terms of minerals and valuable metals (it lacked only bauxite and exploitable oil in early 1970), it is relatively poor in agricultural terms. Only 15 percent of its land is arable, and about 70 percent of the land consists of mountains and semidesert (see ch. 2, Physical Environment). The shortage of water is considered a national problem, and efforts have been inaugurated to deal with it. Much of the land, however, is suitable only for grazing (see ch. 20, Agriculture).

In these circumstances, the people are scattered unevenly throughout the land. Much of northern and eastern Cape Province is sparsely settled. A substantial proportion of the population lives in urban areas. This is particularly true of whites, Coloureds, and Indians. A third of the African population is urbanized, and many more people are dependent on those who work in urban areas. It is probable that a great many more Africans would live in the cities if it were not for the laws requiring that most who work there must leave their wives and children at home and must themselves leave when they have finished a work contract (see ch. 4, Population; ch. 8, Living Conditions).

The major urban centers (eleven cities with populations of 100,000 or more in 1969) were located in the industrial and mining regions of the southern Transvaal and the adjacent sections of the Orange Free State and at harbors along the eastern and southern coasts. These cities and others varied in racial and ethnic composition (for example, Cape Town had a very large Coloured component, and Durban, a very large Indian one), but all were characterized by residential segregation, which was a consequence not only of custom and income differentials but also of law.

Since the promulgation and implementation of the Group Areas Act of 1950 (as amended), the patterns of residential segregation of
the races have hardened to the extent that groups of persons have been forced from urban and rural areas in which they have lived for a long time (see ch. 8, Living Conditions). The principle behind the act and a number of other statutes and institutions is that there ought to be maximum physical and social separation not only between whites and nonwhites but also among the formally defined categories of nonwhites. To this end, for example, each of the four defined groups has its own educational system through the college level. Exceptions are made only in certain circumstances (see ch. 9, Education).

The officially defined races are not themselves homogeneous, and in some cases the classification of individuals is quite difficult and has caused a good deal of hardship to those who have been reclassified. (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages; ch. 6, Social Structure; ch. 7, Family). Technically, the state recognizes three major racial categories: whites (sometimes called Europeans), Bantu, and Coloured. The law formally includes Asians (with the exception of a few thousand Chinese and small numbers of others, the great bulk are Indians) with the Coloured, but in all respects—including the establishment of a Department of Indian Affairs—it treats them as a separate group.

The Africans, all speakers of Bantu languages, are officially divided into eight groups, each of which comprises a number of tribes and subtribes. These groups, designated as national units by the government, are intended to constitute the populations of the Bantustans—semi-autonomous, ethnically homogeneous entities—that are, in principle, one of the ultimate goals of the program of separate development (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages; ch. 13, The Governmental System).

These units correspond roughly to clusters of tribes related to each other linguistically and culturally, although some elements in each cluster differ substantially from others. The situation is further complicated by the fact that years of Christian influence, education, and urban experience have contributed to substantial social and cultural variation within each group such that there may be more in common between well-educated Africans of different tribal origin than there is between some members of the same tribe. Government policy, however, insists not only that Africans be separated from others but also that Africans of different tribes be separated from each other if that is possible (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages; ch. 6, Social Structure; ch. 13, The Governmental System).

Another major obstacle to the realization of the Bantustans is the limited quantity of land now allocated to the Africans. This land, variously called the reserves or Bantu homelands, constitutes about 13 percent of the total land area, much of it overpopulated in the
absence of significant changes in agricultural methods and likely to be inadequate even then (see ch. 20, Agriculture). The government’s proposed solution would be to bring white-owned industry to the borders of the reserves that will make use of black labor living in them. In early 1970 the development of such border industries was a long way from realization (see ch. 19, Character and Structure of the Economy).

The basic distinction within the white group is that between Afrikaners and English speakers. The linguistic and cultural differences have been reinforced by a long history of conflict and mutual distrust (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 12, Social Values; ch. 18, Political Values and Attitudes). Their appraisal of the racial situation, however, has brought them closer politically, even if they remain for many purposes and in other contexts quite distinct.

The great bulk of the Coloured population is urban, Christian, and Afrikaans-speaking. Some are rural. There is a group of Muslims usually called the Cape Malays; those who have lived in Natal for a long time speak English. Although individuals have joined the group since the nineteenth century, most Coloureds are the descendants of early unions between the Dutch and a number of nonwhite groups, including Hottentots, Malays, African slaves from outside South Africa and, more rarely, local Africans. Although they have developed features of culture specific to their situation, their orientation has always been to white society, and status within the group has been largely determined by the degree to which an individual approximates what are thought of as white physical characteristics.

The Indian population, concentrated largely in Natal where they were first brought to work on the sugarcane plantations, is differentiated by religion (most are Hindus, some are Muslims, and a few are Christians), by caste (although this has been of decreasing importance), and by language and regional origin. Although the ancestors of many of these people began as plantation workers, most are now urban or at least engaged in nonfarming occupations. The range of wealth and education among them is substantial (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages; ch. 6, Social Structure).

The society in which these people live is dominated, politically, socially, and economically, by whites. Many of the forms of domination—pass laws that require Africans to prove a right to be anywhere but in a reserve, the reservation of the best jobs for whites, and separate but not necessarily equal facilities for whites and nonwhites—are of long standing (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 8, Living Conditions; ch. 22, Labor). The doctrine of apartheid and its implementation systematized that domination.

The idea of separate development had been suggested by others before the Nationalists advocated it. Some liberals broached the idea before World War II. They assumed that most whites would
never consent to integration, and they considered the existing system of racial discrimination and baasskap intolerable. Their solution was the allocation to Africans of substantially more land than they had and the gradual development of essentially independent African states, which might furnish some labor to the white state's economy but would not be subservient to it. The proposal attracted no one, white or nonwhite.

In the late 1940's and early 1950's the Nationalists, newly in power, put into practice a similar idea as a solution to the problems as they had begun to see them before World War II. Integration in any form was out of the question. South African industrial growth needed African labor, but Afrikaners had not won power to be overwhelmed, in what they considered their cities and towns, their villages and farms, by Africans. The solution was maximum feasible separation of the races and, where separation was not altogether feasible, maximum control of the residence, movements, and behavior of nonwhites.

Many Africans, other nonwhites, and a few whites tried to oppose the implementation of apartheid, through the courts, by passive resistance, and by public protest. In effect, opposition to the system led to the enactment of a series of statutes intended to minimize opposition by nonwhites generally and by others outside formal opposition in Parliament. The institutions and practices developed to safeguard the existing social order were largely supported by the white minority. Given the absolute supremacy of Parliament, there was little that the courts could do. Some Africans and a few others considering change through institutional channels impossible have tried violent means but have made little headway against a ubiquitous and well-trained security force (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 14, The Legal System; ch. 15, Political Dynamics; ch. 26, Public Order and Internal Security).

During the period in which apartheid was developed as an idea and implemented as a system, South Africa's economy became the most developed in Africa. The gold, diamonds, and other minerals and valuable metals that attracted foreign investments provided the country with a foundation for the development of a substantial industrial plant. South Africa suffered comparatively little during the depression years of the 1930's, and the economy began its expansion and diversification then, in good part with government support. Of considerable importance in development during the 1930's and 1940's were the concerted efforts of Afrikaner organizations to train and help their people who were moving into the industrial world from a rural one. Not only were new commercial and industrial firms formed in this way, but a relatively skilled labor force was also developed. At the same time, Africans from South Africa and neighboring territories were available as unskilled and
semiskilled labor at relatively low cost (see ch. 21, Industry; ch. 22, Labor).

By early 1970 South Africa was producing much of the consumer goods that its people used and a good portion of the basic manufactures and capital equipment that its economy needed (see ch. 21, Industry). Much of the country's demand for manufactures was still supplied by imports, however, and the value of these was still much greater than that of exported manufactures in the late 1960's. This imbalance was offset by the export of gold, diamonds, and a wide variety of other valuable metals and minerals (see ch. 19, Character and Structure of the Economy; ch. 24, Foreign Economic Relations).

The government has played a major part in the patterned development of the economy, has influenced the allocation of resources and has encouraged the establishment of basic manufactures and the diversification of industry. Some of this has been accomplished by the manipulation of tariffs and exchange controls, but the government has also engaged directly in the organization and operation of basic industries (see ch. 21, Industry).

Ownership and management of industry is, therefore, mixed. Local and foreign private investors and managers have a very important role, but the government has a substantial degree of direct control of some industries, particularly those it considers essential to the country's security, and it maintains a firm grasp on the development of industrial and commercial enterprises by private persons and firms. Again, it is concerned not only with economic growth for its own sake, but also with the country's economic self-sufficiency in what it considers to be a hostile world and with the persistence of the existing social structure. It does, however, welcome foreign investment, even largely foreign-owned industrial plants, not only because it contributes to economic growth, but also because it may provide an avenue or basis for friendly relations with influential foreigners.
CHAPTER 2

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

The Republic of South Africa is the southernmost country of continental Africa (see fig. 1). Its western limits are formed by the coastline of the Atlantic Ocean and its southern and eastern extremities by the Indian Ocean. It shares inland frontiers with South West Africa (Namibia) in the northwest, Botswana and Rhodesia in the north, and Mozambique and Swaziland in the northeast. South Africa’s territorial landmass completely surrounds the small independent state of Lesotho. The country’s four provinces are Transvaal, Cape Province, Natal, and the Orange Free State. The national administrative capital is Pretoria, and Cape Town serves as the legislative capital.

Covering an area of 472,500 square miles, the country measures nearly 1,000 miles in its longest east-west axis and over 700 miles from north to south. Extraterritorial holdings consist of the small Walvis Bay enclave on the coast of South West Africa, covering a 434-square-mile area, and two small islands 1,200 miles southeast of the African mainland.

The major topographical features are a broad and lofty interior plateau, a steep semicircular escarpment that surrounds the plateau, and a narrow belt of coastal lowlands on the west, south, and east. The country ranges from temperate and subtropical farmland, grassland plains, and verdant valleys to craggy mountain peaks, semiarid scrubland, and sparsely inhabited desert. Approximately 70 percent of the land consists of mountains and semidesert, and no more than 15 percent of the country is cultivable. The agriculturally inferior land, however, harbors one of the world’s richest and most varied stores of mineral wealth.

The country has a variety of climatic conditions, largely because of topographical diversities and the effect of the ocean currents. The southwestern cape area enjoys a Mediterranean climate; the interior is semiarid; and subtropical conditions exist in northeastern Transvaal and eastern Natal. The annual average rainfall for the whole country is about 17½ inches. It is unevenly distributed both seasonally and geographically, and about two-thirds of the country receives less than 15 inches a year. Drought conditions occur frequently in many regions, and the shortage of water resources is recognized as a national problem.
The national transportation system is the most extensive in Africa. It includes a highly developed rail network, generally good roads, two airlines, and four major seaports. The government administers all aspects of the system except the provincial roads and the smaller of the two airlines.

In mid-1968 the latest government statistics estimated a population of 19,167,000, of which approximately 68 percent was African, 19 percent white, 10 percent Coloured, and 3 percent Asian. The rural population lives mainly in regions where soils and climate favor agriculture. These areas include the Highveld, the Transvaal Bushveld, eastern Natal, and southwestern and southern Cape Province. Much of the urban population has settled in the industrially developed minerals regions of southern Transvaal Province and northern Orange Free State. The remaining urban people were concentrated largely in the commercial and industrial centers that have developed around the major seaports of eastern Natal and southern Cape provinces (see ch. 4, Population; ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

In 1969 there were eleven cities with populations over 100,000. Johannesburg, with more than 1.5 million inhabitants, was the third largest city on the African continent. About 32 percent of the republic’s African peoples lived in towns, including temporarily located migrant workers. The rest were divided between white-owned farms and the segregated native reserves. Approximately 88 percent of the Coloured grouping lived in Cape Province, and most of the Asians were concentrated in cities and towns of Natal Province on the eastern coast.

ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE AND BOUNDARIES

Most of the borders are defined by natural features. The Republic’s northern borders range across the African continent’s southern tip for almost 2,900 miles.

Except for the 309-mile border with Mozambique and a 200-mile stretch along South West Africa’s southeastern sector, the inland frontier is formed by the course of the Limpopo River in the east and the Orange River in the west. All internal borders are either demarcated or delimited and are undisputed. The western, southern, and eastern extremities are surrounded by nearly 1,900 miles of semicircular coastline formed by the Atlantic and Indian oceans. The coastline forms the truncated apex of an inverted triangle with Cape Agulhas as its most southerly point.

A number of small landforms off the Republic’s southwestern coast include Dassen, Robben, and Bird islands. All are uninhabited except for Robben Island, which serves as the site of the country’s maximum security prison. In 1947 South Africa formally annexed
two small islands, Prince Edward and Marion, which lie in the In-
dian Ocean approximately 1,200 miles southeast of Cape Town.

Extraterritorial holdings include the small enclave of Walvis Bay on the western coast of South West Africa about 750 miles north-
west of Cape Town. The enclave's area of 434 square miles was annexed by the Cape Colony in 1878 and incorporated in the Union of South Africa in 1910. The harbor at Walvis Bay is protected by a 5½-mile-long peninsula known as Pelican Point and provides modern shipping facilities for the thriving fishing industry. The enclave is connected to South Africa by a modern system of roads, the South African railway and airline, and by sea transport routes.

From independence in 1910 until 1961 the country was known as the Union of South Africa, a constituent part of the British Common-
wealth of Nations. It comprised the former British colonies of Cape of Good Hope, Natal, Transvaal, and Orange River Colony, which became the four administrative provinces of the union at independence. At that time the latter province became known as the Orange Free State. With redesignation as a republic in 1961, the names of constituent provinces remained unchanged.

The country's provincial boundaries are guaranteed by the repub-
lican Constitution and cannot be altered except by express petition to Parliament by the individual provinces concerned. Local admin-
istative units and authorities that have jurisdiction over them vary from province to province. In all cases, however, local administra-
tive authorities are subject to the control of their parent provincial council (see ch. 13, The Governmental System).

South Africa's administrative structure conforms to the official racial segregation policy of apartheid (see ch. 13, The Governmental System). In 1913 Parliament passed the Natives Land Act, which set aside approximately 22.7 million acres of land throughout the country as eight or nine ethnically designated native reserves. The largest, Transkei, covers 16,500 square miles along the southeastern coast. These territorial reservations were to provide restricted areas into which the black African population could be segregated according to tribal origin. The acreage of the demarcated territories reserved for the preponderant African population is 13 percent of the Republic's total area of 472,500 square miles.

In 1955 the government adopted certain aspects of a plan for developing separate black African areas, including the native re-
erves. This plan, prepared by the Tomlinson Commission, called for establishment of segregated autonomous regions designated as Bantustans. Each would be governed eventually by its own elected authorities, with central government supervision, and would be encouraged to develop its own economic and social existence. Part of the Tomlinson proposals were accepted by the government, and the
first of the proposed Bantustans was established in the Transkei homeland in 1963 (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

Four small reserves for the Coloured population of northwestern Cape Province are located in the Namaqualand magisterial district south of the Orange River. These reserves originated as mission stations during the first half of the nineteenth century. They were recognized by the government of the Cape Colony and were administered by the missionaries assisted by tribal councils. Shortly after 1909 administration of the Coloured reserves was assumed by the Cape Provincial Council. Although the number of inhabitants is undetermined, the population density probably does not exceed eleven persons per square mile.

GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS

The general physiography of the country consists of a broad, centrally depressed plateau edged by a prominent escarpment overlooking marginal slopes that descend to the western, southern, and eastern coastal peripheries. The mountainous edges of the plateau extend in a sweeping arc from the country's northeastern tip to its southwestern extremity. Collectively, these ridges are known as the Great Escarpment. These elements form the basis of the division of the country into its chief geographic regions (see fig. 2.). They are also fundamental to regional variations in climate, natural vegetation, soil composition, and the country's wealth of natural resources.

The Plateau

Inland from the crest of the Great Escarpment, the country consists generally of extensive rolling plains, dropping gradually to an altitude of about 3,000 feet in the center of the plateau. These upland plains are erosional in origin, but the widespread presence of nearly horizontal rock strata has also contributed to the general flatness of the terrain.

Within the plateau, variations in topography have differentiated a number of generally distinctive subregions. The largest of these is the plateau and dolerite-capped hills of the Highveld, extending from southern Transvaal, encompassing all of the Orange Free State, and stretching southward through northern Cape Province. The term veld is an Afrikaans word meaning grassland. In a geographical sense, it has both a botanical and altitudinal connotation. In the Highveld, grassland is the dominant vegetation feature, and the undulating land surface lies mostly between 4,000 and 6,000 feet above sea level. Its northern limit is formed by the Witwatersrand ridge, on which Johannesburg stands at 6,000 feet.
The Witwatersrand, known colloquially as the Rand, is a ridge of auriferous rock about sixty-two miles long and twenty-three miles wide in southern Transvaal. A watershed for a number of northern streams, it literally means "ridge of white waters" in Afrikaans. The area was the site of the first gold discovery in 1886 and subsequently was found to contain the world's largest proven deposits of this valuable mineral.

North of the Witwatersrand lies an area known to South Africans as the Transvaal Middleveld or Bushveld Basin. Bushveld refers to a type of dry savanna vegetation, characterized by open grassland with scattered trees and bushes. The elevation, much lower than that of the Highveld, averages between 2,000 and 3,000 feet. In general, it is a central basin surrounded by a series of broken mountain ranges of from 5,000 to 6,000 feet high. North of the Bushveld Basin, the land rises again to the Waterberg Plateau and the Pietersburg Plain, an upland that is like the Highveld in altitude. Beyond the northern margin of this upland, the topography falls steadily to the valley of the eastward-flowing Limpopo River.

Inland from the Highveld, the plateau slopes gently westward and changes in character largely because of increasing aridity. Generally known as the Cape Middleveld, this area embraces the lower basin of the Orange River west of Kimberley and much of the semi-arid

Source: Adapted from Republic of South Africa, Department of Planning, Development Atlas, Pretoria, 1966.

Figure 2. Geographic Regions of the Republic of South Africa.
tableland of west-central Cape Province. South of the Orange River, low gradients and the erratic flow of the stream’s tributaries have produced vast depressions or pans, which are characteristic of the area. North of the Cape Middleveld the plateau becomes a sandy plain about 3,000 feet in altitude known as the Kalahari Basin. The area is a semiarid southern extension of the great Kalahari Desert that lies north of South Africa’s west-central frontier.

The Great Escarpment

Probably the most fundamental physiographic feature is the continuous series of mountain ridges that rims the interior plateau, separating it from the marginal areas. The Great Escarpment runs almost unbroken from the Zambezi River in Rhodesia around the southern edge of the African continent and arcs northward, following the western edge of the landmass through South West Africa and into Angola. In South Africa the escarpment lies at distances of from 35 to 150 miles from the coastline and has a variety of local names. In the east and southeast it is known as the Drakensberg Mountains. Traced westward through Cape Province, it is known variously as the Stormberg, Sneeuberg, Nuweveld Reeks, and Roggeveldberge.

The crestline in the southwestern and the western sections vary from 3,000 to 7,000 feet. The highest ridges in the escarpment are formed by the Drakensberg Mountains in and surrounding Lesotho, where rugged peaks of altitudes of from 10,000 to 11,000 feet above sea level overlook the coastal belt of Natal Province. Generally the scarp crest rises above 5,000 feet, and there is a drop of 2,000 feet or more from crest to foot.

Marginal Areas

Erosion has left a sloping, often dissected, tract of land between the escarpment and the coast. Its character varies according to the type of rocks and geological structure across which it has been formed. From the northern Transvaal area southward through Natal and the Transkei, the marginal areas descending toward the coast from the Great Escarpment consist of an inner range of foothills or coastal slopes. In this eastern marginal area, or Lowveld, the fall from the plateau edge to the coastline generally occurs in three descending surfaces, which results in a stepped terrain. The first surface has an altitude of about 4,000 feet; the second lies between 2,000 and 4,000 feet; and the coastal zone descends from 2,000 feet to sea level. Across these steps the chief rivers have cut valleys and canyons to depths as great as 4,000 feet.

In the southern and southwestern Cape Province the Cape Range
mountains dominate the marginal area. Between them and the Great Escarpment lies the semiarid Great Karoo. This basin has been carved by southward-flowing rivers that plunge through the mountains in deep gorges before they reach the Indian Ocean. The altitude of the Great Karoo plains is between 1,500 and 2,500 feet.

The Cape Range mountains run north to south in the southwestern region and east to west in the southern area, meeting at right angles northeast of Cape Town. Northward they include the Sederberge, Bokkeveldberge, and Great Winterhoek mountains with elevations to nearly 7,000 feet. To the east there are two prominent ranges—the Langeberg and the Swartberge mountains. The Langeberg stretches for almost 300 miles toward Port Elizabeth and is separated from the Swartberge Mountains by the valley of the Little Karoo. The highest point in the Langeberg Mountains is nearly 7,600 feet.

Between the Atlantic coast and the western edge of the Great Escarpment, there is a narrow belt of desert, a southward extension of the Namib Desert of South Africa's northwestern neighbor, South West Africa. Except in this area and along the Indian Ocean in northeast Natal, the coastal plains bordering the seashores are very narrow or entirely absent.

CLIMATE

Although its location suggests a general subtropical climate, the country has a wide variety of climatic conditions. The tropical belt of high atmospheric pressure that circles the globe between 25° and 30° south latitude dominates the South African landmass. This belt is continuous over both land and sea during the winter months, but in summer it gives way to low pressure systems that occur over the land surface. The interplay of these wind systems, the extensive variations in terrain, and the peripheral ocean currents have a combined effect on the country's climatic patterns (see table 1).

In most regions, summer occurs from December through May, and winter from June through August. With few exceptions, the climate is moderate with warm, sunny days and cool nights. The mean annual temperature for the country in general is slightly under 60°F.

The southwestern cape area has a Mediterranean climate, but northeastern Transvaal and eastern Natal are subtropical in character. The western coastal region of the Southern Namib, much of the northern Cape Middleveld, and parts of the Karoo have a typical desert climate. Summers in the central Highveld vary from warm to hot, and winters range from mild to cold. Along the southern and eastern coastal stretches the climate ranges from warm to hot with generally high humidity.
Table 1. Climatological Averages for Eight Stations in South Africa*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Latitude (south)</th>
<th>Altitude (feet)</th>
<th>Annual</th>
<th>Hottest month</th>
<th>Coldest month</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Average annual rainfall (inches)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Johannesburg</td>
<td>26°12'</td>
<td>5,751</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pretoria</td>
<td>25°45'</td>
<td>4,350</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durban</td>
<td>29°50'</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Elizabeth</td>
<td>25°36'</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloemfontein</td>
<td>29°07'</td>
<td>4,665</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimberley</td>
<td>28°48'</td>
<td>3,927</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Town</td>
<td>33°54'</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Nolloth</td>
<td>29°14'</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Based on government meteorological data collected over a period of fifteen years and rounded to the nearest tenth.

Source: Adapted from Republic of South Africa, Department of Planning, Development Atlas, Pretoria, 1966.
Temperature varies as much or more with elevation as with latitude. Thus, although Johannesburg is almost eight degrees closer to the equator than Cape Town, its mean annual temperature is slightly less because of its higher altitude. Coastal temperatures are affected largely by the prevailing ocean currents. On the west coast the Atlantic Ocean’s cool Benguela current moderates the temperature, even along the coastline of the arid Southern Namib. In like manner, the warm waters of the Indian Ocean raise temperatures to readings higher than those in areas of corresponding latitude on the opposite side of the country.

Temperature ranges are greatest in the interior and least on the western coast. The highest recorded temperature of 120°F occurred in the Orange River valley of the Southern Namib and in the eastern Transvaal Lowveld region of the north. The lowest temperature recorded was 6°F. in the eastern Transvaal at an altitude of 5,600 feet.

Rainfall begins in the north in October and is most frequent in January and February. During this period the highest temperatures occur in November as far south as the northern Orange Free State. On the coasts the maximum temperatures are registered in January and February and the minimum in late July or August. Summers of six months’ duration are the general pattern on the south coast and lengthen as one progresses northward. In the same latitude, the summer is longer over the eastern Highveld than over the western interior.

Frost is a common phenomenon from the middle of May to the middle of September. Although it occurs mostly on the higher elevations and in the valleys of the Highveld, other high-terrain areas have received frost. Snow falls at times on the higher mountain ranges, and the cold winds that accompany it have resulted in occasional death of humans and livestock.

Rainfall plays a more important role than any other climatic factor. In most of the country it is largely seasonal in nature and greatly affected by topography. Generally, the most arid regions are located in northern and western Cape Province where the land descends below 3,000 feet. The wettest areas are on the Drakensberg Mountains in Natal, where the annual rainfall averages nearly seventy-five inches, on some of the southern Cape Range mountains, and along the eastern coastal reaches. An annual rainfall of over forty inches, however, is rare in South Africa. Approximately 90 percent of the entire country receives less than thirty inches annually (see fig. 3).

About half of the republic can be classed as semiarid or arid, a fact that has made South Africa increasingly aware of the limited nature of its water resources for agricultural and industrial development. About 85 percent of the country receives rainfall only
during the summer months. In the remaining zones of seasonal moisture, rains fall only during the winter.

The western coastal strip, the Southern Namib region, is the driest area of the country. Rain falls over the southwestern region of Cape Province during the winter months. In this region it is heaviest over the surrounding mountain ranges and least in the intervening valleys of the Karoo (Hottentot word for waterless). The southern coastal belt is the only region in which the rainfall is fairly equally distributed throughout the year. Although some rain tends to fall throughout the year along the eastern coastal belt, there is a pronounced concentration during the summer because of moist air masses from the Indian Ocean.

Rainfall over the interior plateau averages from over forty inches annually in the escarpment surrounding Lesotho to less than three inches around the lower Orange River. The rain is confined to summer months, and winters often bring drought conditions. The western interior, largely a southward continuation of Botswana's Kalahari Desert, is the vast semiarid region of the country. Almost complete drought conditions prevail from May to September, with only occasional penetrations of moist air from the northeast. Aridity diminishes in the central interior.


Figure 3. Mean Annual Rainfall in South Africa.
On the Highveld and in the highlands around Lesotho, mean annual rainfall varies from twenty to thirty inches, with a high of seventy-five inches at the crest of the Drakensberg Mountains. On the Highveld the winter months of June through August are usually dry. Summer rainfall on the Highveld and the eastern marginal slopes is usually associated with spectacular thunderstorms. These electrical disturbances occur on as many as 100 days in the eastern Highveld and on only about 5 days in the western and southwestern Cape Province.

Rain falls very heavily at times. Examples of more than twelve inches in twenty-four hours have occurred, and the hardest rainfall recorded resulted in nearly two inches within a span of fifteen minutes. Because of this characteristic, the land is often subject to severe flash flooding, with extensive soil erosion and damage to roads and bridges. Hailstones, which occur mainly in November, also are sometimes the cause of destruction to property and crops.

Rainfall reliability is another important aspect of the climate. Generally, it is more likely to occur with regularity in those areas where it falls heaviest, and it is least reliable in the drier sections. There are few regions, however, that never experience droughts. The interior Cape Middleveld and parts of the western Highveld appear to be the most prone to prolonged rainfall shortages. In the summer rainfall zone, where temperatures are highest at the time of rainfall, evaporation losses are often severe and lead to further depletion of critical water supplies.

THE LAND

Among the country's natural features are lofty mountains, subtropical beaches, grassy upland plains still inhabited by wild animals, rolling hills, fertile valleys, and vast arid expanses, when plant life appears only after a rain. The Kalahari Desert reaches into the northern Cape, and steppe conditions extend beyond the limit of the sand. Although there are hundreds of square miles of flat, agriculturally useful grassland and cultivated fields, nearly 70 percent of the land consists of mountains and semidesert.

Apart from the coastal strip in Natal, the soil generally is thin and deficient in organic content and other necessary nutrients. Overgrazing, poor range management, insufficient rainfall, and long-term uncontrolled soil erosion have scarred the countryside from the eastern Transvaal to the western part of Cape Province. In 1969 only about 12 to 15 percent of the entire landmass was cultivable, and the government was devoting extensive funds and conservation efforts to arrest and repair the damage to the republic's land resources.
Soils and Vegetation

Variations of relief, rainfall, and temperature have produced soils that are largely immature and not especially fertile. In the winter-rainfall areas, soil-forming processes work slowly, and good soils are limited to the basins where the shales weather relatively rapidly into a soil. Few soils have an adequate organic content. This results from limited vegetation over the western two-thirds of the country, leaching in the wetter areas, monoculture, and overgrazing (see ch. 20, Agriculture). Most soils also are deficient in nitrogen and phosphorus.

In the Lowveld of Natal and the Transvaal, where the average annual rainfall exceeds 20 inches and annual average temperatures are over 65° F., soils are red in color and have a high content of iron oxide and aluminum hydroxide. Under natural conditions, they will support grassland and occasional forest. Cultivation succeeds well initially, but the soil rapidly becomes exhausted and is prone to erosion.

The Highveld is characterized by fairly acidic soils, gray in color, somewhat saline in nature, and often low in humus content. In areas of dolerite outcrops and igneous rocks such as the Bushveld Basin of Transvaal, the soil improves to a black clay and is suitable for agriculture. The mineral content of the black clays make the most potentially fertile soils, but the rainfall in the regions where they occur is usually low. Soils of southwestern Cape Province tend to be slightly saline, generally immature, and organically deficient. Probably the best soils in the southern area are the mildly acidic loams in the Karoo region.

Most of the soils are extremely vulnerable to erosion. In the marginal areas below the Great Escarpment and those parts of the interior plateau dissected by rivers, rapid runoff occurs. In the drier parts of the country, vegetation often is too sparse to have enough binding effect on the soil to deter erosion.

Soil conditions, however, have improved considerably since World War II. Because of its realization of the scale on which valuable land was being destroyed, the government began to reverse that trend with the passage of the Forest and Veld Conservation Act of 1941. Since then, improvements in agricultural techniques, soil research, and general conservation measures have remedied the situation in many areas.

The vegetation regions are of five general types: forest, savanna, grasslands, semidesert and desert, and Cape maquis. Changes of vegetation between one zone and the next occur very gradually and often merge almost imperceptibly, except in areas where changes in elevation occur abruptly (see fig. 4).
The most extensive types of vegetation are the semidesert shrubs and succulent plants of the semiarid Cape Middleveld and western Highveld regions. The shrubs are mostly perennial woody bushes about three to twelve feet high, occurring in sporadically spaced clumps. The most common of these include several species of Pentzia, bitter karoo, and saltbushes. Some can survive a drought of ten months and provide excellent grazing for small stock. The succulent plants include low bushes six to eight inches in height and the taller euphorbia, aloes, and Portulacaria.

Grassland generally is found at altitudes about 4,000 feet, where cooler temperatures prevail and more than fifteen inches of rain fall annually. The principal species, prevalent over 60 percent of the area, is the red grass or Themeda triandra, which dries out in autumn after the rains. It attains a height of from one to three feet and is recognized as one of the best pasture grasses in the country.

Because grass growth is limited to the summer rains of October through March, it usually loses its nutritious character and becomes woody and indigestible in the winter. To encourage grass growth at the beginning of the rains, farmers remove the dead grass by burn-
ing, a practice which has contributed to past erosion problems. The growth of an inferior vegetation known as love grass follows overgrazing and soil erosion and later gives way to bristle grass or Bermuda grass. In the higher elevations of the Highveld, some fescues are common.

The savanna vegetation is known locally as bushveld. It is found mostly in areas below 4,000-feet elevation where at least fifteen inches of rainfall occurs annually. All varieties of savanna are represented, from open woodland to grassland mixed with scattered trees. Savanna occurs throughout the Transvaal’s Bushveld Basin, the Limpopo valley, and in the Lowveld of eastern Natal and Cape provinces. In the drier areas such as northern Transvaal, the most common trees are acacias, aloes, euphorbias, and baobabs. In the more moist areas of the savanna regions, broad-leaved deciduous varieties dominate. These include stinkwood, South African mahogany, and marula. Various palms are found in the lower valleys of Natal. The commonest savanna grasses include Themeda, Digitaria, and Panicum.

In the extreme south the grassland gives way to Cape maquis vegetation, which consists largely of drought-resistant evergreen shrubs. Some grasses, however, occur in the wetter sections. The region of maquis vegetation surrounds the southwestern cape and extends eastward, skirting the coast to Port Elizabeth. Vegetation in this zone is found from sea level to elevations of about 3,000 feet. Plants vary in height from three to five feet in areas of lower rainfall and attain heights of fifteen feet where annual rainfall is over twenty inches. Unlike other areas of Mediterranean vegetation, there is a general absence of trees.

Two general types of forest are found throughout the country: the southern temperate and the eastern subtropical. The temperate evergreen forest occupies a limited area in the eastern part of the south coastal zone. The chief varieties of trees include the tall yellowwoods growing to a height of 150 feet, the black ironwood, the Cape beech, stinkwood, and sneezewood. Sporadic stands of evergreen trees can be found in the Natal midlands and in eastern Transvaal. Large forests once covered the escarpment of Transvaal and Natal, but the trees have been exploited for mining timbers. The largest natural forest is located in the mountains of eastern Transvaal and is protected by a government-sponsored conservation program.

An extensive forest of subtropical and tropical trees formerly stretched along a narrow zone behind the eastern coast, Natal, and eastern Transvaal. Most of these trees, however, have been exploited, and only scattered remnants remain. Commercially cultivated citrus varieties exist in these regions, including the orange, grapefruit, lemon, and tangerine.
Drainage

The topography creates two basic drainage patterns. The large interior plateau surface is drained by the northern Limpopo and the central Orange river systems and the latter's major tributary, the Vaal. In contrast, the marginal zones below the Great Escarpment are drained by numerous smaller intermittent streams, each running independently to the sea. None of the rivers is very large, and their flow is extremely variable. A riverbed may be dry one day and a raging torrent within twenty-four hours but almost as quickly subside. River valleys generally are not suitable for large-scale irrigation, and valley flood-plains are small or nonexistent. None of the rivers is navigable, except in small boats for short distances.

The Orange River rises in northeastern Lesotho and flows in a general westerly direction across the plateau to the Atlantic, a distance of 1,400 miles. Its catchment area, including that of its major tributary, the Vaal, is about 219,000 square miles. The Limpopo’s basin covers approximately 70,500 square miles.

In its upper and middle courses the Orange snakes across the center of the Highveld region and is joined midway on the plateau by the Vaal in its descent from the eastern Highveld escarpment. Leaving the Highveld, the Orange falls about 80 feet over a series of steep rapids, followed by an almost vertical drop of about 600 feet at Aughrabies Falls. For the last 400 miles of its course, the river follows a large gorge cut to depths of 1,000 to 3,000 feet below the general level of the plateau. It crosses the coastal plain of the Southern Namib region and enters the Atlantic by a single mouth, five miles north of Alexander Bay. The Orange is inaccessible to seagoing vessels, but it is navigable by small boats for about 30 to 40 miles.

Below the Vaal confluence in the center of the Highveld, its tributaries bring very little water to the Orange, and much is lost by evaporation or is drawn off for irrigation purposes. In exceptionally dry seasons vast areas of the flow may cease altogether.

In eastern Natal the Tugela River is the largest and potentially most important of the coastal rivers that rise in the Great Escarpment and flow through the marginal regions toward the sea. Gradients of the Natal and Transkeian rivers are usually steep, and many marginal rivers have incised deep valleys. Because of the proximity of the watershed to the east coast and the steep gradients, the rivers are too short for navigational purposes, despite their generally perennial nature. A number of minor streams rise in the Karoo and cross the Cape Range mountains southward to the coast through a series of gorges, but only a few are perennial.

There is only one natural lake, the small Funduzi, located in the extreme northern tip of Transvaal’s Limpopo Valley. Although
there are natural hollows or pans on the surface of the land, most are filled with water only part of the year. Some of the larger pans in the Orange Free State are twelve square miles in size. The water in these depressions may be saline, brackish, or almost fresh.

Resources

South Africa has the largest deposits, or ranks among the world’s leading producers, of gold, diamonds, platinum, uranium, coal, iron ore, chromite, manganese asbestos, and antimony. In addition, deposits of a large variety of other minerals are known to exist within the republic. They include copper, silver, magnesite, nickel, tungsten, fluor spar, gypsum, zinc, mica, talc, tin, lead, titanium, graphite, kaolin, felspar, marble, lime, phosphates, silcrete, salt, arsenic, molybdenum, tantalum, monazite, mercury, beryllium, barytes, and zirconium. In early 1970 bauxite had not been discovered.

A number of the mineral deposits are small, but they probably are sufficient to meet the country’s domestic needs for many years to come. Mineral resources are concentrated mainly in the provinces of

Source: Adapted from Republic of South Africa, Department of Planning, Development Atlas, Pretoria, 1966.

Figure 5. Mineral Deposits of South Africa.
Transvaal and Orange Free State, but extensive deposits exist in all provincial areas (see fig. 5). The government by act of Parliament retains exploitation rights over all the country’s mineral reserves.

Although South Africa comprises less than 1 percent of the world’s surface, it produces nearly three-fourths of the gold of all countries other than the Communist ones. Gold was first discovered in the Archaean rocks near Johannesburg in 1854, and exploration in 1886 revealed extensive gold-bearing reefs throughout the Witwatersrand region of southern Transvaal. After the turn of the century the east and west Rand extensions of the original deposit were developed.

The gold ore is contained in thin tabular sheets of accumulations that form part of the Witwatersrand geological system. Composed of a sequence of sediments up to five miles thick, the system is assumed to have been deposited by water. It overlies a floor of granite and older metamorphic rocks. The Rand’s gold was originally discovered when the reefs outcropped on the surface of the land. These reefs ran in an east-west direction and dipped steeply to the south to progressively greater depth.

In 1934 boring operations confirmed the long-suspected existence of gold deposits deep below the surface in the western Orange Free State. This discovery led to the development of an entirely new gold field south of the Vaal River. The first ore was produced from this area in 1951, and in the late 1960’s the Orange Free State was responsible for about one third of the national production. Moreover, the size of this deposit indicated that this proportion likely would rise still higher in the future. Prospecting operations in the eastern Transvaal Highveld also indicate the likelihood of further gold deposits in that region (see ch. 21, Industry).

With the more recent discoveries in the Orange Free State, gold deposits appear to form a large reef or arc extending over approximately 300 miles. This reef is believed to contain the world’s largest gold ore reserve and a large number of other minerals usually associated with gold deposits.

The gold-bearing reefs of the Witwatersrand system contain quantities of uranium and thorium. Although the concentrations are low, the reserves of uranium are believed to be one of the world’s largest accessible sources of this strategic mineral. Not only can uranium be extracted from gold ore currently being mined, but also there is a large amount of it present in the waste material deposited in earlier years from the older mines.

Diamonds were first discovered in South Africa in 1867. Until 1929 the republic led the world in diamond production. Other countries have come to produce more industrial diamonds, but South Africa continued to rank as the chief supplier of gem-quality stones. The principal sources of South African diamonds are in and
near the bed of the Vaal River, west of Kimberley in the southwestern Transvaal, and along the western coastal region of the Southern Namib. Recent exploration of the ocean floor along the continental shelf has revealed important deposits of diamonds.

The reserves of platinum in the Transvaal’s Bushveld Basin are believed to be large. First discovered in 1924, the reef formation was subsequently traced over a distance of hundreds of miles through Pietersburg in northern Transvaal to the Pretoria area in the western and central part of the province. The reefs vary in thickness from a few feet to about thirty feet.

Coal deposits have been estimated conservatively at 75 billion tons, or about 80 percent of the estimated reserves in all of Africa. Transvaal Province possesses nearly 90 percent of the known reserves, the bulk of which is close to the Witwatersrand mining area. Large deposits also are in northern Natal and the north-central area of the Orange Free State. Vast reserves are believed to exist in southeastern Cape Province.

Most of the coal is the bituminous variety, of which a limited and rapidly diminishing amount is coking quality. Anthracite deposits have been found in Natal and Transkei, although they have not been exploited. A considerable portion of the reserves may consist of low-grade coal, but it should be suitable for the generation of electric power and for conversion into petroleum fuels. Most coal deposits are found at shallow depths. With the exception of deposits in the Orange Free State, the seams are regular, nearly horizontal, and from four to fifteen feet thick.

Iron ore is found generally in the western, southern, and eastern reaches of Transvaal’s Bushveld Basin. Most deposits are easily accessible. The reserves of high-grade ore are not extensive, but those of medium and lower grades are large.

With the growing use of titanium in modern aircraft, jet engines, and missiles, the country is the fortunate owner of one of the world's largest deposits of titaniferous magnetite, from which this strategic metal is derived. Large deposits are located in the Transvaal Bushveld igneous complex, and further deposits exist on the south coast of Natal. The ilmenite in beach sands from Port Elizabeth northward along the Indian Ocean is considered another potential source.

South Africa is considered to have the second largest chrome ore deposits in the world. Again, this mineral is found in the Transvaal Bushveld, where a 170-mile chromite belt parallels the platinum reef. Grades of this ore vary, but the average is about 45 percent chromite.

Manganese deposits rank among the best in the world. Estimates of the size of these reserves range as high as 1 billion tons. The ore is found in northwestern, southwestern, and north-central Cape
Province; northern Natal; and throughout most of the Transvaal mining regions. Copper deposits exist in many regions of South Africa, notably in northwestern Cape Province, in the Transvaal mining districts, and in central Natal.

The remaining list of important commercially exploitable mineral resources includes tin ore deposits southwest of Pretoria; high-grade asbestos in northeastern Cape Province and throughout Transvaal; antimony, phosphates, vermiculite and gold-associated silver deposits in Transvaal. Although there is no rock salt in the republic, large quantities of evaporative salt are derived from salt pans in the arid inland areas of northwestern and northeastern Cape Province.

Underground oil reserves had long been thought to exist and, after nearly three years of widely scattered, unsuccessful exploration, coastal and offshore surveys confirmed the existence of a sedimentary section 4,500 meters thick. Although the extent of natural petroleum deposits remained undetermined in mid-1969, optimistic prospecting operations were underway in several sectors of Cape Province. Drilling sites include the Karoo region, the offshore regions of the southern coast, and Matatiele, close to the eastern border of Lesotho near the Transkei boundary.

Despite immense mineral wealth, water resources are greatly limited and must be carefully conserved. Thus, although water is one of the major factors in shaping the economic landscapes, water transport has never played any part in the development of the interior. Moreover, it is only quite recently that attempts have been made to harness the waters of the major rivers to serve any useful purpose except on a relatively small scale.

Surface evaporation and rapid runoff adversely affect water table levels. Approximately 12½ percent of the country's requirements are supplied by ground water, which in many cases is in danger of exhaustion. In the western parts of the republic, people are almost entirely dependent on boreholes for their water supplies. Often the water is brackish in comparison with well water found in central and eastern areas. Most ground water has a high mineral content; and only in the southern and eastern marginal areas is the ground water reasonably pure.

A relatively high water consumption rate and the markedly limited supply have prompted the institution of a number of remedial measures in recent years. In 1960 there were over 247,000 dams to assist in the conservation of water resources and increase the republic's water potential. These ranged in size from small earthen catchments provided by individual farmers to large state-constructed dams with a storage capacity approaching 2 million acre-feet. Vaal Dam, about fifty miles south of Johannesburg, is the largest and most important of these installations. Completed in 1936, it is used for storage and to control floodwater and flow as far as the Vaal.
Orange confluence. At times it provides water for irrigation beyond this point. Its chief purpose is to supply water and hydroelectric power to the city of Johannesburg, the Witwatersrand, and other populous settlements of western Transvaal.

The most ambitious effort to increase the water potential is the multipurpose Orange River Development Project. Approved by the government in 1962, it will develop irrigation and hydroelectric power in six phases over a period of thirty years at a cost of nearly US$600 million. Three major conservation dams will be built in the Highveld region. When completed, an estimated 4.5 million acre-feet of water will be available for irrigating nearly 800,000 acres of farmland. The total power development under this comprehensive project aims at a final output of about 200 megawatts. The project is linked to an extensive government program of soil conservation (see ch. 20, Agriculture).

Wildlife

There is a wide variety of big game and smaller wild animals. Because unrestricted hunting threatened to deplete the animal population, the government established a series of thirteen game reserves and national parks throughout the country to protect and preserve the natural wildlife. Most of the small mammals are still found wild in their natural habitat, but the larger animals survive only in the protected areas.

The largest of the government preserves, Kruger National Park, an area of about 8,000 square miles, extends for about 200 miles along the Transvaal-Mozambique border. Because of the numerous animal species that abound in Kruger Park, it has become South Africa’s chief tourist attraction.

Lions and elephants are usually found only in or near the game reserves. Smaller antelope still roam wild, and the leopard, baboon, jackal, and hyena are still found in the less frequented areas. Primates include the bush baby or night ape, the vervet monkey, samango monkey, and the chacma baboon.

The carnivores are represented by the fox, jackal, weasel, badger, otter, civet, mongoose, hyena, wildcat, lynx, leopard, lion, and cheetah. Along the southern coast the Cape sea lion, or fur seal, and the elephant seal are seen occasionally. The aardvark and the African elephant, the tallest of all African species, can be seen in the game reserves. One of the most common mammals is the hydrox, or shrewmouse.

Among the hoofed mammals are the black and the white rhinoceros, two varieties of zebra, the bush pig, warthog, hippopotamus, giraffe, Cape buffalo, and about twenty varieties of antelope, or buck as they are generally called in South Africa. There are two
varieties of hares. The scaly anteater is often seen in the Cape region.

Rodents appear to be the most numerous of the animals native to the area. Six families are represented, including the mole rat, squirrel, dormouse, rat, mouse, and gerbil. In the seas surrounding the country, there are whales and dolphins. Over twenty genera of bats have been located.

Of more than 100 species of snakes, about one in four is poisonous. The rear-fanged snakes, which are moderately poisonous, include such species as the skaapsteekers (sheep strikers) and the large boomslang, or tree snake. Among the front-fanged snakes are the deadly mamba, three species of cobra, and the closely related ringhals. One of the latter, a spitting snake known locally as a “ringed neck,” is peculiar to South Africa. The vipers are represented by the horned and puff adders. A venomous sea snake, the Hydrus platyurus, is occasionally found along the coastal reaches. Non-poisonous snakes include the useful mole snake and the egg-eating Dasypeltis scabra. One species of python common to South Africa often attains lengths of twenty feet.

Many species of amphibians exist in areas of permanent water. Terrestrial and aquatic turtles are well represented, and lizards and chameleons are numerous. The Nile crocodile is found as far south as the Tugela River in eastern Natal.

Most of the birds are of the Ethiopian type, but representatives of tropical, antarctic, and migratory types exist as well. The tropical group includes parrots, lovebirds, flamingos, touracos, and others. These are found chiefly in the eastern regions, having come southward along the East African savanna corridor. The southern or antarctic birds include the jackass penguin, the albatross, the Cape pigeon, the Cape hen, and several shearwaters. About 200 species of fresh-water fish inhabit South African rivers and streams and include carp, bass, perch, catfish, and tiger fish. Many of the streams in recreation areas have been stocked with trout. Salt-water marine life includes rock lobster, pilchards, mackerel, sharks, sole, anchovies, and four varieties of tuna.

Nearly all orders of insects are represented. Termites are abundant, and beetles, bees, ants, and wasps are prevalent. The Anophe-line mosquito and the tsetse fly, which were formerly widespread in Natal, are found, although eradication efforts have limited their presence in some areas. The brown locusts, which formerly swarmed over South Africa, are now destroyed in the immature stages by spraying.

**TRANSPORTATION**

The transportation system is the most extensive and highly developed in Africa. Development of this network dates from the
mid-nineteenth century. For the first 200 years after the arrival of European settlers at the Cape of Good Hope, the trails of ox-drawn wagons alone linked the coastal centers with the hinterland. In 1969 the government owned and operated the public transport facilities. The South African Railways and Harbors Administration under the minister of transport operated the railways, airways, harbors, and most of the highways. There are no navigable inland waterways.

Roads

A comprehensive network of roads has been constructed covering all of the more populous areas (see fig. 6). The National Roads Act of 1935 created the National Road Board for the administration of a system of roads under the authority of the central government. The board's program provided for the construction, reconstruction, repair, and maintenance of all highways classified as national. Although the original act designated fifteen routes, the number of national roads in 1968 had risen to nineteen. The interconnecting system links all primary and most secondary population centers with asphalt-surfaced highways of a specified width of at least 100

Figure 6. Roads, Harbors, and Airports of South Africa.
feet. In early 1969 the national highway system comprised approximately 6,200 miles, of which 5,500 miles were surfaced for all-weather use. The remainder of these national roads were scheduled for surfacing through central government funding.

The provincial administrations are charged with the responsibility for construction and maintenance of all other roads, but the central government assists with a partial subsidy plan. Main provincial roads are eighty feet wide with gravel or asphalt surfaces. District roads are usually sixty feet wide and of gravel and often usable only in good weather. In 1968 there were 13,000 miles of asphalt provincial highways, 39,000 miles of gravel roads, and approximately 150,000 miles of unsurfaced minor roads.

National roads are of high standard and are adequately maintained. The condition of gravel-surfaced roads varies with weather and traffic conditions, but most are adequately engineered with culverts, bridges, and all-weather standards. Hazards of water, sand, and steep gradients, however, may be encountered on minor roads and on those in sparsely populated areas.

Railways

The total absence of navigable waterways and the location of rich mineral resources in the interior required the development of an extensive railway system for heavy long-distance hauling. Railway construction began in 1859 with the building of fifty-seven miles of rail line from Cape Town to Wellington. The first line to be opened for traffic, however, was a two-mile section between Durban and Durban Harbor in 1860. These two ventures were private enterprises but were taken over subsequently by governments of the respective areas.

Extensive railway construction under state control quickly followed the discovery of diamonds near Kimberley and subsequent gold strikes on the Witwatersrand. When the Union of South Africa was established in 1910, the government-owned lines in the four provinces were amalgamated into one centrally controlled state undertaking, which also administered the principal harbors. At that time there were 7,500 route-miles of railways.

After 1910 the railway progressed rapidly, and by 1968 the total trackage of over 19,000 miles was over two-thirds of Africa’s total railway system. Operating routes in 1968 totaled 13,700 miles (see fig. 7). Except for about 500 miles of feeder lines with a track gauge of two feet, both main and branch lines employ tracks and equipment based on a gauge of three feet six inches. Adoption of narrow-gauge trackage dates from the 1870’s when the railways were first negotiating the difficult country of the Cape Range mountains and Natal. Although the narrow gauge restricts railway
capacity; it is compatible with the lines in Rhodesia and Mozambique, with which the network connects.

The plateau nature of much of the country has been an advantage for railway construction. The extensive escarpments and dissected marginal zones, however, have presented great difficulties to the railway engineer. These problems are being overcome only in recent years at heavy engineering and construction costs. In 1968 there was no direct rail connection between the major east coast cities of Durban and East London, and Durban had only one rail link with the interior. Because the bulk of the freight either comes from or is moving to the southern Transvaal, there is considerable railway congestion in that area and on the lines linking it to the various ports.

In 1926 a program of railway electrification was begun, and by 1968 over 2,300 miles had been electrified, mainly in industrial areas such as southern Transvaal. Rail lines in the Witwatersrand area are electric, as are those connecting the coal mines of the Witbank area, Kroonstad, and the Free State goldfield. In


*Figure 7. Railway System of South Africa.*
Natal the main line has been completely electrified from Durban to the Transvaal border. In southwestern Cape Province the line to the interior has been electrified to Beaufort West.

The South African Railways and Harbors Administration operates an extensive road-transport service that connects rural areas to the railways, with buses and trucks operating over a route mileage of more than 31,800 miles.

Ports

The principal harbors are located at Durban and East London on the eastern coast; Port Elizabeth and Mosselbaai on the southern coast; Table Bay at Cape Town in the southwest; and Walvis Bay, South Africa’s enclave in South West Africa (see fig. 6). Although the republic is not well endowed with naturally sheltered harbors, the ports at Durban, Cape Town, and Port Elizabeth are among the largest and most modern in Africa.

Durban, the largest and busiest South African port, is located on Durban Bay, a large harbor well protected by sandspits. Its size has permitted ample room between its quays, but the harbor entrance is narrow. Its depth is maintained at a minimum of fifty feet, but without continuous dredging operations it would be only a few feet deep.

Cape Town has the largest dock area of any port in southern Africa and the largest drydock in the southern hemisphere. Before construction of a breakwater in 1860, the harbor afforded no protection from northwesterly winter gales. Cape Town’s Table Bay harbor was rebuilt in the period from 1937 to 1940.

Port Elizabeth extends for several miles along the open shores of Algoa Bay on the Indian Ocean. It has even less natural protection than the facility at Cape Town. The main breakwater enclosing the harbor on the east and south was constructed in 1927. A new quay built in 1935 can accommodate the largest vessels that visit South Africa.

In addition to the modern drydock and ship repair facilities at Cape Town and Durban, there is a drydock at East London, the small river port northeast of Port Elizabeth. The East London harbor, however, is handicapped by silting and a somewhat narrow estuary.

Civil Aviation

The first regular commercial air service was introduced in 1929 by a private company known as Union Airways. It was formed primarily for carrying domestic mail. In 1934 South African Railways, which had been authorized to operate its own departmental air-
craft, assumed control of Union Airways and renamed it South African Airways (SAA). By 1938 the new airline had acquired larger aircraft fitted with modern communications and navigation equipment and was operating frequent scheduled flights between most of the country's major cities. In 1939 regional service was begun between Johannesburg and Luanda, Angola. At the outbreak of World War II, the airline's planes and personnel were mobilized for military service. Many SAA aircrews and ground technicians served with distinction in the South African Air Force until the end of the war.

After the war the national airline continued to expand. Equipment inventories kept pace with the expansion of civil air service, and in late 1960 SAA introduced Boeing 707 jet aircraft on its route to Europe. In early 1970 SAA operated a comprehensive network of domestic, regional, and international services. Domestically, SAA flights connected all major cities of South Africa and South West Africa. SAA participated with the Central African Airways in frequently scheduled flights from Johannesburg to Salisbury and Bulawayo in Rhodesia. A similar arrangement with Divisão Exploradora Transportes Aéreos (DETA) provided regional services between South African cities and Lourenço Marques in Mozambique. In association with Botswana Airways Corporation, SAA provided air service between Johannesburg and Gaberone.


In mid-1969 there were more than 270 licensed civil airports in the Republic (see fig. 6). Jan Smuts Airport near Johannesburg was the only one of international standard. Other major airports were located at Durban, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, Bloemfontein, East London, Kimberley, Middelburg, Upington, Pietersburg, Phalaborwa, and Walvis Bay.

SETTLEMENT PATTERNS

Settlement patterns are a consequence of colonial adventure, migration, war, and a quest for wealth based on underground mineral treasure (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Since the promulgation of
the Act of Union in 1910, settlement patterns generally have con-
formed to the government’s policies of segregating the population
by distinct ethnic groups (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages;
ch. 15, Political Dynamics).

The English-speaking whites have settled in Natal, on large farms
in eastern Cape Province, or in the suburbs around the cities of
Johannesburg, Cape Town, East London, Pretoria, and Port Eliza-
beth. Here they function in industry and commerce, the pro-
fessions, skilled crafts and, to a limited degree, agriculture.

Before a trend toward urbanization that began in the 1930’s, tra-
ditional Afrikaner settlement patterns were related generally to agri-
culture (see ch. 4, Population). By the late 1960’s the former stere-
otyped distinction between the rural Afrikaner and the urban En-
GLISHMAN was no longer valid. Afrikaners had moved to the cities
and towns in large numbers. Many were wage earners, but others
had entered the top levels of government, business, finance, science,
and the professions.

Although Afrikaners still constituted more than 80 percent of all
white farmers, the number who actually lived on and worked their
own farms was diminishing. Approximately 30 to 40 percent of the
farms in Cape Province were owned by white landlords who lived in
urban centers while their rural holdings were left in the care of
nonwhite employees. Most Afrikaner farms were large open-country
acreages concentrated through the Highveld; the Transvaal Bush-
veld; the flat midlands, river basins, and coastal lowlands of Natal;
southwestern Cape Province; limited sections of the Karoo; and a
narrow coastal strip near Port Elizabeth on the southeastern coast.

Most of the African population is settled in the eastern half of the
republic and over one-third in the native reserves or homeland areas.
Originally most of the Africans were organized in tribes, living in
small settlements, or kraals with their families and livestock. They
were pastoralists and shifting cultivators, and common grazing lands
were controlled and used by the various family groups (ch. 3, His-
torical Setting; ch. 4, Population; ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Lan-
guages).

The only resemblance to this settlement pattern in the late 1960’s
existed in the native reserves, which were established and de-
marcated by the government’s Natives Land Act of 1913 (see ch.3,
Historical Setting). According to the 1960 census, about 44 percent
of the Africans lived in the reserves; the rest were settled in towns
or on white-owned farms.

The Coloureds have settled mainly in western Cape Province.
About 88 percent of the Republic’s total Coloured population live
in this area, half of them within 200 miles of Cape Town. Members
of the group provide unskilled labor for white-owned farms and
industry, although a small number are craftsmen such as builders or
carpenters. A limited number of Coloureds are settled on government-developed reserves that constitute 1.3 percent of the country's total area. Most are located in northwestern Cape Province, although one small Coloured reserve exists in the Orange Free State.

The smallest of the population groups are the Asians, whose largely Indian ancestors settled on British sugar plantations in Natal in the mid-nineteenth century. Approximately 83 percent lived in Natal Province, with virtually none in the Orange Free State. Legislation prohibits their free movement within the Republic. Roughly three-fourths of the Indian population is concentrated in Durban, Pietermaritzburg, and other large towns of Natal. The Asian group includes about 7,500 Chinese, the largest concentrations of whom were in Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth, Kimberley, and Pretoria.

A shift in settlement patterns over the last few decades has resulted in a steady increase in urbanization. As a result of this settlement trend, a number of cities have sprung up, and the major ones have increased in size at phenomenal rates (see ch. 4, Population). In 1969 South Africa had eleven cities with populations exceeding 100,000.

Standing astride the rich Witwatersrand mining district on a site that was nothing but grassland eighty years ago, Johannesburg is the country's largest city and the largest in Africa south of the Sahara. The population was over 1.5 million in mid-1960 and had increased 270 percent since 1936. Johannesburg is the focal point of the transportation network of South Africa, the financial capital, and the core of the wealthiest section of the country. The Republic's most bustling and cosmopolitan city, it is occupied by all the racial and cultural groups.

Johannesburg, which dominates the national economic life, sprung into existence after the Witwatersrand gold discovery and subsequently has stimulated the development of many other industries (see ch. 21, Industry). A modern city, one of its striking features is the wealth of the white sector of the population. Until the government began clearing away the African settlements on the city's outskirts, the African shantytowns presented a stark comparison with conditions in the white districts.

A city built in a span of only a few years, Johannesburg is planned along modern lines. The central business district reveals neat square blocks separated by both wide and narrow streets. The city's central area is surrounded by mine tailings and the large railroad station with its maze of tracks. As a result, it has expanded upward with a towering skyline of tall buildings, some exceeding twenty stories.

Despite its legacy of modern planning, Johannesburg has no distinctive architectural character. Buildings are replaced and constructed at a rate reported to be among the highest in the world.
The result is a gradual modernizing of the structures in the downtown districts. The central city suffers from heavy traffic problems, and the morning and evening rush hours resemble those in many European and American metropolitan areas. In conformity with the official policy of maximum racial separation, African workers must live outside the city. There is no subway, and the flood of workers arrive and depart in thousands of cars and by train, bus, and bicycle.

Pretoria, the nation’s administrative capital, has grown rapidly. Located only thirty-five miles north of Johannesburg, it has slight significance apart from its governmental function and gateway to northern Transvaal. In 1960 the population of Pretoria exceeded 422,000 and was growing at a rapid pace. The city is built on a modern rectangular plan with a large central square, wide avenues, government buildings, numerous historical monuments, and gardens.

Cape Town on the southwestern coast, with over 807,000 inhabitants in 1960, is South Africa’s second city in both size and importance. It is considered to be the most beautiful city in the country. With a centuries-old history, it stands alone among the Republic’s cities in terms of architecture, tradition, and culture. Its Mediterranean climate is a valued asset to residents and visitors alike.

Lying at the foot of Table Mountain, Cape Town sprawls around both flanks of the mountain. Because it stands close to the shoreline, space for urban development is limited. In the central city, development has been haphazard, and the modern rectangular blocks of Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Durban are missing from Cape Town. The one modern wide avenue is the main street from which a maze of narrow lanes, alleys, and one-way or dead-end streets radiate. Reclamation of a large portion of Table Bay for a new central business district has given the city a new stretch of multistory buildings. Cape Town, as the national legislative capital, serves as the residence for government officials during the six-month periods that Parliament is in session.

Along the coastline stretching from Cape Town to central Natal are the flourishing seaport cities of Port Elizabeth, East London, and Durban. With a population of over 681,000 in 1960, Durban is South Africa’s third largest city. It has a number of large industrial plants and one of the country’s chief harbors. It is also one of the country’s leading tourist vacation spots. Port Elizabeth is a major industrial area and one of the leading seaports.

On the inland plateau of the Highveld, the two major cities are Kimberley in Cape Province and Bloemfontein in the Orange Free State. Although no longer as vital as it was in the earlier diamond strike days, Kimberley remains a focus for mining operations in the area and a significant trading center. Bloemfontein, once the capital
of the former Orange Free State Republic, remains the provincial focus of administration and cultural affairs. Because it is the locus of railway, road, and air transportation systems, Bloemfontein is one of the Republic's chief distribution centers. In the 1960's it experienced an increase in industrial activity, because its water supplies were more favorable than those in other overburdened industrial areas.
CHAPTER 3
HISTORICAL SETTING

Modern political and social institutions in South Africa are direct consequences of clearly discernible historical developments over a period of three centuries. At the start of the 19th century the society was highly stratified in racial terms and was marked by substantial cultural differences among various elements in the population. Access to political and economic power was limited by racial barriers, and there was a high potential for continuing conflict (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages; ch. 6, Social Structure; ch. 15, Political Dynamics; ch. 19, Character and Structure of the Economy).

Modern social institutions are the outcome of a series of conflicts of a roughly similar kind that began with the first contacts between the groups that make up the society. These conflicts have always been framed in racial terms, and the basic issues have been the questions of the control of land and, later, of the control of labor to work the land.

The European colonists and their white descendants, with their superior technology and more developed political organizations, have striven from the beginning to dominate the numerically superior African communities. By the mid-eighteenth century, after 100 years in South Africa, most whites were so convinced of the superiority of their culture that nothing could challenge their view that Africans were destined by God to be permanently relegated to positions inferior to the whites. Most of the history of South Africa in the twentieth century is the history of the efforts of the white community to insure the continued absolute supremacy of its interests over those of the nonwhites in a rapidly developing industrial economy and in the face of the growth of independent black African states and a generally hostile world opinion. These efforts to maintain white supremacy led to the imposition of a series of social and legal restraints under which the majority of the population has chafed in the decades since World War II.

The earliest inhabitants of South Africa with living descendants were the largely pastoral Hottentot (Khoikhoi) and the Bushmen (San) hunters and gatherers. Bands of both groups roamed much of southern Africa before the beginnings of the Christian Era. Bantu-speaking peoples, more typically negroid than the Bushman and Hottentot, advanced into South Africa from the north in search of
new land and pastures. Like the Hottentot, they herded cattle, sheep, and goats; but they were also horticulturists, and they produced and used iron tools and weapons. They probably crossed present borders of South Africa sometime before A.D. 1000. Until the eighteenth century, however, they limited their advance to the richer agricultural areas to the north of the Orange and Kei rivers.

The first European contacts with the country began after the Portuguese discovered the route round the Cape of Good Hope to the Indies in 1488. Because of its inhospitable coastline, the country was largely ignored, until the Dutch East India Company established a revictualing station at Cape Town in 1652. The colony remained in the hands of the company for its first 150 years. In order to produce the agricultural products needed to supply the station and its ships, the company brought in agricultural workers.

The company's European employees proved inadequate farmers, and farms were granted to European freemen. Efforts to coerce the Hottentot into service largely failed, and slaves were imported from Asia and other parts of Africa. Unions of slaves, European masters, and Hottentot led to the development of one of the country's major population groups, the Coloured peoples, who gradually adopted the language and much of the culture of the Europeans.

Many of the Dutch settlers turned from farming to cattle raising in the dry interior of the Cape. These frontier ranchers, called Boers, developed their own subculture, based on their self-sufficient, patriarchal communities. They were hostile not only toward Africans with whom they fought but also toward the government of the Cape, which was attempting to restrain both their movements and their commerce. After the middle of the eighteenth century, the Boers began to encounter the Bantu tribesmen, who, like the Boers, were advancing into the Eastern Cape in search of new pastures for the cattle herds upon which their economy depended. Warfare opened in 1779 as Boer and Bantu competed for the range lands. Such sporadic conflicts were to continue for 100 years, until all of the African lands were either in white hands or under white sovereignty.

As a result of the Napoleonic wars, the Cape Colony became a British possession in 1806. Relations between the Dutch settlers and the British were at first cordial but deteriorated as a result of the more liberal attitudes displayed toward nonwhites by the British, particularly after 1828. One manifestation of these attitudes was the abolition of slavery in 1834. This liberalization was greatly resented by the Boers, and the most bitter of them emigrated to the unclaimed lands north of the Cape Colony's Orange River frontier, which had been partially depopulated by inter-African warfare in the previous twenty years.

The major emigration—the Great Trek—took place between 1836
and 1838. The Boers settled in two regions, between the Orange and Vaal rivers and beyond the Vaal River, establishing the republics of the Orange Free State and of the Transvaal, as well as a short-lived republic in Natal. Britain annexed Natal in 1843 and proclaimed a protectorate over the territories of the Basuto king. It proclaimed British sovereignty over the Orange Free State, but relinquished the territories in the face of Boer demands in 1854.

The political history of the second half of the century is generally that of the conflicting claims of sovereignty and control between the British and the Boers. The once powerful African tribes and nations, weakened by the years of warfare that preceded the assault of the Boers, were able only to retard, not to halt, the advance of the Europeans. Most of them were easily conquered and driven from the choice lands desired by the Europeans into reserves, which became smaller and smaller. Four of the tribes with the strongest organization and leadership were able to retain their autonomy for a considerable time. The Zulu and the Xhosa-speaking Pondo were eventually absorbed into the British colonies, although the Pondo even then retained a very limited form of political cohesion. The Basuto (South Sotho) and the Swazi were able to retain limited independence of action as British protectorates, permanent black enclaves in a white-dominated country.

Diamonds and gold were discovered between 1867 and the end of the century. The discoveries triggered an influx of new white immigrants and worldwide financial interest. These two factors led to the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902, which resulted in uncontested British control over the Boer states. In 1910, however, under joint Boer and British leadership, the country was united as the Union of South Africa, a dominion in the British Commonwealth.

During the next thirty years the country gradually became an industrialized state. The political divisions of the period revolved around one point—the securing for the poorer portions of the white population the dominant position in the labor market over the contesting interests of the nonwhites and the largely British capitalists. This poor white group was composed largely of Afrikaners as the Afrikaans-speaking Boers had come to be called. This period also saw the related developments of increased restrictions on the already limited political freedom of the nonwhites, a lessening of ties to Britain, and increased Afrikaner participation in business ownership.

Despite the improved economic position of the Afrikaners, a major portion of the Afrikaner community looked to episodes of their earlier history and found continued inspiration for opposition to the British and a mixture of fear and hatred of the Africans as potential competitors. These Afrikaners opposed South Africa’s support for Great Britain in World War II. By the end of the war,
they had a political organization, the Nationalist Party, strong enough to be victorious in the parliamentary elections of 1948 and in subsequent elections of the 1950's and 1960's.

During these two decades the Nationalists developed and partially implemented their policies of apartheid (racial separation). At the same time the Nationalists cut the country's ties to Britain, a process culminating with the establishment of a republic and withdrawal from the British Commonwealth in 1961. By 1966 effective parliamentary opposition to the Nationalist doctrine and rule had been largely eliminated by the party's continued dominance at the all-white polls, and the extraparliamentary opposition, by the imposition of stringent laws, enforced by an effective police system.

THE PRE-EUROPEAN PERIOD

Man and the manlike creatures who may have been his ancestors have inhabited the South African plateau for millennia. The remains of the predecessors of modern man have been found at several South African sites, which contain remains of Australopithecine (man-apes) who inhabited southern and eastern Africa in the early Pleistocene, well over one million years ago. Fragmentary remains suggest the emergence of an intermediate hominid, not quite Homo sapiens, about a half million years ago. Much of the research on early man, his products, and his environment has been done by South African specialists (see ch. 10, Artistic and Intellectual Expression).

By the end of the Pleistocene—roughly 10,000 to 20,000 years ago—and probably earlier, all forms were fully Homo sapiens, hunters and gatherers using stone tools. Some lived in the interior but hunted different species; others gained a livelihood by gathering shellfish and other things along the coast. Their precise relationship to modern man in South Africa was still a matter for scientific dispute in the late 1960's, but there is some evidence that hunters and gatherers of the late Pleistocene and early recent periods were the ancestors of the peoples called Bushmen and Hottentot by early Dutch settlers.

Prehistoric archaeology shows that people resembling the modern Bushmen and Hottentot, but of a more nearly average height, inhabited South Africa for some thousands of years. By the time the first Europeans encountered them, those known as Hottentot had abandoned hunting and had acquired herds of cattle, goats, and sheep.

The ancestors of the Bantu-speaking majority, moving southward from the Congo area, entered the Zambezi area around the beginnings of the Christian Era and, as early as A.D. 400, probably established the beginnings of the sociopolitical system that gave rise
to the ruins of Zimbabwe in modern Rhodesia. These people carried a knowledge of agriculture and of iron-making. At some point before they crossed the Limpopo River (the northern boundary of modern South Africa), many of them had also acquired cattle, and it is likely that their search for new pastures led them to move south. The ancestors of the Bantu-speaking peoples crossed the Limpopo sometime before A.D. 700, settling first in the eastern Transvaal (see Fig. 8).

No specific link has been established between the earliest Bantu-speakers and modern peoples, but it is fairly clear that the ancestors of those Africans called Nguni-speaking peoples crossed the Limpopo about A.D. 1300 and drove some of the earlier arrivals south and west and absorbed others. The Nguni came to occupy Swaziland and all of South Africa south of the Limpopo to the Kei River and between the Drakensberg Mountains and the Indian Ocean, apparently driving the Hottentots before them. The forward elements of the Nguni had reached the Great Fish River by A.D. 1500. The journals of Portuguese sailors cast away on the Natal
coast as early as 1552 testify to the already dense Bantu-speaking population in Natal at that date. The advance of the Nguni halted between the Kei and the Great Fish rivers until the mid-1700's, while they built up their strength in the then rich Transkei lands.

THE ARRIVAL OF THE EUROPEANS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BOER VALUES

The first European contacts with the South African coast resulted from the great rush to find an ocean route to the Indies at the end of the fifteenth century. In 1488 a Portuguese expedition under Bartholomew Diaz rounded the southern tip of Africa for the first time. Diaz’ voyage ended near the modern city of Port Elizabeth before turning back to Europe. It was only on the return voyage that the voyagers discovered the Cape of Good Hope. Nine years later a second expedition under Vasco da Gama, making the first voyage from Europe to India, landed at Mosselbaai to trade with the Hottentots for meat to stock the ship for the long voyage.

Because of the value of the spice trade between Europe and the East, significant numbers of Portuguese ships began to use the route almost immediately. To ease their supply problem, the Portuguese established refreshment stations at convenient points but ignored South Africa in favor of the gentler coasts of Angola and Mozambique. During the sixteenth century a number of Portuguese ships were wrecked along the South African coast, and their survivors, some of whom walked across the country to the Portuguese settlement at Lourenço Marques, provided the earliest account of the lands and peoples of the interior of the country.

By the end of the sixteenth century Portugal’s power had begun to decline, and English and Dutch ships vied to replace the Portuguese on the profitable spice trade route. The English began to call sporadically at the Cape in search of provisions after 1601, but they continued to prefer Ascension Island in the South Atlantic as their calling station.

Serious Dutch interest in the Cape was awakened after 1647, when a captain of the Dutch East India Company was shipwrecked there with his crew for several months. On their return to Holland, they reported favorably on the Cape’s potential as a station for supplying company ships at the mid-point of their long voyage to the East. In 1651 the directors of the Dutch East India Company dispatched an expedition under Jan van Riebeeck to establish such a refreshment station. His party of some 100 men and 4 women landed at Table Bay on April 6, 1652, and it was from this nucleus that South Africa’s European settlement grew.

Van Riebeeck established friendly relations with the nearest Hottentot tribe, whose chief had learned some English from trading with passing ships. The total Hottentot and Bushman population
then living in what was to become Cape Province has been estimated at only 25,000, but the great bulk of the Hottentot inhabited the richer lands around the Cape of Good Hope. They were apparently vastly outnumbered by their herds.

The settlers began to lay out farms and to trade for cattle and sheep to provision company ships. As the Hottentots began to realize the permanent nature of European settlement, they observed that the more cattle they traded to Europeans the more land the Europeans demanded for grazing. Their interest in cattle trading therefore began to decline.

Partially motivated by the continual theft of stock by the Hottentots and by the Bushman hunters, who considered cattle as wild game, the Dutch in 1659 declared war on the Hottentot, who were quickly defeated. The Dutch took control of desirable grazing lands and the Cape Peninsula as their reward for victory (see fig. 9). This loss of cattle to theft was to be a recurrent cause or excuse for warfare against the Africans and for seizure of their lands by the settlers throughout South Africa's history.

The Dutch East India Company had not intended theft-Cape settlement to develop into a colony. The early settlers were all company employees and were expected to produce by their own labor the foodstuffs required to provision passing company ships. The Europeans, however, proved to be an insufficient labor force. Attempts to recruit Hottentot labor did not succeed, and therefore slaves were imported, at first from the west African slave markets and later from eastern Africa and from the Dutch East Indies.

Despite the importation of slaves, the production of foodstuffs remained inadequate, evidently because of lack of motivation of the company employees. For this reason in 1679 the company's directors in Holland became convinced of the need to give land to permanent settlers, who would be better motivated to raise crops and cattle for their own profit for sale to the company. A small number of company employees had been allowed to hold land at the Cape from 1657 onward, but after 1679 Germans and Dutch peasants were dispatched from Europe, lured by offers of free farms of their own.

The number of free farmers rose particularly after 1688, when French Huguenots, who had fled into Holland from religious persecutions in France, accepted offers from the company for free passage to Cape Town. The Huguenots were for the most part skilled farmers and winegrowers. They quickly assimilated themselves to Dutch control and the Dutch language. Many of South Africa's Dutch-speaking leaders of the next three centuries were to bear French names. This increase in population was accompanied by a second war against the Hottentot to provide the required farm lands.

In 1713 an epidemic of smallpox, brought by a company ship
Key to Figure 9

1—2. Extent of Dutch East India Company Colony in about 1700 and 1750.
3—4. Northward and westward extensions of the boundary until 1797 and 1824.
5. “Neutral zone” between Great Fish and Keiskamma rivers during the period 1819–47.
7. Boundaries of Cape Colony extended to Orange River and Drakensberg Mountains in 1847.
8. Griqualand East. Independent Griqua State from 1802 until annexed by British government in 1871 (given to Cape Colony in 1880); adjacent Kimberley triangle formally annexed in 1876.
11. Orange Free State created by Voortrekkers. British claimed sovereignty until 1854; independent until Boer War.
13. Xhosa Territories. Annexed by Cape during period 1879–86.
17. Tzaneen Republic, 1888.
18. Bechuana,land Protectorate of imperial government from 1884 to 1905.
23. Southern Rhodesia. Founded initially by Cecil Rhodes as extension of Cape Colony.
from India, wiped out a quarter of the white population and totally devastated the Hottentot. In some areas along the colony’s borders whole tribes disappeared, and Hottentot resistance to the Dutch advance, feeble from the first, was no longer of any serious consequence. A portion of the remaining Hottentot fled from contact with the Europeans into the poorer hinterlands. The majority, however, were simply engulfed by the more advanced society that descended upon them and absorbed into it as the largest portion of the Coloured population.

Although organized opposition by the Hottentot ceased after 1713, the Dutch settlers were to remain in conflict with Africans along the edge of the frontiers for another century and a half. These conflicts were nearly all fought on a very small scale. As early as 1715 the military formation of the Dutch, which was to bear the brunt of such wars on the European side, had appeared. The commandos, irregular groups of lightly armed frontiersmen, saw their first service in campaigns to exterminate the Bushmen and were
effective in this type of warfare. The units were composed of white and sometimes of Coloured civilians called out as a military posse on the authority of an appointed local leader. Because the frontier farmers were accustomed to a hard life and were generally expert shots and horsemen, these irregular mounted rifle units were able to serve the Dutch and their Afrikaner descendants effectively against both the Africans and the British.

The Bushmen particularly angered the Dutch by their continual theft of cattle and sheep. They fought effectively with poisoned arrows and were able to take a considerable toll among the Dutch, who pursued them into their mountain retreats. The Bushmen often killed or maimed stock that they had stolen rather than let it be recovered by the settlers. Dutch hatred for the Bushmen reached the point where Bushmen were considered nonhuman and frequently slaughtered outright. Those who were not killed were put to work as serfs on Dutch farms and absorbed into the developing Coloured population, which sprang from unions among Dutch, Hottentot, African slaves, and Asian slaves.

The original free farmers had been given grants of land with the understanding that they would function as the virtual vassals of the Dutch East India Company. They were forbidden to trade with the Hottentot and were required to sell all the produce that they did not consume themselves to the company at fixed prices. The ban against trade was aimed at insuring that the company, through its monopoly, would get the best bargain in purchasing cattle for resale to the ships.

Increasing herds and an increasing population led naturally to the demand for more and more land. Beyond the narrow rings of mountains that fringe the Cape area, the high plateau (veld) was found to be very dry, particularly in the Karoo region, into which the earliest cattle farmers had expanded. Great acreage was required to support the cattle, and farms of 6,000 acres were common. Since the company did not sell land to the frontiersmen but rather leased it in return for an annual rental fee, there was little encouragement to expend money and energy on building a permanent homestead; as the grasses or water on farms were depleted or as the herds or family increased in number, the hardy pioneers would pile their belongings into their wagons and trek to a new site with greener or broader pastures. Thus they came to be called Trekboers, or wandering farmers, a term that came to be accepted, particularly in its shortened form, Boer, as a title of honor by all the frontiersmen of South Africa and by their admirers.

These Trekboers adopted an attitude of hostility toward external control. For them, the only important community was the extended family under the senior married male. At the core of the family were the man's wife, his unmarried brothers and sisters, his
own sons and daughters and, if his sons were married, their wives and children. Closely associated with the family in the community were its African slaves, usually few in number, and its Hottentot servants and their families. The head of the group was its patriarch, a ruler dispensing law and punishment to its members and particularly to its slaves and servants.

The Trekboers compared their way of life to that of the Hebrew patriarchs of the Old Testament. A Boer patriarch saw himself, like Abraham, leading his family, followers, and herds through the wilderness to a better land under the guidance of the Lord only. They carried the Biblical analogy further and equated the forces of evil and darkness with the dark-skinned people who often surrounded and always opposed their advance to greener pastures.

The attitude toward relations with the Africans developed during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was to carry over to future generations of white South Africans (see ch. 12, Social Values; ch. 18, Political Values and Attitudes). Europeans made their first contacts with nonwhites who were either slaves or the servile remnants of the Cape Hottentots. This initial experience, combined with the Europeans’ higher level of technical civilization, their dominant economic and legal position, and the tenets of Afrikaner religion (the narrowly defined “predestination of the Elect” of seventeenth-century Calvinism) left them with a natural feeling of superiority to men of color.

At the same time, however, the Europeans developed a fear of the Africans. Even in the early Cape Colony the slaves had outnumbered the whites, and the early slaves, particularly those from the west coast of Africa, were rebellious. A tightly knit social stratification had to be maintained in order to insure control by the numerically inferior whites. On the frontier this fear had been heightened by the poison arrows of the Bushmen.

As the Boers began to make contact with the Bantu, they projected their earlier feelings toward dark-skinned races to the new enemy. In this case, the fear was heightened by the real military threat posed by the large numbers and organization of the Bantu. Moreover, unlike the Hottentot and Bushmen, the Bantu speakers were direct competitors with Boers on the frontier for land and cattle. In fact, the advance guard of the Boers lived a life very similar to that of their African neighbors. Both depended upon large tracts of land to support the herds upon which their economies were solely based. Both were wandering pastoralists with little interest in sedentary agriculture, encumbered by few possessions and always prepared to move to find greener pastures.

Thus were hardened the attitudes that were to dominate South Africa’s history—a demand on both sides for access to large tracts of land, a sense of white superiority tinged with fear of the numeri-
cally stronger blacks, and a need to keep the Africans in their inferior position in order to retain the land and the sense of superiority.

The European-Xhosa Clash

The first major Bantu-speaking people met by the Dutch were the Xhosa, the southernmost Nguni. After the founding of the colony at Cape Town, it was not unusual for slaves and rural Europeans to join the Xhosa to escape from slavery or from the harsh penal laws (see fig. 10).

Xhosa trade with the Cape Colony began in the earliest years of the eighteenth century with irregular traffic in cattle and ivory. The Dutch farmers soon found that cheap trade goods could be exchanged for large amounts of ivory. By 1770 a regular wagon road existed from the Cape to the Great Fish River, generally assumed to be the southern frontier of Nguni territory. In addition to ivory, the Europeans were also interested in trading for the Xhosa cattle, which could be obtained in exchange for a handful of glass beads and iron nails. The cattle brought high prices from ships revictualing at the Cape and, although the cattle trade was supposed to be a monopoly of the Cape government, the farmers apparently found ways to avoid the restrictions. It was the cattle, not the ivory trade, that was to be of historical importance, as the economies of both the rural Dutch and the Xhosa societies were based on cattle herding.

Until the second half of the eighteenth century the two groups remained separated by the region, over 100 miles wide, between the Gamtoos and Great Fish rivers, except for the trading parties of Boers and the limited advance of small groups of the Nguni. After 1750, however, both groups began to move into the region between the two rivers in search of pasture for the herds of their expanding populations. Initially the area was the scene of confused conflict between variously allied combinations of Boers, Hottentot, Bushmen, and Xhosa. By the third quarter of the century, however, the major and continuing conflict began to take shape as the Boers and the African Xhosa struggled for control of the land.

Throughout the eighteenth century the company tried to limit the westward expansion of the Boers, primarily because expansion increased the chances of conflict with the Bantu that would result in military expenditures but also because the Boer ties to the government seemed to decrease as their distance from the centers of administration increased. Despite the company's efforts, some Boer families had already trekked beyond the Great Fish River into Nguni country by 1770. By 1778 a significant number of Boers were settled along the river's western banks. In that year, the com-
pany's Cape Colony governor, van Plettenberg, concluded the first treaty with two minor Xhosa chiefs. The treaty delimited the frontiers between the colony and Xhosa territory, but the Africans did not understand that the treaty was intended to limit their westward expansion.

Within a year the first serious conflict (the First Kaffir War) began, set off by Dutch efforts to expel Xhosa tribes from the area west of the Great Fish River. The war consisted largely of attacks by Boer commandos on Xhosa settlements and Xhosa raids of Boer farms. Both parties sought cattle. Although battles were often bloody, assault on unarmed parties or the killing of women and children were the exceptions in the Kaffir wars. The second and third Kaffir wars of 1789 and 1799 were very similar to the first. In each case the authorities were trying to turn back the flow of the Xhosa who, in search of new pastures, had crossed a border set by the colonial authorities without meaningful Xhosa agreement.

In the fourth war, conducted in 1812, the government made extensive use of regular military forces for the first time and established permanent military posts just inside the frontier. After the fifth war in 1819, a neutral belt was established between the Great...
Fish and Keiskamma rivers. In 1820, in order to strengthen the frontier, 4,000 British settlers were given farms along the west bank of the Great Fish River, centered on Grahamstown. Unions between white and Coloured and white and Xhosa occurred along the frontier, and a Cape Coloured settlement was established in the Kat River valley over the opposition of the Boers, who feared that the Coloured might support the Xhosa.

Missionaries had first entered the Xhosa country in 1799. By 1845 there were at least seven permanent stations in Xhosa territory, under the London Missionary Society or the Scottish Presbyterian church. The missionaries created an alphabet for Xhosa with which to translate the Scriptures and opened village schools. In 1841 a seminary was opened at Lovedale to train Europeans and Africans as teachers for the mission schools.

The missionaries brought the Protestant ethic of the necessity of labor. Even Lovedale's seminary students were required to perform daily manual labor, in order to learn to stimulate the spread of modern agricultural techniques and to break down the Xhosa tradition that only women cultivated while the men hunted, herded, or fought. The missionaries also created a market for modern goods that could only be obtained through the cultivation of cash crops or employment by whites for cash wages. By 1828 the demand for laborers for Dutch farms was strong enough to force the colonial government to lower the barrier to Xhosa entry into the colony under a system of labor passes.

The Arrival of the British

Influenced by their independent way of life and selectively by ideas of the rights of citizens generated by French and American revolutionary thinkers, the Boers began to demand to have their voices heard in the colony's government in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. Annoyed at the government's failure to take vigorous action against the Bantu-speaking peoples blocking their expansion and to insure the availability of new land and cheap labor, the Boers established two short-lived republics, at Swellendam and Graaff-Reinet, in 1795, with clauses in their constitutions allowing the virtual enslavement of all Hottentots.

Before the company could take action against the rebels, the royal government in Holland was replaced by a French inspired republic. The head of the royal government, the Prince of Orange, fled to England and appealed to the British government to occupy his colonial possessions until he was restored to the throne. As a result, from 1795 until 1803 the Cape Colony was under British control, ending 143 years of Dutch East India Company rule. After
a brief return to Dutch control, the Cape passed permanently into British hands in 1806.

Although the British quickly suppressed the newly proclaimed Boer republics, they took steps to conciliate the Boers. The Dutch colonists had few objections to the imposition of British control for their ties to the Netherlands government had been weakened by time and by their dislike for the company. Indeed, a good portion of the population was by origin French or German rather than Dutch. In addition, early British actions met the Boers' demands by lifting all restrictions on trade and by insuring the flow of cheap nonwhite labor.

New colonial legislation, the Coloured Labour Ordinance of 1809, required that all Coloured be employed and that they have a fixed place of abode, while denying to them all rights to own land within the colony. All were required to carry proof of employment and to obtain a permit to change residence and job or to travel from one district into another. Thus under British rule began South Africa's pass laws that were to remain the most hated burden of the nonwhite populations throughout the country's history.

The Effect of British Liberalism

The Boers' friendship with the British was short lived. In 1807 the importation of slaves into any part of the British Empire was forbidden, cutting off the supply of new slaves to South Africa, and agitation continued to grow, led by abolitionist movements in Britain, for the abolition of slavery throughout the empire. The demand for an end to slavery was aimed primarily at the large slave holdings in the British West Indies, but the Boers were aware that the British missionary societies in South Africa were siding with the Africans and were leading the demands for the improvement of the position of both slaves and other nonwhite workers.

The Boers were particularly resentful of the efforts of the new British magistrates to insure that employers gave just treatment to slaves and Hottentot and of all other moves that they saw as equating nonwhites with whites before the law. The "Black Court" circuit of 1813 heard charges brought by servants and slaves against their masters and, although most charges proved to be unjustified, the Boers were grieved by the fact that the servants' word was accepted in court at all.

A crucial point in the development of relations was reached in 1815. A Boer farmer, accused of mistreating a Hottentot servant, refused to appear in court. A British officer with Hottentot troops, sent to compel his attendance, was fired upon, and in the ensuing fight the farmer was killed. A number of his Boer neighbors rose in
revolt, and after their arrest five were publicly hanged at Slachter's Nek. The hanging of white men, and the shooting of a white man by Hottentot police, all over the issue of a nonwhite's charges, became a permanent irritant, and the story was used for a century to fan Boer resentment against the British.

The Boers continued to be antagonized by the actions of the English-speaking missionaries. Partially as a result of agitation in London by the missionaries' supporters, the Coloured Labor Ordinance of 1809 was repealed by Ordinance 50 of 1828. The new ordinance restored the right of the Coloured peoples to own land within the colony and granted them the right to move freely within the colony without the burden of passes. The clauses of the vagrancy law that had allowed the Dutch to force the Coloureds to work on their farms or go to jail were also abolished. The abrogation of these clauses was a blow not only to Boer sensitivities but also to their economic position, since it ended the legal guarantees for the continued availability of cheap Coloured labor; the labor market was such, however, that many Coloured continued to work under white masters under much the same terms for another six generations.

The emancipation of all slaves in the British Empire, which was proclaimed by Parliament in 1833, came as a great blow to the Boers. The financial loss to the Boers was severe, since most received only a very small portion of the slaves assessed value. The last of the slaves had been freed by December 1838, and their freedom before the law was assured by the Master and Servant Ordinance of 1841, which provided equal treatment for all servants without distinction as to color.

The abolition of slavery ruined a limited number of Cape farmers, but the great majority of the Boers did not depend on slaves for their labor. In the 1830's, however, other British actions directly affected them. The Sixth Kaffir War had erupted in 1834. The British forces, assisted by Hottentot troops, had forced the Xhosa back across the Kei River for the first time. The British governor annexed all the land between the Great Fish and Kei rivers, opening a sizable portion of territory, called Queen Adelaide Province, to farming by the expanding Boer population.

The British missionaries, however, protested to London against this seizure of Xhosa land, and the British cabinet forced the governor, Sir Benjamen D'Urban, to restore the land to the Africans. The blow to Boer hopes for new lands for their sons came when they were beginning to feel seriously the impact of English culture. English had become the medium of instruction in the free schools and the language of the courts, while British criminal procedure had been superimposed on the earlier Roman-Dutch system (see ch. 14, The Legal System). Boers were left at a disadvantage in the courts,
and English influences were even beginning to be felt in the center of their life, the Dutch Reformed churches.

The Boers reacted to all these factors by deserting the Cape Colony for a new land of their own, where they hoped to be free of British interference. In 1836 began the Great Trek, the most important population movement in South African history, which led the Boers across the Orange River and into the Transvaal.

The Great Trek

Beginning in 1836 approximately 4,000 Boers emigrated from the British colony northward into the lightly populated lands north of the Orange River. Packing all their possessions into covered wagons drawn by their oxen, the Boer families and their Hottentot servants began the Great Trek from the Eastern Cape up the steep passes onto the Transvaal plateau.

The plateau areas that the Boers first entered had been nearly depopulated by the intratribal warfare generated by the Zulu campaigns of the previous twenty years, and some of the Africans who remained looked on the Boers as potential allies in future battles against the Zulu. The Boers had other potential allies in the Griquas, a frontier Coloured group, who at the time were strung out along the Orange River with a center at Philippolis, close to the Boer route of march.

In January 1837 a mixed party of Boers and Griquas attacked the headquarters of the warlike Ndebele and scored a considerable victory against their leader Mzilikazi. The Boers then established their first major settlement at Winburg, in an area ceded to them by an ally, the chief of a small Sotho tribe.

The original settlers under Andries Potgieter and Gerit Marais were joined in June 1837 by another party of Voortrekkers under the leadership of Piet Retief. The combined groups decided to form a loosely federated government in the hope of providing general guidance for all the Trek parties, but no real grounds for unity could be found. Although they all wished to escape British rule, agreement stopped there. They disagreed on religious matters, on where to settle, and on leadership. The essential limitation, however, was Boer disdain for government in general. Some historians have considered their flight from the Cape as much an escape from all governmental authority as from the British rule in particular. Finally the Boers' nomadic way of life with only small scattered permanent communities made centralized government both difficult to construct and of limited value.

By 1839 the Winburg Trekboers had split four ways. Retief and his party went to Natal, while Potgieter and Marais followed different routes to the north. Potgieter's party crossed the Vaal River and
built the town of Potchefstroom, where they remained until 1845; they then migrated across the plateau to descend into the Lowveld, the first Boer settlement in tropical Africa, where they established a new republic with its capital at Lydenburg.

The British government's attitude toward the independence of the Boer settlements was mixed; the Cape government and Foreign Office were uninterested in any claims that would increase their expenditures, particularly for defense. The government, however, already had tenuous links with the Griquas, who had been considered British subjects living outside British territory. In return for small subsidies, the Griquas were expected to prevent Bantu incursions into the adjacent regions of the colony. In 1843 additional ties to the lands across the Orange River were formed by the Cape government when treaties were approved with the king of the Basuto (South Sotho), Moshweshwe, and the chief of the Pondo.

In 1845, when fighting broke out between the Boers and the Griquas of Philippolis, the Cape government provided military support to the Griquas. The British finally proclaimed the Orange River Sovereignty in February 1848, bringing the entire region up to the Vaal River under their sovereignty. The Boers and Griquas were to have limited self-government, with elected legislative councils under British resident commissioners. A British resident was also appointed to oversee Moshweshwe's activities.

The Winburg Boers rejected British rule and interference in their relations with neighboring Africans societies, particularly with the Basuto. They were supported by Andries Pretorius, who led commandos down from the Transvaal, but the British forces were victorious. Nevertheless, the British recognized the necessity of coming to terms with the Boers north of the Vaal and in January 1852 signed the Sand River Convention, in which they agreed to recognize the independence of the Boer states across the Vaal.

By 1853 the British had tired of their attempts to play a role across the Orange River. Although the Orange River Boer community by then had lost a good deal of its enthusiasm for shouldering the responsibility and expense of independence, the British resident managed to assemble enough proindependence votes at the Bloemfontein Convention in 1854 to support the creation of the new Orange Free State Republic. At the insistence of the new state, the British agreed to end all treatymaking with Africans north of the Orange River, if such treaties might infringe on the republic's interest. Nevertheless, following continued border disputes between Moshweshwe and the republic, the British did proclaim a protectorate over Basutoland at the king's request in 1868.

The Settlement of Natal

The Voortrekkers under Retief initially made contact with the English traders who had settled at Port Natal (later Durban) in
1833. The traders had advised the Boers to seek a treaty with the Zulu chief Dingane for the right to settle the northern half of Natal. At first the Zulu chief agreed to a treaty; when Retief and his followers returned to sign it in February 1838, however, Dingane, fearful of the Europeans’ growing power and numbers, massacred Retief’s party and the men, women, and children who had remained behind at their settlement. Nearly 700 Europeans were killed in the two battles. In December a Boer army under Andries Pretorius avenged the massacres by its victory over the Zulu king at the great Battle of Blood River. The victory is still observed as a national holiday in South Africa, as the Day of the Covenant, because the Boers had sworn an oath to God before the battle.

In 1839 the Boers proclaimed the Republic of Natalia, with its capital at Pietermaritzburg and a government composed of an elected council, or Volksraad, of twenty-four members with supreme legislative, executive, and judicial functions. With the Zulu threat broken, the British merchants now saw the Boers as rivals and urged their government to annex the territory. On the basis of earlier claims, British forces invaded the region, and in 1844 Natal was declared to be a part of the Cape Colony. A portion of the Boers remained in the province, but the majority trekked away again into the Transvaal. Natal became a separate British colony, with limited self-government based on the Cape model, in 1847.

NONWHITE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

The Africans

The missionary groups working with the Xhosa had made clear to the authorities in London that the Xhosa attacks on white settlers had been motivated by the real need for land to sustain their herds and not, as the colonists generally represented it, by a desire to raid European cattle herds. Despite the imperial government’s more realistic attitude, new Xhosa wars occurred in 1846 and 1852. The former Queen Adelaide Province was annexed under the name of British Kaffraria in 1847. The war of 1852 was followed by the recall of the British governor, Sir Harry Smith, whom the imperial government held responsible for provoking the war because of his efforts to weaken the powers of the chiefs. In 1856 an attempt was made to stabilize the new border by settling 6,000 Germans, largely former soldiers in the British Foreign Legion, in British Kaffraria.

In all the Xhosa wars with the Europeans, it was organization and central leadership as much as modern firepower that allowed the Europeans to triumph. At the time of their first contact with the expanding colonialists, the Xhosa had no unifying political struc-
ture. Throughout the period of conflict no leader arose to provide the Xhosa with the unity and direction that enabled the development of the Zulu and Sotho nations to the north and west in the same period.

Among those who did exercise influence among the Xhosa were diviners who so sometimes acted as prophets. Their usual practice was to diagnose Xhosa difficulties as the consequence of the prevalence of witches among them and, sometimes, the displeasure of the ancestral spirits. They usually recommended the purge of witches and sacrifice to the spirits. In March 1856 Mhlakaza, a leading Xhosa diviner, had a vision under the influence of his brother's young daughter, Nongquase, who had seen strange people and cattle in a vision of her own. The substance of their visions, and especially that of Nongquase, resulted in May 1856 in a recommendation and a prophecy: The Xhosa should sacrifice their cattle, as they had done before under the direction of other seers; this time, however, they were to kill and eat all the cattle they possessed. In addition, they were no longer to plant crops for, according to the prophecy, on February 18 of the following year their grain storehouses would fill by themselves, great new herds from the cattle of the Europeans would come to fill their pastures, and the Europeans would be cast into the sea by a great wind.

The injunctions of Nongquase were obeyed. When the miracles failed to occur, an estimated 70,000 people died of starvation. Nongquase's prophecy reflected the impact of European contacts in more than its references to Boer cattle, for the Xhosas were made to expect the spiritual assistance of the Russians, enemies of the British, who were believed to have succeeded in their efforts to throw the British back into the sea in the Crimean War, which had just ended.

The Zulu

In the early nineteenth century a young warrior of the Zulu clan established the most powerful nation in southern Africa. This remarkable man, Shaka, was born in 1787. A proven warrior at an early age, he became the captain of the troop of chief Dingiswayo. He invented and introduced a military formation and improved weaponry, which under his leadership made his troops formidable. He expanded his small fighting force, organizing the entire Zulu clan to support his military plans, and quickly overcame the neighboring clans. When Dingiswayo died, Shaka seized control of his throne and proclaimed the creation of the ama-Zulu nation. By the end of his twelve-year rule he controlled an area larger than that of Great Britain.

Shaka organized a large and highly effective standing army di-
vided into *impis*, or regiments, with a tightly controlled command structure. Mining and smelting were expanded to supply metal for weapons. He created a system of tribal law and organized the nation's agricultural activities to insure adequate supplies for the *impis*. Shaka replaced the traditional weapon, the *assegai*, or throwing spear, with a short, stabbing spear and with a large shield, which enabled his warriors to ward off the spears thrown by their enemies and then to engage them in hand to hand combat with the short spear. All males under forty served in one or the other of the regiments, according to their age. No male was allowed to marry until he was over the military age, and sexual intercourse was forbidden to the warriors. Shaka required them to undergo rigorous training and enforced rigid discipline.

Shaka made extensive use of spies, signals, and psychological warfare. His reputation for cruelty was such that few of his potential opponents actually engaged him in combat but instead fled, tribe by tribe, to more distant parts of the country, creating a dispersion of Nguni and Sotho speakers throughout southern Africa. His primary military tactic was to attack in a “horned crescent” formation, in which one regiment, supported by a reserve regiment, attacked in the center, while two other regiments formed flanks or horns, that advanced and enveloped the enemies’ flanks. He continued to strengthen his forces by incorporating conquered enemies into his own regiments. Eventually, his military forces may have consisted of as many as 80,000 men, housed in regimental barracks scattered throughout his territory, each housing 2,000 or 3,000 warriors.

His military system, organizational ability, and remarkable personal leadership enabled the creation of an African nation with a single language and social system in place of the earlier multitude of separate tribes and dialects. Effects, both direct and indirect, of the rise of the Zulu nation were felt from the Cape of Good Hope to Lake Tanganyika, disrupting the established order of a fifth of the continent for the better part of a century (see fig. 11).

Shaka was murdered by his half-brothers in 1828. After a short interregnum Dingane, one of Shaka’s half-brothers, took over the Zulu throne. Dingane was a weaker figure than Shaka, and his twelve years of rule marked the beginnings of the collapse of Shaka’s system, brought about in part by Dingane’s inability to come to terms with the advancing white colonists. He was eager to accommodate traders who would provide the goods he wanted but he had continual difficulties in dealing with them, partly because he was ill-served by interpreters and some of his subordinate chiefs and partly because the traders did not always communicate with him. When the Boers under Piet Retief entered Natal in 1837, Dingane agreed to a treaty allowing them to settle in Natal; but he came to

Figure 11. Major Population Movements in South Africa from 1750 to 1837.

fear the incursion of so many whites and, when Retief and a party of more than seventy visited his capital on February 3, 1838, Dingane had the entire party killed.

The killing of Retief's party led to a war with the whites in which Dingane's forces were defeated at the Battle of Blood River in December, 1838. Dingane escaped, but his efforts to reassert his rule over the Zulu was frustrated by his brother Mpande, who had the help of the Boers. Dingane then fled to Swaziland, where he was killed. Mpande's rule continued until 1872, when he was replaced by Cetshwayo, the last of the independent Zulu kings who ruled until he was defeated by the government of Natal in the Zulu War of 1879-80.

The war of 1879 was begun by the British when Cetshwayo refused to accept British resident commissioners. The British army under General Lord Chelmsford invaded Zululand with a force of 5,000 Europeans and 8,000 Africans to face Cetshwayo's army of 40,000. The Zulu won a resounding victory at the onset of the campaign at the battle of Isandlwana, totally destroying one of the three columns into which Chelmsford had divided his army. The Zulu warriors had displayed remarkable military ability in the face
of modern weapons at four other battles before being soundly defeated at Ulundi by reinforced British forces with well placed artillery. Zululand was officially annexed in 1887 and became part of Natal Province.

The Emergence of the Basuto Kingdom

In the first half of the nineteenth century the reactions to the growth of the Zulu under Shaka led to the formation of another important African nation, the Basuto. The original Basuto were the southern branch of the Bantu-speaking Sotho, who had populated the fertile high plateau of the Transvaal after their migration into southern Africa. Under the impact of the Zulu wars, the Basuto, led by Moshweshwe, withdrew into the higher reaches of the Drakensberg Escarpment, where they settled around a military base at the rocky fortress of Thaba Bosiu. They were joined by many refugees from other clans and tribes fleeing from the Zulu, who were eventually absorbed into the Basuto (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

Moshweshwe, who was a very able ruler, had no ambitions for a military conquest. He was, however, a skillful defensive military leader, and his followers took full advantage of the rugged mountain terrain of their new homeland. A man of great insight, he saw well in advance that the white men were the real threat to tribal independence. To blunt the force of the white advance, he invited Christian missionaries into his country in 1833 to convert his people, in order to avoid presenting the Boers with an excuse to attack his followers as uncivilized heathens. He chose the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society because he saw the French, who were not politically involved in southern Africa, as the least threat to his independence.

The Basuto king was impressed by the military capabilities of the small bands of Griquas who marauded on the southern and eastern borders of his kingdom. Modeling themselves on the Boer military formation, the Griquas made extensive use of horses and firearms, both of which the Basuto adopted permanently.

The Basuto king and his followers made skillful use of the mobility provided by their mountain ponies and became able marksmen. Once the danger from the Zulu had passed, they managed to defeat several strong attacks from the Boers of the Orange Free State. Nevertheless, Moshweshwe realized that the growing number and strength of the whites would eventually enable them to defeat his kingdom. For this reason he applied for protection from the queen of England, with the statement that he and his people only wished to be as "fleas in the great queen's blanket." A protectorate over the Basuto was established by the British in 1848 over Boer objec-
tions. Six years later, however, the British gave into Boer demands and relinquished the protectorate.

The Tswana

Originally part of the greater Sotho ethnic division of the Bantu, the Tswana were gradually driven to the western regions of the Transvaal plateau and the greener fringes of modern Botswana over a number of centuries. The Tswana found most of the country along and across the upper Limpopo inhabited by small clans of more primitive groups, whom they conquered and absorbed (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

The westward movement of the Tswana was accelerated in the 1800's as they reacted to the Zulu wars, particularly as Nguni groups, spinning off from the Zulu forces or even in flight from them, continued warfare across the Transvaal plain. One of these groups, the Mantatees, plagued the Tswana in 1822 and 1823, until defeated by a force of Tlhaping (a Tswana tribe) and an armed band of Griquas.

The most important of the Zulu offshoots were the Ndebele who, having fled the Zulu under the leadership of one of Shaka's lieutenants, Mzilikazi, settled in the western Transvaal for nearly two decades. They ravaged the Tswana, forcing them to flee across the upper Limpopo River, and harassed other Sotho peoples in the northern and western Transvaal in order to build a short-lived empire of their own. In late 1837, after continual losses in battles with Griqua, Boer, and Zulu forces, most of the Ndebele fled into what is now Rhodesia (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

The movement, raiding, and fragmentation of peoples in the 1820's and 1930's came to be known as the difaqane (variously translated as the wandering or the fragmentation) in the traditions of the peoples involved. Generated largely by the internal dynamics of African peoples and affected only indirectly by the movements of Europeans, the difaqane was responsible in good part for the nineteenth- and twentieth-century distributions of many Bantu-speaking peoples in southern Africa and for the heterogeneous origins of any single group of people (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

The Development of the Coloured Community

The Coloured community, which included a million and a half people in the 1960's, had its origins in the unions of African slaves, Hottentot, Bushmen, Indians, Malays, and Europeans in the melting pot of the early Cape Town settlement. The Hottentot were numerically the most important element. Widely dispersed and without central political organization, the Hottentot had been unable to
organize successful opposition to the Europeans or to the Bantu. Some were killed in the so-called Hottentot Wars (1658–60 and 1673–77). Others were destroyed by white men’s diseases, notably smallpox, which struck three times in the eighteenth century. Despite violence and disease, the majority of the Hottentot were not killed; they were engulfed and absorbed, becoming a major element in the Coloured community.

The first slaves came from the West African slave markets, but this source was quickly replaced by others in Mozambique and Madagascar. Asian slaves and political exiles from the Dutch East India Company’s holdings in India, Ceylon, and Indonesia were also introduced, but Africans predominated. It is estimated that three-fourths of the children born to slaves in the first forty years after the founding of the colony were fathered by the European slave-owners. The Hottentot factor became significant because both whites and slaves took Hottentot women as wives and concubines. The descendents of this mixture constituted the Cape Coloured and the smaller Coloured subgroups, chief of which are the Cape Malay, who remained Muslim, and the Griqua (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

In 1754 there were 5,000 to 6,000 colonists and free men in the Cape Colony, and more than 6,200 slaves. Europeans continued to be outnumbered by slaves until long after the ending of the slave trade. The nature of agriculture in the colony was such that slave-holdings were usually small, particularly on the frontiers.

After the Cape Colony came under permanent British control in the early nineteenth century, the position of both the slaves and free Coloured populations began to improve. The importation of slaves was abolished throughout the British Empire in 1807. Steps were taken by judicial decision and statute to improve the treatment of the Coloured populations, and Coloured persons were given access to the courts. Laws were also passed limiting the sale of minor slaves and finally forbidding the breaking up of slave families.

The legal position of the Coloured peoples within the Cape Colony was completely changed by two acts of the government. The first of these was the historic Ordinance 50 of 1828, which provided that all free Coloured persons were equal with Europeans before the law. The ordinance also provided for improved labor conditions. In 1838 the imperial government abolished slavery throughout the empire; emancipation of the Cape Colony’s slaves was carried out between 1834 and 1838. Despite these two acts, social and economic discrimination against the Coloured continued. Complete official racial equality in the Cape continued until after the colony was absorbed into the Union of South Africa in 1910.

Even before the two acts, small portions of the slave and Coloured communities had begun to achieve a degree of economic
independence. A significant minority of the slaves had become skilled workmen. After their emancipation these Coloured workers, generally located in Cape Town, were able to establish themselves as an important economic class, dominating many of the craft occupations.

The newly liberated slaves and the vast majority of the Hottentots mingled to such a degree as to become indistinguishable in the succeeding generations. They adopted the language of their former masters, the Dutch farmers, and copied their European culture as nearly as they could afford. The vast majority continued to work as unskilled agricultural laborers on the Dutch and later the British farms. For those who were able to find employment in the urban centers, however, equality brought the opportunity to enjoy at least a part of the rising educational and economic opportunities of the colony.

Those Coloured peoples who moved into or were born on the frontier regions of the Colony for the better part of a century formed a different cultural group from the Cape Coloured proper. Those on the eastern frontier came into contact and in some cases intermarried with the British colonists who established themselves along the Great Fish and Kat rivers after 1820. The groups of Coloureds in the west who moved northward with the extension of the Cape boundaries claimed to be descendants of Hottentot mothers and white fathers and proudly labelled themselves Bastards.

One such group was the Griquas, descendants of a white-Hottentot mixture, who had been pushed northward and eastward from the vicinity of the Cape to the Orange River in the second decade of the nineteenth century by expanding white settlers. Equipped with horses and guns, they established a small state, partly with the help of representatives of the Church Missionary Society. By the 1820’s all were Christians and spoke Afrikaans. Because of their military skills, organization, and location on the frontier, the Griqua were frequently involved, independently or allied with others, in battles or skirmishes with Bantu and Boer (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

The Coming of the Asians

The fourth and smallest division of the population of South Africa is the Indian portion. The first Indians to enter South Africa, other than scattered castaways from ships on the India-Europe run, were slaves brought to Cape Town by the Dutch East India Company to work the Cape farms. The traffic in Indian slaves continued from 1658 to 1767, but these immigrants did not long survive as a separate ethnic group. They have all been largely absorbed into the Cape Coloured community.
The more than half million Indians in the country in the late 1960's are mostly the descendants of indentured laborers brought to the country beginning in 1860 to work in the newly established sugarcane fields of Natal Colony. The labor of the more malleable Indians, who were already at work in the cane fields of Mauritius, was preferable to the more accessible but independent-minded Zulu of Natal. At the request of the colony's government, the British government prevailed upon the Indian states to allow the flow of indentured workers to Natal. From the first the imperial government sought to assure that Indian subjects worked under fair conditions, setting a minimum salary and a maximum period of indenture, five years. At the end of the fifth year the laborers were guaranteed either return passage to their homes or crown land in Natal of equal value and freedom to work and live in Natal.

Between 1860 and 1864, 6,500 Indians had entered the Natal Colony, but the imperial government halted the traffic in 1865 because of reports of unsatisfactory working conditions. The prohibition remained in effect until 1874. Despite this halt, the demand for indentured labor for the tea, coffee, cotton, and sugarcane plantations continued to grow. Few of the Indians returned to their homeland at the end of their periods of service. By 1890 there were more than 33,000 Indians in Natal; more than 20,000 of these were free residents, working as skilled agricultural laborers or in lower urban positions. They had already begun to enter the lower levels of trade, which they were to come to dominate.

The Natal government sought ways to inhibit the population growth by cancelling the provision for granting land to the Indians at the end of their five years and encouraging their return to India. Nevertheless, the need for indentured labor continued, and the Indian immigration was not ended until 1913, with as many as 100,000 entering between 1891 and 1911. The Indians remained largely concentrated in Natal because of the exclusionary legislation of the Boer governments of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State and the competition of the Coloured community in the Cape Colony (see ch. 4, Population; ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

THE GROWTH OF THE BOER REPUBLICS

After the Sand River Convention of 1852, the Transvaal Boer leaders, assured of freedom from British interference, assembled at Potchefstroom in 1856. They adopted a unified constitution that provided for a president, an executive council, a legislature (Volksraad), and a high court to rule the new South African Republic from a capital at Pretoria. The new constitution failed to satisfy many of the leaders. Short-lived separatist republics were organized by the settlers in the Soutpansberg Mountains and at Lydenburg.
Andries Pretorius, who was elected president, was unable to effect unity even in the Transvaal regions. In the hope of reconciling all of the Boer leaders, he accepted an invitation from the Orange Free State in 1859 to become joint president of the Orange Free State as well as the Transvaal. His Transvaal supporters were not pleased, however, and he was forced to resign his earlier post. He remained president of the Orange Free State until 1868. In 1869 Pretorius was against elected as president of the Transvaal. Despite his popularity, the republic remained badly divided. They had neither the administrative nor financial resources for viability.

In 1872 Pretorius was replaced by the Reverend T. F. Burgers, a minister of the Dutch Reformed Church. Burgers was known as a religious liberal, and existing dissension within the republic was exacerbated by a new division between the conservative church members who saw him as a heretic and his liberal supporters. In order to improve the economic position of the government, Burgers took a number of largely unsuccessful steps to improve the country's economy. In 1872 the first gold was discovered in the Transvaal at Lydenburg. Although the mine was proved to be exploitable, government did not make proper use of it as a source of income.

The imperial government, alarmed at the continued signs of instability in the republic and enticed by the prospect of control of the new gold discovery, decided on a plan to annex the Transvaal. A British official, Theophilus Shepstone, was sent to deal with the Boers, and he received the immediate support of President Burgers, who saw annexation by the British as the only possible solution for the republic's continuing financial difficulties.

The majority of the Boer leaders, led by Paul Kruger, preferred political independence to economic viability, and Shepstone was forced to issue a proclamation annexing the country in 1877 without the hoped-for support of the Transvaal Volksraad. The British took steps to improve the territory's financial position. In 1880, however, the Boers under Kruger, taking advantage of the fact that the British forces were occupied by three wars against African tribes, rose in revolt in what was to become known as the First Anglo-Boer War. The British forces were defeated at the Battle of Majuba; unable to provide more troops, Britain accepted the armistice, granting complete self-government but retaining ultimate control over relations with foreign states and African tribes.

In 1884 the Transvaal laid claim to a substantial section of Zululand. The Boers based their claim on a treaty with the Zulu king in which he apparently granted them nearly half of Zululand, including a route giving access to the sea, in return for Boer help in defeating a rival claimant to the kingship. Zululand had been proclaimed a part of Natal in 1877, but control of the country had remained uncertain even after the British had vanquished the Zulu...
warriors in 1879. The imperial government was moved to establish control by the Boer claim in 1884. The British seized the entire coast and the portions of Zululand that the Boers had not yet occupied. In northwestern Zululand the Boers established a separate state called the New Republic, which was absorbed into the Transvaal in 1888.

THE DISCOVERY OF DIAMONDS AND GOLD

Even before the discovery of the first gold at Lydenburg, diamonds had been found in 1867 along the route of the Vaal River above its confluence with the Orange. The most important discoveries lay within a triangle of territory between the two rivers, and mines were quickly opened in the area, the most important at Kimberley. Ownership of the land had already been claimed by the Cape Colony, the Orange Free State, the Transvaal, and Griqualand West, still recognized by the British as an independent state. No control had been exercised by any of the claimants, however, as the area had little value until the discovery of the diamonds.

In 1872 an official of the Natal government was asked to arbitrate the claims to the contested area. He awarded it to the Griquas, whose claim predated the others. As soon as the award had been made, Griqualand West was annexed by the Cape Colony, on the basis of a previous request from the Griqua leaders, although the British agreed later to pay £90,000 compensation to the Orange Free State.

The rich production of the new mines provided the basis for the development of the Cape Colony. As early as 1871 there were more than 4,000 whites engaged in the diamond hunt, and Kimberley had become the second largest town in South Africa. The short stretch of railway running north from Cape Town in 1867 was purchased by the Cape Colony government, and work to extend it to Kimberley began in 1874. By 1881 the equivalent of US$22 million had been invested in diamond production.

The profitable development of the mines attracted a number of remarkable men to the country, including Cecil Rhodes, who managed to make a fortune in diamonds by the time he was twenty-one years of age. By 1887 he was the head of the diamond cartel, De Beers Consolidated Mines, Limited, which had gained control of 90 percent of the colony's diamond production. He had also established strong political connections in both Cape Town and London.

Rhodes, motivated by a desire to play a major part of the further development of the British Empire, planned to link the British possessions of southern and eastern Africa by a land bridge. As a start, he was anxious to have Britain gain control of the route of the so-called Missionary Road. This route, used since the 1840's by the
missionaries who followed in David Livingstone's wake to work among the Africans of the lands along either side of the Zambezi River, ran north from Kimberley through the Tswana country to the Zambezi. Rhodes realized that control of the route by Britain would also limit the westward expansion of the Transvaal. The route crossed the lands occupied by the tiny Boer republics of Stellaland and Goshen, which had been established by men from the Transvaal. By 1884, however, the republics had ceased to exist, and the Transvaal by agreement with the imperial government had extended its borders westward to include the portion of the former republics up to the Missionary Road.

The territory south of the Molopo River and along and west of the road was occupied by tribes of the Tswana group. This area was annexed to the Cape Colony as British Bechuanaland. The next British move was the establishment of a protectorate over the Tswana territory north of the Molopo in 1886 over Transvaal’s objections. Rhodes made immediate use of the new Bechuanaland Protectorate (what is now Botswana), to have forces under his control enter the Matabele lands beyond the Limpopo River. In 1889 he obtained a charter for his British South Africa Company, which enabled the company as the agent of the British government to establish political control over the large area that was to become Rhodesia. The company retained control over the area until 1923 when Rhodesia became a crown colony.

Rhodes had been elected prime minister of the Cape Colony in 1889 and used his political position as well as his wealth and personal ties to further his goals. In London he was backed by important British political and financial leaders who supported any extension of imperial rule as well as those who were opposed to the rise of the new Germany, which was the only other major European country with an interest in southern Africa. The German interest in expanding its colony of South West Africa dovetailed with the plans of some of the Boers of the two republics who were interested in links with Germany as a counterweight to British pressures.

Rhodes managed to retain good relations with the Afrikaner political leader in the Cape Colony, Jan Hofmeyr, who supported his call for an economic federation of the English and Boer states. By 1894, however, it had become obvious to Rhodes that the Transvaal leader, Kruger, was not willing to surrender voluntarily any of the Boer republic’s antonomy, particularly since the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand in 1886 had provided the Transvaal with the basis for future economic stability and independence.

The discovery of the incredibly rich gold deposits led to an influx of white miners from all over the world. These foreigners, or uitlanders, as they were called by the Boers, constituted 75 percent of the white population of the Transvaal republic by 1895; but the
Boers retained political control by refusing the franchise to persons with less than seven years' residence. The uitlanders, supported by the wealth of the mining companies, demanded a change in the political system so that they, with the majority of the population and nearly all the wealth, would have some control over the administration of the country.

In 1892 the miners formed the National Union in Johannesburg, center of the mining industry, to campaign for their demands. At Rhodes' instigation the union sent an ultimatum to President Kruger demanding conditions that it knew he would not meet. According to Rhodes' plans, the workers on the Witwatersrand were then to revolt against Boer dominance, and a large military force of British South Africa Company police under Rhodes' associate, Jameson, was to enter the country from Rhodesia. The British governor of the Cape would then take over control of the Transvaal to end the crisis. In late December 1895 Jameson did march into the country with a mounted force of 500 men, but the revolt on the Witwatersrand did not occur; he and his forces were captured within a week, and Rhodes' machinations were partly exposed.

Rhodes was forced to resign as prime minister of the Cape. The British government denied all knowledge of the plot. Intrigues against the Boer governments on the part of the British continued, however, in most cases stimulated by the British mine owners who were irked by the policies of the Boer government, which they saw as interfering with the operation of the mines and the development of new claims. In April 1899 foreign miners on the Witwatersrand presented a petition to the British government asking for protection against unfair discrimination by the Kruger government.

The British governor in the Cape, Alfred Milner, met President Kruger to discuss the miners' demands, but President Kruger refused to compromise. Negotiations continued into September, but each side became more intransigent. The British demanded an admission of British suzerainty, and the Boers were incensed by the arrival of additional British troops from overseas and the stationing of British troops on the Transvaal border. On October 11, 1899, the Transvaal declared that a state of war existed, and the Orange Free State, linked to the Transvaal by a defensive alliance, also entered the war against Britain.

THE ANGLO-BOER WAR OF 1899 AND THE CREATION OF THE UNION

At the beginning of the conflict the British had only 25,000 troops in South Africa, divided between the Cape Colony and Natal. The Boer commandos readily available may have numbered as many as 87,000 men. The Boers were initially victorious, their
forces driving into both the Cape and Natal. The Boers, however, attempted to reduce the British strong points at Kimberley and Mafeking by siege, and the ensuing delay lost them the advantage that might have been theirs if they had continued their march toward Cape Town and Durban. The British were allowed time to bring additional forces from Great Britain and India, as well as colonial forces from Canada and Australia.

Even after the arrival of the British troops, the Boers continued to win a number of important victories against superior forces, making full use of their advantages, knowledge of the terrain, excellent mobility, and skill in guerilla warfare learned from long years of combat with the Africans. The Boers, largely without a supply system, lived off the countryside. The British therefore adopted a tactic of leveling farms throughout the republics and forcing the wives and children of the Boers into concentration camps. Afrikaners have remained permanently outraged by the death of some 26,000 of their wives and children from disease in the unsanitary camps.

The hardships encountered by their families, as well as the bleakness of their prospects, led the Boers to seek an end to the war in early 1902. After discussions in March, the Boer leaders voted to accept the terms offered by Lord Kitchener, the British commander. The peace treaty required the surrender of the Boer forces and an acknowledgment of the sovereignty of the British king. In return, the British promised to grant internal self-government at an early date and to give major financial assistance to the Boers to compensate for their losses in the war. In addition to the promise of self-government, Britain agreed not to extend the franchise to the Africans but to leave the matter for consideration by the new colonial legislatures. The peace treaty was signed on May 31, 1902.

The British governor, Sir Alfred Milner, was appointed as the high commissioner and governor of the new colonies. He gathered together a staff of young administrators, commonly referred to as “Milner's kindergarten,” to set in motion all the requirements for a new governmental structure. In a very short time, the gold mines had resumed operations, and the war prisoners had been returned to their farms. The British spent over £10 million on rehabilitation for the Boer farmers and property owners. All four colonies were combined into a South African customs union, and a common administration for the four separate rail networks was created.

Milner was recalled, however, after the fall from power of the Conservative party government in London in 1905, and the new cabinet of the Liberal party, which had opposed the war, set out to regain the friendship of the Boers. The Liberal party leadership granted responsible government to the Transvaal and the Orange Free State with purely white electorates, leaving not only the Af-
ricans but also the Coloured and Indian populations permanently without a political voice.

The new governments came into being in March 1907 with two former generals of the Boer army, Louis Botha and Jan Smuts, as the principal political leaders of the Transvaal. The pro-Afrikaner party also won the 1908 elections in the Cape Colony. The new British governor and the three new colony governments all supported the call for a union of South African states, seeking both economic and political strength through unity. A national constitutional convention representing all four colonies met in 1908 and 1909, with the chief justice of the Cape Colony as chairman. A number of former Boer leaders, having been defeated in their efforts for separate statehood, came out strongly for a unitary rather than a federal government in the hope of assuring the dominance of the Boers, who constituted more than half of the white population.

The proposed constitution provided for a high concentration of power in the hands of the National Parliament, which was to be largely unhindered by constitutional restraints. Only two clauses in the new constitution were to be protected from alteration by a simple majority vote of the new legislature. The first guaranteed legal equality between the languages of the English and Boer communities. The second clause provided weak protection for the non-white franchise in the Cape but did not extend the electoral rolls to cover any nonwhite voters in the other provinces.

The proposed constitution was strongly endorsed by the separate colonies and was enacted by the British Parliament in September 1909. The new state came into being as the Union of South Africa, a dominion of the British Empire, on May 31, 1910. The new constitution provided for the future accession of Rhodesia, Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Swaziland to the Union.

The first elections under the new constitution were held in 1911. The Afrikaner parties of the four provinces had merged to form the South African Party, under Botha and Smuts, and it won the election. Another Boer general, J. B. M. Hertzog, was initially included in the cabinet but broke away in 1912 to help form the Afrikaner Nationalist Party.

The Botha-Smuts government represented those who saw the British victory as final and accepted the idea that the new Union should be composed of a single united white people, with a culture composed of a synthesis of the English and Boer traditions. Hertzog's opposition party feared the swamping of the Boer, or as they had come to be called, the Afrikaner people by the culture of the less numerous but more powerful British. Hertzog therefore supported a "twin-stream" policy, which would protect the weaker Afrikaner culture at least until the two white groups were on an equal footing in political and economic strength. In addition, Hert-
zog felt that the Afrikaners' strong republican traditions should be conciliated by a gradual weakening of South Africa's ties to the imperial government.

Although the parties adopted different attitudes toward the Coloured population of the Cape, both were opposed to further unregulated entry of Africans into the labor market. The Nationalists also supported the Botha government's Native Land Act of 1913, limiting the area in which African tribes would be allowed to own land in the future. The delimited zones constituted less than 10 percent of the country's area; although a commission in 1916 recommended that the government significantly enlarge the area, the white voters were not interested in efforts which would expend their tax moneys to improve the position of the Africans.

**POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE NONWHITE COMMUNITIES**

In the middle of the nineteenth century, at a time when the constitutions of the Boer republics specifically forbade any equality between races, even in the churches, the Cape Colony's constitution granted equality not only in the courts but even at the poll, without any racial barriers. English, Afrikaner, Coloured, and African were all eligible to vote, if they had the necessary property qualifications. The qualifications were high enough to exclude the vast majority of the nonwhites, but in time the electorate came to include a small but significant minority of the nonwhite population.

The spread of the franchise led to an increasing interest in politics, and nonwhite voters began to think in terms of political organization. In 1882 an organization known as the Cape Native Education Association was founded, the first modern African organization with a political orientation. In 1884 J. T. Jabavu, the first African to complete a secondary school education, began the first Bantu newspaper, the *Imvo-Zabantsundu* (Native Opinion), which was concerned with issues that affected the African voters: pass laws, antinative legislation, and the demand for equal administration of justice in the courts.

In May 1887 a bill was passed in Parliament by the combined votes of the Boer and British parties. The bill, by raising the qualifications, struck 30,000 Africans off the voters' roll, nullifying the rapid increase in the number of African voters between 1872 and 1887. The black men's vote had increased enough so that in two of the constituencies they actually had a majority. The financial rather than the educational requirements were raised because the Africans were already interested enough in politics so that the whites feared that an educational test would only encourage the Africans to learn. The property qualifications were again raised in 1892.
In this period also began an African voting pattern in Cape Province that was to last until the 1930's. The Africans, not in a position to elect representatives of their own, had a choice between the predominantly British party and the predominantly Afrikaner Boer party. Since the Boer party, at that time called the Bond, was openly hostile to them, the Africans gave their votes to the British party as the lesser evil. At the same time the Cape Coloured also set a pattern that was to continue. The Cape Coloured had committed themselves to emulation of the whites and they were Afrikaans-speakers. They therefore voted for the Boer party, and a portion of them continued to do so until the 1950's.

Another type of protest organization, part of what was to become known as the Ethiopian Movement, the creation of purely African Christian churches was begun in 1882. The first of these was led by Nemiah Tile, a Tembuland African who had been a Methodist minister. His Tembu National Church had strong tribal ties and for this reason did not spread; however, it set the example for the paths that other African religious leaders were to follow. By the early 1890's the Ethiopian movements had greatly spread under the inspiration and support from the African Methodist Episcopal church of the United States. Ministers aspiring to be leaders went to America to study and returned to Africa filled with the zeal of the American Negro religious movements of the late nineteenth century. In addition, the church in America sent out ministers and advisors to the developing African churches. The churches were the first African mass movements on intertribal lines and were politically oriented with calls for "shaking off the white man's yoke" (see ch. 11, Religion).

In 1893 the white settlers of the Natal Province were granted responsible government, and again the white man faced a nonwhite challenge to his supremacy. The franchise was not based on race, but in practice only the whites had the vote. Africans could become voters, but only two or three qualified. The first act of the new white legislature was to cancel all voting rights of the Indians. In 1896 Mohandis K. Gandhi took up residence in South Africa and became the leader of the Indian opposition. It was, in fact, in South Africa that Gandhi perfected the nonviolent civil disobedience program that was to be his road to victory in India. His first passive-resistance campaign began in 1906, when the Transvaal government passed a law requiring all Indians to carry passes. Only 500 out of 13,000 Transvaal Indians registered under the pass law. The passive-resistance campaign continued for a number of years under Gandhi's leadership. Natal government measures against the Indians became harsher as time went by, particularly after Indian workers in the mines and sugar plantations began to support Gandhi's demands with strikes. Worldwide indignation against the Natal gov-
ernment, however, forced it to retreat. A number of the laws adversely affecting the Indians were repealed, but the Indians were not granted the franchise.

To counter the all-white character of the Constitutional Convention, African leaders called together the National Native Convention in 1909. The convention drew its delegates from various African groups, including the Cape Native Electoral Association, formed in 1884 to organize the Cape African vote, the Natal Native Congress, and the Transvaal Native Congress, organized in 1904 and 1907, respectively. After seeing the draft Union constitution and considering the implications for the African, the National Native Convention sent a delegation to London to protest, particularly against a clause prohibiting nonwhites in Parliament. The Africans had also hoped that their views would be presented by Cape liberals at the Constitutional Convention and that they would win an extension of the Cape native suffrage to the Africans of the other three provinces. Their hopes were not sustained.

With the 1909 convention as a training ground, the South African Native National Congress was formed in January 1912. The word Native was dropped from the title almost immediately. The Congress had as its moving spirits the Reverend J. L. Dube and K. I. Seme, a graduate of Columbia University and trained in law in London. The inaugural convention invited the tribal chiefs as well as representatives of the groups that had participated in the 1909 convention. All “kings, princes, paramount chiefs and other persons of royal blood of the Bantu” were to have the right to attend meetings of the association as honorary vice presidents.

The aims of the organization were declared to be the uniting of all smaller organizations into a national body, the uniting of all the different tribes of South Africa to demand equal rights and justice, and the putting forward of the political demands of the African people. The new congress met its first challenge in 1913 when parliament passed the Natives Land Act. The congress sent a delegation to London to protest the act, but they found that Great Britain was no longer in a position to respond to an appeal.

SOUTH AFRICA IN WORLD WAR I
AND THE POSTWAR DECADE

When World War I broke out in 1914, the South African Party's leaders offered their support and accepted responsibility for imperial defense efforts in southern Africa, including the seizure of the neighboring German colony of South West Africa. Most conservative Afrikaners, however, opposed the country's support of Great Britain. Boer commandos, with a strength of some 12,000
men, rebelled when Botha ordered South African forces to invade the German colony. The rebellious forces included former Boer generals who accepted German offers of support for the reestablishment of the republics. The revolt was poorly planned, however, and the government forces defeated the rebels without difficulty.

The forces under Botha's command invaded the German territory, completing their conquest by the middle of 1915. South African volunteer forces then played a considerable part in the British campaign against the German troops in Tanganyika. The volunteers included a Cape Coloured corps commanded by British officers. A South African brigade fought alongside British forces in France, where they were supported by a labor corps of Africans.

South Africa became a charter member of the League of Nations in 1919, and the league agreed to assign South West Africa as a mandate under South Africa's guardianship. Prime Minister Botha died in August 1919, and he was replaced by General Smuts after his return from Europe.

South Africa was struck by the worldwide inflation of the post-war period, and the resulting industrial troubles were exacerbated by the continuing influx of rural Afrikaners into the labor market. The closing of the frontier and the destruction of the Second Anglo-Boer War had caused the first influx of unskilled white labor into the industrial labor market. Whites had first been employed as simple laborers on the state-owned railways as early as 1903.

The union movement came to South Africa with skilled European artisans in the 1880's, but unions were established only in the Cape Colony at first. Some Cape unions from the first were multiracial, with the Coloured membership often outnumbering the whites. The country's first major strikes occurred in the mines in 1907 and 1914. In both cases the government intervened forcefully on the side of the employers to put down the strikes of white workers. Martial law was declared in the 1914 strike and nine leaders were secretly deported.

The unions had begun to form national organizations after 1902. By the beginning of World War I the South African Industrial Federation had been created, which joined all of the industrial unions, particularly those of the Transvaal. The Labour Party was formed to support the unions as early as 1909. A group of Marxist socialists split from the Labour Party in 1915 to form the International Socialist League of South Africa, which became the Communist Party of South Africa in the early 1920's (see ch. 15, Political Dynamics).

In late 1921 the organization of the mine owners on the Witwatersrand, the Chamber of Mines, under the pressure of rising costs, announced a plan to reduce the wages of the white workers
and to hire Africans for semiskilled jobs, previously reserved for whites, at lower wages. Two thousand white workers would lose their jobs.

A strike was immediately called by the Mine Workers Union, supported by the South African Industrial Federation. A second organization, the Council of Action, was formed, which demanded a nationwide strike of all white workers to support the miners. The council gradually became the voice of all the unions involved in the strike. As relations between the strikers on one hand and the Chamber of Mines and the government on the other deteriorated, the council became more radical in outlook and established stronger ties to the newly formed Communist Party. The Council of Action’s demands were accompanied by the creation of Boer-style commandos among the white workers, which included a majority of Afrikaner republicans. The socialists and Afrikaners united under the slogan, “Workers of the World, Unite and Fight for a White South Africa,” and the workers who appealed for the proclamation of a socialist republic by the Nationalist Party spent much of their energy in pointless attacks on Africans.

The strikes and riots lasted for ten weeks. At the end the riots, by then labeled a “Red Revolt,” were crushed by government troops, with a total loss of 230 lives. Although the mine owners’ decision to employ Africans was reversed, the salaries of the white workers were cut by 25 percent.

The First Nationalist Government

The Smuts government’s handling of the crisis created many enemies for his party, and in the elections of 1924 the South African Party was defeated by a coalition of the Nationalist and Labour parties, with Hertzog becoming prime minister. The policies of new Hertzog government were supported by the right wing of the Labour Party under F. H. P. Creswell.

One of the new government’s first acts was to propose the creation of a state owned steel industry, a proposal supported by both wings of the government. The Labour Party members favored nationalization of large-scale industry, while the Nationalists felt that the creation of their own steel industry would end the country’s dependence on Great Britain for its steel needs. The railroads and harbors had already come under central government control as a result of the Anglo-Boer War. The Iron and Steel Industry Act passed by Parliament set up the South African Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR). The creation and success of ISCOR set the pattern for future Nationalist Party attitudes toward state involvement in major industrial development projects (see ch. 21, Industry).
The steel works did not come into production until 1933. South Africa abandoned the gold standard in December 1932, in the middle of the worldwide depression. As a result of the freeing of gold, the value of the gold production soared, and the country's industrial development boomed on the strength of the new availability of excess capital (see ch. 21, Industry).

A second effect of the new state-owned industry and its successors was the fact that they served as symbols of the ending of the total domination of the English-speaking portion of the population over the country's economy. In the same period the private economic enterprises of the Afrikaners were beginning to challenge the total English dominance in a number of fields. Such developments were encouraged by the activities of the semisecret Afrikaner organization, the Broederbond (Brotherhood), support to all Afrikaner attempts to obtain economic, as well as cultural and political, control of the country.

South Africa's independence of imperial control was further underlined by other political and economic moves under the Nationalist government. A national flag and a national anthem were adopted, a commercial treaty was negotiated with Germany, and the customs preference for British goods was reduced. Finally in 1931, the British Parliament passed the Statute of Westminster, which assured that the British government could not exert ultimate control over the acts of the Union government and that the British ambassadorial delegation was separated from the office of the governor general.

White and Nonwhite Labor

The Nationalists took steps to improve the position of white labor by passing the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 and the Wage Act of 1925. Although both acts were intended to help only white workers and the Industrial Conciliation Act provisions specifically exempted Africans from its protection, the acts actually indirectly improved the salary position of some nonwhites. The first African trade union, the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union of Africa (ICU), had been organized in 1919, primarily as a political organization. The growth of the ICU and the growth of the Non-European Trade Union Federation, founded in the middle of the 1920's, as well as of the Coloured unions of Cape Province, were facilitated by the new laws. A nationwide organization of white workers, the South African Trade Union Congress, had been organized with the assistance of the minister of labour in 1924. The congress was reorganized as the Trades and Labour Council in 1931 but at that time included only 21 of the country's 139 unions, primarily those composed of skilled workers.
Acts specifically aimed at protecting the white workers from African competition included the Mine and Works Act of 1926, which legally barred Africans from holding skilled positions in the mines. Further government control over the African population was provided by the Hostility Law of 1927, which made it illegal for anyone to encourage African hostility against the Europeans, and by the Riotous Assemblies Act of 1930, which allowed the minister of justice on his own initiative to ban an individual from entering any specified part of the country for a period of up to twelve months.

South African participation in the war of 1914 had greatly affected the outlook of many Africans in South Africa. Thousands of Africans were recruited into the Native Labour Corps and were sent to Europe. They returned with new ideas, and they did not relish returning to the old life.

In the years following the war the primary objects of African interest were the numerous and complicated pass laws. They were aimed at directing and controlling every movement of the Africans, in order to insure that as many as possible remained in the labor pool for the white industry. In 1919 the African National Congress (ANC) led a serious but unsuccessful passive resistance campaign against the pass laws. The protest included the burning of passes, which was to become the perennial symbol of African nonviolent agitation.

The ICU was to play an important part in African nationalism throughout the 1920s, surpassing the role of the ANC. The ICU was founded by Clements Kadalie, a Nyasalander. In 1923 the ICU spread beyond the limits of Cape Province into the Transvaal and then the Orange Free State and Natal. It aimed initially to join with the white trade unions of South Africa. In 1928, however, Kadalie’s plea for racial harmony was rejected by the European Trade Union Coordinating Committee, which replied that the European worker feared competition from great masses of Bantu laborers with their lower standards of living. This fear induced the whites to demand protection from their union against the rise of African workers. The ICU received considerable support from the Communist Party at first, but the Communists of the ICU were expelled in 1926.

Despite assistance from the British Trade Union Congress, the ICU did not have the administrative and leadership strength to sustain its growth. As it became larger it became fragmented, and in 1928 it split in half with its most powerful divisions, the Natal unions, seceding. The ICU continued to exist into the late 1930s but had lost its significant strength.

The 1929 Elections and the Black Specter

The Labour Party, in difficulties for some time, split completely in 1928, and only the Creswell faction supported the Nationalists'
bid for a second term in the 1929 election. After a bitterly fought contest, the Nationalists won. For the first time racial issues, introduced in such a way as to capitalize on the traditional fears of white voters, divided the white parties. The Nationalists publicized their plans for insuring permanent baasskap (white dominance) and accused Smuts and his South Africa Party of planning to grant political rights to Africans. Smuts was specifically accused of planning to extend the nonracial Cape Colony franchise to the other provinces. The Nationalists also alleged that Smuts would follow the recent suggestion of the noted historian Arnold Toynbee that South Africa might one day have to divide its territory between the whites and blacks. The Nationalist Party scornfully rejected the idea of territorial separation of the races.

The Nationalist Party’s accusations dredged up all the old emotional issues of Boer-Bantu and Boer-British relations. Boer accusations against the British made in the early nineteenth century became political currency more than a hundred years later. The Nationalist platform undermined support for both the South African Party and the Labour Party. Poor whites deserted the Labour Party because it had occasionally, though unemphatically called for improved working conditions for nonwhites. After 1929 the Labour Party was never able to regain its former strength.

The African Peoples Organization (APO), formed in the Coloured community in 1902, retained its strength and was an important force in the polls until 1930. The APO did not present candidates of its own in most elections but supported those candidates who seemed least opposed to Coloured interests, although a small number of Coloured candidates successfully contested elections for seats on the Municipal Council of Capetown. During the 1920’s the Coloured voters constituted nearly an eighth of the Cape electorate and potentially held the balance of power between the English and Afrikaner parties.

In 1930 and 1931, however, the Union Parliament diluted the Coloured vote by broadening the European franchise; all property qualifications for white voters were removed, and white women were given the right to vote. The Coloured and African franchise remained limited to males with relatively high levels of income. Despite this setback, the first time a racial factor had been introduced in Cape Province voting rights since 1828, the great majority of Coloured persons continued to hope for better treatment from the whites and did not join opposition movements.

THE CREATION OF THE UNITED PARTY

The worldwide depression hit the country in 1931. The government was blamed for failing to cushion its impact by abandoning the gold standard until too late. Hertzog, fearing that the National-
ists might lose the 1934 elections, sought a coalition government with Smuts, who was willing to enter into a common front to bring the country out of the depression. Hertzog's willingness to enter a coalition was also based on the fact that he and a major portion of his followers no longer feared that Afrikaner culture would be overwhelmed by English influences; Smuts, in turn, wanted to end the influence of the right wing of the Afrikaner community on government decisionmaking. The two parties merged in 1934 to form the United Party. Sections of both parties refused to join the new United Party however. The Afrikaner extremist, D. F. Malan, formed the Purified Nationalist Party, while the most pro-British of Smuts' former followers formed the Dominion Party. The Purified Nationalists were to form the parliamentary opposition for the next fourteen years.

The strength of the new United Party after the 1934 elections allowed it to pass without difficulty a number of measures which Hertzog's Nationalists had sought since the mid-1920's. In 1936 Hertzog proposed legislation to carry segregation into the election booth with the Representation of Natives Bill. The bill proposed that African electors in Cape Province be removed from the common role. Instead they were to be given a roll of their own and were to be allowed to elect three white members to represent them in the lower house of Parliament; the Africans of the whole country were to be represented by four white senators elected by indirect means.

A National Native Representative Council with purely advisory powers was also created. It could consider all proposed legislation affecting the African community, but the government would be under no compulsion to listen to its advice. A second bill, the Native Land and Trust Bill, authorized an increase in the native reserves (the areas formally allocated for African occupation), but only to an area equal to 13 percent of the Union's area, and this was to be the permanent home for the Africans who constituted the population. The right still retained by the Africans of Cape Province to own land outside of the reserves would be abolished.

African reaction to the two proposals was unanimous and immediate. A new feeling of strength and self-respect had already begun to appear among the younger educated leaders, partially stirred by the Pan-African sentiments generated by the brave defense put up by the Africans of Ethiopia against a white aggressor, the Italian army, in 1935 and 1936. In this atmosphere the threat to the African franchise of the Cape rejuvenated the ANC. The ANC annual convention in 1935 reflected not only a new level of influence and organization among Africans but also a new interest in the body by the Indians and Coloureds, some of whose leaders attended the meeting for the first time.

As a result a joint organization was formed, the All-African
National Convention, which held a national meeting in December 1935 to demonstrate the strength of opposition to the two bills that were then before the joint session of the country's Parliament. The convention flatly rejected the proposal for the establishment of a National Native Representative Council as in no way an adequate substitute for the threatened loss of the Cape franchise. While welcoming the provisions increasing the size of native reserves, it condemned the other provisions as an attempt to force all Africans into a position of permanent economic dependency.

The Parliament ignored the storm of African verbal opposition and passed the bills in April 1936, although they did drop their efforts to exclude the Coloured voters in the same fashion because of the opposition of the more liberal members of Parliament. Further anti-African legislation in 1937 increased the government's power to bar Africans from entering urban areas by refusing them permits to seek work in the towns and provided for the forcible return of unemployed urban Africans to reserves. It also set up legislation under which municipalities were to be compelled to create separate residential areas by race.

In the 1938 elections the United Party won by a very large majority, but the Purified Nationalist Party, which again played upon fears of black advancement, greatly increased its electoral strength. In their growth the Purified Nationalists profited by their ties to the Broederbond, which used the 1938 celebration of the Centenary of the Great Trek to make impassioned appeals to the antiblack and anti-British sentiments in terms of themes of Afrikaner history.

**WORLD WAR II, THE BROEDERBOND, AND THE NAZIS**

The racial and economic ideas of the extreme wings of the Purified Nationalist Party and of the Broederbond led them to feel an affinity for the National-Socialist Party of Hitler's Germany, which espoused similar doctrines. Afrikaner extremists were attracted by Hitler's claims of the racial superiority of Germanic peoples, his enmity for Britain, and his state socialism designed to provide improved economic opportunities for a racial elite.

The majority of the Afrikaner supporters of the United Party were opposed to South Africa's entry into the World War II. The Purified Nationalist Party went a step further and clearly desired a German victory, hoping that the fall of Britain would be the opportunity for turning South Africa into an Afrikaner republic.

Hertzog attempted to keep the country neutral, but a parliamentary majority of 80 to 67 supported Smuts and took the country into the war on Britain's side. More than 200,000 English and Afrikaans-speaking South Africans served in the armed forces during the war and fought with distinction in Ethiopia, North Africa,
and Europe. More importantly from the point of view of the allied war effort, the country’s industry and agriculture were retooled to meet the needs of Britain for outside assistance and to support the Allied forces operating in North Africa. As a result, the country’s industry was substantially expanded during the war years (see ch. 21, Industry).

There was considerable agitation against participation in the war, and some of it was specifically in favor of Germany. A number of organizations appeared that modeled themselves on or emulated the German Nazi organizations. The Handhawersbond, organized on the “Brown Shirt” mode had a claimed strength of 100,000; and the New Order, led by Oswald Pirow, openly supported the German Nazis and was in turn supported by broadcasts reaching South Africa from German propaganda radio stations.

The most important of the pro-Nazi organizations, however, was the Ossewa-Brandwag (Ox-Wagon Guards), whose origins were linked to the Broederbond. The Ossewa-Brandwag was a nationwide organization with units in every population center in the country. By the time the war began, it had adopted national socialism and sought the abolition of private enterprise and the establishment of an authoritarian state. The Ossewa-Brandwag was heavily involved in anti-British propaganda, including strong efforts to destroy the morale of the Afrikaners who constituted more than half of the South African military forces. Its members were responsible for most of the significant number of sabotage attempts carried out in the country. Many of the leaders of the Ossewa-Brandwag were interned for much of the war, including a future prime minister, J. B. Vorster, and a number of men who were to serve in the cabinet in the 1960’s.

As the war turned in favor of the Allies, Hitler and his doctrines lost much of their attractions for the Afrikaner extremists. Under Broederbond pressure, the various organizations dissolved to allow their members to attach themselves to the Purified Nationalist Party.

THE RISE OF THE NATIONALIST PARTY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF APARTHEID

Wartime elections in 1943 again returned the United Party with a large majority. The Purified Nationalist Party, or simply the Nationalist Party as it had come to be called, began almost immediately to turn its efforts toward the 1948 elections. As early as 1945 the leader of the Nationalists, D. F. Malan, had decided to stage an election campaign modeled on that of 1929—to achieve victory at the polls by playing upon white fears of African encroachment.

The rapid economic development brought about by the war had
attracted large number of Africans to the cities, where, because of the labor shortages, they had filled numerous semiskilled and some skilled positions in industry. This rapid increase in black urbanization was not matched by any appreciable increase in housing or other social services for the nonwhites. Overcrowding, demoralization, and an increased crime rate resulted. The rise of a generation of African leaders with more education and a greater degree of freedom from traditional restraints, as well as the influence of the statements, beginning with the Atlantic Charter, of the Allied leaders on self-determination and popular freedoms, led the Africans to expect an improvement in their position in the postwar era. The African leaders demonstrated the new vitality of the ANC by boycotting the National Native Representative Council in 1946.

The Nationalist Party used the changes in the position of the African community to convince the white voters that the limited steps to improve the position of the nonwhites that the United Party had taken indicated that the party had fallen under the influence of the new liberal forces arising in Britain and Western Europe in the immediate postwar years. In addition, Smuts, as a strong supporter of the United Nations, lost support among the electorate when South Africa was attacked for its racial policies by the government of India in the United Nations. As a result of the charges of racism, the United Nations had refused to end South West Africa's mandate status so that South Africa could incorporate the territory.

The Nationalist Party proclaimed that it offered the voters a new policy to insure continued white dominance. The policy was in line with the theory expounded by the editor of a leading Nationalist paper, H. F. Verwoerd, and was presented to the party in the report of a special commission headed by P. O. Sauer. It called for the very policy that had been rejected in 1929, the separation of the races in South Africa by rigid barriers, including restricting the entry of members of each racial group to particular portions of the country. Segregation in multiracial areas was to be carried into every field. Separation had been legally established only in major matters, such as separate schools, and public opinion rather than law had been depended upon to establish and enforce most segregation; the law would now legally demand separation in everything. The Sauer Report labeled the program apartheid or "separateness." Apartheid was to be the basic ideological and practical issue in South African politics for the next quarter of a century.

The Nationalist election platform stressed that aspect of apartheid that would preserve a market for white labor in which the nonwhites could not compete. The 1948 election catapulted the Nationalists from a small minority party to a commanding position. Its seventy seats, combined with the nine seats won by its ally, the Afrikaner Party (absorbed by the Nationalists in 1949) gave it an
eight-vote parliamentary majority. From 1948 onward governments controlled by the Nationalist Party enacted legislation and otherwise attempted to implement the apartheid philosophy as expounded in 1948, with the aim of creating a white-dominated state in which all liberal opposition was effectively silenced.

The new government labeled opposition to its policy as treason and announced that the United Nations was an enemy of liberty because it had demanded the right to conduct annual inspections of conditions in South West Africa (see Appendix—South West Africa). The government curtailed the flow of immigrants because it feared that they might bring in foreign and liberal influences. In the face of demands for a broadened franchise, the limited parliamentary representation for Indians, only recently established, was repealed.

In 1949, the first full year in office for the Nationalists, marriages between the races were declared illegal, and sexual relations between whites and nonwhites were made punishable by up to seven years in prison. Africans were deprived of protection under all unemployment insurance laws, and the National Native Representative Council was abolished.

The Population Registration Act of 1950 created an office to classify each individual in the country by race. Although this only indirectly affected most of the people, those whites and Coloured whose ancestral background or appearance left question for debate were caused hardships by the classifications, which led to the separation of husbands from wives and parents from children (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages; ch. 6, Social Structure). The South West Africa Affairs Act of the same year created representation in both houses of Parliament for the small white community of the mandated territory, with one representative for each 3,000 voters. In the elections under this act, the Nationalists won a complete victory, increasing their margin in the lower house of Parliament from five to eleven.

Two other major acts were passed in 1950, the Group Areas Act and the Suppression of Communism Act. The first of these supplied the basis for the construction of an apartheid society. It provided for the proclamation of reserved racial areas in all cities and the expropriation of property and the forced removal and resettlement of persons who might be in the wrong area. The law was implemented gradually, but during the next fifteen years it came to be applied to every town in the country (see ch. 6, Social Structure; ch. 8, Living Conditions).

Under the Suppression of Communism Act, communism was defined not as Marxist socialism or Marxist-Leninism but as any doctrine that "aimed at bringing about any social, political, industrial or economic change in the country by unlawful acts or omis-
sions... or the encouragement of feelings of hostility between whites and non-whites.” The act empowered the government to declare any organization or publication unlawful. It also provided for the compilation of a list of all members of the Communist party, who could then be banned from membership in any organization or attendance at any public gathering. The ban could not be appealed to the courts (see ch. 26, Public Order and Internal Security; ch. 14, The Legal System). Passage of the act allowed the government to expel the two Communists who were sitting in Parliament and in the Cape Provincial Council, but it served chiefly as a justification for government attacks against any of its liberal opponents.

In 1951 the passage of the Bantu Authorities Act permitted the government to reestablish and strengthen tribal organizations and to appoint and remove chiefs. Other acts of 1951 and 1952 required African women to carry passes for the first time and extended government control over the movement of Africans into urban areas (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages; ch. 6, Social Structure; ch. 8, Living Conditions).

In 1951 the government began a six-year battle to remove the Coloured voters of the Cape from the common voting roll. Under the government’s proposal the Coloureds were to be represented in Parliament by four specially elected white members in the lower house and one in the Senate. The Board of Coloured Affairs was also to be created on the model of the discredited African Representative Council.

The bill was initially passed by a simple majority vote. The appeals court, however, declared the bill invalid, on the grounds that the constitution required that acts affecting the franchise could only be passed by a two-thirds vote of both houses of Parliament sitting jointly. The Nationalists then passed a High Court of Parliament Bill, which allowed Parliament to set aside, by a simple majority, any judgment of the appeals court. This act was also declared invalid. Therefore, in 1953 and again in 1954, the government attempted to obtain two-thirds majority votes but failed both times.

Finally in 1955 the government took advantage of the provision of the constitution that allowed Parliament itself to decide on the composition of the Senate. The existing Senate was dissolved and a new Senate created, in which the Nationalist Party held all but eight seats, more than enough to allow it to control two-thirds of the combined houses. The government immediately passed a constitutional amendment that abolished the power of the courts to consider the validity of parliamentary acts (see ch. 14, The Legal System). In addition, again by a two-thirds vote, legislation removed the Coloured voters from the common voting roll and created the Coloured Advisory Council.
During this crucial period, the Coloured population continued to hope that the United Party and a new, all-white political organization, the War Veterans Torch Commando, formed primarily to protest the Coloureds' disenfranchisement, would succeed in protecting their right to vote. The Nationalist Party's eventual success in passing the legislation left the great majority of the Coloureds largely apathetic.

While the debates on the Coloured vote were continuing, other significant pieces of legislation were passed. These strengthened the hand of the state, particularly in police matters, and provided for the creation of racially segregated public amenities. Among the important acts were the Bantu Education Act of 1953 which removed African education from the Department of Education, Arts and Science and local bodies and placed it in the Department of Native Affairs, under new educational directives. African children were henceforth to receive an education markedly different from that given to white children. The government's plan was carried out despite vigorous and continuing protests by the Africans against what they saw as the degradation of their educational standards (see ch. 9, Education).

In 1956 the Industrial Conciliation Act authorized the minister of labour to create regulations limiting all jobs to members of specified races and set up administrative machinery for insuring compliance with his decisions throughout all industrial establishments (see ch. 22, Labor). The head tax on Africans was increased by 75 percent, and the government refused to consider the imposition of a minimum wage for the Africans, who were legally barred from striking. At the same time, an official commission reported that African wages in Johannesburg were insufficient to meet the acceptable minimum living standards to maintain health.

The Nationalist Party won in the elections of 1953 and 1958, each time increasing its majority in Parliament. D. F. Malan retired in 1955 and was replaced by J. G. Strydom, the party's leader in the Transvaal. The United Party had lost more and more of its Afrikaner adherents to the Nationalists because it was continually accused of wanting to improve the position of the Africans at the expense of the whites. The United Party was further weakened by the removal of the 43,000 Coloured voters from the common voting roll, as most of them had generally supported the party.

To lure back its Afrikaner supporters, the United Party opposed the Nationalist legislation to increase the reserves on the grounds that it would require spending European tax money for the betterment of the Africans. By 1958 the party also dropped its stands in favor of the Coloured voters. Nevertheless, it was not able to regain its strength because it lacked a coherent program and dynamic leadership. The Nationalists were able to achieve victory without a
plurality in 1948 and 1953 because the electoral districts of South Africa have always been structured in such a way as to favor rural areas, most of which are dominated by Afrikaners (see ch. 15, Political Dynamics). In the 1958 elections the Nationalists bettered their previous showings at the polls, winning 103 seats to the United Party’s 53; yet their share of the popular vote was only 52 percent. The United Party did win all four of the separate Coloured seats, but this was a hollow victory, as only some 12 percent of the Coloured electorate bothered to cast their ballots. Nearly all of the younger Coloured voters boycotted the election.

In 1959 the government announced that the African local governments in the reserves were now strong enough to be considered as the representative voice of the African population and that African representation in Parliament was, therefore, redundant. Legislation followed that abolished the seats for African representatives in the Parliament and provincial legislative bodies. The government also took steps to increase the number of white voters by reducing the minimum age for voters from twenty-one to eighteen.

Prime Minister Strydom died in office in 1958 and was replaced by H. F. Verwoerd, the foremost proponent of apartheid and an equally strong supporter of demands for creation of a republic. Accordingly, in 1960 Parliament passed a bill authorizing a referendum among the white voters on the question of establishing a republic. In order not to alienate a portion of the electorate, Verwoerd promised that the new republic’s constitution would vary as little as possible from that of 1910 and that South Africa would make every effort to remain within the British Commonwealth of Nations. The referendum, held in October 1960, resulted in a small majority for a republic. Subsequent legislation altered only those clauses of the constitution that made reference to Great Britain and substituted an indirectly elected president for the governor general who represented the British monarch.

The new republic came into being on May 31, 1961, with C. R. Swart as its first president. Despite earlier agreements, South Africa withdrew its application for continued membership in the British Commonwealth in October 1961 on the grounds that other Commonwealth countries planned to demand that South Africa change its policies if it did continue in the Commonwealth.

The postrepublic parliamentary elections were held in October 1961, the Nationalists gaining 105 seats to 51 for the United Party. Before and during the election, a strong movement developed to support a new organization, the Progressive Party. Those who formed it were concerned by what they considered the deteriorating relations between whites and Africans. The party called for the gradual extension of the franchise to educated Africans and an end to apartheid and racial injustice. Despite considerable financial
backing from industrial circles and a well-run campaign, the Progressive Party was soundly defeated in all but one constituency—a wealthy Johannesburg suburb.

Prime Minister Verwoerd did not live to fill out the five years of the Parliament elected in 1961. An attempt had been made on his life by a wealthy white farmer in April 1960. The would-be assassin, David Pratt, had fired two shots into his head but Verwoerd had recovered. Pratt was adjudged insane, and no political motives were ascribed to the attempt. On September 6, 1966, while the prime minister was addressing Parliament, a second attempt was made. This time the assassin, a parliamentary messenger, was successful. Again the assassin, clearly insane, was without political motivation. The former minister of justice, B. J. Vorster, became prime minister.

The first test of the government's territorial separation policy occurred during Verwoerd's premiership when, in late 1963, limited self-government under careful white control was granted to the oldest of the African Reserve governing bodies, the Transkei Bunga. The first Transkei Council had been established in 1895, and by 1931 this had become the General Council of the Chiefs of all of the Transkei. In 1956 the General Council had been reformed into the Transkeian Territorial Authority. The move in 1963 made this body the Transkei Legislative Assembly, with a chief minister elected by the Bunga responsible for a number of internal affairs, although subject in all decisions to the veto of the South African cabinet (see ch. 13, The Governmental System; ch. 15, Political Dynamics).

AFRICAN RESISTANCE IN THE POSTWAR PERIOD

The difficulties caused in the 1930's by having different organizations competing for leadership in the nonwhite movements led in the mid-1940's to another attempt to unite all the nonwhite organizations in a common front to battle the discriminatory laws. The new federation, the Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM), took advantage of the strong opposition in the government to a proposal to create the Department of Coloured Affairs, modeled on the Department of Native Affairs. Although the protest was successful (the legislation was not brought up again for fifteen years), the NEUM did not attain a strong enough position to serve as a permanent unifying organization for such diverse elements as the ANC and the APO.

While ANC members continued to sit in the National Native Representative Council, a sizable element within the ANC supported a policy similar to that of the NEUM calling for a boycott of all government-sponsored bodies. In 1944 ANC members favoring
this more radical policy formed the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL).

In 1946 the government's suppression of a strike in the gold mines, led by the fairly large and effective but short-lived nonwhite trade unions that had been formed during the favorable labor period of World War II, resulted in the total abandonment of the National Native Representative Council by the African members. The same year marked a turning point for the Asian organizations. The South African Indian Congress, which had been in existence since the early 1900s, passed into the control of militant and left-wing Hindu leaders led by Yusuf M. Dadoo, a longtime Communist Party member, while more conservative Indian elements, led largely by Muslim businessmen, formed a new group, the South African Indian Organization.

In 1949 the militant ANCYL persuaded the ANC as a whole to adopt its program of action, which called for an end to cooperation with the government and boycotts, strikes, and civil disobedience. The ANCYL was inspired by militant African nationalism and Gandhi's nonviolent techniques. The new attitude in the South African Indian Congress and the ANC led to a formal alliance between the two groups.

The 1949 change of policy transformed the ANC from a discussion forum to an action group utilizing mass demonstration and pressure. A nonwhite convention held in December 1951 formally adopted a resolution to be presented to the government, calling for the repeal of the pass laws, the laws limiting African land rights, and the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950 (the vagueness of which allowed it to be used more against African organizations than against Communist organizations). The resolution also called for an end to the forced displacement of Africans from urban areas and to the Nationalist Party's efforts to place the Coloureds on a separate voting roll. The Africans threatened that if the government did not comply with their demands for justice they would begin a large-scale passive resistance campaign. In June 1952, with the advice and some assistance from the South African Indian Congress, the ANC undertook a campaign that became the largest ever waged by nonwhites in South Africa, achieving great international publicity but little practical success.

During the campaign over 8,000 people, chiefly Africans but including a number of Indians and Coloureds, volunteered to deliberately violate the pass and segregation laws and were jailed. As a result of the popular support gained, the organization grew from a small body numbering some 15,000 to a politically powerful organization of 100,000. Although the defiance campaign was unsuccessful in its efforts to force the government to repeal some of the undesirable legislation, it consolidated African sentiment and gave training to
future leaders. It was perhaps the only organizationally successful campaign ever conducted by South Africa's nonwhites.

Despite its success, the ANC soon suffered internal conflicts that affected its future. A former president of the ANC defected from the organization and founded the National-Minded Bloc, which was opposed to any ties with the Indian community. This break paralleled the main division in the ANC between the “Africanists,” whose origins lay in the ANCYL and who felt that the fight for African independence could be won only by Africans alone, and the majority of leaders within the ANC, who believed in a policy of cooperation with all organizations opposed to apartheid.

The ANC's lack of success, particularly organizational success, after the 1952 disobedience campaign left the younger group of activists totally unsatisfied. In 1957 the group within the ANCYL founded a periodical, The Africanist, edited by Robert Sobukwe. Greatly affected by the attainment of independence by Ghana that year and by the slogans of Pan-Africanism as espoused by Kwame Nkrumah, the group, composed of the younger African leaders, urged greater militancy, racial assertiveness, and identification with Pan-Africanism. The Pan-Africanism that the new group professed had always been latent within the ANC and other movements, but it had not become manifest earlier because of the ANC's close ties with a very small number of whites and a somewhat larger number of Asians who worked for the Africans' cause.

At a 1959 conference a new body, the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), was established. It pledged itself to support the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights but declared that the salvation of Africans must be the work of Africans themselves. Other races in a free South Africa could claim no special privileges and would have to consider themselves as Africans. Robert Sobukwe was elected president of PAC.

Prime Minister Vorster described Sobukwe as “a dynamic personality with a remarkable organizing ability.” Sobukwe believed that the vast mass of Africans would follow a purely African leadership if that leadership could arouse their racial consciousness and was prepared to lead them in the struggle against the racial laws. The PAC believed that the white regime could be brought to an end by passive disobedience, if it could be done on a massive enough scale.

The first PAC attempt at a mass disobedience campaign, aimed against the pass laws, began on March 24, 1960. It ended the same day with the Sharpeville incident, in which at least 67 Africans were killed and 186 injured when nervous white police turned their guns on a peaceful crowd of African demonstrators.

The massacre at Sharpeville shocked even the Afrikaner government, which called a brief halt to the most stringent applications of the apartheid rules. In fact, the acting prime minister, P. O. Sauer,
speaking on May 20, 1960, stated that South Africa should reconsider its whole approach to race relations. As the potential explosiveness of the crisis subsided, however, the offers of change gave way to measures of control over African organizations and those thought to be sympathetic to them. The ANC and the PAC were banned, and thousands of Africans were arrested, including the leaders of the two parties as well as a number of leaders of the largely white Liberal Party. The government demonstrated by the bannings and arrests that it would persist in its policies towards the Africans and also that it was able to effectively prevent by military force all but the most widespread expressions of African resentment.

In December 1960 those ANC and PAC leaders who were able to do so met under the chairmanship of Jordan Ngubane of the Liberal Party to call for a gathering of representatives of all opposition groups at an All-In Africa Conference, to be held in 1961. The conference supporters included the South African Indian Congress, which had served to some extent as the voice of the banned ANC, and the South African Coloured Peoples Organization, a small left-wing group founded in 1953 (later called the South African Coloured Peoples Congress). Before the conference was actually held, however, splits had already developed. The former PAC members refused to participate in a multiracial conference and withdrew from the planning committee. The Liberal Party supporters of the conference also resigned. Under the leadership of former ANC members, the conference was held in Natal in March 1961. The conference issued an ultimatum to the government calling for a national convention of all races and urging the Africans to prepare for a mass nationwide demonstration in case the government did not meet with its demands. The “stay-home” demonstration, which was opposed by the PAC, had very limited success in the face of a large-scale mobilization of military and police forces.

To insure that the government would have the military and police strength to prevent and put down any incidents of internal disorder, a number of acts were passed by Parliament between 1961 and 1965. Three defense acts granted wartime powers, including the police power of arrest, to the military forces in times when emergencies have been declared by the government as a result of internal disorder. These acts also brought all military units up to combat strength and created a white police reserve force.

Legislation authorizing the implementation of censorship was passed, and new regulations forbade the publishing of the works or statements of any banned person. Finally, laws were passed increasing the general police powers of the state. These new laws, backed by heavy penalties, granted the South African security forces powers that have been described by the International Com-
mission of Jurists as repressive as those of any Communist or Fascist dictatorship (see ch. 26, Public Order and Internal Security).

The new laws included extremely strong punishment provisions for persons convicted of any act of sabotage, which would automatically be considered an act of treason. Penalties, from five-years' imprisonment to the death penalty, could also be imposed on persons convicted of receiving training outside South Africa in methods of violence or in methods for achieving the aims of a banned organization of those persons urging forcible intervention by an outside power, even the United Nations.

Activists of both the ANC and PAC had reacted to the banning of their organizations by adopting new policies concerning the use of violence. In 1962 and 1963 the underground organizations of both movements allowed or authorized the creation of subordinate organizations whose primary purpose was at least sabotage and at most armed revolt. In December 1962, an organization called the Spear of the Nation (Umkonto We-Sizwe, in Zulu) began a sabotage campaign aimed primarily at the destruction of public utility equipment. The new organization clearly shared the orientation of the ANC. At about the same time, a secret organization, Poqo, developed within the PAC, with aims that were quite openly terrorist. Unlike the relationship between the Spear of the Nation and the ANC, the PAC and Poqo were synonymous organizations. Most sabotage activities, however, have been confined either to the Spear organization or to a largely white organization called the African Resistance Movement (ARM).

The motivation for the turn to violence was explained by the leader of the Spear of the Nation, Nelson Mandela, in 1964 when he told the court trying him for sabotage that the Spear leaders had concluded in 1961 that without violence there was no way in which the African people could succeed in their struggle against white racism. The minority white government's actions of the previous sixteen years had ended all hope of utilizing peaceful means to improve the position of the African majority.

Because of the extreme measures taken by the police, primarily the enormous police intelligence network based on a nationwide system of paid informants, the sabotage programs of the three movements were of only very limited success. A small number of powerlines, bridges, train stations, and radio towers were blown up in a three-year period, but these acts did little harm to the country's economy. On the other hand, the police were able to infiltrate and apparently destroy all the terrorist organizations. Nearly 200 mass political and sabotage trials were held in a three-year period ending in December 1965, and 1,300 persons were sentenced to an average of seven years in prison. The most important of the trials arose from the arrest of a large group of the most important leaders of
the banned ANC while they were assembled at a meeting at Rivonia near Johannesburg in July 1963. Eight persons were sentenced to life imprisonment on the strength of plans discovered at the meeting outlining a widespread sabotage campaign.

Although the police efforts successfully squashed all overt manifestations of African resistance to the government, the causes of the Africans' resentment remained. The imprisoned leaders, particularly Nelson Mandela, Robert Sobukwe, and the banned elder leader of the ANC, Albert Luthuli, who was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1960 for his preaching of nonviolence, became martyrs in the eyes of the majority of the African population.

The driving of the ANC and PAC underground also resulted in the creation of a refugee population among the leadership of the two parties. A few nonwhite leaders had left South Africa earlier in the 1950's in order to travel abroad, particularly touring capitals behind the Iron Curtain or attending conferences, such as Bandung Conference in 1954. Immediately following the Sharpeville incident, the national executive committee of the ANC decided to send Oliver Tambo, the vice president, to serve as ambassador abroad. Representatives of the PAC also left in 1961. Both organizations, as well as the South African Indian Congress, the nationalist movements of South West Africa, and the Trotskyite remnants of the NEUM maintained offices in the capitals of one or more independent African countries, with the ANC and PAC both based in Dar es Salaam.
CHAPTER 4

POPULATION

At its last census in 1960, South Africa's total population possessed the characteristics of a less developed country. It was youthful, with a high birth rate, a gradually declining mortality rate, and a rate of growth ranging between 2 and 3 percent a year. The population, however, was composed of two distinct, dissimilar segments. The larger, about 80 percent of the total, consisted of the combined African, Coloured (of mixed origin), and Asian (chiefly Indian) communities. The demographic characteristics of the non-whites, which because of their preponderance gave the cast to the population as a whole, closely resembled the model of a less developed country.

The second segment comprised the white minority. This group approached more closely the model of an industrialized society. It was older than any component of the first group; it had a substantially smaller proportion of individuals in the under-fifteen age group and a greater percentage in the economically active age category. Its rate of natural increase was well below that of the first segment, and it was heavily dependent upon immigration to hold its position in the total population. Population growth from 1960 to 1968 indicates that the white proportion of the total population was declining.

The minority, but politically dominant, white segment, through its policy of apartheid, was attempting to control and arrange the population distribution of the far larger African, Coloured, and Asian communities so as to maximize the geographic separation of these groups from whites and from each other. The need for non-white workers in the rapidly industrializing white areas tended to counteract the government's policy (see ch. 8, Living Conditions; ch. 21, Industry; ch. 22, Labor).

In the case of the African majority, apartheid had accentuated a system of migratory labor involving large movements of workers between the "white area" and the African reserves. Yet, despite efforts to segregate the Africans, permanent migration into white areas, especially urban centers, was going on in the late 1960's (see ch. 6, Social Structure).
STRUCTURE OF THE POPULATION

In mid-1968 South Africa's population was officially estimated at 19.17 million. This represented a gain of about 3.2 million since the latest census, taken in September 1960, when a population of 15,994,181 was recorded. The latter total included 569,973 Africans whose permanent domicile was outside South Africa. Foreign visitors in South Africa at the time were excluded, as was the population of Walvis Bay, which was treated as part of South West Africa (Namibia).

The South African government has established its own criteria for grouping the population into racial categories: Africans (officially designated Bantus); whites; Coloureds, who are principally of mixed blood but include some Malays; and the Asians (Asians), mainly Indians. Africans were the largest racial community, comprising over two-thirds of the population in 1968. They were followed by the whites, who made up not quite one-fifth. The Coloureds constituted one-tenth, and the Asian segment, 3 percent (see table 2). The white segment, based on language used in the home, was composed largely of about 1.8 million (58 percent) Afrikaans speakers and 1.1 million English speakers (37 percent).

Age and Sex Distribution

The 1960 census showed a slightly greater number of males (50.26 percent) than females (49.74 percent), or a ratio of 101 males to 100 females. In mid-1967 estimates indicated little change in the proportion, males comprising 50.24 percent and females 49.76 percent. The slightly higher ratio of males in the overall population, which runs counter to the usual ratio of between 95 and 100 for national aggregates, appeared to be largely the conse-

Table 2. South African Population by Racial Composition, 1960 and 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>Mid-1968*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>10,927,922</td>
<td>68.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>3,080,159</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloureds</td>
<td>1,509,053</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asians</td>
<td>477,047</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15,994,181</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*South African Government estimate.

quence of an excess of male immigrants and of males in the foreign labor force (see ch. 22, Labor).

The African and Asian communities had more males than females. In 1960 there were 101.8 African and 102.6 Asian males to 100 females. The higher ratio of African males can be attributed to inclusion in the census figures of more than half a million Africans from outside South Africa, mainly migrant workers, among whom males constituted over 83 percent. A study of 1946 census data showed that exclusion of these migrants lowered the ratio to 95.5.

In the Asian population life expectancy of males at birth was greater than for females until sometime in the 1950's. Data for 1959–61 showed this situation to have been reversed, but the earlier preponderance of males presumably remained influential at the 1960 census. In mid-1967 estimates, African males continued to outnumber females 101.8 to 100. The ratio dropped in the Asian community to 101.8, presumably reflecting further effects of the change in male-female life expectancies.

In 1960 both the white and Coloured communities had more females than males: the ratio for whites was 100.7 and for Coloureds, 101. In mid-1967 the ratio for Coloureds had risen to 102 and that for the whites had declined to 100.3. In both 1960 and 1967 the white ratio was affected by the larger proportion of males among immigrants. Excluding this gain, the ratio of white females to males was about 101 to 100.

In 1960 about 6.4 million persons, or 40 percent of the total population, were under fifteen years of age. Another 634,000 (4 percent) were sixty-five or over. The fifteen-to-sixty-four economically active age group comprised 56 percent, or roughly 9 million (see table 3).

About 41.5 percent of the African population was under fifteen, and 3.4 percent was sixty-five and above. The bulk of the community (55.1 percent) fell within the fifteen-to-sixty-four age group. The median age was between eighteen and nineteen. The native-born African population was probably younger than indicated by the census; most of the 570,000 Africans from adjacent and nearby countries included in the census were workers in the fifteen-to-sixty-four age group.

The Coloured and Asian populations, like the African, were characterized by youthfulness. Of the Coloureds, 45.2 percent were under fifteen, and 3.2 percent were sixty-five or over. In the Asian community 44.5 percent were below the age of fifteen, and 1.8 percent were sixty-five and above. About 51.6 percent of the Coloureds and 53.6 percent of the Asians were between fifteen and sixty-four. The median age for both populations was about seventeen years.

In June 1965 estimates of age distribution for Coloureds and
Table 3. Population by Age, Sex, and Racial Group, 1960, South Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Africans</th>
<th>Whites</th>
<th>Coloureds</th>
<th>Asians</th>
<th>All groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-4</td>
<td>831.3</td>
<td>860.8</td>
<td>179.6</td>
<td>172.9</td>
<td>134.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9</td>
<td>774.3</td>
<td>770.1</td>
<td>167.0</td>
<td>160.9</td>
<td>113.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-14</td>
<td>642.5</td>
<td>632.6</td>
<td>160.5</td>
<td>154.3</td>
<td>92.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19</td>
<td>522.7</td>
<td>511.8</td>
<td>137.9</td>
<td>134.1</td>
<td>71.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>480.0</td>
<td>478.8</td>
<td>118.4</td>
<td>115.2</td>
<td>65.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>467.1</td>
<td>452.3</td>
<td>104.3</td>
<td>102.2</td>
<td>54.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>374.5</td>
<td>360.6</td>
<td>103.0</td>
<td>102.4</td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>338.3</td>
<td>298.9</td>
<td>98.1</td>
<td>98.5</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>292.5</td>
<td>272.8</td>
<td>92.7</td>
<td>93.5</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>244.1</td>
<td>201.5</td>
<td>82.5</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-54</td>
<td>172.7</td>
<td>167.3</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>84.9</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-59</td>
<td>124.4</td>
<td>114.3</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>17.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>60-64</td>
<td>96.5</td>
<td>114.6</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65-69</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70-74</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75-79</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80-84</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85-89</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5,511.9</td>
<td>5,416.0</td>
<td>1,534.9</td>
<td>1,545.9</td>
<td>750.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 All totals not exact because of rounding.
2 Less than 0.1 percent.

Asians, which were based on the 1960 census figures brought forward by birth, death, and migration data, showed little change for the Coloured community. A total of 45.5 percent was under fifteen, 51.6 percent was in the fifteen-to-sixty-four range, and 2.9 percent was sixty-five and above. The median age remained at about seventeen years. Among the Asians those in the under-fifteen group declined to 40.6 percent. A higher portion had moved into the fifteen-to-sixty-four category (57.9 percent), whereas there was 1.5 percent sixty-five and over. This shift raised the median age of the group to between eighteen and nineteen.

The age structure of the white population in 1960 was markedly different from the other populations. There was a greater proportion in the fifteen-to-sixty-four economically active age group (60.7 percent) and in the sixty-five-and-over category (6.9 percent). Only 32.4 percent was included in the birth-to-fourteen-years age group. The median age was between twenty-four and twenty-five, about six years higher than the African median and seven years above that of the Coloured and Asian segments.

In mid-1965 estimates for the white community showed a small decline in the under-fifteen age group to 31.5 percent, an increase in the fifteen-to-sixty-four category to 61.9 percent, and a small decline to 6.6 percent in those sixty-five years and over. The median age remained between twenty-four and twenty-five, about six years higher than the African median and seven years above that of the Coloured and Asian segments.

Regional and Rural-Urban Distribution

Based on mid-1968 population estimates, the average population density of South Africa was about forty persons per square mile. This compared with thirty-four per square mile at the latest census in 1960. These averages, however, were deceptive. The 1960 census showed that most of the population lived in the eastern half of the country. The western part was relatively sparsely settled except for one high-to-medium density pocket in the South and Southwest Cape.

Climatic conditions were responsible in considerable part for the distribution pattern, the eastern half having a more favorable distribution of rainfall, while the western half was comparatively arid. Another main determinant was the location of important exploitable mineral resources in the eastern section, around which heavy population concentrations have built up. Likewise, all but one of the large ports and most of the reserves designated for the African population were situated in the eastern sector (see ch. 2, Physical Environment). The highest average provincial density was eighty-
nine per square mile in Natal. It was fifty-seven in the Transvaal, about twenty-eight in the Orange Free State, and slightly over nineteen in Cape Province, in which most of the semiarid areas are found (see fig. 2).

In 1960 about 53 percent of the population (8.5 million) resided in rural areas. The average rural population density was 18 per square mile. It was highest in Natal, with 57 per square mile. In the Transvaal it was 19, in the Orange Free State 15, and in Cape Province about 11 per square mile. Rural densities varied greatly. There were over 200 persons per square mile in the southern coastal region of Natal, where intensive farming was carried on. High densities also occurred in the rural areas occupied largely by Africans; there were areas with densities above 200 per square mile in the Transkei and Ciskei homelands and in reserves in Natal.

Rural densities above forty per square mile were found in the immediate vicinity of Cape Town and in the industrialized centers of the Witwatersrand. In both instances, local economic and social conditions influenced the size of the rural population. In general, rural densities of ten to forty per square mile coincided with the areas of white settlements, to which African workers had been attracted. In contrast, the semiarid regions of Cape Province had an average of under ten persons per square mile.

In 1960 roughly 49 percent of the population (7.474 million) was urban. About 5.6 million (75 percent of the urban populace) lived in forty-two cities of 20,000 or more. The remaining 1.8 million (25 percent) resided in 621 towns and urban villages ranging from 20,000 down to communities of under 200 population. Population density in the eleven largest cities (100,000 and over) varied from 900 to 4,000 per square mile. Eight had densities above 1,500 per square mile, and three—Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Durban—had more than 3,600 persons per square mile.

A distinctive feature of the rural-urban population distribution was the large population clusters formed of the principal urban centers and their surrounding rural areas that had population densities of ten to forty and over per square mile. The largest of these clusters was located in the southern Transvaal. It encompassed an area including Johannesburg, Pretoria, Vereeniging, and the communities of the Witwatersrand. Other major clusters were centered on Cape Town, Durban, and the Port Elizabeth and East London areas. Heavy population concentrations also occurred outside these principal clusters, but they were rural in nature and composed of African settlements, such as in the Transkei. They lacked distinct urban centers and depended upon subsistence agriculture.

The rural-urban character of the four racial groups differed greatly in 1960. More than two-thirds of the African population
was rural. In contrast, the white and Asian populations were highly urbanized, more than four-fifths of each community living in urban areas. Over two-thirds of the Coloured population also were urban dwellers (see table 4).

There were 7.4 million rural Africans in 1960. About 4.8 million, or 65 percent of all rural Africans, were domiciled on the reserves, but it was estimated that more than a half million of these were usually away as migrant laborers; of rural Africans, 1.4 million were in the Transkei. The other 2.6 million (35 percent) resided in rural areas located mainly in the eastern half of the country. Of the latter group, over 2.1 million were on white-owned farms. In 1960 the ratio of the African population working and living on these farms to the white farming population was about seven to one in the Orange Free State, six to one in the Transvaal, and two to one in Cape Province. The figure for Natal was unavailable; however in 1951 the ratio stood at between nine and ten to one.

About 3.5 million Africans (32 percent of the African populace) were urban dwellers in 1960. Although only 32 percent of the Africans were urbanized, because of their numerical preponderance in the population, they constituted in absolute terms over 46 percent of the entire urban population. They outnumbered the more highly urbanized whites: 3.471 million to 3.08 million. Almost 1.8 million (roughly 51 percent) were in cities of over 100,000. Another 802,000 (23 percent) were in cities between 20,000 and 100,000, and the remaining 897,000 (23 percent) resided in smaller towns and communities. In 1960 they were the largest racial group in thirty-one of forty-two cities with populations of 20,000 and over and constituted more than 50 percent of the population in twenty-six (see table 5).

Africans made up about 59 percent of the urban population of the Transvaal in 1960. There was a high concentration in the cities of the Witwatersrand. They accounted for 56.5 percent of Johannesburg’s population of 1.2 million and constituted between 54 and 75 percent in the other principal cities of the region. In the Orange Free State, Africans heavily outnumbered all other racial groups, making up over 78 percent of the province’s population. Although only about 38 percent were urban, they constituted 64.5 percent of the total urban population. Many were centered in the goldfields, where they constituted over 71 percent of the population of the principal cities of Odendaalsrus, Virginia, and Welkom. They also made up over 52 percent of the population of Bloemfontein, the provincial capital, and more than 67 percent in the agricultural and rail center of Kroonstad.

Although Africans constituted over 56 percent of the population of Cape Province, they made up only about 29 percent of the urban population. The proportion in part was influenced by the large rural
Table 4. Rural-Urban Distribution of the Population by Regions and Racial Composition, 1960, South Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>African</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Asian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Province:</td>
<td>2,331</td>
<td>3,029</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>2,388</td>
<td>811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td>81.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natal:</td>
<td>1,078</td>
<td>1,899</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>1,779</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number (in thousands)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>89.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orange Free State:</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>749</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number (in thousands)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>76.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transvaal:</td>
<td>3,428</td>
<td>2,843</td>
<td>2,016</td>
<td>2,617</td>
<td>1,252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number (in thousands)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>85.4</td>
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<td>South Africa:</td>
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<td>8,520</td>
<td>3,471</td>
<td>7,457</td>
<td>2,575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number (in thousands)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>83.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The actual number consisted of seven persons.
2 Figures for South Africa do not always equal sum of regional totals because of rounding.

Table 5. Population and Racial Composition of Towns Over 20,000 in South Africa, 1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Racial Composition (percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Coloured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johannesburg</td>
<td>1,152,525</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Town</td>
<td>807,211</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durban</td>
<td>681,492</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pretoria</td>
<td>422,590</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Elizabeth</td>
<td>290,893</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germiston</td>
<td>214,393</td>
<td>40.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloemfontein</td>
<td>145,273</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Springs</td>
<td>141,943</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benoni</td>
<td>140,790</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germiston</td>
<td>128,598</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East London</td>
<td>116,056</td>
<td>42.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welkom</td>
<td>97,614</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roodeport</td>
<td>95,211</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krugersdorp</td>
<td>89,947</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimberley</td>
<td>79,031</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vereening</td>
<td>78,835</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brakpan</td>
<td>77,777</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boksburg</td>
<td>71,029</td>
<td>38.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carletonville</td>
<td>56,246</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uitenhage</td>
<td>48,755</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klerksdorp</td>
<td>43,726</td>
<td>44.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kroonstad</td>
<td>42,438</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potchefstroom</td>
<td>41,927</td>
<td>49.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paarl</td>
<td>41,540</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Randfontein</td>
<td>41,499</td>
<td>32.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanderbijpark</td>
<td>41,415</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>40,359</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigel</td>
<td>34,008</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queenstown</td>
<td>33,182</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grahamstown</td>
<td>32,611</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worcester</td>
<td>32,274</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pietersburg</td>
<td>28,071</td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westonaria</td>
<td>26,640</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Witbank</td>
<td>25,881</td>
<td>33.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethlehem</td>
<td>24,125</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ladysmith</td>
<td>22,955</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orkney</td>
<td>22,425</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stellenbosch</td>
<td>22,333</td>
<td>48.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oudtshoorn</td>
<td>22,229</td>
<td>45.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odendaalrus</td>
<td>21,268</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rustenburg</td>
<td>21,061</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upington</td>
<td>20,366</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,618,297</strong></td>
<td><strong>35.9</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Less than 0.1 percent.
2 Dashes represent zero.

communities in the Transkei and reserves in the Eastern Cape. A considerable disparity in distribution of Africans, both urban and rural, however, existed between the eastern part of Cape Province and the remainder of the province. This stemmed from the requirement for a permit to enter those areas of the province that were formerly the territory of the Cape Colony. The permit system originated in the late 1700's and has continued to the present time (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Thus, whereas Africans in 1960 comprised over 40 percent of the urban residents of East London and Port Elizabeth in the Eastern Cape and were the largest racial group in both cities, they were a minority of the urban population in the South and Southwest Cape. In Cape Town they made up less than 10 percent of the population and in other principal towns made up less than 15 percent.

In Natal only about 19 percent of Africans were in urban areas in 1960. Again the proportion was affected by the large African communities on reserves as well as by the large number of Africans on white farms (366,000 in 1951). Urban Africans, however, represented sizable elements in Natal's two largest cities, Durban and Pietermaritzburg. They constituted about one-third of the population in the former and over two-fifths in the latter, in which they were the largest racial group.

The urban centers and towns of South Africa were originally established by the whites, and in 1960 about 84 percent (2.6 million) of the white community resided in them. More than 1.5 million (about 60 percent of urban whites) lived in eleven cities with populations over 100,000. Three-quarters were in the four cities of Johannesburg, Durban, Pretoria, and Cape Town. Another 482,000 whites (18 percent) were in thirty-one towns with populations from 20,000 to 100,000. The remaining 564,000 (22 percent) lived in smaller urban communities. The heaviest area of concentration, over 1 million, was in the Southern Transvaal. Despite its high degree of urbanization, the white community represented the largest racial group in only one city over 100,000, Pretoria, and in four cities in the 20,000 to 50,000 range.

About a half million whites, 16 percent of the white population, lived in rural areas in 1960. Most were in the Transvaal (42.1 percent) and in Cape Province (37.5 percent). The average rural density of the white population for all South Africa was only about one per square mile. There were somewhat higher densities, ranging between three and seven per square mile, in the Cape Town agricultural region, around East London and Port Elizabeth, in coastal Natal, the grain-growing areas of the southern Transvaal and northern Orange Free State, and in irrigated sections along the Orange River. In the more arid parts of the country, it was less than one per square mile.
The Coloured community originated and developed largely in the area now included in Cape Province. In 1960, of the total Coloured population of 1,509,053, roughly 88 percent (1.3 million) lived in the province. Of the 1.3 million about 66 percent lived in urban areas. Coloureds made up over 50 percent of the population of Cape Town and were major segments in other principal towns of the South and Southwest Cape, including Oudtshoorn (50.8 percent), Paarl (52.1 percent), and Worcester (48.2 percent). They also constituted almost one-quarter of the population of Port Elizabeth in the Eastern Cape. Many urban Coloureds were employed in the construction industry, factories, commerce, and in domestic services. There were 452,000 Coloureds in rural areas in Cape Province, in 1960, of whom about 313,000 were on white-owned farms. They constituted the bulk of the farm labor in the Western Cape and formed the base upon which farming was carried on there (see ch. 22, Labor).

About 7 percent of the Coloureds resided in the Transvaal (108,000). Almost 92 percent were urban dwellers and over 8,000 lived in the Witwatersrand. They were employed chiefly in manufacturing, commerce, and services. The Coloured populations in Natal and the Orange Free State totaled only 45,000 and 26,000, respectively. In Natal they were largely urban (about 39,000), of whom almost 33,000 lived in the two cities of Durban and Pietermaritzburg, while in the Orange Free State they were divided into about 15,000 urban and 11,000 rural residents.

In 1967, 41,833 Coloureds, or roughly 2.2 percent of the Coloured population, lived on reserves. There were twenty such reserves in 1966, eighteen located in Cape Province and two in the Orange Free State. They appeared to be mostly rural in nature.

The Asian community, which made up only 3 percent (477,074) of the total population in 1960, was centered in Natal. At that date 395,000, or 83 percent, were in that province. Both historical and political reasons accounted for their concentration (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 18, Political Values and Attitudes). Asians were imported into Natal as indentured workers beginning in 1860. Many remained after completing their terms of service, and these were augmented by a flow of immigrants who also came to Natal. Movement within South Africa, however, was limited. The Orange Free State early denied them entry, and this restriction remained in force as of 1969. In the 1960 census only seven Asians were counted in the province.

Restrictions also were early set up by the Transvaal on Asians' living areas, trading rights, and the holding of property, with essentially the same intent to prevent immigration. In the Transvaal, however, the restrictions were not as stringently enforced, and circumvention also occurred. In contrast to none in the Orange Free
State, there were 11,000 Asians in the Transvaal at the first census in 1904, and by 1960 the number had risen to 64,000. There were fewer restrictions on Asians in Cape Province, but the area appears to have been comparatively unattractive, perhaps because of competition with the Coloureds. In 1904 there were 10,000 Asians in the province. The total reached 18,000 by 1951 but remained at that figure in the 1960 census, constituting in fact a proportionate loss in Asian population in the province.

The Asian population in 1960 was highly urbanized. In Natal 318,000 (over 80 percent) lived in urban areas, of whom 236,000 were in Durban, where they formed the largest racial group, and 27,000 in Pietermaritzburg. About 60,000 in the Transvaal (94 percent), also were urban. Almost 40,000 of these were in the Witwatersrand industrial region. In Cape Province all but a minute fraction were urban. One-half lived in Cape Town. Most Asians in urban areas were employed in manufacturing, commerce, and the services.

Tribal Composition

Under the policy of apartheid, every African whose domicile is in South Africa is considered a member of one of the major or minor tribal groups within the country and a de jure resident of a tribal homeland or reserve. In the white area of the country he is treated solely as a migrant, temporary worker and is required to have a pass to be there (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages). Many Africans are in fact permanent urban residents without any links with a reserve. A survey made in Pretoria in 1961 and 1962 showed 15 percent of the urban African residents to have been born in or near the city. Another 25 percent were apparently settled and had no perceptible economic or social connection with the rural areas. A study in East London also determined that about 15 percent had been born and brought up in that city. Many intertribal marriages occur within the cities, and it is doubtful that the children from these unions would relate themselves to any particular tribe, especially where the parents are permanent urban dwellers.

In the 1960 census all Africans were grouped by home language into nine specified language groups associated with the reserves and one miscellaneous group. These totals have been used to represent the various tribal populations. In mid-1967 official estimates of tribal sizes were made, based on the 1960 census data (see table 6). Annual average growth rates and tribal percentages have been computed from these data but, in view of the apparent uncertainty and lack of vital statistics, no further interpretation has been undertaken.
Table 6. The Growth of Tribal Populations of South Africa, 1960 and 1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>1960 census (in thousands)</th>
<th>Mid-1967(^1) (in thousands)</th>
<th>Total 1960 census (in percent)</th>
<th>Increase 1960–67 (in percent)</th>
<th>Average annual growth rate (in percent)(^3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Xhosa</td>
<td>3,024.5</td>
<td>3,570</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>2.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zulu</td>
<td>2,867.2</td>
<td>3,340</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>2.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swazi</td>
<td>334.3</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>2.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ndebele</td>
<td>294.3</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>2.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Sotho</td>
<td>933.1</td>
<td>1,122</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>3.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sotho</td>
<td>1,320.9</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>1.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tswana</td>
<td>1,148.9</td>
<td>1,335</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>2.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsonga</td>
<td>511.1</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venda</td>
<td>245.8</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>1.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>247.9</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10,927.9</td>
<td>12,742</td>
<td>100.1(^3)</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>2.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) South African government estimate.
\(^2\) Computed from indicated population increase.
\(^3\) Does not add to 100 because of rounding.

POPULATION DYNAMICS

South Africa's population tripled from 5,174,827 in 1904—the first official census—to 15,994,181 in 1960. Racial composition showed little change from 1904 to 1960. In both censuses Africans constituted slightly over two-thirds of the population, whites about one-fifth, and the Coloured and Asian segments together roughly one-eighth. In the latest intercensal period (1951–60), the population increased at an annual average rate of 2.5 percent. The growth rate from 1961 to mid-1967 was estimated at 2.36 percent which, if maintained, would result in a doubling of the population in about thirty years.

The South African government has projected a population increase to between 37 million and 42 million by the year 2000. The white population is expected to total 6 to 7 million, the Coloureds, 4.6 to 5.8 million, and the Asians, 1.1 to about 1.2 million. The differences relate to fertility and migration assumptions derived from record data. Projection of an African population of 25.2 to 28 million was also made based on growth rate assumptions, birth and death statistics being unavailable.

Under the low projection, the African population would constitute 68.29 percent of the overall population, approximately the same as in the 1960 census. Under the high estimate it would decline to 66.59 percent. In both cases its share of the total population would remain about two-thirds. The Asian community would also remain at about 3 percent. Significant changes were projected, however, in the white and Coloured populations. Under both low (16.26 percent) and high (16.76 percent) estimates, the white community will decline to about one-sixth of the total population. In contrast, the Coloured community, which since 1951 has had a consistently higher growth rate than the other population segments, will increase its share of the total to one-eighth. Under the low projection, it will constitute 12.47 percent, and under the high 13.89 percent.

Africans

The African population increased during the intercensal period 1951–60 at an average annual rate of 2.65 percent, compared with a growth rate of 1.79 percent during the period 1946–51. Reliable birth and mortality data were lacking for the period. By applying the reverse-survival method to 1960 census figures, however, a crude birth rate of 46 per 1,000 was obtained for the period 1950–55. The mortality rate in the first part of the 1950's was estimated at 27 to 32 per 1,000, which at that time would indicate a rate of natural increase of between 1.4 and 1.9. The increase
between 1951 and 1960 appears to have been the result not only of natural increase but of more complete enumeration and migration. Cultural factors, including a belief that material progress and an easier life were related to family size, ancestor worship for which offspring were required, and a feeling for tribal growth, encouraged a high birth rate among Africans, particularly in tribal areas (see ch. 12, Social Values). This may have been offset to some extent by economic and social change among completely urbanized Africans—those born or permanently domiciled in urban areas and with few or no tribal ties. Data on the number and attitudes of this latter group were not available. In the mid-1950’s it appeared that the African population in general was entering the developmental stage characterized by a birth rate near the biological maximum. At the same time, there was a probability that the death rate had started to decline. South African government estimates of increases in the African population since 1960 have been based on the 1946–60 annual average growth rate of 2.29 percent. This assumption would result in the African population’s doubling in about thirty-one years.

Coloureds and Asians

The Coloured and Asian populations increased between 1951 and 1960 at average annual rates of 3.43 and 2.87 percent, respectively. From mid-1961 to mid-1967 the annual average was 3.1 percent for the Coloureds and 2.42 percent for the Asians. The Coloured population has maintained a high birth rate approaching that of the African segment; in 1966 it was 43.6 per 1,000, while its mortality rate had gradually declined to about 15 per 1,000. The crude birth rate of the Asian community was lower, 32 per 1,000 in 1966, but the mortality rate of 7.3 per 1,000 was only about half that of the Coloured population.

Whites

In contrast to the burgeoning nonwhite segments of the population, the white community increased from 1951 to 1960 by an average annual rate of only 1.65 percent. Its crude birth rate in 1960 was 25 per 1,000, and the mortality rate about 9 per 1,000, the rate of natural increase being about 1.6 percent. Between mid-1961 and mid-1967, however, the estimated annual average growth rate rose to 2.26 percent. This appeared to be almost entirely the result of the substantial net gain in immigration that occurred during the period.

The government has an assisted immigration scheme aimed at attracting white immigrants, particularly as skilled workers and
managerial personnel, for whom suitable employment is readily available. Offices were set up in several European countries to facilitate recruitment. Under the immigration plan, assistance is given by providing help toward passage costs, and full free inland transportation and accommodation until the head of the family obtains employment. Since 1961 the flow of immigrants has increased substantially, a total of 241,000 arriving between 1961 and 1967. During this same period 69,000 persons emigrated, making a net gain of 172,000. A preference was indicated for northern Europeans, but other whites appear to have been welcomed. Official statistics show a substantial increase in immigrants from the Rhodesias, particularly in 1963 and 1964. This movement was generated in considerable part by the granting of independence to Zambia (Northern Rhodesia) in 1964. There was also an increase from other parts of Africa between 1961 and 1965. This appears to be connected with the emigration of whites from Angola following the widespread revolt in 1961, intensification of the Africanization program in Tanzania during the period, and Kenyan independence in 1963.

Urbanization

By 1960 roughly four-fifths of the combined white, Coloured, and Asian communities were living in cities and towns, compared with about one-half at the first Union of South Africa census in 1911. The African population in 1960 was about one-third urban, against one-eighth in 1911. The magnitude of urbanization during this period was apparent in the rise of cities. In 1911 there were two with populations of 100,000 and over; by 1960 they numbered eleven. In the same period, cities between 25,000 and 100,000 increased from twelve to twenty-three.

South Africa's urbanization stemmed chiefly from the development of industry, especially secondary industry, in urban areas and from a parallel lack of opportunity and sufficiently remunerative work in rural areas. The latter held particularly for the native reserves. The large-scale movement to the cities began only in the mid-1930's, about the time industrial and commercial expansion was beginning to occur. Additional impetus to the movement was given by World War II demands for strategic materials and enforced expansion of domestic production to meet internal needs (see ch. 21, Industry). In the 1911–21 intercensal period, the urban populace increased by only 404,000. It rose by 1.3 million between 1921 and 1936 but, by the latter census date, the accelerated flow was underway and was reflected in the total. Between 1936 and 1960, the increase was over 4.2 million.

Between the 1936 and 1951 censuses, the urban population increased twice as fast as the general population, and by the end of
the period the urban segment comprised 43 percent of all South Africans, about six times the average for all Africa south of the Sahara. The urban movement continued during the 1951–60 intercensal period but at a slower pace. During this time the urban population rose by 36 percent against a general population rise of about 26 percent. By 1960 most of the white, Coloured, and Asian populations were in the cities, and a further rise in the urbanized segment depended largely upon an inflow of Africans.

The movement to the cities in the 1930's and since then centered largely on areas that were already more densely settled and economically advanced. From 1936 to 1960 the Witwatersrand population increased by 172 percent. Cape Town rose by 135 percent, Port Elizabeth by 165 percent, Durban by 158 percent, and East London by 92 percent. Cities of 100,000 and over grew three times as fast as those between 20,000 and 100,000. From 1946 to 1951 the annual rate of growth of larger cities was 6.3 percent, and between 1951 and 1960 the growth was 3.1 percent. The annual rate of growth of smaller cities was 2.1 percent during the period 1946–51, and 1 percent between 1951 and 1960. The high degree of concentration in the larger cities was apparent in the absolute figures for 1960, which showed 4,242,000 persons in the eleven cities with populations of 100,000 and over out of a total urban population of 7,474,000.

The African urban population increased ten times between the 1904 and 1960 censuses, from 361,000 to about 3.5 million. Africans as well as whites moved in increasing numbers into urban areas beginning in the 1930's. Between 1936 and 1951 the annual rate was about 6 percent. The direction of movement was toward the principal industrial and mining regions. According to the Tomlinson Commission report, about two-thirds of the Africans in urban areas in 1951 were concentrated in the four main industrial regions of the Western Cape, southern Transvaal, Durban, and Port Elizabeth. During this time 40 percent of the increase came from white-owned farms, 8 percent from the reserves and 29 percent from natural increase; 23 percent was contributed by migration from outside South Africa.

African movement to the cities in the 1951–60 intercensal period was at an annual rate of about 4.5 percent. The flow continued toward the main industrial and mining areas, and between 1951 and 1960 the African segment accounted for 66 percent of the population rise in the Witwatersrand and 70 percent in the Orange Free State goldfields: Increases in the African population in major cities between 1936 and 1960 were often dramatic (see table 7).

Although Africans were in urban areas in large number, the composition of the African population in all urban communities was continuously in flux. They were restricted in residence to nonwhite
Table 7. African and White Populations of Selected Cities of South Africa, Selected Years, 1936–60

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>1936(^1)</th>
<th>1951(^1)</th>
<th>1960(^1)</th>
<th>1936–51(^2)</th>
<th>1951–60(^2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>Africans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johannesburg</td>
<td>231.9</td>
<td>260.7</td>
<td>491.8</td>
<td>365.7</td>
<td>112.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durban</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>96.8</td>
<td>162.1</td>
<td>152.9</td>
<td>221.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pretoria</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>122.4</td>
<td>151.1</td>
<td>199.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Elizabeth</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td>123.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germiston</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>121.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloemfontein</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>75.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Town</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>173.4</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>266.7</td>
<td>75.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East London</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>58.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) Population in thousands.  
\(^2\) Increase in percent.

sections and locations separate from the white areas. This gave the cities either a checkerboard pattern or one composed of a central, white-occupied core surrounded by a ring of African communities. The government was determined to preserve the white character of the towns, and Africans entering a white section were considered only as visitors. Only individuals born in the city area or who had met certain employment-length requirements were treated as permanent residents of the nonwhite locations. All others were there by permission as temporary workers. In its concern to limit the number of Africans in the cities, the government had instituted a system of labor permits and was promoting the establishment of border industries intended to provide employment for Africans near the native reserves. Africans who required permits to live and work in white areas could be “endorsed out,” under the influx-control laws, and several hundred thousand had been affected between the early 1950’s and the late 1960’s. As of 1969 government policy had little apparent effect on the pattern of African urbanization (see ch. 21, Industry; ch. 22, Labor).

The urban white community increased roughly four times, from 599,000 to about 2.6 million, between the first census in 1904 and 1960. In 1904 the white segment was already almost 54 percent urbanized. The majority, however, were English speaking; at that time, only slightly over 6 percent of the Afrikaners lived in the towns. During the industrial expansion of the 1930’s, many rural Afrikaners joined other segments of the population in the move into urban areas. By 1936, 44 percent were urbanized, and in the 1960 census the total rose to 76 percent. In 1960 about half lived in smaller communities which, although treated as urban, were actually hamlets.

The total of urban whites increased by 53 percent between 1936 and 1951 to become almost four-fifths of the white community. In the intercensal period 1951–60, the rate slowed. The increase during this decade amounted to 23 percent, the total urbanized reaching about 84 percent in 1960. In both periods, white increase in most of the main cities was well below that of the African community. The white increase in Cape Town, however, exceeded that of the Africans between 1936 and 1951.

The Coloureds and Asians also took part in the urbanization movement. Between 1936 and 1960 the Coloured urban segment increased by 131 percent compared with a 96-percent rise in the total Coloured community. They centered mainly on cities and towns in Cape Province. In Cape Town their numbers almost doubled, from 229,000 to 418,000, between 1946 and 1960. Urbanization of the Asian population was somewhat greater, being 159 percent between 1936 and 1960, against a population rise of 117 percent. The Asians who were largely in Natal moved into the
cities of that province in comparatively large numbers. Between 1946 and 1960 the Asian communities in Durban and Pietermaritzburg more than doubled. During this time they grew faster than the white and African populations in Durban and by 1960 had become the largest racial group in that city.

A definite, continuing aspect of urbanization in South Africa is the relatively large-scale redistribution of local urban population segments. This is carried out mainly under the provisions of the Group Areas Act, which went into effect in 1950 and involves removal of groups and entire communities to "proclaimed" areas designated by the government for their specific racial occupancy. The removals are a deliberate attempt to separate the racial groups in the city, town, or district to conform with the general policy of apartheid (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages; ch. 8, Living Conditions). Although urban whites as well as Africans, Coloureds, and Asians are covered by the act, all but a few of those moved between 1950 and 1968 have been nonwhites. Estimates of the number moved during this period range between 500,000 and 1 million persons. Fringe locations to which groups are removed may be situated over thirty miles from the central district of the city and have involved the uprooting of long-established homes and communities.
CHAPTER 5

ETHNIC GROUPS AND LANGUAGES

The doctrine of separate development, which in early 1970 was the expression of apartheid as the dominant political philosophy of South Africa, is based upon an officially asserted theory of race and inborn racial cultural capacity. The philosophy and the assumptions associated with it have been explicitly stated in speeches by government officials and in a variety of documents and laws. Ethnic groups are classified into categories defined as races, separated as completely and as economically as possible. Official doctrine emphasizes separateness and difference rather than racial ranking, but in practice ranking does occur at least between white and nonwhite on a basis of white supremacy. Social, economic, and political privileges are assigned, and behavior is regulated in accordance with membership in these racial categories. The official categories in the late 1960's were white (of European origin), Coloured (mixed of any two categories), and Bantu (African). A fourth category, Asiatic, consisting chiefly of Indians, was included with Coloured for some purposes but received differential treatment in most cases. The fullest privileges are reserved for the white category and the least for the African. Assignment to a racial category is made on a basis of ancestry, obvious resemblance to an accepted racial stereotype in physical appearance and overt behavior (see ch. 6, Social Structure).

Ethnic groups are broadly defined by historical origin, and, more specifically, by tribal organization or cultural community; they are often identified with a language or dialect as well. The country has two official languages, English and Afrikaans, the mother tongues of the two politically dominant ethnic groups. Many members of other ethnic groups tend to favor one or the other of these, speaking it either as their mother tongue or as their preferred language for general communication. Each language is associated with a cultural tradition including religious affiliation, family form, and folklore—from which the other ethnic groups have adopted elements in greater or lesser degree. In some cases, for example, the Afrikaans-speaking Coloured, groups have developed their own variants of the dominant culture. Some individuals from ethnic groups that use other languages as their mother tongues have lost their parental linguistic affiliation and may speak one of the official languages.
Religious affiliation tends to reinforce ethnic boundaries (see ch. 11, Religion).

Speakers of Bantu languages outnumber all others, but many Africans speak English, Afrikaans, or both. The most widely spoken home languages are Afrikaans, followed by Xhosa, Zulu, Sotho (all Bantu), and English. Many more Africans speak Afrikaans than English, largely because so many of them live and work on Afrikaner-owned farms, but literate Africans tend to prefer English; most of the printed matter directed to African readers is in English (see ch. 17, Public Information). In many areas, white employers or managers prefer to use pidgin languages rather than to assume or acknowledge that Africans know European languages.

Only remnants of the Khoisan-speaking Khoikhoi and San, popularly but sometimes pejoratively known as Hottentot and Bushman, remain. These were the first people encountered by the early Dutch settlers. The Bushmen, now on the northern and western borders and in the arid areas of adjacent countries, continue as hunters and gatherers. The few scattered Hottentot, once nomadic herders, are usually found living in association with Coloured or Afrikaner farmers. Until the 1950s the Hottentot were classified with the Coloured, but they were then reclassified as natives and thereby included in the same category as the Bantu-speakers.

Economic and diplomatic considerations enter into the definition of race in regard to treatment or reception of visiting noncitizens: foreign diplomats are counted as white, at least in official situations; Japanese businessmen are also counted as white, whether resident or not, because of their economic importance; while the Chinese resident community is classified as Asiatic.

**LANGUAGE USE**

South Africa in early 1970 had two official languages: English, in a standard form; and Afrikaans, a locally-developed descendant of Dutch. Most Africans speak Bantu languages of the Nguni, (including Xhosa and Zulu) Sotho, Tsonga, or Venda stocks as their mother tongue. Languages or dialects within each stock tend to be mutually intelligible. There were also a few remaining islands of the Khoi-San languages, spoken by scattered Hottentot and Bushmen. Both Bantu and Khoi-San languages were formerly associated with specific cultures, but only aspects of these traditional ways of life survive in the Reserves.

Bilingualism was nearly universal, especially among persons in intellectual and commercial strata of society who tended to have contacts outside their own communities. The least bilingual were rural Africans who were not accustomed to entering the cities. Many Africans in domestic and other labor were not encouraged to
learn the European languages but rather to communicate in one of the two pidgins: Kitchen Kaffir, used between domestic help and their employers; and Fanakalo, the language of the gold fields—both Zulu-based with English and Afrikaans overlay. Many Africans speak two or more Bantu languages, but the number has not been recorded.

Europeans other than the English and Afrikaners tended to align themselves with either the English or the Afrikaans linguistic community. Some, especially those who entered the country since World War I or II, continued to use their mother tongue within the community. The Chinese and Indians, who represented more than one language or dialect group from their own respective countries, also used English to communicate within the community between linguistic subgroups. Some Africans, members of families long resident in the cities, spoke one of the two official languages rather than a Bantu tongue.

Only a small proportion of the population was equally fluent in both English and Afrikaans. Some rural Coloured still could use Khoi-San languages, and a few could speak Bantu. In Natal some Europeans living near the reserves learned Bantu before learning English or Afrikaans and were completely bilingual.

THE WHITES

The whites are dominated by two ethnic groups, which are partly defined by language: the English and the Afrikaners. They represent different traditions of society, law, and religion; formerly, they also represented different economic bases, of which the stereotype still persists. Each has been politically dominant in the past; but the Afrikaner Nationalist Party, in power in early 1970, had been dominant since 1948.

Each group during its period of administration has sponsored settlement of ethnic groups from various parts of Europe who have tended to align linguistically, culturally, and politically with both groups but more often with the English. Intermarriage and interchange of cultural material between English and Afrikaners had been restricted in large part because of Afrikaner national self-consciousness.

The Afrikaners have the longer tenure; so long, in fact, that they have developed their own language and culture. They consider their ties to the Netherlands effectively broken and that they have no homeland but South Africa. The British, on the other hand, came as subjects and representatives of the British Empire, and they have maintained some contact with Great Britain. Nevertheless, they too are oriented primarily to South Africa.
The Afrikaners

The Afrikaners are the politically, culturally, and numerically dominant ethnic group among the whites (see ch. 6, Social Structure; ch. 15, Political Dynamics). They are primarily of Netherlands Dutch origin, although their original settlements also included Belgian (Brabant), French Huguenot, and German families as well. Their tenure begins with the Dutch East India Company's refreshment station, which sponsored the first settlement at the Cape of Good Hope (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). The Dutch origin of Afrikaner language and religion is clear, but their culture has been strongly molded by their three centuries of African experience. They are very conscious of this and of their historical role as Voortrekkers, or pioneers.

Afrikaners publicly emphasize their cultural identity, including staunch religious faith, a strong and well-ordered family, and equalitarianism among Afrikaners, and stress the historical traditions from which they are believed to derive (see ch. 7, Family; ch. 11, Religion; ch. 12, Social Values). Until recently, in speeches made by almost all political leaders, rural patterns of life were stressed at the expense of urban patterns. The tradition of the Voortrekkers has been exalted and old customs praised. Afrikaans has become invested with a strong nationalistic importance along with other aspects of culture that give the Afrikaners an identity separate from other whites.

Language has been an important factor in cultural unification since the early days of the colony. The Dutch East India Company encouraged settlers from any friendly—at that time, Protestant—part of Europe. In 1688 after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, Huguenots who had taken refuge in the Netherlands were sent to South Africa as permanent settlers and interspersed among the Dutch farmers in several regions. Dutch was made the sole language of instruction in the schools; the use of French disappeared, and the Huguenots intermarried with the other settlers and became rapidly assimilated to the Dutch. By the end of the seventeenth century a people had come into existence who called themselves Afrikaners in contrast to the Europeans, who were company servants and only temporary residents of the colony. In the nineteenth century when the British arrived and retained their own language and culture, the Afrikaners rejected them as uitlanders (foreigners).

More than 75 percent of the Afrikaners live in urban areas, including both cities and small towns, as the result of a conscious economic and political movement since 1936, when only 44 percent, including those working in the minefields, were urban residents. In 1906 only 6 percent were urban dwellers so that, with the exception of Natal, there had been a virtual ethnic cleavage along the
economic division between rural Afrikaners and urban English. The high number of unskilled laborers in the Afrikaner population put them at an economic and social disadvantage and for economic survival, it was necessary that Afrikaner leaders promote an entry into urban and industrial life (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 4, Population; ch. 21, Industry; ch. 22, Labor). The organizations that fostered urbanization tended to encourage separatism as a means of retaining cultural identity. The most effective unifying factors that survive in the urban milieu are the Dutch Reformed Church and the Afrikaans language (see ch. 6, Social Structure; ch. 11, Religion).

The Afrikaner ideal pattern, based on their early experience, was one in which burghers (independent merchants or citizens of the town) and boers (originally farmers on indenture contracts to whom company land was to be assigned) were the only elements in the local social system. The terms burgher and boer have both been used to describe the Afrikaans-speakers as a group, and the terms are not objectionable, though Afrikaner has been considered a more appropriate term.

Most of the original colony were farmers; some, unable to cope with African farming conditions, preferred to herd the cattle purchased from the Hottentot. Of these herders, a number abandoned permanent housing and lived entirely in covered, bullock-drawn wagons and, like the Hottentot, moved constantly to find fresh pasture. By the time of British rule in 1815, a subculture of herders, known as Trekboers (traveling farmers), had arisen. These became prominent in the early Voortrekker groups and were joined by farmers whose way of life had been disrupted by the British laws freeing the slaves (see ch. 3, Hitorical Setting). They form a romantic part of the Afrikaner historical tradition.

Most Afrikaners have either a farming or a stock-herding family tradition, and this remains their stereotype of themselves, especially in the form of the Voortrekker who first pushed into new country. They express this by means of folk festivals (for example, the Day of Covenant, celebrating victory over the Zulu), with period costumes and folk dances. Increasing social differentiation among Afrikaners, however, particularly since the 1930's, has come into conflict with an equalitarian ideal rooted in an earlier and simpler rural life (see ch. 6, Social Structure).

Afrikaans is the most widely spoken home language in South Africa. It is the native language of the Afrikaners and of 89 percent of the Coloured, according to the census of 1960. Moreover, as an official language it is a second language for many others. It is a form of Dutch derived from Middle Netherlandic, the spoken language of seventeenth-century Brabant, in an area overlapping the boundary of modern Holland and Belgium.

In the course of time, Afrikaans was exposed to influences from
English, German, French (from early Huguenot settlers), a Malay-Portuguese pidgin, and African languages. It has adopted only a few scattered words from each; French influence in particular was limited to a few place and family names. English, a language of the educated and one with which Afrikaans speakers have had considerable interaction, has apparently had a stronger effect on vocabulary and spoken usage. In formally taught Afrikaans, conscious efforts have been made to maintain a basically Dutch vocabulary and to reject words borrowed from other languages, so that such words have a colloquial or slang status.

After three centuries of separation from its parent language, Afrikaans remains essentially a form of Dutch. It differs from Standard Dutch in a few pronunciations, borrowing a little from Malay but mainly from German and English, and in the extreme degree of simplification of its grammar. It is, however, understandable to a speaker of Standard Dutch.

Although Standard Dutch was the Afrikaners' language of education until 1914 and was used by the church, the government, and polite society, the first book in Afrikaans appeared in 1861; in 1875 an organized literary group was founded to further the use of Afrikaans, which was felt to be in danger of being displaced by English. In view of British domination, and what was believed to be a British policy of Anglicization, the early literary society and later ones propagated Afrikaans literature in the form of books, poetry, drama, papers, periodicals, and a translation of the Bible. Literary societies exerted pressure for cultural nationalism and coherence of the Afrikaners. This pressure was supported by the presence of the members of the Dutch Reformed Church and was developed by political leaders into a political and cultural purism and isolationism.

Since the first publication of Afrikaans literature, the language has gradually replaced Standard Dutch as the language of the Afrikaners. The Constitution of 1909 had given Standard Dutch and English complete equality as official languages. In 1914 Afrikaans was admitted into the Dutch Reformed Church for use in services. In 1925 the South African Parliament declared it an official language; since that time Dutch has been used less and less, except as an adjunct to Afrikaans in the universities. The use of Afrikaans has become an essential mark of identity as an Afrikaner, despite the fact that it is also the language of most of the Cape Coloured.

The British

The British in South Africa are urban and are the dominant group in industry. They include individuals and groups from all parts of
the British Isles—England, Ireland, Scotland, and Wales. Also included are former nationals of other countries, especially Germany, whose settlers entered under British sponsorship and became part of the English-speaking group.

The British Empire acquired South Africa in 1806 as a result of the Napoleonic wars (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). The Dutch were initially willing to accept their administration because the professional administration of the British was generally more favorable to popular needs than that of the Dutch East India Company. Conflict between two established churches, the Dutch Reformed and the Anglican, was obviated by laws allowing freedom of religion; however, cultural differences relating to race relations and to language dominance produced friction between Afrikaners and British.

The first group of British settlers, 4,000 men and women from all parts of the British Isles, brought to the eastern Cape Colony arrived in 1820. Although they were to be given land grants, only a few were farmers; others were urban laborers and artisans, professional men, and doctors. Those willing to go outside the cities encountered natural disasters; after three successive failures of the harvest and a series of floods, most of the settlers returned to the towns. New grants of land were made nearer the frontier, but the difficult conditions again forced many, especially the inexperienced farmers, to leave their land and go to the cities; many others turned to wool-farming and trade.

Initially the rural settlers were on good terms with the Afrikaners, who were sympathetic to settler groups that represented nonconforming church organizations. Some British and Afrikaners intermarried but, on the whole, they did not become assimilated to each other either linguistically or culturally. Each group tended to settle in specific areas and maintained its own customs. Although Afrikaners set up schools quite early, British settlers tended to be more literate, and the communities they established often had newspapers and other features of British life of the nineteenth century.

Friction arose through the government order establishing English as the official language of government and education. There was also friction between the Afrikaners and the administration because of the abolition of slavery and regulations passed concerning the rights of servants, which was one of the causes of the Great Trek (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

Later settlers coming from the British Isles because of the famine conditions in the 1950s were sent to Natal, but many could not face the conditions in Natal and either fled to the towns or left the country entirely. Some attempted commercial farming with little initial success because soil and climate were unfamiliar and because they lacked the knowledge to deal with local cattle and crop
plagues. After much experimentation, it was decided that sugar would be the most profitable crop for the region (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 20, Agriculture).

Germans from the British Foreign Legion of the Crimean War comprised one of the larger groups of settlers sent to strengthen the Bantu border. Very few women and children came with them, and a number of single women, mostly Irish from farm families, were selected and imported. This German group lived among English-speakers, and their wives spoke English so that they became assimilated to the English-speaking part of the population as earlier German groups had been to the Afrikaners.

The discovery of diamonds in 1867 and gold in 1884 created great rushes of rural population to the mining areas, among members of all races. Much of the mining land had originally belonged to Afrikaners, who lacked either the technique or the capital to develop it. The population was increased by settlers from many countries, especially England. British investment was also heavily attracted to the mining ventures; with roots in Europe, the British settlers were able to tap financial sources unavailable to Afrikaners (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 21, Industry).

Many of those interested in the mines were Jews, some from England, others from eastern Europe. Most of those settling in South Africa became English-speakers; their social and political sympathies have generally lain with the British, although they consider themselves to be, and are considered, a special group. They have been important in the foundation of new industries and also in commercial farming. Their entry to South Africa was at one time limited by regulations setting a quota of fifty a year for Eastern Europeans, since the largest number were from Lithuania; it did not limit the large influx from Germany during the Hitler persecutions, even though some sympathy for Hitler existed among elements of the population.

After the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), an attempt was made to establish a government in which both Afrikaners and British could cooperate on an equal basis. The Afrikaners, however, came to be predominant in politics, and they gradually gained control of the educational system. The British have continued to be dominant in industry, but the Afrikaners have made great strides in that field (see ch. 19, Character and Structure of the Economy).

For many years the Afrikaners have tended to accuse the British of divided loyalty, though African-born British appear to be wholly committed to their present homeland. In the face of vocal nationalism praising only the Afrikaner cultural tradition, their position tends to be anomalous.

English is the mother tongue of the British settlers, as well as the communicating language of the Indian population and the preferred
second language of many other groups. In addition, it is the mother
tongue of members of European settler-groups, who came when
South Africa was under British rule, and of the Coloured in Natal.
British Standard English is spoken formally, but the colloquial form
used is not very different except in the use of words and phrases
borrowed from Afrikaans, Zulu, Malay, and other languages, which
are used according to current fashion.

A great deal of the higher education has been in English, so that
educated Afrikaners are generally bilingual, and some Afrikaner
families have become entirely English-speaking. The growth since
World War II of Afrikaner universities, however, has somewhat
diminished the reliance on English (see ch. 9, Education). Neverthe-
less, English has the advantage of being the most practical
language for international use.

THE AFRICANS

The Population Registration Act of 1950 classified as Natives
those whose origins lay exclusively or primarily with the Bantu-
speaking peoples of the land and the very small number of
Khoisan-speaking peoples (Hottentot and Bushmen). In early 1965
the official term for black Africans came to be Bantu, a term con-
sidered both inaccurate and derogatory by Africans and scholars,
including white South Africans. The term African will therefore be
applied to Bantu speakers and those directly derived from them.

African groups are commonly classified in terms of categories
based on linguistic affinity: the Nguni, the South Sotho, the North
Sotho, the Tswana (West Sotho), the Venda, and the Shangaan-
Tsonga. Each of these linguistically defined categories consists of a
number of peoples, variable in size, usually called tribes (see fig.
12).

In early 1970 the government officially recognized eight African
national units for the purposes of its plans for the implementation
of apartheid or separate development. These were the North Sotho
(of which the most important group was the Pedi), the South
Sotho, the Tswana, the three major Nguni-speaking groups—Zulu,
Swazi, and Xhosa—the Tsonga, and the Venda. These coincide
broadly with the main linguistically defined categories and to some
extent coincide with the distribution of the main official home-
lands. These official homelands are roughly coterminous with the
long-established tribal reserves.

Tribes as they were defined for the purposes of government
policy were not usually culturally homogeneous groups with long
histories of stability. Competition among African groups and be-
tween Africans and Afrikaners in the eighteenth century and par-
ticularly in the nineteenth century had led to a good deal of move-
ment, splintering, and amalgamation. Some groups incorporated others, including members of different linguistic clusters (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

Industrial growth and urbanization led to further differentiation. Substantial numbers of Africans came to have extended urban experience and some were third- or fourth-generation urban dwellers.
Although defined by law as members of one tribe or another, there were Africans who spoke only English or, less frequently, Afrikaans. Even the way of life of those Africans who had lived all their lives on the reserves had been substantially affected by their involvement in a white-dominated society (see ch. 6, Social Structure; ch. 7, Family; ch. 8, Living Conditions; ch. 9, Education; ch. 11, Religion).

Until the Population Registration Act of 1950, the very small remnant groups of Khoisan-speaking peoples were differentiated from the African population and, in the case of the Hottentot, were included among the Coloured, into whose composition they entered significantly. The few remaining Hottentot generally lived as distinguishable segments of rural Coloured communities.

All the African groups in South Africa were traditionally organized in terms of patrilineal kinship, although the extent to which this controlled-group formation and solidarity varied (see ch. 6, Social Structure; ch. 7, Family). All indigenous peoples, except the Bushman, kept stock (cattle, sheep, and goats). The Bantu-speakers, but not the Hottentot, were also horticulturalists. Many groups, particularly among the Bantu, specialized in crafts of various types. Because of the need for pasture and, among the Ban'su, of the requirements of shifting agriculture, communities moved frequently, even when they had built relatively solid settlements. All groups had chiefs, who usually inherited their position, but their powers varied considerably. In all tribes deference was also given according to the seniority of individuals and groups.

The Bantu Speakers

The South African Bantu are the southernmost representatives of the very large population who speak Bantu languages in sub-Saharan Africa. Except for a few Khoisan speakers, the Africans in all neighboring territories are speakers of Bantu languages, as are most Africans to a point north of the equator. The range of variation in culture and social organization of the Bantu in this vast area is substantial, but those in South Africa occupied only a small part of that range. Physically, Bantu speakers—including the South African ones—are also quite variable, but for the most part appear more typically negroid than do the Khoisan speakers.

As the Bantu speakers moved south to occupy their present territory, they absorbed women and even warriors from tribes they encountered; they also intermarried freely with allies and friendly peoples and accepted client groups intact. Each group consisted of a nucleus representing the original migrating unit, and it was this nucleus that supplied the chief. A varying number of individuals or whole groups of different origin was associated with the nucleus, often on the basis of reciprocal economic arrangements. Client groups and individuals hunted and herded for their patrons or
gathered wild foods such as honey. They were paid in kind and protected. Slaves were not kept and none were sold, except by the Tsonga near Lourenço Marques.

Each tribe consisted of a number of extended families. At its fullest extent such a family consisted of a man and his wives, his unmarried brothers, his sons (married or single), his daughters-in-law, his unmarried daughters, and his grandchildren (see ch. 7, Family). Each family lived in a homestead with any client servants it had. Except among the Sotho, homesteads (or krais as they came to be called) were dispersed, permitting local grazing for cattle, sheep, and goats and providing a plot or plots for horticulture. Although dispersed, these krais were sufficiently clustered to form a kind of neighborhood. The composition of such a neighborhood varied. In some cases a cluster of nearby kraals was inhabited by the families of related males, who constituted a patrilineal lineage. In other cases, lineages were dispersed and a cluster of kraals might be headed by unrelated men.

Until the emergence of powerful chiefs such as Shaka of the Zulu in the early nineteenth century, chiefdoms were small and, for many purposes, autonomous even when local chiefs owed a limited fealty to a paramount chief. Each chief maintained a court at which cases were tried and at which an attempt was made to deal with conflicting customs. The juxtaposition of a variety of groups competing for pasture and the tendency for tribes to move had led to the development of a military capacity. In many tribes the military were organized on a community basis, but some regiments based on age cut across local communities; Shaka was to adopt and intensify such organization to build his Zulu empire (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

The Bantu speakers were cattle herders, with the exception of the Tsonga, who lived in territory near water that was infested with tsetse fly; they also kept sheep and goats. Cattle were important as units of wealth first, and secondly for milk; they were rarely killed to be eaten, though they might be used for religious sacrifice. Herding cattle was men's work, though women might participate in dairying; anyone approaching cattle had to be in a state of ritual purity. Women's work was cultivating, which was done with short-handled iron hoes. Millet and sorghum were the traditional grains; some plants of the pumpkin and bean families were also grown. Early in the 1600's the Bantu were found to be cultivating maize, tobacco, and certain squashes.

Individual tribes tended to specialize in certain trades, such as metal-working and smelting, carving, skin dressing or some agricultural specialty. Some lineages of a tribe would manage a mine and hire laborers from other tribes. Trade was carried on along well-established routes, much of it along rivers by canoe, with the
Tsonga as middlemen. Hunting products such as furs and sometimes ivory were supplied by client hunting groups.

The Sotho-Tswana Group

The Sotho-Tswana group of the southern Bantu-speakers is widely distributed throughout South Africa. Divisions within the group are more regional than cultural; it is remarkably homogeneous in both language and culture. All members but some Tswana identify themselves primarily as Sotho, rather than naming their particular tribe. They are identified according to region as: the South Sotho, inhabiting Lesotho and neighboring areas of South Africa; the North (sometimes Central) Sotho, centered on the northeastern Transvaal reserves; and the Tswana or West Sotho, centered on the North Cape and western Transvaal along Botswana. The whole group was estimated at 5 million in 1965 (see ch. 4, Population). Botswana and Lesotho are independent states, but the greater number of Sotho-Tswana speakers live in South Africa.

By their own traditions, they represent several waves of migration, the first ones settling eventually in the North Cape, the western Transvaal, and the fringes of Botswana. These were the ancestors of the Tswana. Later waves eventually moved south, but some remained in the northern Transvaal. There is a well-established tradition showing that tribes customarily split into new tribes when their population was sufficiently large or when there were other reasons for a part of the group to withdraw from the main tribe. Most of the existing tribes preserve genealogies that show their interrelatedness. The present distribution of the Sotho-Tswana peoples is, in large part, a consequence of the difaqane—the turbulent movement of peoples that developed in the early nineteenth century. Movements of peoples, however, continued into the early twentieth century, the last major move being that of some Tswana groups about 1915 (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

The population is stratified, including chiefs' lineages, commoners, aliens, and descendents of slaves. Some, like primitive hunting groups of Sotho or Bushmen (known as Sarwa), were clients who supplied game or wild fruits and honey to their patrons in former times; they now have been released from their clientage situation and occupy their own areas. There are allied groups of Ndebele, an offshoot of the Nguni, in all three regions, who owe allegiance to the Sotho chiefs (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Fragmentary lineages or tribes from other Bantu groups are also found in the reserves.

Subsistence in the reserves is based on cattle raising and agriculture; sheep, goats, and other livestock are also kept. The cattle are rarely killed, even for religious sacrifice, and their dairy production is mediocre; nevertheless, though only the worst are sold, they
produce a definite cash income. Farm produce is also sold; cultivation by hand is women's work, but if ox-plows or machinery are used the men participate. As elsewhere, agriculture suffers from the absence of the mature men. Hunting supplies skins, a little food, and some prestige items. Formerly, the Sotho and especially the Tswana Rolong were ironsmelters and general metalsmiths; these techniques have been entirely lost because of competition with modern products. Usually the young men spend at least five years in wage labor off the reserves in order to finance their marriages (see ch. 7, Family). Some men work in urban industry and mining, but they prefer to work as domestics in homes and hotels. They are also found as migrant laborers on farms and as outdoor laborers, such as roadmakers and erosion-control workers. Sotho have a reputation as good stonemasons, a skill they may have exercised before European contact.

In former times both the Sotho and the Tswana were distinguished from other South African Bantu speakers by their large settlements, which in the nineteenth century might have ranged as high as 20,000 adults. A settlement of this size would be a chief's capital, with cattle posts around it and fields surrounding the area for a radius of twenty miles. Within such towns, the quarters of specific groups were placed in relation to the chief's domicile according to rank. Cattle pastured near the posts would be under the care of tribal bachelors or client-herdsmen and hired herdsmen. These towns were still characteristic of the Tswana as late as the early 1950's but disappeared among the Sotho in the past few decades.

Because the reserves are smaller than the original tribal territory and because of population growth, many Sotho and Tswana live on farmland owned by whites in the vicinity of the reserves; they often farm the land individually and pay rent to the landowner, who is said to be "farming Bantu" rather than running a farm. The government has declared itself against this system and has taken steps to eliminate Africans permanently in residence on white-designated territory. Since the owners of the property in question derive considerable benefit from the permanent tenant farmers, there has been opposition to this by white farm groups (see ch. 20, Agriculture).

The South Sotho

The present situation of the South Sotho is largely the result of the efforts of Chief Moshweshwe, who gathered together fleeing and disorganized fragments of Sotho and some other tribes during the difaqane (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Setting up a mountain stronghold on the present territory of Lesotho, he protected himself by submitting to Shaka nominally until he had acquired strength enough to defend his territory militarily. His group
cluded both Sotho and Tswana speakers, two groups of Coloured, Ndebele, and small groups from other Bantu-speaking groups. Most of these are now settled in the independent state of Lesotho, but part of the territory extends into South Africa. Culturally, these groups were originally similar and have become even more homogeneous. Lesotho is organized as a unit centered on the kingship, but the king has no extraterritorial authority over the South African reserves. These have functioned as independent chiefdoms, the rulers of which are generally derived from the same royal lineage.

The South Sotho outside of Lesotho (including Lesotho nationals resident in South Africa) were estimated at 1.5 million in mid-1967. Their tribal structure no longer functions intact except in the case of the Khoakhoa and the Taungs. The land is good for agriculture and grazing; agricultural and herding clientage is practiced, whereby a poor man or a youth wanting to earn his bridewealth works for a richer man and receives his pay in the form of a share of the increase of the herds (see ch. 6, Social Structure). A certain amount of selling takes place, though grudgingly; cattle are no longer used in tribal religious rites to the extent that they once were. Competing with wage labor, cattle owners often use young boys or youths as herdsmen, some hired and some relatives.

Wool-sheep and wool-bearing goats had become commercially important by the 1930’s, to the extent that there was a shortage of meat-stock. Cattle continue unimproved, but mechanized farming has been introduced. Maize is the main staple, with sorghums next; grain is eaten and used in the making of beer, one of the more important cash commodities produced on the reserves. Fodder grasses have been introduced as local feed and as a cash crop. Tobacco, once cultivated, is no longer important, perhaps because of professional competition. The custom of growing a kitchen garden around or behind the house has been borrowed from Europeans. Neighborhood working parties may be gathered informally to help in heavy work, or labor may be hired; some people contract for the use of mechanized equipment with the individual farmers. Hoe agriculture is the work of women; when plows, oxen, or machinery are used it becomes the work of men.

The South Sotho area is no longer supplied with game for hunting, but collecting is important, on local territories, to the membership of various local groups. Not only wild herbs and foodstuffs but also thatching-reeds, building materials, and clay are public property. Some items such as grazing areas and certain trees are conserves and are rationed, and valuable things such as coal or semi-precious stones are government property.

Northwest of Lesotho, a large area is occupied by white-owned farms, worked by Sotho who live on them, keeping the produce and
paying rent to the farmowners. Sotho and other Africans who still live on white-owned farms are bound to them in that they cannot leave without a pass card that must be obtained by means of the signature of the landowner. They also pay heavily for upkeep and other services on the land.

Wage labor is prevalent among the South Sotho, although they tend to avoid manufacturing and prefer domestic service. Although some work in Lesotho, most are employed in South Africa. Their former metal-working crafts have disappeared, but they still find work as artisans, blacksmiths, brickmakers, housebuilders, and stonemasons. They also work in commerce as small shopkeepers and beer-sellers.

The system of initiation and the formation of age-graded regiments credited to the Sotho were borrowed by many other tribes, especially the Zulu, who used it as a basis for their war machine. Initiation was by circumcision of the boys and a period of instruction in special traditional knowledge. Girls undergo a less elaborate initiation for a shorter time in which they are given instruction in correct behavior, domestic duties, and sexual matters. Formerly, regiments were organized around the sons of chiefs; when one of these was initiated his whole class became his bodyguard and personal henchmen.

The Tswana (West Sotho) who are domiciled in South Africa are distributed in a series of reserves parallel to the Botswana border, between the Orange Free State and western Transvaal. There were well over 1 million Tswana speakers in the South African census in 1960 (see ch. 4, Population). Both in Botswana and in South Africa the Tswana are characterized by their wide variety of interacting tribes gathered around a Tswana nucleus, and ranked according to work or other prestige factors. Part of this arises from the original Sotho-Tswana invasions and part from more recent disruptions during, and since, the difaqane. They form an elaborate status system that still operates to the extent that the large-town pattern prevails; however, the organization is now informal and social rather than political. Discrimination against low-ranking tribes is no longer legal or political but is applicable only in cases of intermarriage or other social relations. Minority tribal groups have been assigned their own land and function as regular tribal groups.

The Tswana areas are large enough to allow for hunting as a supplementary economic activity, and the Bushmen who still live in association with the Tswana (known as Sarwa) continue to some extent to act as hunting clients. By custom the Tswana provide dogs and hunting equipment plus tobacco. They also provide equipment as well as land for client agriculturists or herdsmen. The agricultural client farms his patron's assigned land for a share in the harvest; the
herding client cares for the patron’s cattle on the reserve grazing land, having full use of the dairy products and part of the increase. Agricultural and herding clientage is a traditional way in which a person who has lost his stock may recoup his fortune. These customs are weakened today in the presence of outside wage labor, since the agricultural resources of the reserves are often inadequate. Cattle raiding, which was once a bona fide source of income, no longer exists; the existing range cannot carry enough head of cattle for the population in any case.

The Tswana were not forced into wage labor by economic or other circumstances as early as were the Xhosa, and for some time recruiting on the reserves was forbidden by the chiefs. Some of the young men, however, sought it of themselves. At first they tended to work as farm laborers or stonemasons or at other outdoor work. In early 1970, however, they were heavily represented in the labor force, especially in the Rand gold mines, though they avoided work in manufacturing. Their preferred work was in personal or domestic service, especially as hotel personnel.

For general purposes many of the tribes have trust funds fed from tax revenue, which pay for services on the reserves such as fencing, well-digging, or the servicing of pumps. Land in the reserves is held by the tribe and assigned for use by the chief, with local chiefs and ward heads acting as his agents.

Tswana villages are still large and closely settled, with a five-class system of stratification based upon the presence of foreign clients and the exclusiveness of the chiefs’ lineages. They center on the residence of a chief. The Tswana were known for their highly developed court system, administered by the chief and councillors of each lineage. The courts have always been heavily preoccupied with witchcraft, and in early 1970 they handled mainly domestic cases. In former times, witchcraft was dealt with by the highest authority because it was believed to involve grave robbing or even ritual murder. A chief was under the law and could be tried by his own councillors. He could also be freely criticized in the public assembly.

As with the Sotho, age-grade regiments are still in use, functioning as organizers for ceremonies and as labor battalions. Girls’ groups also have community functions, although they are not officially initiated. The boys’ regiments are organized as classes in the initiation schools, but are locally centered. The separate tribe otherwise was organized on a basis of kinship plus wards (see ch. 6, Social Structure).

Differences between the Sotho and Tswana seem largely to be a consequence of differences in the resources of the reserves and the specific local client tribes.
The North Sotho (Pedi)

Within the North Sotho (Pedi) tribal cluster, Sekhukhune III, paramount chief of Sekhukhuneland, has some nominal authority over other Pedi groups; but he was a minor under a regency in 1965 at his accession. Chief Sekhwati Mampuru, a senior kinsman and head of Nebo District, has greater prestige. Important chiefs like Sekhukhune and his nominal subordinate Sekhwati are confirmed in set jurisdictions by the government, but many tribes outside, including non-Pedi, recognize their leadership. The chief's role is partially sacred as an intermediary for the ancestral spirits and as general protector of the agricultural cycle, with special powers of rainmaking.

The chiefs have the right to control the age-grade regiments, which organized group ceremonial activities in the reserve settlements and functioned at other times as heavy labor squads (see ch. 6, Social Structure). Some chiefs have occasionally been criticized for using these regiments as contract labor off the reserves and receiving the pay for it.

The traditional pattern of settlement of the North Sotho is a homestead consisting of a number of huts arranged around a fenced ceremonial enclosure, usually in an arc but sometimes a complete circle, with a permanent meetingplace and cattle byres inside. Modern European-type housing—or sometimes, traditional homes—laid out in rows may also be found. Settlements are relatively permanent, though traditions exist of villages having to move in time of war. The large type of settlement characteristic of Sotho and Tswana groups is found in Sekhukhuneland in two cases: the village of Chief Sekhukhune and that of Chief Sekhwati. Each contains the whole tribe in residence with the chief. These villages are stratified according to the number and types of client groups and Sotho groups present.

In the northern reserves cattle are farmed out as in the South, but usually to kinsmen, and the herdsmen are rarely entitled to any of the increase unless it is unusually large. The custom is explained as being for the good of the lineage-community. Agriculture is traditional, based on sorghums and millet with the addition of maize, which has become the most important single crop. Gourds, melons, pumpkins, and beans of various types are also grown. The diet is also supplemented by gathering of wild foods, including greens, fruits, roots, grubs, and insects. Chickens are very important as a source of meat; cattle are killed only under special circumstances. Sheep and goats are used in much the same manner as cattle, but are worth less and not much used for food. Beer and a nonintoxicating traditional beverage are said to be important for supplementing the vitamin supply.
The work habits and preferences of the North Sotho are similar to those of the South Sotho: they prefer domestic labor and try to avoid manufacturing. They appear in numbers in the Rand gold mines. Some of the available wage earning takes place on the Pedi reserve itself, where asbestos and chromium mines are located in Sekhukhuneland. The government hires some workers in emergency conservation projects, including women and children. Some also work in hospitals, schools, and other institutions on the reserve. Few women work as full-time wage earners, and if they do they usually leave the reserve for good. Many, however, work seasonally on European farms at harvest time. Some of the men's labor is also seasonal, especially in time of drought. Many of the reserve shop-keepers are local Pedi.

Money has become an essential, both for the payment of taxes and for the acquisition of European goods that have become quasi-essential, such as sugar, tea, bread, and store-clothing. The use of money as a measure of value has changed concepts of the worth of certain things, and certain items are now bought rather than made. It has also produced differences of wealth, some of which are attacked with accusations of witchcraft; community responsibilities, however, tend to remain the same.

The Nguni

The Nguni are believed to be the longest established Bantu-speaking group in South Africa. They were already in Natal in the early 1500s and have no known connections with the North; the Ngoni of Zambia who migrated northward in historical times, are the exception. The “clicks” in their speech and their use of cattle suggests long contact with the Hottentot. They are divided into three main linguistic and cultural groupings, each of which includes a number of tribes and tribal clusters: the Xhosa, the Zulu, and the Swazi.

Most of the Nguni are found in Natal and the Eastern Cape, with the Xhosa in the semi-autonomous Transkei and in the Ciskei. The Swazi are the main exception, occupying independent Swaziland on the borders of the Transvaal and territory inside that province. Groups of Mzilikazi's Ndebele also live with the Sotho under Sotho suzerainty. The Xhosa are the most numerous and the most urbanized of the South African Bantu, but the Zulu are possibly the best known because they constituted the core of Shaka's empire. Since the Swazi were strongly influenced by the Zulu, the Xhosa may be taken to represent the more traditional Nguni pattern, because the Zulu pattern was changed at several points by traits borrowed from other sources or developed by Shaka himself.

Cattle are extremely important to the Nguni; those remaining on reserve land make herding their most important economic activity.
The stock is generally unimproved, however, and of little value as a source of dairy products, while they are never killed as beef animals. Milk is both a basic staple food and a substance of ritual importance. Their clan system is based upon the inheritance of cattle and is said to be weakened where the economy no longer depends on the herds. Customarily cattle are held by seniors who turn them over to dependent herdsman, chiefly young relatives, who have the right to the use of the milk and once in a while to a calf.

Horses, pigs, and wool-sheep were acquired from European settlers. Chickens were known to Africans at an early date, but whether they were a native breed or acquired is unknown. The farming of millet, sorghums, and mealies (maize) has always been important not only for itself but for the brewing of beer used for ritual and pleasure. Both wheat and African vegetables, as well as those acquired from the Dutch, have been used since early times. Tobacco has been found growing wild in the area since the 1600's; its origin is unknown.

Hunting was a sport and was an ancient supplementary source of food, hides (for clothing), and ivory (for trade). The products of gathering were traditionally used by the women and children, but men used them only during times of famine. Cultivation, using hoes, was entirely women's work. Clothing was made of cowhide and animal skins before the introduction of woven wool. Houses were domes about ten feet in diameter, made of bent saplings covered with mats or with grass thatch. Nguni homesteads are built on the edge of a circular cattle-pen or kraal. Only the ash of cleared brushwood was used as fertilizer on the fields, but crops of tobacco were often grown in the deserted cattle-pens.

Nguni domestic groups consisted of a man and his wives, his sons and their wives, and any dependent poor people who might be under their protection or hired to help with the livestock. Three generations of adult males in a homestead were not unusual, so a homestead might consist of as many as twenty huts—each wife with her young children having a separate hut; the unmarried young people had their own hut also. Chiefs’ homesteads tended to be larger than those of commoners, but rarely exceeded fifty huts except in the case of Shaka's war concentrations. In a good location, however, relatives or friends might settle in the same area and, although spaces would be left between the homesteads, they would constitute a good-sized local or kin grouping.

Although much of this pattern of life is maintained on the reserves, its relative importance has fallen far behind that of wage labor simply because the land area is insufficient for the population in most of the reserves, especially those of the Xhosa. The type of house was changed, during a time of relatively permanent settle-
ement, to a Sotho-type wattle- and daub-house with thatched roof; in modern times dwellings were of brick and stone, with roofs of thatch or corrugated iron. The settlement pattern may be of the old style or it might be a modern housing project.

Circumcision was a ritual originally borrowed from the Sotho, who used the training classes formed in connection with it as a basis for the tribal military structure. Boys of about the same age, one of whom would be the chief’s son, would be initiated together and would then lead the group as his private guards. The Nguni military pattern was based rather on the local group and included men of different ages. Shaka the Zulu appears to have combined the two somewhat, when he abolished the circumcision classes and substituted his own regimental system based on the age-group but extending throughout the entire locality. Circumcision as a system of initiation is still followed by most of the Nguni and Sotho who retain the old religion, but most of those who are Christians ignore it.

Certain Nguni tribes practiced metalworking crafts, but most groups had a shortage of metal and apparently received little in trade. The Nguni of early contact times were described as using wooden spears with fire-hardened tips. Dingiswayo, of the Mthethwa (a tribe later absorbed by the Zulu), developed trade into an elaborate long-distance connection with the Coastal Portuguese. To supply the demand for the skin cloaks that were his tribe’s main stock in trade, he set up a handicraft operation that employed 100 men. He also taught and encouraged wood-carving when he discovered the market value of fine wooden bowls and spoons.

Nguni society is basically organized in a kinship structure of extended families, lineages, and clans, of which families are the most important. They are arranged in independent chiefdoms. Only the Xhosa have kept to this traditional level until recently, however; and now they too have a new organization. Even in the old pattern, some chiefdoms would become large enough to split into two or more, though keeping track of their traditional relationship; a few remained as large tribes with subchiefs and a paramount chief. The Zulu and the Swazi, however, have developed more unified systems in the course of time.

The Xhosa (Cape Nguni)

The Xhosa are the most numerous of the South African Bantu-speaking tribal groups. In mid-1967 they were estimated at 3.6 million, distributed mainly in Cape Province but, as the most urbanized of Africans, they were also found throughout areas where wage labor existed, especially the industrial areas. They are sometimes known as the Cape Nguni since the Xhosa proper are only one cluster of the group; the whole group, however, is remarkably homogeneous. There are twelve main clusters: Xhosa proper,
Thembu, Mpondomise, Bomvana, Bhaca, Hlubi, Bhele, Zizi, Mfengu, Xesibe, and Ntlangwini. The Mfengu comprise a special category of detribalized Nguni made up of remnants of tribes destroyed by Shaka during the difaqane. The Hlubi, Ngwane, Bhele, and Zizi were refugee groups that arrived more intact; the others had lost their tribal structure, although sometimes they arrived as lineages with their cattle.

A broad division of the group that is visible to Europeans with whom they come in contact in the process of wage labor is that between the "school" Xhosa and the "red" (or "red blanket") people. The traditional costume of the nonurbanized Xhosa is based on a kilt and blanket, stained with red ochre, that is also used extensively as a cosmetic. Those who wear this can generally be assumed to be uneducated and non-Christian, since education was mainly obtainable from mission schools (see ch. 9, Education). They tend to be at a disadvantage in obtaining jobs that call for a knowledge of reading or of European languages, and they are less experienced in communicating with Europeans. In an urban setting they tend to keep to themselves and to form groups based on local or kin groupings from the reserves, whereas the "school" people tend to form friendships based on their urban contacts and to be more outgoing. The "school" people regard the "red blanket" people as unsophisticated country folk and are, in turn, considered by them as "city slickers" who sometimes take advantage of them. There is, however, a good deal of interaction among them and, in the face of a non-Xhosa threat or enemy, the two groups will make common cause.

Xhosa of both groups are found working for wages everywhere in South Africa, but they almost have a monopoly on African jobs in the cities and industrial towns of eastern Cape Province; they are also found in numbers in cities of the Transvaal. They tend to express a preference for work in manufacturing, though they are represented in most forms of heavy labor. They have experienced more substantial changes in cultural values by exposure to the urban milieu than have other groups and have developed new patterns in the towns (see ch. 12, Social Values).

The Xhosa at the time of the difaqane had undergone a series of small wars with the British and Afrikaners, which resulted in the diminution of their territories in relation to their population. Their pattern of settlement was that standard for the Nguni as a whole—small homesteads housing extended family groups but located fairly close to each other, in groups, according to kinship. The sudden expansion of the Zulu caused refugees from northern Natal to flee into Xhosa country, in groups ranging in size from individuals to tribes.

Small groups of refugees, some with their cattle, who took refuge
with the Xhosa, were known as the Fingoes from the Xhosa word *mfengu*, translated by some as beggars, by others as marauders. They soon became so numerous that they were competing with the Xhosa for grazing land, and a number of clashes took place. The Fingoes were under British protection, however, and could not be displaced. Because they had lost their original tribal organization, they were more willing than other tribal groups to cooperate with the government and were more readily drawn into employment and into the Christian missionary centers. Although the Xhosa among whom they lived tended to have some hostility toward them and the British, they appear to have intermarried with the Xhosa and have come to be included with that people since their dialects were similar. Many Xhosa were drawn into both wage labor and church missions. The division within the Xhosa between “school” (mission-trained) and “red” or “red blanket” Xhosa (non-Christian, traditional) only partly coincided with the original difference between Xhosa and Mfengu.

The role of the London Missionary Society at this time was important. They established mission farms on the borders of Xhosa territory, which inculcated not only the Christian religion but also the dignity of manual labor and techniques for Western-type farming. Since the use of the plow required the work of a man, this drew Xhosa men into advanced agriculture and may have assisted strongly in their survival, as the economy was forced to change by the disruption of their former world. Women were also taught domestic labor, which gave them an advantage when they needed to be self-supporting and enabled them to enter the towns as did the men. Entry into other forms of work followed naturally after these.

As the pressure of population from the Fingo refugees became extreme, a number of clashes took place between them and their hosts; but the European government tended to favor the Fingoes. The territory was not only overpopulated but was also overstocked with both Xhosa and Fingo cattle competing for the grazing land. In these circumstances the Xhosa were visited by a series of millenial cults that persisted in the form of five or more waves of mass hysteria until the 1920’s. The peak, however, came in 1853 when at the behest of a prophetess, cattle were killed, first in traditional sacrifice, then wholesale. Other stock were also slaughtered and grain was not sown. This expression of religious faith was to be followed by the coming of great quantities of cattle, the filling of grain warehouses, and the disappearance of all Europeans (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 11, Religion). The result, however, was that the Xhosa, suffering famine and without means of self-support, were forced to seek European employment and constituted the bulk of the African labor force in the late nineteenth century, not only in the Cape but in other provinces as well (see ch. 22, Labor).
The Xhosa home areas, like the others in South Africa, still cling to traditional farming on plots too small to be economic and the raising of largely ceremonial cattle. Most of the people of working age, including a great many of the women, seek wage labor elsewhere. In the Transkei there are a few sources of employment, including a small factory that manufactures furniture and prefabricated houses, clothing, and soft drinks, as well as factories, some bakeries, a number of garages, dairies, and contracting companies. There are also several hundred African-operated bus lines. A few small plantations also operate.

It was estimated in 1967 that approximately 250 university graduates were living in Transkei, many of whom were teachers; there was a total of about 3,000 teachers. Other university graduates are mostly doctors and attorneys. There are also numerous small businessmen and clerical workers. These figures, however, apparently include Africans, Indians, Coloured, and some whites. No figures of a comparable sort are available for the smaller Ciskei region.

The Zulu

The Zulu are probably the best known of the African tribes because of their spectacular military expansion under Shaka. Originally they were a small clan, but Shaka incorporated into their organization any other clan or tribe that he conquered or, in some cases, merely the part that would then be useful to him. Sometimes they took only the young women, sometimes only the young men for the army. In this way they absorbed segments not merely of Nguni tribes but also of Sotho, Tsawan, and other groups, some of which were not within South Africa. Although his own soldiers and his own family turned against him because of the extreme discipline in which he kept his troops and because of the witch-hunt he instituted after his mother's death, the reconstituted tribes that formed the nucleus of his empire are still proud to call themselves Zulu.

The term is understood today to include all tribes claiming descent within the Zulu or Qwabe genealogies, or from any whose residence in Zululand (Northern Natal) or the rest of Natal dates from the reign of Shaka. The Qwabe are the senior branch of the tribe to which the Zulu belonged as a junior branch.

The last king of a unified Zulu national unit was Dinuzulu, who died in 1913. Thereafter, the tribes functioned as separate units for the most part, except when temporarily grouped into sections. One of these, the Tholana, consists of refugees who gathered together in Durban (then known as Port Natal) to seek protection from the white settlers. One group followed Nathaniel Isaacs, a young white man who had been pressed into service by Shaka; after his death they were divided between two of his companions, one of whom,
Henry Ogle, married an African woman and gave rise to a chiefly lineage of his own name. Another, the Kholwa, whose name means “believers” or Christians, occupied the area of the Ifumi Mission Reserve and after a time converted en masse, finally arranging to be placed under a Christian chief. Most other tribes have a similar history of fleeing, after defeat, in an attempt to find land to live on and have had long periods of maneuvering or strife with the whites before they were able to settle permanently.

A small offshoot of the Zulu confederacy, less than 100 men under Shoshangane, fled from Shaka’s violent despotism to the territory of the Tsonga, whom they conquered. They then formed a military organization strong enough to resist Shaka; the Tsonga took the name of Shangaan in his honor and remember him with pride. Other groups also fled but disappeared. An important offshoot that survived, however, was a party of between 200 and 300 Ndebele under Mzilikazi, a Zulu headman. The Ndebele raided the Sotho and more northerly Shona, incorporating some of their groups. Some of the Sotho allied with them voluntarily. Some remnants of these Ndebele live in the North Sotho and Tswana reserves under the suzerainty of the Sotho and Tswana chiefs; the bulk of the Ndebele (Matelele), however, live in Rhodesia.

The Zulu concentrated even more heavily on the raising of cattle than the other cattle-raising Bantu, though they never utilized them as completely for packing and riding as did the Hottentot and Xhosa. The Zulu used them only for dairying and occasional pack-carrying, the Ndebele only for dairying. Under modern conditions, native commissioners on the reserves have made an effort to see that the stock is improved by the process of preventing the purchase of inferior animals and encouraging the killing (culling) of inferior dairy cattle. They have also attempted to prevent the overstocking of the reserves by having surplus cattle sold. It is difficult to persuade the Zulu of the value of getting rid of cattle at all, because they are used largely for ceremonial payments, specifically bridewealth, and the quantity of the animals is more important than the quality for purposes of prestige. Dairying is men’s work; only Christian women are said to milk cows, and a menstruating woman is not allowed to milk or even drink milk for fear that the cow will waste away and die. Poor pasture is believed responsible for the low milk yield. Cattle are believed to have a mystic involvement with the life of the tribe, so that if all were sold the tribe would die. The deceased ancestors are felt to have an interest in the ownership of the cattle along with the living.

Agriculture traditionally is the work of women using hoes; but plows are now used, always by men. The staples are maize and millet, but European and American vegetables such as tomatoes are also fancied by noneducated people. Bananas and pawpaws
(papaya) are grown in the Zulu territories and are sold as a cash crop, along with a local tuber called madumbes. Attempts have been made to introduce the commercial growing of sugarcane but without success. The people seem generally suspicious of the motives of the government when attempts are made to introduce innovations or manipulate their customs.

Because of the prevalence of wage labor, a good deal of food and other supplies are bought from shops. This includes plows and cement used in home building. Many women, as well as men, work. Zulu men appear to prefer work in manufacturing and construction trades; they also appear in the Rand gold mines and as urban policemen. Many Zulu are Christian, and they have their own churches as well as the sects introduced by Europeans (see ch. 11, Religion).

The modern infrequency of polygyny and the adoption of modern European-influenced building techniques has tended to change the residential pattern of the Zulu homestead, though many still retain the tradition of a crescent of houses grouped around the cattle-pen or kraal, with the horns pointing downhill. The tendency now is to group the houses irregularly around one of the better located ones and to move the kraal downhill where possible. Since the site is usually on high ground, this puts the cattle nearer the grazing area.

Land and other resources on the reserve, as is customary in most cases, is owned by the tribe as a whole and apportioned by the chiefs. The government prefers this, discouraging the possession of freehold property by Africans on the ground that it weakens the tribal structure. Some African freehold does remain in specified rural areas. Christian members of the tribe, having been exposed to European land-management systems, tend to feel that freehold would be far preferable. The traditional pattern links the land with the local kin group; the right to occupy is inherited theoretically by men only, and the land reverts to the chief when a male line has died out, unless an unusually capable woman of the family may arrange to keep the land in production herself; in that case she may be left in possession.

The structure of the age-graded regiments is still maintained, being used largely in group hunts, though these are not very frequent. They have functioned within the past decade in skirmishes between neighboring rival tribes, often starting with quarrels at weddings; the last serious assembling of the regiments, however, appears to have been in 1923 by the Mbo and the Makhanya. They maintain ritual customs of keeping themselves prepared and ceremonially pure at specific ceremonies, invoking the ancestors to be with them in battle; many Zulu Christians end the list of ancestors with the name of Jesus Christ. Sacrifices of strengthening include a ritual bulldogging of a black bull in which the warriors of first one
group and then another are sent in to try to break the animal’s neck. Its flesh is eaten afterward. On the other hand, any killing of a man, even in war, requires a sacrifice of purification with washing inside and out; even if the killing was accidental, the killer is believed to be possessed by a supernatural bloodlust until this is done.

The Zulu law courts administered by the chiefs are especially well developed. An attempt was first made to codify Zulu law in 1891, and a major finished form was prepared in 1930 as the Natal Code of Native Law (see ch. 14, The Legal System).

The Swazi

The Swazi are named for Mswati, who was ruler of the tribe at the time of first interaction with the Europeans, after the difaqane. Culturally they are similar to the Zulu. They are associated in their area with other Nguni, especially Zulu, some Sotho, and a few Tsonga. Two-fifths of the Swazi live in South Africa and the rest live in Swaziland. In South Africa they are found mainly in territory formerly conquered by Mswati, in northern Natal, and in eastern Transvaal. Some in the Transvaal share the North Sotho Reserve, in the part known as Sekhukhuneland, where they have come under strong Sotho influence.

They live in scattered homesteads like other Nguni. People scattered along one ridge or valley within “shouting distance” of each other form a neighborhood group for purposes of cooperation, often with an informally selected leader. Principalities of districts under their own chiefs are recognized by the government. Independent Swaziland has a unified organization centered on its king and its rainmaking queen mother; no data on internal structure are available for the larger South African chiefdoms.

Many are Christian and follow church regulations; however, some do not marry in the church until after the birth of children and effect traditional marriages to secondary wives later. Patrilineal kinship is of primary importance. Clans and lineages are ranked with the royal clan at the top and the others placed according to the rank of the officials whom they have been producing in recent traditions.

Individual status is also hereditary, and leadership is inherited by primogeniture in chiefs’ lineages; a woman’s status is determined by that of her husband after she marries. The first wife of a chief is very carefully chosen in regard to suitable lineage. The role of a chief is both that of leader and priest of his tribe, and that of an administrator and intermediary for the government; he is responsible for keeping order and collecting taxes.

On the reserves, as well as elsewhere, subsistence is agricultural, the raising of cattle being of primary importance. Women may not handle cattle; since plows have become standard, the men are therefore required for heavy agriculture. Although Swazi also participate
in the standard types of unskilled labor, those in the Transvaal state
a preference for work in commerce. The Swazi, like the Sotho and
Tswana, follow the custom of farming out cattle to poor men, who
herd them and take full responsibility for their well-being, in return
for the use of the milk and some of the increase of the herd. These
borrowed cattle are sometimes identified to outsiders as owned by
the herdsmen. The herds act as a bank account, but most of the
potential profit goes to the herdsmen in the form of the dairy
products and a portion of the calves. Only in recent times have the
Swazi been persuaded to commercialize their cattle, which have
been treated as nearly sacred.

Unskilled migrant labor from Swaziland enters South Africa for
the sake of higher wages. Some unskilled labor is brought into
Swaziland by foreign contractors from South Africa.

The Swazi in the Transvaal area, whose territory adjoins the
northern border of Swaziland, petitioned the government in 1932
to rectify the boundaries to include them within Swaziland, as had
been the case in 1881, and to recognize them as subject of the
Swazi king, Sobhuza. Those in the Natal reserves are reported to
have occasionally brought him tribute as late as the 1940's and to
have called on him to arbitrate in cases of land dispute and inheri-
tance. His influence is still strong among South African Swazi,

Tsonga

The Tsonga, who appear in statistical records frequently as
Shangaan, are a coast-oriented people whose original territory ex-
tended into southern Mozambique. In South Africa they occupy
three groups of reserves in the northeastern Transvaal, adjoining the
Venda, the North Sotho, and the Swazi. The name Shangaan is
derived from that of Shoshangane, a lieutenant of Shaka who
conquered them; although strongly influenced by Zulu language
and culture, they are not Nguni.

They are fishermen and canoemen, using the Limpopo River and
others for transportation. In former times they acted as middlemen
between inland tribes and the coast, carrying metal goods such as
Venda iron hoes, gold, and copper or products of hunting such as
ivory, rhinoceros horns, and furs. They brought back amber from
coastal tribes and cloth from Portuguese trading posts. They were
the only South Africa Bantu to take an active part in the slave
trade, selling women war captives to the Portuguese at Lourenço
Marques.

Their main domestic animals were goats and chickens, which they
used in rituals of a central African type. The tsetse fly inhibited
cattle-farming, so milk was not a staple food. In times of drought
when the lakes were low they organized large community fishing
beats to drive the fish into traps. In warfare they used large long-
bows and iron *assegais* (spears). They participate in modern industry, and according to a survey made in Pretoria they expressed a preference for work in manufacturing.

The Tsonga lived in scattered homesteads rather than large settlements, with huts set in a half-circle around a byre; each wife had her own courtyard surrounded by a low fence. Because of the shortage of cattle for payments such as bridewealth, iron hoes might be used instead. Their inheritance pattern was central African in that a man's heir was his younger full brother. They had a cult of the ancestors, like the other Bantu-speakers, and they practiced circumcision in the Sotho tradition. They had no tribal high chief, but many small chiefdoms; each chief held his own law court without consulting any other.

**The Venda**

The Venda were originally a lineage of chiefs who took over an aboriginal group, the Ngona. In the course of time they intermarried with Shona girls and established a kingdom. Traditionally, their land of origin was one of rivers and forests; this, as well as their folk tales of a magic war drum and of the introduction of fire and a number of religious rituals, shows affinity to tribes in the area of Malawi.

They adopted circumcision in the nineteenth century from the Sotho because otherwise it was dangerous to travel in Sotho territory. The Lemba were by tradition a group of hereditary craftsmen who served the Venda as potters, weavers, and metal-smiths working gold, copper, and iron. They married among themselves and referred to the Venda chief's lineage as Vha Senzi, the Swahili word for "bush pagans," although they spoke a form of Shona rather than Swahili. They seem to have had some form of contact, possibly indirect, with the coastal areas. The Lemba form of circumcision appears to have been influenced by the coastal Muslim peoples, and the Lemba keep Muslim regulations regarding wine and methods of slaughtering animals.

The Venda were hunters and bred huge hunting dogs. They had few cattle, being near tsetse-fly zones. They grew eleusine as their chief grain, mainly for making beer. Cotton, which grew wild in their territory, was woven and worn as a special prerogative of chiefs and their families. They forged iron hoes, which they used for trading and for bridewealth; their Lemba clients worked gold, and they bartered for copper from the Messina mines, which were in their territory but were managed by a Tsonga lineage with workers employed from the local tribes. The Venda built stone villages with a mazelike pattern of streets and walls with loopholes for thrusting spears.
They are the smallest linguistic group in South Africa, estimated at 280,000 in 1967. Their present homeland, in the northern Transvaal around Soutpansburg, has been reconstituted with its own Territorial Authority, which convened officially on October 9, 1969. They have an executive council of six councillors, the chief of whom functions as a prime minister; the others serve as heads of government departments. The council also has its own civil service. People in the territory participate little in outside affairs, even in proportion to their number.

The Bantu Languages

The Bantu languages form a segment of a subfamily of the remarkably large Niger Congo family of languages and are distributed throughout the length and breadth of Africa, south of 5° N. They are characterized by: a system of noun classifications sometimes termed grammatical genders, signalized by prefixes having singular and plural forms; roots built of consonant-vowel-consonant; and suffixes distinguishing verbs from nouns. They are usually classified according to geographical zones. Their polysyllabic character gives them a rhythmic quality especially effective in formal or literary forms of the languages.

In South Africa four Bantu language groups are represented: Nguni, Sotho-Tswana, Tsonga, and Venda. The last is a single language with two main dialects; the others are represented by a number of languages with dialects. Within each group there is some degree of mutual intelligibility, and in some cases mutual intelligibility is said to exist even between languages of different groups that have been in close contact. There appears to be a great deal of mutual influence of these languages on one another. Some of these Bantu languages are characterized by the presence of lateral fricatives and by the use of "clicks" (implosives), which may be borrowed from the Khoi-San languages or, as has been suggested, separately developed.

The Sotho and Tswana languages represent a large group with many speakers. South Sotho is the language of Lesotho, and Tswana of Botswana; however, the greater number of speakers of both these languages reside in South Africa either permanently, as citizens, or temporarily, to work. The census of 1960 lists South Sotho speakers then resident in South Africa at roughly 1.3 million and Tswana speakers at 1.1 million. North Sotho or Pedi speakers were listed at nearly 1 million, giving a total of 3,396,943 Sotho-Tswana speakers identified in the census; in 1965 the estimated total was 5 million. The three languages named have written forms used in the schools and now possess a body of modern literature.

The Nguni group includes roughly 6.5 million speakers listed in
the census of 1960 as resident in South Africa; the languages included in this census are: Zulu, with roughly 2.9 million speakers listed; Ndebele (an offshoot of Zulu), with nearly 300,000; Xhosa, with about 3 million; and Swazi (properly Swati) with more than 300,000. The two pidgin languages, Kitchen Kaffir (isi-Piki or isi-Lololo) and Fanakalo, are based on Zulu and Xhosa mixed with English and Afrikaans.

Of the Tsonga group, only Shangaan (Hlangaanu) is listed, with about 500,000 speakers. A total of 1.2 million was estimated for the whole group in 1959. Venda is listed in the 1960 census as having nearly 250,000 speakers. A group of more than 200,000 were listed as speakers of other Bantu languages.

Hottentot and Bushman

Early European arrivals in the Cape area found it populated by nomadic groups of cattle herders and hunters, mostly speakers of Khoisan or click languages, whom they named Hottentot and Bushman, respectively. Though both these culturally defined groups are probably part of the quite varied cluster of African negroid peoples, some of their characteristics—prominent cheekbones, yellowish or coppery skin—suggested mongoloids to the early Dutch, who sometimes called them Chinese. Hottentot and Bushman are generally smaller than the Bantu-speaking populations of South Africa, but a little taller than pygmies.

Although both Hottentot and Bushman have been used as pejorative terms—and scholars and others now use Khoikhoi for Hottentot and San for Bushman—the more widely known names will be used here. Each name covers a cultural category: Hottentot are herders of cattle, sheep, and goats, Bushman are hunters and gatherers. Each category contains a number of tribes and language groups.

The Hottentot were herders of cattle, which they milked, used for brideswealth and fines, and rode in war. They also kept sheep and goats; dairying was considered woman’s work. Houses were usually small portable domes made of skins on a framework of poles. A bride brought her own house and kept all her property separate from her husband’s. Rush mats were used for sleeping; clothing and ornaments were of skin.

They migrated by patrilineal clans, and when making camp the lineages and households aligned themselves formally according to seniority. Unrelated dependents attached to owners of large herds camped with their patrons’ families. Since it included unrelated groups, their larger organization is sometimes referred to as a horde rather than a tribe. It might be as large as 1,600, as reported by a chief at Saldanha Bay in 1659. The Nama people in 1863 consisted
of seven hordes, though depleted by two centuries of warfare and disease; the dominant clans of the seven were related to each other. Chieftainship was informal, derived from seniority or preeminence in the lineage. A chief led migrations, mediated quarrels, and executed any condemned by the group. Hordes made alliances for warfare.

The Hottentot traded herbs and dagga hemp (an herb smoked like tobacco) to the Bantu for metal and to the Europeans for beads. They had client groups of Bushmen who hunted and gathered honey for them. The Nama Hottentot also had a negroid client group of iron smelters, the Berg-Dama, who were Khoi-speaking though resembling Bantu. All the Hottentot sold cattle and land-rights to the Dutch East India Company station for beads and other trade goods; some groups sold even their breeding-stock and were forced to seek employment as servants or herders at the station, though they were never successfully enslaved. Two smallpox epidemics in the eighteenth century wiped out some groups and decimated others.

Some accepted Christianity. Later, they had close interaction with the Trekboers, sometimes hostile and sometimes friendly, as allies or client groups. They acquired horses and guns, while the Trekboers acquired Hottentot houses and cattle. Both groups collaborated on the near-extinction of the Bushmen, and so much interbreeding took place (legal only when the Hottentot were Christian) that only a few of the original families survive. These are attached to Coloured farming villages or work on white-owned farms. Before 1950 these fullbloods were classed with the Coloured because of their relatively light skin color and close association with Coloured and whites; the Population Registration Act of 1950 classed them as Native (African). Most of these retain their language and their old religion.

The Bushmen survive only in a few scattered groups along the South West Africa and Botswana borders, and most are within those countries rather than in South Africa. They retain four unrelated San languages and practice their old hunting and gathering culture to a great extent. A similar group that speaks a Khoikhoi language, the Sarwa, remain as clients of the Tswana chiefly in Botswana. Though the Bushmen herded for the Hottentot, there is little evidence that any attempted herding for themselves. When drought or overhunting had lowered the supply of game, they hunted cattle as if they were wild game, bringing down the wrath of the Trekboers, the Hottentot, and the Coloureds. These groups attempted to exterminate the Bushmen and attempted to take their young children to be raised as farm servants (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). It is not known today what physical differences if any, distinguished the Bushman from the Hottentot; early writers state that each was
easily recognizable, but modern survivors of both groups are similar in type.

The Bushmen have few material possessions. Those remaining today live in either swamp or desert. Their houses are brushwood shelters, and their main garment is a skin cloak, in which the woman carries her baby and some ostrich eggshells full of water. In the Kalahari Desert region, water is often available only in subsurface deposits that the women tap with reed siphons in order to fill their eggshells. Their main valuables are fine beads, which they make of ostrich eggshells. Any metals they possess are acquired from other peoples. Like the Hottentot, they used poisoned arrows. The more recent of the famous rock-paintings of South Africa are attributed to them, although it is not certain that the Bushmen were the only painters. This art died out with the specialists who practiced it during their period of warfare with the Trekboers and Hottentot.

Their only social organization is a loose band structure that is known to be related to other bands in the same area; there are no large groupings. The headman’s office is hereditary in certain families, however. He is the custodian of the land resources of food and water and is given precedence in moving and camping. He starts the first fire at a new camp with sticks, and taking fire from him is an acknowledgement of his leadership. Most Bushman groups avoid contact with any other groups or individuals unless they have some certainty of their good intentions.

THE COLOURED S

With some exceptions those persons defined as Coloured under the Population Registration Act of 1950 and subsequent amendments are descendents of early unions among Khoikhoi (Hottentot), San (Bushmen), whites (usually of Dutch origin), Africans often brought to the Western Cape as slaves, and East Indians (Malays).

In 1959 a proclamation issued under the Population Registration Act defined seven groups as Coloured. Of these, only three corresponded to classes that had traditionally been considered Coloured and had so conceived themselves. Two of the seven, Chinese and Indians, had hitherto been treated as Asians for most legal and statistical purposes and continued to be so treated despite the formal redefinition. A third—Other Asiatic—is of little practical significance since it refers to persons generally accepted as a race or tribe whose national home is in an Asian country other than India, Pakistan, or China. The Japanese, however, have been officially defined as whites and are in fact represented chiefly as visiting businessmen or diplomats.
The four subcategories that more or less comprehend those persons or groups traditionally recognized as Coloured are the Cape Coloured, the Cape Malays, the Griquas, and Other Coloured. The last includes those not otherwise defined as white, native, or in other Coloured subcategories.

Perhaps the largest of these categories is the Cape Coloured, most of whom still live in the province in which they originally emerged. They are largely urban, including traders, skilled craftsmen, and unskilled workers, but substantial numbers work on white-owned farms in Cape Province. There are Cape Coloured in the other three provinces, but only in the Transvaal did they exceed 100,000 in the 1960 census and more than 90 percent of these were urban, living in Johannesburg and the Witwatersrand. The smaller group in Natal is also heavily urbanized.

Among the Cape Coloured are the rural inhabitants of the Coloured reserves, white-owned farms, and towns in the Western Cape (Little Namaqualand). Beginning before the middle of the nineteenth century, descendents of Afrikaner-Hottentot unions carrying Dutch names pioneered Coloured settlement in the northwest Cape area and elsewhere as they sought to isolate themselves from white domination. Most of these people called themselves Bastards or some variant of that term. In most cases they accepted the guidance and authority of European missionaries. In order to establish themselves in Little Namaqualand they drove out indigenous herders and hunters (Hottentot and Bushmen) or accepted them as a lower class in the same community. The Coloured segment of the Little Namaqualand communities were quite conscious of their mixed descent and their Afrikaans speech and considered themselves superior to the indigenous peoples or to those mixed elements that spoke a Khoi language and continued to intermarry with Hottentot.

The Cape Malays constitute a smaller group—under 100,000 in 1960—who may be distinguished by a slightly larger Malay biological component than the Cape Coloured population, but they are characterized primarily by their continued adherence to Islam (see ch. 11, Religion). They too speak Afrikaans.

The Griquas are descendents of a white-Hottentot mixture that had been pushed north and east from the vicinity of the Cape to the Orange River, in the second decade of the nineteenth century, by expanding white settlers. Although only a small offshoot of the larger Coloured community, the history of the Griquas is illustrative of the development of South African race relations and of the problems that have engulfed the Coloured people in particular. In addition, the historical problems of the Griqua states in the 1800's are indicative of those that were to be encountered in the origination and application of the separate development theory of the
Nationalist Party government in the middle decades of the twentieth century.

The group consisted initially of the Bastard and Hottentot followers of the Bastard patriarch, Adam Kok, who had been appointed as captain by the Dutch East India Company in the middle of the eighteenth century. Under pressure of the expanding Boers, Kok's followers and others left the Cape Colony to move into the nearly empty land beyond the frontier. Joined by another group of Bastards under Captain Barends, these people settled to the north of, and between, two great curves of the Orange River, still known as Griqualand West. To strengthen their community they invited missionaries from the London Missionary Society, who joined them in 1801 and convinced them that the term by which they called themselves was pejorative; the missionaries gave them the name Griqua, from the name of the tribe of Hottentot who accompanied them. The missionaries also drew up a constitution that provided for a central executive—under the missionaries and captains—and three magistratures to enforce a short law code. The Griqua nation coalesced around these institutions. Although the society was largely patriarchal, from 1820 to 1838 the nation functioned under an elected leader, without family ties. He was Andries Waterboer, of Bushman extraction, and had been a teacher at the missionary school until his election.

The Griquas' chief strength lay in their military superiority to the advancing Bantu tribes with which they came in conflict. They had copied the commando formation of the Boers, armed and mounted men who functioned as irregular cavalry and used their firepower and mobility to defeat their more numerous spear-carrying opponents. The Griqua captains received regular supplies of ammunition from the Cape government in return for defending the portion of the Cape frontier region south of their territory from Bantu onslaught. In 1823 the Griquas turned back the furthest westernward Bantu advance of the Zulu wars, the attack of the Mantatees on the Tswana lands adjacent to Griqualand East (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

In addition to battling the Bantu, however, the Griqua group known as the Bergenaar carried out raids against the Tswana, the Bushmen, and even against the distant South Sotho. Although the Cape government seemed to regard the Griquas as its subjects, it did not lay claim to Griqualand, and the small nation remained almost entirely independent.

In 1825 a group of the followers of Adam Kok settled at Philippolis on the upper reaches of the Orange River. The Philippolis lands of the Griqua were located north of the Orange River within the territory that was to become the Orange Free State, directly in
the path of the Boers' northward advance. By 1845 the Boers and Griquas were in armed conflict over grazing land. British troops crossed the Orange River boundary to support the Griquas, and Griqua ownership of all the land between the Orange and Modder rivers, an area larger than Belgium, was subsequently confirmed by the British in a treaty the next year. In 1848, however, the British altered the treaty, leaving the Griquas confined to half the former area. In 1854 their position was further weakened when the British withdrew all claims to sovereignty over the area across the Orange River, leaving Philippolis within the new Boer republic. Nevertheless, as late as 1860, the Griqua still possessed title to a half million acres of land.

Both groups spoke Afrikaans and had societies centered on the patriarchal family and Christianity. The Griquas and their Hottentot followers had adopted Dutch names, and they had copied Boer racial attitudes; they considered themselves superior to Bantu and Bushmen and avowed the superiority of whites. The Griquas, however, held their land in common and worked and lived together in villages, unlike the Boers who were dedicated to individual farmsteads. Despite the similarities between Boer and Griqua, the Boer was not ready to tolerate the existence of a community of independent men of color in a land they controlled.

The level of civilization in Philippolis was relatively high as new immigrants from the Cape Coloured population joined the community during this period, and its location gave it direct contact with Cape Town. A limited cash economy developed from the sale of cattle and produce and from the lease or sale of land to the richer Boers. In 1859 issues of a Griqua newspaper even appeared at Philippolis. By that date, however, it was already obvious to the Griquas that they would again be forced to emigrate because of Boer pressure on the land, as new laws enabled the Boers to buy Griqua land while forbidding the Griqua from buying Boer land; consequently, the Griquas were no longer able to provide for population growth.

The Griquas decided to emigrate as a group to an area chosen for its rich agricultural potential, the well-watered upper reaches of the modern Transkei, which at that time was largely unpopulated. The exodus to the new Griqualand East was begun in December 1861, after the sale of the Philippolis lands to the Boers. Some 3,000 Griquas and their followers trekked with their herds and possessions for more than a year, arriving in their new domain in February 1863. The trek, however, had decimated much of the Griquas' wealth and herds, and the first years of the new settlement were difficult. It was not until 1870 that their economic position began to rise again.
The government of Griqualand East was modeled on European institutions with which the Griquas were familiar, both British and Boer, under a code known as the “Book of Griqua Laws.” The captain was the government’s executive, with a legislative council, known as the Raad, of twelve elected members and a local administration of magistrates modeled on that of the Cape Colony. A new constitution promulgated in 1870 delineated the powers of the captain and created an executive council or cabinet. The legislative council, now the Volksraad, functioned as a legislature and as a court of appeal. A European, T. C. Brisley, was appointed government secretary and sat as clerk of both councils. The estimated 9,000 Bantu in Griqualand appear to have been treated fairly. After 1870 Bantu cases before the courts were tried in Bantu courts under customary law.

In 1874 the state was absorbed into the Cape Colony by decision of the Cape government. Despite the appearances of wealth and stability, the new Griqua state had much the same problems that had beset the community at Philippi. Again, the Europeans were enabled to buy land from the Griquas, who were not able to resist the attractions of the cash offered to them or who fell into debt to the European store owners and saloon keepers. By 1905 less than ten Griqua landholders remained, the rest having been reduced through loss of their land rights to take jobs with the Boers.

With some exceptions, the Coloured population has been oriented to the whites, socially, culturally, and politically. Most are Christian, speak a European language—usually Afrikaans—as a mother tongue and, until the 1950's and 1960's, in the Cape Province and Natal, had certain political and other privileges not accorded Africans or Asiatics. The claim by the Coloured population to special status was given some recognition by the white population, but the effort of the Afrikaner Nationalist Party to implement the philosophy of apartheid has led gradually to the loss of special political privileges and to the drawing of a more rigid line between whites and Coloured. The Coloured, however, continue to resist the implications of apartheid and to see themselves as essentially different from other nonwhites (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 6, Social Structure; ch. 15, Political Dynamics).

THE ASIANS

Of the estimated 560,000 persons classified as Asiatics in South Africa in mid-1967, all but a few thousand were Indians, chiefly Hindus but speaking five different languages. The only other group of any size consisted of about 7,500 Chinese. Although most Asians were imported as agricultural or railroad workers in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries most had become small businessmen or craftsmen in the towns in the late 1960's (see ch. 4, Population; ch. 6, Social Structure).

When sugar was decided upon as the best commercial crop for Natal attempts were also being made to develop a cotton industry, but African labor was found unsuitable because of lack of experience. Arrangements were made to import Indians who had previously saved sugar industries in other colonial situations. An agreement was drawn up with the government of India for their proper treatment, including the provision that at least one-fourth of the group must be women. They would be indentured laborers for five years, after which each Indian could decide whether to return home (with a free passage) or whether to remain and find new work. If they chose to remain they would be given land to the amount of the cost of their passage. Many settled permanently. The first group in 1860 were 6,000 from Madras and 300 from Calcutta, mixed in caste and religion, though most were low-caste Hindus; 12 percent were Muslims and 5 percent Christians. Later, planters cooperated to give more financial aid to Indian immigrants. Many began to move into the towns as specialized workers, servants, and traders; others became truck farmers serving the towns. Some paid their own way and entered the country as clerical workers or merchants. These came to be known as passengers, in contrast to the former indentured laborers, and considered themselves to be of a better class. Most were from northern India, and many were Muslims.

From time to time, emigration from India was stopped by the Indian government because returning Indians complained of bad treatment in South Africa. Nevertheless, the community grew by immigration and natural increase until there were more Indians than whites in Natal. Except for the censuses of 1936 and 1946, when there were a few more whites than Indians, the Indians have outnumbered the whites in that province in all censuses from 1904 through 1960.

Under the leadership of Mohandas Gandhi and later under his sons, Indians made some efforts to change their status in South Africa and to gain some political leverage. With the coming into power of the Nationalists in 1948, there was, for a brief period, an attempt to return all Indians to newly independent India or Pakistan. By that time, however, most Indians in the country had been born there, and few had any wish to leave despite the difficulty of their position.

Indians have largely retained their traditional religious affiliations, although some have become Christians (see ch. 11, Religion). Aspects of the caste system that inhibit intermarriage between segments of the community and limit association still have some effect, but the caste councils have disappeared.
In the Population Registration Act of 1950, the Asians were officially included as one of the seven subcategories of the coloured category. Nevertheless, they continued to be specifically distinguished in official statistics; for example, in the 1960 census and subsequent estimates, they were treated as a separate category subject to regulations that do not apply to Coloureds (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 6, Social Structure; ch. 22, Labor).

The ancestors of the Indian population came from both northern and southern India, and the languages they speak include three northern and two southern tongues. All five have their own writing systems and bodies of literature.

Hindi and Urdu from the north are essentially the same language, differing in the heavier use of Persian and Sanskrit forms in Hindi and of Tuki or Arabic derived words in Urdu. The use of Hindi today implies origin in India, and usually Hindu religion; whereas Urdu is the official language of Pakistan and usually implies the Islamic religion; the distinction is rigid only on the official level, however, and many forms or words of both vocabularies are interchangeable. The distinction is even weaker in South Africa, where the community is far older than the Partition. Hindi is written in the Devanagari script, which is derived from Sanskrit, but Urdu is written in Arabic script with a Persian influence.

Gujarati is related to Hindi and has dialect variants based on the speakers’ membership in a religious community: Hindu, Parsi, or Muslim. It is spoken mainly in Gujarat and Maharashtra, near Bombay. Its script is related to Devanagari. Its modern forms were much influenced by the speeches and writings of Mohandas Gandhi.

Tamil and Telugu are Dravidian languages from the south. Tamil has the oldest literature in southern India; both have scripts based on Devanagari but otherwise show little similarity. The cultural nationalism closely linked to language difference so prevalent in India has little effect in South Africa.

According to the 1960 census almost 70,000 of the nearly 500,000 Asians spoke English as a first language. Afrikaans was spoken by fewer than 10,000, and the two most important Indian languages were Tamil (more than 140,000 speakers) and Hindi (more than 120,000).
CHAPTER 6
SOCIAL STRUCTURE

The most significant criterion for the ordering of social relations in South African society is race (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages). Within each racial category, however, are other historically developed social divisions of considerable importance in determining subgroup affiliation, life-style, and status. These social divisions are not always exhaustive or mutually exclusive, and some sources of social differentiation may override others. Thus, although the historic distinction between English and Afrikaner remains significant for most whites, it is less likely to govern the social interaction of the small number of highly educated liberal intellectuals or of some members of the industrial, financial, and commercial worlds. Similarly, educated and politically active Africans are more likely than others to ignore tribal affiliation in forming their friendships and associations.

Subgroup formation and the patterning of relations between and within races vary to some extent regionally and to a greater extent with respect to urban and rural areas. Regional variation may be exemplified in the numerical preponderance and significance of the Coloured population in the Cape Province generally and in the Cape Town metropolitan area specifically in contrast to the preponderance and significance of Africans with language and life-style different from that of the Coloureds in most other regions and metropolitan areas. Urban-rural differences in social structure are marked by the relative complexity of relations and numbers of subgroups and other social divisions in urban areas. In a given rural area, for example, only Afrikaners (or English) and members of a single African ethnic or tribal community may be present. In most cities, on the other hand, elements of each of the four racial categories are usually represented: Afrikaners and English ranging from millionaires to poor whites; Asians of two major religious groups—Hindu and Muslim—and of substantially varying economic status; Coloureds, including well-educated professionals and laborers; and Africans of several tribes and of varying income, education, and outlook.

Despite local variations in patterns of relationship and differentiation within racial categories, whites have been generally dominant politically, economically, and socially (see ch. 3, Historical Setting;
Although this pattern of dominance emerged in roughly its present form in the nineteenth century, there have been strains and ambiguities in the structure, in part because of difference within the dominant community and in part because economic and educational development gave rise to differentiation within the numerically predominant African population. Thus, a minor trend toward relations of a more or less egalitarian sort between educated whites and nonwhites and the formation of interracial voluntary associations developed in the 1930's and 1940's.

With the coming to power of the Nationalist Party in 1948, some tendencies in the social structure were accentuated, some revised, and others inhibited. In general, the fundamental pattern of white dominance already established in law and usage was more fully entrenched in law. At the same time, an effort was made to implement the concept of apartheid which, in principle at least, was intended to minimize all but the most necessary relations among members of different groups. Thus, trends to the formation of mixed voluntary associations, minor though they were, were legally ended. Similarly, growing tendencies to the breaching of tribal lines among Africans, although not stopped, were legally discouraged because the principles of apartheid require not only that the racial categories be separated but that Africans be identified as members of specific national units and that, urban or not, they be ultimately under the jurisdiction of tribal chiefs (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages; ch. 13, The Governmental System).

INTERRACIAL RELATIONSHIPS

The relationships of the racial groups to each other are prescribed by law and custom. When the concept of apartheid became official policy with the coming into power of the Nationalist Party in 1948, much that was not firmly expressed in law became so. The principles of race relations are expressed in two general forms, which some term “grand apartheid” and “petty apartheid” (see ch. 1, General Character of the Society; ch. 12, Social Values; ch. 18, Political Values and Attitudes). Grand apartheid refers to the plan to separate the races by moving them into separate geographic areas, providing separate services and education, and requiring social avoidance between the races. Petty apartheid refers to the separation of amenities in those situations where whites and nonwhites are, or might be, in the same area, and to detailed restrictions on social relations. Some regulations fall between these categories. Many of the petty apartheid regulations are based on older custom, and customary attitudes in applying the regulations often make them more stringent, although in some situations authorities at
higher levels use their judgment to reduce consequences of the rules which would cause severe hardship.

Underlying the implementations of both grand and petty apartheid is the conception that every individual can be categorized as a member of a specific race and, in the case of Coloureds and Africans, of specific subdivisions of a racial category. The Population Registration Act of 1950 and subsequent proclamations and amendments sought to specify and regularize the racial categories and, in the case of the Coloured category, to subdivide it into Cape Coloured, Cape Malay, Griqua, Chinese, Asiatic (Asian), Other Asiatic, and Other Coloured (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages). The Population Registration Amendment Act No. 64 of 1967 made it clear that the state president was authorized to establish ethnic or other subcategories of the Coloured and African (Bantu) populations. By the end of 1967, according to the minister of police and interior, identity cards indicating classification had been issued to more than 2.7 million whites, more than 1 million Coloureds, and more than 300,000 to Asians who, despite their formal inclusion under the Coloured category, were separately considered for most purposes. Data on the classification of Africans was available only for the end of 1966 and showed that nearly 8.9 million Africans had been issued identity cards.

The formal establishment of categories and the process of registration were beset by difficulties. The criteria for classification were sometimes ambiguous, and their application sometimes resulted in splitting families and in substantial changes in the legal status of persons who had lived on the assumption that they were members of one group rather than another.

Until 1967 the basic criteria for classification were appearance and acceptance by the community, but race classification appeal boards and courts sometimes disagreed on appearance, and the relevant community did not always agree. In the Population Registration Amendment Act No. 64 of 1967, the basic criterion for classification became descent, a change made possible by the fact that a substantial proportion of all segments of the population had already been classified. A person was to be registered as white if both his parents had been so classified; as Coloured if both parents were so classified or if one was white and the other Coloured or Bantu; and as Bantu if both parents were Bantu or one was Bantu and the other Coloured. Provision was also made to deal with cases where a person claimed to be white in the absence of proof that both his parents were classified as white; appearance, habits, education, speech, general acceptance in place of residence and employment, and social relations with whites were to be taken into account.

The premise of baasskap (white dominance) remained dominant
in the application of regulations pertaining to both petty and grand apartheid, and in accompanying customary attitudes, speech, and behavior. A number of conventions exist in regard to the relationships between whites and nonwhites in various kinds of daily interaction which are not prescribed by law but which have a binding character. These include stylization of deference and inferiority behavior on the part of the nonwhites and of superior paternalism on the part of the whites; they also include the convention that nonwhites must never be in charge of whites in any sort of work, except in certain rare cases such as hospital nursing, and then behavior should be circumspect.

Nonwhites are expected to maintain constant deference toward whites, and a customary deferential behavior has developed for ordinary purposes. Africans are expected to speak in a simplified dialect or pidgin in communicating with whites (see ch.5, Ethnic Groups and Languages). Those who speak in a cultured or educated manner are regarded as insolent unless they are recognized professionals, teachers, or government personnel at a fairly high level. Coloureds and Indians are also expected to show deference but in a less extreme form, and those who are educated are given less discriminatory treatment. This form of behavior is demanded especially by Afrikaners, particularly by those of the lower class interacting with laboring Africans. In the Transvaal until the late 1960's Africans were not allowed on the sidewalks. Coloureds are expected to show deference in a more standardized European manner, such as standing and removing the hat.

Whites, especially Afrikaners, address Africans and Coloureds as "boy" or "girl" if their names are not known, or by a real or conjectural first name ("John," "Joe," etc.). They avoid using terms of respect normally used to whites. Coloureds and Africans of higher status in speaking to whites must use normal respect terms, but ordinary Africans and Coloureds are expected to address a white man as "Baas" (Boss or Master) and a white woman as "Nooie" (Mistress or Madam). In Afrikaans, the terms "boy" (jong) and "girl" (meid) referring to an African man or woman differ from the terms "boy" and "girl" used to mean subadult whites (seun and meisie). To designate an African or Coloured child, "little" is added "boy" or "girl" (kleinjong or kleinmeid). The term "Hotnot" (Hottentot), which formerly designated a free hired hand as compared to a slave, has become a severe pejorative, especially when applied (as usual today) to a Coloured; the terms "Outa" and "Aia" (Auntie and Nannie or Nursie) applied as forms of address to old Coloured women have acquired a similar overtone, though formerly thought of as respectful. Different terms for Auntie and Uncle ("Oupa" and "Ouma") are used by both Afrikaners and Coloureds in speaking to equals. Occasionally, whites will shake hands with educated Coloureds.
Historically, two patterns of race relationships developed: one, primarily rural, was based on the interaction of Afrikaners, first with Hottentots and imported slaves, later with Coloureds and Bantu speakers; the other, primarily urban but secondarily connected with commercial farming, was based on the interrelations of the English with Africans, Indians, and Coloureds. The rural pattern, to which many Afrikaners hark back despite their urbanization, evolved in the context of a patriarchal family headed by an Afrikaner elder. Nonwhites were either dependents of the family or the enemy. In the urban (or British) case, nonwhites were part of the labor force, or tribesmen to be administered.

Although these patterns have blended in recent times, some differences persist. Many English and some urban Afrikaners tend to see nonwhites as persons performing economic functions, usually of an unskilled or semiskilled kind. Their labor is necessary for the great industrial machine developed in South Africa, but complete petty apartheid is not necessary. The color bar is a social matter. For most Afrikaners, in one degree or another, nonwhites are alien, not to be trusted, and must be either under patriarchal control or separate. Complete separation has been an unrealizable ideal and, in those relations that must take place, Afrikaners tend to act in terms of baasskap.

THE WHITES

Given their respective histories, members of the Afrikaner and English ethnic groups tended, until World War II, to be concentrated in different strata of the society (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages). Both groups are now mainly urban and are represented in some degree at all levels. Each, however, has a different conception of its internal differentiation.

The Afrikaners, who early established a rural way of life, continue to idealize it. Their idealization of rural tradition and their emphasis on their role as Voortrekkers (pioneers) are associated with their sense that they are the elect and with their insistence that all Afrikaners are essentially equal (see ch. 11, Religion; ch. 12, Social Values). There has always been some differentiation among Afrikaners in terms of wealth and status, however, and it has become more marked. Formerly, social differentiation was accompanied by a relatively narrow range of difference in life styles, but urbanization, the significant range of goods and services available in the modern economy, and the impact of differences in education have led to a greater range of wealth, status, and life style.

The English conception of social stratification relies on criteria of wealth, occupation, and education. The traditional aristocracy played little part in the peopling of South Africa and in the establishment of English communities there. Because the British
(and Jews of English and other European origin) pioneered industrial and commercial development in the country, there were, for a long time, greater numbers of them at higher economic levels, a situation undergoing change. The problem of poor whites, of which there are still some, seems to have arisen largely among Afrikaners rather than among the English.

**Predecessors of the Modern System**

In the seventeenth century the South African Dutch constituted two main social classes: the burgheers and the Boers. As the managerial classes of the Dutch East India Company, the burgheers participated in the administration of the station. When the Dutch came to form small communities outside the station and, eventually, outside the jurisdiction of the company, those farmers who were able to participate in the town council and did so regularly came to be called and respected as burgheers. The Boers were the settled farmers and were distinguished from the nomadic cattle herders (Trekboers), who were troublesome from the company’s point of view because they were relatively unproductive and tended to provoke hostilities with the Hottentots (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

Landownership in the seventeenth century placed one roughly on a level with the gentry and was desired as a matter of honor as well as for economic advantage. The Dutch East India Company recognized as owners some of those to whom it assigned land but stressed that those who wanted to be gentry must be good farmers.

Under the revolutionary Batavian government of the late eighteenth and very early nineteenth centuries, the term burgher came to mean roughly the same as the popular revolutionary form of address, citizen. After 1806 the Afrikaners, then under British rule, gradually built up an image of themselves as a nation of farmers.

The most important distinction was that between the agricultural Boers and the largely commercial and industrial English. It became a matter of pride to reject the English urban-industrial status pattern. When, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, those of British origin who came to work the diamond and gold mines brought to South Africa the conceptions of working class and boss (or capitalist), the Afrikaners rejected such notions as alien and improper for a people who were essentially farmers. They resented equation with the laboring class because labor was for Africans and Coloureds, but they were in no position to become capitalists, and they considered the activities necessary to commercial or industrial entrepreneurship equally alien. Nevertheless, there were numbers of Afrikaners who could not find work on the farms and were forced
to go to the city for work. Unskilled, these poor whites could often obtain work only as heavy manual labor, which they considered “Kaffir’s work” (Kaffir, the Muslim term for heathen, applied in South Africa to Africans).

Beginning in the mid-1930's, the increasing urbanization and concerted political power of the Afrikaners led to the passage of legislation and the formation of associations intended to eliminate the category of poor whites (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 21, Industry). Low-level supervisory work and certain other kinds of positions, particularly on the railroads, have become the prerogative of unskilled whites. There are, nevertheless, some who must rely on welfare (see ch. 8, Living Conditions).

The Modern System

Broadly, the Afrikaners—roughly three-fifths of the white population—govern the country and constitute the bulk of those at all levels of government from policymakers to clerical personnel in administrative offices. Except in Natal, most white farmers are also Afrikaners; here again they cover a wide range from the owners of Cape vineyards—often of Huguenot descent—and large-scale commercial grain and livestock farmers to the few remaining Trekboers who lead a rough seminomadic life in northwest Cape Province. A substantial proportion of the skilled labor in industry is also Afrikaner in origin. Despite substantial inroads at the highest levels by Afrikaners, industry, mining, finance, and commerce have been largely dominated by the British or by English-speaking Europeans. Variations in income and occupation among the latter are substantial but do not, perhaps, cover so wide a range as among the Afrikaners.

Except among small and special segments of the white population, Afrikaners and English lead largely separate lives. Thus, people who might, by virtue of their similarity of occupation, educational level, and income, constitute a lower middle or upper middle class are distinctly divided into Afrikaner and English, have little interaction with each other, tend to live in different sections of a city, and are members of different churches and of different social, professional, and specialized associations (see ch. 11, Religion).

Interaction does occur among some intellectuals and in the highest reaches of the industrial and financial world. Because of the heavy emphasis on the establishment and growth of Afrikaner universities as alternatives to the older, and internationally more prestigious, English-dominated ones, several generations of educated Afrikaners have grown up in a different university tradition. Even some learned societies are either Afrikaner or English. Some Afri-
kaners do, however, go to English-speaking universities, and other outside universities are regularly associated with English speakers having similar interests.

The Afrikaners' efforts to give themselves a greater voice and stake in South African industry and commerce led to the establishment in the 1930's and 1940's of many exclusively Afrikaner economic organizations ranging from savings banks and insurance companies to industrial enterprises. In part through their efforts, a number of Afrikaners have reached top levels of economic power and status in internationally important corporations. These interact socially with their English-speaking peers but, in doing so, they become suspect to the ordinary Afrikaner. Indeed, some very conservative Afrikaners are likely to call up the old distrust of international capitalists as a threat to the Afrikaner volk (people) and their way of life.

One other Afrikaner group, the Cape Dutch, moves easily among the English; members of the oldest established white families in South Africa, these people, together with upper class Englishmen, form a less clearly segmented upper class than prevails in other major cities. Even here, however, the distinction is felt.

Except for the very small number of poor whites and the slightly larger group of very rich ones, most white South Africans fall into categories usually designated by the phrase middle class. Among the English, gradations within this very large category are determined by occupation and supported by differences in type of schooling. This is not so much a matter of the level of education attained as where it was obtained. Attendance at the right private schools both supports and symbolizes status.

Although no detailed description and analysis has been published as of early 1970, available information suggests that the bulk of the white-collar civil service as well as a substantial segment of the well-paid skilled workers are Afrikaners. English speakers tended to be concentrated in private commercial and industrial enterprises, either as entrepreneurs controlling businesses of varying size or as professional, technical, and managerial personnel.

This pattern began to change a little in the 1960's. The drift of Afrikaners into the civil service had been encouraged by the sense of participation in an Afrikaner-controlled government and by the requirement, more generally met by Afrikaners than by others, that civil servants be bilingual in Afrikaans and English. Moreover, when Afrikaners first began to come to the cities, most business was under English control. By the 1960's, however, the demand for able whites in commerce and industry, private and public, had grown so large that Afrikaners were drawn into them; salaries in the civil service were generally lower than in industry. There was, however,
no significant drift in the other direction; the civil service remained largely in the hands of Afrikaners.

A change was also taking place in the composition of the class of skilled workers. Until 1961, when a change in immigration policy occurred, the government had discouraged the immigration of whites for fear that Afrikaners might come to be outnumbered. Encouragement of white immigrants led, by the middle and late 1960's, to an average intake of roughly 30,000 a year, many from Great Britain and from former British dependencies in Africa (Kenya, Zambia, and others). Some, however, came from southern Europe. Many immigrants were skilled craftsmen, drawing high enough wages to permit a South African middle-class style of life that included servants.

Afrikaners have become increasingly urbanized since the 1930's, but many remain on the land, and it has been estimated that they control 85 percent of agriculture. From the Afrikaner point of view, a farmer is a symbol of the volk and of the tradition of the struggle of the volk to survive as a nation. Regardless of his wealth, therefore, he is respected as long as he maintains a white life style. A number do control thousands of acres, and many are able to farm profitably under a system of government support that does not encourage the most efficient farming techniques (see ch. 20, Agriculture; ch. 22, Labor).

With some exceptions, however, the wealthiest farmers live not on their farms but in towns. The farms are worked by Africans or Coloureds and managed by other Afrikaners or, sometimes, by Coloureds. Some urban Afrikaners, if they have the opportunity, purchase farms, presumably as a response to their sense that to be a farmer is to be a true Afrikaner (see ch. 12, Social Values). A few wealthy farmers live on their farms in something approximating a plantation style with great houses, many servants, and a country social life. These, however, are confined to the southwestern Cape Province—the vineyards—and to parts of Natal where most English-speaking farmers, some of them very wealthy, are to be found.

Historically, the clergy of the Dutch Reformed churches have played a significant and respected role in Afrikaner communities as educators and as ideologists. Although the emergence of educated laymen in the late nineteenth and in the twentieth century has diminished the importance of these functions of the clergy, it has not eliminated them, given the significance of religion for the Afrikaner view of themselves and of others (see ch. 11, Religion). A Dutch Reformed clergyman is still an important figure and, even in cases where a clergyman has arrived at a position that runs against the Afrikaner grain, as some of them have, he is not ignored. In effect, the importance of religion and the religious for Afrikaner
confidence and cohesion insists that dissenters as well as those clergymen who support the general Afrikaner position be given attention.

THE COLOUREDSD

A number of observers have alluded to the great complexity of the internal ranking system of the Coloured, but none have described it. At the least, there are distinctions among upper, middle, and lower economic groups with a rural versus urban division that is partly an ethnic subgrouping. Their highest economic class is composed of business and professional people and includes some people in the arts in which Coloureds are well represented. The uppermost group of Coloureds is on the economic level of the lower middle segment of the white community. Their middle range consists of low-level white-collar workers and artisans. The bulk of the group, however, consists of poor farm workers, domestic servants, and factory workers both skilled and unskilled. In some situations where they live in direct juxtaposition to whites, they function as a lower class to the white community.

In some Orange River communities in the Western Cape, unless whites are present, Coloureds play the role of upper and middle classes in that bare rural economy, and a few surviving Hottentots constitute a lower class. In Natal and the Transkei they function sometimes as separate group of outside technical specialists; on the reserves and in a few situations, they have been absorbed into the African group. Most, however, take great pride in being of higher status than the Africans. Economically, the Cape Malay subgroup are better off than others, given similar educational background, but they rarely attempt professional training.

Within equal educational and economic levels, actual skin color is a strong prestige factor. Until the passage of the Population Registration Act and subsequent proclamations and amendments, if a family or person were light enough and maintained a life-style like that of a white family, they might have become accepted as whites where they resided and applied officially for reclassification as whites, even when they had known Coloured relatives or past affiliation. This had a tendency to weaken solidarity within the group. This possibility has been diminished in the 1960’s, and it even became possible for a family classed as white to be broken up or reclassified as Coloured (see ch. 7, Family).

Whereas Africans are legally seen as nonpermanent residents of urban areas, most Coloureds are officially recognized as urban people and are permitted to enter a number of trades not available to Africans; better education is available to them, and low-level white-
collar and supervisory jobs that are not open to Africans are reserved for them. During relocations under the Group Areas Acts, the rural Coloured villages and their accompanying territory were declared reserves, and the regular residents were registered as regular “occupiers.” The urban groups, like the Africans, were moved into quarters farther from the middle of town but not assigned to rural reserves as were the Africans, so that they remained permanently in the urban townships.

The whites, particularly the Afrikaners, have had considerable ambivalence toward the Coloureds, because they had essentially the culture of the whites living nearest to them (rural or urban) and because some were clearly among descendants of the early Dutch. A few Afrikaner intellectuals have even suggested the incorporation of the Coloureds in the white population, but this has little support. Official sources discuss the idea of helping the Coloureds to develop their own culture without outside influences, but their culture is not essentially different from that of the whites. Most sources discussing the government policies of the 1950’s and 1960’s, say little about them, dealing mainly with the relationships between Africans and whites. In early 1970 the Coloureds formed a relatively small part of the population, though their rate of increase suggests that this will not long be the case (see ch. 4, Population).

The Urban Coloureds

The urban Coloureds have grown up in the cities and especially Cape Town itself; they have a strong Malay component, but only the Muslims are generally known as Malays. The whole urban Coloured group, including Malays, is credited with the origin of a large proportion of the folk music and other artistic expression of South Africa, especially in Afrikaans; some sources regard this as a response to the frustration of their helpless and partially anomalous position (see ch. 10, Artistic and Intellectual Expression). Another form of response is believed to be the prevalence of the delinquent gangs known as skollies, though a similar group exists in the white community.

In the urban setting the Cape Malays are high in prestige. Their egalitarian religion, Islam, attracted many slaves and freedmen to their unsegregated congregations in the early days of the colony, so that today the group is a mixed group of Coloureds. The religion holds the community together, giving it a greater cohesiveness than other Coloured groups and preventing strong class discrimination within it (see ch. 11, Religion). A high rate of alcoholism is associated with the Coloureds as a whole but, because alcohol is forbidden to Muslims, the Malays have a reputation for greater effi-
ciency and dependability than others. Except for their religion, they are highly Europeanized, speaking Afrikaans in most cases or English in Natal.

The original Malay slaves included political prisoners and revolutionaries, of whom some were aristocrats who arrived with their whole entourage. Some of these had lodgings of their own in Cape Town and held salons at which many of the better educated Malayans and other Muslims gathered. This source of prestige has no significance, but their religious leaders and their leading merchants are also community leaders.

The Rural Coloureds

A group of settlements are to be found in the area of the Orange River in western Cape Province. Most of these have been declared Coloured reserve areas. These settlements and their outlying areas consist of Bastards (see Glossary), an Afrikaans-speaking, Christian Coloured population, and a few people of partial Hottentot culture (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages). Mine laborers, also Coloured, live in the region.

The traditional class system of one well-studied reserve comprised four categories of lineages (clusters of related families). The pioneer Bastards (or Voortrekkers) were old families that constituted the bulk of the class known as onderstraters (those who live in the lower street). Lineages of Namaqua Hottentot and other lineages of mixed origin constituted the bulk of the bostraters (those who live in the upper street). They were initially marked by differences in life style and in the attention paid to maximizing white physical characteristics, with the onderstraters stressing breeding for that purpose. A third group of lineages consists of the kommers (newcomers). These are quite heterogeneous in status, education, physical features, and the like. Some are essentially aligned with onderstraters, other with the bostraters. Finally, there are the bywoners, refugees from uprisings in the early twentieth century who were permitted to enter the community as servants.

A new set of classes has emerged, based in good part on the traditional system but modified by legal requirements pertaining to the occupation of land. In this set, the most numerous—89 percent of the community—and privileged group is made up of the registered occupiers, who include the onderstraters, the bostraters and most members of the kommer lineages. Other kommers, chiefly teachers with what are considered white features, are classed as strangers—4 percent of the community—but they are eligible to become registered occupiers if they conform to the local way of life long enough. In the 1950's there were a few whites with long-term residence, who were included in the stranger class. Another 6 per-
cent of the community consists of bywoners, who work as servants and shepherds. A fourth group—1 percent of the community—consists of whites, chiefly missionaries, police, and government people who either live on the reserve or visit it frequently.

The fundamental distinction is that between the registered occupiers and all the others. The registered occupiers have legal rights to land for house construction, cultivation, and pasturage, and they have the right to sit on the management board and vote for its members. Least privileged are the bywoners.

Cutting across all of these distinctions is still another set of emergent status groups. The new people are those who are oriented to modern Afrikaner life, although they apparently wish to remain separate. Education, wealth, modern occupations, and political participation are the goals they set and the criteria they use for evaluating others. The conservatives are those who prefer the old life style centered in the church.

THE AFRICANS

By government definition, all Africans are members of tribes whose reserves are their official homelands. Apartheid (in the late 1960’s and early 1970, meaning separate development) policy assumes that Africans are essentially rural and that their residence in the cities cannot be truly permanent. It assumes further and seeks to promote an African social structure based upon a version of a traditional system of tribal allegiance, chiefs, and subchiefs with some modifications (see ch. 13, The Governmental System). Nevertheless, census figures in 1960 showed that nearly 32 percent of all Africans were urban dwellers, and it is known that a substantial proportion of African males, roughly 500,000 every year, officially domiciled on the reserves, worked in the cities as migrant laborers (see ch. 4, Population; ch. 22, Labor). This was a response to the demand for labor of the growing industrial economy and of the limited opportunities for an adequate livelihood based on agriculture on the reserves (see ch. 20, Agriculture; ch. 21, Industry).

Despite official doctrine and efforts to implement it, urban Africans developed urban patterns and associations. In the circumstances, many were poor and not firmly attached to a stable family structure (see ch. 7, Family). A number of them, however, did emerge as businessmen, professionals, intellectuals, and politicians—a kind of African middle class.

The African Reserves or Homelands

The system of native reserves was established in the late 1840’s in Natal by the British administrator Sir Theophilus Shepstone, who set aside a number of small, scattered pieces of land for African
occupation only. They were conveniently placed for the supply of farm labor to as many white-owned areas as possible but distributed to prevent any massing of the Africans in strength. The intention of the Nationalist government before April 1970 was to consolidate these into a group of self-administering enclaves containing no white-owned territory; these protected enclaves are popularly referred to as Bantustans. Only the Transkei achieved this status, although some white territories, specifically the major towns, persist. Others have reached different stages of local self-government (see ch. 13, The Governmental System).

Traditional African social organization was based on lineages, or kin groups theoretically related to each other, grouped together in tribes; unrelated groups might attach themselves to the tribe for protection or because they specialized economically and could exchange their product with the hosts for food. Each lineage had its head, but one of these lineages would have precedence over the others, and its head would be head of the tribe. Another lineage might supply most, or all, of the chiefs of subdivisions of the tribe, so that there would be a royal lineage status and a noble lineage status; the other lineages of the main tribe would be commoners, and some of the dependent groups also had that status, whereas others would be considered outcasts or menials. A tribe, thus, assimilated members of other origins, but it also became a composite society of several layers of rank, especially in cases where the original chiefly lineage had established itself through conquest of a core of the rest.

Some elements of the traditional system persist, but they are changed in form and function, in part in response to changed economic and other circumstances, and in part because the source of ultimate authority is the South African government, which seeks to implement its own policy in the reserves.

The government of South Africa, over a period of time, accepted a number of the chiefs as native authorities; and the current government appointed or confirmed a number of lesser chiefs to participate in the government of the homelands as presently constituted. The legislatures of the territorial authorities and of the Transkei are constituted half of elected representatives and half of appointed chiefs. Many of the latter represent chiefdoms that had ceased to function and had been revived by the government for the purpose, and some chiefs appointed represented a cadet branch of the lineage, since the senior branch was unsympathetic to government policy.

A number of chiefs who function as legislators or in other positions of authority still command respect, but none are able to represent their people to the government in any matter counter to government policy without being removed and disciplined, so that only
a few who are careful diplomats are able to represent their constituents in a controversial matter. They can do little other than administer directives from the government and communicate government decisions. Some are willing to accept this and persuade their tribesmen to accede to any government policies or demands.

Because they are either helpless or careless of the problems of their followers, a great many of the chiefs—most, in fact—are accused of "selling out" to the government. Many are content to agree to any policy of a government that backs their positions. Some have used the prerogatives of their position for private advantage, as in the case of chiefs accused of farming out the labor of their young men. It has been a frequent response of the Africans questioned for their opinions concerning the chiefs that the chieftdom is finished; the chief is a sellout or a nonentity. A few of the most outstanding, however, have succeeded in making themselves felt politically and in acquiring a following. Many of these are old, however, and have no successors.

Africans seem to be ambivalent toward their chiefs. Some of the younger people would like to dispense with them entirely in favor of more modern governmental officials, but any African who can make himself felt politically attracts a following, and many of these are chiefs. It still appears to make a difference to Africans generally that certain people, especially leaders, are members of the chiefs' lineages, yet most are so powerless that they are little esteemed. Although a chief usually came from a ruling lineage in the old days, he could also rise to chieftainship through a demonstration of personal prowess, usually but not always military. In modern times demonstrated capacity for achievement may lead to chieftainship, but only if the individual gains the approval of the government. If, however, he succeeds in this, he is likely to lose the respect of his people.

Lineages are more important among traditional families than among Christian, because in Christian communities the church group often takes over obligations that in traditional society belong to the lineage. Lineage members may decide, however, to honor obligations despite the fact that the Christian no longer performs rituals for the ancestors. Although many Christians maintain traditional ties, others withdraw from lineage interactions after conversion because of the necessity to perform blood sacrifices to the ancestors; they also cannot eat meat that they know comes from such a sacrifice.

Europeans are encountered on the reserves in the persons of administration officials and shopkeepers, or other representatives of the urban centers outside the reserves; they have only limited influence on the reserve life. Coloureds are also encountered, though rarely; in the Transkei a number of Coloured artisans have been
encouraged to remain because of their economic function, as they were not yet replaceable with Africans. In Natal Indians often are the reserve shopkeepers; their own caste traditions generally limit interaction between them and the Africans unless they have lived a long time in an all-African community.

Urban Africans

African urbanization may be considered to have started with the discovery of diamonds and gold in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The opening of mining attracted men of different races and classes into one place and threw them into commercial interaction. Crowded living quarters and the gathering of merchants followed, along with services and service workers of various sorts.

Between the advent of the mining industries and the Group Areas Act No. 41 of 1950, an urban population of Africans developed, some of whom have forgotten their original Bantu languages, and some even their original tribes; many have been urban for two or three generations. Evidence available in 1969 estimates that 2 million Africans were then living in residential areas connected with the South African cities. In regard to these, a survey of four Bantu locations showed 51 percent born in the respective urban areas; 24 percent who had lived there over thirty years; and only 11 percent had less than ten years’ residence.

Before the Group Areas Act, it was possible for an African to own land in urban areas, and some had built their own homes. In the urban sectors or locations where they were allowed to live, they were settled by families without regard to tribal affiliation or, sometimes, even language group. This had an effect, in many cases, of weakening tribal boundaries. Although their rights were limited under the earlier colonial system, they had the right to any education they could get, held a variety of white-collar jobs, and were represented in a number of professions. They were able to advance in industry according to their skills and to compete successfully with poor whites and Coloureds (see ch. 8, Living Conditions; ch. 21, Industry; ch. 22, Labor).

Each city or town has certain peculiarities that arise from the circumstances of the industry supporting it and the local derivation of its population, as well as other historical factors. In each city or town, however, the long-term African residents have developed adjustments of their own to the situation.

The Xhosa are the single largest bloc within the African urban labor force. Their early initiation to urban life was significant but, more important, their absolute numbers in the country were larger than those of other African groups, and they were well located in relation to many of the chief urbanized areas, which include de-
tached mining or industrial areas at a distance from any city. Training provided by the London Missionary Society mission farms to the Xhosa men introduced them to new labor techniques, and that given to the Xhosa women made them potential wage earners also, as domestic labor skills were equally in demand in town and country.

Detailed studies have been made only in areas dominated by Xhosa speakers, and specific patterns can only be indicated in regard to them. Sotho, Tswana, and others use their own terminology for urban categories, but there is reason to believe that the patterns found among the Xhosa apply to urban Africans generally. For example, the “school” (educated) versus “red” (uneducated, traditional) categories of the Xhosa apply to others, although the names and distinguishing marks of such traditional groups as the Swazi, Sotho, and Tswana differ; tribal hair styles rather than red ochre stain indicate the traditional tribesman. The general pattern of styles of life may be taken as generally similar (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

The primary division in an urban situation is that between long-established townsmen and newly arrived migrant workers. A second is that between the “school,” or educated, and “red,” or traditional, which crosscuts the other categories, as it is also found back on the reserves. A third type of division, based upon the style of life, may be made among the bulk of the population, consisting of laborers or low-level white-collar workers, the professional and higher white-collar workers, sometimes referred to as the “excuse me” people, and the tsotsi, who were originally understood as mainly young criminals, some of them organized into gangs. The term still applies to young toughs, although some urban Africans use it to refer to the youthful, high-fashion smart set (roughly equivalent in dress to the “mods” of Great Britain in the 1960’s).

Each segment of the three-part division of middle class, ordinary urban African, and tsotsi tends to be divided into an older and a younger age group. The non-tsotsi in some contexts refer to a simpler two-part division into tsotsi and “decent” people.

The distinction between traditional and nontraditional is no longer marked strictly by the presence or absence of literacy. Religion and lifestyle are more significant indices of difference. Many in the traditional category can now read and write, and many nontraditional (that is, Christian) people never studied long enough to become really literate.

A limited number of Africans have the right to full-time residence in urban areas; since 1952 all have been considered to be rural workers belonging to the Homelands and to be in the city for work as migrants (see ch. 22, Labor). Since nearly all young adult Africans have had at least some experience of wage labor, much of
which is available in urban areas, there are many degrees of urbanization and sophistication among those who retain roots on the reserve. Some experience may be gained in rural areas through farm labor, which is on a highly commercial basis. For those who are able to attend schools, change from the traditional pattern has already begun before they leave their reserves. Many of these are, or become, Christian and are a step further from traditional customs but nearer to communication with townsmen and Europeans.

Another category of persons sometimes equated with tsotsi, consists of those who have lost their values and not acquired others. Such persons are found in the towns and on the reserves and are known by a word also used to describe European hoboes, implying the lack of a known code of morals and behavior. They tend to dress in a European style like "school" people and take part in the traditional rituals but break the traditional taboos and the Christian ones as well. They are generally not trusted. The term applied to them in the town is sometimes also used to describe the violent and uneducated criminal.

The tsotsi are young urban Africans who tend to group themselves in gangs and sometimes to be of borderline or outright criminality. Their reputations vary from "clever devil" to pathological criminal. In Langa, an African township of Cape Town, where a general sociological survey was made in the years 1955 through 1957, they were identified as belonging to two age sets: one from fifteen to twenty-five, and one from twenty-five to thirty-five. The tsotsi in Langa were also referred to as "location boys" and by such nicknames as "oo-clever" and "Spoilers" (from the name of an Alexandria gang). Their girlfriends and wives are known by the Bantu feminine form of their names, for example, oo-tsotsikazi.

Tsotsi tend to use a mixture of Bantu and Afrikaans slang characteristic of their white gang counterparts in Johannesburg and Cape Town, to be extreme in their style of dress, and to smoke dagga (marijuana). The younger age group are sometimes still in school, or they may work as required by law, trying to avoid heavy manual labor or long hours. They are not generally considered dependable. The younger ones may be wild in public, but the older ones affect the role of young men about town; their wives are expected to be settled housewives and not to go to work or even brew beer lest they be exposed to arrest. Both young and old make use of any opportunity for stealing and preying on both black and white, but rural Africans, new in town, suffer from them most.

In East London in the 1950's, many urban Africans were very hostile to tsotsi, and several incidents led to the formation of vigilante groups that tried to hunt down the tsotsi. They attacked all boys in the area of the younger age group indiscriminately, though some town-born men called their attention to the difference
between innocent and guilty; the vigilantes tended to be rural and "red" migrants who regarded the whole age group as undisciplined and guilty of misbehavior, needing to be beaten. Africans in one community believed the tsotsi to be illegitimate or other fatherless boys whose mothers and grandmothers had been unable or unwilling to apply any discipline, though some have entered the group from far better families.

Generally, the tsotsi rely on skill but often indulge in violence when it suits them and are reputed to have no sense of honor or pity. Many tsotsi have actually had as much education as the average teacher but rarely show it, preferring their antisocial way of life.

A number of African millionaires were on record during the late 1950's. They derived their money from ownership of numerous small businesses such as multiple trade outlets or mail-order herb-remedy sales. It is uncertain whether it would still be possible to achieve this status under the new regulations, which limit both the number of trading licenses to be given to Africans and the goods that they may sell and also prohibits them from receiving trade permits in white areas. At this level of society, distinctions of age and education do not generally apply; the more skillful merchants are usually older men and not necessarily well educated, though in many cases they may be (see ch. 23, Domestic Trade).

Urban Africans are drawn from all the tribal clusters and virtually all the individual tribes, so far as is known; however, some tribes are disproportionately represented among them. This is partly the result of the proximity of certain homelands to the labor areas. There are also varying degrees of urbanization, since some industrial areas, though urban in basic structure, lack some of the peculiarities of a large city with its specific architectural structures, condensed layout and wide range of population types.

The history of a tribe has an effect on the degree of urban participation of its members. The tribes known as Mfengu, or Fingoes, for instance, which were driven from their original homelands in the first half of the nineteenth century and took refuge on the already crowded Xhosa reservations, were quicker than others to accept the training offered by the London Missionary Society, including both work training and religion, which gave them an advantage in obtaining urban work. The Mfengu are the most urbanized and least dependent on the countryside. Association and competition with them led the Xhosa to follow suit, which made the Xhosa-speaking tribes the best represented in wage labor. In the "red" versus "school" division, the "school" groups of longer standing are generally Mfengu (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

Under the Group Areas Act, government policy has been to separate tribal groups from each other and assign them different township residential areas. In urban locations, however, interaction con-
continues to some degree. Schools for young children tend to be separate also, because they specialize in only one of the Bantu languages. They appear to be not too widely separated geographically, however, for play groups still contain children of more than one tribe.

At work there is a constant interaction of members of various tribes. Although job preferences vary according to tribe, the available labor is assigned to the necessary work, and preferences are not necessarily accommodated. In Johannesburg there has been occasional intertribal rioting; in Cape Town, however, communities tended to ignore tribal boundaries, so that tribe affiliation was merely an additional item for personal identification, like the difference between Irish and Scottish in an English-speaking community.

Africans living in town at a distance from their families tend to develop little mutual aid societies within the small group of their friends to handle certain common problems, and some of these societies become formalized, especially if they grow to contain a large number of members. The largest are usually the burial societies, especially those of the women. The men’s societies gather to give money to the bereaved for the funeral and other necessary expenses. The women’s societies also provide money and, in addition, their members may participate in nursing the sick and helping the bereaved with domestic work. This work would be done by the lineage members or fellow church members if they were at hand or had the means. Generally, in urban societies “red” and “school” people do not participate together. Members of any group are usually of the same age, sex, and income level. A few consist of kinsmen.

Loan societies are formally organized but may include no more than four people who pool their money. They tend to be well-off and of borderline ethical standards, as they charge high illegal interest. Customarily, anyone joining must be introduced by a friend, who stands surety for him. The original pool may be no more than R20 (1 rand equals US$1.40). Other organized groups include gambling clubs based on a favorite game.

Young bachelors living together may organize their housekeeping and ownership of utensils cooperatively; some may also take turns handling the money for the whole group, to encourage each other in thrift and to save the expenses.

Market women, usually a group of three, will help each other in times of trouble; if one is sick, the others will take over her haggling and will see that she gets home safely, if necessary in a taxi, to her village. Other groups are merely social clubs of several women who meet once a month and take turns as hostess. Other types of groups include women’s prayer circles or other religious services, men’s...
sports clubs, competitive fund-collection groups (for whatever purpose), political gatherings, and the ordinary home-boy groups.

In addition to these, people also participate in the large welfare organizations, such as the YWCA and Zenzeli. In addition to other specific purposes, most of these organizations have considerable importance for the distribution of urban information to these members. Many newcomers to a city are unfamiliar with the workings of an urban economy or even the use of money. Many men encourage their wives to participate in groups that will help them in work, as they may receive needed experience. In any case, the companionship and mutual advice help to establish security for the members in the urban setting. It is said that young women never establish groups of this sort, as they want their money to spend at once; nurses and domestic maids often have savings clubs, however.

**Relations Within and Across Tribal Lines**

Relations between members of tribes or larger groupings tend to vary according to the area. In some areas those who have lived there a fairly long time tend to interact without regard to tribal origin, and this is especially the case with “school” people. The sharpest division is the linguistic one between Sotho and Nguni speakers, but this may be bridged by the use of English or Afrikaans in many cases. The most cohesive grouping, on the other hand, is that of the “home-boys,” based on the home community, which may have contained members of more than one tribe. Members of Xhosa and Mfengu groups, for instance, may be from the same area and function as “home-boys” together in town. If members of a community are too few to constitute a viable group, members of the tribe often band together as “home-boys.”

These “home-boy” groupings are very important to the newcomer, as they help to induct him into new conditions of life, providing a familiar source from which he can acquire needed information. The group functions as a mutual aid group in many ways, with members helping each other obtain lodgings, permits, and job information. The “home-boys” group is more important among the “red” than among the “school” people, because the latter often have other associations by which they may be oriented in town, and they also have a better command of English, which enables them to relate to the white culture; however, their relationships with their homes and kinsmen may already be disrupted to some extent.

There is some tendency for the tribes to stereotype each other: Sotho speakers sometimes refer to the Nguni speakers as “clickers,” because of the distinctive consonants in their languages; they also tend to equate the Xhosa Iva with the tsotsi, calling them “oo-
clever" and "hard." The Pondo are described as "wild." There is some resentment of the Mfengu for their currying of favor with the whites. These stereotypes are not necessarily divisive, however, and many young people resent the government's attempt to encourage the celebration of "tribal days," which emphasize old hostilities and have a divisive effect; they frequently refuse to participate as a matter of principle.

In the urban setting people who had status in the tribal system must fend for themselves as do others. In some cases, where they have been provided with education, they may be able to take positions of leadership in a community if they have other qualifications; if they have sufficient wealth they may be able to help fellow tribesmen, or if they have legal or other skills they may be able to help a tribesman in trouble.

Persons with traditional status, however, may as easily be uneducated and low in urban status or in funds. In this case they may be accorded status only in ritual situations; otherwise they are of little importance save as a contact-person from home. If the man himself develops the strength of character to win respect, he will probably receive it. Otherwise the town African will look to the man who is likely to provide practical leadership.

Only a few chiefs in a few tribes have become outstanding as leaders, and some of these have been at a relatively low level in the chiefly hierarchy. In some cases they have been put under restraints and restrictions by the government to prevent their taking any political measures to change the existing situation (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages; ch. 15, Political Dynamics; ch. 18, Political Values and Attitudes).

The leaders in the town are those who distinguish themselves in their respective social groups: political spokesmen who are particularly trusted or gang leaders who are particularly successful. These groups reject each other's values for the most part, and only very remarkable leaders of political importance would be respected by all.

Since most of the African leaders who act as go-betweens in communication between the African areas or tribes and the government, or the urban groupings (whether the new townships or the old locations), are appointed by the government or elected from a slate of permissible candidates, only a few of them are able to function in such a way as to win respect from the Africans; they must be exceedingly skillful in negotiating with the government, since any serious opposition to government policy may lead to removal. Many outstanding leaders in recent years, such as Chief Luthuli, have been banned or exiled to back-country villages set aside for the purpose (see ch. 15, Political Dynamics).
THE ASIANS

Although the Indians of South Africa belong to five language groups and have three religions—Islam, Hinduism, and Christianity—they have a general sense of belonging to a single group because of the common conditions in which they live. The religious boundary between the Hindus and Muslims is the widest gap in the community. Because of the egalitarian character of Islam and the emphasis on religious brotherhood, the Muslim community has greater cohesion than the others in spite of internal economic stratification. The few Christians tend to interact with Hindus, since most of them are converts from that faith, although 5 percent of the indentured Indians who came to South Africa in the nineteenth-century were Christians, chiefly Catholics.

The Muslims form a slightly more homogeneous religious group than the Hindus, who have a number of sects among them, both traditional and modernizing (see ch. 11, Religion). Three linguistic groups are present among the Muslims: Memon, Gujarati, and Urdu; Memon is a Gujarati variant spoken by an upper-level occupational group of merchants. These linguistic communities tend to be ranked socially with Memon highest and Gujarati second. Many of the Urdu speakers are known to have been recent converts to Islam from the low-caste Hindu community, and there is some feeling about this in the Gujarati-Memon-speaking community. Discrimination among these groups limits social contact and intermarriage, especially the latter.

The Hindu language groups are not actually ranked, but a cultural difference divides the Hindus, originating in North India, who speak Hindi and Gujarati from those, originating in the south, who speak Tamil and Telugu. There are strong barriers to intermarriage between them and a tendency to avoid social intercourse. There also remains some feeling in regard to caste (varna), though occupational castes (jatis) have virtually disappeared. Caste communities no longer function, the last remaining few having dropped out of use when the government refused to recognize their right to control caste members. The government's policy has tended to be against caste on the ground that it is inhuman and degrading.

Another division in the Indian community was derived entirely from its own particular South African experience: that between the indentured, who came as plantation labor, and the passenger, who paid his own way, arriving as a merchant or a clerk. These categories have some correlation with the others; most of the passengers were Gujarati speakers, with some Hindi or Urdu speakers. Far more were Muslim than Hindu. Roughly 10 percent of all Indian immigrants in the nineteenth century were passengers.
The distinction between passenger and other Indians was recognized in South African law until it was legally abolished in 1963. By that time it had more importance for the older generation than the younger, since most young Indians in South Africa reject both this division and the occupational caste system as well. Linguistic distinctions are also disappearing in the face of the spreading use of English, and only the religious divisions remain strong. A tendency to marriage within one's own caste group continues, however.

To a great extent, the Indians, especially the Hindus, have taken on a relatively modern class structure in place of their caste system. The first arrivals of the community were brought in as indentured contract labor for the cane fields, and the least successful since then have risen only to the level of domestic servants in private or public establishments. Others have entered trade, and a few have become millionaires. Still others have pursued education and become doctors, lawyers, or other professionals. They have been important in political life in opposition to racial discrimination, especially before and after World War I (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

The weakening of the occupational caste system in the Hindu communities is partly the result of the fact that the old occupations practiced in India did not necessarily apply in South Africa. Moreover the relatively small proportion of women who came with the indentured Indians meant that breaches of the marriage barrier between occupational castes were frequent. Nevertheless, the distribution of the Indian labor force tended to place those who were lower caste in manual labor groups, and the bulk of these were the Tamil and Telugu, who were also darker skinned than the rest. Those who entered as commercial or priestly and educational workers tended to remain in those classes as well as castes. This is the process that has tended to maintain and reinforce the varna system. None of the Indian landowning castes is represented as such, though high-level merchants have their own estates. The most important source of status is education, as it would be in the caste hierarchy, and much veneration is paid to the man who has earned a doctorate. Learned work is the highest of the professions, and dirty manual work the lowest. Between these two extremes are the merchant classes of varying degrees of wealth and the clerical workers. The Muslim community tends to cluster on this middle level with fewer in the top and bottom categories.

The Indians occupy a precarious position in South African society, being neither African nor European and having their own culture and system of stratification. Their economic status and education have long been more similar to those of the whites than to those of the Coloureds with whom they are partially equated. Many, however, remain poor. Their social levels include both manual labor and high-level professional and commercial personnel.
They tend to keep themselves aloof from the Africans and most of the Coloured also, though they have intermarried with both under certain circumstances; usually, they have easily assimilated the children to their own group because of strong family ties.

Africans tend to resent Indians, partly because the Indians have preference in skilled labor and because Africans feel that Indian shopkeepers have exploited them. If an Indian merchant hires an African he will assign him only to heavy manual labor rather than a clerical job in the shop, and if an African is the customer he will receive much more casual service than would another Indian. An Indian addressing an Indian woman customer will address her as “Grandmother,” a title of respect, of “Aunt” if she is younger; an African they will be addressed by the more informal title “Mother.”

Although Indians are not intentionally offensive to Africans, they tend to imitate the behavior of the whites toward them. On the other hand, they do not discriminate against African use of Indian-owned motion picture theaters and shops. Africans working as servants in Indian homes are treated virtually as members of the family. There is some condescension toward them, however. Indian attitudes toward Africans are said to be based on cultural and occupational criteria rather than on race as such.

The success of Indians in business has rendered them vulnerable to hostility on the part of both whites and blacks; they are often accused of sharp practices, as are most merchants, though apparently with less reason than many. Regulations limiting their economic expansion, known as the Pegging Acts because they restricted Indian economic activity to the status quo, were passed between 1939 and 1946; these also limited land purchases, so that they could no longer be made from white owners in Durban. It was believed at the time that they were penetrating the white areas, though in fact relatively few cases of that were found. They have consistently been forbidden entry into the Orange Free State, and residence in the Eastern Cape is limited to East London and Queenstown.

The Coloureds are usually able to get along well with the Indians and not infrequently intermarry with them; this is especially the case with Muslim Indians and Cape Malays. There has been some feeling that they did not participate sufficiently in protests with other nonwhites. On the other hand, considerable hostility built up against them in Natal during the late 1940's among the Zulu, who staged a series of riots against them in Durban and other towns; there was a high death toll, with some deaths resulting from police gunfire. The conflict appears to have been caused largely by an accumulation of economic frustrations.

Under the Group Areas Act, the Indians have been moved from urban centers along with other nonwhites; they have been moved...
from the section of Johannesburg that they had occupied since the Boer War to the township of Lenasia. Although 90 percent of them have been born in South Africa, they are often considered to retain ties to India and to have an outside homeland to which they could return if necessary. This is probably due in part to their retention of distinctive dress, language, food habits, and religion and in part to the fact that immigration was only recently stopped. An interest was taken in them by the Indian government until 1954 when the ambassador was withdrawn in relation to the Pegging Acts, and trade relations were severed. In 1961 the South African government acknowledged that the Indians were in South Africa to stay, and their status was formally changed from resident alien to citizen, although their prerogatives as citizens remained limited.
CHAPTER 7
FAMILY

All ethnic groups have a form of family organization in which the father is legally dominant and inheritance is primarily through males. Women have substantial rights in the white groups and some rights in all others. In most rural areas the family is important in community organization, and in some cases a community may consist entirely of a group of relatives and their dependents. Among Africans and the rural Coloureds, and in some cases among the Asians and the largely urban Cape Malay, the aggregate of kin constitutes a formally recognized lineage—persons who trace descent from a common ancestor. In the case of the Afrikaners and Coloureds, informal lineages of some importance have developed from long residence in one area; among Africans and Asians, however, lineages are the basic element of social organization and vary in depth and strength with residence but are independent of it.

In an urban environment the domestic group is usually limited for practical purposes to the basic nuclear family (parents and unmarried children), although Asians (Indians) and Cape Malays often are able to maintain wider ties. The stresses of urban life are severe even among the whites, whose rising divorce rate has left many families fragmented. The Africans who enter the city primarily as migrant laborers or remain there often under conditions of severely inadequate housing, undergo great stress because of the separation of families during the working period and form many extralegal unions to supplement, or substitute for, formal marriage. Among the Christian Coloureds, many still bear the mark of the slave period during which they were either discouraged from marrying or forbidden to do so. Stable families have developed only in the higher social and economic classes. Among the Asians and, especially, the Cape Malays, religion and community structure appear to have given better support to family solidarity.

The government expressly forbids any illicit connection between members of different races and any marriage between whites and nonwhites. Aside from this, it recognizes, with some modification, the customary marriage and family patterns of the various ethnic groups. It validates and regulates marriage and divorce but not stringently. It protects the rights of family members, especially children.
and dependents, and regulates matters of inheritance and disposal of family property.

The law of the land is modified Roman-Dutch law, but the customary law prevalent among the nonwhites is regarded as binding within its own community. It is not recognized as fully legal, since it allows for polygamy in the case of the Africans and Muslims, and subsequent marriage under the Roman-Dutch law supersedes any previously customary marriage and nullifies it (see ch. 14, The Legal System).

Marriages of whites and Christian nonwhites, whether religious or civil, are subject to Roman-Dutch law. By means of antenuptial contracts, property management may be varied from the Roman-Dutch system of common property between man and wife. When a marriage has been contracted either under the standard Roman-Dutch system, an antenuptial contract, or a traditional system of law, all future transactions relating to the marriage should be according to the system originally chosen and are judged accordingly in a court of law. In order to be valid, dissolution of a marriage is carried out according to the secular Roman-Dutch system or to the traditional system of the nonwhites. Although not all religious groups recognize dissolution, some have their own religious courts to deal with it. Dissolutions are not valid without action in the secular courts.

In all cases authority in the nuclear family is vested in the husband or the father; in cases where a man holds authority over married sons, it is supported by custom rather than by law. In many urban situations a husband or adult male is either absent or transient, and the family is informally but strongly centered in the mother or grandmother. In a strongly patriarchal Afrikaner or rural Coloured family, the sons have authority and responsibility in the father’s absence in proportion to their seniority. Women are dependent and under their husband’s authority in the traditional families of all the ethnic groups; under Roman-Dutch law, however, they may contract before marriage to control their own property. Under modern conditions they are now also potential breadwinners, although Hindu and Muslim women are not encouraged to work and tend to help in family businesses when they do so.

Similarity in family organization from one ethnic group to another generally derives from similarities in the conditions of livelihood. Isolated farms or migratory herding requires the cooperation of relatively large groups, but the housing conditions of a city discourage it. Labor migration produces lone men and women in towns, who make ad hoc marital arrangements.

Variation is found in all groups according to financial and social status, and choices between optional marriage or family arrangements are made to suit the situation; antenuptial contracts, for
instance, are more useful to women who control a large patrimony and are, therefore, found only in the upper economic levels of the population. In rural areas, where the family constitutes the community or a relatively large part of it, the authority of the father is of great importance; it is often weakened in urban situations.

A rural-urban division exists in nearly all ethnic groups, except among the Indians; whose families function the same way in either a rural or an urban setting, and the Cape Malays, who are urban dwellers only. Rural families generally constitute larger groups that amount to extended families (a combination of related nuclear families of two or more generations). The traditional Afrikaner type, which is said still to exist in the smaller villages and open countryside, may include two or more generations of adults plus servants in close interaction. In the days before the Boer War of 1899–1902, all servants were under the authority of the head of the household, as were family members, and were treated much like second-class family. Later, only underage “apprentices” were under family authority.

No direct information is available as to the survival or change of this form of household, given the legal limit on the number of nonwhite service personnel who may live in the same household with their employers. Families in an approximation of the older form appear to exist in the Coloured settlements along the Orange River in western Cape Province. Information is similarly lacking on the present situation of the rural Africans whose former living pattern is relatively traditional. In this system also the dependents and service personnel lived in the same household with the family to which they were attached. Some traditional client groups, however, constituted a secondary tribe or lineage living with the dominant one and were assigned land of their own in modern times.

The trend in all ethnic groups to seek urban employment has cut down the number of people resident in their parental households in most rural areas. The Africans, who are prevented by government policy from taking permanent roots in the city, base themselves in most cases on the reserves, where lineage members and part of the extended family may still be resident. The nonemployed members of the immediate family may remain there in the care of an older relative, preferably male, who is either retired or working the reserve farm and pasture lands.

INTERMARRIAGE BETWEEN ETHNIC GROUPS

The Prohibition of Mixed Marriage Act of 1949 forbade intermarriage between whites and nonwhites and declared the mixed marriage of a domiciled South African null and void if celebrated outside South Africa. The Immorality Act of 1927 had forbidden extramarital sexual relations between Africans and whites, and the
Act of 1950 applied that prohibition to Coloureds and Asians, as well. Illicit connections of whites with nonwhites are a criminal offense. The only exception would be a case in which a South African woman might marry a nonwhite man outside the country; the marriage would then be accepted in theory. In a recent case, however, a couple, in which the husband was South African Coloured and the wife British, were told that if they had not been nonresidents—as they had recently—been living in England—they would have been prosecuted; they were ordered deported. In some cases where a marriage had been well established for a number of years before being brought to notice, the problem has been solved by declaring the white partner to be a member of the other's ethnic group, as in the case of a white woman married to a Chinese. This is at the discretion of the magistrate; many will separate a couple married three years and who have young children. In some cases there is a question as to which group one of the partners actually belongs; a process of investigation of genealogy, witnesses, and the physical features of the accused must then take place (see ch. 6, Social Structure).

Marriages between Coloureds and Africans are not forbidden and were reported to be increasing in the 1950's as a result of Africans following an urban way of life. Generally speaking, however, members of the Coloured group prefer to select partners with visible white characteristics. Intermarriage is more likely to take place between members of two groups, both of which fall within the Coloured category, such as urban Coloured with Asian or Cape Malay. Asian straight hair and features have prestige value in racial status assessment, and Indians also bear the character of good providers.

Marriage among the Coloureds is potentially a means of maintaining or raising prestige and should preferably be legitimate and with a partner from the best possible social milieu available; if a man or woman marries someone of low status, usually one showing strong Hottentot features, he or she is considered to have let down his or her lineage. At the same time, illegitimacy, even when one parent is a full-blooded white, is a source of stigma.

In the Orange River area, however, some few remaining white Trekboers—Afrikaans-speaking nomadic pastoralists—carry on a more or less nomadic cattle economy near the Coloured Reserves and have a good deal of close interaction with the Coloureds. In some cases the regulations against miscegenation appear to have broken down, and customary marriages have been carried out not only with nonwhites but sometimes with more than one wife, as in the Springbok area. Many of these Trekboers lived in the reserves until the Group Areas Act of 1950. Some of the registered occupiers in the same area and many of the bywoners (tenants) are Hottentot; although they are generally avoided as marriage partners.
by the other ethnic groups, some occasionally intermarry with the Coloureds.

THE WHITES

The rural family in the early days of the Cape Colony consisted of the entire population of a homestead, all of whom were to some degree under the authority of the head of the household. The domestic group included the immediate family and any dependent relatives residing with them; married sons and their wives and children usually remained in the household and continued to help work the land. Hottentot hired labor was not under the parental authority, but those who had become Christians joined in prayers with the family, as did Christian slaves and freedmen. Non-Christians were sometimes called the householder's shepsels (creatures) rather than his volk (people). Indentured servants (apprentices) were officially under instruction, as they were underage, and were usually expected to behave as second-class children in the household. Bywones, who were often poor relatives, also participated in the landowner's family prayers. A residual form of this pattern appears to continue in the smaller dorps (hamlets) and rural areas; slaves no longer exist, but there are house servants.

Lineages of a sort occasionally occur in some white families that have lived in the same rural district for many decades. It is not a formal grouping as among Africans but merely consists of family members residing in the same district. Its functions vary with the customs of the particular family.

An increase in manager-operated farming in competition with family farms, fluctuation in prosperity of the farms, and an increase in urban employment opportunities have caused many men and women of the younger generation, from both the original farm families and those of the former white tenants, to migrate to the cities. Some have been replaced by nonwhite farmers or tenants, or hired labor.

A modern form of rural family consists of a nuclear family living close to other relatives with whom cooperative interaction takes place. Although nearly all white families are assisted by service personnel of various categories, they cannot generally be considered second-class family because interaction is less intense and the head of the household has less legal authority over them and a less paternalistic attitude toward them.

The urban white family usually is nuclear. Many urban families have come to the towns recently, and many others are connected with large industries through the man's position so that they may be required to relocate frequently. Urban conditions of this sort are found in the small industrial towns as well as the cities. Some
variations may be found at different status levels; families in the higher economic strata are likely to have wider communication with their kin in other parts of the country; women of wealthier families were more likely to marry men not of their own neighborhood or town. When a family moves, the young unmarried women of the house tend to move with their parents, but young men may be transferred separately and may establish a family elsewhere.

The divorce rate in urban areas is high, especially in years of expanding prosperity. This might be tentatively correlated with the increasing independence of women who can now seek employment and fend for themselves; the more liberal attitude of certain urban churches toward divorce probably has also had an effect. In cases of divorce the mother-centered family having minimal paternal influence is a frequent result. In 1968 and 1969 the divorce rate reached 40 percent during the first year of marriage.

THE COLOURED

The Coloureds fall into two clearly defined groups, rural and urban, in their way of life and family tradition. The Cape Malays differ from other urban Coloureds in that religion partly controls marriage and family patterns. No data are currently available on other small subgroups.

Characteristically, the Coloureds, with the exception of the Cape Malays, follow the customs of the whites with whom they are most closely associated. Those who reside in Natal tend to follow an English pattern; most of the others speak Afrikaans and follow the general white urban cultural pattern or, in the rural areas, the early Voortrekker pattern.

Among the rural Coloureds, the nuclear family is the basic unit, but houses of married children are often grouped with those of the father. These may constitute the whole community and are customarily arranged with the oldest son's hut on the left of the father's, while the huts of the other sons or newly married daughters are lined up on the right in order of seniority. Each household has its own livestock, and each cooks and eats together as a single family, but the related households often cooperate in harvesting or in managing crops. The more closely cooperative families are usually grouped in single Hottentot-style huts, even when neighbors of the same social status are using the Dutch type. Larger communities may consist of extended groups or of separate nuclear families, or they may be a combination of both.

A strong division of labor exists between men and women, the men working outside the house and women inside. If the house is a Hottentot mat hut, the women construct it; if it is the European type, the men build it because the work is heavier. The better
houses are comfortable Dutch cottages, also built by the men. Related men formerly cooperated in herding and cultivating, often organizing themselves into plowing or harvesting teams and going from one landholding to another. Since the late 1940's, however, it has been difficult to form an entire team from one family. Because agriculture has not been productive enough to support a cluster of related families, the sons of the house go to the diamond mines or the cities as migrant labor, and hired labor may be used when necessary. Some young women also migrate as wage workers.

Women are accustomed to cooperating on such work as housebuilding, for which they also weave the mats; less heavy work usually requires the assistance only of a woman's unmarried daughters. It includes cooking, fetching water and firewood, making clothes, weaving mats for hut repair, and other housekeeping chores. Women milk the cows or goats, although the men herd them; it is traditional that when a housewife has obtained milk for her household, she should give the surplus to a household having none. The men slaughter animals for food, and the women prepare the carcasses. Chickens belong to the wife, who takes charge of the eggs.

On one small Coloured reserve in Namaqualand, the custom is that a young man who wishes to visit or go out with a girl must first ask her parents' permission and state his intentions. If they disapprove of him they may allow him to see her but may warn him that they will not consent to marriage. The girl's parents usually consider the suitor's character and maturity. Formerly the young man would also have obtained his parents' approval, but this custom has been largely rejected. In the past, premarital pregnancy was punished with a church penance and a flogging for both young people by their parents or the village council. By the late 1940's and early 1950's more than 90 percent of all first babies born in the small reserve studied were conceived out of wedlock.

If the young people decide to marry, the boy chooses a go-between from among his father's relatives, usually an older uncle or aunt. The go-between, with the boy, his parents, and some other relatives, pays a formal call on the girl's family bringing in food and tea to show that the young man can provide for his bride. The go-between formally asks for the girl. Before giving consent, her parents ask the young man's relatives to promise to help the bride if she is in need, or they may refuse immediate consent and wait until the young suitor proves himself for a while.

The marriage takes place in the church, following the publication of the banns. After the wedding the young couple live with the bride's parents for a while, usually until the first baby is born, then move to the bridegroom's homestead.

On this reserve, a person is not considered fit for marriage until he
is a confirmed member of the church, and he is not considered an adult until he is married. All but a few men marry before thirty-five years of age, and the majority by twenty-five. Most women marry in their early twenties. Choice of a partner is based upon good character and prestige. Church authority excludes as possible spouses cousins or their husbands and wives, although some marry relatives-in-law; a few conservatives, however, disapprove of marriage within the same main lineage. Marriage should be into or above one's social group.

Inheritance of the parents' land passes through the youngest son, because the older sons have already been helped by the father in setting up their own households. Deference is paid to the older sons and daughters in order of age; and in the absence of the mother or father, the senior sister or brother exercises authority and responsibility. Terms of respect should be used between all brothers and sisters. The terms used for brother or sister vary according to birth-rank and have senior, middle, and junior forms, implying respect and deference for the elder ones. First names are used between relatives only if their ages are the same or close together. Terms meaning "older father," "younger father," "older mother," and "younger mother" are used for aunts and uncles. The closest kinship bond is that between brothers, and it tends to persist after they have become adults.

Large groups of people sharing the same family name constitute a lineage; lineages are ranked in four categories and vary in prestige (see ch. 6, Social Structure). These lineages are effective as forces in the community, and each has a leader chosen from among its senior members; they control land owned by their members, although this is nominally the function of the reserve management board. Different branches of a lineage are identified by the prefacing of the name of an ancestress to the family surname; the branch name is usually Hottentot.

Many lineages have been occupational groups by tradition, such as masons and builders, carpenters, and pipemakers. Great store is placed in lineage heirlooms and lore, and all male kindred strive to be present at a senior lineage leader's funeral, to do him honor, listen to his biographical obituary, and ascertain that he died peacefully or whether he had a long illness. Lineages may acquire good or bad reputations, and the individual member is obligated to do his best to help it maintain a reputation that will enhance its status.

Urban Coloureds, most of them Christians, follow the white community in family form and marriage rule. They use the same kinship terms as the whites, either English- or Afrikaans-speaking. Descent is counted primarily through the father, as among the whites, and secondarily through the mother. There is, however, a high rate of broken homes correlated with a large number of mother-centered
families, in which the mother acts as breadwinner while the children remain under the care of her own mother (who is often head of the family), an older child, or a neighbor. When the father is present, he is often less dominant than the father in a white family because he is often severely limited in available employment opportunities while his wife is more highly employable; her work may be not only necessary to the household but also the primary source of income. This tends to weaken his role and morale.

Very strong status distinctions are characteristic of urban Christian Coloureds, and proper behavior is regarded as crucial to the definition of one's position. On the higher levels, therefore, illegitimacy is considered an extreme disaster. Coloureds at the lowest levels consider illegitimacy normal but foolish. At intermediate levels it is a disgrace but can be lived down.

Heavy drinking and fighting within the family group are reported to have a high incidence among laboring groups, but among upper and middle classes this behavior is strongly disapproved, and disputes are kept as private as possible. Tensions and hostilities on these upper levels tend to appear in political and other factional disputations rather than within the household. Unstable families and matri-centered households are characteristic of all but the highest status levels. Fatherless families of this sort are usually considered a heritage from slavery, when slaves were often discouraged from marrying; the trend among the Coloured group since then has been, where possible, to work toward the approximation of white standards of value and behavior.

The Cape Malays follow the Islamic law in marriage, which involves a secular contract drawn up by the religious authorities who, in a Muslim state, would have a recognized civil function as well. Muslim law allows up to four wives, and some Malays have more than one, but in the 1950's none were reported to have more than two. Muslim women are not allowed to marry outside their faith, but ethnic discrimination is counter to the Islamic tradition; Cape Malay men and women sometimes marry Indians or other Muslims outside the community, although they do so infrequently. Muslim men, on the other hand, sometimes marry Christian women of the Coloured community, as the Malays have prestige for their financial dependability and stable homes.

THE AFRICANS

The classical form of an African household was established on a homestead with cattle and other livestock belonging to a tribesman who had the right to use tribal land assigned to him by the chief for the raising of crops by his wife or wives. Such a household was more or less self-supporting. Each kraal (homestead) consisted
of a group of small huts, one of them for the group's social and religious activities and a separate one for each wife and her children. Dependents—sometimes poor relations—and clients had their own living arrangements, the nature of which has never been adequately described, especially as clients were often of alien tribal origin. The ground plan of a homestead was standardized, the eldest son and his mother being on the left side of his father and the second son on the right; others were alternately right and left in order of seniority, the whole group of huts being centered either on the cattle kraal or on a ceremonial enclosure. Among the Nguni speakers (Zulu, Swazi, and Xhosa), these homesteads stood alone or in small groups, whereas among the Sotho and Tswana they were grouped in villages (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

In the extended family, especially the polygynous form, precedence and economic tasks were specified by tradition, with its accompanying status behavior and form of courtesy. Where the personal and economic base survive, the forms are maintained. In former times, members of an extended family living in the same kraal were subject to a good deal of stress, because of the necessity not to give offense (see ch. 12, Social Values). Generally, women work with vegetables and men with cattle, although the women participated in dairying in some tribes.

The growing need to engage in migrant labor in the towns and the difficulty of supporting an extended polygynous family on the limited land available in the reserves have led to a diminution in the size of the household for all but a few. This has also led to a situation in which old men, women, and children constitute the family and men of working age are present only part of the time. In the rural areas outside the reserves, the families are more likely to be smaller and monogamous. Urban life, where the family is possible at all, has been marked by nuclear families, although one or two kinsfolk of the spouses may be attached to the household.

The Legal Basis

The Native Administrative Act of 1927 provided for the use of customary law in the separate courts established for African affairs. These courts have discretion as to whether to apply the general (Roman-Dutch) law or African traditional law in a given situation (see ch. 14, The Legal System). African law may not be applied if it is "repugnant to principles of natural justice or public policy." This clause has been used to abolish a wife's right to divorce her husband for impotence.

By proclamations between 1879 and 1885, provision had been made for Africans to marry under Roman-Dutch law if they so desired; traditional marriage law was formally ignored, although it
might be tolerated. A law in 1849 had earlier given precedence to African law for Africans but also allowed for Christian marriage of accredited Christian Africans by a specially licensed preacher. Christian marriage carried the obligation of monogamy, as did marriage under Roman-Dutch law; in the case of Africans, however, it did not abrogate property, and succession arrangements derived from the traditional law.

These and other experiments in law during the colonial period laid a foundation for the preparation of the Natal Code of Native Law, which was applied to all Africans in Natal. In regard to marriage, it defined the essential requirements as being the assent of the bride’s father or guardian if necessary and the bride’s declaration of willingness before witnesses; it limited the size of the lobolo (bridewealth) to a certain number of cattle or amount of money; it specified grounds and procedures for divorce from a customary marriage; it detailed the personal status of those subject to it; and it described the processes of inheritance.

Marriage

In the old tradition marriage could not take place until the young man, and usually also the girl, had been ritually initiated into full adult membership in the tribe. In some groups this still prevails, but it has less significance in others. A boy may choose a girl of either equal or lower ranking lineage. Some groups permit, or even prefer, marriage partners to be cousins of a specific kind. Others forbid marriage between cousins.

A description of patterns of courtship and marriage among a section of the Zulu provides an indication of patterns elsewhere, although there are significant variations from group to group. Courtship can be quite formal. The young man initiates it and may meet the girl informally or be formally accepted as a sweetheart by the girl through an older friend as a go-between. Traditionally, sexual activity short of actual intercourse was permitted, watched over by members of the girl’s age group. Now greater secrecy is employed, but sex frequently goes farther and the supervision no longer takes place.

During formal courtship the girl pays visits to her sweetheart’s family. If they have a good opinion of her qualities and of her family and lineage, and if their son has declared his interest in marrying her, the boy’s mother informs her own brothers, and the father informs his lineage members. If there are no objections, the mother, with the girl and one of her friends, begin to prepare beer for the ceremony.

The young man takes counsel with his fathers and brothers to choose a go-between and to decide how many cattle should be given
to the girl’s family. The cattle constitute the *lobolo*, intended both as a mark of respect to the girl and her family and as a compensation for taking the girl. Other gifts of cash and kind are also given, since the cattle are no longer as important economically as in former days. Institutional ways are available for an unwilling girl to flee to a preferred suitor or for an unwanted suitor to carry off a girl. If all are willing, however, the *lobolo* is paid in three groups; the bride’s family gives three head of cattle and a goat to the groom’s family. Some of the *lobolo*, the goat, and two of the beasts from the bride’s family are sacrificed to honor the ancestors and to bind and purify the marriage.

When the wedding is definitely decided upon, the bride makes a series of formal visits to her future husband’s relatives to be introduced to the ancestors; she also visits members of her own lineage so that ancestral spirits resident with them may be apprised of her plans. These visits and the exchange of gifts establish a relationship not only between the prospective bride and groom but also between their respective kin. The wedding takes place in the young man’s family *kraal*, usually on a Saturday so that those working in towns not too far away may attend.

From the time of her betrothal, the young woman must keep a number of taboos considered to show respect to the husband’s family and ancestors. Failure to keep these taboos is believed to anger the ancestors, who might prevent her from conceiving or giving birth; such faults must be expiated by the sacrifice of a goat by her husband and another by her father unless she makes an immediate gesture of apology. This is believed to be related to the fact that her links to her husband’s lineage exist only through her marital status; her own lineage ties are maintained, and she is, to some extent, always a stranger to her husband’s lineage. In a lasting marriage, however, she becomes more completely a functioning part of the family, and if she is a first or only wife she may inherit the role of her husband’s mother in the *kraal*.

As soon as the wedding is over, the bride moves into her husband’s *kraal*, where she works in her mother-in-law’s hut and under her supervision until her first child is born. This often causes trouble in the case of modern brides who are unwilling to be subordinated.

Christian boys and girls are often in school at adolescence and become acquainted there; great disapproval is attached to premarital sex at that time, and any contact they may have is necessarily kept secret from older people and most of their friends. Even mild petting generates a good deal of guilt. Pregnancy may result in excommunication by the girl’s church, or public penance, and later denial of a church wedding, although this is becoming less frequent.
as premarital pregnancy becomes more prevalent. Usually the identity of the responsible boy is never publicly known.

The formal request is made for a Christian bride in a manner similar to the traditional one. Some churches regard lobolo as buying the girl, and it is not paid. Some use a monetary lobolo, which will usually be higher than the total payment for a non-Christian bride because the girl is educated. The girl’s family will spend a proportional sum on the wedding display and trousseau of the bride and also the household equipment she brings with her. The Christian girl has the freedom to speak out against an unwanted marriage. Almost entirely omitted are formal visits to the bridegroom’s family which, among other things, have the significance of showing the bride to the ancestral spirits. The formal giving of an engagement ring is customary among the Christians.

The Christian girl’s lineage is considered less in matchmaking than are her background and her church community. Friends are more likely to accompany the young man going to make his proposal than relatives, because he is often separated from his kindred spatially or spiritually. A difference in attitude toward a desirable bride appears between the Christians and traditionalists. The latter prefer a wholesome, sturdy, hard-working girl and fear that a beauty would attract other men; the Christians desire a fashionably beautiful girl, preferably educated.

Parts of the traditional marriage ritual not actually associated with the worship of ancestral spirits are followed by the Christians. Enough lobolo cattle are provided to slaughter for the wedding feast. Family and lineage members with whom the parties are still in touch will attend, and the publication of the banns in church constitutes an invitation to the congregation. Gifts of food and beer are contributed by most householders attending, which may be used only to feed the guests.

Christians rarely attend non-Christian weddings, since churches do not encourage the association. Moreover, there is often a class distinction, as Christians are usually better educated.

Although marriage in other tribes may differ in detail, basic principles to which the specific customs are attached resemble each other. These include negotiation for the lobolo and its payment in cattle, followed by a ceremonious presentation of the bride to the bridegroom and her introduction to the ancestral spirits of his family and lineage. Usually, there is courtship between the young man and the girl first, but this may not be the case if the bridegroom is an older man.

All the traditional Sotho, Tswana, and Nguni follow the custom of marriage with wife’s or husband’s next-of-kin if the original partner dies or if the wife is barren, because at least part of the bride-
wealth paid for a bride signifies the transfer of her potential fertility to her husband’s lineage. A traditional householder may marry two or more wives, being limited, in principle, only by his finances. His occupation and place of residence may actually decide the number, however. Among the Zulu the lobolo for a third or later wife may be taken from the cattle received from the lobolo of a first or second wife’s daughter; among the Sotho a sister and brother may be “paired” by the parents, so that the sister’s lobolo may be used to obtain a wife for the brother.

Family Structure

The extended form of family survives on the reserves to the extent that the family members are in residence at some given time; because many Africans are required to return to the reserves when not actually working in the urban areas, they maintain contact with relatives who have chosen to remain and practice cultivation and raise cattle in their traditional territory (see ch. 22, Labor). The men of working age and some of the women working outside the reserves are either on vacation or between jobs when they return to the reserves. The wives must remain on the reserves because they cannot work while they have young children, and no provision is made to accommodate them in the towns. The wives are left in the care of their husband’s male next-of-kin (father, uncle, or older brother) and may live with him or with the mother-in-law. Any members of the lineage or the extended family who remain on the reserves are obligated to help in situations of this sort, although it may not be easy, since the returns from most reserve cultivation are below the subsistence level, and those from cattle husbandry no better (see ch. 20, Agriculture).

The lineage attempts to support to the best of its ability those of its number who are in need, but it regards rituals performed for the ancestors as an obligation in return. For this reason the Christian convert is often alienated from his lineage unless he compromises the teaching of his church by participating in the sacrifices of cattle to the ancestors. He may refuse to participate in the rituals or in the initiation ceremonies at which the young boys and, sometimes, girls are introduced formally to tribal traditions. Burial is also carried out by the lineage, although if he was a Christian in good standing he may be buried by his church. Sometimes the lineage may refuse to perform the office for one who has avoided the traditional rites.

Urban areas are increasingly populated by solitary men and women, many of whom have left wives or husbands on the reserves because of the Group Areas Act, which is being applied to more and more categories of Africans in order to prevent them from be-
coming permanently urban (see ch. 8, Living Conditions). The wives or husbands may visit only for seventy-two-hour periods and must then return to the reserves. Except for those families that can demonstrate deep roots in the city, a married couple lives together in the city only if both are working; if they are together only because both work, their children over five must return to the reserve. Many marriages are weakened by these enforced separations and the fact that both spouses may establish other relationships. In some cases, an entire second family may be produced, weakening the first but having little firm foundation itself unless there is a divorce and remarriage.

If the man was married in the traditional manner and keeps both wives, they may intrigue to obtain a greater inheritance for their respective children, as they might have while living in a traditional polygamous kraal in former times. At other times the unrecognized mother of illegitimate children must look to her own lineage members to support them. Many families consisting of mother, grandmother, and children have developed both on the reserves and in the towns; these matri-centered and manless families are unable to discipline the children and are blamed by the Africans for the delinquency of the isotsi (young criminals or toughs) (see ch. 6, Social Structure; ch. 26, Public Order and Internal Security). If they return to the reserves and a male relative is available, some social control may be regained, but sometimes this does not take place. No data are yet available as to whether the relocation of the African residential areas into townships will have an effect on the delinquency problem, but the lack of male presence is considered by some to be crucial in the matter.

The urban Xhosa, when able to marry, try to adhere to correct forms of marriage; if Christian they use a Europeanized system, and if traditional they approximate the traditional form as closely as possible. The simple nuclear family is common; if multigeneration households occur, they are likely to consist of a mother and her daughters, with men absent. In families that are intact, because the woman is as likely to be working as the man—in fact must if she is to stay with him—consultation between them as to the management of household finances is common, as is a tendency for the man to help with the housework.

Even when they have otherwise been lax in providing for them, traditionally oriented men often try to see that their children even their illegitimate ones, are given the ritual initiation into the tribe so that they will be able to marry in the traditional manner and be able to keep in touch with their kindred. A traditional Xhosa often has one wife in town and one or more on the reserve. Sometimes they mutually support each other, but occasionally friction between wives is the cause of divorce, and that between son
and stepmother may be the cause of a youth’s migration to town. In any form, however, the family is even more important in the town than on the reserve, because it is often the only available fixed landmark in a town worker’s life. Care is frequently given to the cult of the ancestor, even though blood sacrifice may be difficult to perform in some situations. On an occasion such as the baptism of a baby, church members sometimes make sacrifices as thank offerings, without reference to ancestors but probably to God.

After divorce or widowhood a woman often returns to her parental family but may continue to have children. It is not unusual for a patriarchal extended family to have a mother-centered second generation. There are also cases of a broken older generation and an intact nuclear family in the second generation both making up an extended family. Women become important as breadwinners and go into business in small shops as well as taking wage labor of various sorts. They are often assisted by other relatives, and considerable solidarity may exist among people who are fairly distant kin, because closer ones are not available in the urban situation. When no kin are living in the city, it is usual to keep closer touch with those left on the reserves.

Most of the best educated women are teachers or nurses. There are few in this upper range, and they are usually very circumspect in their behavior and strict in family life. Their lobolo is set at the highest possible figure, and they never participate in polygamous marriages. They try to marry husbands of equal status, but have difficulty in finding men of this sort. Many remain unmarried and others marry men of lower status, although by doing so they come under tutelage of their husbands.

**THE ASIANS**

The Indian community is characterized by religious, linguistic, regional, caste, and class divisions (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages; ch. 6, Social Structure). Members of each of these categories tend to marry within their own group. Many young people are beginning to reject caste divisions, however, and to bypass linguistic ones by use of the English language. On the other hand, class divisions arising out of industrial urban society appear to have been growing stronger during the 1960's. The strongest barriers are still religious, though these also are sometimes broken.

Traditionally, marriages are arranged, as in India, by the parents of the respective young people, who go carefully into details of status and caste background, personal tastes and qualities of character, and properly matching horoscopes before deciding on a partner for their child. The arrangement usually is successful, but in any case divorce is a great disgrace and almost never occurs; it is not
recognized in orthodox Hinduism. In 1951 the total number of divorces recorded among the indentured group of Natal Indians since their first arrival in South Africa was twenty. Many young people subscribe to a more modern ideal pattern, however, and wish to marry for love; the parents tend to find this disturbing.

Interruption of the lines of occupational caste (jati) is now common, but marriage outside the larger caste divisions (varna) is still infrequent, occurring only twenty-five times in one sample of 312 marriages. Very few people marry outside their linguistic group, which generally would involve a culture conflict as well; the Gujarati-speaking north Indians are strictest in this regard and often return to India for a wife. The Tamil- and Telugu-speaking south Indians, who have relatively similar customs, are those most likely to break this barrier. The most complete separation, however, is still that between Hindus and Muslims. Aside from the few Parsis, who are expected to leave their religious community if they marry out of it, the other religious faiths represented in the Indian community are usually less stringent. Intermarriage between Hindus and Muslims does occasionally take place, usually between young intellectuals (see ch. 6, Social Structure; ch. 11 Religion).

Sanctions against marrying outside one’s group would be controlled in India by a council of caste elders; in South Africa, however, any rejection of caste breakers is a family matter; their parents or the head of their household will order them to leave, and their other kin will avoid them. Other personal ties are not necessarily disrupted, however, and many of their associates may be sympathetic under modern conditions. Sometimes the youths of a caste or religious group may demonstrate against or even try to assault somebody who has married out, but hostility soon dies down, especially if the offending couple moves away; sooner or later the family, too, may forgive and forget.

In some cases where castes are equal, intermarriage may be refused on grounds of “custom”; this usually occurs where linguistic and regional differences also obtain, as between northern Hindus and Tamils. Most of the north Indian groups practice marriage outside the lineage, whereas Tamils practice marriage between the children of a brother and sister. A Tamil man calls his sister’s daughters “daughter-in-law” from their cradle, although only one may actually marry into his family, and he is as liable for marriage payments as he would be in the case of a stranger.

Marriage usually involves a religious ceremony and is then legally registered according to the civil law; only one wife may be registered, and only her children will be regarded as legitimate for purposes of inheritance, according to the law of Natal. The registration must take place within one month of the marriage. Polygyny is not a Hindu ideal and has always been rare, but the older generation
sometimes considered it justifiable if the first wife had no sons, since for religious reasons sons were a necessity. Although Muslims, by their religion, are allowed four wives, who must be treated with exact equality, in practice they rarely have more than one.

Most Indian families of all faiths tend to be of the extended form; sons continue to reside in the household with their wives and children. The household of a wealthy old man may even include married grandsons. In some public housing facilities, however, only one married son may be allowed to remain with the parents.

The oldest male is the head of the family, and others take precedence under him in order of their seniority. Within their generation, men take precedence over women but defer to women of the older generation. Although each married woman in the household has her own cooking fire for her husband and children, the work is done with complex cooperation. Traditionally, older men and their wives, who take responsibility alternately with the actual parents of any children in the house, are then addressed as “father” and “mother” by all the children, adding “elder” or “younger” according to their age relationship to the children’s father. In the 1960’s, however, the English kinship terms “uncle,” “aunt,” and “cousin” were replacing the traditional terms, and Western behavior patterns were similarly replacing the traditional relationships.

A north Indian, asked to name his relatives, names only those on his father’s side, whereas a Tamil or Telugu names those on both sides equally. In the latter case, however, the mother may be a near relative of the father to begin with. A Hindu bride transfers her allegiance to her husband’s family, and if she returns to her own family after his death she may not enter into their family rituals, as she still owes her allegiance to his household gods. Children are important to the family not only to perpetuate the line but also to carry out funerary and other religious rituals, and an unmarried adult is considered to have failed in his religious duties. A man or woman engaged in prolonged university studies may be excused for postponing marriage.

A great wish for children is expressed in both Hindu and Muslim religious ideology. Among Hindus particularly, a bride is surrounded by religious and magical practices intended to ensure conception and delivery of a healthy son who will carry on the sacred continuity of the family. Muslims also use protective and purifying ceremonies within the framework of their religion. In a modern family the advice of a Western-trained physician is followed, although traditionalists disapprove.

Muslim women are usually more conservative than Hindus, less frequently able to speak English, and appear rarely at public functions. Education is usually higher among Hindu women than among Muslims. Dating is disapproved in both groups, though it takes place clandestinely. Hindu women have had women’s social clubs for
some time, but Muslim women began only in the late 1950's to attend such gatherings and to work behind shop counters. Occasions where men and women could meet socially under heavy chaperonage were an innovation in the 1960's.

Family businesses, common in the Indian community, are usually managed by the senior male of a household; in old age, however, a father may hand over the management to the eldest son, retaining the religious headship. In a family having only girls, the youngest may be requested to remain in the parental household, and her husband remains with her, so that they can inherit the bulk of the family property. Ordinarily, the bride goes to her husband’s house and although she receives gifts and anything she may ask for when she visits her parents, she is encouraged to depend upon her husband as much as possible, since otherwise he feels his honor to be slighted. Only in the most extreme cases will sons-in-law take refuge with their bride’s parents; a decision must also be made in the case of an heiress’s husband, because he will be required to perform the rites for her family rather than for his own.

Death in Hinduism is regarded as a passage to the deceased’s next life, either in one of the heavens and with release from the cycle of rebirth, or else another life on earth according to his merits. The funerary rituals, led by his heir and carried out by the closest members of the family, are intended to ensure his future well-being and to preserve the mystical continuity of the family. It is considered auspicious for a woman to die before her husband; she is then laid to rest in her wedding garments. Otherwise, she appears adorned for the last time at her husband’s bier and has her symbolic wedding ornaments ritually removed, after which she crops her hair short and assumes the white garments of a widow. This is now often limited to a minimum ceremony, such as casting her marriage token (usually a neck pendant) into the coffin, because of the emotional strain of the longer ceremony on the widow.
CHAPTER 8
LIVING CONDITIONS

The wide variations in living patterns and conditions in early 1970 were largely the result of unequal income opportunities among the population's four official ethnic groups and of the government's policies of separation of the races (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages). Over 46 percent of the entire population had settled in urban areas, drawn there by the attractions of industrial wealth and aspirations for a better way of life. State programs for housing, health services, and social welfare had improved the well-being of large segments of the population, but the improvements maintained the pattern of racial inequality.

A series of legislative measures designed to implement the government's apartheid policies were in force. They restricted interracial mingling, controlled the mobility of members of the society, limited their use of public facilities, and denied them the right to choose their own places of residence. Although most laws applied to all, their effect was most strongly felt by the African majority.

Vast sums of money had been spent by the state to reduce a housing shortage of crisis proportions that earlier had left many thousands of nonwhite citizens residing in the city slums. By 1970 population resettlement programs had considerably reduced these unhealthy conditions, and many of the nation's poorer citizens were living in state-financed public housing projects. In some of the new communities, however, sanitary facilities, electricity, and public amenities had yet to be provided, and living habits conditioned by years of deprivation often remained unchanged.

Life for most of the country's white population was comfortable, although the standard of living for the relatively small number of indigent whites was substantially lower. The homes of white urbanites in the middle and upper income groups were mainly large Western-style suburban houses or apartments in high-rise buildings located in areas limited to white occupancy. Those of the lower income groups were assisted by various welfare programs, including public housing. Standards of life among white farmers were comparable to those in urban areas and were largely determined by income.

Although the republic was not a welfare state, over 2,000 government and private agencies provided social welfare services to people...
of all ethnic groups. Through a comprehensive system of social legislation the state provided sheltered workshops for the physically handicapped, disability grants to the crippled, allowances to large families of meager incomes, except Africans, and pensions to the elderly, the blind, and the veterans of the nation's wars.

Modern medical services provided in more than 700 hospitals and public health clinics located throughout the country had improved the standards of health. Prevalent disease rates were highest among Africans, many of whom suffered from tuberculosis, blindness, and disorders caused by malnutrition. Most Africans had accepted the techniques of modern medicine, but many living in the homeland areas and some in Westernized urban localities continued to rely on traditional remedies in times of illness.

Not all white people were wealthy, but the average per capita income of their group was more than ten times that of the nonwhites, and the standard of living of most whites was substantially higher than that of most nonwhites. Many Coloureds and Asians as well as 45 percent of all African families existed at levels below the government's minimum standard for healthful living.

Ample leisure time was available to most of the people for a variety of relaxing activities. By government proclamation, all public places of recreation were segregated, and nonwhites did not always have the equivalents of facilities available to whites. Apartheid policies in sports prohibited multiracial teams and interracial competition. The people were sports enthusiasts, but their athletes had been banned from the International Olympic Games, and many foreign teams refused to compete with the country's all-white groups.

PATTERNS OF LIVING

Most South Africans were engaged to some extent in the nation's monetary economy. They derived some cash income from the highly developed business and industrial sector or from agricultural activities (see ch. 20, Agriculture; ch. 21, Industry). White South Africans usually characterized themselves as sturdy and independent people, fond of outdoor living and sports, hospitable, and free and easy in ordinary social intercourse. The practice of racial separateness that pervaded the national way of life, however, restricted social relations in the living patterns each group followed.

For most of the white population, living conditions compared favorably with those of the industrial nations of the West. A wide disparity existed between their standard of living and that of most Africans. Standards of living for the nation's Coloureds and Asians ranged somewhere between these two extremes. In 1970 marked racial disparity existed in income, housing, levels of health and
nutrition, medical facilities, public amenities, social welfare, and leisure activities.

Long before the advent of separate development as an official government doctrine, law and custom had established distinct living patterns among the various segments of the population. The nation's cities and towns were established by whites, and most of them regarded urban areas as their domain. Because they represented a ready source of labor, Africans were permitted in urban areas, but they were regarded as temporary migrants. Most white citizens believed that African residential rights did not extend beyond the bounds of their official homelands or reserves, and in 1913 the Natives Land Act prohibited them from acquiring rural land, except in the Native Reserves, without permission of the governor general.

With the industrial growth that began in the 1920's and burgeoned in the 1930's and 1940's came the need for inexpensive labor in white-financed industrial centers. Industrial work in urban areas provided an undeniable attraction to growing numbers of Africans who could no longer subsist on their allotted margin of the sparsely watered, arable land (see ch. 2, Physical Environment). Many thousands migrated from the reserves to the cities, towns, and mining regions, creating serious social problems.

The Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, as amended, and the Bantu Laws Amendment Act established compulsory residence for urban Africans in separate areas, known as locations, on the outer edges of the settled white areas. These laws regulated the entry of Africans into the cities and towns and prescribed their place of settlement. Until 1937 Africans were still permitted to buy plots outside these locations except in the Orange Free State and certain Transvaal towns. After that year the practice was prohibited all over the country. Africans who owned real estate outside the proclaimed African urban townships had to dispose of such property. They could not own land in urban townships and had to lease plots from the local authorities. They could own land, however, in the few towns within their own native reserves. Under the terms of subsequent amendments, non-Africans were prohibited from acquiring land in African urban areas or on reserves.

In the 1950's the government began enforced removal of people of different races who previously had lived relatively close together. The Population Registration Act of 1950 and its amendments provided for classification of the entire population into distinct racial categories of whites, Coloureds, Africans, and Asians (see ch. 4, Population; ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages). This classification became fundamental to the government policy of separate development.

The Group Areas Act of 1950 established segregated areas desig-
nated for occupation by each ethnic group. Although the legislation applied to all races, Africans were most frequently affected. Implementation of the act involved uprooting thousands of nonwhite families living in areas designated by government proclamation as white, relocation of their business establishments, and resettlement of entire populations in areas designated for specific ethnic occupation. Many of the urban sites formerly occupied by Africans were slums and shantytowns, although some contained comfortable, if modest, houses. Most African properties acquired outside the reserves before 1937 were surrounded by white-owned land and were known officially as black spots. Government resettlement plans called for the elimination of 469 black spots and the return of their African inhabitants to the reserves or to newly developed group areas. By 1968, 106 of these sites had been cleared in addition to portions of 14 others, involving the resettlement of 75,810 persons.

Laws other than the Group Areas Act also restricted movement and choice of residential areas for nonwhites. In 1885 the Transvaal restricted the number of Asians who could live there, and in 1891 the Orange Free State completely prohibited Asians from owning or occupying land within its boundaries. In early 1970 Asians in Natal, Transvaal, and Cape Province required permits to travel, even for a visit, from one province to another. Curfew regulations prohibited the unauthorized presence of Africans in white sectors of towns between 11 P.M. and 5 A.M., and whites could not visit African locations without special permits.

The pass laws, dating from the 1700's and revised in 1952, were designed to restrict the movement of all Africans (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 22, Labor). All members of this group above the age of fifteen were required to carry a reference book that contained identity cards, work records, tax records, and endorsements by police officials indicating where the holder was authorized to be. These documents became a valuable adjunct to labor control (see ch. 22, Labor). Reference books had to be carried at all times, and failure to produce them on demand constituted a criminal offense. Violations of the pass laws were the most frequent causes of police arrests involving Africans (see ch. 26, Public Order and Internal Security).

African men, but not women, living in the reserves could obtain permission to come to urban areas as migrant workers to accept specific time contracts with specified employers, but they had to return to their reserves before entering into a new contract (see ch. 22, Labor). Because rural women were not permitted entry to towns, unmarried men desiring wives had to choose among women already living legally in the towns. Married men had to leave their wives and children on the reserves and reside in all-male barracks or hostels during the period of their work contracts.
unqualified for residence in their own right often were deserted by their husbands or obtained divorces and were returned with their children to a native reserve. Widows could remain if they were qualified for residential rights and if they continued to pay the rent on their houses.

A majority of white citizens owned automobiles, and many owned more than one. Nonwhites of higher income also owned cars. Wealthy white farmers and mining officials owned small private airplanes. Sixty-two percent of all white families had nonwhite domestic servants. A large number of Afrikaner households refused to employ domestic help because they believed the practice was incompatible with the state's policies of racial separation. In theory, urban households could keep only one live-in servant; in practice, most white citizens overlooked the government's single-servant decree. The more affluent families had from two to four domestic servants, including a houseboy who served food, a nursemaid if there were small children, a gardener, and often a chauffeur. Families living in large apartment houses often had both a maid and a houseboy. The size of domestic staffs on white farms was larger than those maintained by urban residents.

All the main towns had purified central water systems, waterborne sewage disposal facilities, and electricity, but these were not always available in some of the newly constructed areas occupied by nonwhite ethnic groups. Wide varieties of goods and services were available in the major cities to those who could afford them.

The standard of living for all South Africans increased steadily from the mid 1950's, but in 1968 the white one-fifth of the population still accounted for 86 percent of the total private consumption expenditure. The annual national per capita income of whites was between R1,400 and R1,500 (1 rand equals US$1.40). The national per capita income of urban Africans was from R120 to R130 per year; for those living in the reserves, it was from R30 to R35. Despite their lower incomes, Africans in 1968, because of their numbers, constituted a buying force of R1.2 billion annually, and there was evidence of their desire for an improved standard of living. It was estimated that, by the turn of the century, this group would command 30 percent of the net domestic product and have a buying power of more than R20 million a day.

Although the average earnings of whites were higher than those of nonwhites, not all white inhabitants were wealthy. Poverty existed among a small segment of the white population, although it was not of the same magnitude as among nonwhites. White beggars were to be seen in the large cities, and some white persons received welfare assistance. A moderate number of Asian, Coloured, and African business and professional people had above average incomes, and their standards of living exceeded the levels of others within their
ethnic groups. This accounted for the sharp contrasts in housing and personal amenities within the group areas where both low and higher income individuals of the same ethnic group were forced to settle.

Living costs and lower wages for most nonwhites largely accounted for their inability to afford a better way of life. In 1968 approximately 45 percent of all African families lived below the subsistence level, and 67.6 percent of the African families living in the largest African township of Soweto near Johannesburg lacked R13.56 each month to meet their minimum needs.

Subsistence expenditures by Africans were highest for food, with sharply decreasing amounts devoted to clothing, rent and water, fuel and lighting, transportation, taxes, cleaning materials, medical expenses, and education. Because Coloureds and Asians had better incomes, there were fewer in these groups living in poverty conditions. The average monthly household income of Coloureds was R142.63, and expenditures averaged R135.80. This group spent as much for food alone as the average African devoted to his entire budget. Moreover, Coloureds were usually able to afford to spend something for dental care, insurance, credit loans, dry cleaning, and recreation. The average monthly income of Asians living in Durban was R77.50; incomes of wealthier professional men, businessmen, and industrialists were not included in this average. Half of the Asian households had incomes below government-determined poverty levels; 58.4 percent of the households received less than R60 each month. Expenditure priorities were similar to those of Africans.

Throughout the country racial segregation pervaded every aspect of daily life and was manifested in an abundance of signs reading "whites only" and "nonwhites only," written in combinations of English, Afrikaans, and local African languages, that reserved for separate use most facilities ranging from public toilets and telephone booths to the entrances to public buildings. It was illegal for whites and nonwhites to dine together in public unless they had obtained a special permit. Nonwhites occasionally removed the segregation signs or defaced them by removing the "non" prefix. Damaging a sign, however, constituted a punishable offense.

General standards of clothing varied somewhat among different ethnic groups and areas of the country. Most whites had retained the custom of Western styles of dress regardless of their location. In the larger cities such as Cape Town and Johannesburg, clothing styles reflected trends current in both England and the United States. British-style school uniforms were usually worn by white children. Rural white inhabitants and many of the urban Afrikaners dressed more conservatively than did the English-speaking whites who lived in cities.

Africans, Coloureds, and Asian men in urban areas dressed in
Western-style clothing; Indian women, however, usually wore the traditional sari and accompanying accessories. In rural areas most Africans who had known urban life dressed in simple Western clothing. Most of the children wore shirts and short trousers or dresses. A large number of Africans living in the reserves wore the traditional dress of their particular tribal group. Among the lower income groups, the quality of clothing was usually inferior.

HOUSING

The urbanization trend that commenced in the 1920s and intensified during World War II brought about a nationwide housing shortage; in early 1970 it remained one of the country’s major problems. Comfortable dwellings were readily available for white families of the population, but suitable housing for nonwhites often was difficult to obtain. As with other living essentials, the quality of housing varied largely with income levels and the ethnic origin of the occupants.

Most of the acute housing needs were concentrated in urban areas that had attracted many thousands of African workers and their families before legislation restricted their freedom of movement. By the end of World War II, the housing shortage had reached crisis proportions. Shantytowns of shelters constructed from cardboard boxes, packing crates, corrugated iron sheeting, and scrap material sprang up virtually overnight. Overcrowding and lack of sanitation, clean water, and other amenities quickly reduced these inhabited areas to slums in which disease and crime were rife. People living in these substandard areas could not be evicted because other accommodations were not available. With the advent of the Group Areas Act and later plans to create self-governing Bantustans, the government turned its attention to housing needs in the reserves (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

In 1970 public housing was largely the responsibility of local authorities, although the state established housing standards, provided subsidies and, in certain areas, made low-cost loans available to authorized persons wishing to build their own houses. State responsibilities were administered by the Department of Community Development. The government trained and employed Africans as builders in their own urban townships. Industrial employers who did not provide workers with housing accommodations were required to contribute to a fund for financing the cost of water supplies, electricity, sanitary services, and access roads. Some of these funds were also used to subsidize transportation services to the townships.

Public housing was of three basic types: economic, subeconomic, and sub-subeconomic, the latter two often alternatively labeled...
auxiliary housing. The total amount of family income was the basic determinant of a person's qualification for public housing. For economic housing, qualifying income limits were R225 for white families with up to two children and R300 for those with more than two children; R225 was the qualifying limit for Coloured and Asian families; data for the African group was not available. For all groups, rental of houses built with state funds was subsidized for families in the lower income groups. Families with monthly incomes of R101 to R130 paid 3 percent on the capital outlay, and those with R131 to R160 paid 5 percent. The state housing fund bore all losses incurred in these projects. The latest government statistics indicated that, in 1967, 64,650 families qualified for public housing. Of this number, 4,250 were white, 21,950 were Coloured, 11,550 were Asians, and 26,900 were African.

For subeconomic housing, the qualifying limit on monthly income was R100 for whites and R60 for Coloureds and Asians; for Africans it was R30 in areas where building wages were controlled and R25 elsewhere. An applicant's income was defined as his earnings plus one-half of money earned by each of his resident children and the full amount paid him by any lodger. Sub-subeconomic housing was reserved for indigent Africans who did not qualify for subeconomic accommodations.

Although data on the total number of houses built under public housing programs were not available, more than half a million dwellings were constructed between 1948 and 1966. The vast majority of these houses were occupied by Africans. In 1967 top priority was given to houses for indigent white families.

Community Development

Relocation procedure under the Group Areas Act and its subsequent amendments was lengthy and complicated. Government-approved plans designating certain areas for specific racial occupation were brought into force by proclamations published in the Government Gazette. Members of any other group, termed “disqualified persons,” had to move out when notified to do so. Despite the often improved living conditions found in the new communities, demonstrations protesting relocation orders were frequent, and the police often were summoned to supervise demolition of houses and removal of disqualified persons.

A Community Development Board assisted local authorities in developing new townships and attempted to reduce the financial losses of those who had to move. When a group area was proclaimed, independent evaluators were appointed to establish the value of all properties owned by racially disqualified persons. If an owner received less than the evaluated amount when he sold, the
board paid him 80 percent of the difference. If he received more than the evaluation, he could keep the entire sum provided the sale was concluded within five years of the proclamation. If the sale was made after that time, he had to pay the board one-fourth of the difference between the evaluation and the price he obtained. These provisions were designed to speed up sales by persons disqualified to remain in the area.

Comparatively few white families were required to move as a result of the Group Areas Act proclamations, but many thousands of nonwhites were resettled because most of the previously racially mixed areas were allocated to whites. The areas in larger cities set aside for nonwhites were some distance outside the urban centers and, at the time of the proclamation, usually were largely unimproved. The state and local authorities were jointly responsible for providing roads, sewer facilities, electricity, schools, and other public amenities. In urban townships, houses were built with public funds for rental to those in the lower income groups. Plots were available for sale to non-Africans who could afford to buy property and build their own homes. Africans were not permitted to buy property in any urban township except those within the reserves.

In the early 1960's Johannesburg's nonwhite location of Sophiatown was proclaimed a white area, and thousands of nonwhites were forced to vacate their makeshift homes. Although the settlement contained the worst slums in the country, there were also many respectable homes owned by nonwhites of higher income levels. Owners were compensated by the state, the entire area was bulldozed into a flat expanse of rubble, and 133,000 Africans were moved to the new township of Soweto. Johannesburg's 46,000 Coloureds were relocated in two similarly constructed townships in the western part of the city, and 37,000 Asians moved to houses in the new township of Lenasia. The new white community built where Sophiatown once sprawled was given the Afrikaans name Triomf (Triumph).

The cost of relocation brought financial loss to many, despite the law's provisions relating to state compensation. Among those who endured the heaviest losses were many Asian businessmen. The state had designated small central areas for Asian merchants in a few of affected cities, but those who could not be accommodated in these small business zones faced the prospect of moving their establishments to the new Asian townships or trying to obtain temporary permits to operate their stores in the original locations. Because most of their customers had been members of other racial groups, many Asian merchants could not succeed when limited to Asian patronage. Under temporary permits in their original locations, they were not permitted to expand their establishments. In Durban whites were unwilling to pay high prices for homes previously occupied by Asians.
although many were good quality houses with well-developed grounds. Competition for land within reasonable distance of job sites had driven up the prices of land in the Asian group areas.

Many of the relocated Coloureds had previously lived in overcrowded slum conditions, but in western Cape Province a large number were forced to leave attractive homes where their families had lived for generations. Coloureds were allowed to remain in some of the larger towns in eastern Cape Province, such as East London, Queenstown, and King William’s Town. The rest would move eventually to the Cape Midlands or to new townships in western Cape Province when employment opportunities became available in those regions. To speed up the process, the government required employers in these areas to hire Coloureds rather than Africans whenever possible (see ch. 22, Labor).

Public housing of the economic class consisted of standardized or detached four- and five-room brick cottages erected at a cost of R550 to R600 each. Auxiliary housing varied from semidetached brick and masonry duplexes to two-story masonry apartment buildings. To avoid overcrowding, each detached cottage was built on a lot of 5,000 square feet. Sufficient space was available for small home gardens, and the state encouraged such cultivation in addition to the planting of lawns, trees, and flowers. The new townships also contained larger, Western-style houses of professional and businessmen, some of which were built at a cost of around R20,000. The government intended that each township eventually would have its own business and shopping centers, schools, public transportation, parks, gardens, hospitals, clinics, civic centers, hotels, restaurants, recreation facilities, and administrative offices.

According to the original building specifications, each house of every category was to have piped water and electricity. Originally, interior doors between rooms were provided, but many of the townships’ occupants removed them for use as firewood. The government then built houses without them, and persons who desired interior doors had to pay extra rent. Many houses were built without floors or interior ceilings. In most of the nonwhite communities, homes were built more quickly than public amenities could be provided. Families often were required to occupy the new houses before the existence of electricity, sanitation systems, adequate police protection, public telephone or postal services, and recreation facilities. The average Soweto house in Johannesburg had piped water but no indoor bathroom or electricity. In early 1970 there was no information on government plans to provide these facilities.

In those nonwhite communities where piped water and waterborne sewage disposal existed, improved housing did not always change the living patterns of former slum dwellers, and many areas were breeding grounds for insects and disease. Homes of the lower
income groups deteriorated rapidly because of the occupants' inability to alter former living patterns.

Rents for public housing were relatively low in most nonwhite areas, and a four-room house in Soweto was available for about R5 to R10 per month. The cost of larger upper income dwellings was greater and was scaled to their occupants' ability to pay. Monthly rent for the average Coloured home was approximately R18.60. Rental costs for Asians compared favorably with those charged Africans of all income groups.

Nonwhites in White Areas

In the mining communities, homes similar to those provided by public housing programs were available for nonwhite miners eligible under the Group Areas Act to live with their dependents in the mining regions. Rents were usually free, and housing provided by mining companies was considered to be part of the eligible miner's pay. Single men and those ineligible to live with their families were quartered in long, brick-walled barracks or hostels with corrugated iron roofs. An average of twenty-five men occupied rooms measuring eighteen by twenty-five feet. Each miner had a concrete cubicle, the slab floor of which was his bed. Furniture, consisting of a few wooden tables and benches, usually was made by the occupants. Communal showers and bathroom facilities were also used for laundry purposes. Modernization and improvement of some mining hostels was begun in the late 1960's.

By law, African servants could not be housed in the same building with their white employers. Live-in domestic help had to reside at least fifteen feet from the main house, in a dwelling concealed from the front of the property. Most servants' quarters consisted of one room and a bath. The single window in these structures had to be above eye level and no larger than 10 percent of the floor space. Furniture usually consisted of a single bed with a straw mattress, fruit crates or castoff bureaus and chairs from the main house, and newspapers for rugs. Only the newest and most luxurious white homes had cold-water showers and modern toilet facilities for servants. In white luxury apartment buildings the servants' quarters, in the form of a double row of connecting rooms, were usually built atop the flat roof.

The White Sector

In the larger cities white families usually lived in quiet suburbs where the majority of residents owned their homes. Most of the houses were of Western design and ranged from traditional Cape Dutch to modern California-ranch styles. The urban homes owned by upper income whites were surrounded by spacious gardens, and
most had private swimming pools and tennis courts. Housing was also available to urban whites in modern apartment buildings. The windows of suburban houses were covered with sturdy iron bars, installed as a precaution against burglary. The homes of wealthier families were also protected by burglar alarm systems.

In smaller towns about 80 percent of the white citizens occupied houses, and the remainder lived in apartments. Although many homes were larger, the average house had five rooms plus a pantry and bathroom. Two-thirds of the residents owned their homes. Most white-occupied houses in small towns had modern amenities, including piped water, waterborne sewage disposal, and electricity. White families usually heated their homes in cold weather with electric heaters and fireplaces.

Wealthy white farm families lived in large, spacious Cape Dutch houses, completely equipped with all the amenities of their urban counterparts. Less affluent white farmers often lived in rough timber and masonry homes, which they had constructed without professional assistance. These houses were much smaller than those of the wealthy farm families. Modern conveniences in small farm homes were often lacking, although most were comfortable and provided satisfactory shelter for their inhabitants.

The Traditional African Sector

A large number of Africans in the reserves followed traditional living patterns and resided in tribal villages, or kraals, having little contact with the urbanized industrial sectors. For these pastoral people the cultural traditions that had prevailed for generations still marked their way of life in early 1970, although many of their young men had migrated to the modern cities in search of a different existence. The size of the kraals depended on structure and composition of the family (see ch. 6, Social Structure; ch. 7, Family). The dwellings grouped together within the kraal reflected individual tribal variations, but most were of the same basic structural design and composition.

Traditional houses were low, circular huts, or rondavels, that in appearance were often likened to beehives. These dwellings were constructed of poles bound together with tough grass and daubed over with mud that baked hard in the hot sun. Floors in the rondavels were of the same wattle construction. Over a conical framework of poles attached to the top of the hut's cylindrical wall, roofs were thatched from tall grass that grew wild in the area. Cooking usually was done outside over an open fire. Most of the tribal groups, notably the Ndebele, embellished the floors and the interior and exterior walls of their rondavels with brightly-colored mural art (see ch. 10, Artistic and Intellectual Expression).
HEALTH

In 1970 whites on the average lived longer than nonwhites because of their better diet, easier access to medical care, and higher living standards (see table 8). It was not possible to compare longevity estimates for all ethnic groups within the population for the same time period because vital statistics were available only for whites, Coloureds, and Asians. All inhabitants were required to register births and deaths, but many Africans living in rural areas failed to comply with the regulation. Health studies carried out in the field by the government’s Institute of Family and Community Health in the early 1960’s indicated high infant mortality rates among the African group.

Table 8. Vital Statistics and Life Expectancy Rates in South Africa, 1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Population groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Whites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth rate²</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death rate³</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant death rate³</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male life expectancy⁴</td>
<td>64.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female life expectancy⁴</td>
<td>70.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n.a.—not available.
¹ Data limited to Zulus in 1962.
² Per 1,000 persons.
³ Per 1,000 live births.
⁴ In years.


Extensive medical services of high quality existed in all cities and towns, and government-sponsored health clinics operated in most of the rural areas. The modern urban medical facilities offered health services equal to those available anywhere, and the government provided funds and assistance to its program of public health service for those inhabitants who could not afford private care. Many private organizations and individuals were actively engaged in combating disease and ill health among all elements of the population. Major contributions were made by municipalities, church organizations, missionary societies, the mining industry, and a wide range of private welfare bodies.

Much of the prevalent ill health was attributable to poor dietary habits and to unsanitary conditions among the lower income groups. Water polluted by human and animal waste was frequently used for laundering, bathing, and drinking in some of the more remote rural areas. In the towns housing was often overcrowded, and many of the nonwhite townships did not have adequate water and sewage disposal.
systems. Open pit latrines and practices of indiscriminate human waste disposal were common in many rural areas.

The unavailability of adequate safe water was a serious handicap to good health practices in many communities. Because parts of the country experienced seasonal water shortages, available supplies were limited and often contaminated. Rural inhabitants depended for their supplies on dug wells, while others were forced to rely on rivers and streams. Water could be drunk with reasonable safety in major cities and towns that had municipal water supplies. Some improvements had been achieved in a number of group areas by the installation of piped water, with an array of public spigots from which inhabitants could obtain clean water.

Although the best medical care was available only to those who could afford to pay for it, considerable progress had been made in improving the health of most South Africans. Public health services were often overburdened by the vast numbers of poorer people seeking medical attention. Rural clinics were available to most members of lower income groups, and medical services were either free or partially without cost. Mobile units provided medical assistance to most remote regions. The battle against ill health, however, was not entirely one of providing services. The relationship between environment and disease was not fully understood by all Africans, although most trusted the “white man’s medicine.” Health education programs to change old practices were gradually having a beneficial effect, but a large number of Africans still relied on traditional medical practitioners, who operated in the context of belief in witchcraft and sorcery (see ch. 11, Religion).

**Diet and Nutrition**

Generally, the country was self-sufficient in basic food crops (see ch. 20, Agriculture). During years when crop failures and drought occurred, however, some food supplies had to be supplemented with imports. For the white population, sufficiency of healthful food was seldom a problem. For other ethnic groups, proper food and nutrition were less adequate because of lower incomes and continued reliance on traditional but often improper dietary habits.

The staple food of the African population was corn (maize), which was ground and eaten in the form of a porridge called “mealies.” Government studies revealed that the African’s diet was too high in carbohydrates and deficient in proteins, vitamins, minerals, and fats. Too few of these people consumed meat, milk, or green vegetables. Although many African families had home gardens, the main foods grown were corn, beans, pumpkins, and potatoes. Few of them cultivated green vegetables, and of these, cabbages were the most common. Lack of Vitamin A was responsible for much of the prevalent blindness, and lack of Vitamin C was a...
contributory factor in a high incidence of respiratory diseases.

Among those indigent families whose income was below the subsistence level, dietary patterns were both malnutritious and unnu-tritious. Breakfast for these people of all ages consisted of black tea, heavily sweetened with sugar for necessary energy. Often lunch consisted of scrapings from the previous night's "mealie" kettle. Dinner usually was limited to mealies and boiled leaves that substituted for vegetables.

Among Africans who could occasionally afford nutritious foods, government programs of nutrition education often were not accepted. Many Africans continued to believe that children who ate fish would grow beards or that eating eggs would make a child bald. From a more practical standpoint, many African children were forbidden to eat eggs and chickens because both were luxuries and the prerogative of grownups. To prevent them from disobeying, they were often told that eating eggs would make them sterile.

Nutritional deficiencies among nonwhites also were responsible for a high incidence of kwashiorkor, pellagra, rickets, scabies, and gastroenteritis. In the late 1960's gastroenteritis was the most frequent single cause of death among children of the poorer nonwhites and was closely associated with protein deficiency. During the same period more than 50 percent of all African admissions to mental hospitals were the result of pellagra. Kwashiorkor, resulting from protein deficiency in nursing mothers and young children, retarded the development of many thousands each year. Particularly prevalent among African children between one and five years of age, the disease often produced cancer of the liver in those who survived. In 1967 the minister of health released data showing that 10,830 children died from kwashiorkor that year. Of these, 7 were white, 12 were Asian, 1,046 were Coloured, and 9,765 were African.

The state had made an extensive effort to curb the problems of malnutrition among nonwhites. Projects in nutritional education were provided for nonwhite wives and mothers in attempts to improve dietary habits. The state had promoted the sale of "mealie" meal containing fortified skimmed milk. Under this plan the skimmed milk powder was made available to local authorities for distribution to children of preschool age for R0.15 a pound. The state paid R0.05 of the cost, local authorities paid R0.05 and, if possible, the parents paid the remaining R0.05. Health education programs also encouraged the cultivation of vitamin-rich vegetables and the use of whole grain fortified bread.

The white population consumed good quality meats, dairy products, eggs, fruits, and vegetables, which were plentiful throughout the country. These fresh products were supplemented by canned, frozen, and other processed products. Despite the availability of more nutritious foods among the white population, a 1966 study of the causes of white male mortality, published in the South African...
Journal of Science, attributed the high rate of coronary heart disease and cirrhosis of the liver to affluent living patterns, particularly dietary and drinking habits.

A few foods eaten by white South Africans were of local origin. A pork sausage known as boerewors was a traditional Afrikaner dish, as were biltong and braaiwels. These were variations of impala, springbok, kudu, and blesbok meat that were grilled over an outdoor open fire. During warm months, cold meats, fruit, and vegetable salads were popular. An abundance of seasonal fruit was readily available.

The principal attack on kwashiorkor and malnutrition has been made by a private nonprofit organization called Kupugani (Zulu for “uplift yourself”). The group’s efforts began in 1962 when it started to purchase unmarketable farm surplus foods at extremely low costs and sold them at prices far below those charged by ordinary food stores. Customers were limited to nonwhites and indigent whites. Products available in the group’s sixty-odd urban retail outlets included protein-fortified biscuits and soup powders, peanuts, peanut butter, fish paste, fortified candy, and a precooked powdery substance made of “mealie” meal, fish, milk, bone meal, peanuts, soya, and yeast. In addition to its food stores, the organization provided over 250,000 nonwhite schoolchildren with a daily free meal of protein-fortified biscuits and soup.

In the principal African townships near large cities, nursery schools, or crèches, provided nourishing food to many preschool children. Operated by the nongovernmental African Self Help Association, the nursery schools were financed and staffed mainly by white women. These centers provided care for young children during the times when their mothers were at work to supplement family incomes. The children often received most of their nourishment at the centers and, during the day, were fed milk, soup, “mealie” meal, fruit, and vegetables.

Because of a traditional African taste for beer, the government’s Council for Scientific and Industrial Research had devised a standardized, healthful formula for the drink. Made largely from corn, the beer was acrid, flat, and sour. Priced at R0.20 a gallon and containing 3-percent alcohol, it was dispensed in waxed paper cartons at government-owned bottle stores throughout the African group areas. Most Africans did not like the taste of the product, known officially as Bantu beer, but they drank it in large quantities nonetheless and sweetened it with sugar to make it more palatable.

Prevalent Diseases

Complete data on the incidence of common diseases were lacking because many cases of illness did not come to the attention of medical authorities. Because hospitals and clinics were often
crowded, it was customary for many sick Africans to depart after waiting for long periods without receiving professional attention. Although health statistics showed relatively high rates of illness among Africans, the incidence of disease had diminished among most of the population as modern health measures became progressively more effective.

Among the most common illnesses were various dysenteries and parasitic diseases, tuberculosis, pneumonia, and disorders caused by malnutrition. The incidence of typhoid fever and diphtheria remained relatively high among Africans despite the government's immunization program. Venereal disease, which was virtually unknown among Africans before the arrival of the white man, was prevalent among migratory workers, and various forms of it were congenital in many young children. Public health efforts to eradicate both syphilis and gonorrhea included routine tests that permitted early treatment. Free vaccines supplied by the Department of Health had reduced the incidence of poliomyelitis, smallpox, and tetanus among all population groups. Trachoma, a contagious disease of the eyes that often resulted in blindness, had received considerable attention from health authorities. Mobile units of the Bureau for the Prevention of Blindness visited remote areas to examine nonwhites for signs of the disease, and approximately 45,000 children were under treatment for trachoma and other eye diseases. Since the bureau's inception in 1947, 3,500 successful eye operations for cataracts had been performed, and thousands of nonwhite children had received a trachoma serum that had been developed by its research program.

Epidemic diseases such as smallpox and typhus occurred occasionally among nonwhite groups, but they were largely controlled by mass immunization. The incidence of illnesses caused by large numbers of insects and animals found throughout the country, by use of polluted water, and by lack of understanding of sanitation and personal hygiene procedures remained high among the lower income groups.

The earliest white settlers brought with them the first case of tuberculosis, and they infected their close associates and servants. With the discovery of gold and diamonds, miners from Europe brought the disease with them and infected large numbers of Africans employed in the mines. The low living standards of most African laborers contributed to the spread of the disease, and in 1955 it reached epidemic proportions. Government health efforts diminished this trend, but in the late 1960's tuberculosis incidence rates remained higher than those of any other disease. Efforts were made to vaccinate persons who had never been infected; tests and chest X-rays were administered throughout the country for the diagnosis of potentially infectious cases; and over 26,000 hospital beds were provided for the treatment of anyone whose tests indi-
cated the presence of the disease. Intravenous therapy with modern drugs provided promising results for treatment of infected patients.

The state tuberculosis program was assisted by mission hospitals and the South African National Tuberculosis Association (SANTA). In the late 1960's SANTA operated thirty-four tuberculosis centers with a total of 7,220 beds, or two-thirds of those available for all tubercular patients. The state's Department of Health paid most of the cost of operating the centers, and local authorities provided the remaining funds. In addition to detecting and treating the disease, SANTA also provided postconfinements care to prevent recurrences. Sheltered employment was provided when possible for all chronic cases to assure that treatment was not hampered by adverse living conditions.

High-quality research in the nation's leading medical centers minimized many diseases that were once endemic to the country. By the late 1960's the incidence of malaria had been greatly reduced by spraying techniques, although some cases still occurred in a small area of northern Transvaal Province. Sleeping sickness rates also had diminished rapidly. The only endemic disease that had not been brought under control in 1970 was bilharzia, a debilitating disorder caused by blood parasites that often led to cancer in untreated victims.

Folk Medicine

Modern medicine was fully accepted by most nonwhites who had been educated in urban schools where medical facilities were available. Many African migratory workers and a small percentage of the lower income and less educated Asians and Coloureds still relied to some extent on the services of tradition-oriented practices of folk medicine for their ailments and sought Western medical assistance only as a last resort.

The outlook of many tradition-oriented Africans was dominated by a belief in the power of ancestors and of good and evil magicians. Good fortune was usually interpreted as an indication of ancestral benevolence, aided, when necessary, by the herbal specialists, or isinyanga. Any misfortune, such as sickness, was blamed on ancestral anger or the machinations of evildoers, such as witches and sorcerers known as batakati. Believers turned to the diviner, or isangoma, to diagnose the cause of misfortunes and to prescribe the cures. To overcome or counteract witchcraft, the various tribal specialists employed a variety of medicomagical techniques. Tradition-oriented Africans believed that the ancestors stopped short of killing their victims; no such belief, however, inhibited the witches or sorcerers.

The medical value of the herbal potions and salves used in traditional remedies was uncertain. Some practices had proven to be
useful, and most nonwhites had their own home cures for various ailments. Others were ineffective and extremely dangerous to persons with serious diseases or other disorders. In cases of psychological origin or with psychological complications, the efforts of African specialists often had therapeutic effects even when their medicines were biochemically ineffective.

Although the reliance on ancestral cult tended to decline in the towns and cities, belief in magic and witchdoctors persisted among many rural Africans and in urban areas. Inaccessibility of modern medical facilities and lack of education contributed to the continuation of these beliefs. Largely because of traditional reliance on supernatural powers to cure illness, most Africans were susceptible to the claims of patent medicine, many of which were sold by Indian merchants.

Medical Services

In early 1970 control and administration of medical and public health services were the responsibility of the central Department of Health, the four provincial councils, and more than 700 local authorities. The department was responsible for the promotion of health and the control of infectious and communicable diseases. It provided advice and funds to assist in the medical and health services furnished by provincial administrations, local authorities, missions, and voluntary organizations.

The ministry employed full- and part-time district doctors in urban and rural areas to give medical care to patients who could not afford to consult private practitioners. These doctors provided medical services in numerous public health outpatient clinics spread throughout the country and were the initial source of medical attention for most nonwhites. They were controlled by the provincial councils and the municipalities. A number of similar clinics were operated by various private welfare groups. Medical and paramedical staffs treated minor ailments and injuries, organized immunization campaigns, performed prenatal and postnatal services, gave advice on health problems, investigated outbreaks of contagious diseases, conducted public health campaigns, and referred patients with serious illnesses and injuries to hospitals for further treatment.

The Department of Health operated hospitals for the mentally ill, tuberculosis sanitoriums, and leprosariums. It administered malaria control programs, and its medical inspectors ensured that health services provided by local authorities and other groups were properly run.

The four provincial administrations operated general hospitals with outpatient services in addition to the clinics, and clinic health and medical personnel were trained at these facilities. The provinces also provided district nursing and midwife services to rural areas,
supervised the health functions of local authorities, and gave physical examinations to schoolchildren. The Department of Bantu Administration and Development assisted the provinces in fulfilling their health responsibilities by building and equipping general hospitals in rural African areas.

Local authorities, assisted by state subsidies, operated infectious disease hospitals, outpatient services in nonwhite townships, and clinics providing prenatal care, pediatric services, and outpatient treatment of tuberculosis and venereal diseases. Local authorities were also responsible for environmental health services such as clean water supplies, sanitary services, and the inspection and certification of food handlers.

With the aid of state subsidies, mission societies provided general hospitals for nonwhites and trained nonwhite nurses and midwives. SANTA operated settlements for tubercular nonwhites. In addition to the government-supported medical institutions, a large number of private nursing homes, maternity homes, and sanitoriums were available. Many of the nation's doctors had private practices and were available to patients who were able to pay for their services.

The Chamber of Mines and a number of industrial firms maintained hospitals for their employees financed by health plans to which both employer and employee contributed weekly amounts of money. When a worker was injured on the job, all reasonable medical expenses were met from a central fund. Several trade unions had established medical benefit societies and employed doctors to treat their members.

According to the latest available government statistics (1962), the country had a total of 717 hospitals. Included were 410 general hospitals, 97 tuberculosis sanitoriums, 88 maternity homes, 60 nursing homes for the aged and infirm, 15 institutions specializing in various infectious diseases, 12 hospitals devoted to care of industrial casualties, 11 orthopedic hospitals, and 24 that specialized in a variety of specific disorders. Fifteen of the latter category were mental institutions and 4 were leprosariums. The total number of medical facilities included 24 government-operated public health institutions, 121 private hospitals, 104 mining and other industrial hospitals, 119 operated by various religious groups, and 127 sponsored by nongovernment welfare organizations.

Except for a few hospitals, admission of patients was governed by the official policy of racial separation. A notable exception to this standard rule was Cape Town's Red Cross War Memorial Children's Hospital where specialized facilities were available to children of all ethnic groups. In addition to inpatient care, the Cape Town hospital operated an outpatient service that handled over 1,000 patients daily. Facilities were crowded, but the institution was staffed by full-time general practitioners, surgeons, interns, dentists, speech
therapists, physiotherapists, orthodontists, radiographers, dieticians, social welfare workers, and schoolteachers for long-term patients.

A total of 1,988,059 hospital beds were available in the nation's hospitals: 593,857 for whites, 128,171 for Coloureds, 40,082 for Asians, and 1,225,949 for Africans. The white group had easier access to hospital facilities; at the same time, official statistics noted that nonwhites had at their disposal nearly six beds for every 1,000 of its population compared with the accepted World Health Organization (WHO) standard of five beds for every 1,000 people.

All public health institutions were financed by taxes and nominal fees paid by patients. Nonwhite outpatients were charged R0.25 for each visit to the outpatient department of public health service hospitals. The fee included any medicine prescribed. Inpatients paid R0.05 on admission, regardless of whether it was for a major operation or treatment of a minor ailment. Treatment by medical specialists and all medicines were free of charge.

Most major hospitals were in the country's largest cities, although in 1968 the Department of Bantu Administration and Development announced a policy of siting all new hospitals for Africans inside the native reserves. With the opening of new medical facilities, African hospitals in white areas would be reclassified and would not accept African patients. The program for new African hospital construction had produced five institutions with 4,300 beds in reserves since 1965, and three more with a total of 1,000 beds were being constructed in 1968.

The largest hospital in Africa was Baragwanath, seven miles south of Johannesburg. It provided medical services to over 500,000 nonwhite citizens of the Witwatersrand region. The installation had 2,500 beds and ten operating theaters. Patients were attended by 216 doctors, nearly half of whom were specialists, and 1,200 African nurses. Twenty-four of the doctors were nonwhite. The hospital was a major training center for nonwhite nurses. Approximately 60,000 patients were treated there each year, and an average of 1,200 surgical operations were performed every month.

There were nearly 6,000 beds for whites and over 8,500 for nonwhites in the nation's mental hospitals. During the late 1960's about 12,000 persons were admitted to these institutions for treatment and, according to government statistics, 11,000 had been returned to community life. Although much had been done in the field of mental health, the incidence of mental illness had created some problems in treatment. There was no shortage of hospital accommodation for white mental patients in 1967, but a considerable lack of beds for nonwhites existed. During 1966, 330 white and 4,469 nonwhite mental patients awaiting admission to hospitals had to be accommodated temporarily in police cells for an average period of nine days until hospital space became available.
nonwhites were released by the police when it became apparent that their condition was due to the use of marijuana and other drugs. Although use of temporary police facilities was subsequently abandoned, a shortage of beds in mental hospitals often resulted in patients being discharged before they were fully cured in order to make room for more acute cases.

A number of major hospitals were noted for their work in medical research, and the achievements of their medical specialists were internationally recognized. Much of the research was conducted at hospitals connected with colleges and universities, such as the work of Dr. Christian Barnard, a noted heart surgeon, who pioneered in the field of human heart transplants at the University of Cape Town's Groote Schuur Hospital in 1967. Research in vaccines had produced a number that were employed against prevalent local diseases. A notable example was the development of a vaccine to immunize against trachoma.

In 1967 medical, dental, and paramedical personnel throughout the country totaled 85,764. The ratio of doctors to inhabitants was approximately 1 to 1,600 and for dentists 1 to 13,000. Of the 11,879 doctors, 160 were nonwhite; 4 nonwhite dentists were included among the 1,455 who provided dental treatment. Few nonwhites entered the medical and dental professions, and for many the obstacles to education were insurmountable (see ch. 9, Education).

Medical and dental training were provided at the universities of Cape Town, Natal, Pretoria, Stellenbosch, and the Witwatersrand. In 1967, 3,713 students were enrolled in medical schools. The total enrollment comprised 3,137 whites, 131 Coloureds, 312 Asians, and 133 Africans. The graduation class of 387 was composed of 328 whites, 17 Coloureds, 31 Asians, and 11 Africans. A number of the medical schools accepted students from the white, Coloured, and Asian groups. African medical students attended the University of Natal, as did most other nonwhite medical students.

Training of African women as nurses began at the Victoria Mission Hospital at Loveday, Cape Province, in 1903. In 1970 there were nearly 100 training schools for African nurses and midwives. The curriculum included courses in surgical assistance, orthopedic care, pediatrics, anesthesia, ophthalmic nursing, intensive nursing procedure, and maternity care. Auxiliary male and female nurses were trained at 62 nursing schools. Separate courses were offered to nurses wishing to practice in mental hospitals.

For many living below subsistence levels, even the nominal fees charged by the public health services were a deterrent to obtaining medical attention for illness. Most hospital outpatient departments operated with inadequate staffs to handle the large numbers of patients. Nonwhite clinics in group areas had a single doctor who
saw hundreds of patients in a long working day. Waiting time for sick people was lengthy, and many often departed before seeing the doctor.

Owing to separate development policies, several African doctors with specialist degrees had left the country to practice elsewhere because the government restricted their practices to those of general practitioners in African group areas. A number of doctors had voiced objections to segregation in the field of health, including the prominent Dr. Barnard, who, despite his Afrikaner origin, had begun in 1969 to criticize openly the government’s rules for medical practice (see ch. 18, Political Values and Attitudes).

SOCIAL WELFARE

In traditional African society, assistance was a function of extended family relationship. In times of need, an individual expected to rely on his tribal group for aid, and in turn he assisted those of his lineage. These patterns, however, were largely inoperative among the masses of Africans who had migrated to South African cities and industrial areas, where family ties were disrupted. Although the traditional system still prevailed among many living in the reserves, assistance to indigent urban dwellers had become a problem of society in general.

Although the country was not a welfare state in 1970, numerous welfare services were provided by national, provincial, and local authorities and by a variety of private organizations. The Department of Social Welfare administered programs that dealt with pensions, relief for the indigent, family allowances, protection of children, adoptions, juvenile delinquency, and probationary services. Through national legislation requiring the registration of all nongovernmental welfare organizations, the National Council for Welfare Organizations and various local councils coordinated the voluntary work of over 2,000 private welfare groups. Some received subsidies from state and local government funds. Included among the nongovernmental groups were organizations devoted to the care of the crippled, the blind, the deaf, the mentally ill, unwed mothers, children, and indigent families. Most religious denominations provided relief and family welfare services, and pension funds had been established by the railways, commercial firms, and the mining industry for the protection of employees and their families. At provincial and municipal levels, welfare was connected with most public health, education, and recreation programs.

With a few exceptions, welfare work was performed among all ethnic groups. Most voluntary and professional workers were white, but the number of African social workers was increasing. Before 1959 Africans trained at Johannesburg’s Jan Hofmeyr School for
Social Work and subsequently at the Bantu University colleges. A number of Coloured and Asian social workers assisted in the programs among their respective peoples. In 1966 the government notified all registered welfare organizations that it was opposed to multiracial groups and that separate welfare societies were to be established for the nonwhite races. Faced with the possibility of losing government subsidies, most welfare organizations complied with this policy. A number of welfare agencies that catered to nonwhites were closed because their locations were redesignated for other ethnic groups under the Group Areas Act.

In 1968, 584,300 persons received assistance from government welfare agencies. Nearly 80 percent were men over sixty-five years of age and women over sixty, who were granted social security pensions, the cost of which was entirely government funded. Those qualifying for old-age pensions had to be residents for the previous five years. The amounts of pensions were determined by a means test that established levels of "free" incomes for each ethnic group. Eligible persons with incomes below the amount stipulated qualified for the entire allowable amount. Those with incomes above the "free" amount received progressively reduced pensions. In 1966 an amendment to the Pension Laws Act granted annual bonuses of R24 to all white persons receiving old-age, blind, or disability pensions. These provisions were not extended to those of other ethnic groups.

In 1968 nearly 60 percent of all old-age pensioners were Africans, and they received 18 percent of all money paid for assistance of the elderly. White persons, who constituted about 24 percent of all old-age pensioners, received over 61 percent of the budgeted funds. Coloured and Asian persons received amounts somewhere between these extremes.

Family allowances or maintenance grants were available to all racial groups except Africans. Families of three or more children under sixteen years of age were eligible if the father was unemployed and family income from all sources did not exceed R1,392 annually in the case of whites of R360 for Coloureds and Asians. Disability pensions were paid to persons of all groups who were incapacitated for adequate self-support. In addition to having a disability, qualifying applicants had to be citizens for the previous ten years, and pensions were subject to the same means test as those for old age. In 1968 approximately 80 percent of all pensions for blindness were granted to Africans. Survivor pensions for the maintenance of fatherless children were determined by the total amount of family income and the number of children involved.

War veteran pensions were paid to 22,517 persons. Of this number, 19,745 pensioners were white and 2,772 were Coloured or Asian. African ex-servicemen did not receive compensation until
1966 when 351 veterans were granted monthly pensions of R42.45 each.

Under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, most employees received payments in event of injury on the job. Provisions of the act did not apply to agricultural workers unless they were injured while using powered machinery, or to alluvial miners unless their injuries resulted from the use of similar equipment or explosives. Others excluded from the program were domestic servants, casual workers, and anyone earning more than R3,120 annually. Costs of the program were paid by employers through insurance premiums that varied with the occupational risk involved. Compensation granted to injured employees extended to survivors in the event of a worker’s death. Medical expenses were paid for periods not exceeding two years, although further medical or surgical treatment was often provided.

Employers initiated all claims actions, but workmen often could not be located when claims were granted. Unclaimed funds were placed in a special account, and the names of workers concerned were published in the Government Gazette. Lists published in 1967 and 1968 contained the names of 19,200 injured workers for whom money was available; 80 percent were Africans. The total amount of money involved was R1,365,131. When money due white, Coloured, or Asian workers was unclaimed, letters were sent to the person’s last known address. Many Africans did not receive money to which they were entitled because employers often did not maintain proper records of their employees despite statutory requirements, and few kept records that indicated an African’s next of kin.

Unemployment compensation was payable to employees in industry and commerce who earned R2,860 or less. It was not available to domestic servants, public employees, agricultural workers, employees in rural areas other than those employed in factories, African mineworkers, and all Africans earning less than R546 annually. Workers paid 0.5 percent of their earnings, employers contributed 0.5 percent of their payrolls, and the state provided funds equal to 25 percent of the contributions from insured persons and their employers. Full-wage benefits for a maximum of thirteen weeks a year were payable to eligible insured workers.

In 1968 the Department of Labor operated thirteen sheltered workshops organized to provide training for the physically handicapped. Crippled persons were given medical treatment, taught to use their orthopedic appliances, and trained to secure jobs in the open labor market. Those unable to secure jobs were employed at a factory on bead and felt work, sewing, knitting, and contract work for industrial firms.

Accommodations for the elderly and infirm included: 190 state-aided homes accommodating 12,600 white persons; 5 homes that
provided shelter for 405 Coloureds; and 2 for Asians with beds for 54 persons. For Africans there were 12 state-aided homes, 10 of which were located in the reserves. They accommodated a total of 850 Africans, who were admitted if destitute. A moderate number of private homes for the aged were operated by mission and religious organizations, and many private institutions were available to whites.

The Department of Bantu Administration and Development operated fourteen state-subsidized homes for derelict children, a home for boys with behavior problems, four youth camps for boys convicted of Criminal Procedure Act offenses, and one similar camp for girls. The department subsidized six workshops for blind Africans, administered a training program for the deaf, and operated an institution where the crippled were taught to process fiber. A single day center for mentally retarded African children in Soweto recorded musical records and sold them to raise funds for the establishment of similar centers elsewhere.

LEISURE

The use of leisure time was as varied as the living patterns that existed among the nation's four official racial groups. For traditional Africans in the reserves, daily gatherings of men sitting and talking were regarded as part of male responsibilities in the tribal way of life. These gatherings were occasions for discussing community affairs, settling disputes, conducting business transactions, and perpetuating tribal traditions. Dancing and singing in this traditional setting were less a leisure activity than an important aspect of social and religious ritual (see ch. 11, Religion).

For those of the population who labored in the urbanized industrial sectors, leisure activity meant time spent away from a job and the opportunity to relax in favored pastimes. The degree of relaxation and pleasure derived from leisure activity usually depended on a person's racial affiliation, and the rules of separate development often determined the availability of leisure-time facilities. For many in lower income groups, leisure was a time of aimless inactivity or those periods when jobs were not available.

The modern sector of the nation celebrated twelve statutory public holidays: New Year's Day, Van Riebeek Day (April 6), Good Friday, Easter Monday, Ascension Day, Republic Day (May 31), Family Day (second Monday in July), Settlers' Day (first Monday in September), Kruger Day (October 10), Day of the Covenant (December 16), Christmas Day, and Boxing Day (December 26). Although most persons observed all of these occasions with vacations from their job, a number were ethnically inspired, and their observance was limited to those who considered the event commemorated of great value. For example, few Africans regarded the
Day of the Covenant as a time to celebrate, although it reminded Afrikaners of the Battle of Blood River in 1838 when the Boers decisively defeated thousands of Zulu tribesmen (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

Businesses closed at 5 P.M. on weekdays and at noon on Saturdays, and these leisure hours in addition to the numerous public holidays provided the population with ample opportunities for relaxation. Social events such as cocktail, bridge, and dinner parties were standard forms of entertainment among those of higher incomes. Dancing, swimming, and tennis were popular forms of relaxation. All groups patronized motion picture theaters known locally as the “bioscope.” Concerts, nightclubs, and dining at hotels or restaurants attracted those who could afford these forms of leisure activity. On weekends and holidays, large numbers of city dwellers frequented the country’s numerous segregated beaches and picnic spots or visited friends on nearby farms. Many wealthy white urbanites owned farms and spent their leisure time there. Touring the country’s scenic attractions, national parks, and game reserves was common for long weekends, and many spent their holidays abroad.

Most of the nonwhite groups spent some of their leisure time in activities organized specifically for their own people. The Indians of Durban gathered for an annual sports day, which featured a beauty contest, a fashion show, and a sports contest that included a race run by sari-clad women. Members of Cape Town’s Coloured population gathered in large numbers each New Year’s Day to witness the parade of costumed marchers at the annual Coon Carnival and to indulge in the revelry of the Mardi Gras atmosphere. Africans and many white tourists were attracted to the frequent mine dances sponsored by the mining industry. On these occasions African ceremonial dancers, who worked as miners, performed traditional African dances accompanied by tribal musicians and instruments. The dances were a favored competition between mining companies, and they entertained many miners who had little else to do with their spare time. The government regarded the mine dance celebrations as a means of preserving tribal individuality.

The mild climate favored a wide variety of outdoor sports, and all ethnic groups were enthusiastic participants in this form of leisure activity. Rugby football was the national sport, but soccer, tennis, cricket, lawn bowling, golf, and baseball were also favored sports. Horse racing was a popular event for all groups, and for the more affluent white citizens it was also a favored social experience and hobby. Most ethnic groups had adopted Western sports, and young boys played soccer in the fields near their tribal kraals. A sport known as *jukskei* and played almost exclusively by Afrikaners originated during the pioneering days of the Voortrekkers. The game resembled deck quoits and was played with wooden pegs.
representing those in the early ox yokes that were used in games at the end of a day’s journey.

Although much of the population enjoyed many of the same forms of leisure activity, the rules of separate development also applied to most forms of entertainment. In 1958, under the Group Areas Act, proclamations regarding the “occupation of premises” by various ethnic groups were extended to film theaters (see ch. 17, Public Information). Nonwhites could not attend theaters in a white district without a special permit, and whites were not permitted to attend performances in nonwhite areas. In 1965 a presidential proclamation extended the mixed-audience ban to sports events and all forms of entertainment except when the government granted permission.

Nonwhite entertainers could seldom perform in public halls or in hotels where white guests were present. Permits usually were denied to all but established entertainment groups. It was no longer possible for the white Johannesburg Symphony Orchestra to accompany massed African choirs singing in a public hall. White charitable organizations could not organize concerts with white entertainers to perform for handicapped nonwhite children. Most foreign entertainment groups excluded South Africa from their tour itineraries.

The 1965 proclamation did not affect interracial entertainment if only invited guests were admitted to privately owned premises. Under the Liquor Act, however, whites could not offer alcoholic beverages to Africans. Until 1962 the sale of liquor to Africans was also prohibited, and after that date this group could legally obtain it only from government package stores.

The rules for apartheid in sports covered five different but related issues. Whites and nonwhites could not play on mixed teams; interracial competition in sports was prohibited; nonwhite players could not participate on sports fields located in white districts without a government permit; national rules of segregation in sports also extended to foreign teams visiting South Africa; and mixed audiences at sporting events were prohibited except by government permit.

International reactions to South Africa’s sports policies generally were unfavorable. The International Olympic Committee withdrew its invitation to participate in the 1964 Olympic Games in Tokyo, and in 1968 South African athletes were banned from the Mexico Olympic Games. The country was asked to withdraw from the International Football Association, and the International Table Tennis Federation refused to recognize the all-white South African Table Tennis Association. South African tennis players were refused permission to compete in the Davis Cup matches. A number of foreign sports associations also adopted self-imposed bans on competition in South Africa. Interracial West Indian and British cricket teams and Brazilian rugby teams refused to visit South Africa.
CHAPTER 9
EDUCATION

The overall school system is largely patterned on that of Great Britain but is divided into four component systems each serving members of a separate racial category—African, Coloured, Asian (Indian), and white. Each component is essentially complete in itself and comprises primary schools, academic, vocational and technical secondary and high schools, teacher training institutions, and institutions of higher education.

Administrative control of the four divisions is vested in different governmental agencies. The provincial governments play a major role in primary and secondary education for whites and white teacher training. The central government concerns itself with white advanced technical and higher education and also determines general educational policy for whites throughout the system.

The education of Coloureds and Indians is in the hands of the central government in separate departments: the Department of Coloured Affairs and the Department of Indian Affairs. They control education for students in their respective racial categories from primary through higher education with certain exceptions, notably in Cape Province and the Transvaal where Indian students also attend Coloured schools. African education is administered by the Department of Bantu Education in the central government.

Although large numbers of children from all racial groups were entering school, the eventual grade level reached varied greatly. In the case of Africans only about one-half the children entering the lowest primary grade reached the fourth primary school year, completion of which was considered a minimum for the acquisition of functional literacy. Only one-quarter reached the final year of primary school, and only one-tenth entered secondary school. The principal government emphasis in African education has been on primary education at the lower level and the development of mass literacy.

In 1967 African students in secondary classes constituted less than 4 percent of the African school population. By comparison more than 30 percent of white students were in secondary classes. In the case of Indian students, about 20 percent in Natal and close to 30 percent in Transvaal were in secondary school. Coloured
students, who have a relatively high dropout rate, had less than 10 percent in secondary work.

The statutory financing of education varies for the different racial groups. For whites, expenditures are about equally financed by provincial and central governments with respect to primary and secondary education and teacher training. Higher education is supported by the central government. African education is financed in part by the central government, in part by direct taxation of Africans. There is, additionally, a large but unknown amount paid out for education by African parents from voluntary contributions made to supplement statutory funds. Education for Coloureds and Indians is financed almost entirely by the central government. During the latter half of the 1960's roughly R325 million to R350 million (1 rand equals US$1.40) was expended annually on education. Some three-quarters of the total expenditure was for white education; about one-tenth was for Coloured; one-tenth was for African education; and about one-twentieth was for Indian education.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Organized schools were established early in the history of the Cape Colony, largely as the result of the Dutch Reformed Church's requirement that communicants be able to read. By the 1700's there were a number of elementary schools run by parish clerks. Farmers also engaged traveling tutors (meesters) to conduct schools for their children. Education was limited to the fundamentals of reading, writing, and arithmetic, and little interest existed beyond that level. A Latin high school established in 1714 ceased to function in 1742 because of a shortage of students.

A detailed program for a system of elementary, secondary, and teacher training schools developed in 1805 was interrupted by the British takeover in 1806 (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). The British, in an effort to spread the use of English, extended the school system to the country areas. By 1827, twenty-six such schools were in operation in country districts.

The English-medium schools in the Cape Colony failed to meet the needs of the largely Afrikaner rural population, partly because of the language medium used and partly because of lack of textual relevance to country life. Attendance declined gradually. To counteract this the government in 1843 started financial assistance to third class rural schools, many of which were attended by Afrikaans-speaking children. In 1863 the Cape Colony superintendent general of education found that few students in the aided schools were proficient in English. In 1865 all first and second class schools were directed to use English, whereas third class schools...
were given one year to conform to the ruling. The directive was largely ignored in the third class schools, and Afrikaans remained the principal medium in most of these schools, which increased in number from 61 in 1863 to 168 in 1887. The directive did result, however, in Afrikaans being largely eliminated as the language medium in schools in the larger towns and in secondary education.

Education of Africans by Europeans started at the beginning of the 1800's. Missionary stations were established in the Eastern Cape where they taught the Xhosa to read and write. Other stations were established in the area of Natal among the Nguni. In 1841 the Lovedale seminary to train African teachers was founded in the Eastern Cape. Financial assistance was given to these schools by the government, which considered their work as valuable in pacification of the African areas.

The mission schools in Cape Colony and Natal originally had no color bar, and white, Coloured, and African children often attended the same school. In public schools in the Cape Colony, white and Coloured children commonly went to the same schools for the early grades. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, however, separate schools gradually developed for whites, whereas education of Coloured students was carried out by mission schools. In the Orange Free State and South African Republic (Transvaal), there was separate education for white and African pupils from the start, although Coloured children of lighter complexion could be found attending white schools. By 1910, the year of union, it was general practice in all four provinces for white and nonwhite children to attend different schools. Those for white pupils were financed and administered by the provinces, whereas nonwhite schools were operated by the missions with state aid.

In the late nineteenth century, the question of language medium became a subject of considerable controversy in the white population. In the urban areas this population was largely English speaking, and instruction was predominantly in English. Moreover, after the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), many teachers were brought from Great Britain. Few of them learned Afrikaans, and Afrikaans-speaking children were mostly taught in English. Many Afrikaners demanded instruction in their mother tongue but, for financial reasons in considerable part, the state was unable to introduce bilingualism in the schools or set up separate unilingual ones.

By 1940, however, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, which were dominated by Afrikaners, had made use of the mother tongue compulsory in primary schools. The medium to be used in secondary schools was left to a decision by parents or local conditions.

Since the 1948 political victory of the Nationalist Party, which has been a strong advocate of unilingual schools, mother-tongue
instruction has also been made compulsory in secondary schools, through matriculation, in the Transvaal and Orange Free State and in Cape Province from the primary school through Standard VIII in the secondary school. In these provinces, provincial officials decide the mother tongue of the child. Only in Natal do parents have this right. The second official language is taught essentially as a foreign language in the mother-tongue school. Upon completion of secondary school, students are expected, however, to be proficient in both official languages.

Underlying nationalist Afrikaner insistence upon mother-tongue instruction was the educational philosophy known as Christian National Education (CNE), which has been unofficially implemented as educational policy. CNE's principal thesis is that all peoples have their own distinctive culture, which education must aim at strengthening. As applied to the education of Afrikaner children, the term Christian means an outlook on life and the world founded on the Holy Scripture and the articles of faith of the Dutch Reformed churches, which are basically fundamentalist and authoritarian in outlook (see ch. 11, Religion). National is defined as love of one's own things, including country, language, history, and culture. All school subjects—religion, geography, history, science, and other topics—are to be taught in the spirit of and in line with these concepts.

A version of CNE was advocated at the end of the Anglo-Boer War by the Dutch Reformed churches in an effort to raise the morale of the defeated Afrikaners. It was then primarily a demand for separate state-aided church schools where Afrikaner children could be taught Calvinist doctrine and instruction carried out in the Dutch language. The effort was unsuccessful; however, agitation for CNE gradually subsided, as the churches grew increasingly influential on school committees. The idea of CNE was revived during the conflict over language-medium use in the 1940's, by the most conservative of the Dutch Reformed churches, the Gereformeerde Kerk.

The current, more extensive and stronger CNE program was actually drawn up by the Federation of Afrikaner Cultural Organizations (Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings), and made public in 1948. Protests from various educational groups and the general public were widely voiced at that time. Afrikaner teachers' associations, however, supported the program, as did the Afrikaner press, although prominent individual Afrikaners expressed opposition. The Nationalist Party has disavowed on occasion that CNE is official party policy, but CNE has gained strength with the party's successive victories, and CNE principals have been adopted in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. They also exercise considerable influence in parts of Cape Province. On the other hand, Natal has refused to accept CNE.
Under CNE the control of education in primary and secondary schools belongs to the parents, as organized groups, that is in bodies such as school committees. These bodies nominate the teachers and supervise their teaching. The spirit and trend of education are overseen by the churches, although academic standards and a good portion of the financing of education are considered the responsibility of the state. School committees now exist in all provinces except Natal. Most of the small towns in Cape Province, the Orange Free State, and the Transvaal have Afrikaans-medium schools. In these towns the local Dutch Reformed Church predikant (preacher) is usually the school committee chairman, and the concepts of CNE are an overriding force. In the view of some observers, the emphasis on CNE was beginning to isolate students in such schools from the mainstream of modern Western thought.

The concepts of CNE are significant to an understanding of the current educational policies of the Nationalist government with respect to nonwhites. According to the 1948 CNE program the whites are the guardians of the nonwhites. This trusteeship imposes on the Afrikaner, in particular, a solemn duty to see that nonwhites are educated in accordance with CNE principles. In the case of the Coloured people, they should be made race conscious through strict application of apartheid in education. Mother-tongue instruction was also stressed for Coloureds—a large majority of whom use Afrikaans as the home language (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

CNE maintains that the educational system for Africans should be based on the principles of trusteeship and segregation, and that the African should not be placed on the level of the whites. African education, however, should be based on a European life and world view, in particular that of the Afrikaner nation as the senior guardian. Complete acceptance was not the aim. Education should bring about development in the African of his own interpretation and acceptance of Christian and national values. It should lead to a self-supporting African community capable of providing for itself in all ways. The mother tongue should also be the basis for instruction and education, although the official languages should be learned as the means to cultural advancement. Teaching and teacher training must be carried out by Africans themselves, under the control and guidance of the state. In this process, however, African education must not be at the expense of white education.

ADMINISTRATION

African Education

Before 1954 most of the schools providing education for African children were under the direct supervision and management of private religious groups and missions. Many of these were state subsi-
dized. Control of state-aided schools was jointly exercised by provincial education departments and the churches. Some schools for Africans were run by the provinces, and various tribal and African community groups supported others. In Natal, the Orange Free State, and the Transvaal there were departments of native education that dealt specifically with African education. In Cape Province control was vested in an education department that handled education for all races.

In January 1949 the recently elected Nationalist government appointed a Commission on Native Education. Known as the Eiselin Commission, this body was charged with the formulation of principles and aims for education for Africans. The commission was instructed to view Africans as an independent race. In its investigation it was to give due consideration to their past and present history, racial qualities, distinctive characteristics and aptitudes, and to their needs in view of changing social conditions. The commission was also directed to look into the extent to which the existing primary, secondary, and vocational education systems for Africans, and African teacher training, needed to be modified in order to bring the system into line with the principles and aims proposed and to prepare Africans more effectively for their future occupations. The organization and administration of African education were also to be considered.

The commission’s main recommendations, submitted in 1951, were that African education should be placed under the administration of a department of the central government; that there should be integration with other government measures to raise the level of African life; and that African communities should gradually assume local control of schools from the missions. These recommendations were incorporated in the Bantu Education Act No. 47 of 1953. This act and subsequent amendments, however, provided only a broad outline for the proposed system of education. Implementation was left to the responsible minister, who was given wide powers to issue regulations concerning school control, syllabi, instructional media, conditions of service of teachers, funds, and other matters. Actual control of African education, except for technical, special, and higher education, was vested by the act in a Division of Bantu Education in what was then the Department of Native Affairs.

Existing provincial schools for Africans were transferred to the central government in 1954 under terms of the act. In 1954, also, the Department of Native Affairs notified state-aided primary and secondary mission schools—most of the 5,665 African schools then in operation were in this category—that subsidies would be reduced and cease completely from 1958. The government offered to buy or rent these schools. Many church groups for financial reasons de-
cided to accept the offer, the alternative in most cases being closing of the schools, loss of employment for teachers, and lack of opportunity for education by many students. The major exception were the schools of the Roman Catholic Church, which decided to operate independently. In 1966, 472 of these were still in operation.

In 1954 the department informed teacher training institutions, most of which were also mission operated, that the government would conduct training of teachers for state and state-aided schools. Again the offer to buy or rent existing facilities was made.

In October 1958 administration of African education was removed from control of the Department of Native Affairs, and a separate Department of Bantu Education was established, headed by a cabinet minister. In 1966 a single minister was appointed as head of both the Department of Bantu Education and the Department of Bantu Administration and Development, with deputy ministers in direct charge of each department.

In 1969 the Department of Bantu Education was functioning through a number of regional offices whose locations were determined largely by ethnic considerations. They included the Northern Transvaal office in Pietersburg, concerned with the North Sotho, Tsonga, and Venda language groups; Southern Transvaal, headquartered in Pretoria, dealing mainly with the Tswana; Orange Free State office, located in Bloemfontein, but also covering the Northern Cape, which deals with South Sotho and Tswana; Natal office in Pietermaritzburg, which handles the Zulu language groups; and the Ciskei office at King William’s Town, dealing with the Xhosa-language group outside the Transkei.

The head of the Department of Bantu Education is aided by an Advisory Board for Bantu Education established originally in 1963. The board consists of Africans appointed by the minister. Seven members are picked in consultation with territorial and regional authorities to represent the principal African language groups. Eight others are appointed to represent African school boards, church groups, the African university colleges, and training and other schools.

Control of local African community schools, those schools acquired from missions and churches, is exercised through school boards and committees. Approval of the Department of Bantu Education is required for the members of these bodies. In rural areas all members are appointed by the government or local African authority. In urban areas, however, some members are chosen by parents. The principal functions of the school board are: to establish, maintain, and control schools; to employ teachers for the schools under its jurisdiction; to control, maintain, and allocate equipment; to supervise school funds; and to investigate complaints. Prior approval of the department is required in the appointment of
teachers. Board members who vote for appointments without such approval are held personally liable for the teacher's salary.

The board in rural areas that have regional or district African authorities consists of eight members. The chairman and vice chairman are appointed by the African authority, which also selects two members from parents on school committees and two other individuals considered to have special qualifications. The remaining two are appointed by the department and represent religious or other interests. Where no African authority exists or where more than one tribal group is found, the composition of the board may differ somewhat.

Boards in urban areas are larger. Six members are selected by the Department of Bantu Education, including the chairman, vice chairman, and four persons representing religious and other interests. Two or more members are appointed by the Bantu affairs commissioner, and the parents on school committees in the area elect four members from among their group.

School committees have responsibility for raising and managing school funds, for maintaining school buildings and grounds, and for advising school boards with respect to teacher appointments and efficiency of school operations. They also have the right to expel pupils when necessary. Committees in rural areas consist of seven members—five nominated by tribal authorities and two by the Department of Bantu Education. Two of the tribal nominees represent the tribal authority or chief, and three are picked from among parents. In urban areas parents elect four representatives; two or more are appointed by the Bantu affairs commissioner, and two are nominated by the department. Approval of nominees is required from the department, and any member may be expelled by the department or the entire committee dissolved.

There has been some criticism of the school board and committee system. There are complaints that the Department of Bantu Education maintains too much control and that all members of the two groups are not elected by popular vote. Too much also appears to be expected in the line of fund raising. The system in general, however, has been favorably accepted, and the department reported in 1966 that about 50,000 parents were actively participating in school affairs. The increased participation by parents has been described by the South African Institute of Race Relations as one of the gratifying aspects of the African educational system.

Another category of school is the farm school established by farm owners for the children of employees. These are managed directly by the owner or his representative, who has full power to employ and dismiss teachers. Many of the managers are actually missionaries. There are also some mine and factory schools set up for the children of bona fide employees. Control is also in the hands of the employer or his representative.
White Education

The education of white students is controlled by the Department of National Education. The Educational Services Act, No. 41 of 1967, specified that the department was to control education for white students at the university level and in technical colleges, schools for handicapped pupils, industrial and reform schools, and educational services for whites no longer in the compulsory education system, such as apprentices and those taking continuation classes. Before passage of the act the department also directly controlled vocational and technical schools, including commercial and domestic science schools. Under the act, control of such schools was transferred to provincial authorities on April 1, 1968. The purpose of the shift was to give the provincial education departments, which control academic education, a greater ability to direct students into education suited to individual aptitudes than was possible when academic and vocational institutions were under separate direction. The type of training in these schools, however, may not be changed without approval of the minister.

Provincial governments exercise control over white education through education departments. These are headed by a director in Natal, the Orange Free State, and the Transvaal and by a superintendent general in Capt Province. The provincial education departments have responsibility for administering white primary, secondary, vocational education, and teacher training that is below the university level.

The minister of national education is authorized by the National Education Policy Act, No. 39 of 1967, to determine general policy with respect to white education in those primary and postprimary schools, through the secondary level, which are maintained, directed, controlled, or subsidized by the Department of National Education. This authority also applies to schools bearing a similar relationship to the provincial administrations. Independent private schools are not encompassed by the act.

The act established certain guiding principles for white education in primary and secondary schools. It was firstly to have a Christian and broad national character; however, the religious beliefs of parents and pupils with regard to religious instruction and ceremonies were to be respected. The inclusion of the terms Christian and national character aroused public concern at the time the legislation was under consideration, according to the South African Institute of Race Relations, because of their use in the CNE program published in 1948 by the Federation of Afrikaner Cultural Organizations. The minister of national education, however, gave assurance to the House of Assembly that there was no intention of imposing the CNE system.

The act stipulated that education was to be free, including books and stationery for full-time pupils in state and provincially con-
trolled schools, whose parents were citizens or who lived in South Africa. Either English or Afrikaans was to be used as the medium of instruction, depending on the mother tongue. Gradual adjustment was permitted if existing practices were at variance with the provision. Compulsory education requirements and school age limits were brought into uniformity, and syllabi, courses, examination standards, and research and planning were to be nationally coordinated. Some diversity was permitted, however, based upon particular circumstances. The act also provided for uniformity of conditions of employment and salaries of teachers. Parents' interests were recognized through their inclusion in a system of control or school boards. Also stipulated was that planning would take into consideration the views and recommendations of officially recognized teachers' associations.

In the formulation of policy the minister of national education is assisted by a National Advisory Education Council, originally established in 1962. Revision of the Council's makeup was made in the National Education Policy Act. The minister appoints all members, who include staff from the ministry and provinces, persons distinguished in the field of education, and others particularly qualified for any aspect of the council's work. The act also provides for a statutory Committee of Educational Heads to advise the minister and administrators of the provinces on ways to carry out national educational policy on a coordinated basis. The committee consists of provincial education department heads, and the director for higher education in the ministry, who acts as chairman.

School committees have limited local control of primary and secondary schools in Cape Province, the Orange Free State, and the Transvaal. These committees are elected by the parents. Their principal functions include the selection and appointment of teachers, subject to approval by the provincial education department. In Natal there are no committees, and school affairs are directly controlled by the education department.

Coloured and Asian Education

The education of both Coloured and Asian students was under provincial control until about the mid-1960's. The educational system included provincial schools, provincial-aided schools, and a number or private schools. At the beginning of 1964, under provisions of the Coloured Persons Education Act, No. 47 of 1963, control of Coloured education in Cape Province and the Transvaal was transferred to the Department of Coloured Affairs in the central government. A similar transfer was effected on April 1, 1964, for Natal and the Orange Free State.

The act provided for the establishment of an Education Council for Coloured Persons, regional education boards, and Coloured
school committees. The council, composed of Coloureds in the educational field, was set up in early 1964. It is essentially advisory in nature. Fifteen regional boards were established: ten in Cape Province, three in the Transvaal, one in Natal, and one in the Orange Free State. Their principal functions include advising the minister of Coloured affairs on new schools in their respective areas, staff appointments, and other educational matters. Board members are appointed in part by the minister and in part are elected by school committees.

The Indians Education Act, No. 61 of 1965, provided for a similar transfer of control of Indian education—Indians constitute close to 99 percent of the Asian population—from the provinces to the Department of Indian Affairs. The transfer was effected in Natal in 1966 and in the Transvaal in 1967. This included in the Transvaal mixed Coloured-Indian schools in which Indian pupils constituted a majority. Takeover did not occur in Cape Province where Indians attend Coloured schools. The department planned, however, to establish Indian schools in the province when separate group residential areas for Indians were set up. As in the school systems for other racial groups, pupils in the Indian primary and secondary schools learn both official languages. The minister of Indian affairs has stated, however, that the medium of instruction would be the one best understood in the area from which a school's population was drawn.

**PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION**

In accordance with the recommendations of the Eiselin Commission, the primary education system for Africans is divided into: a lower primary school of four years, comprising grades Sub-Standard A, Sub-Standard B, Standard I, and Standard II; a higher primary school (also of four years), comprising Standard III through Standard VI. Secondary education is five years for the full course and comprises Form I through Form V.

The educational system for whites, Coloureds, and Asians consists of seven primary grades, from Sub-Standard A through Standard V, and five secondary grades comprising Standard VI through Standard X. In all systems, some secondary schools offer only three years of instruction (Form I through Form III for Africans and Standard VI through Standard VIII for others) and are sometimes referred to as junior secondary schools. Others offer the full five years and are called high schools.

**Africans**

There were 2,229,556 students in primary and secondary schools in 1967, including about 350,000 students in the Transkei. Roughly
96 percent were in primary schools and slightly less than 4 percent in secondary and high schools (see table 9). Of the 8,902 primary schools, 2,888 were lower primary, 453 higher primary, and 4,044 combined primary schools; there were 1,517 primary schools in the Transkei. Secondary and high schools, including technical secondary schools and vocational schools, totaled 315; in addition, there were 63 secondary, high, and vocational training schools in the Transkei.

African children may enter Sub-Standard A at seven years of age, but the actual age of many pupils entering the first primary grade is higher. Median ages at entrance compiled by the Bureau of Statistics for 1962 were 8.69 years for boys and 8.55 years for girls.

The course of instruction in lower primary school is complete in itself and is intended to impart a fundamental education in reading, writing, and arithmetic. Pupils are acquainted with Afrikaans and English, as well as with religion, handicrafts, gardening, hygiene, and environmental subjects. The latter include history, geography, and nature studies, which are related in large part to the pupil's own local surroundings. The division into lower and higher primary schools has been based upon the fact that many pupils drop out in the early years of schooling. Pupils are urged to complete Standard II at least and, in order to encourage continued attendance, promotion is automatic to that grade. The government considers completion of Standard II as the absolute educational minimum for any practical benefit to the pupil or the community. At mid-1967 pupils in the lower primary school constituted 74.4 percent of all pupils in primary school.

In the substandard grades double sessions are used in many schools to meet the demand for space and permit larger numbers of pupils to attend school. In these cases there are two 3-hour sessions instead of a single 4½ hour regular session. In general, the same teacher is used for both sessions. The system was introduced in 1955 as a temporary measure, but it appears to have become a permanent feature. In 1967 almost 650,000, or 69 percent, of the pupils in Sub-Standard A and Sub-Standard B were attending such double sessions.

Higher primary schools, Standard III through VI, provide more intensive study of the subjects covered in the lower primary school, with some additions. An attempt is made to give a practical knowledge of English and Afrikaans. There is considerable emphasis on manual training. This is particularly true in primary schools established by white farmers for the children of their African employees. Weak students in Standards III through VI are allowed to repeat a class, but if still unable to attain the set level for passing they may be refused continuance in the school. External examinations, that is examinations given by authorities outside the school, are required
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Africans</th>
<th></th>
<th>Whites</th>
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<th>Coloureds</th>
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<td>19.91</td>
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<td>49,235</td>
<td>6.21</td>
<td>6,913</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>5,845</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>82,065</td>
<td>2.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form IV (Standard IX)</td>
<td>3,718</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>36,930</td>
<td>4.66</td>
<td>2,716</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>3,730</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>43,094</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form V (Standard X)</td>
<td>2,075</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>28,601</td>
<td>3.61</td>
<td>1,589</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>2,117</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>34,382</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class not specified</td>
<td>19,659</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>1,209</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>21,066</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>21,066</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>2,229,556</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>793,189</td>
<td>100.02</td>
<td>431,495</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>155,646</td>
<td>100.01</td>
<td>3,609,886</td>
<td>99.97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Does not include students in vocational and special schools and those taking secondary classes in technical colleges.
2 Percentage does not add to 100 because of rounding.
3 For Africans, Standards Sub-A through II constitute the lower primary school.
4 For Africans, Standard VI constitutes the final year of primary school. For whites, Coloureds, and Asians, Standard V is the final primary school class.
5 Secondary school classes are designated Forms in African schools and Standards for other racial groups.

upon completion of Standard VI. Passing grades must meet a minimum level for admission to secondary school. A school-leaving certificate is given to those who pass but do not reach this level.

The South African Institute of Race Relations has characterized the courses of instruction in both lower and higher primary schools as basically sound from the educational viewpoint, although it considered that in such subjects as history, geography, and handicrafts there was undue emphasis on tribal environment and the needs of rural pupils. There has been criticism, however, from both African and white sources of the use of the mother tongue as the medium of instruction throughout the entire primary school period. Since 1959, moreover, only Bantu languages may be used in Standard VI examinations.

Before enactment of the Bantu Education Act, the mother tongue was used for the first four to five years, with subsequent instruction being in an official language. Africans have pointed out that use of the mother tongue introduces intellectual restrictions, since the lexicons of Bantu languages are geared to a peasant community and limit the individual to the narrow bounds of his tribal society. The government has recognized the need for new terminologies and from time to time has published lists for the seven main languages of new terms describing modern scientific concepts as well as simplifications of mathematical terms. Other criticisms of mother-tongue use are that intercommunication among African groups is hampered by lack of a common medium; also that knowledge of an official language is a requisite in employment.

Although the government maintains that use of the mother tongue through primary school is for the benefit of the African, the use of mother tongues reinforces cultural and social attachments to the tribal group and is consistent with the official policy of fostering separate development. Some indication of the African attitude toward this question was the decision of the Transkei government in 1964 to gradually substitute either English or Afrikaans, depending upon parent preference, in Standard III in place of Xhosa as the medium of instruction.

Secondary education is divided into a course of three years, covering Form I through Form III, called the junior certificate course, and an additional two years, Form IV and Form V, designated the senior certificate course. In Form I all students take essentially the same course of instruction. Compulsory subjects, requiring examination, include three languages—one a Bantu language and the others, Afrikaans and English—arithmetic, social studies and general science, and optionally either agriculture, arts and crafts, home-crafts, or woodworking. Compulsory in Form I through Form III, but not requiring examination, are religious instruction, physical education, music, and singing.

Pupils who complete Form I successfully then select either an
academic course, which can lead to higher education, or a commercial, vocational, or technical course. Pupils unsuccessful in Form I are usually not allowed to repeat the grade. Compulsory for all courses in Form II and Form III are the three languages, social studies, and general arithmetic or mathematics. Other compulsory subjects relate to the course being taken.

The courses for the junior certificate follow the basic syllabi used in white secondary schools. Upon completion of Form III all candidates for a certificate are required to write an external examination. Since 1962 this examination has been prescribed by the Department of Bantu Education. Students then may go on to the two-year matriculation course; or technical or commercial courses for a senior certificate, offered through Form IV and Form V. The basic syllabi followed for these are also the same as the ones used for white students.

During 1966 new general basic syllabi were developed by the central government and provincial education departments designed to modernize courses of study and bring standards in secondary schools closer to those in the universities. They were also intended to form an adequate basis for the level of work demanded in Form V by the examinations of the Joint Matriculation Board. The new syllabi were introduced in African schools in Form I through Form III at the beginning of 1967; Form IV and Form V matriculation syllabi were to go into effect in 1970. Teachers' guides for the new syllabi have been issued by the Department of Bantu Education, in particular for the "new" arithmetic and science subjects.

The number of candidates for the examination for the junior certificate has increased rapidly since about the mid-1960's. In 1967 they numbered 16,389, of whom 11,100, or 67.7 percent, passed. This compared with 9,119 candidates in 1961. It was estimated that about 19,000 full-time candidates would enter the examination in 1968. There were 1,760 candidates from the Republic for the matriculation examination in 1967, of whom 844 passed, and 249 from the Transkei, of whom 112 passed.

The Department of Bantu Education has maintained a policy of establishing new high schools, those providing Form IV and Form V courses for matriculants, in the reserves. Two principal reasons were given. First, that results have been poor in urban areas, where schools are attended by day students and homework is not supervised. Second, that the future field of activity of the matriculants was expected to be in the reserves, and study in that environment was preferable. High schools in the reserves are boarding schools.

The department conducts four schools for the sons of chiefs and
of councillors to chiefs. Students take a regular three-year, post-
Standard VI course with some African administration and law. Those passing with set grades can proceed to a two-year course for the senior certificate or a diploma by studying African administration, traditional and common law business economics, and subjects relating to adjacent and other African territories and countries.

Whites

School attendance is compulsory for white children between the ages of seven and sixteen. Most children, however, begin Sub-
Standard A during their sixth year, and some start below age six, with the median age of pupils in the Sub-Standard A being about 6.5 years.

In 1967 there were 793,189 white pupils in regular primary and secondary schools. Provincial and provincial-aided schools had 744,036 (about 94 percent), and 49,153 (about 6 percent) attended private schools, largely on the secondary level. In addition, there were 28,256 pupils in vocational and special schools, largely on the secondary level. White pupils in primary and secondary education in 1967 constituted 23.1 percent of the estimated white population, a figure that compares well with percentages in other developed Western countries.

There were 2,807 primary and secondary schools for whites in 1967, including 2,488 provincial and provincial-aided schools, 217 private schools, and 102 vocational and special schools. The number of separate schools has decreased substantially; at the same time the absolute number of pupils has gone up. Enrollment in 1967 was almost double that in 1940, yet there were about 1,000 fewer schools in 1967. This is largely the result of a policy to centralize educational facilities for whites in larger schools. In turn, this permits greater differentiation in course offerings to suit the individual abilities and interests of a larger school body.

The primary school curriculum includes English, Afrikaans, social studies (history and geography), nature study, hygiene, religion, singing, arts and crafts, handwriting, and physical training. Instruction is in either English or Afrikaans. Upon completion of primary school the student goes directly to secondary school.

Secondary education leads to a junior certificate upon completion of Standard VIII and passing of examinations in Natal, Cape Province, and the Orange Free State. The Transvaal does not hold certification examinations, but certificates of attainment may be issued upon completion of Standard VIII. Students who go on to complete Standard X may take examinations for a senior certificate variously designated as the Cape senior certificate, Orange Free State school-leaving certificate, Transvaal secondary school certificate, and Natal senior certificate.
The Cape, Natal, and Orange Free State certificates do not in themselves grant admission to a degree course at a university. If a stipulated combination of courses is taken, however, the Joint Matriculation Board can grant exemption from the matriculation examination, which then qualifies the student for a university. The Transvaal secondary school certificate, likewise, does not qualify the holder for university entrance; it is possible, however, to write an examination for the university entrance certificate instead, which is accepted by the Joint Matriculation Board.

The number of candidates for examinations for the junior certificate was not available, because some schools do not write the examination. The number of candidates for matriculation examinations varies but in the mid-1960's was running between 40,000 and about 50,000 annually. Figures for 1966, the latest available, showed 40,484 candidates, of whom 12,401 (30.6 percent) obtained a university entrance certificate and 17,680 (43.7 percent) received school-leaving certificates. A total of 10,403 (25.7 percent) failed.

**Coloureds**

The primary and secondary school system follows the pattern for whites. There has been a gradual introduction of compulsory education for Coloured children. In Natal they are now required to attend school from the age of seven to the end of the school year in which age sixteen is reached or Standard VIII has been passed. In Cape Province attendance has been compulsory in several districts. At the primary schools serving the areas around Alice, Cradock, Keiskammahoek, and King William's Town, a secondary school at Simonstown, and a high school at Kimberley, attendance is required by children between ages seven and fourteen who live within three miles of the school. Attendance has not been compulsory in the Orange Free State or the Transvaal. In December 1967, however, the central government directed that effective January 1968 any Coloured child residing within three miles of a state aided school anywhere, who enrolls at the beginning of a school year in any class, must attend school throughout the year.

The Bureau of Statistics reported 1,812 state and state-aided primary, secondary, and high schools for Coloureds in operation in 1967. There were also 27 private schools. Of the combined total of 1,839 schools, 1,672 were in Cape Province, where most of the Coloured population resides, 56 were in Natal, 44 were in the Orange Free State, and 67 were in the Transvaal (see ch. 4, Population).

Enrollment in primary, secondary, and high schools for Coloureds totalled 431,495 in 1967. State and state-aided schools accounted for 427,245 (about 99 percent) and private schools for 4,250...
(about 1 percent). Ninety percent (388,773 pupils) were in primary schools, and slightly less than 10 percent (41,513 pupils) were in secondary and high schools. A small number (1,209 pupils) was unclassified.

There is a continuing shortage of school buildings. A construction program is underway, but double sessions are required in some schools, principally in Sub-Standard A and Sub-Standard B, to overcome the lack of space. The Minister of Coloured Affairs reported in May 1968 that 16,380 pupils and 469 teachers were involved in such sessions, mainly in the two substandard grades. The total represented about one-tenth of the pupils in those grades.

The syllabi used in Coloured primary, secondary, and high schools follow the syllabi used in the educational system for whites in Natal, the Orange Free State, and the Transvaal. Slightly modified syllabi are used in Cape Province. Primary students completing Standard V can go directly into Standard VI without examination. Coloureds follow the same syllabi as whites for the junior and senior certificates and for matriculation. The number of Coloured students taking and passing the junior and senior certificate examinations varies from year to year. In the mid-1960's, however, there were roughly 5,000 junior certificate candidates each year; of this number about 70 percent passed. Candidates for senior certificates or matriculation examinations ranged from a little more than 1,000 to nearly 1,500. Passing rates ranged from 40 to 60 percent of those taking the examinations.

Asian (Indian)

Compulsory education for Indian children has been under consideration but is dependent upon the expansion of school buildings and the addition of additional classrooms. In Natal, where a large percentage of the Indian population is located, there are separate schools for Indians. In Cape Province Indian children attend the same schools as Coloureds, but they constitute only about 1 percent of the combined total. They also attend the same schools in the Transvaal but constitute over 41 percent of the combined Coloured-Indian student body in the province. There are no Indian schools or pupils in the Orange Free State (see ch. 4, Population; ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

There were 345 state and state-aided primary schools and postprimary schools and 7 private schools for Indians in 1967, according to the Bureau of Statistics. There were 283 primary schools in Natal and 62 in the Transvaal. There were 2 private schools in Cape Province, 3 in Natal, and 2 in the Transvaal.

The minister of Indian affairs in May 1968 reported a total of 157,537 Indian pupils, of whom 135,397 were in Natal and 22,140
in the Transvaal. Almost 77 percent were in primary schools and about 23 percent in secondary and high schools. Double and platoon sessions also were used in the primary schools to accommodate pupils. In 1967, 22,768 pupils in 629 classes ranging from Sub-Standard A to Standard V were involved. Congestion occurs in many schools. For example, one of two Indian high schools at Lenasia outside Johannesburg, constructed to accommodate 800 pupils each, had about 1,100 pupils in 1968 and the other had 1,300. They were, moreover, unable to accept another 500 students who applied for admission.

The syllabi used in Indian schools follow those for white schools. The medium of instruction in Natal is English, and many pupils in primary school in the province take an extra year in the sub-standard grades to learn the language. The medium in other areas is either English or Afrikaans. Pupils successfully completing Standard V go directly into Standard VI.

The dropout rate for Indian students is much lower than for Coloureds and Africans. The number of Indian candidates for the junior certificate and senior certificate or matriculation examinations is also comparatively greater. In 1967, 5,661 candidates sat for the examinations for the junior certificate, with 3,876 (more than 68 percent) passing. There were 2,111 candidates in Natal and the Transvaal for the senior certificate and matriculation examinations given at the end of 1966 and in early 1967. Of these, 1,294 (more than 61 percent) passed.

UNIVERSITY EDUCATION

University education was first formally authorized with the founding of the University of the Cape of Good Hope in 1873. At the time this institution was primarily an examining body, and actual university-level education was conducted at colleges located in Cape Town and Stellenbosch. From this beginning the university system had expanded by 1969 into ten residential universities, almost exclusively restricted to white students, one nonresidential university offering degrees to all racial groups through correspondence courses, a university college for Coloureds, three university colleges for Africans, and one university college for Indians. The three university colleges for Africans were to be raised to university status at the beginning of 1970 under legislation passed during 1969. The university colleges for Coloureds and Indians were to attain similar status at dates determined by the state president.

Four of the residential universities use English as the medium of instruction. They are the University of Cape Town, University of Natal, which has branches in Durban and Pietermaritzburg, Rhodes University, located at Grahamstown in Cape Province, and Univer-
sity of the Witwatersrand at Johannesburg. Five other universities employ Afrikaans, including the University of Pretoria, Potchefstroom University for Higher Christian Education, University of Orange Free State, located at Bloemfontein, University of Stellenbosch, and Rand Afrikaans University, a new university that opened in 1968 at Johannesburg. Another, the University of Port Elizabeth, which was founded in 1965, uses both Afrikaans and English. The nonresidential University of South Africa also uses both language media.

In 1969 universities were under the jurisdiction of the Department of National Education, under terms of the Universities Act, No. 61 of 1955. The nonwhite university colleges, however, were controlled by the ministers of Bantu education, Coloured affairs, and Indian affairs. A Universities Amendment Act, No. 67 of 1969, provided that control of these institutions would remain in the hands of the respective ministers after elevation to university status.

A Committee of University Principals established by the 1955 act advises on admission, attendance, and other administrative matters at the residential universities. Each of these universities, however, controls admittance of individual students and appoints members of its staff. Two of the English-medium universities, Cape Town and Witwatersrand, accept nonwhite students having ministerial approval, whereas the Afrikaans-medium ones do not. Rhodes, also English medium, accepts nonwhites in certain postgraduate courses, and nonwhites are admitted to the medical school of the University of Natal.

In mid-1968 there were 50,630 students enrolled in the ten residential universities (see table 10). Some 97.6 percent were white, 0.3 percent were African, 0.6 percent were Coloured, and 1.5 percent were Asian. The University of South Africa had 21,036 registered for correspondence courses, of whom 81.6 percent were white, 10.6 percent were African, 2.6 percent were Coloured, and 5.2 percent were Asian.

Government policy concerning racial separation in higher education was enunciated by Prime Minister F. Malan shortly after the Nationalist Party assumed power in 1948. He stated that, although every possible step would be taken to provide university education for the African and Coloured peoples, it would be through separate institutions. The Holloway Commission, appointed in 1953 to look into the matter, declared against establishment of any new universities for nonwhites in the near future, principally for financial reasons. It suggested use of existing facilities at Durban and Fort Hare for undergraduates and continuation of open graduate studies at universities that would accept nonwhites.

The government, despite the commission's recommendations, introduced a bill in 1957 to create separate nonwhite institutions of higher education. Strong opposition developed, but the Extension of University Education Act, No. 45 of 1959 was enacted, pro-
Table 10. Enrollment in Universities and University Colleges in South Africa by Race, Mid-1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Residential Universities:</th>
<th>Africans</th>
<th>Whites</th>
<th>Coloureds</th>
<th>Asians</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cape Town</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7,001</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>7,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natal</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>5,303</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>5,867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orange Free State</td>
<td>1,332</td>
<td>3,328</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>3,282</td>
<td>7,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Elizabeth</td>
<td>887</td>
<td>887</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>1,774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potchefstroom</td>
<td>3,328</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>3,328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pretoria</td>
<td>11,500 1</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>11,500 1</td>
<td>11,500 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rand Afrikaans</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhodes</td>
<td>1,759</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1,790</td>
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<td>1,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stellenbosch</td>
<td>7,170</td>
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<td>7,170</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>7,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Witwatersrand</td>
<td>8,394</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>8,610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>46,408</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>50,630</td>
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<th>University Colleges 2:</th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durban</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,407</td>
<td>1,407</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>1,407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Hare</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The North</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zululand</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,432</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>1,407</td>
<td>3,508</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correspondence University 3:</th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>2,236</td>
<td>17,161</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>1,094</td>
<td>21,036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>3,836</td>
<td>63,569</td>
<td>1,530</td>
<td>3,239</td>
<td>75,174</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Approximate enrollment.
2 Legislation enacted in 1969 raises the university colleges to university status from 1970 for Fort Hare, the North and Zululand, and at dates to be determined for Western Cape and Durban.
3 Correspondence classes only.


Subsequently, the University College at Fort Hare Transfer Act, No. 64 of 1959, authorized takeover of the University College at Fort Hare in the Eastern Cape by the minister of Bantu education for use as an African university college. Fort Hare, with a reputation extending outside South Africa, was privately founded in 1916 as South African Native College. It was originally supported by
missionary and private funds but became increasingly financed by
government subsidy. It admitted not only Africans but also Col-
ourebs and Asians, and in its early years it had some white students.
The name was changed in 1951, when it affiliated with Rhodes
University. By the act Fort Hare was placed under the absolute
control of the Department of Bantu Education. At the time of
takeover there were 489 students: 72 percent, African; 14 percent,
Coloureds; and 14 percent, Asians. From January 1960 new regis-
trants were restricted to individuals of Xhosa or Fingo origin (see
ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

The Extension of University Education Act authorized establish-
ment of two additional university colleges for Africans. These
opened in 1960. One, the University College of the North, is locat-
ed at Turffoop near Pietersburg in the northern Transvaal. This
caters to the North and South Sotho, Tsonga, Tswana, Venda, and
Ndebele groups in the Transvaal. The other, the University College
of Zululand, at Ngoye in Natal, serves students of Zulu and Swazi
origin (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages). All three also take
some African students from South West Africa (Namibia) and Rhode-
sia. Facilities at the new colleges are reported to be excellent, and
as of March 1967 more than R5.7 million had been expended on
them and for improvements at the university college at Fort Hare.
At mid-1968 there were 451 students at Fort Hare, 613 at the
University College of the North, and 368 at the University College
of Zululand. Most of the teaching staff at each was white: 77 of 97
at Fort Hare; 61 of 79 at the University College of the North; and
62 of 71 at the University College of Zululand. Student-teacher
ratios were, respectively, 4.7 to 1, 7.8 to 1 and 5.2 to 1. More than
69 percent of students were taking degree courses. At the end of
1967 the three institutions granted a total of 129 degrees, 29 post-
graduate diplomas, and 87 nongraduate diplomas.

A University College of the Western Cape was established in 1960
for Coloureds at Bellville in the northern suburbs of Cape Town.
Enrollment rose from 313 in 1961 to 669 at mid-1968. There were 83
whites and 2 Coloureds on the teaching staff in 1968. The student-
teacher ratio was about 7.9 to 1. About 64 percent of the students
(425 individuals) were taking degree courses. The precise number of
students receiving degrees each year was not available. At the end of
1967 or early 1968, about 37 graduated with degrees and another
46 received diplomas—including 13 awarded a postgraduate University
Education Diploma. The university college is under administrat-
ive control of the Department of Coloured Affairs.

The University College for Indians envisaged in the Extension of
University Education Act of 1959 was established in 1961 at Dur-
ban. Control is by the Department of Indian Affairs. In 1966 it was
announced that new facilities would be built, and the university
college moved from its location on Salisbury Island in Durban harbor to Westville, outside Durban. Plans called for accommodation at the new site initially for 2,000 students. Work is now underway on buildings. Enrollment at the college has risen rapidly, from 114 in 1961 to 1,407 at mid-1968. The teaching staff in 1968 was composed of 109 whites and 25 Indians, and the student-teacher ratio was about 11 to 1. Over 81 percent of the 1,149 students were taking degree courses in 1968. No recent figures were available on degrees and diplomas conferred by the college.

TECHNICAL AND VOCATIONAL EDUCATION

Vocational and technical high schools for whites were transferred in 1968 from the control of the Department of National Education to the provincial education departments. In 1967 thirty-one technical high schools, twenty-six commercial schools, and eight domestic science high schools were reported in operation. In June 1966, 28,943 students were attending these schools; of these, 23,513 were full-time students, and 5,430 were part-time students. Nearly half of the students (12,078 full time and 1,522 part time) attended technical high schools; less than a third (7,615 full time and 1,034 part time) attended commercial high schools; a small proportion (1,146 full time) attended domestic science high schools, and less than one-fifths (2,674 full time and 2,874 part time) were attending combined commercial-technical high schools.

In addition to the technical and vocational high schools there are a number of technical colleges for whites that are under the control of the Department of National Education. According to figures of the Bureau of Statistics, there were thirteen state and state-aided white technical colleges at mid-1966. They had an enrollment of 9,412 full-time and 23,296 part-time students. Over 69 percent (6,506) of the full-time students were in the secondary levels from Standard VI through Standard X. The colleges are mostly operated by the Department of National Education. Four larger institutions, the Cape, Natal, Pretoria, and Witwatersrand technical colleges, however, operate as state-aided institutions. The Advanced Technical Education Act, No. 40 of 1967, provided for the establishment of colleges that would furnish more advanced technical education, including the training of teachers for technical subjects. Vaal Triangle College, which opened in August 1966, is listed in this category. Its goal is to train artisans and matriculants for supervisory and management positions. Cape, Natal, Pretoria, and Witwatersrand technical colleges have also been designated advanced technical colleges that will provide training on a level between the other technical colleges and the universities.

African technical and vocational education is under the control of
the Department of Bantu Education. In 1968 there were eight technical secondary schools located in different parts of the country. Boys completing higher primary school who obtain certain passing grades in Standard VI may take a three-year course leading to the technical junior certificate examination at these schools. Technical subjects available include building construction, carpentry, plumbing, metalworking, drafting, motor mechanics, leatherwork, and tailoring. At one school, the Vlakfontein Technical School in Pretoria, courses are also offered for the technical senior certificate. There were 4,555 students enrolled in the various technical schools in 1968. In addition, there are a technical secondary school and a technical college at Umtata in the Transkei. In 1968, 185 boys were enrolled in the Transkei for the technical junior certificate course.

In 1968 there were eleven state-controlled vocational trade schools for boys. These offer two- or three-year courses, depending on the trade, for students who have passed Standard VI. Training as electricians is offered only to those who have completed Standard VIII (Form III). Courses include various aspects of construction, carpentry, plumbing and metalwork, drafting, general and motor mechanics, tailoring and leatherwork, and upholstering. A Certificate in Vocational Training is awarded on completion of the course. The training furnished, however, is inadequate for the national technical certificate examination. This examination is open to artisans of all racial groups and is conducted by the Department of National Education. The Dube Vocational Training Center, operated independently by the municipality of Johannesburg at its own expense, trains African students to a level sufficient to pass this examination.

Enrollment at the center in 1968 totaled 192 in the second term. According to M. Horrell of the South African Institute of Race Relations, the response to facilities provided by the state technical secondary schools has not been enthusiastic. Apparently, many students who are unable to obtain admittance to an academic secondary school enter technical schools as second-best. A partial reason may also be the lack of adequate employment and pay upon completion of the course.

There are both state-operated and state-aided technical and vocational schools for Coloureds. State schools located in Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg, Kimberley, and Port Elizabeth were reported in 1968 to have 2,356 students, of whom 55 were full time and 2,301 part time. State-aided schools in Cape Town, Stellenbosch, Port Elizabeth, Cradock, Flagstaff, Kirkwood, and Aliwal North, had 643 full-time students. The Department of Coloured Affairs, which controls Coloured vocational and technical education, has also established a system of multilateral offerings in certain regular high schools that gives students a choice of academic, commercial, or technical courses leading to junior and senior certifi-
cate examinations in those fields. The number of students taking technical courses in those schools was not available. A Coloured technical college at Bellville in the suburbs of Cape Town offers a full-time course for a teaching certificate in commerce. It also has part-time courses leading to various national technical certificates, as well as a diploma in the printing trade and one in public health nursing. In 1968 this school, known as the Peninsula Technical College, had 36 full-time and 283 part-time students.

As of early 1968 there were no vocational or technical schools under the direct control of the Department of Indian Affairs. Department high schools also did not offer technical or vocational courses. In Cape Province and the Transvaal, Indians and Coloureds attend the same schools and, presumably, some Indians are taking technical or vocational courses in those provinces. Vocational and technical training from Standard VI through Standard X is available for Indians at the M. L. Sultan Technical College in Durban. Enrollment in these courses in 1968 totaled 987 full-time students. Under the Indians Advanced Technical Education Act, No. 12 of 1968, the college has been designated a college for advanced technical education for Indians. With approval of the minister of Indian affairs, the technical college also may provide teacher training and full- and part-time secondary education.

TEACHERS AND TEACHER TRAINING

African

In 1968 there were 31,705 African teachers, excluding the Transkei. About 92 percent were teaching in the lower and higher primary schools, 7 percent in secondary and high schools, and 1 percent in schools of higher education. The government subsidized 25,332 of them, and 6,373 were paid from private sources. African parents and school boards paid the salaries of 4,604 teachers in government-subsidized schools, more than 15 percent of all teachers in the school system for Africans. The remaining 1,769 privately paid teachers were employed by church and other private schools. In 1968 there were also 6,258 teachers in the Transkeian school system. All were subsidized by the Transkei government.

The Department of Bantu Education reported twenty-five state and state-aided teacher training schools and three mission institutions in operation in 1966. There were about eight others in the Transkei. Most of the schools in the Republic were located in rural areas. Courses at the various schools are for different ethnic groups and are designed to train the numbers of teachers needed in different parts of the country for instruction in the particular area's mother tongue. In those teacher training schools located in an area
using one Bantu language, part of the instruction is given in that
language, although in general Afrikaans and English are also used as
media of instruction. The amount of instruction in the three lan-
guages, however, depends upon the capabilities of the teaching
staff.

Teacher training courses include the lower primary certificate,
which is open only to women and requires two years of work after
Form I; and a higher primary certificate, which requires two years
beyond the junior certificate and prepares teachers for higher pri-
mary school. There is also a secondary teachers’ diploma requiring
postmatriculation professional training and a number of degree
courses in art or science at a university college. Those completing
the course can teach in secondary or high school. A new junior
secondary teacher’s course was introduced in 1968 at several
teacher training schools. Applicants must have a senior certificate or
a matriculation certificate. They are trained for teaching posts up to
the junior certificate level. Courses are also offered at the university
colleges that lead to nongraduate and graduate university education
diplomas.

The qualifications of many teachers are relatively low. In 1968
roughly 42 percent had only the lower primary certificate, and
another 19 percent had lesser qualifications. The crash program to
train primary school teachers initiated after the central government
took over African education in 1954 was largely responsible for this
situation; the program concentrated on the lower primary certifi-
cate course. The deficiencies of this course have been recognized by
the government, and it is being phased out. It has already been
discontinued by the Transkei government.

The number of teachers holding university degrees has shown a
continuing decline. In secondary and high schools the total dropped
from 36.3 percent in 1961 to 25.5 percent in 1966. Part of the
reason for the drop has been the promotion of better qualified
teachers to positions in the Department of Bantu Education, such
as inspector or school board secretary. Another reason, however,
appears to be that some well-qualified teachers have left the pro-
fession because of conditions of employment and comparatively
low salaries and have taken better paid positions in commerce and
industry.

Salary increases were given in 1963, and further improvements
were made in 1967. Additional raises, covering a three-year period
beginning April 1, 1969, at the end of the period will result in a
total increase of 10 or 15 percent, depending upon qualifications.
During 1967 also a contributory pension plan was started under
terms of the Government Non-White Employees Pension Act, No.
42 of 1966. The plan includes teachers, not already covered by
existing pension funds in Cape Province and Natal, whose salaries
are paid in full by the Department of Bantu Education and who earn more than R180 annually.

White

Most white teachers are trained at teachers colleges under the control of the provincial education departments. Training is also provided at a few colleges under control of the Department of National Education, and training facilities exist at the white universities, most of which have faculties of education. All teacher training is postmatriculation. For primary teachers the course is either two or three years. Most schools offer a two-year course for women, who may then take a third year of specialized work. Men usually take three years of work. Secondary teachers take one year beyond the baccalaureate or higher degree. Degree courses in education are provided by the universities.

The Bureau of Statistics reported nineteen teachers colleges for whites operating in 1966. Eight were in Cape Province, seven in the Transvaal, three in Natal, and one in the Orange Free State. Of 9,985 students, about 71 percent were women. There were, in addition, 2,406 teacher training students at universities, of whom 781 were enrolled for postgraduate teaching diplomas and 1,625 for undergraduate diplomas. There were 36,116 teachers in public and private schools in 1967.

Coloured

The minister of Coloured affairs reported a total of 15,473 Coloured teachers in all schools in May 1968. About 87 percent of Coloured teachers are employed in primary schools, 11 percent in postprimary and teacher training schools, and the remainder in other schools. About 91 percent of the teachers in the school system have professional qualifications but do not hold a degree.

Training for primary school teachers is offered by three state and seven state-aided church schools and colleges in Cape Province, the Bechet State College at Durban, and the Dr. Blok State School in Bloemfontein. Other teacher training courses on a higher level are given at the Rand College of Education and the University College of the Western Cape. Courses for Coloured teacher trainees offered in 1968 included: the lower primary teacher’s certificate, requiring two years of study beyond the junior certificate, which was open only to women; and the primary teacher’s certificate, available in Cape Province and Natal requiring two years of work beyond matriculation. One-year specialist courses were also given in a number of subjects for teachers who had received either primary certificate. The Rand College of Education offered a three-year postmatriculation course leading to a teacher’s diploma. At the university college,
students could take three-year postmatriculation courses for a lower secondary teacher's diploma or a nongraduate university education diploma; a one-year postbaccalaureate course leading to the university education diploma; or courses leading to degrees at various levels in education.

The Education Council for Coloured Persons in 1965 pressed for discontinuance of the lower primary teacher's certificate course. This has not been possible because of a continuing shortage of teachers, the result of resignations and the increasing number of posts. The number of Coloured matriculants is also relatively small—in 1967, less than 1,200—and many of them do not wish to become teachers. Coloured teachers reportedly consider salary scales inadequate. On the average they earn only about two-thirds of the salary paid white teachers, with equal qualifications and experience, in similar positions. Although increases totaling 10 or 15 percent, depending on professional training, became effective from April 1, 1969, relative differences will remain since white teachers were also granted salary increases.

Asians (Indian)

Information on the number of Indian teachers was available only for Natal and the Transvaal. In May 1968 the minister of Indian affairs reported a total of 5,736, of whom 1,500 were in post-primary and teacher training schools. About 13 percent had degrees, 73 percent had professional qualifications but no degree, 12 percent had no professional qualifications, and the remainder had other qualifications.

Training for primary and secondary school teachers is provided at the University College for Indians and the Springfield Training College, both in Durban, and the Transvaal College of Education at Johannesburg. Training for secondary teachers is also provided at the M. L. Sultan Technical College in Durban. In May 1968 the minister reported a total of 1,241 students in these institutions. Of this number 627 were preparing for primary school teaching and 614 for secondary school work. Salary scales for Indian teachers are the same as those for Coloured teachers. Increases similar to those given Coloured teachers also became effective from April 1, 1969.

FINANCING OF EDUCATION

Primary and secondary education for white children is financed through provincial taxes and supplementary subsidies from the central government. These subsidies are equal to about 50 percent of the provincial expenditure, with certain additions in the case of Cape Province, Natal, and the Orange Free State. Higher education
is financed partly by tuition fees and partly by subsidies from the central government. Recent figures on the central government's contribution were not available; in 1964, however, it represented about 63 percent of the combined income of the eight residential universities then in operation and the University of South Africa. Estimated expenditures by the central government on universities, agricultural colleges, and teachers training colleges for the 1968/69 fiscal year were set at about R34.5 million. In September 1968 the minister of national education announced appointment of a commission to make recommendations on operation of the white universities, including finances. A basis for subsidization during the financial year 1969/70 and subsequent years was to be determined.

The main statutory source of financing for African education, excluding the Transkei, is the Bantu education account established through the Exchequer and Audit Amendment Act, No. 7 of 1955. Revenue in this account comes from the central government's consolidated revenue fund, from the African general tax, and from miscellaneous receipts and fees (see ch. 25, Fiscal and Monetary Systems). Since 1955 there has been a fixed appropriation of R13 million paid into the account from the consolidated revenue fund. During the period 1962/63 an initial additional amount was appropriated from this fund to cover costs of the African university colleges. This appropriation has been continued in succeeding years to a maximum of R1.5 million a year.

An increasing amount is contributed to the account by the African general tax. Originally, four-fifths of this tax was paid into the account, but since April 1, 1963, the entire amount collected has been credited. Although collections from the Transkei were excluded after 1964, the percentage constituted by this source has continued to rise. In the period 1955/56, the first year of operation of the Bantu education account, the African general tax contributed R3.93 million, or about 23 percent of the total account revenue. The estimated receipts for fiscal year 1968/69 were set at R10.5 million. This represented slightly more than 40 percent of anticipated revenue. Miscellaneous receipts, including boarding fees, have also risen, in fiscal year 1968/69 being estimated at R1.1 million. They, however, constituted only about 4 percent of the estimated total revenue for that year.

The Bantu education account has been indirectly benefited through the charging of certain expenditures to the consolidated revenue fund rather than to the account. This included a decision in fiscal year 1962/63 to charge salaries and expenses of the minister of Bantu education and his assistants to the fund, as well as subsidies for schools for handicapped African children. In 1968 the minister stated that other administrative expenses and salaries of the department would also be paid from the consolidated revenue
fund and estimated that the saving to the account in the first year alone would be more than R2 million. Since establishment of the Transkeian government, the national government has also subsidized the Transkeian Education Department out of the consolidated revenue fund. The amount is estimated at about R3 million annually. No cutback in appropriations for the Bantu education account, however, has been made.

The account maintained a surplus during its first ten years but has suffered deficits since then, and on March 31, 1968, was reported to have a deficit of over R2 million. This was expected to increase during fiscal 1968/69, based on estimated expenditures for that year totaling R32.3 million against anticipated revenues of R26.1 million. The Finance Act, No. 78 of 1968, made provision for funds to cover the deficits from other available moneys in the exchequer account, with any deficiency at the end of a financial year to be covered through interest-free loans from the loan account. Additional funds have also been secured for African education from the loan account through borrowings for capital expenditures on new schools, including the university colleges, and to buy mission schools and buildings. By March 31, 1967, over R9.4 million was owed on this account.

Financing of education for Coloureds is through the central government's consolidated revenue fund. Certain expenses related to Coloured education are paid from the general budget of the Department of Coloured Affairs. Excluding these, estimated expenditures for fiscal 1968/69 totaled about R32.6 million. Of this amount almost R30.1 million was allocated to primary, secondary, and high schools and to teacher training. The University College of the Western Cape was allocated R733,700, and state-aided vocational and special education received R477,100. In addition to appropriations from the consolidated revenue fund, about R5.4 million was to be secured from the loan account for school buildings and additions.

A main portion of Indian education expenditures was also provided from the consolidated revenue fund in fiscal 1968/69. Some expenditures are also made by the Cape and Transvaal provincial governments. Major items in the estimated budget for fiscal 1968/69 covering Natal and the Transvaal totaled over R14.5 million. They included almost R10 million for primary and high schools, R511,800 for teacher training, R628,500 for aid to vocational and special schools, R1.2 million for the University College for Indians at Durban, R530,000 for assistance to the M. L. Sultan Technical College, and R915,000 for equipment and maintenance. About R2.6 million additional was to be obtained from the loan account for school buildings purchased or constructed and R978,000 for capital expenditures connected with the Indian university college.
Complete details of per capita expenditure on pupils of the different racial groups were not available. According to G. H. A. Steyn of the Transvaal Education Department, the per capita expenditure on white students by the several provincial education departments was R162 in 1965, including both general and capital expenditures. M. Horrell of the South African Institute of Race Relations place the per capita expenditure on African pupils at R12.39 in the 1966/67 school year, but estimated that it would rise to R15.55 in the 1967/68 period as the result of actions by the Department of Bantu Education to make new funds available. These amounts included the Transkei but excluded capital expenditure and the African university colleges. Expenditure on African primary pupils for fiscal 1966/67 was reported at R11.50 in the Republic and R14 in the Transkei. For secondary pupils it was R52.58 in the Republic and R101 in the Transkei. According to the minister of Indian affairs, expenditures for Indian pupils in Natal in the school year 1966/67 were R53 for primary pupils and R84 for secondary and high school pupils. Current expenditures on Coloured pupils were not available. In Cape Province in 1960 they were R59.13, compared with R144.57 for white pupils in the same year.

Education, including textbooks, is free for all white children through secondary school, although in Cape Province students reaching the age of nineteen must pay school fees. Education for Coloureds is free in the Transvaal, including textbooks and stationery, and through Standard VI in Natal. In Cape Province and the Orange Free State, free supplies have been furnished only to needy students. During 1968 it was reported that starting in January 1969 free textbooks, stationery, and basic equipment would be issued to all Coloured pupils throughout the country. Textbooks have been lent free to Indian pupils in Natal since April 1966 and in the Transvaal since April 1967.

In contrast to the other racial groups, African parents and African school boards and school committees are required to provide substantial supplemental financing for their children's education. Mother-tongue readers and those for the two official languages are furnished free in the primary schools, as well as teachers' handbooks, but the student has to buy other texts and stationery. A regional survey by the South African Institute of Race Relations published in 1967 showed average costs for these items to run about R1.35 annually in lower primary school; R4.85, in higher primary school; R12.40, in Form I through Form III; and R24 in Form IV and Form V.

When state and state-aided African schools are started, furniture is supplied free, but subsequent replacements must be made by the schools entirely at their own expense, in most cases. The costs of equipment for vocational, handicraft, and science courses are also
largely borne by the school. Students usually must themselves perform cleaning and maintenance duties for buildings, and school boards pay for any work beyond the students' capacities. School boards likewise are required to raise half the capital cost of building new schools. Africans in urban areas are assessed for lower primary school construction through amounts added to rentals in African housing schemes. This may be R.20 a month. Shortage of state-subsidized teachers is another problem for African parents, and many school boards have had to raise funds for additional instructors. Privately paid teachers constituted about 15 percent of teachers in state and state-aided African schools in 1968. To help meet costs, school boards ask for voluntary contributions from pupils. This is R.10 a quarter in lower primary and R.30 in higher primary school. In postprimary schools, the contribution may be compulsory—up to R1 a quarter in academic classes and R2.50 a quarter in vocational and technical classes.

ADULT EDUCATION

The number of persons attending primary and secondary classes for adults varies considerably. In June 1967, according to the Department of Bantu Education 3,481 Africans were enrolled in adult education classes. Of this number 2,283 were in lower primary classes, 832 in higher primary classes, and 366 in secondary classes. During 1968 the Department of Coloured Affairs reported 3,537 persons in primary and 1,870 in secondary classes, or a total of 5,407 individuals taking adult study. During 1968 also the Department of Indian Affairs stated that 970 Indians were studying in adult secondary classes. There were none in primary classes.

Adult education for Africans in particular has been beset by application of group area laws, by regulations, and by an apparent lack of interest on the part of the Department of Bantu Education. Regulations issued in 1957 and revised in 1962 required all classes for ten or more adults, except those on white farms and in mine compounds, to register annually. Classes could be conducted only during the regular school year, and appointment of teachers required approval of the department. Registration requests for classes in white areas had to be accompanied by a permit from the local Group Areas Board. The department refused to pay subsidies for such classes, and municipalities were forbidden to make grants from their Bantu revenue accounts. Voluntary white teachers also were not permitted to function in African urban townships. In 1967 classes still functioning were told that registration would not be granted after that year. In early 1968 the minister of Bantu education reported that fifteen adult classes for Africans had been closed in Cape Town, Johannesburg, and Pietermaritzburg because of the expiration of group area permits.
In 1967 and 1968 several African organizations started adult literacy classes in African urban areas, including Benoni, Boksburg, and Vosloorus and at Pretoria. The number of Africans in these adult classes, however, is not known. The South African Institute of Race Relations in the late 1940's developed a new system for use in literacy education and published primers in the Bantu languages. By 1953 it was estimated that over 10,000 Africans were annually being made literate using these materials. The techniques and materials are now employed in classes at some gold and coal mines, by mission groups, by the Department of Prisons and other agencies, and by student volunteers teaching farm laborers.

Reliable figures on general literacy among the population are not available. The deputy minister of Bantu education stated in May 1967 that literacy among Africans was about 50 percent in 1964. The Office of Policy and Research, United States Information Agency, in 1966 estimated the overall literacy rate of the population in English and Afrikaans at 60 percent. The rate among whites was estimated at 99 percent and among Africans at 55 percent. Larger numbers of African children are now entering school each year. Basic instruction is in the vernacular, and although many do not reach a grade level sufficient to impart literacy, the absolute number of individuals literate in the Bantu languages is undoubtedly increasing.
CHAPTER 10
ARTISTIC AND INTELLECTUAL EXPRESSION

South Africa has produced a large volume of literature in both English and Afrikaans, and some of its writers have won international recognition. Painting and sculpture have attained a level that compares with the art produced in other Western countries. Moreover, since World War II, a new-found understanding of the indigenous African tradition has developed, reflected in the works today of many outstanding artists. The public, which had ridiculed the pioneers in the new art styles, had come by the 1960's to accept and appreciate modern art and take pride in the accomplishments of the country's artists.

There is a widespread interest in the performing arts among all population groups. Symphony orchestras exist in several larger cities, and the country has a number of accomplished composers. The government subsidizes performing arts councils that stage performances throughout the country. Private African and Coloured groups are active in the theater. African musicians have assimilated Western popular music and added a distinctive character to it in their own Township Jazz.

Literature and intellectual expression have been affected by the government's policy of separate development, and measures taken to prevent criticism of that policy. Restrictive acts have prevented meaningful contacts between white and nonwhite writers, the exchange of ideas, and the mutual acquisition of an understanding of the life, emotions, and problems of other racial groups. The banning of a large number of books has affected all groups by denying individuals access to important literary works published abroad, as well as some at home (see ch. 17, Public Information). It has prevented South Africans in general from learning through this medium what Africans think and feel about their own lives and those of the whites in the country. A further effect has been the loss to the whole community of competent writers of all races, who have left the country to seek a place where freer expression is possible.

LITERATURE

The country's literature and writing are divided by language and cultural traditions into three principal segments. Two of these are
found within the white population and are the result of fundamental differences between Afrikaner and English backgrounds and of the use of Afrikaans or English as the medium of literary expression. The third main segment encompasses Africans writing in the Bantu languages. Included among those writing in Afrikaans are most of the Coloureds, a majority of whom are also closely akin culturally to the Afrikaners (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages). Among those writing in English are some of the better known African writers. These writers are essentially urbanized, and most possess a largely nontribal outlook.

Apartheid has had a profound effect on both white and nonwhite literature. The barriers erected by separate development have deprived the African writer of the opportunity to learn about whites other than from a distance. As a result, white characters in African writings are generally stereotyped, flat, and insensate beings, presented in an unfavorable light as the cause of the oppressions felt and experienced by the African.

White writers, for their part, have little firsthand knowledge of nonwhites and, although there are some notable exceptions, usually describe the African not from knowledge acquired through personal contact but from impressions or bits and pieces obtained by talking with domestic help or workers. White writers cannot enter an African district or township without permission from the authorities, and such permission appears to be given rarely. They therefore, write from direct experience of life at the lower levels of society.

**Afrikaans Literature**

Afrikaans literature commenced only in the latter half of the nineteenth century when Afrikaans began to emerge as a full-fledged language in its own right. The first organized effort to promote Afrikaans writing was by the Society of True Afrikaners (Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners), which was founded in Paarl, Cape Province, in 1875. Before the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), however, literary Afrikaans was largely experimental and devoted to polemics. Its principal growth as a literature began only about 1910.

Afrikaans at first was essentially the language of the veld. It had an earthiness and dynamism that suited it ideally to poetic expression and the outstanding writers during the period from about 1910 to 1920 were poets. Among the earliest was J. D. du Toit, who, under the pseudonym Totius, wrote lengthy epic poems describing the suffering of the Boers. Among his contemporaries were C. L. Leipoldt, perhaps the most important poet of the Anglo-Boer War and also a dramatist; Jan Celliers, whose poems dealt both with the
experiences of the war and with pastoral themes closely tied to the Afrikaner way of life; and Eugene Marais, who also sought to give meaning to the emotionally shattering events of that war.

Afrikaans prose began emerging only in the 1920's. It took twin paths, one characterized by realism, the other, romanticism. Novels dealt chiefly with religion, personal problems, and the movement of the Afrikaner from the country to an urban setting. The best known romanticists were D. F. Malherbe, whose themes were mainly biblical and pioneering history, and C. M. van den Heever, who wrote about the conflicts brought on by the trek to the cities. Local realism in the lives of farm and hamlet folk was portrayed in the novels of Jochem van Bruggen and Jan van Melle.

The most notable poet of the 1920's was Toon van den Heever, whose nonconformist approach was a forerunner of the poetry of the following decade. The flowering of Afrikaans poetry began in the 1930's with the emergence of a number of poets of unusual talent, who became known as the Dertigers (“men of the thirties”). Prominent among them were: W. E. G. Louw; Nicholas Petrus van Wyk Louw, who today is considered the outstanding Afrikaans poet; Elizabeth Eybers; and Uys Krige, a romantic poet who is also known for his short stories and plays.

There was a shift from largely lyrical poetry to more objective expression. A new craftsmanship and professional character was evident in their work. Preeminent was N. P. van Wyk Louw, a master technician, whose works have been called milestones in the development of Afrikaner literature. Van Wyk Louw moved from the epic poem to the modern ballad and finally to poetic drama. Among his outstanding writings is the epic poem Raka, which deals with a Congolese tribe and its belief in Raka, a mystical half-human, half-animal creature. The struggle between Raka and the spiritual leader Koki has been interpreted as an allegorical representation of the conflict between order and chaos, reason and objectivity against blind, subjective action, and ultimately civilization as opposed to nature.

In the 1940's Afrikaans poetry was characterized by a strong sense of actuality, particularly in the works of D. J. Opperman. Opperman, who skillfully employs images, allusion, and metaphor, did not confine himself to nature or patriotic poetry but dealt with racial problems, political tensions, and a variety of other themes. Writing important poetry in Afrikaans also in the 1940's were S. J. Pretorius, Ernst van Heerden, G. A. Watermeyer, Peter Blum, Olga Kirsch, and the Coloured poet S. V. Petersen.

Van Wyk Louw, Eybers, and Opperman produced some of their best works in the 1950's. At the same time, the voices of new, younger writers were heard, not only in poetry, but in novels, short stories, and drama. Their writing, continuing into the 1960's, was
frequently characterized by experimentation and new forms. It dealt with newer realities, including the effects of urbanization and the stresses of city life and its frustrations. Some of their writings, particularly a novel by Etienne le Roux dealing with Afrikaner juvenile delinquents and one by Jan S. Rabie that treated white and Coloured relationships realistically, evoked indignation and strong comment from the more conservative elements of Afrikaner society.

Le Roux and Rabie were members of the school of writers known as the Sestigers ("men of the sixties"). Together with Uys Krige and Frans Venter, they constituted the foremost Afrikaans prose writers of the decade. Other members of the Sestigers were the poets Breyten Breytenbach and Andre Brink and the poetess Ingrid Jonker. Outstanding among Coloured writers in Afrikaans during the 1950's and 1960's were the poets S. V. Petersen, P. J. Philander, and Adam Small.

Literature in English

Writing in English began with the poetry and prose of William Pringle, who lived in the country from 1820 to 1826. His descriptive prose piece, *Narrative of a Residence in South Africa*, showed keen perception, vitality, and a realistic appraisal of the times and conditions. His poetry expressed the conflict between whites and blacks with feeling, and its understanding and humanitarianism makes it stand out from other poetry in the 1800's.

The first English prose that possessed the intimate flavor of the new country was the novel *The Story of an African Farm* by Olive Schreiner. Published in 1883, it is still considered one of the greatest South African novels. She subsequently wrote other novels, but they did not reach the level of her first work.

It was not until the 1920's that novels were produced that attracted attention in the English-speaking world. Among the outstanding novelists of that time were William Plomer, Sarah Gertrude Millin, Ethelreda Lewis, and Pauline Smith. Plomer, in his *Turbott Wolfe*, published in 1925, was one of the earlier writers who introduced race relations into his fiction. He wrote of Africans as individuals and of their lives and problems, in contrast to the earlier tendency to relegate them to a part of the surrounding scenery. Sarah Millin's *God's Stepchildren*, published in 1924, dealt with the Coloureds and the problems of race. It was a theme that became a major interest for later writers. Ethelreda Lewis also wrote of the nonwhites. Her novel *Mantis* (1926) was concerned with the effects of Western culture on tribal life. Pauline Smith, in a collection of short stories, *The Little Karroo*, published in 1925, wrote with feeling for the rural Afrikaner.
Important among prose published in the 1930's was *In a Province* (1934), by Laurens van der Post, which dealt with Africans from the country and their involvement in city life. Stuart Cloete's *Turning Wheels*, an account of the Great Trek, appeared in 1937; its realistic portrayal of intimate relationships among the characters was considered an offense to the ancestors of the Afrikaners, and the book was banned.

One of the best known novelists is Alan Paton, who achieved an international reputation with *Cry, The Beloved Country*, published in 1948. This novel, a plea for understanding of the problems faced by the African, was followed by others which have further increased his reputation. Herman C. Bosman's *Mafeking Road* (1947), a collection of short stories, treats with warm humor Afrikaner farm community life after the turn of the twentieth century.

A notable group of new writers emerged in the 1950's. Among those most outstanding were Nadine Gordimer, Dan Jacobson, and the Coloured novelist Peter Abrahams. Nadine Gordimer's works were characterized by a keen psychological insight into the relationships of whites and Africans. She has written a number of novels and has particular talent for short stories. Her collections of short stories include *Six Feet of the Country* (1956), *The Soft Voice of the Serpent* (1957), and *Not For Publication* (1965). She is known in the United States from stories that appeared in the *New Yorker* magazine. Dan Jacobson's *A Dance in the Sun* (1956) brought him early success. A collection of his short stories, *Beggar My Neighbor*, was published in 1964, and an ambitious novel, *The Beginners*, in 1966. He has a discerning talent, and his writing is characterized by a wry humor and restraint. Peter Abrahams has written extensively. One of his better known works is an autobiographical novel, *Tell Freedom: Memories of Africa*, published in 1954. This book is banned in South Africa. Abrahams was living outside the country in the 1960's, as were the two white writers.

Other prose writers in English of note are: Mary Renault, whose novels have been bestsellers in the United States; Daphne Rooke, who uses characters from all races but in a nonpolitical context; and Alex la Guma, who has written many short stories and two novels. A former Coloured member of the Cape Town City Council, la Guma now lives outside the country, and the quoting or publishing of his writings is prohibited in South Africa. His novel, *A Walk in the Night* (1962), uses the racy English vernacular of the Coloureds in Cape Town.

Poetry in English was saddled throughout the nineteenth century with the poetic traditions of Great Britain. Thomas Pringle's verse in the 1820's, notably *Afar in the Desert*, *Bechuana Boy*, and others, showed genuine interest in the country and feeling for the nonwhite population. His older cultural associations, however, in-
fluenced the structure of his poetry and tended to mold and distort its context. Succeeding English poetry into the 1920's displayed largely a nostalgia for the mother country and distrust of the new and experimental. In the first two decades of the twentieth century, poetry was sentimental, isolated from its surroundings and still looking to the literary traditions of Great Britain.

During the 1920's, however, an indigenous poetry more attuned to South Africa began to develop. Included were the verse of Francis C. Slater, particularly his symphonic poem *Drought*, and the works of the two major poets, Roy Campbell and William Plomer. Campbell's *The Flaming Terrapin* and two collections of poems by Plomer, *Notes for Poems* and *The Family Tree*, appeared during this time. They showed individuality of style, expressive vitality, and control of language. The backward look toward overseas tradition was gone, and their poetry captured the troubled spirit of the country and the challenge of the environment.

In 1926 Campbell and Plomer, together with Laurens van der Post, started the magazine *Voorslag* (Whiplash). Criticism of the magazine's outspokenness on racial problems led to Campbell's going to England in 1927. Plomer and van der Post also left the country. In 1928 Campbell published *The Wayzgoose*, a satirical attack upon the attitudes of the white population in South Africa, particularly those in politics, the arts, and literature. His poetry continued to develop until his death in 1957. Works that will undoubtedly last include *Tristan da Cunha*, *The Serf*, *The Zulu Girl*, *Choosing a Mast*, and *Skull in the Desert*.

Campbell's writing had a strong influence on South African poets who followed him, including Guy Butler, Roy Macnab, Anthony Delius, and Frank T. Prince. World War II also made a great impression on the country's poets. It was during these years that Butler, Delius, and Macnab emerged, as did also Charles Eglington, F. D. Sinclair, and Uys Krige (writing in English). In the 1960's a number of promising young poets also appeared. Among them were: Perseus Adams, who published a first collection of poems, *The Land at My Door*, in 1965; Ruth Miller, who also published her first collection in 1965, *Floating Island*; and Sydney Clouts, whose volume of poetry, *One Life*, appeared in 1966.

**African Literature and Writers**

The traditional literature of the African tribes consists of orally presented narratives of considerable variety. They include folktales, fables, riddles, and praise-poetry. Folktales are intended chiefly to entertain. Their telling has been largely the prerogative of old women. Fables usually have a moral, and their principal characters are animals representing humans in disguise. Through the fables and associated proverbs, traditional values, perceptions, and experiences
are passed on. Riddles represent the more humorous and lighter aspects of oral literature.

The highest form of oral literature are the praises, which are poetic and rhythmic in style and presentation. Their original subjects included birds, cattle, initiation rights, and the deeds of warriors and kings. Collections have been made of the praise-poetry, one of the most outstanding being Izibongo Zamakhosi, containing praises of the Zulu kings, which was compiled and annotated by C. L. S. Nyembezi. Oral literature in its various forms is still practiced, but new themes and subjects have been added dealing with modern life. In turn, oral literature is influencing the style and form of modern written literature.

Written forms of the Bantu languages were developed by missionaries in the nineteenth century, and early literature consisted mainly of religious verse and moral anecdotes. Secular writing began about 1884 with the founding of the newspaper Imvo Zabantzundu (African Opinion) by John Tengo Javabu. Among writers in the first decades of the nineteenth century were Thomas Mofolo, who wrote in Sotho. His Chaka is an excellent historical romance dealing with the warrior tyrant of the Zulus. In 1930 appeared Mhudi, another historical romance, by Sol Plaatje. The story concerned Mzilikazi, one of Chaka's generals who founded a separate kingdom. Perhaps the outstanding African writer of the first half-century was B. W. Vilikazi, who wrote in Zulu. Vilikazi is better known as a poet, although he also wrote a number of historical novels. He was the first African poet of note to depart from the style of the praise-poem.

The older generation of writers in the Bantu languages, influenced by missionary thought and approaches, tended largely to moralize and to teach in their writings, which were also often mainly descriptive in style. Included in this group were writers such as J. J. R. Jolobe, who wrote in Xhosa, and R. R. R. Dhlomo in Zulu. These features have not entirely disappeared from more recent Bantu literature, although in some social novels—for instance, works in Zulu by C. L. S. Nyembezi—character portrayal has been developed. Themes today also frequently deal with clashes between older and newer ways and ideas, urban life, and the African's emergence as an individual. A classic novel in the vein of the old and the new is Ingqumbo Yeminyanya (The Wrath of the Ancestral Spirits) by A. C. Jordan, in Xhosa.

Writers in the Bantu languages today are faced, however, by the problem of a limited reading public; the audience for much of their work is the African school population. This also has a deterrent effect upon subject matter, since controversial topics, such as religion, politics, and sex, might prevent possible acceptance of their work by the government for use in the schools.

African writers in English of some reputation in the 1960's in-
cluded Ezekiel Mphalele, Can Dorsay Themba, William “Bloke” Modisane, Casey Motsisi, Lewis Nkosi, and Todd Matshikiza, all of whom were staff members of the magazine *Drum* in Johannesburg in the late 1950’s or early 1960’s. Others were Peter Clark (Peter Kumalo) and Richard Rive, whose material was published by *Drum* (see ch. 17, Public Information). These writers all used English as their medium of expression.

Most African writing today in English is in the form of the short story or autobiography and is characterized by its protest nature. It is highly realistic, its language melodramatic, and the tone violent and rebellious. Humor is rare—as is also the case with most of the writing by whites—and satire is largely unused. Underlying most modern African writing is an assumption that existence of the world of the African is dependent upon that of the whites. In only a few cases—for instance, in some stories in the collection *The Living and the Dead*, by Mphalele—do African characters act and react in essentially all-African situations.

African writers in English employ this medium partly as a protest against the government’s policy of mother-tongue instruction in African schools as an element of its plan for separate development (see ch. 9, Education). To a considerable extent, however, the use of English is dictated by the wish to communicate with a larger public and for reasons of practicality. Because of difficulties in securing publishers within the country for works that give freer expression to social and political subjects, many writings by Africans have had of necessity to be published outside the country. The wish for freer expression has also caused noted African writers to go into exile in Europe, North America, and other parts of Africa. The works of many of these exiles have been banned in South Africa.

**PAINTING AND SCULPTURE**

**Prehistoric Rock Art**

Primitive art forms—rock paintings and rock engravings—have been found in over 2,000 different locations in the country. Thousands of rock paintings occur in caves and beneath sheltered rock outcroppings in the Drakensberg, in the coastal and mountainous areas of Cape Province, and in the northern part of the Transvaal. Rock engravings (petroglyphs), on the other hand, are found on boulders located mainly in the dry central plateau region (see ch. 2, Physical Environment).

The two art forms may be the work of different peoples. The early rock painters may have been a Bushmanoid people. Later
painters were certainly Bushman (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages). Paintings occur in monochrome, bichromes, and polychromes, many with delicate shadings. Some rival those found in caves in France and Spain. Many Bushman paintings seem to have been done for the pleasure of painting. The later Bushman paintings show an excellent knowledge of foreshortening, as well as perspective and composition.

All aspects of life are portrayed, with human figures in particular usually shown in action. There are depictions of winged antelopes, half-human, half-animal beings, and similar creatures. In the Southwest Cape, paintings attributable to the seventeenth century show trek wagons and galleons. Rock paintings had become a dying art in that part of the country by that century, but it maintained an excellent, naturalistic style in the Drakensberg area well into the 1800’s.

Many paintings are dated at between about 300 and 800 years ago. Weathering and rock exfoliation have damaged many, but preservation of records through the copying of several thousand figures in the Ndedema Gorge in Natal has been undertaken. This work began in 1968 as the result of publisher interest in printing a detailed record of the country’s rock art.

Rock engravers probably appeared first toward the end of the Middle Stone Age, perhaps about 19,000 B.C. Their art developed more rapidly than rock painting and reached its height during the succeeding Late Stone Age, continuing from then until about the seventeenth century. Three main techniques were used in engraving. Those believed to be the oldest consist of an incised line made with a sharp stone, such as flint. A second method consisted of pecking the surface of the rock with a stone. The finest ones were apparently made using a stone chisel-like tool. Some figures are in relief, others essentially only in outline. Among them are engravings that have attained a high artistic quality and demonstrate a definite mastery of perspective. Subjects include various animals, such as antelopes, rhinoceroses, hippopotamuses, and ostriches and human as well as mythological figures.

**Modern Painting**

Little effort appears to have been devoted to artistic endeavors in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the late 1700’s Samuel Daniell visited the country and subsequently published in England a series of color plates illustrating African scenery and animals. His work initiated a period of topographic art that saw the production of a large quantity of visual reports on the landscape, flora, fauna, and people. It was basically descriptive, however, and more a historical record than art.
One of the most important of the topographic artists was Thomas Baines. Baines, an illustrator for *The Illustrated London News*, turned out a very large number of detailed drawings on all aspects of the country and its inhabitants, mainly during the third quarter of the nineteenth century. From the historical standpoint his visual reporting has great value. He was an accomplished draftsman but did not earn a reputation as a painter of quality.

Probably the best known recorder of the period and the country’s first full-time professional artist was Thomas Bowler. Bowler came from England in 1834 and, in the middle decades of the century, produced many pictures, chiefly watercolors, depicting the languid life of the times in Cape Colony. Many were reproduced in England as lithographs.

The latter half of the nineteenth century was dominated by the style portrayed in Bowler’s work. The profound developments in art in Europe that occurred during this period, including the rise of French impressionism, had little influence on art in South Africa. About the turn of the century, however, Peter Wenning came from the Netherlands bringing with him the tradition of Dutch painting, while Hugo Naudé, who had gone to Europe to study art, returned with new ideas affected by impressionism. At the same time, romantic depiction of the local scene began in the work of Gwelo Goodman, whose techniques were influenced by neoimpressionism, and that of John Amshewitz.

Through World War I, however, Victorian academicism was the principal style of popular taste. Impressionism was accepted but only in watered-down form. Painting during this time remained essentially only a continuation of the style of early nineteenth-century Europe, without any sign of an original South African outlook. It was colonial and nostalgic, and its African scenes were Europeanized, with no serious effort being made to introduce the real spirit of the local milieu.

In the period between the two World Wars, the development of a contemporary South African painting was furthered largely by two women painters, Maggie Laubser and Irma Stern, and pioneer artists J. H. Pierneef and Wolf Kibel. Both women studied in Germany in the 1920’s and brought back to South Africa the new expressionist style. Their early work in a style new to South Africa brought unfavorable reaction from a public that demanded a faithful reproduction of nature. Kibel’s work was also subjected to ridicule. He died in 1938 but finally achieved posthumous success. Laubser and Stern went on to eventually become two of the country’s most esteemed artists. J. H. Pierneef introduced the second great French art movement through his experiments with cubism. His work did much to bring life to the country’s art. He is noted for his landscapes, which are painted in a unique manner that came to be labeled the “Pierneef Style.”
World War II largely isolated South Africa; luxury items could no longer be imported. At the same time, industrial expansion was bringing about accumulation of wealth with few opportunities to spend it. The public turned to art, in part perhaps from the standpoint of investment and social prestige. It was a good period for the artist. It brought, however, inflated prices, and work whose quality did not match them. Some of the country’s best known artists, including François Krige, Alexis Preller, and the country’s outstanding portrait painter, Neville Lewis, first emerged during the war years.

The end of the war brought emigrants as well as returning South Africans who had served overseas, with new ideas and impressions in art. Along with them came the so-called Primitive Revival from Europe. The country’s artists for the first time began seeing the flavor of Africa as a part of the national scene rather than as a sort of curiosity. It represented a new source of inspiration, which for the South African artist was at first hand, a natural background in his life, in the form of rock painting and engravings, the crafts of the African tribes, patterned house painting, and other expressions of tribal art and tradition.

One of the first stimulated by the Primitive Revival was Walter Battiss. Battiss, during the 1930’s, had followed generally the style found in Whistler and Millet. He had long studied Bushman art, however, and, after World War II, began to paint in a personal style that incorporated the vitality and spirit of their rock paintings applied to African themes. Since this start, a national style has developed that is based on a common acceptance of the integrity of the African tradition among such leading artists as Alexis Preller, Bettie Cillier-Barnard, Maurice van Essche, Douglas Portway, Rupert Shepherd, and Eleanor Esmonde-White.

Other artists of note in the 1960’s included May Hillhouse, Gordon Vorster, Sidney Goldblatt, Ruth Prowse, François Krige, Enslin du Plessis, and Irmin Henkel. Henkel, a German emigrant to South Africa in 1951, has developed a reputation as a portrait painter. Among African artists in the late 1960’s, using the modern medium, probably the most outstanding was Gerard Sekoto, who now lives in France. Other known African artists were Louis Maqhubela and “Dumile” (M. Zweli-Dumile Mxgaji). Two young African artists of promise were Enoch Tshabalala and Cousin Walaza.

Sculpture

The first sculptor of note was Anton van Wouw, an Afrikaner whose works of monumental proportions became known near the end of the nineteenth century. Van Wouw’s statue of President Paul Kruger of the South African Republic (Transvaal) stands in the central square in Pretoria, while one of his most noted bronzes, of a
Voortrekker mother shielding her two children, forms the central figure at the entrance to the Voortrekker Monument outside the city. His National Women’s Memorial, a monument to the memory of the women and children who died during the Anglo-Boer War, is located near Bloemfontein.

Another Afrikaner of the period, Fanie (Stephanus) Eloff, like Van Wouw, also was a realist. Most of Eloff’s creative life was spent in Paris and covered the period from about 1910 to the late 1940’s. His work was largely in bronze, which could not be cast at the time in South Africa. Although influenced by Rodin and the Swedish sculptor Edström, Eloff developed a style of his own that was marked by graceful form and rhythmic movement. He also produced a number of outstanding portraits both in bronze and marble.

Another group of sculptors combined the contemporary approach to sculpture with the symbolism found in African tribal motifs. Among them were Willem De Sanderez Hendrikz, Coert Steynberg, Moses Kottler, Lippy Lipschitz, Edoardo Villa, and Zolton Borbereki. As in the case of the outstanding painters who accepted and adapted the African tradition to their own genius, these sculptors also evolved a style that was national in character.

Hendrikz was the first Afrikaner sculptor to break with realism and follow modern trends. He had earlier training in architecture, which became an important factor in his work, some of his best being set against an architectural background. His bronze door for the Volkskas Building in Johannesburg has been called one of the most significant sculptured decorations made for a public building in South Africa.

In the late 1960’s, in the forefront of the country’s white sculptors were Lippy Lipschitz and Edoardo Villa, and among the Africans, Sydney Kumalo and Lucas Sithole. Lipschitz has worked with a great variety of materials, including bronze, wood, bone, coral, and stone. Much of his work has been made for homes and people, an intimate domestic sculpture. He has also executed monumental sculpture, however, an example being his family group in granite made for a memorial in East London. Edoardo Villa has produced notable sculpture employing the welded-metal technique. One of his works won the Chamber of Mines Gold Medal and the Olivetti Prize for Sculpture at the 15th Transvaal Academy Exhibition in 1969.

Perhaps the foremost African sculptor in the late 1960’s was Sydney Kumalo, whose inspiration is largely based on African forms and themes. The works of another noted African sculptor, Lucas Sithole, are dominated by African traditional forms and often have religious themes. Many of his pieces are made of wood and then covered with a copper sheath. Both men have had their
work exhibited outside the country, including the São Paulo and Venice Biennales in the case of Kumalo and the Venice Biennale for Sithole.

African Art

The creative carvings that are common among African tribal groups in central Africa are not typically found among the tribes in South Africa. Two types of decorative art are, however, well developed. These consist of bead work and a striking form of mural art used to decorate both the outside and inside of dwellings.

Beadwork is employed for a variety of objects including necklaces, armbands, anklets, aprons, headdresses, and headbands. Its use goes back at least several hundred years. Motifs and design follow accepted patterns, but the work shows a high degree of esthetic feeling and imagination.

Mural art is found today among various tribal groups, with the master muralists being the Ndebele of the Transvaal. Traditional patterns vary with different tribes but originally appear to have been geometric. The Sotho-Tswana people use triangles, rectangles, diamonds, and zigzag lines filled in with solid color or, in some cases, parallel lines of different colors. Inside the rondavel (see Glossary) animal figures are also employed. In the case of the Pedi, murals are found mostly on the walls surrounding the court. These walls are divided into panels of gray, ochre, and reddish browns, each panel being further decorated with a motif, which today may consist of a playing-card symbol, an animal, decorated circles, and the like.

The Ndebele, who adopted the rondavel from the Sotho, also copied the mural style of the latter, decorating their hut walls and the wall surrounding the court with patterns similar to the Sotho ones. The patterns are still followed for part of the motif but are much more elaborate. Richer colors and a greater variety of design are used also to form the panels that cover the façades of the hut and the court. The designs appear to have come from beadwork patterns. Associated with them may be simplified human forms and motifs based on numerals, flowers, letters of the alphabet, and the like. More recent decorations have adopted themes from modern urban life, including buildings, street scenes in the cities, and other features.

Most of the murals are executed by women, although among certain Xhosa in the Eastern Cape some interior friezes that appear to be plants and combinations of plant and human figures are done by men. These friezes, however, seem to have a special significance beyond mere decoration. Mural art has been stimulated by contact with modern life and ways. Its color range has been extended by
use of commercial pigments, and it shows a vitality today that is characteristic of a living and developing art form.

ARCHITECTURE

The early architecture of the Cape was influenced by the classical concepts of Andrea Palladio and the grand garden designs of André le Notre. The large farm manors of the time were planned in the Palladian tradition. They resembled those found in the Netherlands, but, in general, were more massive in structure. They were situated on commanding sites, and the surrounding area was set off with well-ordered orchards, vineyards, and stately avenues of trees. Gables followed the styles then current in Amsterdam but were more monumental in design. Their distinctive style, known as Cape-Dutch, was copied throughout the countryside, even in the construction of smaller farmsteads. British settlers who arrived in the Cape in large numbers in the 1820's, however, frequently built in the rural styles then prevalent in Great Britain. Similarly, in the towns they copied the Georgian townhouses of the old country. The economic activity engendered by discovery of diamonds in the 1860's and gold in the 1880's saw the construction of many new buildings in interior towns such as Johannesburg. These early buildings were basically plain and functional in design. The growth of wealth in the late nineteenth century, however, was accompanied by the addition of ostentatious and excessive ornamentation. Baroque residential palaces were erected in a great variety of styles, decorated with cast iron and terracotta. In the cities monumental structures of stone and marble arose. Elegance was the aim, and architects were brought from Europe to design them. A contest seemed to be underway, with each new bank or city hall building, for instance, seeking to outdo earlier ones. The architect’s personal preference in many cases appeared paramount, as exemplified in the construction of the Paarl Gymnasium built in Egyptian style.

In 1910 Prime Minister Cecil J. Rhodes commissioned Herbert Baker, a young architect, to develop a national style for public buildings. Baker based his structures on the Mediterranean classical tradition. Among his finer buildings are the Union Building in Pretoria, the University of Cape Town, the town hall at Bloemfontein, and the Barclays Bank buildings in Johannesburg and Pretoria. His style was officially adopted by the Public Works Department and used into the 1940's in the designing of various government buildings, schools, memorial structures, and hospitals.

Modern architecture, as distinguished from traditional classical and neoclassical styles and the miscellany of the rococo, was introduced to the country in the late 1920's through contacts between Rex Martiesssen, a young lecturer in architecture at the University
of the Witwatersand, and Le Corbusier. At about the same time, the newer church architecture of the Netherlander De Stijl, was also introduced. In the 1930's houses and apartment buildings following the new designs were constructed in Pretoria. Similar designs spread to other parts of the country, and during this decade the country's architects gained experience in the functional approach to architectural problems. The building industry at the same time also gained needed experience in the use of reinforced concrete and steel.

Modern architecture was relatively common when the economic expansion of the 1940's accelerated the pace of urbanization. The demand increased for apartment, business, and public buildings of all types. Structures based on modern design began arising in all major cities. By the start of the 1970's they represented a national style not only in office and industrial buildings and apartments but also in private homes, schools, theaters, and churches. Initially, overseas architects, in particular Le Corbusier, exerted a strong influence. Gradually, however, what might be called a distinctively South African style has developed.

One aspect of urban architecture is the several hundred thousands of essentially boxlike, four- or five-room, identical houses built by the government for residents of African townships. These are now typical of the locations assigned to Africans on the further outskirts of the cities, such as Soweto at Johannesburg, and of locations adjacent to towns and hamlets in the rural areas (see ch. 8, Living Conditions).

In various parts of Natal structures erected by the Indian community are found in modified Indo-Persian styles. Some buildings in similar styles are also found in the Transvaal associated with the Indian population there. A number of Islamic-type buildings occur in the Cape Town area connected with the Cape Malay community.

MUSIC AND DANCE

The African Community

Music is an integral part of the lives of the African population. In tribal areas communal and group singing are associated with entertainment, with the telling of folk tales, with work, with groups moving to and from the fields, and with many other events. A great variety of musical instruments is also found, including rattles, clappers, drums, horns and trumpets, whistles, flutes, and stringed instruments. The local flora has affected the type of instruments made and used. Much of the country is treeless, and the great drums of the Congo are not found. There is rather an emphasis on stringed instruments, flutes, and the like. There is little serious instrumental music in tribal areas, the major development being in communal singing, which is unaccompanied.
Vocal music in the rural areas is essentially a living folk music, which is undergoing constant, although gradual, change. One of its main features is spontaneous creation by the singers who, while keeping to the traditional pattern for the melody and rhythm, modify the words, tune, and drumming of the song as they sing it. Continuity of style exists, but this traditional music is far from being repetitious or a hand-down from generation to generation. Some of the Xhosa and Zulu folksongs have been made familiar to Western audiences in Europe and North America through the singing of Miriam Makeba.

One of the significant features of African music is the relationship between the melody and the tonal character of certain words. Such words must be given an exact tone to convey the proper meaning. The pattern of the melody is tied to the rise and fall of these tones and moves up and down to conform with the correct tones in order to maintain the sense of the phrase. The music exhibits a limited harmonic development and intricate rhythmic structure. The eight principal Bantu languages in the country have developed distinctive melodic structures related to their own tonal features.

From about the 1920's the influence of Western popular music, largely American dance music, brought adoption of these styles by African bands in urban areas. Harmony and rhythm continued to remain basically Western, but the adaptations were colored gradually by a reversion to the African melodic structure. Out of this combination has arisen the present Township Jazz or Bantu Jazz. The music is melodically restricted but possesses the strong rhythm of traditional African singing, which is emphasized by the beat of percussion instruments. This music has great appeal for the African today, and the number of bands playing it has increased enormously. In the late 1960's Township Jazz numbers were bestselling phonograph records. It was estimated that some 90 percent of employed Africans in urban areas were buying them.

In 1969 there also existed another group of African musicians, who formed a progressive jazz school. Most of them had been trained by white musicians. Their technical skill surpassed that of the Township Jazz players in general. Their "African sound," however, retained a distinctly traditional sound that has become the distinguishing mark of their progressive style.

Communal singing led naturally to the formation of African choral groups in urban areas, some of which have achieved wide acclaim. From 1959 until the mid-1960's, massed African choirs annually presented Handel's Messiah before segregated audiences in Johannesburg. They were accompanied by the Johannesburg Symphony Orchestra. In 1965, however, the government, under provisions of the Group Areas Act, prohibited mixed casts and refused to allow the orchestra to accompany the choir. A performance was later permitted in St. Alban's Anglican Cathedral in
Pretoria. Performances have been given since then but under the direction of African conductors and accompanied by African orchestras.

Dancing, like singing, is also an integral part of tribal life. Dancing is associated with a variety of ritual ceremonies and is performed by individuals or by groups. It is connected with the life of the village, initiation into adulthood, weddings, festivals, and the like. Much group dancing appears also to be for pure recreation and enjoyment. Dancing is encouraged by mine owners among African mine workers as a form of recreation. Contests are also held as entertainment. In the Johannesburg area over 100,000 African miners are reported to engage in the dances, practicing several times a week for Sunday performances.

The White Community

Early music among the Afrikaners was mainly religious, based on the Calvinist doctrine that ordinary music was to be made only to the glory of God and that communal singing and rhyming psalms only would be permitted at church services. Religious music, thus, was sung at home in connection with family worship as the only permissible type. At the same time, however, a secular folk-type music arose, composed originally mostly by Malay slaves for the entertainment of the household. Although there was opposition to secular music on religious grounds, it managed to survive. During the Great Trek songs based on Dutch, German, and French folk-songs were popular, and new ones were composed. This music continued to be sung afterwards and came to be known popularly as boeremusiek (literally, farmers’ music).

Boeremusiek has a set form and rhythm all its own, with a basic, somewhat monotonous beat. It can probably best be described as rural-type music. It is usually played around a nucleus of instruments consisting of an accordion, concertina, and guitar. The music is common at braaivlei parties (barbecues), and the Afrikaans-language radio programs include a large amount of it.

The British settlers in South Africa retained British musical traditions and folksongs. There was no urge to develop new forms, and the settlers maintained a receptiveness to developments in England, Europe and, later, in the United States. Radio broadcasts in English in the 1960’s included popular music of the type played in Great Britain and the United States and classical music (see ch. 17, Public Information).

In the classical music field, development began with the establishment of a conservatory at Stellenbosch in 1907. In 1912 the Cape College of Music was founded in Cape Town, and two years later a permanent city orchestra was formed there. In other areas of the country, however, music remained at relatively low level. Some
larger cities, including Johannesburg and Durban, and also smaller centers had orchestras but essentially of amateur status. Training levels at music schools were generally low; leadership in the classical music field was principally in the hands of immigrants into the 1930's.

After establishment of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) in 1936, symphony orchestras were set up and maintained until 1954 in Johannesburg, Cape Town, and Durban. In 1954 these were combined into the country's first full-size orchestra at Johannesburg. In the late 1960's there were, in addition, symphony orchestras in Cape Town, Durban, and Pretoria. During this period, music schools or departments were also established at the different universities.

The flowering of Afrikaans poetry in the 1930's acted as a stimulus to Afrikaner composers to write music either for the new poems or to compose songs themselves. Their work, however, was generally characterized by lack of originality and depth, simplicity, and little technical skill. Attempts to write instrumental music without words were not successful. Perhaps the most successful of the melodic composers was S. le Roux Marais, who became well known in the mid-1930's for his song "Die Roos" (The Rose). This and subsequent songs made him the best known and liked composer of his class among the Afrikaner populace.

The first accomplished composer of contemporary music was the Afrikaner Arnold van Wyk, whose First Symphony was performed in 1943 in England where he was then studying. He has written numerous pieces since, some of which have also been performed in Europe and England. In the 1960's South Africa's most distinguished composers, in addition to van Wyk, included Hubert du Plessis, Stefans Grové, and John Joubert, all of whom were Afrikaners. The works of these three have, likewise, been performed abroad, and both Grové and Joubert were working outside the country in the late 1960's. Younger composers in the latter 1960's who showed promise included Cromwell Everson, Stanley Glasser, Graham Newcater, and Carl van Wyk.

Contemporary classical music has not been influenced by boeremusiek. The use of Afrikaans verse in vocal arrangements and the choice of subject might seem to indicate a difference from European classical music. There is certainly a spiritual content related to life and its tensions in the country, but composition generally follows the Western European tradition.

THE THEATER

There is an active interest throughout the country in the theater. Dramas, musicals, operas, and other stage performances are pre-
presented by a variety of groups, which include white, African, Coloured, and Indian companies. A National Theater Organization was set up by the government toward the end of the 1940’s, which presented plays in both English and Afrikaans. Its companies not only gave performances in the larger centers but also toured widely in the provinces. This organization was replaced in 1963 by separate performing arts councils established in each province.

Each council has English and Afrikaans companies, as well as ballet and children’s companies. Their operations, which are subsidized by the government, also include seeing that the best available concert artists, small instrumental groups, ensembles, and touring orchestras are provided not only in the cities but also in smaller towns. The councils also arrange for internationally recognized musical groups, artists, producers, and others to perform or stage productions in the country. Additionally, they encourage or commission South African artists to create new works for the professional stage.

Among nonwhite organizations concerned with the theater, the most outstanding in the 1960’s were probably Union Artists, also known as Dorkay House, in Johannesburg and its associated African Music and Drama Association (AMDA) and the Coloured Eoan Group in Cape Town. Until 1966 Union Artists promoted theatrical and other performances that drew large audiences but withdrew from this field as the result of promotional failures. Among its important productions were King Kong, The Blood Knot, and Sponono, which were later also staged abroad, and Township Jazz. Its activities are mainly centered now in AMDA, which trains African students and sponsors student productions.

The Eoan Group, founded in 1963, originally began by giving speech training to Coloureds in a part of Cape Town. Since then its activities have expanded greatly, and it now stages operas, ballet performances, and dramas. Its operatic and musical show presentations, in particular, are highly regarded throughout the country.

In the late 1960’s the country’s premier white English-language playwright was Athol Fugard. His play, The Blood Knot, a story of two Coloured brothers, one of whom passes for a white, had long runs in England and the United States. Wait a Minim, a musical revue produced by Leon Gluckman, also had successful runs in those countries, after two years of playing in South Africa.

African playwrights and producers of note were Gibson Kente, Cornelius Mabuso, and Basil Somlahlo. Kente wrote the book, lyrics, and music for Sikalo, which was the first musical created and directed entirely by Africans. It was performed in various parts of the country and also in Swaziland during 1966 and 1967. He also wrote and produced a musical, Lifa, put on in Soweto in 1968. Cornelius Mabuso produced the musical verse-drama Shaka. Adapt-
ed from a work by X-Goro, it was performed in Johannesburg in 1968. Basil Somhlahlo has written and produced plays, his latest being Thembile, put on in Soweto in 1969.

SCHOLARSHIP AND INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT

Intellectual development for the greater part of the population was affected at every turn in the 1960's by the official policy of separate development. Fundamental was the difference in educational opportunities for the white and nonwhite racial components of the population. For the whites there was ready access to a well-developed, modern educational system which provided an opportunity, to all those sufficiently qualified, to obtain a higher education. For nonwhites, however, the opportunity for many to advance beyond a secondary education was seriously restricted by shortage of facilities, the necessary financial means to continue studies and, to some extent, by the quality of teaching in the nonwhite primary and secondary schools. In the case of Africans, an acute shortage of secondary schools in the late 1960's was a further limiting factor (see ch. 9, Education).

The result of educational restrictions upon nonwhite possibilities for intellectual advancement was very apparent in the number of recipients of degrees and higher education diplomas. At the end of 1968 or in early 1969, a total of 10,850 whites received degrees or diplomas. In contrast, only about 850 nonwhites were awarded degrees and diplomas.

Broad intellectual development for all groups was hindered directly by the restrictions placed upon intellectual exchange by the operation and enforcement of the Group Areas Act. The restrictions made personal contact on an equal basis with members of other racial groups and the direct exchange of ideas and acquisition of intimate knowledge of extragroup thinking either extremely difficult or impossible. A somewhat similar situation, although one not connected with official racial policies, was also encountered within the white group itself in the division in language and general philosophical outlook between the Afrikaans- and English-speaking populations (see ch. 6, Social Structure).

The major research organization in the country is the South African Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), established in 1945 by act of Parliament to coordinate research in general and to aid the development of secondary industries. CSIR maintains its own research laboratories and institutes, centered chiefly in the Pretoria area but located also at Johannesburg and Grahamstown. In 1969 it had in operation eleven separate institutions that encompassed a broad spectrum of theoretical and applied research in physics, chemistry, telecommunications, mechanical en-
gineering, nutrition, the mathematical sciences, and in the fields of construction, roads, water supply, personnel, and the woolen textile industry. It also operated the Republic Observatory at Johannesburg.

CSIR, in addition to its own directly conducted research, subsidized industrial research by a number of industry-controlled nonprofit research institutions. It also encouraged basic research at universities and medical schools through grants to research workers and for staff and equipment. During the mid-1960's it was providing about R500,000 (1 rand equals US$1.40) annually for this purpose. CSIR likewise does work under contract for private industrial firms. In 1969, moreover, it was operating under contract a radio space research station, at Hartbeeshoek in the Transvaal, for the United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration and was jointly sponsoring a French satellite-tracking station at Paardefontein. It also was collaborating with the country's Department of Defense on defense research projects (see ch. 27, The Armed Forces).

Various central and provincial government departments conduct independent research in agriculture, forestry, fishing, geological surveying, and other fields. Government-sponsored research is also carried on by laboratories of the Atomic Energy Board. Extensive research, in particular, is carried out by the Directorate of Agricultural Research under the Department of Agricultural Technical Services. In 1969 the directorate had ten specialized and seven regional institutes in operation. One of the best known was its Veterinary Research Institute at Onderstepoort, near Pretoria, which does work on animal diseases and manufactures animal vaccines.

Basic research in the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities is carried out at different universities. Many of the country's private industrial firms also have substantial research laboratories. In the scientific and technological fields almost all positions of significance are held by whites. The opportunities for nonwhites to obtain advanced training in laboratories are extremely limited. The government laboratories employ nonwhites only in the lowest positions. The English-medium universities employ some Africans, Coloureds, and Asians as technicians (see ch. 9, Education).

In the field of social science research, the South African National Council for Social Research acted as an advisory body to the minister of national education until early 1969. Its function was to promote and organize research in the social sciences generally, encourage and undertake planning of projects, and aid the training of highly qualified workers through grants and scholarships. The National Bureau of Educational and Social Research, under the department, conducted actual research in education and the social sciences. These two bodies were scheduled to merge at the be-

Because of its location, South Africa has also produced research in physical anthropology and prehistoric archaeology of substantial importance. Thus, the earliest finds of the australopithecinae, now considered to be among the earliest precursors of modern man, were discovered in South Africa in the 1920's. Subsequent research pertaining to discovery, description, and analysis of protohuman and early human materials has been carried forward by South Africans. Some, who have received an international reputation, have left the country to work elsewhere, but a number still do research and teach at the major universities in the country.

Because Afrikaners claimed to have arrived in South Africa no later than the Africans, a matter of historical and political justification for their position, archaeological research into the coming of the Bantu-speaking peoples was not systematically pursued (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Nevertheless, a number of professional archaeologists, attached to universities and museums, have done a good deal of work, and there seems to be no extensive inhibition of research of this kind.

Research in the social sciences and humanities, which deals with the white population only, is generally not restricted. Research concerned with the nonwhite population, however, and particularly studies involving the African community, is sometimes difficult for the white researcher. Permission is required from the government to enter African areas, and such permission may be withdrawn without a reason being given. The white anthropologist or sociologist must engage an African to live in the community under study, since he is given only daily permits to enter the area.

Problems may also be encountered in studies of the nonwhite populations related to suspicions of informants that the researcher might be a local official or member of the security police (see ch. 26, Public Order and Internal Security). Certain areas of study concerned with nonwhites—for instance, the investigation of political attitudes—may also have to be avoided to prevent suspicion among, or disapproval by, the authorities. The result has been a greater concentration on ethnographical studies and slighting of the social and economic changes among nonwhites engendered by urbanization and industrialization.

There were more than fifty learned societies and scientific and professional organizations functioning at the end of the 1960's. Their areas of activity ranged from archaeology and astronomy to wildlife conservation and zoology. Most of them, as well as the various research institutes, published scholarly journals and reviews. The total number of the different publications in 1968 was about 100.
South Africa has produced among its white population scientists and professional people of international reputation, such as Dr. Christiaan N. Barnard, of heart transplant fame, physicist Sir Basil Schonland, ichthyologist J. L. B. Smith, and physical anthropologist Phillip Tobias. The country's participation in international scientific and social science activities and its potential contribution in these fields have, however, been seriously affected by its domestic policy of racial separation.

In the late 1950's South Africa, in conjunction with Great Britain, Belgium, France, and Portugal, formed the Committee for Scientific and Technical Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara (CCTA). A main purpose was to utilize the country's scientific know-how and resources to help the various African nations as they attained independence. South Africa also became a member of the Council for Science in Africa and the Economic Commission for Africa.

The newly independent nations, opposed to apartheid as they were, increasingly refused to accept the technical and economic aid offered them. Their criticism finally led to South Africa's resignation from CCTA. This was followed by withdrawal in 1963 from the Council for Science in Africa and the Economic Commission for Africa. In the same year it withdrew from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). An effort to expel South Africa from the World Health Organization (WHO) failed; however, its participation in WHO activities at present is quite limited. The result has been a feeling of isolation from institutions, scholars, and intellectual developments in other parts of Africa on the part of many of the country's scientists and scholars.
CHAPTER 11
RELIGION

Religion is closely linked to ethnic membership and to political and social perceptions and behavior. Each of the ethnic groups that settled in South Africa brought with it its own religion. Most of the world's major religions, as well as a variety of local African systems, are represented by at least a few people, and there has been a good deal of conversion and realignment, with or without proselytizing.

The overwhelming majority of the population is Protestant; the largest membership is that of the Dutch Reformed churches, associated with the large Afrikaner segment of the white community and the related Cape Coloureds. The Methodist church, the largest single denomination among the Africans, is second, although most Africans belong to the many small separatist, or independent, churches, and nearly half belong to traditional African religions specific to their tribes (see table 11). The African separatist churches must gain formal government recognition if they or their ministers are to have certain rights, but most persist even without such recognition.

Some Christian churches maintain ties with an international church; others do not. Some of the latter originated in South Africa, including the African separatist churches and two branches of the Dutch Reformed Church. Some churches with international affiliations have a worldwide outlook and may be influenced by international public opinion. Others are members of international organizations that have an exchange of ideas as their object and listen to opinions other than local ones. Some, however, tend to be isolationist and to regard with suspicion any foreign influences.

There is no established church in South Africa and no official religious discrimination; however, the government has an ethnic Afrikaner flavor, and as such the Dutch Reformed churches are identified with it. The government has also been known to limit the activities of churches that it deemed to be encouraging disagreement with its policies, especially in regard to their work with nonwhites. This is especially the case with internationally based churches, which have both white and nonwhite membership and try to avoid the practice of apartheid in as many situations as possible.

The Roman Catholic Church has such an international orientation and is also perceived as a traditional enemy by some of the Protes-
Table 11. Religion and Race in South Africa, 1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Whites</th>
<th>Coloureds</th>
<th>Asians</th>
<th>Africans</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nederduits</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gereformeerde (Dutch)</td>
<td>1,324,052</td>
<td>440,370</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>524,706</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gereformeerde (Reformed)</td>
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<td>7,184</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18,112</td>
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<td>Hervormde</td>
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<td>2,921</td>
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<td>21,565</td>
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<td>Anglican</td>
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<td>260,849</td>
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<td>6,191</td>
<td>204</td>
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<td>117,123</td>
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<td>192,234</td>
<td>118,900</td>
<td>10,316</td>
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<td>Apostolic Faith Mission</td>
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<td>17,245</td>
<td>665</td>
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<td>139,873</td>
<td>123</td>
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<td>6,542</td>
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<td>307</td>
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<td>Bantu Christian churches</td>
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<td>112</td>
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<td>338</td>
<td>72</td>
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<tr>
<td>Confucian</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,073</td>
<td>26</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>327,783</td>
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<td>Islam</td>
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<td>92,130</td>
<td>99,068</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>4,384</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>9,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No church affiliation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and refuse to state*</td>
<td>36,874</td>
<td>14,162</td>
<td>7,013</td>
<td>3,001,659</td>
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<td>26,061</td>
<td>5,289</td>
<td>490,238</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,080,159</td>
<td>1,509,053</td>
<td>477,047</td>
<td>10,927,922</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Most of the Africans in this category are adherents of tribal religions.


tant groups. Ecumenical gestures after the Vatican Council in 1966, however, led to a rapprochement with members of the interfaith organizations, especially the Anglicans, who in South Africa have a nearly Anglo-Catholic orientation.

Although Jews in South Africa have never suffered serious discrimination beyond some relatively mild social snubs; they have had reason to fear more, in view of the activity of the Nazi propagandists before and during World War II. The Afrikaner press, however, has often used ethnic terms to discuss Jewish public figures who take an anti-National Party stand. The effect of this has been to cause the bulk of the Jewish population to maintain a careful silence and to remain politically neutral. The prime minister has, on the other hand, publicly praised the Jewish community for the maintenance of its own "racial purity."

Some of the Protestant churches have been willing to condone the practice of apartheid, especially the Gereformeerde Kerk (one of several Dutch Reformed churches); most have taken the stand that
they would back separate development if conditions of decent living and human dignity could be maintained for all races and their welfare be promoted. Otherwise the apartheid regulations must be interpreted as anti-Christian. The Catholics have taken the stand that all discrimination, whether by race, culture, or sex, must be discouraged and abolished as against the law of God.

Islam is in principle egalitarian and, in South Africa, practices this precept as well as preaching it. It therefore has been gaining a few adherents. A number of the Christian churches have had missions at work to proselytize among the Muslims, and there has been some resentment of this in the Muslim communities.

Many South Africans, clergy and laity alike, are unusually dedicated to what they consider the social implications of their religious beliefs, and they have been willing to back these publically, even at the risk of conflict with the government. They have done a good deal to obtain services, provide welfare, and improve conditions for the nonwhites. They have acted, if sometimes belatedly or confusedly, as the conscience of the country.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The religious affiliations of South Africans can no longer be classified on a basis of ethnic grouping, though each originally had an ethnic affiliation. At the time of the first European contact with Africa, the African religions were closely integrated with tribal life. Nature gods, lineage spirits, animal totems, and a varying concept of a higher creator or cosmic god were common elements. Rituals included rites of passage, blood sacrifices to ancestors and sometimes the gods, and totemic dancing and other dance rituals. Magic and divination were also practiced, the latter being important to the juridical process. Although the Hottentot religion is imperfectly known, it is known that it differed somewhat in the character of its gods from that of the Bantu; however, the basic forms were similar.

The burghers (independent merchants) and Boers of the Dutch East India Company entered southern Africa, bringing with them predikants (preachers) of the Dutch Reformed Church (Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk—NGK), which became the established church. A religious war against Spain had partitioned the Low Countries into the Protestant Republic of the Netherlands and the Catholic Spanish Netherlands, now Belgium. Many of the settlers were Protestants from Belgian Brabant, like Jan van Riebeeck. Anti-Catholic feeling ran high, and for a long time no Catholics were admitted into South Africa.

In 1778 the Lutherans were allowed the right of public worship. The British similarly allowed the Muslim Cape Malays to worship openly during their first occupation, and the Kerkenordre
(Churches Order) of 1804 gave equal protection of the law to "all religious associations which for the furtherance of virtue and good contact respect a Supreme Being." The Catholics took this opportunity to establish a church, and later, with increased immigration, they established their earliest Apostolic Vicarate at Cape Town in 1847. The small Jewish community established a congregation in 1841. When the Anglican church was introduced along with British colonial government, there was no direct conflict between the Dutch Reformed and Anglican churches.

At first the Dutch Reformed ministers sought to convert the Africans with whom they came in contact, and many of the Hottentots became Christian. The Moravian Brethren entered as missionaries in 1792, in time to provide places of refuge for fugitives from the tribal turmoil and conflict; and in the same year the Dutch Reformed Church also established formal missions. But the Dutch settlers had been losing interest in the conversion of the Africans because of the practice of slavery and later were unwilling to associate with Hottentot or other converts on an equal basis, and conversions soon decreased.

The Cape Coloured groups were also rejected, so that it was left largely to missionaries other than those of the Dutch Reformed Church to take an interest in these communities. As a consequence, most rural Coloured became members of smaller Evangelical sects, such as that of the Moravian Brethren, although many urban Coloured remained Dutch Reformed.

The church was an important source of education in South African development. In the early days the predikant was often the only teacher in a Boer community. The London Missionary Society paid systematic attention to education, establishing model farms for the purpose of teaching nearby Africans modern farming methods as well as housekeeping to the women. It sought to inculcate the Protestant ethic of respect for work and humility and thereby to obliterate the warrior's traditional contempt for manual labor, which had traditionally been turned over to vassal groups. Later, formal schools were established by other mission groups. Some missionaries who had no ties to the Afrikaners or to the English, both then expanding, were more welcome than those linked to either, and groups such as the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society were invited to establish schools (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

Many European and American missionaries entered South Africa to work among the Bantu speakers at the very time of hostile contact between them and the Voortrekkers; their success despite African distrust of white intentions appears to have been the result, at least in part, of medical and educational work. They also encouraged active and fairly equal participation in the church by the
Africans. American missionaries among the Zulus ordained the first Zulu pastor in 1870 after a ten-year effort in the area; they laid down a clear code of religious ethical behavior and, in 1883, produced a Zulu translation of the Bible. In 1885 they turned over the Home Missionary Movement to a board of six Zulus. In Natal the government gave the Americans large tracts of land where they established their stations, which were soon surrounded by communities of Zulu converts. Americans, Scandinavians, and Germans tended to encourage the African converts to establish their own congregations.

After the discovery of gold, a new influx of missionaries from Europe and America arrived to work with the African laborers flocking to the Rand. Many of these represented Pentecostal churches, Salvation Army groups, and Seventh Day Adventists. In Natal the South Africa General Mission established the Dumisa Training Institute for Pastors and Evangelists, an interdenominational theological institute where many Zulus were trained who later became the heads of separatist congregations. The separatist church movement, which began between 1890 and 1910, was an attempt to give new churches roots in the soil where they had been planted; it sought to produce “a self-supporting, self-governing, and self-propagating church.” It met with considerable hostility and suspicion among the English and Afrikaner religious and secular authorities. In some cases separatist churches were set up with leaders and members whom missionaries would have considered insufficiently qualified or instructed. They were successful from the beginning in the sense that they attracted and held many Africans.

The earliest Muslims to establish themselves were Malay slaves and political exiles imported to the Cape Colony from Indonesia, the first arriving in 1667. Indonesian Islam was basically of the Sunni branch but was strongly influenced by Shiah theology through Persian contacts. A number of those imported to the Cape were political prisoners who had been guerrilla leaders against the Dutch; they were often men of high social and religious standing and considerable education. These men rallied groups of Muslims around them and established congregations, conducting services usually by permission but also secretly if necessary. The burial places of these men, considered saints, are shrines today. The saints’ tombs are central to Muslim worship.

Whereas other ethnic groups among the slaves, including Ceylonese as well as Africans from Madagascar, lost their original cultures, the Islamic group maintained its cohesion and continued to grow. It spread among the slaves in the colony at a faster rate than Christianity, probably because of its egalitarian ideology and strong sense of community. Though at first it was necessary to gather in
secret, toleration was later granted, and the first mosques were built in 1850. The Muslims then formed themselves into a series of communities, each grouped around a mosque.

**CHURCHES OF THE WHITE COMMUNITIES**

Two definite attitudes are found among the white devotees of the Christian churches in South Africa. One identifies specific church groups with specific ethnic groups and equates the interests of the church with those of nationality; to betray one is to betray the other. This is primarily the case with those who identify the Dutch Reformed churches with the Afrikaners, and those who identify the Church of the Province of South Africa (Anglicans) with the English-speaking community.

The other attitude is that which regards the church as a God-given community above and overriding all other communities and their interests; if an ethnic group's interests or desires conflict with a course of action demanded by the religion, its interests must be set aside. The scripturally defined religion then becomes the yardstick by which policies and customs are tested.

Often churchmen and laymen may hold both attitudes simultaneously until a conflict situation seems to demand that one or the other be chosen. This has been the source of much debate within and between churches during the 1960's.

Respectibility in the Afrikaner community is closely bound to church participation; in early Voortrekker settlements only those who so participated were known as burghers or had full citizenship status in the community. In modern times political leaders had to be men of undoubted religion, who in public speeches would strive to equate the Dutch Reformed Church, the Afrikaner nation, and their own policy in the eyes of their constituents. Moreover, because the presbyterian organization of the Dutch Reformed churches permits participation in church government by the congregation, many political figures are able to point to their experience as church functionaries.

**The Dutch Reformed Churches**

The Reformed churches are so called from the fact that, during the Protestant Reformation, they reformed their organizations' creeds and practices through direct consultation of the Bible, thereby setting themselves apart from the customs of the Roman Catholic Church. They include, besides the Dutch Reformed churches the Presbyterian Church, a number of German regional churches and approximately forty-nine French Huguenot congregations. Some of these have subdivided or reunited since that time, usually
on a basis of theological agreement or difference, though the trend throughout the 1950's and 1960's has been toward unity. The central organizations of these churches have always kept some communication with each other but are independent and differ in specific details.

The basic organization of these churches is presbyterian in that all secular business is handled by a group of twelve elders (presbyters) and twelve deacons, who also may assist the minister with the service. Specific duties vary according to the conditions and requirements of the particular congregation. The Presbyterian churches traditionally give considerable leeway to individual congregations in ordering the forms of their services, whereas the Reformed churches provide liturgies to be followed in carrying out the forms of worship.

Reform in the Netherlands developed under Calvin and Zwingli. The Netherlands was then a federation of states, each with its own church; the range of opinion later produced factions and further subdivisions. In 1618 and 1619 a general synod for all Reformed churches was held at Dordrecht. It decided to espouse a strict view of the Doctrine of Predestination, generally considered the most salient feature of this group of churches. This was set forth in the Canons of Dordrecht and is implied in the Dordrecht revised Confession of Faith and the Heidelberg Catechism, which are in general use.

The Confession of Faith used by the Reformed churches specifies belief in the Trinity, in the canonical books of the Bible as being the written Word of God and absolute authority for the Faith; in Adam’s Fall and Original Sin, the punishment for which is bodily death; and in Christ’s Incarnation, death and Resurrection to redeem man from sin and death. Only those who believe in God and Christ are so redeemed, however, and faith is a gift of God given only to a chosen few (the Elect). Good works are an expression of faith, and the plain duty of the believer, but have no influence on God as to whether the individual will be saved or not. The concept of Free Will, important in other churches, is denied. This is the basic doctrine of Predestination.

The ideal church is set forth as a single universal church with the proper ordering of its organization and sacraments, the “false church” (apparently the Roman Catholic) being condemned for not living up to this. The acceptance of governments is enjoined, with condemnation of those who rebel against a government that is carrying out its functions and promoting order and religion. Lastly, the belief in the Day of Judgement, with its eternal reward and punishment, is stated in detail.

The doctrine of Predestination is set forth in its details in the Canons of Dordrecht. These state that, from among fallen mankind,
God has chosen, or elected, a certain number of persons for redemption by Christ, for no reason other than his own Grace and Wisdom. Some were so elected under the Old Covenant, many under the New. Others are to be left to their sinful devices to perish, and their guilt remains. The Elect cannot be lost, even if they sin or their faith becomes weak, because God works on them through conscience and experience to bring them back to the Way. They owe it as a duty to strive for righteousness, but that does not affect their election. The reason for this is not to be questioned or comprehended by man; God is perfectly just, and man should only praise and adore him. It is denied that when God calls, man chooses to accept the call or not; it is God who gives faith to accept the call, and Free Will does not exist.

The canons mention that this doctrine has been criticized on the grounds that it would lead to spiritual sloth among believers and to unnecessary damnation of others and that it accuses God of arbitrary tyranny. This is denied, without answering the criticism other then to reject it and to warn the critics against false witness. The Synod judges the doctrine of Predestination to be directly derived from the Scriptures and any other to be of Satan.

The Dutch Reformed Churches in South Africa

The Dutch Reformed Church in South Africa is not a single church but three separately founded organizations, the oldest of which has subdivided into regional and ethnic synods plus missionary branches. They maintain contact with each other but vary in their climate of opinion regarding fundamentalism and puritanism and in their attitude to the world outside their own communities, usually as exemplified by Protestant interdenominational and ecumenical organizations such as the World Council of Churches and the various international groupings of students or churchmen, such as the Christian Institute and the World Christian Student Federation.

Usually the term Dutch Reformed Church is used in such a way as to imply the largest of these three, which had its mother-church in the Netherlands, but sometimes the term is used for all three together, though they do not always act together. The largest and senior church has a higher representation in urban areas than the other two, which developed independently in frontier areas for lack of clergy from the church at the Cape, so that to some extent there is a rural versus urban division involved in the development of religious opinion.

The Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk

The church that came to the Cape with the original Dutch East India Company settlement was the Dutch Reformed Church (Ne-
The Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk—NGK), which is still the largest. It has been growing rapidly, apparently acquiring some members from the other two Dutch Reformed churches; this trend may be related to increasing urbanization, since the others are primarily associated with the interior and rural areas. Its main seminary is at the University of Stellenbosch, and another is at Pretoria. It sponsors many social service organizations, especially for women, and a variety of schools for the handicapped; it also carries on missionary work both inside and outside of South Africa, sometimes cooperating with other European and American Reformed or related churches. It has seven independent regional synods, five of which are in South Africa (Cape Province, Natal, Orange Free State, Northern Transvaal, and Southern Transvaal), and the other two are in South West Africa (Namibia) and Central Africa (Rhodesia and Zambia). It also has a mission church (the Nederduits Gereformeerde Sendingkerk), which serves the Coloureds, and an African branch, the Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk van Afrika, which has six regional synods for the separate language groups and other regional synods outside South Africa.

Another daughter-church, the Nederduits Gereformeerde Indian Church now exists. In 1966 it had 262 regular members plus a staff of white and nonwhite missionaries, evangelists, and lay-workers.

The Nederduits Hervormde Kerk

The Nederduits Hervormde Kerk (NHK), whose name is merely a variant spelling of Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk, was the first official church of the Transvaal Republic in 1858. Contact with the church at the Cape had been lost, because the Cape government considered the Voortrekkers to be runaways and refused to provide them with ministers. They, therefore, depended on Dutch Reformed missionary ministers sent out from the Netherlands and Presbyterians sent from Scotland. Both of these groups of clergy were too sophisticated theologically for their congregations, which were more or less illiterate; they had also been isolated from European thought in the Rural Cape areas for a long time. An American Presbyterian, Daniel Lindley, finally took charge of virtually all the religious life of the Voortrekkers from Natal to the Limpopo, riding from place to place. The church that was founded, however, was officially related to the Nederduits Hervormde Kerk in the Netherlands, a relatively liberal church.

After contact with the NGK was reestablished, some settlers returned to their original allegiance, but others did not. The new organization survived, but even today about a third of its attendance has been in the Transvaal. It is described as having adherents and not members. Until 1961 it was strongly opposed to mission work, having strong racial feelings; then, however, it began to estab-
lish a missionary organization. Having trained no African ministers itself, it obtained African evangelists from the NGK but often hired those who were not yet sufficiently trained and qualified; the larger group did not approve.

The Gereformeerde Kerk van Suid-Afrika

The Gereformeerde Kerk van Suid-Afrika (The Dopper Church) broke away from the NGK in 1859, wishing to practice a stricter Calvinism. They disapproved of the singing of hymns in church, as well as of drinking, smoking, and dancing; at the present time they also forbid motion pictures. They had been losing members, apparently to the NGK, during the 1950's but appear to have gained some from among the more conservative members of that church because of its anti-apartheid statements during the 1960's.

Affiliations and Organization of the Dutch Reformed Churches

An interchurch commission maintains contact between these three church groups. It takes a special interest in Afrikaans Bible translation. There is also a Federal Council of the group of NGK regional churches.

The General Synod of the NGK is a member of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches, which it joined in 1966; previously, some of its regional (provincial) synods had belonged separately. This includes American, German, and other Calvinist churches, including Presbyterian. It also belongs to the Reformed Ecumenical Synod, which includes twenty-seven churches from all over the world.

The Dutch Reformed churches are strong supporters of the Bible Society of South Africa, formerly called the British and Foreign Bible Society, which cooperates with the NGK in the translation of the Bible into various African languages and periodic revision of the translations. The Coloured and African branches of the church are included in this support.

The Dutch Reformed Churches and Apartheid

In the earliest period, the conversion to Christianity by an African, then usually a Hottentot or an imported slave, conferred on him the privilege of associating with other Christians; a slave could not thereafter be sold and was supposed to be manumitted. This often caused settlers to discourage the Christianizing of their servants. Later, the idea of Hottentots and slaves as potential associates or marital partners ceased to be approved by most of the Cape society despite continuing unacknowledged miscegenation.

In the areas where the Boers had churches, the Hottentots under-
going religious instruction were often relegated to special services, but this did not constitute discrimination so long as it was intended to enable them to understand regular services later. As settlement continued, however, one finds records of the church leaders agreeing to segregated seating or separate services for already Christian Hottentots and Coloureds, deprecatingly, “because some of our brethren are weak.” Later, a rationale grew up, based on the scriptural “Cursed be Canaan; a servant of servants he shall go to his brethren” and on injunctions to the Israelites not to marry the “People of the Land.” The Trekboers based their stand on this, claiming racial equality to be unscriptural. This attitude continued to be that of the Dutch Reformed churches until around the time of World War II, although they maintained an active mission church and an additional African branch.

In the nineteenth century, when European and American missionaries were working among the Bantu speakers, the British in Natal were competing with the Voortrekkers in expansion. The Voortrekkers felt that the missionaries were English agents bent on extending English influence among the tribes with a view to displacing the Boers. Boer commandos were active against Bantu, Bushmen, and sometimes the British; one commando even went so far as to raid the base camp of David Livingstone and take his supplies (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

Equating the well-being of the NGK increasingly with that of their own nation, the Afrikaners tended to be religious isolationists, especially those who were members of the two Voortrekker churches in the Transvaal. The NGK at the Cape, however, maintained contact with the related churches in the Netherlands and the United States. When reappraisal of racial attitudes was demanded by the conditions of World War II, this church began to feel pressure from the overseas churches, especially after the accession to power of the Nationalist Party in 1948. The Cape and Transvaal synods of the NGK and the NHK were then in the World Council of Churches, which officially reproved them for their acceptance of apartheid laws.

This caused consternation, and it was feared that the Afrikaner churches would withdraw from the World Council. In 1950, however, at the Bloemfontein conference called by the component synods of the NGK, a statement was issued taking a stand for separate development as against apartheid. This they understood to mean total territorial separation of the races; apartheid regulations could be tolerated only as a means of implementing this and were expected to disappear when the separation was finally attained. The whites would have to become independent of African labor.

Later, in 1957, the NGK synods made a declaration, under the
influence of two prominent theologians, that there was no scriptural basis for apartheid. A great deal of public controversy arose; perhaps 80 percent of the intellectual members of the churches agreed with the statement, but 80 percent of the other members, who constituted the majority, disagreed. Even the Broederbond was divided. At this time the government began to issue statements in the Afrikaner press and directly to the churches that the World Council of Churches was subversive in its influence. Prime Minister Verwoerd demanded that the Nederduits Gereformeerde churches should withdraw from it. The moderator, Reverend van der Merwe, himself quite conservative, found this action of the prime minister to be highly irregular and rejected it.

During the 1960's the controversy continued. The general secretary of the World Council of Churches from 1938 until 1966 was W. A. Visser't Hooft. A minister of the NHK in the Netherlands, he had visited South Africa in 1952, writing a report explaining the problem at hand and making suggestions concerning it. His presence probably encouraged the Afrikaner churches then in the World Council to remain. In 1962 two clergymen of the NHK in South Africa challenged the practice of limiting their church's membership to whites. One, A. S. Geyser, an Afrikaner, was deposed from his ministerial status and resigned from the Faculty of Theology of University of Pretoria but was reinstated on appeal. The other, A. van Selms, from the Netherlands but given special status as a minister in South Africa, resigned from the faculty at Pretoria in sympathy; he was deprived of his special status on the grounds that he no longer taught at Pretoria, though others had been allowed to retain their status on resignation.

In 1966 both the NGK and the NHK took a stand against the Christian Institute (an interracial group), ordering their members to withdraw from it. The NGK left discipline to the various parishes. One parish accordingly investigated four of its members but decided to take no action against them and thanked them instead for exemplary conduct in the congregation. This decision was referred to the Johannesburg Ring of the Church, which decided to ask the Broad Moderature (the highest church body operating between General Synod meetings) for a clarification and motivation of the synod's 1966 resolution and the scriptural basis for it. No further action has been taken against members of the Christian Institute by the NGK.

The NHK's insistence that its members who belonged to the Christian Institute resign from that body led several theologians and ministers to resign from the church instead; others were deprived of their ministerial status. Six of these men later were accepted as ministers by the Presbyterian church, taking substantial segments of their congregations with them. The Presbyterian church then arranged to hold some of its services in Afrikaans.
The Church of the Province of South Africa (Anglican)

The Anglican church, called the Church of the Province of South Africa, is felt to have only shallow roots in South Africa because of its dependence on England for its hierarchy; few bishops are of South African origin. Its strongest hold is in Natal. Although its membership includes more Africans than whites and Coloureds together, few of its clergy are African. Still fewer have been promoted to higher than basic parish positions, but in 1969 a third African bishop was appointed. On the other hand, the Anglican church has been very active in the promotion of African causes relating to working conditions and has taken a stand against apartheid. Its policy in regard to the main cathedral at Cape Town has been stated as, “All races to all services at all times.”

It has bowed to the system of apartheid to the extent of maintaining separate congregations and Sunday school classes in the same building, with separate sets of clergy for the African and the white services; in some other churches it has maintained a back and front segregation of the sanctuary. Such segregation may or may not have existed before the apartheid laws were established, since these practices were accepted without question in many areas until the quite recent reappraisal of the church’s position was begun. The salaries of parish clergy are related to the wealth of the parish, and on this basis those of most of the African clergy are far lower than those of the whites. In addition, many of the African clergy have voluntarily accepted low stipends as an offering to the church. The whites’ salaries are frequently five times those of the corresponding Africans, and additional discrepancies appear in the retirement programs.

In theory, Anglican schools, which are of a high quality, do not discriminate against any ethnic group, but the religious practices in the routines effectively eliminate Indians and Jews. An opportunity was obtained to open their main college, Bishop’s College, to Coloured students, but there were none there as late as 1961; more recent information was not available. It is felt that the expense has prevented their taking advantage of government cooperation. As the Anglicans have had only a small reserve of cash to run their schools since government subsidies to church schools were withdrawn, they have been forced to make the tuition cover most of the working needs (see ch. 9, Education). The result of this is that the African schools have closed for lack of funds and only white ones have remained open.

The Anglican church has been prominent in interfaith movements and has taken a great deal of initiative in their organization and activities. At the same time, it has discouraged its members from accepting communion in other churches. It has become more centralized under the leadership of the 1960’s and increasingly “High Church.” It has also attempted to increase proselytizing among the
Cape Malays and other Muslims, which has been resented by the Muslim community. A number of their bishops have come into conflict with the government over apartheid regulations, and one was deported; the church has backed him to the full but has been unable to reverse the penalty.

The Roman Catholic Church

The Roman Catholic Church is under the jurisdiction of the Apostolic Delegation of Southern Africa. It is a missionary church and, as such, is staffed in the higher levels with non-South Africans who are in the country on a temporary basis. The priests, however, are often nonwhites, especially in local situations, and the church has consistently pursued a nonracist policy, which is probably the reason for the rapid increase in its membership. In addition, all four archbishops are of South African birth. The priests, white as well as nonwhite, have been prominent in efforts to aid their parishioners in any and all situations. For example, when displaced Africans camped in a field without shelter because they had been moved out of an area to be rebuilt for white or Coloured use, the Church provided emergency shelter and supplies at the risk of being blamed by the government as “agitators.”

On the other side of the ledger, the African priests often complain of their subordination to the white clergy and that they are treated as no better than altar boys. This is a longstanding complaint that has been made for at least a decade. Their schools always have been segregated, and it has been felt, in view of the current shortage of funds for education, that the fashionable ones where the pupils could pay tuition were better kept.

Although the imported clergy far outnumber those born in South Africa, they come from all countries of Europe and therefore are dominated by no one country. All four archbishops are South African born and, together with the African clergy, this gives the Church a more definite South African cast than many of the other internationally based churches. The Church is regarded with suspicion by many of the Protestant denominations, which emerged historically out of conflict with the Catholic Church, and it is often credited with having control, along with the Communists, of such international organizations as the World Council of Churches, rendering it necessary for the head of the World Council, Reverend Visser’t Hooft, to make public statement denying this accusation, which had appeared in the Afrikaans press.

THE EVANGELICAL AND OTHER CHURCHES AMONG THE RURAL COLOURED

The Trekboers (nomadic herders) who moved into the interior of South Africa took with them predikants of the Dutch Reformed
Church who made some converts among the Hottentots during the association of the two nomadic peoples. After the departure of the whites, Coloured bands and associated Hottentots continued to consider themselves Christian but were without the service of a pastor. Many of these, notable the Griqua, invited whatever missionaries they encountered to live among them and establish a church; these included Moravian Brethren, Catholics, and members of the Rhenish Missionary Society. Most of the invitations were accepted, though in some cases the missionaries were withdrawn later, either because of lack of funds from the parent church or because the local governmental authority felt that they exerted an influence that was against government policy and political in nature.

Usually, the nomadic band would be encouraged by the missionary to settle at a spot with good water and build a church, which would form the nucleus of a community; a school might also be established. Missionary schools or the preacher acting as a teacher were the only sources of European cultural information available in the hinterland; many of those who later became outstanding leaders were trained in this way (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

Most of the Cape Coloured Reserves are served by the Nederduits Gereformeerde Sendingkerk mission branch of the NGK, although most members are Christians of long-standing. The policy of the Dutch Reformed Church in South Africa is to assign all nonwhite congregations to a mission church rather than a regular one; the ministers of the mission branch, white and nonwhite though ordained and similar in function to the regular church ministers, are given a title implying a more temporary status than the latter and may serve in a white congregation only under special circumstances. The organization is the same in both mission and mother-church, except that, even though the mission congregation has its own Kerkraad, or governing body, the administration is directed mostly by officers of the mother-church.

The mission branch of the NGK is the only religious institution officially recognized; it sponsors children's and young people's societies and cooperates with the various burial societies. In 1957 a regulation was issued by the minister of the interior to enforce the Mission Stations and Communal Reserves Act of 1909 by which any religious organization other than the established church must have special permission to hold any service to be attended by more than five members. This has been used to curtail the activities of Anglicans and Roman Catholics, sometimes in areas where they have been serving for over a century; the regulation is enforced, and a number of people have been punished for breaking it.
INTERFAITH ORGANIZATIONS

The South African Council of Churches, formerly called the Christian Council, is an organization whose members comprise twenty-seven churches and church organizations, including the Christian Institute of South Africa, the Interdenominational African Ministers’ Association, the Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA), and the University Christian Movement. The Dutch Reformed churches are not members, but the Nederduits Gereformeerd Sendingkerk sends observers, as does the Roman Catholic Church.

In 1968 an African acted as chairman of the session. In September of the same year an interdenominational Theological Commission organized by the council issued a “Message to the People of South Africa” which, though not binding on the membership, was published in the name of the council on the authority of its biennial meeting. The commission had individual members of a number of denominations including the Catholic Church, the NGK, and the NHK. The message stated that the gospel of Christ is universal and cosmic; salvation is to be sought wherever Christians found themselves; and the church had the right and duty to concern itself with political systems. It declared apartheid to be a doctrine hostile to Christianity because it limited the person’s ability to obey God in loving his neighbor. The lore built up around apartheid had become a “false gospel” for many South Africans.

This message was severely denounced by the prime minister, who demanded that the churches should not use the pulpit for politics, threatening that their cloth would not protect them. They replied in Pro Veritate, the organ of the Christian Institute, that their message could not be challenged on biblical grounds and that furthermore there was evidence that apartheid did not succeed in practice. Twelve leading members of the council wrote an open letter to the prime minister, agreeing that the pulpit should not be used to support a political party but that the government was more than the instrument of a party and that this was a matter of the Will of God, so that they could not allow themselves to be silenced.

The Baptists rejected the message on the grounds that opinion on race had nothing to do with salvation by faith. The Anglican and Catholic churches endorsed it heartily. The Dutch Reformed churches were silent. A group of 112 clergy of Cape Town, however, including one from the mission church, issued a statement deploiring the prime minister’s remarks and endorsing the statement. The Evangelical Lutherans and Quakers also endorsed it, while the Congregationalists and the Methodists called the attention of their ministers to it. Both these latter churches elected African heads of their councils for 1970.
Acting together, the executive committees of the South African Council of Churches and the Christian Institute of South Africa have established six commissions to study the implications of the message for the church, law, politics, economics, education, and social relations and to seek acceptable alternatives to the apartheid system. This is the Study Project on Christianity in Apartheid Society, or SPRO-CAS. In July 1969 132 prominent South Africans were enlisted for the commissions, including social scientists, social workers, businessmen, trade unionists, and journalists; among them are Alan Paton and one of the government’s economic advisers, as well as the first African to receive a doctorate in economics, S. B. Ngcobo. The government was notable silent in regard to this project as of early 1970.

The Christian Institute is an association of individual members of all races and denominations. It includes ministers and members of the Dutch Reformed churches, who have been under pressure from their main synods to withdraw. The Dutch Reformed churches tend to reject the institute on grounds of doctrine, though local councils have refused to discipline members who are in the institute until this is clarified. The institute organizes interracial Bible study groups and provides assistance to the ministers of the African Independent churches. It arranged theological refresher courses for them at Pietermaritzburg in the spring of 1969 and in Durban in the summer of that year.

When the World Student Christian Federation urged the Student Christian Association of South Africa to dissociate itself from the apartheid policy and to bring sanctions against the Republic, the South African group withdrew and split into four separate bodies: Afrikaners, English, Africans, and Coloureds including Indians. The Afrikaner body, the Afrikaanse Christlike Studentvereiniging, associated mainly with the NGK, was attacked by the NHK because Catholics were among the members and because it had ties to the World Council of Churches and the Christian Institute. The NHK withdrew its objections, however, when the association broke with the World Council of Churches.

The ecumenical University Christian Movement, a student organization, was founded at a conference in Johannesburg in 1966. It included delegates from all churches but the Dutch Reformed, and more than half of them were nonwhite.

AFRICAN TRADITIONAL RELIGIONS

A little less than half the African population follow traditional religions. These, though specific to each tribe, are generally similar throughout a language group and vary from one language group to another only in minor ways. The tribal religions are directly related
to the environment; to the traditional ways of life; to the variations of the climate and the seasonal cycle on which the people have depended for the well-being of their crops and cattle; to the wild animals of the surrounding countryside, which might be either dangerous or sources of additional food; to the hazards of fortune and disease; and to the personal relationships among people residing together with their tensions and rivalries and their memories of loved or hated dead.

Because of the long contact that all of the Africans have had with Christians and their teachings, it is not always possible to tell when an African concept or custom is of traditional origin or borrowed. All local tribal religions, however, apparently recognize a creator god, who is usually remote but believed to send the weather and the seasons. Prayer or sacrifice are not made to him except in a few tribes, and then usually in times of extreme emergency. He is thought of as a great chief, with wealth and wives; his family does not enter into the specific theology, however, except where he is believed to have a son who assists him, as among the North Sotho. He is believed to desire righteous and helpful behavior. It is common to hear his name used as an exclamation by both Sotho and Nguni. Among the Tswana, the same term is used for God and for a traditional prophet; the implication appears to be that the prophet has an indwelling power.

The most important and highly developed aspect of religion in all the African tribes is the cult of the ancestors. This is intimately connected with the continuity of the lineage and the identity of the individual. Worship is carried out in the form of prayer and sacrifice. Sacrifices consist of food and drink, usually beer; human sacrifice has been reported in times of disaster and emergency but is rare. Among the North Sotho, prayer is described as informal and familial in tone but is usually preceded by the recitation of the particular ancestor's praise-poem. Prayer may be a thanksgiving or a request for aid. If dissatisfied with the sacrifices they receive or the social behavior of their descendants, ancestors are believed to send bad dreams or sickness; signs and omens may also be a means of communication, and sometimes they may interfere in the arrival of the seasonal rains, though they do not send them.

The dead, whether good or bad, are believed to live in a land similar to the present world, except that conditions are always perfect; the cattle are fat and the grass is always lush. The food sacrifices are apparently necessary to their comfort, however. Not all of the dead become worshiped ancestors, though any who appear in dreams may be given a sacrifice, even a child. Only those who died in old age and with many descendants are considered worthy of worship—those descendants are, in fact, their main worshipers. Also considered worthy are those who had authority and influence in
this life. These are usually men but may also be influential women, especially one's own mother, even though she belonged to a different lineage. Their personalities are thought to remain much as they were in life.

Prayers and sacrifices are usually performed by the heads of tribes, lineages, or households, depending on the object of the worship. Diviners and herb doctors constitute two other categories of professional religious practitioner, and the same individual may be both. Because the herb doctor must travel about the countryside to collect herbs, he is likely to be a man, since contact with persons of all sorts would be inappropriate for a woman. Diviners, on the other hand, are more often women. Their role is to interpret the messages sent by the ancestors in dreams or omens, or to divine the cause of an illness or run of misfortune either by intuition or by throwing a set of divining bones with standardized symbols that define relationships between community members living and dead: displeased ancestor, broken taboo, or possibly hostile witch or sorcerer.

The herb doctor is considered to be more effective if he can divine as well, but it is usual for the diviner to diagnose and the doctor to treat the problem. Medication may include herbal preparations applied to the body externally or applied to charms and amulets to provide supernatural protection, as well as taken internally. The latter are often purgatives but in general are chosen for their spiritual properties or their effect on the spirit powers as much as for empirically tested qualities.

Characteristically, the herbalist inherits his profession, though he also serves an apprenticeship and constantly increases his knowledge of remedies by acquiring formulae from other herb doctors. He may have considerable theatrical sense but more often is quiet, serious, and dedicated to the public welfare.

The diviner, on the other hand, receives a special calling that takes the form of dreams, depressions, and sometimes seizures. The person called is said usually to resist as long as possible, but the attacks grow and, if he or she does not respond, sickness will ensue. Men are said to resist more effectively than women, which is the reason given for the greater number of women in the profession. The diviner also serves an apprenticeship during which he or she is taught a good deal of esoteric knowledge, much of it dealing with the cosmic high creator-god. After a set time of seclusion during which secret instruction and treatment with magic herbs are given, there is a formal and public initiation. The diviner is then supposed to be able to divine the will of the ancestors, smell out witches, and diagnose the causes of bad effects.

Before the coming of the Europeans into the African tribal areas, these diviners were greatly feared because their witch-finding ability was often the sole cause of torture and execution of those accused
of witchcraft. They can no longer hold such power of life and death but are influential in the communities where they serve and are resorted to in the urban areas as much as in the rural, despite official government disapproval. In the late 1960's their number was said to be growing.

Other spirits are believed to exist beside those of the dead, some of which are neutral and others malevolent, and these may be controlled by witches (people who inherit, or are born with, evil power) or sorcerers (those who acquire evil power by learning magic rituals). Notable among these is the tokoloshe, a little hairy incubus blamed for foul dreams, perversion, and similar aberrations. The form of the name given is Bhaca, but linguistic variations are found among other Nguni and Sotho. Other spirits are water snakes, who live in deep pools of water; they may fascinate and drown people, kidnap and marry them, suck their blood and let them go, or receive them in a friendly way and teach them magic power for good or evil. Some people claim to have spent three days at the bottom of some pool learning from a snake; there are also legends of women having been kept by them for years, or men in a few cases; usually they are feared as deadly and malevolent.

Although there appears to be no actual concept of good versus evil in the tribal religions, a distinction is made between the helpful and the antisocial, which includes one between benevolent and malevolent; there is also a concept of purity versus pollution, usually connected with sex and the natural processes of birth and death. Among the Tswana, a person who is sick or in a state of ritual impurity from sexual intercourse, childbirth, or burial of the dead is said to be "hot" and therefore dangerous to anyone in a precarious state of health, such as newborn babies, the sick, or young people undergoing initiation. A similar concept, though perhaps not under the same terminology, is found among the Nguni. Anything that heals or purifies is said to be "cool," such as certain medicines or the byproducts of a sacrifice.

Full membership in the lineage and, therefore, in the religious cult of the ancestors does not occur until the initiation at puberty, which also marks acceptance into adulthood. Preceding the initiation is a period of seclusion of the group to be initiated, during which the boys or girls are given instruction in moral and social behavior as well as secret esoteric knowledge. Young people are usually on the reserves at this time in their lives, and the rites are often performed in the absence of the migrant laboring father, who will, however, usually make an effort to see that this is done for them. He may also send any illegitimate children whom he wishes to recognize to his lineage elders, both to protect and to acknowledge them.

When a believer in the traditional tribal religion goes to the city to
work, he believes that the spirits of his ancestors remain with him to protect him from the hazards of city life. If he is able to return to the reserve periodically, he performs his sacrifices to them there; if not, it is sometimes possible to perform them in the urban area. It is necessary first to get police permission and to have the sacrificial animal inspected at the slaughterhouse before he can perform the rite legally; a policemen must stand by to see that the meat is ritually handled and not merely put up for illegal sale. Because of the difficulty of meeting these requirements, sacrifice was sometimes done secretly and, therefore, illegally. If blood sacrifice is impossible, the person may tell the ancestors so and expect them to be understanding; the same applies if he is unable to produce the proper amount of ritually home-brewed beer for a drink-offering.

At the same time, the ancestors expect him to reflect credit upon them by his behavior in the city; if not, illness might be sent to him or his relatives as a warning. He is expected to be responsible for the behavior of his children or younger relatives with him, if any; in the absence of any lineage mates, the older workers in the barracks are supposed to make themselves responsible for younger workers, as they are the nearest thing to relatives present. A person who betrays his lineage, as for instance an African who tries to pass himself as a Coloured, is liable to incur bad luck from the displeasure of his ancestors; and indeed it is said that such people usually come to a no good end.

Witchcraft is believed to be as effective in the town as in the country, and the tokoloshe may be described as traveling through the air in an elevator like the one in a skyscraper. Herb doctors are also resorted to, and diviners are said to be on the increase. In view of the hazards of city life and possible unemployment, a person needs much protection against jealous rivals or the generally malevolent.

**AFRICAN CHRISTIANITY**

A large number of Africans belong to internationally based churches. The Methodist, Catholic, Anglican, and Lutheran churches have the largest African memberships. These churches have, generally speaking, held out against government policy for the right to integrate the church during worship, although Africans have sometimes considered them discriminatory even so.

Others are members of mission churches, whose main organization is outside Africa and most of whose higher staff are from other countries. The foreign staff is liable to deportation in the event of conflict with the government, and this may in some cases limit their ability to back their parishioners. The nonwhite Dutch Reformed churches are not under this disability and can often exert
influence in the Dutch Reformed meetings, claiming consideration for their people, with whom, they, unlike most whites, have had extended personal contact.

A number of missionary-founded churches were set up as African-staffed indigenous churches, partly because there was doubt that the foreign personnel would be able to remain indefinitely; later it came to be felt that if Africans must live in a segregated society it was better for them to have their own leadership where it was needed rather than absentee leadership. In some cases, the missionaries themselves broke with their parent churches because of misunderstandings of various sorts and remained with their missions.

Members of the more formal internationally based churches have for the most part done their best to encourage the work of the independent or separatist churches, offering theological instruction to help regularize their message. The Christian Institute, especially, carries on special classes of this sort at available seminaries. Church and secular leaders, however, have tried to dissuade groups from seceding and fragmenting their churches any more than necessary. On the other hand, the separatist leaders are usually glad to join church unity organizations of all sorts. The international churches recognize their offshoots provided they maintain an orthodox gospel and do not add non-Christian themes or practices. The Watchtower Society, though not strictly a church, has a strong influence in the African areas.

Africans have a large number of independent churches with entirely African personnel. Some are separate African branches, or synods, of national or international churches, which also have white, Coloured, and Indian branches; others are organizations founded—from Europe or North America (chiefly the United States)—as African branches of churches to which the missionaries belonged; and still others were independently developed in Africa. Of these, some are large with a number of congregations, and others are single churches, often with just a few members. Among those locally developed, some appear to exist for the financial profit of their founders, but most embody a deep and sincere devotion.

The separatist churches have their headquarters on the reserves for the most part, as most of them originated in tribal territory but, with the increasing migration of large groups of members into the towns, they have had a need to reorganize in order to maintain contact between centers, especially during the late 1950's and the 1960's. At first, expansion nearly ceased while the church leaders worked to maintain contact with their original members, but later organizations were developed in each place separately, with contact maintained by periodic visitation.

In 1966 there were an estimated 2,400 African independent
churches. The proliferation of such churches seemed to be the result of a tendency for members of any one of these churches to break away, either because of external pressures or internal difficulties. Movement in search of employment or housing sometimes forced a group to break away. The problem of status has been another cause of fission; the parent church may have been unwilling to grant status to African (or if the parent church was African, to subordinate) leaders. Most of the separatist churches have drawn nearly all of their congregations into offices of some sort connected with preaching or administration. The proportion of African Christians in independent churches grew from 9 percent in 1946 to 21 percent in 1968.

The strongest influence on these churches is that of the evangelistic and Congregational missionaries from Europe and the United States who worked among the Africans after the period of turmoil in the early nineteenth century and during the early period of industrialization, up to World War I.

Some of the separatist churches do not have the sanction of the parent churches because they combine traditional African tribal beliefs and practices with Christianity. Others, which are accepted, utilize Christian concepts in a truly African way. The idea of the divine calling of a minister or missionary is strong in all branches of Christianity but is especially institutionalized among the African believers. In the origins of some of the independent sects, the founder often has a deeply moving vision of the other world and a direct divine command, usually specifying practices to be followed in the new church. These may be Old Testament prohibitions or sacrifices, or they may be African ones that either resemble or coincide to some extent with those in the Old Testament or in a church of which they have experience, such as a sacrifice, fasting, and abstinence from sex at certain times, from work on certain days, or from certain foods.

Because of the race and culture-bound character of most European and American churches, a tendency has arisen among Africans not merely for separatism but for a complete reinterpretation of the Bible and even for a parallel gospel to develop whereby Christ becomes a black African at His second coming, an African Christ is to arise as the true Messiah, or the prophet of the particular church is himself the new Christ. In view of the stress on racial prestige in southern Africa, the fact that Jesus must be considered a white man becomes a barrier to faith. A more completely African concept of the Creator usually also comes into use. In a number of African languages, the same work is used for a prophet and for the general concept of God, implying an indwelling of divinity; this has carried over into a number of churches.

The example of the ethnic character of the faith of the Old Testa-
ment is sometimes taken for justification, with the statement that a similar revelation has been given to Africans; in other cases, the Bible is claimed to have been rewritten by the Europeans, and a special African scripture to be the true one, from which the dogma of the new church is alleged to have been drawn.

Some of the separatist churches have a Pan-African character, such as the Zionist and Ethiopian churches, though the former is connected to a partly white group of six churches centered in Zion, Illinois, and claims kinship with them, to be realized in future unity. Others have a distinctly tribal character, such as the Shaka Zulu church and the Tembu National church. Many groups separated themselves from earlier separatist groups, so that the tie to the original group is tenuous. Some of the churches stress the faith in Jehovah and the Holy Spirit at the expense of Jesus who has an obvious ethnic affiliation. Many separatist leaders have played a successful part in tribal politics and even married their daughters to the traditional chiefs without objecting to polygyny. Most have taken a stand above politics.

The separatist churches are sometimes categorized as either Ethiopian or Zionist. The Ethiopian churches were usually founded by groups that withdrew from their parent churches for reasons of racial discrimination, whereas the Zionist arose from a calling of the leader. There is sometimes a combination of both factors. In the forms of worship, some stress baptism; others, usually the Zionist, are Pentecostal in character; and a third group are Sabbatarian, observing Saturday rather than Sunday as the Sabbath.

Leaders are generally comparable to either chiefs or prophets in character. The Ethiopian churches have leaders, usually intelligent and sometimes intellectual, who are good organizers and executives and have separated from the parent church because they felt discriminated against in matters of promotion and authority. The Zionist leaders also practice a method of intuitive divination, involving the use of questioning in the manner of a traditional diviner, although they do not employ his material objects for divination. Certain ministers become known for this ability and are called in by neighboring congregations in times of emergency. Some of the Zionist prophets claim status equal to that of Moses, especially Isaiah Shembe, whose cult is still active with his son at the head. The second-generation leader is less likely to be outstanding and more likely to be able to accommodate to the government than the original prophet or chief.

The development of the African independent churches is directly related to land deprivation and economic difficulties. Neither old religions nor chiefs were able to help in the hardship conditions resulting from the curtailment of tribal land, and many of the church leaders have made an effort to establish colonies of their
followers, with varying degrees of success. The prestige of a church leader, as that of a chief, is directly related to his courage in the efforts that he makes for his people and in contacts with the whites, as well as to his ability to organize; in the Ethiopian churches this is especially so, and the importance of the leader as a chief is stressed.

The government reserves to itself the right to recognize the churches, giving the ministers, if approved, the right to act as marriage officers. Until 1963 it required that a church applying for recognition should have been in existence for at least ten years and have a constitution and an organization able to construct buildings and schools. The ministers must have had the equivalent of Standard VI education (eight years) plus two or three years of training for the ministry. Minister and congregation were required to be in conformity with standards of ethical conduct, and the service was to follow accepted lines. Under these conditions, roughly 1 percent were recognized. A new system of government recognition of African churches was instituted in 1963, which was felt to be more favorable by African churchmen, since cases were to be judged on their individual merits rather than on the previous list of formal requirements. There was no information in early 1970, however, on the number of churches that have been formally recognized under the new regulation.

In 1965 a number of separatist churches formed the African Independent Churches Association (AICA), inviting two members of the Christian Institute to sit on their board of management as advisors. The institute raised money to provide financial assistance and arranged for theological training as well as refresher and correspondence courses to be provided with the cooperation of various seminaries of different denominations. By 1968, 200 separatist churches had joined the AICA. Several other large organizations of the same sort have been formed to deal with problems of training and of ecumenical contacts.

INDIANS: HINDU AND MUSLIM

As in India, Hinduism in South Africa has a popular and scholarly form. The latter involves the study of deep theology and philosophy, in both conservative and liberal aspects, usually dealing with high and abstract concepts of God. It is developed through the study of written scriptures and commentaries; it belongs to men of the higher castes, for the most part, and is only available to the middle castes through the wider dissemination of literacy under modern conditions. The popular religion consists in the following of traditional rituals of worship whose meaning is not always known to the participant; in the keeping of ritual prohibitions on actions or the use of certain foods; in celebrating certain calendar holidays
whose significance may vary regionally; and in praying to household
gods, saints, and the mother goddesses who control disease.

Both the popular and the scholarly religions have an abstract
concept of God, who is known by various names and controls the
universe but is usually thought of as too remote to be asked for
favors. The gods of the Hindu Trinity, the Creator, the Preserver,
and the Destroyer (Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva), with their consorts,
play different roles in the folk religion than they do in the scholarly
form though some of the same story motifs found in the popular
religion may serve as points of departure for theological concepts in
the latter. Between the two stand such modern sects as the Aryasamaj,
which stresses correct following of meaningful rituals but re-
jects superstition and magical practices.

In South Africa, especially in urban surroundings, many practices
traditional to various regions of India become difficult or impos-
sible, such as the use of animal sacrifice in devotions. In that case,
either the celebration of that particular ritual may be dropped en-
tirely or another variant may be used, substituting, for instance,
nutmeg for a goat in the sacrifice. Ritual purity enters into worship,
but in its day-to-day observance there is a good deal of laxity. The
mere fact of being outside India is to some extent polluting to the
traditional belief; moreover, it is required less of the laboring classes
than of the higher. Maintaining ritual purity is a sign of higher caste
but, among the educated, many tend to drop those things that
make them different. The strictest observance is usually among the
higher caste Gujaratis and some Tamil, though these understand the
procedures differently.

It has been said that whereas an Englishman’s house is his castle,
an Indian’s castle is his shrine. Every act in traditional Indian daily
life has a religious significance, positive or negative, and everything
is ritually clean or unclean, or may be purified by some special
method. The correct living of this life affects one’s spiritual future,
and some householders dedicate themselves to religious study after
their sacred duty of rearing a family has been accomplished.

The caste into which one is born is supposed to indicate the
spiritual status to which one has reached in one’s accumulated lives.
Details of rebirth on earth or in heaven are differently conceived of
according to one’s religious philosophy. Although this spiritual life
depends essentially on one’s own acts, the rituals carried out by
the family at a funeral, including food sacrifices, are believed to support
and sustain the deceased until his soul is ready for its next depar-
ture. Death creates uncleanness, and other rites purify the deceased
and the souls of the persons of the living family.

Among northern Indians (usually the Gujaratis), disposal of the
body is by cremation; the purifying fire god is one of the chief
household deities in the form of the sacred hearth fire and lamps.
The ashes are consigned to the care of a river goddess; in India these are such as the sacred Mother Ganges, but the African rivers are considered sufficiently sacred as a location for the ceremony. Among Tamils, burial is usually practiced in Mother Earth, also considered a goddess. Prayers are said to Yama, the ruler of the dead, and to Siva, god of death and rebirth, the cycle of nature.

The Indian Muslims tend to be very strict in their observances, though influenced by the Hindu attitudes on many matters such as status. Unlike the Malays, their women have kept strict seclusion until recent times, with some loosening seen during the last decade, and many still do (see ch. 7, Family). They have little contact with the Malays, who are concentrated in different provinces, and when they do, there is little intermarriage between the two groups. For the most part, the Indian Muslims tend to remain in their own communities. Daily life and community service religious organizations parallel those of the Hindus rather than those of the Malays.
CHAPTER 12
SOCIAL VALUES

Although the social values of South Africa have developed during three centuries of interaction of the various peoples, the values that dominate the arrangement of national institutions are those of the politically dominate white group and, especially, those of the Afrikaners with whom, in early 1970, the ruling Nationalist Party was essentially identified (see ch. 15, Political Dynamics). In these circumstances, the primary social value is the possession of the physical traits associated with membership in the white race as defined by parliamentary statutes and associated proclamations (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages). Political and social status depend directly on such possession, and the opportunity for economic status derives, in good part, from political and social status.

The maintenance of the social order by which the primary value is guaranteed is itself an important value for whites. Deviation from the rules and practices that characterize that social order is regarded with considerable anxiety.

Another value of some importance, at least from the Afrikaner point of view, is correct religious standing, implying reasonably active membership in one of the Dutch Reformed churches (see ch. 11, Religion). Historically, these churches and Afrikaner nationalism have been closely associated, and Afrikaner perceptions of the world and of the interpretation of the Scriptures have been closely linked (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Because of these links, the Dutch Reformed churches provide an authority, perhaps the only authority, that can test and validate governmental action. When church leaders question the moral validity of such action, the government feels impelled to respond in some way.

Loyalty to one's own group is valued, and respected to some extent, by other groups. The politically and numerically dominant ethnic group among the whites—the Afrikaners—stress the importance of such loyalty and regard behavior based on considerations other then the solidarity and well-being of the ethnic group as strange and worthy of condemnation. In the context of race relations, the relevant group may be widened to include all whites. Among other groups—Africans, Coloureds, and Indians—the value of racial (sometimes nonwhite interracial) solidarity is limited to some political activists. For most others, the relevant group is
smaller—linguistic group, tribe, religious sect, local community, or lineage. The significance of such groups and of loyalty to them varies with context (urban or rural), occupation, education, and other factors (see ch. 6, Social Structure).

Many of the values and perceptions retained by all groups are related to conditions of the past. Afrikaners value their traditions as pioneers and stress them in their national ceremonies, although very few of them live a life remotely like that of their forebears. English speakers, particularly those with economic status, may stress nineteenth and early twentieth-century British patterns, especially in education. Rural and even some urban Africans consider the accumulation of cattle (without reference to their quality) important, although the values that such accumulation supported—lineage status and well-being—are of decreasing significance.

All groups tend to see social relations in terms of inequality. For whites and for most Coloureds, race is the primary basis for hierarchy. For Africans, lineage membership or tribal membership traditionally defined status. Seniority was always important in interpersonal relations. These are still important but may be challenged in some segments of the African population by education and religious affiliation as more desirable bases for differentiation. Linguistic and cultural as well as caste differences have significance for Indian definitions of status (see ch. 6, Social Structure).

Distinctions implying or expressing inequality within the white group are based on ethnic membership, occupation, education, and other criteria. In the course of their struggle for political domination and economic development, Afrikaners developed a concept of the essential equality of all members of the ethnic group, as an adjunct of Afrikaner solidarity in a specific historical situation vis-à-vis the English and the nonwhites. In other contexts, and especially since Afrikaners have achieved much of what they sought, distinctions with implications of inequality are increasingly made.

The conception of racial inequality is, from the white point of view, pervasive. In some cases, the stress will be on cultural difference, but race and culture are seen to go together and, when they clearly do not, race is the decisive criterion. Thus, even in situations where the skills of nonwhites are superior to those of whites, matters are so arranged that nonwhites will not occupy a position where they can supervise or give orders to whites.

Each racial and ethnic group has a stereotype of itself and of all the others. These are related to the way in which a person thinks he should act to be a good member of his group, and to his real or vicarious experience of other groups. The whites use these stereotypes to justify many regulations laid down for nonwhites; the nonwhites use them in an attempt to understand what to expect of the whites and how to achieve goals with the aid of whites or in
spite of their disapproval. Within racial groups, the ethnic stereotypes may merely be marks of tribal distinction invested with mild curiosity or, in situations of greater tension, serious divisive factors.

Although scientific thought is well represented in the universities and although South Africa's economic and technological development make substantial use of secular, instrumental modes of thought, religiously influenced perceptions of events are still frequent. Situations are interpreted in terms of religious or magical views of cause and effect and are measured by religious standards. This view of the world is more prevalent among the older members of all groups than among the younger and tends to be characteristic of many Africans, both followers of traditional religions and Christians.

No misfortune is thought to occur without a willed cause: the ancestral spirits are displeased; a witch or sorcerer is hostile; or God has punished sin. This view may be less intense among whites, but occurrences are related to the will of God and, in some churches, trouble may be considered the penalty for sin and good fortune the reward for virtue. For some, particularly fundamentalists of the Dutch Reformed churches, good fortune is not reward for virtue but the consequence of God's grace, over which the actions of men have no influence.

Among many Africans, one's own behavior brings consequences. Moreover, specific ritual is thought to force or persuade a supernatural agent to carry out one's wish or to alleviate the misfortune that the agent, supernatural or other, has caused.

VALUES AND PERCEPTIONS OF THE WHITES

Insofar as the concept of apartheid and its implementation imply white domination, they rest on values held by most whites, both Afrikaners and English speakers. For the Nationalist government and for many Afrikaners, apartheid implies separation as well as domination, and attempts to implement separate development do not meet with the approval of some whites. Of those who disapprove, some object because they value economic efficiency, and separate development is an obstacle to efficient operation. Thus, some industrialists would like to have available a more skilled African labor force for both technical and white-collar work even if this requires giving Africans access to educational and residential opportunities that they did not have in early 1970.

Others, including many rural Afrikaners, are concerned with the permanent availability of labor and service personnel. To the extent that separate development deprives them of such labor or may involve costs to them, they may prefer to revert to pure baasskap (white dominance). On the other hand, these people also have a
sense of the numerical predominance of Africans in the population, and they are sometimes torn between their wish for the straightforward baasskap of an earlier period and their sense that it would be better to keep Africans out of areas in which whites live. These views, and to some extent, this conflict characterize the members of the ultraconservative verkrampte (literally, the cramped ones), who formed the Herstigte Nasionale Party (Reconstituted National Party) in late 1969 (see ch. 15, Political Dynamics; ch. 18, Political Values and Attitudes).

Still another conception of apartheid has been supported by elements in the Dutch Reformed churches (see ch. 11, Religion). As early as a conference at Bloemfontein in 1950, a small number of the clergy and laymen emphasized that apartheid was morally justified only if the nonwhite groups were given substantial opportunities for development and a good deal of autonomy, if not ultimate independence. Those who have taken this position have acknowledged the probable cost to whites of full implementation of separate development. A similar position has been taken by the Afrikaner intellectuals associated with the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA). Supporters of this perspective profess, or at least accept, the view that there is a close link between race and culture and that South Africa's racial situation cannot be dealt with in terms of integration.

Very few white South Africans take the position that all South Africans are capable of participation—socially, politically, economically, and culturally—in a single society and should, therefore, be brought into that society. Those who take this position to some degree or other range from Dutch Reformed clerics to industrialists and include intellectuals in or out of the universities. Their precise proposals vary, particularly with respect to the processes by which and the pace at which such integration should take place. In any case, most other whites look at them askance, and nonwhites, particularly Africans, tend to be skeptical and uncertain of their good faith.

An appropriate white lifestyle is usually visualized as that of a prosperous farmer, country gentleman, or businessman, even-tempered and comfortable, ranging through the levels of what would be a middle class society and including a few families above and below. At all levels this way of life depends upon nonwhite labor both in domestic service and in industry; no white does manual or menial labor, supervisory jobs and white-collar positions being reserved for whites as long as they are available to fill them.

The right to this way of life is conferred by membership in the white racial category as legally defined. This membership is highly valued, and its superiority is accepted for the most part by members of the Coloured category as well, who value a partial white
ancestry in proportion to its visibility. The line is drawn by law between legal whites and legal Coloureds, and quite a number of individuals are reclassified from time to time under this law. A lifestyle conforming to certain standards is considered to accompany the racial classification and, if genealogical or physical data are ambiguous, may be used in the classification process (see ch. 6, Social Structure).

The extreme valuation of white racial status is such that not only are social contacts avoided and nonwhites encountered only in business or service circumstances, but also a white will be careful to avoid manual labor because it is "Kaffir's work" (see Glossary). For example, a white hospital nurse may not be allowed to do the tasks such as washing up that are customarily assigned to the African assistants. In sports, a white would not be permitted to play against a nonwhite in public competition, as the situation would place the contestants on an equal footing; there also appeared to be considerable anxiety that the white might lose. There was some indication in late 1969, however, that this policy might be partially altered in order to permit South Africa to participate in international sports competition.

The Afrikaners stereotype themselves as rough and simple, in accord with an image based on the early Voortrekkers. They reject the image of urban society and maintain a remembrance of the pioneering past by display in public festivals of such symbols as oxcarts, folk dancing, and poke bonnets. Their language is also part of the stereotype, and a great deal of importance is invested in it. They tend to regard themselves as the only true inhabitants of the land, claiming the later entrance of the Bantu speakers to the Cape region, and describe the country as having been empty at the time of their arrival (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). They stress the importance of equality without social classes within their group, though they have developed economic classes in modern, particularly urban, contexts.

Godliness and clean living, which they regard as part of their rural background, is another part of the self-stereotype of the Afrikaners. The Bible is the measure of right behavior and is usually the ultimate authority for the opinions on both sides of any religious argument. Their godliness may also be considered a product of a purely South African experience. Opinions going against the general trend, which may be expressed even by the most outstanding and conservative church leaders, are likely to be attributed to the influence of a recent trip abroad.

The English stereotype themselves less noticeably and do not form as close an ingroup. They have their identity in separate strata rather than a single group. Most think of themselves as irrevocably South African, but many have retained British citizenship. If of the
educated class, they conceive of themselves as cultured, sophisticated, and broadminded, even when not liberal. There is some uncertainty of identity discernible in the English ethnic community because of the detachment from the British Commonwealth and the tendency of the Afrikaners to separate themselves from other groups.

The Afrikaner stereotype of the English may give them some credit for greater culture and education, but this has less salience than it once did. The Afrikaner tends to place them in a commercial class and often lumps them in this regard with the Jews; they are considered to be the city people par excellence, which was accurate before 1935. Higher education is associated with the English language, even though the speaker and the teacher of English may in many cases be an Afrikaner. Many Afrikaners consider English speakers to be snobs; in view of studies of social-distance that show the Afrikaner more willing to accept the Englishman socially than vice versa, this may be well-grounded.

Attitudes Toward Nonwhites

The attitude of the Afrikaner was formed by the fact that his ancestors arrived in Africa at the height of the slave trade, remained insulated from changes in European thought thereafter, and were under no pressure to change their way of life so long as they could maintain it by isolation and military power. The tradition from which they came, although Protestant, was neither puritan nor equalitarian. Many of the first Dutch settlers arrived fresh from Catholic-Protestant warfare, and their background permitted them to discriminate against any who were not of their own religious sect, let alone of their religion. This showed in their dealings with other Europeans as well as with Africans (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Accordingly, Christianization and civilization of the Africans was the justification given for enslaving some and forcing others into service, though the attitude that work was moral in itself was also taken.

At the time of the Great Trek in the second quarter of the nineteenth century, the justification given for white domination was that the Africans were the children of Ham and were under the curse, “A servant of servants he shall be to his bretheren!” This justification was still used by some in the third quarter of the twentieth century. A general reason given for the right of whites to manipulate the fortunes of the Africans is the stereotype: “They are just like children!” This is emphasized by the use of terms meaning “boy” or “girl” rather than “man” and “woman” in reference to Africans and by the use of first names. The same terms
are used for Coloureds, and in their case the stereotype is “happy-go-lucky” or “irresponsible.”

Two distinct attitudes appear among the white population, generally in relation to the Africans: one is an inability to see their faces as belonging to individuals; the other is a fear of the numbers that they represent, so that nonwhites in a group become frightening. These two attitudes reinforce each other, so that an African face will be said to show no feelings, and apprehension may be expressed in regard to what may be in the African’s mind. The panic of armed police in the presence of unarmed demonstrators may probably be attributed to similar attitudes.

Fear of the African is also shown in the form of preoccupation of many whites with the idea that any freedom allowed the Africans will lead to miscegenation and absorption of the whites, and a fear of rape that bears little or no relationship to crime statistics. Few Afrikaners, however, deny that Afrikaners were among the ancestors of most of the Cape Coloureds, although some attribute paternity to the casual sailors in the seaports.

The English have tended to accord the African more political status, although they have maintained social distance from them to a similar extent. Their experience in South Africa began effectively at the same time as the freeing of slaves throughout the British Empire, and they maintained this policy in South Africa in opposition to the Boers. Their main settlement was in Natal, in contact with the militarily effective Zulu, whom they respected and whose chiefs they treated as independent rulers or potential subordinate authorities in the colonial system. The Afrikaners saw all black-skinned Africans as “kaffirs” or heathen, whether they were Christian or not, and as potential labor, whatever their rank in their own group.

The British recognized the African differentiations of rank, so that the son of a Bantu chief might be singled out for special education and privileged treatment that might in many cases not be available to many whites. Their control of Africans was the same as that which they exercised over any of their colonial peoples, and they used the same justifications of empire-building and the “civilizing mission.”

These attitudes represent general tendencies in the white group but are far from invariable. They represent attitudes held by the politically dominant groups and the bulk of the average people but not by intellectuals, nor by those who have had direct opportunities to work in contact with nonwhites; these, including missionaries and others, have strong respect for Africans as human beings, even when taking a paternalistic attitude. Dissent from the present policies, therefore, comes largely from people of these sorts.
Religion and Race

Religious justification of the subjugation of nonwhites and of racial discrimination began to be seriously questioned in the churches as early as the 1950's. Those belonging to the World Council of Churches declared it to be against Christian teaching in 1961.

For South Africa, however, debate within the Dutch Reformed churches, as closely linked as they were with the Afrikaners' sense of their own nationhood, was more significant than positions taken by churches of the uitlanders (foreigners), which were regarded with suspicion in any case.

In early 1970 a study commission appointed by the Cape Province Synod of the Dutch Reformed Church (Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk—NGK), the largest of the Dutch Reformed denominations, reported that "Nowhere in scripture is humanity divided into isolated units on the grounds of biological or natural difference." The corollary was that racial mixture was not sinful. The synod neither accepted the report nor made a public statement concerning it and referred the matter back to the commission and to the General Synod for further study. J. D. Vorster, an actuary of the church and brother of the prime minister, objected to the report on the grounds that the commission was viewing marriage from an excessively "individualistic viewpoint" and not sufficiently as an integral part of a particular society.

Although the position had not been accepted even by the Cape Synod, which was probably more liberal than the NGK synods of other provinces and other Dutch Reformed churches, a report of this sort from a commission appointed by it was a new development. Nine years earlier, in 1961, the Cape Province Synod had withdrawn (with other Dutch Reformed synods and churches) from the World Council of Churches after its declaration on racial discrimination (see ch. 11, Religion).

This was perhaps the most radical statement made by a group attached to the Dutch Reformed Church, but statements implying one degree or another of criticism of either the underlying assumptions and values of South African whites or the actual workings of apartheid laws had been made by individuals and groups from time to time. In response to these, the government—in the person of the prime minister—had felt constrained to tell ministers to restrict themselves to purely religious matters. Ministers had, in turn, responded that political and social matters were religious matters as well (see ch. 11, Religion).

The extent to which the ordinary communicant was responsive to the more liberal or radical of the Dutch Reformed clergy and laymen in early 1970 was not known. There was no indication that
these men had more than a very small following. Moreover, the canons of the Dutch Reformed churches stress their duty to obey any duly constituted government that allows the practice of their religion and does not lead the people to sin.

The Preferred Life

Formerly only the English-speaking part of the population, including the Jewish communities, had had an experience of urban-industrial society; in early 1970, however, only a small part of the white population was rural. Although 25 percent of the Afrikaners were rural, their publicly stated social values are based on a rural ideal. The term boernasie (nation of farmers) is sometimes used in self-reference by writers of the urban Afrikaner press (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages; ch. 6, Social Structure). They deny the presence of social classes among them. Industrial development has been rising steadily, however, and there is now a relatively uniform way of life in the industrial towns and cities, so that English speakers and Afrikaners may be distinguished from each other largely by the languages that they speak at home. The church communities also segment the communities, being the centers for the social life of their own groups, although only older members of the community appear to be regular churchgoers. In smaller industrial towns there appear to be few other centers of gathering.

The ideal life for most people in smaller industrial towns appears to be one of secure employment and regular promotion, for which they are willing to accept frequent transfer if necessary. Women and men both may leave a small town to seek employment in a city for economic reasons; those who remain are usually satisfied with the small-town economic conditions. In some towns this permanent part of the population may be less than half the total. This group seeks to maintain status and continue the way of life to which they are accustomed, but those who think in terms of advancement leave town for the larger cities, although they may maintain a legal residence in the community of their birth.

Observers who have sought to delineate the career and status values of urban whites differ in the emphasis. Some stress that wealth is the first consideration of those entering a commercial or industrial career, and status and authority are seen as byproducts. Others suggest that many whites consider a substantial income as necessary to security and an appropriate lifestyle but are more concerned to acquire the status and, secondarily, the authority that goes with a professional occupation or with a political career. It is not clear whether the distinction is associated with differences between English and Afrikaners, but it seems that the careers in
politics and public service, to which many Afrikaners are attracted, are more likely to bring them status and authority than great wealth.

THE AFRICANS

Stereotypes

Among Africans, each of the linguistic groups and their tribal subdivisions have their individual stereotypes of themselves and of each other. They also have stereotypes of whites. These ideas are partly related to their customary way of life and the area in which they live.

The Xhosa are considered to be sophisticated, partly because of their long urban experience and partly because their linguistic patterns allow for considerable subtlety of speech. They have the reputation for diplomacy in negotiation and are often called upon to act as spokesmen for a mixed group of tribesmen in such a context. They also have the reputation of being "tricky," however, and it is not unusual for one or two of the more aggressive Zulu to accompany a Xhosa spokesman to see that he negotiates honestly. The Zulu frequently initiate action, regarding themselves as natural leaders. The Xhosa, however, regard them as too quick to bow to authority and vulnerable to dictators, as in Shaka's conquests, whereas the Xhosa, with many independent chiefs, retained their freedom and individuality. The Zulu have a high regard for physical fitness and tend to be quick to strike a blow, which leads some of the other tribes to consider them heavyhanded.

The North Sotho and other members of the northern group of tribes began urban wage labor later than did the Xhosa and other Nguni, so that they are often considered to be rural and unsophisticated by other tribesmen. They see themselves in a similar light. The same is true of the Pondo tribe of the Zulu who, being near the sugarcane fields, are usually employed there. They are rarely given the opportunity to work with machinery because the whites have stereotyped them as simple and unmechanical.

Nonwhites, particularly Africans, stereotype the Afrikaners as being hostile to them but honest and rough in manner. It is often stated that the Afrikaner is more to be trusted than the Englishman, who may appear more friendly, because one knows where he stands with the Afrikaner. The Englishman's manners are more polished and correct, and he may appear sympathetic but may cherish many attitudes that, though less obvious, may be counter to the nonwhite's interests and designed to further those of the Englishman.

Traditional Values

Many Africans, even some of considerable education and sophistication, put great emphasis on the chiefly and royal lineages in their
tribes. In some cases these were originally of a different ethnic origin than the mass of the people ruled or were part of a group that dominated other groups and organized them under one rule. Many of the ministers of the African independent churches either can trace their family trees to these lineages (or have marital ties with them) or attempt to establish some connection, in order to reinforce their rights of leadership. Although many of the chiefs in power are regarded as of little use because of their helplessness or subservience in the presence of government pressure, their lineages are still watched hopefully for signs of the appearance of a leader (see ch. 6, Social Structure; ch. 11, Religion).

The concept of a militarily dominant group assuming suzerainty over other groups was well established among the Sotho and especially among the Tswana. It reached its apotheosis, however, among the Zulu with the imperial expansion of Shaka (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Many tribes that until his time had been independent were forcibly bound into Shaka’s armies and often suffered considerably from his attacks before that. Afterward, however, they boasted of having been a part of his organization, calling themselves Zulu.

**Urban Africans**

Among the Africans one can now find people of third- and fourth-generation urban tradition, completely divorced from the tribal land, with varying degrees of education. Their values include tribe and lineage more as sentiment than as true values, especially if they are Christian, as many are, or at least of Christian background. Their social values are linked to the means of obtaining the necessities of life and to the social group in which they move—friends rather than kinsmen, in most cases, especially among the Christians. Money is valued because it is the means of obtaining food, shelter, sexual gratification and recreation, or a permanent wife; if the individual is on a slightly higher economic or social level, it is the means of obtaining an education.

Arrest and imprisonment for trivial or accidental offenses such as being without a pass are so frequent that no stigma is attached to it, even among respectable young householders, who have a good home and some opportunity for success in the South African system. Africans who engage in violence and robbery among their fellows, however, are considered criminals. In cities as large as Johannesburg there is a good deal of danger in going and coming from work because of criminals working alone or in gangs; they cause a preoccupation that shows clearly in psychological studies of African city dwellers.

Some of the younger criminals set a high valuation on lore learned from American motion pictures, especially those dealing with violent subjects. They attempt to imitate American fads and styles and
borrow a great deal of slang, which they interlard with a combination of their own and other African languages to produce a homemade jargon that is their trademark. Their chief aims are money and sexual satisfaction; many of them drawn into the criminal life because of the frustration of being unable to earn a living from honest pursuits. Some are well educated but yet could not obtain work for which their education prepared them.

African women, as others, would prefer stable marriages, with the whole family domiciled together but are rarely able to attain this, especially in the lower income levels. They seek security sometimes from the lineage and sometimes from mutual-help arrangements made with other women. They have been forced to be independent and are often able to carry on businesses of their own successfully, with or without the assistance of a husband. They are fairly careful of appearances, however; the better educated generally follow European styles of dress and proprieties of behavior, whereas the more traditional are careful to observe the correct behavior of respect toward their husbands even though women are often financially dominant and more capable as managers.

They have a strong sense of tidiness and cleanliness and take pride in decent living quarters. Sources record the spotless condition in which the women of the Johannesburg slums kept their narrow quarters under impossible conditions. These have now been razed, and the new projects, if not entirely satisfactory, are at least in better condition than the old “yards.”

According to some observers, a great many urban Africans suffer from uncertainty about relevant norms and from a loss of norms. Many have lost a sense of importance and have a feeling of powerlessness and isolation. There is a good deal of conflict concerning religion: should they believe in the ancestors or in foreign gods, and in what way? Many, if not most, believe in and fear witchcraft and sorcery, resorting to diviners and native doctors in preference to Western medicine or simultaneously with it.

Under modern urban conditions the number of traditionalist diviners and herb doctors has increased rather than decreased with the growth of sophistication. European medical help is not always easy for the ordinary worker to obtain; but more than that, the accumulation of anxieties, hazards, and unknown possibilities under urban conditions sends him to the diviner, who will tell him how to gain the favor of his employer or whether an enemy has cast an evil spell on him in order to steal his job. These diviners are typically women, who may sometimes work for wages at least part of the time. Some outstanding ones, however, are men, one of whom is a distinguished writer of folklore. The involvement of very shrewd and perceptive Africans in these roles has suggested to some that the lack of educational opportunity and the lack of an outlet for
leadership has lead many able men to seek the traditional learning that also gives an opportunity for the exercise of authority.

An even more fertile ground for the exercise of leadership is in the Christian ministry, especially in the African independent churches. The minister is a chief, in the Bantu language, and his church is often referred to as though it were a tribe. There is a tendency in these churches to draw most of the adults in the congregation into some leadership role connected with these churches, either in the hierarchy or in some special project. The leader usually is assisted by a woman who is especially susceptible to the motions of the Spirit, and she may conduct the service if the leader is away for any reason. If he should suddenly die or be incapacitated, she takes charge of the process of finding his successor, so that her role is in many ways parallel to that of the queen mother in a tribe. A great deal of nationalistic Africanist feeling is expressed through these churches, especially in the case of those believing in a black Messiah, a special prophet, or a second coming. For this reason the government supervises them while allowing them basic freedom.

THE COLOURED AND THE INDIANS

The Coloureds, both rural and urban, are accustomed to accepting the values of the white community without question although, over a period of time, feeling for their own rights has developed some sense of independent identity. Among the Cape Malays, equality in the eyes of God and within Islam is a positive value. Among other Coloureds, many levels of status are distinguished and valued: the standard of higher status is close approximation to white physical characteristics. Some bitterness is caused by the visibility of Coloured traits among many accepted whites and the fact that if parental associations were not considered many of the Coloureds might cross the color bar. Only a few have begun to identify their political status with other nonwhites and to make common cause with them; a great many more retain the long tradition of considering Africans inferior. Their way of life is as near to that of the Afrikaners as they are able to approximate financially, but they labor under economic and political disabilities that limit the possibilities.

Among the rural Coloureds, as among the Africans, membership in a lineage of old tradition and of a high degree of white ancestry is of high social value, giving authority in the community; the members of these lineages are usually also the recognized occupiers of the land, so that economic and political value are added. The urban Coloureds are rarely of long lineage and consider the fortunes of the immediate family as more important.

The highest social value in the Indian community, Hindu or Mos-
lem, is that of education. This is the mark of higher social status as it is also the key to higher economic status. In matters of religion, higher status in some situations may also be obtained through learning, in the religious context. Financial success is the second value, but the two may be interdependent. The importance of social status is partially fixed by the caste background, but in the South African context it may often be raised through economic success and education. This is especially true in the case of men, and to a lesser degree, of some of the Hindu women.
SECTION II. POLITICAL

CHAPTER 13

THE GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM

The country’s system of government has as its major principle the absolute supremacy of the national Parliament. Ultimate power is vested solely in Parliament, specifically in its lower house, and it is applied by its cabinet of ministers. The principle was reflected in the debates during the drafting of the republican Constitution in 1961. Since at least 1956, the courts have been enjoined from considering the validity of the acts of Parliament, which is empowered to pass any legislation it sees fit on any matter, public or private. Moreover, with one very limited exception, laws may be made and unmade solely by the decision of a simple majority of Parliament. The breadth of parliamentary power is such that as early as 1934, in its decision in the case of Sachs vs. Minister of Justice, the appellate court held that Parliament could “make any encroachment it pleases upon the life, liberty, or property of any individual subject to its sway,” and its powers have been considerably enlarged since then.

The second central principle of the system is that it is designed primarily to guarantee the supremacy of the interests of the whites. No more than 40,000 nonwhite voters have ever been enrolled, as compared with 2 million registered white electors in 1966. The last nonwhite voters were removed from the electoral rolls in 1968. All white citizens eighteen years of age or more are permitted to vote.

Although the government is clearly unitary, it has vested some powers in subsidiary elements at the provincial level, the provincial councils. In addition, the government’s proclaimed policy since 1948 has been to develop systems of local self-government for the nonwhites. The most important means by which this policy was to be fulfilled was the creation of small, semiautonomous states, generally referred to as Bantustans, in which all internal affairs would eventually be the responsibility of elected or traditional African leaders. One such semiautonomous national unit, as they are officially called, was created in 1963, and more were in various stages of creation in early 1970.

The courts, although unable to pass on the legality of acts of Parliament, retain the ability to determine whether the execution of
an act by the executive branch falls within the powers assigned by existing law (see ch. 14, The Legal System). South West Africa (Namibia), while not a portion of the Republic as such, is so closely connected to it as to be, for all practical administrative purposes, a fifth province. It was represented as such in Parliament (see ch. 16, Foreign Relations; Appendix—South West Africa).

THE CONSTITUTION

Until 1961 the country was governed under the South Africa Act of 1909, generally referred to as the Union Constitution. Although the country was a British dominion formally ruled by a governor general representing the crown, its own government was granted full independence of action in internal affairs from the first. It was recognized as an independent state under international law in 1919, and the last real vestige of imperial control lapsed in 1931. Nevertheless, a majority of the country’s white voters favored the proclamation of a republican form of government with total independence from foreign rule (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

Other than the creation of a state president to replace the crown and the breaking of the largely theoretical ties to Great Britain, the new Constitution did not differ significantly from its predecessor. A majority of the articles in both constitutions are identical and the major work of the 1961 Constitution's drafters, who comprised the members of the two Houses of Parliament sitting together, was the pruning of articles that had already been superseded by constitutional amendments or that had simply come into disuse since 1909. Critical components of the constitutional system remained balanced on unwritten but binding custom. Except for two articles that ensure the continued use of two official languages, the Constitution remains a basic law, subject to change at any time at the will of the legislature.

A few other sections of the republican Constitution purport to place limits on the powers of Parliament; for example, Article 114 states that Parliament may not tamper with the provincial boundaries or abolish provincial councils without the approval of the provincial governments involved, and Article 14 forbids Parliament to reduce the salary of a state president during his term of office. In fact, however, these injunctions were regarded by the drafters as having only the effect of moral strictures; Article 118 empowers the government in power to overturn such articles by a simple majority vote, and precedents for such moves exist in the country’s constitutional history.

PARLIAMENT

All legislative and executive powers are vested in Parliament—the president, the Senate, and the House of Assembly. Under ordinary
circumstances, passage of legislation by Parliament requires the approval of all three constituent parts, that is, passage of the bill by both houses and signature by the president with the approval of the cabinet or, as it is formally called, the Executive Council.

The State President

The state president is head of the Republic and commander in chief of the defense forces. He is regarded as a totally nonpolitical figure who is intended to serve as the focal point of loyalty to the state. The Constitution assigns him the executive powers of government and entitles him to exert nominal authority over certain subjects, particularly foreign affairs, diplomatic relations, control of immigration, granting and renewing of passports, and the extending of pardon and mercy to criminal offenders, as well as the calling and proroguing of the houses of Parliament and the appointment of ministers.

Although formally the president is executive of the government, his office has very little genuine political power because he may only exercise his vested powers on behalf of the real executive, the cabinet of ministers. The state president is elected by secret ballot of the members of both houses of Parliament jointly resolved into an electoral college. Nominees are accepted on a motion of any two members of Parliament.

Election is by simple majority vote. If only one candidate is nominated, he takes office automatically. If more than two candidates are presented and none receives a majority of the votes cast on the first ballot, the candidate with the lowest number of votes is eliminated, and subsequent ballots are taken under the same rules until a majority is obtained. In cases of a tie vote, the electoral college is adjourned in order to reconsider. Upon reconvening, if the vote remains deadlocked, the presiding officer, who is either the chief justice or another justice of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court appointed by the chief justice, must cast the deciding vote.

The state president holds office for seven years from the date of oath and may not run for reelection unless specifically authorized to do so by the electoral college. His salary and pension provisions are specified in the Constitution, and he may not hold any other remunerated public office. He may resign or be removed from office. Removal may be effected by a simple majority vote of both houses of Parliament for reasons of misconduct or inability to perform duties efficiently. A bill to remove the president may only be considered after at least thirty members of Parliament request the creation of a joint committee of the two Houses to consider charges against him. If both Houses resolve without debate to appoint such a committee and if the committee's report is unfavorable, a motion for removal may then be considered.
The Constitution provides for the appointment of an acting state president whenever the office of state president is vacant or if the state president is traveling abroad or temporarily unable to perform his duties. The line of succession for the office of acting state president is the president of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Assembly, and any other person selected by the cabinet of ministers.

The Executive Council

The cabinet is referred to as the Executive Council in South African practice and is composed of the prime minister and all of his ministers, numbering eighteen in early 1970. The Executive Council does not include the deputy ministers, who may not number more than six by law. There are, strictly speaking, no ministries; instead, ministers are directly at the head of one or more of the thirty-odd departments of government. The prime minister is supported by an executive office, called the Office of the Prime Minister.

The great powers of the Executive Council derive from its control, sanctioned by custom as well as provided for by the Constitution, over the action of the state president and from its ability to dominate a majority of the members of the House of Assembly through application of rigid rules of party discipline. In addition, through its control over the president, the cabinet is free to assent to, or withhold his assent from, bills passed by the two Houses of Parliament and to return to the House of origin any bill that the ministers feel should be amended.

Ministers must be members of one of the Houses of Parliament and may address either house. Nonmembers may be appointed as ministers but must become members within three months of their appointment. A newly selected minister without a seat may be appointed to fill one of the nominated seats of the Senate and, if no vacancy exists, a nominated senator may be requested to resign in order to create the necessary opening. Ministers have only rarely been appointed from among nonmembers, however, and most ministers have been drawn from the lower house. Efforts are made to ensure that each province is represented in the cabinet.

The doctrine of collective responsibility of ministers is observed; that is, decisions of the cabinet bind every member of the government, and the cabinet must always have the support of the majority of the legislators of the lower house on a vote of confidence. No specific requirement exists that would require resignation of the government after defeat of a government-sponsored measure on an ordinary issue, but political party discipline was so rigid throughout the 1939–69 period that no significant split in the ruling party vote occurred.
Party discipline, at least in the ruling Nationalist Party, is such that, even if a prime minister fails to discuss important legislation with his party’s parliamentary caucus before its introduction, universal support is still mandatory and failure to follow the party whip will lead to dismissal. If a minister does not agree with the decision of the cabinet, custom requires that he resign, but this has no backing in law; on at least three occasions in the state’s history, a minister in disagreement has refused to resign, and the cabinet was forced to dissolve itself, to be reconstituted without the recalcitrant minister.

The Houses of Parliament

The two houses of Parliament were initially intended by the 1910 Constitution to strike a balance between the British and American bicameral systems; the lower house was to be dominant, but significant powers of review were to be left in the hands of a Senate whose composition would differ from that of the lower house and which would be above political considerations. The upper house did not develop as initially planned, however, and the members of the Senate, like those of the House of Assembly, became divided along political party lines. As a result, the Senate has largely supported the actions of the lower house without exercising the independent review functions it was expected to have.

Parliament must be summoned by law at least once each year. The government has the power to dissolve both houses of Parliament, or the House of Assembly or, in certain circumstances, the Senate alone, before the end of their five-year tenure. This power had only been used once between 1910 and 1960 but, between the proclamation of the Republic in 1961 and early 1970, two elections were called more than a year in advance of the required date. Despite the announced dissolution of one or both houses, the members remain competent and may be recalled up until the day before the election of the new membership.

Conventions control the operation of the party system within the legislature—for example, the pairing of pro and con votes of persons not present for a balloting on the floor and the fair representation of opposition parties on select committees. The existence of a party system, of the formal opposition, and of a designated leader of the opposition is provided for by law. The houses of Parliament are empowered to adopt most of their own rules of procedure as they see fit, but the quorum of each house is set by law at fifteen in the Senate and thirty in the House of Assembly. Similarly, the Constitution specifies the method of selecting presiding officers and sets standards for membership. All members of Parliament must be whites.
The House of Assembly

The lower house in early 1970 consisted of 166 members elected by the white voters, 6 of them assigned to South West Africa and the rest to single-member constituencies throughout the Republic. In addition, 4 white representatives elected by Coloured voters sat and voted in the house until the eve of the 1970 parliamentary elections at which time the last nonwhite representation in Parliament was abolished in accordance with a 1968 law.

The 160 constituencies for South Africa's white voters are divided among the provinces according to their proportion of the white electorate. The seats assigned to a province are then provided with constituencies roughly equal in white population. The Delimitations Commission, composed of three Supreme Court justices, is allowed to alter the division so that constituencies may vary as much as 15 percent above or below the population norm.

The commission is intended to be impartial, but the government is empowered by law to request the commission to reconsider its decisions, and the Constitution permits the commission to give due consideration to a number of factors other than population. The variation permitted in constituency size has widely been used to favor rural constituencies, a pattern that has given greater weight to the Afrikaner supporters of the Nationalist Party. The Nationalists came to power in 1948 with a supporting vote 20 percent smaller than that of the opposition.

The Senate

The Senate consists of forty-three members chosen by provincial electoral colleges and eleven members nominally appointed by the state president. Six of the appointed members were previously selected to represent nonwhite interests, but this function was abolished in 1968. Two of the elected and two of the appointed members represent South West Africa's white population in the upper house, giving the voters of the disputed territory proportionally greater representation than the voters of the Republic.

Each provincial electoral college is composed of the members of the Provincial Council and of the province's House of Assembly delegation. The college's decisions are made by proportional representation. Until 1955 the number of senators from each of the province was required to be equal; since then, however, the number of elected seats assigned to each province has been determined by a complex formula relating to the size of the House of Assembly delegation but with a minimum number of eight from each province. Thus, the Transvaal had fourteen senators in 1969, the Cape Province eleven, and the Orange Free State and Natal eight each, in addition to the two seats for South West Africa.
Since 1955 the government has been empowered to dissolve the Senate within 120 days after provincial elections. The government is thus able to take advantage of favorable results in the provincial elections to improve its position in the Senate. No use had been made of the power to call for separate dissolution of the Senate, although separate elections for senators had been required after the restructuring of the upper house in 1955. Because of the lack of real power in the upper house, the question of separate dissolution was not considered important after 1961.

Legislation

Legislation before the House of Assembly and Senate is handled in accordance with British parliamentary practice: bills, whether introduced by the government or by private members, are given three readings. The initial reading presents the proposed bill to the House of Assembly; it is then assigned to a select committee of members of government and opposition parties, which considers the proposal and returns a draft bill to the House of Assembly with one or more reports recommending favorable or unfavorable disposition. The committee may not detain legislation. After committee stage the bill is given a second hearing by the House of Assembly, in which its provisions are voted on article by article. Finally, the bill, or that portion of it which successfully passes the second hearing, is voted on in its entirety for final passage in its third hearing. If passed, it goes to the Senate, where it is handled in similar fashion.

Following British practice, money bills may be originated only in the House of Assembly, and the Senate may not amend them. In addition, money bills must be introduced by the government, and the House of Assembly cannot add to such bills. Although the Senate may delay an act, it may not defeat it permanently. Tax and appropriations bills passed by the House of Assembly become law when signed by the state president, as do any other measures passed by the lower house in two successive sessions, even if the Senate withholds its assent. This provision had not been put to use in the first eight years of the republican Constitution.

Party divisions are the rule in both houses. A formal structure is given to the division through the institutionalization of the idea of Government and Opposition sides on all issues. Since party discipline is rigid and virtually all votes take place along party lines, the Opposition does not attempt to sway the vote but, rather, to concentrate its energies on the formal "question periods" during which ministers are required to answer opposition criticism.

Efforts are then made to discredit the government position in the eyes of the voters. Debates are frequently bitter, and attacks are often made at the personal level. The majority party and, therefore,
the government have the ability to close debate or to limit the time of speakers so as to effectively prevent anything resembling a filibuster. If it wishes, the government may prevent any debate at all on an issue.

PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

The provincial government system is copied to some extent from that in practice in Switzerland at the beginning of the twentieth century. The chief executive of the province is the provincial administrator, who is appointed for five years by the national government, which provides his salary. He may be removed only for cause; he may not be removed by a new national government, nor can he be removed by a vote of no-confidence by the province’s legislative body. The appointee’s position is not a political one, although he is usually a political figure. He is also usually a resident of the province.

The provincial administrator is the representative in the province of the national government as well as the chief executive officer of the provincial government. He has a veto power over all appropriations, since most of the provincial outlays are met from national funds. He has no veto over other legislation, however, and must promulgate ordinances passed by the Provincial Council. He may be heard in the council but may not vote in it. Further, power over the administration of provincial affairs is not his but rests in the five-member Executive Committee.

The provincial administrator is the chairman of the Executive Committee and ordinarily casts one vote in it. If, however, the absence of one member of the committee results in a tie, the administrator is authorized to cast a second, tie-breaking vote. He must carry out majority decisions. The remaining four members of the Executive Committee are elected by the Provincial Council and hold tenure with it, but they, like the provincial administrator, do not have to resign if they lose the confidence of the council. Until 1963 elections were conducted by proportional representation, and executive committees were often divided along party lines. Since 1962 members of the committee have usually belonged to the party dominant in the council. Although the elected members of the Executive Committee are not required to be members of the Provincial Council, they almost always are.

The provincial councils are popularly elected bodies, with members elected from single-member constituencies. The size of the council is required to be the same size as the province’s delegation to the lower house of Parliament, although a minimum size of twenty-five is set. In 1970 the Natal and Orange Free State councils
had the minimum number of members, whereas the Cape Province had fifty-four and the Transvaal sixty-seven. In the two larger provinces the constituencies for members of each Provincial Council were the same as the parliamentary constituencies, but special delimitations were made in the smaller provinces.

Until 1968, when they were deprived of the right, the Coloured voters of Cape Province elected two whites to represent them in the council of that province. By 1970 only white voters were represented in either the national or provincial legislatures. No member of Parliament may retain his seat if elected to a Provincial Council, but both members of Parliament and members of provincial councils may, and do, hold lesser elective offices at the local government level.

The provincial governments have control over primary and secondary education for whites, municipal and local government, hospitals and health, local institutions and roads, local public works, markets, and game preservation. They have no borrowing power of their own and receive over half their funds from the national treasury (see ch. 25, Fiscal and Monetary Systems).

The general capacities and powers of the provincial governments are assigned by the Constitution. Within their competence, the councils are free to legislate as they see fit, although acts of Parliament take precedence, and the national legislature may void acts of the provincial bodies on any subject. Every ordinance passed by a Provincial Council must be considered by the national cabinet, which may either grant assent, refuse to grant assent or reserve an ordinance for further consideration. If assent is not granted within twelve months, the ordinance is voided.

Throughout the state’s history the national government has continually placed stricter limits on the provincial councils’ areas of action, and this process of whittling away their powers continued through the 1960’s. Only the Natal Provincial Council attempted, for historic and political reasons, to oppose the movement toward uniformity under central government direction (see ch. 15, Political Dynamics).

The government of South Africa claims absolute jurisdiction over the territory of South West Africa, which was mandated to it by the League of Nations after World War I. Although the claim is contested by a majority of member states of the United Nations and although the United Nations General Assembly had ordered South Africa to end its administration in 1969, the South African government continued to effectively administer the territory as an integral part of the country. Features of the national, provincial, and local government systems were extended to include the territory. The sole notable difference between the governments of the four prov-
inces and that of South West Africa is the fact that the local legislature of the latter is called the Legislative Assembly and has only eighteen members (see Appendix—South West Africa).

**LOCAL GOVERNMENT**

Local government in the areas zoned for whites—more than 80 percent of the country—is patterned on the English model. In all provinces except Natal, suffrage is restricted to taxpayers. Until 1968 Coloured taxpayers retained the franchise in municipal elections in Natal and Cape provinces, and as recently as 1960 Coloured municipal councillors were chosen in open elections in three major cities.

Municipal governments include more than 300 city and town councils, more than 80 village management boards, and more than 50 local township or village councils. The form of municipal government varies to some extent from province to province, but largely similar systems have been in effect in the Transvaal and the Cape since the reform of the Transvaal system in 1960. Municipal councillors are elected for five-year terms. They then elect an executive committee and a mayor whose position is largely honorary. The chief executive and administrator is the town clerk, who is responsible to the council, although the committee can have the council dissolved and new elections called.

Local officials derive their legal authority from the provincial councils, but they play an important part in the relationship between the national government and the population of the area. National policy concerning urban problems has been to place the burden of dealing with them on local rather than national or provincial governments. For example, municipal officials are responsible for the control of the urban African population, both as a labor force and as the inhabitants of urban locations. In this and most other matters, the national government retains overall control, however, by enacting general legislation and by other means such as requiring that municipal bylaws affecting Africans obtain ministerial approval.

Because the national government supplies only about 7 percent of municipal revenues, it cannot exert pressure on local governments through control of the purse strings. Municipalities, therefore, sometimes exhibit independent attitudes on matters of local interest, including aspects of race relations, under their control. Thus, labor bureaus, which control the influx and supply of African labor in industrial towns, often ignore national policy by allowing larger numbers of African laborers to remain in the towns (see ch. 22, Labor). In another context, the municipal council of Cape Town, which has a traditionally liberal attitude toward the Cape Coloured
population, has strongly resisted national efforts to force segregation in public facilities such as beaches and buses. Local governments do not control the police who, except for traffic police, are under the national government (see ch. 26, Public Order and Internal Security).

Two other forms of governmental authorities were the divisional councils and magisterial districts. Divisional councils, rural units of elected local government, existed only in Cape Province. The country as a whole is divided into more than 300 magisterial districts. Magisterial districts are basically the lowest geographic divisions of the country for the court system, a magistrate's court being the center of each district. For convenience, however, the district and the magistrate's court serve as the center for the varied duties of the national government at the local level. The police subdivisions and entities such as social welfare offices are set up along magisterial district lines.

AFRICAN REGIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The program of separate development under Bantu authorities is designed by the government to provide a system of local government for Africans, by Africans, under white control. It is intended primarily to legitimize the exclusion of Africans from participation in, or influence on, national government or local government in the 87 percent of the country's territory under purely white control.

Separate political development is based on two acts of Parliament, the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 and the Promotion of the Bantu Self Government Act of 1959. The purpose of the Bantu Authorities Act was to permit the construction of local government from the bottom up to be placed in the hands of village chiefs or headmen. No such figures existed for major portions of the African population, even in the historic native reserves, either because the groups had traditionally been ruled by a council or because the older form of government had been totally destroyed by the encroachment of white power.

The government, however, asserted that it intended to restore the traditional structure and to superimpose on it a hierarchy of African authorities that would allow Africans, from bases in the reserves, to govern themselves, free as far as possible from subjection to the white-dominated economy and political institutions of the republic. These newly created Bantu authorities were to be given limited administrative, executive, and judicial powers.

Regional authorities were to be established with jurisdiction over two or more Bantu authorities. Finally, when the system for a particular ethnic group had sufficiently matured, territorial authorities were to be created to exercise jurisdiction over a number of
regional authorities. Eventually, a territorial authority was to exercise a degree of control over all Africans of a specific ethnic group, whether they lived in the reserves, in rural areas zoned for whites, or in African townships located in white urban centers. At first, efforts to implement the act were strongly resisted, but after 1955 provisions of the act were carried out in many reserves.

The Promotion of Bantu Self Government Act of 1959 recognized eight national units based on ethnic rather than geographic considerations. Each national unit was eventually to be given the opportunity to develop as a self-governing entity on the basis of the governmental system it developed for itself. Ultimate authority, however, lay with white commissioners general appointed to serve in positions equivalent to that of the governor general in the British or French colonial system. Provision was also made for the appointment of African officials from each national unit to be assigned to each urban African township outside the reserves to function as an official link between national unit in the reserves and its citizens employed in the cities.

The key sections of the act provided for the gradual transfer of legislative power over affairs within the national units, commonly termed Bantustans, to their own legislative bodies. These bodies would continue to be called territorial authorities until they reached a level of competence sufficient for them to be replaced by a Legislative Assembly. The Legislative Assembly would govern the national unit.

In late 1969 only one Legislative Assembly had been created, that of the Transkei, which had been granted a constitution in 1963, although fully constituted Territorial Authority legislative bodies were in existence in Ovamboland in South West Africa and in the scattered native reserves of Ciskei, Tswana, Venda, and North Sotho. The republican government was authorized to gradually assign responsibilities to the various territorial authorities. The other planned national units are for the Shangaan, the Swazi, and South Sotho.

The national units were not intended to be territorial bodies; citizenship within the national unit had nothing, directly or necessarily, to do with residence within the borders of the unit's assigned reserves, which, with the exception of the Transkei, were not integral but scattered pieces separated by areas restricted to white control and residence. Methods were to be sought in the future for exercising Territorial Authority control over elements of the national unit wherever they might be found, even as isolated segments within a white community.

According to the then prime minister, H. F. Verwoerd, the territory under African control will be permanently restricted to the 13 percent of the area of the republic assigned as native reserves in
1936. The government expressed the idea that the elective principle conflicted with African tradition and, therefore, should never be applied to more than a minority of the Territorial Authority or Bantustan Legislative Assembly seats. African traditional democratic principles, it was stated, were drawn from the willingness of the chiefs to consult with, and accept the advice of, subordinate authorities and followers.

The Transkei

The Transkei was the first national unit to reach the final stages of a Bantustan whose Legislative Assembly had limited but increasing powers of internal self-government. The document under which the Transkei functions was drafted by the former Transkeian Territorial Authority under the guidance of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development and passed by the national Parliament as the Transkei Constitution Act on May 24, 1963. The governing Legislative Assembly consists of 109 members, of whom 4 are paramount chiefs and 60 are lesser chiefs, all sitting ex officio. The remaining 45 seats are held by popularly elected members.

The Constitution makes the Transkei a self-governing territory within the Republic of South Africa. The area of jurisdiction consists of the African-populated areas of the Transkei region. Thus, excluded are areas zoned for whites, including much of the capital, Umtata; the only harbor, Port St. John; and twenty-five other towns. A narrow strip of land along the coastline has also been left in white hands for security reasons.

The republican government has announced its intentions to turn most of these white zones over to African control as the white population departs, and provisions for this exist in the Constitution. A national flag and national anthem are authorized. Citizens of the Transkei retain South African citizenship as well as Transkeian citizenship. The franchise is universal over the age of twenty-one, and taxpayers between eighteen and twenty-one may also vote. Xhosa is the official language.

The national government's power to appoint or remove all chiefs at will allows it to exert subtle control over a majority in the Legislative Assembly. Debate and voting by some appointed members as well as by the elected members, however, display a considerable degree of freedom.

Although the powers of the Transkei Legislative Assembly (TLA) are greater than those of the territorial authorities, they are limited by the Constitution. The government of the republic retains sole control of certain matters; these include internal security, foreign relations, communications and the national rail and road network, immigration into and out of the Transkei, public finance and bank-
ing, customs and excise taxes, and constitutional amendments. In addition, all bills passed by the TLA must obtain the signature of the state president, giving the government of the republic pocket veto powers over all acts of the Transkei government. Moreover, the state president retains the power to legislate by proclamation in all Bantu areas, including the Transkei.

Exclusive authority over certain matters is assigned to the TLA, although acts on these subjects also need the signature of the state president. Specified powers of the TLA include control over education, conservation, local roads and bridges, labor matters, welfare services, and African local government. In these matters, TLA legislation has supreme authority over Transkeian citizens residing within the region. Provision is made for the South African Parliament to add other duties to this list. In addition, TLA has the power of taxation over its citizens, including those residing outside its borders in the white urban centers of the Republic.

Because of the great poverty of the Transkei, the revenues raised by the TLA are adequate for only about a fifth of the total governmental budget; the balance is made up by a subvention from the republic government. The TLA does not have the authority to raise loans or to establish customs or excise taxes, so that it remains dependent on the grant supplied by the republic.

The TLA elects a cabinet, but the Constitution does not specify that the cabinet is responsible to the legislature; and by early 1970 no disagreements of sufficient magnitude between the cabinet and the legislature had occurred to establish whether the tradition of responsibility current in the republican Parliament or the non-responsible system comparable to that found in the country's provincial councils would be adopted.

The chief minister and the other ministers are the heads of departments, with white civil servants appointed as their senior assistants by the Department of Bantu Administration and Development. In 1969 the individual ministers were responsible for Departments of Finance, Justice, Education, Agriculture and Forestry, Roads and Works, Posts and Telegraphs, Transport, and Information; the Department of the Chief Minister was under the chief minister. The cabinet, once elected, remains in office for the duration of the TLA, a maximum of five years. At the request of the cabinet or of the TLA itself, the state president may order dissolution. He also retains the power to remove one or more members of the cabinet at the request of the TLA if he sees fit.

Many writers have asserted that the Transkei occupies the same constitutional position that had been occupied by most British and French colonial territories in the early 1950's and is on the same level as the neighboring British colony of Lesotho (then Basutoland) was placed in 1963. In both the colony and the Bantustan,
the majority of legislative seats were held by government-appointed chiefs, and the powers assigned to the self-governing units and to the colonial power were virtually identical.

Urban Bantu Councils

Since 1923 an Urban Native Advisory Board has been created in each urban location or township zoned for African residence outside the reserves. The board was a mixture of elective and appointive members and until 1968 the chairman was usually an appointed European official. The board advised the local office of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development and its white urban council equivalent of the opinions and problems of the African inhabitants. Its duties are advisory, and the white authorities may, and often do, disregard its comments. For this reason the boards have little popularity with the African population and, where elections are held, they stir little interest.

The Bantu affairs departments of the white municipal governments have been delegated by the national government with primary responsibility for control of the adjacent African urban group areas or townships. The Bantu townships are financed from their own revenues, and it is rare for a municipal government to add to the Bantu revenue accounts, which it controls. In addition, the municipal governments are responsible for African labor affairs and the administration of projects for urban Africans in areas such as housing and social welfare, which are, however, funded by the national government. The white municipal authorities have the authority to establish and assign powers to urban native advisory boards within limits set by the National government.

In 1963 a parliamentary act provided for the creation of urban Bantu councils, which were to be gradually given considerable control over local government-level matters within the urban African townships. The councils have gradually replaced the boards. Each consists of six members, who could either be elected or appointed. Appointed members, however, can only be included if chosen by the so-called tribal ambassadors, sent by chiefs in the reserves to represent them among their urban cotribesmen. In late 1969 all the councils were still restricted to an advisory role, and the Department of Bantu Administration and Development had no plans to give them greater powers.

Local Government Organs for Coloureds and Asians

During the 1960's the government drafted and began to implement plans that would carry the program of creating separate political organs for the nonwhites to its logical conclusion by providing quasi-governmental organs for the Coloureds and Asians.
The National Council for Coloured Affairs had been established in 1959. The council had twenty-seven members, fifteen nominated by the government and twelve elected by Cape Coloured voters. The body had no assigned powers, however, and could only advise the government's Department of Coloured Affairs. It was replaced in late 1969 by a new entity, the Coloured People’s Representative Council, a national body of sixty members, two-thirds of whom are elected by the Coloured voters throughout the country. Of the forty elected seats, six represent constituencies in the Transvaal, three each in Natal and the Orange Free State, and twenty-eight in Cape Province. All Coloured adults may vote for the elected members of the Coloured People’s Representative Council, and prospective voters are required by law to register.

An executive council of five members, similar to the provincial executive council, is to function under an appointed chairman. The duties of the council are initially to be restricted to advising the government on matters affecting the Coloureds. The council is gradually to be delegated responsibility by the state president to legislate for its constituents in fields such as local government, education, and welfare.

At the local level some fifty-five Coloured consultative and management committees existed in 1968, to represent the population of Coloured urban townships and Coloured reserves. Only one of these committees had elected members, the rest being entirely appointive. The consultative committees have only advisory power, but it is planned to eventually make all the committees elected management committees, charged with responsibility for local affairs within the Coloured area.

Asian local government is to be separate from, but modeled on, that already being set up for the Coloured communities. An advisory body, the South African Indian Council, composed entirely of government appointees, was created in 1964. At the local level there were six consultative committees in Indian townships in 1968. In Natal, however, where Indians outnumber whites, a separate system of local government for Indians exists. There, Indian group areas have local affairs committees, of which the eleven most advanced in 1968 had elected majorities. One entirely Indian local government has already been created.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

The Administrative Structure

Although the members of the Executive Council (cabinet) of the Republic are referred to as ministers, they do not head ministries. Instead, they are directly charged with supervision over one or more of the government departments or major independent offices,
which numbered thirty-eight in the late 1960's. Ministerial assignments are sometimes mixed; for example, one minister may simultaneously head as many as four departments as diverse as the Department of Indian Affairs and the Department of Sports; others may head departments dealing with related matters, such as the departments of Bantu administration and development and Bantu education; some may head only one important department. The departments are largely stable in number and composition, although they do not generally exhibit any common internal organizational structure.

In addition to the departments and offices, the national government directly runs eighty or more major public entities. These include a number of statutory bodies under direct ministerial control with responsibility for such affairs as the railways and harbors, broadcasting, electric supply, and the development of residential group areas; More independent of political control are a number of corporations. The oldest of these is the state-owned iron and steel industry, founded in the 1920's. Others, largely created since 1948, include state corporations, some of them operating as legal monopolies, in the fields of armament manufacture, fertilizer production, oil exploration, industrial and fisheries development, the development of the Orange River Basin, and the economic development of the Bantustans. State involvement in industry and business was expanding in 1969 (see ch. 21, Industry).

Separate administrations exist for the provincial, South West African, and Bantustan governments, although their civil servants are members of the national public service on assignment to the regional bodies. Municipal governments are legally corporate bodies and hire their own employees.

The Civil Service

Among the 875,000 government employees in 1967, 116,000 were civil servants under the guidance of the Public Service Commission, an impartial body that has the power to protect civil servants from arbitrary dismissal or salary reductions. Recruitment, promotion, and general control of staff are, however, the responsibility of the minister in charge of each department, who is required only to first take into account the commission's recommendation when considering men for promotion. Nevertheless, the civil service operates with considerable freedom from political favoritism. Since 1948 civil servants have been entitled to run for political office without resigning from their posts.

The civil service is handicapped, however, by the need to provide enough administrative personnel for a nation of 20 million people while restricting the choice of its personnel above the very lowest
levels to candidates drawn from among the fewer than 4 million whites. This problem has been accentuated since World War II by the general shortage of white labor, which has meant that the civil service must compete for staff with the better paying private enterprises.

Further, the civil service has little appeal to the English-speaking portion of the white population. White government employees are overwhelmingly Afrikaans speaking. For example, only about 10 percent of the applicants for the foreign service in recent years have been English speakers. Although most appointments to top posts in the civil service, police, and army have gone to Afrikaan speakers since the Nationalists came to power in 1948, the lack of interest on the part of the English speakers is less the result of actual discrimination against them than of the greater attraction of jobs in the English-dominated commercial and industrial spheres. In addition, the English speakers often lack the degree of bilingualism required by civil service rules, a problem not faced by the more bilingually inclined Afrikaner population. As a result, most public employees are drawn from among the Afrikaners, who constitute only one-ninth of the country's population.
CHAPTER 14
THE LEGAL SYSTEM

The country's legal system reflects the direct influence of two legal traditions—the Roman-Dutch and the English—brought by the two major ethnic components of its white population. The white rulers have developed an amalgam of these traditions and their own legal solutions to the problems, as they saw them, of racial and cultural heterogeneity and, in the last hundred years, of rapid economic growth and urbanization (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 4, Population; ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages; ch. 21, Industry).

Given South Africa's dual legal heritage, substance and procedure in its legal system resemble that in many Western countries as do the structure and behavior of its courts. Some aspects, for example criminal procedure and company law, may be closely akin to that of England; others, for example contract and family law, may have a Roman-Dutch or general continental character. With some exceptions the judicial system functions, in principle at least, in ways similar to those of English courts. Most important, South African courts, like British courts, are independent but, like those courts, operate in a governmental structure that stresses parliamentary supremacy (see ch. 13, The Governmental System). Specifically, South African courts cannot declare the substance of an act of Parliament invalid.

Most of the peculiarities of the South African legal system stem largely from its attempts to deal with the country's nonwhites, who constitute more than 80 percent of the population, and to maintain a social and political system dominated by whites. A very large body of parliamentary statutes, provincial ordinances, local bylaws, and administrative regulations pertain to the ordering of relations among the officially defined races of South Africa and to the control of the behavior of its population, particularly its nonwhites.

The courts spend much of their time trying cases that result from alleged breaches of these laws. Thus, nearly 45 percent of all criminal prosecutions from July 1967 through June 1968 were for violations of the pass laws, designed to control the movements of Africans, and of laws and regulations of a similar or related sort (see ch. 8, Living Conditions).

Another source of problem and controversy are the laws designed to protect the system and maintain internal security. Several of these
provide for arrest and detention by the police without recourse to the courts. Such laws, as well as other features of the operation of the legal system, have led to charges by the International Commission of Jurists as well as by many bar associations and reputable legal authorities that the rule of law has been largely eroded in South Africa. The South African government has taken exception to claims, but some South African lawyers consider that the government has not responded to the burden of the charges.

In any case, controversy focuses largely on the substance of parliamentary acts and the operations of the executive rather than on the judiciary. Criticism of courts and judges, even by those highly critical of the South African government and social system, has been tempered in the past by statements that the judiciary tends to be competent and fair within the limits of the system, given the strongly entrenched customary as well as legal conceptions of race and race relations and the clearly established doctrine of parliamentary supremacy.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH AFRICAN LAW

In the period of Dutch rule from 1652 to 1806, the common law governing the white colonists came to be the Roman-Dutch law then in force in Holland, the dominant province in the United Republic of the Netherlands and the most important voice in the body exercising control over the Dutch East India Company. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the law of the Cape was constituted by Roman-Dutch common law and by the statutes promulgated by several authorities.

The first of these authorities was the Estates-General of the United Republic of the Netherlands but, except for its regulation of the law of intestate succession, promulgated in 1611 and still effective in modern times, the Estates-General was not a significant source of law for South Africa. A second source was the Council of Seventeen, supreme governing body of the Dutch East India Company. Its most important general action, taken in the late sixteenth century, was to instruct the Indian government in Batavia (Dutch East Indies), center of administration for the Dutch East India Company, to apply the Roman-Dutch law of Holland to its possessions, one of which was to be the Cape.

A more important source of substantive law were those statutes of the states of Holland embodied in the common law of Holland before 1652. Subsequent edicts of the States of Holland became law at the Cape if they were specifically stated to apply there, or if they were plainly of universal application. Statutory rules expressly incorporated in the Roman-Dutch common law of Holland after 1652 were also applied in South Africa.
Statutes and ordinances issued by the governor general and the Council in Batavia were binding in all territories under the control of the Dutch East India Company, including the Cape Colony if conditions permitted. These, in the form of a compilation called “Statutes of India” in the Cape, formed part of the law of the colonists from 1715 when they were formally accepted by the Governor in Council of the Cape until 1806 when the British took over.

In the more than 150 years of Dutch East India Company rule, the Governor in Council at the Cape issued many statutes dealing with a variety of local matters. Only a few of these were still in force by the mid-nineteenth century, however, and none by the mid-twentieth.

When the Cape came under British rule in 1806, no immediate effort was made to replace the Roman-Dutch with English common law, and in 1858 a Commission of Enquiry into the state of the law could assert that Roman-Dutch common law still constituted most of the law in force at the Cape.

Nevertheless, substance and procedure were substantially modified by English principle and practice by the end of the nineteenth century, in part with deliberate intent and through explicit legislation, in part indirectly and gradually. English influence had its greatest impact in mercantile, company, and insolvency law, but the law of evidence and criminal procedure were remodeled on the English system as were other aspects of law, ranging from civil procedure to the laws of inheritance.

Just as Roman-Dutch common law spread from the Cape Colony to the other areas that were to become part of South Africa, so English influence was transmitted to the Transvaal, the Orange Free State, and Natal. The last, settled largely by persons of British origin, was more directly affected by English practice, its judges tending to look to the British courts for guidance. The basic common law of Natal, however, like that of the other territories, was Roman-Dutch.

The republics established by the Voortrekkers (pioneers) in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State in the mid-nineteenth century sought to preserve a system of law grounded in the Old Roman-Dutch texts and explicitly excluded reliance on Netherlands law as it developed after the French Revolution and under the influence of the Napoleonic Code. Nevertheless, as professional lawyers and judges assumed greater importance in the Trekker republics, pleaders and courts came to refer to a wide variety of European sources.

More important for the ultimate unity of the legal system of the Union of South Africa, the courts and lawyers of the Trekker states came to rely heavily on the law developed in the Cape courts, despite the fact that the Boers who had established these states had left the Cape to escape British control. When the Transvaal and the
Orange Free State were annexed by the British after the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902), modified Roman-Dutch law was specified as the law of both. Thereafter, substantial numbers of laws passed in the Cape were taken over (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

With the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910, a slow movement to legal uniformity began. There had been a good deal of similarity in the substantive private law of the four provinces even before union, but there were also differences in detail, and these took some time to resolve. The legislature of the union was, at first, concerned chiefly with the public law and, despite the establishment of a single appellate division of the Supreme Court for the union as a whole, the provincial divisions of the Supreme Court continued to differ on the content or on the interpretation of aspects of private law. It was not until the late 1940's and early 1950's that legislation unified important aspects of private law and eliminated deviant practice in some provinces. When, in 1960, H. R. Hahlo and Ellison Kahn, professors of law at the University of the Witwatersrand, summarized the development of South African law, they noted that common and statute law were generally uniform, although some differences remained.

Until 1910 the institutions and officers engaged in the administration of justice in the units that came to compose the Union of South Africa developed in diverse ways under the varied influence of Roman-Dutch and British law and the exigencies of colonial life. Some of the courts and jurisdictions that emerged in the nineteenth century prevailed into the twentieth and affected the judicial structure of the union, but others gave way before efforts to unite the courts of the country in a single system.

Similarly, legal personnel in the preunion era varied substantially in professional training, qualifications, and the extent to which they could, or in fact did, perform certain legal functions. Thus most of those acting as judges or lawyers in the early days of the Trekker republics were laymen, although they gradually gave way to professionals. It was only toward the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth that the qualifications for various kinds of legal practitioners were clearly set out and that admission to practice was predicated on meeting those qualifications. The specification of qualifications meant, among other things, that the distinction between advocates and attorneys (akin to that between barristers and solicitors in Great Britain), always in effect in principle, became effective in fact.

The African populations encountered by the expanding whites in the late eighteenth and in the nineteenth centuries had developed systems of rules and dispute-settling procedures different in substance, goals, and style from the systems of the pioneer Europeans. There was some variation from tribe to tribe, but each community
or chieftainship dealt with disputes and breach of rules in a patterned way consistent with its own social structure and values.

When the African population gradually came under white rule beginning roughly in the mid-nineteenth century, their indigenous legal systems were dealt with in very different ways. In Cape Colony, for example, they were ignored completely at first. By 1864, however, the Native Succession Law gave limited recognition to one aspect of tribal law. In the Transkei, indigenous law was recognized from the first, and magistrates were authorized to apply either the law of Cape Colony or customary law at their discretion. This discretionary power of magistrates (later native, then Bantu, commissioners) was to characterize the application of local or tribal law in modern South Africa.

In Natal the British administrator, Theophilus Shepstone, proceeded on the assumption that traditional structures were to be maintained or reinforced where they had begun to crumble. From 1843 to 1875, chiefs continued to exercise their judicial powers. The Native Administration Law of 1875 transferred these powers to newly established courts of administrators of native law, which were to continue, however, to apply customary law.

In 1878 the Natal Code of Native Law (commonly called the Natal Code), a compendium of administrative rules and aspects of substantive law, was introduced in Natal. The code gave formal status to aspects of local African law, but it also changed some of it. A good deal of customary law was not in fact included in the Natal code. Such unwritten law was nevertheless applied unless it was contrary to an express provision of the code relevant to the case in hand.

The Trekker republics in the Transvaal made no provision for the recognition of tribal law. For example, polygyny and marriage payments (loboło or bogadi) were considered immoral by the Boers who refused to recognize them; the first marriage law in the Transvaal provided for a valid marriage only between whites. In effect, under the law of the Trekker Republic, Africans could not validly marry. Toward the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, some recognition was accorded the law of Africans living in the Transvaal, but the situation remained uncertain, and the decisions of the courts contributed to the uncertainty.

Whatever the degree of recognition given indigenous legal systems, it was generally marked by an exception or restriction often referred to as the “repugnancy clause.” African law, custom, or usage was to apply in disputes between Africans provided that (in typical language) it was not repugnant to the settled principles or policy of natural equity (or justice). The range of customs considered repugnant varied in time and place. In some instances, specifically where polygyny and bridewealth were considered unacceptable there were
significant modifications in the law of succession and in personal status, for an individual's rights and duties depended on the legitimacy of his mother's relationship to his putative father. This relationship was often put in doubt by disallowing polygyny and particularly bridewealth, the transfer of which legitimised marriage and guaranteed the status of offspring.

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the formal provisions dealing with the application of indigenous law probably affected few Africans directly. Most still lived in more or less traditional style, and administration was concerned chiefly with maintaining order. Most relations concerned with family matters, inheritance, and personal status were carried on without significant reference to white administrators or law. On the other hand, a few Africans were coming to the cities; some had already become Christians, had some education, and were engaged in activities outside the traditional range. As early as 1865, Natal offered to such Africans exemption from the operation of customary law upon application. This was not, however, equivalent to full incorporation of such Africans in white society; they continued to be subject to the same general disabilities as other Africans.

THE SOURCES OF LAW

The rules and principles applied by the courts are found in legislation, case law, custom—of little importance in modern South Africa—and old authorities in Roman-Dutch law. In addition, the special system of dispute-settling institutions that deals with many of the cases in which Africans only are involved, may apply customary law, as that is understood by those in authority.

The major source of law is legislation: a wide range of social, economic, and political relationships is explicitly dealt with by acts of Parliament, provincial ordinances, municipal bylaws, and other subordinate legislation—often in the form of administrative regulations—made by government bodies at all levels. Except for certain aspects of procedure, however, South African law is not systematically codified.

Given the parliamentary supremacy characteristic of the South African state, any conflict between an act of parliament and other legislation, or between such an act and other sources of law, is resolved in favor of the parliamentary act. Some of the legislation is quite old, but most of it dates from the time of union in 1910, and much of the statutory law governing race relations was enacted after 1948, although it had roots in earlier enactments.

A South African court must follow the decision of a superior court in a like case. Moreover, a prior decision of any court has persuasive authority for analogous cases that come before it. A
division of the Supreme Court need not, however, follow the ruling in a similar case of another such division.

In general, precedent is followed, a consequence of the influence of British law and British-trained legal personnel on the South African legal system. Nevertheless, the courts have explicitly given some flexibility to the rule that precedent be followed. A court may ignore or override its own earlier opinion if it considers that opinion to have been mistaken.

It is still possible to find in arguments before any division of the Supreme Court references to old authorities on Roman-Dutch law, and such sources may occasionally provide the basis for a decision of a court. Compilations of rules and opinions made by Dutch jurists and records of decision of the High Court of Holland—all made in the eighteenth century or earlier—may be cited. A variety of other commentaries on Roman law have also been used. Often, however, the old sources have been found to be in conflict or inappropriate to modern conditions—for example, in financial matters—and they have been ignored.

The old sources have remained symbolically significant because they are considered part of the heritage of the Afrikaner majority of the white population. For some, indeed, reliance on Roman-Dutch law and the elimination wherever possible of the "impurities" introduced by the influence of British law were part of the Afrikaner struggle for nationhood. Since the Afrikaner-based Nationalist Party achieved political dominance and Afrikaners began to enter the higher reaches of the economic system, however, the symbolic significance of the old sources has diminished.

COURTS, THE JUDICIARY, AND OFFICERS OF THE LAW

With the creation of the Union in 1910, the existing supreme courts were loosely unified as provincial divisions of the Supreme Court of South Africa under an appellate division. Courts of specific areas (for example, the High Court of Griqualand West and the High Court of Witwatersrand) became local divisions. This set of courts and certain specialized courts constitute the superior courts of the Republic. Under them are the inferior courts—those of district and regional magistrates.

Modifications in structure, procedure, and administration have been made from time to time. The most recent modifications and a consolidated version of earlier changes were incorporated in the Supreme Court Act, No. 59 of 1959. The Constitution Act of 1961, establishing the republic, refers to this act as the basic instrument governing the judiciary. Other than that, the Constitution Act simply notes (section 94) that the judicial authority of the Republic shall be vested in the Supreme Court of South Africa and that,
except as otherwise provided in the Supreme Court Act, the seat of the Appellate Division shall be at Bloemfontein in the Orange Free State. This confirms a pattern established in 1910. Section 95 of the Constitution Act states that "All administrative powers, functions, and duties affecting the administration of justice shall be under the control of the Minister of Justice."

The Courts

Until 1950 the Privy Council was, in principle, the apex of the appeal hierarchy, although appeals to it could be made only by its leave, and the Parliament of the Union could limit the right to appeal. The number and range of appeals to the council were, in fact, quite small.

After 1950 the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court became the final court of appeal for South Africa (and South West Africa). The provincial divisions have both original and appellate jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters. To the four original provincial divisions (Cape, Natal, Orange Free State, and Transvaal), has been added the Eastern Cape Division, thereby limiting the Cape Provincial Division to jurisdiction in the Western Cape. The local divisions (Witwatersrand, Durban and Coast, and Griqualand West) are direct descendants of courts that, having been established to meet a special need in the nineteenth century, survive because they continue to meet such a need in the twentieth. Except for Griqualand West Local Division, they are courts of original jurisdiction in densely populated and highly industrialized areas. Griqualand West has concurrent original and appeals jurisdiction with the Cape Provincial Division and acts as a circuit court in a relatively remote area.

In addition to the Supreme Court, comprising the appellate, provincial, and local divisions, there are several specialized superior courts—water courts, special courts for income tax appeals, the court of the commissioner of patents, and others that may be established by statute—which deal with specific problems. Special criminal courts are constituted ad hoc by the state president on the recommendation of the attorney general to try cases in which the issue is treason, sedition, public violence, advocacy of communism, and similar matters. Such a court is constituted by two or three Supreme Court judges who need not be appointed from the same provincial division.

Two forms of inferior courts—district and regional magistrates' courts—are significant for the number and range of cases they deal with. The Republic is divided into magisterial districts that constitute both administrative and judicial units. The number and boundaries of these vary with economic development and population growth; in the late 1960's there were roughly 300 such dis-
districts. The district court—commonly called the magistrate's court—has original jurisdiction in civil matters involving a money value of R400 (1 rand equals US$1.40), although there are some exceptions. A district magistrate's court may try all criminal offenses except those—murder, treason, and rape—that may entail capital punishment. Certain other offenses defined by such statutes as the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, the General Law Amendment Act of 1962 (dealing with sabotage), and the Terrorism Act of 1967 have been assimilated, for purposes of punishment, to treason.

Because the district magistrate’s court had limited powers of punishment and a heavy burden of criminal cases was thus falling on the provincial and local divisions, regional magistrates' courts were established in 1952 and given greater powers of punishment. These courts have only criminal jurisdiction.

**Appeals**

If a criminal matter originates in a superior court, the accused may appeal to the Appellate Division directly on the merits, that is, with respect to the facts of the case as well as questions pertaining to the substantive law and on procedural and other technical grounds. Application for leave to appeal must, however, be granted by the court of original jurisdiction or, should it refuse, by the chief justice. Leave to appeal is to be granted if there is a “reasonable prospect of success on appeal.”

The prosecution cannot appeal from a superior court to the Appellate Division, but the minister of justice may submit a question of criminal law to it for decision if he considers that a decision on that question by a lower court may be in error. The Appellate Division’s decision will be used for future guidance.

Ordinarily, three members of the Appellate Division hear appeals in criminal cases, but appeals from special criminal courts are heard by five judges, and the chief justice may interrupt an appeal hearing by three and convene a larger court if he considers that the issue is more complex or important than it was originally thought to be.

In civil cases, appeals on most matters go directly from the superior court of original jurisdiction to the Appellate Division. In a few instances, appeals may be made from the decision of a single judge of a provincial division to the full court of that division, but this step may be skipped if the parties agree and if the court of original jurisdiction gives leave to go directly to the Appellate Division. Civil appeals are heard by five members of the court.

Appeals from a district or regional magistrate's court go to the appropriate provincial division where they are usually heard by two judges. The accused may appeal as a matter or right on questions of fact, law, or procedure. The attorney general (prosecuting officer)
may appeal only on a question of law or when the charge has been dismissed.

In addition, a provincial division automatically reviews cases in which a sentence or fine imposed by a district magistrate's court exceeds a specified limit or where the division, acting as appeal court, has been given reason to believe that proceedings in the magistrate's court did not meet standards of justice. Such reviews of cases tried before regional magistrates were eliminated in 1955, apparently because of the very heavy burden they entailed for the superior courts.

**Juries**

The Abolition of Juries Act of 1969 repealed laws providing for trial by jury in criminal cases under specified circumstances. Juries in civil cases were abolished in the Cape and in Natal as long ago as 1927; they had never been possible in the other provinces. The role of juries in criminal trials had been diminishing in importance for several decades up to the enactment of the Abolition of Juries Act. Beginning in 1954, the accused was tried without jury unless he specifically asked for one, and in certain kinds of cases—such as those involving illicit dealing in precious minerals or supplying liquor to nonwhites—the minister of justice could order a nonjury trial. A nonjury trial could also be ordered by the minister if the victim or the accused was white and the other party nonwhite. Moreover, trials before special criminal courts (for treason, riotous assembly, and acts considered of a related kind) were held before two or three specially chosen judges and without a jury.

Until 1954 in practice and after 1954 in law, juries were composed of white males only. Juries of men and women had never been permitted, and in the rare case where the accused was permitted to ask for a jury of women, there were not enough women on the jury list to constitute a jury of nine. In addition, a fairly large number of men were exempted from jury service because of the positions they held, and these were often men of substantial education and experience. Ellison Kahn, Professor of Law at Witwatersrand, summing up the situation in 1960, noted that "at no time... has the jury been a true microcosm of the various elements of civilized society."

In part because of the typical constitution of juries in criminal trials, counsels for the defense were generally reluctant to advocate trial by jury, even when this was possible, unless they were certain that the accused had the sympathy of the public. Given the all-white composition of juries, defense counsel for nonwhites rarely chose to have jury trial even if the victim was also nonwhite or if the violation did not involve a victim. Indeed, judges in both courts of original jurisdiction and in the Appellate Division had, from time
to time, condemned the behavior of juries. The law eliminating juries in trials of interracial crimes was, in part, a response to that behavior.

Both before and since the Abolition of Juries Act of 1969, a judge could appoint one or two persons to sit as assessors. These must have either legal experience, or expertise in the matter before the court. Assessors have a voice in the decision, and if they dissent from the judge's decision must, personally or through the judge, justify their dissent. In a court of a judge and two assessors, majority votes have occurred, and both assessors may outvote the judge. Assessors may sit in both superior and inferior courts but are rarely employed in the latter.

Judges and Lawyers

Judges are appointed by the state president on the recommendation of the minister of justice, who usually consults the senior judges of the provincial division to which the judge is to be appointed. According to the Supreme Court Act of 1959, a judge need be only a "fit and proper person." In fact, most appointments are made from the ranks of the senior advocates, usually from those in private practice. Occasionally, however, a government law adviser is appointed, an event generally criticized by the members of the bar. Appointments to the Appellate Division must be made from the ranks of judges—the usual practice—or from former judges, which is rarely done.

The chief justice of the Appellate Division is generally appointed from the ranks of other judges of appeal. The judge-president of a provincial division is ordinarily appointed from the ranks of ordinary (puisne) judges of the division with preference going to the senior puisne judge, but there have been exceptions. The judges of provincial and local divisions are often chosen from local advocates, but there has been an increasing tendency to go outside the area of jurisdiction of a division to appoint judges.

Although many South Africans believe that a prospective judge's political and social views affect his chances of being appointed, there is no clear evidence that this is the case. On the other hand, advocates of substantial legal reputation but pronounced liberal views have rarely been appointed since the Nationalist Party took office in 1948.

If political and social outlook are not explicitly considered in judicial appointments, ethnic affiliation is. In 1960 the minister of justice, speaking in Parliament said: "we should try as far as possible to keep . . . the Afrikaans-speaking and the English-speaking on an equal basis; in other words, you must be watchful so that the proportion is maintained, and I accuse the previous government that they did not keep watch." In effect, an Afrikaans-speaking
advocate has a better chance of appointment to the judiciary if an
equal balance is maintained since there are many more English-
speaking advocates than Afrikaners despite the numerical predomi-
nance of the latter in the population as a whole.

Notwithstanding the overtones of political and ethnic considera-
tions in the choice of judges of the superior courts and the conditions
of absolute parliamentary supremacy under which they must func-
tion, many observers otherwise critical of South African society and
politics, and even of aspects of the court system, have commented on
the integrity and adherence to professional ethics of most South
African judges regardless of their political preferences. On the other
hand, some South African and other lawyers have suggested that
many judges do not provide an interpretation of the law favorable
to the protection of individual liberties even to the extent that the
wording of the law permits them to offer such an interpretation.

Magistrates (in Afrikaans, *landros*) are, except in larger towns,
both administrative and judicial officers. In more densely settled
urban areas, some of them are engaged exclusively in judicial work,
and regional magistrates are always so engaged.

Although magistrates may be appointed from among persons in
private practice, they are almost always appointed from the public
service, apparently because neither the remuneration nor the presti-

gue targets practicing lawyers. Since 1957, they have been con-
sidered a part of the professional (in contrast to the administrative),
division of the public service.

The minimum qualification for appointment to the magistracy is
the passing of the Public Service Law Examination, conducted by
the universities. Preference in appointment may be given to those
with higher qualifications. A regional magistrate must have passed
the Public Service Higher Law Examination or hold an LL.B. (law)
degree granted by a South African university. He is also required to
have ten years of experience as a district magistrate before appoint-
ment.

Most magistrates before 1960 had met only the minimum require-
ments for appointment and had only a rudimentary knowledge of
the civil law at the time of their appointment, despite the fact that
most civil cases come before the magistrates' courts. Of criminal
matters they generally had a broader knowledge, although it was
usually from the perspective of the public prosecutor in which ca-
pacity many of them had worked. In 1960 the Department of
Justice established scholarships for full-time university study for
magistrates, a program that may diminish lawyers' criticisms of the
magistracy. As of early 1970, however, the results of the program
had not been established.

In addition to judges and magistrates, there is the usual variety of
court officials and administrative officers who have quasi-judicial
functions. Such, for example, are the registrars of deeds, patents, companies, and the like whose decisions may be appealed to a division of the Supreme Court.

The state employs a variety of legal personnel, members of the Public Service, who undertake legal tasks on its behalf. The most important are the attorneys general, the state attorney, and the law advisers. The attorney general of each province and his staff are, in practice, responsible for all prosecutions, although the minister of justice has ultimate authority. The state attorney and his professional assistants do the state's legal work. The senior and other law advisers are advocates who advise the government on matters ranging from the drafting of legislation to the confirmation or commutation of death sentences. They may also appear for the state in court in some civil matters.

Lawyers are either advocates, who make up the bar, or attorneys, who constitute what is called the sidebar. The distinction corresponds to that between barristers and solicitors in Great Britain. An advocate appears for clients in court, draws and settles pleadings (written arguments for plaintiff and defendant), and gives legal opinions, all on the instructions of an attorney. An attorney acts on behalf of clients in legal matters; he may appear for his client in magistrates' courts but cannot argue a case before a division of the Supreme Court. Attorneys are also often conveyancers and notaries, but they must pass examinations in order to practice as such. In the early 1960's there were many more practicing attorneys (about 3,000) than advocates (about 400).

An advocate is admitted to practice in a provincial division, with automatic right to practice before another on application, if he has a postgraduate LL.B. degree from a university in the Republic or an appropriate law degree from a foreign university, rare in recent years. For graduates in law from South African universities no further examination is required. Practical training is acquired after admission to the bar. An attorney is admitted to practice through a varying combination of academic and practical qualifications. For example, an applicant may be admitted if he has an approved undergraduate degree, has passed certain examinations and has served for two years as a clerk to an attorney who provides him with instruction. More often, aspirants serve for five years and study part time for a minimum university diploma or certificate in law.

Procedure

In magistrates' courts where most civil suits are dealt with, cases are argued orally. In the divisions of the Supreme Court, this is also the case unless there is no real dispute about the facts; in the absence of such dispute, the suit may be dealt with by application.
That is, the parties submit affidavits and petition for a ruling. The growing importance of this procedure is the result of the desire to avoid the long and costly process of oral proceedings in court.

Criminal procedure and the rules of evidence in criminal cases have long followed the English pattern with important exceptions. These matters were first systematically codified in the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act of 1917 and renacted with some revisions in the Criminal Procedure Act of 1955 as amended.

Criminal cases may be brought before any one of several levels of courts. Most are in fact heard before the district or regional magistrates’ courts. In the case of those to be brought before a superior court, a preparatory examination (preliminary hearing), is held before a district magistrate for the purpose of discovering the case for the prosecution to the defense and to the judge who may have to act in behalf of a defendant should he lack counsel. If, on preliminary examination, the case seems fairly simple, and if it is considered that the district magistrate’s powers of punishment are adequate to the offense, the preliminary hearing may be converted into a summary trial before the magistrate. Conversely, a case initially brought before a district magistrate for summary trial may be converted into a preparatory examination or sent to a regional magistrate with wider powers.

Ordinarily, the judge or magistrate conducts a trial in which the issues are raised and witnesses examined by counsel for the prosecution and the defense. It is permissible, however, for a South African judge or magistrate to call witnesses and ask questions, within certain limits. This is particularly the case when the defense lacks counsel, a frequent occurrence in the magistrates’ courts.

The defense is entitled to counsel, but it is not mandatory that it be provided for him. In trials for crimes for which the death sentence must or may be given, pro deo (for the sake of God, charitable) counsel must be provided for indigent defendant at the request of the judge. Pro deo advocates have usually been junior members of the bar. Counsel in other cases is provided either by private organizations or under the Legal Aid Act of 1969, by counsel selected by the newly established Legal Aid Board staffed by government personnel, and by persons appointed or confirmed by the minister of justice. Given the recency of its establishment, the performance of the new board cannot be evaluated.

In principle, the accused in a criminal case must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In most ordinary crimes, the principle seems to prevail. A number of statutes, however, apparently put the onus of proving his innocence on the accused. Thus the Terrorism Act of 1967 punishes any act committed “with intent to endanger the maintenance of law and order.” One such act would be that which was likely to obstruct traffic. It is incumbent upon the ac-
cused to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not intend to obstruct traffic. The Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1953 states that an offense is presumed to have been committed by way of protest (punishable by up to five years imprisonment and whipping) if the accused acted at the same time and place and in company with two or more persons charged with the same offense.

The General Law Amendment Act (commonly called the Sabotage Act), of 1962 makes punishable (minimum sentence, five years; hanging permissable), a number of acts ranging from endangering public health to obstructing traffic if such acts have any of ten listed effects, including “to cause or promote general dislocation, disturbance or disorder; to further or encourage the achievement of any political aim, including the bringing about of any social or economic change in the Republic; and to embarrass the administration of the affairs of the State.” In order to escape a verdict of guilty, the accused must prove “that the commission of the alleged offense, objectively regarded, was not calculated and that such offense was not committed with intent to produce” any of the listed effects.

Punishment

Although the range of discretion of judges in imposing sentences is limited, there is some flexibility in that the law defining some crimes sets out a permissible range of penalties, often, however, with a provision for a minimum mandatory sentence. Periodical imprisonment—which permits the convicted person to earn a living and have access to his family—may be the penalty for less serious crimes. In other cases, the sentence may be to imprisonment for training (from two to four years), on the assumption that the convicted person is capable of rehabilitation. On the whole, however, the scale and range of punishments for crime in South Africa seems to be based on a philosophy of deterrence and retribution rather than one of rehabilitation.

The clearest and most explicit instance of the principle of deterrence, if not of retribution, is the widely used penalty of whipping. Another is the range of offenses for which the death penalty may be given. The Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act of 1917 made the death penalty mandatory for murder and permissible for rape and treason. It was not mandatory, however, for a woman who killed her newborn child or for a convicted murderer under sixteen years of age (raised in 1959 to eighteen). The mandatory sentence for murder led to the reprieve of more than 75 percent of those convicted for murder between 1917 and 1935. In 1935, therefore, the concept of extenuating circumstances was introduced giving a judge who found extenuating circumstances the discretion of im-
posing a sentence other than death. The introduction of this concept has led to a substantial reduction of the number of persons sentenced to death for murder. On the other hand, death as a permissible penalty has been extended to a number of offenses other than those originally defined in the act of 1917.

Among the offenses for which death was subsequently made a permissible penalty were (in 1958) robbery or attempted robbery, housebreaking or attempted housebreaking in which aggravating circumstances were found to be present, and (in 1965) child-stealing and kidnapping. Aggravating circumstances were defined in slightly different terms for robbery and housebreaking, but the burden of the definitions is that such circumstances will be found to occur when assault or grievous bodily harm occurs or is threatened before, during, or after the offense itself. The justification for the extension of the death penalty was explicitly stated by the then minister of justice who noted the increase in the number of robberies and attributed them to well-organized, reckless, and murderous gangs that could be deterred only by the prospect of the death penalty.

The other crimes for which a sentence of death may be given have largely to do with internal security. The Suppression of Communism Act of 1950 makes undergoing any training that could be of use in furthering the aims of any banned organization punishable by hanging unless the accused can prove he had no such intent. Other offenses under this act are, however, not subject to the death penalty. The General Law Amendment Act of 1962 lists a number of offenses for which the death penalty may be given. The Terrorism Act of 1967 makes any act “with intent to endanger the maintenance of law and order in the Republic” punishable by hanging. The act, may on the face of it, be a legal one, but the burden of proof of intent rests with the accused.

In 1969, B. van Niekerk, of the Department of Law at Witwatersrand University, released a study in which he said that South Africa accounted for about 47 percent of the known total of executions imposed as judicial penalties. The issue of capital punishment has been raised by the press and various specialists from time to time, but there is little support, either in the Parliament or among many other specialists, for its abolition.

Van Niekerk and others have also noted that there is a racial pattern in the distribution of capital punishment. Whether for the more traditional crimes of murder and rape or for offenses under the security laws, Africans or other nonwhites are more likely to be executed for a given offense than whites. Specifically, nonwhites guilty of the murder or rape of whites are more likely to receive the death penalty than whites guilty of the same crimes against nonwhites. On the other hand, if the crime is intraracial rather than interracial, whites often receive the heavier penalty; in the case of
murder, extenuating circumstances are found or the charge is changed to culpable homicide, apparently on the assumption that violent and disorderly behavior are common among nonwhites.

CUSTOMARY LAW AND THE COURTS

Not until 1927 was an effort made to unify policy with respect to customary law and its application. The Native Administration Act of that year provided for the establishment of special courts that would have the discretion to apply customary law in disputes between Africans. Until the early 1960's, the term native was applied to these courts; it was replaced by Bantu in 1964.

Since 1927, four types of courts have existed to deal with disputes between Africans: chiefs' courts, Bantu commissioners' courts, Bantu appeals courts, and Bantu divorce courts. Chiefs' courts may settle civil disputes between Africans and many also try Africans for infractions of local African criminal law. They are not, however, courts of record, and Bantu commissioners' courts that hear appeals from Chiefs' courts in effect retry each case, hearing and recording all the evidence. Appeals then lie to a Bantu Appeals court and its decision is final. It may, however, grant leave for appeal to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court; the minister for Bantu administration and development may also bring a case before the Appellate Division if he thinks that a decision of a Bantu appeals court may be in error. Appeals from the decisions of Bantu divorce courts may be brought before a provincial or local division of the Supreme Court. In principle, cases of the sort brought before the Bantu divorce courts may be heard in the first instance by provincial or local divisions, but the government prefers that Africans use the Bantu courts.

The Native Administration Act empowered the governor general (later, the state President), to appoint or recognize headmen and chiefs and to grant them judicial powers. The state president is also authorized to appoint Bantu commissioners from those members of the public service who have passed the civil service law examination, roughly equivalent to that required of attorneys. In the reserves where Africans predominate, a Bantu commissioner may also be appointed magistrate for the district; conversely in rural areas in the white zone, a magistrate may also be a Bantu commissioner. In urban areas, Bantu commissioners hold that office exclusively. Each of the Bantu appeals courts consists of three members: one, the presiding judge, is permanent and is usually appointed from the ranks of senior Bantu commissioners; the other two are also Bantu commissioners, and one may have an essentially permanent appointment, although this varies with the press of work.

The system of Bantu courts staffed by whites was based on the
assumption that Bantu commissioners would have a knowledge of African law. There was, however, no requirement that those appointed to the post know an African language or be systematically instructed in customary law. Some acquire such specialized knowledge; others used the assessors permitted them and took evidence to determine the relevant customary law. In general, however, most Bantu commissioners relied on their own conceptions of local law, and there is some evidence that the reliance was misplaced.

The Native Administration Act, which granted the courts dealing with disputes between Africans the right to exercise discretion as to the application of local African law rather than general South African law, raised a number of problems, in part because the act offered no guidelines for choice. Some courts acted on the assumption that the act establishing them was the outcome of a policy decision to emphasize legal segregation and that they were to stress local African law unless it proved to be clearly inapplicable. Others stressed the primacy of general (common) law, arguing that customary law be applied only if clearly appropriate. Finally, it was possible for a Bantu commissioner's court to use his discretion without reference to any principle.

The Appellate Division has occasionally given some guidance when a case on appeal has provided it an opportunity, and the Bantu appeal courts have developed some principles to guide the Bantu commissioners' courts in a limited range of cases, but the situation remained uncertain. The principle that local African law be applied except where clearly inappropriate seems to be compatible with apartheid doctrine generally, and the application of African law has been made mandatory rather than discretionary in the Transkei, the only fully established Bantustan in the Republic as of early 1970.

The general effect of the principle of discretion has been the development of customary law in the Bantu courts, as members of the courts have, over the years, modified that law by reference to general South African law. Various authorities have recognized that changing circumstances required change in the substantive law applicable to Africans. The process has been haphazard, however, and the Africans to whom the law applies have had nothing to do with it. It has been the prerogative of the white commissioners.

THE JUDICIARY, APARTEID, AND THE RULE OF LAW

Beginning in the 1950's, but reaching a peak in the 1960's, South Africans and others have lodged a series of criticisms concerning what has been called the erosion of the rule of law in South Africa. The government, in response to some of these criticisms, published a monograph, *South Africa and the Rule of Law*, in which it claimed that the rule of law was fully operative in South Africa.
For some critics, the alleged erosion is directly linked to the system of race relations in the country in the sense that nonwhites are subject to a range of regulations and orders for which they have no legal redress. For others, the erosion is at least in part attributable to assumptions in the courts, by the judiciary and by others that informally but nonetheless effectively limit the rights of nonwhites in the courts. For most critics the major issue has to do with the operations of the police and other security forces under statutes that effectively preclude recourse to the courts. In this context, the power of the judiciary in the South African system comes into question.

In principle and practice, the courts have no power to measure the substance of acts of Parliament against a standard and declare them invalid. The national Parliament’s supremacy is absolute (see ch. 13, The Governmental System). The courts may, however, review the ordinances, bylaws, and regulations of subsidiary governmental bodies, agencies, or officials to determine whether they are expressly or implicitly granted to such subsidiary organs by acts of Parliament. They also have the power and the duty to interpret acts of Parliament insofar as these are not unambiguous with respect to intent and implications.

The courts have, however, exercised a limited power of review with respect to certain sections—the entrenched clauses—of the South Africa Act of 1909. The power of review was limited to the question of the validity of the procedures followed by the Parliament in altering or repealing the entrenched clauses. The question of the substance of the change was presumable not at issue. According to the South Africa Act, an entrenched clause, of which there were several, was to be repealed or altered only if the bill embodying the change was passed at the third reading by two-thirds of the total membership of both houses of Parliament sitting together.

With the coming into effect of the Statute of Westminster in 1931, the Parliament of the Union of South Africa became independent of any residual control by the Parliament of the United Kingdom (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). The supremacy of the Union Parliament was then seen as unequivocal and by the late 1930’s, the status of the entrenched clauses had been called into question by some courts and academic writers.

The issue was not clearly joined, however, until 1951 when an effort was made to repeal two putatively entrenched clauses—sections 35 (1) and 35 (2)—of the South Africa Act. Essentially, the two sections provided that anyone registered to vote or, by the law then in force, having the right to register, could not be deprived of that right for reasons of race or color alone. These sections had specific application in the Cape Province where numbers of nonwhites meeting certain specifications had long been entitled to vote.
on a common roll with whites. Some nonwhites in Natal also had a right to vote.

The Separate Representation of Voters Act of 1951 was enacted by the Parliament following the usual procedures for ordinary legislation. The act provided for two voters lists instead of one in the Cape Province. One list was to contain the names of all nonwhite voters already registered and of those who would thereafter meet the specifications for exercising the franchise. A second was to contain the names of white voters. Nonwhite voters in Cape Province were to elect four representatives to the lower house of the Parliament and two provincial councillors. Nonwhite voters in Natal were to remain on the common roll, but no new names were to be added to the 2,000 or so persons then registered.

When the act was challenged by some Cape Province nonwhites, it was permitted to stand by the first court. The Appellate Division, however, decided that the act had come into direct conflict with sections 35 (1) and 35 (2) and that these were entrenched and could be repealed or altered only by special procedures.

The government, unable to achieve a two-thirds majority, sought to circumvent the courts by the High Court of Parliament Act, Number 35 of 1952. That act provided that any act of Parliament declared invalid by the Appellate Division was to be brought by a minister to the High Court of Parliament for review. The High Court was to be constituted by the members of Parliament, although the appeal was first to be heard by a judicial committee thereof. The opposition refused to participate and the High Court overruled the Appellate Division's decision in the separate registration of voters case. The Appellate Division then declared the High Court of Parliament Act invalid, indicating that the High Court was essentially Parliament itself and that the entrenched clauses did not therefore receive the protection of an independent court.

After the Nationalist Party was returned to power in the 1953 elections, it sought and twice failed, in 1953 and 1954, to pass a separation of voters bill by the requisite two-thirds majority. In 1955, the government took an entirely new approach. It first passed the Appellate Division Quorum Act requiring eleven judges to sit when the Appellate Division heard final appeal on the validity of an act. It then passed the Senate Act of 1955, increasing substantially the number of members in the upper house, changing the method of election of its elected members and dissolving the existing Senate at the end of 1955.

Given the changes in the new Senate, the government had its two-thirds majority and successfully enacted the South Africa Act Amendment Act in 1956 by the entrenched procedure. That act made valid the Separate Representation of Voters Act of 1951 and limited the entrenched clauses to two, excluding Section 35 on
voting: Section 137, which made English and Dutch (later replaced by Afrikaans) the two equal official languages and Section 152, which is the entrenchment clause itself. The amendment explicitly stated that “No court of law shall be competent to enquire into or pronounce upon the validity of any law passed by Parliament other than a law which alters or repeals or purports to alter or repeal the provisions of section 137 or 152 of the South Africa Act, 1909.”

These events effectively resolved uncertainties about the review powers of the courts with respect to parliamentary acts, and the outcome was confirmed in the constitution that proclaimed South Africa a republic in 1961. Section 59 (2) repeated the wording of the South Africa Act Amendment Act of 1956 explicitly forbidding the courts to question the validity of an act of Parliament except for two entrenched clauses. In the Constitution, these were sections 108 on official languages and 118 specifying the procedures for changing both sections.

Given the fact of parliamentary supremacy, and particularly the losing struggle to maintain the remnants of judicial review, the courts since the mid-1950’s have generally been reluctant to engage in further battles. According to some South African lawyers, few judges are willing to interpret a parliamentary act against the general grain of political and racial policy even when the wording of the act might permit such interpretation. Certainly the courts would not now question the Native Administration Act of 1927 as amended, the Groups Areas Act of 1950, as amended, and other acts which give the executive sweeping powers to make rules for Africans in the reserves and to move Africans and others from place to place outside the reserves.

In any case, the Parliament precluded such review in the Notices (Prohibition of Interdicts) Act of 1956, which stated that, in the event of an order for the removal or ejectment of an African or of his arrest or detention for the purpose of ejectment or removal, “no interdict or other legal process shall issue for the stay or suspension of such order . . . ; and no appeal against or review proceedings in respect of, of such order or any conviction or finding upon which such order is based, shall have the effect of staying or suspending the execution of such order . . . .”

In general, however, reference to the erosion of the rule of law has focussed not on the alleged shortcomings of the courts, but on the statutes and executive practices that have had the effect of limiting the degree of protection that the courts can afford to the liberties of the individual. The South African government in responding to criticism stated: “The rule of law may even mean different things to different people, but there is general agreement that it requires that a person on trial be accused in open court; be given an opportunity of denying the charge and of defending himself and
that he be given the choice of a counsel. These rights are at all times assured by the South African courts, also in the case of persons charged under the Terrorism Act."

These rights are generally accorded persons on trial, even according to some of the critics. The usual conceptions of the rule of law, accepted by those in the legal profession in South Africa and elsewhere, go further, however; and to the criticisms on other counts, the government offered no response. The central proposition of the concept of the rule of law is that no person should be detained or punished without trial in open court and without an opportunity of denying the charge and defending himself.

Under the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, the minister of justice, if he is satisfied that any person advocates, advises, defends, or encourages the achievement of any of the objects of communism (very broadly defined), may impose on that person a banning order severely restricting where that person may live and work, whom he may see, social and other functions that he may attend, and the like. There is no time limit for such a ban, but it is usually imposed for five years and it may be reimposed. Such a banning order can be imposed without trial before a court or any other tribunal. There is no formal charge and the banning or its particulars cannot be challenged in the courts, unless it can be proved that the minister acted in bad faith, failed to apply his mind to the matter, or did not observe certain formalities. The minister may be required to set out in writing the reasons for the banning order and the information on which it was based, but he can refuse to do so if, in his opinion, such disclosure would be detrimental to public policy. The Natal Provincial Division, sitting as a full court, has held that the minister of justice was in fact prohibited from giving such information if, in his opinion, it might be detrimental to public policy and that he need not give reasons if to do so would involve disclosure of information.

The General Law Amendment Act of 1963 introduced the ninety-day clause, withdrawn in 1965, but subject to reimposition by the state president's proclamation. Under this law, any commissioned police officer may arrest any person suspected, on reasonable grounds, of having committed, having intended to commit, or intending to commit certain offenses against the security of the state. This may be done without a warrant. A commissioned officer may also arrest any person, who in his opinion, has information relevant to the commission or intention to commit such offenses. Such persons may be detained for interrogation at a place chosen by the police until they have, in the opinion of the commissioner of police, satisfactorily answered all questions. The law specifies a ninety-day limit for such detention, but the Appellate Division has interpreted certain phrases in the statute to mean that a person so detained may be rearrested. Of 1,095 persons arrested between
1963 and 1965, 134 were kept for more than ninety days and thirteen for 180 days or more. Only 575 were actually charged with specific violations, however, and more than 200 of these were acquitted.

A person under detention may not be visited by any person without the permission of the minister of justice or a commissioned police officer. He has difficulty, therefore in obtaining legal assistance. On the other hand, he must be visited by a magistrate once a week, but the magistrate need not report to any higher authority.

Act Number 96 of 1965 inserts into the Criminal Procedure Act of 1955 a provision that permits the attorney general to detain state witnesses to certain offenses in order to protect them from murder, intimidation, or injury, or to prevent them from absconding. The act, however, also authorizes the attorney general to issue a warrant for the arrest and detention of any person when he considers it “in the interest of such person or the administration of justice.”

Under these provisions, suspects as well as potential witnesses have been detained. The detained person may be released on the order of the attorney general, or on the day on which the criminal proceedings concerned are terminated, or after a period of six months, whichever is shorter. The act also provides that no person, other than an official in the performance of his duties, shall have access to the detained person except with the consent of the attorney general or his delegate and under conditions prescribed by them. Moreover, no court shall have jurisdiction to order the release of a person so detained or to question the validity of any regulation made by the minister of justice relating to detention, or to question the attorney general’s discretion as to the persons allowed access to the detainee. The detainee may write to the minister of justice concerning his detention and release, and he may, but need not be, visited in private by a magistrate every two weeks.

The Terrorism Act of 1967 also provides for the detention and interrogation of those suspected of terrorist activities. None but the minister of justice or officials in performance of duty may have access to the detainee, and his release is at the discretion of the commissioner of police. No court may question the validity of any action taken under the section authorizing detention, nor may it order the release of a detainee.

The law of South Africa has not contained the principle of *habeus corpus*, but it has developed a doctrine which gives persons very similar protections. These protections in connection with accusations of ordinary crimes, but the Parliament has largely abrogated them in matters of state security. Arthur Suzman, a leading South African advocate, notes that in such circumstances a person may be detained, in some cases indefinitely, without formal charge, without an opportunity of confronting his accusers and denying their accusations, without formal trial, and without redress in the courts.
CHAPTER 15
POLITICAL DYNAMICS

Political activity takes place on at least two levels, reflecting the stratification of the country into the dominant white and the subordinate nonwhite groups. At one level political interaction occurs solely between divisions of the white community, generally that between the Afrikaners and the English speakers but also along the lines that divide the more and the less conservative elements within that society. At the other level political interaction occurs between the whites as a whole and the three disenfranchised nonwhite groups who make up more than 80 percent of the country's population.

Formal political power is legally concentrated in the hands of the white minority. Within this group power is exercised in the form of a parliamentary democracy on the English model. All white adults are enfranchised and, within certain limits, are free to express political opinions, to organize politically, and to elect any of their numbers to Parliament, formally the supreme source of governmental power (see ch. 13, The Governmental System). At least three political parties, the ruling Nationalist Party, the opposition United Party, and the small Progressive Party, have had a well established existence. Usually at least one other party has emerged ad hoc to contest major elections.

The limits on political freedom are of two kinds. First, one strongly united group, often without the support of the majority of the voters, has managed to retain control of Parliament since 1948, and by early 1970 that group appeared to have such a strong hold on the majority of parliamentary seats as to preclude a change in government. Second, and much more important, political action was permissible only within certain bounds since many forms of political expression were illegal and others, including peaceful ones by whites, were strongly discouraged.

Expression of political opinion by nonwhites was effectively prevented by a number of laws and by the activities of the police acting in accordance with parliamentary statutes (see ch. 14, The Legal System; ch. 26, Public Order and Internal Security). By early 1970 the creation of new and the continued existence of all multiracial political organizations and almost all other organizations with a multiracial membership had been forbidden by law.
The powers given the police to enforce racial and political restrictions could be applied without reference to the courts. These powers permitted the government to imprison or ban anyone without stating a reason to a tribunal of any kind or to Parliament. The government remained ultimately responsible to the electorate for the application of these laws, but the support for such laws by a majority of the limited electorate allowed the government to function without fear of effective challenge.

This impunity was based upon the political values of the white community that were centered upon retention of its dominant economic, political, and social position (see ch. 18, Political Values and Attitudes). All steps to preserve white domination were supported by a majority of the electorate. The government's position was further strengthened by its control or the control of its supporters over the major means of public information and education (see ch. 17, Public Information; ch. 9, Education).

Organizations with a white membership did exist for the purpose of informing and influencing the population on issues of political significance. The Nationalist Party controlling the government sought increasingly to restrict political activity to the parliamentary context, that is, to the three or four parties that may contest parliamentary elections. The Nationalists have indicated that they would prefer to see the disappearance of those organizations, however peaceful, that seek to exert influence for social and political change outside the party system or electoral process.

Although South African politics have always been dominated by the issue of white-black relations, the issue was one for debate only between the two segments of the white population until 1950. Even with limited representation of a small number of Coloured and African voters in Parliament, no weight was given in government decisionmaking to nonwhite opinions. These, in fact, have had no effective political voice since the final defeat of the last of the independent African tribes in the 1890's.

Political debates on nonwhite problems were always paternalistically conducted by those whites who saw themselves as able to represent the needs, but not necessarily the desires, of the nonwhite communities. African political opinion only began to be effectively mobilized, even in the urban areas, in the 1950's, and even then the degree of white involvement in the leadership of nonwhite movements was itself viewed as paternalistic by a major portion of the African leadership.

Although the nonwhite political movements of the 1950's were able to affect few, if any, changes they did provide the nonwhites with a political voice for the first time. The government crushed these movements in the early 1960's, but it provided in its program of separate development at least a theoretical outlet for nonwhite
political opinion (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). The provision of such outlets was a major aim of the separate development program, which created urban advisory boards, territorial authorities, Coloured and Indian representative councils, and at least one Bantustan legislature. One announced aim of these measures was to allow the nonwhites a means of expressing their own points of view to the national government through their own representative and administrative organs.

The major conflict among politically minded nonwhites was whether to reject these bodies as efforts of the government to delude internal and external observers or to accept them and turn them to their own ends no matter what the government's intention was in creating them. The existence of officially sanctioned representative bodies for Africans in which they may express their opinions has not meant, however, that the government has decided to give weight to these voices except within carefully limited and politically nonsensitive areas having to do with affairs completely within their own local communities.

POLITICS IN THE WHITE COMMUNITY

For many years, politics in South Africa consisted largely of the effort of the Afrikaner community as such to gain political dominance in the state. In the 1930's and 1940's, Afrikaner political leaders had to gain the support of 85 percent of the Afrikaner voters, since they had little hope and no intention of swaying the English speakers or the few enfranchised nonwhites to their cause. They were successful only by fostering Afrikaner exclusiveness. Distinctively Afrikaner organizations were created in all fields: culture, charity, labor, education, finance, and business. These provided the means to insulate the Afrikaner from all English influences and contacts. The creation of a separate ethnic community was the major factor leading to the Afrikaner political victories in the postwar years (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

After 1960, however, the Nationalist Party began to feel strong enough to seek support from the English-speaking population as a means of strengthening its position in the face of external and internal African opposition. By early 1970 the attitude of most leading Afrikaners in government and many outside it had changed. The majority of the Nationalist Party leadership had come to be seen, and to see itself, as the preserver of the domination of the whites, not that of the Afrikaners alone.

The whites were united primarily by a common fear of rising African nationalism. Other factors contributing to unity were the disappearance of the contentious issue of formal ties to Great Britain; the common experience of urbanization, as more and more
Afrikaners came to the towns; common reactions to foreign opposition; and the growth of Afrikaner business interests to rival those of the English speakers (see ch. 4, Population; ch. 6, Social Structure; ch. 16, Foreign Relations; ch. 21, Industry). As these factors made their impact, the hold of the most conservative elements over the Nationalist Party was gradually weakened.

The government was also motivated by the fact that its new powers of coercion, its expenditures to support its security and defense forces, its propaganda operations, and the implementation of separate development required the support of the entire white electorate. The government used foreign opposition to its advantage to consolidate its position. By lumping all opposition into a single category with the Communists, support had been gained for the passage of security legislation against purported foreign threats. These new laws were frequently used against all internal opponents of the regime.

Opponents of every political belief and skin color were portrayed either as Communists or as "liberalistic" dupes or fellow travelers of the Communists. Such mild opponents as the South African Institute of Race Relations, the Catholic Church, and the Progressive Party were not spared these labels. In South African law, communism was not limited to Marxism but was defined broadly enough to cover all opponents of the established order attempting to bring about any change in the country's social structure by any means outside the context of purely parliamentary politics (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Communist agitation was blamed for the widespread opposition of nonwhites to apartheid.

Opponents of the system, white as well as black, are silenced by banning orders, house arrest, the threat of extended criminal prosecutions, detention by the police without recourse to the courts, and other measures (see ch. 14, The Legal System; ch. 26, Public Order and Internal Security). Passports are refused to South African citizens, and noncitizen residents, particularly missionaries, who may express dissent are expelled.

The government-controlled South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) is regularly used to attack legal organizations considered hostile by the government. Such organizations include some of the English-language press, the South African Institute of Race Relations, the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS), the liberal leaders of the Christian churches, and even the two parties (the United Party and the Progressive Party) of the parliamentary opposition.

The government also exercises control over the right of publication and censorship over imported printed matter, films, and recordings. The newspapers remain officially uncensored but are constantly open to government pressure, and individual issues of
periodicals may be and are banned by government censors after publication. The English-language newspapers retain considerable autonomy and freely criticize the government on a regular basis despite the pressure, but only one of the regular newspapers normally gives support to the Progressive Party or to attitudes mildly opposed to racial separatism (see ch. 17, Public Information).

The government's ability to suppress or intimidate opposition voices, however, had little to do with its victories at the polls. Its real strength lay in its ability to attract the support of the white electorate including, by 1966, substantial segments of the English-speaking community. The Nationalist Party had increased its margin of victory in every election since 1948. In each case its major appeal to the white electorate has been that its policies will ensure the continuation of the white's superior position.

Among the parliamentary opposition, the United Party is well enough aware of the fact that this protection is the primary political concern of its supporters and potential supporters, so that the party's platform has been equally in support of retention of the white's superior position, although its proposed methods vary from those of the Nationalist Party. A major portion of the support for the only other remaining parliamentary opposition group, the Progressive Party, which would extend the vote to educated Africans, comes from the whites of the upper educational and economic classes. They see themselves protected from a lowering of their relative standards by their financial and intellectual accomplishments rather than by law and are therefore willing to give the vote to a minority of Africans, and eventually to a majority of Africans, as long as this will ensure their own continued economic and political stability.

THE NATIONALIST PARTY

Major political decisionmaking is carried out within the higher ranks of the Nationalist Party. Members of the party at the apex of government exercise strict party discipline over the members of its majority delegation in Parliament. In early 1970 the Nationalist Party had controlled the government for twenty-two years. It had been without serious danger of challenge from the parliamentary opposition for twelve years, and there was little reason to expect that either the United Party, with 38 seats in the House of Assembly compared to the Nationalists' 127, or the Progressive Party, with only 1 seat, would present a serious threat in the foreseeable future.

Although the party could count on the support of a fairly sizable portion of the non-Afrikaner white population in early 1970, its
great strength results from its strong identification among Afrikaners with the very heart of the Afrikaner volk (people) or ethnic nationhood (see ch. 18, Political Values and Attitudes). As the Afrikaner's party it is able to count without fear of challenge on the support of nearly all Afrikaners, 60 percent of the electorate. Those Afrikaners who vote against it or work against it from what is considered a non-Afrikaner perspective may be ostracized from the community and left in social isolation. As one Afrikaner member has stated in Parliament, the Nationalist Party is more than a political organization, it is the personification of the efforts and thoughts of the whole volk.

In the past and, to a limited extent even in the late 1960's, the Nationalist Party has often been described as divided between the Transvaal and Cape attitudes, with the Transvaalers viewed as the conservatives. The differences are usually described as the result of the Cape Liberal tradition. This vague tradition is associated with the western half of Cape Province where the Coloureds rather than the Africans predominate in the local population. The Cape attitude is distinguished by a strong paternal feeling toward the Coloured population and a tradition of the Cape as the center of Afrikaner business enterprise.

The more numerous Transvaal Afrikaners have generally triumphed in politics but have been outdistanced in the economic affairs by both the Afrikaners of the Cape and the English-speaking businessmen of their province. The Transvaal and the Orange Free State include most of the strongholds of Afrikaner conservatism. The differences between the wings, however, tend to be those of regional competition, rather than principle or economics. The Transvaalers are eager to avoid Cape dominance, real or imagined, and the influence of the Cape leaders.

With the exception of the few Afrikaners who helped in the formation of the Progressive Party in 1959, the recent efforts of Afrikaners to move toward new racial policies have been made by persons who have remained with the Nationalist Party. Two groups, the Dutch Reformed Church's leadership and the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA), have sought justice for the non-whites, but within the structure of the party-supported separate development program. A third grouping composed of Afrikaner businessmen and industrial leaders is the most outward-looking group within the Nationalist Party. They are thought of as being guided by businesslike pragmatism. They are impatient with the government's program of racial separation, because it presents barriers to industrial expansion through limiting the use of Africans as skilled labor and places limits on their external markets through its weakening of the country's image overseas.

Their influence, however, within the Nationalist Party in early
1970, although growing, was still weak, and they were unable to lead or even in some cases to influence party opinions. Among the Afrikaner businessmen, the most economically influential are at odds with the Nationalist Party because of their opposition to apartheid. Notable among these is Anton Rupert, head of one of the two or three largest tobacco companies in the world. Those Afrikaner businessmen who remain within the Nationalist Party are labeled “liberals” by the majority if they express views at variance with the mainstream. The most important business influences in the party are Afrikaner-owned corporations like the Federale-Sanlar-Bonuskor, a loose grouping, and the management of para-statal corporations like the South African Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR) (see ch. 19, Character and Structure of the Economy: ch. 21, Industry).

The only challenges to the party’s position in the Afrikaner community have come from elements of the party agitating for the adoption of more conservative positions by the Afrikaner leadership. Such a fragment, with considerable political impact, left the party in late 1969 but did remain within the framework of Afrikanerdom since its only appeal was for a purification of Afrikaner leadership and a closer adherence to its traditions.

The new body was called the Reconstituted Nationalist Party (Herstigte Nasionale Party—HNP). This split between the two wings of the Afrikaner movement is commonly labeled a confrontation between the verligtes, or outward looking, and the verkramptes, or backward looking, wings of the party. The major question that divided the two groups was whether Afrikaner nationalism was to remain exclusive or whether, in order to face internal and external opposition better, an effort should be made to create a common white nationalism by breaking down the barriers erected against the English-speaking whites and new white immigrants. A related issue was how to preserve Afrikaner culture in the face of the demands of contemporary urban society for conformity with modern Western traditions, particularly as this Western influence might bring with it strong elements of racial liberalism.

More concrete questions deriving from the central ones were often the focus of debate between the two groups, including, for example, the approach to be taken to the question of admitting foreign nonwhite athletes to sports competition in the country and the sensitive matter of relations with neighboring black states, particularly as this would require the admission of their black diplomatic representatives to the country.

In the cases of sports and relations with neighboring black states the verligtes were motivated by a feeling that the country needs to keep the few friends it has and to lessen hostility along its borders. If the country’s image can be improved by admitting a nonwhite
athlete as a member of a sports team or a black diplomatic representative, then the government should take a pragmatic stand. As the verligtes interpret it, the presence of such foreign nonwhites in South Africa has no connection with apartheid, which is an internal policy. In verkrampte opinion, by contrast, the country should refuse to be influenced by foreign opinion if that required even the smallest weakening in the purity of its racial program.

On the question of internal racial attitudes, the two wings of the Afrikaner political camp were in basic agreement, and in fact the HNP's major objection to the Nationalist Party's apartheid policy was that it was not being implemented with the vigor and speed needed to provide political justice to the Africans in their separate Bantustans and to remove them from the white areas and economy. The two parties also divided along personality lines, but the clash was primarily between the verkramptes and the men in the party whom they condemned as too liberal.

The leaders of the verkramptes according to one authority are found primarily among senior members of the professional classes, particularly among the Afrikaner clergy, teachers, and lawyers. The new party's first convention in October 1969, however, revealed support for its doctrines from members of the younger elite, including Afrikaner university students, trade unionists, and some wealthy traditionally minded businessmen as well as from the older group of large landowners in the Transvaal. The new party's stronghold is in the Transvaal and is centered in the national capital, Pretoria, although elements of the party are also found in the Orange Free State and Cape provinces.

The emergence of the verligte and verkrampte division was already apparent in 1966, but it was not until the middle of 1968 that the party's leader, Prime Minister B. J. Vorster, after an anonymous letter campaign by the verkramptes against the Nationalist Party leadership, was willing to admit publicly that the party was divided. This admission was followed by the dropping of the leader of the verkramptes, Albert Hertzog, from his cabinet post in August. In the political campaign against the verligtes, the verkramptes used as the major issues those they felt would stir popular sentiments of revulsion among the Afrikaner voters; the issues included the decisions of the government to extend diplomatic relations to black African states, to allow immigration by white Roman Catholics, and to allow nonwhite athletes from overseas to compete in South Africa.

The verligte policy of B. J. Vorster has aimed at the creation of a broad white front to replace the narrow Afrikaner nationalism upon which his party had depended since its inception. He also supported the outgoing policy toward other African states that had been formulated by his predecessor, Prime Minister H. F. Verwoerd (see ch. 16, Foreign Relations).
Nationalist party policy continued to demand stronger implementation of apartheid and greater separation of the races in all spheres. It remained the party's policy that Africans in the white areas be allowed to remain only to perform the work required to keep the white industrial system running, and even the presence of these may be severely limited. Although some observers both inside and outside the country saw hope for liberalization in the country's continued economic growth, neither industrialization nor urbanization has liberalized Afrikaner racial and political attitudes. The conflict within the Afrikaner community is between groups whose racial attitudes toward nonwhites are in close agreement.

The majority of the Afrikaners upon whom the two parties depend for support are members of the semiskilled working classes, small shopkeepers, or petty civil servants—those most likely to feel the pressure of nonwhite competition and therefore most likely to demand protection from the state in the form of racial legislation or support for exclusionary contracts.

White labor, however, has demonstrated a certain willingness to allow Africans to improve both their skills and their wages as long as the white's positions remain both secure and clearly above those of the nonwhites. They have also made it clear that in case of recession the employment of the whites will always be preserved by lowering the level of nonwhite employment. Some white labor unions have opposed the government's separate development program because they view the government's efforts to create industries along the borders of the reserves as ways for management to hold down white wages by giving newly developing jobs to the Africans (see ch. 19, Character and Structure of the Economy; ch. 22, Labor).

Among the persons listed in early 1970 as members of the verkrampte group and the leadership of the HNP were its leader Albert Hertzog, formerly a minister in the Vorster cabinet, at least four other members of Parliament defecting from the Nationalist Party, the director of the South African Broadcasting Corporation, the chairman of the Broederbond (Brotherhood), a director of the Africa Institute, and the secretary of the White Building Workers Union. The HNP was also closely linked to the Afrikaner Ordre, founded by Hertzog in 1968 with the aim of infiltrating other Afrikaner organizations in the hope of eventually gaining control of the Nationalist Party. The Afrikaner Ordre, like the HNP, has its stronghold in the northern Transvaal, particularly in Pretoria. Twenty-seven Afrikaner groups have been listed as front organizations for the Afrikaner Ordre, and twenty other organizations contain significant sections under its control.

At first the verkramptes gained the support of the Afrikans Pers (Press) group of newspapers, particularly through Die Vaderland, the most conservative of the newspapers, although they remained
under Nationalist Party control when the HNP split away. The HNP has the support of the extremely conservative English-language magazine, the *South African Observer*, and in January 1970 it began to publish its own weekly paper, *Die Afrikaner*.

In line with Afrikaner traditions, the *verligte-verkrampte* conflict is joined not only in the political groups, but also in the church and cultural organizations. It is impossible to gauge the degree of support among the Afrikaners for the *verkrampte* cause. It cannot be judged from the strength of the HNP at the polls because the HNP’s main reason for existing is not to win votes for itself, but to swing the larger party toward its doctrines by presenting an electoral threat from the right, which the Nationalist Party will be forced to meet by moving to the right itself. This pressure for a conservative turn within the Nationalist Party is strengthened by the fact that a major portion of the *verkrampte* group, including some members of Parliament, have remained as members and leaders of the major party.

An important place in Afrikaner political life is filled by the Federation of Afrikaner Cultural Organizations (Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings—FAK). The FAK played a major part in the creation and maintenance of the binding ties to Afrikaner *volk* that inspire and ensure much of the political unity of the Afrikaners. Another organization of great past and continuing significance is the Broederbond, much more controversial and with much greater direct political impact than the FAK. Since it is a secret society, whose membership figures are unknown and whose leadership is often unclear, its power is difficult to assess.

From the Broederbond’s founding in 1918 until the Nationalist Party took power in 1948, its executive council, called the Twelve Apostles, was the most effective voice of the Afrikaner political and social movement and provided its central leadership. Since the Nationalist Party came to power, this role has largely been taken over by the government’s cabinet. The power exerted by the Broederbond cannot be readily distinguished from that exerted by its members in high posts, since its membership includes much of the Afrikaner elite—all Nationalist prime ministers and many other important figures, including key cabinet ministers, the head of FAK, the chairman of the South African Broadcasting corporation, and major Afrikaner business leaders.

It is clear that the Broederbond works to place its members in key positions in all walks of life. Membership is by invitation and is limited to Afrikaners of proven loyalty and ability. Its minimum aims are the advancement of Afrikaner leadership in all spheres. One significance of the split of the HNP away from the Nationalist Party lies in the fact that this is the first split that has divided leaders of the Broederbond, since both Prime Minister Vorster and HNP leader Hertzog are members of the Twelve Apostles.
Because of the prestige involved in membership in the Nationalist Party, a third or more of the qualified Afrikaners are members. A very large proportion of the members are active in party work, even though the party's secure position in the late 1960's and early 1970 left it without the spur of competition. In the election of April 1966 as many as a third of its House of Assembly seats were gained without contest.

The lowest units of organization are the local groups or cells of about ten members with an elected leader. These operate under a branch at the polling district level and a division at the parliamentary constituency level. Major power is vested in the provincial party congress. Divisional or branch leaders meeting annually in the congresses elect all higher party officeholders except its national leader. They also decide upon or approve the national leadership's recommendations for party platforms for the coming year.

Between meetings of the congresses, authority is exercised by the provincial steering committee and the provincial leader. They have broad powers, including the appointment and dismissal of the many paid functionaries, the approval of the eligibility of candidates nominated for political office, the maintenance of party discipline, and the application of policy.

At the national level is a Federal Council composed of the national leader, seven representatives from each of the five provincial level councils (including South West Africa), and one representative of the National Youth League (Nasionale Jeugbond), the party's junior auxiliary, responsible for much of the success in inculcating Nationalist ideas in Afrikaner youth. The Federal Council meets only occasionally, however, and its functions are usually performed by the Steering Committee of the party composed of the four provincial leaders.

The other party body at the national level is the parliamentary caucus, composed of all Nationalist Party members in the two houses of Parliament. It meets weekly during parliamentary sessions. In addition to discussing a common approach to upcoming bills and debates, the caucus is also empowered to elect the national leader of the party. Any tendency that the caucus might have to demonstrate either independence from or direct leadership of the party as a whole is inhibited by the fact that a majority of its members are professional party politicians and nearly a third of them are former paid party workers.

This fact and the tight control exercised by party whips ensure close adherence of all members to the party line on every issue, and splits in party votes on any question before Parliament are extremely rare. In fact, the control of the party whips is so strong that many members of Parliament wield more power through their extraparliamentary contacts than through their parliamentary seats.

More important to party unity than this discipline, however, is
the fact that control over the party has become highly centralized during its long period in power. The real focus of power within the party, as within the government, lies in the cabinet, under the leadership of the prime minister. This focus of power is strengthened by participation of the same important people in government and party. The prime minister is also the party leader, and the four provincial leaders who compose the party Steering Committee are also generally members of the cabinet, just as are a number of the leaders of other Afrikaner organizations, notably the Broederbond.

The members of the cabinet as well as the other members of Parliament also maintain close ties to the Afrikaner business world. Politicians, even though considered honest, do not see close personal ties to business interests as a conflict of interest, and election as a member of Parliament often leads directly to a seat on a corporate board of directors. The South African civil service has an exceptional reputation of honesty, but the civil service rules leave all promotions in the hands of the political figures who head the departments, and all civil servants are therefore open to political influence; major emphasis is openly placed on loyalty to the political programs of the government. Nearly 400,000 voters, at least a fifth of the electorate, are employed by the government.

The concentration of power precludes significant influence for pressure groups. Pressure group tactics, in any case, are not in the political tradition. As party financing is by popular subscription and there are few important individual or corporate contributors, neither money nor organized pressure groups play an important part in power moves behind the scenes. The Broederbond is the only apparent nonpublic body with significant power behind the scenes.

The attempt to concentrate power includes efforts to strengthen the hand of the central government at the expense of the provincial and local government units, largely motivated by the resistance to certain programs and policies by the Natal, Witwatersrand, and Western Cape governments, all in United Party strongholds. Strong efforts are also made to limit contact between whites and nonwhites to official channels so that only the party leadership, through its control of the government, can claim the knowledge necessary to make decisions about the needs and desires of the nonwhites.

THE UNITED PARTY

The United Party has stood little chance of regaining control of the government since the 1953 elections, despite the fact that in both 1958 and 1961 its popular vote was approximately the same as that of the Nationalists. Its strength was cut by the removal from the common roll before the 1958 election of the Coloured voters,
nearly all of whom supported it. United Party defeats until the 1966 election may be attributed to electoral inequalities resulting from a number of factors which continued to provide the Nationalists with a parliamentary delegation much larger than would be expected from its share of the popular vote.

The major cause of this disparity was the fact that the English-speaking voters who generally support the United Party are largely concentrated in urban centers, so that the party has won most of its constituencies by significant margins, whereas the Nationalist Party, whose supporters are more thinly spread over most of the country, has consistently won the majority of its seats by narrow margins. In addition, the population of the overweighted rural constituencies consists almost entirely of Afrikaners. The Boundary Delimitations Commission, which may vary the size of districts by as much as 15 percent above or below the norm to take geographic and ethnic factors into consideration, has at times assigned boundaries that favor the Nationalists, particularly in rural seats, assuring the Nationalists of about six extra seats.

The United Party has also been weakened by the arbitrary assignment to the Nationalists’ South West African stronghold of six seats in the House of Assembly and four in the Senate. South West Africa thus had an average constituency with less than half the population of constituencies in the Republic itself (see Appendix). The United Party has avoided contesting many Nationalist strongholds, and the Nationalists similarly avoid United Party safe seats.

The party’s greatest weakness, however, results from its failure to make a successful appeal to the Afrikaner voters whose support would enable it to move forward in constituencies outside the English-speaking urban areas. This lack of appeal resulted from a number of factors, including the party’s lack of a forceful image, particularly pale in comparison with the internal dynamism of the Nationalists. In addition, because of the government’s strongly pro-Nationalist control of the SABC, the linguistic separation in the school system, and the United Party’s long failure to publish a newspaper in Afrikaans, it did not provide sufficient contact with the majority of the Afrikaners. Its program has continually failed to present any imaginative challenges to the Nationalist Party programs and has not succeeded in its efforts to refute their charges that it was an Englishman’s party.

In general, the United Party’s lack of a clear alternative policy has resulted from its adherence to the same basic attitudes toward the preservation of white dominance as those of the Nationalists, a weakness it has found unavoidable since it is the most important political value of the great majority of the electorate. The United Party has sought broader support not by challenging the basic doctrines of the Nationalists but by attempting to portray the govern-
ment under Nationalist Party leadership as incapable of achieving its separate development program without disrupting the economy and further alienating the African population.

At the extreme, its national leaders accuse the Nationalist Party of having no real intention of creating meaningful self-government for the Africans or, alternatively, they accuse it of weakening the country through the creation of separatist African mini-states. At times lesser United Party leaders have even accused the Nationalist Party of being Kaffir-Boeties, or African lovers, understandably the strongest term of opprobrium to Afrikaners, and of failing to give priority to the needs of the whites. Such accusations are based on the Nationalists giving priority to assistance to the African reserves to further separate development.

After suffering its fifth successive and most severe defeat at the polls in 1966, the United Party began a rebuilding campaign by establishing a clear party platform from which to rally support. It adopted a new slogan: “One land, one nation, one loyalty” with the aim of calling attention simultaneously to the end of the English-speaking South Africans’ vague ties to Britain; to the need for an end to exclusively ethnic nationalism; and to its stated mistrust of the Bantustan program, which would divide the South African territory into mini-states.

The party called for the creation of a single national authority for the whole country. The African reserves were to be developed and administered by Africans but were to remain politically an integral part of South Africa; Africans were to be given a political outlet at the national level by token representation in the Parliament.

The government was attacked continually on the grounds that its program for separate development has not been effectively implemented because it cannot be. United Party criticism stresses that such implementation would ruin the country’s economy, which could not support the expense necessary to build up the reserves at the same time that white industry would be deprived of black labor and black consumers.

In place of apartheid, the party called for the creation of what it termed a racial federation with self-government by each racial group and control over its own affairs. Central control would be exercised through a Parliament dominated by the whites but with meaningful representation for the Coloured voters and at least significant token representation for the Africans and Indians. The representatives of the African and Indian communities would be required to be white, so that only whites and Coloureds would sit in Parliament. There would be 166 representatives for white voters, six for Coloureds, two for Indians, and eight for Africans in the House of Assembly. The balance in the Senate would be similarly aligned. At the local government level the Coloureds, the Indians, the urban Africans,
and the Africans in each reserve would elect councils for self-government that would be analogous to the existing white provincial councils with much the same powers.

Despite its efforts, the party's strength appeared still to be in decline. A serious defection to the left had weakened it in 1959 when eleven United Party members of Parliament had deserted to form the Progressive Party. Between 1966 and early 1970, the major movement was into the Nationalist Party as the United Party continued to suffer from its position as a continual loser and as the Nationalists opened their arms wider to English-speaking members. It was not clear whether this trend would be sustained as the Nationalist Party moved to the right to counter the political threat posed by the HNP with the approach of the election scheduled for April 1970.

An English-speaking member of Parliament from its Durban stronghold and a number of other prominent party members joined the Nationalist Party at the beginning of the 1970 campaign, specifically motivated by the defection of many of the verkramptes from that party into the HNP. But Nationalist Party efforts to lure back the HNP supporters brought these United Party defections to a halt and apparently resulted in a reversal of the trend.

**THE PROGRESSIVE AND LIBERAL PARTIES**

The Progressive Party was largely created by persons defecting from the United Party in 1959 because of its failure to adopt a new and more challenging position toward racial legislation; they were joined by people leaving the Liberal Party because of its adoption of militantly pro-African policies. From its formation the Progressive Party was able to attract an impressive membership, and during 1960 it was represented by eleven members in Parliament. Its supporters notably included liberal Afrikaners as well as English speakers. It was more than adequately financed through the support of a number of prominent personages, including Sir Harry Oppenheimer, the country's most important business leader. It also received varying degrees of support from a number of English-language newspapers.

The party's program called for rejection of racial domination by any group. The franchise would be extended without regard to race to all who had obtained a specified educational level, preferably completion of primary school, or a certain income level. This would have the effect of giving a majority in the electorate to nonwhites within a decade, but future domination of the country by any one racial group would be prevented by a rigid constitution with a strongly entrenched Bill of Rights to protect the minorities.

The Progressive Party was able to elect only one parliamentary
candidate in 1961 and 1966, Mrs. Helen Suzman, chosen from a wealthy Johannesburg suburb. In 1961, however, it succeeded in polling 69,000 votes in the twenty districts that it contested compared to the United Party's 105,000 votes in the same districts. Seven of the seats were lost by less than a thousand votes. The party's vote totals fell off to 41,000 votes in twenty-seven constituencies in 1966. This still indicated an interest in the party's position, however, as the Liberal Party, which had earlier espoused the same causes, had never received more than 4,000 votes. The Liberals had presented only two candidates in 1961 and because of the effect of extreme pressure from the government, including the banning of many of the party's leaders, they were unable to present candidates in 1966. The strength of the Progressive Party in early 1970 appeared to be on an upswing.

The Liberal Party had made a strong appeal to the Africans, and the party's membership was about half nonwhite. The Progressives also made an appeal to the nonwhite leaders and consulted many of them in the formation of the party's platform. It evoked little response from Africans, but it had considerable strength in the Coloured community, and by 1968 most elected representatives of the Coloureds were Progressive Party members.

This relationship with the Coloureds was ended in 1968, however, when the government passed two closely linked bills affecting the Coloureds and the opposition parties. The first deprived the Cape Coloured community of its representation in Parliament, which it had enjoyed for more than a century. The second major act, the Prohibition of Political Interference Act, was linked to the first in intent. It made interracial political parties illegal.

The second act forbade members of one race to assist the parties or candidates of another race. The parliamentary debates on the bill show that it was aimed primarily at United Party and Progressive Party support for Coloured candidates. It had the immediate effect of destroying the Liberal Party, which voted to abolish itself in late 1968, and of forcing the Progressive Party to limit its membership to whites. Its longer range effect was to close the last avenues for political discussion between whites and nonwhites free of government control.

The act effectively prevented the United Party and the Progressive Party from assisting the Coloured political parties in preparation for elections to the organs of local government, to the national Coloured Peoples Representative Council, and from assisting the Democratic party in the Transkei. The new law did not prevent the Nationalist Party from assisting those Coloured parties or African parties in the Transkei which it favored, since prosecutions under the new act could be initiated only by an attorney general, an official acting under the direction of the Nationalist minister of justice.
AFRICAN POLITICAL DYNAMICS IN THE BANTUSTANS

In the structure of the governmental organizations created as part of the separate development program there are, in addition to the national councils for Indians and Coloureds, 374 tribal authorities, 53 regional authorities, and 6 territorial authorities for African self-government, arranged in a hierarchical structure. The keys to the success or failure of the government's program of geographic and political separation of the races are the national unit governments, the popularly labeled Bantustans. Although one is supposed to be created for each of the eight proposed national units, only one of the territorial authorities within South Africa, the Transkei, had been raised to that level by early 1970. The Transkei therefore served as model, labored, and showcase for what the Nationalist Party portrayed as a revolutionary advancement in political relations between nations.

The government of the Transkei is headed by a chief minister, who is the head of the majority political party in the Transkei Legislative Assembly (TLA), a partially appointed, partially elected body (see ch. 13, The Governmental System).

The Transkei's territory consists of some 16,500 square miles, some 3,300 of which are reserved for white occupation for the foreseeable future. The only outlet to the sea, Port St. John, is to remain a permanent part of South Africa, and a strip of land running the full length of the coast will remain under white control for security reasons, apparently permanently, thus cutting the territory off from external contact.

The population of the Transkei consists of about 1.4 million Africans. According to the government, about 1.5 million more Xhosa-speaking Africans living in urban areas outside the Transkei, but related to tribes within the Transkei, will eventually be placed under the control of the Transkei government through their tribal urban councils.

The national government claims to have made strong efforts to assist the Africanization of the Transkeian commerce. Between 1964 and 1968 the government had purchased 175 white-owned trading posts to be turned over to African management, and a program had begun for the training of African shopkeepers, but the Transkei has little other economic opportunity for its residents who remain largely dependent upon the money earned by Transkeians working in the white state.

The prime minister of the Transkei in 1970, Chief Kaizer Matanzima, condemned the creation of a multiracial state and called for the creation of an entirely black Bantustan in the Transkei. Matanzima has accused the African advocates of multiracialism of seeking to divide the Africans in order to prolong white control. This line of argument sounds like the philosophy of the Pan Africanist Congress.
(PAC) but is used in an entirely different way. Some observers, however, have speculated that Matanzima may gradually change from his parochial nationalism into a Pan African one. Matanzima supporters have taken seriously the demand for self-government and expect progressively greater autonomy to be granted to the Transkei.

Matanzima's Transkei National Independence Party (TNIP), the governing party in the TLA, requested in 1968 that a number of other government departments be turned over to control of the Assembly by the national government as a step on the road to independence. The opposition Democratic Party, motivated by an interracial philosophy clearly at odds with the apartheid policy of the national government, called for the permanent retention of the Transkei as a part of South Africa, and the third party in the Legislative Assembly, the Transkei People's Freedom Party, called for the immediate granting of total independence. The responsible minister of the Republic government, head of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development, although reaffirming the government's separast policy, stated that the road to independence would be a long and difficult one and that the Republic government would be the sole judge of readiness. He said further that, in addition to a clear ability to provide their own stable government without outside financial or technical assistance, a near impossibility for an area as devoid of resources and as over populated as the Transkei, the Transkei's rulers must clearly recognize the permanence of South Africa's dominance over the rest of southern Africa. Despite this rebuff, the TNIP continued to press for the transfer of additional ministerial responsibility to the TLA.

The power of the Democratic Party in the TLA had declined gradually during the five years after the 1963 elections, as six members defected to the TNIP and two seats were lost to the Transkei People's Freedom Party. Elections for a new assembly in 1968 gave the TNIP 44 percent of the 800,000 votes cast. The Democratic Party gained 36 percent of the votes. With the support of all but eight of the sixty-four seats of the appointed chiefs, the TNIP held more than three-quarters of the seats. This new support for the TNIP may have resulted from a number of factors; a major one was the TNIP's obvious strength resulting from its ability to control the TLA, no matter which way the popular vote ran, through its fifty-six supporters among the appointed chiefs, who outnumbered the forty-five elected members. In addition, the opposition made strong allegations that the TNIP had made use of ten-year-old emergency regulations to intimidate voters. In the opinion of a number of observers, however, acceptance by the Transkei residents of the separate development program as the only ray of hope in a bleak political picture was a major factor in the TNIP's victory.
OTHER AFRICAN POLITICAL MOVEMENTS

The only African organization with a political orientation that is allowed by the government to operate outside of the reserves is the small Bantu Federation of South Africa, claiming 50,000 members, which supports separate development but on terms differing from the government's in that it argues for unity of all African groups. The opinions, attitudes, and organization of other African political groups are difficult to ascertain (see ch. 18, Political Values and Attitudes).

According to a senior fellow of the South African Institute of Race Relations in 1968, “Government and police action had crushed the political leadership of the Africans and other nonwhite opposition groups and in so doing had left these groups voiceless.” These leaders had, however, been marginal in nonwhite society and were removed before any coherent political organizations with grassroots involvement could come into being.

The chief point of conflict during the later years of the 1960's among the politically minded Africans has been the argument over the value to the Africans of the Bantustan policy. The extent of African support for the policy is very difficult to determine. Most Africans, in the judgment of some outside observers, reject its primary aim, that of having them regard the reserves as their only permanent homes. These same observers note, however, that the sense of futility of opposition to the government has produced a political listlessness among the Africans that will cause large numbers of them to gradually adopt a policy of looking at the Bantustans from an optimistic point of view in hopes that these may lead to an improvement in their situations and, perhaps eventually, to a degree of independence or self-government.

The African nationalist parties have generally condemned the Bantustans. Most see them not as potentially independent states but as what one has described as rural prison camps whose African inhabitants would be left at the complete mercy of the white economy, forced by the limited area and poor quality of the agricultural lands to become even more dependent upon the selling of their labor to the white industrialists. They also see this creation of a permanent labor reserve as the government’s primary aim in creating the Bantustans. Even if the Bantustans were given a meaningful degree of freedom, they would never be able to accommodate more than a small proportion of the total African population of South Africa, leaving a majority of Africans permanently disadvantaged within the white state (see ch. 20, Agriculture).

In the view of the African elite, the granting of a qualified franchise would hardly resolve any of the conflicts in South
African society, as it would leave the vast majority of the population without a means of influencing the changes needed to improve their positions. But the extension of the franchise to nonwhites on a common roll, no matter how limited, would be a revolutionary act in South African society and would be viewed by most whites as the first step to what they most fear, majority rule.

The qualified franchise desired by the Progressive Party, which would extend the right to vote for common or equal representatives in Parliament to all persons of all races who have completed primary school, would probably lead to a nonwhite majority in the electorate within a decade. Although the African elites have expressed little interest in the Progressive Party's doctrine, there is little doubt that they would do so if the Progressive Party were able to demonstrate any potential for success, since even the most moderate changes envisioned by that party's supporters would result in a totally new political arrangement for Africans, one which could not fail to appeal to the African leaders.

Government suppression of its major nonwhite opponents in 1960 forced the political activists among the nonwhites and one of their white allies, the Congress of Democrats, a front organization of the South African Communist Party, to reject the nonviolence that all had previously accepted and to seek new means to change the society. They decided to use terror tactics to frighten the whites into coming to terms with them or into seeking new solutions for racial problems. These tactics also sought to create strains on the country's economy by attacking and sabotaging the economic infrastructure.

In some cases, efforts were made to place so heavy a burden on the country's security forces that the added cost of security would be more than the white economy cared to bear. On the other hand, they expected to force the creation of security controls that would further antagonize the nonwhites. Those African and Coloured leaders overseas also sought to organize external guerrilla forces for an assault on South Africa and to serve as the external headquarters and spokesmen for the underground and terrorist organizations of the African National Congress (ANC) and the PAC. Finally, they sought to mobilize world opinion against South Africa because of its internal racial policies.

Elements of the nonwhite political movements had fled into exile as early as 1960 (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 18, Political Values and Attitudes). The ANC affiliated itself with the Pan African Freedom Movement of East, Central and South Africa (PAFMECSA), and the ANC and PAC established offices in Dar es Salaam, Accra, Cairo, London, Algiers, and New York, adding Lusaka (Zambia) to the list in 1964.

The representatives of the two parties abroad faced continued
problems in attempting to maintain relations with the underground movement at home. They had to continually demonstrate that they held a mandate from movements that were effectively organized and led. They also had to deal with the impatience of African leaders from independent countries who were critical of them for being cut off from the struggle within their country. Their greatest difficulties were in morale, however, as the better part of a decade has passed without their being able to demonstrate any effective achievements. The PAC suffered from a number of strains between its leaders resulting in serious splits, particularly after 1966. In 1969 and early 1970, internecine fighting between elements of the PAC led to its loss of accreditation in the vital refugee centers of Tanzania and Zambia.

The ANC and PAC abroad continued their often overstressed ideological and tactical differences (see ch. 18, Political Values and Attitudes). There was also distrust between the two over their search for external support and funds. The ANC continually labeled the PAC an American lackey. Others allege that the PAC’s Poqo terrorist groups had received large sums of money from Kwame Nkrumah when he was president of Ghana. Jordan Ngubane, the Liberal Party’s strongly anti-Communist African leader, observed that an unexpected switch in PAC tactics before Sharpeville was apparently due to Ghanaian influence. The South African Communist Party’s London publication, The African Communist magazine, attacked the PAC as a “pillar of white supremacy.” The African Communist strongly supports the ANC, which has admitted receiving support from the Communist parties of Eastern Europe (see ch. 18, Political Values and Attitudes).

From their positions in exile the PAC and ANC leaders have stressed a policy of future violence. Both have sent refugee volunteers by the hundreds for military or sabotage training, at first to the Communist bloc, later to other African countries. The ANC requires a military commitment on the part of all students being given the chance for schooling under its sponsorship. It has continued to claim that it sends armed militants back into South Africa, and a small PAC force was intercepted in Mozambique en route to South Africa. The ANC’s greatest efforts have been joint guerrilla operations within Rhodesia with the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union in an attempt to create a base for operations across South Africa’s boarders by overthrowing the white minority government in Rhodesia. These efforts, although substantial from 1966 through 1968, had almost ceased by early 1970 (see ch. 26, Public Order and Internal Security).

Little violence has occurred in South Africa since the mid-1960’s. The efficient South African Police (SAP), presumably through an informer network, captured a very large percentage of the returning
revolutionaries. The number of acts of sabotage, even at their high point in the 1963-65 period, was surprisingly small, and their impact on the South African economy, against which they were aimed, was miniscule. Of the acts of sabotage actually carried through, a large number were evidently performed by the white anti-Communist revolutionary underground, the African Resistance Movement, whose members were affiliated with the Liberal Party.

There were sporadic indications of an ANC underground organization within South Africa in the late 1960's, notably when the Congress movement, in 1968, on the day it has proclaimed as South Africa Freedom Day, raised the ANC flag on some of the major buildings of several cities and engaged in the covert distribution of propaganda leaflets. More significant have been five major trials under subversion laws in 1968, 1969, and early 1970 of groups, including one led by the wife of Nelson Mandela, charged with attempting to construct a nationwide covert nationalist organization, and of trying to arrange for the landing of saboteurs and arms along the country’s coast.

The majority of their best leaders are in jail, detention, or exile, and the small hope they once held for significant assistance from independent African countries is growing dimmer. Their main hopes now lie in any event that might crystallize and rejuvenate the sentiments of the mass of the South African population itself so that it would rise up and overthrow the present order, or in a change in the international situation, either through the launching of an anti-South African effort, such as an economic blockade by the United Nations, or through the attainment of independence by Rhodesian or Mozambiquan African nationalist movements.

POLITICS IN THE-COLOURED AND ASIAN (INDIAN) COMMUNITIES

Both Coloureds and Indians have been neglected in government and Nationalist Party policymaking. The problems they pose have not been considered as pressing as the white-African confrontation. Unlike the Africans, for whom self-government in the Bantustans is at least offered as a possible goal for the future, these minorities are to remain effectively disenfranchised groups within the white areas but separated from the white community. They may look forward to limited control over local and cultural matters, but it has not been suggested that they are ever to have either the partial autonomy in their own areas offered to Africans or to participate in national political affairs in any way.

The government has always assumed that, should a black revolution be attempted, the Coloureds and Indians would throw in their lot with the whites because their own interests demand it, no mat-
ter how they have been previously treated by the whites. The government and the majority of the white electorate, therefore, have ignored the voice of those whites who have called for removal of the political barriers against the Coloureds and Indians. These wish to see the other minority groups incorporated into the ruling group to provide it with a numerically and morally stronger base from which to deal with the major sociopolitical problem, that of their relations with the African majority.

Coloured Politics

Among the Coloured, the level of political activity was relatively high in the late 1960's, but only because they had been without significant political outlet since the early 1950's (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). When the government established the Coloured People's Representative Council after removing Coloured representation in the Parliament in 1968, six political groups became active in the Coloured community, of which five contested the elections for the council in the fall of 1969.

Despite its failure at the polls, control of the council went to the Federal Coloured People's Party. Of forty seats filled by election, the party won only three contested ones and three uncontested ones in its rural strongholds. But the majority of twenty seats filled by appointment went to its supporters, including many who had been defeated in their try for election. One of these was Tom Swartz, chairman of the party and long close to the Nationalist Party's leadership. Despite his defeat in the elections, he was appointed chairman of the executive committee of the Coloured People's Representative Council. Although it initially favored retention of Coloured representation in Parliament, the Federal Coloured People's Party now supports the government's policy of separate development and calls for the creation of what it terms vertical apartheid, that is, of separate but equal states.

The smaller Conservative Party, which split from the Federal Party in 1968, stands fully behind the government's separate development program. The National Coloured Party and the Republican Coloured Party also support separate development, if not quite so strongly. The South African Labor Party, which won a clear majority of the elected seats in the 1969 elections, seeks total rejection of the separate development program for Coloureds and their complete political integration into the white community. It won twenty-six of the thirty-seven contested seats and found its major strength among the voters of the urban areas. The government's appointment of twenty of its opponents to the twenty nominated seats in the sixty-seat body prevented its taking control of the body despite its clear election victory. The government attempted to
justify its action by pointing to the fact that the Labor Party, with 44.5 percent of the total vote, had not obtained a majority of the votes cast in the five-way contest and that the majority of the votes had been won by the four pro-apartheid parties.

The Coloured People's Congress, a member of the outlawed Congress Alliance with the African National Congress, still had some sort of underground organization, as its pamphlets circulated during the election. The urban Coloured electorate of Cape Province feared control by the rural conservative minority, and the English-speaking Coloured groups in Natal feared dominance by the Cape and loss of their own somewhat distinct status.

Indian Political Movements

The South African Indian Congress (SAIC), which had existed since the days of Gandhi’s leadership before World War I, split in 1946 when an antisegregationist council was created within it. The more militant leaders within the SAIC, influenced by developments in India and supported by their working-class followers, used the council to rise in the organization. When they gained control of the SAIC, the older and more conservative leaders, largely Muslim businessmen, left to form the South African Indian Organization (SAIO).

By the late 1950’s the SAIC was aligned closely with the ANC and supported mass political action and Indian identification with African interests. The SAIO, on the other hand, represented the interests of the Indian commercial classes who feared to lose the benefits of their relatively high economic position. They were keenly aware of the threat presented by rising African nationalism to their intermediate status in the society and wished to be identified with white, rather than African interests. The SAIC continued to represent the interests of the ANC after the banning of that organization in 1960 until it was itself driven out of existence a few years later.

The white government’s policies toward the Indians began to change in 1961 when it finally accepted the idea that the Indians were to be permanent residents of South Africa and that therefore they must be fitted in to the government’s overall policy of apartheid. The government created a Department of Indian Affairs in line with the decision to establish separate administrations for each race. The new policy granted Indians the chance gradually to gain limited control over purely Indian affairs at the local government level, such as management of the schools for Indian children. The years after 1964 saw considerable improvement in the facilities provided for Indians and their purely administrative relationships with the government. Efforts within the Indian community in 1967 to establish political parties that would accept apartheid had to be
abandoned for lack of support. The Indian community has remained without an organized political group since the disintegration of the SAIC and the SAIO under government pressure in the first half of the 1960's.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY

Communist interest in South Africa began early because it was for a time the only country on the continent with an industrial proletariat. Initially, the Communists did not comprehend the strength of the forces that divided white and black workers, and they concentrated on South Africa in the hope that a South African Communist Party would be able to serve as a missionary force for the propagation of communism among the Africans of the continent.

The South African Communist Party was founded in 1921. Through the 1920's and 1930's it was divided over the racial question. During the party's involvement in the Rand strike of 1922, it supported the white workers who considered the African labor force to be a threat to their wage position. Later in the decade, it became involved in African unions. By 1930, however, it had been expelled from most unions.

In the 1930's a schism developed, caused in part by disagreement on racial matters, but also by reaction to the directives of the international Communist leadership during the period when Stalin was consolidating his power in the Soviet Union and in the Third Internationale. Some party leaders deserted communism altogether; others, notably the Coloured leaders, turned to the Trotskyist movement.

Despite its internal difficulties, the party had an impact on a small number of the African elite. Notwithstanding its early support of white against black workers, it had gradually acquired a reputation as the only political organization that could claim to have adhered steadily to some form of multiracialism.

By the late 1940's it was able to attract some members of the African National Congress and the South African Indian Congress. The younger and more radical leaders of the Indian community, the leaders of the working class Hindus in particular, were open to Communist influence from the left wing of India's own nationalist movement.

Although the approach to South Africa's problems by the international Communist leadership changed, it continued to look on the party as the potential leader of Communist expansion in the rest of the continent. The legal Communist Party of South Africa was dissolved in 1950 just before the Suppression of Communism Act went into effect, and all of its leaders were banned, imprisoned, or exiled. The South African Communist Party was officially reconstruc-
tuted in 1953 as an exile and underground organization with its headquarters in London.

A leading member of the underground party was jailed in 1966 following his serving as the defense attorney at the Rivonia terrorist trials (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). The party's London-based magazine *African Communist* described the lawyer, Abraham Fischer, as a leader in the building of an underground party and as the acting chairman of the Central Committee.

The government's efforts to penetrate the party and its successor had apparently been very successful. After the mid-1960's no overt manifestations of effective leadership by it were observable. It has been estimated that a few hundred hard-core members of the South African Communist Party remained in South Africa in the late 1960's, but most of its members were in prison or in exile in Great Britain and other countries.

The South African Communist Party in exile is aligned with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and has supported its position in its conflicts with the Chinese party. Although the South African party is based in Great Britain, it apparently does not have close ties with that country's Communist Party.
Despite the country's importance in the world economy, only twenty-three countries maintained full diplomatic relations with South Africa in the late 1960's. These included the United States, Canada, Australia, Argentina, and ten states of Western Europe. It had no ties, other than economic ties, with the Communist states or the countries of Asia, and its only relations to states in its own continent were with the four countries under its direct economic influence—Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Botswana. Its strongest ties were to the two political entities of southern Africa that faced similar threats to their white minority or colonial regimes from the pressure of African nationalism, the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, and the British colony of Rhodesia, whose white rulers had declared the country to be independent.

The country's relations were primarily conditioned by two sets of external factors. On the one hand, the major developed Western states attached great importance to uninterrupted economic ties with South Africa. For Great Britain, the country was both a very important market and a major location of overseas investments. For the other states, it was primarily a source of raw materials and gold.

On the other hand, the great majority of the Western states and of the rest of the world community were strongly opposed to South Africa because of its internal racial policies. This opposition was clearly demonstrated by the support of all but a handful of states for continued condemnations of the country voted by the United Nations General Assembly.

Because South Africa's entire economy rested largely on its exports, imports, and foreign investments, the major theme of its foreign policy was to try to prevent further deterioration and to improve its relations with actual or potential trading partners in Europe, Japan, and North America. It sought also to improve its relations with the rest of Africa so as to acquire markets for its finished products in that continent's developing countries and to avoid the creation of hostile states on its borders, which would weaken its own internal security posture.

The widespread external opposition to the country took the form of efforts to exclude South Africa from major international organizations; to deprive it of control over the mandated territory of
South West Africa (Namibia); to impose international economic sanctions; to support guerrilla organizations seeking to bring down the political order by force; and even to demands by some for concerted military intervention by an international force. The country was protected from the full force of this hostility by two major factors. First, its borders were protected by a ring of states that were either economically dependent upon South Africa or were in general sympathy with its position. Second, its major trading partners were unwilling to break their profitable economic ties, particularly as no clear program to bring about internal change had been enunciated.

The country's foreign policies were adopted largely in reaction to the widespread external hostility. In the first ten years of its rule the Nationalist Party government, with strong isolationist tendencies, remained preoccupied with internal affairs. Even in the late 1960's, the electorate's political interests were almost entirely taken up by domestic issues, and all but a few of the politicians have continued to display a similar lack of interest in foreign affairs. After 1957, however, the government gave greater and greater attention to external affairs, and much effort was devoted to the defense of domestic policies against the increasing criticism and the real danger of hostile action from other countries motivated by antipathy to its domestic policies.

During the 1960's the country had withdrawn or been expelled from nearly all the specialized agencies of the United Nations, all inter-African organizations, and a large number of nongovernmental bodies, including the International Olympic Committee and other sports bodies upset by the country's racial division of athletic teams.

Many of the country's leaders favored resigning from the United Nations General Assembly and other bodies where the country encountered continual criticism, but their isolationist efforts were opposed by those who sought to improve the country's position by strengthening its ties to the outside world. This question was the major foreign policy division in the country's internal political debates, and isolationism was a major political issue in the 1970 parliamentary election (see ch. 15, Political Dynamics).

In the 1960's the country sought to break the ring of opposition and to influence public opinion in the Western states through major diversified propaganda efforts to improve its image without, however, altering its internal policies. Any fundamental change in the country's foreign relations position inevitably depended upon changes in internal policy amounting to a basic reconstruction of the pattern of the society, a condition rarely required of states forced to adapt to the changing circumstances of international politics and one that the South Africans were not prepared to
make. As South Africa entered the 1970's, it appeared that its international ties were being strengthened by a number of factors, basically economic, but the moral and ideological issues that divided it from most of the rest of the world remained.

SOUTH AFRICA'S WORLD POSITION, 1919-69

Until after World War II, South Africa occupied an important position in international relations, primarily because of major states' high opinion of the country's long-time prime minister, Jan Smuts. The young state in 1919 was able to exert influence far beyond its meager strength at the Versailles Conference after World War I and at the discussions leading to the creation of the League of Nations. As part of the war settlement and of the terms of the creation of the League, South Africa was awarded the mandate over the former German territory of South West Africa, which it bordered on two sides. It was the only country to receive a mandate that could be administered as an integral part of its national territory (see Appendix—South West Africa).

In the interwar years South Africa played a significant part in the creation of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Its military and industrial contributions to Allied efforts in World War II were significant, and at the end of the war, Jan Smuts, one of the few remaining political leaders of international stature who had been involved in the creation of the League, was able to make significant contributions to the creation of the United Nations, a fact attested to by Harry S. Truman, then president of the United States. In addition to its membership in the United Nations and the British Commonwealth, South Africa was the only important independent state in Africa with ties to the white settlers throughout the continent.

Throughout this period South Africa's policy debates over external affairs dealt only with the question of continued ties to the Commonwealth and Great Britain, a matter of sensitivity to the Afrikaner population, which saw them as signs of continued British domination over Afrikaner interests. The English-speaking white population remained loyal to the British crown.

The years that followed the creation of the United Nations saw the steady decline of South Africa's international position. The issues that brought about this decline related less to changes within the country than to a change in the attitudes of most European states and the United States in regard to the rights of nonwhite majorities to rule themselves. South Africa's sociopolitical system was not unique in the prewar world, whose attitudes toward the underdeveloped nonwhite countries had been governed by the idea of the "white man's burden," the supposed duty of the "advanced"
white nations to manage the affairs of the “backward” colored races. The attitudes and aims in the majority of Western states changed during the war and immediate postwar years. As a result of these changes, as well as the efforts of the colonial peoples themselves, a half-dozen states attained independence in the early postwar years, and the stage was set for decolonization in a large number of other emerging countries.

South Africa, however, was ruled not by a colonial elite but by a landed white minority, and this difference, little more than a technicality in the prewar era, became a crucial distinction in a world social order based on new suppositions. Colonial forces and colonists could be withdrawn to the motherland, and political decisions could be made by politicians responsible to electorates not greatly or directly affected by loss of the elite privileges provided to the colonists. South African whites, particularly the Afrikaners, who had broken their ties to Europe two centuries earlier, had no place to which to withdraw, and the decisions were made by politicians solely responsible to an electorate who would all suffer from any loss of their privileges as the racial, political, and economic elite.

As a result, while the European colonial powers moved toward new programs for their nonwhite subjects, South African electors brought into power an Afrikaner government with even more conservative ideas of the superiority of white dominance than its prewar predecessors. The new government lacked the international contacts and experience of the Smuts government. Moreover, major segments of the new ruling party had distinctly isolationist views.

Since 1948 South Africa has been continually subjected to stronger criticism in the United Nations and before world opinion as a result of its failure to conform to the new norms of political behavior by granting political rights to its nonwhites. India, which had raised the question of the lack of political rights of South Africa’s 400,000 Indians before the United Nations in late 1947, remained for a long time the major critic. Other countries also advanced criticism on the grounds that South Africa’s treatment of its African population was in violation of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, a document they held to be second in importance only to the United Nations Charter, but one to which South Africa has never subscribed.

South Africa was also vulnerable to criticism before the international forum because of its mandate over South West Africa. After the collapse of the League of Nations, South Africa approached the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1947 with a request to allow the annexation of the territory, but the motion was defeated, partially as a result of the Indian accusation. South Africa then refused to provide the United Nations with the annual reports on affairs in the territory that were required of it by the
terms of the mandate, contending that the mandate’s requirement was that a report be given to the League and, since the League had ceased to exist, no report was due. The United Nations efforts to exert control over the territory continued to be a major foreign policy issue for the country in early 1970 (see Appendix—South West Africa).

Despite the growing opposition to its internal policies, South Africa retained an active role in the international community. Its forces served with the United Nations in Korea, and its views on African affairs, particularly the administrative, economic, and technical development of the continent, continued to be respected by the colonial powers involved in Africa.

The period after 1957 brought about a change in Africa’s political balance. Ghana became the first black African country to obtain independence from colonial rule in that year, and the next ten years saw the number of other independent states on the continent rise from six to thirty-seven. To the leaders of these states, who had struggled for the overthrow of white minority rule, South Africa’s racial policies were anathema. At the same time a hardening in attitudes toward the country because of its political philosophy of racial superiority occurred in the major Western states, in part motivated by the coming to power of the nonwhite states with their considerable influence exerted through bloc voting in the United Nations but primarily by a growing awareness of the moral issues involved.

Until 1960 the United Nations activities on the subject were limited to condemnatory resolutions by the General Assembly. After the Sharpeville incident, however, the issue was elevated to the United Nations Security Council. The Security Council voted to consider apartheid as a possible danger to peace and security and thus made the discussion of apartheid legally an international issue. A similar motion before the General Assembly was carried ninety-six to one. In 1962 the General Assembly passed a resolution requesting member states to apply economic and diplomatic sanctions on a voluntary basis. It also requested that member states close their ports and airports to South African vessels, a provision complied with in the next three years by the great majority of African states; the majority of these countries also barred overflight rights to South African aircraft, which forced the country’s aircraft to fly to Europe via much longer routes over the ocean.

In 1963 the Security Council passed resolutions requesting member states to bar the sale of arms to South Africa. The United States and a number of other countries had already imposed at least partial arms embargos. After passage of the resolutions the United States, Great Britain, and nearly all other states established comprehensive embargos, which were still being maintained in early 1970. France,
however, did not honor the embargo and shipped large arms supplies to the country. In December of 1963 the Security Council created a committee of experts to recommend measures that the United Nations might support to bring about change within the country. The recommendations released in early 1964 included the creation of a United Nations scholarship program for South African refugees and the further study of resources needed to apply sanctions against the country.

In 1964 the question of economic sanctions against the country became a major international issue. The movement had lost momentum by 1970, however, following the failure of sanctions against Rhodesia. An effective blockade of the southern African coast would have required the full support of the world’s major powers. In the face of the demands for sanctions, however, South Africa made strong efforts to ensure that it would be able to frustrate any future sanctions by stockpiling several years’ supply of strategic materials, including petroleum, which it must import.

Since the coming to power of the Nationalist Party in 1948, at least some of its theoreticians have urged an outgoing policy toward the rest of Africa and called for the creation of a broad customs and monetary union that would be dominated by the strong South African economy, giving the country the position of the senior partner among a group of independent but economically subservient states. Some envisioned this grouping as running as far north as Kenya. As many observers have noted, in its simplest form this transnational policy is aimed at stilling the fears of the electorate by erecting a protective barrier of states north of the country’s borders.

Since 1958 the official government policy has been to offer friendly relations to all newly emerging African states without modifying its racist policies. At the same time the government gave up its longstanding claims that had regarded the three high commission territories (Bechuanaland, now Botswana, Swaziland and Basutoland, now Lesotho) as the country’s eventual patrimony, in line with the tentative agreements made in drafting the country’s constitution in 1910.

REFUGEES

The view of South Africa in both independent Africa and the Western World has been significantly influenced by the small but steady flow of South African refugees. Whites are generally free to leave the country, and some who oppose the government have done so; others have been expelled. Nonwhites are not generally authorized to leave, and Africans in opposition are not expelled. Nevertheless, the number of Africans fleeing the country continued to
grow; despite stringent security measures, many slipped across the long borders with Botswana, and a few defected while on rarely authorized overseas trips.

Except for those who leave South West Africa for Zambia via the Caprivi Strip, these refugees are largely members of the educated segment of the African population, able to exert an influence beyond their numbers. They have included a number of students seeking to continue their education free of the influences of apartheid. Roughly 200 of these have received their education with assistance from the United States government, either in the United States or at two schools for refugees in Tanzania and Zambia.

RELATIONS WITH GREAT BRITAIN

Great Britain and South Africa are strongly linked by economic, historical, cultural, and ethnic ties (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Since at least 1961, however, the British government has made clear its opposition to the country’s racial policies and has taken the stand that these policies warrant international concern. In 1963 it joined the arms embargo against South Africa, despite the fact that as the country’s major arms supplier it suffered a major loss of foreign trade.

Major sections of the British political parties and other prominent organizations have continued to call for strong efforts to bring about a change in South Africa’s racial order, largely on moral grounds. On the other hand, certain British financial and manufacturing interests are deeply involved in, and in many cases dependent upon, trade with and raw materials from the country, and these have created a strong lobby in South Africa’s favor. South Africa has responded to the British arms embargo by finding a new source in France and has sought to end some of its ties to Britain by encouraging investment and trade from continental Western Europe and the Far East. Its economy, however, remained closely oriented to Great Britain (see ch. 24, Foreign Economic Relations). For this and other reasons, the country maintains its largest diplomatic staff in Britain and expends its greatest propaganda and other efforts there to prevent a deterioration of relations and to improve its image.

The major theme of South African propaganda is the insistence that the nonwhites are better off materially than Africans in any other part of the continent and that continued prosperity will improve their standards, while foreign action against the South African economy would be felt primarily by the nonwhites, who would be the first to lose their jobs.

Great Britain’s policy toward South Africa was guided to some degree by its need for the naval base at Simonstown. Until 1967 the
Simonstown Agreement granting use of the base to Great Britain also linked the two countries in a mutual defense pact. In January 1967 an agreement, which replaced the original treaty, provided for British use of the base facilities, even during a war in which South Africa remained neutral, the stationing of a liaison officer at the base, and a continuation of British military overflight rights. Although the value of the base appeared limited, the importance of the Cape route was reinforced in mid-1967 to South Africa's advantage by the closing of the Suez Canal, which greatly increased the flow of traffic around the Cape.

South Africa has not hesitated to attempt to use its control of Simonstown to its diplomatic advantage; for example, when Great Britain joined the arms embargo against it, South Africa threatened to terminate the agreement if the British government refused to relax its stand. Again in 1968 the country's foreign minister warned the British government that unless the embargo was lifted, South Africa would denounce the base agreement. The commandant general of the South African Defense Force has admitted that long-range air transport capabilities were diminishing Simonstown's importance.

RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

Considerable strains in relations between the United States and South Africa resulted from efforts by the government of the United States to make clear its opposition to the country's racial policies and to encourage its government to modify its policies to meet the demands of the country's nonwhite leaders and world opinion. In the mid 1960's both the United States and Great Britain had concluded that the imposition of worldwide economic sanctions would be impractical in current circumstances because of the difficulty of enforcement and the economic costs involved. The South African government considered United States policy to be a consequence of its desires to retain the confidence and support of the other independent states of Africa; the United States, however, rested its support for demands for change within South Africa on its fear of a racial conflagration.

The United States has continued its arms embargo and has taken a number of lesser actions, such as barring the visits of naval vessels to South African ports. The United States has also resisted attempts by South Africa to portray itself as an important part of the Western World's defenses against Communist efforts at expansion in the Indian Ocean and Africa; it has argued that the hatred and ill will South Africa has generated among the Asian and African states does more to forward the aims of communism than the South African government's military strength at the strategic Cape does to prevent
their realization. From 1967 to 1970 United States' efforts to stabilize world currencies by preventing a rise in the price of South Africa's gold exports were also viewed by South Africa as an effort damaging the country's interests. American diplomats in South Africa took a leading position in expressing support for multiracialism, and the United States generally supported measures in the United Nations expressing abhorrence of apartheid and seeking to influence the country to alter its racial policies.

South Africa's leaders viewed all these moves with alarm. For many of them the United States' motives were incomprehensible, and many viewed them as the unfair efforts of a major power to exert influence over their country's internal affairs. Despite these antagonisms, South Africa continued to espouse anti-Communist views paralleling the United States' general world policy.

RELATIONS WITH AFRICAN STATES

Until the appearance of the new African countries in the 1960's, the country looked upon itself as a European state on the African continent. During the 1960's, however, the country's leaders have come to conceive of themselves as white Africans and to believe that their country's place is as the major power among the states of the southern half of the African continent. They hope that the black African states will ignore South Africa's internal ideological and racial policies. To facilitate this, they seek to convince the other African states that their racial policies are purely an internal affair of no business or importance to the rest of the continent, that apartheid policies are no threat to them, and that they should live at peace with South Africa. Its relations with its neighbors are primarily aimed at the security of its frontiers and the expansion of markets for the country's manufactured products; a secondary goal is reduction of opposition from the western nations, which South Africa sees as being primarily influenced by the antagonism of the independent African states.

The government considers that its strongest hope is not in establishing good relations with African states but in having those states become more fully involved in their own problems and in intra-African tensions, and thus able to devote less energy to the Pan-Africanist ideals of seeing the liberation of southern Africa from racial and colonial rule. South Africa's offers of aid, technical cooperation, and the benefits of a common market have little appeal to nationalist leaders in independent countries whose main ideological commitment is to an Africa free of non-African rule, and for most of whom the South African white minority government is the absolute antagonist.

Although by early 1970 the peak of opposition to the country
seemed to have passed, the improvement in the country's relations with some African states was only relative. The governments of all the states—even the most encircled of them, Lesotho—are basically opposed to South Africa's racial policies and only deal with the country out of necessity or the desire to influence a more rapid change. None can be viewed as an ally, except the white minority government in Rhodesia. Even the Portuguese in Mozambique and Angola, although linked to South Africa economically and in a common opposition to African nationalism, rejected the label of "ally" on the grounds that they did not accept South Africa's racial philosophy.

Relations with Rhodesia

By early 1970, despite its close ties to and involvement with the white minority regime in Rhodesia, which had unilaterally declared its independence of the British crown in late 1965, South Africa had still not granted diplomatic recognition to the neighboring colony. This failure to extend diplomatic recognition resulted largely from its deference to Great Britain and its doubts over the consequences of recognition on its own position.

The South African government would prefer to see continued white rule in Rhodesia, but open support for Rhodesia, while it remained without British approval, would further weaken South Africa's ties with the United States and Europe and would make it even more difficult to establish relations with black Africa. In its view, underwriting some of the cost of Rhodesian white rule in the face of world sanctions or in the case of large-scale guerrilla warfare would be a burden to the South African economy. If the white Rhodesian regime became embroiled in a widespread military campaign, the South African government knows that its electorate would clearly favor South African military support, if only under the supposition that led to the stationing of South African paramilitary police in Rhodesia from 1966 to 1970, that South African revolutionary exiles would enter their country under the cover provided by armed conflict in Rhodesia. If, on the other hand, Rhodesia had a responsible African or multiracial government, the South Africans realize that they would be in a position to exert strong pressure, similar to the pressure brought to bear against its other neighboring African-run states, to insure that Rhodesia was not used as a haven for anti-South African regime activities, and less world attention might be focused on southern Africa.

These latter considerations by the government, however, have been limited by two factors. First, any weakening of support for Rhodesian whites is viewed by the South African white electorate as a sign of weakness and as a betrayal of the group with which
South Africa has the strongest personal, cultural, and historic ties. Second, the ability of the Rhodesian government to remain in power in the face of a world boycott has made the Rhodesians something of heroes to the South Africans, and the continued failure of sanctions against Rhodesia has weakened some of the demand for sanctions against South Africa. The government has announced that the South African Police (SAP) would remain in Rhodesia as long as the threat of guerrilla invasion remains.

Relations with Portuguese Territories

Despite differences in racial philosophy and strong cultural antagonisms based on historic ethnic and religious factors, in early 1970 Portugal and South Africa were closely linked by common economic and security interests in the Portuguese colonies of Angola and, particularly, Mozambique. The latter has always supplied a major portion of South Africa's mine labor and provided important sea and rail transit facilities through the port of Lourenço Marques. The mutually beneficial flow of labor to the South African mines and of minerals to the Mozambique ports have been controlled by international treaty since the turn of the century. During the 1960's South Africa developed two new economic interests in the country, the exploitation and production of oil from fields in Mozambique and the construction of the huge hydroelectric project at Cabora Bassa, which eventually will supply electricity to South Africa. The country is also interested in oil and hydroelectric production in Angola.

The countries were primarily linked by common security interests. Guerrillas operating in both Angola and Mozambique from bases in the independent states were attempting in the late 1960's and early 1970 to overthrow Portuguese colonial rule. Victory in either case would bring a revolutionary African government to the borders of South African controlled territory. In the case of Mozambique this would present a critical situation because of the proximity of their common borders to vital population and industrial centers. The extent of South African support for the Portuguese forces was not generally known, but the major foreign policy questions, as in the case of Rhodesia, were what actions the country should be prepared to take in the future, if insurgent victory seemed imminent, either because of guerrilla victories, or because the military-economic strain on Portugal proved too great.

Relations with Independent States

By early 1970 a few members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) had economic and other ties with South Africa, or
had expressed at least limited interest in such ties. In addition to the four states under South African economic sway (Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, and Botswana), these included Malagasy, Mauritius, the Ivory Coast, Gabon, and Ghana.

Lesotho’s, Swaziland’s, and Botswana’s reasons for maintaining ties with South Africa are primarily geographic. Lesotho is entirely surrounded by the country, and Swaziland has no access to the outside world except through South Africa or the Portuguese colony of Mozambique. Botswana does touch borders with Zambia at one point and thus is able to maintain direct air and limited vehicular contact with an independent country (via a ferry across the Zambezi River at a point where the river’s ownership is contested with South Africa). The only practical route for the majority of Botswana’s imports, however, is via the rail line to South Africa.

Malawi, Lesotho, and Botswana and, to a lesser extent, Swaziland are also bound to South Africa by economic necessity. As much as half of the Lesotho government’s revenues are drawn from a customs union with South Africa. All of Lesotho’s imports and exports must pass through South Africa. Large numbers of workers from these countries, as well as from the Portuguese colony of Mozambique, work in South Africa and their remitted pay is a major source of national income. About 130,000 of Lesotho’s total population of 900,000, the great majority of its economically active population, work in the mines and on the farms of South Africa.

One-tenth of Botswana’s total population was employed in South Africa in the mid-1960’s, but the country was in a somewhat more independent political position at the beginning of 1970, after the discovery of considerable mineral resources and the inflow of large amounts of foreign capital to exploit the new discoveries. In addition to a more independent economic position, the new mines and subsidiary developments were expected to provide a source of wage employment to replace the dependence on jobs in South Africa. This new independence enabled the government to adopt a more independent attitude toward South Africa in late 1969. In speeches before the UN and on political platforms, Botswana’s prime minister, Sir Seretse Khama, stated that his country, as a nonracial democracy in the heart of southern Africa, would serve as a direct challenge to South Africa by making more obvious the falseness of its racial policies. His country has also strengthened its ties to the OAU and provides refuge to those fleeing from South Africa. It was clear, however, that Botswana remained unwilling to serve as a base for underground activity by South African blacks.

Although Malawi is geographically independent, it faces much the same problems as the three states surrounded or bounded by South Africa. More than a third of the Malawi total work force—70,000 workers—were employed in South Africa in the late 1960’s.
Africa is Malawi's largest trading partner, and the South African government is financing the major part of the costs of constructing Malawi's new capital city of Lilongwe. Malawi's only rail line to the sea runs through the Portuguese colony of Mozambique. Although Malawi's economic ties are certainly influential, its president, H. K. Banda, is ideologically committed, as is Botswana's president, to aims similar to those espoused by the Malagasy government.

The Malagasy Republic dropped some of its barriers to South Africa in 1968 and 1969, allowing a new tourist hotel to be constructed under South African management and the establishment of tourist flights from South Africa to Malagasy. In part, this policy is aimed at obtaining revenue from the tourist market, but Malagasy's primary reasons for adopting a less hostile attitude to South Africa are not economic or geographic. The Malagasy government, while strongly opposed to apartheid, believes that it can be best weakened by increasing the contacts between white South Africa and black Africa. It hopes that the younger generation's leaders in South Africa will have the opportunity to come to know Africa and to realize that if Africans in the rest of the continent can rule themselves and can function harmoniously with the white minority, then white South Africans can expect the same capabilities and the same good will from the blacks of their own country. The prime minister of Ghana, Kofi Busia, also called in late 1969 for a reassessment of the OAU states' relations with South Africa, as had the government of the Ivory Coast.

The majority of the thirty-six member states of the OAU remains rigidly opposed to any concession to South Africa. Their major political philosophy is African unity that, in its international political context, is viewed principally as the way in which the independent but weak states may exert a meaningful impact on world affairs and gain the strength to avoid being left at the mercy of the stronger powers. The strength through unity which they seek is not racial unity, for it includes the Arabs of northern Africa. Their philosophy does, however, include total opposition to foreign domination or to the continuation of rule by white minority regimes, which they identify with the white colonial governments from which they themselves achieved independence. Despite the permanence of the Afrikaners' ties to the continent, the other states cannot bring themselves to view theirs as an African government, as the South Africans had hoped. The more concerned of the leaders, particularly the president of Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda, also fear the effect upon the independent African countries of what they see as South Africa's efforts to divide the rest of the continent and of the inevitable bloody interracial warfare arising from the future clash between the country's blacks and whites.

The African nations most actively opposed to South Africa are
Zambia and Tanzania. Both are key members of the OAU’s African Liberation Committee, which supplies a major portion of the funds for the military operations of the revolutionary movements in southern Africa. In addition, Tanzania has provided a headquarters in exile for the two South African liberation groups, the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress. Zambia serves as the primary route for guerrilla forces entering the southern tier of countries. Both have provided haven for significant numbers of persons fleeing South African rule. South Africans and South West Africans in the two countries numbered about 15,000 in 1969.

Prime Minister Vorster stated in 1968 that Tanzania, Zambia, and certain other black African states were slowly but surely building up an army for an eventual attack on South Africa, but assured his listeners that the government would continue to do everything possible to discourage such military action. Ranking South African military officers had already publicly stated that in their opinions reprisals should be carried out against Zambia for serving as a sanctuary for guerrillas en route to Rhodesia and South West Africa.

South Africa encountered its first externally based guerrilla activity during 1966, as attacks were made against its forces in the Caprivi Strip of South West Africa by forces of the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO). Elements of the African National Congress allied with the Rhodesian guerrillas, the Zimbabwe African People’s Union, during 1967 in order to open a route into South Africa through Rhodesia. Apparently no similar overt guerrilla activity occurred during 1969 or early 1970. Guerrilla attempts of the Pan-Africanist Congress in 1968 to open a second attack route through Mozambique from Zambia to the northeastern Transvaal were intercepted by Portuguese forces.

DIPLOMATIC TIES

In 1969 some forty states maintained ties with South Africa at the consular level or above. This figure included the nonresident diplomats of the three adjacent African states of Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland but did not include the accredited diplomatic mission of the rebellious British colony of Rhodesia. Only one state, Malawi, had an accredited black diplomat, although both Japan and the Republic of China (Taiwan) had Asian consul generals. More than half of the seventeen countries represented at the consular level were represented only by honorary consuls. The division of the country’s seat of government between separate legislative and executive capitals had led a number of countries to maintain offices in both Pretoria and Cape Town. In addition various countries maintained consulates at the business capital, Johannesburg, and such ports as Durban, East London, and Port Elizabeth,
and even Walvis Bay, the South African enclave on the coast of South West Africa.

The only notable bilateral or multilateral ties to other states were the customs union with Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland; the labor and transport treaties with Mozambique; two treaties allowing the operation of space tracking stations in the country by France and the United States; and an agreement providing for British military overflights and the use of the naval base at Simonstown. Despite apparent ties, no military agreements with Portugal or Rhodesia had been avowed.

Foreign diplomats, even those from the few countries generally friendly to South Africa, find difficulty in making contact with the country's officials, a result in part of South Africans' formal concept of diplomacy. More important, however, is the reserve that Afrikaners have retained in dealing with foreigners, partially the result of their current experience of worldwide opposition. This reserve extends particularly to representatives of the foreign press because the Nationalist Party leaders and Afrikaners generally consider much of the foreign reporting as unfair to their position.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE AND POLICY FORMATION

The South African Department of External Affairs, later to become the Department of Foreign Affairs, was created in 1927. By 1934 there were nine legations. For its first thirty years it remained under the control of the prime minister. Policy formation is carried out by a very small number of people led by a handful of senior diplomats. There is a severe shortage of foreign service staff so that special efforts, such as preparation of papers for the defense of South Africa's interests before the United Nations General Assembly, must be carried out as an additional duty by senior level staff.

The total establishment in 1965 consisted of some 600 persons, 160 in Pretoria and 430 stationed abroad in some fifty overseas posts. Only about 10 percent of the recent applicants for the foreign service have been English speaking, although a good proportion of the senior officials, those appointed before 1953, were English speakers. Only the white population has any influence on foreign policy formation.

The foreign service has few political appointees, even at the ambassadorial level, except for the position of ambassador to London, long considered the most important post in the foreign service establishment. Those ambassadors who have not been professional foreign service officers have generally been chosen from the ranks of former cabinet ministers or members of Parliament. The professional staffing of the service and the resultant lack of political influence of its ambassadors have tended to mean that less weight is given to their reports than might otherwise be the case.
The Information Service of South Africa (ISSA), created in 1938, is distinct from the foreign service. Its staff is usually junior to the foreign service personnel. Its officers are responsible for a majority of the public contact programs overseas and therefore, bear the brunt of hostility to their country. ISSA officers are less career oriented and large numbers have been drawn from the staff of the Afrikaner newspapers, to which they often return. In 1964 the ISSA was reorganized along geographic lines.

Expenditure on propaganda efforts aimed at foreign countries multiplied thirty times between 1952 and 1967 and was very high in proportion to the size of the country and its national budget. The costs were approximately one-third greater than the per capita expenditure of West Germany, for example, and three times as great a proportion of the national budget as that of the United States.

Except for the military attachés, only a small proportion of the staff in overseas posts are drawn from outside the foreign service and the ISSA. Officers of these two services overseas serve under emotional stress from nearly constant confrontation with foreign nationals opposed to South Africa's internal policies.

In 1969 South Africa had diplomatic and consular posts in twenty-eight countries, as well as consulate generals in Mozambique and Angola and a diplomatic mission in Rhodesia. There were also ambassadorial posts at the United Nations and the headquarters of the European Economic Community. The largest contingents were in Great Britain and the United States. The forty-five South African diplomats in the United States included five stationed at the United Nations and consular posts at New York, San Francisco, and New Orleans as well as at the embassy in Washington.

Decisions are generally made at the top level among the most senior staff of the department. At times the prime minister has been known to take an interest in the day-to-day operations of the department, in part the result of the long tradition of the prime minister's direct responsibility for foreign affairs, and the close link between internal and external policy. The first minister of foreign affairs was not appointed until 1955, and much policymaking continued to be conducted in the prime minister's office.

All important foreign policy decisions are considered by the full cabinet, with leadership generally being taken by the prime minister, the foreign minister, and others with interests in foreign affairs, such as the ministers of defense, information, and finance. Influence on cabinet decisions is then exercised by the senior officials: the secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, the secretary of the ISSA, and a handful of other senior officials of the foreign service.

The legislature has little involvement in foreign policy formation. Few members of Parliament are specialists in foreign affairs.
Nationalist Party caucus in Parliament has a foreign policy information group, but the group has little influence on government policymaking. In part, their position is weak because of the narrowness of view of much of the Party's membership on foreign policy questions, particularly among the right wing of the party, which views nearly all foreign influences as subversive and, therefore, most foreign ties as dangerous. The only foreign policy steps to which they react are those that they feel show any sign of weakness on the part of the rulers. The strong party discipline among the Nationalists and the reluctance of the United Party, which views itself as the loyal opposition, to criticize in any way that might support or be taken to support foreign criticism, reduce the scope for meaningful foreign policy debates.

The major white opposition party, the United Party, sees South Africa's foreign policy in much the same terms as the Nationalists do, except that they tend to emphasize the need for stronger ties to the outside world, particularly the white Commonwealth states. It bases its foreign policy appeal to the electorate on a claim that its programs for a racial federation would come closer to meeting the demands of the Western states with which South Africa has the strongest need for ties. The party has adopted no policies toward foreign affairs that differ significantly from the major wing of the Nationalists.

The Progressive Party is also eager to keep external pressures to a minimum, even though its internal policies are completely at odds with the government's racial policies. Its leaders hope that they can achieve meaningful changes in the system by extending the franchise to all educated men, regardless of their color (see ch. 15, Political Dynamics).

Internal policies are closely tied to ideological considerations, and most of the important foreign policy issues arise over international challenges to those ideologically tied, internal policies. Nevertheless, most foreign policy originates on an ad hoc basis as a response to a particular challenge or changing circumstances.

The major foreign policy issue that occupied South African attention throughout the 1960's was the challenge to South Africa's continued control over its League of Nations mandate (see Appendix—South West Africa). A very high proportion of the time and energy of the Department of Foreign Affairs and the other government bodies dealing with international issues was devoted to countering charges before the International Court of Justice and the United Nations, as well as in efforts to defend South Africa's position. Considerable effort was also involved in contingency planning in case the International Court's decision did go against the country and in case international efforts, particularly economic sanctions, were applied in an effort to enforce an unfavorable decision. Even
after the International Court ultimately declined to consider the issue in mid-1966, contingency planning continued in the face of a renewed threat from the United Nations General Assembly to end the mandate.

OTHER INFLUENCES ON FOREIGN POLICY

Other forces formulating foreign policy are limited in number and strength. Only a very small number of academicians are interested in international affairs. In the mid-1960's, for example, there were no scholars specializing in the United States and at most a dozen specializing in the affairs of black Africa, the area of crucial interest to South Africa; in 1965 only one of these was a political scientist. Few, if any, of these had any contact with the policymakers of the government. This paucity of scholarship extends to international affairs in general.

The press, particularly the Afrikaans press, had similar limitations in international affairs. Only one South African journalist was stationed in the United States in the mid-1960's. The influential Afrikaans press read by government leaders and the formulators of foreign policy was almost entirely dependent on the United States and British foreign news services for their external reports. The government's radio monopoly, the South African Broadcasting Corporation, was notably lacking in objective foreign reporting, in the opinion of most foreign writers and many South African critics, and was generally used by the government to defend its position on foreign policy questions. The English-language press featured foreign news with some prominence, but its long hostility to the governing party prevented it from having significant impact. Even Afrikaans papers were rated by observers as having only a slight direct impact on policymaking in general and even less on foreign policy, although some political columnists had significant influence on opinion in the Nationalist Party and thus eventually on the government (see ch. 17, Public Information).

The press does maintain much more extensive contacts in black Africa than does the government, and an occasional South African journalist freely visits all but the most hostile countries. The English-language press, particularly the magazine News/Check, carries considerable reporting on the rest of Africa, but it is apparently against government policy to seek out information from any outside sources.

The Dutch Reformed Church, which has strong influence on internal policies, has become increasingly less interested in affairs outside the country's borders in the last two decades, despite its early ties to missionary activities in the rest of Africa and its former interest in ecumenical movements.
The armed forces, which play such an important part in foreign policy formation in some countries, are assigned primarily to an internal defense role and are completely subordinate to the political powers. The armed forces do maintain attachés and they are eager to maintain good relations with France, the only supplier of sophisticated arms which has not maintained an embargo against the country, but this policy coincides with the government's. The military point of view on foreign policy questions is sought on issues concerning the neighboring states because of their importance to South African security. Paramilitary police operate in Rhodesia in concert with the Rhodesian army, and at least enough South African military have been assigned to the Portuguese colonies to be familiar with the insurgent warfare being conducted there; the country's military staff remains knowledgeable about the rest of the countries of southern Africa through other means. The government's primary intelligence gathering body, the Special Branch of the police or its successor, the Bureau of State Security (BOSS) created in 1969, does have an external intelligence role (see ch. 26, Public Order and Internal Security; ch. 27, The Armed Forces).

The general electorate is little concerned with foreign policy matters and has created few means of effecting foreign policy. Despite advanced market research capabilities, no public opinion surveys on foreign policy matters have been undertaken, and foreign policy is not a major political issue. Only a limited number of pressure groups exist and only one, the strongly Zionist Jewish Community, is oriented at all toward foreign affairs. The government's support for Israel, however, has hinged on other considerations. The government is particularly sensitive to reacting to external or internal pressure groups.

The only two organizations concerned with international affairs are the South African Institute of International Affairs and the Africa Institute. Both are organizations of limited membership and appeal. The former is composed chiefly of English speakers of liberal views and has no influence on the government. The Africa Institute, on the other hand, is a scholarly organization which has received some government support to undertake studies on Africa, but these have not been of a policymaking nature.

The only real influence on foreign policy from outside the center of the government is exerted by the business community to whom foreign economic ties and trade are so vital. The key element in the business community's efforts is the South Africa Foundation, directed and funded by major business interests and ultimately designed to strengthen the country's image overseas, providing vital support to the Information Service. Since the business interests by the late 1960's included a sizable proportion of Afrikaners with a considerable influence in government, the business community or
portions of it had fairly direct access to the policymakers. A number of businessmen are noted overseas as liberals interested in improving the position of the nonwhites in the country's economy, and some are also concerned with improving the Africans' political position.

ATTITUDES TOWARD OTHER STATES

For many years the country's nonwhite population looked to Great Britain as the foremost foreign power with any influence over their lives, primarily as a result of Britain's historical protective role (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). After 1931 Britain no longer retained any power, except a vestigial influence over questions involving the Indian community resulting from imperial control over India. These last interests were undertaken by India and Pakistan at their independence in 1947, and it is to India in particular that the Asian community of South Africa has looked for limited assistance and moral support. Although Britain continued to be regarded as the proponent of just colonial rule even into the 1960's, as early as the last decades of the nineteenth century African and Coloured interests had begun to shift to the United States, initially as the result of contacts between American Negro religious groups and the independent African Christian churches of the country.

Throughout the first half of the present century, American Negro religious and cultural influence grew in importance, although the political influence of the United States was weakened by the Africans' knowledge of segregation. This American influence was broadened during World War II by the impact of the liberal and anticolonial pronouncements of the United States government and by its replacement of Great Britain as the world's foremost English-speaking power. The postwar victories of civil rights forces in the United States and American advocacy of anticolonialism raised the American image to the foremost position. Beginning in the late 1950's, however, the most important foreign political image for the country's African population was that of the newly independent states of Africa. In the late 1960's the United States seemed to be ranked first culturally, but ranked first politically were those African states whose stability and progress under African leadership stood in marked contrast to white South Africa's denials that Africans were capable of ruling themselves.

The English-speaking white population travels extensively outside its own continent. They are thus widely familiar with the rest of the world but particularly with Great Britain and the United States. In addition to tourism these are the two countries with which they maintain the closest economic and other ties. Britain is regarded as the cultural, if no longer the political, homeland and many have
family ties there. British cultural influences are challenged only by American influences among the population as a whole. British influences also predominate throughout the educational system, although the large numbers, particularly among the English speakers, for whom efficiency in business and technology are predominant values, look to the United States for higher educational ideals. The English-speaking whites also have a strong affinity for the white states of the British Commonwealth, particularly Australia which, because of its location at the periphery of Asia, is viewed as being in a position analogous to that of the white South African nation.

In recent years some of the wealthier among the Afrikaners have also been well traveled, but the community as a whole continues to be not only preoccupied, as are the English speakers, with their country's internal affairs, but actually inward looking, and continues eager to exclude foreign influences even on the cultural level, though largely without success (see ch. 17, Public Information). The majority, even of the political leaders, have had only limited personal contact with foreigners and display considerable reserve. Prime Minister Vorster, for example, had only been outside the country once, on a pleasure trip to Brazil, until 1970. The cosmopolitan upbringing of the younger generation has diminished this attitude, and educated younger Afrikaners often appear to be as outgoing as do the English speakers.

Among the English speakers, the widespread foreign hostility that they encounter has created a feeling that a unanimity of opinion is required in the country, the kind of unanimity found in states at war. Of those who might otherwise express criticism of the government, many withhold that criticism out of fear of giving support to the enemy or of appearing treasonous to their countrymen.

Such defensive attitudes are tempered by the knowledge that the country's foreign trade, equal to roughly one-half of the gross national product (GNP), is crucial to the national economy (see ch. 24, Foreign Economic Relations). South Africans, therefore, are no longer really ready to withdraw into isolationism. The government efforts to improve its international relations appear well worth undertaking to the government rather than allow barriers to be placed in the way of trade, but this interest does not extend as far as a willingness to make the fundamental changes to their society which foreign opinion demands.

Strong support exists among some of the country's political leaders and the white electorate for withdrawal from the United Nations, a body most hold in extremely low opinion. The government in 1961 insisted that its only reason for withdrawing from the Commonwealth was the insistence among the other members on the principle of majority rule regardless of race. These are just as strongly demanded in the United Nations, and the condemnation of
South Africa is much stronger. The country continues, however, to retain its membership and to conduct an active foreign relation program at the United Nations.

To some extent the Afrikaners retain an emotional tie to the ancient homeland, the Netherlands, and because of this and the mutual intelligibility of Dutch and Afrikaans, many of the Afrikaners of the old generation who studied overseas studied in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, this tie is of little practical significance, particularly in view of that democratic country's repugnance for the South African political system.

An antipathy is felt toward the other strong opponents of apartheid in Europe, the Scandinavian states, as well as to the states of southern Europe for religious reasons. This latter attitude remains despite South Africa's close interaction with Portugal in Mozambique and press portrayals of the Portuguese army fighting the guerrillas there as South Africa's front line of defense.

The Jewish population is strongly Zionist, but most of South Africa's support for Israel's diplomatic position has come from the Afrikaner leadership. These nationalists see Israel's position surrounded by Arabs and their own position surrounded by black Africans as analogous.

Among the whites, the Communist nations were shunned and looked upon as the major opponents and the real fomenters of opposition to the country. For most, however, the term "Communist state" was not necessarily limited to states of the Sino-Soviet bloc but was sometimes used as a pejorative for all of the more vociferous foreign opponents of the country's internal policies. The black Africans generally viewed the Communist countries as too remote to be of interest and additionally were influenced by unfavorable information about the Soviet Bloc presented by South African and Western media.

A number of programs function to expose South African leaders to the outside world, including some important bilateral programs with the United States. The most important of these is the United States-South African Leader Exchange program, financed by South African and United States businessmen with interests in promoting relations between the two countries or in introducing South Africans to United States racial attitudes. The program provides for prolonged familiarization visits of leaders, including a limited number of nonwhites, from all walks of life. A large number of white businessmen, particularly of the younger generations, have worked and studied in Europe and the United States.

The increased contact between the country's white electorate and the outside world has generally resulted in greater support for the government. Afrikaner political traditions are based on a long history of struggle for survival against external opposition, from...
distant European liberal opponents of slavery and serfdom as well as from the surrounding black African nations with whom Afrikaners vied for control of the land. In the late 1960's they saw the Nationalist Party's aggressive defense of its policies in foreign affairs in much the same light, and the party's leaders were buoyed by the knowledge that the voters would view any weakening of their position as a direct threat to their survival. The continued calls from the outside world for improvements in the position of the African majority were to the Afrikaner majority little different from the liberal British demands of the early nineteenth century for the improvement in treatment of the black Africans, which triggered the traumatic event of Afrikaner history, the abandonment of their former homelands in the Cape for the Great Trek to the Transvaal (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

The English speakers have become more closely aligned with the attitudes of the Nationalist Party since the creation of the Republic and the breaking of the ties to the Commonwealth in 1961, partially as a result of the removal of these two contentious issues from the political arena and partially as a result of other factors. Among these is the generally bitter resentment of the criticism of their country, a criticism they are more apt to encounter because of their generally closer ties to the rest of the English-speaking world. They see foreign opinion as misinformed and are particularly disturbed by what they see as the failure of the foreign press to compare South Africa's problems with those they see as faced by the rest of the continent's countries, particularly those involving the treatment of racial minorities. They have also reacted strongly to some of the more tragic postindependence events in the rest of the continent. These situations have increased their fears of African rule, and caused them to move closer to Afrikaner racial views.
CHAPTER 17

PUBLIC INFORMATION

South Africa's potential for leadership in the circulation of information to the public exceeded that of any country south of the Sahara. In early 1970 its technological competence, professional journalistic skills, and wealth exceeded those of most African states striving to inform and educate emergent populations. The government estimated that more than 90 percent of the white citizens and approximately 55 percent of the Africans were literate in the two national languages—English and Afrikaans. The literacy rate among Coloureds and Asians was assumed to be higher than that of Africans and may approximate that of whites. The availability of information, however, was generally adequate only among those citizens who qualified for it under the rules of separate development based on race.

In 1970 over 600 newspapers and periodicals circulated among an estimated 4.5 million readers. In the newspaper field there were twenty-one dailies and about 130 country newspapers that appeared once a week, twice a week, or once every two weeks. There were over 500 periodical journals and magazines.

Although a small number of publications appeared in each spoken ethnic language, sixteen of the dailies and a large majority of the less frequent newspapers and periodicals were published in English. Approximately one-third of all publications, including five daily newspapers, were in Afrikaans. A single white-owned English-language daily aimed at African readers, and ten other newspapers and periodicals appealed to Africans in combinations of all African ethnic languages, English, and Afrikaans. Two weeklies catered to Coloured in English and Afrikaans, and six were aimed at Asian readers in English and Gujarati. Newspapers, including those published for nonwhite readers were largely white-owned, although a few employed some nonwhite journalists.

Among all publications a free choice of printed information was constrained in varying degrees by twenty laws that regulated the manner and limits of free expression. Most of the newspapers objected to these restrictions, but in general all tolerated the pattern of political, economic, and social development that favored a single element of the nation's citizens. To remain active, most of the newspapers had chosen to exist under a system of self-censorship.
Their influence was restricted, because they spoke largely to a white readership that constituted 19 percent of the population. The influence of the nonwhite press was negligible.

An act of parliament gave the government a monopoly over all broadcasting. One of the continent's most technically advanced radio services broadcast multilingual programs and commercial advertising to a domestic audience of approximately 10 million listeners. Separate networks provided transmissions in English and Afrikaans. Radio Bantu offered African listeners programs in seven ethnic languages, including school broadcasts to African children. A few hours of broadcast time were devoted each day to programs aimed at nonwhite minority groups in their various languages. Although largely an entertainment medium, radio reached a larger segment of the population than did the press.

Because all radio was government-owned, the predominant English-language press regarded it as a major source of government propaganda. A gradual nationwide shift from long-range amplitude modulation (AM) domestic transmissions to those requiring frequency modulation (FM) receivers had been initiated by the government. This project was steadily diminishing the size of the audience that listened to foreign shortwave broadcasts, which were often critical of apartheid policies (see ch. 13, The Governmental System). Television was forbidden by the government.

Motion pictures were popular with all ethnic groups, but feature films were mainly of British and United States origin and were subject to government censorship. Local film companies produced occasional feature films in English and Afrikaans depicting national historical events, but most of their output consisted of newsreels, commercial advertising, and travelogues for sale to foreign film distributors.

The volume of books published in most major cities and the number of well-stocked libraries throughout the country far exceeded the average for continental Africa. General availability of books, however, was constrained by government policies that sought to establish national reading standards. Books published abroad and imported into the country were reviewed by government censors, and many were banned from sale and circulation.

To counter the effects of foreign information on domestic readers and to combat critics both at home and abroad, the government had established an extensive information program to publicize its views and to ameliorate its public image. It was assisted in this effort by business and professional organizations seeking a sympathetic response from foreign investors and tourists.

THE GOVERNMENT AND FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

Freedom of information and the right of the press to circulate free of government control were established in 1828 by Thomas
Pringle and his fellow journalists, John Fairbairn and George Grieg. An exponent of liberalism, Pringle emigrated from England in 1820 and published two issues of his monthly *South African Magazine* before the British governor suspended publication because of its editor's political views. Pringle contested the decision and was joined by Fairbairn and Grieg, whose paper, the *South African Commercial Advertiser*, also had been prohibited on political grounds. Eventually the British government overruled its colonial governor, and freedom of the press became an established principle in South Africa.

Although freedom of the press is not guaranteed by a specific constitutional act, the law, judicial decisions, proclamations and rules state clearly that the principle is officially affirmed by the government. Nevertheless, in early 1970 a series of twenty parliamentary acts and provincial ordinances remained in effect to restrain freedom of information.

Nine of the restrictions on freedom of information in effect in 1970 were established a number of years before the Nationalist government came to power. The Native Administrative Act of 1927 instituted a special censorship of films shown in the territories then reserved for Africans and prohibited words or acts that could encourage hostility between nonwhites and whites. In a country where race relations are the significant social and political issues and where political discussion is constantly concerned with racial arguments, this act makes it possible for the state to regard any political act or statement as coming under the law.

The Entertainments (Censorship) Act of 1931 established a screening board for examining films and other public entertainment. One of the duties of the board was to eradicate scenes of intermingling between white and nonwhite persons. The board’s powers of censorship were extended by the Customs Act of 1955 to cover the banning of “undesirable” printed publications imported into the country.

After the Nationalists became the governing party in 1948, reinforcement of the earlier regulations was undertaken, and eleven new laws were enacted within a period of fifteen years. Many were inspired by the government’s desire to consolidate and reinforce the practice of apartheid. Each of these laws delineated the prohibited activity and specified punitive sanctions to be taken against transgressors.

The most far-reaching act of this series is the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, which gives the government the power to ban any newspaper deemed to be spreading communism. The definition of communism contained in this act is so broad that it can be and has been used to suppress publications that are critical of the government’s apartheid policies. The government alone determines if a newspaper is disseminating views that advocate communism.
Under the terms of this act, newspapers are enjoined from reporting many news events of Communist nations. Moreover, the act gives the government power to ban people from attending meetings, and its amendments prohibit newspapers from publishing any statement by a banned person, whether he is alive or dead or whether he has left the country and lives abroad. If newspapers from abroad publish the views of banned people, the news stories are deleted before being distributed to South African readers.

A general system of control over the importation of publications has been established by the Customs Act of 1955. It prohibits the importation of any materials that are “indecent,” “obscene,” or objectionable on any other grounds. The Publications and Entertainment Act of 1963 incorporated the Customs Act of 1955 and the Post Office Act of 1958 and introduced a method of general control over all forms of publications. Under the terms of the act, publications are considered undesirable if they are “indecent, obscene, offensive, or harmful to public morals; blasphemous or offensive to the religious convictions or feelings of any section of the inhabitants of the republic; if they bring any section of the inhabitants into ridicule or contempt; if harmful to the relations between any sections of the population; or if prejudicial to the safety, general welfare, peace or good order of the state.”

Labeling a publication “indecent,” “obscene,” or “undesirable” is determined by the Publications Control Board, whose members are appointed by the minister of interior. The board has sweeping powers that extend to the examination and prohibition of any newspaper, book, magazine, and film imported into the country, and its decisions cannot be appealed to the courts. During its first year of operation in 1963, the board banned 7,500 publications and notified the public of these prohibited materials through the official Government Gazette. Included were some 4,000 books that cannot be stocked by bookshops and libraries or bought and read by individuals. The board’s work diminished after its initial effort, and in the late 1960’s it was estimated that about 700 to 800 books were being banned annually. The censors are particularly wary of paperbacks.

In general, the banned publications fall into three broad categories: pornography and horror, politics, and sociology. Some are clearly Communist in nature and some do detail violence and horror. No information is available about how many banning judgments have been dictated exclusively by security reasons and how many by the government’s desire to protect itself from the critics of apartheid. If a state of emergency is declared, the government under the Public Safety Act of 1953 has the power to close down domestic newspapers and prohibit the publishing or dissemination of any printed matter.
Under the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1953 it became an offense to use language or to perform any act calculated to cause anyone to contravene a law by organizing protest measures. Thus, if newspapers publish even the fact that Africans are planning to organize a strike against racial restrictions, the editors are liable to a charge of incitement, including penalties of up to five years in prison, a whipping of up to ten strokes, or both.

Under the Criminal Procedure Act of 1955 anyone who is believed to have information required by the police for their investigations can be brought before a magistrate and questioned. Refusal to answer can mean up to a year in jail, and this sanction can be constantly renewed. Such a law places in jeopardy any journalist who insists on protecting his sources.

The Riotous Assembly Act of 1956 prohibits the publication of material likely to engender feelings of hostility between the races. It was largely concern over the sanctions authorized by this law that prompted editors of the daily press to give the Sharpeville incident of 1960 less coverage than it received abroad (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 26, Public Order and Internal Security). The photographs taken of the incident and published in foreign newspapers never appeared in South African publications.

The Official Secrets Act of 1956 makes it an offense to publish or communicate any information relating to military and defense matters, but a 1965 amendment enlarged its scope to include police matters defined as "relating to the preservation of the internal security of the republic or the maintenance of law and order by the South African police." The authorities can prosecute any editor who has published any unofficial information about the police. The result has been that few editors publish anything affecting the police except departmental press handouts and material that has been approved by police authorities.

The Defense Amendment Act of 1967 is similarly written. It states that every item of news about defense matters must have approval for publication from the minister of defense or his designated representative. It applies to all information about the defense force and forces of allied nations while they are in South African territory. This act permits the Department of Defense to decide what is and what is not publishable. Newspapers run a considerable risk if anything is printed without the department’s approval.

The Prisons Act of 1959 affects the right of newspapers to publish pictures or stories relating to prisons and prisoners. Offenders are liable to a fine of R200 (1 rand equals US$1.40) or one year in prison without the option of a fine. Under this law it is also an offense to "publish any false information concerning the behavior or experience in prison of any prisoner or ex-prisoner or concerning the administration of any prison, knowing the same to be false, or
without taking reasonable steps to verify such information, the
onus of proving that reasonable steps were taken to verify such
information being upon the accused." The act was instituted principal-ly because of sensational stories concerning prison conditions
published by the African magazine *Drum* in the 1950's.

In 1967, under the Prison Act, charges were brought against the
editor and a reporter of the country's largest moderate, anti-
Nationalist newspaper, the *Rand Daily Mail*, and the editor of the
Sunday Times, both published in Johannesburg. The charges
stemmed from the publication in both papers of a series of articles
that alleged maladministration in the nation's prisons and maltreat-
ment of prisoners. The charges later were dropped against the
*Sunday Times* newsman after his paper printed an apology for vio-
lat ing the Prison Act. The editor of the *Rand Daily Mail* backed up
his reporter and, in turn, was supported by his publishers. In
1968—three years after the articles appeared in print—court pro-
cedings began against the two journalists. The trial continued until
mid-1969, when the two were convicted. The editor was sentenced
to pay a R200 fine or serve a 6-months' imprisonment, suspended
for three years on the condition that he did not commit another
offense punishable under the Prisons Act. South African Associated
Newspapers Limited, publisher of the *Rand Daily Mail*, was fined
R300, although it had not been formally indicted in the newspaper
trial. Four years of legal proceedings cost the publisher approxi-
mately R280,000.

Despite the numerous laws that constrain freedom of informa-
tion, the government has continued to propose additional restrictive
legislation. In 1950 a Press Commission was appointed to investi-
gate and study the journalistic practices, ethical standards, and
professional conduct of the nation's press. The commission delib-
erated for thirteen years.

In 1960 an Afrikaner legislator introduced a bill to amend the
1955 Customs Act and recommended the same restrictions on
materials published in South Africa as those imposed on imported
publications.

The Newspaper Press Union, an association of newspaper propri-
etors founded in 1901, voluntarily drew up its own press code in an
effort to prevent government censorship of the South African press
and to forestall further restrictions. It established the three-member
Board of Reference to administer the code, acting on complaints
submitted by anyone. The board, known popularly as the Press
Control Board, has no statutory or disciplinary powers. Acceptance
of the code by members of the press is voluntary but, once ac-
cepted, it becomes binding.

Although many newspapers, including the *Rand Daily Mail*, and
the South African Society of Journalists refused to subscribe to the
code and regarded it as self-censorship, its adoption by most of the press had an effect. Restrictive measures recommended in the Press Commission's 1964 Report remained largely unadopted in 1970. Moreover, the amendment to the Customs Act that became law as the Publications and Entertainments Act of 1963 refrained from subjecting South African newspapers and periodicals to overt censorship.

Apart from restrictions on freedom of the press, a large number of laws, policies, and practices controlled the people's free access to information in 1970. Motion pictures were censored or banned altogether and were generally available in most areas only to the white members of public. Bookshops were prohibited from selling the works of a lengthy list of internationally acclaimed authors, and most nonwhite readers were either denied access to public libraries or were supplied with a narrow range of subject matter. The government-controlled radio service reflected government-approved programming. Despite its existence in many other African countries, the government has refused to permit the introduction of television.

THE PRESS

From its early nineteenth century beginning, the popular press had developed mainly to serve the political and financial interests of the literate white segments of the population. The press, financed largely by white South Africans and partially from Great Britain, provided the chief national outlet for public information, with little attention given to the black majority.

In 1970 the high degree of national economic achievement was indicated by the large number of individual publications and the general sophistication of their content and style. Over 600 newspapers and periodicals circulated throughout the country. The combined circulation of all publications was estimated at approximately 4.5 million copies, but this figure did not include the many copies of all publications that were shared with other individuals or read aloud to illiterates.

All newspapers and periodicals had to be registered with the post office, and a government publication license was required. A deposit of R20,000 often was required of a newly registered newspaper, and this fee was forfeited in the event the paper was later banned. In addition, permission to publish had to be obtained from the Newspaper Press Union, which wielded sufficient power to prohibit the establishment of a publication without its consent. In view of the many laws that tended to restrict press freedom, criticism of the government, although it occurred frequently in the opposition newspapers, tended to be circumspect. None of the English-
language newspapers supported the Nationalist policies, but criticism usually stopped short of providing grounds for legal retribution. Although moderate by usual journalistic and political standards, the English-language newspapers were viewed by the government as proponents of leftist liberalism.

Over the years the press had become divided along racial, ethnic, and linguistic lines. Its publications tended to reflect the divergent views of the country's two white population groups—the English-speaking inhabitants and the Afrikaners. In 1970 the differences in social and cultural tradition between the British and Afrikaner settlers were still reflected in the daily and weekly publications that catered to and spoke for these two groups. Newspapers that served the English-speaking community were published in the English language; those that spoke to and for the Afrikaners appeared in Afrikaans. These language differences were symbolic as well as practical to both white groups. To the descendants of the British settlers, the use of English was a reminder of former bonds with the mother country and the British Commonwealth. Publications in Afrikaans preserved and enhanced the identity of the Afrikaner community.

Although a few newspapers appeared in languages other than English and Afrikaans, nonwhite readers had to depend mainly on the white-controlled press. A single daily and two Sunday weeklies—all published in English in Johannesburg—were the newspapers most widely read by Africans. Eight other weekly and monthly papers appeared in African ethnic languages. Six weekly and monthly papers were published in English for Asians, and two weeklies appealed to Coloured readers—one in English and one in Afrikaans.

In addition to government policies that restricted much of the press from serving as a representative medium of information for nonwhites, illiteracy had limited potential newspaper readership to about half the African population. Because newspapers could not succeed as profit-making ventures on circulation alone, advertising revenue was crucial to continuous operation. Whereas South African companies spent about R38 million annually on advertising in the white press, they allocated slightly over R1 million to the nonwhite publications, being aware that readers of nonwhite newspapers had less money to spend on most advertised products (see ch. 8, Living Conditions). A further deterrent to African newspapers was posed by heavy licensing fees and the government's control and allocation of newsprint. All papers that catered to a general African readership had to struggle to make ends meet.

Newspapers

The first newspaper, the bilingual Capetown Gazette and African Advertiser, appeared in 1800. After Thomas Pringle's successful
struggle for freedom of the press in 1828, newspapers were started all over the country. Many South African newspapers have had a long life. Such papers as the Eastern Province Herald (founded in 1845), the Natal Witness (1846), and The Friend (1850) were still publishing weekly editions in 1968. Apart from some early newspapers in the Dutch language, the first Afrikaans paper, Die Berger, was started in Cape Town in 1915. Its editor, D.F. Malan, later became prime minister.

The country did not have a national newspaper apart from the official Government Gazette. Instead each major city and town had its own competing group of dailies and weeklies (see table 12). In 1969 there were twenty-one daily newspapers: six in Johannesburg, three each in Cape Town and Port Elizabeth, two each in Durban and Bloemfontein, and one each in Pretoria, East London, Kimberley, Pietermaritzburg, and Queenstown. Of these dailies, sixteen were English-language papers and five were in Afrikaans. Three English and two Afrikaans Sunday papers appeared in Johannesburg, one English Sunday paper was printed in Durban, and one Afrikaans weekend paper was published in Cape Town. In addition, about 130 country newspapers appeared once a week, twice a week, or every two weeks.

With few exceptions, the areas of circulation for most daily newspapers were regional in nature (see fig. 13). In every case there was an inner area, incorporating the city or town of publication and its immediate environs, in which at least 70 percent of each issue was sold. In addition, there was an outer area that accounted for the sale of most of the remainder, which was distributed by road, rail, and air. The boundary of this wider area represented in many ways a limit to the penetration of political and cultural ideas, interests, and influences originating in the central city or town. It also represented a limit to the paper's commercial sphere of influence, as measured by the effective range to which advertisements for its products, jobs, and services extended before yielding to the attraction of the next large center.

The areas of circulation were largely related to the size of the city or town of publication and to the success that certain newspapers had in expanding their sales areas at the expense of others. Although there was no single clear line of demarcation between the area served by one paper and that of another, areas dominated by specific centers were reasonably distinct. The Johannesburg dailies had the largest circulation and covered most of the Transvaal, much of the northern Orange Free State, and part of Swaziland. Those of Durban and Pietermaritzburg were restricted mainly to Natal but also served southern Swaziland, part of the Orange Free State, and part of northeastern Cape Province, where they overlapped considerably with the areas of circulation of Port Elizabeth and East London papers. Another area of significant overlap included Mossel-
Table 12. Principal Newspapers and Periodicals Published in South Africa, 1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Place of Publication</th>
<th>Circulation</th>
<th>Publisher</th>
<th>Orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DAILY:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Argus</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Cape Town</td>
<td>105,000 daily; 148,000 Saturday</td>
<td>Argus Printing and Publishing Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>United Party; general appeal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Times</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>67,000 daily; 102,400 Saturday</td>
<td>Cape Times Ltd.</td>
<td>Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Bulletin</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>Johannesburg</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>Daily Dispatch Ltd.</td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Dispatch</td>
<td>do²</td>
<td>East London</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>Argus Printing and Publishing Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>Independent; general appeal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily News</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>Durban</td>
<td>82,000</td>
<td>Queenstown Representative (Pty.) Ltd.</td>
<td>United Party; general appeal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Representative</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>Queenstown</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>Argus Printing and Publishing Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diamond Fields Advertiser</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>Kimberley</td>
<td>6,400</td>
<td>Nasionale Koerante Beperk</td>
<td>United Party; general appeal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Die Burger</td>
<td>Afrikaans</td>
<td>Cape Town</td>
<td>52,700 daily; 66,200 Saturday</td>
<td>Nasionale Koerante Beperk</td>
<td>Nationalist Party; general appeal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Die Oostertig</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>Port Elizabeth</td>
<td>10,400</td>
<td>Do.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Die Transvaal</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>Johannesburg</td>
<td>39,000</td>
<td>Do.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Die Vaderland</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>57,000</td>
<td>Voortrekkers Beperk</td>
<td>Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Die Volksblad</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>Bloemfontein</td>
<td>29,000 daily; 34,000 Saturday</td>
<td>Die Africanse Pers Beperk</td>
<td>Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Province Herald</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Port Elizabeth</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>South African Associated Newspapers Ltd.</td>
<td>United Party; general appeal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>City</td>
<td>Readership</td>
<td>Ownership</td>
<td>Political Affiliation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evening Post</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>24,000 daily; 48,500 Saturday</td>
<td>South African Associated Newspapers Ltd.</td>
<td>Do.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Friend and Goldfields Friend</strong></td>
<td>Bloemfontein</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>Argus Printing and Publishing Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>Do.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Natal Mercury</strong></td>
<td>Durban</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>Central News Agency Ltd.</td>
<td>Do.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Natal Witness</strong></td>
<td>Pietermaritzburg</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>Natal Witness (Pty.) Ltd.</td>
<td>Independent; general appeal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pretoria News</strong></td>
<td>Pretoria</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>Argus Printing and Publishing Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>United Party; general appeal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rand Daily Mail</strong></td>
<td>Johannesburg</td>
<td>112,000</td>
<td>South African Associated Newspapers Ltd.</td>
<td>Proliberal; general appeal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Star</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>75,000 daily; 141,000 Saturday</td>
<td>Argus Printing and Publishing Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>United Party; general appeal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>World</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>87,300</td>
<td>World Printing and Publishing Co. (Pty.) Ltd.</td>
<td>Independent; appeals to top-income Africans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WEEKLY:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dabreek en Sondagnus</strong></td>
<td>Afrikaans</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>Arikaanse Pers Beperk</td>
<td>Pro-Nationalist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Die Beeld</strong></td>
<td>Johannesburg</td>
<td>320,000</td>
<td>Nasionale Koerante Beperk</td>
<td>Do.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Die Nataller</strong></td>
<td>Durban</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>Drakensberg Press Ltd.</td>
<td>Nationalist Party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Post</strong></td>
<td>English</td>
<td>244,000</td>
<td>Post Newspapers (Pty.) Ltd.</td>
<td>Independent; general African appeal</td>
<td>United Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Place of publication</td>
<td>Circulation</td>
<td>Publisher</td>
<td>Orientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunday Express</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>189,000</td>
<td>South African Associated Newspapers Ltd.</td>
<td>Do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunday Times</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>420,000</td>
<td>Do.</td>
<td>Do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunday Tribune</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>Durban</td>
<td>139,000</td>
<td>Argus Printing and Publishing Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>Do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekend World</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>Johannesburg</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>World Printing and Publishing Co. (Pty.) Ltd.</td>
<td>Independent; exclusive African appeal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVERY TWO WEEKS:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News/Check</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>Checkpress (Pty.) Ltd.</td>
<td>Anti-separate development; appeals to business and professional readership</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n.a.—not available.

Average circulation for daily and Saturday.

Xhosa-language supplement on Tuesdays.

baai, George, and Oudtshoorn, which received newspapers from both Cape Town and Port Elizabeth. The Cape Town press influence reached well into the Karoo, but the more developed parts of northern Cape Province were more effectively served from Kimberley.

Newspapers have played a distinct role in the development of Afrikaner nationalism and have been an important means of welding Afrikaners into a united community. In the process, however, relations between the English-language press and the government generally have not been cordial. Frequent editorial attacks on the government in such papers as the Rand Daily Mail have brought police raids on newspaper offices and occasional confiscation of the editor’s passport.

During the years before their rise to prominence, the Nationalists realized the political power of the press. Lacking newspaper facilities sympathetic to their cause, party leaders often declared publicly that the English newspapers were their most dangerous enemy. Over half of the numerous laws enacted by the Nationalist Parliament to constrain journalistic practices resulted from legisla-
tion introduced and sponsored by Afrikaner political leaders. For the most part, these measures were directed toward diminishing the critical voice of the English-language press. Concurrently, the Nationalists established their own newspapers sympathetic to their cause.

Because the Afrikaners are strongly affected by the written word, the Nationalist Party relies heavily on its press. Although the long struggle between the newspapers of the English-speaking financial groups and the Afrikaners has had decided political overtones, the competition in the late 1960's had developed into a contest for readership. Despite their supremacy in government, the Nationalists have had difficulty attracting readers to their newspapers. Circulation figures in the main cities and town showed the extent to which the English language predominated in the newspaper field. The sixteen English dailies published in 1969 had a combined daily circulation of over 831,000 copies, while the five in Afrikaans circulated an estimated 200,000. The combined circulation total of all weekly papers was about 2 million, and in this class the Sunday editions in English were the most widely read.

Readership statistics were more significant when measured against the sizes of the two white groups. Over 60 percent of the total number of whites were Afrikaans-speaking, which would tend to give the Afrikaans press a clear advantage over its English-language rivals. Circulation figures revealed, however, that a large number of Afrikaners preferred to read the English-language newspapers.

Building circulation along narrow racial and ethnic lines has proved difficult in a land where the white population of less than 4 million was spread over nearly half a million square miles. The obvious market for increased newspaper circulation was with the preponderant African group. Because a majority of the literate urban Africans have been educated in English-language schools, they were readers or potential readers of English-language newspapers. Most Africans preferred evening and Sunday newspapers, because they contained more advertising and were bulkier. In recent years some English newspapers have recognized the possibilities of developing circulation among nonwhites but have shrank from catering openly to their tastes for fear of antagonizing their white readers. In the government's view, reporting news about African political movements was undesirable, although these are the subjects that interested a growing number of African readers.

In early 1970 two publishing chains controlled most of the English press. The largest of these was Argus Printing and Publishing Company Limited, an organization that dated from the late nineteenth century and one that shared corporate directors with some of the biggest mining firms on the Witwatersrand. The other major
The Argus group controlled six daily newspapers, two of the Sunday papers (one of them in Afrikaans), and a constantly expanding number of periodicals. The dailies published by Argus were the Cape Argus (Cape Town), the Star (Johannesburg), the Daily News (Durban), the Friend and Goldfields Friend (Bloemfontein), the Diamond Fields Advertiser (Kimberley), and the Pretoria News. Its Sunday papers included the Sunday Tribune (Durban) and Sondagstem (Johannesburg).

South Africa Associated Newspapers Limited published in Johannesburg the Rand Daily Mail, the Sunday Express, and the Sunday Times, whose 420,000 circulation made it the country's largest newspaper. In Port Elizabeth SAAN holdings included the Eastern Province Herald and the Evening Post.

In late 1968 Argus announced that it had been offered a controlling interest in SAAN; one month later the proposed merger was cancelled as a result of government opposition to the move. In a public statement Prime Minister Vorster said that it was not in the public interest that SAAN should be taken over by Argus. He added that legislation would be introduced in 1969 to deal with the question of newspaper takeovers in general, as well as the investment in or control of newspapers by foreign capital. Had Argus been allowed to take up the option, it would have acquired control of 77 percent of the English-language dailies and 98 percent of the English-language weeklies. In effect, this would have placed 60 percent of the total daily newspaper circulation and 54 percent of the circulation from all weeklies in the country in the hands of one anti-Nationalist publisher.

Except for the Argus-owned Sondagstem, all Afrikaans newspapers were controlled by Nationalist Party political figures. Former Prime Minister D. F. Malan was once the editor of the Cape Town daily, Die Burger. Similarly, former Prime Minister H. F. Verwoerd left the editorship of the Johannesburg daily, Die Transvaal, on his rise to Parliament; after his assassination, it was disclosed that 20 percent of his estate consisted of stockholdings in publishing companies. When B. J. Vorster succeeded H. F. Verwoerd as prime minister in 1966, he also became chairman of the board of the two largest Afrikaans publishing companies, although he later resigned both positions. Similar press connections existed among a number of other cabinet ministers and members of Parliament.

Although African newspapers lagged far behind the white-owned press both in magnitude of publications and in circulation, a modest number aimed at nonwhite readers. The largest and most popular of the African newspapers were the Sunday Post and the daily evening...
World; both tabloids were published in Johannesburg. The Post, with a circulation of 244,000 in 1969, had the largest circulation of any nonwhite newspaper in the country and claimed over seven readers per copy. The World had a circulation of 87,300, and it was estimated that each copy was read by five people.

The publishers of the Post also distributed with their regular editions a companion supplement called Drum. This paper was the successor to an earlier publication that began under the same name in 1951 and rose to become the most celebrated of the African publishing ventures. The original Drum covered events of African interest and crusaded for all nonwhites; in 1965 it was sold to Post Newspapers Limited and became an inoffensive newspaper insert aimed at African males.

Newspapers in the African ethnic languages included the weekly Durban Ilanga and Marionhill Umtshwathi in Zulu and English; the weekly Umtata Umthunywa and King William's Town Imvo in Xhosa and English; the Cape Town monthly Wambo in Xhosa, Zulu, Tswana, Sotho, Tsonga, and Venda; and the Rustenburg monthly Utwang in Tswana. One Muslim and four Indian weekly newspapers aimed at general appeal among the Asian group. All were published in Durban in English, but the bilingual Indian Views also appeared in Gujarati. Although Coloureds had access to the popular Afrikaans- and English-language publications, two Cape Town newspapers catered specifically to Coloured readers; the Cape Herald, an English-language weekly, claimed the largest readership among Coloureds with a circulation of 300,000, and the weekly Nuwe Stad appeared in Afrikaans. Other weekly newspapers serving specific ethnic communities included four in Yiddish, one in Greek, and one in Dutch.

Comparison of the content of English- and Afrikaans-language newspapers revealed a difference more fundamental than mere language. The English press devoted about equal attention to foreign and domestic news, with extensive coverage given to British developments abroad. The Afrikaans papers were almost exclusively preoccupied with domestic issues. The English press generally supported the opposition United Party, which fell from power in 1948, and most of its papers were critical of the Nationalist government and its apartheid policies. The Afrikaans press followed a single domestic mission—to defend and project the Afrikaner way of life and the policies of its political leaders. In their editorial criticism of each other, however, each press faction ordinarily dealt more in policies than in personalities.

Most newspapers aimed at white readership rarely carried news about African sports or politics, and an African's picture was seldom published. Moreover, names of nonwhite individuals were usually avoided in news stories. Most editors preferred the anonym-
ity of the identifying terms “Coloured” or “Asian.” Many of these practices, however, were diminishing in the English press, as efforts were made to attract nonwhite readers. Most of the larger papers published special editions for Africans and employed at least one or two African reporters on their staffs.

Most African newspapers were breezy in style, a feature their editors considered to be sprightly writing rather than editorialization. Sensationalism was common, and headlines over routine stories were often startling. Some reticence was observed, however, and most editors preferred to keep racial matters and sexual offenses out of their headlines. Both the World and the Post printed everything in English. Ilanga was published partly in English and partly in Zulu; its publishers hoped that by using two languages they could help to create a bridge of understanding between whites and Africans.

Except for the tabloid World and its Sunday edition, the Weekend World, all principal newspapers were published in a regular eight-column format. Apart from the usual news pages, most papers devoted a number of inside pages to features on homes and gardening, motoring, books, travel, sports, business and financial matters, features for men and women, and a children’s column. Writings of a variety of columnists, letters to the editor, an editorial page, a classified section, comics, and a display advertising section completed the makeup. In accordance with a ruling by the Newspaper Press Union, editors could not mention the name of a commercial concern or a product trade name anywhere in newspapers except in financial and business sections or on the advertising pages.

Periodicals

Approximately 500 periodicals were published and circulated in 1969. These ranged from magazines with general appeal for the entire family to specialized journals devoted to hobbies and trades. The number was unusual when measured against the size of the population and the relatively low literacy rates among large segments of the people. Circulation figures for individual periodicals varied greatly, from a few hundred for the more esoteric to over 100,000 for some family magazines. In 1967 the government estimated the combined total circulation of all periodicals at 1,634,000 copies. As in the case of newspapers, however, these figures did not reflect the actual size of the readership, because it was impossible to account for those who read the publications through the African custom of copy-sharing.

Periodicals comprised seven general categories. The national or family magazines, which were edited for general family appeal, were the most popular and had the greatest circulation. Among the most
widely read were Personality in English, Die Huisgenoot in Afrikaans, and Charme in English and Afrikaans. The Sunday newspaper supplements were akin to magazines, although they usually have a shorter life, and catered mainly to the whole family, although in some cases they were devoted more specifically to women’s or men’s interests. Examples of this type of periodical were the Johannesburg Post’s supplements, Drum with an appeal for men and Home Post for women.

A large number of periodicals were aimed at special interest groups. These included the women’s and home magazines such as Fair Lady, Femina, and Sarie Marais; financial magazines such as Financial Mail and The Financial Gazette; juvenile magazines; and sports, pastimes, and hobby magazines, catering to virtually every hobby and every form of sport, including magazines for car, camping, travel, flying, gardening, and pigeon racing enthusiasts.

The professional periodicals included magazines and journals that served the interests of all the professions. A large variety of trade journals were circulated to persons in trades, the unions, and industry. There were thirty-three religious periodicals. House publications included a number published by companies for their employees, shareholders, and customers.

Apart from the broad range of subject matter, periodicals offered their readers a wide choice of languages. In 1969, twenty-three of fifty-one publications of the most widely read national or family category were in English, nine were in Afrikaans, and nine were in both languages. Two appeared in African languages; one periodical was in Sotho, Zulu, Xhosa, Pedi, Tswana, Tsonga, and Venda, and the other, in Sotho, Zulu, and Xhosa. Three were in German, two in Dutch, and three in combinations of Hebrew and Yiddish. There were no periodicals in the Asiatic languages.

The two African-language periodicals, Bona and Wamba, were oriented to detribalized Africans and were cheaper in price than those aimed at white readers. Many with general appeal to Africans, such as Drum and Home Post, had national circulation. All were largely pictorial magazines in which African politics and African achievements were standard features. Their treatment of some matters was markedly sensationalistic.

News Gathering

Most of the newspapers retained staffs of reporters to cover local events. The large dailies and the principal weeklies also maintained correspondents in several of the other cities, and part-time reporters on the smaller papers within the region passed news items to the city papers. Apart from a relatively small number of Africans, Coloureds, and Asians employed by newspapers and magazines published for their groups, most working journalists were white.
The latest available government statistics revealed that in 1964 a total of 38,725 persons were employed in printing and publishing activities. Of this number, 3,406 were Coloured, 1,158 were Asian, 2,834 were African, and 31,327 were white.

A number of the large dailies had at least one or two African reporters on their staffs, and the Rand Daily Mail had an African columnist. The original periodical Drum gave a few talented African journalists their start in the profession, and the new Drum had a staff of reporters composed largely of Africans.

The areas African reporters covered are not notably tranquil, and they must be resourceful and durable. An African reporter is always subject to arrest because of pass law violations. Six World reporters were assaulted in line of duty in 1967, and an African newspaper-woman of the Rand Daily Mail was arrested in 1969 for entering a resettlement camp for Africans without a permit. African reporters did not always have ready access to transportation, telephones, or to many reference libraries. Their freedom of movement was restricted, and they were often refused access to official functions and to “whites only” premises. They usually were not admitted to the press galleries of Parliament or the provincial councils where matters affecting nonwhites were discussed (see ch. 13, The Governmental System). Apartheid also worked in reverse to hamper press reporting. White journalists needed special permission to enter African townships and Native Reserves, and were thus inhibited in the collection of news about African life and activities. Many white journalists have been arrested for failure to observe these restrictions.

The independent South African Press Association (SAPA) was the major distributor of news to the press and to overseas media. It was preceded by Reuters, which started a news service in South Africa in 1912 in association with local newspapers. After World War I the British news service encouraged the South African newspapers to combine and run it themselves, and in 1938 SAPA took over the Reuters news machine. By agreement, SAPA supplied domestic news, and Reuters remained to supply international coverage for the white dailies. In 1969 SAPA was both a news-gathering and a news distributing agency, owned by most of the newspapers in the country and serving virtually every newspaper as well as the South African Broadcasting Corporation. SAPA had its own editorial staffs in the main cities and hundreds of local correspondents all over the country.

Eight independent press agencies provided the nation’s press with material obtained from abroad and maintained clipping services of foreign publications for use by South African newspapers and periodicals. With representatives in the United Kingdom, continental Europe, the United States, Canada, and Australia, these agencies...
provided the South African press with many syndicated features. Included were comic strips, news and fashion photographs, illustrated feature articles, cartoons, Hollywood columns, puzzles, games, and reprints.

In 1950 Agence France-Presse (AFP) opened a bureau in Johannesburg. In 1956 the state-owned South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) became a subscriber in accordance with the Nationalist government's policy of encouraging radio news competition with independent SAPA. The foreign press services were joined later by Associated Press (AP) and United Press International (UPI), both of which maintained staffs in Johannesburg to distribute news of the United States to South African papers and to channel South African events to the United States. Other foreign news agencies with offices in Johannesburg included the Italian Press Agency, Deutsche Presse Agentur (DPA), and the Jewish Telegraphic Agency of London. Staffs of all the foreign press services were relatively small. Most employed a number of part-time reporters of major papers throughout the country to channel news items of overseas interest to the Johannesburg bureaus.

A number of British, American, and other foreign newspapers have permanent correspondents stationed in Johannesburg and Cape Town, and some sent correspondents to other areas for various periods of time. During the thirteen years of press study by the government's Press Commission, the foreign news representatives cooperated with the group's study. For more than five years news agencies and correspondents filed copies of all outgoing news dispatches in order that the commission might appraise what was being said abroad about South Africa. When the commission's report was presented in 1964, foreign correspondents in general were accused of failing to understand the South African way of life, which led them to "mis-report the South African political and racial scene and to ascribe false motives to the Whites in general and more in particular to the Afrikaner, the present Government, and the members of the National Party." The commission stated that news stories about South Africa carried by Reuters, AP, UPI, and AFP were almost always "unfair, unobjective, partisan, and angled."

Under the Nationalist government a long list of foreign newspaper correspondents have been expelled from the country or have been refused visas. A more discreet system involved the issuance of press cards, permitting the authorities to restrain or suppress the activities of foreign journalists. Most British newspapermen usually did not need visas, but this privilege was occasionally withdrawn without advance notice.

RADIO

Radio broadcasting was started in 1923 by a group of Johannesburg radio amateurs, and the first scheduled programs were
established in 1924, three years before the formation of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in London. These early efforts were soon followed by similar ventures in other major cities, subsidized by their city councils. In 1936 the government took radio out of private hands and by act of parliament formed the South African Broadcasting Corporation. Organized under the management and control of a board of governors appointed by the minister of post and telecommunications, the SABC was patterned after the BBC.

At its modest beginning, the SABC offered listeners a single network service that was largely musical entertainment. Although programs were mainly in the English language, a one-hour program in Afrikaans was broadcast each week. Aimed at a literate white audience well-served with newspapers, the SABC made little use of the medium as an authoritative source of information or education. Eventually the program material was expanded to include discussions, drama, and variety.

In 1969, sixty-seven radio stations employing mediumwave, shortwave, and very high frequency (VHF) FM transmitters beamed nine services to a large domestic audience and shortwave programs to listeners abroad (see table 13). These facilities were on the air for a total of 1,303 hours each week, broadcasting in various combinations of fourteen languages. In 1969 an estimated 3.1 million radio receivers were in use, bringing the SABC output to approximately 10 million listeners. In its attempt to reach as large an audience as possible, the SABC had devised an intricate series of networks, some of which shared the same broadcast stations and transmitter facilities. Because of the wide variation of languages used, services were equally complex.

The national program, or Home Service, broadcast on thirty-six mediumwave transmitters located in eleven major cities throughout the country. The Home Service was bilingual, with simultaneous broadcasts on separate frequencies in English and Afrikaans. The original of SABC's networks, the Home Service programs were on the air for a total of 117½ hours a week. Program material of the English broadcasts covered all aspects of modern radio entertainment, with emphasis on popular and classical music, discussion panels, and drama. Programs in the Afrikaans language provided a large amount of background music, much of which was traditional boermusiek, similar in form to United States country and western music.

In December 1960 the government announced its intention to replace gradually the SABC mediumwave and domestic shortwave transmissions with VHF broadcasts from an extensive system of regional FM stations. By late 1969 approximately 84 percent of the population lived within range of its broadcasts. The FM system comprised 53 stations broadcasting five separate services. Three of
Table 13. Radio Stations in South Africa, 1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Power (in kilowatts)</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mediumwave:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloemfontein</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>All mediumwave stations broadcast Home Service and Springbok Radio commercial service in English and Afrikaans. Three transmitters at each station.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Town</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durban</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East London</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grahamstown</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johannesburg</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Rand</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Rand</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimberley</td>
<td>0.25</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pietermaritzburg</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pietersburg</td>
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<tr>
<td>Port Elizabeth</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pretoria</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shortwave:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloemendal</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>&quot;The Voice of South Africa&quot; international broadcasts to eighteen world regions in English, Afrikaans, Zulu, Swahili, Portuguese, German, French, and Dutch. Total of four transmitters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paradys</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>English, Afrikaans, Greek, Portuguese, German, Italian, and Indian programs to domestic listeners; Springbok Radio commercial service; regional commercial service over Radio Highveld, Radio Good Hope, and Radio Port Natal; Radio South Africa domestic broadcasts in English and Afrikaans. Total of nine transmitters.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Frequency Modulation (FM):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aliwal North</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alverstone¹</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beaufort West</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bedford</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethlehem</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloemfontein²</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boesmanskop</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butterworth</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Johannesburg (Brixton)³</td>
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*All FM stations broadcast programs of Radio Bantu and Springbok Radio networks.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Power (in kilowatts)</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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<td>Napier</td>
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<td>Pretoria</td>
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<td>Zeerust</td>
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1 Stations belonging to Radio Port Natal network.
2 Stations belonging to Radio Highveld network.
3 Stations belonging to Radio Good Hope network.

these services were known as Radio Highveld, Radio Good Hope, and Radio Port Natal. Together, their broadcasts covered areas in which 75 percent of the white population lived (see fig. 14). An African service, Radio Bantu, and a commercial service, Springbok Radio, also were broadcast over VHF-FM.

Radio Highveld, with studios in Johannesburg, began operations in 1964 and covered most of the Orange Free State, the Witwatersrand, and western Transvaal. Radio Good Hope, with studios in Cape Town, began transmitting in 1965 to southwestern and eastern Cape Province. In 1967 Radio Port Natal, broadcasting from its Durban studio, extended FM coverage to most of Natal Province. Those areas beyond the range of the FM system received identical programs broadcast by nine transmitters of the national shortwave station at Paradys in the Orange Free State. The program content of Radio Good Hope, Radio Highveld, and Radio Port Natal broadcasts was largely continuous music with short news bulletins every

hour. Quarter-minute and half-minute spot commercial advertisements brought to listeners radio advertising from small business firms that could not compete with high advertising costs on the national commercial network. The three regional FM networks were on the air from 5 A.M. to midnight on weekdays and from 6 A.M. to midnight on Sundays.

The government-owned commercial network, Springbok Radio, was established shortly after World War II to compete with the popular commercial programs beamed from Lourenço Marques in neighboring Mozambique. In 1969 it was the principal radio advertising service and provided blanket coverage of the country. Its commercial programs were broadcast by the extensive network of mediumwave, shortwave, and FM transmitters owned by the SABC. Listener surveys indicated that approximately 1 million persons tuned their receivers to Springbok Radio each weekday. Apart from paid advertising, the network's program content consisted of drama, quizzes, variety shows, panel games, comedy, serials, and popular music. Since 1961 the available advertising time had been completely sold out to commercial sponsors. In 1969 Springbok Radio was on the air from 3 A.M. to midnight on weekdays and from 4 A.M. to midnight on Sundays, with separate transmissions in English and Afrikaans.

Six services in seven African languages comprised the network known as Radio Bantu. A separate FM service was beamed to each of the Zulu, Xhosa, South Sotho, North Sotho, Tswana, Tsonga, and Venda reserves. The Zulu, Xhosa, and South Sotho services operated for 18 hours a day from 5 A.M. to 11 P.M. A bilingual Venda-Tsonga service was broadcast on mediumwave from a transmitter at Pietersburg in northwestern Transvaal Province during the periods from 5 to 6:30 A.M. and from 9:30 to 10 A.M.

Radio Bantu programs included news bulletins, newsreels, lectures, religious broadcasts, drama, serials, children's and women's features, quiz contests, discussions, music, agricultural and gardening features, sports, and short weekday broadcasts to African schools in African languages (see ch. 9, Education). The network was staffed with African announcers, program compilers, clerks, technicians, and disc jockeys.

Broadcasts by Radio Bantu covered most of the areas where Africans lived (see fig. 15). Statistics indicating the size of the audience that received African-language FM broadcasts were not available. The total number of Africans who owned FM receivers, however, had increased from 103,000 in 1962 to 1,890,000 in 1968.

The SABC's external service, Radio South Africa, broadcast from the government's international shortwave radio center at Bloemendal near Johannesburg. The H. F. Verwoerd Station began operating in 1965 to counter the spread of anti-South African
broadcasts from Radio Cairo, Radio Moscow, and Peking Radio. "The Voice of South Africa" was broadcast around the clock daily to eighteen areas of the world in Zulu, Swahili, English, Afrikaans, Portuguese, German, French, and Dutch. Broadcast power was provided by four 250-kilowatt Brown Boveri transmitters.

In addition to its overseas broadcasts, Radio South Africa brought entertainment in English and Afrikaans to domestic listeners. This service emanated from the national shortwave station at Paradys. Daily broadcasts from midnight to 5 A.M. included music, spot advertising, and messages to workers employed on night shifts. The Paradys station also broadcast brief shortwave programs each day to domestic listeners in Portuguese, Greek, German, and Italian. Short programs in English were presented for Indian listeners.

The SABC was financed by advertising revenue and license fees, paid annually by listeners who owned radio receivers. In 1967 statistics published by the Department of Posts and Telegraphs revealed that licenses had been obtained for 1,588,739 of the
3,000,000 sets believed to be in use. Many urban African listeners received SABC programs through a radio distribution network known as the rediffusion service. This system consisted of a loudspeaker rather than a receiver placed in the home and tuned constantly to the government broadcasts; in 1963 there were 1,153,504 subscribers. On the day following the Sharpeville massacre in 1960, thousands of these speakers were ripped from the walls of African homes when the SABC broadcast bulletins exhorted Africans not to strike or take other overt action (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

Programs for nonwhites were checked by SABC officials, who must approve all material presented over Radio Bantu and the other nonwhite services. In 1963 the SABC refused to broadcast any commentary on the golf tournament in which a championship Indian golfer had taken part. In replying to queries regarding this omission, the SABC replied that in terms of the policy laid down by the board of governors, the corporation did not broadcast multi-racial sport. The chairman of the Broadcasting Board stated that there must be no cultural integration among the races “in no matter how limited a field.”

In 1950 the SABC established its own news service. By 1968 it had become a large, independent news-gathering and dissemination service, employing over a hundred full-time reporters in the main cities and local correspondents all over the country. Overseas news was received from Reuters, AFP, AP, and UPI. The SABC news service operated in direct competition with the independent SAPA, which was dominated by the English press. SABC newscasts avoided all subjects inimical to the policies of separate development and to Nationalist Party aims.

The SABC consistently supported the government’s apartheid policies. Its resources were used in criticisms of institutions and bodies perceived as being hostile to the regime, including the English press, the United Party, the South African Institute of Race Relations, the National Union of South African Students, and the Christian Institute. Demands from such organizations for the right to reply on radio to SABC criticism usually were refused.

The Broadcasting Act of 1936 directed the board to “frame and carry out its broadcasting programs with due regard to the interests of both English and Afrikaans culture.” A parliamentary amendment in 1960 established the Bantu Program Control Board and amended the Broadcasting Act to read “English, Afrikaans, and Bantu cultures.” An opposition member of Parliament presented a bill in 1963 condemning the government’s refusal to supply Parliament with full information on the activities of the SABC and asking that a commission be formed to inquire into the corporation’s policies, bias in news reports and political talks, the use of radio for political propaganda and indoctrination, and the work of the Bantu Program Control Board. The bill was defeated.
TELEVISION

The country had the financial, technical, and production resources to support a television service on a large scale, but the government had not authorized its development by early 1970. Various reasons were advanced to explain why South Africa did not have television when many less affluent African nations had introduced this modern information medium. All arguments divided into two opposing views: the English press and its readers and the members of the opposition United Party supported the mounting pressure for a national television network, and the Nationalist government and Afrikaners in general opposed its introduction.

Speaking for the government position, the former Minister of Posts and Telecommunications Albert Hertzog in March 1964 described the medium as "a deadly weapon used to undermine the morale of the white man and even to destroy great empires." The government's long-term rejection of television reflected two basic concerns. One concern was the fear that the availability of comparatively inexpensive tape material from abroad, in the English language, would eclipse whatever local productions were possible initially in the Afrikaans language and that as a result Afrikaans culture would suffer. Another concern was that the government and the Nationalist Party were apprehensive that the ideological content of foreign program material would undermine the apartheid practices supported by the SABC. Foreign-produced material "drenched with liberal and demoralizing propaganda," according to Hertzog, would inevitably invade local broadcasting.

A substantial economic lobby continued to press for a television license, and a number of business firms had made initial preparations for the marketing of television apparatus. Although one of the government's official arguments against the medium was its great cost, the nation's financial leaders and business groups contended that much of the initial expense could be regained through commercial services. In early 1970 large amounts of investment and advertising money was available for development of television and allied services, and many people were preparing for its advent. The new studios of the SABC were readily convertible for television broadcasting, and the manufacturers of neon lighting had been instructed to install suppressors in their products to preclude interference with television reception.

With the successful lunar orbit of the United States' Apollo program in 1969, the pressure for television increased. After the successful moonshots, there was a strong undercurrent of public bitterness that South Africans had been deprived of the opportunity to see televised photographs from the moon. News reports indicated that 20 persons flew to London to see the moon landing on British television. The day after the moon landing approximately
6,000 persons attempted to attend a videotape showing of the event of a film that had been flown from New York to Johannesburg. Because the planetarium where the film was to be shown had a capacity of 500, the presentation had to be cancelled, and police were called in to control the crowd.

On July 30, 1969, the minister of posts and telegraphs declared that the government would not be forced by public opinion to introduce television. He warned against stock exchange speculation by electronics firms based on the belief that the government would soon change its policy on the subject. Moreover, he cautioned that if television were ever introduced, the medium would be placed under strict control. There would be a service in two languages for whites and a third in several languages for the nonwhites. Programs would concentrate primarily on news and cultural features, and advertising would also be strictly controlled. The government would not “allow television to have a bad influence on the nation.”

In August 1969, SABC’s chairman announced that the broadcasting corporation was prepared to establish television service within three years of government authorization. His statement was published in headlines six-columns wide on the front pages of the Afrikaans newspaper Die Transvalier and was quoted by most other papers. The broadcasting official indicated that sufficient material would have to be available to provide a distinctly South African service. The government remained concerned that British and United States television films would dominate the programming.

For a number of years the English press and the electronics industry have speculated on the crisis that would develop if television broadcasting were established in independent Swaziland or Lesotho, both of which are enclave states within the South African landmass. With the knowledge that such broadcasts would be clearly visible in many sections of the country, the government has obtained a parliamentary law that forbids any citizen of the republic to participate in or advertise on any radio or television broadcast that the government deems to be “hostile.” Similar possibilities were anticipated when the Transkei Bantustan was granted a measure of territorial authority in 1959 (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 13, The Governmental System). The Transkei Constitution expressly excludes the fields of radio and television from the competence of the territory’s legislative council.

FILMS

Motion pictures constituted the most popular entertainment medium in the country, largely because there was no television to provide competition. Surveys made in 1966 confirmed that films were particularly favored by the half million young white adults.
between the ages of sixteen and twenty-four, whose combined spending power approximated R1 million per day.

A number of feature-length films in Afrikaans have been produced by local firms, but most of the English-language films were imported from the United Kingdom and the United States. Documentaries were produced and distributed by the Department of Education, Arts, and Science, and local film producers devoted most of their feature output to newsreels depicting national events. In the 1960's an attempt was made to stimulate the film industry, including the granting of state financial aid, and thirty-three film productions received government funds totaling over R430,000. Despite this assistance, locally produced films remained a financial risk at the box office, and local film producers decided to undertake coproductions with foreign companies or to make films that could also be shown abroad.

Two companies were active in the field of feature films immediately after World War II. Both planned to produce a series of motion pictures in Afrikaans but, after four unsuccessful products entered the market, these plans were cancelled. In 1969 Twentieth-Century Fox of Southern Africa and Killarney Studios of Johannesburg both continued to produce an occasional feature film. Costs of film-making were magnified by the industry's insistence on producing bilingual products. All scenes had to be performed and photographed twice, once in Afrikaans and once in English. No subtitles or dubbing techniques were used to accommodate the two national languages, and the entire cast therefore had to be bilingual. Each production resulted in two full-length films, and the cost of producing them was excessive.

The themes of local productions, including documentaries, usually stressed Afrikaner nationalism. A great number depicted the historical Great Trek of the early Afrikaner settlers (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Similarly, numerous productions have portrayed isolated Boer military victories over British forces in mid-nineteenth-century settings. A great proportion of the documentaries extol the country's tourist attractions and its advances in medicine, industry, and technology. During World War II a series of forty-two anti-German propaganda films were made by a cartoonist of the Rand Daily Mail for African Film Productions Limited of Johannesburg. In 1968 the public's attraction to the medium of entertainment had produced eighteen companies that made films for advertising purposes, including filmed commercials for local motion picture theaters and foreign television.

In 1966 there were approximately 3,300 commercial theaters devoted to public showing of motion pictures. Of this number, about 2,750 indoor theaters were equipped with 35-mm. and 16-mm. projectors, and approximately 550 outdoor theaters were
equipped with 35-mm. equipment. Combined seating capacity of all theaters approximated 522,000, of which 450,000 seats were available in indoor theaters. Attendance estimated indicated a weekly audience of over 1 million persons.

Theaters in areas designated for whites were prohibited to nonwhite members of the public. There were no statistics to indicate the number of theaters available to nonwhites, but a number of these were constructed in the late 1960's within African Group Areas (see ch. 8, Living Conditions). In Johannesburg there was a single theater operated exclusively for Africans, and many patronized theaters owned by Indians and Coloureds. In 1968 the government's Department of Community Development instructed the owners of Indian and Coloured theaters to provide separate facilities for African and non-African patrons and to limit the number of Africans to one-tenth of the audience. If a film being shown was labeled “not to be shown to Bantu” by the government censorship board, Africans could not be admitted. During August 1968 three Indian and Coloured theaters were raided by the police, and films so certified were confiscated because Africans were present.

Films for Africans were subjected to strict censorship. Under the terms of the Publications and Entertainment Act of 1963, the censorship board could prohibit the showing of films to any particular ethnic group. On numerous occasions the board decided that, although a film could be shown in a nonwhite theater, children from ages four to sixteen and Africans could not be admitted. There was a tendency to bar from the general public all films that presented whites in an inferior position to nonwhites. A large number of motion pictures made in the United Kingdom and the United States were shown only after certain scenes were removed by the government censors. This action often had adverse effects on a film’s continuity and disturbed the more perceptive members of the audiences. In the late 1960's it was becoming increasingly difficult to obtain acceptable films from abroad, and about a fifth of those coming into the country were banned.

BOOKS

Because of the large number of publishing firms, bookshops, and libraries, the population had a greater potential for reading than that of most other African countries. National laws, however, restricted free access to public libraries and banned 700 to 800 books each year.

Book censorship under the amended Customs Act brought all books published abroad under the scrutiny of the eleven-member Publications Control Board, all of whom were Afrikaners. Not all members read every book, and four votes from the board were
sufficient to clear or condemn a book. Local publishers usually did not print anything that might be objectionable. A publisher in Pretoria took advantage of the system shortly after the law came into effect by issuing a periodic list costing R20 annually for librarians and other subscribers who desired to keep abreast of acceptable books.

A large number of books are banned for the same reasons that the board uses for newspapers, periodicals, and films imported from other countries. Additionally, many books never reach the reading public, because the censors also employ a mass-banning technique whereby all works of a growing list of foreign authors were not permitted to circulate within the country. Most liable to the close scrutiny of the board were imported paperback editions, particularly those with suggestively illustrated covers.

**Book Publishers and Bookshops**

Of approximately 540 firms that provided publishing and printing services throughout the country, about 45 published most of the books available to domestic readers. The majority of these book publishers were long-established companies whose operations were not connected with the publication of newspapers or periodicals. They were located in the major cities or university towns. In the 1960’s approximately 30 other smaller publishing firms produced books for public sale.

Books were sold only through authorized booksellers. Publishers usually did not sell directly to the customer, although a number had begun to disregard this custom. The major distributor to the nation’s estimated 4,000 book shops was the Central News Agency, which also distributed publications imported from other countries. The remaining book distributors were Natal Magazine Company, Publishers Distribution Corporation, and South African Educational Books. All but the Natal firm provided distribution services in most of the major cities of the country.

**Public Libraries**

The republic had a long tradition of library service. Many of the institutions available to the reading public maintained extensive book collections, trained staffs, and the modern techniques of microfilming, copy reproduction, and electronic processing. There were two national deposit libraries—the South African Public Library of Cape Town and the State Library of Pretoria. Both housed important collections and received a copy of every book published in the country. In the late 1960’s the number of public libraries offering lending services totaled 370. The combined totals of books on their shelves approximated 5.7 million volumes.
Separate library services were provided for the different population groups. The use of public libraries in urban areas was governed by the Separate Amenities Act, which required separate facilities for white and nonwhite groups. As a result, the major libraries were not available to nonwhite readers. Separate reading rooms were provided in the two deposit libraries. To comply with the law, branch services were provided for the different ethnic groups in the larger cities.

In the mid-1960's there were nineteen branches of the Cape Town libraries for whites and twelve subbranches for Coloureds, and there was one traveling library for whites and two for Coloureds. The three African townships in Cape Town did not have a library service. In Durban there were eleven municipal libraries and one reference facility for whites, one library for Coloureds, and one branch library for Africans. Library facilities for Africans in provincial rural areas varied according to location. The service for Africans in Transvaal Province operated on the same principle as that for whites, but the bookstock for Africans was the smaller of the two separate sections. In the Orange Free State a free library service was available to whites, but there was no corresponding facility for Africans.

Bookstocks in white libraries were generally substantially larger than those in nonwhite libraries. For example, the Pietermaritzburg library for whites (31 percent of the population) had a stock of over 63,000 books in its lending library and 35,000 reference works. The city's Market Square branch for nonwhites (69 percent of the population) had a total bookstock of 11,137 volumes, including 2 reference books.

In some areas libraries were started by individuals or private groups and operated by voluntary services. An example of this type of facility was the African service library for the Venda people of the northern Transvaal, which was begun in 1962. The bookstock consisted of gifts from individuals and institutions. The library was housed in a private house and operated voluntarily by a teacher. The demand for a library service in that area was shown by an initial reader registration of 1,000 persons.

Audiovisual materials, films, records, and photographs were standard items in many libraries for whites, and their use among nonwhites had increased in the late 1960's. The number of hours that branch libraries remained open varied with the population groups. In Johannesburg the branches for whites were open usually for forty-six hours each week.

Mandatory separation of facilities made it unlikely that adequate library services could be provided to all sections of the reading public. The need for separate bookstocks made book provision extremely expensive. The cost of large reference works for each racial group together with their upkeep appeared prohibitive. While in
theory books could be borrowed through an interlibrary loan system, choosing from a catalogue did not compare to the open access to shelves that was available to the white population.

GOVERNMENT INFORMATION PROGRAMS

Because of the mounting pressures of adverse international public opinion and the system of economic sanctions ordered by the United Nations in 1966, the government had intensified a campaign to win support both at home and abroad (see ch. 16, Foreign Relations). To respond to its critics, the republic mobilized a many-sided counterattack through films, periodicals, and booklets of its information service, through employment of public relations firms in foreign countries, and through publicizing the views of many outsiders who express strong sympathy for its policies and who eulogize the country as a lucrative field for capital investment.

In its quest for Western sympathy, this information offensive relied heavily on the nation's traditional image of stability within a continent of unrest and a singular stronghold of anticommunism. The ultimate objective was to alter world opinion about the republic and its political goals. Strong technological and financial efforts were employed in the campaign.

A state information office was established in 1947 as a successor to the Information Bureau that had served as a war propaganda office during World War II. With the advent of the Nationalist government in 1948, the office was reorganized and the overseas information program was expanded. In 1948 there were three information branches overseas—in London, New York, and Nairobi. A year later the government increased the number of information attaches and assistants to sixteen. Officers were assigned to Paris, Rome, Bonn, Lisbon, The Hague, Buenos Aires, Ottawa, and Leopoldville (later Kinshasa). The information office announced its intention to place an information attache in every country with which the Union had diplomatic relations. In 1950 funds reserved for the information office totaled R118,000.

In 1951 the Union established an office in Washington, D.C., in addition to its New York bureau, and in 1963 a branch was set up in San Francisco. Information efforts in the United States had the twofold purpose of telling the government's story of South Africa to the Americans and also to the United Nations, with its potentialities for spreading news and influencing world opinion. In 1955 the information office hired four United States public relations firms to assist in its programs. In early 1963 the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations investigated the activities of one of the New York public relations firms. The inquiry was based on the grounds that the firm had not complied with the
United States Foreign Agents Registration Act. In 1965 another public relations firm engaged in South Africa's overseas information program was tried by the government on similar grounds.

By 1966, after a decade of continuous expansion, the information budget had risen to R3.18 million. The information office was elevated to departmental status with its own cabinet minister, and its personnel complement, including overseas representatives, had risen to 378.

In 1970 the Information Service of South Africa (ISSA) produced numerous informative periodicals, hundreds of attractive pamphlets and booklets, occasional press releases, and documentary films for motion picture theaters and television. Six information service periodicals were circulated among overseas readers, half of them produced in South Africa and half in the service's New York office. The magazine Panorama provided informative articles about the republic, accompanied by color photography. The weekly South African Digest featured the latest statements by government officials and data on current developments. The illustrated monthly Bantu dealt with developments for the African groups; produced largely for South African readers, a limited number of copies were sent abroad.

Overseas offices of the information service distributed weekly news releases summarizing for foreign readers material cabled daily from Pretoria. Business Report, distributed to the financial communities, emphasized economic news and data of special interest to businessmen. The monthly periodical Scope provided an elaborately illustrated version of contemporary events. Monthly circulation of these publications in the United States alone exceeded 23,000 copies.

The hundreds of pamphlets and booklets included the complete texts of many speeches by cabinet ministers, reprints of articles from foreign publications favorable to South African policy, and a large amount of material written especially for the information service covering aspects of South African life. The service's audiovisual section produced a number of color films each year in English, Afrikaans, French, German, Dutch, Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese. Although several hundred films have been made for introduction on foreign television, the information service has experienced difficulty in getting desired material onto television screens. More success has been achieved in getting short television recordings of interesting South African events incorporated in foreign television news services.

The government used in its information program the shortwave broadcasts of "The Voice of South Africa," the South African Tourist Corporation (Satour), and South African Airways (SAA). Both Satour and SAA produced illustrated travel material depicting
the republic in favorable terms. The practice of providing free trips to South Africa for sympathetic foreign businessmen, journalists, educators, and others was partially financed from the ISSA budget. Some of these trips were paid for by the South Africa Foundation, a private organization financed mainly by the country's prominent businessmen. Although the foundation contended that it did not engage in political propaganda, its activities and policies consistently supported the government by emphasizing only the expansion of the white sector of the economy.

FOREIGN INFORMATION CHANNELS

Information of foreign origin is disseminated in varying quantities by all of the public media. Subject to the limitations imposed on imported printed material by the Publications and Entertainment Act of 1963, a number of major newspapers and periodicals from the United Kingdom and the United States were available to South African readers and were distributed through newsstands and bookshops. Similar material from continental European countries such as Germany, France, and the Netherlands could be found, and some periodicals from India were available to Asian readers. Most of the feature films seen by theater audiences were of British and United States origin, although many of these were edited to comply with provisions of the 1963 act.

Because of the large number of shortwave receivers in use, a number of foreign radio broadcasts could be heard. The BBC's World Service and African Service broadcasts in English were received by a large number of listeners, particularly those in the white business and financial community. Other foreign broadcasts heard by South Africans were the transmissions of the Voice of America in English, Radio Moscow in Zulu, Radio Peking in English, and Radio Cairo in English, Zulu, and Sotho. Data indicating audience sizes and listening patterns were not available. The government's concern over the possible effects of foreign radio broadcasts led to the establishment of "The Voice of South Africa" in 1965.

A number of foreign governments operated information and cultural centers in the country. In the late 1960's these included representatives of the British Information Service and Alliance Francaise centers, in eight of the nation's major cities. Cultural programs by the West German and Netherlands governments and the United States Information Service were also in operation. These centers provided South Africans with informative materials aimed at acquainting them with the general culture and way of life of the sponsoring country and with the current policies of their governments as they affected matters of interest to South Africans. The
centers offered lectures and discussions, recorded and live musical concerts, film and slide showings, and special photographic exhibitions.

In some instances the Nationalist government has objected to the products of these foreign information programs. In 1965 the Publications and Control Board requested cuts in the United States Information Agency film entitled "John F. Kennedy, Years of Lightning, Days of Drums," because of scenes showing United States Peace Corps volunteers working with Africans in Tanzania, Negroes and whites working together in the United States, and scenes of the American civil rights program. The United States Information Agency refused to show a cut version of the film.
CHAPTER 18
POLITICAL VALUES AND ATTITUDES

The whites who rule the country view South Africa as a multi-national state composed basically of a white nation (or for some, two white nations), a number of African so-called national units, and the Coloureds and Asians who are usually designated as peoples. They insist that the white nation is, and must remain, politically dominant. The Afrikaners, the larger segment of the white group, have used their numbers and organization to exercise total control over the government since 1948. The political values and attitudes of the English-speaking portion of the white group have been adopted largely in reaction to those of the Afrikaners. For all but a very few whites, however, one political value is primary: the assurance of their continued political, social, and economic dominance.

Nearly all political activity of the state takes place within the white population. Major differences in attitudes concern the means of ensuring continued minority control. The dominant Afrikaner political group and its supporters favor the creation of pseudoindependent political bodies in order to encourage continuation of the loyalty of the nonwhites to their own smaller units and the creation or recreation of such loyalty where none exists. In place of loyalty to South Africa or to its government, they seek to ensure control by any means deemed necessary.

The values and attitudes of the nonwhite communities in the late 1960's and early 1970's are subjects on which accurate information was largely unavailable. Since 1960 the government's effective and rigid control over the nonwhites' means of political expression, the fear of voicing protest it has instilled in the African and, to a lesser extent, in the Coloured and Indian communities, and its control over sociological research of any kind reflecting on political questions among the Africans have meant that definite information on nonwhite political opinions is extremely limited. At the same time, opposition groups operating underground are, out of necessity, secretive so that no observer has made any judgment about their extent, effectiveness, or even their aims in the late 1960's.

The voices of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) from their headquarters in exile in independent African countries cannot be taken to reflect the attitudes...
of even the militants within the country, for the exiled leaders have been out of the country since the early 1960's. Some indirect judgments can be drawn from the positions known before 1960 and the attitudes expressed by individual Africans or those few non-Africans with access to limited portions of the African community since that date.

In general, the major political values of the nonwhites, who constitute 80 percent of the population, were directly opposed to those of the white community. They sought a rearrangement of the country's racially stratified political structure to admit them to a place among the seats of power and a voice in their own destiny. They constitute the most sophisticated nonwhite population on the African continent, with a long tradition of educated leadership and the unifying experience of lengthy and widespread urbanization.

The hero of the new generation of Africans, educated in the Bantu schools and universities, is more likely to be the imprisoned nationalist leaders, such as Nelson Mandela or Robert Sobukwe, than the leader of the progovernment African politicians in the Transkei, Kaizer Matanzima. The new generation is aware, however, of the great strength of the government's security forces, particularly the African informers employed by the police. Unable to achieve, by either parliamentary or extraparliamentary means, their primary desire for access to control of the country, many have apparently resigned themselves to lesser goals for the time being. They outwardly accept the government's separate development program in the hope of profiting from its provisions or of using them to their eventual advantage when time brings change to the country's internal or external situation. The attitudes of portions of the Coloured and Indian communities are inhibited, however, by a fear of inundation by the Africans in a state with a government elected by universal franchise since they, like the whites, fear loss of their relatively privileged social and economic position.

Only in the Transkei has expression of African sentiment been briefly allowed, but even there the ten-year-old emergency proclamations against opposition to government policy were still in force in early 1970, and little data was available to indicate the true meaning of votes for or against apartheid policies. There has been some opportunity for political analysis within the Coloured community, but few observers have made meaningful examinations of the evolving Coloured opinions. In any case, they do not necessarily reflect general nonwhite attitudes.

**THE DOMINANT WHITE COMMUNITY**

The primary concern of the whites is their continued absolute control over the political system which maintains the country's
strict racial cleavages and which, in their view, ensures that their descendants can continue to enjoy the fruits of their superior economic and social position. Despite the great numerical superiority of the nonwhite population, the whites conceive of South Africa only as a white man's country (see ch. 4, Population). They strongly oppose any extension of political power, no matter how small, to the nonwhites within their country but consider instead that nonwhites should be treated permanently as the major natural resource of the country which, like its other natural wealth, should be preserved and treated with care as the raw material for the continued strength of the white economy.

Although a majority of the whites traditionally have looked upon the African majority only as servants or enemies, nearly all expressed some form of condescending paternalism toward subservient Africans, in its less harsh form labeled “Cape liberalism.” By 1970 many within the mainstream of the white political movements sought to improve the material and, in some ways, the political position of the nonwhites for a variety of reasons. For many the nonwhite political opposition of the 1950’s and early 1960’s had been a revelation. They had never before realized that the Africans might have political feelings. Keenly aware of the strong overseas opposition to their stand and of the great potential for trouble represented by a restive nonwhite population despite the rigid and effective police control exercised in the 1960’s, they sought to find a means of relieving the building pressure of the Africans for a political voice by creating political outlets limited to the affairs of the different tribal and minor ethnic groups (see ch. 16, Foreign Relations; ch. 13, The Governmental System).

A smaller but influential group of whites, initially limited to English-speaking businessmen but by 1970 also including Afrikaner business interests, sought to increase the education and standard of living of the nonwhites and, in some cases, to ensure their permanent acceptance as part of the urban population, because they felt the nonwhites represented the answer to increasing needs for a permanent skilled labor force on the one hand and an expanded market for finished products on the other (see ch. 21, Industry; ch. 22, Labor; ch. 23, Domestic Trade). But the growth in the educational and economic levels of the nonwhites and the increased industrialization have not lessened white insistence on the preservation of their privileged political and social position; the improved level of income of the nonwhites is to continue to be outstripped by the economic growth of the whites, so that the great disparity between the groups is to remain.

Some observers note a more significant possibility for change in the moral attitudes expressed by many Christian churches that presented a unified verbal opposition to the country's racial policies in
the late 1960's. Most Afrikaners and nearly all leaders of the government, however, were strongly linked to the more conservative Dutch Reformed churches that strongly supported the government's racial separation policy and went so far as to suspend its ministers for opposing the continued racial separation in the country and in the church.

By 1970, however, even the major leaders of these influential churches had raised their voices in moral protest, expressing the opinion that racial separation (apartheid) is only morally acceptable if viable black states or territories can be established in which Africans can live under decent social, economic, and political conditions. They see present conditions as intolerable and justifiable only if they are a transition to such black states.

These clergy of the Dutch Reformed Church expressed special concern over the effect of migratory labor on African family life, and they called for the white population to be willing to undergo great sacrifices in order to improve the position of the nonwhite community. Despite the public moral concern of the clergy and some laymen, the attitudes of the vast majority of whites, who see themselves as a bulwark of Christianity, remained unchanged. Neither of the major political parties has felt constrained to alter its political programs, and neither would consider even eventual economic, let alone political, parity between the whites and any portion of the nonwhites. Only a very small portion of the white voters were willing to support the Progressive Party, the only remaining party advocating the gradual granting of equal political rights at least to the educated nonwhites (see ch. 15, Political Dynamics).

Despite the emergence of a small but growing African educated class, the urban and industrial experience of a very large segment of the African population and the orientation toward a nontribal culture of large numbers of Africans, most whites believe that tribal nationalism—political unification and self-government for specific African ethnic groups—is a much more potent force than any general feeling of African nationalism. Whites publicly avow, therefore, that the political desires of the bulk of the African population can be best satisfied by the creation of tribal nations.

Whites see the problems faced by newly emergent countries as the result of the failure of the colonial powers to provide for an orderly and systematic development of an indigenous leadership, a process that they claim to be carrying out in their own quasi-colonial Bantustans. They publicize every incident of intertribal tension in the independent African states as a sign that their policy is the better one, not only for the whites but for the Africans.

Most South African whites view those among them who oppose separate development as neglecting the long-term political implica-
tions that would follow the permanent establishment of an African urban proletariat that, dispossessed of their tribal heritage, would present a continuous threat to the preservation of white rule. They believe, further, that support for apartheid among Africans comes from those who have maintained close ties to their tribes and who have not yet been corrupted by foreign doctrines that influence those who live in multiracial metropolitan communities.

Traditionally, the white population has been split into two distinct parts along ethnic lines: the Afrikaners and the English speakers (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages; ch. 6, Social Structure). Since the late 1940's nearly all of the country's formal political competition has taken place between parties largely representing these two groups. Until recently they were united only in their common desire to ensure the supremacy of the white groups, although even on this issue they were divided by differing approaches to the Africans and different attitudes toward the Coloured and Indian minorities.

By 1970, however, the split between the white groups had lost much of its political significance for both sides, except in the eyes of the ultraconservative rump of the Afrikaner community labeled the verkrampte (literally, the cramped ones). This blurring of distinctions is partly the result of the weakening of the English speakers' political, although not their economic, position and the continued defeats of their United Party at the polls (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 15, Political Dynamics).

The major impetus for change and unity came from the Afrikaner side. Formerly, the Afrikaner voter had two primary objectives: first, protection from English political and economic dominance; and second, protection from African dominance. The first of these is no longer an issue because of Afrikaner political strength, whereas the second—now of even greater importance—serves as a unifying factor. The major interests of the English-speaking voters included the creation of harmony within the white community without loss of their dominant cultural and economic position. The easing of Afrikaner militancy has contributed to harmony among whites. At the same time, the English speakers, originally less preoccupied with the racial issue and more interested in preserving the traditions of British constitutional democracy, have been moved—by fear of the growth of militant African nationalism—to support both stronger racial laws and stronger security laws in direct violation of those traditions.

Although the Afrikaners have remained economically disadvantaged as a group, in comparison with the English speakers, their rise into the higher levels of commerce and industry has been significant. As a result, the late 1960's saw an end to the Afrikaners' sense of inferiority that had been a major factor in the intragroup
politics of the white community. Most of their political leaders felt self-confident enough to encourage or to reflect the breaking down of the isolationist barriers erected against the contamination of the Afrikaners by foreign or English-speaking ideas.

URBANIZATION AND RURAL INFLUENCES

For most Afrikaners the urban centers had traditionally been viewed as centers of moral corruption and decay designed to ensnare the Afrikaner volk (people). By 1970, however, the shift of most Afrikaners away from agriculture and their new self-confidence led them to view these same population centers as their cities. Although Afrikaner rural traditions remained important, they were much more remote, being part of the Afrikaner's heritage rather than his daily way of life.

The Nationalist Party has successfully retained the Afrikaner vote, as its supporters moved to the city, but urbanization has led to a change in the character of the party, including a decline in its ethnic, but not its racial, militancy. At the same time, expressed opposition to capitalism has vanished. Such opposition was very common during the 1930's and 1940's, when capitalism for the Afrikaner meant the dominance over his country's economy by large foreign companies owned by English speakers.

The urbanization of the Afrikaner has also been accompanied by a rising educational level, which has provided the Afrikaners with access to new and varied sources of political information, including the English-language press. Such sources have replaced traditional dependence upon the minister of the village Afrikaner church and the teacher of the village school.

The key political issue that divides the white electorate is the method to be utilized in exercising control over the nonwhites. Even before coming to power in 1948, the Nationalist Party had gained at least tacit support from its followers for its policy of apartheid, the most important element of which envisions the creation of separate quasi-autonomous states for African tribal groups within the country.

Support for the program among the Afrikaners is attributable to a recurrent theme influencing Afrikaner political attitudes—the yearning for the golden age of Afrikaner separatism, the period of the Boer states (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). At that time their relations with the Africans had not been complicated. Africans were of only two classes: those few employed as servile laborers by the whites; and the so-called unspoiled savages, who inhabited the lands reserved for their tribe by treaty with the benevolent white government. The treaties left affairs within the reserve in the hands of the chiefs but could hold them responsible for anything that disturbed
the good order of the white republics. By seizing this image, the Afrikaner avoids giving weight to the fundamental changes (industrialization, education, and urbanization) affecting the Africans and the fact that the reserves are unable to provide a homeland for most Africans.

For most adherents of apartheid, however, support on the practical level results from a view of separate development either as the most effective or the most just form of what the Afrikaners refer to as baasskap, or white dominance. Apartheid is to substitute legal distinctions for the cultural, educational, industrial, and economic distinctions that originally differentiated the whites as superior to the nonwhites but which crumbled as the nonwhites became more urbanized and industrialized in the twentieth century.

Opposition to the policy of separate development by some whites, who, however, support white supremacy, originates from the conviction that effective separate development would require the expenditure of vast sums of money by whites—an expense they have shown themselves unwilling to shoulder. Some also say that no matter how much money is spent, the reserves will remain too poor, too small, and too scattered to support their existing populations, let alone those whom the government envisions forcing into the reserves from white areas.

Others see the policy as cutting off the supply of labor when economic expansion requires more and more skilled and unskilled labor. Still others fear that the new states to be created, commonly called Bantustans, would obtain real independence and serve as bases for attacks on, or agitation against, the Republic. Particularly among the United Party supporters, many do not believe that the limited governments of the Bantustans would provide a political outlet sufficient to absorb the energies, or to satisfy the demands for a political voice, of the nonwhites, despite the costs and efforts expended.

ATTITUDES AND TRADITIONS IN THE AFRIKANER POLITICAL MOVEMENT

The Afrikaner political movement has fractured a number of times, with new splits always toward more conservative attitudes. Such a split occurred in the late 1960's, formalized in the creation of a new political party in late 1969 (see ch. 15, Political Dynamics). The new divisions were labeled the verkrampte and the verligte (literally, the enlightened ones).

The verkrampte appear to be opposed to all foreign influences and change and see the traditional value of isolation of their community and country as a means of preserving Afrikaner traditions from outside influences that might bring about change, and thus, of en-
suring the continued purity of Afrikaner culture. To quote one of their foremost leaders, Jaap Marais, they refuse “to enter into the widening stream of culture mixing which ultimately must end in the identity-less mass-person desired by liberalism and communism by which way the world is being prepared for the eventual domination of the anti-Christ.”

Another observer has suggested an analysis of the primary difference between the verkrampte and verligte. The verkrampte fears that the Afrikaners will lose their dominant political position and their identity if they lose their exclusiveness and traditionalism, whereas the verligte believe that the Afrikaner people are strong enough now to emerge from isolation and must do so in order to meet the challenge of the new international situation and the future internal challenge of African nationalism.

Critics have represented the verkrampte, in part, as the reactionary element found in every conservative party in modern society. They have suggested that such elements, faced with the complexity of that society and changing moral and cultural patterns, seek stability and certainty in a retreat to an earlier order. Such sentiments are strengthened in South Africa by the Afrikaner traditions of strict racial exclusiveness. In addition, some verkrampte elements see the crumbling of traditional Afrikaner group solidarity as the result of creeping liberalism throughout the government and the leadership of the Nationalist Party. Their fear is heightened by the development of new social and cultural attitudes within the Afrikaner community, such as the views of the group of younger novelists and poets called the Sestigers (men of the sixties), who are attempting by their writing to acclimatize the Afrikaner to the modern world (see ch. 10, Artistic and Intellectual Expression).

The political values of Boer society, which Afrikaners consider part of their political heritage, include egalitarianism, distrust of government authority verging on anarchistic tendencies, and opposition to limitations on personal initiative. Egalitarianism, however, has applied to whites only and often solely to Afrikaners. Moreover, political equality in a society in which the major political unit was the patriarchal family, referred chiefly to the equality of the patriarchs who were capable of challenging governmental authority.

This patriarchal tradition is retained in vestigial form in a value system that gives the perquisites of leadership to older men. Even in 1970 political leadership by younger men, which in South Africa means anyone under forty, was very rare and, although this attitude was changing, the average age of political leaders remained more advanced. Finally, despite the older egalitarianism, a strong tradition of executive leadership has developed, supported by Afrikaner admiration of the last years of the Boer republics under the dominance of Paul Kruger and the leadership exerted by earlier patriarchs.
In addition, many of the members of the English-speaking community, which remained strongly tied to the British concepts of a parliamentary system until the 1960's, have been moved to support strong leadership and to develop a respectful attitude to both Prime Minister Verwoerd and Prime Minister Vorster. The community considers these men to have saved them from the assault by African forces, which many saw as inevitable without a strong hand at the helm of government. For these reasons, considerable sentiment exists for a nonparliamentary executive form of government; the majority of Afrikaner leaders, however, favor the retention of the parliamentary system. They recognize the great advantages of the existing system of responsible government with all power concentrated, in principle, in the hands of a legislature that has, in practice, responded to the bidding of the cabinet through strict party discipline.

Adherence to one's own group is one of the most widely expressed of Afrikaner political sentiments, and the triumphs of Afrikaner history are considered a result of united efforts. Conversely, mixing with or supporting another group even in defense of a morally desirable cause is viewed as a political evil. This cohesiveness provides the great strength of the National Party caucus in Parliament. Splits within the Afrikaner political movement have always stressed stronger, not lesser, Afrikaner exclusiveness.

A major tenet of orthodox political and social values among Afrikaners was belief in, and support of, the Christian National Education (CNE) program, which sought to create or strengthen the faith in Afrikanerdom of their children throughout their educational process and to ensure that racial and ethnic divisions are stressed along with absolute loyalty to one’s own group (see ch. 9, Education). The program also provided the guidelines for the government’s educational system for nonwhites.

The Afrikaners see themselves as the bastion of white, Christian civilization in black, heathen Africa. As a corollary, they consider that they alone understand the problems the country faces and that, given this combination of mission and knowledge, the Afrikaner alone has the right to decide on the whole of southern Africa’s future.

Afrikaners tend to view with suspicion the two religious minorities, Catholics and Jews, who are considered opponents of the traditional values of Calvinist Christianity. Both groups are also suspect as foreign influences with a predilection for racial liberalism and because they, like the English speakers, maintain personal and other ties in Europe or Israel and would have a place to seek refuge if South Africa were torn apart by a nonwhite revolution. These religious minorities are, therefore, open to the Afrikaner’s charge that they are not interested in the country’s long-range good.

Afrikaners tend to be hostile toward foreign states, particularly
black African states, Communist states, and those Western states that oppose South African racial policies (see ch. 16, Foreign Relations). At the same time, the majority of white South Africans display favorable personal approaches toward white visitors and tourists, motivated at least in part by a desire to impress them favorably and to win their support for their country.

WHITE OPPOSITION TO RACIAL POLICIES

The major opposition to apartheid from within the white community comes from the Christian churches, other than the Dutch Reformed churches, which have a largely Afrikaner membership. The other churches, almost without exception, condemn apartheid as being in direct and violent conflict with true Christian teaching. Their verbal attack on apartheid reached significant levels in the late 1960's. The three Dutch Reformed churches, whose members outnumber the total white membership of all the other churches, did not support their position, but they have adopted new attitudes toward the necessity for justice in racial relations and a small number of Dutch Reformed ministers have been among the most articulate and conscientious opponents of apartheid.

The Methodist church, which has the largest following among the Africans, has elected an African bishop as its head. The Anglican and Catholic churches, whose white priests have maintained the closest ties to the African communities of any of the country’s whites, have been most outspoken in their criticism. The ecumenical South African Council of Churches, to which all Protestant groups except the Dutch Reformed churches belonged, has raised the widest and most effective protest (see ch. 11, Religion).

These voices have been largely ignored by the government, however, since the vast majority of its supporters are members of the Afrikaner churches as are nearly all government leaders. The government has effectively silenced churchmen who are noncitizens, including a number of British and Americans serving as bishops in the country, by denying them visas, that missionaries are required to renew every three months.

Other white organizations that have opposed the government’s racial policies include the South African Institute of Race Relations, which is the major source of published information on race relations and nonwhite attitudes within the country. Another is the Black Sash, a women’s organization dedicated to demonstrating its opposition to what it views as the totalitarian nature of Afrikaner rule. The Citizens Action Committee, composed of prominent South African white leaders from diverse groups organizes protests against the more stringent applications of the numerous apartheid laws and other restrictive legislation. The National Union of South
African Students (NUSAS) has opposed the implementation of apartheid in, and government efforts to exert control over, the universities.

Another organization concerned with the country's race relations and politics is the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA). Although Afrikaner in membership and championing separate development it strongly favors speedier creation of meaningful outlets for African political expression on the reserves that would provide genuine separate development. It also favors the creation of self-governing homelands for the Coloured and Indian communities, which is a government policy.

POLITICAL ATTITUDES AMONG THE STUDENTS AND YOUTH

The National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) is an organization that links the student governing bodies and the student representative councils of the white English-language universities. The white Afrikaans-language universities are generally linked by the student group called the Afrikaanse Studentebond (ASB). The two organizations represent the opposite extremes of major white political opinion in the country.

NUSAS, viewed by the government as bordering on the subversive, was under frequent police and administrative pressure throughout the 1960's. A number of its senior leaders have been banned or exiled, and threats were publicly voiced by the prime minister to bring the organization to heel. Government opposition is aroused despite the fact that the organization's policies are generally in line with the country's policies of white supremacy. Only a minority of the NUSAS leaders advocate incorporation of the Coloured and Indian communities into the white electorate or the enfranchisement of the African elite, both of which are advocated by the Progressive Party in Parliament. The government's concern is indicative of its fear of the growth of liberal ideas among the younger members of the white elite rather than any specific opposition presented by the NUSAS, which is primarily concerned with the question of academic freedom, including the freedom to have interracial contacts on campus. NUSAS' over expression of opposition has gone beyond peaceful sit-ins and picket lines on campuses. English-speaking proponents of apartheid at the universities of Witwatersrand and Natal are represented by organizations, each of which is called a conservative student association.

The ASB is the dominant political organization at most of the Afrikaans schools. The body generally expresses itself in terms that are conservative even by Afrikaner standards. Its annual congress in 1969, for example, concerned itself not with racial issues but with
support for the traditional Afrikaner program of CNE and saved its strongest applause for speakers favoring a continued separation of English and Afrikaners within the white community (see ch. 9, Education). A number of its chapters had acquired strong ties to the conservative wing of the Nationalist Party, which split off to form the Reconstituted National Party (Herstigte Nasionale Party—HNP) in October 1969. Because of these ties, it lost the support of significant numbers of students at some of the Afrikaans schools in the late 1960's.

The only student organization that strongly opposes the government's racial policies is the University Christian Movement founded in 1967 under the aegis of the Methodist, Roman Catholic, Anglican, Presbyterian, and Congregational churches. It was reported in late 1968 to have 3,000 members of all racial groups and to have chapters at twenty-five institutions of higher education. In late 1968 it was forbidden to form branches at the African university colleges. Membership is not restricted to Christians, and at its first national convention in 1968, which dealt with ways to bring about peaceful change in the country's social situation, about half the delegates were Africans. The police took immediate action against the organization's activities; its first publication was banned, and its leaders lost their passports and were subjected to police searches. According to the movement's leaders, efforts were also made to recruit paid informants within the organization. Ten white members were arrested during a church service for attending services in a nonwhite church, and the prime minister threatened police action to crush the organization.

With the exception of the ties of individual students to the University Christian Movement, no interuniversity organization exists with an African membership except for the small African Student Cultural Association. A report in the Rand Daily Mail in July 1968 stated that the African university students consider themselves black nationalists but that they were reluctant to express their views for fear of retaliation by security police.

**POLITICAL VALUES AND ATTITUDES OF THE AFRICANS**

The only opportunities for political expression allowed to any significant portion of the African population after the banning of the ANC and the PAC in 1961 were the two elections to the Transkei Legislative Assembly in 1964 and 1969. A majority of votes in the first election and a surprisingly large number of votes in the second election went to the Democratic Party in evident support of its policy, which favored the creation of a multiracial South African nation and the rejection of geographic apartheid. The Transkei National Independence Party, which favored separate
development and has publicly demanded that the government set a
schedule for the achievement of self-government and assurance of
eventual independence within a southern African federation, lost
the first election decisively but won the second election, polling 44
percent of the votes cast compared to the Democratic Party's 36
percent (see ch. 15, Political Dynamics).

The crushing of the opposition leadership outside the Transkei
accounted for the apparent political apathy among Africans in early
1970. Both the elite and the general population were so cautious
about expressing political opinions that even social workers were
unable to estimate the prevailing attitudes of the Africans among
whom they worked. Experienced observers, however, have sug-
gested that their resentment, largely silent, is aimed primarily at the
limitations placed upon them, particularly of the petty affronts to
human dignity encountered daily and the lack of opportunity for
political expression.

The African majority seemingly continued to hope that they
might eventually gain an effective voice in their own destiny
through some adequate form of parliamentary representation and
that there would be an end to the racial bars and arbitrary popula-
tion control, particularly the efforts to remove them from the
cities. Others see hope in the more attractive parts of the govern-
ment's separate development program, particularly in the possibility
that the Bantustans may be granted true independence. That hope
has been retarded, however, by the government's failure to give firm
assurance of their independence and to implement announced plans
for local organs of government for Africans in the urban areas. The
continued fragmentation of the reserves, despite the government's
publically expressed intention of consolidating them, and the lack
of economic opportunity within them have contributed to diminish-
ing the expectations of those Africans who saw some value in sepa-
rate development.

Some of the leaders of the Bantu territorial authorities still en-
vision the eventual combination of the African homelands to form
one great black state; they look forward to a day when divisions
between the tribal-groups will disappear and hope their millions of
fellow Africans, working in the white urban areas, will be given
political rights as permanent residents within the white state. The
publicly announced Bantustan program of the government, how-
ever, has never had the scope envisioned by these Africans.

Overawed by white power after the successes of the security
forces during the 1960's, the majority of Africans, at least in the
towns and in the poorer rural areas, feel helpless and channel their
bitterness and disenchantment into aggression in their personal
lives, an important factor in the extremely high urban crime rate.
Their strongest resentment was directed against the limitations
placed on their aspirations to improve themselves, including the government restrictions on their expansion into better paying jobs, the lack of encouragement for technical training, and the arbitrary nature of the population control measures (see ch. 8, Living Conditions; ch. 22, Labor).

The approximately 1,600 African students in the universities in early 1970 constituted a potential African elite. The country's stability rested in part on the government's ability to gain at least limited support from these students, for they must supply the technical and administrative leadership for the proposed national units (tribal nations).

Despite their reticence, something of the attitudes of these African students was known, because of their contacts with academic observers, South African whites, and foreigners on their campuses. Like their fellow Africans, these students were impressed by the sense of inevitability of white power, and they were largely quiescent under the watchful eye of, and constant threat of repression by, the police. Nevertheless, they were clearly hostile to the government. For example, according to the Institute of Race Relations and other observers at Fort Hare, the most important of the Bantu universities, the students have continually refused to form a campus organization because of the belief that any leader they elected would be forced to become a government stooge or would be viewed as such by his fellows. Victimization and police interrogation and harassment were feared if students spoke out freely, and none believed that any degree of academic freedom existed. Students at a number of schools felt that a quarter of their fellows were in police pay and would report even the slightest antigovernment statements. Rectors, other administrative staff, and faculty were not trusted and were thought to have close links with the police.

No matter how strongly the educated portion of the African population may oppose racial separatism, it has been influenced by the pervasive philosophy and structure of the South African situation to look for solutions to the problems of their own racial group rather than to consider South Africa as a whole, although this solution may well take the form of interracial equality rather than African superiority. This sense of the group shows in another way in the widespread rejection of interracial but elitist programs that might offer the franchise to educated Africans. Both Africans and whites have noted the failure of elitist or assimilation philosophies of government in the former European colonies in Africa where such efforts were made to satisfy the demands of the educated portion of the indigenous population for a voice in control of their own countries.

The Africans on the reserves, roughly a third of the African popu-
lation, are its least vocal segment; a substantial number of them are kept quiet by government control, as in the Transkei where emergency laws to suppress expressions of opposition have been in effect for a decade. Information on their present attitudes is almost nonexistent, but there is nothing to indicate that their attitudes toward the government have improved since an earlier era when a noted anthropologist working among the Zulu indicated that Africans saw even those actions of the government that were aimed at their immediate benefit as probably containing a hidden double purpose against their real interests. For example, they saw government-organized efforts to introduce measures for agricultural improvement as attempts to deprive them of their food and thus weaken them. Government assistance was compared in a common analogy with the food that is thrown into a pond to attract the fish, so that the next time they will bite on the baited hook.

If they are suspicious of assistance to their advantage, they are bitter about legislation that is not to their advantage. That such suspicion continues can be seen from the government's repeated failures in the 1960's to find African traditional leaders willing to serve as members of government-appointed bodies, despite its strong efforts to convince them that advantages would accrue to their followers and despite the offer of increased salaries for the chiefs involved.

THE COLOURED POPULATION

The government claimed Coloured support for its policy of separate development. According to statements by white opposition leaders in Parliament in 1968, however, if the Coloured community were given the opportunity to freely express its views, it would totally reject the government's "whole oppressive policy of separate development." In the view of these white leaders, the government was able to claim support for its policies toward the Coloureds only because it had silenced the leadership of the community through intimidation by the security police, banning orders, the dismissal and threats of dismissal of Coloured leaders from government posts, and other means. Because of the long years of utter frustration, the Coloureds now suffered from a sense of futility in their efforts to obtain political justice. Separate development had been accepted by some Coloured leaders but only under the mental duress resulting from their despair of ever reaching their intended ends of political equality.

According to a prominent Coloured political leader, R. E. Van der Ross, the Coloured community suffers from what he called communal neurosis, resulting from its failure to throw off the psychological burden of the inferiority complex that it had retained since
its emancipation from slavery. Only in the 1960’s did it begin to develop an acceptance of political responsibility. In the past the Coloureds had completely accepted the economic, social, and political superiority of the whites. Never in their history had they achieved any improvement to their own position; it had always been the result of the benevolent paternalism of some portion of the white overlords, from the ending of slavery in the 1830’s to the fight for retention of the Cape Coloureds on the common electoral roll in the 1950’s. The result of this paternalism has been to leave them without any tradition of self-leadership, so that cooperation with the whites is viewed as the usual manner of achieving ends that more dynamic communities might seek by political means.

More dynamic individuals have generally attempted to escape into the white community. The Coloured population had fought apartheid for twenty years because it sought to become an integral part of the white community. It had accepted separate development out of necessity, and the new Coloured attitude was to demand everything that was due the Coloureds in a just division of the country. The Federal Coloured People’s Party and other Coloured groups in effect have called for progress of the Coloured community so that it may match the white community on its own merits and, thus, attain equality through vertical apartheid. The Labour Party, however, formerly led by Van der Ross and led from 1967 until early 1970 by M. D. Arendse, remains totally opposed to separate development for the Coloureds and has a majority of urban Coloureds as supporters.

Both the supporters and opponents of separate development still tend to regard themselves as an appendage of the white community and are quite conscious of having formerly held a political standing and of still holding a social standing superior to that of the Africans and, to a lesser extent, the Indians. Few have shown any desire to be dragged down through political cooperation with other nonwhite groups.

The Coloureds were apparently particularly stirred from their long political apathy by the first nationwide election among them, that for the Coloured People’s Representative Council in late 1969, although even these were boycotted by, or failed to stir the interest of, a large number of the potential electorate. It is not known if their new-found political interest continued after the election, particularly in light of the government’s successful reversal of the election results (see ch. 15, Political Dynamics).

Although the Coloureds acknowledge that the policy of separation enforced by the white government may occasionally benefit them economically and culturally, they see themselves as second-class citizens; they consider the policy as directed against nonwhites since they know that they have had no part in-framing the policies
to which they must conform. Thus, even the proapartheid Federal Party has in its manifesto the need to protect the existing rights of the Coloured people and to be ready to negotiate constitutionally for further rights and more freedoms that would lead to first-class citizenship.

ATTITUDES OF THE INDIAN COMMUNITY

Traditionally, the Indians, like most Coloureds, have sought to break down the color bar that separates them from the whites and limits their economic expansion. They have also tried to obtain political representation in Parliament.

In the 1950's, however, the leadership of the South African Indian Congress (SAIC) passed into the hands of younger and more radical leaders who favored the advancement of all nonwhites as the Indian's route to political justice. The rival South African Indian Organization (SAIO) continued to voice the traditional demands for acceptance into the non-African elite.

In the early 1960's the major question of Indian politics continued to be whether to support an organization based on the assumption of superiority to the African majority or to support one that wished to act on the assumption that the racial discrimination and economic restrictions experienced by most Indians and Africans gave them common interests and required their political unity.

Indians of both opinions opposed the creation by the government of separate governmental organs for the Indians in 1963 and 1964; to accept them would imply acceptance of apartheid by the Indians and their permanent inferiority to the whites. In particular, they saw the creation of the South African Indian Council, declared by the government to be the representative body for all Indians, as an attempt to circumvent their demands for representation in Parliament. In both these reactions they exactly mirrored the reactions of the Coloureds to the creation of the Coloured Representative Council.

By 1970, however, this opposition had disintegrated. The government had effectively crushed both the SAIC and the SAIO so that no political party or other organized political voice existed in the Indian community after 1965. By 1968 the government was able to obtain the agreement of a number of Indian leaders, including a former leader of the SAIO, to serve on the council. Although many Indians continued to boycott the body as not representative of the community's true interests, the majority appeared by 1970 to give their support to the council and to local Indian bodies, as well as to the government's Department of Indian Affairs, on the grounds that these provided practical improvements.
They do not, however, commit themselves to the doctrine of apartheid. Even moderate leaders of the Indian community look forward to the creation of a nonracial democracy and see enfranchisement as the only means of obtaining democracy. Like other leaders of nonwhite groups, they recognize the reasons for the whites' racial prejudices but view white insistence on economic and political security as having rested upon the insecurity of nonwhites throughout South Africa's history.

Indian political attitudes are fractured along religious, linguistic, and ethnic and socioeconomic lines (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages; ch. 6, Social Structure). In political matters, however, the forces that hold the Indians together, particularly their opposition to apartheid, seem to be stronger than those that divide them. Moreover, they see their primary political ties to be a unified South African nation. Most emigrated from the Indian subcontinent before World War I, and their links with the homeland have largely been broken. The religious and social divisions that mark social and political relations in India and Pakistan exist in a much weaker form, if at all, in South Africa.

ATTITUDES TOWARD COMMUNISM

The Communists have had a small number of African, Coloured, and Asian, as well as white adherents since the early 1920's. Their numbers remained very small, and they were largely without influence in other political and labor organizations after the late 1920's. The Communists gained some influence, however, after the development of the Congress movement in the 1950's, because of the organizational support they were able to provide to the African National Congress (ANC) through the Congress of Democrats, a small group of whites most of whom were supporters of the Communists. There was also a small number of aggressive Communist supporters in the SAIC.

When the Communist Party was banned in 1950, it was reported to have about 2,500 members including perhaps 1,200 Africans. At that time, the ANC had 20,000 members. Communist ideology remained an anathema among the great majority of ANC leaders, but its president, Albert Luthuli, sought a common front with all who, like the Communists, supported the limited goal of an end to the domination of the white minority.

Because of their organizational sophistication, the Communists exerted considerable weight in the joint leadership of the Congress Alliance. In part because the Communists were whites, a segment of the ANC split from the older body to form the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) under a leadership with a membership on which the Communists had no influence.

The attitude of the nonwhite opposition to the Communists in
early 1970 was obscured by a number of factors. The most serious of these was the government's continued efforts to label all of its opponents Communists and to convince the rest of the world that it alone stood as a bulwark against Communist expansion in southern Africa. In addition, the exiled leaders of the ANC and PAC, receiving little assistance from the West, have turned increasingly to the Communist states for arms and military training. The heavily fragmented PAC in exile has sought aid from a number of sources, and the leaders of one faction have apparently come under strong Communist Chinese influence. The ANC has established some ties with the front organizations of the European and Cuban Communist bodies as well as with the South African Communist Party in its London exile.

The language used by the leaders of both groups reflects Marxist jargon, but such jargon is regularly found in the political rhetoric of other non-Communist leaders of independent Africa. It is the vocabulary of revolution in the second half of the twentieth century among African parties that want to portray themselves as revolutionary, whether or not they are under Communist organizational influence. Despite their language, the two exile groups continued, in the latter half of the 1960's, to send the major portion of their students to schools in, or run by, the Western countries; their leaders and members in exile continued to display a primary interest in achieving democratic rather than Communist goals.

The appeal of doctrinal communism and Communist organization (to be distinguished from revolutionary rhetoric) seems to be very limited among most Africans. Long years of anti-Communist propaganda, the widespread influence of Christianity, and their preoccupation with racial rather than economic class distinctions partly account for the doctrine's restricted attractiveness. Moreover, communism is seen as a "white man's doctrine" and not, therefore, the answer to African problems.

Among a small group of the Coloured elite, the doctrines of Leon Trotsky were popular in the 1940's, and the body that they founded, the Non-European Unity Movement, still existed, at least in exile, in the late 1960's. It never achieved any significant support even among the Coloured, and by 1970 its leaders were no longer publicly espousing Trotskyist doctrine.

The remaining opposition groups—the Liberal Party, which dissolved itself in 1968, and the terrorist organization with which it was sometimes associated, the African Resistance Movement, as well as the legal Progressive Party—are all strongly anti-Communist. Communism was viewed as the absolute antithesis of their way of life by the majority of whites, and anticommunism is a strong value binding the English and the Afrikaners together, although, like the government's, their definition of communism tends to include all the government's opponents.
SECTION III. ECONOMIC

CHAPTER 19

CHARACTER AND STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY

As a world producer and exporter, South Africa has been known for nearly 100 years for its rich goldfields, currently the source of two-thirds of the estimated world supply of newly mined gold. For a full century it has been a leading world source of gem-quality diamonds, and it is also the center of the diamond sales monopoly, channeling diamonds from other producing countries through the Central Selling Organization in London to the exchanges of Amsterdam, Antwerp, and New York.

Farther down the export scale, the vast sheep ranches of its arid veld have furnished low-cost raw wool for Britain’s textile mills, and the more fertile and varied farming areas of Cape Province have supplied to world markets off-season fruits, dried or tinned specialties, and a little wine. Exports of deciduous fruit, cane sugar, and surplus feed maize originated in the fertile farming districts. Under the stimulus of government price support, however, their cultivation has been extended to risky marginal districts of low or erratic rainfall. By the 1960’s the country’s commercial farms were able to fill nearly all the food requirements of the urban population, as well as earn foreign exchange on world markets (see ch. 20, Agriculture).

The country has abundant resources of a number of minerals besides gold and diamonds. Its industrial development has been based in part upon the exploitation of extensive reserves of coal and iron ore. It exports quantities of uranium, platinum, manganese, ferroalloys, asbestos, and copper.

Since World War II growth in manufacturing has surpassed that in mining and agriculture. The cost of imports of manufactured goods is still more than three times the value of exports of manufactures, but accelerated industrialization in recent years has made the country more nearly self-sufficient in some basic manufactures and has led to production of a more varied and sophisticated range of consumer goods and capital equipment (see ch. 21, Industry).

In the 1950’s and 1960’s the country was often described as a dual economy. It was dual in the sense that an expanding and
increasingly diversified modern industrial and commercial sector, based upon a rich natural endowment of mineral and fuel resources, was able to draw upon an abundant and increasing supply of low-cost surplus labor from a traditional sector of relatively unproductive subsistence agriculture, located chiefly within the confines of the African Reserves or Bantu homelands.

Out of the country's total population of nearly 16 million at the 1960 census, an estimated 4.3 million to 4.8 million Africans were domiciled on the reserves and were wholly or partly dependent upon subsistence agriculture (see ch. 4, Population; ch. 20, Agriculture). The number dependent upon subsistence production in the rest of the Republic was undetermined.

The majority of the population, however, was engaged in, or dependent upon, the developed, "European" exchange economy, concentrated in the urban areas but extending to white-owned commercial farms and sheep or cattle ranches. In the 1960's more Africans than whites were engaged in this developed sector which, for more than a century, had drawn upon the reserves for labor and, to a lesser extent, for growth in the urban consumer market (see ch. 22, Labor; ch. 23, Domestic Trade). In 1960 the developed sector was drawing about 500,000 migrant workers directly from the reserves and another 500,000 from outside the Republic. Many of the African workers in manufacturing and services came from employment in domestic service or commercial agriculture which, in turn, recruited the less experienced workers from the reserves.

The subsistence sector of the reserves, in turn, was far from self-supporting. As a source of income for the reserve population, subsistence agriculture has for the most part become an inadequate alternative or supplement to wages derived from migrant or local wage labor for the developed sector (see ch. 20, Agriculture).

When the level of activity and employment in the developed sector was expanding, as was the case during most of the 1960's, dualism in the economy was reflected primarily in the existence of two widely disparate standards of personal income and, to a lesser extent, in differences in per capita productivity arising in part from restrictions on vertical and geographic mobility imposed by law or custom. The extent to which differences in productivity might be attributed to cultural differences, were there no such artificial restrictions, remained a subject of disagreement among white South African employers and scholars (see ch. 22, Labor). Despite ideological assumptions to the contrary, there was a high degree of interaction between the traditional and modern sectors, and few adult men remained long without experiencing work in the exchange economy. Urban Africans and migrants from the reserves or from nearby African countries formed the base of the modern sector of the economy, and the subsistence sector functioned primarily as a pool of labor for the exchange sector.
The low standard of living prevailing on the reserves and the relatively unproductive use of available manpower resources in the rest of the economy are reflected in the country's relatively low per capita product and income. In 1964 per capita income was valued at the official rate of exchange at US$507; an attempt by the United Nations Statistical Office to work out a valuation in terms of actual United States purchasing power in 1964 increased this estimate to about US$700 in 1964 dollars. The United Nations estimate of per capita income at the official rate of exchange in 1967 was US$521. This was higher than the estimated per capita income for most other countries of Africa but less than half that of any of the developed countries.

No real statistical facts are available on the share of the national income accruing to the African two-thirds of the population. According to a speech by the chairman of the Board of Trade and Industries in 1964, estimations of African income are usually based upon the assumption that Africans in the Republic get approximately one-quarter of the total net domestic product. He stated that recent investigations indicated, however, that one-fifth would probably be a more realistic estimate. If this flat ratio were applied to the net domestic product for 1963 (including that accruing to Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland), the estimated 11,648,000 Africans in the Republic at that date would have a share amounting to roughly US$136 per capita at the official rate of exchange—higher than in some African countries, but lower than in others.

A United Nations survey published in 1966 declared that the average per capita income of Africans in the Republic was not much more than US$100. Moreover, this average covers the wide gap between urban African incomes and average income on the reserves, as well as extreme variations among incomes on the reserves (see ch. 20, Agriculture). In the modern sector, excluding the African reserves, wage income at the same period was thought to be allocated between whites and all groups of nonwhites in the ratio of five to one. In 1969 the director of Market Research Africa, a private organization, estimated that Africans constituted 67.9 percent of the Republic's population and received 18.8 percent of the total cash income.

In the international statistics that classify various national economies as "less developed" or "more developed," the tendency in the late 1960's was to group South Africa with the "more developed" countries, in spite of its relatively low per capita income and fairly large undeveloped subsistence sector. This classification was adopted, for example, by the United Nations Statistical Office in its *International Tables on National Accounts for 1968*. A study published by Johns Hopkins University Press in 1967 classified South Africa among the transitional societies at an intermediate level of development, on the basis of a list of forty-one variables including...
sociopolitical factors regarded as determinants in the economic growth process. A study published by the University of Chicago in October 1969 concluded that classifying this dual economy as either less developed or more developed is unsatisfactory: it is less developed by virtue of its average per capita income, yet the white-dominated sector of the economy is clearly technically “more developed.” It therefore included South Africa in the “more developed” group of countries.

It is characteristic of underdeveloped regions and of remote rural subsistence sectors that they tend to yield incomplete or vague census returns. An official attempt has been made to adjust for this factor in South Africa’s statistics on population, economically active persons, and national income and product; but some distortion remains. For example, it is acknowledged that the number of African women actively engaged in subsistence agriculture is substantially underestimated (see ch. 20, Agriculture; ch. 22, Labor). Similarly, the imputed product of subsistence agriculture as a component of the agricultural sector’s contribution to gross domestic product may be highly speculative. Partly for these reasons and partly because of differences in productivity, most data on the country’s economy tend to be largely limited to the developed sector. Moreover, some South African economists with many years’ experience in working with the national product and industrial data reportedly find them unsatisfactory in other respects as a measure of the country’s economic structure.

Subject to this important reservation, the data on sector origin of domestic product and employment show a fairly advanced level of expansion in manufacturing, trade, and services (see table 14). In the employment of its people, South Africa is still basically an agricultural country. If estimated contribution to domestic product, rather than estimated employment, is accepted as the criterion, however, then the role of agriculture or mining is less important than manufacturing or services and slightly smaller than the share of wholesale and retail trade.

**PATTERNS OF GROWTH**

The country’s economic structure has evolved over a period of 100 years by what has been described by a prominent South African economist, D. Hobart Houghton, as a process of growth through imbalance. In his words, South Africa in the mid-nineteenth century was almost a textbook example of a backward country. Economic activity consisted largely of a patriarchal, white, subsistence-level farming and ranching economy and equivalent tribal herding by Africans. Beginning in the 1870’s and 1880’s, after the discovery of diamonds and gold, periodically renewed spurs of
vigorous growth and prosperity in mining brought about the construction of railways, roads, and coal-based power facilities. The mines became the centers of urbanization. Some farmers began to produce for the market, although it was not until after World War II that white farming became almost entirely market-integrated. Foreign trade developed, and important economic ties were forged with overseas enterprise, particularly with London (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 21, Industry).

Gold mining played a leading role in generating the consumer incomes, tax revenues, industrial demand, and capital formation that fueled economic growth. The government, however, has played a crucial role from the start in determining the allocation of available resources. Since the mid-1920's it has also taken the lead in fostering the process of economic diversification that culminated in the 1930's and 1940's in the establishment of basic manufactures, and since World War II, in the growth of a more diversified and sophisticated manufacturing sector, more productive commercial farming, and well-developed services and financial institutions. By differential freight rates, price supports, and other forms of subsidy, it has lent substantial support to white farmers (see ch. 20, Agriculture). By the increasingly protective manipulation of tariffs and exchange controls, it has fostered domestic manufacture and, since the 1930's, has been directly engaged in the creation and operation of basic industries, including iron and steel, machinery, petrochemicals, phosphates, and pulp and paper (see ch. 21, Industry).

Thus the historical estimates of gross domestic product (GDP) show a long-term reduction in the share contributed by agriculture, forestry, and fishing—from about 21 percent of GDP in 1911 and 22 percent in 1920 to only 14 percent in 1930, 12 percent in 1940, and 17 percent in 1950. The share contributed by mining was also reduced—from 26 percent in 1911 to 17 percent in 1920, 15 percent in 1930, 19 percent in 1940, and 13 percent in 1950. Over the same period there was an accelerated growth in the share contributed by manufacturing—from 4 percent of the GDP in 1911 to 7 percent in 1920, 9 percent in 1930, 12 percent in 1940, and 17 percent in 1950.

The importance of gold mining to the economy, even in the 1960's, was probably greater than appears from the statistics on employment or GDP. It has played an important part first as a channel for foreign investment, technology, and skills and later as a source of corporate and government saving and investment, as a source of monetary liquidity, as a major net earner of foreign exchange, as a stabilizing factor in the external balance of payments, and in counteracting swings in the business cycle (see ch. 21, Industry). Some observers also believe that the country's international importance as a source of gold and other minerals has played a part
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standard international industrial classification</th>
<th>Economically active adult males</th>
<th>Gross domestic product</th>
<th>Economically active males</th>
<th>Gross domestic product</th>
<th>Gross domestic product</th>
<th>Percent average annual growth rate</th>
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<tr>
<td>Agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishing</td>
<td>1,538,597</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>1,045</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>12.3&lt;sup&gt;5&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>Mining and quarrying</td>
<td>601,862</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>1,105</td>
<td>13.7</td>
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<td>12.2</td>
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<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>579,230</td>
<td>928</td>
<td>1,887</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>20.9</td>
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<td>Construction</td>
<td>275,707</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>6.3</td>
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<td>Electricity, gas, water, and sanitation</td>
<td>38,061</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>0.9</td>
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<td>Transport, storage, and communication</td>
<td>197,771</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>863</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
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<td>Commerce (wholesale and retail trade)</td>
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<td>648</td>
<td>1,198</td>
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<td>13.3</td>
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<td>Banking, insurance, and real estate</td>
<td>339,555</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>383</td>
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<td>Ownership of dwellings and defense</td>
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<td>304</td>
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<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
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<td>Public administration</td>
<td></td>
<td>468</td>
<td>871</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>9.6</td>
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<td>Other services, including domestic service</td>
<td>510,489</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>801</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>8.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Activities not adequately described</td>
<td>308,552</td>
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<td></td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>1</sup> In percent of total

<sup>2</sup> Standard international industrial classification

<sup>3</sup> Economically active adult males

<sup>4</sup> Gross domestic product

<sup>5</sup> Percent average annual growth rate

<sup>6</sup> Economically active adult males
<table>
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<th>Description</th>
<th>Value 1</th>
<th>Value 2</th>
<th>Value 3</th>
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<tr>
<td>Total estimated active adult males</td>
<td>4,389,824</td>
<td></td>
<td>99.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total gross domestic product at current factor cost</td>
<td>4,976</td>
<td>9,032</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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</table>

1Includes South West Africa (Namibia). It is not clear whether these data include some approximation of subsistence activity and production. Data substantially underestimate the importance of agriculture as a sector of activity for the African population.

2Differs from the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO). The system adopted for classifying persons whose census returns were vague varies.

3Based upon a 10-percent sample of 1960 census returns for whites, Indians, and Coloureds and a 5-percent sample of census returns for Africans. Census returns for Africans may themselves be incomplete. Data on economically active females are manifestly incomplete and have, therefore, been omitted here.

4In million rand; 1 rand equals US$1.40.

5Economic activity in subsistence cultivation is primarily the domain of African women; subsistence herding is done chiefly by boys.

6It is not clear whether the imputed value of subsistence production is included or whether this is the output of commercial (white) agriculture only.
in inhibiting the further deterioration of its foreign political relations in the 1960's (see ch. 16, Foreign Relations). The country produces about two-thirds of estimated world gold output and furnishes asbestos, uranium, ferroalloys, and a number of other minerals to major industrial users abroad.

The importance of mining employment and output relative to output in other sectors of the economy has varied, partly as a function of the relationship between the general price level, which moves upward with the level of domestic and foreign activity and demand, and the official price of gold, which varies only when there is a currency revaluation by South Africa or major gold purchasers (see ch. 25, Fiscal and Monetary Systems). After 1933 the official gold price was high relative to the general price level, and gold production pulled the country out of the worldwide depression in advance of most other countries, stimulating income generation and the creation of capacity in other sectors. There was another upward revision of the rand price of gold after the devaluations of 1949, but at that time the pressure of domestic demand on the overall price level was much stronger than in 1933, and the high earnings and rapid expansion of mining in the early 1950's were permitted partly by the exploitation of rich new goldfields.

Domestic manufacturing, which had started to expand toward the end of the 1930's, was given a powerful stimulus by wartime conditions, a stimulus renewed by the release of pent-up demand and by the increase in protection for manufacturing after World War II (see ch. 21, Industry). Thus in the postwar period the expansion of manufacturing capacity has been an important source of growth. Having started with relatively limited manufacturing capacity and pronounced underutilization of resources, the country experienced a rate of postwar growth in GDP that, in constant prices, was fairly high by international standards. According to United Nations data, the country's average annual rate of growth in GDP in the years 1950-68 was somewhat in excess of the average for developed countries, roughly comparable to that of Portugal and lower than that of Israel and Japan.

In the 1960's expansionary forces were particularly strong. Consumer demand was high, and business expectations were optimistic. The annual rate of immigration of skilled white labor exceeded anticipated levels, and from 1965 to 1969 there was a net inflow of foreign capital. Available resources, therefore, permitted production to expand at a higher rate than anticipated. In the 1960-67 period the GDP grew at an average rate of 6.5 percent a year, as compared to 4.4 percent a year in the 1950-60 period. Preliminary reports indicated that the real growth in GDP was only 3.6 percent in 1968 but at least 6 percent in 1969. The slowdown in 1968 was attributed in part to restraint in private investment expenditure but
also to the unfavorable effect of the worst drought in many years on the level of agricultural production.

The expansionary pressure of demand during much of the period exceeded the growth in domestic production capacity, so that the high rate of growth was accompanied by a rate of inflation that was well in excess of government expectations, although perhaps not inordinately high by international standards. The level of domestic expenditure was considerably higher than available national product, which had to be supplemented by a high level of imports of goods and services. During much of the period, overspending on both consumption and investment was restrained with difficulty by the government through fiscal policy or monetary controls on credit or foreign exchange (see ch. 25, Fiscal and Monetary Systems).

Demand exceeded expectations in the 1960's both because national income was higher than anticipated and because there was a higher propensity to consume than had been foreseen by government planners. The acute shortage of skilled labor in years of expansion exerted upward pressure on white wages and incomes and may have affected some elements of productivity (see ch. 22, Labor). Because available resources of capital and white labor permitted a higher rate of growth than expected, employment of non-white labor, which, by law, forms the unskilled base of the labor force, expanded even more rapidly. Consumption expenditure, particularly on durable goods, by both whites and nonwhites exceeded expectations (see ch. 23, Domestic Trade).

As in other countries, private consumption is the single largest element of domestic expenditure, but its relative importance declined somewhat during the 1960's (see table 15). Government consumption expenditure was mounting, largely because of increased expenditure on defense, munitions, police, and population control (see ch. 26, Public Order and Internal Security; ch. 27, The Armed Forces). The recorded increase in stocks in the 1960's also included stockpiling of strategic materials. The rate of fixed capital formation was fairly high during most of the period, ranging from 20 to 29 percent of the GDP. This is a range more generally characteristic of developed economies and somewhat higher than the average for countries with a comparable per capita product. It is permitted by a high rate of personal and corporate saving, a moderate and not highly progressive rate of personal income tax, and a high rate of government investment in productive capital and physical overhead capital (see ch. 25, Fiscal and Monetary Systems).

Mining output expanded during the 1960's at a slower rate than total output, so that the proportionate contribution of gold mining to the GDP was somewhat reduced. The output of commercial farming, including subsidized surplus production, generally im-
(in million rand)

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Compensation of employees</td>
<td>1,853</td>
<td>2,731</td>
<td>2,890</td>
<td>3,059</td>
<td>3,341</td>
<td>3,681</td>
<td>4,094</td>
<td>4,511</td>
<td>4,797</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income from unincorporated enterprises</td>
<td>855</td>
<td>1,095</td>
<td>1,235</td>
<td>1,330</td>
<td>1,272</td>
<td>1,392</td>
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<td>Corporate transfer payments</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saving of property</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>396</td>
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<td>Direct taxes on corporations</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>430</td>
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<td>General government income from property and entrepreneurship</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>239</td>
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<td>Less interest on the public debt</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>47</td>
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<tr>
<td>Less interest on consumers' debt</td>
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<tr>
<td>Statistical discrepancy</td>
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<td>-126</td>
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<td>102</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>-87</td>
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<td>National income</td>
<td>3,005</td>
<td>4,303</td>
<td>4,528</td>
<td>4,889</td>
<td>5,458</td>
<td>6,048</td>
<td>6,625</td>
<td>7,218</td>
<td>7,884</td>
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Category of Expenditure
(constant 1958 market prices):

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<td>Private consumption expenditure</td>
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<td>3,753</td>
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<td>General government consumption expenditure</td>
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<td>489</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>781</td>
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<td>Gross domestic fixed capital formation</td>
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<td>1,024</td>
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<td>1,443</td>
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<td>Increase in stocks</td>
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<td>94</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>329</td>
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<td>Exports of goods and services</td>
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<td>1,574</td>
<td>1,656</td>
<td>1,755</td>
<td>1,851</td>
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<tr>
<td>Less imports of goods and services</td>
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<td>1,345</td>
<td>1,246</td>
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<td>Statistical discrepancy</td>
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<td>-119</td>
<td>-72</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>-75</td>
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<tr>
<td>Expenditure on gross domestic product</td>
<td>3,868</td>
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<td>Net factor income from the rest of the world*</td>
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<td>-199</td>
<td>-223</td>
<td>-196</td>
<td>-195</td>
<td>-209</td>
<td>-226</td>
<td>-233</td>
<td>-245</td>
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<td>Expenditure on gross national product</td>
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<td>5,441</td>
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<td>6,384</td>
<td>6,719</td>
<td>7,120</td>
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1 By type of income and category of expenditure; includes Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Southwest Africa (Namibia) as well as the Republic of South Africa. It is not clear to what extent the imputed value of subsistence production and consumption is included.

2 Includes taxes paid to foreign governments by South African corporations.

3 Includes undistributed earnings of foreign-controlled subsidiaries.

4 Excludes undistributed earnings of foreign-controlled subsidiaries.

proved during the 1950’s and 1960’s but was still subject to sharp annual fluctuations resulting from low rainfall in marginal dryland farming areas (see ch. 20, Agriculture). Agriculture experienced an exceptionally good year in 1967. The highest rate of growth in the 1960’s was in manufacturing. During the 1961–67 period, output in manufacturing and construction grew by 9.3 percent a year and employment by 8.9 percent. Productivity per worker was increased by only 0.4 percent annually. Among the branches of manufacturing with a higher than average rate of annual growth in the years 1963-67 were production of transport equipment and parts, electrical machinery, metal products, textiles, beverages, and paper and paper products (see ch. 21, Industry). In 1968 and 1969 glass was reported to be a new growth industry.

Throughout most of the 1960’s private enterprises and households accounted for about 76 to 77 percent of the GDP at factor cost, with general government accounting for between 9 and 10 percent; government-operated railways and harbors, about 7 percent; public corporations, 3.5 percent; and other government enterprises, 3.5 percent. The economic importance of general government and public corporations had increased since World War II, but the relative importance of expenditure on railways and harbors had declined somewhat since 1911, when it accounted for about 8 percent of the GDP. The relative share of private enterprises and households had declined slightly, beginning in the 1930’s when the government began to assume an active role in basic industry as well as in the construction and operation of transport and power facilities (see ch. 21, Industry; ch. 23, Domestic Trade). The government and public corporations accounted for between 35 and 45 percent of fixed capital formation in the 1960’s, and the government generated between 19 and 25 percent of expenditure on the GDP.

An economic survey of Africa published by the United Nations in 1966 stressed the fact that South Africa’s abundant natural resources provide excellent potential for a rate of economic growth even higher than that actually achieved during the 1960’s. Although the country’s rainfall is for the most part low and unreliable and its soils are generally deficient in nitrogen and phosphorus, it nonetheless has 35 million to 40 million acres of cultivable land (about 2 acres per capita) extending over temperate and subtropical zones and several times as much grazing land for sheep or cattle (see ch. 2, Physical Environment). Despite the appreciable increase in productivity of white commercial farming since World War II, its economic output per capita and per acre still leaves much room for improvement. With mounting overpopulation on the African Reserves, the per capita farming output of Africans has declined to well below subsistence level. In the words of the United Nations survey, the country’s mineral resources are unequalled (see ch. 2, Physical En-
vironment). The survey concluded that the country's resource endowment could sustain a much higher level of product and average income than had been achieved by 1965.

According to one view, the two principal factors inhibiting more rapid growth in the 1960's were the limited size of the domestic consumer market, deriving from low per capita income, and the limitations on more productive use of nonwhite labor, deriving from the country's political commitment to the ideology of apartheid (see ch. 1, General Character of the Society; ch. 12, Social Values; ch. 18, Political Values and Attitudes). The Nationalist government, however, is firmly committed to the exclusive use of white labor for skilled positions despite the acute and growing shortage of skilled and semiskilled workers in the late 1960's. The government's economic development program, a biennial assessment of the resource gap that might arise from alternative postulated annual rates of growth over the ensuing five-year period, firmly assumes that a major determinant of feasible growth in the developed economy will be the annual rate of white immigration.

In the 1963-67 period the average annual rate of growth, at 6.4 percent, exceeded the government's target of 5.5 percent because the inflow of foreign capital, the level of white immigration, and the increase in employment of nonwhites, as well as the expansionary force of demand, all exceeded expectations. The estimates for the 1968-73 period contained in the development program published in December 1968 postulated that, assuming a much higher annual productivity increase in secondary industry, a future growth rate averaging 5.5 percent a year at constant prices could be attained with available production factors plus an annual net white immigration of 30,000 a year. A growth rate in excess of 5.5 percent would be possible with a net inflow of foreign capital or with immigration in excess of 30,000 a year.

The development program also estimated that, at an annual growth rate of 5 percent a year in constant prices in the years 1968-73, the supply of nonwhite labor would exceed demand, but at a growth rate of 5.5 percent or more demand would exceed supply, and at a real growth rate of 6 percent a year, the number of nonwhite unemployed might be reduced by 100,000 over the five years. The development program did not take into account the possible effects of the Physical Planning and Utilization of Resources Act of 1967, under which ministerial permission must be obtained for the employment of any additional African workers in the existing urban areas (see ch. 22, Labor).

ECONOMIC ATTITUDES, VALUES, AND OPPORTUNITIES

The country's excellent natural endowment for economic growth and the high rate of expansion achieved in the developed sector in
recent years may have the effect of eroding resistance to change traditionally found among the tribal villagers of the reserves and also, in a different form, among the Afrikaner segment of the white population (see ch. 12, Social Values). Africans are participating in the developed economy in increasing numbers and, despite their very limited wage incentives, employment trends seem to support surveys showing that urban African workers are very responsive to wage differentials (see ch. 22, Labor). On the reserves, where tradition is more firmly entrenched and apparent opportunities even more severely limited by land scarcity and other factors, response to change has been slow (see ch. 20, Agriculture).

Some observers report that the white population, with its higher economic incentives, has been channeling its energies increasingly into consumption and economic activity. The business climate was generally optimistic during the 1960's and, when foreign investors sold their shares on the Johannesburg stock market in 1960 and 1961, the falling market permitted more Afrikaners to buy in. Afrikaner attitudes to economic growth remain somewhat ambivalent, however, even among the successful and those in political power. This ambivalence may be partly attributed to the overriding priority accorded to apartheid racial policies. A view expressed by former Prime Minister H. F. Verwoerd and frequently echoed by other Nationalist leaders and Afrikaner scholars is that racial separation is more important than economic growth. The apartheid program, as formulated in the Sauer Report of 1948, is founded upon the conviction that even the kind of rigidly stratified economic integration that resulted from urban expansion during World War II constituted a potential threat to white political hegemony (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

The values associated with private enterprise, in particular, do not traditionally rank very high on the scale in either the African or the Afrikaner tradition. Among the Afrikaners, financial success came to be associated after 1870 with the despised uitlanders (foreigners), or English speakers. Before the defeat of Germany in 1945, the Afrikaner press liked to portray the English-speaking industrialists in pejorative anti-Semitic ethnic terms. This stereotype has since disappeared from Nationalist publications, but suspicion of capitalism appeared to survive among some successful Afrikaners in the 1960's.

The most enduring controversy between some private entrepreneurs on the one hand and government and white labor unions on the other has concerned the use of nonwhite labor in industry (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 22, Labor). The cost of skilled white labor is relatively high, and because it is in very short supply workers of marginal efficiency must sometimes be used in skilled positions. Some of the country's industrial entrepreneurs have
found that low-wage African workers can be quickly trained to perform sophisticated operations, and they consequently resent the all-pervading restrictions that they see as hampering industrial expansion and productivity. Assuming that the relatively abundant supply of African labor would keep its cost materially lower than that of white labor, even in the absence of repressive legislation, more flexible use of African labor might result in higher profits to some employers. Among the foremost industrial proponents of a more flexible labor policy is Harry Oppenheimer, chairman of the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa, which has experience with mining operations in independent Zambia and elsewhere in tropical Africa.

The country is usually regarded as having a private enterprise economy, both because the private sector accounts for about three-fourths of the GDP and because white-owned private property is usually respected and the profit motive encouraged wherever it does not come into conflict with overriding political or racial policies. The moderate incidence of personal taxation and opportunities for material prosperity have encouraged immigration and the transfer of capital from countries such as the United Kingdom since World War II.

In many ways, however, the state had a more dominating and far more pervasive role in the economy than in most Western countries since World War II. Since before the turn of the twentieth century, it has intervened to reallocate resources and income, notably to the benefit of rural whites. Since the 1920's and 1930's it has taken a very active part in reserving industrial jobs for white workers and in fostering the development of manufacturing, partly under state ownership and management. Both before and since 1948, the government has also seen itself in a paternalistic role, regarding the nonwhite population as being almost wholly dependent upon its ostensible benefactions and the white population as relying upon its regulation and control of nonwhites to preserve their favored status. In 1930 a minister of the Dutch Reformed Church, testifying on the conspicuous habit among rural whites of expecting too much from the state, cited a well-known sociologist from the United States as saying that there was no country, with the possible exception of Russia, where dependence on the government was greater than in South Africa.

In the 1930's the Rescue Action Society (Reddingsdaadbond—RDB) was formed by the Broederbond (Brotherhood), with which many members of the Nationalist government in power in early 1970 were associated, to promote increasing Afrikaner ownership and management of private or government enterprises in finance, business, and industry (see ch. 21, Industry; ch. 25, Fiscal and Monetary Systems). It has had a notable degree of success, particu-
larly since the Afrikaner Nationalists gained full control of the government in 1948. Moreover, since the 1930's economic growth has brought increasing material prosperity to Afrikaner workers and landowners. Some English-speaking observers have expressed the hope that the increasing Afrikaner experience in management and participation in the fruits of private industrial enterprise might have the effect of diluting longstanding Afrikaner suspicion of capitalism and of English-speaking entrepreneurs.

At the end of the 1960's ownership of farm and ranch land was still largely in the hands of Afrikaners, and ownership of other forms of private enterprise was primarily in the hands of English-speaking whites. Financial power was highly concentrated, with the mining finance houses, one or two Afrikaner finance houses, and such government enterprises as the South African Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR) controlling a number of enterprises in industry and finance. Except for the farmers and perhaps some of the new Afrikaner entrepreneurs, however, the private financial interests were said to have negligible political influence. The most effective economic power and control rested with the government, and the most politically effective economic interest groups were the white farmers' organizations and the white trade unions.

The Indians are the only nonwhite population group to have played a significant entrepreneurial role. Coloureds have had only a minimal role as entrepreneurs, and one survey found that even average urban African households in Cape Town and Johannesburg received more income from ownership and property than did the average Coloured household. Entrepreneurial opportunities for Indians have been chiefly confined to small-scale commerce, but some have developed larger trading enterprises (see ch. 23, Domestic Trade). According to the minister of Indian affairs, there were some 350 Indian-owned factories in the country in 1967. Coloureds and Africans have usually lacked the capital to take advantage of even such limited entrepreneurial opportunities as exist in their own residential areas, and for the most part they lack the commercial tradition and experience found among the Indian population.

Group area legislation is expected to reduce the future role of Indians in wholesale and retail trade but to increase somewhat the entrepreneurial activity of Coloureds and Africans within their restricted residential areas. By the late 1960's the first of these effects was most in evidence. Although in principle the government had stated that group areas legislation would not be used to deprive the present generation of Indian traders of their livelihood, in practice considerable pressure had been brought upon many of them to move their business as well as their residence out of the white areas. Toward the end of the 1960's more Indians were being obliged to
enter semiskilled industrial jobs rather than entering commerce. In
the late 1960's the authorities stated that in a few specified resi-
dential areas Indian or Coloured entrepreneurs will be permitted or
even assisted to establish industries or other enterprises, providing
that unemployment exists and that their enterprises provide oppor-
tunities for employment for people of their own race.

As of early 1970, however, the only economic power vested in
nonwhite groups was their relatively limited purchasing power (see
ch. 23, Domestic Trade; ch. 8, Living Conditions). Africans were
not allowed to own land, although as tribe members they might
retain occupancy rights to land on the African reserves vested in
the ; antu Trust (see ch. 20, Agriculture). Coloureds and Indians
had : residential property rights only in designated areas, and most of
those forced to move to new group areas had lost part of the value
of their previous residential property. Africans were legally pro-
hibited from forming or joining labor unions and were taxed with-
out political or economic representation. Nonwhites occupied the
lowest occupational categories and received much lower remunera-
tion than whites (see ch. 22, Labor). Their opportunities for train-
ing and educational and professional advancement were generally
very limited both by custom and law, and their geographic as well
as occupational mobility was limited by statute and administrative
practice.

ECONOMIC PLANS FOR SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT

The ruling Nationalist Party's policy of separate development, or
geographic apartheid, was intended eventually to have a positive as
well as a negative economic aspect. The purpose of the policy was
to reduce the number of nonwhites living or working in areas in-
habited by whites, and initial emphasis was concentrated upon
enacting into law all the negative restrictions on geographic and
occupational mobility of the nonwhite population that had been
based partly upon custom and partly on legal or administrative
regulations (see ch. 22, Labor; ch. 8, Living Conditions). Africans
and other nonwhites were moved out of urban areas in large num-
bers and were settled in suburban townships, deported to the re-
serves, or dispatched to transit camps. Party leaders declared their
intention, however, of eventually encouraging some form of sepa-
rate development for Africans within the borders of the African
reserves, which occupy about 13 percent of the country's total
land area (see ch. 20, Agriculture).

In 1949 the Nationalist government appointed a Commission on
the Socioeconomic Development of the Bantu Areas, popularly
known as the Tomlinson Commission, to investigate conditions on
the reserves and to present the rationale of separate development.
In October 1954 the commission submitted its 3,755-page report, known as the Tomlinson Report, of which a summary of 211 pages was published in 1955. The commission found that the real per capita income of the population on the reserves had been declining over the past twenty years; that less than half the 1951 population of the reserves could be supported by subsistence agriculture; and that a considerable proportion of the income necessary to maintain the population of the reserve at subsistence level was, in fact, being provided by the earnings of labor migrants to the white areas (see ch. 20, Agriculture).

The Tomlinson Report concluded that the program of separate development must rest upon the recognition that the mass of the African population would have to find employment in industry rather than in agriculture. It therefore recommended the adoption of a policy to promote rapid industrialization within the homelands, to be achieved by government and private white investment and entrepreneurship. It estimated that during the first ten years the program would cost more than R208 million (1 rand equals US$1.40) at 1953 prices and recommended that the government spend about R50 million during the first five years.

The commission’s proposal was rejected by the government in its White Paper of May 1956 on the ground that it would defeat the whole object of separate development and would, in the words of the paper, “help kill the white industries now existing in white areas.” The government paper asserted that industrial development within the homelands should be left to African initiative alone, with some financial and technical assistance from the government. The level of such assistance, however, was to be much lower than that proposed in the Tomlinson Report, which had been intended only as a supplement to white capital.

By 1968 the government had decided to relax its policy against white enterprise in the African homelands. In the words of the 1968 report of the government’s Bantu Investment Corporation, “it was found that although the Bantu were already proficient in matters commercial, they were incapable of handling large-scale industrial development. It was also found that it was not at all times possible for the development corporations to command the necessary experience to promote industrial development in all conceivable spheres.” Whatever the reason for the shift in policy, a bill permitting the admission of white enterprises into the homelands as temporary agents or contractors of the government’s Bantu Trust under certain limiting conditions was enacted into law on April 16, 1968. In practice, there had been no embargo on white enterprise in the homelands in the past, and before 1968 some ninety mining concessions had already been granted to white entrepreneurs.

By early 1970 it was not yet clear what significance the new
regulations on white-owned industry in the African homelands might have, but most observers thought it improbable that large- or medium-scale industry would be allowed to develop there in competition with industries in the white areas that employ large numbers of white workers.

To assist the development of small-scale commercial, artisan, or manufacturing concerns on the African reserves, the government had established the Bantu Investment Corporation in July 1959. The Xhosa Development Corporation was established in 1966 and took over the concerns managed by the Bantu Investment Corporation in the Transkei. In March 1969 the Bantu Mining Corporation was established to investigate the mining potential of the reserves, undertake prospecting, and work specific projects. The share capital of all three corporations is wholly owned by the Bantu Trust, descended from the old Native Trust (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 20, Agriculture). The trust receives a small annual appropriation voted by Parliament and also derives income from local taxes, quitrents, and fees paid by Africans, from mining royalties and licensing and prospecting fees, and from interest on its investments and profits on various ventures such as its trust farms (see ch. 20, Agriculture).

In its annual report for the year ended March 21, 1967, the Bantu Investment Corporation reported that since its inception eight years earlier it had granted loans to African businessmen totaling R3.1 million, of which 85 percent had been for trading concerns and about 13 percent for services, mainly bus services. At the same date the Xhosa Development Corporation had approved loans to African businessmen totaling nearly R95,000. By March 1968 the Bantu Investment Corporation had granted twelve loans to Africans for light manufacturing concerns, and the corporation itself had established or taken over two furniture factories, two vehicle-repair works, and a maize mill. The Xhosa Development Corporation was administering seven small manufacturing concerns in the Transkei, including a sheet-metal works and a spinning and weaving factory. The Bantu Trust was also acquiring trading stations and garages from whites and, where possible, leasing them to Africans or employing African managers (see ch. 23, Domestic Trade).

In February 1968 the minister of Bantu administration and development told the Legislative Assembly that thirty-five establishments in the category of manufacturing had been established in the homelands between 1960 and the end of 1966, employing a total of 945 Africans and 37 whites. Direct investment in these concerns by the Bantu Investment Corporation had been R1.1 million, not including expenditure on related services.

The government had also accelerated its program for agricultural betterment in the reserves by the increased participation of reserve
inhabitants in conservation and soil rehabilitation works. It had undertaken increased land-use planning by which fragmented land in use by subsistence cultivators was consolidated into grazing camps, residential villages, and fields suitable for cultivation. By the late 1960's, however, it had made little progress in reducing the numbers dependent upon the land by creating alternative sources of livelihood. It was, therefore, unable to implement the Tomlinson Commission's recommendation that plots of economic subsistence size be created to permit the development of a stable class of full-time African peasants on the reserves (see ch. 20, Agriculture).

By the 1950's industry in the white areas—that is, outside the African reserves—had become highly concentrated in a few major districts (see fig. 16). The southern Transvaal, including an industrial complex centered at Johannesburg but extending from Pretoria to Vereeniging on the border of the Orange Free State, had the highest degree of industrial concentration. With Cape Town, Durban, and Port Elizabeth, the major port cities, it accounted for 80 percent of the country's manufacturing employment and out-


Figure 16. Border Areas, Reserves, and Industrial Areas of South Africa.
put. As industrialization gained impetus during the 1950's and 1960's, industrial concentration began to spread in corridors along the transport lines between existing centers: from Durban to Ladysmith, from Cape Town through Paarl and Worcester, and from Port Elizabeth to Uitenhage.

By the late 1960's most of these established industrial centers had become prescribed areas, in which further employment of Africans was to be limited to the indispensable minimum. Among the means used were influx control, regulation and restriction of African labor by labor boards, restriction of African immigration, job reservation restrictions and moral suasion of white employers (see ch. 8, Living Conditions; ch. 22, Labor). Africans not needed as labor could be endorsed out of white areas and sent to rural settlements on the reserves or, if they had no relatives willing to support them, to one of twenty-four transit camps, still without means of support.

Although the Nationalist policy visualized the African Reserves as primarily a pastoral economy, it recognized in principle that their population could only be sustained and further growth of the white economy permitted by providing industrial employment for a large part of the male population of the reserves. The government's principal long-range objective, however, is to stem the flow of non-white labor toward the established urban areas, where resident Africans had come to outnumber the white population. As an alternative to increasing employment of Africans in the established urban areas, therefore, the Nationalists decided to adopt the Border Industries Scheme, which was announced as official government policy in September 1960.

The scheme is designed to encourage the growth of existing industry and the establishment of new industries at selected growth points in specified border areas, so called because they are in the white areas within thirty miles of the border of one or more African reserves yet located conveniently in relation to shipping or other facilities and to white residential areas and amenities. The Border Industries Scheme is sometimes defended on economic grounds as corresponding to the industrial decentralization programs of other countries. A defense of apartheid policy published in South Africa in 1969, however, states that "the chief purpose of this programme is to prevent the unhealthy (sic) concentration of Black labourers in the White urban areas."

This policy culminated in the enactment in July 1967 of the Physical Planning and Utilization of Resources Act. This act, which went into effect in 1968, gave the minister of planning complete discretion to approve or disapprove plans for expansion by any firm employing more than three workers, when such expansion would involve the acquisition or zoning of industrial land or the employment of one or more additional nonwhite workers. The areas pre-
scribed under the act included all the main industrial areas of the country except those in Natal. During 1968, when industrial expansion was exceptionally slow, employers asked for 42,271 African workers and were granted 26,916. During 1969 employers on the Witwatersrand were refused permission to bring 15,500 African men from the reserves as labor. Toward the end of 1968 the minister of planning said that special allowance had been made in 1968 for expansion plans already underway but that the period of grace was coming to an end and that henceforth not another acre of land in the big industrial centers, such as Port Elizabeth or the Witwatersrand, would be approved for industrial expansion.

At the same time that the physical planning act made it difficult for industrialists to expand their operations in the existing areas of industrial concentration, notably in the southern Transvaal, the Border Industries Scheme offered incentives and government assistance for those firms that expanded or located new plants in designated border areas. Industries already operating in these areas would continue subject to the color bar and to job reservation, but new industries were initially exempted from work reservation requirements establishing a minimum quota for the employment of whites (see ch. 22, Labor). It appeared at first that Africans working in the border areas might in many instances be able to advance to jobs requiring somewhat greater skill than would be permitted in established industries.

White labor union objections have since brought about modifications of this policy in some of the new industries. In the automobile industry, for example, the job reservation agreement worked out with the white unions did not specifically mention the Rosslyn area adjoining Pretoria West because there were at that time no auto factories there. In 1969 the white unions made representations on the question, and the Industrial Tribunal was directed to investigate whether quotas should be applied to safeguard the level of employment of the whites and Coloureds in the industry in Rosslyn. The president of the Coordinating Council of South African Trade Unions declared that “everyone must be made to realize that a border area remains a white area, and that the development of border areas aims only at the decentralization of industries.”

A feature of employment in border areas is that wages paid are reported to be considerably lower than in the prescribed urban areas. These differentials were officially justified by differences in the local cost of living. According to one report, the assumption that Africans employed in border industries would be able to return nightly, or at least weekly, to their homes inside the reserves had not been realized to any considerable extent. Much of the government's expenditure on the Bantu homelands, however, had gone to the construction near their borders of large dormitory villages for
the housing of workers in border industries. Among the many incentives offered to such industries is that the government assumes the cost of housing for nonwhite workers and subsidizes the construction of housing for white employees.

The districts designated as border area growth points and eligible for the range of government subsidies or other incentives to industry are subject to change from time to time by administrative decision. The initial growth points were contiguous to existing industrial concentrations. For example, Rosslyn was within a few miles of a major concentration of white industry at Pretoria West, and the industrial estate of Elangeni at Hammarsdale, heavily financed by the government's Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) under the Border Industries Scheme, is a few miles from the old industrial concentration of Durban-Pinetown in Natal. In mid-1968 the government reported that industrialization had proceeded satisfactorily in Rosslyn, Hammarsdale, and Pietermaritzburg, so that these three areas would no longer be eligible for maximum benefits. Instead, efforts were to be concentrated on attracting industry to the other border area growth points.

From the inauguration of the Border Industries Scheme until the end of 1968, direct additional investment in manufacturing and construction in designated border areas totaled about R314 million. Between 1960 and mid-1967 the government, including the IDC, had spent about R173.3 million on development of the border areas, and private enterprise had spent more than R220.9 million. Government expenditure included about R18.5 million for 35,000 African houses in thirty-six new townships within the borders of the African reserves. It also included many forms of financial assistance to industries relocating in the border areas, as well as direct investment by the IDC.

The tempo of border area financing by the IDC quickened somewhat in fiscal year 1968/69, but annual expenditure remained low in relation to the level that would be required to meet either of the stated objectives of the separate development policy: providing employment adequate to meet the subsistence needs of the population on the reserves or diverting the flow of surplus African labor from the established urban areas to the border areas. In early 1970 the outlook for eventual realization of these policy goals remained uncertain. The business monthly *South African Industry and Trade* opined in March 1969 that “the voters are not ready to make heavy sacrifices to finance more rapid implementation of Bantustan and Border Area Schemes, as Nationalist intellectuals would like—though there is sure to be some extra spending under this head as window dressing.”

During the 1960’s it was estimated that about 58,000 African men entered the country’s labor market each year. Of these, about
35,000 a year entered the labor market directly from the African reserves. About 15 percent of all economically active African men were employed in secondary industry, comprising manufacturing and construction. In the period from June 1960 through December 1968, the total number of African workers employed in the border areas and on the African reserves together increased by 54,000, or about 6,350 a year. It was estimated that about 5,000 a year were employed in the border areas; it is not clear how the remainder may have been employed on the reserves. Not all of the increase in border area employment during this period was attributable to government action. It was estimated that 110 new enterprises were started without government assistance, 135 new industrial enterprises received government assistance, and 74 established enterprises received assistance for extensions.

In its 1968 report, the IDC estimated that by 1971 there would be a need to absorb more than 23,500 Africans a year in border industries. In September 1968, however, the minister of economic affairs announced that the government hoped to increase the number of new jobs for Africans created in border areas from 5,000 a year in the 1960's to 9,000 a year. To meet this modest target, about 20 percent of the country's total annual investment in manufacturing would have to be diverted to border areas. The IDC would have to contribute about R27.5 million of the required annual investment of R80 million.

In mid-1969 the government announced that incentives somewhat greater than those for border areas would be offered to white industrialists at selected growth points within the African reserves. The growth point initially selected was Temba (Hammanskraal). The minister of Bantu administration and development expressed the hope that within five years it might be possible to employ some 65,000 workers in the five new growth points to be created within the African reserves.

In November 1969 the business weekly Financial Mail assessed the extra incentives offered for industry in growth points on the reserves as "insufficient to accelerate decentralization enough to provide the job opportunities the homelands so desperately need." As had happened when the Border Industries Scheme was first announced, business sources expressed the hope that white labor unions would not be able to insist on the application of job reservation to the industries to be established on the reserves. It was announced that there would be a new apprenticeship system for Africans and that they would be able to occupy more highly skilled jobs than in the white areas.
CHAPTER 20

AGRICULTURE

In the 1960's agriculture was still the most important single sector of economic activity, in terms of the number of families involved. The market production of commercial agriculture, however, only accounted for 10 to 12 percent of gross domestic product at market prices, depending upon rainfall and other crop conditions for the year.

Although parts of the country are well endowed for production of a variety of crops, the larger part of its land area is unsuited for cultivation. Surface water is scarce, and over much of the territory rainfall is inadequate (see ch. 2, Physical Environment). The inherent fertility of most arable soils is rather low. Estimates of arable land range from 6 to 15 percent of the total land area, and in 1960 only 7 percent of the total land area was under cultivation. About 74 percent of the total land area was pastureland, much of it suitable only for migratory grazing of sheep and goats (see fig. 17).

Agricultural information is generally reported for statistical and other purposes on a geographic basis, with the African reserves treated separately from the rest of the country. Very little statistical information is available on agriculture in the African reserves, which have the largest number of people wholly or partly dependent upon agriculture for a livelihood. The principal crops grown in the reserves are maize (corn) and sorghum. Cattle and other livestock are extensively kept, but they are not very productive and do not contribute in important measure to the diet of the reserve population.

Commercial agriculture, which is almost entirely in the hands of whites, still makes an important and steadily growing contribution to the money economy, despite the more rapid growth of manufacturing since the 1930’s. In recent years its output of crops, such as grain, fruit and sugar, has overtaken that of such traditional ranching products as wool, mohair, and meat (see table 16). Production of wine and table grapes has been an important activity since the early days of white settlement, but production of citrus fruits, food grains, and other arable crops dates largely from the period between the two world wars.

The country is one of the world's principal exporters of agricultural products, including wool, citrus and deciduous fruits, sugar,
Key to Figure 17.

A Irrigation regions. 1962. includes small-scale irrigation areas and large-scale government irrigation areas but excludes future phases of Orange River Project. Variety of climates. Crops—tobacco, wheat, fruit, alfalfa, others.

B Dryland crop farming regions of inland plateau. Crops—wheat, groundnuts, potatoes, beans; includes maize triangle. Livestock in some areas—sheep, dairy cattle, pigs, poultry. Other products—cheese.

C Transitional farming regions. Large areas suitable only for grazing; some areas suitable for crops.

D Drakensberg Mountains grazing region. Rainfall adequate, but topography limits most of area to grazing. Crops—chiefly maize; livestock—mostly sheep, some beef and dairy cattle.


F Thornveld. Gets less rain than E. White ranchers—winter grazing; Africans—crops such as maize, other summer crops; some grazing.

H Coastal region. Extreme variations in rainfall and climate. White and Asian farmers: crops (west to east)—forestry, deciduous fruit, tobacco, citrus, pineapple. African farmers, in reserves: crops—maize, pineapple, sugar; livestock.

K Winter rainfall crop areas. Crop—wheat; livestock—dairy cattle, sheep.

V Western Cape fruit region. High winter rainfall. Crops—table grapes (wine), peaches, apricots and other deciduous fruits, wheat; livestock—dairy cattle, sheep.

S Sheep grazing region.

M Cattle grazing region.

X Coastal swampland.

Z Coastal desert.

Figure 17. Agro-Economic Regions of South Africa, 1962.
and fish and fish products. In good crop years it has exported large quantities of surplus feed maize at considerable loss to the government, which subsidizes the producer price at above world market level. The commercial farming sector is able to meet nearly all the food requirements of the urban population. Only cocoa, coffee, tea, rice, and sometimes wheat or maize are imported, and some meat comes from adjacent territories. Because of the disparate development in this century of white and African agriculture, however, there is often a serious net food deficit on the African reserves.

Agricultural products ranked first among the country’s merchandise exports until 1950, when they were surpassed by industrial goods. Although industrial exports continued to gain steadily in value, in the 1960’s agriculture was still furnishing between one-third and two-fifths of the country’s commodity exports, excluding gold (see ch. 24, Foreign Economic Relations). The farm sector usually purchases around 7 percent of the total merchandise imports, so that unlike manufacturing it is a net exporter. In the 1960’s its net contribution to the balance of payments remained less significant than that of gold mining, but the future of the gold mining industry was, as always, a subject of conjecture, and an important sector of opinion believed that reliance on farm exports as a source of foreign exchange might increase after 1970.

This outlook provided some justification for the government’s continuing heavy commitment to price support and to other expenditures on white agriculture. Because of the dearth of surface water much of the scant arable land can now be used only for dryland crops, such as maize. Not only is the harvest subject to the vagaries of drought seasons, but in normal crop years the surplus of feed maize must be exported at a price well below that paid by the government’s Maize Board to the producer. The government expects that massive irrigation projects underway in early 1970 may raise the market value of the country’s agricultural production by 10 percent. It is not clear, however, whether the increased production will repay the massive investment required. With irrigation, the acreage devoted to more economic crops than maize may be increased. There is also much room for expansion in the use of feed grains for domestic production of meat, a product for which demand both at home and abroad is more responsive to increases in consumer income than is the demand for grains.

Until the 1930’s livestock herding and cultivation determined the way of life and furnished the livelihood of a majority of the white population as well as of the African population. Since 1936 the white segment of the population has been predominantly town-dwelling, although the Afrikaner element of the urban population retains a strong idealized rural or pastoral tradition, and farmers and ranchers remain a favored element of the white community (see ch.

<table>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Livestock Products:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Wool</td>
<td>117.1</td>
<td>92.8</td>
<td>105.3</td>
<td>95.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cattle (slaughtered)</td>
<td>95.3</td>
<td>121.8</td>
<td>124.2</td>
<td>134.4</td>
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<td>Milk and dairy products</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>102.2</td>
<td>113.0</td>
<td>120.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sheep (slaughtered)</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>58.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other (poultry, pigs, and others)</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>87.5</td>
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<td>434.9</td>
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<td>487.9</td>
<td>508.0</td>
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<td><strong>Field Crops:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Maize (mealies)</td>
<td>140.9</td>
<td>155.3</td>
<td>193.5</td>
<td>367.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sugarcane</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>72.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>35.8</td>
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<td>Hay and alfalfa seed</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>25.4</td>
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<td>Potatoes and sweet potatoes</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>16.3</td>
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<td>Sorghum (kafir)</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>13.2</td>
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<td>Groundnuts (peanuts)</td>
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<td>16.5</td>
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<td>Other (tobacco, cotton, and others)</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>68.9</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>365.7</td>
<td>415.2</td>
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### Horticulture:

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<td>Deciduous fruit</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>50.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Citrus</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>26.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subtropical fruit</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>9.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Viticulture (wine and table grapes)</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dried fruit</td>
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<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vegetables</td>
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<td>44.3</td>
<td>46.2</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>134.0</td>
<td>155.6</td>
<td>155.8</td>
<td>162.0</td>
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</table>

### Selected Crops (in percent of total gross value):  

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle (slaughtered)</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk and dairy products</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wool</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viticulture</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruit</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugarcane</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>934.6</td>
<td>1,015.5</td>
<td>1,051.7</td>
<td>1,307.1</td>
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1. May include subsidies from government varying from product to product.
2. 1 rand equals US$1.40.
3. Crop year ending June 30.
4. 1967 was a record crop year; 1968 production was lower because of drought, though higher than in years before 1967.

6, Social Structure; ch. 12, Social Values). The country's numerically predominant nonwhite population has entered the urban labor force in rapidly increasing numbers since the 1930's, but the majority of Africans—in contrast to Indians and Coloureds—are still engaged in agriculture as a way of life. Because of the small size of average African land holdings and the low per capita productivity of African agriculture, many of those engaged in it cannot derive their full subsistence from the land and may depend heavily upon migrant remittances, welfare, gathering of wild foods, or such occasional wage labor as may be available in the vicinity.

There is no official estimate of the total number of people dependent upon agriculture. One unofficial source suggested that of the population of almost 16 million in 1960, about 40 percent may have been dependent upon agriculture for a livelihood. About 16 percent of the white, 17 percent of the Indian, 32 percent of the Coloured, and at least 68 percent of the African populations were officially defined as rural (see ch. 4, Population). Of the officially recorded active population in 1960, about 30 percent was recorded as active in agriculture, fishing, or forestry (see ch. 22, Labor).

About 41 percent of the African population classified as economically active was listed as engaged in these activities. The figure for the economically active, however, may have substantially underestimated the reliance of traditional African agriculture upon the numbers of women and children who customarily perform most of the daily tasks.

The majority of African farm families have been confined within the African reserves (Bantu homelands), where mounting population pressure has resulted in progressive deterioration of soils, stock, farming methods, and productivity. Of the estimated 7.4 million rural Africans in 1960 about 4.8 million, or 64 percent, were domiciled on the reserves; about 500,000 of them were probably away as migrant laborers (see ch. 4, Population). The remaining 2.6 million were in the rural white areas, more than 2.1 million of them on white-owned farms as tenant farmers, hired labor, or squatters. The government was committed to a policy of removing Africans from the white areas except where their labor was required on white farms. By the end of the 1960's large numbers of rural Africans had been removed and resettled or simply sent to the reserves.

LAND POTENTIAL AND LAND USE

The country's rainfall is generally low and unreliable, and other water resources are relatively scarce. The inherent fertility of most arable soils is rather low and has been further reduced in many areas by centuries of unscientific farming and overstocking. Erosion and soil depletion have been serious problems in the more sparsely
settled white farming areas as well as in the overcrowded African reserves.

Estimates of the share of total land area suited only for pastoralism range from as low as 66 percent to 80 or 90 percent. The higher estimates may refer to the entire land mass, including Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. Estimates of arable land have ranged from 6 percent of the total to as much as 15 percent. In 1960 only 7 percent of the land area of the republic was under cultivation.

Of the land suited for pastoral production, most has a rather limited carrying capacity and can be used only for very extensive or shifting livestock grazing. Much of the western Cape Province, which constitutes an important share of the entire white farming area, is too arid for cattle and suitable only for sheep raising. The best conditions for sheep farming are found on the Highveld, but it is more extensively practiced in the dryer Karoo (see ch. 2, Physical Environment).

In 1960 about 87 percent of the total land area of the Republic was in farms and ranches. Of this, about 13 percent was in use by Africans within the African reserves, and another 1 percent was estimated to be in use by Africans outside the reserves. None of this land is officially regarded as being owned by Africans. Of the 87 percent of the land area in farms and ranches (84 percent of the country's total land area), about 85 percent was pastureland, much of it with only a low carrying capacity, and only 12 percent was cropland.

Cropland constituted about 11 percent of the white farm and ranch land and 14 percent of the land in use by Africans. Most of the African reserves are located in the eastern half of the country, where rainfall is higher than in the dry sheepranching interior of the west.

**GEOGRAPHIC ALLOCATION OF LAND**

When the Union of South Africa was established in 1910, there were considerable differences among its four component provinces in the relative amounts of land occupied by whites and Africans and in the legal status of African land rights (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). The Natives Land Act of 1913 was intended to establish a uniform and stable policy limiting the land rights of Africans to those areas where they were already long secured by treaty or other express enactment and guaranteed by the last-minute intervention of the British government. The basic objective of the law was to prevent the acquisition of further rural land by Africans and thus guarantee in perpetuity white ownership of most of the country's agricultural land. The sentiment in Parliament at the time the law was enacted was that idle or unoccupied land remaining in the
country should be kept for bywoners (white squatters) or other poor whites in preference to Africans.

Nonetheless, in the parliamentary debate that accompanied the passage of the Native Land Act of 1913, it was almost universally acknowledged that the extent of the land reserved to Africans under the law was inadequate and unjust. It was the intention of the legislators that further land should be provided for them, and the Beaumont Commission was established to prescribe the amount of such further provisions. The final solution of the land question was postponed, however, because the right of Africans to buy land in the more advanced Cape Province was legally linked to the right of franchise, and until this right was abolished no white Parliament would honor the promise of 1913. It was not until 1936 that a political package was finally worked out by which the African franchise and the right of Africans to buy land in the Cape Province were abolished, and the Native Trust and Land Act was enacted.

The Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 authorized the extent of the released areas, also known as quota land, which could eventually be added to the territory of the native reserves in addition to the scheduled areas provided by the 1913 act. A portion of the area thus released consisted of government-owned crown land, but most of it was already in the ownership of white farmers. Moreover, since the Beaumont Commission’s original recommendation of 1913, white-held land had enormously increased in value as a result of the rise in demand during and after World War I. It was a period of white land hunger in which the bywoners were being expelled by landowners and drifting in large numbers to the urban areas.

Consequently at the end of the 1960’s, more than fifty years after the Beaumont decision and thirty years after the 1936 act, the released areas, somewhat smaller in extent than those recommended by the Beaumont Commission, were still in the process of being purchased piecemeal from reluctant white farmers with funds very gradually allocated to, or earned by, the Trust. In the interim, the African population had multiplied, and its herding and farming practices, though they had become more intensive, had so deteriorated through overcrowding that soil depletion, erosion, and overstocking had become severe. The initial recommendations had not made adequate allowance for the high, long-term land requirement of tribal cultivation and herding practices but had been predicated upon improvements which have never been extensively adopted.

The total authorized area of the African reserves (including the Transkei and full-fledged Bantu homelands) amounts to roughly 13 percent of the Republic’s land area. Africans resident on rural land in the remaining area, the white areas of the country, were in the process of removal at the end of the 1960’s. Of the total authorized area of the reserves of roughly 40 million acres, nearly 3 million
acres remained to be purchased by the Trust at the end of 1967. Of the total authorized area of the reserves, about 15,345,000 acres consisted of released areas under the 1936 act, and 22,702,000 acres of scheduled areas under the 1913 act. In addition, about 2,235,000 acres had been acquired by Africans between 1913 and 1936. None of these figures can be regarded as immutable, however, as areas may be excised or added by the government in the process of consolidating the Bantu areas and eliminating isolated, African-owned black spots not immediately adjacent to the reserves. Under the law, however, the reserves are regarded as inalienable in the sense that white farmers may not purchase land in them at will.

The effect of white conquest, treaty provisions, and legislation in limiting African land rights in the country has resulted in severe problems of overpopulation and land deterioration in the African areas. Some historians have also seen it as a basic factor in the relatively slow development of the country’s white agriculture. Whereas land use in the reserves became overintensive, white landowners tended for many years to rely on extensive and relatively inefficient use of land and of the African labor generated by the shortage of African land. Until World War II, many rural whites, according to this view, were essentially land occupiers rather than active farmers or ranchers. They also developed a strong reliance upon government support, so that the country was sometimes said to be “farmed from Pretoria,” the national capital. Since the 1940’s there has been a very perceptible improvement in the productivity of white agriculture, though from a rather low base. Continued low average yields may be attributed in part to lack of rainfall or to the low inherent fertility of many of the country’s soils (see ch. 2, Physical Environment).

**SUBSISTENCE AGRICULTURE IN THE RESERVES**

Agriculture in the African reserves suffers from all the complex problems endemic to agriculture in much of sub-Saharan Africa. Some of these problems may derive from soil depletion or from dependence on variable climatic conditions and scarce surface water. Others are sometimes attributed to tribal forms of land tenure or livestock accumulation, but the gravest problem of agriculture in the African reserves of South Africa is overpopulation in relation to the production potential of the unimproved land.

In many tribes, traditional methods of cultivation and herding assumed that unlimited land would be available for long periods of fallow or pasture renewal or that the tribe could migrate to new land when grazing or soil was exhausted. When the reserves became overpopulated, the alternation of crops and fallow and rotation of grazing were progressively abandoned, and maize monoculture and
overgrazing became the rule. Among the causes of low productivity in tribal agriculture are fragmentation of landholdings, failure to use manure or fertilizer, shortage of male labor in the fields at the time of cultivation, late or inadequate plowing or sowing, failure to cull inferior stock, and lack of fencing for livestock. These problems have been perpetuated, and in many cases accentuated, by the continuing migration of productive male labor and by the inadequacy of complementary infrastructure and services.

In the late 1960's the government had initiated large-scale measures to halt the progress of erosion and soil depletion in the reserves, to consolidate fragmented plots, and to encourage the use of fencing. Traditional land-use practices persisted, however, and because of overpopulation there had been no perceptible increase in average yields. The principal economic obstacle to improvement of agriculture in the African reserves appeared to be the lack of alternative opportunities for the surplus farm population within the context of the policy of separate development.

More than a century of rivalry and warfare over grazing land and cattle between nomadic Boer herders and their African counterparts and the background of land allocation between the white and African farm populations did not enhance confidence in the authorities or promote cooperation between tradition-oriented African subsistence farmers and agricultural planners or extension agents. Chief Albert Luthuli described in his memoirs how difficult it is to persuade Africans to reduce their cattle herds by culling unfit stock, when they are familiar with the spectacle of white farmers with thousands of head of cattle on spacious ranches. Where government-sponsored betterment schemes involved removing people from the land, they sometimes created active unrest among the population and had to be enforced by police and troops.

Lack of access to capital has been a further disadvantage of agriculture in the reserves. It is chiefly as a result of massive government intervention and the use of revenues from gold mining and manufacturing that the country's white agriculture has been brought in this century from a stage of progress that differed from that of African agriculture chiefly in the more extensive use of land to a fairly modern, commercial, and highly capitalized activity. In the crucial period 1910–34, for example, government expenditure on agriculture in the African reserves amounted to less than 1 percent of expenditure on white agriculture, not including large amounts of loans later repaid by white farmers. When white farm incomes declined after World War I, the provision of alternative sources of income for the surplus white farm population was made a major objective of national policy.

The white-owned land is sometimes said to have been inherently somewhat less productive, acre for acre, than that of the reserves.
This comparison probably includes unproductive land and white-owned grazing land of marginal productivity. The government’s information service reports that 45 percent of the Republic’s most fertile land is located in the Bantu areas. For the most part, however, the reserves, with the exception of the western Transkei and Pondoland, were regions of only medium or poor fertility. There were regional differences in the historical treatment of Africans and their land. In many areas, the reserves consisted of land that had been left for African occupation after the better land had been taken over by white farmers. Northern and western reserves are particularly poor.

Moreover, government expenditure on infrastructure, irrigation, and conservation was far greater in the white farming areas than in the reserves, where the soil-depleting practices until recently so prevalent among white farmers have been aggravated by land scarcity, overpopulation, and overstocking. The government-appointed Tomlinson Commission estimated in 1955 that at least 30 percent of the land in the reserves was very badly eroded and that another 40 percent suffered from moderate erosion.

At the time of the agricultural census in 1960, the total land area of the reserves was about 36,477,000 acres (nearly 13 percent of the land area of the Republic), including released areas that had been purchased up to that date. Most of this—34,925,000 acres—was occupied by Africans as farmland. African-occupied farmland outside the reserves constituted another 1 percent of the country’s land area. About 76 percent of the reserve land gets an average of more than twenty-five inches of rainfall a year, making it relatively well-watered by South African standards.

Reliable census data on the population of the reserves are not available, but there were thought to be roughly 4.8 million people domiciled there in 1960, of whom more than 500,000 were thought to be away at any one time (see ch. 4, Population). More than 670,000 families, about 95 percent of the reserve population and nearly 30 percent of the total population, were wholly or partially dependent upon agriculture in the reserves. The average area of farmland available for each African farm family on the reserves was about 52 acres, of which 7 acres were cropland. The ratio of land to population had declined markedly since the early 1930’s. By comparison, the average area of farmland available to the white farm family was 2,142 acres, of which 235 acres were cropland. The ratio of cropland to total farm holdings was 14 percent in the reserves, compared to 11 percent of white farm holdings.

The average farm family in the African homelands is thought to be obtaining less than half the annual production of all crops and animal products required for subsistence. Even in the Transkei, which is considered a relatively favorable farming area, large quanti-
ties of maize must be imported to help meet the needs of the population. On the reserves as a whole undernourishment is widespread, and there is danger of starvation in years of drought. In the drought of 1962 there was a state of near-starvation in some of the northern Transvaal and Zululand reserves. Two investigators found that the situation had been severely aggravated by the drought but that malnutrition was apparently a permanent condition, attributable to poverty as well as to lack of vitamin-consciousness among the reserve population. Allegations regarding starvation in Tswana-land in 1969 were denied by government officials.

The figures almost universally cited on the agricultural capacity of the reserves are those presented in the 1955 Summary of the Report of the Tomlinson Commission, appointed by the government to study and make recommendations concerning the socioeconomic development of the Bantu areas, some of which the government either flatly rejected or failed to accept (see ch. 19, Character and Structure of the Economy).

In the hearings held by the Tomlinson Commission in the early 1950’s, most witnesses suggested that the minimum imputed income envisaged for an African farm family should be about R240 a year (1 rand equals US$1.40) in produce or cash. The commission concluded, however, that if this were accepted as the target income for farm families in the reserves, 80 percent of those then engaged in agriculture would have to be removed from the land. It therefore decided on a lower estimate of acceptable annual income, which was based on an economic survey of 900 African farmers in the mixed farming and pastoral regions of the reserves. Only 111 out of this group of 900 made their full living from farming, and the average gross imputed income of these 111 amounted to about R113 a year. The commission therefore decided that a farm unit producing an average gross family income of R120 a year at the prevalent low standard of productive efficiency would be adequate to attract an African man to full-time farming, and this was made the target income in future calculations regarding attempts to establish a full-time African peasantry on the reserves.

To produce this target income by the methods prevailing in the reserves, the commission estimated that an African farm family would need an average of roughly 110 acres of land. This was designated “an economic farming unit” and was calculated to provide the bare minimum subsistence for an African family of six, estimated at about fifteen 200-pound bags of maize a year. The entire output of such a unit would thus be required for the farm family’s own consumption, and no surplus for commercial sale or for a reserve against famine in case of drought would be provided. The commission envisaged the unit as providing enough land to ensure initial survival, thus inducing the family, and particularly its
male head, to devote their full-time energies to farming. This was seen as a prerequisite for instruction, improvement of the land, and gradual increases in productivity that might eventually permit the production of a commercial surplus.

On this basis, the Tomlinson Commission recommended that at least half of all African families engaged in farming should be removed from their land to permit its reallocation into full-time economic farming units capable of sustaining a family of six. It estimated that the land then available in the reserves should be able to support about 307,000 full-time farming families, or about 51 percent of the estimated total de facto population of the reserves at the 1951 census. Unless productivity were radically improved, however, the farm families would be able to sustain only themselves. They would produce no surplus to feed the rest of the population of the reserves. Thus at least half of the inhabitants of the reserves in 1951, plus the entire natural population increase, would be obliged to derive their entire living from wage employment, which has hitherto been used largely in combination with the subsistence obtained from crops or herds.

The Tomlinson Commission made no claims for the depth or breadth of its surveys or for the scientific accuracy of its estimates, and critics have since pointed out that its proposed economic subsistence unit would in fact prove too small for all but optimum conditions. One prominent South African economist has recorded the prevalent impression that the land of the reserves could probably support only about one-third of the 1960 population, even under optimum conditions and with considerable improvement in soil conservation and methods employed. The dearth of data on the African areas is such, however, that the commission’s target estimates were still being almost universally cited at the end of the 1960's. The calculation of an “economic farming unit,” for example, provides a convenient yardstick by which to measure subsistence-level farming in the reserves. It demonstrates that most farm families in the reserves are producing well below subsistence level and are able to derive only a portion of their living from the land.

In June 1968 an official of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development said in an interview that, in line with the Tomlinson Commission’s recommendation, the government accepted in principle the eventual goal of settling about 40 percent of the Africans in the homelands on economic farming units. It had been realized, however, that the income from economic farming units of the size recommended by the commission would be inadequate because it did not allow for any surplus to be used as a reserve in time of drought.

In the early 1950’s the Tomlinson Commission had found that
most farm families were already producing on the average less than half their usual grain requirement of fifteen bags a year. The average value of agricultural output for a family of six persons was estimated at about R44 a year. This was supplemented by about R42 a year in earnings from outside work.

Moreover, the commission found very severe inequalities in income among African families on the reserves, so that the average data do not give an accurate portrayal of the poverty of much of the land. At the time of the commission’s survey, about 12.7 percent of the families were earning 46.3 percent of the total income of the reserves as a whole. The average income was found to be much smaller in the northern areas, where the inhabitants produced less from farming than in Natal or the Transkei but were unable to compensate by earning more in paid employment. It was thought that they may have depended more heavily on the gathering of wild foods.

The published summary of the commission’s report did not clarify to what extent the inequality of incomes might be found within a single village or extended family group. Because tribal tradition stresses mutual aid, it is often customary for a family in more comfortable circumstances to feed or care for less fortunate relatives or villagers. This custom may somewhat reduce the incidence of destitution or starvation. Although it fosters social stability, it also operates to hinder the spontaneous accumulation of capital or land and is a factor impeding the voluntary formation of economic farming units at the expense of other members of the tribe.

Average maize yields per acre were lower among Africans in the reserves than among Africans who were occupying white farmland on squatter or sharecropping arrangements and who presumably had some access to superior implements, supplies, conservation infrastructure, and instruction or example. African yields were also considerably lower than the average yield of white farmers, which in turn was rather indifferent in comparison to potential yields demonstrated on government experimental stations. In the crop year 1959/60, for example, the average yield was 1.2 200-pound bags per acre in the Bantu areas, 2.3 bags per acre by Africans on white farms, and 3.1 bags per acre obtained by white farmers. At government research stations in the white farming areas, yields of 9 to 14 bags per acre were being obtained. On demonstration units on the reserves, yields of 8 bags per acre were attained where there was no more than five inches of rainfall during the growing season.

In the late 1960’s government sources reported that the progress of the “agricultural revolution” in white farming toward mounting surplus production had raised the average maize yield on white farms to more than 5 bags per acre in a good crop year. Data on
yields in the Bantu areas were somewhat obscure and conflicting. In January 1962, for example, the minister of Bantu administration and development stated in Parliament that production of grain in the Bantu areas had been increased by 25 percent during the past few years. This may have been attributable in part to the normal alternation of favorable and unfavorable crop conditions. Yields in the Transkei, reported to be one of the Republic's best agricultural zones, rose during the 1960's, in large part because of above-average weather conditions. Nonetheless, according to the annual report of the Department of Agriculture, average yields in 1964 were only 1.0 to 1.7 bags per acre in Griqualand East, Tembuland, and the Transkei proper. Only in Pondoland, the most fertile region of the Transkei, had they risen from about 1.0 bags per acre in 1955 to 2.0 bags in 1964.

The Tomlinson Commission estimated that of the active population of the reserves in 1951, at least 95 percent were practicing mixed or pastoral farming. Relatively few, however, could get an adequate living from farming or stockraising. It is customary, therefore, for every able-bodied adult male in the reserves to go out to work in the industrial areas. The total pool of such migrant labor in the reserves was estimated at about 1,140,000, but only about 40 percent, or 500,000, were thought to be absent from the reserves at any one time (see ch. 4, Population; ch. 22, Labor).

Many agronomists feel that the depressed state of agriculture in the reserves is partly attributable to the perennial absence of able-bodied men. Although the statistics indicate that in the 1950's only 40 percent were absent at any one time, visitors to the reserves often comment that only women, children, and aged or infirm men are seen. In the agricultural tradition of most South African tribes, cultivation of the soil is the task of women; herding, that of the men. The maintenance of cattle herds, as practiced in the tribal tradition, is not incompatible with the absence of the male family head; herding is usually done by boys. As more land is acquired and more effective methods of herding and tillage are introduced, however, the participation of able-bodied males will become increasingly important. Since the widespread introduction of the plow in place of the hoe, for example, plowing has become the province of men. A migrant laborer cannot always time his return to accord with the seasons, and late plowing and sowing are often the cause of a poor harvest.

Mechanization is almost unknown on the reserves, but the plow or the ox-plow is widely used. As the land has become increasingly overcrowded, methods have become increasingly inefficient. Rotation of crops and fallow is now little used except on government-supervised betterment projects; manure and fertilizer are not employed; fencing of pasture and farms is inadequate; forests have
almost disappeared; and monoculture of maize or sorghum is prevalent. Dung must often be used for fuel instead of on the land, and use of green manure or fertilizer is inadequate. Improvements that have been widely introduced into the country’s white agriculture since the 1920’s, such as crop rotation, fencing of herds, and the use of tractors instead of oxen, have not yet been extensively adopted on the reserves. Livestock are allowed to graze over stubble after the harvest, impacting the soils.

Although the money economy depends heavily upon the use of migrant labor, the system is often deplored by both advocates and opponents of apartheid policy, for different reasons (see ch. 22, Labor). Both shades of opinion among white South Africans tend to favor the establishment of a full-time, self-sustaining peasantry on the reserves, on the assumption that the restrictions against African land ownership outside the reserves constitute an irreversible fait accompli. Consequently, the concept of a viable target income is often discussed in terms of how much land would be required to attract an adult African male into full-time farming on the reserves, assuming that the alternative is not starvation but acceptance of a readily available migrant labor contract.

Discussion of the problem of agriculture on the African Reserves is complicated and confined by the largely artificial structure of the national economy in which it is situated. For example, although poverty and undernourishment are prevalent on the reserves, the economy as a whole produces a mounting surplus of maize for feed that is exported at a heavy loss. Whereas the Tomlinson proposals call for African families to be removed from their land and given huts in new communities that would eventually have some other source of support, the surplus production of commercial maize growers presents a mounting problem and a growing burden on the public exchequer. Redistribution of the land in surplus production is prohibited by legislation and by the weight of white public opinion; in fact, measures are being taken to remove large numbers of Africans hitherto located in the white farming areas.

It is not clear to what extent government subsidies to support the producer price of maize may be of benefit to the African urban or rural consumer. Government sources report that the cost of food subsidies to the government in the 1960’s was about R30 million a year, mainly for the benefit of lower income groups. Before World War II, and again since 1953, the domestic price of maize has been above the world market price, but the difference has apparently been partially met by the taxpayer rather than the consumer.

Details of the subsidy program and its impact on malnutrition are not readily available. With increasing overpopulation of the reserves, maize has become the mainstay of the customary diet of the Africans. It was traditionally supplemented by amasi, or curdled milk, a
plentiful source of protein and fat-soluble vitamins. With the pressure of population and livestock on available grazing land, however, the herd has deteriorated, and today many families cannot afford amasi as a part of their daily diet. Because maize meal is lacking in essential nutrients, diseases of malnutrition, such as kwashiorkor, are common. In recent years the government has undertaken projects in nutritional education and promoted the sale of corn meal fortified with skim milk. Powdered skim milk has been distributed in some African Reserves. A private organization has also made extensive efforts to distribute unmarketable farm surpluses among the poor (see ch. 8, Living Conditions). Nevertheless, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research has estimated that the vast majority of rural and urban Africans are undernourished, and one of its participating physicians, who was among the few whites permitted to visit remote reserves, asserted that most Africans in small reserves were on the verge of starvation.

By the end of the 1960's the removal of African farm families from the white areas was proceeding, but reallocation of land within the reserves was impeded by the lack of adequate funds and the difficulty of providing alternative forms of subsistence for families removed from the land. Consequently, according to government statements, only those families who had no pasture or field rights under tribal tenure or who agreed to relinquish their rights were being established in townships divorced from the land. Large numbers of subsistence farmers were being resettled in new villages to permit consolidation of fragmented arable or grazing land but were retaining their tribal land rights. Good progress had been made in soil conservation measures for the stabilization or rehabilitation of eroded land. There was as yet no solid evidence, however, that average yields on the reserves as a whole had been appreciably improved or that production had been increased so as to provide for the rapidly mounting population. Consequently migratory labor in the urban areas, for all its evils, remained the chief hope and the principal source of support for the rural population of the reserves.

Land Tenure in the African Reserves

The tradition among most African ethnic groups in the Republic is allodial tenure. Under this tradition, the individual's inalienable right to land is not vested in a particular property but in his membership of the kinship group or tribe. Land was held by the chief in trust for the tribe, and every tribesman had grazing rights on the common grazing land of his tribe. When he married, he acquired the right to a piece of arable land to be cultivated by his wife or, in the case of plural marriage, to one for each wife and her children.

These land rights were unlimited as long as the land accessible to
the tribe was unlimited. The tenure system was well adapted to shifting cultivation and nomadic pastoralism. After the confinement of Africans within the borders of the reserves, overpopulation and land depletion led to a progressive reduction of the amount of arable and grazing land available to the tribal groups and consequently to each of their members. As village or tribe population increases, the land is subdivided to ensure that each member has some land to cultivate, as well as access to grazing. Fragmentation is common. Because so little land has been added to the reserves, the area available to an average African family has progressively diminished, until it is less than half of that required for subsistence.

Tribal tradition emphasizes stability, security, and mutual aid and tends to discourage the accumulation of land by one tribal member at the expense of others. According to one source, however, there is evidence that farmers who have more livestock are sometimes able to secure rights to a larger share of tribal land. Africans who enter the professions or government service usually lose their tribal land rights, retaining perhaps only enough for a home and a small kitchen garden. Migrant laborers, however, if they leave their wives and families behind on the land, usually retain land rights equal to those of other tribe members. This enhances the income and security of the migrant but tends to freeze the tenure pattern of the tribe or village.

At the time of the Tomlinson Commission's investigation in the early 1950's, individual land tenure—that is, title to land independent of tribe membership—was the exception among Africans on the reserves. It occurred in certain "surveyed areas," most notably in the Glen Grey District of the Ciskei, where individual title had been accorded to Africans by Cape Province in 1894. Individual title also occurred in several other surveyed districts of the Ciskei, in seven surveyed districts of the Transkei, and in certain mission reserves in Natal. As in the tribal areas, however, individual tenure applied only to arable land. All grazing was communal.

The government of South Africa regards itself as the owner of all land in the reserves, usually through the Bantu Trust, as well as of all crown land outside the reserves. At the time of the Tomlinson Commission's Report in 1955, use and ownership of land in the reserves was usually vested in the tribe through its chiefs, by permission of the white Bantu commissioners appointed by the Trust. The Trust intervened only where it wished to undertake betterment schemes or land planning, or on the "Trust Farms" located on released land purchased by the Trust under the legislation of 1936. Even on such government-managed schemes, occupation of the land was usually vested in the tribe rather than accorded by individual title.

The Tomlinson Commission recommended that the government
grant individual freehold title to Africans in the reserves “in areas where they desire that their land should be granted to them under title deed.” This proposal was rejected by the government on the grounds that it would undermine the whole tribal structure. Its white paper affirmed instead that “the desired aim of stable occupational rights on allotments in Tribal and Trust areas . . . must be secured rather by modernizing the methods and conditions which govern the allotment of land by tribal authorities.”

Government Action

Although the government has accepted in principle the recommendation of the Tomlinson Report regarding the establishment of a class of full-time farmers on the reserves on subsistence units of economic size, in practice it has not been able to make much headway toward this objective. Instead, its policy has been essentially an accelerated and more extensive form of the previously existing “betterment” policy, with emphasis upon conservation and land-use planning.

According to reports by white South African observers in the early and middle 1960’s, the government was removing from the land only those Africans who did not have rights to crop land or a share in communal grazing under tribal usage. This meant that very few units of economic size could be created. The creation of economic units is officially regarded as an ultimate objective to be realized gradually. The planners have been inhibited in pursuing this objective by the absence of alternative means of livelihood for those who would have to be removed from the land, and in most betterment areas the majority of farmers could hope to receive only about one-sixtieth of a subsistence unit.

The Tomlinson Commission had specifically recommended that migrant laborers should be deprived of their land rights so as to encourage full-time farming. The government, however, in its policy of separate development, is seeking to encourage urban Africans to remain migrants with their homeland in the reserves. Depriving them of their land rights would tend to sever the tribal ties that the government is anxious to maintain.

The government’s more gradual approach to land planning may also be less likely to arouse active resistance among villagers on the reserves than a program in line with the Tomlinson recommendations, which would require the removal of at least half the subsistence population from the land. There has been serious unrest in response to even moderate betterment programs in some of the reserves, and outbreaks of violence occurred in the early 1960’s, notably in Pondoland and other eastern districts of the Transkei bordering on Natal. Usually other policies as well as agricultural
betterment played a part in arousing resistance, and in some instances disputes over land schemes were only one symptom of broader tribal disaffection. In one instance in Zululand a village resisted being removed to a new location, and those who cooperated with the government were allotted the best arable plots, with the result that 200 villagers attacked the collaborators, killing two. In Pondoland in 1960 the paramount chief’s collaboration with the government made him so unpopular that resistance culminated in a revolt, and a state of emergency was declared in 1960, with the government bringing in security forces and jets (see ch. 26, Public Order and Internal Security).

The impression of most white South African observers permitted to make escorted visits to selected reserve districts appears to be that in more recent years land planning and resettlement have proceeded more smoothly. A 1963 report of the unofficial but internationally recognized South African Institute of Race Relations affirmed that betterment schemes that in previous years had been bitterly opposed were now widely accepted in the Transkei. The report stated that in order not to antagonize the villagers, the authorities were not forcing the pace, despite their full awareness that the poverty of the territory calls for rapid reform. No reclamation work was being undertaken in areas where it was still opposed by the inhabitants. If the inhabitants of a village insisted, land was being reallocated in the same proportions that formerly applied under tribal usage. Elsewhere, however, the objective was gradually to allocate larger plots to men considered likely to become full-time subsistence farmers. This was being done only with the concurrence of the chief or headman. There were renewed demonstrations and talk of violence over betterment in Pondoland in 1969.

The 1963 report of the South African Institute of Race Relations stated that in the Umtata area of the Transkei certificates of occupation were being granted for large plots consisting of about 10.6 acres of arable land and grazing for ten cattle units. The certificates of occupation were made conditional upon beneficial use of the land. If the occupier failed to fulfill the recommended conditions, he would forfeit the land and be moved to one of the locations designed for those who would eventually hope to find some source of subsistence other than agriculture. People in this category were given smaller arable or grazing rights or in many cases only garden plots surrounding their hut. The report stated that freehold tenure might be granted at a later stage when the less productive farmers had been moved off the land. Later reports have not given details regarding plans for creating larger farming units, and the status of these plans in the late 1960’s was not clear.

As of 1968 it was reported that there had been no attempt to remove Africans from their lands in the Transkei. In the eastern
districts of the Ciskei in the mid-1960's, the authorities were reportedly not depriving of land anyone who possessed land rights at the time of planning for rehabilitation. Consequently it was possible to create subsistence units of economic size only for a very small minority of farmers. In the King William's Town district of the Ciskei, one of the most advanced betterment areas, a survey in the winter of 1962 showed that after government planning and rehabilitation only 41 families, or 3.7 percent of the sample of 1,090, were farming a full economic subsistence unit of 111 acres, while 60.7 percent of the sample were farming 2 acres or less.

The rehabilitation program, as it is now understood, includes conservation of the soil by means of reclamation or stabilization and the planning of what are known as “betterment areas,” where the soil is classified into categories suitable for different types of land use. Although the villagers may retain their proportionate rights to land under rehabilitation or planning, scattered huts are usually relocated and grouped into one or more designated residential areas, in order to leave more unencumbered land for planning. Sometimes a whole village may be relocated; village sites are selected for the availability of water and of suitable soil for gardens, the proximity of arable lots, and reasonable proximity of schools and other facilities. Fragmented holdings of arable or grazing land are then consolidated, and areas of land are designated for cultivation or grazing. As far as consistent with suitable land use, plots designated for either residence, cultivation, or grazing are made contiguous, so that optimum use can be made of common fencing, erosion control, and plows and other implements.

The minister of Bantu administration and development told Parliament on May 28, 1968, that the estimated proportions of the total agricultural land area of the Bantu areas that had been planned by being divided into arable land, grazing camps, and residential areas were 69.4 percent in the northern areas, 65.2 percent in the Ciskei, 38.4 percent in the western areas, and 37.9 percent in Natal. A newspaper reported in August 1968 that more than 50 percent of the agricultural land area of the Transkei had been planned for rehabilitation in the same fashion and that 70 to 75 percent of the land-use reallocations had already been carried out.

Since 1953 the government's soil conservation work on the African reserves has been considerably speeded up. A more extensive method is being followed, by which the inhabitants of the reserves themselves undertake most of the work with official assistance. Previously white officials hired African labor to undertake more intensive conservation work in certain selected locations. The conservation work involves planting grass strips and constructing banks to control erosion. Grassland is fenced so that, where overstocking permits, grazing can be rotated to allow the pasture to
recover before regrazing. Soil conservation includes reclamation, to restore land to productivity after it has deteriorated, and stabilization, to arrest further deterioration of the soil and vegetation.

The land acquired in the released areas since 1936 had not deteriorated to the same extent as the badly overpopulated land of the reserves. According to the Tomlinson Report, the 9.9 million acres of “Trust farms” on the land acquired by the Bantu (formerly Native) Trust in the released areas consisted by definition of “betterment areas.” Since only stabilization, and not reclamation, was required in these areas, the conservation work proceeded much more rapidly. The released areas purchased since 1936, however, consisted for the most part of inferior land in areas of low rainfall in the northern Transvaal and northern Cape, some of it bordering the Kalahari Desert. Some of the released land already had a fairly high African population.

By February 1968 the government was able to report progress in agricultural betterment works in the reserves. A total of 41 percent of the agricultural land area of the reserves had been “planned” for land use. Some 22,789 miles of roads had been built. About 65,141 miles of fences had been constructed for grazing camps or cultivation areas, and 177,999 miles of grass strips had been planted to counter erosion. About 5,821 boreholes had been drilled as livestock watering points. Irrigation projects had been undertaken and 4,513 dams constructed. In February 1968 the minister of Bantu administration and development announced that his department was employing 481 African agricultural advisers (extension agents) and training another 139 at agricultural schools. Such schools were found at Fort Cox in the Transkei, at Arabie south of Pietersburg, and at Taung in the western areas. The Cwaka Agricultural College of Zululand was being completed near Empangeni in 1967.

Reports varied on the success of efforts to reduce livestock numbers on the reserves. White agronomists and economists tend to agree that the African custom of investing in the maximum number of cattle units, more or less regardless of quality, results in overstocking and deterioration of grazing and diminishes livestock quality and productivity. The agricultural authorities try to induce villagers to accept the idea of culling their livestock for two reasons. First, the culling of inferior stock would permit more selective breeding and gradual development of more productive variants of the hardy native varieties of Afrikander cattle and other livestock. Second, the very limited grazing area available to Africans means that, unless livestock numbers are reduced by culling, rotational grazing cannot be practiced, and overstocking will result in progressive deterioration of both herds and grazing land.

Even in independent countries where the authorities are Africans, attempts to introduce culling and reduce livestock numbers have
been met with resistance in some tribes. It is particularly difficult, however, for white agronomists and other authorities to understand the tribal tradition, and the consequent cultural conflict sometimes tends to inflame opposition and harden attitudes on both sides. In South Africa the issue has an additional emotional content because white planners are seeking to work within the context of the present limitations on land available to Africans, which are not accepted by African nationalists and are resented by many other Africans. Many whites, aware of African resistance to cattle culling, believe that a substantial portion of the wages paid to urban Africans "go down the drain" in the form of investment in cattle that soon die off or become unproductive because of overstocking on the reserves.

In the 1960's reports suggested that the authorities had had some success in introducing cattle culling in some areas, but other sources indicated that severe overstocking was still prevalent in most areas. One report suggested that in some government schemes grazing rights were being made conditional upon stock reduction. It was announced in 1968 that of a total grazing area of 23.6 million acres in the reserves, nearly 20 percent was under a system of controlled grazing. The authorities were also said to be making breeding stock available for the improvement of herds in some areas.

In February 1968 the minister of Bantu administration and development reported that roughly 50,000 acres of the total agricultural area of the reserves were under irrigation. A number of irrigation schemes had been introduced by the government in the Transkei and in other Bantu areas. The largest of these is the area below the Lubisi Dam at Qamata in the Transkei, which is growing maize, sorghum, cotton, wheat, and vegetables. By 1968 some ninety subsistence farmers had been settled on the Lubisi project on plots of 3.2 acres.

Several reports by white South Africans have indicated that excellent work was being done by government officials in conservation planning work in the reserves. They were impressed by the tact and understanding being shown by many agricultural officers in model betterment areas such as the one in King William's Town district in the Ciskei. In 1957 and 1964 an agronomist who revisited areas of the eastern Ciskei with which he had been familiar many years earlier reported that he found an amazing improvement. Eroded scrubland had given way to fenced and rehabilitated pasturage, rotational grazing had been introduced, and there were patches of arable land that were well situated and ably cultivated. He stated that those in touch with the people were able to report the beginning of stock reduction and culling by Africans. Controlled burning of weeds had permitted valuable pasture grass to reestablish itself in areas where it had almost disappeared.
Although production in the reserves continues at below subsistence level, cash crops have been introduced in a few areas (largely on "Trust farms" in the released areas) with the encouragement of agricultural officials. Those few Africans who produce for the market are eligible for the same price subsidies granted to white farmers, where quality and grade of the product are comparable. In some areas the government is also encouraging the development of village markets to help Africans vary their diets and increase their cash earnings.

The Tomlinson Commission had estimated that in crop year 1951/52 at least 95 percent of crop production and 60 percent of the livestock products of the reserves were consumed at home by the producers and that no more than 25 percent of the combined agricultural production of the reserves was sold. No more recent estimates are available, but in view of the growth of population it seems probable that the relative proportions were similar in the 1960's.

Among the marketable crops being introduced on the reserves are citrus and other fruits. By the end of 1965 about 460,603 fruit trees had been planted, and by 1968 about 147,317 citrus trees had been planted on the "Trust farms" in the released areas. The citrus estates on the "Trust farms" yield a net profit of about R80,000 a year to the Bantu Trust, which uses it on betterment projects. At least one of these estates, in the Acornhoek area of eastern Transvaal, markets its fruit overseas. In the reserves other than the Transkei, about 34,600 acres were under sugarcane in 1968. In crop year 1967/68, sugarcane production reached a record level of 330,000 tons. There were about 4,480 African growers, with small-scale growers predominating. Resilient fibers were also being produced both in the Transkei and in other Bantu areas. Outside the Transkei about 21,000 acres were planted to fibers. More than 21,000 acres were planted to vegetables and more than 4,200 acres to cotton. A large tea estate was being developed at Lambasi near Lusikisiki in the Transkei and would eventually consist of about 1,270 acres. During 1966 Africans on the reserves produced 1,078,619 pounds of wool, 216,469 gallons of milk, and 137,276 pounds of cream for market. At the end of 1965 some 133 dairy projects had been established. They had 1,831 participants, whose gross income for 1965 was R47,575.

Government officials concur that there has not yet been any significant overall increase in production by Africans on the reserves. They stress, however, that this is not because of any lack of zeal on the part of agricultural extension agents. They attribute the lack of progress to the difficulty of inducing part-time subsistence farmers to give up their land rights and to the traditional reluctance of rural Africans to adopt Western agricultural methods.
Critics of the government, on the other hand, tend to emphasize that more funds would have to be allocated to create alternative forms of employment in the reserves if the existing land area is to be reallocated so as to permit the establishment of a class of full-time subsistence farmers and the reserve population as a whole is to be brought up to or beyond subsistence level.

AFRICANS IN WHITE FARMING AREAS

While the white farm population was declining between the 1930's and 1960's, the requirements for active African farm labor on white farms were increasing with more intensive cultivation of the land. The number of adult male African farm laborers on white farms increased from about 464,000 in 1937 to 622,000 in 1956. 1964 it was estimated at less than 560,000. Because African earnings in agriculture were very low, the farm sector found it increasingly difficult during the 1950's and 1960's to compete with urban areas for available adult male labor.

Some of the expedients for making African labor available to white farmers caused considerable national and international controversy in the 1950's. In 1952 the South African government reported to the United Nations Committee on Forced Labor that farmers' associations had been authorized to construct prisons in accordance with official specifications where serious offenders were transferred to perform work for farmers. Criminal and influx control violations were still used in 1969 as a source of labor for white farms. In the late 1960's "idle or undesirable persons" were being sent to work on colonies or prison farms in the farming areas for periods of two or three years under the provisions of the Work Colonies Act of 1949, the vagrancy laws, and other statutes (see ch. 22, Labor; ch. 26, Public Order and Internal Security). Africans may be judged idle or undesirable by white Bantu commissioners. The grounds on which they can be so categorized were further widened under the Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 1964.

Under the new system violators are used as farm labor only after completing their training in detention camps. Because most petty offenders against influx control regulations and other statutes are unable to pay fines, they must serve prison sentences. Public works cannot supply enough employment for the large numbers of such prisoners, and the farm community needs the labor. An African who prefers prison is under no obligation to serve as farm labor. As far as possible the schemes devised by the authorities for hiring prison labor to farmers are under some form of official supervision or inspection. Since 1964 local labor control boards, consisting of local farmers and, in each instance, an employee of the rapidly expanded Department of Bantu Administration and Development,
have governed the farm labor supply on a district basis, removing to the reserves those African residents or workers declared redundant or providing additional temporary labor when required (see ch. 22, Labor).

African residents in the rural white areas, estimated at about 2.6 million in 1960, included tenant laborers and squatters, among others. Under the labor tenant system, Africans work for farmers for part of the year in exchange for the right to live on the farmer's land, where they usually keep stock and cultivate plots of land. Squatters, often resident for generations, are not traditionally obligated to furnish labor, produce, or services to the white farmer, although they sometimes pay rent and may be used as a source of casual or domestic labor.

White South African farmers tend to resent the general impression that their labor is secured at very low cost to them. In their view the cost is high, in productivity terms. The adjustment to marginally rising labor costs has commonly been disturbing to white landowners in Africa, who have often based their farm economy upon the somewhat inefficient use of large numbers of African workers.

In 1967 the director of the South African Agricultural Union declared that white farmers who allowed African squatters to live on their land were performing a vast social service by supporting Africans who were not doing useful work but could not be absorbed in the reserves nor admitted to the towns. Addressing a farmers' organization in July 1967, the deputy minister of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development maintained that the shortage of labor on farms would be far more critical were it not for the government's influx control measures in the urban areas (see ch. 22, Labor). He strongly criticized rates of pay and housing conditions for farm workers and said that if "the farmer would revise archaic conditions of service, he would find that even though the wage structure might not be competitive with that in industry, he could still attract the Black farm laborer."

In line with its official policy of racial separation, the government wants eventually to replace African labor on white farms by mechanization as far as possible. In the meantime, it has shown a preference for the system of regulated temporary full-time labor over the traditional rights of permanent African residents on white land. It is pursuing the official objective of abolishing the labor tenant system and of deporting or resettling African residents from white farms or crown land in the white areas to locations in or adjoining the reserves.

There is no consistent statistical series on African labor and dependents on the white-owned farms. The total African population on white farms was estimated at 2.1 million in 1960. Adult male laborers, probably including labor tenants but not squatters,
were estimated at about 622,000 in 1956. An officer of the Department of Agriculture estimated in 1959 that for every African adult male laborer on the white farms there were almost three dependents.

The South African Institute of Race Relations published yearly figures announced by the government on registered squatters and labor tenants on white farmland and on its program to remove "redundant" squatters and tenants. Under the Native Trust and Land Amendment Act No. 18 of 1954, amending the act of 1936 and designed further to discourage the maintenance of labor tenants and squatters by white farmers, squatters could not be registered unless they had been continuously resident since August 1936. The number of labor tenants would be regulated by the local labor control board, and the usual number required would be assumed to be five per farm. Others could be declared redundant and removed. The 1954 act removed the previous statutory obligation for the government to provide land for resettlement of such Africans; they can be deported to the reserves or provided with jobs elsewhere.

At the end of 1966 the government reported that 167,916 male labor tenants were registered and that there were 78,708 families of squatters on white farmland. By the end of 1967 it reported only 37,132 labor tenants and 77,182 squatters registered; yet only 3,029 labor tenants had been resettled during 1967. In earlier years the government reported that some labor tenants were being "declared redundant" and sent to the reserves. At the end of 1965 the government had reported only 28,192 registered labor tenants but 704,465 registered squatters. The last figure presumably registered each family member separately.

In addition to removing labor tenants and squatter families on white-owned farms, the government has been engaged in consolidating the African homelands by removing the remaining islands of African villages or farms left outside the reserves in what are known as African-owned black spots in white areas. These are isolated settlements in which individuals owe their land to their tribal land rights, but the government does not recognize the right of the group as a whole to the land in question. When the group is resettled, those members who did not have land rights equivalent to at least 42 acres at the old black spot settlement are regarded as squatters and removed into reserve villages or townships for those without land. Under the acts of 1913 and 1936, the government has a statutory obligation to provide those who held more than 42 acres with land regarded as equivalent to their old holdings. Holdings of as much as 42 acres are fairly rare on the reserves; it is not clear what proportion of the residents of black spots have holdings of this size. The areas for resettlement of black spots must be adjacent to the reserves and must be in addition to the scheduled or released...
areas promised to the reserves under the legislation of 1936. Re-settlement of Africans from black spots has been delayed by the difficulty of purchasing such land from white farmers.

The Beaumont Commission in 1913 had declared that it was far too late in the day to attempt to draw bold lines of demarcation between the African and white areas, since reserves, mission lands, native farms, and other lands solely occupied by natives were hopelessly intermixed with lands owned and occupied by whites, making the task of consolidation enormously costly and certain to create widespread dissatisfaction. Nevertheless, the government by the late 1960's was well engaged upon the task. Three small black spots had been removed before 1948. Between 1948 and the end of 1967, as many as 75,810 Africans had been removed from 39 black spots totaling 163,130 acres. In addition, the government had removed from the African reserves, as part of its program of consolidation, 18 isolated scheduled and released areas involving 302,496 acres. At the end of 1967, 39 other African-owned black spots and 6 isolated scheduled or released areas were in process of removal. There remained 1,157,280 acres of scheduled and released areas in the reserves that were regarded as black spots and slated for removal. In white areas 276 African-owned black spots totaling 216,380 acres remained for removal. The Bantu Trust and Land Act of 1964 provides that African-owned land outside the reserves may be expropriated if the state president considers this in the public interest, but in recent years the larger part has been purchased.

COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURE

The development of agriculture in the white areas in the two and a half decades since World War II has been in striking contrast to that in the African areas. White farming has become almost wholly market-integrated and has responded to the rise of domestic and export demand with an average growth in production of 4 percent a year in the period 1948–68. It produces almost entirely for the market and is thought to account for more than 90 percent of the agricultural output of the country.

Census data on white farming reportedly include some Indian and Coloured farms, usually very small in size. According to one estimate, the number of white males actively engaged in farming had dropped from 178,000 in 1936 to 99,000 in 1968—a decline from 24 percent to about 7 percent of the active white population.

In the same period the average productivity of white farms has made great strides. The commercial farming sector is not only supplying all the most important food requirements of the domestic urban market but has surpassed its pre-World War II position as an exporter. To traditional prewar exports such as wool, mohair, hides
and skins, fresh fruit, sugar, and wattle (acacia) bark, it has since added regular exports of canned fruits, peanuts, peanut oil, and maize (corn).

Size and Tenure of Farms

The size of white farms varies greatly, from large sheep ranches of more than 10,000 acres in the Northwest Cape to small farms of less than 100 acres in the areas of more intensive production in irrigated tracts or around the cities. This range of farm types and capacity reduces the significance of overall size data. Field studies made in the 1960’s, however, indicate that most crop farms are of less than the optimum size to benefit from economies of scale.

Because of the low productivity of much of the arid ranching land, statistical average farm size (excluding African reserves) is relatively high—about 2,000 acres. About 75 percent of the farms were below the average, but they occupy only 23 percent of the area. Those farms with more than 2,100 acres accounted for 77 percent of the farming area but for less than 25 percent of all farms. In 1960 less than 40 percent of the farms were smaller than 423 acres, and fewer than three-fifths had less than about 1058 acres.

The smaller farms listed probably included most of the 11,400 absentee or part-time farms listed in 1960, which were providing only a secondary source of income for their owners. Rural holdings used only for residential purposes, however, had been excluded from the statistics since 1957.

Most white-occupied farmland is operated by or managed for the benefit of the owner. The prevalence of owner-occupied rather than tenant farms, along with land speculation and high farm prices, has increased the burden of mortgage indebtedness. Many larger farms or ranches include some rented land in addition to owned land. The average size of mixed rented and owned farms is higher than the overall average, but the average size of wholly rented farms is lower than that of farms held by owners. About 75 percent of white farms or ranches are farmed by the owner, and 3 to 5 percent by managers. Some 20 to 22 percent are rented or share-cropped or operated in some other manner. About 9 percent of the total number of farms are operated by managers, who may, in many instances, be close relatives or even sons who will eventually inherit.

Historical Foundations of Agricultural Policy

During much of the twentieth century the history of white farming in South Africa has been in large part a history of increasing government intervention in the interest of the powerful farming constituency. Until World War II farmers sought government
support primarily in ensuring their access to land and to a plentiful supply of landless nonwhite labor.

Between the two world wars the fall of market prices for agricultural products directed attention to the plight of the white farmers, and government intervention took the form primarily of price support and market control. Productivity was neglected, and concern for soil conservation did not culminate in legislation until 1946. At least until after World War II government agricultural policy was aimed primarily at maintaining Afrikaners on the land rather than at improving food supply or increasing per capita production.

The prevailing social mystique was expressed in a white paper issued by the Department of Agriculture in 1944, which concluded that "... the farming population makes a most valuable psychological and spiritual contribution to the essential elements of the nation. There is a great difference between town and country, both sociologically and economically. By having a fairly large percentage of people whose mental outlook embraces a love for the soil and livestock, for rural pursuits and outdoor life, in fact for things permanent and for the whole biological process which is unfolded on the farm every day, a steadying influence of great value is exercised on the economic and social life of the nation." This view was echoed in the 1959 Report of the Commission of Enquiry into European Occupancy of the Rural Areas, which concluded that the maintenance of an economically independent white farming community was essential to the preservation of a Western, Christian outlook in the country as a whole.

The period of pioneering expansion in which white farmers or ranchers were trekking and homesteading new tracts of grassland for pasture may be said to have continued until nearly the end of the nineteenth century (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). When the land had been occupied, division of farms began, and more intensive use of the land gradually developed. From being primarily subsistence-oriented, white farming gradually became predominantly market-oriented, affected by the impetus of mounting demand during World War I.

Until World War I only wool and a little wine were produced for export. Sugar was the mainstay of the economy of Natal, but production of grain and fruit was inadequate to meet domestic demand. The beef and dairy industries had not yet developed. Cattle were extensively kept but were used primarily as trekoxen, for ploughing or for hides.

After the war grain production expanded rapidly, and an export trade developed in both citrus and deciduous fruit. The rapid development of maize production was apparently a direct consequence of government intervention designed to alleviate the backward condition of much of white agriculture in the 1920's. Experts had
testified that the country had excellent potential for maize-growing, and government assistance was consequently concentrated upon this crop. Railway freight rates were set so low that transport costs were virtually eliminated. The Land Bank made sizable advances to maize farmers, which in some cases had to be written off when world market prices declined. A costly system of grain elevators was constructed by the state-owned South African Railways.

At first, the subsidized maize exports helped to fill empty freight cars returning to the coast after delivering imports, but soon they were diverting cars from use for more remunerative exports. One critic of the policy has estimated that many tens of millions of rand were involved in unremunerative railway investment for the benefit of maize exporters. Wheat growers and other irrigation farmers benefited from differential water rates and the construction of costly dams and irrigation projects. Water for industry and for residential use is in short supply, and the allocation of water to agriculture, regardless of cost, has been the target of some criticism.

Government intervention in the market also took the form of quality control and eventually of export and market controls more stringent than those of many other countries. Government-imposed standards for the grading of export fruit were first imposed in 1914, and fruit exports eventually came under complete government regulation with the establishment of the Fruit Export Board and the Fruit Exchange in 1925. The Perishable Products Export Board was established in 1926. Dairy products first came under government control in 1917. The Dairy Industry Control Board was established in 1930, and in 1932 it was given detailed jurisdiction to establish compulsory export quotas. A similar evolution took place in meat marketing, which was first subjected to export quality control in 1917 and came under the almost unlimited powers of the Meat Industry Control Board in 1932. Marketing wine through the growers’ cooperative organization has been compulsory since 1924, and there have been compulsory export quotas for maize and tobacco since the early 1930's. By 1967 there were twenty different commodity control boards in operation to stabilize commodity prices and regulate marketing and export (see ch. 23, Domestic Trade).

These price support and marketing control measures culminated in the Marketing Act of 1937, which set up a National Marketing Council, a Producers’ Advisory Committee, and a Consumers’ Advisory Committee. It served as an enabling measure both for the commodity control boards already established and for the setting up of new boards. It provided that a majority on each board should represent the producers concerned, and it granted the boards unrestricted price-fixing powers and far-reaching monopoly powers in the purchase and sale of farm products.
As in other countries, the agricultural price-support policies have come in for strenuous criticism from economists who deplore their effect on efficiency of production or from critics who represent the interests of consumers or industrialists. Both economic groups have contributed heavily to subsidize agriculture, through taxation, through differential freight and water costs, and through the higher cost of foodstuffs and raw materials. For many years the mining industry in particular was a favored source of revenues for transfer to the agricultural sector, but manufactured goods were also penalized by differential rail freight rates and by a government policy that discouraged the growth of competitive road transport (see ch. 23, Domestic Trade). Some economists and other critics of the policy also pointed out that the heaviest burden was on the African population, for whom maize is a staple of diet.

Until World War II market control policy was primarily based upon restricting food supplies to the domestic market through protective tariffs and compulsory exports, in order to support domestic prices at a level considerably above the low world prices prevailing in those years. During the war years, market control and subsidy operated to keep domestic prices generally below those prevailing on existing external markets. Since 1955, however, there has been a tendency to return to the earlier position, with prices supported at above world market level. Control over the retail price of maize has been lifted, however, and the one-channel price scheme for meat has given way to compulsory auction. A government report in 1961 attributed the favorable rate of growth in agricultural production since the war to price support maintained under the Marketing Act. The report also noted that in the case of some commodities substantial surpluses had resulted, which could only be exported at a loss.

During the 1920's and 1930's the average Afrikaner farmer had not prospered despite price supports and other assistance, such as irrigation projects. Consequently, by the end of the 1930's some government advisers and leading Afrikaners had recognized the need to improve per capita productivity in agriculture and to provide more remunerative employment for the "poor whites" in industry, trade, and services. The market potential of the African population was often not taken into consideration, however, and marketing efforts were directed at the export trade rather than at stimulating domestic consumption by lower food prices or more broadly distributed urban wage income.

The turning-point for white agriculture came with World War II, when demand for foodstuffs was fueled by the increase in African wage earners and by the accelerated movement of whites as well as Africans from the rural to the urban areas (see ch. 21, Industry; ch. 22, Labor). The number of white males classified as economically
active in agriculture, forestry, and fishing fell from about 178,000 in the 1936 census to about 141,000 in the 1946 census. By 1968 the number was estimated at only about 99,000. From 1921 to 1941 the number of whites engaged in agriculture had shown a slight increase, while the number engaged in manufacturing had increased by nearly 200 percent. By 1946 the bywoner, or white squatter, had virtually disappeared from the rural scene. The political influence of farmers began to be exercised primarily through their campaign contributions rather than by their numbers among the electorate.

Since 1940 the country’s white agriculture has been market-integrated. There is some disagreement regarding the growth of productivity, but the gross value of output gained fairly steadily despite the recurrent droughts to which the country is subject. According to one report, the volume of agricultural production increased by 92 percent in the twenty years 1948–68. The gross value of arable crop production had increased from R75 million in 1939 to R552 million in 1965; and livestock production, from R61 million to R409 million in the same period. The physical volume as well as the value of meat and dairy production had risen substantially. The average yield of wheat on white farms increased from 2.1 bags per acre in crop year 1945/46 to 3.3 bags per acre in 1961/62, and the average maize yield, from 2.5 to 5.4 bags per acre. At government research stations, average maize yields of 9 to 14 bags per acre were being obtained.

Capital investment in agriculture was greatly accelerated during this period. It rose from a total of R2,240 million in 1949 to R6,502 million in 1969, or from an average of R20,000 to R65,000 per farm. Only about one-tenth of total investment as of 1969 was in vehicles and implements, an increase of 300 percent in twenty years. From only 6,019 tractors in use in 1937, there were 20,242 in 1946 and 119,196 by 1960. Use of the traditional Boer oxplow had become less common, and oxcarts or horse-drawn vehicles had largely given way to motor trucks, of which there were 69,376 in use in 1960. By international standards, mechanization is not very extensive, since labor is in relatively abundant supply.

Production

In the 1960's livestock products constituted on the average a little more than half the total value of output in the predominantly white-owned commercial farming sector. Production of field crops and fruits and vegetables had gained greatly, however. Wool was still the principal export, but subsidized exports of maize had become quite important in good crop years, and exports of both deciduous and citrus fruits, fresh, dried, or processed, had grown considerably.
in value. Production of cane sugar, the mainstay of Natal Province since the nineteenth century, had also increased in volume, but prices on the world market have been so uncertain in recent years that reduced export quotas and substantial export subsidy have been required. Among the crops produced in the country, but not listed in the table because the value of production in the 1964–67 period did not attain at least R21 million a year, are tobacco (R20 million in 1959, but down to R11 million in 1966) and cotton (R7 million in 1967).

Because seasons are the reverse of those in the northern hemisphere, in most regions of the country, the country has an advantage in export of some products, notably fruit, to the markets of the northern hemisphere. For some crops, the entire harvest falls within the confines of the calendar year; for others, the harvesting season begins in the final months of one calendar year and extends into the next.

Maize and Sorghum

Maize and sorghum are summer grains grown largely as products of dryland farming, in the summer rainfall regions of the eastern half of the country. The principal white maize-producing region, known as the maize triangle, covers the Highveld regions of the Orange Free State, southeastern Transvaal, and northeastern Cape Province. It produces more than 90 percent of the country’s commercial corn output. Maize is also produced in areas of Natal and of the southeastern Cape; much of this is reserve or other African production.

Conditions in the eastern half of the country are inherently favorable for the production of maize, which has become the staple food of the country’s African population, largely replacing sorghum and milk, and is also used for livestock feed. Since irrigation is not used, the crop is subject to abrupt fluctuations in output as a result of drought conditions in some years. Since the 1950’s white maize growers have not only developed higher yields on existing cropland but, under the impetus of heavy subsidies, have also expanded their maize acreage into dryer areas in the western Highveld, which are more vulnerable in drought years.

Disposal of surplus maize production in normal crop years has been a chronic problem since the 1920’s. The problem abated during and after World War II but emerged once more in 1953. In the crop year 1961/62, for example, the net loss on production of 53 million 200-pound bags of maize was estimated at R10,406,000. In 1967/68 the export loss was estimated at R0.65 per 200-pound bag for white maize and R0.40 for yellow maize. Since the late 1950’s the country has become the world’s third largest exporter of maize. In the late 1960’s there were isolated reports that white farmers
were converting some of their maize acreage to the growing of wheat. Sorghum, a traditional African crop, is grown by white farmers chiefly where conditions are unfavorable for maize production. It is used as feed and for the production of the traditional Bantu beer. Some sorghum is exported to nearby countries for beer production, but the bulk of sorghum exports go to the United Kingdom.

Wheat

Winter wheat has long been cultivated in the winter-rainfall region of the southern Cape Province, which still accounts for more than two-fifths of total wheat production. In recent years wheat growing has been extended into other regions, notably the summer-rainfall region of the Orange Free State Highveld, where precipitation and harvests are less reliable. In a good crop year the Orange Free State may produce more than the Cape, but in a poor crop year its output is less than half the winter wheat harvest. For the country as a whole, there is a strong year-to-year fluctuation in wheat output, but there has been an overall expansion in years of favorable climate since the 1950’s. To encourage production, wheat is subsidized, and sales are controlled by the Wheat Industry Control Board under a one-channel fixed-price scheme similar to that for maize. The country has not yet attained self-sufficiency and must import quantities of wheat in drought years.

Other Grains

Other food and feed grains produced in the country include oats, barley, and rye. They are grown almost entirely by white farmers as winter grains, chiefly in the winter wheat producing areas.

Wool and Sheep Ranching

The dry western interior of the country can support little except sheep ranching. It is most extensively practiced in the dry Karoo, though more favorable conditions for ranching are found on the Highveld. The country is the world’s fourth largest producer of wool, which is the second or third ranking export commodity, after gold and, sometimes, diamonds. Sheep ranching was, after viticulture, the earliest economic activity of white settlers. By crop year 1910/11 it was already producing 56,400 metric tons of raw wool in the grease. The record production years have been 1932/33—the year of the great drought—with 148,300 metric tons, and 1965/66, with 148,400 metric tons, which were valued at R115,647,000. In recent years the fluctuations in the annual quantity of output that characterized earlier wool production have been modified to some extent, but price variations still result in extreme fluctuations in the...
value of output, which in the 1950's and mid-1960's was many times the level of the 1930's and 1949's.

Domestic production of wool products, such as yarn and textiles, has expanded greatly since World War II. It still takes only a minor share of total raw wool production, however, so that the price to the producer is primarily determined by world market conditions, and domestic price-support policies have had very limited success. Wool is sold at auction in the country's four principal ports. Port Elizabeth is the foremost wool export center and the seat of the Wool Commission. South Africa is a member of the International Wool Secretariat, founded in 1937 with New Zealand and Australia; it employs the Woolmark label of the secretariat.

Woolless breeds of sheep, raised for meat production, constituted only about 11 percent of the national flock in 1960 and a somewhat higher percentage in the African areas. Most sheep raised are dual-purpose breeds, used chiefly for wool production. Of the 35.1 million woolled sheep in 1960, about 28.2 million were Merino and 1.1 million Karakul. White farmers own about 90 percent of the country's sheep. Sales of lamb and mutton to the domestic market have increased substantially since World War II but, despite higher prices, are still far less significant than annual wool exports.

Cattle Ranching

The country is well adapted for cattle ranching, which for centuries was the chief activity of both the white and African populations. White ranchers own about three-fifths of the cattle in the country and most of the grazing land. Cattle numbers do not afford a relevant comparison, however, since the white-owned herds are far more productive than the average African-owned herd.

Cattle ranching is done mainly in the eastern half of the country. Of the country's total land area of 256 million acres, only about 63.5 million are estimated to be suitable for cattle ranching, chiefly in the northwestern Cape Province and the Transvaal Bushveld. Because of the shift of emphasis from production of draught oxen to beef production, old established ranching areas have lost in importance, and the better pastures closer to urban markets have gained.

The hardy, drought-resistant Afrikander cattle strain, the result of a cross between native and European breeds, has in recent years been adapted for higher beef yield. In higher rainfall areas and intensive production units near the urban markets, breeds such as the Shorthorn, Red Poll, Hereford, Sussex, and Aberdeen Angus are raised; these have also been used to improve the yield of Afrikander stock.

Dairy production is limited to the areas of higher rainfall. It has been greatly expanded since the war and for the most part has kept
pace with the increase of domestic demand. In years of drought, however, the country must sometimes import quantities of dairy products. There is great room for expansion of dairy sales and production if African incomes could be increased and nutrition standards improved.

Fruit Growing

The Republic has areas admirably suited for the growing of grapes, citrus, deciduous, and even subtropical fruits. Citrus trees were planted in the 1860's, and production for the market was underway as early as 1910. Fruit production and export has been in continuous expansion since World War II and particularly since the early 1950's. In 1960 the Republic had some 335,000 acres in orchards and 178,000 acres in vineyards. Of the area in orchards, 165,000 acres was in deciduous fruit; 143,000 acres in citrus; and 27,000 acres in subtropical fruits, such as pineapple, banana, papaya, litchi, avocado, or pomegranate.

Production of citrus fruit, chiefly oranges, has more than doubled since the early 1950's but in 1967 was only about half as great in value as the output of deciduous fruits. Deciduous fruits, predominantly apples, pears, peaches, and apricots, are grown primarily in the southern Cape Province. The southwestern Cape was formerly the principal area of citrus production, but in recent years production in the Transvaal, most notably the Lowveld along the edge of the Great Escarpment, has exceeded that of the southwestern Cape (see ch. 2, Physical Environment). The areas most suitable for cultivation of subtropical fruit are the coastal belt of the eastern Cape Province, Natal, Zululand, and the eastern and northern Transvaal.

Domestic fruit consumption has been growing since World War II, but exports still take more than 80 percent of production. The country enjoys an advantage on the European market because its seasons are the opposite of those in the northern hemisphere. Competition for fruit exports is mounting, however, and storage techniques in the northern hemisphere are becoming more sophisticated. South African exports can be heavily affected from year to year by such factors as the size of the deciduous fruit harvest in Europe, competition from Israel and Spain, protective regulations, and devaluation, consumption limitations, or variations in consumer income in its principal market, the United Kingdom. At the end of the 1960's the outlook was for setbacks on the export market, but the domestic market, and particularly African consumption, had as yet scarcely been tapped.

Viticulture

Wine growing in southwestern Cape Province dates from the early days of white settlement, when Huguenot exiles from France established the first vineyards. In 1960 about 88 percent of the vines
were being used for wine production, 8 percent for table grapes, and 4 percent for raisins and currants. Wine is produced primarily for domestic consumption, but exports averaged about 18 million liters a year in the five year period 1961–65. More than half the wine produced is used for distilling, and only about 11 percent of the remainder is exported, chiefly to the United Kingdom. The industry is controlled by a central winegrowers' cooperative, which takes care of distilling, fortifying for port or sherry, and marketing. It establishes export quotas for member growers, although the overall quota has never been reached. Dessert wines predominate among exports, but there is also a variety of table wines, port, and sherry.

Sugar Growing

Sugar production dates from the 1860's, when canefields were established along the coastal belt of Natal, then a British colony. Most of the country's Indian population is descended from the indentured laborers brought to work in the canefields between 1860 and 1913 (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). About 70 percent of the cane plantations are still in the hands of white owners, using principally African labor. In 1960 it was estimated that only about 8.8 percent of the area in sugarcane was held by Indian growers and 3.5 percent by Africans. It has been estimated that in Natal Province as a whole, one family in five is dependent upon some phase of the sugar industry for its livelihood.

Government subsidy brought an important increase in production of sugar in the late 1950's and 1960's. From the most favorable production zone in a narrow 250-mile strip along the subtropical coast of Natal from Durban to Port Shepstone, cane growing was extended into the interior of Natal and even to the Transvaal. The area planted to cane increased to 840,000 acres in Natal alone in 1968. Much of the increase in production was being exported, and the country was the world's fourth largest exporter. In the years 1962 through 1966, exports constituted more than two-fifths of total production, compared to one-eighth during the 1950–54 period. In many years, sugar was the country's third largest agricultural export. The government's export subsidy program was based upon price expectations more favorable than those that have actually prevailed on world markets in the late 1960's. Consequently, growing exports have meant a considerable loss to the public exchequer. Under the International Sugar Agreement reached at the Geneva Sugar Conference in 1969, South Africa's export quota was cut by 10 percent in the interests of stabilizing world prices.

Conservation, Irrigation, and Water Projects

Soil conservation and irrigation have been greatly expanded since the 1950's, contributing to the pronounced rise in agricultural
production. Unscientific farming and grazing and misuse of the soil had led to severe deterioration of the soils in the white farming areas as well as in the African Reserves by the 1920's, but it was not until 1946 that growing alarm at the misuse of the country's soil resources culminated in the passage of the Soil Conservation Act. It set up a National Soil Conservation Board that could cooperate with farmers to improve farming methods. It could also proclaim Soil Conservation Areas in which it had considerable power to regulate or prohibit practices that could lead to depletion or erosion of the soil.

By the mid-1960's almost all the white agricultural land had been proclaimed as soil conservation districts or areas, and more than R40 million had been spent by the government on soil conservation under the 1946 act. Conservation plans had been prepared for nearly 41,000 farms and completed on nearly 10,000. Erosion and soil depletion still constituted a serious problem in some areas, but substantial progress had been made. A study made in the Orange River catchment area in 1967, however, revealed a low degree of concern for conservation by white farmers and continuing deterioration of the soil in spite of the conservation program.

Because rainfall and surface water are scarce over much of the territory, early settlement of both Africans and white settlers was determined by the presence of rivers or springs (fontein, in Afrikaans). Early white settlers began using irrigation in the southwestern and southern Cape, where water was relatively plentiful. Some small diversion dams were constructed in the nineteenth century, but general control over the water resources of the country was established under the Irrigation and Conservation of Water Act of 1912, modified by the Water Act of 1956. Local irrigation districts and boards were established under the 1912 act, and a number of small-scale irrigation projects were undertaken with the aid of loans from the central government. Only during the great agricultural depression of the 1930's, after a particularly severe drought, did the central government begin to undertake large-scale irrigation as a form of public works project and as a means of assisting white farmers.

By 1960 more than 247,000 dams had been constructed to provide water for irrigation and other uses (see ch. 2, Physical Environment). In 1965 about 2,078,000 acres were under irrigation, about 450,000 of them at government irrigation projects. The government had spent substantial sums, either in public works or in loans to local authorities and groups, on water storage, diversion, and irrigation. It was estimated in the mid-1960's that about 45 percent of the water-supply potential of the country's streams and rivers was being used, and the largest projects had been completed. It was projected that about 75 percent of the country's surface water potential would be in use.
The most ambitious of the government's water projects is the multipurpose Orange River Development Project to harness the waters of the Orange River for irrigation and power (see ch. 2, Physical Environment). It was to be developed in six phases over a period of twenty to thirty years and on completion would irrigate an estimated 800,000 acres, creating a white farming heartland that could boost the country's farm production by as much as R113 million a year, or about 10 percent. The first phase of the project would include three major storage dams. The contract for the largest, the key Hendrik Verwoerd Dam, was signed in 1966; construction was well underway by 1967, and completion was expected in 1971.

South Africa also expected to participate in two major water projects with neighboring countries: the Oxbow project with Lesotho and the giant Cabora Bassa on the lower Zambesi in Mozambique, not far from the borders of Zambia and Rhodesia. A South African firm was part of the consortium that had the contract for construction of Cabora Bassa, which was delayed when the Swedish participating firm withdrew in late 1969. The South African government had agreed to help finance the project and to take the surplus electrical power generated. The Oxbow scheme will center on dams on Lesotho's northern border where the Orange Free State meets Natal. It will supply water for South Africa's Vaal Dam, principally for hydroelectric power for industry in the Witwatersrand.

FISHING

Data on the South African fishing industry customarily include fishing out of South West Africa (Namibia), which is largely in the hands of South Africans. On this basis, the country has in recent years been among the ten leading fishing nations of the world. In the late 1960's it ranked sixth in volume of catch, after Peru, Japan, the Soviet Union, Norway, and the United States. It was the world's largest producer of pilchards and the second largest producer of fish meal.

Of the estimated landed catch of 1.6 million short tons in 1967, an estimated 742,400 short tons was landed in South West Africa. The area delivers an unusually large proportion of its catch for industrial use. In 1967, for example, an estimated 1.6 million short tons were used by plants or factory ships turning out fishmeal, oil, and fatty byproducts. Only about 150,000 short tons were consumed fresh.

In South Africa, in contrast to many other countries, fishing has been a sector of strong growth in recent years. The increase in the catch has apparently come from improved techniques and more
intensive exploitation of the fishing grounds rather than from more abundant supply. It is only in the past twenty years that the country has been among the leading fishing nations. The value of the annual catch increased from R9.5 million in 1956 to R16.2 million in 1966. The volume of the annual catch reached a record high in 1968, after having doubled over the previous ten years.

The country has almost 2,000 miles of coastline, and if the waters off South West Africa are included, the fishing grounds cover about 150,000 square miles. The principal fishing centers are Walvis Bay (a South African enclave in South West Africa); Lüderitz, in South West Africa proper; and the South African ports of Lamberts Bay, Port Nolloth, St. Helena Bay, Saldanha Bay, Cape Town, Hout Bay, Gansbaai, Mosselbaai, Port Elizabeth, East London, and Durban.

There has been a trend toward the use of increasingly larger fishing vessels, and the country has two of the world’s largest factory ships. More than 700 motorized fishing vessels were registered in the country in 1968; some estimates place the number of motor fishing boats considerably higher. Among the principal types of fishing practiced are trawling for bottom-dwelling or demersal fish, such as Cape hake (stockfish), sole, and Kingklip, as well as inshore fishing for pelagic or surface fish, such as pilchard, anchovy, mackerel, maasbanker, and crayfish (rock lobster). In 1968 the pelagic catch alone was estimated at some 2 million short tons.

There are more than 1,000 varieties of fish in the coastal waters, of which about 25 may be of commercial significance. The principal food fish caught is Cape hake (stockfish), which makes up less than 10 percent of the annual catch. Pilchards and anchovies are now the principal varieties used for canning and for the production of fish meal and oil. It is only in recent years that anchovies have become important in the catch; previously the nets used were not fine enough to catch them. In the past, there have sometimes been abrupt year-to-year variations in the supply of certain varieties of fish in the coastal waters, as when pilchards disappeared temporarily in 1953. A progressive decline in the supply of pilchards off the Cape in the late 1960’s appeared to be reversed in 1968, when the supply off Walvis Bay showed signs of declining.

Most of the fish caught is processed and exported, and there are also some exports of fresh and frozen fish or shellfish. Southwest African crayfish (rock lobster) from Lüderitz is flown fresh to France and exported frozen in quantity to the United States. Only about 8 percent of the total fishing catch is consumed within the country. The mining compounds are the leading domestic purchasers of fish, which they use to feed their African workers. Otherwise, the country’s Africans eat little fish. Apart from the gold mines, the principal purchasers are restaurants, hotels, and institutions.
Whaling operations are still carried out offshore, although South Africa has not sent a whaling fleet to the Antarctic since 1957. Union Whaling Company operates out of Durban on the east coast, and Saldanha Whaling Company of Cape Town carries on joint operations out of the whaling station at Saldanha Bay on the Western Cape with Hector Whaling Limited, a British firm. In 1964, 4,211 whale units were caught and processed for whale oil, sperm oil, vitamin oil, whale meat, and meat extract.

FORESTRY

The country is deficient in natural forests but has pursued a large-scale afforestation policy, so that in the 1960's plantations were supplying about three-fourths of its timber needs. Of the total land area of 472,500 square miles, less than 600,000 acres is covered by natural forest, of which the most valuable varieties are indigenous stinkwood and sneezewood (see ch. 2, Physical Environment). Plantation forests cover an area of about 2,222,000 acres and are devoted principally to conifers, with smaller areas of wattle (a variety of acacia) and eucalyptus. Most natural forests are the property of the state, but the majority of the plantations are in private hands. For the most part, government timber is delivered to privately owned sawmills.

Timber production was estimated at about 6.8 million cubic meters of sawn stripped logs in 1964. If allowed to mature, the plantation timber compares favorably in quality to the imported product, but because of the dearth of timber immature trees are usually used. Softwood is imported from the United States and Canada, and in smaller quantity from Scandinavia and the Soviet Union. Some pulp, mine timbers, and lumber are also imported from Swaziland. South Africa is the world's leading supplier of wattle bark and extract for tanning. Wattle plantations account for about one-third of total timber acreage.
CHAPTER 21
INDUSTRY

In 1969 the Republic of South Africa did not yet have the employment pattern of a fully industrialized nation, but industry has long been the principal source of national income and foreign exchange earnings (see ch. 19, Character and Structure of the Economy). Diamond and gold mining has been the core of economic development and the leading source of foreign exchange since before the turn of the century. Since World War II the country has developed a broad industrial base and a sophisticated range of manufactures, including most consumer goods and a wide variety of capital equipment and supplies for both agriculture and industry.

By the mid-1960's the country was thought to be engaged upon the drive toward industrial maturity. The principal obstacles were the limited size of the domestic market, resulting from the low income of most of the nonwhite population, and the inflexibilities derived chiefly from the stringent application of apartheid ideology to the supply and use of labor in industrial enterprise. On the other hand, the existence of large unutilized or underutilized reserves of nonwhite labor permitted a high rate of industrial expansion, and the low cost of nonwhite labor, resulting from supply conditions in conjunction with business and government policy, was an important factor permitting the continuing profitable operation of the gold mines and the low-cost extraction of the coal that powered the nation's factories (see ch. 22, Labor).

Low-cost labor, low-cost fuel and power, and fairly low-cost steel gave South African industry a cost advantage over most developed countries that, in some lines of production, has wholly or partially offset its low unit productivity and its inability to make optimum use of technological advance and to benefit from the economies of scale that are possible in countries with a larger or more affluent internal market.

Although shortage of water may prove a limiting factor, the abundance and variety of other natural resources has provided an important advantage lacked by the majority of other developing countries. Perhaps even more important in this respect was the early development of the mining industry after the 1880's, which provided a source of capital and a nucleus of industrial demand, urbanization, and sophisticated entrepreneurial talent and skills that
partly facilitated the rapid growth of manufacturing after World War II.

Thus the country's industry is in a sense situated advantageously between two worlds—the world of the industrially mature nations, which serve as export markets and with which it has close financial, technological, and entrepreneurial links, and the world of underemployment in sub-subsistence African agriculture, from which it draws the bulk of its low-cost labor force (see ch. 20, Agriculture). Having started from a position of very limited manufacturing capacity and substantial underutilization of resources at the outbreak of World War II, the country exhibited a rate of postwar industrial growth that materially surpasses that of the more mature economies of the United States and Western Europe.

At the same time, official sources stress South Africa's status as the most industrially advanced nation in Africa, a statement that is often termed meaningless but which permits it to claim an almost endless range of "firsts." One of these is that Africans in the Republic—including migrant laborers from nearby countries—generally have a higher rate of urban employment, and therefore a somewhat higher average cash income, than in much of Africa. Because it also has more relatively high-income whites than other African countries, it had in the late 1960's a better market and a better pool of developed and potential industrial skills with which to attract foreign investment and promote further industrial growth.

Because of these advantages, foreign firms seeking investment on the African continent often tend to turn first to South Africa and to accept as an inevitable concomitant the ubiquitous government intervention in the interest of apartheid and Afrikaner ideology that is an increasingly prominent feature of industrial life in the country (see ch. 22, Labor; ch. 24, Foreign Economic Relations).

The prime movers in the country's industrial development have been the state on the one hand and the great mining finance groups on the other. The mining groups were the original founders of the industrial economy, generated the initial stage of growth in primary industry up to World War II, and retained a very active share in the postwar growth of the mines and, to a lesser extent, in that of manufacturing. They still control the mines and the greater share of private industry, as well as banking. They have joined with the government in financing a number of the mixed enterprises that have taken the lead in replacing imports by establishing or expanding South African manufacturing since World War II.

The primary impetus in promoting the growth of manufacturing since World War II has probably come from government action. By direct investment and control of the steel industry, by important participation in other major industries, by increasingly protective manipulation of tariffs and import controls, and by the use of tax
incentives and other instruments of policy, the government has consistently taken the lead in restructuring the country's money economy, ensuring that an important share of the growing domestic market for both consumer and producer goods has been used to generate the rapid growth of domestic manufacturing capacity.

Among the factors responsible for the growth of the industrial economy since World War II have been the expansion of new gold mining areas and the expansion of the domestic consumer market, first with the growing urbanization of rural whites and then with the still fractional but nonetheless profitable growth of the nonwhite consumer market during and since the war (see ch. 23, Domestic Trade).

The wartime expansion of manufacturing industry, though it did not end the color bar to skilled jobs, eroded some of the quantitative restrictions on employment of nonwhites in industry that had impeded growth of the domestic consumer market in the prewar years. Since then, the number of industrial jobs for nonwhites, though still far from meeting the subsistence needs of the mass of the population, has been growing steadily, fueling renewed expansion of market demand and economic growth (see ch. 22, Labor).

The growing urbanization of the African population, resulting from the mounting labor requirements of industry during and after World War II brought a political and ideological reaction that since 1948 has sought expression in the policy of apartheid (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Since 1948, and increasingly since 1960, this policy has sought to check the flow of African labor from the countryside to the urban areas by placing stringent controls on the supply of labor to industry. Although it has been largely unsuccessful in checking the rate of urbanization, the policy has influenced every aspect of industrial planning and management, affecting both the cost structure and the market potential of domestic industries. In 1968 the government had initiated new measures intended to restrict industrial investment in existing urban areas that might result in the employment of additional nonwhite labor.

Industry has been highly concentrated in four principal areas: the southern Transvaal, Cape Town, Durban, and Port Elizabeth. Together they account for about 80 percent of manufacturing employment and output. The last three are seaports and therefore offer a favorable situation for industries processing or using imported materials or components, particularly when the imported goods are heavy or bulky or are subject to discriminatory rail charges applying to manufactures. The largest concentration of industry, however, has been in the southern Transvaal, close to the urban market that grew up around the mines of the Witwatersrand (commonly called the Rand).

Differential freight rates on manufactures have also favored the
growth of industry in the southern Transvaal by making it more economic for a factory producing finished goods to be located near its market. As the country's industry has turned more and more to the use of domestic materials and components, the advantage of location near the ports has decreased, and the southern Transvaal has absorbed more of the total growth in manufacturing industry. In the census year 1953/54 the southern Transvaal area accounted for 48 percent of the value of net output and 45 percent of total employment.

For a number of reasons, chiefly to implement the ideology of apartheid, the government has long sought to check the concentration of industry in the southern Transvaal and to promote the decentralization of manufacturing activity. Since the 1950's, this policy has been closely associated with the desire to achieve geographic apartheid in the form of separate development for the Bantu Homelands or African Reserves.

The central philosophy of the government's program is that no African has a right to live permanently in white areas, that is, the seven-eighths of the country outside the African reserves. In principle, only Africans whose labor is required by whites or by white-owned enterprise may be allowed in these areas, and they are officially regarded as temporary migrant labor (see ch. 22, Labor). Even if they and their parents have been born in the area in question, they are officially treated as residents of one of the homelands and may be removed to the homelands at any time (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 15, Political Dynamics).

In order to divert the substantial labor surplus of the African reserves away from the existing municipal areas, the government adopted its Border Industries Scheme in September 1960 (see ch. 19, Character and Structure of the Economy). Under this scheme, incentives and government assistance are offered to white-controlled enterprise to expand or locate new plants in eight designated border areas within thirty miles of the borders of African reserves, from which they could draw their daily African labor force. A number of these border areas closely adjoin the old industrial areas, which are known as controlled areas or prescribed areas and often referred to as white areas, although they do not differ materially in "whiteness" from the border areas (see fig. 16).

From 1960 to 1967 new employment had been created outside the prescribed areas for about 7,000 African men a year. Of these new jobs, about 5,000 were in the border areas. In the same period an average of 35,000 African men a year were becoming available for the labor market from the homelands. Thus the creation of new jobs outside the prescribed areas was by itself far from sufficient to absorb the surplus labor supply of the reserves. During the same period the total yearly increase in African workers—including for-
eign and urban Africans—in the prescribed white areas was estimated at more than 50,000 a year—30,000 on the Rand alone—so that urbanization was increasing.

In a further effort to stem the tide of migration, the government enacted the Physical Planning and Utilization of Resources Act of 1967, which went into effect in January 1968. It gave the minister of planning complete discretion to approve or disapprove plans for expansion by any firm employing more than three workers, when such expansion would involve the acquisition or zoning of industrial land or the employment of one or more nonwhite workers (see ch. 22, Labor). The effects of the act upon industry in the prescribed areas had not become fully apparent by the end of 1968, but it was reported that the shortage of African labor in some of these areas was causing some firms to take a greater interest in the possibilities of expansion or relocation in the border areas (see ch. 19, Character and Structure of the Economy). Government control over the supply and utilization of African labor by private enterprise was still further tightened under Section II of the Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 1968 (see ch. 22, Labor). An important section of the act made it clear that prescribed areas, where influx control and related laws and regulations can be applied, need not necessarily be urban areas.

MINING

The country's unusually rich mineral resource endowment, in combination with its low-cost unskilled labor supply, advanced mining technology, low-cost fuel and power, and well-developed economic infrastructure, have made possible a very extensive range of mineral production, both for export and for domestic use. At the prices and factor costs prevailing in 1968, there were reported to be nearly fifty commercially exploitable minerals in the republic, some of them found in combination or extracted as a byproduct of gold, copper or other minerals (see ch. 2, Physical Environment). Bauxite was the only industrially important mineral not found in the country.

In 1967 the value of total sales from all types of mining was R1,287 million (1 rand equals US$1.40), of which gold accounted for R768 million (see table 17). In 1967 the mining industry employed 615,515 persons, 413,833 of them in gold mining alone. Sales data for uranium and platinum are not disclosed, but South Africa is an important world producer of both minerals.

In the mid-1960's South Africa had been the world's leading gold producer for some seventy years. Its known reserves of gold were still the world's largest, and it was producing about two-thirds of estimated world gold output, or three-fourths if estimated production of the Soviet Union is excluded. By 1966 the gold-mining
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Mineral</th>
<th>Unit of quantity</th>
<th>1966</th>
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<th>1967</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Production (quantity)</td>
<td>Sales (quantity)</td>
<td>Sales value (in thousand rand)</td>
<td>Production (quantity)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>1,000 oz.</td>
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<td>30,879</td>
<td>776,197</td>
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<td>Uranium</td>
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<td>Platinum</td>
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<td>n.a.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
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<td>52,847</td>
<td>51,722</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diamonds (sales)</td>
<td>1,000 carats</td>
<td>6,037</td>
<td>5,732</td>
<td>61,595</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper (sales)</td>
<td>1,000 tons²</td>
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<td>130.4</td>
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<td>140.6</td>
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<td>Asbestos</td>
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<td>276.6</td>
<td>261.3</td>
<td>28,983</td>
<td>268.5</td>
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<td>Iron ore</td>
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<td>7,493</td>
<td>7,047</td>
<td>19,262</td>
<td>7,608</td>
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<td>Manganese ore</td>
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<td>2,185</td>
<td>2,316</td>
<td>24,654</td>
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<td>Lime and limestone</td>
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<td>11,722</td>
<td>9,398</td>
<td>11,774</td>
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<td>Chrome ore</td>
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<td>1,169</td>
<td>1,103</td>
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<td>Phosphates</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,172.1</td>
<td>1,213.2</td>
<td>6,510</td>
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<td>3,058</td>
<td>5,261</td>
<td>3,775</td>
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<td>Antimony</td>
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<td>20.3</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>4,171</td>
<td>22.2</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Concentrates</td>
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<td>n.a.</td>
<td>3,168</td>
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<td>200.7</td>
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<td>Silver</td>
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<td>2,937</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
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<td>348.8</td>
<td>3,036</td>
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<td>1461.3</td>
<td>111.9</td>
<td>110.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vermiculite</td>
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<td>Fluorspar</td>
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<td>80.8</td>
<td>1249.0</td>
<td>105.1</td>
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<td>Total Sales Value</td>
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<td>830.9</td>
<td>172.3</td>
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<td>Precious minerals</td>
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<td>Other metals</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building materials</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other minerals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>221.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and mineral products</td>
<td></td>
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n.a.—not available

1 rand equals US$1.40

2 Short tons.

industry had attained record or near-record levels of total gold output, aggregate profits, and profit margins. The rate of post-World War II expansion in the industry had been high.

Gold remained the foundation of the country's mining activity, but the value of production of other minerals had increased appreciably since World War II. The expansion in production of industrial minerals in particular began to play an important role in the 1960's, especially as gold production leveled off toward the end of the decade. From 1962 to 1968 the physical volume of mining production excluding gold rose by 44 percent.

The country ranks as a leading world supplier of a number of minerals in addition to gold and diamonds. In 1967 it either had among the largest deposits or ranked among the world's largest producers of platinum, uranium, coal, iron ore, chromite, manganese, asbestos, antimony, and corundum. Its goldfields are thought to offer potential uranium resources second only to those of Canada—one report said second to none. Although it ranked below the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Kinshasa) and probably below the Soviet Union in production of industrial diamonds, its sales of gem diamonds were still the highest in the world. It was thought to rank with Communist China in production of antimony and close behind the Soviet Union in production and reserves of chromite. It probably had the world's largest commercially exploited reserves of manganese with the exception of the Soviet Union. The enormous platinum reserves of the Transvaal Bushveld extend for hundreds of miles, and at full capacity the Rustenburg Mine was the world's largest platinum producer.

Mining has played a key role in generating economic growth and development in the money economy. It has done so through its direct contribution to national product and foreign exchange earnings, through the direct reinvestment of mining profits, and through its importance to the national exchequer. Also of significance have been its more indirect effects in generating income, attracting foreign capital and skills, creating an urbanized market for consumption and production goods, and underwriting the creation of supporting industry, transport, and power facilities.

The direct contribution of mining to domestic product, measured in current market prices, has shown some cyclical ups and downs over the years since 1910, primarily in response to factors affecting gold output, but there has been a long-term increase in the volume, as well as in the current net value of gold mining production. The relative proportion of domestic product contributed by mining, on the other hand, has shown a long-term decline with the growth of manufacturing, government, trade, and services. Mining and quarrying contributed an estimated 28.0 percent of gross domestic product in 1911; 17.1 percent in 1930; 20.6 percent in 1940; and 13.0
percent in 1950. Between 1963 and 1968 it has accounted for between 12 and 13 percent of annual gross domestic product, depending in part on annual fluctuations in the contribution of agriculture as a result of climatic and other factors.

The greater the growth of manufacturing industry, however, the greater has been the need for imports to keep it going. These growing imports have been financed in large measure by the net exports of the mining industry, particularly gold mining, which in recent years has imported only a small proportion of its needs. A study made in the accounting year 1956/57 found that the gold mining industry exported nearly 100 percent of its output, but that only about 6.8 percent of its total intersectoral purchases were derived from imports. Thus gold mining, despite the decline in its relative contribution to domestic product, remains of crucial importance to the country's balance of payments, furnishing between 30 and 50 percent of total exports from year to year (see ch. 24, Foreign Economic Relations).

The significance of mining to the generation of incomes in the republic through the creation of employment is less easily determined. More than 65 percent of the African workers, and thus nearly 60 percent of all workers on the mines, are recruited from outside the republic (see ch. 22, Labor). Much of the low wage income generated by mining goes, therefore, to such countries as Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Mozambique. These foreign Africans are temporary migrant workers whose contracts last from four to eighteen months. With the exception of a minority of senior workers, native African mineworkers are recruited from the Native Reserves, are treated as temporary migrant workers, and housed in compound barracks. Their wages go mostly to the Transkei African homeland, but several other reserves depend largely upon the export of labor to the gold mines as their primary source of support.

The mining companies early turned to the recruitment of foreign African labor as a means of increasing their labor supply without raising wage rates for Africans. As early as 1902 the members of the industry's Chamber of Mines were mutually pledged not to exceed a maximum average wage for their African labor, and fully monopolistic labor recruiting—with a monopoly on the demand rather than the supply side of the market—was achieved in 1913, so that mine operators are never in competition with one another for the available supply of labor (see Ch. 22, Labor).

In consequence, the current monetary value of African wages remained unchanged until the 1940's, keeping the larger part of the industry's wage bill relatively stable. Since then cash wages for Africans have risen but less rapidly than the national price level, so that according to one estimate the real purchasing power of cash wages for African mine workers in 1968 was no higher, and perhaps con-
siderably lower, than in 1911. In addition to cash wages, the mines must provide an African worker with his rations, with a concrete bunk in the barracks, with an issue of work clothing and with medical care if required. Altogether, wages in kind were estimated in 1964 to cost the employer about R7 a month and to be worth about R13 a month to the African worker. Even if these wages in kind are included, the wages of African mine laborers are substantially lower than those in manufacturing. The differential between average African earnings and average white earnings in mining has increased considerably since World War II; at the same time, in manufacturing the gap between black and white earnings had stayed fairly constant. There is, therefore, a tendency for native African labor to favor manufacturing at the expense of mining.

The system of migrant labor, initiated by the Chamber of Mines, has been perpetuated and rigidified by law and by government enforcement to such a degree that in more recent times the mining operators have often found that their schemes for improving productivity and profits by better training and more flexible use of the low-wage component of their labor force, or for improving living conditions by creating family villages, are firmly quashed by the government or by the white unions (see ch. 22, Labor).

This inflexibility in the use of low-wage labor is of concern to mine operators and shareholders because the cost of white labor in the South African mines as expressed in wages has long been among the highest in the world, quite apart from the question of productivity. The unions are politically powerful, and a multitude of well-enforced regulations to protect the vested interest of white labor have made featherbedding practices rife, often prevented the training of African labor for optimum productivity, and limited the available supply of skilled labor. Because of the large gap in wage rates between the two components of the labor force, cost calculations and the usual range of day-to-day management decisions, in mining as in much of the country’s industry, are fraught with emotional implications and political significance for a large element of the ruling white minority.

Of 615,379 workers employed in mining in April 1967, 62,225 were white; 4,473 Coloured; 441 Asian; and 548,240 African. Average cash wages for white workers were more than seventeen times the average cash wage of nonwhites and, if benefits received in kind are included, they were more than nine times the African wage (see ch. 22, Labor).

Since World War II and particularly since 1960, earnings of nonwhites in the mines have been rising, attracting more volunteers for enlistment from the increasingly impoverished African reserves, from Mozambique, and from other nearby states. Concurrently, advances in technology have reduced the number of both white and
nonwhite workers required on the mines. Thus the chronic "shortage" of unskilled labor that prevailed at the previous stable wage rate has eased and in the 1960's had ceased to be a limiting factor on production. After 1961 total employment in mining began to decline, and in 1966, for the first time, more Africans sought work on the mines than could be accepted (see ch. 22, Labor).

GOLD

The first mineral discovery of real commercial importance was that of diamonds, made near Hopetown in 1867. The diamond rush to Griqualand West in the 1870's heralded a phase of development of mining infrastructure and finance that paved the way for the rapid development of gold mining on the Rand a decade or two later (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). The diamond discoveries established a channel for foreign capital and skills, which later turned readily to take up the challenge of the gold discoveries on the Rand. Before long the diamond-mining finance houses and those in gold mining had interlocked directorates, and a sizable fraction of the profits from diamond mining is thought to have gone into the more capital-intensive operations of the goldfields.

The first major gold discovery on the Rand was made in 1886 on an outlying farm called Langlaagte at the present site of Johannesburg. In the ensuing gold rush, claims were established and a number of workings opened up around Johannesburg, in what is now known as the Central Rand (see fig. 18). Gold from the deep-level pyritic ores of this central portion of the Rand was somewhat difficult to recover until the MacArthur-Forrest cyanide process of treatment was successfully introduced in 1890. By 1895 the Rand was the world's principal gold producer, a position it has retained to the present day.

After 1890 a number of new mines were opened up on the Central Rand, and mining was begun on the west Rand. There was a second flurry of discoveries before World War I, and by 1907 four important mines were in production on the far east Rand, where the important development of the 1930's was to take place. Production on the Old Rand reached a peak in 1912, and by 1931 twenty-seven of its mines had closed down, it was then thought, for good.

After the departure from the international gold standard by Great Britain in 1931 and by South Africa in December 1932, the price of gold in South African currency rose by nearly 100 percent between 1932 and 1935, stimulating the extraction of lower grade ores in the older mines and causing the creation of fourteen large new mines within three years, chiefly on the far east Rand.

The low overall price level of the 1930's, with the rise in the price of gold, also stimulated new exploration farther afield.
ing operations were suspended in July 1940 because of the war; borehole tests had already indicated the existence of important deposits outside the area of the Old Rand. Intensive new exploration had opened up the major fields of the far west Rand and the...
Klerksdorp area, both of which became important producers after the war. The deposits of the Orange Free State goldfields had also been discovered during the 1930's, and the first mine was opened there in 1946. The development of these fields and a significant number of other new mines was stimulated by a new rise in the official parity of gold after the European devaluations of 1949.

By 1968 it was possible to speak of a great gold-bearing reef, the Witwatersrand system, forming a semicircular arc about 300 miles in length and extending far beyond the Witwatersrand itself (see ch. 2, Physical Environment). The Klerksdorp area lies about 50 miles to the southwest of the far west Rand, and it is another 90 miles to the Orange Free State fields. This reef is thought to be the largest gold ore reserve in existence and to form the largest cognate groups of metalliferous ore deposits being mined anywhere in the world.

Since about 1940 production in the Old Rand has been on the decline, but output in the new areas has shown a phenomenal expansion. In 1965 the new areas were producing 80 percent of the country's gold and were responsible for an even higher share of the industry's profits. In 1965 and 1966 the ten largest producing mines in the republic, which were also the ten leading profit earners, were located in the newer gold mining areas of the far west Rand, Klerksdorp, and the Orange Free State fields. These ten mines accounted for 49 percent of total gold output and for 68 percent of total profits. The oldest of them was Blyvooruitzicht in the far west Rand, where gold was first declared in 1942; in the other nine, gold had been first declared after 1951, in one case as late as 1962.

The concept of gold as a wasting asset has been central to every discussion of the country's economic future since the inception of the gold mining industry. Since the 1920's the government has placed emphasis on the development of manufacturing against the day when the gold reserves will no longer be commercially exploitable. There has been much disagreement, however, on the question of how long the reserves may be expected to last. According to an economic adviser to the prime minister, the predictions of both mining geologists and financial experts on this score have proved notoriously unreliable and in the case of South Africa have usually been gross underestimates. For example, in the 1920's it was generally thought that the mining industry was at or near the peak of its production capacity; in 1930 the government estimated that the peak would be reached in 1932; and the future level of gold output was projected at R51 million for 1940, when in fact it reached R236 million.

In early 1969 the Economic Geology Research Unit, established by the government in 1959, completed its ten-year study, with the conclusion that 25 percent of the country's gold reserve still lies
undiscovered in the Witwatersrand Basin. The undiscovered gold is thought to occur very deep underground (at depths of 5,000 to 10,000 feet) so that commercial exploitability would depend upon future cost-price relationships and technological developments. It is thought that even to locate the deposits would probably cost R10 million to R20 million.

Assessment of the country’s gold ore reserves and their potential for exploitation is continually being revised, not only as a result of new ore discoveries and technological advance but also as a result of periodic changes in the international gold price and of year-to-year changes in factor costs. The calculated reserve includes ore down to the lowest grade of gold content that can be profitably recovered at the current calculation of marginal cost. In the absence of new discoveries or a change in the price, therefore, the tonnage of ore and gold in the calculated reserve is reduced each time marginal costs rise as a result of domestic inflation or other factors. For example, it was estimated that a rise of R0.45 per ton in the costs of production between 1961 and 1964 had reduced the calculated reserve by between R450 million and R500 million.

Central to the discussion is the question of the probable future level of the gold price as expressed in South African rand or in major currencies. In periods of international monetary uncertainty or crisis, therefore, South African gold producers and monetary authorities tend to find their interests aligned with those of gold hoarders or speculators who are banking on a devaluation in one or more major currencies. Such uncertainty prevailed during much of 1968 and 1969 and affected South Africa’s gold marketing policy and, consequently, its balance of payments (see ch. 24, Foreign Economic Relations). It also brought South Africa into policy conflict with the monetary authorities of leading developed countries—the former gold pool countries—which, with the cooperation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), were seeking to dampen speculation in gold against major currencies.

In March 1968, at a meeting in Washington of the central banks of the former gold pool countries, it was decided to introduce a two-tier gold price system and to invite other members of the IMF to participate. Under this system the free market price of gold (for speculators and hoarders and for industrial use) was allowed to move freely, but participating central banks no longer supported the price by standing ready to buy the entire supply at the official price of US$35 an ounce. Because monetary uncertainty continued to prevail through early 1969, speculators maintained a lively demand for newly mined gold. In an attempt to drive up the price, the South African monetary authorities adopted a policy of first suspending and later severely restricting as far as possible the
country’s sales of gold during 1968. The price of gold on the free market consequently rose to as much as US$44 an ounce.

In 1969, however, speculation in gold subsided, and the price on the free market threatened to fall below the official price of US$35 an ounce (see ch. 24, Foreign Economic Relations). South Africa sought an arrangement by which official support of the price of a portion of its gold sales could be resumed. Under an agreement reached at the end of 1969 and effective January 1, 1970, the IMF agreed to support the price of South African gold at US$35 an ounce by making purchases whenever the free market price has fallen below that level, provided that South Africa has had a balance-of-payments deficit on its other transactions over a period of at least six months. When these two conditions exist, the IMF will purchase from South Africa an amount of gold reasonably commensurate with one-fifth of weekly sales from new production. Such purchases may be made for each day on which London fixing prices are US$35 or below, and South Africa may accumulate eligible days.

In 1966 South Africa’s Chamber of Mines predicted that, if the domestic cost level continued to rise at the rate of the preceding two years, gold production would start to decline after about 1970, in the absence of any unforeseen change in the other variables involved: the international gold price; the valuation of South Africa’s currency; new ore discoveries; labor productivity; and technological advance. A detailed study published by the IMF in late 1968, however, concluded that gold production in South Africa had in fact proved relatively less responsive to the relation between the gold price and the national wholesale price level than in most other producing countries. The study concluded that the level of production in South Africa, and consequently in the world, could be considered primarily a function of the importance of the gold mining industry to the balance of payments and to the economy as a whole.

The South African industry has been unusual in that individual mines have withstood exhaustion for so long and that the long-term decline in yield in the older mines has been offset each time by the yield of new and often much richer gold-producing areas. The low level and relative stability of the wage rate for 90 percent of the labor force has been a key factor in keeping some of the older mines commercially exploitable at a much lower level of subsidy than prevails elsewhere, as well as in making possible a generally high rate of profit for the industry as a whole. Though inflexible color-bar regulations often interfere with the optimum utilization of the low-wage component of the labor force, the industry has attained an advanced level of technology and efficient management.
in most other respects. There has therefore been a tendency for many observers to conclude that, barring new mineral discoveries, further progress in productivity would depend heavily upon the more flexible utilization and more effective motivation of African labor.

The more flexible utilization of low-wage nonwhite labor has been consistently sought by the Chamber of Mines in an effort to reduce mining costs and just as consistently opposed by the white miners’ unions, which were usually backed by the government. An early move by the mine operators to “bring about a change in the minutiae of work regulations” caused the 1922 Rand miners’ strike, and after the Nationalist-Labour coalition victory in the 1924 elections the rigid color bar was reasserted (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 22, Labor). Forty years later the gold mine operators attempted to introduce an experiment giving African “boss-boys” the right to start their gangs working in an area without a lengthy wait for white inspection, but the government ordered the experiment discontinued “in view of the detrimental implications involved.”

In a 1967 “productivity agreement” between the gold mine operators and the white unions (echoed in a similar agreement for the coal mines) the granting of an increase in white wages averaging 11 percent was tied to a productivity concession permitting African “boss-boys” to start their gangs working without white supervision in an area where no blasting had taken place since the last inspection, providing that the white miner in control visits them within two hours. It was estimated in the press at the time that the clause might save an average of two working hours per African per shift. Two years later, however, in June 1969, the president of the Chamber of Mines was deploring the “failure of any substantial measure of the hoped-for increase in productivity as a result of the . . . agreement. One of the main reasons . . . has been allegations that the industry’s intention is to advance Bantu on the Mines to the detriment of the . . . white employees. These allegations are repudiated by the Chamber . . .”

It has been characteristic in the South African economy for market forces to adapt to the requirements of the prevailing ideology rather than vice-versa, since they are the more flexible of the two frequently-opposing forces. The political influence of the Chamber of Mines in this respect is limited, and some observers believe that assistance to the mining industry in a cost squeeze can therefore more feasibly take the form of tax relief or other subsidy than of any meaningful relaxation of the color bar.

In March 1968, at the time of the introduction of the international two-tier price system, the South African government introduced the Gold Mines Assistance Act of 1968, which by increasing subsidies permits a lower grade of ore to be extracted without loss
to the mining companies. It thus extends the life of some operations previously judged marginal or vulnerable to further cost increases. Any mine whose current profit does not exceed 8.8 percent of working revenue is eligible for subsidy. The IMF study of late 1968 had found about eight small gold mines that were submarginal, six that were marginal, and seven near-marginal, with profits of R0.50 to R1.50 per ton. In 1966 about 2.2 percent of production came from mines operating at a loss, 3.2 percent from marginal mines, and 20.1 percent altogether from those with a profit of from R1.50 per ton to a net loss. The level of profit for most of the industry was still very high through 1966. The profitable operations of the gold mining industry accordingly had a high differential burden of taxation compared with other economic activities. In 1966 the industry’s tax, including the government’s share of profits under lease arrangements, amounted to 41.2 percent of profits on gold and uranium. Since marginal or near-marginal mines were relatively few and small, the industry as a whole was still far from receiving a net subsidy.

Published assessments of the cost structure and prospects of the industry had generally assumed that 1966 would prove to have been a peak year for South African gold production; but output showed a slight renewed gain in 1968 despite the costly flooding of the West Driefontein mine, one of the two largest producers in the country. Several new mines had been opened, and the West Driefontein mine was expected to be in full production again by mid-1969.

In 1968 there was also a potentially important technological advance that served to illustrate the range and variety of changing factors that can affect output and mine life and thus influence the overall economic picture from one year to the next. This was the development of a prototype rock-cutting machine that, according to a United States Bureau of Mines report, might eventually eliminate blasting, reduce costs, increase the economic depth of gold mining from the previous maximum of around 11,000 feet to as much as 15,000 feet, and thus possibly extend the life of many gold mines. By eliminating blasting, it could reduce idle waiting periods by four hours or more and even permit twenty-four-hour operations. The prototype had yet to be improved to prevent rock flaking from fouling the machine, but it was thought that the difficulty could be overcome in time. Blasting has long been a white prerogative and an issue fraught with emotional and political significance for the white unions and their supporters (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

The organizational structure of the great South African mining finance groups is both complex and tightly knit. The high degree of financial concentration in the industry came about in response to
the technological challenge of deep-level mining, with its high capital requirement, and had been largely completed by 1910. Of the individual prospectors and small companies that emerged from the great Rand gold rush of 1887–97, 576 firms were registered, 313 were eliminated and 206 were merged. By 1910 the 55 remaining companies had been consolidated under the control of the present seven holding companies or their corporate predecessors. These seven competing but often interlocking finance houses vary considerably in size. Most have considerable foreign participation, although share ownership by the South African public is reportedly growing.

The largest of the seven finance houses is the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa Ltd., which was founded by capital from the De Beers diamond mining monopoly. It was headed first by Sir Ernest Oppenheimer, and then by his son, Harry Oppenheimer, who is also chairman of De Beers. In 1968 the Anglo-American Corporation was producing 40 percent of the country’s gold output and nearly 31 percent of the non-Communist world supply. In 1962 it had majority participation in twenty-two investment companies, thirteen gold mines, fifteen coal mines, five copper mines, seven other mining companies, and twenty-nine other firms. It has played a leading part in important mining enterprise elsewhere on the continent, notably on the Zambian copperbelt. Most of the leading mining houses have begun to diversify their investment in recent years, both in countries other than South Africa and in activities other than mining.

Second largest of the holding companies engaged in gold mining is Gold Fields of South Africa, descended from the original company founded by Cecil Rhodes and affiliated with the international operation, Consolidated Gold Fields. The others were: Union Corporation; The Corner House Group, whose chairman is the United States entrepreneur Charles W. Engelhard; Anglo-Transvaal; Johannesburg Consolidated Investments; and General Mining, which has been taken over by the Afrikaans Federal Group.

Returns to shareholders in the gold mining industry have usually been quite high, but government regulations ensure that an appreciable share of profits from the gold mining industry remain in the country in the form of taxes or reinvested profits. In 1965, for example, out of total gold sales of R755 million, dividends paid abroad by the gold mining companies amount to about R29 million, and imports for the industry were only R15 million. Dividends paid in South Africa took R97 million, taxation R126 million, and expenditure on stores R260 million. The total bill for wages, salaries, and allowances amounted to R202 million. These figures are only approximate because data on uranium operations may not be disclosed.
Uranium production began in October 1952. The uranium is extracted from gold-bearing ores in special plants constructed on a number of gold mines and financed from British and United States loans repayable from the sales of uranium to those countries. Sales by the industry were reduced by international agreement after the demand for uranium slackened in the early 1960's, but its potential capacity is high. In 1968 international demand appeared to be reviving, and South African sales were expanding, with fourteen gold mines producing uranium and one mine, West Rand Consolidated, producing primarily uranium with gold as a byproduct. Great Britain had a long-term contract for South African uranium; Japan was negotiating for a contract; and sales were also being made to the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), Switzerland, and France. By mid-1969 world stockpiles of uranium were beginning to mount. Nevertheless, Anglo-American corporation was planning to build a very large uranium plant in anticipation of a revival of world demand after 1973.

MANUFACTURING

The growth of manufacturing output and the extension of the range of manufactures produced domestically have been the most striking features in the transformation of the country's economic structure since before World War II. Fostered by heavy government investment and by protective tariffs and import controls, the growth of manufacturing industry has been favored by the availability of natural resources, financial resources, low-cost power, and low-cost unskilled and semiskilled labor—by almost every requirement, in fact, except a large domestic market and a flexible social structure. A broad industrial base has developed and acceleration of industrial growth has been rapid.

The general uncertainty of definition of the country’s statistics on manufacturing and gross national product has impeded quantitative evaluation of the overall rate of postwar industrial growth and of the rate of expansion of individual branches of industry at constant prices, leaving the data open to differing interpretations. Despite partial recessions in 1961 and 1968, however, it was clear that during the 1960's the country was enjoying a boom in industrial growth. The official volume index of mining production rose by an average of 7 percent a year in the decade from 1957 through 1967, and the physical volume of manufacturing production had increased by an average of 9.6 percent a year (see table 18).

Government Policy Toward Manufacturing

Early manufacturing in South Africa catered to the consumer demand of the minefields and rural areas and to the needs of the
Table 18. Principal Sectors of Manufacturing Industry in South Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>1963/64(^1)</th>
<th>1965/66(^1)</th>
<th>1965/66 Gross(^2)</th>
<th>1965/66 Net(^2)</th>
<th>Index of physical volume of production(^3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>1,536</td>
<td>112,222</td>
<td>794,117</td>
<td>208,483</td>
<td>171.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beverages</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>18,763</td>
<td>153,857</td>
<td>61,085</td>
<td>208.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4,160</td>
<td>54,104</td>
<td>24,266</td>
<td>111.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>62,650</td>
<td>242,631</td>
<td>95,198</td>
<td>272.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wearing apparel</td>
<td>2,142</td>
<td>100,073</td>
<td>307,073</td>
<td>133,886</td>
<td>151.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood and wood products</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>38,204</td>
<td>86,583</td>
<td>39,356</td>
<td>141.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>22,304</td>
<td>77,814</td>
<td>41,160</td>
<td>146.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper and related products</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>25,361</td>
<td>165,007</td>
<td>74,276</td>
<td>261.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing and publishing</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>27,245</td>
<td>132,298</td>
<td>82,330</td>
<td>237.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubber products</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>15,721</td>
<td>95,097</td>
<td>46,099</td>
<td>149.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals and related products</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>50,888</td>
<td>390,320</td>
<td>173,806</td>
<td>194.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonmetallic mineral products</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>68,888</td>
<td>208,345</td>
<td>109,332</td>
<td>185.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base metals</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>57,865</td>
<td>403,506</td>
<td>168,624</td>
<td>229.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal products</td>
<td>1,398</td>
<td>89,914</td>
<td>428,637</td>
<td>185,047</td>
<td>189.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical machinery</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>33,527</td>
<td>213,972</td>
<td>81,824</td>
<td>208.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other machinery</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>41,448</td>
<td>243,149</td>
<td>109,347</td>
<td>181.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport equipment</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>51,431</td>
<td>407,044</td>
<td>121,163</td>
<td>319.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous industries</td>
<td>822</td>
<td>38,434</td>
<td>237,408</td>
<td>101,513</td>
<td>205.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,944</strong></td>
<td><strong>858,075</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,650,962</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,857,395</strong></td>
<td><strong>205.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) Census year.
\(^2\) In thousand rand (1 rand equals US$1.40); value added in net figures.
\(^3\) Base year (100) 1956/57.

gold and diamond mining industries, the farms, and the railroads. Explosives and fertilizer factories, for example, were established before the turn of the century. The domestic market was extremely limited, however, and, except during World War I, domestic production found it difficult to meet the cost competition of imports. Available investment capital showed a preference for the more lucrative mining industry. Manufacturing was providing only about 6.7 percent of gross domestic product in 1911, 11.9 percent in 1921, and 15.4 percent in 1931 (see ch. 19, Character and Structure of the Economy).

The stimulus to manufacturing came first with the increase in tariff protection in 1925; then from the devaluation of December 1932 and the consequent rise in gold mining earnings; from World War II and the growth of the government-owned steel industry; after 1948 from the manipulation of import controls and tariffs; and finally from a concerted government drive for greater economic self-sufficiency in the face of growing political isolation. The growth in manufacturing has come about because demand was present and the necessary resources and low-cost inputs were available, and each succeeding phase of expansion has generated a fresh growth in demand. Direct government investment in manufacturing has on the whole been much smaller than private investment, but in many instances government policy has stimulated investment by guaranteeing a share of the market or by threatening exclusion from the market.

Some protective tariffs had been introduced in Cape Province in 1906 and on the national level in 1914, but protectionism first became an avowed part of national policy when the Nationalist-Labour coalition government came to power in 1924. This early protection was closely linked to the “civilised labour” policy of the coalition government (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). It stimulated the development of a number of established industries, including food-processing, clothing, blankets, footwear, cigarettes, motor-assembly, tires, and sawmilling; but it was relatively limited in its effects. From 1925 to 1944 tariff protection was granted only to industries already fairly well established, and an effort was made to avoid high duties on producers’ goods for agriculture or mining. Many of the industries that benefited from this early protection used imported semifinished products, such as textile goods.

According to some estimates, most of the growth of manufacturing between 1932 and 1939 was a direct result of the rapid expansion of gold mining after the rise in the gold price at the end of 1932. Although tariffs were so imposed as to avoid injury to gold mining, the industry was spending an increasing proportion of its expenditure on domestic manufactures, and some part of this was the result of tariff protection. During this period, moreover, the
government was making the heavy commitment to a domestic steel industry that was to permit a rapid expansion in base metal output during and following World War II.

During the 1920's the government had attempted to encourage the establishment of a domestic iron and steel industry, first by offering subsidy to any private producer who would set up a plant of more than 50,000 ton capacity and then by trying to establish a mixed enterprise with participation by both government and the shareholding public. The public failed to take up the share issue, however, and after 1931 the government became almost the sole shareholder of the South African Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR), which first began production in 1934. Previous private steel production had been entirely from scrap, and it was ISCOR that first used domestic iron ore. Government ownership of ISCOR was originally pressed by the Labour Party as an experiment to demonstrate its all-white-labor policy. Costs proved prohibitive, however, and the policy was modified after 1936. In the 1960's attempts to promote an all-white labor force in some operations were revived with some success.

The public's reluctance to buy shares in the operation appeared justified when the international steel cartel systematically undercut ISCOR's market during the depression of the 1930's. Only by threatening to impose an effective countervailing duty was the government finally able to come to a market-sharing agreement with the cartel in the late 1930's, by which ISCOR was enabled to apply to the domestic market a basing-point system modeled upon that declared illegal in the United States under antitrust legislation. Thereafter profits were high, and ISCOR was able to consolidate its position to meet the ensuing boom in demand. The industry's cost structure remains the focus of some controversy. Opponents of government enterprise point to hidden social costs, such as the construction of branch railway lines, and to the maintenance of fixed prices, but the government claims one of the lowest cost steel industries in the world.

World War II tremendously stimulated demand for the products of South African industry and effectively excluded competition from imported finished products while permitting import of essential raw materials. Important additions were made to steel producing capacity, and the machinery and equipment industry was expanded to produce military requirements to specifications in large volume. Ship repair and the production of armored cars and munitions became important activities, as well as expanded production of footwear, clothing, blankets, and canned goods to meet military demand in addition to consumer demand. Where necessary, the government financed construction of new "annex factories," which were placed under the operation of private firms.
When the period of postwar shortages began to ease, exchange controls were adopted in 1948 that helped to perpetuate some of the protection provided to domestic industry by wartime conditions. Moreover, a number of domestic industries were by then well established, and the forced advance in technology and labor utilization during the war had enabled them to improve their cost structure and to benefit from the country's enormous advantage in costs of fuel, unskilled or semiskilled labor, and other resources.

During World War II the Eastern Group Supply Council of the British Commonwealth, charged with procurement from India, Australia, and certain other Commonwealth countries, had found that South Africa was a particularly good source for rapid expansion of wartime supply because of the existence of large unutilized resources at the outset of the war. The shortage of traditional white male factory labor could be overcome by the use of white women and of African and other workers. Between 1939 and 1945 white employment in manufacturing industry increased by 20 percent and nonwhite by 74 percent.

The government-appointed Van Eck Commission had found in 1941 that the country's prewar factories had for the most part been operating on too small a scale and that they were not well enough mechanized to make optimum use of available low-cost power and semiskilled labor. Consequently they had a high cost structure and were heavily dependent upon tariff protection, which cost an estimated equivalent of US$58 million a year.

During World War II the proportion of large-scale manufacturing units grew, and there was significant advance in the level of technology and resource exploitation. These trends have been accelerated since the war, although the low level of most nonwhite incomes still materially limits the size of the market and inhibits economies of scale.

The color bar in industry was not abandoned during the war, but the needs of industry had led to a tremendous increase in the number of semiskilled or simply white-supervised, low-wage nonwhite workers in industry. Not only were costs thus reduced and profit per unit of labor input improved, but the consumer market was expanded, although only by a fraction of its potential. At the same time the geographic and social mobility of the rural white population was being improved, skills and training were being acquired, and the traditional disinclination for active work was being overcome (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). After 1940 agriculture became increasingly market-oriented, and mechanization and the average size of farming operations increased. The surplus white farm population was moving into employment in manufacturing, government, trade, and services.

After World War II the whites' reaction to the process of partial
economic integration and growing urbanization of the nonwhite, and more particularly of the African, population was a crucial factor in the election victory of the Nationalist Party in 1948 and in the evolution of the apartheid policy (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). The party's viewpoint, as expressed in the Sauer Report of 1948, was that Afrikaner nationalism and the unregulated economic integration of the black man were two incompatible forces and that only separate development—that is, geographic apartheid—would provide a weapon for the whites against the mass integration of the Africans and prevent white South Africa from eventually succumbing to revolutionary Africanisation. Separate development was therefore regarded as an investment in self-preservation by the white community.

The Van Eck Commission report of 1941 had also recommended that the policy of protection give greater emphasis to favoring the establishment of industries to process South African raw materials, rather than exporting these materials in their unprocessed or semi-processed state. This became a part of postwar policy, which has applied protective tariffs and import controls to goods in an increasingly early stage of manufacture. Since 1944 it has also been official policy to give advance assurance of tariff protection to firms wishing to establish manufacture, and this policy was further extended in the late 1950's.

Thus the country's manufacturing, which had already broadened its base and improved its cost structure during the war, was guaranteed a degree of sheltered expansion by the greatly increased tariff protection that has applied since the war. Moreover, since 1948 exchange controls have been increasingly relied upon as an effective means of import control to limit or exclude competition for a favored industry and as a means of inducing foreign firms to guard against loss of their South African market by setting up or expanding subsidiaries within the country. Thus, in contrast to the limited scope of prewar protection, competition has been effectively reduced, first by wartime conditions, then by postwar shipping and goods shortages, and finally by government controls, favoring the forced, that is, protected, industrialization of the South African economy since 1940.

Because of the country's increasing political isolation since 1948, and particularly with the growing role of independent African countries, the government has come to place increasing political emphasis on the concept of greater economic self-sufficiency, particularly in types of manufacturing capacity with possible strategic potential. After the flight of capital in 1961 following the Sharpeville tragedy, the government served notice that henceforth import permits would not be issued until importers gave positive proof that all domestic sources of the commodity in question or possible sub-
stitutes had been thoroughly canvassed. Subsequent relaxations in exchange controls have usually been designed to combat inflation by furnishing some price competition but have not materially affected the intensified policy of fostering domestic manufacture.

The successful expansion of ISCOR since the late 1930's has set a precedent for direct government investment and operation of activities in which private investment appeared to be lagging or where government priorities were not being fulfilled rapidly enough. In 1940 the government formed the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), a semiautonomous public institution, to promote the development of manufacturing by direct state investment. By mid-1965 the IDC had investments of more than R200 million in 202 companies.

IDC has a substantial interest in at least ten major industrial enterprises: The South African Pulp and Paper Industries Ltd. (SAPPI); South African Coal, Oil, and Gas Corporation (SASOL); Phosphate Development Corporation (FOSCOR); Good Hope Textile Corporation (Pty.) Ltd.; Northern Lime Company Ltd.; Fisons (Pty.) Ltd.; Fine Wool Products of South Africa Ltd.; Masonite (Africa) Ltd.; South African Marine Corporation Limited (Safmarine); and South African Industrial Cellulose Corporation (Pty.) Ltd. (SAICCOR). Government-owned corporations are seldom designated as such. Like many private firms, some of these government firms carry the designation “Pty.” for proprietary company, because they have never offered shares to the general public.

The degree of government participation in these ten major undertakings varies considerably. SAPPI, for example, was founded by one of the large mining groups, Union Corporation, with government encouragement in the form of protection as well as finance. It has an effective monopoly of the paper production industry. SASOL, which started production in 1950, operates the largest oil-from-coal plant in the world and, with Fisons, forms the nucleus of a vast petrochemical complex at Sasolburg on the Vaal River near Vereeniging. By mid-1965 its capital investment of R112 million represented more than half of IDC's total investment. Through ISCOR the government also controlled the major enterprises in the steel-producing group, including steel manufactures and heavy machinery.

In some cases, IDC has injected public capital into an enterprise and then withdrawn it for re-use once the enterprise is paying its own way. For example, Klipfontein Organic Products, founded during World War II and continued as a government enterprise to provide insecticides and other chemicals, was turned over to a private concern in 1965.

IDC has also played a key role in seeking out foreign capital and directing it to specific lines of manufacturing that the government
wishes to encourage, by promising a protected market or by threatening to impose protection that will give the market to domestic or other foreign firms. IDC often retains a share of either capital or management in such enterprises and by government influence may direct production into the desired channels. Prime examples of government-directed development in which private capital has retained the major share are the textile industry and, since 1961, the automobile industry.

Branches of Manufacturing Activity

Between the end of World War II and the mid-1960's, the strongest growth in current value of gross manufacturing output took place in production of machinery, metal products, paper and paper products, textiles, and transport equipment. Food processing remained the most important branch of manufacturing, both in terms of employment and its contribution to domestic product.

The clothing industry was a close second in number of workers employed, but as a source of domestic product it was fifth in importance, after metal products, chemicals and related products, and basic metals. The machinery and electrical equipment industry, of relatively limited significance at the end of World War II, had become an important generator of domestic product by the mid-1960's.

Base Metals

Before the government-owned ISCOR entered production in 1934, the country's base metals output was confined to a limited amount of steel from scrap and to small-scale production of copper, bronze, and brass. The industry found its footing during World War II, and since that time production of base metals and their manufactures has expanded greatly. From 1948 to 1968 total production of finished steel has grown at an annual rate of 5.5 percent, and by 1968 steel output was thought to have exceeded 3 million tons for the first time. The domestic market does not warrant production of the entire range of special steels, but the range of products offered has been so extended that in the late 1960's imports constituted only about 10 percent of consumption in a normal year and about 20 percent in a year of high demand.

In 1968 there was some excess capacity in the industry, which was seeking export markets. Japanese buyers had shown considerable interest in taking South African steels, but disagreement over high rail rates to the ports led to cancellation of an important Japanese order in 1968. In addition to high railway rates, the major problems confronting the industry in 1968 were the shortage of skilled labor, resulting from job reservation for whites, and the
decline in domestic reserves of coking coal. ISCOR was experimenting with development of a substitute "form coke" from local noncoking coals at a new pilot plant. Recruiting teams were scouring Europe in search of skilled labor but had very limited success.

ISCOR dominated the production of base metals, metal manufactures, machinery, and equipment. The company itself produced more than 80 percent of the country's steel output and controlled one of the smaller producers, Union Steel Corporation of South Africa, Ltd. (USCO), which as a private firm antedated the foundation of ISCOR. ISCOR also controls the Vanderbijl Engineering Corporation Ltd. (VECOR), the country's principal producer of heavy industrial equipment, founded by the government in 1947. It also had interlocking directorates with the principal producer of pig iron and ferroalloys, African Metals Corporation Ltd. (AMCOR), which was founded by the government in 1937. VECOR is part of a giant steel and engineering products complex at Vanderbijlpark near Vereeniging. USCO, though controlled by ISCOR, operates independently. The government also plays a leading role in the Palabora Mining Company Ltd., a consortium formed to exploit the copper ore deposits at Phalaborwa in the northeastern Transvaal Lowveld border area. Two-thirds of the company's capital, however, comes from abroad, and the consortium includes British, Canadian, United States, and West Germany companies.

By 1968 there were three large vertically integrated steelworks in the country using domestic iron ore. ISCOR owned two, at Pretoria and Vanderbijlpark, and was planning a third at Newcastle in central Natal, a border area with an established white community. The third existing large integrated works using domestic ore was run by the Anglo-American corporation's Highveld Steel and Vanadium Corporation at Witbank. It produces vanadium-rich slag as a coproduct. USCO, Dunsweet Iron and Steel Works, and Scaw Metals, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Anglo-American corporation, produce steel products from cold pig iron and steel scrap.

Stainless steel production was begun in late 1966 by Southern Cross Steel Corporation. The export of ferroalloys has been increasingly developed since World War II, and more processing of domestic ores is taking place within the country, using low-cost electric power. In 1967 ferrochrome was being produced by the Anglo-American corporation near Witbank, by AMCOR at Kookfontein and Witbank, and by Rand Mines at Germiston and Middelburg. More than 95 percent of the ferrochrome produced was exported, much of it to the United States. The Anglo-Transvaal group had a large ferromanganese plant in Natal. Ferrosilicon was also to be produced at Kookfontein. In the mid-1960's most of the refined and blister copper produced in the country went for export, and a relatively limited proportion was consumed internally.
Of the eventual production of the new Phalaborwa copper mine and refinery, about one-third is destined for domestic use. Bauxite is the only important mineral not found in the country, but aluminum and a large variety of manufactures are produced from imported ingots. In 1968 the government approved construction of a big new aluminum smelter at Richards Bay in the Natal Coast border area as an important import-replacement project. It may use imported alumina as a raw material.

Machinery and Equipment

Until World War II the domestic capital-goods industry was confined largely to servicing and repair of imported equipment. After the adoption of protectionism, a few plants producing rock drills and other mining equipment were able to meet the competition of imports, but for the most part the gold mines gave little encouragement to domestic production. During the war expansion of the industry was fostered and encouraged by government construction of capacity where necessary, imports were largely cut off, and a number of lines of production became firmly established.

After the war the introduction of import control in 1948 coincided with a new upsurge of demand generated by the massive development of the new Orange Free State goldfields. In the following two decades, a high rate of capital formation by both government and private industry assured demand, and continuing protection and import control reserved a portion of the market for domestic producers. By 1965 the heavy-equipment industry had reached the stage where it was able to produce almost every type of plant and machinery. Production of light equipment ranged from rock drills to auto parts and from hardware to small-tool manufacture. The railways were getting almost all their rolling stock and equipment from domestic producers; only certain kinds of diesel engines and electrical and brake equipment not obtainable internally were imported. From 60 to 90 percent of equipment expenditure by the railways was for domestically produced equipment, and an effort was being made to increase the ratio.

Automobiles

The motor vehicle industry has shown a development pattern characteristic of the country’s industry, progressing from the import of complete vehicles to the progressively more complete domestic assembly of vehicles from imported components, and finally to the successful government drive for increasing use of domestically produced components. The manufacture of motor vehicles has been selected by the government as the foremost instrument for advancing the level of manufacturing production to take up the expected slack in the gold-mining industry over the next decade.
The auto industry has been the most conspicuous recent example of the technique of using tariffs or import controls to induce massive foreign investment in domestic manufacturing capacity. It illustrates the success of the accelerated import-substitution program launched in 1961 in offsetting the flight of capital after the Sharpeville incident and the widespread social unrest that followed.

In 1961 the Board of Trade and Industries announced that it would permit imports of certain components for a "South-African made car"—that is, a car with a given percentage of domestically made parts or "local content." At that time the import content of cars assembled in South Africa was 82 percent by value or 87.5 percent by weight. Under the new program the required domestic content was increased, and all the major foreign automobile companies were obliged to expand their South African capacity or build new plants to produce engines and other essential components.

The second phase of the program called for 45 percent local content in 1964, increasing to 55 percent by the end of 1967; and in October 1968 the government announced the third phase with a new target of 65-percent net local content, to be met by participating manufacturers by December 1976.

Participating firms included Ford, General Motors, a German consortium of Mercedes and Volkswagen, British Motor Corporation, Chrysler, Renault, Fiat, Datsun, Toyota, and others. In 1968 Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler together were producing 60 percent of the cars sold. By 1968 an estimated R400 million was invested in the automotive industry, and it was estimated that the raising of the local content requirement from 55 to 65 percent would necessitate about R260 million more in capital investment. The expansion of capacity up to 1968 was thought to be justified by the projected increase in overall demand, including increasing sales of used cars to Africans. The expanded plans of auto manufacturers initially resulted in a sizable increase in employment of quickly trained Africans for semiskilled assembly-line jobs. This in turn brought successful pressure from the white labor unions for the introduction of job reservation and a minimum quota of 45-percent white employment in the industry, even where white unemployment was almost nonexistent, and American managers were obliged to adapt to the requirements of the country's ideology by cutting their nonwhite labor force.

Shipbuilding

For reasons of strategic self-sufficiency as well as industrial development, the government wishes to promote the expansion of the domestic shipbuilding industry. In early 1969, however, the problem of how best to approach this objective was still unresolved. The cabinet was awaiting the result of a study on whether probable
future demand could best be met by expansion of capacity at existing yards or by creation of new capacity at decentralized locations. It was also uncertain whether future demand for construction of large- or medium-sized vessels could justify the heavy cost of investments required. South African production has hitherto consisted chiefly of fishing trawlers, pleasure craft, tugboats, lighters, and similar small craft.

The country's demand for construction of large- or medium-sized vessels has hitherto been very limited, and world competition is intense. There is overcapacity in a number of countries, and most developed countries are trying to subsidize their own industries. On the other hand, demand for repair work at South African yards has risen substantially since the closing of the Suez Canal in mid-1966. Demand for repair of passing vessels is relatively unpredictable, however, and may not necessarily justify costly expansion. In 1968 the established shipyards at Durban and Cape Town were turning away profitable repair contracts for lack of space. The Cape Town repair yards in particular were besieging the Department of Transport with demands for more facilities to meet orders.

Durban handles five times as large a repair volume as Cape Town. More than 90 percent of shipbuilding orders have gone to the Durban yards, with about 75 percent of them to the five-year-old Baren Shipbuilding and engineering Corporation (BARSHP). In 1968 BARSHP had about R15 million worth of orders in hand, and its losses were running about R3 million. It had received a government order for a 25,000-ton express bulk carrier, to be delivered in mid-1970, which would be five times the size of the largest vessel previously built in the country, a 4,500-ton cargo carrier launched in August 1968. Another Durban yard, James Brown and Hamer, owned by the Anglo-Transvaal mining finance group, had previously handled mostly repair but was expanding its shipbuilding capacity.

Two sites that were being considered for future shipbuilding capacity were Richards Bay in eastern Natal, which was a designated border industry growth point and site of a big new harbor in the planning stage, and Saldanha Bay on the west cape coast above Cape Town. A Dutch shipbuilder had made a bid to provide technical knowledge for a yard at Saldanha Bay that was to be almost entirely government financed, and the bid was under consideration in 1969.

Military Hardware and Munitions

An important stimulus to growth in manufacturing in the 1960's has been government expenditure designed to build up domestic capacity for production of military equipment. The embargo on
arms shipments to South Africa imposed by the United States and other leading members of the United Nations has been somewhat ineffective because of nonparticipation by other producers such as France. Nevertheless, the government is seeking to develop greater self-sufficiency in production of arms, vehicles, and equipment for the military and the police.

In mid-1969 the minister of defence told Parliament that the country had been able either to import or to manufacture almost everything it needed in the way of defense equipment. Domestic factories were supplying all the vehicle requirements as well as some of the most modern and sophisticated equipment. In early 1969 the government took over the country's only aircraft factory, Atlas Aircraft (see ch. 27, The Armed Forces).

Textiles

The textile industry has been a prime example of the evolution of the import-substitution policy since World War II. Before 1939 domestic production was concentrated chiefly on a few finished consumer goods—blankets, clothing, and the output of a few underwear knitting mills. When the IDC was founded in 1940, one of its first tasks was to finance domestic manufacturing to fill the gap between the production of domestic wool, which was being stockpiled in large quantities for lack of export shipping space, and the urgent need for large-scale production of army blankets. With the aid of state finance and protection, the domestic textile industry began to grow.

In the 1940's new capacity was created for wool scouring and mixing and cotton spinning and doubling. IDC's South African Fine Wool Products textile mill was founded at Uitenhage and an integrated spinning, weaving, and finishing mill for cotton fabrics at King William's Town, both in the Eastern Cape. In the 1950's the industry was producing double jersey cloth, nylon hosiery, and warp-knitted fabrics, and mass production had been introduced for an increasing range of medium-priced lines. By the early 1960's production of both plain fabrics and a variety of specialty fabrics was increasing, and both medium-priced and higher priced lines were growing in volume and range of output.

Growth of textile capacity began with the production of finished goods from imported components and then progressed rapidly with increasing use of domestic raw materials. As has been characteristic of the growth pattern of South African manufacturing, however, the growing range and complexity of substitutable intermediate products has brought competition from imports of intermediate goods of the kind best produced with a high input of technology adapted to a large export market or a domestic market far larger
than that of South Africa. In these intermediate goods, protection is less effective, and South African manufacturers less able to compete.

In the textile branch, such intermediate products include notably synthetics, of which there are currently a bewildering variety on the world market. In the mid-1960's finished piece goods of cheap synthetics were also bringing import competition, forcing domestic manufacturers to expand their production of synthetics in order to compete. Antidumping duties were imposed but were not wholly effective, and low-priced clothing of polyester viscose fabrics was coming in from Rhodesia.

In this respect South Africa is often cited as an interesting example of a country that, benefiting from the technological advance developed in the mature economies, has passed the takeoff point, but in engaging upon the drive for industrial maturity encounters problems arising from the relatively limited size of the market for its domestically produced manufactures. In the growth of the textile industry to its high point in 1965, the increasing employment of Africans and Coloureds in textile production in itself helped to generate new income, and the African market for finished consumer goods justified the expansion of the industry. In the mid-1960's, however, high costs of finished clothing from domestic materials were beginning to present a serious marketing problem, in view of the relative stability of nonwhite wage rates in terms of real purchasing power.

Textile production tapered off after 1965, and in the later 1960's concentration and rationalization of the industry was taking place in the form of numerous takeovers and mergers. Import controls, which had been somewhat relaxed to combat rising textile and clothing prices, were strengthened in June 1968 to restrict imports of synthetic fabrics, and at the same time a study of tariff simplification was initiated with a view to making protection for the industry more effective.

Mineral Fuels

In 1968 natural gas was discovered at Plettenburg Bay. Intensive petroleum exploration, with the participation of twenty foreign companies including leading United States firms, indicated the likely existence of exploitable petroleum reserves. In 1969, however, the country's most readily exploitable mineral fuel was coal, of which it possessed vast and easily accessible reserves (see ch. 2, Physical Environment). Hydroelectric resources were limited and largely unexploited, since coal provided a cheap source of 80 percent of the country's electric power and gave such industries as ferroalloy production a valuable cost advantage. Coking coal re-
serves were limited, however, which was an important problem for the steel industry.

From 15 to 18 percent of the country's gasoline requirement is met by the government-owned SASOL oil-from-coal plant at Sasolburg, the largest operation of its kind in the world and the center of a giant petrochemical complex. SASOL, founded by the IDC in 1950 after a 1927 White Paper had indicated the potential of a coal-based petrochemical industry for the country, is based upon United States and German processes. It began operations in 1955 and first realized a profit in 1960. The gasoline produced by SASOL is marketed within a triangular area enclosed by the towns of Virginia in the Orange Free State goldfields, Hartebeestfontein in southwestern Transvaal, and Balfour in eastern Transvaal. It is sold at regular gas stations owned by the big foreign oil companies.

In addition to the intensive oil exploration program and the oil-from-coal operation of SASOL, the government's campaign to increase self-sufficiency in oil production as a safeguard against possible future sanctions included the conclusion of long-term supply contracts with Middle Eastern countries, the buildup of stockpiles of crude oil, the construction of pipelines and tanker facilities, and increasing South African and government participation in refining and marketing operations.

The largest established foreign-owned producers in 1968 were Shell, Mobil, Caltex, and British Petroleum (BP), who together had hitherto controlled about 73 percent of production and distribution of gasoline and related petroleum products. Shell-BP had a large refinery at Durban, established in 1954 and under expansion in 1968–69. Caltex had a smaller refinery at Milnerton near Cape Town. It was also undergoing expansion in 1969, as was Mobil’s Wentworth refinery near Durban.

In the late 1960's the government was entering refinery production with construction of the country's fifth refinery at Sasolburg. It would be operated by a new corporation, National Petroleum Refineries of South Africa (Pty) Ltd., which was a joint venture of SASOL, Compagnie Française des Petroles (French Oil Company), and the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). Upon completion in 1970–71, the new refinery is expected to produce 2 million tons of refined oil a year, enough to meet 25 percent of the country's estimated requirements under a fifteen-year contract. Sasolburg is located far inland on the Vaal River near Johannesburg and will be dependent on crude oil pipelines from the ports. In early 1969 a pipeline from Durban to the Rand was operating at 68-percent of capacity. A second pipeline from Durban to Sasolburg by way of Witbank-Ogies was scheduled for completion in mid-1969. A third pipeline would eventually link Sasolburg with Richards Bay in...
eastern Natal, where a big new tanker port was planned. In mid-1969 the government was engaged in stockpiling a two-year supply of crude oil underground in disused coal mines in the Witbank-Ogies area.

The government had drastically increased its control over gasoline marketing under a new system providing special treatment for companies "who have promoted participation of South African capital and enterprise in the manufacture and marketing of petrol products." An increased share of the market was to be earmarked for the Compagnie Française des Petroles, Esso, Sonarep, and the new South African Company, Trek. Shell and BP each hold 22.5 percent of the shares of Trek; 10 percent is held by IDC; and the remainder, by General Mining and the Afrikaans Federal Group, two Afrikaner business groups. It had a ten-year supply contract with Shell-BP. By August 1968, 100 former Shell and BP service stations had been converted to Trek.

Chemicals

Both the government—through IDC, SASOL, FOSCOR, and SAICCOR—and the great mining finance houses are active in the development of chemical production, which has grown substantially since World War II. The domestic chemical industry now provides not only explosives for the mines and fertilizers for agriculture, but also a growing and increasingly sophisticated variety of primary and intermediate materials for manufacturing. The 1960's were years of unprecedented expansion in the industry, with a very high rate of capital investment and an annual increase in net output at current prices of more than 8 percent a year. The greatest growth took place in fertilizers and plastics.

In the mid-1960's the country was self-sufficient in sulfuric, nitric, and hydrochloric acids as well as in chlorine, acetylene, oxygen, ammonia, cyanide, zinc chloride, sodium sulfate, lead and silver nitrate, and dioxide, and within the next ten years it expected to be able to meet domestic needs in a range of other major chemicals. By 1968, however, chemical firms were up against the problem encountered by other intermediate producers in South Africa, that is, the difficulty of meeting price competition from giant plants in industrially mature economies with markets of a size to permit economies of scale and optimum use of advanced and costly technology. At the demand of the industry, the Board of Trade and Industries was directed in December 1968 to make a study of ways and means of increasing the degree of protection for the industry.

POWER

About 80 percent of electric power is derived from coal and, because the overall cost of coal mining is low, average rates for elec-
tricity have been kept down. They are materially lower in the areas adjacent to the coalfields, favoring industries in those areas (see fig. 5). In 1967, for example, rates varied from R0.0010 per kilowatt-hour in the Western Cape to R0.00431 in the Rand and Orange Free State areas. Another factor that keeps power costs low is the very high consumption rate of the gold mines, which enables stations on the Rand to operate at an average of 80 percent of maximum capacity throughout the year. The industry's major problem on the Rand and in some other areas, is shortage of water.

Power supply was in the hands of private enterprise until 1922, when the government enterprise Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM) was established. In the late 1960's ESCOM was producing more than 80 percent of the total. In the thirty years since 1938, its power sales have risen from 3.57 billion kilowatt-hours to 26.66 billion kilowatt-hours. In 1967 ESCOM had embarked upon an expansion program designed to double its generating capacity over the next ten years. Because big new stations must be located where water is available, ESCOM will need to establish a national power grid, connecting up some of the present independent transmission systems. It is increasingly extending its power network and taking over from local power-supply units.

If a national grid is completed, it will be possible to make economic use of the country's first nuclear power station, which was still in the planning stage in 1968. The station is to be built at Melkbostrand, about eighty miles west of Cape Town, and will initially supply power to the Western Cape. It is not expected to enter production until 1978 at the earliest.

CONSTRUCTION

Private construction employed some 252,000 in 1967, an increase of nearly 100 percent over the level of employment in 1960. Net output in the construction industry as a whole was also booming, with the government constructing large new townships and major planning projects such as the US$1.2 billion Orange River Dam in Mozambique, the Malawi Railway Project, and copper mining projects in the Chilean Andes. Other big new construction projects still in the planning stage are the oil pipelines and the Richards Bay tanker port.
CHAPTER 22
LABOR

At the beginning of 1969 the economically active population—the total number of individuals working for wages and salaries, self-employed, and some of those engaged in family farming, stock-raising or family enterprises—consisted of roughly 7 million persons. Many African women and young people, active in subsistence agriculture are not included. Wage and salary earners included more than 2.2 million workers in industry, mining, construction, transport, and communications; about 1.25 million persons were working on farms; and over 600,000 persons were in government and the public services. Additional numbers were engaged in commerce, as domestic servants, and in other pursuits for which some form of wage or salary was paid.

The labor force in the white areas was divided into two major components. One consisted of whites, Coloureds, and Asians. The government considered it the country’s permanent work force. The second major component was comprised only of Africans. One element of this was migratory: at any time more than 500,000 Africans were in constant movement between the white areas and the reserves; there were also over 500,000 migrant foreign Africans. Another segment had a restricted form of permanent residence in the urban and industrial centers of the white areas, and still another resided as tenant farmers in the rural white areas (see ch. 4, Population; ch. 8, Living Conditions).

Workers of all three African segments domiciled in South Africa were officially treated as migrants from the reserves and homelands temporarily working within white areas, even though they might have permanent residence rights. The government’s position in this matter was that “The Bantu who come to work here [in the “white areas”] accept employment here on the basis of migratory labor; they come to sell their labor,” and when they “have completed their work here, they return to their homeland.” The African labor force, as a result of this stand and official efforts to control and direct it, was kept in a constant state of uncertainty. It was generally unstable and unable to acquire the degree of skill needed for continued growth of the economy.

Within the overall labor structure there was general job discrimination in favor of white workers and a denial of equal opportunity
to Coloured, Asiatic, and African workers to employment, job training, and advancement. Managerial and skilled positions were generally reserved for whites. Secondary clerical and semiskilled jobs were open to Coloureds and Asians. The unskilled jobs at the base of the labor pyramid were assigned to Africans; economic pressures, however, had brought some advancement to semiskilled work, especially in the manufacturing industries.

The longstanding practice of job discrimination was buttressed by the attitudes of many white workers, but official application of apartheid concepts to the use of the labor force had reinforced and intensified some discriminatory practices (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). The officially recognized acute shortage of skilled and semiskilled workers that characterized the labor situation in early 1969, in the midst of a potentially abundant supply, was rather directly attributable to this factor. Differences existed in the wages received by the different racial groups. Whites in general had higher wages than did Coloureds and Asians. At the lowest wage level were the Africans. Job discrimination and stratification were largely responsible, but failure to give “equal pay for equal work” was also important. In government and public services, for example, inequality in pay for the same position was based on the official racial category to which an employee had been assigned.

Labor organizations existed for white, Coloured, and Asiatic workers in early 1969. Unions could be freely formed by these workers but were confined to specific racial groups, and the government had instituted steps to separate workers in existing mixed unions. The African worker, however, who constituted the largest element in the overall work force, was prohibited from joining in registered unions in the white areas. Strikes were legally permissible by white, Coloured, and Asiatic workers, but forbidden to the African work force.

THE LABOR FORCE

Composition

In the 1960 census the economically active population comprised 5,720,860 persons, or 35.8 percent of the total population. This figure included all individuals, without regard to age, who were employers, employees, or workers engaged on their own account (see table 19). About 570,000, or 10 percent of the total, were workers imported from outside South Africa. By the end of 1968 the number of economically active had risen to approximately 7,058,000, or 36.8 percent of the population.

Somewhat more than one-third each of the African, white, and Coloured segments of the population were listed as economically
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>African</th>
<th></th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th></th>
<th>Asians</th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percent of All workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>Percent of</td>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>Percent of</td>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>Percent of</td>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>Percent of All workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional, technical,</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>137.9</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and related workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>205.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative, executive, and managerial workers</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>86.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical workers</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>276.4</td>
<td>88.3</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales workers</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>97.6</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers, fishermen, lumbermen, and related workers</td>
<td>1,474.9</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>117.4</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>127.6</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miners, quarrymen, and related workers</td>
<td>536.3</td>
<td>93.9</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers in transport and communications</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsmen, production-process workers, and laborers</td>
<td>715.8</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>272.8</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>188.8</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service, sport, and recreation workers</td>
<td>711.2</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>117.7</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers not classified</td>
<td>285.6</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,889.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,151.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>553.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>125.7</td>
<td>5,720.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Includes 534,700 Africans classified as mine laborers.
2 Less than 0.1 percent.
3 Includes 633,648 Africans classified as laborers.
4 Includes 611,060 Africans classified as domestic servants.
5 Does not add to 100.0 because of rounding.

active in 1960, whereas only about one-fourth of the Asiatic community was classified in this category. At the end of 1968 the proportions were roughly the same for the African, Coloured, and Asian populations, but there had been a significant increase in the economically active white group to over two-fifths of the white community. This was accounted for in part by an influx of immigrants. More than 42 percent of the individuals gained through excess of immigration over emigration between 1961 and 1967 were classified as economically active.

Of the economically active population in 1960 roughly 4.4 million, or 77 percent, were males and 1.3 million or 23 percent, females, a ratio of better than three males to each female worker in the labor force. Males constituted roughly three-fourths of the African and white labor forces and two-thirds of the economically active Coloureds. A greater proportion of white and Coloured females than of African ones were economically active in all age groups through sixty-four years of age. Among the Asians, men predominated in the economically active group, constituting almost 91 percent. The comparatively small number of Asian women in the active labor force was explained by religious and other cultural factors that tended to restrict extrafamilial activities by females (see ch. 11, Religion).

Distribution

Manufacturing, the largest and most important sector in the money economy, had an average of 1,033,750 employees during the period January through April 1968. Africans made up 52.7 percent (545,000); whites, 25.2 percent (260,500); Coloureds, 16.3 percent (168,750); and Asians, 5.8 percent (59,500). A trend analysis of employee racial proportions in the manufacturing industries made for a December 1967 conference of the Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA) showed a decline of about 1 percent a year from 1961 to 1967 in the percentage of whites. In 1961 white workers constituted about 30 percent of all workers in manufacturing. In the first quarter of 1967, however, the average number of whites was only about 25 percent, and a further decline to about 20 percent was projected for 1971. The proportion of African workers showed only small changes between the 1958–59 period and 1967, standing at approximately 53 percent. During this period, however, Coloureds and Asians increased their share of jobs from 19 percent to about 22 percent. TUCSA maintained that this was evidence of the government's policy to bring the Coloureds and Asians further into the white sphere of influence and to use them as "the buffer between entrenched white interests and the inevitable evolutionary encroachment of the African."
An average of 659,378 workers were employed in the mining industry during 1967. Africans constituted 86.5 percent (570,413); whites, 12.5 percent (82,324); Coloureds, 0.9 percent (5,845); and Asians, 0.1 percent (796). Most Africans in mining were classified in government statistics as laborers. The deputy chairman of the House of Assembly’s Bantu Affairs Commission reported in February 1968 that there were 368,000 foreign Africans in the mines. The Witwatersrand Native Labor Association, which recruits labor for most of the gold mines and some coal mines, reported that, as of December 31, 1967, the African labor force working for its members and contractors included almost 60,000 workers from Lesotho, 16,000 from Botswana, 3,800 from Swaziland, 105,700 from Mozambique, and 57,000 from African tropical countries. Contract labor was easily secured from these countries because of limited wage job opportunities in them. In Mozambique, moreover, labor was directed toward South Africa by the Mozambique government, which has granted exclusive labor-recruiting rights for that country to the Witwatersrand Native Labor Association (see ch. 16, Foreign Relations; ch. 23, Domestic Trade).

There were about 1.25 million workers on farms in the white areas as of June 30, 1964. Regular employees, including tenant farmers who worked as laborers part of the year in exchange for the right to live on the farm, totaled 756,581. There were 365,557 casual employees and 131,523 domestic farm servants. The latter were a definite part of the farm economy, although in strict terms they were not farm laborers.

Africans were the largest group, constituting 83.9 percent (634,607) of regular employees, 86.5 percent (316,333) of casual workers, and 83.5 percent (109,864) of the domestic farm servants. White regular employees numbered 12,496, or slightly less than 1.7 percent of all regular workers. Most whites were managers or overseers. There were only 380 casual white farm workers as of June 30, 1964, and 53 white females were employed as domestic farm servants. Coloureds constituted 13.6 percent (102,666) of regular farm workers and 13.2 percent (48,353) of casual workers, and 16.2 percent (16,175) were employed as farm servants. Most of the Coloureds engaged in work on farms were in the Western Cape. Asiatic regular farm workers, numbering 7,096, made up less than 1 percent of the total. Only 491 Asians worked as casual laborers, and 331 were engaged as domestic farm servants. In addition to Africans working on farms in the white areas, an undetermined number was engaged in subsistence farming and in stock grazing on the reserves and homelands.

A sample survey of the building industry covering the period January through April 1968 showed an average of 266,750 employed in construction during that time. Africans made up 66.9
percent (178,500); whites, 26.7 percent (50,750); Coloureds, 12.9 percent (34,500); and Asians, 1.1 percent (3,000). The Association of Chambers of Commerce of South Africa reported in April 1967 that the wholesale and retail trades employed about 420,000 persons. Roughly 200,000, or 45 percent, were whites, and 220,000, or 55 percent, were nonwhites. Commerce was a principal employment for many Asians. According to census data, 23 percent of economically active Asian workers were in commerce and finance in 1960.

At the end of March 1967, 875,064 persons were employed in government and public services, including 221,215 workers in railroads and harbors and 47,122 postal workers. Africans made up the largest group, constituting 47.8 percent (418,450). Whites constituted 42.8 percent (374,708); Coloureds, 7.8 percent (68,119); and Asians, 1.6 percent (13,787). A steady increase in the number of white, Coloured, and Asian employees occurred between 1962 and 1967. Increases in African employees were also registered but were not uniform. In 1962 nonwhites outnumbered whites by 90,505, and by 1967 there were 125,648 more nonwhites than whites. During the 1962 period the number of Asian employees rose by about 52 percent; Coloureds, about 28 percent; Africans, by roughly 17 percent; and whites, by not quite 14 percent. The increase in the total numbers of employees during this time was 16.8 percent. The relatively greater increase in nonwhite employees is ascribed to an absolute shortage of white workers.

AVAILABLE SKILLS AND MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

The growth of the economy has created a steadily rising demand for more labor. For the three-year period 1961–63, the number of new jobs was estimated at over 500,000, and the national economic development plan, a running plan revised annually, anticipated the creation of an additional 750,000 jobs during the period 1964–69. A shortage of 11,000 white workers was projected for 1968, based upon an annual average economic growth rate of 5.4 percent. At the same time, there would be 234,900 nonwhites unemployed or otherwise unclassified. The plan stated that increases in white productivity and further encouragement of immigration were required to offset the shortage of whites. No reference was made in the plan to the possibility of replacement of white workers by nonwhites and, in fact, decreases in nonwhite unemployment were tied in with the availability of sufficient skilled white workers to meet the demand for white labor.

Despite the higher level of net immigration actually attained than originally projected, the labor market was very tight in 1968 (see
ch. 4, Population). The average monthly number of registered unemployed whites, Coloureds, and Asians during 1968 was only 13,676, less than 1 percent of their combined economically active populations. In September 1968 the minister of immigration noted that even if every adult white were fully employed there would still be 12,000 to 13,000 skilled positions to be filled annually.

Shortage of skilled labor and semiskilled manpower stems principally from government policy that restricts advancement of the nonwhite labor force. The result of this restriction was apparent in the racial distribution of persons engaged in some type of professional or technical work at the time of the 1960 census. This census showed whites as constituting 67.1 percent of all individuals in this category, although they made up only about 20 percent of the economically active population. Africans in similar positions made up 23.6 percent but formed about 68 percent of the economically active population. Coloureds fared somewhat better, constituting 6.8 percent compared with their share of 9.7 percent of the economically active population. Asians made up 2.5 percent but constituted 2.2 percent of the economically active population. A comparison by racial groups of persons performing some sort of managerial and professional work made by E. G. Malherbe of the South African Institute of Race Relations, based on 1960 census materials, showed that high-level positions were held by 18.5 percent of the economically active white population, 1.7 percent of economically active Africans, 3.4 percent of Coloureds, and 13.2 percent of Asians.

Nonwhite professionals and technicians were largely confined to teaching or nursing and auxiliary medical services, with negligible numbers in other professions. Almost 84 percent of the Africans in this group were in these two professional and technical areas, as were about 93 percent of the Coloureds and 85 percent of the Asians. In contrast, just over 50 percent of whites were in teaching or nursing and auxiliary medical services (see table 20).

The chief mechanism used to restrict advancement of the nonwhite worker, especially the African worker, into the semiskilled and skilled job categories was the job reservation system or, as it is commonly called, the labor color bar. The purpose of this system was to reserve the better paying jobs for whites and, in some cases, certain jobs for Coloureds and Asians. A second intent was to prevent the reemergence of a group of "poor whites," a class that had comprised a segment of the white population until industrial growth during and after World War II. "Poor whites" are those white workers who, in a free labor market, would be unable to support themselves in accordance with European standards, and maintain the line that separates whites from blacks. They would
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>White</th>
<th></th>
<th>African</th>
<th></th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th></th>
<th>Asian</th>
<th></th>
<th>Total Number of Workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Architect</td>
<td>2,258</td>
<td>99.6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>2,267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>7,594</td>
<td>99.6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>7,624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveyor</td>
<td>2,091</td>
<td>99.3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemist, physicist</td>
<td>2,418</td>
<td>99.8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>2,422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterinarian, biologist</td>
<td>1,434</td>
<td>97.7</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1,468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical practitioner, dentist</td>
<td>7,385</td>
<td>96.0</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>7,777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurse, midwife, nursing aide</td>
<td>21,691</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>13,913</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>2,848</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>38,886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical auxiliaries</td>
<td>5,108</td>
<td>97.2</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>5,257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other medical services</td>
<td>3,660</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>3,148</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>6,993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor, teacher</td>
<td>38,907</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>23,456</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>9,893</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>3,846</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>76,102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jurist</td>
<td>4,943</td>
<td>98.2</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>5,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draftsman, technician</td>
<td>16,303</td>
<td>96.4</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>16,912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chartered accountant</td>
<td>6,213</td>
<td>99.4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>6,248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>17,840</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>7,393</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>26,406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>137,845</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>48,482</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>13,972</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>5,202</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>205,501</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Percentage totals do not always add to 100.0 because of rounding.
2 Less than 0.1 percent.

form a white unskilled labor class that would compete with African and Coloured labor, a situation considered intolerable by most whites (see ch. 6, Social Structure).

Job reservation operates through policy directives and statutory measures and by agreement, tacit or explicit, between employee associations and employers. The official white labor policy dates from the early 1900's, when poor whites were hired as laborers on the railways in the Transvaal and the then Orange River Colony. In 1911 the Mines and Works Act included the first statutory color bar; it authorized the setting up of regulations for the issuance of certificates of competency for skilled jobs in mining and engineering. The rules established effectively barred from these positions nonwhites in the Transvaal and Orange Free State. The regulations were thrown out by the courts in 1923, but they were reinstated through an amendment to the Mines and Works Act in 1926. Coloureds were permitted under the revised act to qualify for certificates; in actual practice, however, none were certified.

In 1924, when a coalition of Afrikaners and British came into political power, it introduced a “civilized labor” policy, which directed state and provincial authorities and the public services to employ “civilized” rather than “uncivilized” labor. Civilized labor was defined as that rendered by persons whose standard of living was recognized as tolerable from the usual European viewpoint. Uncivilized labor was that provided by persons “whose aim is restricted to the bare requirements of the necessities of life, as this was understood among barbarous and underdeveloped peoples.”

No overt color bar was contained in the directive, but European standards were interpreted to be white standards, and the onus was placed on nonwhites to prove that they were “civilized.” The directive, which still remained in force in 1969, has been used, not only to reserve jobs for whites, but also to prevent a drop in the standard of living of many whites. Thus, unskilled jobs in state and provincial government, such as doormen, guards, and cleaners, have been treated as in the province of whites. Only when whites have not been available have nonwhites been taken on, and in periods of unemployment nonwhites have been dismissed and the jobs given to whites. Whites tend, however, to seek these jobs only when economic conditions are poor. Whites have also been engaged under the policy to prevent them from becoming a public burden. In the early 1960's the state railways were employing between 10,000 and 11,000 persons considered to be in this category. The concept has apparently developed among many whites that state employment should always be available for them, if they can find nothing else. Their attitude reflected current government policy in this matter.

A statutory color bar was established in the building industry in 1951 through the Native Building Workers Act. The act, as
amended in 1953 and 1955, prohibited Africans from doing skilled jobs in construction work in white urban areas. They were authorized, however, to do skilled work on housing intended for African occupancy. The latter concession, although limited, represented a real gain for the African worker who, before the act/ was permitted to work on any type of construction only as a laborer.

The most comprehensive legislative measure embodying job reservation was adopted in 1956 in a major revision of the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924. Section 77 of this revision, entitled "Safeguard against Inter-Racial Competition," authorized the minister of labor to establish a color bar for any job, reserving the work or classes of work in an undertaking, industry, trade or occupation for a specified race. It also prohibited replacement of employees of one race by those of another; set minimum, maximum, and average percentages of persons of a specified race to be employed in a type of work and industry; and prohibited persons of another race from doing work in the specified class.

Twenty-four job reservation determinations based on this act had been made through 1968. Most were designed to protect whites from competition by nonwhites. Several also provided protection to Coloureds and Asians from African competition. The determinations, which included such fields as transport and construction, the furniture, motor vehicle, clothing and footwear industries, and services (elevator operators and hotel employees) were in some cases nationwide, in others regional or limited to a locale. The actual number of persons affected appears comparatively small in relation to the total work force. The minister of labor estimated that as of April 1968 about 105,000 individuals were potentially affected. It would seem that not more than 5 percent of the economically active population has been touched by the determinations and by job reservations made under the Mines and Works Act. Indirect forms of job reservation through productivity agreements between unions or employee associations and employers appeared to affect many more workers than did the statutory determinations. The numbers, although unknown, were presumably large, since the agreements concerned not only white workers but applied to nonwhites as well.

The government has been forced to relax the labor color bar in special situations in order to alleviate the manpower problem. This was done by granting temporary exemptions to job reservations. In such cases, however, certain conditions were imposed, including the prohibition of any white worker's being under the supervision of a nonwhite and the provision that should whites become available they would be hired. In June 1967 the minister of labor reported that 817 job reservation exemptions had been officially gazetted.

A more significant relaxation of the labor color bar, with more
profound effects on the nonwhite labor force, has been brought about by productivity agreements between unions and employers. A major step in this direction was taken in 1964 in an agreement between the Mine Workers Union and the Gold Producers' Committee of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State Chamber of Mines. Leaders of the union suggested that, in conjunction with a request for higher wages, some of the supervisory duties of white miners could be delegated to African "boss-boys" to increase productivity. The employers accepted the plan, and the experiment was approved by the government. A public controversy developed, however, related to the question of apartheid, and after several months the undertaking was terminated, primarily on political grounds.

The experiment showed that white workers and their unions were willing to accept certain modifications of their privileged position in order to solve the manpower problem, provided that their position on the labor scale was not endangered. Tacit government acceptance of the idea was also apparent in arrangements with white worker associations on the railroads in 1964, and since then to employ nonwhites in positions previously reserved for whites. In this case, the white associations agreed to release lower graded jobs to nonwhites; but they demanded social separation at places of work.

The tightening labor situation led, despite the earlier political outcry, to new productivity agreements. In 1966 white construction artisans in the Transvaal received increases in pay and fringe benefits in return for which they accepted a new class of nonwhite "operators" between artisans and laborers. In 1967 agreements were reached for the coal mines in the Transvaal, Orange Free State, and Natal to allow the participation of Africans in certain skilled operations. Also in 1967 African "boss-boys" were given more authority in the gold mines, and Africans were permitted to run certain types of equipment underground.

A major productivity agreement affecting over 270,000 workers was made in 1968 between the thirty-two employers' associations of the Steel and Engineering Industries Federation of South Africa and seven engineering trade unions. Job categories were divided into two groups. The upper group excluded Africans unless exemptions were granted, whereas jobs in the lower group were opened to workers of any racial group—in practice mostly Africans. Although the classification of jobs opened a greater number of advanced positions to Africans, the downgrading in some cases brought little or no gain in wages.

Productivity agreements opening the way to nonwhite advancement have not been accepted wholeheartedly by all the white trade unions, and there have been protests against the use of "white" occupations as bargaining points. The minister of labor has also
indicated that approval of agreements was given in the understanding that reclassified jobs would be restored to whites if an economic recession made this necessary.

JOB TRAINING FACILITIES

An Apprenticeship Act was passed in 1922 and reenacted in amended form in 1964. It provided for the registration of apprentices and established rules for training and conditions of service. The act contained no legally defined color bar, but in practice Africans were not accepted as apprentices. Coloureds and Asiatics have been signed on in comparatively limited numbers. Data for 1967 showed apprenticeship contracts for 8,738 white, 1,084 Coloured, and 189 Asiatic youths registered during the year. The number of white apprenticeships contracted in 1967 constituted about 8 percent of males in the white economically active age group. For Coloureds it was about 2.4 percent, and for Asiatics, slightly more than 1 percent.

Minimum educational requirements stipulated by the act reduced the possibilities for nonwhites to enter trades as apprentices. Moreover, Africans could not be apprenticed because they could not belong to a registered trade union. One of the main barriers to Coloureds and Asians has been the opposition of some white unions. There has also been tacit agreement between various white unions and employers that only whites will be trained. In 1968, for example, the white Motor Industry Employees' Union forbade its members under threat of fines, suspension, or expulsion, to train nonwhite apprentices. It recognized the need, however, for nonwhites to be trained for service in their own communities and areas and authorized their admittance to workshops, but only if nonwhite journeymen did the training.

The Native Building Workers Act of 1951 made provision for the training of African construction workers. The period of apprenticeship was shorter than for whites in the industry, and those completing training were to be used only on construction intended for African occupancy. By May 1964, 757 had been trained under the act, according to the minister of labor. Other workers with sufficient experience have been allowed to take tests for certificates of competency. Under these various provisions, 4,209 persons had been qualified as of May 1967. At that date there were 141 registered as learners.

Largely because training facilities for nonwhites are inferior to those for whites, the training of individuals is unequal for the different racial groups. Nonwhites, particularly Africans, therefore lack opportunities to attain a level of training sufficient to enter technical and higher education (see ch. 9, Education).
Training for Africans

The government is encouraging technical and vocational training for Africans, although it maintains that the skills developed should be used in the service of Africans in the Bantu homelands or in border industry areas. In general, it feels that priority should be given to training artisans. The Bantu Education Journal in November 1966 stated that the government policy was to locate any newly established African trade schools in the homelands. There were thirteen trade schools for Africans in 1968, including two in the Transkei, which provided training in trades for African youths. There were also nine technical secondary schools, of which one was in the Transkei. The schools in 1968 had a total enrollment of 455. In 1968 a four-year course for engineering technicians was begun; about twenty applicants a year will be accepted.

Training for Whites

In June 1966 there were 33,535 full-time and 47,930 part-time white students and trainees in technical, commercial, and vocational institutions. The part-time group included 8,024 in apprentice schools. There were also 3,947 students in university engineering faculties in 1967.

Training for Coloureds

The minister of Coloured affairs reported in 1968 that Coloured state technical and vocational schools existed at Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, Johannesburg, Durban, and Kimberley. They had 55 full-time and 2,301 part-time students. There were a number of state-aided schools with 643 full-time students, and 141 students were attending part-time technical classes. Peninsula Technical College at Bellville, Cape Province, had 36 full-time and 283 part-time students. An unknown number of Coloured students were enrolled in technical courses at high schools. There was a total of 16 Coloured engineering students in 1968.

Special training centers for Coloured youths were authorized in 1967. One of the reasons given by the minister of Coloured affairs for their establishment was the high degree of unemployment of youths under twenty who had neither worked nor registered at a labor office. Coloured males between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four were required to register in May 1968; in subsequent years all those reaching eighteen years of age would register in February. The recruits, to be called cadets, were to be trained for any type of employment fitting their age, ability, educational qualifications, and other factors. Exemptions would be given to recruits who were full-time employees or full-time students or were under
apprenticeship contracts. After three months in a reception center, a cadet considered to meet training standards could freely choose to be sent to an educational institution or be apprenticed. Those not qualified would be trained to do useful work, such as on irrigation, soil reclamation, or construction projects. It was expected that they would find employment with little difficulty, after completing training.

Training for Asiatics

As of 1968 facilities for vocational and trade training for Asiatics were meager. The minister of Indian affairs stated in May 1968 that there were no vocational or trade schools under the control of the department and no technical classes in high schools under the department's jurisdiction. Technical and vocational training on approximately the high school level were available at the M. L. Sultan Technical College located in Durban. This school also had branches at Pietermaritzburg and Stanger, and part-time classes were conducted at several other locations in Natal. In 1967 the school had 1,579 full-time and 4,556 part-time students. The minister of Indian affairs also announced in 1968 plans for a technical college at Lenasia, the all-Asian community established outside Johannesburg under the Group Areas Act. There were 73 Asian engineering students in 1968, studying at Cape Town, Natal, and Witwatersrand universities.

WAGES AND HOURS

Wages of white, Coloured, and Asiatic workers are negotiated between employee associations or unions and employers under the Industrial Counciliation Act. In those industries or trades that are not sufficiently organized to conduct collective bargaining, a Wage Board appointed by the minister of labor looks into work conditions and pay rates. The board can recommend minimum pay rates if considered necessary. Its determinations have the force of law when approved by the minister. The wage rates for Africans, who are not permitted to organize for collective bargaining, are set in many cases by the Wage Board. Wages of workers in the border areas are also established by the board. There have been complaints that wages set for these areas are lower than in other parts of the country for similar industries. The Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA) has expressed concern that the system of collective bargaining could be undermined by this practice (see ch. 21, Industry).

Wide wage differentials existed between whites and nonwhites. This was related largely to the occupational structure of the work
force. Whites, who held most of the skilled jobs, had average wages substantially higher than those of Coloureds and Asians, who occupied the intermediate skilled and semiskilled positions. The average wages of Coloureds and Asians, in turn, were generally substantially above those of Africans, who were mostly unskilled workers.

Industrial conciliation agreements on wages usually contain provisions specifying rates for jobs that apply equally to anyone, regardless of race. In some areas of employment, however, different pay scales are used for persons of different races in the same position. For instance, the annual starting salaries for police constables, as reported by the minister of police in March 1967, was R840 (1 rand equals US$1.40) for whites, R576 for Coloureds and Asians, and R450 for Africans. Basic annual salaries of trained nurses also were unequal. According to the minister of health in February 1968, salaries started at R1,380 for whites, R840 for Coloureds and Asians, and R660 for Africans.

In manufacturing, average monthly wages during the four-month period January through April 1968 were R244.81 for whites, R66.05 for Asians, R63.34 for Coloured, and R46.53 for Africans. During the same period average monthly wages in the building industry were R255.05 for whites, R100.87 for Coloured, R43.19 for Africans, and R135.25 for Asians. The much higher average wages paid to Coloured and Asians in construction were related to the greater number of these people employed in skilled and semiskilled jobs. Skilled African construction workers employed in African townships, whose wages are not included in the industry average, were paid higher rates.

Average monthly wages in the mining industry paid during 1967 were R282.01 for whites, R70.85 for Asians, R59.32 for Coloureds, and R17.11 for Africans. Cash wages of Africans were substantially lower than in the manufacturing and building industries. African workers in mining, however, also received wages in kind, although the combined cash-in-kind wage still fell short of wages in the other two industries.

A study of wages paid to Africans in 1964 by mines of the Transvaal and Orange Free State Chamber of mines showed that the average combined monthly income to Africans was R26.65 in gold mines, R27.13 in coal mines, and R23.45 in other mines. Wages in kind—food, shelter, medical care, and miscellaneous employer contributions—were reckoned in terms of their estimated value to the African worker. In the gold mines the cost to the employer was 57 percent of the estimated value. The African mine labor market has been largely insulated from the rest of the economy, and the law of supply and demand in wages is nonoperative. Mine owner association recruiting agencies provide much of the labor, including a large
number of foreign Africans, and therefore eliminate competition. Influx laws also do not apply to Africans seeking work in the mines, thus channeling workers into the industry.

In commerce, sample surveys of worker earnings in 1964, including overtime pay, allowances, and certain employer contributions, showed that white male sales clerks earned an average weekly wage in Cape Peninsula of R40.27 and Coloureds, R27.27. In Pietermaritzburg whites earned R41.04 and, in Durban, R43.55. Asians in these two cities earned R23.56 and R26.60 respectively. In Cape Peninsula white male office personnel received R36.92, compared with R26.85 for Coloureds. White female office personnel in the same area had average weekly wages of R21.60, and Coloureds, R19.16; the differential was much smaller than for office staff.

In government and public services, sample surveys by the Bureau of Statistics covering provincial and local administrations and the public services, excluding employees of the Railways and Harbors Administration, showed average monthly salaries for September through December 1967 to be R149.17 for whites, R66.16 for Asians, R52.69 for Coloureds, and R23.58 for Africans. Many of the Africans were also furnished free food and accommodations. Average monthly wages of employees in the Railways and Harbors Administration during 1965 were reported by the minister of transport as R181.63 for whites and R32.70 for nonwhites.

Wages for domestic servants vary in different parts of the country. Average wages for October 1966 for full-time domestic servants, not including positions such as cooks and chauffeurs, were reported by the Bureau of Statistics at R17.31 in cash and R17.39 in kind in Port Elizabeth. African men received R10.32 in cash and R15.04 in kind in Pietermaritzburg, whereas on the Witwatersrand the average was much higher, being R19.02 in cash and R18.95 in kind. African women received between R10 and R12 in cash and from about R15 to not quite R17 in kind in several larger cities, with higher rates prevailing on the Witwatersrand, where the average rate was R14.35 in cash and R17.68 in kind.

Wages of agricultural workers, representing costs to the farmer, also vary greatly, depending on the location of the farm and on whether the labor is recruited, resident, seasonal, or furnished by tenant farmers. Wages were highest near urban centers. A study in the Eastern Cape and Natal of the monthly cost to the farmer in 1965 for a full-time adult worker indicated a high in dairy farming, of R16.78 per month including cash, wages in kind, and other costs; a low of R9.94 in mixed farming; and a median of R13.41 in stockraising.

Maximum hours for the standard workweek in manufacturing, construction, commerce, and industries coming under the Industrial
Conciliation Act are established by Industrial Council agreements. In 1967 the regular workweek in the principal manufacturing industries ranged between 42 and 46 hours, with the exception of the printing and newspaper industry, which had a 40-hour week. The length of the workweek remained relatively constant in most manufacturing subsectors during the ten-year period 1958-67; however, declines of an hour or less occurred in several subsectors during the period, and the workweek was reduced in the chemical industry in 1962 from 45 to 42½ hours. The building industry in 1967 had a 40-hour week, and in the commercial distributive trades the workweek was either 45 or 46 hours, depending upon employee position.

PLACEMENT AND CONTROL OF AFRICAN LABOR

In the late 1960's job placement of most African labor domiciled in South Africa was under the control of a network of labor bureaus. The system consisted of local labor bureaus administered in urban areas by municipalities and in rural areas by government officials. There were, in addition, district and regional bureaus and a central bureau, all under government direction. Officers in charge of labor bureaus were officially declared "peace officers" and had the power of arrest and search that accompanied this designation.

The bureaus were originally charged with handling the registration and placement of African workers who did not possess residence rights in the white areas (see ch. 4, Population. In 1964 their authority was extended to cover persons with such rights and to apply additionally the influx laws that are used to maintain in prescribed areas only the number of African workers needed to meet labor requirements.

All male Africans over fifteen years of age in the white areas, who are either unemployed or illegally employed—that is, employed without labor bureau sanction—are required to report to the local labor bureau. Exception is made for full-time students and all students in educational institutions and for certain classes of Africans, including tribal chiefs, teachers, government officials, and professional persons. Employers who use African labor are, in turn, required to report their requirements, and any vacancies to the appropriate labor bureau. They state the number and kind of laborers needed, wages, and working conditions and file a form authorizing the labor bureau to sign a contract with the laborers on the applicant's behalf. The employer also agrees to deliver all laborers to the nearest native commissioner upon the termination of their contract. Africans with residence rights in prescribed areas who wish to work as casuals or contractors must secure a permit from the labor bureau for this purpose. If the bureau refuses to
register or cancels their contract of service, they may be ordered to leave the prescribed area.

In prescribed areas any unemployed African may be denied registration unless he possesses residence rights. An African returning to such an area to a specific job from which he has been away less than a year may be permitted to register, as may those who have received from a regional labor office permission for employment in the area. Registration may be granted, likewise, to Africans in a prescribed area who were legally employed there before becoming unemployed, providing there are jobs open. Persons without residence rights who refuse to accept jobs offered to them have their registration canceled and lose the right to remain in the area. They are then sent back to their local area labor bureau.

One of the strongest measures available to the labor bureaus to force Africans to accept jobs is the vagrancy laws under the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, which the bureaus can apply administratively. Under the vagrancy laws any African may be charged as an “idle person, habitually unemployed and without sufficient honest means of livelihood,” if he refuses jobs offered by a labor bureau on three consecutive occasions; fails to accept a suitable job without lawful cause or, on more than two occasions in any period of six months, has failed through his own fault to keep employment secured for him by a labor bureau; or has been discharged more than three times in a one-year period because of misconduct. He may also be designated an “undesirable person,” a term that includes individuals who reenter proclaimed areas without permission. Since 1964 Africans possessing residence rights have also come under the vagrancy laws. If declared to be either an undesirable or idle person, he automatically loses any right acquired to remain in the area.

Africans considered to be either idle or undesirable may be arrested without a warrant and taken before a white native commissioner. An individual may be sent to his home area or to another place, as directed by the native commissioner in charge; or, if the African agrees, he will be ordered by the commissioner to take employment with an employer for a period of time set by the commissioner. On the other hand, the idle or undesirable person may be sent to a work colony for three years or, under the Prisons Act of 1959 an idle person may be sent to work for two years on a farm colony or another place of detainment. Jurisdiction in all cases involving idle and undesirable persons was in the hands of administrative officials; appeal on the decision could, however, be made to the courts.

Most prisoners in the farm colonies, which are part of the prison outstation system, work for local farmers under contract with the Department of Prisons. The department in 1952 informed the Inter-
national Labor Organization that associations of farmers had been authorized to construct prisons in certain areas in accordance with department specifications. These prisons were located in areas that were high food producers and short of labor. In 1967 there were twenty-three farm prison outstations: thirteen in Cape Province, nine in the Transvaal, and one in Orange Free State. They had accommodations for about 6,200 prisoners. Wardens were furnished by the farmers, but the Department of Prisons directly controlled the outstations and also provided food and medical services. In 1964, according to the minister of justice, farmers were paying fifteen cents a day for each prisoner used as a laborer.

The Bantu Laws Amendment Act No. 42 of 1964 allowed the establishment of prescribed areas outside urban, mining, and industrial areas. Any new area set up came under the regulations requiring permission from a labor bureau for an African worker to seek employment in the area. Legislation also called for gradual abolition of the labor tenant system still prevalent in the Transvaal and Natal, and labor control boards (divisional councils in Cape Province) were given jurisdiction over all farm labor, including domestic servants and tenant farmers. The boards, which consist of an official of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development and at least three local farmers, determine the number of African workers needed to meet area labor requirements. Any workers in excess were to be removed to the reserves or made available for employment elsewhere under regular labor bureau procedures. In addition, the regulations concerning idle and undesirable persons were extended to cover rural areas generally. These regulations previously had applied to prescribed areas only.

The South African Institute of Race Relations, in commenting on the Bantu Laws Amendment Act, stated that the general effects of the measure were to increase controls over the presence and employment of Africans throughout all parts of the Republic outside the reserves; to leave them with no enforceable rights of movement, employment, and residence; to direct rather than guide labor; and to greatly restrict the rights of urban Africans to live under conditions of family life.

In April 1968 new regulations went into force covering African workers in the reserves and tribal areas, with the exception of the Transkei. Tribal labor bureaus were authorized for each territorial and district office and in the offices of each tribal or community authority. Every unemployed African domiciled in the area of a tribal labor bureau, who depended upon employment for livelihood, was required to register with the bureau as a work seeker within one month after the regulations became effective. Subsequently, all individuals upon reaching fifteen years of age were required to register, if they were not full-time students. Exceptions
were made for men over sixty-five and for women, unless they desired to work. Within a reserve, seasonal and casual laborers, independent contractors, and persons regularly cultivating, and largely dependent upon, land for a livelihood were also exempted.

The tribal labor bureau seeks employment for the individual and attests to his contract of service. Unless the African worker or work seeker has been registered and his contract attested by the bureau, he is forbidden to leave for employment outside the reserve. The contract cannot be for more than one year, after which he must return to the reserve. He may then enter into a new contract to which the same limiting terms apply. The effect of the legislation was to make every worker from the reserves a migrant. The regulations, according to the deputy minister of Bantu administration and development, gave “judicial recognition to our expressed policy of building our economy on contract labor.” He explained further that this plan enabled the African worker to retain ties with his tribal or rural setting and, at the same time, largely eliminated the possibility of his becoming urbanized.

African workers employed in mines or any type of industrial establishment can be fined or imprisoned for breach of contract under provisions of the Native Labor Regulations Act and amendments. The penal sanctions apply not only to failure to enter into, or carry out, the terms of a contract and desertion or absence from a place of employment, but also to the refusal to obey a lawful command and to the use of abusive language to the employer. African labor in rural areas comes under similar provisions under Masters and Servants statutes, which have been in effect since 1856. Although the Masters and Servants laws apply to all races, they have been held by the courts to pertain only to unskilled workers.

African labor has been subject to pass laws intended among other things to control and direct its movement and employment since the early nineteenth century (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). African workers were actively recruited for mines, factories, and work on farms and as domestic servants. Because of the increasing numbers of Africans in the white areas, however, the white community introduced restrictions on entry through influx control, particularly into towns and urban areas. This was effected principally through parliamentary acts and regulations. By 1968 almost thirty acts had been passed and a substantial number of regulations issued that either directly or indirectly regulated the movement of African workers and their rights to employment.

The pass system became highly complex, and it was often necessary for an African worker to have ten or more documents on his person in order to conform to the various laws. On several occasions
between the late 1910’s and late 1940’s, government committee recommendations ranged from simplification to outright abolition of the system. In 1952 a Natives (Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents) Act was passed. The new act required that all African males sixteen years old and above carry a reference book. The reference book, hardbound, contained previously disparate documents, including identity card, employment and influx authorization from a labor bureau, name of employer and address, and details of personal history. All males were required to possess a reference book by 1958. Effective beginning in February 1963, the requirement also applied to African females sixteen years of age and above.

Details of contracts of Africans and their termination must be entered in the reference book by the employer, and no African may be employed who does not possess a reference book, nor may he be employed if the book does not show that a contract has been terminated. In the Transvaal and Natal an African may not be employed whose reference book indicates that he is domiciled in the province outside a native reserve, unless he has a labor-tenant contract or statement from the owner of the land on which he is a tenant that he is not obliged to furnish his services.

Under influx control laws, the entry of African labor into prescribed areas is not only controlled, but also there are provisions that allow the “endorsing out” of Africans considered surplus to requirements. Periodic reports from local urban authorities to the minister of Bantu administration and development are required on Africans in the area, their occupations, the local labor requirement for African workers, and the number not needed and desired removed. Work and residence permits of the latter are canceled, and they are then endorsed out by local urban authorities. Individuals endorsed out are returned to the reserves unless the district labor bureau offers employment in the nonprescribed areas or in another prescribed area. Large numbers are involved; the minister of Bantu administration and development has reported that, between 1956 and 1963, 464,726 endorsements out had been made from twenty-three major towns. In 1964, 98,241 persons were endorsed out of eight major urban areas, and in 1965 more than 86,000 from nine urban centers. Stated government policy also is to encourage the return to the reserves of labor no longer fit for employment. Elderly and infirm persons have been endorsed out under this policy. The deputy minister of Bantu administration and development in 1966 likewise called for African professional personnel, businessmen, and industrialists who were “unproductive” in terms of labor needs in the white areas to return to the reserves as development was carried out.
The trade union movement is comparatively small. In 1968 only about 520,000 persons, or roughly one-quarter of the 2.2 million workers in the fields of mining, manufacturing, construction, transport and communications, and public services, were members of trade unions authorized to negotiate on their behalf. The vast majority of workers in the white areas, constituted by the African labor force, was excluded by law from the industrial relations system that was open to white, Coloured, and Asiatic members of the work force.

The country's first labor organizations were branches of trade unions based in Great Britain. These branches were established, beginning in the 1880's, by emigrants from that country. They were craft unions composed of skilled white workers, whose self-interests gradually became identified with preventing the use of nonwhite labor—African, Coloured and Asiatic—in any but unskilled jobs (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

In its development, trade unionism was strongly influenced by legislation which reflected the racial attitudes of the government. Measures that have had the greatest impact are the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924, a new Industrial Conciliation Act in 1956, subsequent amendments of the 1956 act, and the Native Labor (Settlement of Disputes) Act of 1953. The first two acts concern the white and Coloured labor force, the latter defined as consisting of all those persons neither white nor African. The acts detail the legal rights and privileges of trade unions and protect the right to organize; they also set forth the rules governing collective bargaining, the exercise of the right to strike, and the legality and enforcement of collective agreements. The machinery for collective bargaining consists of industrial councils, which negotiate wage rates, working conditions, and fringe benefits. The agreements reached have the force of law when approved by the minister of labor and may be applied by the minister to employers and employees in the industry, even though they did not actively participate in the negotiations. In effect, this provision, which encompassed African workers, brought them under agreements in the making of which they had no part and subjected them, without representation to the penal sanctions attached thereto. There were 131 such agreements in force in May 1964 covering more than 552,000 workers, of whom over half were Africans.

The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 did not specify racial segregation of unions, and during the ensuing years racially mixed unions developed, especially in Cape Province. The new Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956, amended in 1959, contained a provision that sought to enforce racial separation of the unions. Unions were required to establish separate bra...
separate meetings, and only whites were permitted to establish executive and administrative bodies. Coloured members were authorized to attend or participate in meetings of the executive body only when invited for questioning or when given approval to explain or make representations concerning allegations made against a member.

The new act further stipulated that no new mixed trade unions were to be registered, nor any union that was open to both white and Coloured membership. The act discriminated against existing mixed unions in favor of racially segregated ones, either white or Coloured, the mixing union being threatened with deregistration if it failed to comply with the provisions of the act.

The minister of labor was permitted to make exceptions to the racial separation provision of the act in cases where separate branches could not be established because of the limited number of eligible persons. As of early 1968, eleven racially mixed unions had been exempted from the requirement that they have all-white executive committees. The reason given was that there were too few white members. Six of the unions, however, had to guarantee that white members would have some representation. The exemptions were indefinite for seven unions and for specified periods for the remaining four. Fifteen unions had also been exempted from holding separate meetings, ten indefinitely and five for stated periods. Indefinite exemptions were reviewed annually.

Trade Union Coordinating Bodies

There were three trade union coordinating bodies in 1968. One, however, the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), described by the South African Institute of Race Relations as a left-wing organization, existed in name only. Its leadership had been banned by the government, deported, or had left the country. Many of its affiliated unions had also gone out of existence by that date. The other two were the Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA), described as middle-of-the-road, and the South African Confederation of Labor, classified as right-wing. The latter organization was composed of the Coordinating Council of South African Trade Unions, the South African Federation of Trade Unions, and the Federal Consultative Committee of South African Railways and Harbors Staff Associations.

SACTU was established in 1955 as a multiracial body, with membership open to any racial group of workers. It afforded equal rights to both registered unions and to unregistered African labor organizations. The founding membership comprised twelve unions and about 30,000 persons; by 1961 it had increased to forty-six affiliated unions and over 53,000 persons, with Africans predominating. Its membership in 1961 consisted of 38,791 Africans.
SACTU was associated with a number of politically active Congress groups (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Its political associations and advocacy of political action as part of union activity opened it to strong action by the government. In 1961 the minister of justice, under provisions of the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950 issued an order prohibiting a scheduled annual conference. Subsequent banning orders restricted the official activities of SACTU leaders at its offices and in the affiliated unions and forced many to resign, thus greatly hampering operations. By November 1963 thirty-five officers or former officers were under police detention, and by April 1964 fifty-two officials and members had been banned. Police raids were frequently made on headquarters offices and documents seized. The tactic appeared to be to destroy SACTU without declaring it an unlawful organization. Despite these difficulties, a meeting was held in April 1964 reported by attended by representatives of thirty-one unions with a membership of 46,000 workers. Shortly thereafter, however, one of the largest affiliates, the Textile Workers' Industrial Union, withdrew, stating that the detention and bannings had made it impossible for SACTU to carry on its functions properly. Since then SACTU appears to have largely disintegrated, and its membership at the end of 1968 was unknown.

TUCSA was originally formed in 1954 under the name South African Trade Union Council (SATUC). The present designation was adopted in 1962 to avoid confusion with SACTU. The council was established primarily in an effort to cope with the situation created, beginning in 1954, by the Nationalist government's proposed revision of the Industrial Conciliation Act, which would drastically affect unionism and union organization.

The founding membership of TUCSA consisted of forty unions with about 147,000 persons, organized in both white unions and mixed unions of whites, Coloureds, and Asiaties. The council decided at the time not to affiliate strictly African unions or those with African members. In 1958, however, a committee to aid African unions was established, and four years later, at TUCSA's annual conference in 1962, the decision was made to accept properly constituted, although unregistered, African unions as affiliates.

TUCSA maintained that prohibition of legal African unions while the number of unorganized Africans was increasing in many industries constituted a diluting effect upon the bargaining power of the registered unions. It advocated organizing African unions under the guidance of white trade unionists and legal recognition through registration, under the same conditions and following the same bar-
gaining procedures that held for the existing unions covered by the Industrial Conciliation Act.

Various methods were used to carry out the actual unionization of Africans and bring them into the bargaining process. For example, the TUCSA-affiliated shoe workers and leatherworkers unions, both of which were mixed unions, organized African workers in those industries into the unregistered National Union of African Leather Workers, resulting in those industries' becoming about 95 percent organized. The African union in 1965 became a member of the Federation of Leather Workers Unions, comprised of the two mixed unions. Representatives were able to participate in annual federation conferences, which were not bound by the same legal restrictions applying to individual unions. Decisions made at a conference were then taken up with employers by the two legal unions; agreements applied equally to all workers regardless of race.

By October 1967 thirteen de facto African unions with a combined membership of 6,500 were affiliated with TUCSA. TUCSA's policy and efforts finally brought government reaction. The minister of labor in October 1967 stated that it was not government policy to recognize African unions and accused TUCSA of being out of touch with traditional attitudes. Several of the TUCSA affiliates then expressed open opposition to the affiliation of African unions, and a special conference was called in December 1967 to deal with this subject. In an effort to resolve the problem, six African unions resigned, and several were ruled in bad standing. Only three, representing fewer than 600 workers, remained affiliated.

The conference adopted a resolution for submission to the next annual meeting. The principal points were that TUCSA membership should be confined to registered unions; that the Native Labor (Settlement of Disputes) Act of 1953 was ineffective in stemming the entry of African labor into skilled and semiskilled jobs at reduced rates and that this was undermining the negotiating power of the registered unions; that representations should be made to the minister of labor to allow African workers limited membership in the registered unions; and that the coordinating union organs were to represent unorganized African labor at wage board proceedings.

In April 1968 the 14th Annual General Conference of TUCSA voted overwhelmingly to continue to accept affiliation of African unions. Shortly afterward, several unions withdrew, and others followed suit during the remainder of 1968. By the beginning of 1969 TUCSA had lost fourteen member unions representing over 35,700 members, constituting about one-fifth of TUCSA's total strength of 178,654. After the minister of labor threatened TUCSA with deregistration, the 15th Annual General Conference in February 1969
reversed the previous position and voted to give affiliation only to registered unions and those eligible under the Industrial Conciliation Act.

The South African Confederation of Labor was formed in 1957 by alliance of the South African Federation of Trade Unions and the Coordinating Council of South African Trade Unions. The confederation and component bodies have consistently shown general agreement with the government's apartheid policy as it affects the labor movement, and with job reservation and the nonrecognition of African labor unions. The affiliated unions have almost entirely white memberships; in 1967 of more than 180,000 members, all were white except for about twenty Coloureds.

During 1968 the confederation reportedly increased its numerical strength. This was particularly true in unions affiliated with the Coordinating Council of South African Trade Unions, which solidly backs the Nationalist Party. In June 1968, during the period of dissension within TUCSA over affiliation of African trade unions, the confederation changed its constitution to permit affiliation by individual unions. The purpose appears to have been to bring in unions breaking away from TUCSA, in addition to attracting independent unions.

The confederation has shown signs of internal disagreement between verligte (less conservative; literally, enlightened) and verkrampte (more conservative; literally, cramped) factions (see ch. 15, Political Dynamics; Glossary). A group of affiliated unions centered in Pretoria was reported to hold to the verkrampte position that constraint on economic progress is preferable to acceptance of advancement by Africans. In late 1966 a clash was reported in the top leadership. Verkrampte members, particularly of the coordinating council, were accused of introducing politics into union meetings. On the other hand, J. H. Liebenberg, president of the Railways and Harbors Staff Associations, in June 1968 called attention to the dangerous situation that could develop if African workers were not given a way to express and bring about correction of grievances. He stated that existing legislation for African workers did not go far enough and that they must be allowed to negotiate with employers on their own behalf. A similar viewpoint was taken in May 1968 by Ken du Preez, president of the South African Federation of Trade Unions. Both leaders indicated, however, that they did not believe African workers wanted trade unions, and du Preez expressed the opinion that they were not at the stage for unionism.

African Industrial Representation

African workers' associations were unable to register as trade unions under the industrial conciliation acts. They were barred
under the definition of employees contained in the acts, which states that employees are persons other than natives, the latter term being further defined as consisting of individuals "generally accepted to be a member of any aboriginal race or tribe of Africa."
The long-term opposition of the government to unionization of Africans is based on the contention that the African population lives under tribal conditions and possesses a comparatively primitive state of culture. The government maintains that it is impossible to fit them into the "legislative pattern of trade unionism and collective bargaining."

Despite the fact that African unions cannot register, they are recognized as legal bodies, and a number of them exist. Their total membership is small, being estimated in late 1967 at about 8,100. Members constituted only about 0.3 percent of the African work force.

Separate industrial conciliation procedures were established for the African labor force—excluding mining, agriculture, domestic service, and government and education employees—through the Native Labor (Settlement of Disputes) Act of 1953, which was amended in 1955. Under the terms of this act, African workers involved in a dispute take no part in the conciliation procedures, either directly or through representatives. African unions are likewise not included in the conciliation machinery, although their opinions are occasionally sought. For instance, the industrial council negotiating a new agreement between the Steel and Engineering Industries Federation of South Africa and the engineering unions in 1967 and 1968 took under consideration representations from the African Engineering Workers' Union. In place of direct negotiation between African employees and the employer, white native labor officers act as intermediaries and are assisted by regional native labor committees. The committees have at least three Africans, nominated by the minister of labor, sitting on them, but chaired by a white native labor officer. In addition, a Central Native Labor Board composed of whites acts as an appeals board.

The Native Labor (Settlement of Disputes) Act provided for the setting up of work committees in industrial and commercial enterprises that employed twenty or more Africans. In such cases, consultation and negotiation are restricted to the individual employer and his employees at the factory level; collective action on an industry, trade, or regional basis is prohibited.

The work committee substitute for union action appears to have had little appeal for the African worker. As of 1968 there were only about fifty such committees in existence. The white officials in the conciliation machinery for Africans are distrusted by many African workers, who do not understand that under the terms of the Native Labor Act these officials are not acting as advocates of the workers.
but from a primary concern to maintain industrial peace. There has also been criticism of the inadequacy of representation by white Bantu labor officers, because of their lack of detailed knowledge of the particular industry. In the 1967–68 negotiations involving the engineering trade unions, only two officials from the Bantu Labor Board represented African workers, who constituted about 65 percent of the total workers affected by the negotiations. The negotiations were lengthy and quite complex. Under the circumstances, satisfactory representation of African workers' claims appears to have been impossible.

Industrial Disputes

By comparison with other industrialized and semi-industrialized countries, the number of workers involved annually in strikes is relatively small. The Bureau of Statistics reported 76 strikes during 1967; they involved only 3,531 individuals, of whom 657 were whites and 2,874 were Coloureds and Asians. During the five-year period 1963–67, strikes averaged about 84 a year, with an average of 4,662 persons engaging in strikes annually. The strikes appear to have been of short duration in general, less than one man-day being lost per striker, with the exception of 1964 when the average was over seven man-days. In 1965 a considerable number of members of the white Mine Workers Union conducted nonrecorded wildcat strikes in connection with efforts to rationalize labor policy and the use of nonwhite workers. A leadership fight developed within the union, and token wildcat strikes supporting different sides began in 1965 and continued into 1966. In October 1966 the government passed the Industrial Conciliation Further Amendment Act, which prohibited strikes or lockouts related solely to intraunion matters.

Strikes by African workers are illegal under the terms of the Native Labor (Settlement of Disputes) Act. Severe penalties are imposed for striking, up to three years' imprisonment or a fine of R1,000, or both. Labor officers concerned with implementing the act attempt to prevent disputes, and workers and employers are both urged to report any dissatisfaction or sign of unrest. If a dispute arises, the African workers are given an opportunity to air their grievances without the employer present. If local labor officials are unable to settle the dispute, it is referred to higher bodies and, eventually if unresolved, to the Wage Board.

If a work stoppage occurs because of misunderstanding by the workers, or if the employer is at fault, the stoppage is not defined as a strike, and the workers are not prosecuted under the act. If a strike does occur—that is, a stoppage accompanied by actual demands on the employer—the matter is referred to the public prose-
uctor. Few details were available on disputes involving African workers. The South African Institute of Race Relations has voiced the opinion, however, that the Labor Department has been successful in settling a large number of such disputes.
CHAPTER 23
DOMESTIC TRADE

About 420,000 persons of all racial groups were estimated to be engaged in the distributive trades in 1967, an increase of nearly 16 percent over the 363,000 recorded in the September 1960 census. They contributed R1,198 million (1 rand equals US$1.40) in current prices to the gross domestic product, about 13.3 percent of the total. This compared with R668 million, or 12.7 percent, contributed in 1961.

Wholesale and retail operations are well developed but were in the midst of structural changes in 1969, brought on by the growth of supermarkets and self-service chain stores, the rise of discount shops, and the development of shopping center complexes. Intense competition, primarily in the white retail sector, was resulting in mergers and the takeover of smaller businesses by larger ones. Price cutting and lower profit margins were adversely affecting many small dealers, both in the cities and country areas, as was the extension of chain stores into the smaller communities.

In 1969 modern retail outlets existed in the white sections of all larger cities and towns and in many of the smaller ones. In cities such as Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Durban there were also well-developed but comparatively small areas of Indian-operated shops and bazaars. In early 1970, however, the continuation of various Indian trade areas within the “white cities” was uncertain because of the progressive application of the group areas laws (see ch. 6, Social Structure; ch. 8, Living Conditions).

The African urban townships and locations generally had their own African-operated stores. With some exceptions, however, these stores were permitted to provide only daily necessities and some services. For most durable goods residents were obliged to patronize white stores in the white urban centers. In Asian group areas, where restrictions of this nature do not apply, a variety of stores existed. This was less true among the Coloureds, who long played a relatively minor part in the trading field. The establishment of new Coloured group areas, in which trading was restricted to Coloured dealers, had begun to provide greater opportunities for their entry into the retail trades in the late 1960’s.

In the African Reserves in 1969 there were several thousand
country stores furnishing African residents with daily necessities and soft goods. In the early 1960's white traders operated most of these stores. New trading licenses, however, are now reserved for Africans. The government also has a policy of buying out white dealers and leasing their stores to Africans. As a result, in 1969 more Africans were operating retail businesses in the reserves, principally general stores. Many of these operations were small, and a substantial part of the total retail trade in the reserves still remained in the hands of white dealers in the late 1960's.

Domestic trade is aided by the country's modern rail, highway, air, and coastal transport facilities. Railway transport has been characterized by steady growth in volume of traffic. Rail freight cargo increased by almost 52 percent in the ten years between 1958 and 1968. This period also saw an increase in passenger traffic of almost 79 percent.

Use of the comparatively well-developed road net has also risen. In 1968 the number of licensed vehicles was 75 percent greater than in 1961. Commercial vehicles increased by 80 percent during this time, and the number of buses almost doubled. In 1969, however, restrictions limited the movement of freight by road by private business. These were intended to reduce competition with the government-owned railroads. At the same time, the national railways administration had in operation an extensive road cargo and passenger transport service. This was basically complementary to the rail system. Cargo carried by this service rose by 19 percent between fiscal 1961/62 and 1967/68, and the number of passengers by over 39 percent.

Air freight traffic has also increased markedly within the country, expanding almost six times between 1957 and 1967. Most domestic air cargo is transported by South African Airways (SAA), a government-owned company. In the late 1960's a considerable amount of cargo was also being moved by coastal shipping between the major ports as well as several minor ports. The volume of coastal traffic increased about seven times between the mid-1950's and mid-1960's.

CHARACTERISTICS

The concepts and practices of apartheid (see Glossary) apply only indirectly to the conduct of business in the distributive trades. Individuals of any racial group are accepted as customers. The white population possesses the greatest buying power; however, the largest consumer group consists of the African population. Although the economic status of most Africans is low, their overall purchasing power is still very substantial. In 1963 it was estimated at over R1,000 million, about one-fourth of the total private consumption expenditure that year. Although figures are not available,
African buying power rose further by 1969, in view of the growth in absolute numbers of Africans employed in the money sector of the economy.

White retailers are very conscious of the African customer's importance, not only as a purchaser of necessities but also, in the urban areas in particular, as a buyer of luxury and higher quality goods. There appears to be a growing tendency among retailers to treat customers, irrespective of race, on a first-come first-served basis. Some white-owned shops in white urban areas today cater especially to Africans and employ African salesmen.

Stores in the white urban areas, which constitute the greater proportion of the country's retail establishment, resemble those found in the economically developed Western nations. Shopping areas and centers in the cities and towns have well-stocked stores run by individuals, partnerships, or companies, with varying numbers of employees related to the nature and volume of business. Large department stores first began to open between World Wars I and II, and they are found today in all bigger cities. Self-service stores are also widespread in the cities, and supermarket chains have been expanding into the smaller towns. One of the larger chains in 1969 had set an eventual goal of a supermarket in each “viable” community in the country. In the late 1960's wholesaler discount stores, selling directly to the consumer, also began opening in the large cities. By 1969 they appeared to have become a permanent part of the urban retail scene.

Private consumption expenditure in 1967 was R5,789 million, 69.5 percent of the net national income. The economic development program for 1968–73 projected a rise, in terms of 1967 prices, to R6,120 million in 1968 and to R7,580 million by 1973, based upon a 5 percent annual growth rate assumption for the gross domestic product. If this rate is maintained during the five-year period, private consumption expenditures are expected to increase through 1973 by about 4.6 percent and to constitute slightly over 69 percent of the net national income in that year.

There has been a long-term trend toward greater expenditure on durables, with a decrease in the relative importance of nondurables. Between 1947 and 1967 total private consumer expenditure on nondurables declined from 59.9 percent to 56.8 percent; at the same time, consumer expenditures on durable goods rose from 11.9 percent to 14.3 percent. In nondurables there was an overall drop in expenditures for food, clothing, footwear, and related items; in durables the largest increase was in transport equipment.

The shift to greater expenditure on durables was partly related to increasing urbanization of Africans, their employment for cash wages, and their growing purchases of items such as radios, washing machines, and used and new automobiles. The main factor, however, was the increased purchasing power of the white population,
which has risen substantially since World War II. By 1968 white per capita income was between R1,400 and R1,500. Increased income has brought greater financial security and an ability to buy more durable goods. Contributing factors have been the rise in installment sales and the tendency of whites to marry earlier and establish independent households. Another possible factor was the restriction officially placed on the number of nonwhite servants allowed to live on the urban premises of employers, resulting in greater demand for labor-saving, durable equipment. Improved advertising techniques have also presumably had some effect.

The large increase in expenditure for transport equipment—private consumption expenditure on transport and communications rose by almost 33 percent between 1947 and 1967—reflected the growing part automobiles now play, particularly in the white consumer market. Possession of two or more cars per household is not uncommon in the white community, and a car is one of the first items purchased by white youths after they begin working. Refrigerators, washing machines, deep freezers, and other household durable equipment also constituted a growing element in white consumer purchases.

The progressive application of the Group Areas Acts No. 41 of 1950 and No. 77 of 1957, under which racial groups are being physically separated with respect to residence, has brought some change in the domestic trade structure. Africans are being settled in townships often many miles from the white urban centers, and the removal to these outlying districts, in which only Africans are given permits to operate stores, has had some effect on the volume of trade of some white retail merchants.

Fears were expressed by white trade organizations that possible development of large African businesses in the townships would adversely affect white business. The Department of Bantu Administration and Development, however, has limited trading by stores in the townships to essential daily necessities. Existing services such as dry cleaners, gasoline stations, and garages are permitted, but new licenses are not being issued. The department has also indicated that where Africans can obtain their needs from white traders in the white areas nearby, permits for any new African businesses would not be given. Moreover, an African trader in an urban African residential area is not permitted to sell or deliver goods to a non-African living outside the area.

The temporary nature of African business in the white areas has been emphasized. Government policy is that buildings to house African shops are to be constructed by local authorities for lease only to the African trader, and the latter is not to be permitted to put up his own building. The department is also opposed to the issuance of licenses to existing African companies or partnerships that wish to pool resources for the establishment of a larger under-
taking or the acquisition of additional outlets in townships or other urban African areas. Individual African traders, likewise, are not allowed to carry on more than one business in the urban area in which they have residence rights or to start a new business there if they have a business or trading interests elsewhere.

Existing stores in the townships and African urban locations vary greatly. Some are well built and adequate in size, while others may actually be unsuitable as a shop. The better ones may have a refrigerator, cash register, and telephone. Stocks also vary considerably but usually offer a reasonably wide selection. The distance from shops in the white urban center, which affects competition, plays some part in the size and kinds of stock carried. In those townships sufficiently far away from the urban center, the limited number of stores allowed and the lack of white competition can result in a profitable undertaking for the African trader. In some cases, however, competition is intense. In 1967, for example, over 200 traders in the African township of Soweto outside Johannesburg, faced by price competition from supermarkets in that city, joined forces to secure better prices from a large wholesale company.

The Asian trading community, mostly Indian, has been substantially affected by the enforcement of the group areas laws. A retail trades census in 1961 showed that Asians owned over 6,900 retail enterprises, about 20 percent of all retail businesses, and about 6 percent of wholesale enterprises, although they constituted only about 3 percent of the population. Many urban Indian traders have been required to move to new group areas. Most customers of these traders were of other racial groups, and consumer requirements are insufficient in the Indian areas for all to reestablish themselves. In 1968 it was estimated by the Indian Merchants', Residents', and Property-Owners' Association in Johannesburg that only about 50 of 500 Indian traders forced to move from Johannesburg's western section had been able to start new businesses.

In some cases arrangements have been made for Indian traders to operate businesses in their original location in the white urban area, provided they live in a group area reserved for their own race. In Johannesburg, for instance, plans were in existence in late 1968 for construction of a complex of shops, a bazaar, and a market near the center of the city by municipal authorities for rent to Indian traders; however, completion was not expected until sometime in the early 1970's. One of the factors also inhibiting reestablishment by Indian traders forced to move is the statutory prohibition against interprovincial migration (see ch. 4, Population; ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

Indian businesses vary greatly. In areas of high Indian concentration as in Natal, many Indian retail stores are small concerns, marginal in nature and with low trade volume. Many are run by families. In the larger cities there are better shops and bazaars.
operated both by family members and paid employees. Some Indian wholesale and retail businesses are quite large and have branches in other cities.

The Coloured population has participated to a much smaller extent in domestic trade. Lack of finances and experience have been limiting factors that placed them at a disadvantage with whites and Indians. The establishment of Coloured group areas in which traders are restricted to Coloureds has, however, opened up opportunities. This has been at the expense of white businesses and in particular of Indian traders, many of whom lived among the Coloureds and carried on trade with them before specific Coloured group areas were established.

Coloured retail enterprises in general have concentrated on foodstuffs. A 1961 census of retail trades showed 60 percent of Coloured-owned businesses to be in this category. Another 35 percent were trading stores catering to Africans. Only 5 percent were engaged in other retail trades. There were at that time no Coloured wholesale businesses. During the 1960's Coloureds continued entering the retail trades, but in 1967 the Minister of Community Development stated that the Coloured community was still only finding its feet in the trade sector. A Coloured Development Corporation was established to promote and encourage Coloured business, including trade. The corporation not only gives assistance to prospective businesses—for instance, it contributed R12,500 in 1967 toward construction of a Coloured supermarket in Pietermaritzburg—but also constructs new retail outlets which it then makes available to Coloureds through shares.

WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE

Increasing competition in the distributive trades has brought a change in the traditional pattern of the wholesale and retail trades. Large retailers, such as department and chain stores as well as groups of individual retailers, now handle wholesale buying and warehousing through their own organizations. Some wholesalers have their own retail stores and also engage in manufacturing. Many manufacturers sell directly to the retailer, a common practice in the reserves, and additionally have established wholesale and retail outlets. In the late 1960's only about 50 percent of total merchandise sales was estimated to be going through both wholesale and retail channels. Another 40 percent was sold by the manufacturer directly to the retailer; the manufacturer also disposed of somewhat less than 5 percent of his products directly to the consumer. About 5 percent was sold by wholesalers to consumers.
Wholesale Trade

Censuses of the distributive trades are taken at irregular intervals. The most recent for which figures are available covered the period from July 1960 to June 1961 and showed 5,486 businesses engaged in wholesale trades. Of these, about 50 percent were in the Transvaal, 25 percent in Cape Province, 15 percent in Natal, and 10 percent in Orange Free State. The high proportion of wholesale businesses in the Transvaal was a function of the centrality of the Witwatersrand in the economic structure of South Africa.

About 21 percent of all wholesale houses (1,173 businesses) were individually owned or partnerships, 60 percent (3,302) were companies, and 19 percent (1,011) were establishments controlled by central or provincial governments, local authorities, or cooperative societies and companies. Whites owned about 82 percent (964) of individual wholesale businesses and partnerships, and Asians, over 17 percent (202). Coloureds owned 7 businesses, less than 1 percent of the total, and none was owned by Africans. Asian businesses, however, were concentrated largely in foods, beverages, tobacco, clothing, and textiles. About one-seventh of Asian wholesale dealers were general wholesalers.

Whites owned controlling interests in 3,191, or more than 96 percent, of the wholesale companies, and Asians controlled 110, or over 3 percent. Africans controlled one company. White firms, whether individually owned, partnerships, or companies, were operating in all wholesale trade areas, while most Asiatic firms were engaged in the food, beverage, tobacco, clothing, and textile trades or as general wholesalers. Public wholesale businesses and those controlled by the cooperatives were mainly dealers in foods, beverages, tobacco, paper, books and stationery, machinery, farm implements, and building materials.

Many wholesalers are small to medium size. An estimate in late 1967 showed about 55 percent with total annual sales ranging from about R10,000 to R85,000. Despite the encroachment of manufacturers and retail organizations into the wholesale field, the total turnover in the wholesale trades grew in absolute terms during the economic expansion that occurred during the 1960's. Sales in 1968 amounted to R3,184.1 million compared with R2,905.1 million in 1961, a rise of over 50 percent. As 1970 began, the wholesaler still was an important part of the distributive chain, with the rural stores constituting his biggest customer.

Retail Trade

Retail sales in the late 1960's were running close to R2,000 million annually. Although a considerable number of large department
stores and self-service chains were in operation, the majority of retail shops were small businesses with total annual sales under R5,400. The distributive trades census of 1960–61, which included all retail operations having total annual sales of R1,000, enumerated 36,330 retail businesses. Of these, 74 percent (28,005) were individually owned or partnerships; about 17 percent (6,136) were company operated; and the remaining 6 percent (6,189) were owned by government and local authorities or by cooperative societies and companies.

Whites owned 66 percent (18,538) of the individual businesses or partnerships; Asians (mostly Indians), 22 percent (6,175); Coloureds, 9 percent (2,527); and Africans, 3 percent (765). Included among these businesses were 4,138 Bantu trading stores that operate in the reserves and African locations in urban areas. Whites owned 66 percent (2,749) of these; Coloureds, 21 percent (870); Asians, more than 11 percent (467); and Africans, less than 2 percent (52). The total number of such stores actually owned by Africans at the time must have been greater than recorded because an unknown number in the reserves presumably had annual incomes totaling less than R1,000 and would not have been included. In June 1959, two years before the census, the minister of Bantu administration and development stated that 2,373 general dealer’s licenses had been issued to Africans that year. There were also 4,104 Africans in other trading activities, many of them hawkers and peddlers, who appear not to have been included in the census. There were also 387 Bantu trading stores operated by companies in 1960. Two hundred seventy, or 70 percent, were controlled by white shareholders, and 107, or almost 28 percent, by Asians. Six were controlled by Coloureds and 4 by Africans.

Wholesale and Retail Pricing

The operations of the market system are affected by various statutory measures and regulations that control pricing of different commodities and products. A price controller is authorized under a 1964 price control act to fix maximum wholesale and retail prices for certain categories of goods. These include items of basic importance to the farmer, goods supplied by a small number of producers who could exercise monopolistic price controls, and goods subject to possible shortage of supply. Among items in the late 1960’s for which maximum prices had been established were coal, fertilizer, fishmeal, several manufactured iron and steel products, sugar, barley, bread, and dairy products.

Pricing in the retail field has also been affected by the resale price maintenance system whereby the manufacturer suggests, fixes, or sets a minimum retail price for his product. This system came under
strong attack as the result of a price war that began in October 1967, largely in the home appliances field. Manufacturers, distributors, and retailers dealing in these items decided to abandon the system. There had been complaints also from other sectors concerning the effect of the system on price levels, and the Board of Trade and Industries in early 1968, following a lengthy investigation, recommended general abolition of resale price maintenance, with provision for exemption of suppliers able to show that their practices were in the public interest. The board noted that only about one-quarter of the manufacturers actually imposed price maintenance for their products, but about three-quarters of retailers strongly supported the system. It stated that the practice was monopolistic in effect and contrary to the concept of free enterprise.

The board's recommendations were accepted by the government and embodied in legislation passed by Parliament in the first part of 1969. Under this legislation the minister of economic affairs has been empowered since July 1, 1969, to declare unlawful any resale price maintenance actions. Manufacturers, however, are still allowed to suggest retail prices, but these are to be considered only as guides, and the retailer has the full prerogative to determine the final retail sale price.

Agricultural pricing comes under the provisions of the Marketing Act of 1937. The act was intended to increase price stability and reduce the price spread between producers and consumers. About twenty control boards for different sectors of agriculture have been established. Some have price-fixing powers and complete control of marketing; others possess regulatory powers only. Controls are largely exercised through a system of agricultural cooperatives (see ch. 20, Agriculture).

**TRADE IN THE AFRICAN RESERVES**

Trade in the reserves is carried out through country stores, many of which in the late 1960's were owned by whites. The government, however, had in operation a program of buying out non-African store owners and leasing their businesses to Africans. Government policy, moreover, was to issue new trading licenses in the reserves only to Africans. The fact that African traders can get by with less income than white traders and the increased competition from new African stores have also resulted in the sale of some white stores to Africans.

New trading rights are usually authorized only in residential settlements that have been developed under rehabilitation programs in the reserves. Businesses of the same kind cannot be opened less than two miles apart, although exceptions are made depending upon
population concentration. A shopowner who has a general dealer's license is not permitted to operate another store closer than twenty miles.

Retail store ownership is mainly single proprietorship. The Tomlinson Commission in 1955 noted that one-man African concerns were more successful, and a study in 1965 in eastern Cape Province indicated that observation to be still valid. Management of white and African stores is mainly by the owner or a member of his family. African storekeepers often treat all receipts as income and do not set aside money to purchase more varied stocks, which would attract customers. Some African businesses have failed as a result.

White general dealers carry larger stocks. In 1965 in eastern Cape Province their stock averaged R4,000 to R5,000, whereas the stocks carried by over 60 percent of the African dealers in that region were less than R500. African stores tend to be smaller and to deal more in groceries, which have a faster turnover. African shops vary greatly in size and appearance. In some cases they are impressive, while others are little more than huts.

Dealers in the reserves obtain most of their goods from wholesalers. Fresh produce is secured locally by many white dealers and by some Africans, but most African storekeepers buy produce from markets in larger towns. Some factories sell their goods directly to African storekeepers, and various wholesalers use African salesmen. Many African retailers, however, appear to be relatively indifferent to the salesman's race. Trade discounts and credit availability to African retailers are in accordance with standard business procedures. Credit is based principally upon reliability assessment. There is evidence, however, that African retailers make out better on a cash basis. Distribution of goods in short supply by wholesalers is generally nondiscriminatory and is rationed relatively equitably among white and African traders.

White general dealers and some African storekeepers function also as middlemen. They buy local products such as hides, wool, poultry, and eggs for sale to wholesalers or agents. Grains are controlled by government boards, and purchases by both white and African storekeepers are usually for resale only to individual customers. White traders also act as recruiting agents for African laborers.

Price cutting for competitive reasons is not usually practiced by either white or African traders. If white traders give quantity discounts, nearby African retailers do likewise. Prices tend to be competitive, and the African trader sends someone to the nearest white store to check on prices. Business acumen has increased among African traders, but many did not work actively to attract customers and seemed to be satisfied to wait for them to come in. In some areas a small gift is given at the conclusion of a sale for
goodwill purposes. This is also done by many white storekeepers.

White dealers provide postal services, cash money orders, and deliver telephone messages. They also buy produce locally, which creates good will, furnish milling facilities, and generally extend more credit. Some African traders offer similar services but to a more restricted degree. African storekeepers also furnish less credit, in part because they have a smaller capital. Installment sales are made by both white and African dealers. Some whites and Africans charge slightly higher prices or collect interest when credit is given. Barter by licensed stores is forbidden by law, but does occur. African customers generally buy at the nearest shops or at those that offer lower prices and have a better selection of merchandise.

TRADE PROMOTION

There are about 150 chambers of commerce affiliated with the Association of Chambers of Commerce of South Africa, which has its headquarters in Johannesburg. About one-quarter are major chambers with direct representation on the association’s executive committee. The others, organized by region, have regional representation on the committee. Many of the member units issue newsletters, and the central association publishes an official monthly trade paper, *Commercial Opinion*.

There is a separate organization in commerce, industry, finance, and mining, for Afrikaans-speaking businessmen, the Afrikaanse Handelsinstitut, founded in 1942. Located in Pretoria, its membership is open to any firm, half of whose invested capital is owned by Afrikaners. It usually cooperates closely with the various chambers of commerce, and some members are also members of those organizations. In the commercial field it publishes a quarterly journal called *Volkshandel*.

An African Chamber of Commerce was founded in Johannesburg in 1955. Its chief objectives were to promote African commercial and industrial development, prevent unfair competition in the African townships from non-African groups, secure better trade conditions, and generally assist African traders. Known as the National African Chamber of Commerce in early 1970, it has branches in various parts of the country. It publishes a quarterly journal called *The African Trader*.

Trade fairs are used rather widely to promote business. Most of the specialized industrial exhibitions are organized and managed by professional exhibition management companies, which had about twenty fairs scheduled in 1969. The largest fair is the annual Rand Easter Show held in Johannesburg each April. A wide range of goods is displayed at this show, and attendance is over 500,000. Regular annual shows are held in other cities at different times of the year, including Port Elizabeth, Durban, and Bloemfontein. An-
Annual farmers shows displaying agricultural and other products are held in most of the country districts.

Commercial advertising is employed extensively in trade promotion. Advertising techniques are advanced and quite sophisticated, and use is made of all information media. Outdoor advertising is widespread and includes billboards, posters, and forms such as bus panels. Theater advertising is also widely employed and reportedly is very effective. In 1968 there were about thirty-five advertising agencies in different parts of the country. The larger ones were mostly centered in Johannesburg, with branches in other cities. Services include market research and analysis.

TRANSPORTATION

Railroads

The rail system in 1969 consisted of a network totaling about 12,250 route-miles. Railways linked all main population centers and economically important sections of the country and constituted the most important sector in the overall transportation system. Total capital investment in the system on March 31, 1968, was R1,924.7 million, with operating revenues in fiscal 1967/68 amounting to R594.1 million (see table 21). Railroad employees numbered about 200,000 and included almost one of every ten economically active whites (see ch. 22, Labor).

The direction of early railroad development was inland from the ports in Cape Colony and Natal, but major development occurred with the growth of diamond mining in the interior of Cape Colony. In 1873 Cape Colony nationalized the existing railway, then totaling about sixty miles, and in 1874 began building a line to Kimberley, the center of the diamond diggings, completing the last link in 1885.

The discovery of gold in the Witwatersrand in the 1880's led the Cape Government Railways and the Natal Government Railways, which had also started inland in the late 1870's, to try to reach this new source of traffic. Paul Kruger, president of the South African Republic (Transvaal), concerned over the British-controlled economic forces moving toward his state, stopped their advance at the Transvaal border (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). He then secured an agreement with Portugal for a line eastward from Johannesburg to Lourenco Marques in Mozambique, the closest port to the Witwatersrand. Construction of the last Cape and Natal links to Johannesburg was then permitted. The first train from Cape Town reached Johannesburg in 1892. In the same year another Cape Government Railways line to Johannesburg, from Port Elizabeth through Bloemfontein, was also opened; the Orange Free State section of this line was financed by Cape Colony. Three years later,
Table 21. Selected Statistics on South African Railways Operations, Selected Years
(in millions)

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<td>79.7</td>
<td>93.5</td>
<td>110.0</td>
<td>114.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue tons</td>
<td>(67.7)</td>
<td>(81.1)</td>
<td>(97.3)</td>
<td>(103.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free-haul tons</td>
<td>(12.0)</td>
<td>(12.4)</td>
<td>(12.7)</td>
<td>(11.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total train miles</td>
<td>98.9</td>
<td>107.8</td>
<td>116.9</td>
<td>120.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating revenues (rand)</td>
<td>328.0</td>
<td>410.7</td>
<td>548.2</td>
<td>594.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating expenditures (rand)</td>
<td>294.1</td>
<td>345.0</td>
<td>480.8</td>
<td>503.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating surplus (rand)</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>90.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Totals include operations of the railways in South West Africa (Namibia), which are treated by the government as an integral part of the South African railway system.
2 Transportation and subsidiary services, including road transport, tourist, precooling and catering services, publicity, and grain elevator operations.
3 1 rand equals US$1.40.


in 1895, the first train service started between Durban and Johannesburg.

In 1894 the Johannesburg-Lourenço Marques line was opened. The Transvaal government in its agreement with Portugal guaranteed part of the Witwatersrand traffic to Mozambique in exchange for recruitment rights for laborers for the Witwatersrand mines. The new line soon drew a considerable amount of cargo from both the Cape and Natal lines. Frictions developed that in part were responsible for the Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902 (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). In 1901, however, the British High Commission Authority, which then controlled most of the Transvaal, entered into a new agreement with Mozambique on mine labor recruitment. Mozambique was guaranteed 50 to 55 percent of the Witwatersrand rail traffic through Lourenço Marques. This arrangement was further confirmed in a Transvaal-Mozambique Convention after the war, which provided for a minimum of 50 percent of the traffic.

The provisions of the postwar convention were reluctantly accepted by the Cape, Natal, and Orange Free State governments when the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910. In 1938 a new Mozambique Convention was negotiated. This guaranteed that a minimum of 40 percent of the seaborne imports to the Witwatersrand would enter through Lourenço Marques and the Mozambique rail link to the Transvaal. By the mid-1960’s guaranteed percentages were not being met, and by 1968 South Africa had paid almost
R4.4 million to Mozambique Railways as compensation. Although the South African government has urged businesses to utilize Lourenço Marques facilities more fully, the compensation amount has continued to rise. In fiscal year 1967/68 it totaled over R1.3 million, compared with R650,000 in 1965/66 and R791,800 in 1966/67.

The railways are state owned and operated. The operating agency is the South African Railways and Harbors Administration, under the minister of transport, with actual management in the hands of an appointed general manager. The railway system was formed at union in 1910 from the then separately controlled Cape Government Railways, Natal Government Railways, and Central South African Railways. The latter comprised the former Transvaal and Orange Free State railways systems. Initially each of these systems continued to operate independently, and full merger was achieved only in 1916.

Large supplies of domestic coal and a lack of domestic oil production have resulted in continued extensive use of steam locomotives. In sections more distant from coal sources, however, diesel-electric traction is employed. Diesel locomotives are also used in zones where the water is unsuitable for steam locomotives or is scarce. Electric traction is employed in the major suburban areas of Cape Town, Durban, and Pretoria-Johannesburg and on main lines, particularly in Natal, where steep gradients give electric traction a distinct advantage.

Diesel engines were first used for main line operations in 1958. In March 1969 the South African Railways had 324 diesels, more than double the number in 1961. Fifty-five more were on order or authorized. Electric locomotives totalled 1,111 in March 1969; 101 more were on order or authorized. Despite the strong emphasis on steam locomotives, their number has declined steadily, from 2,669 in March 1961 to 2,490 in March 1969. A Commission of Inquiry into the Coordination of Transport suggested further replacement of steam locomotives by diesel and electric engines as a way of increasing the carrying capacity of the main lines.

Electric service was introduced in Natal in 1926 and in 1928 in the Cape Town area. Rapid extension of this service occurred in Natal, but in the other provinces major development has taken place mainly since the mid-1950's. The Witwatersrand area is now largely electrified. The line from Johannesburg eastward to Komatiport on the Mozambique border is also electrified, as are the lines to Kimberley, the rail center of Kroonstad in Orange Free State, and between Johannesburg and Durban. Electrification projects underway in 1969 included the line from Kroonstad to Harrismith in Orange Free State, which is scheduled to be completed in 1970 and will permit all-electric service between Kroonstad and Durban. Several projects were also under way in Natal, including extension.
of electric traction from Durban to Empangeni and construction of a new line from Empangeni to Vryheid. Work on the latter is to be completed during the 1972/73 fiscal year. The main line in Cape Province from Cape Town to Beaufort West is electrified, and an electrified line extends westward from Kimberley to important mining areas in the Northwest Cape.

There has been a continuing rise in overall long-distance and suburban passenger traffic. A total of 476.5 million passenger trips was registered in 1967/68, 54 percent above the 309.4 million in 1961/62. In the same period, suburban trips almost doubled, from 231.7 million to 446.3 million. First- and second-class suburban trips rose from 106 million in 1961/62 to 125 million in 1965/66 but experienced a decline after the introduction of higher fares in September 1966; in 1967/68 they totaled 116 million. Third-class suburban trips rose from 187.9 million in 1961/62 to 330.3 million in 1967/68. A further 13 percent increase in third-class trips was anticipated in 1968/69, based mainly upon an increase in services to be provided to African townships.

On the main lines long-distance, first- and second-class traffic has declined. In 1961/62 trips totaled 5.1 million, but were only 4.4 million in 1967/68, a drop of almost 14 percent. This situation is found in railroad operations in many of the more developed countries and is associated with improvement in competitive transport facilities. The decline in this traffic in South Africa, however, has been more than offset by a rise in use of nonwhite third-class facilities. Third-class trips during the same time increased by more than 55 percent, from 16.6 million in 1961/62 to 25.8 million in 1967/68.

Freight traffic grew from 77.5 million tons in 1961/62 to 103 million tons in 1967/68. Coal, ores and minerals, and agricultural products accounted for over two-thirds of revenue tons transported in 1967/68. Coal and coke shipments made up about one-quarter of revenue tonnage, ores and minerals more than one-fifth, and agricultural products one-fifth. The South African Railways in 1968 had a stock of 140,882 standard-gauge freight cars of all types, of which some 130,000 were designed for transporting merchandise. Over 95,550 were eight-wheeled, and 45,145 were six-wheeled. There were additionally almost 2,000 freight cars for use on the two-foot-gauge lines.

Apartheid is enforced in railroad services. Separate coaches, compartments, or sections of coaches are used by whites and nonwhites. An exception is the international coaches on trains traveling to Botswana and Rhodesia, which can be used by nationals of other countries of any race. Dining facilities are segregated, and diners are served by persons of their own racial group. The railways also have special kitchenette cars that are used for nonwhites.

A limited number of first- and second-class coaches are air conditioned. The Blue Train, an extra-fare train between Johannesburg
and Cape Town, however, is completely air conditioned. All main line trains have dining cars. Meals are also available at dining and refreshment rooms at main stations.

Highways and Road Transport

There is a well-developed system of national and provincial highways connecting all the main population and industrial centers, as well as secondary cities and towns. These highways, including secondary and feeder roads, total about 115,000 miles. Additionally, there are about 100,000 miles of minor local and land access roads in rural areas. A national highways system was authorized by the National Roads Act of 1935, the development and administration of which is now under the National Transport Commission. In 1969 there were nineteen national routes in the system with a total length of about 6,670 miles. Roughly 85 percent were hard-surface, all-weather roads. Provincial roads totaled more than 108,000 miles, of which about 11 percent were paved, all-weather roads.

Principal national routes included an 1,100-mile highway that traversed the entire country from George on the southern coast in Cape Province, through Bloemfontein, Johannesburg, and Pretoria, northward to the Rhodesian border. A major 1,000-mile route ran along the southern and eastern coasts from Cape Town, through Port Elizabeth and East London, to Durban. A third route connected Durban with Johannesburg, and another ran eastward from Pretoria to the Mozambique border, where it tied in with a road to Lourenço Marques. Other national routes fill in this net, bringing into the system most of the cities above 20,000 population. One branch route also connects with the road net South West Africa (Namibia) (see ch. 2, Physical Environment).

The construction and maintenance of national highways are financed through a National Road Fund, the resources for which are parliamentary appropriations and customs duties on imported gasoline. Other roads are the responsibility of the provincial administrations and local authorities. Where main provincial roads pass through urban areas, however, financial assistance is furnished by the central government. There are also a limited number of special roads, which totaled 825 miles in 1968. These are roads considered to be important nationally, although they do not necessarily connect important cities. About 70 percent of construction costs are furnished from the National Road Fund. Upon completion, maintenance becomes a provincial responsibility.

There were 1,929,000 licensed motor vehicles of all types in 1968, an increase of 75 percent over 1961. Licensed vehicles in 1968 included 1,415,000 motor cars, station wagons, and jeeps; 29,000 buses; 373,000 commercial vehicles of various types; and 112,000 motorcycles, scooters, and the like.
The transportation of goods by road is restricted by the provisions of the Motor Carrier Transportation Act, No. 39 of 1930, intended to limit competition with the railroads. Private businesses are permitted to deliver certain goods in their own vehicles up to 150 miles, and a smaller number of goods up to 300 miles. Exemptions can be requested from a local Road Transportation Board. There are ten such boards, each in charge of a road transport area, with headquarters at Bloemfontein, Durban, Cape Town, Johannesburg, Kimberley, East London, Port Elizabeth, Pietermaritzburg, Potchefstroom, and Pretoria.

The principal road cargo and passenger transport system is operated by the South African Railways and Harbors Administration. This system is based upon railheads and railway stations and acts essentially as a feeder to the rail net. It serves rural areas and also the African Reserves, where it frequently constitutes the only organized transport to the urban centers. Bus services are also operated between towns where rail services do not exist or are inadequate. In fiscal 1967/68 route mileage over which these transport services were provided totaled 31,793 miles. There have been only slight changes in route mileage since 1961/62. Both motor vehicle and trailer mileage, however, have risen substantially. In 1967/68 motor vehicles ran a total of 36.2 million miles, compared with 29.3 million in 1961/62, an increase of 23.5 percent. During the same period, trailer mileage rose by almost 40 percent, from 18.1 million miles in 1961/62 to 25.2 million miles in 1967/68. Goods carried increased from 3.2 million short tons in 1961/62 to 3.8 million short tons in 1967/68, or by 19 percent. At the same time, passengers rose from 7.9 million in 1961/62 to 11 million in 1967/68, or by more than 39 percent.

Ports and Shipping

The principal ports are state owned and are administered by the South African Railways and Harbors Administration. The main harbors are Cape Town on the southwest coast, Port Elizabeth on the south, East London on the southeast, and Durban on the east coast. Durban handles more than 50 percent of the annual tonnage through the four ports, and Cape Town, about 25 percent. An important smaller port is situated at Mosselbaai, halfway between Cape Town and Port Elizabeth. It can accommodate coastal vessels, but larger ships must unload by lighter. There is also a small harbor at Port Nolloth on the northwest coast. This port is owned by the Consolidated Diamond Mines of South West Africa. It handles about 60,000 tons a year, largely supplies for the mines.

The four major ports are equipped with modern cargo handling, storage, docking, and ship servicing and repair facilities, including graving docks at Durban, Cape Town, and East London. There are
bulk oil storage facilities at Durban, Cape Town, and Port Elizabeth and large grain elevators at Durban, Cape Town, and East London. The elevator at East London, which went into operation in 1967, can handle more than 1 million tons of grain annually. Durban has a 200,000-ton sugar terminal that makes possible loading a 10,000-ton freighter in twenty-four hours. All four ports have precooling facilities.

A significant rise in harbor operations has occurred in the 1960's. During the fiscal year 1967/68 a high of 17,465 vessels, aggregating 84.1 million gross registered tons, called at the ports. This total does not include ships diverted by closure of the Suez Canal. This compares with 13,712 ships totaling 58.1 million gross registered tons in 1959/60, and represents a 27.4-percent increase in numbers and a 44.7-percent increase in gross tonnage over that year. Cargo handled in 1967/68 amounted to 42.1 million tons, more than double that handled in 1959/60. Over 76 percent of cargo tonnage in 1967/68 passed through the two ports of Durban (22.1 million tons) and Cape Town (10.5 million tons).

The diverting of ships around Africa following the shutting of the Suez Canal in June 1967 brought a large amount of additional traffic to South African ports, particularly Durban and Cape Town. The first diverted vessel entered Durban harbor on June 6, 1967. Through March 31, 1968, 3,352 such ships had entered the country’s ports. The added traffic placed a strain on berthing, repair, and other facilities already taxed by growing foreign trade.

Expansion of port facilities to meet usual traffic increases is being carried out. In early 1969 the minister of transport also approved a longer range development plan for Cape Town port, which will eventually add twenty-two berths and increase handling capacity by about 75 percent. The estimated eventual cost of the project, work on which began during 1969, is over R99 million. A committee has also been appointed to examine containerization, and intentions are to develop berths at Cape Town and Durban to handle container ships.

The four main ports cannot accommodate the larger ore ships and oil tankers in world service. As a partial solution a new 8,800-foot offshore oil tanker terminal was under construction at Durban in 1969 at a cost of R4.5 million. This will handle carriers to 200,000-gross registered ton tankers and move a maximum of 14,000 short tons of oil an hour. The first offloading is expected in mid-1970. Bulk ore exporters are also reportedly seeking construction of a two-mile offshore pier at Port Elizabeth, the major ore exporting port, which would permit loading of ore carriers up to 150,000-gross registered ton size, compared with the 50,000 to 60,000-gross registered ton maximum as of 1969.

Development of current harbors to handle the large new ships is considered very costly. A completely new harbor at Richards Bay,
on the east coast about 120 miles north of Durban, is planned that will be able to handle the largest oil tankers now being built and large bulk carriers. A graving dock, capable of servicing vessels of 300,000 gross registered tons, is also planned. Construction is scheduled to start in 1971, and partial use of the port is expected in 1974.

There were 925 vessels of all categories with an aggregate gross registered tonnage of 496,203 gross registered tons on the South African Register in March 1968. The merchant fleet engaged in foreign trade numbered 39 vessels aggregating 315,581 gross registered tons. This compared with 27 vessels totaling 180,000 gross registered tons at the end of 1963. Smaller vessels included 689 fishing boats of 65,625 gross registered tons and 52 coastal vessels totaling 54,825 gross registered tons. The remaining registered vessels included whaling boats, harbor craft, research vessels, and pleasure craft. There are a number of shipbuilding yards, mostly in Durban and Cape Town. The chief shipbuilding center is Durban (see ch. 21, Industry).

Most of the oceangoing shipping is operated by the South African Marine Corporation Limited (Safmarine). Safmarine was established at Cape Town in 1946 and is the oldest existing South African shipping company. General cargo services are operated to the United States, Great Britain, and European ports, and sugar and pig iron carriers are operated to Japan. At the end of 1966 Safmarine operated a fleet of thirty-three vessels totaling 447,000 deadweight tons. Several of these were time chartered. During 1967 five additional new dry cargo liners and a refrigerated ship were added to the fleet. A further, high-speed cargo ship built in Japan arrived in 1968 and two more were due for completion in 1969. The company also has a 213,000 deadweight ton tanker scheduled for construction in Japan, with delivery expected near the end of 1971. This vessel is designed to use the new offshore oil tanker terminal under construction in 1969 at Durban.

The largest coastal shipping company is Unicorn Lines, based in Durban. The line was established in 1966 by merger of three coastal shipping companies. It operates not only in domestic coastal service but also to ports in neighboring countries. In early 1968 it initiated a new service to Malagasy Republic and in the latter part of the year to the Seychelles Islands. During 1968 Unicorn Lines had a fleet of twenty-six freighters, with three 4,500-ton vessels on order, one of which was launched in August. The line carries about 1 million tons of cargo annually.

Air Transport

Domestic and international air services are highly developed. An extensive air network interconnects the major urban and industrial
centers of Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, Port Elizabeth, and East London. There are also regular air services between these main centers and a number of other principal cities and towns in other parts of the country. Regular overseas flights by the government-owned South African Airways, TREK Airways, a privately owned South African company, and fourteen major international airlines linked the country in 1969 with Europe, the Middle East, Australia, and North and South America. Regional air services were in operation connecting nearby African nations.

The principal domestic carrier is South African Airways (SAA), which has a virtual monopoly on internal air services. SAA's regional services in 1969 were also flying to Bulawayo and Salisbury in Rhodesia, Maseru in Lesotho, Blantyre in Malawi, Gaberone and Francistown in Botswana, Lourenço Marques in Mozambique, and also to Malagasy Republic and Swaziland. SAA's overseas service included flights from Johannesburg to London, Paris, Rome, Zurich, Frankfurt, Lisbon, Madrid, and Athens. It also flew to New York via Rio de Janeiro and to Sydney, Australia, via Mauritius. Additionally, TREK Airways had regular flights to Luxembourg.

SAA is the air arm of the South African Railways and Harbors Administration. The Railways Administration was authorized by law in 1931 to operate an air transport service for passengers and freight. No action was taken until 1934 when it acquired Union Airways, a privately owned air cargo and passenger service established in 1929. In 1935 South West African Airways was also incorporated into SAA.

In 1935 SAA carried some 3,000 passengers. The number grew to 37,000 by 1939 but dropped to 30,000 in 1940. In 1941 operations were suspended for the duration of World War II, and SAA planes were converted to military use. Operations were resumed in 1944. During 1945 over 8,000 passengers were carried. Thereafter services expanded rapidly until by the middle of the 1950's passengers exceeded 250,000 annually. Between 1956 and 1967 the number of passengers more than tripled (see table 22).

The SAA fleet in early 1968 included six Boeing 707 jets, seven 727's, and two 737's. By early 1969 it was scheduled to have an additional two 707's and one more 737. Orders had also been placed for three of the new 460-passenger 747's, with delivery in 1971. In 1969 SAA also had seven Vickers Viscount and four DC3's in service. Total investment, including aircraft, was about R140 million. This was expected to double before mid-1975. Total route mileage was more than 67,100 miles. Route mileage is longer for SAA international flights than those of other airlines in the same service because of the barring of overflight and airport use imposed on SAA by most central and north African countries. This neces-
Table 22. South African Airways Operations, Selected Years, 1956–67

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1967</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Service¹</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miles flown</td>
<td>thousands</td>
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<td>5,498</td>
<td>7,418</td>
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<tr>
<td>Passengers</td>
<td>do</td>
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<td>327</td>
<td>699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freight</td>
<td>thousands</td>
<td>1,890</td>
<td>4,775</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mail</td>
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<td>4,096</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional Service²</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Miles flown</td>
<td>thousands</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passengers</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
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<td>Freight</td>
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<td>625</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mail</td>
<td>do</td>
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<td>461</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Service</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miles flown</td>
<td>thousands</td>
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<tr>
<td>Passengers</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>Freight</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>771</td>
<td>977</td>
<td>1,127</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Includes flights to and from South West Africa (Namibia).
² Flights to and from Rhodesia and Mozambique.


SAA to fly around the African continent on flights to Europe.

There are eight national airports servicing Johannesburg-Pretoria, Cape Town, Durban, Bloemfontein, Port Elizabeth, Kimberley, East London, and Upington. The Jan Smuts Airport, situated halfway between Johannesburg and Pretoria, is also an international airport. D. F. Malan Airport at Cape Town was being converted in late 1969 into a second international airport and was scheduled to start operations in early 1970. There are about 400 civil airports throughout the country, about 175 of which are public airports. Local authorities are given assistance by the Division of Civil Aviation, Department of Transport, in constructing airports that are designed for feeder or local air service. The division also provides subsidies intended to expand aviation, such as for the training of pilots, and also provides help to private flying clubs and glider and parachute groups.

Both domestic and international air freight movement has increased at a rapid rate. This has been furthered by the larger capacity of jet liners and, in the case of export air cargo, by special commodity rates on certain types of goods. SAA also employs jets that can be easily converted from all-passenger to all-cargo use or on
which other space adjustments can be made according to passenger-cargo requirements.

The total weight of domestic air cargo increased almost eight times between 1956 and 1966, and a further substantial increase was registered in 1967. International air cargo also increased by about the same amount in the 1956–66 period, although a slight drop was recorded in 1967. Regional air freight grew at a much lower rate from 1956 through 1965, however, increasing by about 50 percent, from 530,000 pounds in 1956 to 898,000 pounds in 1965. The amount in 1966, however, rose sharply to over three times that carried in 1965 and continued heavy in 1967. The spurt during these two years appears connected with economic sanctions imposed on Rhodesia by many countries beginning in 1966 and an accelerated movement of goods to Rhodesia from South Africa, which did not take such action.

COMMUNICATIONS

Telephone and Telegraph Services

All telephone and telegraph services are a government monopoly administered by the Department of Posts and Telegraphs. An exception is made, however, for the South African Railways, which is authorized to maintain and utilize its own facilities for traffic control purposes. One other exception at the beginning of 1969 was the local telephone services furnished in the Durban area by the Durban Corporation. The department’s 1969/70 budget allocated funds to take over this system by early 1970.

There were about 1.24 million telephones in use in 1968, which represented more than 45 percent of all telephones in Africa. Slightly over one-half were business telephones, and the remainder were residential. More than 907,000, or roughly 75 percent, were automatic, with existing manual exchanges more common in the rural areas. Many farming communities were served by party lines, and more than 95,000 farms were connected to such lines.

Conversion of all manual exchanges to automatic is underway. Fully automatic dialing throughout the country is expected to be completed during the 1970’s. Extension of the trunk dialing system was also in process in 1969. Pretoria subscribers were already able to dial a number of major centers. It was anticipated that by 1972 almost all subscribers with automatic service would be encompassed in a countrywide trunk system. Large-scale expansion of the existing microwave network, which now serves all the major centers and some other areas, is also being undertaken to handle a rapidly increasing number of trunk calls. Extension of this system will free overhead wires for use to extend the trunk net into rural areas.
Industrial, commercial, and residential demand for telephones has continued to grow. New telephone connections averaged almost 60,000 a year between 1964 and 1968. Despite this, the backlog of telephone applications rose to about 72,000 at the end of 1968, an increase of 12,000 over the preceding year. An expenditure of R42.6 million for expansion and improvement of telephone services was contained in the Department of Posts and Telegraphs budget submitted to parliament for 1969/70. This included plans for connection of another 75,000 telephones by April 1970.

Countrywide telegraph services are provided by about 3,360 telegraph offices. In 1968 there were automatic telegraph and telex exchanges in major centers including Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, Pretoria, Port Elizabeth, and Bloemfontein. More than 90 percent of the telegraph system was automatic. The automatic system was to be extended to East London and Kimberley during 1969. It was planned eventually to have teleprinters in all but very small telegraph offices, with the latter tied in by telephone to the teleprinter net.

Telecommunications with overseas countries are by submarine cable and radio transmission. In 1968 there was direct radio service to fourteen countries, including overseas and African nations, and cable service as well to the United States, the United Kingdom, India, and Australia. An important new telecommunication link was completed in late 1968 with the laying of a 360-channel submarine coaxial telephone cable between Cape Town and Lisbon, where it linked up with a new similar cable from London. This new cable also tied in at the Canary Islands with a Spanish cable. The cable, which began operations in early 1969, provides high-quality reliable telephone, telex, and data transmission circuits to Europe and most of the developed countries. In connection with the new cable service, a semiautomatic international telephone exchange has been set up in Cape Town. During 1969 a semiautomatic international telex exchange was also to be set up in Pretoria. This exchange, which will be converted to fully automatic operation in 1970, enables telex subscribers to dial the United Kingdom directly and to communicate with other subscribers in eighty-five countries.

Postal Services

The postal system has about 3,100 post offices. In 1967/68 they handled more than 1,258 million pieces of mail, compared with approximately 1,000 million in 1961/62, an increase of over 25 percent. Mechanization is being introduced to handle the steadily rising volume of mail and to relieve a continuing shortage of staff. The shortage of staff had actually become so acute by late 1969 that the post office appealed to private business not to lure away its
skilled postal workers. Both Johannesburg and Cape Town use underground conveyor belts to move mail between the main post office and railroad station, and in Cape Town overhead conveyors are used in unloading mail from ships.

There has been a continuous upward trend also in the amount of mail carried by air. Airmail within the country and to South West Africa increased from 2,786,000 pounds in 1962/63 to 3,919,300 pounds in 1966/67, a rise of almost 41 percent. During the same time, airmail sent abroad increased by almost 33 percent, from 856,000 pounds to 1,137,000 pounds. There is air parcel service to various European countries, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan.

The postal system also operates a Post Office Savings Bank. At the end of March 1968 it had 1,676,070 accounts with depositor assets totaling R140.8 million. Investors had R11.25 million also in Savings Bank Certificates and R101.4 million in Union Loan and National Savings Certificates. Savings bank business could be transacted at 1,640 of the 3,100 post offices.

South Africa is a member of the Universal Postal Union (UPU). At the sixteenth UPU Congress held in Tokyo, Japan, in October 1969, on a motion made by thirty-two other African countries, it was expelled from the congress. The expulsion was based upon the question of the apartheid policies of the government. A motion to expel it from UPU, however, was defeated.

TOURISM

The number of foreign visitors reached a record 299,772 persons in 1968. This represented over 57 percent more than the 190,510 who arrived in 1961 and was a rise of about 19 percent over the 275,583 who came in 1967, as of that year the largest number to visit the country. The country’s share of world tourists; however, remains relatively small, amounting to only about 0.2 percent of the total. Roughly 80 to 81 percent are vacationing tourists; 13 to 14 percent are on business; and 5 to 6 percent come for study and educational purposes.

The greater proportion of foreign visitors are from Africa, mostly from Rhodesia. Important numbers also come from Mozambique and Zambia. Somewhat less than one-fourth of the total are from Europe; about 6 percent are from the western hemisphere; and about 2 to 3 percent now come from Oceania. During 1968 the absolute number from Europe and the United Kingdom increased substantially. The closing of the Suez Canal and the resultant greater number of ships calling at Cape Town and Durban probably helped to raise the total from Europe. The introduction in early 1969 of a new through air route from South Africa to New York
via Rio de Janeiro, putting South Africa in the round-the-world fare plan, can be expected to increase the flow of tourists further.

International tourism is an important sector of the economy. Annual earnings are estimated at about R100 million. This is more than balanced, however, by South Africans traveling abroad. The deficit gap between 1962 and 1967 ran between R9 million and R17 million a year.

An official tourist promotion agency, the South African Tourist Corporation, was established by legislation in 1947 to provide publicity and information services. In 1968 it had overseas offices in London, Paris, Rome, Frankfurt, New York, Los Angeles, Toronto, and Sydney. There was also an office in Salisbury, Rhodesia. The Department of Tourism was established in the government in 1963 for the purpose of coordinating and developing the tourist industry. As of 1968, however, there was no national program. The government-owned South African Railways and Harbors Administration actively promotes tourism and provides special railway and bus services for tourists. An official Hotel Board sets standards for accommodations and food services. There are also several hundred private travel, tour, and transport offices and publicity associations, which promote different aspects of tourism.

Domestic tourism is on the rise among the white population for whom most existing tourist facilities are designed. Major seashore resort facilities are now heavily taxed at peak seasons, and demand is expected to increase further as the white population grows. Separate tourist and recreational facilities exist for nonwhites. The developed and more easily reached beaches, however, are reserved for whites. In many cases beaches assigned to nonwhites are completely undeveloped. Various local authorities have plans to improve and develop beach, camping, and other facilities for nonwhites, and some work has been undertaken. Private development is also being carried out in certain areas, for example, by Asians at Tongaat Beach near Durban. The government in 1967 opened the new Manyaleti game reserve adjacent to Kruger National Park for the sole use of Africans. The South African Institute of Race Relations in 1968 published a holiday guide for nonwhites furnishing details on travel agencies, tours, beaches, and game preserves and other facilities of interest to the nonwhite tourist. It also included information on hotels and restaurants that can be used by nonwhites.
CHAPTER 24
FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Although South Africa is located at a considerable distance from Europe and the United States, the developed sector of the country's economy has traditionally been closely linked with world markets, drawing capital, technology, skilled labor, and imports from abroad and exporting its gold production and an important share of its production of other crude and semifinished goods. Since the 1930's the government has pursued a policy of developing domestic manufacture, which since World War II has had increasing success (see ch. 21, Industry). Exports of semimanufactures such as base metals have consequently increased, and sales of finished manufactures to other African countries have developed. Concurrently, the government has fostered the growth of commercial agriculture and the export of agricultural products (see ch. 20, Agriculture). Exports of agricultural products have expanded greatly, but there has also been considerable progress in domestic consumption and processing of raw materials that were once entirely dependent on the export market. Despite tariffs and import controls designed to replace imports by domestic manufactures wherever possible, the overall volume and cost of imports have grown in the 1960's as the requirements of domestic industry have multiplied. Some policymakers regard this as a transitional stage in the country's growth, but some other observers regard a large volume and increasing variety of imports as an inevitable concomitant of advancing industrial development.

In 1968 merchandise imports were equivalent to about 20 percent of gross national product (GNP) and merchandise exports, excluding gold, to about 15 percent. Total exports of goods and services, including gold, amounted to about 25 percent of gross national product; imports of goods and services were equivalent to about 23 percent. If gold is included, there is a favorable trade balance, but there is a deficit of varying size in merchandise trade excluding gold.

South Africa is a debtor nation. At the end of 1967 its foreign liabilities amounted to the equivalent of nearly US$5.5 billion, compared to foreign assets equivalent to US$2.4 billion. Foreign-financed or -controlled enterprises continue to make an important contribution to economic growth, particularly to the growth of private enterprise. Since the 1930's, however, the growth of domes-
tic savings, including government savings, has reduced dependence upon annual new injections of foreign capital (see ch. 25, Fiscal and Monetary Systems). The government has taken the lead in introducing or expanding lines of activity that might not return an early profit and has also used tariffs and trade controls to reduce the risk-taking element of much private foreign or domestic investment by guaranteeing a protected market.

Net capital inflow from the rest of the world made up only about 6 percent of gross domestic investment during 1967. Net inflow or outflow of foreign capital remains an important element in the balance of payments and in some years has been the critical factor precipitating an exchange crisis. There has been a growing net payment of investment earnings to abroad, which is an important debit item on the current balance of goods and services.

Gold production and sale, which was mounting until 1967, was the crucial stabilizing factor in the country's external transactions over the years. Even in years of heavy imports, poor agricultural exports, or private capital flight, the assured sale to foreign banks or monetary authorities of large quantities of newly mined gold served to cushion the balance of payments against drastic drains on monetary reserves. Since World War II the country has experienced several brief balance-of-payments crises but for the most part has been able to maintain comfortable reserves of foreign exchange and monetary gold.

Because of the importance of newly mined gold to the balance of payments and to the economy, the international gold price was an issue of vital concern to the country's monetary authorities, who, like gold producers everywhere, were continually pressing for a means of selling their product at a price above the US$35 an ounce that has been the official par value since the 1930's. In periods of international monetary uncertainty or crisis, the country thus tended to find its financial interests aligned with those of speculators who were banking on disequilibrium and devaluation in one or more major currencies and opposed to the interests of monetary authorities in most of the major industrial countries. This conflict of interest over gold was a focus of controversy in the United States and Europe through much of 1968 and 1969 and led to some balance-of-payments difficulties for South Africa during 1969, when international speculation in gold began to subside. By the end of 1969, however, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had reached an agreement with South Africa to support its gold sales at US$35 an ounce and to purchase gold whenever the country was suffering a balance-of-payments deficit (see ch. 21, Industry).

Barring new mineral discoveries, major technological breakthroughs, or a rise in the rand price of gold, the outlook at the beginning of the 1970's was thought to be for gradually diminishing production and sale of gold and, consequently, for increased reli-
ance on other components in the balance of external transactions
(see ch. 21, Industry). Such pessimistic prognoses regarding gold
output have been a recurrent feature in South Africa; although they
sometimes may have proved false in the past, they inevitably in-
fluence economic policy. If the forecast trend develops, it will make
the country more heavily dependent on merchandise exports and
on securing a net inflow of private foreign capital for direct invest-
ment. Conscious of this prospect, the government was pursuing an
active export-promotion policy, seeking to attract foreign invest-
ment and using import and exchange controls to induce foreign
firms to increase the South African-made content of goods they
market within the country. Without modifying its ideology, it was
also seeking to improve its political image abroad, where opponents
of the country’s way of life had for some years been pressing for
more effective boycott of South African goods or for other eco-
nomic sanctions (see ch. 16, Foreign Relations).

After resolutions passed by the United Nations General Assembly
and Security Council in 1962 and 1963 that member countries
apply economic sanctions to South Africa because of its racial
policies, the country withdrew or was expelled from most of the
specialized international organizations associated with the United
Nations, including the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
and the International Labor Organization (ILO). It remained a
member of the IMF and the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (IBRD), also known as the World Bank (see ch.
16, Foreign Relations).

Because of the advent of independence for most African coun-
tries, the growing role of African and Asian countries in the United
Nations, the predominance of Afrikaners in the South African
government since 1948, and the break with the Commonwealth of
Nations in 1961, the trend has been toward growing political isola-
tion for South Africa (see ch. 16, Foreign Relations). The govern-
ment has accordingly sought to increase the country’s self-suffi-
ciency as rapidly as possible on every front. Already largely self-
sufficient in foodstuffs, the economy has increased its domestic
production of a range of other supplies, from pulp and paper to
machinery and transport equipment (see ch. 21, Industry). In the
face of an embargo on the shipment of arms to South Africa by
many leading producer nations, the country has developed domestic
munitions production and alternative sources of imports (see ch.
27, The Armed Forces). Anticipating sanctions on shipments of
petroleum, it has increased domestic oil-from-coal production, con-
cluded long-term supply contracts with the Middle East, built up
stockpiles, embarked upon construction of pipeline and tanker
facilities, and increased domestic and government participation in
refining and marketing operations (see ch. 21, Industry).

It has also assigned top priority to oil exploration in the Republic
and in South West Africa (Namibia). Seven of the world's largest oil companies, as well as several large independent companies, are participating with the government's Southern Oil Exploration Corporation (SOEKOR) in exploring for oil on the continental shelf. The Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa Ltd. is participating in Gulf Oil Company's concession in Mozambique, and there is also a possibility of obtaining oil from existing fields or refineries in Angola.

Among the country's major trade and investment partners, opposition to the ideology of apartheid (see Glossary) or to the means used in applying it has for the most part failed to weigh in the balance against the inducement of high returns from trade or investment in South Africa or against the threat of exclusion from its small but sheltered and prospering industrial and high-income consumer markets and the growth potential of its barely tapped low-income consumer market (see ch. 16, Foreign Relations). Moreover, an important element of published opinion in some countries fears that Africans might be the first to suffer from any reduction in trade or investment in the country.

The United Kingdom continues to be by far the most important partner for both trade and investment. Since World War II the United States has advanced to second place as a source of imports and of capital and has increased its importance as an export market. Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) have greatly increased their trade with South Africa in recent years. Trade has also increased with a number of countries of Western Europe, such as France. The Netherlands is an important diamond market, and Belgium is a market for both diamonds and copper.

Since 1963 South Africa has not distinguished among the different countries of Africa in its trade statistics, so that the effect of the trade boycott by most independent African countries is not readily discernible. Independent Zambia, in trying to reduce its imports from Rhodesia, has been obliged to increase its trade with South Africa in 1967 and 1968, despite its political opposition to apartheid. Malawi, Angola, Mozambique, and Rhodesia have not participated in the boycott, and the increase in trade with these areas may help to account for the overall increase in South Africa's trade with the African continent in 1967 and 1968. Moreover, some export to independent African countries may have been achieved by means of transshipment via Mauritius or other ostensible points of origin. In the late 1960's several members of the Organization of African United (OAU), in addition to Malawi, Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland, had begun to favor more normal trade relations with South Africa because of their conviction that Africans in the Republic would be the first to suffer from the trade boycott (see ch.
FOREIGN TRADE

The country usually has a favorable balance of trade, if exports of gold are included. Merchandise trade excluding gold, however, has shown a net trade deficit varying considerably from year to year, primarily in response to the level of internal activity and consequent demand for imports and, to a lesser extent in response to the movement of world demand and prices for basic commodities such as wool and minerals, which constitute an important share of the country's exports. Because the United Kingdom is its most important export market, conditions there also tend to affect South Africa's export trade. Overall dependence on the United Kingdom has been reduced, however; when the pound sterling was devalued in November 1967, South Africa's currency did not follow suit.

The index of trade volume, corrected for price variations, shows the volume of merchandise exports hovering around 100 in the years 1962–65 (1963=100), compared with an index of 75 in 1956 and 41 in 1950. The volume index for imports shows greater year-to-year fluctuations, but since 1963 it has been consistently well above its earlier level, increasing from 90 in 1957 to 100 in 1963 and 126 in 1966. The country's terms of trade (import prices in relation to export prices) were at their most favorable in 1951, when the demand boom caused by the Korean conflict had a stronger impact on world prices for the country's exports of wool and minerals than on its import price level. The export price level declined after 1957 but rose in the years 1963–66 at more or less the same pace as import prices.

The country has proceeded gradually toward greater self-sufficiency, greater export of a broader range of commodities, and some diversification of trade partners. The expansion of the developed sector of the economy since 1945 has taken place in the shelter of protective tariffs and import controls and has been accompanied by extensive government intervention, including some government-owned and -managed industrial enterprise (see ch. 21, Industry). Consequently, it has been the target of considerable criticism from advocates of free trade and champions of private enterprise within South Africa, who seek to prove that freer competition from imports would reduce costs and encourage a better allocation of resources. Much of the published material dealing with the country's foreign trade has been colored by this longstanding controversy. The debate has been intensified in the 1960's as the government has accelerated its efforts to increase the country's self-sufficiency by

16, Foreign Relations). The majority of member states, however, remained opposed to the resumption of trade with South Africa.
replacing a number of previously imported items by domestic manufactures.

Structure of Trade

From 1947 to 1967 there was some shift in the structure of the country’s export trade (see table 23). The shift may be less pronounced than would appear from the statistics, however, since the category “manufactures classified by material” is a very broad grouping comprising rough uncut gem diamonds as well as cut gem diamonds and primary manufactures such as pig iron and unrefined blister copper. On the basis of the years selected in these data published by the South African government, it appears that the country is less dependent than formerly upon imports of the semi-manufactures that constitute much of the group “manufactures classified by material” and that a larger share of imports consisted of machinery and equipment. Since South Africa’s currency followed the early postwar devaluation of the pound of the United Kingdom, its principal market and supplier, the twenty-year shift in the composition of foreign trade is most evident if not converted into dollars. In the 1960’s, however, the South African currency remained stable in relation to the dollar, not having followed the devaluation of the pound sterling in November 1967.

The country’s import trade in the mid-1960’s comprised a wide variety of semimanufactures and finished manufactures (see table 24). Intermediate goods for the country’s industry tended to predominate, but road motor vehicles remained an important item, despite the government’s program to increase the “local content” of automobiles (see ch. 21, Industry). Machinery and equipment for industry and construction remained the most important import category.

Merchandise exports are usually reported excluding gold because of the difficulty of distinguishing exports of newly mined gold from movements in the monetary stock of gold, such as are normally used by other countries, along with movements in foreign exchange reserves, to cover their balance of payments deficit. The gold mines deliver their production to the country’s monetary authorities, who are charged with the responsibility for marketing it abroad. In 1968, an exceptional year, only 38 percent of the country’s gold production was marketed abroad (see ch. 21, Industry). In most years the divergence between production and sale is much smaller; when there is a deficit in other transactions, sales may exceed production as monetary reserves are drawn upon.

If the concept of “net gold output” used in South Africa’s balance of payments is adopted and added to the customs valuation of merchandise export, gold appears to constitute between 35 and 40
percent of total exports (see table 25). If actual sales of gold abroad are used, the variation is somewhat greater: from 34 percent of total exports in 1962 to 49 percent in 1964. At the beginning of the twentieth century gold had constituted about 80 percent of the country's export, but the growth of other exports has greatly reduced this once near-exclusive reliance upon the stable world demand for gold and the far more unreliable market for wool.

Diamonds, wool, and fruit have long vied for first place among the country's merchandise exports (see table 26). Recent gains in exports and reexports of machinery and maize have been more exceptional in character. A part of the diamond export and re-export comes from South West Africa (Namibia), where the mines are exploited by South Africa. Precise export and value data are not available, but in 1966 South West Africa produced an estimated 1,759,000 metric carats of diamonds, compared to 6,037,000 metric carats produced in the Republic. Industrial diamonds show up in the import and reexport statistics, but gem diamonds are reported chiefly as exports. Johannesburg is the seat of the Central Selling Organization of De Beers, which markets about 80 percent of world production. It enters into long-term contracts with producers outside the Republic for the purchase of their production. Its associated companies buy diamonds on the open markets and elsewhere. Diamonds are also sometimes smuggled into the country from elsewhere in Africa by individuals wishing to sell them on the South African markets, as well as being imported through the customs, where the import statistics originate.

The United States Bureau of Mines reported in its 1967 Minerals Yearbook that South Africa's 1966 exports included US$290 million worth of diamond exports and reexports, of which an estimated US$82 million represented South African diamonds. Exports of uranium ore are also obscured in the statistics after 1965. It may be surmised that they are included in the figure for "other crude materials." The United States reported imports of uranium from South Africa valued at US$29 million in 1966 and US$8 million in 1967.

The country increased its copper export in 1966 and 1967, as the new Palabora Mine entered production of ore and copper anodes, world copper prices rose steeply, and a copper strike in 1967 obliged the United States to find alternative sources of supply. In recent years the greatest variant in the list of exports has been maize. Subsidized production has been expanded into marginal dryland farming areas where the harvest is subject to years of drought, but a good crop year results in large exports of surplus feed maize at a loss to the government (see ch. 20, Agriculture). Major purchasers of this surplus feed maize have been the United Kingdom and Japan.
### Table 23. Composition of Foreign Trade of South Africa, by Commodity Groups, 1947, 1957, and 1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Broad groups standard international trade classification</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Merchandise Exports:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and livestock</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>169.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beverages and tobacco</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crude materials, inedible</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>355.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mineral fuels and lubricants</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fats and oils</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals and related products</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufactures classified by materials</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>156.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery and transport equipment</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous finished manufactures</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transactions not classified</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>184.8</td>
<td>801.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Merchandise Imports:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and livestock</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>37.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beverages and tobacco</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crude materials, inedible</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>75.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mineral fuels and lubricants</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>88.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fats and oils</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals and related products</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>68.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufactures classified by material</td>
<td>231.2</td>
<td>346.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery and transport equipment</td>
<td>156.3</td>
<td>377.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous finished manufactures</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>78.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transactions not classified</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>600.7</td>
<td>1,098.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. The Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) of the United Nations is used in tables on merchandise trade. Gold is excluded.
2. In million rand. Between 1948 and 1950 South Africa devalued its currency along with that of its principal trade partner, the United Kingdom. Consequently, the rand value instead of the dollar value is used for this historical comparison. In 1947 the conversion factor was US$2.01 per rand; in 1957 and 1967 it was US$1.40 per rand.
3. Preliminary and adjusted data.
4. Group number 6 of the SITC is very inclusive and comprises rough uncut gem diamonds, base metals, and a range of semimanufactures.

Table 24. Principal Merchandise Imports, South Africa, 1964-68

(in million US dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wheat (unmilled)</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee, tea, cocoa, and spices</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other food and livestock</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>60.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile fibers</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial diamonds</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other crude materials (inedible)</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>81.8</td>
<td>95.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum (crude or partly refined)</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>86.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum products</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>85.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals and related products</td>
<td>172.2</td>
<td>173.2</td>
<td>183.1</td>
<td>219.4</td>
<td>218.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufactures classified by material:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper and paperboard</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>50.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile yarn and thread</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton fabrics</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other textile fabrics</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>96.4</td>
<td>85.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metals and semimanufactures</td>
<td>118.2</td>
<td>202.9</td>
<td>138.1</td>
<td>169.0</td>
<td>126.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other manufactures classified by material</td>
<td>155.9</td>
<td>180.9</td>
<td>162.3</td>
<td>184.4</td>
<td>196.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery and appliances</td>
<td>548.1</td>
<td>665.3</td>
<td>604.9</td>
<td>735.1</td>
<td>726.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railway vehicles</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road motor vehicles</td>
<td>295.5</td>
<td>289.4</td>
<td>272.5</td>
<td>303.9</td>
<td>317.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>57.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ships and boats</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous finished manufactures</td>
<td>143.9</td>
<td>170.9</td>
<td>155.4</td>
<td>198.1</td>
<td>216.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>86.6</td>
<td>100.7</td>
<td>113.4</td>
<td>101.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,155.9</td>
<td>2,458.9</td>
<td>2,303.7</td>
<td>2,687.0</td>
<td>2,638.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Includes Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and South West Africa (Namibia), as well as the Republic of South Africa.
2 The Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) of the United Nations is used in tables on merchandise trade. Gold is excluded.
3 Preliminary data.
4 Means less than half the unit.
5 Imports are valued f.o.b. (free on board) that is, excluding insurance and freight. Military stores and specie are excluded. Parcel post included.

Table 25. Gold Transactions, South Africa, Selected Years, 1960–68  
(in million US dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sales of gold abroad at transaction prices</td>
<td>802.8</td>
<td>684.7</td>
<td>832.7</td>
<td>1,085.3</td>
<td>1,136.8</td>
<td>415.8¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchases of gold abroad²</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net sales of gold abroad</td>
<td>802.8</td>
<td>684.3</td>
<td>832.6</td>
<td>1,085.3</td>
<td>1,136.8</td>
<td>415.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net change in monetary gold reserves</td>
<td>-60.5</td>
<td>200.2</td>
<td>131.3</td>
<td>-55.4</td>
<td>-54.6</td>
<td>660.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance of payments item &quot;net gold output&quot;</td>
<td>742.3</td>
<td>884.5</td>
<td>963.9</td>
<td>1,029.9</td>
<td>1,082.2</td>
<td>1,076.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold production in thousand fine ounces</td>
<td>(21,383)</td>
<td>(25,494)</td>
<td>(27,421)</td>
<td>(29,114)</td>
<td>(30,331)</td>
<td>(31,066)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold production at par value</td>
<td>750.4</td>
<td>804.9</td>
<td>960.5</td>
<td>1,018.9</td>
<td>1,061.6</td>
<td>1,088.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchandise exports, excluding gold³</td>
<td>1,232.6</td>
<td>1,329.3</td>
<td>1,397.5</td>
<td>1,453.9</td>
<td>1,906.6</td>
<td>2,104.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net gold output</td>
<td>742.3</td>
<td>884.5</td>
<td>963.9</td>
<td>1,029.9</td>
<td>1,082.2</td>
<td>1,076.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total export transactions</td>
<td>1,974.9</td>
<td>2,213.8</td>
<td>2,361.4</td>
<td>2,483.8</td>
<td>2,988.8</td>
<td>3,181.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales of newly mined gold as percent of total export transactions</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ In 1968 South Africa sold an abnormally small portion of its gold production because of the introduction of the two-tier gold price in March 1968.
² Customs valuation. Differs from adjusted valuation in balance of payments.
³ Purchases of gold abroad are reported only in fine ounces for 1965 and 1966, were higher than in 1963 but lower than in 1962.

Compared to other African countries, the Republic has a large number of different export commodities to offer on world markets. Apart from gold, however, many of its exports are primary products that tend to fluctuate in price on world commodity markets. Because the export data used for the 1964-67 period include re-exports and emigrants' effects, they may tend to exaggerate the extent to which exports of manufactures, such as iron and steel and machinery and equipment, have actually increased in recent years. The country's markets for finished products are to some extent different from those for crude or semiprocessed commodities. Japanese purchasers, however, are reportedly prepared to take increasing quantities of South African iron and steel products if railway freight rates to the ports can be reduced (see ch. 21, Industry). They have also expressed interest in buying selected auto parts and made-up textiles, as well as iron ore and increasing quantities of foodstuffs. Further expansion of what might be considered a natural market for South African manufactures in developing African countries may be impeded by the determination of most countries to find alternative sources of imports because of their opposition to apartheid policies (see ch. 16, Foreign Relations). In 1967, 83 percent of South Africa's exports and reexports of machinery and transport equipment and 76 percent of its exports and reexports of miscellaneous finished manufactures went to the African continent.

Direction of Trade

Because the country's exports consist largely of food, crude materials, and primary manufactures and its imports consist of finished manufactures, its key trade relationships have been with developed industrial nations. Because of the country's former colonial ties with the United Kingdom and its membership in the Commonwealth until 1961, the United Kingdom has had the leading role both as a source of imports and as a destination of exports. In early 1970 South Africa still accorded, and received, Commonwealth preference in tariff rates, although the margin of preference has narrowed in recent years. South African firms have long-established commercial ties with British firms, which in turn are adapted to Commonwealth trade, and many English-speaking South African consumers have longstanding preferences for goods of British or Commonwealth origin.

Since World War II, however, active foreign traders from other nations have made important inroads on the South African market (see table 27). This is particularly true of the sale of capital equipment. In 1967 machinery and equipment accounted for 64 percent of South African imports from West Germany; 60 percent of imports from Italy; 55 percent of imports from the United Kingdom;
Table 26. Principal Merchandise Exports, Southern Africa, 1964–68
(in million US dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fish, fresh or preserved</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize (corn), unmilled</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>110.5</td>
<td>148.2</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oranges (fresh)</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apples</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruit and vegetables, other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(fresh, dried, or preserved)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw sugar</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishmeal for feed</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other foodstuffs, including animals</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hides, skins, and fur skins (undressed)</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulp and waste paper</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wool and hair</td>
<td>185.2</td>
<td>172.8</td>
<td>179.4</td>
<td>149.2</td>
<td>161.6</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial diamonds</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asbestos</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uranium and thorium ores and concentrates</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other metalliferous ores and scrap</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other crude materials (inedible)</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>97.1</td>
<td>116.6</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufactures classified by material:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diamonds, nonindustrial</td>
<td>132.9</td>
<td>172.7</td>
<td>221.1</td>
<td>217.9</td>
<td>268.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pig iron, including cast iron</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferromanganese</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferrochrome</td>
<td>nss</td>
<td>nss</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper and alloys</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>125.7</td>
<td>164.5</td>
<td>164.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Other manufactures classified by material  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>103.9</td>
<td>128.6</td>
<td>139.9</td>
<td>149.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery and transport equipment&lt;sup&gt;6&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>87.6</td>
<td>105.5&lt;sup&gt;6&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>178.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>277.2</td>
<td>175.1</td>
<td>162.9</td>
<td>220.0</td>
<td>287.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports and Reexports (excluding gold)&lt;sup&gt;7&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1,458.1</td>
<td>1,347.8</td>
<td>1,690.4</td>
<td>1,910.9</td>
<td>2,110.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>1</sup> Includes Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and South West Africa (Namibia), as well as the Republic of South Africa.

<sup>2</sup> 0 means less than half the unit.

<sup>3</sup> Industrial diamond exports include large element of reexport not reported. In 1967, 98.8 percent of reported export was reexport.

<sup>4</sup> Not all the nonindustrial diamonds reported as exports are from the Republic.

<sup>5</sup> It is not clear where uranium and thorium ores are included in 1966 and 1967, possibly under "other crude materials."

<sup>6</sup> Not separately specified in the source, included in "other manufactures."

<sup>7</sup> In 1967, 66 percent of exports of machinery and transport equipment consisted of reexports.

Exports valued f.o.b. (free on board) at place of dispatch from the Republic. Excludes gold bullion.

50 percent of imports from the United States; and 39 percent of imports from Japan. Passenger cars and trucks were important items, but a range of industrial and construction machinery accounted for much of the import from leading industrial nations.

The United States has become an important trade partner of South Africa since World War II, but the most striking recent shift in the trade pattern has been the increase in trade with West Germany and Japan. Exports to Japan have expanded even more rapidly than imports, and trade with the United Kingdom has been nearly in balance in recent years. There is a heavy deficit in trade, however, with the United States and West Germany.

The United Kingdom and the African continent were the leading markets for South African goods in the late 1960's. Exports to Japan were expanding rapidly. It is not clear to what extent the closing of the Suez Canal in mid-1967 may have influenced the increase in Japan's purchases of South African goods in 1967 and 1968 and its expression of interest in further purchasing contracts for the future. In any case, the two economies are in some respects complementary. The United States was fourth in importance as a market for South Africa's exports in the late 1960's, just ahead of West Germany. Exports to Japan and to the United Kingdom were more or less evenly divided among foodstuffs, crude materials, and semimanufactures (see table 28). Exports to the United States consisted primarily of crude materials and metals whereas manufactures and petroleum products were more important in exports and re-exports to the African continent.

Trade Facilities and Regulation

The country's distribution system is largely in private hands, although government enterprises account for an increasing share of production and thus afford an important market for foreign exporters. Since World War II the economy has developed modern and varied means of distribution, with large-scale units on the increase (see ch. 23, Domestic Trade). Monetary and credit facilities were well developed by the 1960's. The country's resources of entrepreneurial talent and ability are reportedly highly regarded internationally, and business leaders are experienced and sophisticated in foreign trade.

Government regulations permeate every aspect of economic and social activity. The government determines transport and communications policy and development and has tended to discourage road transport and to maintain high rail-freight rates. The system of foreign exchange control and licensing is extensive, but the rigor with which it is enforced varies greatly according to the current monetary and foreign exchange situation. Within the limitations
Table 27. South African Trade with Selected Countries, 1966–68
(in millions US dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>628,508</td>
<td>695,962</td>
<td>629,297</td>
<td>566,055</td>
<td>589,688</td>
<td>666,488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany (West</td>
<td>246,380</td>
<td>323,562</td>
<td>355,179</td>
<td>97,149</td>
<td>120,025</td>
<td>141,893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>25,759</td>
<td>35,755</td>
<td>28,734</td>
<td>566,055</td>
<td>589,688</td>
<td>666,488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>71,852</td>
<td>98,977</td>
<td>109,253</td>
<td>62,243</td>
<td>70,230</td>
<td>60,145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>57,679</td>
<td>75,310</td>
<td>93,821</td>
<td>54,895</td>
<td>49,221</td>
<td>52,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>25,065</td>
<td>35,755</td>
<td>28,734</td>
<td>566,055</td>
<td>589,688</td>
<td>666,488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>71,852</td>
<td>98,977</td>
<td>109,253</td>
<td>62,243</td>
<td>70,230</td>
<td>60,145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>57,679</td>
<td>75,310</td>
<td>93,821</td>
<td>54,895</td>
<td>49,221</td>
<td>52,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>407,819</td>
<td>451,146</td>
<td>465,931</td>
<td>27,976</td>
<td>29,166</td>
<td>34,006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>22,230</td>
<td>25,899</td>
<td>28,380</td>
<td>9,614</td>
<td>7,662</td>
<td>12,208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Hemisphere, other</td>
<td>126,113</td>
<td>117,870</td>
<td>173,544</td>
<td>116,698</td>
<td>245,270</td>
<td>286,231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>185,483</td>
<td>213,539</td>
<td>228,476</td>
<td>34,003</td>
<td>38,894</td>
<td>43,271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>30,933</td>
<td>43,957</td>
<td>39,337</td>
<td>13,607</td>
<td>16,780</td>
<td>18,327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania, other</td>
<td>11,871</td>
<td>3,903</td>
<td>2,032</td>
<td>2,104</td>
<td>3,158</td>
<td>3,731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>179,613</td>
<td>197,759</td>
<td>168,847</td>
<td>272,972</td>
<td>312,791</td>
<td>348,719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ships' stores, parcel post, immigrants' effects; goods not reported by destination</td>
<td>35,566</td>
<td>36,415</td>
<td>36,188</td>
<td>33,546</td>
<td>72,120</td>
<td>92,881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,303,755</td>
<td>2,687,041</td>
<td>2,638,108</td>
<td>1,690,398</td>
<td>1,910,908</td>
<td>2,110,230</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Excludes gold. Uranium exports not reported by destination.
2 Preliminary data.
3 Includes, among others, Hong Kong, Ceylon, and Communist China (People's Republic of China).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>All countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Food and Livestock:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rock lobster</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>n.r.</td>
<td>n.r.</td>
<td>8,708</td>
<td>10,298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize (unmilled)</td>
<td>33,484</td>
<td>n.r.</td>
<td>15,904</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>110,531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fresh fruit</td>
<td>39,504</td>
<td>n.r.</td>
<td>n.r.</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>85,334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canned peaches, pineapple, apricots</td>
<td>32,022</td>
<td>n.r.</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>37,696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw sugar and molasses</td>
<td>13,871</td>
<td>n.r.</td>
<td>14,381</td>
<td>7,934</td>
<td>48,516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>185,840</td>
<td>32,834</td>
<td>81,403</td>
<td>20,996</td>
<td>452,984</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Crude Materials, inedible:</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karakul pelts</td>
<td>15,975</td>
<td>n.r.</td>
<td>n.r.</td>
<td></td>
<td>20,724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw wool</td>
<td>14,477</td>
<td>n.r.</td>
<td>21,967</td>
<td>14,126</td>
<td>135,439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial diamonds</td>
<td>14,561</td>
<td>n.r.</td>
<td>n.r.</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>66,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asbestos</td>
<td>9,236</td>
<td>n.r.</td>
<td>3,822</td>
<td>7,949</td>
<td>41,598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manganese ore</td>
<td>3,381</td>
<td>n.r.</td>
<td>3,381</td>
<td>4,253</td>
<td>26,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other crude materials (including uranium)</td>
<td>61,103</td>
<td>n.r.</td>
<td>29,170</td>
<td>16,704</td>
<td>178,404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>118,733</td>
<td>8,707</td>
<td>82,891</td>
<td>43,193</td>
<td>469,105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Manufactures Classified by Material:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gem diamonds</td>
<td>160,411</td>
<td>n.r.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7,840</td>
<td>221,148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pig iron and ferroalloys</td>
<td>6,360</td>
<td>n.r.</td>
<td>33,169</td>
<td>10,224</td>
<td>75,211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper, refined and unrefined</td>
<td>8,767</td>
<td>n.r.</td>
<td>38,689</td>
<td>48,023</td>
<td>122,014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>194,842</td>
<td>88,774</td>
<td>74,379</td>
<td>78,026</td>
<td>593,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery and Transport Equipment</td>
<td>4,927</td>
<td>88,175</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>2,953</td>
<td>105,448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous Finished Manufactures</td>
<td>2,071</td>
<td>21,013</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>1,690</td>
<td>27,466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Exports</td>
<td>83,275</td>
<td>73,288</td>
<td>51,222</td>
<td>3,523</td>
<td>262,786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (exports and reexports excluding gold)</strong></td>
<td>589,688</td>
<td>312,791</td>
<td>245,270</td>
<td>150,381</td>
<td>1,910,908</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n.r.—not reported in source.

imposed by other policy priorities, the government is actively seeking to promote foreign investment and, where goods needed for development are not available domestically, imports have expanded greatly.

The country accords selective tariff preference to the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth areas. Tariff and trade controls are highly flexible, permitting rapid imposition of protection to favor domestic industry, including producing subsidiaries of foreign firms. In recent years the authorities have pursued a policy of progressively raising tariff and exchange barriers on certain products so as to lock in foreign investors already committed to the market. In general, the government has allowed liberal repatriation of capital and dividends.

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

Annual net movements in the principal components of the country's foreign exchange position are reflected in its balance of payments statement (see table 29). The current account, representing the net flow of goods and services and transfer payments between the country and the rest of the world, is divided into merchandise trade, net gold production, services, and unrequited transfers. The size of the trade deficit is determined in part by the growth in imports, by subsidies for such important exports as maize and sugar, and by year-to-year fluctuations in agricultural production because of drought or other factors. It is affected by the country's terms of trade—that is, the movement of import prices in relation to export prices. Primarily, however, it reflects the level of demand for imports generated by the domestic economy and by consumer purchasing power, as well as the impact of foreign exchange and other restrictions on imports in a given period.

The trade deficit that can be incurred without serious reduction in the country's reserves of monetary gold and foreign exchange has in the past been permitted primarily by large continuing sales abroad of newly mined gold. The most variable element in recent years, however, has been the balance on capital account, particularly net movements of private capital. These have tended to reflect the confidence of speculators or long-term investors in the future trend of the gold price relative to the value of major national currencies, or in the stability and growth of the country's sheltered domestic market and the relative rate of return it offers on investment.

Unlike the merchandise balance and the capital account, the principal categories of services on current account have not usually been a major source of year-to-year payments fluctuations. The cost of insurance and freight on merchandise was a direct reflection of the
Table 29. Balance of Payments, Southern African Monetary Area, Selected Years, 1960–68
(in millions of US dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balance of merchandise trade</td>
<td>-347</td>
<td>-134</td>
<td>-671</td>
<td>-946</td>
<td>-609</td>
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<tr>
<td>Net gold output</td>
<td>741</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>1,076</td>
<td>1,082</td>
<td>1,077</td>
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<td>Receipt and merchandise insurance</td>
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<td>-84</td>
<td>-126</td>
<td>-134</td>
<td>-136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment income</td>
<td>-228</td>
<td>-224</td>
<td>-294</td>
<td>-325</td>
<td>-332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other services</td>
<td>-28</td>
<td>-38</td>
<td>-94</td>
<td>-45</td>
<td>-32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total goods and services, net</strong></td>
<td>37</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>-109</td>
<td>-367</td>
<td>-32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Net Exports</strong></td>
<td><strong>-37</strong></td>
<td><strong>-11</strong></td>
<td><strong>21</strong></td>
<td><strong>22</strong></td>
<td><strong>53</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Central government and banking</strong></td>
<td><strong>29</strong></td>
<td><strong>37</strong></td>
<td><strong>70</strong></td>
<td><strong>85</strong></td>
<td><strong>105</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Balance of payments on current account</strong></td>
<td><strong>29</strong></td>
<td><strong>431</strong></td>
<td><strong>-18</strong></td>
<td><strong>-260</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Current Account</strong></td>
<td><strong>-111</strong></td>
<td><strong>-70</strong></td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
<td><strong>46</strong></td>
<td><strong>141</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Stock exchange transactions</td>
<td><strong>-111</strong></td>
<td><strong>-70</strong></td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
<td><strong>46</strong></td>
<td><strong>141</strong></td>
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<td>Direct private investment</td>
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<td><strong>-14</strong></td>
<td><strong>77</strong></td>
<td><strong>41</strong></td>
<td><strong>97</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Other private long term</td>
<td><strong>-42</strong></td>
<td><strong>-30</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
<td><strong>130</strong></td>
<td><strong>111</strong></td>
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<td>Other private short term</td>
<td><strong>-32</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
<td><strong>71</strong></td>
<td><strong>20</strong></td>
<td><strong>46</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Central Government and Banking</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long term</td>
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<td>-62</td>
<td>74</td>
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<tr>
<td>Short term</td>
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<td>-38</td>
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<td>-31</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total net capital movements</strong></td>
<td><strong>-197</strong></td>
<td><strong>-183</strong></td>
<td><strong>178</strong></td>
<td><strong>144</strong></td>
<td><strong>498</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Errors and omissions</strong></td>
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<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>31</strong></td>
<td><strong>92</strong></td>
<td><strong>126</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>-185</strong></td>
<td><strong>263</strong></td>
<td><strong>190</strong></td>
<td><strong>-24</strong></td>
<td><strong>750</strong></td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Change in gold and foreign exchange reserves (minus equals increase):**

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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Monetary gold</td>
<td><strong>60</strong></td>
<td>-200</td>
<td>-211</td>
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<td>659</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign exchange</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>-63</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-29</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Includes Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, and South West Africa (Namibia), as well as the Republic of South Africa.
2 Preliminary data.
3 Net sales of gold abroad at transaction prices, plus or minus the increase or decrease in monetary gold holdings at par value.


Mounting volume and value of imports in the 1960's. The expansion of South African subsidiaries of foreign firms and foreign holdings of South African securities, with the high rate of dividend earnings during most of the 1960's, has led to a fairly steady increase since 1963 in net dividend payments abroad, the largest element of investment income. The category "other services" reflects a net deficit from travel and tourism throughout the 1960's, despite increased earnings from tourism in South Africa; a small continuing net payment for nonmerchandise insurance; and a continuing net payment for other miscellaneous services, including migrants' remittances, returning residents' funds and effects, and...
legacies. After the closing of the Suez Canal in mid-1967, large numbers of foreign ships were diverted to the route around the Cape, to South Africa's benefit. The previous moderate deficit on transportation account gave way to sizable net earnings for 1967 and 1968 from ships' stores and other port expenditures. Although ships' stores are included in the customs data on merchandise exports, in the balance-of-payments presentation they are excluded from exports and included in the net balance for "other services."

Since World War II the country has experienced only four fairly severe balance-of-payments crises, when there was a material drain on reserves of monetary gold and foreign exchange in addition to usual sales of newly mined gold. The crisis of 1948–49 was caused by a merchandise import deficit so large that it could not be offset even by a large capital inflow. The South African currency (at that time the South African pound) therefore followed the 1949 devaluation of the British pound sterling and certain other currencies, and the balance was subsequently restored. In 1953 there was another crisis caused by excessive imports as a result of inflationary pressure, which was relieved by imposition of monetary and fiscal restraints. The foreign exchange crisis of 1957–58 was caused by a substantial net outflow of private capital, which was reversed in late 1958 by drastic monetary and fiscal measures but resumed in 1959.

The outflow of private capital, which had been initiated in part by a credit squeeze in the United Kingdom and a slowing of the rate of economic expansion in South Africa, was greatly accelerated in 1960, after the shootings at Sharpeville caused investors to lose confidence in the future of the country's economy (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). The break with the Commonwealth in May 1961 also contributed to investors' uncertainty and fueled rumors of a possible devaluation of South Africa's currency. The balance-of-payments crisis of 1960–61 was more severe than any experienced by the country since 1932.

In 1961 and 1962 internal credit was restrained, and strict exchange controls were imposed on imports and other transactions. In June 1961 exchange control was extended to stock exchange transactions: South African residents were not allowed to send funds for purchases of securities abroad, and foreign residents who sold shares on the Johannesburg exchange were not allowed to repatriate the proceeds. Consequently, South African shares were quoted in London at prices well below those on the Johannesburg exchange. During 1961–62 the economy contracted, and demand for imports slowed. Together with the new restrictions, this resulted in an improvement in the foreign exchange position in 1962 despite the continuing net outflow of foreign capital. Economic activity revived after 1963, and exchange controls and import tariffs were effectively used by the government to induce foreign firms to increase
their direct investment in South African manufacturing capacity (see ch. 21, Industry). The outflow of private long-term capital was much reduced in 1964 and reversed by March 1965. Net direct investment in South African subsidiaries of foreign firms was an important element in the positive capital balance in 1965 and 1966.

The strong rate of growth in the economy, particularly in private consumption and in manufacturing production, was reflected in increased trade deficits from 1963 through 1967. The year 1968 affords an illustration of the effect on the balance of payments of a period of limited expansion in the domestic economy but buoyant foreign demand for gold-mining stocks or other South African securities or investments. During the year there was a record inflow of foreign capital. This was largely a result of international monetary uncertainty in the wake of devaluation of the pound sterling in November 1967.

Sales of newly mined gold abroad were very limited in 1968. In March 1968 the monetary authorities of the seven former Gold Pool countries met in Washington and agreed to introduce a new two-tier price system for gold (see ch. 21, Industry). Under this system the free-market price was allowed to fluctuate freely, and only official or central bank purchases for monetary reserves were supported at US$35 an ounce. In an attempt to drive up the free-market price and undermine the two-tier system, the South African monetary authorities withheld their newly mined gold from the international market during 1968 and much of 1969.

Until the fourth quarter of 1968, however, the inflow of foreign capital was sufficient to cover the somewhat reduced trade deficit. Imports had slowed, and exports were increased by sale of the 1967 bumper crop of maize. Consequently, the country's reserves could be built up chiefly in the form of unsold gold production. In the last quarter of the year, when economic activity was mounting, demand for foreign exchange increased, but the authorities were able to sell some newly mined gold on the free market and to the central banks of certain countries, such as Portugal, which were not participating in the two-tier gold agreement.

Monetary events in 1969 reportedly caused gold-mining shares to lose much of their lure for speculators. The French franc was devalued in August, and the Deutsche Mark was increased in value in October. A system of Special Drawing Rights was announced by the IMF in the summer of 1969, to take effect on January 1, 1970. The Special Drawing Rights would be used to supplement gold and foreign exchange in the IMF's resources and increase the quotas on which member countries could draw when needed. According to press reports, speculators had already abandoned gold after March 1969, when interest rates on the Euro-dollar market began rising sharply.
Average share prices on the Johannesburg exchange fell sharply after May 1969, and the press reported that the net inflow of private capital to South Africa had ceased. At the same time, revived domestic activity caused a strong rise in imports, without any corresponding growth in exports. South Africa drew on its monetary gold quota at the IMF, and the press reported that in the three months July through September 1969 South Africa sold more gold than was sold in all of 1968.

At the end of 1969 an agreement was finally reached by which the IMF agreed to make official purchases of newly mined gold from South Africa whenever the country had a balance-of-payments deficit on its other transactions over a period of six months. In addition, the IMF agreed to support the price of gold at US$35 an ounce by providing that whenever the free-market price falls below that level, South Africa may divert its sales to the IMF. The agreement would not prevent South Africa from running a surplus and accumulating newly mined gold in its own official reserves, although it agreed to sell its gold on the free market "in an orderly manner."

FOREIGN INVESTMENT

At the end of 1967 foreign investment in southern Africa—largely in the Republic—amounted to more than the equivalent of US$5.5 billion (see table 30). This figure probably underestimates the current market price in 1967 of shares reported at par value or at the 1956 market value, and therefore does not include the full amount of annual private capital transactions shown in the balance-of-payments data. About 64 percent of the total foreign investment reported was from the sterling area—principally the United Kingdom—and about 14.6 percent was from the dollar area—principally the United States. Despite the expansion of subsidiaries of several United States firms, the relative share of the United States and the United Kingdom in reported foreign assets in South Africa had apparently not altered very materially since 1960. At that time, residents of the United Kingdom owned 20 percent of total foreign liabilities of South African mining companies and more than 18 percent of the foreign liabilities of private manufacturing concerns; the share of the United States was far smaller. Most of these liabilities were in the form of shares and undistributed profits. At the end of 1966 the total long-term and short-term liabilities of the private sector were reported as US$2,699 million to the United Kingdom; US$280 million to other sterling area countries; US$630 million to the United States; US$35 million to international organizations; US$119 million to other dollar area countries; US$255 million to France; US$183 million to Switzerland; and US$308 million to other countries.
The value of direct investment in South Africa reported by United States firms had increased materially during the 1960's, chiefly by reinvestment or retention in reserves of undistributed profits. The increased United States stake in the country's manufacturing was particularly striking (see table 31). This may reflect the success of the South African government's program using tariffs and import quotas to increase the domestically produced content of automobiles, refined petroleum products, and other products marketed in the country by foreign firms (see ch. 21, Industry). The United States figure for direct investment in South Africa, based upon reports by a sample of 1,000 United States firms, is US$666 million at the end of 1967, considerably higher than the equivalent of US$413 million reported by South Africa for direct investment from the dollar area. The source of the discrepancy is not known. It is noteworthy that in investment, as in trade, the United States share is of far greater importance to South Africa than is the South African share to total United States foreign investment or foreign trade.

According to a United Nations report published in 1968, the ratio of total earnings on direct investment by the United States and the United Kingdom in South Africa in the mid-1960's to the reported value of their direct investment in the country has been relatively high. Calculated as a ratio of total reported earnings to the value of reported direct investment, the return of United States investors in South Africa rose to a high of 20.7 percent in 1966. In 1968, however, it was down to 17.3 percent, compared to a return of 21.6 percent for United States investment in all of Africa and 10.8 percent for total United States foreign investment. The United Kingdom data for the mid-1960's showed returns on investment in South Africa at 12 to 14 percent, compared to only 11 or 12 percent on United Kingdom investment in the United States and about 8 percent on total investment abroad.

CUSTOMS AGREEMENT WITH BOTSWANA, LESOTHO, AND SWAZILAND

South Africa has long had a special economic relationship with the former high commission territories of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. Botswana (formerly Bechuanaland) became independent of Great Britain in September 1966; Lesotho (former Basutoland), in October 1966; and Swaziland, in September 1968. The three countries form a common monetary and payments area with the Republic and with South West Africa, all using the South African rand. A customs agreement has been in force between the three countries and South Africa since 1910, with goods moving freely among them. The agreement was renegotiated and a new treaty signed on December 11, 1969. The three new states had pressed for
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Sterling area</th>
<th>Dollar area</th>
<th>International organizations</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Western Europe</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Direct Investment</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Central government and banking:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Long term:</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>183</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Short term:</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>Private sector:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Long term:</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Shares, nominal value:</td>
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<td>112</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>790</td>
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<td>Reserves:</td>
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<td>170</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1,707</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>Long-term loans, mortgages:</td>
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<td>36</td>
<td>70</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<td>87</td>
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<td>623</td>
<td>507</td>
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<td>3,763</td>
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</table>

**Nondirect Investment**

| Central government and banking: | | | | | | |
| Long term: | 49 | 11 | 39 | 70 | 1 | 171 | |
| Short term: | 104 | 144 | | 31 | | 278 | |
| Total: | 153 | 155 | 39 | 101 | 1 | 449 | |
Private sector:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Long term</th>
<th>Long-term loans, mortgages</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Shares⁴</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Short term</td>
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<td>Total Foreign Liabilities</td>
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<td>5,552</td>
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¹Includes Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, and South West Africa (Namibia), as well as the Republic of South Africa.
²Direct investment refers to foreign investments in South African enterprises in which business control is exercised from abroad.
³Nondirect investment refers to all foreign liabilities not covered by the term direct investment.
⁴Listed securities were valued at average market values as at the end of 1956 in the case of nondirect investment. All other securities were included at nominal values.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>Mining and smelting</th>
<th>Petroleum</th>
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<th>Trade</th>
<th>Other</th>
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<td>41</td>
<td>601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968¹</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>692</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total direct investment (end of 1968):**

- **Africa:** 2,673
- **World abroad:** 64,756

**Investment in South Africa as percentage of:**

- **Total Africa:** 25.8%
- **Total world:** 1.1%
1968 Earnings on direct investment in South Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>1968 Earnings on direct investment in South Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>31 nss(^2) 37 nss(^2) 52 120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinvested earnings</td>
<td>-7 nss(^2) 16 nss(^2) 17 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>32 nss(^2) 19 nss(^2) 23 74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Extrapolated from data supplied by sample of 1,000 United States firms, which at last census in 1957 accounted for 85 percent of United States foreign investment. May be revised upon completion of 1966 census. Reported as investment in Republic of South Africa; might include some activity in South West Africa (Namibia) or Botswana.

2 Not separately specified, included in "other."

3 Includes petroleum (refining, distribution, exploration).

4 Earnings plus interest equals income plus withholding taxes plus reinvested earnings.

5 Preliminary data for 1968.

renegotiation of the old treaty, which they found unsatisfactory in several respects.

The most immediate cause of dissatisfaction had been the share of customs revenue allotted to them. Because their tax base is very limited, customs revenue is an extremely important potential source of funds for development and other national needs. Under the 1910 agreement, however, the share of the customs area's total customs revenue allocated to the three former high commission territories combined was fixed at a flat 1.31097 percent, which was reallocated among the three in fiscal year 1964/65. Under the 1969 agreement, a mathematical formula was adopted by which each of the three states would receive a share of the customs area's total pool of revenue from customs and sales or excise taxes based upon the level, two years earlier, of its imports, its production of dutiable or taxable goods, and the duty paid. This means that the greater the total of each former territory's imports and local production of taxable goods, the greater the amount received by that member, with South Africa taking the residue. This formula was applied retroactively as of April 1969. A South African financial journal estimated that for fiscal 1969/70, Swaziland might receive R5.4 million (1 rand equals US$1.40) under the new formula against about R3.2 million under the old agreement; Lesotho, some R4 million against R2.5 million; and Botswana, R3.2 million against R2.8 million.

The new treaty also contains an explicit statement that the exchange of goods among the four countries shall be duty free. The old agreement had not provided effective safeguard against the unilateral imposition of barriers by South Africa against imports from the other three members. Article 6 of the new agreement provides that any one of the three new states may introduce a tariff to protect an infant industry, provided that the tariff is applied equally against all three of the other members. An example is the shoe industry in Botswana, which requires protection against competition from South African-made shoes. Representatives of the four countries are to meet at least once a year, and more often whenever required. If any member's producers are being hurt by the operation of the treaty, their members are to consult.
CHAPTER 25
FISCAL AND MONETARY SYSTEMS

In recent years, South Africa has developed a system of financial institutions comparable to those of a mature economy. Government fiscal and monetary policy in the years since World War II has been generally expansionary; but since 1964 the expanded powers of the monetary authorities have been used, with varying effectiveness, to restrain the expansion of credit and reduce the inflationary pressure of excess demand on the country's price level.

Fiscal and monetary policy is used primarily to generate growth and preserve equilibrium in the white-owned sector of the economy. Development in the African subsistence sector, to bring its productivity and income levels more nearly into line with those of the money economy, has not been given high priority as a direct objective of financial policy. The subsistence sector is, however, affected by the employment of Africans as wage labor in the money economy. Development in the African reserves (see Glossary) is also very heavily dependent upon government expenditure, but the level of such expenditure has been relatively limited through the 1960's. Other priorities made heavy demands upon the available government revenues.

An important objective of fiscal and monetary policy is anticyclical, that is, designed to combat excessive swings in the business cycle—in the form of recession or inflation—in the course of economic growth. Too rapid expansion of aggregate demand in excess of the available supply of goods and services may drive up the level of prices and production costs, as occurred notably in 1964 and 1965. Of the components of aggregate demand, private consumption and private capital formation may be affected by both monetary controls on the extension of credit and by fiscal policy, through taxes on corporate profits or personal incomes. Government capital formation and government consumption are also important components of aggregate demand and are directly determined by fiscal policy (see table 15). During the 1960's, however, mounting government expenditure for defense, police, and population movement control has reduced the flexibility of fiscal policy as an anticyclical instrument, and the authorities have relied more heavily upon monetary policy, notably credit restrictions.

Monetary and financial factors have had an important influence in
the impressive growth of the money economy since World War II. Unlike most developing countries, South Africa has a high rate of domestic saving. The wealth generated by diamond and gold mines beginning in the 1870's was reinvested in large part within the country, at first in response to lucrative opportunities but more recently also as a result of taxation or in compliance with government controls on foreign exchange and capital movements. Since World War II, manufacturing has also contributed heavily to domestic saving.

Compared to most of sub-Saharan Africa, the country has a relatively large white population, making up nearly one-fifth of the nation. Moreover, in contrast to most former colonial countries of Africa, the whites have relatively strong ties, financial as well as affective, to the country in which they live. They are also thought to have a high propensity to save. The high earnings made possible in many lines of enterprise by the use of very large proportions of low-cost African labor have been distributed among the white population, not only in the form of returns on capital, but also in wages and salaries that are relatively high in terms of the country's cost of living.

Thus, the inequality of income distribution, at the same time that it has limited the growth of the consumer market, has fostered the growth of private domestic saving. The fiscal system is also designed to encourage personal saving, although it siphons off a substantial share of corporate saving to fuel government consumption and capital expenditure. The burden of personal income tax is moderate compared to other countries, especially in the higher brackets where a larger share of income goes to some form of saving rather than to immediate consumption. On the other hand, taxation of gold and diamond mining is designed to yield optimum revenue for the public budget, which regularly shows a surplus on current expenditure account. This public saving has been an important element in domestic capital formation, especially since World War II. At times it has exceeded corporate saving and rivaled personal saving in value.

Foreign capital, particularly long-term equity investment, still plays a fairly important part in the creation of new productive capacity in the country. Although heavy foreign purchases of gold mining shares in recent years have been essentially speculative in character, numbers of foreign firms have been establishing production subsidiaries or expanding their plant capacity in the country (see ch. 24, Foreign Economic Relations). Much of this investment has been directed into areas or lines of production given priority by government policy (see ch. 21, Industry).

Until World War II, the country relied heavily upon the financial
markets and the short-term money market of London. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the mining finance houses of Johannesburg generated much of their own financing out of reinvested profits, but they retained close ties with the London financial markets. Short-term assets tended to flow to the London money market, and the commercial banks and insurance companies were for the most part London-based.

In the twenty-four years of postwar economic growth a more sophisticated system of financial intermediaries has developed within the country, and by 1965 the short-term money market was said to be comparable to that of a mature economy. It has grown up in part in response to the growing prosperity and complexity of the money economy, which in turn has helped to foster. In part, the development of new financial institutions has resulted from the desire of the Nationalist government to sever old ties with the British Commonwealth, reduce dependence upon London markets, or ensure the direction of financial flows into activities favored by government policy. This official policy was preceded and accompanied by a successful campaign of the Broederbond (Brotherhood), a nationalist secret society, to increase Afrikaner ownership and management of banks, life insurance companies, mining houses, and other financial institutions.

Government finance has had an important redistributive effect in the limited sense of channeling a substantial share of private corporate earnings, notably gold mining earnings, through the public budget into government consumption or capital expenditure. Much of this expenditure goes for defense, police and prisons, population movement control, interest on the public debt, and administrative expenditures. There are also substantial expenditures that are redistributive in the social sense, notably pensions, heavy agricultural subsidies, and expenditures for the development of agriculture. There is capital expenditure on water schemes such as the Orange River Development Project, designed to create an irrigated white-farming heartland.

Through discriminatory freight charges, government operation of the railways has always been used to subsidize farming at the expense of industry. In more recent years employment policies on the railways and in other government services have been used as a means of income redistribution to provide employment and later pensions for Afrikaner “poor whites” who had left the farms and could not find employment in the cities. Since 1963, concessions on rates or construction of rail, power, and other facilities have been offered to industries that support the government’s population control policies by establishing or expanding plant outside the more developed urban areas (see ch. 19, Character and Structure of the
Economy). By concessions of this nature as well as by its own capital investment activities the government redirects financial flows from one branch of activity or geographic region to another.

Revenue and expenditure are voted by Parliament, which is elected by only the white electorate. It has not been a deliberate objective of government policy to promote the redistribution of income between the white one-fifth of the population on the one hand and the lower income four-fifths on the other. In principle, each population group is supposed to be taxed, to pay for its own education, health, and other facilities. Because many Africans have little or no income, the application of this principle has severely limited expansion in African education, for example.

In practice, there is some net transfer to expenditure on Africans from the central government’s revenue account, which is derived in large part from direct taxes on white profits and earned incomes but also from indirect taxes that affect Africans as well as whites. White earnings, in turn, are derived in part from the use of low-paid, non-white labor. This expenditure has increased somewhat in absolute terms in line with the policy of separate development, or geographic apartheid. For example, the government has been constructing new townships near the borders of the African reserves to provide workers for white-owned factories in the nearby border areas (see ch. 19, Character and Structure of the Economy). There has also been some large-scale rehousing of Africans in the cities (see ch. 8, Living Conditions). Much of the expenditure on Africans is devoted to population movement and control measures.

**SOURCES OF FINANCE**

Before World War II, both foreign capital and domestic private capital gravitated primarily to the gold-mining industry, which in turn generated a considerable volume of self-financing out of retained profits. Because gold mining was highly profitable, particularly after the devaluations of 1931 and 1932, the mining finance houses were not greatly interested in diversifying their investment in other sectors of the economy, except where economies could be achieved by vertical integration in production of mine supplies or equipment. Until the wartime expansion in industrial demand, relatively little capital formation took place within manufacturing industry. Before and during the war, however, direct government investment in manufacturing as well as in economic infrastructure assumed an increasingly important role (see ch. 21, Industry). The expansion of domestic demand, with increased employment of non-whites during and after the war, and the increased use of semiskilled labor encouraged larger-scale production and increased mechanization. Mounting profits provided a growing reserve for self-financing, and excess profits taxes during World War II the war and exchange
controls after the war ensured that an increasing proportion of profits would remain within the country.

By 1949 manufacturing industry is said to have been mature enough to be generating a growing volume of self-financing. A study of a sample of industrial and commercial companies in the period 1949 through 1953 showed them reinvesting an average of 38.4 percent of profits after taxes. Another study for the period 1946 through 1953 showed that reinvested profits amounted to almost twice as much as new capital from shareholders.

The rise in average white incomes since the war, along with reduced upper bracket income taxes and stricter foreign exchange controls, has also increased the level of domestic personal saving by households and individuals. Contractual saving by means of life insurance, pension schemes, mortgages, and installment finance has been in full expansion and is increasingly controlled by domestic rather than British firms.

The growing volume of domestic savings and the growing sophistication of domestic financial institutions mean that the country has been only marginally dependent upon the inflow of foreign capital to maintain its rate of growth in the years since World War II. In certain sectors of industry, however, foreign direct investment has made a very important contribution to the creation of new and sophisticated production capacity. Particularly in the years from 1945 to 1949 and from 1965 through the first quarter of 1969, the net inflow of foreign capital made a significant contribution to total capital formation in the economy. For a time after the Nationalist government came into power in 1948 and again after the Sharpeville incident in the spring of 1960, loss of confidence in the country’s future led to a net outflow of foreign capital, particularly short-term or speculative share capital, which was not locked in by the need to retain a share of the market for industrial goods. From 1965 through the first quarter of 1969, however, there was again a net inflow of capital from the rest of the world (see table 32). The flow of private capital was reversed in mid-1969 with heavy net sales of shares by foreigners on the Johannesburg exchange. This was offset to some extent by a government drawing on the International Monetary Fund (see ch. 24, Foreign Economic Relations).

The government’s planners have estimated that by relying on domestic saving alone—a course urged by some Nationalist partisans—the money economy might be able to achieve a growth rate of as much as 4.5 percent a year. They concluded, however, that a continuing rate of growth in excess of 5 percent a year would require a fairly sizable capital inflow to balance the contractual outflow to which the country was already committed.

At the end of 1967 total foreign liabilities, that is, the sum of
<table>
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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td><strong>Provision for Depreciation:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private corporations</td>
<td>315²</td>
<td>358²</td>
<td>516²</td>
<td>571²</td>
<td>625²</td>
<td>667²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noncorporate private sector</td>
<td>315²</td>
<td>358²</td>
<td>516²</td>
<td>571²</td>
<td>625²</td>
<td>667²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public corporations</td>
<td>47²</td>
<td>53²</td>
<td>70²</td>
<td>81²</td>
<td>93²</td>
<td>106²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government enterprises</td>
<td>60²</td>
<td>73²</td>
<td>134²</td>
<td>145²</td>
<td>159²</td>
<td>174²</td>
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<tr>
<td>General government</td>
<td>17²</td>
<td>19²</td>
<td>720²</td>
<td>797²</td>
<td>877²</td>
<td>947²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total depreciation</td>
<td>424²</td>
<td>488²</td>
<td>720²</td>
<td>797²</td>
<td>877²</td>
<td>947²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Domestic Saving:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal saving</td>
<td>238²</td>
<td>293²</td>
<td>623²</td>
<td>653²</td>
<td>826²</td>
<td>509²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private corporations</td>
<td>155²</td>
<td>180²</td>
<td>282²</td>
<td>366²</td>
<td>374²</td>
<td>408²</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public corporations</td>
<td>5²</td>
<td>15²</td>
<td>28²</td>
<td>27²</td>
<td>27²</td>
<td>27²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current surplus of general government</td>
<td>130²</td>
<td>230²</td>
<td>352²</td>
<td>277²</td>
<td>505²</td>
<td>524²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>528²</td>
<td>718²</td>
<td>1,301²</td>
<td>1,344²</td>
<td>1,705²</td>
<td>1,441²</td>
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<td>Total Gross Domestic Saving³</td>
<td>952²</td>
<td>1,206²</td>
<td>2,021²</td>
<td>2,131²</td>
<td>2,582²</td>
<td>2,388²</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Current Balance of Payments:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net capital inflow from</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rest of the world</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>-153²</td>
<td>258²</td>
<td>149²</td>
<td>169²</td>
<td>446²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in gold and foreign exchange reserves</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>132²</td>
<td>36²</td>
<td>-136²</td>
<td>17²</td>
<td>-536²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total current balance of payments</td>
<td>-153²</td>
<td>-21²</td>
<td>222²</td>
<td>13²</td>
<td>186²</td>
<td>-90²</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Gross Domestic Investment</td>
<td>1,105</td>
<td>1,199</td>
<td>2,315</td>
<td>2,144</td>
<td>2,768</td>
<td>2,298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
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<td>-------</td>
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<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(capital formation)(^6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minus increase in inventories</td>
<td>-60(^2)</td>
<td>94(^3)</td>
<td>-371</td>
<td>-54</td>
<td>-519</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation</td>
<td>1,088(^2)</td>
<td>1,058(^2)</td>
<td>1,944</td>
<td>2,090</td>
<td>2,249</td>
<td>2,318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
<td>4,564(^2)</td>
<td>4,925(^2)</td>
<td>8,075</td>
<td>8,782</td>
<td>9,704</td>
<td>10,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital formation as percent of domestic product</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n.a.—not available.

\(^1\) 1 rand equals US$1.40.
\(^2\) United Nations data do not add to totals, which are from Reserve Bank data to permit comparison over period of time.
\(^3\) Provision for depreciation plus other domestic saving.
\(^4\) Gross domestic saving plus current balance of payments.

foreign long-term and short-term capital investment in the country, amounted to R3,966 million (1 rand equals US$1.40) or about 41 percent of gross domestic product. Of total liabilities, R2,113 million, or 53 percent, was private long-term direct investment. Although theoretically equivalent to a liability, much of this equity investment in plant, equipment, and real estate was not designed to be repatriated and, on the contrary, it can be effectively used by the government as a means of exacting further investment designed to protect the original commitment. Foreign exchange controls have been used in this way to exert pressure on foreign firms to increase their investment in the country (see ch. 21, Industry).

The level of domestic saving has for the most part been exceptionally high considering the country's overall income level. In the mid-1960's it amounted to about 25 percent of national income, compared to 15 percent in the United Kingdom and the United States and about 23 percent in the Federal Republic of Germany.

During much of the 1960's, gross capital formation ranged between 20 and 29 percent of gross domestic product. According to a United Nations study published in 1966, the level of investment has not had as direct an impact on economic growth as might have been expected. One reason cited was that much of the capital expenditure of government went for less directly productive economic infrastructure such as the transport system, which outside the African areas was exceptionally advanced for a country at South Africa's stage of development.

The government-appointed Viljoen Commission in its 1958 report, suggested that because the ratio of capital to output in the government sector was relatively high, mounting private investment expenditure would result in a declining capital-output ratio for the economy as a whole. It has been suggested that this conclusion may have been based upon inadequate data. In fact, since 1953 the government has consistently generated more than 35 percent of gross domestic capital formation, ranging to as much as 45 percent in 1958 and again in 1966 (see table 32).

In the years 1962 through 1968, capital formation by government made up between 8 and 11 percent of gross domestic product. The particularly rapid growth of private sector fixed investment in 1963, 1964, and 1965 resulted in the creation of some excess capacity, so that the rate of growth slowed thereafter. In 1968 there was still excess capacity in some sectors of industry. During the years of inflationary pressure from mounting private investment and other elements of demand, the government held off on some of its own investment plans for new capacity and other projects, which were then launched in 1969.
PUBLIC FINANCE

Control over government revenue and expenditure is vested in Parliament. It must vote tax measures, and the annual budget is presented to it by the minister of finance for debate and vote early each year. The fiscal year ends on March 31.

Taxation

In 1969 the government introduced changes in its revenue structure to reduce direct personal income taxes for the non-African population and to place increasing emphasis on indirect taxation as a source of revenue. Indirect taxes such as customs duties and excise taxes on liquor, cigarettes, and other goods had already been a very important source of revenue. In 1969 the role of indirect taxes was further enhanced by the introduction of sales taxes ranging from 5 to 20 percent on different kinds of goods. They will be imposed at the stage of manufacture or import and will not affect items that are important in the budgets of the lower income groups, such as food, clothing, footwear, medicine, fuel, and rent. Sales taxes are, however, by their nature not directly related to income. The concessions in direct taxation of income were designed to benefit the higher income groups more than the lower income groups, thereby encouraging saving rather than consumption.

Personal Income Taxes

Even before the new tax structure was introduced, direct taxation on households yielded a relatively modest share of total revenue compared to company taxes and indirect taxes (see table 33). It made up only about 21 percent of general government revenue in 1959 and 24 percent in 1966. In the United States in 1966, it constituted 54.8 percent of revenue. The country's tax base is very narrow, and a relatively modest burden of taxation on individual earnings has served for many years as an important incentive to the white immigration that the government is so anxious to encourage.

The government-appointed Franzsen Commission of Enquiry into Fiscal and Monetary Policy, which submitted its report in 1968, had recommended the shift in tax policy to favor saving and restrain consumption in order to combat inflation. It noted that the regular personal income tax was being paid by only 8 percent of the total population. Six percent of the population was yielding two-thirds of the income tax revenue. The commission felt that the previous progressive advances in the tax rate above an annual income of R5,000 discouraged initiative and the entry of married women into the labor force, and that it was thus in conflict with the government's policy of increasing the proportion of whites in the labor force. Accordingly, the tax was made less progressive. The
maximum marginal rate of taxation was reduced from 73 percent to 60 percent on incomes in excess of R28,000 for married persons and R24,000 for unmarried persons. The concessions were expected to deduct about R87.4 million from the potential tax yields in fiscal year 1969/70.

Everyone with an income of more than R700 (if single) or R1,000 (if married) is subject to the national income tax. Deduc-

Table 33. Consolidated General Government Current Account, South Africa Current Revenue and Expenditure, 1959 and 1963–66¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1963</th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1966</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct taxes on corporations</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributions to social security</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other direct taxes on households and nonprofit institutions</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs revenue</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excise taxes and other indirect taxes</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income from government property and entrepreneurship</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minus interest on public debt</td>
<td>-31</td>
<td>-44</td>
<td>-47</td>
<td>-56</td>
<td>-65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current transfers from the rest of the world</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total current revenue</td>
<td>853</td>
<td>1,283</td>
<td>1,413</td>
<td>1,514</td>
<td>1,622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central government</td>
<td>(608)</td>
<td>(935)</td>
<td>(1,014)</td>
<td>(1,085)</td>
<td>(1,134)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government consumption of goods and services</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>849</td>
<td>949</td>
<td>1,055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidies</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other government current transfers to households and private nonprofit institutions</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current transfers to the rest of the world</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total current expenditure</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>952</td>
<td>1,068</td>
<td>1,185</td>
<td>1,322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central government</td>
<td>(447)</td>
<td>(706)</td>
<td>(807)</td>
<td>(888)</td>
<td>(1,009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government saving (surplus on current account)</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ General government comprises all government agencies, whether central, provincial, or local, other than public corporations.

² 1 rand equals US$1.40.

tions are allowed for dependents, which further raise this minimum. In some years a special “loan levy” is imposed that is equivalent to an obligatory loan from the taxpayer to the government, bearing 5 percent interest. It may be repaid at any time within seven years. In 1968 the loan levy equalled 15 percent of the regular national income tax.

In addition, every taxpayer is subject to a provincial tax that varies from about 30 percent of the national tax in the Transvaal to 33 percent in Cape Province. The minimum taxable income is R1,000 in Cape Province and R500 in the other three provinces.

Taxation of Africans

The government has long sought to broaden the tax base by more effective collection of taxes from the African population. Since colonial times, a head tax has been levied on all adult African males regardless of income as a means of compelling them into the cash labor force (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Although the tax amounted to only a few rands a year, it usually represented more than a family could realize in cash from the sale of its surplus, if any, of subsistence agricultural production; (see ch. 20, Agriculture). Consequently, many rural Africans were obliged to go into debt to local merchants in order to pay the tax. The national head tax is usually supplemented by tribal levies.

In 1969 new legislation on African taxes was introduced that will go into effect on March 1, 1970, and will apply to all Africans except those in the Transkei. It makes slight alterations in the rate structure of the head tax and other African taxes. Under this new legislation Africans will no longer be subject to the national income tax and provincial tax applicable to whites, Coloured, and Asians. Except at the very lowest levels, rates of African taxation will be increased and will be somewhat higher than the rates applicable to non-Africans at comparable levels.

The new system will simplify the African tax structure somewhat and eliminate some of its confusion and initial duplication. Under the previous system, Africans with cash incomes in excess of the R500 to R1,000 minimum had to pay the regular national and provincial income taxes paid by other groups. In addition, they were obliged to pay a national head tax of R3.50 on adult African men (known as the African general tax) and a progressive tax on all African incomes over R360 a year (known as the African additional general tax). They were thus subject to double taxation but were entitled to a refund. Having paid the African general taxes, an African was then entitled to take his receipt to the local receiver of Bantu taxes and try to obtain a refund of his regular national and provincial income taxes.

In 1965 the minister of Bantu education stated in Parliament
that only about 53.6 percent of the Africans subject to the African general tax had paid it during the fiscal year 1964/65, and that the estimated amount owing in arrear tax was R30 to R40 million. In 1964 the minister had asserted that “until this matter has been reviewed I cannot approach the Treasury with any justification and ask for a large State contribution [for African education].” An interdepartmental committee was appointed to recommend improved methods of collection. Collections increased from R7,377,751 in fiscal 1963/64 to R11,999,755 in fiscal 1967/68.

The African additional general tax was previously levied at a higher rate on women than on men because the head tax applied only to African men between the ages of eighteen and sixty-five. Under the new Bantu Tax Bill to go into effect in 1970, the progressive tax rates will be the same for men and women, and the head tax on male adults is reduced from R3.50 to R2.50. The new progressive tax rates of the African additional general tax are not significantly higher than the old rates in the lower brackets but rise more steeply with each increase in income. The rates are higher than those provided for non-Africans.

In a further effort to bring more Africans into the tax fold, the government will make it obligatory beginning in 1970 for employers to withhold taxes on African wages at the source. Previously, this was done at the discretion of the employer. During 1968 some receivers of Bantu tax asked employers to deduct arrears of taxes at the source, and the Transvaal Chamber of Industries reminded its members that this was illegal without a court order. In 1968 the government also provided that Africans who could not produce tax receipts on demand should not be arrested if they could prove legal employment or until any reasonable explanation offered has been investigated.

The range and quantity of direct taxes paid by the African population in addition to indirect taxes has made the country's tax structure increasingly regressive in the sense that there is a disproportionate burden on low incomes. There is some disagreement as to how far facilities for Africans and other nonwhites are paid for out of levies on these groups themselves. Because most nonwhite incomes are very low—often below subsistence level—there is a limit to the amount they can be made to contribute to supplement government expenditure on nonwhites, and the bulk of such expenditure comes from the general exchequer, which includes indirect taxes but not direct taxes paid by Africans (see table 34).

It appears from debates in Parliament, however, that many white taxpayers seem reluctant to pay for the needed improvements in schools and other facilities for Africans. The principle that each racial group is supposed to finance as much as possible of its own
Table 34. South Africa, Central Government Expenditure on Africans
(in thousand rand)\(^2\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Services provided in Transkei</th>
<th>Administration</th>
<th>Capital expenditure and social services</th>
<th>Subtotal</th>
<th>Transkei</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assistant to Transkeian government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services provided in Transkei</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(health, police, prisons, other)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bantu administration and development(^3)</td>
<td>15,580.1</td>
<td>69,259.8</td>
<td>75,839.8</td>
<td></td>
<td>75,839.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1,583.8</td>
<td>24,477.6</td>
<td>26,061.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>26,061.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and hospitals</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>22,821.0</td>
<td>22,841.8</td>
<td></td>
<td>22,841.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>11,219.5</td>
<td>11,227.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>11,227.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other services</td>
<td>267.3</td>
<td>370.8</td>
<td>638.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>638.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>17,460.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>119,148.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>136,608.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>16,229.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>152,837.6</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) Fiscal year ending March 31, 1967.
\(^2\) 1 rand equals US$1.40.
\(^3\) Includes construction of townships in vicinity of Border Areas and other population-control expenditures.

separated facilities is perhaps most clearly illustrated in expenditures on education (see ch. 9, Education).

In addition to the African general tax and the African general additional tax, Africans are subject to local taxes and special levies. In most of the African reserves the Bantu authorities impose local levies on Africans of about R2 per adult male per year. These receipts, as well as free labor by Africans, are used to supplement services provided by the government from its ordinary revenue. Because receipts from other taxes on Africans are not fully reported, it is not possible to estimate accurately the total amounts contributed by Africans (see table 35). It is particularly difficult to estimate the share of indirect taxes paid by Africans. In a study conducted for the Africa Institute, it was estimated that the amount paid by Africans in indirect taxation in 1964/65 might have been about R29 million. If this estimate was correct, the amount would be considerably larger in the late 1960's.

According to a United Nations study published in 1966, the trend of taxation in the 1950's and early 1960's had reinforced the trend toward greater inequality of pretax incomes as between Africans and whites. Indirect taxation was contributing a growing share of revenue, and direct taxation of higher income whites was reduced in the same period. Social

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Africans in Transkei</th>
<th>Other Africans</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National income tax</td>
<td>6,629</td>
<td>158,877</td>
<td>165,506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial taxes</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African general tax</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African general additional tax</td>
<td>1,716,416</td>
<td>10,283,339</td>
<td>11,999,755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal and general levies</td>
<td>417,818</td>
<td>1,621,500</td>
<td>2,039,318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local tax</td>
<td>248,591</td>
<td>315,695</td>
<td>564,286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital levies</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>70,116</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levies raised by African</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>school board committees</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other educational charges</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Licenses, stamp, estate,</td>
<td>550,177</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>motor vehicle and road taxes</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other indirect taxes</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other taxes on Africans</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n.a.—not available.

1 Fiscal year ending March 31; estimates by minister of Bantu administration.
2 1 rand equals US$1.40.

expenditure on pensions and similar benefits reinforced this growing disparity (see ch. 8, Living Conditions).

Other Revenue

The income tax on companies yields a high proportion of the country's general tax revenue, as is characteristic of less developed economies. This direct tax on corporations contributed about 27.3 percent of total revenue in 1966, compared with 17 percent in the United States and even smaller shares in most European countries (see table 33). Revenue from mining companies contributed about 9.8 percent of general government current revenue and 13.5 percent of central government current revenue in 1966. Of total government revenue from mining of R158.7 million in 1966, the company income tax accounted for R112.0 million. The export duty on diamonds, which is included in "customs revenue," yielded R2.9 million. Income from government mining property, including alluvial diamond diggings, amounted to R43.7 million.

A 1967 source reported that diamond mines paid a flat rate of 45 percent of taxable income, and that gold and uranium mining firms paid a tax determined by the ratio of profits to gross sales. All other firms paid a lower rate of 33.3 percent of taxable income plus a loan levy of 5 percent on net tax. In the new tax measures of 1969, the loan levy was incorporated into the company tax, fixing this tax at 40 percent. It was not clear whether there were any new provisions for mining companies.

Gross income from government property and entrepreneurship made up about 12.5 percent of current revenue in 1966. About half of it was derived from posts, telegraph, and telephone administration and about one-fifth from mining property, including alluvial diamond diggings.

Government Expenditure

Central government expenditure is divided into three separate accounts. Revenue account comprises all current expenditure except that for African education not derived from general revenue, plus a few items of capital expenditure. The Bantu education account includes current and capital expenditure specially financed. Loan account corresponds roughly to capital expenditure. It is financed largely by borrowing, as well as from the surplus on revenue account, which has shown a fluctuating surplus since 1932.

The annual statistics give a convenient breakdown for central government expenditure on revenue account (see table 36). They do not, however, give readily comparable data for actual expenditures on loan account. These capital expenditures are included, however, along with expenditure on revenue account in the overall
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security and public order</td>
<td>186,061</td>
<td>185,061</td>
<td>262,784</td>
<td>308,745</td>
<td>108,745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population movement and control</td>
<td>150,906</td>
<td>157,350</td>
<td>262,784</td>
<td>261,491</td>
<td>308,745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pensions and social welfare</td>
<td>45,006</td>
<td>45,834</td>
<td>87,893</td>
<td>86,188</td>
<td>95,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural marketing and economics</td>
<td>86,256</td>
<td>65,302</td>
<td>86,188</td>
<td>86,188</td>
<td>85,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post, telegraph and telephones</td>
<td>64,569</td>
<td>72,215</td>
<td>75,886</td>
<td>83,158</td>
<td>95,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest on the public debt</td>
<td>44,413</td>
<td>50,570</td>
<td>56,413</td>
<td>63,880</td>
<td>76,564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocation to Kauka education from</td>
<td>13,179</td>
<td>21,530</td>
<td>27,228</td>
<td>29,828</td>
<td>20,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General revenue</td>
<td>13,179</td>
<td>16,469</td>
<td>15,472</td>
<td>14,722</td>
<td>14,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health, hospitals and institutions</td>
<td>5,460</td>
<td>7,124</td>
<td>8,556</td>
<td>22,536</td>
<td>30,184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning and general government</td>
<td>2,134</td>
<td>3,289</td>
<td>4,034</td>
<td>4,034</td>
<td>4,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public works</td>
<td>13,179</td>
<td>16,469</td>
<td>15,472</td>
<td>14,722</td>
<td>14,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>68,715</td>
<td>82,265</td>
<td>87,380</td>
<td>92,933</td>
<td>92,933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other current expenditure</td>
<td>68,715</td>
<td>82,265</td>
<td>87,380</td>
<td>92,933</td>
<td>92,933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>804,331</td>
<td>880,067</td>
<td>1,074,960</td>
<td>1,242,269</td>
<td>1,242,269</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Fiscal year ending March 31.
2 Rand equals US$1.40.

economic-functional classification of central government expenditure given in the annual budget presentation (see table 37).

The annual statistics do not give readily comparable data for expenditure by general government, which includes specialized agencies and provincial and local government as well as central government. These aggregates are most readily obtainable from United Nations sources.

The most striking trend in government expenditure in the 1960's has been the substantial increase in spending for "security and public order," a category that includes defense, munitions, police, prisons, and the administration of the court system. By 1967 this category accounted for nearly one-fourth of current central government expenditure. Of the R308.7 million spent in this category in fiscal year 1967, R212.1 million went for defense, R64.8 million for the police force, and R18.1 million for the prison system. According to the available statistics, there were no very important increases in the amounts allocated for defense and munitions in fiscal 1968 and 1969, but in the budget presented to Parliament for fiscal 1970 there was a proposed increase of R17.5 million in defense expenditure.

Another prominent trend has been the growing cost of population movement and control despite the rather limited progress toward the stated goals of the separate development program. This category includes expenditure of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development and of the Department of Coloured Affairs and the Department of Indian Affairs, as well as certain expenditures of the Department of Community Development.

The South African Statistics shows an annual surplus of revenue over current expenditure, which is used to help finance a portion of capital expenditure. For the aggregate budget, there is an annual deficit to be met by borrowing. In fiscal 1969, this deficit (excluding debt redemption payments and borrowing receipts) amounted to about R349 million. In fiscal 1970 it is expected to total R457 million. Total expenditure on loan account, which includes the great bulk of capital expenditure, amounted to about R540 million in 1968/69 and R645 million in 1969/70.

BANKING

From the time of the first diamond rush in the 1860's until after World War I, the country's economy was closely tied to the money market and the longer term capital markets of London. There was an adequate network of commercial banks, but those local banks not associated with the overseas money market proved vulnerable, and after the 1860's a continuing process of financial concentration left the London-based banks dominating the money market, as the
Table 37. Economic-Functional Classification of Central Government Expenditure, South Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(in thousand rand)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Current expenditure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consumption of goods and services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>General Services:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense and munitions</td>
<td>257,023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police and prisons</td>
<td>88,339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice and general administration</td>
<td>85,983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community Services:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Services:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>2,238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other education</td>
<td>90,028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>27,373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social assistance and welfare services</td>
<td>4,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>5,612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Services:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State water schemes</td>
<td>5,631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, excluding subsidies</td>
<td>30,599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel and power</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and storage</td>
<td>1,713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>General Government:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural subsidies</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial administration</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bantu trust fund</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transkeian government</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Public Works

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public works</td>
<td>28,910</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unallocable</td>
<td>93,120</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Government Enterprises

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Posts and telegraphs</td>
<td>99,431</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry department</td>
<td>12,021</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9,355</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Public Corporations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Railways and Harbors</td>
<td>10,800</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Development</td>
<td>19,500</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Contract Services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government printer, motor pool, and other</td>
<td>11,760</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>768,532</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

1. Fiscal year ending March 31, 1968.
2. 1 rand equals US$1.40.
3. Of the total, R83,120,000 is interest.
4. Includes current transfers.
5. Total expenditure derives from revenue account, 1,384,241; loan account, 533,759; Bantu education account, 29,754; total, 1,947,754. These figures exclude transfers from revenue account of Bantu education, 4,500; other adjustments, 7,574; total, 1,925,680.
larger mining groups had come to control much of the country's capital market.

Under the Banking Law of 1942, the government ensured that banks would maintain within the country liquid reserves equivalent to a given minimum proportion of their domestic liabilities. After 1948 the government took further steps to create a domestic money market independent of London, in line with proposals that had been under active discussion since the early 1930's.

The banking and investment markets had long been the target of some resentment on the part of the Afrikaner population not only because of their close ties to "imperial" London, but also because domestic firms were largely in the hands of Jewish and other English-speaking South Africans suspected by many Afrikaners of liberal sentiments. Consequently, during the 1930's, increased participation by Afrikaners in the world of finance became a prime objective of the program of the Broederbond.

In 1939 the Broederbond established the Rescue Action Society (Reddingsdaadbond) to collect funds for the cause of advancement of "poor white" Afrikaners. Collections were continued until 1946, and after that date the Rescue Action Society retained the funds collected for its own purposes. It contributed substantially to the financing of private Afrikaner business ventures and helped to establish Afrikaner financial institutions. In 1956 the RDB congress met and decided to bring the organization to an end, but the institutions it founded have continued to flourish. In small towns, Afrikaners in 1950 were playing an important part in business activities that in 1940 had been largely in the hands of English-speaking South Africans. By 1956 it was estimated that about 11 percent of total capital investment in industry was of Afrikaner origin, and in the 1960's one source reported that Afrikaner firms accounted for about 10 percent of the total assets of financial institutions.

The 1942 Banking Act listed four categories of financial institutions: commercial banks, people's banks, loan banks, and other deposit receiving institutions. The last three categories were treated as savings institutions, and commercial banks were considered to be more important in influencing the level of aggregate demand. Reserve and liquid asset requirements were therefore more stringently applied to the commercial banks, leaving loopholes that encouraged other institutions to diversify their functions and enter into competition with the commercial banks.

Between 1942 and the enactment of a new Banking Act in 1964, there was important growth and diversification in the domestic money and capital markets. New financial institutions were created and the established forms greatly expanded (see fig. 19). A short-term money market was created beginning in 1949. Provision of medium-term funds and investment services to trade and industry
was organized; and banks as well as nonbanking institutions entered the consumer credit, sales credit, and discount fields. The building societies—equivalent to savings and loan associations in the United States—grew phenomenally and began to enter into competition with banks.

From the mid-1950's through the mid-1960's, the assets of the financial institutions were growing at a more rapid rate than the gross domestic product. The financial institutions made an important contribution to economic growth. During this period, however, the need for effective and equitable controls on the expansion of credit was growing, for the creation of credit by commercial banks and other private financial institutions was beginning to play a more important part than formerly in increasing the amount of money in circulation and fueling the growth of demand. With the growth and diversification of credit facilities, the 1942 Banking Act proved

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL ASSETS IN MILLION DOLLARS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH AFRICAN RESERVE BANK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938  156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946  278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963  297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966  709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMERCIAL BANKS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938  288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946  997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962  2,147</td>
</tr>
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<td>1966  3,557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUILDING SOCIETIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938  346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946  398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962  2,093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966  2,404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSTALLMENT FINANCE COMPANIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938  8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946  367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962  445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966  522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACCEPTANCE AND DISCOUNT HOUSES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938  NONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946  NONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962  NONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966  NONE</td>
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<td>INSURANCE COMPANIES</td>
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<td>1946  384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962  1,809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966  2,079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUBLIC PENSION AND SOCIAL SECURITY FUNDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938  172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946  314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962  1,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966  NONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938  NONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946  231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966  327</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Figure 19. Growth of Financial Institutions, South Africa.
inadequate to ensure equitable control. A technical committee was appointed to draw up the provisions of the Act to Amend the Banking Act of 1964. It became law on June 16, 1964, went into effect for commercial banks on January 1, 1965, and for other institutions a year later. It is variously referred to as the Banks Act of 1964 or the Banks Act of 1965, as well as by its official title.

The new banking act extended the banking provisions to what are known as near-banks. It listed six categories of banking institutions: commercial banks; merchant banks (acceptance houses); discount houses; hire purchase banks (installment finance, consumer credit, and sales credit firms); savings banks; and another category called general banks, including trust companies and boards of executors. Apart from the discount houses, all of these were brought under the same set of requirements for minimum capital and unimpaired reserves, liquid assets, reserve balances with the central bank, and prescribed investments. A new statutory reserve ratio of 8 percent of short-term liabilities was introduced. The definition of liquid assets was narrowed. The central bank, with the consent of the treasury, could vary the reserve requirements within certain statutory limits, and on its own initiative could require supplementary liquid assets up to a statutory maximum.

The banking act also introduced the concept of “prescribed investments,” including not only liquid assets, but other safe assets that can be readily realized. All except discount houses are required to maintain inside the country prescribed assets equivalent to 15 percent of their total liabilities to the public. Building societies and discount houses were exempted from this and many of the banking act’s other provisions, but were subject to special regulations and safeguards. The near-banks and other institutions other than commercial banks were given a year’s grace, until January 1966, before complying with the act.

The Central Bank

The South African Reserve Bank has the functions and powers common to most semiautonomous central banks today. It issues bank notes, regulates the volume of money in circulation, and acts as fiscal agent for the government. It makes advances to the treasury. It purchases the country’s output of newly mined gold and assumes responsibility for its marketing. It holds the required reserves of commercial banks and other banking institutions. It acts as the bank of rediscount and as the lender of last resort for the commercial banks and other financial institutions. By changes in its rediscount rate and by open market operations in government and certain other gilt-edged securities, it influences the level and structure of interest rates.
The reserve bank acts as consultant to the government in financial questions. It has some autonomy in determining credit policy, but usually acts in close concert with government authorities, which have primary responsibility for the overall direction of monetary policy. In addition to enforcing statutory minimum reserve requirements, the bank has some discretion in imposing supplementary reserve requirements, which may not, however, exceed a statutory maximum. It also uses moral suasion in inducing banks to impose ceilings on credit expansion in inflationary periods.

Founded in 1921, the South African Reserve Bank was the first central bank to be established in the British Empire, after the Bank of England. It was originally a privately owned bank subject to a large measure of state control and was at first in a weak position vis-à-vis the established commercial banks. Its position improved during the 1920's and 1930's and was further strengthened by the banking acts of 1942 and 1964.

Commercial Banks

Until 1942 banking in South Africa was more or less synonymous with commercial bank activity. The Dutch East India Company had established the Lombard Bank in the country in 1793, and banking remained a government monopoly until 1837. In that year the first private commercial bank, the Cape of Good Hope Bank, was established, and thereafter small local banks proliferated. In addition, overseas-based banks, then known as imperial banks, established themselves in the country and in other parts of what is today known as the sterling area. Because of their extensive operations and their ties to the London money market, these banks were much stronger than the small local banks. In 1865 the small banks were hard hit by a severe drought in a time of overexpansion, and many of them were subsequently taken over by the larger banks.

By 1926 the number of commercial banks had been reduced to four. One of these, the Stellenbosch and District Bank, was the sole survivor of the local banks in existence before 1910. The other three existing were the Netherlands Bank, the London-based Standard Bank, and Barclay's Bank D.C.O. Two large overseas commercial banks controlled 95 percent of the country's banking. The trend was subsequently reversed to some extent, and by 1966 there were sixty-one registered banking institutions, eleven of which offered full commercial banking services. Of the five largest banking institutions, three were controlled by South African interests.

The People's Bank (Volkskas) was established in 1934 as an Afrikaner bank with financial assistance from the Broederbond. It grew relatively slowly until the Afrikaners took over political power in 1948. Since then its role has acquired growing significance, al-
though it is still considerably smaller than the South African affiliates of the London-based banks.

During the period of rapid economic growth since World War II, a number of banks with international operations have established subsidiaries in South Africa. Chase Manhattan Bank entered the country in 1959 and merged with Standard Bank in 1965 to form the Standard Bank of South Africa. Other commercial banks operating in the country in 1967 included French Bank of Southern Africa, South African Bank of Athens, First National City Bank of New York (South Africa), the Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Limited. In addition, the Afrikaner firm Trust Bank of Africa Limited was registered as a commercial bank in 1964.

Other Financial Institutions

Until after World War II, the country did not have a short-term money market, and idle money tended to flow to London. This could potentially exert pressure for devaluation of the country's currency in the wake of a sterling devaluation, as had been illustrated after Britain left the gold standard in 1931. Accordingly, the government initiated a study of the situation, and in 1949 established the National Finance Corporation as the first step toward creation of an organized and active domestic market for short-term funds.

The National Finance Corporation was guaranteed by the Reserve Bank of South Africa, and although its capital was privately owned, the government was well represented on its Board of Directors. It was empowered to accept deposits of at least R100,000 at call and at short notice, to pay interest on them, to invest and to deal in government and other gilt-edged securities, and to accept cash from banks, insurance companies, and building and loan-associations to be held as their legal liquid-asset requirements.

The corporation had immediate success in attracting deposits, inspiring British and domestic financial interests to enter into competition by establishing their own acceptance or discount houses. Thus, although the corporation's own turnover declined from its early high, it had effectively stimulated the creation of an active, organized domestic short-term money market. In 1955 the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa Ltd., on of the big mining finance houses, established the country's first merchant bank, Union Acceptances Ltd. Three others followed in close succession: the Central Accepting Bank Ltd.; Hill, Samuel South Africa Ltd.; and in 1963 the City Merchant Bank. The first discount house was opened in 1957, and by 1962 there were two.

The near-banks that serve as intermediaries for much of the country's medium-term credit include installment credit houses, savings banks, and some of the general banks. There is a wide variety of
institutions in this group, some of them closely related to the commercial banks. The near-banks usually lend on less attractive terms than the commercial banks, but handle transactions that involve more risk or are otherwise outside the traditional lending range of banks. As in the United States, they try to attract deposits away from the commercial banks. By the mid-1960's commercial banks in South Africa had not yet extended their functions over quite as wide a range as was current in the United States, but the trend was in the same direction, so that the distinction between commercial banks and other lending institutions was becoming increasingly blurred.

Four of the general banks now provide short-term credit as well as medium-term and long-term credit and are therefore included within the definition of the monetary banking sector. General banks also provide loans for industrial development, underwrite share issues, participate in setting up new ventures, discount consumer credit paper, and offer special services to domestic and foreign investors. In 1965 the principal general banks were the Trust Bank of Africa Limited (also registered as a commercial bank), Nefic Limited, the Standard Bank Development Corporation of South Africa Limited, and the South African National Trust and Insurance (Pty.) Ltd. (Die Suid Afrikaanse Nasionale Trust en Assuransié [Mpy.] Bpk.).

Long-term credit is supplied primarily by insurance companies, pension funds, investment companies and building societies. Building societies, on the British model, perform essentially the same functions as savings and loan associations in the United States. They pay interest on deposits from the public and lend money on the security of a mortgage on real property. The first building society was established in Natal in 1858. In the mid-1960's they were the most widely used of the country's savings institutions, and one of the South African societies was the world's third largest.

Insurance activities were at first dominated by foreign-based companies. The first domestic life insurance company was founded in 1845, and fire insurance at about the same date. Marine insurance was introduced around 1800, and the first domestic firm was founded in 1849. Accident insurance was introduced around the turn of the century, and workmen's compensation in 1914. Automobile insurance has grown in importance with the spread of auto ownership. The National Insurance Act of 1923 was replaced by the act of 1943 providing stricter controls. This act was amended in 1951 and 1959. Since 1943 it has provided that foreign companies cannot be registered to transact insurance business in the country unless they have been established for at least twenty years.

In 1918 the South African National Trust and Insurance Society (Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Trust en Assuransiemaatskappy—
SANTAM) was formed in a conscious effort to increase Afrikaner participation in the country’s business. It handled many varieties of insurance. In the same year a separate Afrikaner firm was established for life insurance, known as South African National Life Assurance Company (Suid Afrikaanse Nasionale Levens Assuransie Maatschappý—SANLAM). It used a “buy-Afrikaner” sales appeal, and after World War II became the country’s second-largest insurance operation.

Apart from SANTAM, SANLAM, and Volkskas (people’s bank), a number of Afrikaner financial institutions have grown and flourished since World War II. They include the Federal Group (mining and investment firms), the first of which was founded in 1939; Bonus Investments Corporation of South Africa Ltd. (Bonusbeleggings Korporasie van Suid Afrika—BONUSKOR), established by SANLAM; Central Finance Corporation, established by SANLAM and BONUSKOR as a deposit-receiving and exchange bank. There is also an agency that administers pension funds (and advises pension funds and similar organizations on investment) and one for medical insurance. The Trust Bank of Africa, founded as an Afrikaner credit institution in 1955, was registered as a commercial bank in 1964, but some of its branches still operate as credit institutions only. Many of these organizations were helped by the Afrikaner Reddingsdaadbond.

The government-controlled Industrial Development Corporation has also played an important role in providing medium- and long-term loan capital as well as equity capital for industry (see ch. 21, Industry). Other government-sponsored credit and investment institutions are the Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa, the Fisheries Development Corporation of South Africa Ltd., and the Bantu Investment Corporation (see ch. 19, Character and Structure of the Economy).

ANTICYCLICAL POLICY IN THE 1960’s

The money economy possesses two stabilizing factors that set it apart from the more familiar policy context of a developed economy. One is the existence of a large reserve of unemployed or underemployed African labor, which can be used to stabilize wage costs for the bulk of the labor force in periods of expansion and as a cushion against white unemployment in the event of a slump. The other unusual factor is the country’s position as the world’s leading gold producer.

African workers, both foreign and native, are treated as migrants and can be endorsed out of the urban community almost at will (see ch. 22, Labor). Africans have been deprived of protection under all unemployment insurance laws, so that the built-in stabi-
izers of the economy do not extend to them. Although their individual disposable incomes are very limited, their sheer numbers and greater marginal propensity to consume have given them increasing importance as a consumer market, and a reduction in African incomes would therefore have an impact on the white economy as well as on the nonwhite population. Throughout most of the post-war period there has been a fairly steady growth in African urban employment, but because of the total population growth it has been accompanied by an increase in declared unemployment as well as widespread underemployment. White unemployment has been limited, and for the most part there has been a consistent shortage of white labor.

Gold is a form of international exchange for which there is an infinite demand, and its price has remained fixed over long periods of time, with upward adjustments when leading industrial countries devalue their currencies (see ch. 21, Industry). Thus, even during the great worldwide depression of the early 1930's, employment in gold mining expanded. The effect of the depression on the white labor force came to an end very early, in 1933, after Great Britain and the United States had left the gold standard and South Africa had followed suit in devaluing its currency a year later. When downturns occur in the business cycle, the country's overall price level falls, and gold mining becomes more profitable because of the widening margin between the fixed price of its product and its declining costs (see fig. 20).

In periods of general economic expansion, on the other hand, the tendency is for profit margins in gold mining to narrow. During the late 1940's and 1950's, the discovery and exploitation of lucrative new gold deposits more than offset declining profits in the older fields (see ch. 21, Industry). Consequently, gold production had a very important expansionary impact on the economy during this period. During much of the 1960's, the mounting cost level in the overall economy was eroding profit margins in the gold-mining industry and, because of the crucial importance of mining to the economy, the monetary authorities were very strongly conscious of the need for restraint. This was particularly true after 1964, when excess demand began to have an inflationary impact on the price level (see table 38). The fact that the country's principal product serves as international money also means that it can be used to cover a trade deficit in other merchandise, and the government can allow an increase in imports to absorb some of the surplus purchasing power that might otherwise tend to drive up domestic prices.

A study analyzing banking statistics in the years 1910 through 1945 concluded that in the years up to 1945 passive creation of credit by the central bank against retained gold output had been
more important in increasing the quantity of money in circulation than was active creation of credit by commercial banks. After the South African devaluation of December 1932, there had been a change from scarcity to abundance of money, and the banks retained considerable excess liquid assets from 1933 through 1950, with reserves replenished by recurrent balance of payments surpluses as well as deposits.

As the banks' excess reserves declined after the war, credit creation by the commercial banks became more significant, and the credit control policies of the central bank consequently began to take on a more active character. With the growing importance of the domestic money market in the 1950's, more effective control by the central bank became possible.

Fluctuations in the business cycle since World War II have been moderate. During most of the period, the trend has been one of continuing growth in the white-owned money economy (see ch. 19, Character and Structure of the Economy). During the war the country had been able to reduce external debt to negligible proportions and build up a substantial monetary reserve. From the late 1940's to the mid-1950's, large amounts of foreign capital were being invested in the new gold mining areas (see ch. 21, Industry). The Korean conflict and reconstruction in Western Europe stimulated external demand for the country's exports. By the time this
Table 38. Price Indices, South Africa, 1953 and 1958–67
(1963=100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Consumer price index</th>
<th>Food only Wholesale prices</th>
<th>Domestic goods</th>
<th>Imported goods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>84</td>
<td>92</td>
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<td>93</td>
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<td>1959</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>99</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>98</td>
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<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>105</td>
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<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>107</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


demand eased after the mid-1950's, the new goldfields were boosting the volume of gold exports and stimulating domestic demand for manufactures, trade, and services. The establishment of a domestic money market after 1949 and the growth of new financial institutions provided a further stimulus to expansion. During much of the period, mounting government expenditure fueled the growth of aggregate demand.

A balance of payments and liquidity crisis occurred in 1960 and 1961, when confidence in the economy was weakened first by the Sharpeville incident in the spring of 1960, and then by South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth of Nations (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). There was a heavy net outflow of both foreign and resident capital in 1960 that continued in 1961. Funds were withdrawn from the banks and other financial institutions, and their ratio of liquid reserves to loans and other liabilities outstanding dropped sharply. The gold reserves of the central bank declined whereas its liabilities had increased.

During this period government controls on foreign exchange and capital movements were used to limit the outflow of resident funds and to press for the increase of foreign direct investment to offset the loss of flight capital. The drop in stock prices on the Johannesburg exchange encouraged domestic saving, and part of the capital outflow took the form of increasing net sales of South African securities by nonresidents to residents. Repressive measures against public demonstrations of discontent convinced investors that decisive social change was still far from imminent, and rumors of an impending devaluation of the rand proved without foundation.

The basically expansionary bias of the money economy in this period was again reflected in a revival of economic activity in 1962, which continued strongly throughout 1963.
activity, the proportion of liquid funds in the hands of the banks and private sector was high in 1962 and 1963, amounting to about 35 percent of gross national product in 1963. The government sought to absorb some of this excess purchasing power by borrowing in excess of its needs, by transferring its balance from private banks to the central bank and by relaxing import controls.

A strong revival of aggregate demand took place from about mid-1961 to mid-1965. There was a particularly strong upsurge in private investment demand in 1963, 1964, and 1965. Mounting economic activity began to put increasing pressure on the balance of payments. The net outflow of foreign capital had been reduced to a trickle, but the negative gap between imports and exports was widening. Gold sales, which had previously furnished a substantial surplus on current account, were now barely covering the deficit.

By mid-1964, it was clear that the economy had entered a phase of inflationary excess demand, largely financed by credit expansion. The new Banking Act of 1964, which provided tighter controls on the banking sector, went into effect too late to restrain the credit expansion of 1964 and 1965. The new controls provided on the near-banks and other institutions did not take effect until January 1966, and there was much public discussion in South Africa—as in the United States and elsewhere at the same period—of the role of the near-banks in credit expansion. With their ratio of liquid assets declining, the banks and near-banks entered into very active competition for deposits from savers, and the cost of housing finance was adversely affected.

Pending full extension of the provisions of the 1964 Banking Act, the monetary authorities increased the discount rate in three successive stages from 3.5 percent in July 1964 to 5 percent in March 1965, increased the ratio of liquid assets to be held by commercial banks, and asked the other financial institutions to apply corresponding ratios on a voluntary basis. South Africa does not have any system of government insurance of savings deposits, but in March 1965 the minister of finance authorized the central bank to fix maximum rates of interest on savings deposits to prevent a further rise in the cost of housing in a period of housing shortage.

During this period mounting government current and capital expenditure added to the inflationary pressure of aggregate demand. Defense expenditure was the most important element of increase in 1964, but in 1965 capital expenditure, notably on railways and harbors, also began to increase more rapidly. In an attempt to curb private expenditure, the government in 1965 introduced a loan levy of 5 percent on personal income and on companies other than gold mines, plus a supertax of 5 percent of the income tax of all companies except gold mines (which pay higher regular taxes). The supertax was later removed, but the 5 percent loan levy was incorporated into the regular company income tax in 1969.
In late 1965 there was a shortlived downturn in aggregate demand attributed to declining inventory investment. Demand revived in the second quarter of 1966, and there was continuing inflationary pressure until mid-1967, when the rate of increase in prices slowed down, the current balance of payments improved, and the authorities were able to relax their policy of restraint. The international monetary uncertainty that followed the devaluation of the British pound in November 1967 brought a strong new net inflow of foreign capital, including mounting purchases of gold-mining shares by the American public.

From 1966 the central bank had been able to take full advantage of its new powers to increase the minimum liquid asset ratios of banks and near-banks. In addition, it imposed a voluntary ceiling on their discounts and advances to the private sector at the level of March 1965. There were successive relaxations of import controls throughout the period to siphon off a portion of excess demand and combat price increases. In 1968, however, the government was largely withholding its gold reserves from the market pending adoption of more satisfactory market arrangements and was therefore not in a position to allow a large deficit on merchandise account. The substantial increase in consumer spending in 1968 was, however, partly offset by a decline in fixed investment by manufacturing industry and by a bad crop year in agriculture. The real rate of growth in 1968 was only 3.6 percent, the lowest since 1961 (see ch. 19, Character and Structure of the Economy). Consumer prices increased by only 2.7 percent in 1968.

In his 1969 budget presentation, the minister of finance announced that government capital expenditure had been kept on a tight rein for several years, so that a backlog had developed. In view of mounting tax yields, he therefore proposed to increase expenditure on loan account by 17 percent and current expenditure by 10 percent. The increased capital expenditure would include R10 million for the government’s new iron and steel plant and R13.7 million for development of the so-called border areas (see ch. 19, Character and Structure of the Economy; ch. 21, Industry). Current expenditure would include an increase of R17.5 million for defense and R18.5 million for increased benefits for government employees to bring them into line with the private sector. Apart from a concession on the personal income tax, he proposed to retain restraints on the growth of private sector demand in order to guard against the possible development of fresh inflationary pressure. Credit controls would be maintained, and he suggested that it might still take considerable time before the ceiling on bank lending could be replaced by a more flexible system of control.
SECTION IV. NATIONAL SECURITY

CHAPTER 26

PUBLIC ORDER AND INTERNAL SECURITY

From the days of colonial administration, the problem of maintaining public order had generated a need for a growing body of laws and an increasingly large number of enforcement officials to counter threats to the peace and good order of the state. In early 1970 the Republic's criminal law was based on a vast series of substantive legislative acts, Roman-Dutch common law, and decisions of the courts rather than a single penal code. Procedural matters were dealt with in the Criminal Procedure Act.

A large proportion of the substantive criminal law was concerned with matters of race. Although legislation dealing with racial matters had been enacted for many years, it had proliferated in the years since 1948 as the Nationalist Party sought to implement its policy of apartheid. Although some apartheid laws applied in principle to the whole population, in practice the effect of most of them was limited to the nonwhite population (see ch. 14, The Legal System).

The South African Police (SAP), a centrally-controlled law enforcement agency of more than 34,000 regular policemen and 19,000 police reservists, was the primary instrument for enforcing law and order and preserving internal security. Trained and equipped to meet modern law enforcement standards, the police had a reputation for general efficiency. To the majority of nonwhite citizens, however, the force was a symbol of white domination and repressive regulations. Under the national Police Act and the amended Criminal Procedure Act, the police had inherited increasing powers to invade private rights in the course of exercising their prescribed functions (see ch. 14, The Legal System).

The incidence of crime had risen steadily over the years despite concurrent increases in the strength of the police force. The high crime rate was attributed to extensive national industrialization and urbanization, although a large share of arrests were made for violation of laws designed to control the actions and living patterns of nonwhite citizens. Most criminal activity consisted of nonserious offenses, but the incidence of serious crime was rising.
The prison system operated 249 penal institutions under procedures established by the national Prisons Act in 1959. In succeeding years amendments to this statutory authority restricted the publication of information critical of the prison system and detailed sanctions that could be imposed on anyone who failed to prove the truth of unfavorable allegations. Although newer prisons provided adequate facilities, a number dated from the colonial era, and their construction and equipment standards did not meet the requirements of modern penology. The Prisons Act emphasized the reformation and rehabilitation of offenders, as opposed to earlier concern with the punishment of criminals. The methods and facilities available for rehabilitating prisoners varied among prisons but were generally adequate in the newer installations.

Allegations of brutality, torture, and maltreatment of suspects and prisoners often were leveled at the South African Police and the Prison Service by the national press, the foreign media, the international political and judicial bodies. Most of these charges with respect to the police were against personnel assigned to the Special Branch, which was responsible for all civil counterintelligence operations. Court records revealed that each year a relatively small number of convictions were obtained in criminal courts against policemen and prison officials.

Despite the country's external manifestation of public order, fear of violence and nonwhite revolution pervaded much of the national life. Increasingly, organizations, including white groups opposing the government's apartheid policies, complained that the South African Police was ceasing to protect the rights of the people and was becoming instead the defense of interests and ideas of the Nationalist Party.

Unable to achieve measurable gains through nonviolent means, African nationalists operated in secret or left the country to be organized, trained, and equipped to fight by the tactics of guerrilla warfare. In early 1970 border infiltration and sabotage occurred on a limited scale, but these actions demanded increasing attention of the police and the armed forces.

CRIMINAL LAW

Except for the Criminal Procedure Act, criminal law was not codified but was derived from Roman-Dutch common law, national legislative acts, and decisions of the courts. Before 1961 many of the laws dealing with criminal offenses were enacted independently by the four provincial governments. Section 59 of the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act of 1961 abrogated these provincial statutes by granting Parliament full authority to make national laws for peace, public order, and security that applied to the entire
Republic. Subsequently, Parliament consolidated and adopted many of the former provincial criminal laws and added a vast number of new ones (see ch. 14, The Legal System).

The Criminal Procedure Act dealt almost exclusively with judicial procedure and evidence. This act defined a crime as a violation of law for which the state could exact punishment. To avoid disproportionate penalties for specific offenses, the act also defined the twofold nature of criminal liability. For a person to be criminally liable, it was necessary to prove that he acted voluntarily (actus reus) with actual or legal intent (mens rea) to commit the offense. Despite this general rule, it was often difficult to interpret the actual meaning of intent under many of the substantive criminal laws. In some laws, Parliament expressly indicated the mens rea required for guilt by employing words such as “willfully,” “intentionally,” or “knowingly.” More often, however, the laws did not indicate whether or not mens rea was an element to be considered, and the courts were required to decide on its applicability. In general, juridical decisions placed the burden of proving the absence of intent upon the accused. Where the courts decided that intent need not be proved, actus reus alone was required and the burden of proof rested with the state.

Ignorance of the law was not an acceptable defense of criminal violation, but extenuations and mitigating factors usually were considered. Children under the age of seven years were not held criminally responsible for any act or omission under common or statutory laws. Children aged seven through thirteen years also were presumed to be innocent under the law, although this presumption could be rebutted by the state by proving that the offender knew his act was contrary to law. From the age of fourteen a child’s criminal liability became the same as that of an adult, but his youth could be taken into account in mitigation of sentence.

In general, the burden of proving a criminal charge rested with the state. The only exceptions to this general rule were in cases where the defense was based on grounds of insanity or where the substantive laws, expressly or by implication, placed the onus of proof on the accused. The state’s burden of proof had to be beyond reasonable doubt; where the onus was on the accused, proof on the basis of probability was sufficient.

Criminal laws did not distinguish between offenses categorized under English common law as felonies and misdemeanors. In the late 1960’s criminal offenses were of six separate classes. Class A offenses were those committed against the safety of the state and public order. In addition to crimes of treason and insurrection, Class A offenses included such violations as income tax evasion and contempt of court. Class B offenses were those against communal life and included drunkenness, gambling, illegal use of drugs, com-
mission of immoral acts, and violations of curfew, registration, and pass laws. Class C offenses were those committed against persons and ranged from simple assault to murder. Class D offenses were those against property and included various forms of theft, robbery, arson, and malicious damage. Class E crimes were those that violated the orderly conduct of economic affairs and included fraud, embezzlement, forgery, and counterfeiting. Class F violations were confined largely to road traffic offense.

Punishments for convicted offenders were covered in some detail in the Criminal Sentences Amendment Act and in many of the substantive criminal laws. Penalties ranged from death by hanging to imprisonment with or without solitary confinement and dietary deprivation, corporal punishment, detention in a prison farm colony or inebriate reformatory, banning, and probation.

The sentence of death was mandatory for murder, unless the accused was a woman convicted of killing her newborn child or was a person of either sex under eighteen years of age, or unless the court found extenuating circumstances connected with the offense. In practice, few women received death sentences regardless of their offense. A 1958 amendment to the Criminal Procedure Act made it possible for courts to impose the death penalty for robbery or housebreaking, or for attempts to commit either offense “if aggravating circumstances were found to have been present.” “Aggravating circumstances” in the crime of robbery meant infliction of “grievous bodily harm or threat to inflict such harm;” applied to housebreaking, the term meant “while in possession of a dangerous weapon or the commission or threat to commit an assault on another person.” According to the latest available government statistics, 107 men were executed for criminal offenses between January 1965 and July 1966. Ninety-two of those hanged had been convicted of murder. An additional 63 offenders were in prisons awaiting execution of the death penalty.

Corporal punishment inflicted with whips or long inflexible canes was imposed at the discretion of the sentencing judge. This form of punishment was not imposed on women or on offenders under the age of eighteen. Between January 1965 and July 1966, a total of 43,769 strokes were inflicted on 8,888 offenders by the nation’s courts.

After three or more convictions for certain acts of violence, guilty persons could be declared habitual offenders by the courts. Such acts included rape; robbery; assault with intent to commit murder, rape, or robbery; arson; fraud; forgery; counterfeiting; breaking and entering; extortion; theft; receiving stolen property; prostitution; illicit dealing in precious metals and stones; and illegal supply of liquor to Africans and Coloureds. Habitual offenders often received corporal punishment and indeterminate prison sentences with hard
labor for a minimum of nine years. Each habitual criminal was given a personal interview once a year with the Board of Visitors. On these occasions, we was questioned and his record was reviewed by the board, which then recommended his release on parole or probation or his continued retention. Probation usually continued for a period of five years. Other possible punishments included imprisonment for periods ranging from 100 to 1,000 hours for less serious crimes and imprisonment for prevention of crime for periods ranging from five to eight years.

According to statistical research by the South African Institute of Race Relations, nonwhites were often more severely punished for ordinary criminal offenses than whites, although the general principles of criminal liability made no distinction between race, creed, or class. In the field of statute law, a large number of laws define acts criminal if committed by nonwhites. The Native Administration Act, the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, and the Natives (Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents) Act were examples of such legislation. Although many of the offenses delineated by these statutes were petty, vast numbers of nonwhites were convicted each year under these and other laws.

The Criminal Law Amendment Act was passed largely to preclude nonwhite demonstrations organized against government-imposed regulations. Under terms of the act, anyone convicted of an offense committed in protest or in support of a campaign against any national law could be sentenced to a fine of R600 (1 rand equals US$1.40), three years' imprisonment, corporal punishment to ten strokes, or a combination of these sanctions. Persons who advised or encouraged such protests could be arrested for incitement and were subject to a fine of R1,000, five years' imprisonment, ten strokes, or a combination of penalties. Convicted persons could also be banned from specific areas (see ch. 14, the Legal System). In prosecuting offenses under this act, courts were obliged to presume that the offense was committed as alleged if the accused was in the company of two or more other persons charged with committing similar violations at the same time and place.

The Suppression of Communism Act and Public Safety Act contained similar provisions protecting the government from attack by those who objected to its policies. Moreover, the laws gave the national police broad powers to ensure their enforcement. Any police inspector was empowered with the right to enter any premises at any time without previous notice. He could question any person and could seize any books, documents, or other material as evidence against suspected offenders. The Criminal Procedure Act permitted all police to search persons, premises, or vehicles without a warrant if they believed a delay in obtaining one would defeat the object of their search. They had also assumed the author-
ity to open the mail of suspected opponents, to search, seize, and retain the baggage of suspicious foreign visitors, and to tap the telephones of suspected persons.

Until 1969 trial by jury was at the discretion of the minister of justice and prisons. He could direct trial without jury for a number of offenses, including crimes defined by the Riotous Assemblies Act and any criminal act against or in connection with a white person if the defendant was nonwhite or in cases where the defendant was white and the victim was nonwhite. In cases involving indictments for treason, sedition, public violence, conspiracy, or incitement to any of these offenses, the attorney general could determine in advance of court proceedings that a trial by jury would likely defeat the ends of justice. Under such circumstances he could direct instead that the case be tried by a tribunal of Supreme Court justices, whose unanimous decision was required. This procedure had resulted in an increasing trend toward mass trials, not only for such offenses as treason but also for criminal violations of apartheid laws. The Abolition of Juries Act No. 34 or 1969 repealed the laws dealing with trial by jury in criminal proceedings. Under this new law a judge could appoint one or two qualified persons to sit with him at such trials to act as assessors (see ch. 14, The Legal System).

The Dangerous Weapons Act of 1968 prohibited the possession of any object that was likely to cause bodily injury if used to commit an assault on another person. Conviction under this law made violators liable to maximum penalties of R200, twelve months in prison, or both. The minister of justice and prisons was empowered to prohibit persons or classes of persons from possession of weapons. In practice, white citizens had little difficulty in obtaining and keeping weapons, but nonwhites were advised of such prohibition through official notices in the Government Gazette. Specific objects listed in these proclamations included firearms, knives, and liquor bottles converted into weapons by knocking off the bottom. The burden of proving a lack of criminal intent rested with the accused.

Through legislative acts passed during the 1960’s, the government tightened control over information that might be interpreted as contrary to the interests of national security. In 1965 the Official Secrets Act was amended, making it an offense to communicate information relating to the “preservation of internal security of the republic or the maintenance of law and order by the South African Police.” An amendment to the Prisons Act prohibited the publication of “false information concerning the behavior or experience in prison of any prisoner or ex-prisoner or concerning the administration of any prison, knowing the same to be false, or without taking
reasonable steps to verify such information." The onus of proving that reasonable steps were taken rested on all accused offenders.

THE NATIONAL POLICE

In early 1970 the South African Police (SAP) was the largest and best equipped nonmilitary law enforcement group south of the Sahara. Organized centrally as a state service, the SAP was the primary instrument for maintaining national internal security, although the army was prepared to provide supplementary assistance in the event of a serious disorder. Established as a national organization by the Police Act of 1912, the force was controlled by the minister of police and interior and administered by an appointed commissioner of police, who held the authorized rank of general.

The SAP consisted of 34,226 full-time policemen backed by a force of 19,442 police reservists, who were available for active duty in times of emergency. The regular force included 18,515 white officers, noncommissioned officers (NCO's) and constables; 1,535 Coloured NCO's and constables; 646 Asian NCO's and constables; and 13,530 African NCO's, constables, and laborers. Most metropolitan police units had personnel of all races, although assignment practices avoided posting a white policeman in a subordinate capacity to a nonwhite NCO or senior constable. Senior officers were promoted from the ranks, and this policy included accession to the post of commissioner of police. There was no direct entry system to the commissioned ranks. Although all commissioned officer positions had traditionally been reserved for white policemen, the commissioner of police announced in late 1969 that commissions would be extended to qualified nonwhite NCO's beginning in April 1970.

All constables on patrol duty were armed for personal protection with batons. Because of a national law prohibiting the possession of firearms by nonwhite persons anywhere in the country, only white policemen were equipped with handguns. Nonwhite constables and NCO's were used largely as auxiliaries to white policemen in maintaining order and executing raids in nonwhite group areas. Following the Group Areas Act and the resettlement of much of the urban nonwhite population, nonwhite police personnel were given increasing responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in the new townships. In early 1970 African policemen were in sole charge of thirty-five police stations. Coloured members of the SAP were responsible for seven stations, and Asian policemen were in charge of one.

In addition to its internal security role, the SAP was responsible for the maintenance of law and order, protection of life and property, and the prevention and detection of crime. The force con-
ducted its own recruiting program, organized and operated its own training schools, and provided services for the health and welfare of its members and their families.

Personnel of the SAP were enlisted voluntarily on a nationwide basis. A majority of white police members were Afrikaners, and most African members were recruited in rural areas, particularly in the reserves. Subject to compulsory military training at the age of seventeen, a large number of white youths chose instead to enlist in the ranks of the national police. There was no organized contingent of women police, although the SAP employed a number of women in administrative jobs and other specialized occupations.

White constables of the SAP wore a uniform that was introduced in 1961. It consisted of a dark gray, open-neck jacket, light gray trousers and shirt, dark gray necktie, black shoes, dark gray peaked garrison cap, and Sam Browne belt. In hot weather and in many rural areas the uniform consisted of a bush jacket, short trousers, and knee socks. Uniform variations for nonwhite constables included closed-neck jackets and pith helmets.

The SAP developed as the outgrowth of a variety of security forces created over the years to meet changing conditions and problems. As the European settlement expanded, the size of the law enforcement body also grew. By the end of the nineteenth century the British colonial government had established the area’s first efficient police force. Modeled after the London Metropolitan Police by a former British police inspector, the new force became known as the Cape Constabulary. Although its size was modest, this organization provided protection to citizens of the Cape Colony and maintained adequate public order throughout the settlement. It was aided by the Water Police, who were responsible for patrolling the waterfront, combating smuggling, and apprehending disorderly sailors. In rural districts, law and order was maintained by a few constables known as landdrosts. When additional assistance was needed, the landdrosts called for volunteers from townships and individual farms; the bodies of volunteers were then organized as vigilantes and were known locally as commandos.

Other regions developed their own law enforcement bodies, including the Natal Mounted Police, the Orange Free State Police, and an African force that provided efficient service to Zululand after the Zulu War of 1879. The Transvaal Police and the Orange River Colony Police were formed in 1908.

The police forces of our four provinces were consolidated shortly after the act of national union in 1910, and from this amalgamation two important law and order groups emerged. The South African Mounted Riflemen were detailed to maintain law and order in rural areas, and the South African Police became responsible for public order in most of the towns and cities. The South African Mounted
Riflemen were mobilized for military service in World War I, and the South African Police assumed the task of providing law and order in rural areas. After serving in South West Africa, the mounted regiments returned temporarily to their civil duties. The SAP absorbed a large portion of the South African Mounted Riflemen and by 1936 had assumed full responsibility for law and order throughout the country. In mid-1939 the SAP was given the responsibility of policing South West Africa (Namibia).

Apart from internal law and order functions, the SAP was empowered under the Police Act to assist in the defense of the Republic. Amendments to the act permitted the use of the national police in areas outside the Republic when requested by friendly governments and when such operations could be construed as essential to South Africa’s internal security. In early 1970 substantial numbers of the SAP were engaged in antiguerrilla operations in Rhodesia and Mozambique.

Control and enforcement of traffic laws was not a function of the SAP. Most cities and towns maintained their own traffic police, and enforcement of traffic laws on the nation’s road system was exercised by traffic police of the four provinces. Similarly, policing of the Republic’s railways, harbors, and airports was handled by police of the South African Railways and Administration.

Organization and Operations

Central to the force’s organization was the South African Police Headquarters, housed in a modern, well-equipped, eight-story building in Pretoria. From this control center the commissioner of police and his staff established policy, supervised operations of the force, coordinated with elements of the government and the military defense forces, and guided the activities of all subordinate police units. Staff elements assigned to the headquarters included a Financial section, the Quartermaster, the South African Criminal Bureau, a Personnel Section, and a Training Section. The structure also included subsections in charge of air, reserve, and police dog activities.

Territorially, the force was divided into eighteen police divisions, each under the control of a divisional commissioner. Designated divisions were those of western Cape Province, eastern Cape Province, Transkei, Kimberley, Orange Free State, Natal, Port Natal, Transvaal, Witwatersrand, Eastern Transvaal, and South West Africa. In addition, a police division was assigned to each of seven African reserves. Individual divisions varied somewhat in strength and organization, depending on the population density and degree of urbanization within each area of responsibility. A division’s territory was further subdivided into districts, which contained varying
numbers of police stations responsible for the control of specific areas. Throughout the Republic there were eighty police districts and 1,029 police stations.

Operationally the force was organized into two separate elements, the Uniformed Branch and the Detective Branch. Although the bulk of the force was assigned to the Uniformed Branch, not all of its members were detailed to regular patrol duty. A large number were uniformed clerks and technical specialists such as radio and electronics technicians, fingerprint experts, and the like. Medico-legal work was provided by officials trained in forensic medicine and attached to the Department of Health. Most new police constables were assigned initially to the Uniformed Branch for routine experience. Those with specialist aptitudes were given further training in SAP technical schools.

The Uniformed Branch was organized generally along British lines, but the Detective Branch was a centralized service that operated from SAP Headquarters. Subordinate police units did not have separate detective elements. This branch consisted of plainclothes detectives assigned to the Criminal Investigation Division (CID), the Security Branch, and a number of technical sections that dealt with specific types of offenses, such as homicide, burglary, and those committed by juvenile offenders. Most detectives were experienced former members of the Uniformed Branch who had demonstrated appropriate aptitude for plainclothes police work.

The Special Branch was concerned with intelligence and counter-subversion, although in early 1970 this unit’s functions and personnel appeared destined for absorption by a new suprapolice organization, the Bureau of State Security (BOSS). Under legislation entitled the Public Service Amendment Bill, the new bureau was to be organized outside the structure of the SAP and control of the Public Service Commission, which supervised all matters relating to other public service agencies. BOSS was to be answerable solely to the prime minister and was to have complete national authority in all matters of internal security, including the functions of military intelligence formerly assigned to the armed forces. It was to be directed by the former deputy commissioner of police and chief of the Security Branch, who late in 1968 was promoted to the rank of full general and appointed security advisor to the prime minister.

Under terms of the enabling legislation, it would be an offense to communicate information about the new bureau that would be prejudicial to state security. Parliamentary and press critics of the legislation interpreted this feature as an attempt to prevent anti-government commentary by opposition newspapers. Another clause of the bill would give the prime minister authority to bar evidence from being used in court if he considered the evidence to be prejudicial to state interests. Many lawyers and opposition members
of Parliament expressed open concern that through this clause a suspect under BOSS investigation could be prevented from testifying in his own behalf. In addition, a number of legislators had voiced objections to the proposed exclusion of the bureau’s budget from treasury scrutiny and the concealment of its personnel strength, qualifications, and salary ranges. In early 1970, as a result of widespread criticism of the BOSS legislation, the prime minister appointed a commission of inquiry to investigate the entire national security network.

In the early years of the SAP transportation was provided chiefly by horses, mules, donkeys, a few camels, and bicycles. In 1970 the force’s remaining 248 horses were assigned to the Pretoria police college for use in the recruit-training program and for ceremonial purposes. An inventory of 4,200 motorized transport vehicles included trucks, buses, pickup vans, jeeps, station wagons, radio patrol sedans, motorcycles, tanks, helicopters, and light, fixed-wing aircraft. To maintain police vehicles in good mechanical condition, a large number of SAP garages were scattered throughout the country. A school for mechanical and driver training at Benoni provided mechanics for the police garages.

In 1963 a countrywide two-way radio system was installed that linked all police stations in South Africa and South West Africa to SAP Headquarters in Pretoria. The 400 vehicles of the Radio Patrol Service, also known as the Flying Squad, were also equipped with two-way radios. Controlled from a communications center at SAP Headquarters, each patrol vehicle was manned by two uniformed policemen trained and equipped to respond rapidly to emergency situations. In December 1966 the country strengthened its motorized police patrols along its borders with additional policemen and motorized equipment. The border patrols were active in the Transvaal, northern Cape Province, and South West Africa, where national frontiers were exposed to infiltration by antigovernment guerrilla units.

A small Air Wing was established in 1965 and equipped with light aircraft for reconnaissance operations. Pilots were hired under contract to the SAP. A six-seat Cessna was purchased in 1965 for use by the commissioner of police. A few helicopters were later added to the aircraft inventory, and others were obtained from the South African Air Force when needed.

Since 1913 the SAP had made increasing use of police dogs in the prevention and investigation of criminal activity. Approximately 250 dogs and their handlers were trained in nine-month sessions at the Quaggaspoort Dog Training School near Pretoria each year. Most of the animals were German shepherds and were trained for patrols in urban areas for tracking in rural districts. All were taught to detect the characteristic odor of dagga (marijuana) and to aid in
locating landmines. In 1969 dogs and their handlers began training as airborne parachute patrols. Under this operational concept dog-and-master teams were air dropped in inaccessible areas where motorized police would be hampered by terrain difficulties. The police also planned to use their airborne teams against guerrilla activities in the nation's remote border regions.

In 1965 a number of new mobile police units, specially trained in guerrilla warfare, were established in strategic areas of the country. Similar to infantry strike forces, these units were ready for assignment anywhere in the Republic at short notice to quell riots, strikes, or guerrilla infiltrations. All units were self-sufficient in weapons, ammunition, communications equipment, motor vehicles, and supplies. Mobile units were trained in the use of tear gas, water hoses, and other techniques of riot control.

In combating ordinary crime, the SAP was engaged in the usual professional task of maintaining law and order. As enforcers of the numerous laws of apartheid, however, they dealt daily with a state of endemic but unorganized rebellion by the nonwhite majority of the population. On the average they secured 3,000 daily court convictions for breaches of the laws of separate development and a large number of admissions of guilt that the courts never investigated. Ordinary crimes, when committed by Africans against white persons, were viewed as a threat to white governmental control. The organization of nonwhite political movements were regarded as threats to internal security, and the police were charged with intervention to suppress all such movements.

Fulfillment of these missions required close contact between the police and the people, a high degree of professional competence, and the employment of sophisticated techniques and equipment. Precipitate use of firearms in crowd-control operations led to high casualties at Sharpeville in 1960 (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Both the SAP and the Nationalist government were displeased with the adverse publicity engendered internationally by the Sharpeville action. Since then the police had perfected less violent techniques or riot control, with tear gas and water cannon in reserve, and had been careful to preclude similar incidents.

In its mission of insuring internal security, the SAP devoted much of its energy and capability to detecting terrorist conspiracies against the government. Although in early 1970 this task appeared destined for the forces of the newly-created Bureau of State Security (BOSS), the SAP Special Branch earned both a national and international reputation during the 1960's for its success in eliminating subversive threats. Allegations of networks of police informers, wiretapping, police brutality, and mental and physical torture of detained suspects were frequently made by United Nations bodies, the International Commission of Jurists, the foreign
press, and most of the national English-language newspapers whose editorial policies opposed those of the Nationalist government.

The public image of the national police was one of varied character among the different ethnic groups of the population. Because they did not deal with traffic offenses, the SAP seldom came in contact with the majority of the white community except when that group required assistance. To most white citizens, members of the SAP were soldiers defending national policies and laws that decreed control of the country by the white minority. To nonwhite citizens, particularly Africans, the SAP was a force to be feared and one to be avoided whenever possible. Despite these diverse attitudes, most persons recognized the policeman as one capable of rough kindness on ordinary occasions. In emergencies, such as fires and natural disasters, policemen were humane, responsive, and heroic. Devotion to duty and traditional disregard for personal safety had brought numerous citations and medals to members of the force.

The police Amendment Act of 1961 provided for the establishment of a police reserve. The mission of this organization of citizen volunteers was to assist in performing ordinary police duties when members of the regular force were required for more urgent tasks. The government initially planned for recruitment of about 5,000 white reservists, but it later increased this quota and extended membership to a limited number of nonwhites. In 1969 the police reserve numbered 19,442 members, including 17,530 whites, 555 Coloureds, 307 Asians, and 1,050 Africans.

The Police Reserve consisted of four separate personnel categories. Group A reservists were regarded as full-time police in times of emergency. They received pay if called up and performed regular police duties. They received intensive police training and were issued police firearms. Membership in this category was limited to white men. Group B reservists were designated the “home guard” and performed police duties two hours a day in their own residential areas during emergencies. Their role was one of crime prevention, and they patrolled specified areas during periods of duty. Group B reservists were not issued firearms. All racial groups were eligible for membership in this category. Group C reservists were employees of local authorities and key industries, and their reserve role was the defense of their employers’ property in event of emergency. Group D reservists were men in rural areas who constituted a civilian riot force, willing to carry out police duties in the initial stages of an emergency until regular police or military troops arrived in sufficient strength. In the late 1960’s all Group C and D reservists were white.

In 1967 African reservists were introduced to police work in a government experiment in Johannesburg’s African township of
Soweto. Five hundred twenty volunteers were trained in the prevention and detection of crime, armed with truncheons, and placed under the supervision of regular police officers in the township. These African reservists arrested an average of 100 men each month for loitering, smoking dagga, and for possession of firearms and stolen property. The success of the Soweto experiment led to an announcement in late 1968 by the commissioner of police that an additional 5,600 African police reservists would be recruited within African Group Areas. Coloured reservists performed similar duty in Coloured townships of Cape Town and Port Elizabeth. Asian reservists were mainly used in their own townships in the vicinity of Durban.

The SAP encouraged its members to participate in competitive sports during off-duty hours and provided numerous hobby and entertainment facilities. A number of police divisions and districts had their own police bands and orchestras for both ceremonial and social occasions. A network of police chaplains was responsible for the spiritual welfare of police personnel and their families. A police museum in Pretoria's SAP Headquarters contained thousands of exhibits to remind visitors of the services performed and the hazards encountered by the nation's policemen.

Training

The SAP placed great emphasis on training, and the broad scope of specialized and academic instruction given members of the force had led to a high level of professional competence. In early 1970 the SAP operated four separate training institutions. The largest of these was the South African Police College in Pretoria, where all white police recruits received basic instruction and where other white police personnel attended advanced courses in specialized subjects. Completed in 1965, the college maintained facilities for approximately 2,000 trainees a year. Three separate smaller police schools trained Coloured, Asian, and African police personnel. Coloured policemen attended Bishop Lavis Training Depot near Cape Town; Asians received police instruction at Wentworth near Durban; Africans were schooled at New Modderfontein's Bantu Police Training College near Benoni.

Recruit training in all four institutions included both theoretical and practical instruction in physical conditioning, self-defense, first aid, the use of firearms, crowd and riot control, close order drill, and horseback riding. Police recruits also were instructed in the various laws with which they would be involved as policemen. All attended lectures on the causes of strained race relations and methods by which ethnic problems could be minimized.

Beginning in 1961 the duration of the course for white police
recruits was lengthened from six to twelve months, and the minimum educational requirement for enlistment was raised from Standard VII to Standard VIII (see ch. 9, Education). Recruits who did not have a matriculation certificate were given intensive academic training by instructors of the Department of Higher Education. The curriculum included courses in Afrikaans, English, sociology and ethnology, elementary criminology, criminal procedure, and statute law. Completion of the first three subjects was required by the end of the year's training, and graduates were required to continue study of the remaining three by correspondence. Although most white recruits arrived at the Police College having matriculated or graduated from Standard VIII, they nonetheless were required to complete a six-month course on common law, criminal procedure, and statute law. Minimum educational qualifications for a nonwhite recruit were Standard VI and fluency in either Afrikaans or English. The six-month training courses for nonwhite recruits were similar to those given white candidates.

Staffs of the four police training institutions included senior police officers, technical specialists, and teachers of adult education courses from the Department of Higher Education. During training all recruits received free housing accommodations, food, and medical services. Trainees with national senior certificates attesting to their graduation from Standard VIII were paid R100 each month. Pay was reduced for students with less formal education. After completing basic training, recruits were promoted to the rank of constable and assigned for two months of duty with a metropolitan police station before receiving a permanent station assignment.

In addition to recruit training, the SAP schools provided instruction courses for police specialists, advanced courses in criminology and law enforcement techniques for senior personnel, and refresher training in the use of firearms and riot control procedures. Specialized training included techniques and procedures associated with crime laboratory work, the use of electronic devices, radio operation and repair, horsemanship for members of the Mounted Section, driver training, and dog handling techniques for those assigned to the Police Dog Section.

**INCIDENCE AND TYPES OF CRIME**

Since the first published crime statistics in 1912, the incidence of criminal activity had risen steadily, except for slight decreases during the years of World Wars I and II. According to the latest available government statistics, the crime rate per 1,000 persons nearly tripled between 1921 and 1967 (see table 39). During this period the size of the SAP fluctuated but in general also increased by a
factor of three. In 1967 a total of 2,271,000 violators of the nation's criminal statutes were brought to trial. The conviction rate averaged about 23 per 1,000 members of the population.

Table 39. Comparative Crime Rates and Police Strength in South Africa, Selected Years, 1921—67

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Estimated population</th>
<th>Police strength</th>
<th>Police*</th>
<th>Number of criminal cases reported</th>
<th>Offense rate*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>6,945,300</td>
<td>10,608</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>367,477</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>8,075,000</td>
<td>10,586</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>649,513</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>10,341,200</td>
<td>11,217</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>964,376</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>12,789,000</td>
<td>17,821</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>1,432,370</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>15,994,181</td>
<td>25,724</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>2,141,000</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>18,300,000</td>
<td>34,226</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>2,706,900</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Per 1,000 population.


In the mid-1960's a sociological study of the nation's crime problem was conducted by qualified personnel of the University of the Witwatersrand, assisted by members of the SAP. The rising crime rate was attributed to the social disequilibrium resulting from the rapid rate of industrialization, a shift of large numbers of people from rural to urban areas, and the enactment of a large body of laws designed to control the actions and living patterns of the non-white ethnic groups. Component factors included overcrowded and substandard living conditions, inadequate income levels, high rates of alcoholism and drug usage, lack of recreational, social, and cultural amenities, and disruption of traditional forms of social control, particularly among African migrant workers. Among the latter group, strong feelings of antagonism toward the white government and white control in general were often conducive to criminal activity.

In the late 1960's most crime was of a nonserious nature, but the incidence of serious offenses had risen during the decade. According to an announcement by the commissioner of police, 9,347 persons died in crimes of violence during 1968; of these, 4,249 were murdered, 4,126 died through acts of culpable homicide, and 972 were killed in assaults. Violation of the apartheid laws and subsequent criminal court action against large numbers of Africans accounted for 44.6 percent of all criminal offense prosecutions.

The crime rate by province was highest in Transvaal, where industrialization and urbanization were greatest, followed in order by Natal, the Orange Free State, and Cape Province. The Witwaters-
rand district in Transvaal Province, with approximately one-eighth of the country's total population, accounted for nearly 40 percent of all criminal activity. Most of it occurred in the city of Johannesburg, although high crime rates also existed in the major cities of Cape Town, Durban, Pretoria, and Port Elizabeth.

Laws defined as those pertaining to communal life were the most frequently violated. Included in this category of offenses were high rates of prosecution for drunkenness and the use of dagga, particularly among nonwhites, violations of pass laws, Bantu tax regulations, and other contraventions of apartheid laws. Most nonserious offenses by white persons consisted of violations of road traffic laws. In the field of serious crime, the vast majority of offenses related to property; 24 percent of all convictions were for crimes of theft, burglary, arson, and malicious damage to property. Crimes against persons constituted 22 percent of all criminal convictions; the most frequent offenses in this class were the various types of assault. In 1967, of 6,043 cases of alleged or suspected murder reported to the police, 1,443 occurred in the Witwatersrand area. The total number of convictions for acts of violence against persons in 1967 totaled 97,907. Excluding suicides, these criminal acts resulted in the loss of 8,640 lives during the year. The victims included 811 whites, 651 Coloureds, 101 Asians, and 7,077 Africans.

Criminal offenses listed in annual police reports were most frequent among Africans and Coloureds than for Asians and white members of the population. In terms of convictions, 261,605 Africans were found guilty of offenses during 1967, compared with 114,405 Coloureds, 46,897 whites, and 8,192 Asians. These figures, however, did not reflect the nearly 938,000 persons prosecuted for violations of the pass laws, for contraventions of labor service contracts, for failure to pay the Bantu tax, and for illegal possession of alcoholic beverages. If the number of apartheid law violations committed by Africans were deducted from the total of all offenses by Africans, the incidence of crime by Africans would closely approximate that among whites and Asians.

Criminal activity by age groups was reported in three categories: juvenile offenders, aged seven to sixteen years; juvenile adult offenders, aged seventeen to twenty years; and adult offenders, twenty-one years and over. Adult offenders were responsible for the preponderance of all offenses; the numbers of offenders in the juvenile adult group were nearly double those of the juvenile group. Among all races and for all ages, males were generally more likely to commit crimes than were females.

In the larger cities most of the ordinary offenses were committed by members of organized criminal gangs, whose lawless activities were a major problem for the overworked SAP. In Johannesburg the bulk of all crimes occurred in the central area of the city,
known to the SAP as the triangle. Overcrowded and offering anonymity and opportunity to a potential offender, the area became a dangerous place at night for residents, casual pedestrians and, often, armed policemen. African criminals generally ranging in age from twelve to forty years, were known as tsotsi, a term meaning criminal toughs that originated during the mid-1940's. White criminals usually were referred to by police as “white tsotsi,” and in Cape Town the term “skollie” was applied to Coloured criminals (see ch. 6, Social Structure).

Following population resettlements under the Group Areas Act, many criminal gangs moved to the large nonwhite urban townships. Knife attacks, robbery, murder, rape, car theft, prostitution, drug peddling, illicit liquor dealing, blackmail, and purse snatching were continued against members of the criminals' own ethnic groups. In the twenty-one-square-mile African township of Soweto near Johannesburg, 1,192 persons died by violence from 1962 to 1965, and the police estimated that three times that number of violent deaths were not reported. The Rand Daily Mail in a 1967 survey of crime in Soweto estimated that as many as 1,000 persons were killed in the township every year, and as many as 20 on some weekends. Many of the gangs operating in the area included teenagers who roamed the streets terrorizing inhabitants, especially on Friday nights, when many came home with their weekly wages. Most tsotsi were armed with knives and firearms despite laws prohibiting their possession. Other weapons used by criminals included the panja, or machete, bicycle chains, and a needle-sharp bicycle spoke, known as an nthomentumshu, which often left the criminal's victim paralyzed for life when thrust through the spinal cord.

The white criminal element operated in the central sectors of the major cities and also committed crimes in the more affluent white-occupied suburbs. High theft and burglary rates had induced householders to install elaborate iron bars or heavy mesh screening over all windows. The wealthier homes were also protected by burglar alarms. Most white persons living in suburban areas owned more than one firearm, and the police conducted training courses in marksmanship for white citizens.

Data on the economic cost of crime were not available, but it was estimated that in Johannesburg alone property worth R2 million passed each year into the hands of housebreakers, robbers, thieves, and other criminals. Damage to premises through arson, broken windows and locks, holes made in walls, and other forms of destruction caused by thieves also represented a considerable financial loss. Motor vehicles were stolen at the rate of about 200 a month, and theft from automobiles averaged about 400 incidents a month.

Merchandise worth millions of rand was stolen each year from stores through shoplifting and from pilferage by employees. It was
estimated that it cost the citizens of Johannesburg approximately R8 million a year for protective anticrime devices and a share in the cost of SAP operations. These funds were used to purchase handguns, burglar alarms, and burglar-proof doors and windows and to employ night watchmen and guard dogs.

THE PRISON SYSTEM

The national penal system was organized under the minister of justice and prisons and administered by the Department of Prisons. The senior officer within the department was the commissioner of prisons, whose administrative authority and guidelines were outlined in the Prisons Act. Article 2 of the act declared that “the functions of the Prisons Department shall be, as far as is practicable, to apply such treatment to convicted prisoners as may lead to their reformation and rehabilitation, and to train them in the habits of industry and labour.” Prisons were staffed by civil servants, and administrative management of the nation’s prisons was subject to review by the national government’s Public Service Commission. Operating and maintenance costs of all institutions within the system were financed from national revenues.

The prison system was composed of thirty-four regional commands, each under the administrative supervision of a commanding officer whose rank varied from captain to brigadier. According to the grading of an institution, the Prison Service member in charge held a rank not lower than that of head warder (guard) and not higher than major. The member in charge was directly responsible to the commanding officer of the prison command.

In the late 1960’s the personnel strength of the Prison Service totaled 8,000, including 221 white officers and 7,779 warders of all ethnic groups. Most white personnel were Afrikaners. Officers, all of whom had risen through the lower ranks, included the commissioner of prisons, a deputy commissioner, two assistant commissioners, and seven brigadiers who served as the commanding officers of the larger regional prison commands. Despite good salaries, there was a relatively high staff turnover resulting from resignations of prison warders, who frequently accepted jobs with private industrial concerns.

To be eligible for the Prison Service, recruits had to be at least eighteen years old and five feet, six inches tall. Educational eligibility included literacy in either English or Afrikaans and possession of a Standard VIII certificate, although Standard VI certification was usually accepted for African applicants. Both men and women were recruited from the white, Coloured, Asian, and African groups.

Before candidates were assigned to prison duties, they were re-
quired to complete a six-month course. White recruits were trained at the new Kroonstad prison training complex; Coloureds trained at Pollsmoor in Cape Province; Asians, at Durban; and Africans, at Baviaanspoort Prison near Pretoria. The course of instruction emphasized discipline, suitable punishment methods, conduct toward prisoners, physical conditioning, self-defense techniques, first aid, firefighting, and close-order squad drill. All candidates were instructed on details of the Prisons Act and attended lectures on practical psychology, sociology, and fundamental criminology. A number of recruits received vocational training in such trades as carpentry, building, painting, animal husbandry, and farm operation. These men were later assigned to supervise and instruct vocational training of the prisoner population. Recruits in training received full pay and privileges.

The Kroonstad training facility accommodated 600 entrants annually and also provided advanced courses for experienced warders and senior staff personnel. Selected members received instruction in management, legal procedure, agriculture, and animal husbandry. The Department of Prisons encouraged Prison Service personnel to improve their academic and technical qualifications through grants of interest-free study loans from the Prisons Benefit Fund.

Although generally lower than those of the police, pay rates for Prison Service personnel were reasonably satisfactory. Retirement on government pensions at the age of sixty was the general rule, but staff members could remain on active duty up to the age of sixty-three, with approval of the Public Service Commission. Prison Service personnel and their families received medical and hospital benefits, and a welfare fund maintained by voluntary contributions afforded financial assistance to widows and orphans as a supplement to state pensions. All active service personnel received state-provided housing accommodations in the vicinity of the prisons to which they were assigned.

Working conditions of most prison personnel were arduous; long hours of service were usually required, including duty at night, over weekends, and on public holidays. Attempts were made in the late 1960's to bring working hours in line with the generally accepted working week observed by private business and industry. Under this adjustment, those who were required to work unusual hours received compensatory time off rather than overtime pay.

Warders serving on prison farms usually were armed with truncheons. Those assigned to medium- and maximum-security prisons were authorized the use of firearms. Many prisons employed German shepherd dogs trained at the South African Police patrol dog school. The animals were highly effective in controlling prison disturbances and in tracking escaped convicts.

Contraventions of prison regulations by staff personnel were handled by trials, and punitive sanctions were prescribed by the
Prisons Act. Proceedings were similar in nature to those of an open criminal court. Conviction for infractions of prison rules required penalties that ranged from reprimands, fines, reduction in rank, and discharge to prosecution by a criminal court. Offenders had the right to appeal convictions to the commissioner of police. In 1966, seven warders were convicted of assaults on prisoners and were discharged from the Prison Service. Similar cases of convictions for maltreatment of prisoners were reported in 1967 and 1968.

Installations

In early 1970 there were 249 penal institutions scattered throughout the country. A major proportion of these were local or district prisons generally used as reception centers for newly convicted offenders and for persons remanded into custody while awaiting trial. The remainder included a number of large central prisons offering maximum security and 12 prison farms. Although local prisons were generally classified as medium security institutions, the Prison Department maintained maximum security at these facilities because of the undeterminable quality of behavior among remand prisoners. Reformatories for juvenile offenders were administered by the Department of National Education and the Department of Bantu Education and were not part of the prison system (see ch. 9, Education).

A number of the prisons built in the colonial period were still in use in early 1970. After World War II some of these were modernized, and a program to construct new installations with ancillary facilities for modern penal operations was begun. In addition to cell blocks, all new installations had kitchen and dining halls, medical dispensaries, a variety of workshops, observation centers, recreational facilities, administrative offices, and housing for staff members and their families. Because agricultural training was a major rehabilitation measure practiced by the Department of Prisons, the newer institutions included areas reserved for farming activities. Five of the twelve prison farms were located in the Transvaal; three were in Orange Free State; and two each were in Natal and Cape Province. In addition, twenty-three prison outstations existed on privately owned farms (see ch. 22, Labor).

In the 1960's the trend in new prison construction favored the gradual replacement of older outdated penal facilities with prison centers on complexes, each containing a reception center, a maximum security capability, and a prison farm. Typical of this penal center was the new Victor Verster Prison Complex near Paarl in western Cape Province. This concept permitted advancement from closed to open prison conditions without the need for transfers and readjustment to new surroundings as prisoners progressed toward the end of their confinement.
The oldest prison in the system was located on Robben Island in Table Bay about seven miles off Cape Town. Approximately two miles long and a mile wide, Robben Island first served as a prison colony for unruly sailors in the seventeenth century. In the nineteenth century it served as a place of detention for Africans who had been convicted of crimes, and old records contained frequent reference to persons condemned to labor there in chains. The facility served as a leper colony during the early years of the twentieth century until the patients were moved to Pretoria in 1931. In early 1970 Robben Island was one of the country’s most impenetrable maximum security prisons.

Physical features, such as floor space, cubic air space, ventilation, lighting, and washing and sanitary facilities, were subject to the health regulations of the area in which each prison was located and to the standards outlined in the Public Health Act of 1919. Maintenance of an optimum standard of hygiene was often hampered by overcrowding and the continued use of older installations. The Department of Prisons, within the limits of its budget, had improved the sanitary facilities at several older prisons. In most of them, it was possible for inmates to take a daily bath or shower, but waterborne sewage disposal was not available in some. Most kitchens were kept in a sanitary condition and contained refrigeration equipment for food storage. The member in charge of each prison was required to make daily inspections of all sections to enforce adequate standards of cleanliness; he was accompanied by a medical officer once each week. Allegations of unsanitary conditions in many prisons usually were leveled at those installations to which nonwhite offenders were confined.

Operations

During 1966, the latest year for which detailed statistics on sentences were available, 339,143 persons were committed to the nation’s prisons (see table 40). The following year prison admissions totaled 423,464, an increase of nearly 85,000. In 1967 over half of those admitted were sentenced to confinement for one month or less, and fifty-five percent were repeated offenders. Nearly 1,700 had been declared habitual criminals by the courts; 2,371 were imprisoned as a safeguard against possible criminal violations; and 4,113 were sentenced for corrective training. Among the white offenders admitted were 6,826 males and 453 females; Coloured males included 43,265 males and 8,244 females. Asian men accounted for 1,550 admissions, and women offenders of this ethnic group totaled 50. Africans convicted for criminal law violation included 313,047 men and 50,029 women. A total of 71,456 juveniles under twenty-one years of age were admitted; 61,053 were Africans, of which
Table 40. Distribution of Prison Sentences in South Africa, 1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sentence</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>Asians</td>
<td>Coloureds</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>Asians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sentenced to death</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life imprisonment</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indeterminate</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevention of crime (five to eight years)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>1,367</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrective training (two to four years)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>3,173</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two years and over</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>5,547</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over six months to under two years</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>949</td>
<td>15,448</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over four months to six months</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1,640</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>17,855</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over one month to four months</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>14,614</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1,850</td>
<td>1,361</td>
<td>90,231</td>
<td>608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Periodical imprisonment</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>24,755</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>4,417</td>
<td>2,234</td>
<td>109,227</td>
<td>911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporal punishment only (cane)</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>42,171</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>6,660</td>
<td>6,202</td>
<td>243,904</td>
<td>1,832</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

about three-fourths were males. The daily population for all penal institutions in 1967 averaged 73,266 prisoners, compared with 55,762 in 1961.

Since 1967 prisoners were classified according to their criminal offenses, past records, and length of sentence; assignment to the nation's three types of penal institutions depended on the degree of prisoner security these factors warranted. Approximately 11 percent of all prisoners admitted were designated Class A and served their sentences on prison farms under minimum security; about 80 percent were placed in medium security institutions as Class B prisoners; those assigned to Classes C and D constituted 9 percent of the prison admissions and were placed in maximum security. Class A prisoners earned their more lenient classifications and treatment by exemplary behavior, usually by promotion from Class B. Most Class B offenders had committed crimes against property rather than against persons. Hardened criminals, gang leaders, armed robbers, and those convicted of sabotage were assigned to the remaining two classes. Of these, Class C was reserved for those capable of being reformed, while those with violent records usually were placed in Class D.

Upon admission to a prison, each offender was informed of his statutory rights as detailed in the "Prisoner's Handbook." He was advised that a Supreme Court justice could visit any prison at any time and that a lower court magistrate could do so at prisons in his own district. During the course of such visits, a prisoner had the right to present legitimate complaints to the court official. Prisoners sentenced to at least two years were first admitted to an observation center for a few weeks, during which time a careful study was made of his personality, criminal record, character traits, background, and aptitudes.

Prisoners were segregated by race and sex, and no person under the age of eighteen years could be detained in a prison before conviction in a court of law, unless a more suitable place of detention was unavailable. Whenever juveniles were remanded to custody in a prison, contact with prisoners over the age of twenty-one was not permitted. For purposes of accommodation and treatment of sentenced offenders, all under the age of twenty-one years were regarded as juveniles.

Apart from safe custody of convicted offenders, prison staffs were responsible under the Prisons Act for constructive prisoner training. The act specified that each prisoner had the right to be allowed to work, and all authorized activity in which there was an element of training was classified as work. Upon attaining an established standard of performance, prisoners received a modest payment, which they could send to their dependents or use to purchase approved articles for personal welfare. A variety of occupational
and vocational training was provided for prisoners considered capable of rehabilitation. The Department of Prisons arranged with other government departments for proficiency tests that conferred diplomas and artisan status on those who passed them. Certificates attesting to the nature and extent of the training were issued to prisoners who were not sufficiently qualified for diplomas at the time of release.

A building section of the vocational training department at medium-security prisons provided courses in electrical wiring, plumbing, stonemasonry, brickmaking, bricklaying, plastering, painting, and joinery. Prisoners training in this section often were employed in the construction of facilities within the prison complex. At larger centers prisoner workshops included those specializing in bookbinding, art needlework, tailoring, beadwork, motor mechanics, furniture caning, sisal processing, shoemaking and leather work, welding, and laundry operation. Clothing and shoes were manufactured in prison workshops by prisoners trained in these vocations.

For those detained on prison farms, the usual training was in agricultural vocations. A total of 44,473 acres was available among the twelve prison farms for the production of maize (corn), a mixture of vegetables, and crops for feeding the farms' livestock. Butter, honey, meat, milk, and crop produce permitted the prison system to be self-supporting in food for the inmate population.

Dietary standards were established by the Department of Health, and food preparation was inspected daily by commissioned prison officers and medical personnel. Because of the availability of fresh meat and vegetables from prison farms, an adequate nutritional diet was possible. Special diets were available for prisoners confined to prison hospitals for treatment.

Although most prisons had small hospital facilities, doctors, and other medical personnel, seriously ill prisoners were removed to public hospitals for treatment. Despite the increasing prison population, a generally optimum standard of health existed. Sporadic cases of infectious disease occurred occasionally, but epidemics were seldom encountered. Prisoners suffering from tuberculosis were transferred for isolation and treatment in a Department of Health tuberculosis hospital. During 1966 the Department of Prisons reported 350 prisoner deaths from causes other than legal executions. Of this number, 15 were killed through willful assault by fellow prisoners; 5 died as a result of injuries received in fights; 5 committed suicide; and 13 died in accidents. The death rate due to natural causes represented approximately 1 per 2,000 inmates.

Privileges extended to those who observed prison rules included visits from family members, access to newspapers and periodicals, and the purchase of articles from the prison canteens. Within safe
custody limits, facilities for sports and recreation were available, and selected groups were allowed to participate in extramural sport. Teams from different penal centers often competed against each other in football, cricket, boxing, tennis, jukskei (an Afrikaner game similar to deck quoits), and gymnastics. Indoor recreational facilities included draughts, darts, chess, cards, dominoes, and miniature billiards. During leisure time, prisoners could participate in debates or in choir and orchestra practice or attend film shows and concerts. A number of larger prison centers had record libraries and phonographs. Most institutions maintained libraries of books for prisoner use.

Although a prisoner could be released on parole at any time, few were paroled before serving at least one-half of their sentences or before completing the minimum period of detention prescribed for corrective training, prevention of crime, or indeterminate sentences. Inmates serving sentences of no more than four months usually were released on parole immediately after admission to prison. The object of this practice was to prevent short-term offenders from coming into contact with hardened criminals and to preclude the stigma of imprisonment. Approximately half of the offenders admitted to prisons in 1966 were paroled in this manner. A large number were released during June 1966 under an amnesty granted to certain categories of prisoners on the occasion of the Festival of the Republic. Dates of discharge of many others also were advanced at that time.

Under terms of the Prisons Act, a prisoner was not permitted to be punished for disciplinary contraventions unless he was first given a regular hearing by a commissioned Prison Service officer or a magistrate. The act also stipulated that proceedings at such a hearing must conform to summary criminal procedure in a magistrate's court (see ch. 14, Legal System). A prisoner on trial for disciplinary infraction was to be considered innocent until proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. He was entitled to legal representation, examination of state witnesses, and presentation of defensive evidence and could testify in his own behalf.

The sentence usually imposed for disciplinary violations was solitary confinement, with or without reduced diet of rice and water, for periods not to exceed six days. Admissions of guilt for minor contraventions allowed offenders to be summarily reprimanded and denied certain privileges for periods not exceeding one month. They could also be deprived of meals not to exceed three in succession. Corporal punishment up to a maximum of six strokes could be imposed on those convicted of serious infractions involving violence or in cases where other punishments had proved ineffective in deterring disciplinary violations. Such sentences were subject to automatic review by a judge of the Supreme Court. Whipping was
permitted only after a medical officer certified that the prisoner was fit to undergo corporal punishment. Similar certification was required for the imposition of solitary confinement and sentences involving dietary deprivation.

Allegations of brutality by prison service personnel and ill-treatment of prisoners often were made by the English-language newspapers, the foreign news media, and organizations such as the United Nations and the International Commission of Jurists. In the late 1960’s such allegations led to an extended trial and conviction of newspapermen associated with Johannesburg’s *Rand Daily Mail* for violation of the Prisons Amendment Act (see ch. 17, Public Information). In 1968 the thirty-two-nation United Nations Commission on Human Rights report to the General Assembly condemned the “torture and ill-treatment of prisoners of South African prisons,” and called on the country to abide by the commission’s minimum rules for treatment of convicts. In reply, South Africa’s Department of Foreign Affairs stated that the group’s investigation lacked objectivity and that prison management in any country was a domestic matter.

An opposition member of Parliament announced in late 1968 that she had seen vast improvements in the prisons since she first began visiting them regularly in 1965. She considered, however, that further reforms were needed, particularly in those institutions reserved for nonwhite prisoners. In late 1969 a South African Supreme Court justice strongly criticized the penal system and called on Parliament for reform action.

**INTERNAL SECURITY**

In early 1970 virtually real or potential threats to internal security were based on the Nationalist government’s determination to defend the social order and its apartheid policies and the struggle by opponents to change the system. Many in government and citizens of all groups have long held the view that violence was to be expected and that it would eventually lead to racial civil war. Fear of revolution pervaded much of the national life. Among the 3.6 million white citizens, there were approximately 2 million privately owned firearms. Every able-bodied white man or woman between the ages of seventeen and sixty-five was subject to military training during times of emergency. The strength of both the armed forces and the police increased materially each year.

Until the violence by police at Sharpeville in 1960, nonwhite opposition to the government’s apartheid policies had consisted mainly of nonviolent acts of disobedience (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Several subsequent attempts to sabotage public and private property led to the arrest and imprisonment of African leaders
associated with domestic sabotage groups. At this point African nationalists in exile decided that to change South Africa’s official policies they must resort to the application of external force. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) set “liberation” of South Africa as a primary objective and approved a policy of recruiting Africans and Coloureds from that country to become “freedom fighters.”

Since mid-1968 OAU assistance has been increased for the African National Congress (ANC) and South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) groups in exile. Recruits were being sent for military training to bases in Tanzania, Algeria, the Soviet Union, and Cuba. Modern arms and ammunition were supplied to the guerrillas by Communist countries. After training, these forces were ordered to attack eastern Angola, Rhodesia, South West Africa (Namibia), and South Africa.

To suppress domestic action in support of ANC and SWAPO forces, the Nationalist government in the late 1960’s had several statutes passed to deal with threats to internal security. Among these was the Terrorism Act of 1967, which provided that a person guilty of terrorism if he “with intent to endanger the maintenance of law and order in the Republic or any portion thereof, in the Republic or elsewhere, commits any act or attempts to commit any act.” The law was made applicable to South West Africa and retroactive for five years. It permitted unlimited detention of arrested persons and denied them the right of habeus corpus or other judicial relief. It abolished the defense of double jeopardy, so that if the prosecution failed to convict an alleged terrorist in one trial, it could retry him for committing the same act.

In September 1967 units of the South African Police (SAP) were sent to Rhodesia to assist that country’s security forces in antiguerilla action. Joint action continued in early 1970, and both ANC and SWAPO forces claimed that some of their units had entered South Africa. The SAP estimated publicly that the total strength of guerrilla forces numbered about 2,000 and that they had increased their own forces along national frontiers and areas of known infiltration routes. A reserve SAP force of about 3,000 men trained for counterinsurgency operations was available for rapid transfer to these areas if needed.

Police elements, moreover, could be supplemented with sizable military units. The army professed the ability to airlift 500 men to any spot in the country within ninety minutes. With extensive resources to back up the military regulars, the country probably could field 85,000 white troops within two days and 200,000 within two weeks (see ch. 27, The Armed Forces).

In early 1970 South Africa had no ties with any Communist state. The South African Communist Party (SACP) was outlawed in June
1950 by the Suppression of Communism Act. It was estimated that a few hundred hard-core members remained in South Africa, where they operated clandestinely, but most of the party's active members were either imprisoned or had left the country to live abroad. Because the Nationalist government labeled most of its critics "Communists," the degree of true internal Communist activity was difficult to determine. The illegal SACP was pro-Soviet and had largely taken over control of the African National Congress (ANC) before that group was banned in 1961. Communist control of the ANC and a number of other organizations opposed to apartheid continued in 1969, according to the Twenty-first Annual Report on World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations, published by the United States Department of State. Despite such control, a number of important ANC supporters were not Communists. Another exiled nonwhite political group, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), was extremely weak and had shown increasingly sympathetic response to the doctrines and aims of the Communist Chinese. The PAC, which was a breakaway element of the ANC partly because of white Communist influence on the latter organization, also had a non-Communist wing.
CHAPTER 27

THE ARMED FORCES

In early 1970 the Republic maintained the strongest military power in Africa south of the Sahara. Composed of an army, an air force, and a navy, the standing force of the South African Defense Force (SADF) had a combined personnel strength of 40,000 to 45,000 men. Through a comprehensive system of military training and organization, South Africa was capable of increasing the strength of its armed forces to more than 200,000 trained men on short notice.

Although the standing force was of modest size, it was highly trained and extremely mobile and possessed impressive firepower on land and in the air. The small but growing navy was improving its ability to defend the nation's extensive maritime regions. The active-duty military establishment was backed by a large paramilitary force and extensive trained reserves.

Service with the SADF was limited to white males, although a number of Coloured men were accepted each year for duty in an unarmed, noncombatant role. Desired strength levels were maintained by a national system of compulsory peacetime military training for all qualifying white males between the ages of sixteen and twenty-five. By law, all white citizens between the ages of seventeen and sixty-five were liable for defense service in time of war. The government had announced its intention to begin the training of eligible white women during 1970. Military personnel, known throughout the Republic as "Springboks," occupied a high place in the esteem of white South Africans. Service conditions were good by modern military standards.

The cost of training and maintaining the military establishment had long been disproportionate to the total national budget but was not excessive when related to the nation's gross domestic product. Support of the SADF was well within the capabilities of the diversified national industrial base, and the armed forces were virtually self-sufficient in all military materiel except heavy equipment. Items such as aircraft, tanks, and ships were still obtainable from a few sympathetic Western sources despite the 1963 United Nations embargo on external supply of arms to South Africa.

Equipment inventories included jet aircraft, missiles, modern ground force weapons, and a growing complement of current naval...
vessels. The country was protected by an expanding air defense system that included an early-warning radar network. Defense research received generous government backing for work on improved military equipment and techniques.

The SADF was organized and trained for operational missions of defense against both external aggression and threats to internal security in coordination with a large paramilitary force. An effective logistical system assured all fighting units of reliable support in supplies and equipment maintenance. A limited number of officers and noncommissioned officers with World War II experience remained on duty with the army, and a sizable number of air force pilots had flown combat missions with United Nations forces in Korea. Apart from these and the troops who had operated against guerrillas in other white-administered states of southern Africa, the bulk of the armed forces had no actual combat experience.

MILITARY TRADITION IN NATIONAL LIFE

Although whites, Africans, and some segments of the Coloured population had a long history of military activity, each group's early efforts at armed action had centered on conflicting individual goals rather than on a unified effort to ward off external aggressive threats to national existence. Even after national independence, military service often was more a matter of ethnic particularism than a traditional symbol of nationalism.

Military tradition among the Xhosa and the Zulu produced proficient warrior groups who battled Boer irregulars in the three Kaffir wars of the eighteenth century (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). A fourth war in 1812 found African warriors pitted against the military regulars of British regiments. Although the Africans were noted for their fighting ability, their threat as a military force was quashed in these early defeats.

Unlike their African opponents, who developed select groups of warriors trained and devoted exclusively to fighting, the Boers and their Afrikaner descendants were traditionally part-time citizen-soldiers who put aside their usual occupations and took up arms to protect their property and way of life whenever an imminent threat arose. For this group, military action meant the raising of bands of largely untrained, undisciplined vigilantes who operated without uniforms, supply systems, or other aspects of military organization. These forces originated and applied to themselves the name commando (originally an Afrikaans word—kommando) and developed guerrilla raiding as an effective military tactic. The safety of the early Boer republics depended on the willingness and ability of these citizen-soldiers to provide a defense in times of peril, and an
organized standing armed force was never considered necessary or desirable.

Military tradition for the English-speaking white group was largely inherited from the early colonial period, when organized regulars or volunteers maintained the security of territorial holdings and backed up the policies of the British Empire. The English-speakers did not form ad hoc commandos like their Boer counterparts but relied on territorial regiments, each with its own colors, uniform, ceremonial traditions, and proud royalist unit designation.

Some elements of the Coloured group, particularly the Griquas, engaged in armed combat with Africans, and occasionally with Boers. For a time in the early nineteenth century, they acted as peace keepers of the colonial power (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

The two dissimilar white forces opposed each other in the Boer rebellion in British-held Transvaal in 1881 and the Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902. The Boers succeeded in defeating the British territorials in the first of these military encounters, and in the second the commando forces, inferior to the British in numbers and logistical support, sustained the struggle for two and a half years until their eventual defeat in 1902. Using guerrilla tactics learned from earlier encounters with African warriors, the commandos concentrated on disrupting railway communications, capturing isolated posts, and avoiding contact with the British columns sent in pursuit of them. The Boers provided their own horses, arms, and ammunition; they fought without pay, and when exhausted, went home to recuperate, plant a crop, and obtain fresh supplies. Because every Boer settlement was essentially a commando base, the war resulted in extensive destruction of farms and crops. By the end of the fighting, the war had cost Great Britain about 22,000 men. The Boers had lost nearly 6,000 men and nearly 20,000 women and children had died in concentration camps.

Although Afrikaners were slow to accept the British military tradition, it was the basis for the initial formation of the national armed forces after independence. Organized around a small cadre of British-trained professionals and a large reservoir of battle-tested English and Afrikaner reservists, the Union Defense Force was established in 1912, two years after the Act of Union. General Jan Christian Smuts, who became the minister of the interior, mines, and defense in 1910, drafted the enabling legislation.

The Defense Act of 1912 succeeded in establishing a reasonably effective defense system and took into consideration the military traditions of the two nationally recognized white groups. Its terms, however, precluded military service by n. nites. Although the Defense Act specified that every white citizen was liable for military service in defense of his country, only a limited proportion of
the country’s white males was selected by lottery for training each year; the rest were expected to become members of voluntary rifle associations. Initially, the armed forces consisted of a headquarters, instructional and administrative staffs, five cavalry regiments, and supporting artillery units. Apart from military duties, the mounted riflemen assisted the police in law enforcement work.

The defense force's first operational task was the containment of a miners' strike on the Witwatersrand in January 1914. Thousands of reservists and citizens liable for emergency duty were called up to ward off a crisis that threatened public order. In 1914, one month after the outbreak of World War I, the British asked the Union government to undertake military operations against German West Africa (later South West Africa). The decision to accede to this request was followed by mobilization of citizens for the armed forces. Protesting this action, a group of Afrikaner officers resigned from the armed forces and organized an armed uprising against the state, but Afrikaner politicians, supported by the national army, effectively quashed this rebellion within two months.

South African troops invaded German South West Africa in January 1915, and the weaker German force surrendered six months later. Immediately after the conclusion of this campaign, the Union government launched an intensive recruiting campaign to organize a combat force for overseas service. An expeditionary group consisting of a heavy artillery brigade, an infantry brigade, and medical and signal units was sent to France. White troops were supported by a labor corps recruited among the African population. Most notable of the South African efforts in France was the Battle of Delville Wood, a successful holding action that became an annually commemorated event throughout South Africa in succeeding years. Apart from duty in France, South African armed forces served in campaigns against the Germans in East Africa and Palestine. Approximately 190,000 white combat troops, 60,000 Coloured auxiliary troops, and 25,000 unarmed African laborers participated in the various campaigns of World War I. Total losses included 12,452 dead.

After World War I, demobilization and gradual reconstruction of a peacetime military organization was started. An air force was established in 1920, and two years later a naval service was formed. Pay scales were reduced to such an extent, however, that many regulars resigned to accept more remunerative jobs in the civil sector. A chronic money shortage for military purposes hampered the systematic development of the armed forces for the next thirteen years. At the end of 1921 the last of the British military forces left the country and turned over their fortifications to the Union government.
In 1922, 14,000 members of the Active Citizen Force were mobilized in an action to contain violence by striking mineworkers on the Witwatersrand. Between 1922 and 1925, the air force was employed to quell uprisings in South West Africa by the Hottentots, the Ovambo, and the Rehobother Bastards (a Coloured group). In 1925 the air force operated the first experimental air postal service between Durban and Cape Town. During 1932 a punitive expedition was sent to South West Africa to contain an African tribal uprising.

The depression years brought further military cutbacks. In 1934 the sea service was abolished in an economy move, and in 1938 the minister of defense announced plans to reorganize the defense force. Before these plans could be executed, World War II broke out. After opposition to South African intervention and attempts to keep the country neutral, Union forces entered the war against Germany in September 1939 (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

During World War II South African armed forces served with distinction in Italian Somaliland, Ethiopia, Libya, and Italy. The air force made a valuable contribution to the Allied effort, and the reestablished South African fleet contributed to mine sweeping and antisubmarine operations in South African waters and the Mediterranean. Of the 350,000 South Africans who served in military roles during World War II, 12,000 were killed in action.

Postwar demobilization did not follow the pattern established after World War I. The armed forces were reorganized, and a ballot system of conscripting citizens for the Citizen Force was introduced. Funds for modernizing and improving the nation's military capability were made available. From October 1948 to April 1949 units of the South African Air Force flew 1,240 missions in support of the Western nations' Berlin airlift. From October 1950 to July 1953 an air squadron served in combat operations with United Nations forces in Korea.

On gaining power in 1948, the Nationalists sought to make the armed forces as Afrikaner-dominated as the police and civil service already were. Nationalist sympathizers were installed in top positions within the military services. Many British-trained, English-speaking officers with wartime service experience were prematurely retired and replaced with Afrikaners of little or no combat experience. Recruitment of English-speakers was discouraged by an amendment to the Defense Act requiring fluency in both national languages for all SADF officers and noncommissioned officers and for all men wishing to enlist in the Permanent Force. Regiments with proud colonial designations, uniforms, and insignia lost their historic identity. New insignia and decorations were substituted for the old, and a new army uniform was introduced. Such changes
were less abrupt in the air force and the navy because most of the technical personnel of both services were English descendants; Afrikaners had not yet become interested in these military fields.

Only since the mid-1960's had the Republic felt the necessity to build up a defense capability for countering a penetration by external forces. With the advent of this threat, the whole question of defense began to transcend the political differences between Afrikaners and English-speaking whites. In early 1970 the armed forces were highly regarded by the white groups, and among the entire population the prestige of a military career ranked higher than that of the police force.

THE ARMED FORCES AND THE GOVERNMENT

The South Africa Constitution Act of 1961 provided for the supremacy of the civil administration in matters of military policy and operation. Supreme authority over the armed forces was vested in the president who was expressly designated as commander in chief (see ch. 13, The Governmental System). He was authorized to establish and designate military commands, areas, and districts throughout the Republic and the military services.

Administrative control of the armed forces was the direct responsibility of the minister of defense, who was appointed by the prime minister. The Defense Act specified that he “may do or cause to be done all things which in his opinion are necessary for the efficient defense and protection of the Republic or any part thereof.” The act authorized the mobilization of the armed forces by the president in time of war, in case of threatened internal disorder, or other national emergencies.

The minister of defense received advice and policy recommendations from a number of governmental bodies. The most influential of these was the Defense Resources Board, composed of former military leaders, industrialists, the president of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, the director of the Bureau of Standards, and the commandant general of the SADF. Other interdepartmental advisory groups included the Defense Research Council, of which the minister of defense was chairman, and the Manpower Board. A Defense Staff Council within his own department served the minister as a policymaking group and included in its membership the SADF’s senior officer and the chiefs of staff of the army, air force, and navy.

The Public Safety Act of 1953 empowered the president to declare a state of emergency in any specified area where public safety or the maintenance of public order was threatened. Although the president could act unilaterally, parliamentary ratification of his action was required. If the legislature was not in session, the presi-
dent had to summon it not later than thirty days after his emergency proclamation. The public and members of the armed forces were to be notified of the proclamation through the media of the South Africa Broadcasting Corporation’s radio services, telecommunications, the press, personal letter, or word of mouth. All emergency proclamations had to be published as well in the official Government Gazette. The minister of defense could also declare a state of emergency if, in his opinion, the urgency of the circumstances required action before a presidential proclamation could be promulgated under terms of the Public Safety Act.

With the passage of the Civil Defense Act of 1966, authority to declare a state of national emergency was also extended to the minister of justice and prisons, subject to later confirmation by Parliament. The act also established a Directorate of Civil Defense to provide protection for the civilian population in times of national disaster such as war, sabotage, and revolt. The directorate had divided the Republic into thirteen target areas, each under an area controller who was a retired military or police officer. Duties included planning for the safeguarding of strategic industries and works; identification of buildings and materials for use as emergency hospitals, shelters, or offices; and training of civilians in rescue work, firefighting, and first aid. Every able-bodied man and woman from seventeen to sixty-five who had not received military training or was not liable for service with police units or the prison service was subject to callup for compulsory training in civil defense.

Noninterference in national political affairs was a military tradition that seldom had been violated. A notable exception to this position occurred in the 1914 Afrikaner officers’ rebellion against the government’s position on military action against Germany. In general, professional military personnel had remained apolitical and loyal to the policies and goals of civil authority. Moreover, the influence of the military upon the formation of South African foreign policy had been minimal (see ch. 16, Foreign Relations).

THE MILITARY AND THE NATIONAL ECONOMY

Since the early 1960’s the cost of maintaining the SADF had remained disproportionate to other national budget expenditures (see ch. 25, Fiscal and Monetary Systems). A trend toward increased funds for security and public order that continued into 1970 included large amounts of money for the buildup of the armed forces, expansion of the Republic’s defense industries, strengthening of the South African Police (SAP) operation of the prison system, and administration of the courts. Together these security expenditures consumed nearly a quarter of the entire
national budget allocations. The bulk of these funds went to the SADF.

The high level of military spending was the result of mounting concern over the government's estimation of threats to the Republic's security from African nationalism both at home and abroad. In the early years of Nationalist Party rule, opposition to apartheid policies by African nationalists were nonviolent in nature and were easily contained by the South African Police. After the shootings at Sharpeville in 1960, however, African nationalists abandoned their traditional non-violent tactics, embraced the philosophy of armed struggle, and accepted assistance from sympathetic foreign sources (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). With this change in tactics, the government began expanding its military capabilities at a rapid rate. In 1962 the minister of defense advised the Senate that military action against South Africa was being secretly planned by member countries of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and requested increased funds for a defense buildup.

The government's preoccupation with internal security was also linked with a traditional concern over potential Communist threats to southern Africa in general. These fears were exacerbated in the 1960's by the British decision to withdraw its own forces east of Suez, which the South Africans regarded as a weakening of the Western position after closure of the Suez Canal. For most white South Africans, this meant that the Republic's armed forces must prepare to defend the vital Cape sea shipping route against any possible Communist move to deny its use to Western nations.

In 1963 the United Nations imposed an embargo on the supply of arms to South Africa, which could be used to suppress internal African nationalism (see ch. 16, Foreign Relations). Although the country had an expanding small-arms industry of its own, the major source of heavy equipment such as tanks, aircraft, and ships traditionally had been the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, France, Switzerland, and West Germany. Following the United Nations embargo, with which most member nations complied, South Africa intensified the local manufacture of munitions and other military equipment and revitalized that portion of the World War II military industrial capacity that it still retained.

The Republic's industrial base was sufficiently diversified to provide much of the lighter military equipment and ancillary supplies needed by the armed forces. Because France had not acceded to the arms embargo, South Africa continued to buy heavy armaments from French manufacturers. Defense equipment from several other Western nations eluded the United Nations restriction through licensing arrangements that permitted its manufacture in South Africa. The nation possessed ample scientific and technical skills for major defense production backed by the South African Iron and
Steel Corporation (ISCOR), which had served as the heart of the country's World War II emergency industrial capability.

Small arms and ammunition were being produced in South African mint, the Defense Ordinance factories, and three plants of the African Explosive and Chemical Industries Ltd., which had previously confined its production to explosives for mining operations. In 1964 a Belgian license was obtained for South African manufacture of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) automatic rifle; a year later an improved version of that infantry weapon and its ammunition were coming off South African assembly lines. Similarly, France granted a license for production of an armored car in South African plants.

In early 1965 the minister of defense announced that he had acquired a total of 127 licenses for local manufacture of foreign-designed military equipment, and a year later the country was producing 140 different types of ammunition, bombs, rockets, and a vast array of infantry weapons. In 1966 the Atlas Aircraft Corporation near Pretoria began manufacturing a jet aircraft under license from Italy. Production schedules included a planned number of these combination trainer-light strike aircraft for export to Rhodesia. A second aircraft company, AFIC Ltd. of Johannesburg, began manufacturing an all-metal, four-seat light liaison airplane in 1968. The aircraft was based on an original Italian design.

By 1968 the government had given top priority to improving its defense posture and dealing with guerrilla attacks from outside the country. Anton Rupert, a leading Afrikaner industrialist, told the South African Public Relations Institute that in his travels abroad he had spoken to many foreign generals about the guerrilla problem. He asserted that "all warned me three years ago that within a decade at the utmost we would be faced with an Algerian-type situation in South Africa." A month later, Prime Minister B. J. Vorster, speaking at a Nationalist Party rally, predicted that slowly but surely an army would be built up in certain central African states for an eventual attack on South Africa. He assured his listeners that the government would continue to do everything possible to discourage such an attack.

The Armaments Development and Production Act of 1968 amended the Munitions Production Act of 1964 and authorized the creation of a new R100 million (1 rand equals US$1.40) Armaments Development and Production Corporation (ARMSCOR). The stated objective of the new corporation was to "meet as effectively and economically as feasible South Africa's armaments requirements, including the armaments requirements for export and firearms or ammunition required by the public." Powers of the corporation's state-appointed board of directors were broadened over those of the earlier Munitions Board. The new Armaments Board
would start new programs to develop and produce arms and would promote companies to manufacture military equipment. Although ARMSCOR itself did not plan to manufacture armaments, the legislation did not rule out the possibility that state-owned subsidiaries might do so at some future date.

Considerable new emphasis had been placed on strengthening harbor and naval defenses. Three submarine shelters costing R14.4 million were to be built at the Simonstown naval base as soon as the size of the harbor was increased. Orders had been placed with France for a number of new frigates, minesweepers, and fast coastal patrol craft. A 4,500-ton cargo vessel, the largest ship every built by a local shipyard, was launched in 1968, and a torpedo recovery ship was under construction at Durban for the navy. In early 1970 there were indications that ARMSCOR was considering the possibility of local construction of submarines and patrol craft.

The Republic established its first operational surface-to-air missile base at Uvongo on the Natal coast in late 1968 to counter possible low-level attacks by supersonic aircraft. The site had good rail and road communications, troops could be stationed there permanently, and the installation was capable of expansion. Partly developed by a French electronics firm, the mobile missile system was manufactured and assembled in South African industrial plants; test firings by army personnel in 1968 proved successful and lent support to the French claim that it was one of the most advanced and effective weapons of its kind. An air-to-air missile of South African design was tested at the Saint Lucia rocket range in late 1969. This weapon was to be produced locally as a standard armament for the air force.

The defense buildup, which continued in early 1970, included plans to establish a radio communication network that eventually would stretch over the South Atlantic and Indian oceans to the South Pole. This capability would supplement the country’s radar network erected in Transvaal in 1965 by a British firm to provide an early warning system against possible aerial attack from beyond the country’s northern frontiers. Seventy-five percent of the complex, computerized control center, satellite radar stations, and communications equipment was manufactured by South African industries.

Legislative authority in the form of the National Supplies Procurement Act granted authority to the minister of economic affairs to mobilize the whole economy at short notice despite the lack of a declared state emergency. The minister was empowered to direct the local manufacture, acquisition, and supply of any goods and services he deemed necessary for the country’s security. He was authorized to import material from foreign sources and to direct
the stockpiling of domestically produced items needed for security purposes. If necessary, he could confiscate such material, paying the owners state compensation determined by his department. Under this authority, the government had stockpiled enough oil to meet both military and civil needs for a period estimated variously at two to five years. The nation’s large and rapid increase in military expenditure was accompanied by strong emphasis on an accompanying program of defense research. Established under the direction of the Defense Research Council, the National Institute for Defense Research was active in the fields of physics, chemistry, and electronics. Work in progress by the institute’s scientists included research on missiles, chemical warfare agents, and nuclear physics.

The number of men serving on active duty with the armed forces was less than 5 percent of the able-bodied white males in the country. The withdrawal of this small number of workers had not created manpower shortages in the civil sector or otherwise adversely affected the national economy. Moreover, technical training given many members of the armed forces benefited the national economy in the form of skilled manpower for industry after military commitments were completed.

The amount of current expenditure for defense from the fiscal year 1968/69 national budget was R258.7 million. This was about six times the amount spent in 1960. The figure represented 21.2 percent of the total national budget and 3.2 percent of the country’s gross domestic product. It equated to a per capita cost to the population of R13.50. The budget presented to Parliament for fiscal 1970 reflected a proposed increase in defense expenditure totaling R276.2 million.

MANPOWER AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE

In early 1970 approximately 4.3 million men between the ages of fifteen and forty-nine constituted a potential manpower pool from which the Republic could draw at least half for its armed forces. The Defense Act, however, limited duty in the SADF largely to white males; the military manpower potential was therefore reduced to about 935,000. The government compensated for the reduction with a comprehensive system of national military obligation that assured both an adequate standing armed force and a trained reserve that could be mobilized quickly in event of emergency need.

National defense laws were sufficiently pervasive to assure that virtually every white male residing in the Republic would receive some measure of military training during his lifetime unless
exempted because of age, physical or mental disability, or a civil occupation deemed more valuable to national interests than services with a military unit.

The Defense Act specified that every white citizen between the ages of seventeen and sixty-five was liable to military service in time of war. A system of national compulsory military training extended this service liability in peacetime to all white males between the ages of sixteen and twenty-five and to aliens after five years' residence in the Republic. Although peacetime conscripts usually were not inducted until they were seventeen years of age, all were required to register at the age of sixteen. Registration was accomplished at all high schools, military headquarters, and police stations throughout the Republic and South West Africa. Failure to register within the specified time periods was an offense punishable by fine of not more than R200 or imprisonment for a period not to exceed six months.

White youths aged twelve to seventeen were liable for training with the Cadet Corps attached to most secondary schools. In early 1970 the government announced plans for the military training of women to begin later in the year. Although women had served in auxiliary units during World War II, they had been demobilized at the end of the war.

The SADF was composed of a Permanent Force, a Citizen Force, and an organization known as the Commandos. The Permanent Force consisted of professional soldiers, airmen, and seamen who provided the cadres for the administration of all SADF units. Officers and men were largely volunteers from the Citizen Force. During peacetime, the Permanent Force supervised a training mission for volunteers and conscripts of the Citizen Force; during wartime, Permanent Force personnel would be absorbed into the mobilized Citizen Force. The Permanent Force and the Citizen Force were organized functionally into an army, an air force, and a navy. The Commandos were essentially a paramilitary force of volunteers and conscripts organized into infantry and air components.

Permanent Force service commitments were for a minimum period of twenty years. Any member who resigned from the Permanent Force with less than one year's service was placed in the Permanent Force Reserve with attendant liability for emergency service until he passed the age of sixty-five. Conscription for service in the Citizen Force carried a ten-year military obligation in the form of one year's continuous active-duty training followed by nine years of training in organized Citizen Force units at specified regular intervals. After the ten-year commitment period, members were then placed in the Citizen Force Reserve until past the age of sixty-five. Although the Commandos were constituted largely of volunteers, the law specified that men could be conscripted for service with these forces if necessary to maintain desired strength levels.
Any white male qualified for military service who had not been conscripted for training with the Citizen Force by the age of twenty-five was expected to enroll for duty with the Commandos. Service with these forces obligated members for sixteen years, after which they were placed in the Commando Reserve until passing the age of sixty-five. Any white male who was not a member of the SADF or one of its numerous reserve categories was considered to be part of a vague manpower pool known as the National Reserve.

For reasons of economy consistent with immediate defense requirements, the active-duty strength of the SADF was maintained at between 40,000 and 45,000 men, including 15,000 regulars of the Permanent Force and approximately 25,000 Citizen Force trainees. By mobilizing all personnel of the Citizen Force units not on active duty, the SADF could increase its strength to about 85,000 within two days. This mobilization capability was expected to increase to more than 100,000 by the late 1970s. With assistance from its paramilitary forces of more than 50,000 Commandos, the 34,000-member police force, the 19,000-man Police Reserve, the Republic could quickly field 200,000 trained men within two weeks without going on a wartime footing.

In 1961 the Defense Act was amended to provide for the establishment of an interdepartmental committee to coordinate internal security operations between the SADF and the South African Police. A subsequent amendment in 1963 tightened up the links between the two by providing that part-time soldiers of the Citizen Force and civilians in the Commando organization could act as policemen in times of emergency. They could be mobilized at short notice without a presidential proclamation or ministerial order, although such action required the approval of the minister of defense within four days. The purpose of this provision was to combat the element of surprise, upon which most subversive elements depended. In small towns having only a few police, augmentation by Citizen Force and Commando units were deemed essential to the maintenance of public safety.

MISSION AND ORGANIZATION

The official fourfold mission of the SADF included defense of the Republic; prevention or suppression of internal disorder; preservation and maintenance of life, health, property, and essential public services; and assistance to the South African Police in the performance of police duties when required. Although it was not specified in the national Defense Act, the government unofficially extended this manifold mission of its armed forces to support of the West in the cold war and defense of the southern hemisphere. Because the Republic was no longer sure which was its greatest enemy—world communism, internal rebellion, or threats by external African
nationalism—it dealt with the dilemma by combining the three into one; all threats to the Republic were seen as part of an international Communist conspiracy against the West.

The task of the army and the air force was to take action to maintain internal security as soon as any disturbance reached a degree where the police were unable to control it. The navy was charged with maintaining maritime security against any invading force. The Commandos were expected to respond to infiltration efforts, sabotage, and insurrection.

High command administration of the SADF was directed by the commandant general through the subordinate army, air, and naval chiefs of staff. The general staff organization included an adjutant general, who supervised military logistics, and a surgeon general, who provided for the health of all military forces. Headquarters of the SADF was located in the self-contained military township of Voortrekkerhoogte, near Pretoria and adjacent to the military airfield of Swartkop. Voortrekkerhoogte, established in 1920, also accommodated Air Force Headquarters, the national military college, headquarters of the Northern Transvaal Military Command, the military hospital, and various training and supply depots.

The Army

In early 1970 the strength of the standing army totaled nearly 30,000 men. An additional 60,000 trained members of the Citizen Force were available to augment regular units if necessary. Part of the increase in military appropriations for fiscal 1970 included funds for mobilization of a large number of reservists. Together, the two component forces of the army comprised more than fifty major units, including at least forty infantry battalions. Several of these units were trained and organized as parachute battalions. The entire army was decentralized and located in the vicinity of major urban centers throughout the country. A number of the army’s combat units were fast-striking shock elements known as Mobile Watches, equipped with tanks, rocket launchers, and antitank weapons. A new combat group formed in 1966 to provide further coordinated mobility and firepower was known as the Joint Combat Forces. An elite unit, this task force was manned by some of the army’s best trained troops, equipped with the most modern weapons available, and assured of adequate air support. The army claimed the ability to airlift 500 men of the task force to any spot in the country within ninety minutes.

In 1969 the SADF embarked on concentrated training of its army forces for unconventional warfare. Five special antiterrorist training camps were established at strategic sites for training in camouflage, tracking, and ambush drill. Trainees were instructed in countermeasures against current guerrilla tactics.
Army supporting units included corps of artillery, armor, engineers, signals, technical services, administrative services, and medical services. Other specialized units included a military police contingent and an aerial reconnaissance squadron. All combat units were equipped with modern armaments. The standard infantry weapon was a late model of the standard NATO automatic rifle. Armored equipment included over 200 heavy and medium tanks manufactured in the United Kingdom, the United States, and France. Several hundred armored cars, scout cars, and armored personnel carriers provided further mobility. Artillery weapons included 40-mm antiaircraft guns, 5.5-inch medium howitzers, 17-pound gun-howitzers, and a new mobile surface-to-air missile system of French design and South African manufacture. The aerial reconnaissance squadron, manned by qualified army pilots, had about thirty light observation planes. These aircraft were supplemented by roughly 250 private aircraft owned by members of Air Commando units. The many light aircraft flying clubs within the Republic also were organized on a standby emergency basis for spotting and guerrilla reconnaissance in support of the SADF.

The country was divided into eleven territorial army commands designated as Western Province, Eastern Province, Natal, Orange Free State, Western Transvaal, Northern Transvaal, Witwatersrand, North West Cape, South West Africa, South Western Districts, and Walvis Bay. Full-time force units and various training organizations were assigned to each command. Apart from individual unit and field training, the army provided specialized courses for members of the artillery corps at a missile test range. Other specialized corps members were trained at technical schools located at Voortrekkerhoogte and training depots throughout the SADF. Pilots for the reconnaissance squadron received flight training at the air force's central flying school, although some received jet aircraft training in France.

In terms of personnel strength and modern equipment, the army was the largest and most diversified in sub-Saharan Africa, but the bulk of its troops were not experienced professionals. Few had any combat experience apart from a limited number of officers who saw service during World War II. Some of the infantry units had engaged in antiguerilla operations in Mozambique during the late 1960's, but the majority of army forces were largely untested in a combat environment.

The Air Force

The Republic's air force was one of the strongest and best equipped in Africa. Constantly growing and improving in experience and equipment, the air arm of the SADF was built on a foundation of 8,000 men, many of whom had seen combat duty.
during the United Nations action in Korea in the 1950's. The air
force was equipped with complex modern tactical weapon systems
including jet aircraft and air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles.

Of the approximately 500 airplanes assigned to the air force,
about 250 were capable of combat. Most were adaptable both to
external defense and internal security operations. The aircraft in-
ventory included roughly 20 jet fighters, 50 jet fighter-bombers, 25
light jet bombers, 5 conventional reconnaissance-bombers, 70 light
and heavy transports, 130 jet and conventional helicopters, 30 light
liaison aircraft, and 270 conventional and jet trainers. Approximately
240 more jets were on order from the Republic’s Atlas
Aircraft Corporation for dual use as trainers and light strike aircraft.

By early 1970 about 60 had been delivered, and their input was
expected to result in the transfer of a number of the conventional
trainers to Citizen Force and Air Commando units. The bulk of the
operational aircraft came from the United Kingdom, France, and
the United States, largely before the United Nations arms embargo.

In early 1970 the air force was composed of five main operational
units. The strike command had two squadrons of jet fighter-
bombers, one squadron of jet fighters, one squadron of light jet
bombers, one squadron of jet reconnaissance-bombers, and an un-
disclosed number of armed helicopter squadrons. The maritime
command consisted of one squadron of conventional amphibian
patrol planes and several squadrons of helicopters equipped for re-
connaissance and antisubmarine warfare operations. Three squad-
rons of light and heavy transports comprised the air transport
command. The number of squadrons in the training and mainte-
nance command was undisclosed. Three squadrons of light liaison
airplanes made up the light aircraft command, although its inven-
tory was expected to be expanded. The Citizen Force operated
approximately eight squadrons with about 150 conventional light
trainers capable of carrying limited fragmentation bomb loads. Air
force personnel operated the nation’s air defense system and
manned all of the radar sites of the early warning network.

Several major air force bases were located in South Africa, and
one was in South West Africa. During the 1960’s the government’s
program of commercial airfield construction added ten new air-
ports, all of which could accommodate military aircraft if neces-
sary. All airfields were equipped with modern navigational and com-
munications aids, and most were integral parts of the nation’s air
defense system. Strategic military airfields included one located at
Nelspruit in northeastern Transvaal, the Waterkloof jet fighter base
near Pretoria, the basic flight training center for conventional air-
craft at Dunnottar in the Transvaal, the central jet flight school at
Langebaanweg in Cape Province, the maritime reconnaissance base
at Langebaan on Saldanha Bay in Cape Province, a large air defense
installation near Pietersburg in northern Transvaal, and Mpacha, located in South West Africa's Caprivi Strip fifteen miles from the Zambian border. The South African government usually described Mpacha as an emergency landing strip for South African Airways jets, but it was generally recognized as a military installation.

The Navy

A modest naval force of nearly 4,000 officers and men were responsible for patrol and safeguarding of the Republic's extensive maritime reaches in the South Atlantic and Indian oceans. Formed originally to work with and to augment the British Royal Navy in defense of the sealanes and approaches to Cape Town and Durban, the South African navy faced these responsibilities alone following the British decision in the 1960's to abandon its East of Suez strategy by 1971 and withdraw its naval units from South African waters in late 1966 (see ch. 16, Foreign Relations).

Headquarters of the navy were located at the Simonstown naval base across the Cape Peninsula from Cape Town. A smaller base was located at Walvis Bay on the coast of South West Africa, and construction of a third base of operations near Durban was begun in 1968.

Thirty-odd vessels were assigned to the fleet, including two former British destroyers, six frigates, twelve minesweepers, ten coastal patrol boats, a tanker, and a harbor tug. The destroyers and three of the frigates had been refitted for antisubmarine-warfare operations, and the destroyers could accommodate antisubmarine-warfare helicopters, of which the navy had eight.

Because of a mounting concern over the threat of undersea attacks, the government had established an antisubmarine-warfare training school at the Simonstown base. The course was attended by both naval personnel and airmen assigned to the air force's maritime command. Both forces operated jointly to maintain a continuous surveillance of neighboring waters for submarines and foreign ships.

In 1967 the minister of defense announced the government's decision to install a radio navigational system capable of determining the position of vessels at sea to within twenty-five yards and thus improving the Republic's maritime defenses. An agreement was signed with France the same year for the purchase of three submarines, each with the capability of carrying twelve torpedoes. Delivery of the first craft was expected in 1970, and the remaining two were promised by 1971. The navy was examining the possibility of arming its coastal patrol craft, destroyers, and frigates with missiles and had approached France concerning the purchase of additional frigates.
Apart from the antisubmarine-warfare school at Simonstown, naval training was conducted at the triservice military academy at Saldanha Bay. The naval college at Gordon’s Bay provided training courses for officers and noncommissioned officers. Practical seamanship training was conducted aboard one of the navy’s frigates.

**The Commandos**

The paramilitary part-time Commandos were organized territorially in the tradition of their citizen-soldier namesakes who fought in the Anglo-Boer War of 1899. The total force comprised over 200 separate units, each known individually as a commando, and had a collective personnel strength of more than 50,000 men. Although these units included a small number of conscripts among their ranks, most of the men were volunteers who had not previously served with the Permanent Force, the Citizen Force, or the reserves of either organization. A part-time militia trained in the use of combat infantry weapons and tactics, the Commandos’ mission was limited to internal security duties, largely in support of the police (see ch. 26, Public Order and Internal Security).

Under a reorganization program in 1968, these forces were reformed as rural, urban, and industrial units. The size of each commando unit varied, depending on the nature and situation of the area to be defended. Some were made up of five Platoons; others consisted of five companies of trainees who received an intensive course in counterinsurgency tactics after completing their basic training at the Commando School. Only the more experienced men defended vulnerable areas of strategic importance.

Most commandos had either a company or platoon of younger members organized as scouts for day and night reconnaissance. These units included snipers equipped with telescope-mounted rifles; dog handlers and trained German shepherd dogs; engineers trained in the use and deactivation of unconventional weapons; and mounted elements equipped with armored cars. Because many members had privately owned light aircraft, special air units known as air commandos had been organized to provide aerial reconnaissance support to the commandos’ and army’s units. The air commando organization comprised about twelve squadrons equipped with a total of approximately 250 light planes.

**The Coloured Corps**

The liability of nonwhites for military service was decided by Parliament and was usually determined by the needs of the SADF. During World War II large numbers of Coloured males were employed in administrative units behind the front lines, and Africans were used as laborers in military units. All nonwhites served in a
noncombatant role and were unarmed. After the war all Africans were released from duty, but a modest number of Coloureds were retained as the Cape Corps Auxiliary Service.

In 1963 the auxiliary service for Coloureds was replaced by the Coloured Corps, which continued to serve with units of the Permanent Force in early 1970. Corps personnel remained unarmed noncombatants and served in roles such as drivers, quartermaster personnel, clerks, and stretcher bearers. In 1965 Coloured recruits were accepted in the navy on a permanent basis. The first hundred volunteers received basic training at the Coloured Corps training center at Eerste River and then received further practical instruction at Simonstown. Serving under white officers, these Coloured recruits were expected eventually to man small vessels such as minesweepers. Others would serve as drivers and mess personnel.

In the late 1960's more than 2,000 inquiries concerning military service had been received by the SADF from Coloured applicants. Although seventeen squadrons had received basic training, the number of personnel in the Coloured Corps was not available.

LOGISTICS

In early 1970 the Republic was self-sufficient in the manufacture of rifles, handguns, machineguns, mortars, ammunition, rockets, grenades, smoke bombs, aerial bombs, and explosives. It had developed its own napalm ordnance entirely from local raw materials and new types of antitank and antipersonnel mines. Uniforms, shoes, blankets, and parachutes were produced exclusively by the nation's textile industries. All food products required by the armed forces came from local sources. The country possessed the most highly developed and capable defense industry in Africa.

For heavy equipment and many associated spare parts, the armed forces continued to rely on certain Western nations, principally France. A mixture of military hardware from various sources and an equipment inventory containing both modern sophisticated items and some of earlier manufacture presented some logistical problems of maintenance and spare parts. Most of these problems, however, did not degrade the SADF's combat capability. In many cases, spare parts were manufactured locally with little apparent difficulty. Moreover, the SADF was supported by a highly developed and diversified logistics system.

Backed by strong government support and the policy guidance of the Defense Resources Board, logistical support of the armed forces operated efficiently and received high-priority attention at all levels. The system was administered for the SADF by the large staff of the quartermaster general. Within each major service component, logistical staffs had been formed to provide expeditious handling of
needed supplies. The backbone of the essentially decentralized system consisted of a series of supply and maintenance depots scattered strategically through areas where units of the armed forces were assigned. The system was backed by extensive rail, road, and air services, all of which were owned and operated by the government. The rapid supply of material to operational units was further aided by the large fleets of motor transport vehicles assigned to the quartermaster organizations.

Maintenance of aircraft and naval vessels was performed both by technicians assigned to military maintenance organizations and by contracts with local commercial firms. The Atlas Aircraft Corporation had a contract for 40 percent of the maintenance of the air force's jet aircraft; other aircraft repair and servicing was handled within the maintenance and training command. Maintenance of the navy's vessels was performed in a similar manner, supported by the nation's vast shipbuilding and repair facilities at Durban and Cape Town.

MORALE AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE

The morale of the armed forces was severely strained in the Nationalists' rise to power in 1948 by the wholesale replacement and resignation of English-speaking senior officers thought to be pro-United Party or actually lacking in loyalty. In the late 1950's the minister of defense expressed misgivings about being able to trust the air force. In Natal and other areas of British sympathies there was considerable resentment over the abandonment of the colonial insignia associated with traditional British military influence. Most of the changes that occurred within the armed forces after 1948 represented efforts by the government in power to organize its military services according to its own desires and needs.

Since the early 1960's the armed forces had been markedly strengthened in a material sense and also in morale. Among the men in uniform, rivalry between the two national language groups had largely disappeared, and the military forces had joined in the common cause of protecting the white minority's favored position within the Republic. Moreover, despite the existence of a strong defense industry of relatively recent influence, the nation did not face the threat of a potentially dangerous military-civilian power group.

Conditions of military service in early 1970 provided a sufficiently high standard of dignity and comfort to maintain a satisfactory input of volunteers. Although life was arduous and demanded hard work and self-discipline, servicemen received fair treatment and recognition for their efforts. All members received free medical treatment for themselves and their dependents, adequate annual vacations and sick leave, annual holiday bonuses, advantageous
group insurance, annual railway fare concessions for themselves and their families, and favorable pension benefits; married personnel received government quarters at reasonable rental, when available. Nutritious food in generous and varied quantities was equivalent to that consumed by the white element of the civilian population and provided a balanced and palatable diet.

Pay rates were somewhat less than those attainable within the civil sector, but the government in its concern for the quality of the defense posture frequently reviewed military pay scales and provided for equitable increases. In addition to base pay, qualifying members of the armed forces received monetary compensation for hazardous duty, professional competence, and outstanding performance. Married personnel received extra allowances for housing and for support of their dependents. In April 1969 pay scales for enlisted men and lower ranking officers were upgraded in a general revision of pay and allowances. Incentive pay for officers of all ranks was increased at the same time.

Housing accommodations for unmarried servicemen consisted of comfortable, if plain, barracks equipped with modern amenities. Married personnel were either granted government housing within the confines of the military facility or received housing allowances to assist in the procurement of private quarters. A three-year military housing program was begun in 1969 for the construction of more than 1,000 quarters for married enlisted men and 240 officers; homes were to be built at thirty military bases.

The health of SADF members was maintained at a level comparable to that of white groups in the civil sector. More than 1,000 military medical personnel were trained annually at the Medical Corps Training Center at Voortrekkerhoogte for duty with the diverse medical and dental units attached to all branches of the service. Approximately sixty different courses were offered at the school, ranging from simple first aid to military medical specialties. All members of the armed forces eventually received some limited medical training at the center, which served the army, air force, and navy. Commissioned officers with degrees in medicine, dentistry, pharmacy, and veterinary medicine received appropriate instruction in field surgery, aviation and naval medicine, shock and resuscitation, anaesthesia, field medical practices, hospital administration, and survival techniques. Commando medical orderlies attended a four-week course at the center after completing basic training at Kimberley. Military medical and dental students attended courses at the University of Pretoria. A well-staffed and equipped Military Medical Institute and a number of military general hospitals provided health services comparable to those offered in civilian institutions. Dispensaries were available at most military units, and the ability to provide adequate medical care to the wounded in a com-
bat environment appeared to be within the capability of the medical service.

Leisure activity for the armed forces included a wide variety of sports, both for physical fitness and in keeping with the national sports tradition. In addition to individual and team competition within individual service organizations, the SADF sponsored an annual athletic championship event at Voortrekkerhoogte featuring interservice track and field competition. Most units engaged in competitive rugby, soccer, and tennis matches. In addition to sports, most military installations maintained modern library services, motion picture theaters, hobby shops, and clubs for officers and enlisted men.

UNIFORMS, INSIGNIA, AND DECORATIONS

Although attempts had been made at various times to reduce the British influence on SADF uniforms, insignia, and decorations, the resulting changes in these military symbols had been only partially successful. In early 1970 the dress and service uniforms of most of the services retained a traditional semblance of British style and influence. Army uniforms, however, had been modified somewhat with German adaptations, and all unit and uniform insignia reflected a distinctive national character. Field uniforms for all members were similar in style and composition to those worn by the combat forces of NATO nations. Members of the army's military police were readily recognizable by their distinctive red caps.

Following independence, Parliament authorized a new complement of military decorations for conspicuous bravery and outstanding service. Bearing distinctively Afrikaner names and inspired by events connected mainly with Afrikaner history, military decorations were presented in ceremonies of dignity and were worn proudly. The recipients of higher awards were entitled to use the official identifying initials after their names. The highest order of military decorations was the Castle of Good Hope; other ranking awards of a long list included the Louw Wepener Decoration, the Star of South Africa, the Van Riebeeck Decoration, and the Medal Cross of Honor.

MILITARY JUSTICE

The Defense Amendment Act of 1957 instituted a series of military law reforms that made military justice more like that dispensed by civil courts. The basic guidelines for military justice were contained in the first annex to the Defense Act of 1957, and they were refined several times through 1967. The documentation of principles and procedures was highly detailed and served as the legal framework for all judicial matters connected with military duty.
The code of military justice delineated offenses, punishments, court-martial procedures, and mandatory reviews of court findings and sentences. Personnel subject to military law included officers and men of the Permanent Force, Citizen Force, Commandos, and all reserve units. Offenses of a more serious nature required trial by general courts-martial, and these were specified by the act. Those of a lesser nature were brought before ordinary courts-martial. Suspected offenses or official complaints of negligent behavior resulted in hearings and findings of boards of inquiry. All findings and sentences were subject to mandatory review and confirmation by higher authority.

The Defense Act provided punishment scales of varying severity for most offenses. The code prohibited cruel and unusual punishment and restricted the combinations of penalties that could be imposed; corporal punishment was forbidden for all members of the SADF. Punishments included death, imprisonment, cashiering, dismissal from the service, reduction in seniority of rank, reduction to a lower rank, fines, severe reprimand, admonition, and extra duty. Members of the Citizen Force, Commandos, and reserves were not subject to the death penalty or imprisonment, although they could be detained in custody for periods not to exceed the date of their service commitment.

Although the armed forces had a workable and reasonable system of military justice with which to handle military offenders, discipline had not been a major problem within the SADF. The South African military man traditionally respected authority and accepted discipline as a normal facet of military life.

FOREIGN INFLUENCE

Despite Nationalist Party attempts to change the traditional British military influence on the SADF, the effects of a colonial military heritage had left its marks. The British military atmosphere was tempered, however, by a perpetuation of the traditional Boer independence, individualism, and reliance on a military philosophy of citizen-soldiering limited to times of threat. These influences combined to produce a military force that was distinctly South African.

The nation's only known military agreement was made with the British in 1955, and reaffirmed in 1967, regarding the joint use of the Simonstown naval base. The agreement provided for joint seaward defense and for the order of R36 million worth of naval vessels, all of which had been delivered by the end of 1963.

As of early 1970 government leaders denied the existence of alliances or treaties with foreign nations requiring military commitments. Prime Minister B. J. Vorster and Minister of Defense P. W.
Botha readily acknowledged their deployment of troops to Rhodesia to aid in guerrilla suppression. Alberto Histroio, an official of the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), charged that South African soldiers were fighting in the Cuando Cubango district of Angola and that SADF bases in South West Africa gave logistical support to the Portuguese army and to South African helicopters operating in Portuguese territory. The foreign ministers of South Africa, Portugal, and Rhodesia had stated publicly that the guerrilla threat fostered by African nationalism against white administration in southern Africa was not sufficiently serious to warrant the establishment of a formal collective defense treaty.

South Africa's continued reliance on France for heavy military equipment unobtainable elsewhere remained as a nominal source of foreign military influence. Limited numbers of South African air force personnel received jet aircraft training at French aircraft factories and flight schools. A group of French scientists were stationed in the Paardefontein military base, where France maintained a satellite tracking station.

Because of stringent security practices and the competence of an active counterintelligence organization, Communist influence within the armed forces was virtually nonexistent. The views of the SADF high command and virtually all members of the armed forces were, in any case, fervently anti-Communist. Moreover, a claim for Western military sympathy appeared to rest on its voluntary assumption of responsibility for filling the Western military power vacuum in the Indian Ocean after the withdrawal of the British forces from the area.
APPENDIX

SOUTH WEST AFRICA (NAMIBIA)


Despite these actions and certain others, the Republic of South Africa has continued to administer South West Africa as if it were, in effect, a fifth province of the Republic. It is a situation made possible, in part, by the contiguity of the two areas (see fig. 21). South Africa does recognize that the territory has a special status in international law, but it denies that the United Nations has jurisdiction. For all practical purposes, the social, political, and cultural patterns characteristic of South Africa obtain in South West Africa, and its economy and system of transportation are largely integrated with those of South Africa.

Because of its anomalous status, this brief introduction to South West Africa is included as an appendix to the Handbook on the Republic of South Africa. Since the name Namibia is very recent and has been used only in official documents for a very short time, the old name—South West Africa (still employed by the South Africans and occurring in the name of the major African nationalist organization)—occurs frequently in the text, and Namibia is used only when appropriate.

HISTORICAL SETTING

Sometime before the sixteenth century the Herero and the Ovambo, Bantu-speaking peoples, moved southward and encountered the scattered Khoisan peoples, both Hottentots and Bushmen were already there. The advance came to a gradual halt with the Herero, the Ovambo, and portions of the Hottentots centered near their present locations.

One group of the Hottentots, who came to be known as the Orlam, were driven or emigrated across the Orange River into present-day South Africa. There they and other Hottentots came into contact and conflict with the early Europeans. Some of their
women cohabited with the advancing Dutch and their Coloured slaves. The descendants of these unions formed a part of the Griqua and Baster (or Bastard) groups who occupied the western portions of the Cape Colony frontier throughout much of the nineteenth century (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages). Others returned to South West Africa and formed the leadership of the Hottentots there, bringing with them a minimal knowledge of European ways of life and military tactics as well as guns.

During the first half of the nineteenth century, the Orlams, particularly the Witbooi section under Hendrik Witbooi, and the Afrikaners, under the formidable commando leaders Jager and Jonker Afrikaner, gained control over all the Hottentots of the area.

These combined groups came to be called the Nama. In 1858 the Nama chiefs, led by Hendrik Witbooi, signed a treaty that united them into a league to bar colonial expansion from the Cape Colony. They had no plans, however, for encounters with colonial pressures from other directions.

Another group of descendants of Hottentot-Dutch unions, then called Basters, remained in the Cape Colony until 1865, when they were deprived of their land by legislation. They then migrated to South West Africa where they purchased from the Nama and the Herero about 8,000 square miles of territory around Rehoboth. In 1871 about 800 of them, ancestors of the people who call themselves Rehoboth or Rehobother Basters, settled there. They established a self-governing republic under a Rehobother raad (assembly), modeled on those of the Trekboers of South Africa in the same period (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

When these people came under German protection in the late 1880's, their treaty recognized their sovereignty and granted them exclusive legal jurisdiction within their small state. Their autonomy continued throughout the period of German rule over South Africa.

Other Hottentot and Baster groups who lived south of the Orange River in what is now western Cape Province were driven into South West Africa by whites in the nineteenth century. Later some of them were to return after conflicts with the Germans.

The first Europeans to reside in the territory were British missionaries who established a station at Warmbad, twenty-five miles north of the Orange River, in 1802. They were followed by Germans of the Rhenish Missionary Society in the 1840's. Traders came soon afterward. During this period there was a good deal of conflict between the Nama and Herero, both of which were essentially pastoral peoples, and Germans and South African British missionaries and traders sometimes advised and intervened.

Only in 1884, with the establishment of a German trading post at the port of Lüderitz on land ceded by Hottentot chiefs, did the German chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, make German claims to the territory. In the meantime, the British of the Cape Colony had annexed the small portion of land around the territory's only good port at Walvis Bay, which remained a part of the Cape Colony and, subsequently, of South Africa.

Germany laid claim to South West Africa in 1884 and established the first garrison there in 1889. By 1894 the Germans had crushed local resistance, chiefly from the Witbooi section of the Hottentots. In the next decade, however, their policies led other groups, chiefly the Herero, to rise against them. The German-Herero War of 1904 resulted in the death of all but 15,000 of the 90,000 Herero and the flight of part of this remnant to Bechuanaland. In 1906 the Nama Hottentot rose again and were finally crushed.
During this period the whites in South West Africa were chiefly missionaries, traders, soldiers, and some farmers for whom the Herero and Nama, largely deprived of their cattle, were forced to labor. In 1908, however, diamonds were discovered at Lüderitz, and numbers of Europeans were attracted to the territory. By 1913 the white population was 15,000.

After the opening of World War I, South African forces invaded the German colony. Little active fighting occurred between the white armies. The Rehobothers, pressed by the Germans for military recruits to supplement the badly outnumbered German forces, refused and allied themselves to the South African forces commanded by that country's prime minister, General Louis Botha. Although the South Africans preferred not to have the nonwhites involved in the fighting, the German forces attacked the Rehobothers, who defeated them in one of the war's larger battles.

THE TERRITORY UNDER SOUTH AFRICAN RULE

The German forces surrendered in early July 1915 and were imprisoned until their repatriation in 1919. The majority of the German civilians were allowed to remain, however, and formed more than half of the white population. In 1924 they were granted South African citizenship. The treaties ending the war required Germany to cede all its colonies as mandates of the League of Nations. The mandate over South West Africa was conferred upon Great Britain, "for and on behalf of the government of the Union of South Africa," which was to act under the terms of the mandate and the supervision of the league.

South West Africa was classified as a "C" mandate, one whose sparseness of population, small size, remoteness from the centers of civilization, and geographical continuity to the mandatory power made it best administered as an integral part of the mandatory itself. Article 2 of the South West Africa Mandate stated, however, that South Africa must "promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the territory." Article 4 prohibited the establishment of military or naval bases in the territory. Article 5 required that South Africa "ensure in the Territory freedom of conscience...and...allow all missionaries, nationals of any state...to reside in the territory." Article 6 required that South Africa make an annual report to the league's council indicating the measures taken to carry out its obligations.

Article 7 stated that "the consent of the Council is required for any modification of the terms of the...mandate." The mandate further stated that South Africa "agrees that if any dispute whatever should arise between the mandatory and another member of
the League of Nations relating to the interpretation of the application of the provisions of the Mandate, such dispute. . . shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice. . . .”

Powers of legislation and administration over the newly acquired territory were vested by the South Africans in a resident administrator. In 1926 they created a Legislative Assembly, representing the territory’s German, Afrikaner, and British white inhabitants, with twelve elected and six nominated members. Control over certain matters, including taxation, was vested in the new assembly’s executive committee, while all other matters, including native and Coloured affairs, remained in the hands of the administrator.

At the end of World War II, South West Africa’s international status after the demise of the League of Nations was at issue. The United Nations General Assembly, to which South Africa first turned, refused permission to incorporate the territory into the South African state, largely because of the country’s racial policies.

Throughout the postwar era, however, the de facto unification of the territory with the Union of South Africa was brought closer by South African legislation. In 1949 the South West Africa Affairs Amendment Act of the South African Parliament gave the territory eight elected and two appointed seats in the South African body. The territory’s Legislative Assembly, by then composed of eighteen elected members, was at first given fairly broad powers, but a number of later acts, culminating in the South West Africa Affairs Act of 1969, limited these virtually to the same as those of South Africa’s weak provincial councils.

A deputy minister for South West African affairs was appointed to the cabinet in 1961. The powers of the local government units for whites were identical to those in practice in the Republic. Appeals from decisions of the territory’s high court, equivalent to a South African provincial division, and circuit courts are to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa, and the legal system is that of the Republic (see ch. 14, The Legal System). Although budgeted from a separate account, taxes are in accord with the South African system and rates. The use of German as a recognized language for official purposes is one of the few points of administrative difference.

In 1955 administration over nonwhite affairs was removed from the hands of the resident administrator and placed directly under the South African Department of Bantu Administration and Development or the Department of Coloured Affairs although, as a vestige of the Rehobother’s independent status, the Republic’s minister of Coloured affairs bears a second title as minister of Rehobother affairs. Until 1970 one of the two nominated senators in the Parliament of the Republic was required to be familiar with the problems of the Coloured and Rehobother communities.
The Africans are subject to all the restrictive legislations that affect the lives of the Africans in South Africa: confinement to reserve lands, color bars in employment, master and servant laws, pass laws, and influx control over those entering urban areas.

In addition, the country is divided into two zones by a line cutting roughly the upper quarter away from the rest. This is the Police Line, first established by the Germans. Of the country's population, 54 percent are Africans who live in the reserves north of the line (the northern sector). They are forbidden to cross into the southern sector, or Police Zone, except to work as contract laborers, creating a permanent, ready, and cheap labor supply for the use of white employers. Of the Africans in the Police Zone, four-fifths do not live in their barren reserves and are engaged in labor on white farms or as laborers in the urban centers.

**SOUTH WEST AFRICA AND THE UNITED NATIONS**

South Africa did not expect its request to incorporate South West Africa to meet with strong opposition when it made its initial request to the United Nations General Assembly in 1946. The defeat at the United Nations, a consequence of opposition to South Africa's racial policies, was sparked by India, newly independent, which was angered at the treatment of South Africans of Indian descent. After this first rebuff, repeated by the General Assembly in stronger terms every year thereafter, the South African government refused to recognize the competence of the United Nations to deal with South West Africa's affairs. It stated that there was nothing in international law specifying that the power over the league's mandate passed to the United Nations, although all other mandatory powers had allowed the transfer of the territories held by them to United Nations supervision.

At the General Assembly's request, the case was carried to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. The court ruled in 1950 that, while South Africa could not be required to place the league mandate under United Nations trusteeship, the mandate treaty status remained in force, and South Africa, therefore, had a continuing international obligation to adhere to its terms, including the submission of annual reports on conditions in the territory, and further that the supervisory function of the league and the mandate had been passed to the United Nations. South Africa rejected this opinion which, as an advisory opinion, had no binding force.

In 1958 the United Nations committee that had been appointed to meet with the South African government to seek a basis for agreement suggested the country be partitioned, with the Police Zone being absorbed by South Africa and the northern area be-
coming a United Nations mandate. The South African government agreed to consider the proposal, but partition was rejected by the United Nations General Assembly.

In 1960 Ethiopia and Liberia, the only African states that had been members of the league, requested the International Court of Justice to rule in a binding decision that the league mandate was still in force and to hold South Africa to be at fault because of its failure to have provided, as required by the mandate’s terms, for the highest material and moral welfare of the indigenous inhabitants. In 1962 the court in a preliminary decision held by an eight to seven vote that it did have jurisdiction to hear the case.

During the next four years the counsel retained by the Ethiopian and Liberian governments and the representation of South Africa presented a voluminous case for and against indictment. Despite this effort, in July 1966 the court, after a seven-to-seven tie vote, one judge having died during the proceedings, rejected the complaint, not on the merits of the case, but solely on the technical grounds that the two plaintiff countries had not established a legal interest-entitling them to bring the case, in effect nullifying its own 1962 decision. The decision shocked South Africa’s many opponents, who had already drawn up plans to implement the court’s expected decision against South Africa.

In October 1966 the United Nations General Assembly voted 114 to 2 (South Africa and Portugal dissenting; Great Britain, France and Malawi abstaining; and Botswana and Lesotho not voting) that, South Africa having failed to fulfill its obligations under the mandate and having, in fact, disavowed it, the mandate was terminated and that the United Nations had direct responsibility for the territory. A fourteen-member committee, including representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union (Great Britain and France having declined membership), was appointed to consider how the UN should carry out that responsibility. The committee was unable to reach an agreed conclusion, however.

In May 1967 an eleven-member United Nations Council for South West Africa was established to make contact with South Africa in order to arrange for South West Africa’s independence by June 1968 and to administer the territory. In November 1967 the committee reported to the United Nations General Assembly that South Africa refused to consider withdrawal. It recommended that the General Assembly seek stronger action. The South African government at the same time stated that, although it continued to recognize South West Africa’s separate international status, it did not recognize the competence of any international body to rule on its administration.

Efforts by the United Nations committee to establish a presence in South West Africa failed in the face of South African opposition. During 1967 a new issue had arisen. South Africa arrested and
brought to Pretoria for trial a group of South West Africans who were accused of being terrorists under an act passed by the South African Parliament after the United Nations had declared South Africa's mandate at an end. The application of such a law in South West Africa, the removal of South West Africans from the territory for trial in South Africa, and the nature of the purported crime caused the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council to regard the trials invalid and the arrest and removal of the defendants a violation of international law. Despite two censures by the Security Council, the South Africans refused to stop the trial and infliction of sentences.

In 1969 the United Nations General Assembly again requested the Security Council to take effective measures to oust the Republic from the territory that the General Assembly, at the request of African and Coloured leaders in exile, had officially renamed Namibia. The Security Council voted in two resolutions to condemn South Africa for continuing its illegal control and to consider effective means to force the South Africans from the territory if they did not withdraw by October 4, 1969. The United States, Great Britain, and France, powers without whose support effective action could clearly not be undertaken, abstained on the latter vote. South Africa again refused to comply with the resolution. No further action had been taken by the Security Council by the end of February 1970.

POLITICAL DYNAMICS AND VALUES

The political dynamics of the territory and the political values and attitudes of its population were closely linked to its international status. The attitudes of the white community, which constitutes 15 percent of the population, were largely identical with those of the whites of South Africa although the all white United National South West Africa Party was not linked with the opposition United Party of South Africa and specifically opposed further South African limitations of the powers of the territory's legislative assembly (see ch. 15, Political Dynamics; ch. 18, Political Values and Attitudes). They viewed the territory as an integral part of the Republic and participated in all the Republic's political processes.

The South African government had retained complete de facto control over the territory despite the United Nations demands that it terminate its rule. In early 1970 it was administered, with few exceptions, as if it were a fifth province of the Republic of South Africa, even though the Republic continued to acknowledge that the territory had a separate status under international law (see ch. 13, The Governmental System). The majority of the white voters, particularly among the Germans and Afrikaners, are supporters of
the ruling Nationalist Party of the Republic, and the Nationalists held all ten seats in the South African Parliament (four in the Senate, six in the House of Assembly) set aside for South West African representatives and a clear majority of seats in the territory’s Legislative Assembly.

The political attitudes of the Cape Coloured population, who make up 2.5 percent of the population and the majority of whom were recent arrivals in the territory, apparently supported the continued control of the country by South African whites. The attitudes of the rest of the nonwhites, 82 percent of the population or at least of the politically articulate portion of it, have been greatly affected by the country’s colonial history, its position as an international mandate, and the hope of termination of South African control and of independence.

The birth of nonwhite nationalism in South West Africa stems from the World War I period. Having fought the Germans before and during that war, the leaders of at least three ethnic groups of South West Africa, the Ovambo, the Herero, and the Rehobothers, felt themselves to have triumphed over the colonial regime and considered South Africa’s mandate to be just what the League of Nations had stated it to be, a trusteeship to assist them on the road to independence.

Although subjugated by the Germans in the 1890’s, the Rehobothers still retain their original territory almost intact. At the time of the South African attack on the German forces in South West Africa, the South African prime minister, Louis Botha, in order to gain their support, made what the Rehobothers felt to be, and still feel to have been, a binding commitment to them for the continuation of their earlier independence.

The Ovambo’s independent spirit also dates from the German occupation. In 1906, after having fought bloody campaigns against the virtually unarmed Herero and Nama, the German colonial administration was reluctant to clash with the well-armed Ovambo in the economically uninteresting far north of the territory. They, therefore, established the Police Line, which still existed in early 1970, cutting off the northern quarter of the country and leaving the tribes beyond it largely to rule themselves. After 1915 the South African victors retained this territorial division. As a result, the Ovambo have been subject to less direct control than most tribes under South African domination. Although their chiefs are government appointed, they have been left to fend for themselves so long as they do not actively oppose the government. In 1968 South Africa announced that Ovamboland was being granted the right to govern its internal affairs through a tribal legislative body and had become what in South Africa was commonly termed a Bantustan (see ch. 13, The Governmental System).
The third group, the Herero, has played a leading role in South West Africa's protests to the United Nations. Their independent traditions are based solely on their strength as a people and on moral courage. The strength that sustained them through their near annihilation in the years 1904–07 and allowed them to reform themselves as a tribe has also enabled their leaders to resist South African pressure to silence their demands for freedom, particularly at the United Nations.

A major issue in African protests has been their confinement to inadequate reserves totaling less than one-quarter of the territorial area. The Africans rarely have the opportunity for anything beyond subsistence farming, small-scale stockraising or contract labor in mines or on white farms. Outside of the northern reserves, areas designated for Africans have poor soil and are small, poorly watered, far apart, and under close supervision of white officials. In many cases a single tribe has been broken up into separate, widely spaced reserves in order to facilitate white settlement in selective areas. Between 1966 and 1968, however, the South African government was engaged in a process intended to increase African territory to one-third of the total area and to consolidate some of them. Movement in and out of the reserve is restricted and highly controlled.

The northern tier of reserves, particularly Ovamboland, has been completely sealed off from the outside world since the German period, and the people there have been more isolated from outside influences than any other South African tribe. This isolation and the tribe’s independent spirit have combined to make the Bantustan, or separate development, program attractive to at least a sizable portion of Ovambo chiefs who accepted the government’s promises of future independence.

Until the late 1960’s the most powerful and consistent opposition to South African rule had been that of the Chief’s Council of the Herero, with whose decisions the Nama leaders generally associated themselves. Together these two groups constitute a majority of the Police Zone’s African population. The council served as the principal voice of African nationalism within that part of South West Africa. Until his death in the late 1960’s, Chief Hosea Kutaka, who had been headman of the South West African Herero since 1917, was its leader. His opposition to South African rule first crystallized in 1925 when the administration attempted to deprive the Herero of their good lands so as to make way for white farmers and to move them to reserves on the edge of the Kalahari Desert.

In 1946 the South Africa government, to support its claim to incorporate South West Africa into the Union, presented a purported poll of the 297,000 nonwhites in the territory showing that 208,000 supported incorporation into South Africa. To check on
these figures, the United Nations Trusteeship Council invited some of the chiefs to testify at the United Nations. Denied passports for the trip, the Chief's Council sent Michael Scott, an Anglican priest, to represent them at the 1949 Trusteeship Committee meeting.

All the chiefs, with the exception of the Ovambo and others in the isolated areas north of the police zone, associated themselves with the effort to send Michael Scott to the United Nations and with many later activities.

The first nonwhite mass political organization grew out of the South West African Student Body, formed in 1952 among the few Africans who had been allowed to leave the territory for limited higher education in South Africa. The student group was led by three men who were to continue to be leaders of later organizations: Jariretundu Kozonguizi, Mburumba Kerina, and Toivo-ja-Toivo. In 1956 Kerina persuaded the authorities to allow him to accept a university scholarship in the United States. Kozonguizi and Toivo returned to South West Africa the same year; by agreement, Kozonguizi was to work in the Police Zone, while Toivo organized the Ovambo.

Kozonguizi reconstituted the student body as the South West African Progressive Association, which in 1959 became the South West African National Union (SWANU) with the support of the Chief's Council. In 1958, to politicize the Ovambo, Toivo also formed the Ovamboland Peoples Congress, which later became the Ovamboland Peoples Organization (OPO).

Although the young leaders cooperated closely at first, Kerina, from his position in New York at the United Nations had insistently written to Sam Nujoma, then president of OPO as well as an executive member of SWANU, urging the extension of OPO into a national organization for all the population groups. Kerina and others felt that SWANU, under the influence of the Chief's Council, would not present the forum necessary to make their position stronger at the United Nations. For this reason OPO, which originally worked only among the Ovambo, broadened itself into the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), aimed at all the tribes. Shortly thereafter, the new SWAPO received the support of the leadership of the Chief's Council because SWANU's Herero members had alienated the Council's new assistant leader, Chief Kapuuo. Thus the new party came to represent both the Ovambo and all but one branch of the Herero.

For a number of years SWANU and SWAPO worked side by side with little or no ideological differences but with friction at the top levels. In this period the entire SWAPO executive was in exile; initially its chief center was at the United Nations around Mburumba Kerina. At home SWAPO's leadership for a number of years included members of the Herero Chief's Council and de-
pended upon Toivo’s organizing among the Ovambo. Gradually, however, men of all tribes joined SWAPO and shared in its leadership. By 1967 even the distant Caprivi African National Union, representing the tribes adjacent to Zambia and Rhodesia, had joined SWAPO, now clearly the dominant national organization in South West Africa. Complete unity was not achieved. In 1966, after Mburumba Kerina’s resignation from SWAPO to attempt the formation of a new united party, the South West African National United Front, the Chief’s Council again lent its support to SWANU, but by 1970 SWANU was inactive.

SWAPO’s platform calls for liberation through United Nations activity, including military intervention, if necessary, to remove South African control. It, however, clearly places the emphasis on the assistance of other African forces within the United Nations context. In addition, it calls for the repatriation to South Africa of only “military and para-military” South African personnel.

SWAPO has succeeded in avoiding the splintering that has often affected refugee political parties in Africa and, having absorbed many of SWANU’s supporters outside South West Africa, entered the 1970’s with a considerable show of vitality. The personality of the leaders of the movement, including its president, Sam Nujoma, contributed, in part, to this vitality. SWAPO’s leaders have held together divergent elements, including the representatives of the people of the remote but strategic Caprivi Strip, the only portion of land under South African control that borders a country opposed to the South African regime. The party has maintained good relations with the governments of Tanzania and Zambia, which provide refuge and a headquarters for the movement.

SWAPO’s morale was enhanced by the creation of a small military wing, the Namibian Liberation Army, which has forced the deployment of South African security forces along the country’s long and remote northern border. In August 1966 the South African government announced that a South African police patrol in Ovamboland had intercepted a heavily armed band of nationalist invaders. SWAPO’s headquarters in Dar es Salaam was quick to accept responsibility for the raiders then and later and has apparently continued to infiltrate men into the territory across the Angolan and Zambian borders. Despite the setbacks at the United Nations, the south West African liberation movements still look to outside assistance, particularly from United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, not armed revolt, as their main hope for deliverance from South African bondage. The hope provided by this possibility gave the organization most of its strength. They have sought limited assistance from both non-Communist and Communist states. Both have supported them diplomatically at the United Nations but have provided only minimal concrete assistance, principally in the fields of education and training for refugees.
PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

The territory lies on the southwestern coast of Africa between 17° and 29° south latitude. It covers an area of 318,261 square miles, but the 434-square-mile coastal enclave of Walvis Bay is technically part of the South Africa’s Cape Province. Bounded on the west by the Atlantic Ocean, South West Africa is separated from South Africa by the Orange River, the northern bank of which marks the territory’s southern frontier. Its eastern border is shared with Botswana; Angola adjoins its northern boundary, a portion of which is formed by the Kunene River. The northeastern extremity, known as the Caprivi Strip, is a narrow projection about 300 miles long and from 20 to 60 miles wide separating Angola from Botswana. South West Africa’s capital is the centrally located city of Windhoek.

Topographically, the territory is composed of three distinct regions. Approximately 15 percent of the total area consists of the arid Namib Desert, a large uninhabited western zone that varies in width from 50 to 80 miles and stretches about 1,000 miles along the entire Atlantic coastline. Inland this marginal zone rises rapidly to a central plateau, stretching from the southern territorial boundary to the northern frontier and covering about half the total area. The plateau and its scarped western edge are northward extensions of South Africa’s inland plateau and Great Escarpment. Varying in altitude from 3,300 to 8,600 feet, the region provides a diversified landscape of rugged mountains, rocky outcrops, sand-filled valleys, and gently undulating plains. Farther inland the plateau gives way to the Kalahari, a semidesert region that extends throughout the eastern section of the territory.

In the Namib coastal region vegetation is limited to those varieties adaptable to extreme drought conditions, usually sparsely scattered, short grasses generally found in protected areas between the dunes. Inland from the Namib, various succulents give way near the plateau edge to desert grasses and aloes. Vegetation on the southern plateau ranges from desert shrubs and succulents to arid shrub grass, wooded steppeland, and acacia thorn-tree savannah. In the northern areas, dry forests of mopani, large fig trees, palms, and baobabs are found. In the shallow, often dry floodwater channels of the northern drainage system, vegetation consists of fairly dense pasture grasses.

The soils throughout the territory are generally immature and infertile. Organic content is highest in the northern part of the plateau region where, under steppe vegetation, soils are brown, or reddish in color, shallow, and typical of arid and semiarid tropical regions. In the higher rainfall areas of the extreme north, however, the soil is brownish-grey, deeper, and composed of moderate amounts of organic matter. In this area they are capable of pro-
Producing limited crops of maize (corn) and perennial grass. In the southern part of the plateau, soils are subdesert in nature, sandy, alkaline, and low in organic content. The Kalahari soils in the eastern region vary from brown, arid and semiarid tropical soils on loose sediments to ferruginous, sandy soils. Most are deficient in phosphates, have limited humus content, and lack potential for cultivation. The soils of the Namib Desert are basically unproductive sand except for sporadic patches of sandy silt and clay in the valleys of the larger rivers.

South West Africa's major physical problem is the general scarcity, irregularity, and uneven distribution of rainfall (see fig. 22). Over 70 percent of the territory the average rainfall is below sixteen inches annually, the minimum for dryland agriculture in a hot climate. Except in the northern and southern extremities, there are no perennial rivers; all others flow intermittently. The whole region has about forty natural springs, and shallow ponds or pans occur sporadically. The largest of these is the Etosha Pan in the extreme north. This seventy-by-thirty-mile depression receives the summer drainage of Ovamboland; as with other temporary bodies of water, its supply is subject to the depleting effects of evaporation brought about by an arid climate and seasonal rainfall patterns.

Generally, the entire coastal region receives an average of less than two inches of rainfall annually. Over the central plateau, rainfall patterns improve somewhat from the southwest to the northeast, but only along the Okavango River in the north and in the Caprivi Strip can rainfall conditions be regarded as favorable for relatively intensive agricultural exploitation. Except for the extreme southwest, the territory lies in the summer rainfall area with high daytime temperatures and low atmospheric pressure caused by comparatively high altitude. Distribution of rainfall throughout the year, or between years, usually results in frequent extremes of drought and flood conditions. To combat the general shortage of water resources, the government has built more than 100 dams of varying sizes across the few major rivers.

As in other parts of southern Africa, climatic temperatures are closely related to the wind systems, the ocean current, latitude, and altitude. Except for the highest mountain areas, the territory’s lowest mean temperatures occur in the coastal Namib region and are largely affected by the cold Benguela Current from the south Atlantic. Walvis Bay has a mean daily temperature of 74.1°F. in February, the region’s warmest month; during its coldest month of August, the mean daily temperature is 56.8°F. The comparatively high winter temperature in the Namib are largely the result of mountain winds from the central plateau that raise the air temperature over the coastal region to more than 90°F. for short periods.

The interior of the territory is not affected by coastal climatic
Figure 22. Average Rainfall in South West Africa (Namibia).

Factors, and temperatures on the plateau show a closer relationship to altitude and latitude. In the mountainous region around Windhoek, the average monthly temperatures for the warmest month, December, range from a high of 86°F. to a low of 63°F. In July, the coldest month, average daytime and nighttime variations range from 69°F. to 43°F. The highest interior temperatures average 103°F. during January in the lower Orange River valley at an altitude of 665 feet. Temperature inversions occur at night in most of the valleys in the mountainous regions. Frost may occur in July in any part of the territory, although it generally is light. Usually, the atmosphere is exceedingly dry, but dense fogs occur frequently along the coastline.

POPULATION AND ETHNIC GROUPS

The population was estimated at 610,100 in 1966, compared with 526,004 reported in official census figures for 1960, an increase of...
about 84,000 or 16 percent, during the six-year period. The heterogeneous population included seven distinct African ethnic groups: Berg-Dama, East Caprivians, Herero, Kaokovelders, Okavango, Ovambo, and Tswana. There were, in addition, five non-African population groups: Bushmen, Hottentots (Nama), Coloureds, Rehoboth Basters (a separate Coloured group), and whites. In 1966 Africans constituted almost 71 percent of the total population (see table 41).

The average population density at the 1960 census was 1.65 persons per square mile. Based on the 1966 estimates, population density rose to roughly 2 per square mile in that year, compared to a 1966 population density in the Republic of nearly 39 per square mile. Population distribution has been affected by original settlement patterns and by the territory's physical geography, which includes large desert areas that are nearly uninhabitable.

The completely rural northern sector of the territory is populated principally by African tribes residing in the Kaokoveld, Ovambo, Okavango, and East Caprivian reserves and by Bushmen. These groups together constituted about 54 percent of the population in 1960. The northern sector at that time had an average population density of almost three persons per square mile, the highest density being about fourteen per square mile in the Ovambo homeland.

About 46 percent of the total population lived in the southern sector in 1960. The diversified economy of this sector had brought substantial urbanization; over 47 percent of its population in 1960 resided in urban areas. Most highly urbanized were: the whites, (73 percent); the Coloureds, (64 percent), excluding the Rehoboth Basters; and the Berg-Dama (42 percent). Twenty-six percent of the Hottentots and 26 percent of the Herero were also urban residents.

Population growth has been greatest among the whites. The average annual growth rate for the group between 1960 and 1966 was estimated by the Republic of South Africa Bureau of Statistics at 4.2 percent. The rate has been greatly influenced by immigration. During this period the Coloureds grew at an estimated average annual rate of 3.2 percent. This figure also was affected by immigration. The indicated growth rate of the Rehoboth Basters between 1960 and 1966 was about 3.3 percent, and for the indigenous groups, about 2.1 percent.

The Bushmen, estimated at about 13,300 in 1966, were still essentially nomadic in the 1960's, although a considerable number of those in the southern sector of the country worked irregularly, chiefly on farms. About 20 percent of the Bushmen largely maintained their traditional way of life in the northern and northeastern parts of the territory and in the western section of the Caprivi Strip. The government had plans to try to induce this group to settle in a homeland at Tsumkwe.
Table 41. Population of South West Africa (Namibia) by Ethnic Composition, 1960 and 1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th></th>
<th>1966*</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berg-Dama</td>
<td>44,353</td>
<td>8.43</td>
<td>50,200</td>
<td>8.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Caprivian</td>
<td>15,840</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>17,900</td>
<td>2.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herero</td>
<td>35,354</td>
<td>6.72</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>6.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaokovelder</td>
<td>9,234</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>1.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okavango</td>
<td>27,871</td>
<td>5.30</td>
<td>31,500</td>
<td>5.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ovambo</td>
<td>239,363</td>
<td>45.50</td>
<td>270,900</td>
<td>44.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tswana (and others)</td>
<td>9,992</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>11,300</td>
<td>1.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total African</td>
<td>382,007</td>
<td>72.61</td>
<td>432,300</td>
<td>70.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bushman</td>
<td>11,762</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>13,300</td>
<td>2.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hottentot (Nama)</td>
<td>34,806</td>
<td>6.62</td>
<td>39,400</td>
<td>6.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloureds:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basters (Rehobother)</td>
<td>11,257</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>13,700</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloureds</td>
<td>12,708</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>15,400</td>
<td>2.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Coloureds</td>
<td>23,965</td>
<td>4.56</td>
<td>29,100</td>
<td>4.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>73,464</td>
<td>13.97</td>
<td>96,000</td>
<td>15.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>526,004</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>610,100</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Official estimate.


The Hottentots, numbering about 39,400 in 1966, were largely concentrated in the southern sector. They were descendants of the Nama who inhabited South West Africa at the beginning of the nineteenth century and of the Orlam, many of whom were of mixed Hottentot-white ancestry. The Orlam moved into South West Africa from Cape Colony at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Although most were pastoralists on the reserves, many Hottentots in the 1960's worked on white farms in the southern sector, while others lived and were employed in urban areas.

The Berg-Dama, also known as the Dama or Damara, are a negroid people of unknown origin. In 1966 they numbered about 50,000 and constituted the territory's third largest population group. Until the late nineteenth century many were slaves of the Hottentots (Nama), whose language they now speak, or of the Herero. There also were fugitive bands that lived under primitive conditions in isolated and higher mountainous areas of the territory. Toward the end of the nineteenth century a small area, the Okambahe Reserve, was established for them, and in 1960 about 3 percent of the group lived on this reserve, where they were engaged principally in cattle raising. The group has been greatly influenced by the modern economy, and many work in urban areas or on white farms.

The Herero, totaling about 40,000 in 1966, speak a Bantu language that is substantially different from the Bantu tongues spoken.
by the Ovambo and Okavango ethnic groups in the northern part of the territory and by Bantu tribes in the East Caprivi Strip. Their social organization has an unusual dual structure based on a system of patrilineal and matrilineal groups, to which each member of the tribe belongs. This system is not found among other ethnic groups in southern Africa. The Herero were decimated during the war with the Germans in 1904, their numbers declining from about 90,000 to about 15,000. Many fled into Bechuanaland (now Botswana). At the end of the war Herero lands and cattle were confiscated. After establishment of the mandate, however, a number of reserves were set up for them, and in 1960 about 44 percent were in these areas. Another 30 percent were in rural areas mainly as farm employees, and about 26 percent lived or were employed in urban areas.

The Kaokovelders, numbering about 10,000 in 1966, are concentrated in their assigned homeland in northwest South West Africa. Divided into the Ova-Himba and the Ova-Tjimba, they are closely related to the Herero in language and culture. They represent elements of the Herero people who remained in the area when the main body migrated south and east into the region known as Damara land, about the middle of the eighteenth century. The Kaokovelders have remained relatively isolated; in the 1960 census none were recorded in the southern sector. The Ova-Himba are principally herdsmen, whereas the Ova-Tjimba rely to a considerable extent on veld food (see Glossary).

The Ovambo, numbering about 270,000 in 1966, occupy Ovamboland, a Bantustan in the far north. The largest ethnic group in the territory, they constituted over 44 percent of the total estimated population. The Ovambo are divided into eight separate but related tribes, each having a distinct area of its own and speaking a Bantu language that is intelligible to the others. Written languages have been developed for the two largest tribes, the Kuanyama and Ndonga. They have a matrilineal system, with the individual family constituting the most important socioeconomic unit.

The Ovambo are primarily an agricultural people, although they also raise cattle. Their economy has been affected by exportation of labor to the territory's southern sector. Three of the tribes had hereditary chieftains, and the others had elected headmen. Missionaries have had a strong influence on the tribes. The Finnish Mission church has developed into an independent Ovambokavango church, which also includes members of the Okavango tribes to the east of Ovamboland.

The Okavango tribes, having an estimated total of 31,500 members in 1966, are located mainly in a relatively narrow strip on the south side of the Okavango River, although their homeland extends about sixty miles inland. The Bantu-speaking Okavango are divided into five separate groups, four of which use dialectical versions of
one language. The Mbukushu, who make up the fifth group, have their own language. Linguistically and in other respects, the Okavango tribes are related to Angolan peoples. Their social organization is very similar to that of the Ovambo. They are also primarily agriculturists but, in addition, raise some cattle and goats. Fish form a valuable supplement to the diet. Each of the five tribes has a hereditary chieftain.

The East Caprivians, estimated to number about 18,000 in 1966, comprise two major tribal groups, the Masubia and Mafue, which together constitute about 88 percent of the population, and a number of small tribes associated with the Mafue. They are not related to other Bantu groups in South West Africa, but have affinities with Zambian peoples. Like the Lozi of Zambia, they speak Bantu languages that are closely related to the Sotho language group in South Africa. Although each tribe has its own language, there is a lingua franca, known as Silozi or Sikololo, that is generally understood and is used in the schools. The East Caprivians have a subsistence economy based on agriculture and cattle raising. Fish form an important part of the diet of the peoples living along the rivers in the area. The Masubia have a patrilineal system, whereas the social structure of the Mafue has definite matrilineal features. Both groups have hereditary chiefs.

The Coloureds (as distinct from the Rehoboth Basters) are mainly immigrants from the Republic of South Africa. Numbering about 15,000 in 1966, they generally speak Afrikaans and, culturally, are similar to the whites. In 1960, 64 percent were urban and mostly residents of Lüderitz, Windhoek, and Walvis Bay. They were employed in industry and commerce, and some had their own businesses. Others were engaged as craftsmen in the building trades. Some residing in rural areas were stock farmers. The Odendaal Commission in 1963 recommended that no homeland be established for the Coloureds but that proclaimed townships be set up in Lüderitz, Walvis Bay, and Windhoek, in which they would have the right to own property; these were to be under the control of Coloured local township authorities.

The Rehoboth Basters, totaling about 13,700 in 1966, are mainly of mixed European and Hottentot ancestry. They are the descendants of a group of Coloureds who moved into South West Africa from the Northwest Cape in 1868 and 1869. Their language is a dialect of Afrikaans, and their culture derives from that of nineteenth-century Boers. They tend to consider themselves a people apart from the more recently arrived Coloureds. Stock raising is one of the chief occupations; however, a diversified economy exists in the district's chief town, Rehoboth.

A small group of Tswana, related to Tswana tribes in Botswana, also live in the territory. In addition, there are small groups of other...
Bantu-speaking people who are not related to the main indigenous African tribal groups.

White immigrants began settling in South West Africa during the nineteenth century. Present members of the white ethnic group are mainly of South African or German ancestry. At the 1960 census about 67 percent spoke Afrikaans, slightly more than 23 percent used German, and close to 10 percent spoke English. They were engaged in agriculture, stock raising, various aspects of commerce and industry, and administration of the territory.

EDUCATION

The official educational policy in South West Africa in 1969 was based on, and closely followed, the concept of separate development in the Republic of South Africa. The stated aim was to educate the pupil to fit into, and make the greatest possible contribution to, his own racial or ethnic group. In line with this objective, the government had established three separate educational systems: one for whites, one for Coloureds, and one encompassing the indigenous Africans, Hottentots, and Bushmen.

Mother-tongue instruction was an integral part of this policy. In the early 1960's mother-tongue instruction in the indigenous educational system was limited by the lack of adequate texts and literature and of teachers trained in the different languages. It was then being used in the southern sector in the first two primary grades only and in the northern sector in the first four primary grades. In early 1970 the extent of mother-tongue instruction in schools for the indigenous peoples was unknown.

In the 1960's the territory's primary schools, in the case of all ethnic groups, consisted of seven grades: Substandard A, Substandard B, and Standard I, II, III, IV, and V. The secondary schools had five standards divided into a junior secondary course (Standard VI, VII, and VIII) and a matriculation course that comprised Standard IX and X. Primary and secondary school syllabuses for whites and Coloureds, including the Rehoboth Basters, followed those used in Cape Province, with slight modifications designed to meet special needs in the territory.

The curricula and syllabuses used in the indigenous schools, through the primary grades and the first three years of secondary school, were basically the same as those used in the African school system in South Africa. No differences existed in the syllabuses for sciences, mathematics, and the official languages; however, some changes had been made in other subjects, adapting them to local situations. For the final two years of secondary school, the courses for all groups—white, Coloured, and indigenous—followed the requirements of the Joint Matriculation Board in South Africa. The final school examination was also the same for all groups.
Until 1960 education for the indigenous groups was carried out largely by mission schools. In that year a plan to convert these schools into community schools got underway. By 1966, 179 of 228 mission schools in the northern sector had been changed over; however, conversion in the southern sector was slower, and by 1966 only 49 out of 111 schools had made the adjustment.

There has been a rapid rise in the number of indigenous pupils. The total in 1966 was 66,064, compared with 37,810 in 1960, an increase of almost 75 percent during the six-year period. In 1966, 62 percent of the indigenous children of school age were attending school. The number reaching the secondary standards, however, appeared to be very small. In 1962, the latest year for which figures were available, only about 1 percent of the primary and secondary school population was in the secondary standards. Government assistance is given for higher education in South Africa.

White education in the 1960’s was compulsory between seven and sixteen years of age, or to completion of Standard VIII. In 1966 there were seventy-seven white schools. Pupils numbered 19,893, constituting approximately 100 percent of white children of school age. The medium of instruction was either Afrikaans, English, or German, with Afrikaans predominant through Standard V in government schools. Private schools were permitted to select their own medium. For higher and technical education, students successfully completing secondary school usually go to South Africa.

Education for Coloureds, including the Rehoboth Basters, was largely in the hands of mission schools in the 1960’s. In 1966 forty-eight of fifty-three schools were mission schools, the remaining five being government schools. The total included three secondary schools, of which one was a mission school. Education for Coloureds was not compulsory, although almost all children of school age were attending school. The medium of instruction in Coloured schools was Afrikaans. Grants and loans were made available by the government for technical and teacher training, as well as higher education, in South Africa.

ECONOMY

The territory has a subsistence economy, located principally on the African Reserves, and a commercial economy that is almost entirely white owned but based largely upon African contract labor. A government source evaluated the marketable output of the subsistence economy at about 3.5 percent of the territory’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 1951. The African inhabitants of the reserves are largely dependent upon the earnings of those who work in the commercial economy. In 1966 the administration reported that about 69,500 Africans, largely from the reserves of the northern sector, were employed on white farms or in other branches of
the developed economy, such as mines, industry, commerce, or administration.

According to the 1960 census, agriculture, including fishing and sealing, occupied about 24 percent of the active white population of the territory. About 33 percent of the active Coloured and Rehobother population and 65 percent of the active African population were thought to be engaged in agriculture. Mining occupied 6.2 percent of the active white population, 2 percent of the Coloureds, and 6 percent of the Africans. Most of the remainder were in construction, commerce, and services. Manufacturing is very limited. Because new mining operations are relatively capital-intensive, the rapid development of mining output in recent years may not have been accompanied by a corresponding increase in employment.

The mainstays of the commercial economy are mineral production, cattle and karakul sheep ranching, and fishing. Ranching is chiefly in the hands of South West African whites of German or South African origin. Fishing from the ports of Lüderitz and Walvis Bay is carried on chiefly by South African fishing companies, and certification of crews is officially restricted to whites and Coloureds. About 50 percent of mining investment in the territory has derived from South African firms and about 50 percent from United States and other foreign investors. Although a share of mining profits is remitted abroad, mining contributes an estimated 50 percent of government revenue in the territory. In 1965 it was estimated that mining provided about 46.6 percent of the territory's gross domestic product. Agriculture contributed an estimated 16.8 percent; fishing, 3.2 percent; and all other sectors combined, 33.4 percent.

Except in the extreme north, most of the land suitable for farming or ranching has in the course of time been taken over by white settlers. The northernmost sector is more suited to rainfed cultivation than the south because of its higher average rainfall, but in recurrent drought years it becomes dependent upon imports of maize from South Africa. In the rest of the territory, water resources are more dependent upon modern technology. Cultivation is possible only where irrigation can be employed, and stockraising depends upon scarce springs or upon the sinking of boreholes, which often must go very deep.

Important parts of the territory are unsuited for stockraising, even with the assistance of technology. These areas bordering on the Namib and Kalahari deserts have been shunned by indigenous tribes as "thirstlands," in some cases, however, they will form part of the new tribal homelands proposed by the Odendaal Commission. This commission was appointed by the South African government, and its proposals, published in 1962 and 1963, have largely
been endorsed by the government. In the late 1960's surface water resources were best in the southern sector, but harnessing of the Kunene River in the 1970's is expected to improve irrigation resources in Ovamboland.

Subsistence cultivation is chiefly confined to the northern reserves, where its staple crops are millet, sorghum, maize, and peanuts. Cattle are extensively kept in Ovamboland but are relatively unproductive and of little commercial significance. In the rest of the territory, subsistence agriculture is largely associated with the herding of sheep and goats or with hunting and gathering.

In the southern sector cultivation is chiefly practiced by white farmers and a few Coloured farmers. There is also some mixed commercial farming of crops and livestock by whites around Tsumeb and Grootfontein in the north. In 1965, an exceptionally good year, about 16,000 two-hundred-pound bags of wheat were produced on white farms in the river valleys of the southern sector. The southern sector, however, is very heavily dependent upon imports of cereals from South Africa.

In the mid-1960's about 99 percent of the gross value of output of commercial agriculture in the territory consisted of livestock products. The relative importance of sales of cattle and of karakul pelts varies somewhat from year to year as a result of export price fluctuations and of the incidence of drought on grazing conditions for cattle. In 1965 the sale of beef cattle accounted for about 56 percent of the gross value of agricultural production and karakul pelts for about 31.6 percent. Dairy products accounted for only 4.6 percent.

Cattle are raised principally in the central highlands around Windhoek and Rehoboth and are largely exported to South Africa. In the rest of the southern sector, the grazing is suitable only for sheep and goats. Karakul sheep were introduced by the Germans before World War I, and by the 1960's the territory was the world's principal producer of karakul pelts. The pelts exported are from day-old lambs, so that the ewes have few young to support and can survive in relatively arid conditions. Karakul exports are chiefly priced on the London market, but cattle exports depend upon market conditions in South Africa. When the South African market for cattle is good, meat canneries in the territory suffer from the rise in costs; when the market is poor, the canneries help to take up the slack.

The conjunction of ocean currents off the territory's coastline causes cold bottom waters rich in nutrients to well up, attracting rich shoals of pilchard and other fish, which in turn attract trawlers and factory ships from South Africa and from leading fishing nations. In the late 1960's fishing operations had become so entwined with those of South Africa that it was difficult to distinguish between the two. Firms operating in the territory were
demanding protection from South African factory ships operating off the coastal waters.

To avoid overfishing of the territorial waters, South African authorities assign catch quotas to participants in the South West African as well as the South African fisheries. The principal products of the territory's fisheries in 1965 and 1966 were canned pilchards and fishmeal. Rock lobster (crayfish) products made up about 13 percent of the gross value, and only about half the rock lobster catch was exported as frozen tails. The value of the territory's fishing output was growing through the mid-1960's.

Exploitation of the territory's mineral resources has varied with the state of world demand. In 1968 its total mineral output was estimated at equivalent to about US$200 million, approximately 60 percent of which was from diamond mining. At the end of the 1960's production and export of diamonds, copper, and lead were the mainstays of the mining industry. It also produced manganese ore, zinc concentrate, tin concentrate, tin-tungsten concentrate, lead-vanadium concentrate, silver metal, cadmium, beryllium, molybdenite, tantalite-columbite, tin-wolfram, cesium, and bismuth. Uranium had been discovered.

The territory was the world's single largest source of germanium and the third largest producer of vanadium, after the United States and South Africa. It also produced and exported quantities of salt, amethyst, rose quartz, lithium minerals, feldspar, mica, and gypsum. The offshore islands were an important source of guano for fertilizer, and some phosphate was also produced.

The territory has two diamond areas, known as Sperrgebiete, to which entry is prohibited. Virtually the entire output of diamonds is produced by a De Beers-controlled company, Consolidated Diamond Mines of South West Africa. It exploits the Oranjemund diggings in the alluvial deposits of the southern Namib, near the mouth of the Orange River, which were discovered in 1908. It also has a diamond concession in the Kaokoveld, and its subsidiary, the Marine Diamond Corporation, mines the foreshore and the offshore diamond areas with mining barges that pump up silt from the seabed and screen it for gems. The offshore operations had not yet become profitable by 1968. The Getty Oil Company has a one-third interest in Consolidated's Diamond Area No. 2, north of Lüderitz.

After Consolidated Diamond Mines, the most important mining enterprise operating in the territory is the Tsumeb Corporation, an international consortium with majority ownership by the United States firms, Newmont Mining Corporation and American Metal Climax, Incorporated. At its Tsumeb and Kombat mines, the consortium is the largest lead producer in Africa and an important producer of copper, zinc, cadmium, and silver. Another important producer is South West Africa Company Limited (SWACO), owned
by Consolidated Gold Fields and Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa Limited. Its Berg Aukas mine produces zinc, lead, and vanadium, and another mine at Brandberg West produces tin-wolfram concentrate.

The Afrikaner mining group, Federale Mynbou, owns the Klein Aub copper mine about 60 miles southwest of Rehoboth. In 1968 it exported its output of about 6,000 tons of copper concentrate to Japan. South African government corporations operating in the territory include a subsidiary of South African Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCO) that operated the Rosh Pinar zinc and lead mine near the southern border, the Uis tin mine near Brandberg, and the Okuroso fluor spar deposit between Tsumeb and Walvis Bay. A West German firm has acquired majority interest in two lithium mines near Karibib, to produce for the Japanese market.

In 1967 the South African policy on new mining investment was extended to South West Africa in that new foreign investors were required to offer 50-percent participation to South African government or private interests. There was a boom in mineral exploration activity in the territory in the late 1960's. The South African subsidiary of Rio Tinto, a British firm, discovered a huge uranium deposit near Swakopmund, and vast new copper reserves were said to have been discovered by the Anglo-Transvaal Witvei, west of Gobabis. United States Steel Corporation has an initial 15-percent interest in the Anglo-Transvaal concession in the territory. New deposits of lead, zinc, and other minerals were discovered near Grootfontein in the north.

An international consortium having minimum 50-percent South African participation was given prospecting rights for five years to a 8,500-square-mile stretch from Rehoboth to Gobabis and the Botswana border. The consortium was committed to spend a minimum of US$350,000 a year on exploration and pay a fee of US$70,000 a year. Intensive exploration continued in several smaller concession areas by Kennecott Copper; the United States firm, Navarro Exploration Company; and other foreign interests.

Since 1968 petroleum exploration in the territory has been conducted under the auspices of Southern Oil Exploration Corporation, South West Africa, Limited (SWAKOR). Six offshore exploration concessions and two onshore concessions were granted to nine firms, including De Beers of South Africa; Shell Oil, British Petroleum, and several other British firms; Société Nationale des Petroles d'Aquitaine; Gulf Oil; and Chevron Oil. SWAKOR reserves the right of participation if discoveries are made.

Through the late 1960's government revenues from the territory exceeded expenditure. Expenditure on physical overhead capital, reallocation of land, education, and other categories had increased somewhat under the five-year separate development plan proposed
by the Odendaal Commission and adopted by the government in 1964. Plans for the 1970’s included development of the Kunene River project in partnership with Portuguese Angola to provide hydroelectric power for mines and towns, as well as some irrigation for Ovamboland.

LABOR

In the 1960 census 203,271 individuals, or 38.64 percent of the total population, were listed as economically active. A majority—124,575 persons, or 61.3 percent—of those economically active were in the southern sector. In that sector indigenous workers constituted 71.2 percent of the economically active population; Coloureds, 6.9 percent; and whites, 21.9 percent.

In the late 1960's labor was reported in short supply. Indigenous workers for the more economically developed southern sector were obtained from both the northern and southern sectors. Those from the northern part of the territory were secured on a contract basis by the South West African Native Labor Association (SWANLA), a quasi-government monopoly with headquarters in Grootfontein. It also recruited from Angola workers for the southern sector and for South Africa as well. Contracts were initially for one year, but could be extended. In 1966 about 40,000 workers in this category were employed in agriculture, mining, commerce and industry, public services, and domestic services in the southern zone.

Workers were also obtained locally in the southern sector from the Nama, Herero, and Berg-Dama ethnic groups. The male labor force from this source numbered between 25,000 and 30,000 in 1966. The indigenous labor force in the southern zone was beset by restrictions similar to those existing in South Africa. These included the requirement to have residence authorizations, valid work contract papers, and permits to look for employment. Master and servant laws and vagrancy regulations were likewise in force, as well as regulations dealing with the number of indigenous workers permitted in urban areas, surplus labor removal, and other matters (see ch. 22, Labor).

In 1966 agricultural workers secured under contract through SWANLA were paid minimum rates of R7.50 (1 rand equals US$1.40) a month at the start, if inexperienced. Periodic increases were given that raised the rate to R9.75 at the end of two years of service. Sheepherders started at R9, and their wages increased to R12. Free accommodation and meals were also furnished, plus a fixed amount covering travel and clothing expenses. Because of labor shortages, however, employers were reported to be paying more than the set minimum.

Contract labor in the mines in late 1966 was receiving an average monthly wage of R23.04. Skilled workers were paid an average of
R45.34 monthly; semiskilled workers an average of R23.07; and unskilled workers, R17.58. Mine workers also received free medical care, food, housing, clothing, and other needs, the estimated value of which was R15.25 per month.

The average monthly wage in manufacturing, construction, and the fishing industry was reported to be about R30 in 1966 for contract labor from the northern sector. The South African Railways and Harbors Administration paid indigenous labor a starting wage of R26 per month. At the end of five years this could rise to R39 monthly. In addition, there were fringe benefits, including subsidized meals and lodging, sickness benefits, and free travel for schoolchildren.

Trade unions and employer organizations existed for the white and Coloured sectors. The Wages and Industrial Conciliation Ordinance provided for their registration and regulation and for the settlement of disputes. The indigenous work force was not encompassed by these provisions. Trade unions of indigenous workers were not permitted to register, and strikes by these workers were illegal and punishable.

TRANSPORTATION

Transportation facilities serving the territory included a limited but expanding road network, an extension of the South African rail line, two seaports, and air service that offers local, interregional, and international flights. All transportation facilities are owned and operated by the South African government with the exception of the road network, for which the territory's administrative authorities are responsible.

In the late 1960's the rail system had a total of 1,453 miles of railway line, or approximately 11 percent of South African Railways' total route mileage. This service connected South Africa's Cape Province with Windhoek, Walvis Bay, the northern towns of Tsumeb and Grootfontein, and intermediate urban centers. All rail service was limited to areas within the Police Zone.

In this vast and sparsely inhabited land, roads serve as the principal source of transportation. In the late 1960's a road network of nearly 19,500 miles connected most inhabited areas. Main roads, generally following the rail line, totaled more than 2,000 miles; of these, about 800 miles were surfaced for all-weather use. The balance of the road network consisted of secondary and district roads, many of which were impassable in inclement weather. Road transport services including both passenger buses and freight transportation, are provided by the South African Railways and Harbors Administration. These connect most outlying regions with the territory's major urban centers.

Both passenger and freight air services between Windhoek and the
South African cities of Johannesburg and Cape Town are provided by daily flights of South African Airways (SAA). The same airline offers weekly international flights between Johannesburg and Europe that stop en route at Windhoek. Local service is provided by the territory’s own South West Airways. The territory has nine principal airfields, twelve secondary airfields, and twenty landing strips. Among the principal installations, three are capable of accepting large jet aircraft, including the modern airport at Walvis Bay. A program of airfield construction projects an eventual increase in facilities that will provide landing strips at all hospitals and clinics in the nonwhite homelands; all administrative centers and major towns will have either airstrips or airports.

Apart from the Walvis Pay seaport, the only harbor in the territory is located at Lüderitz. It is so shallow, however, that all loading and unloading operations must be performed by lighters. Dredging operations in the late 1960’s were underway to improve the ability of larger fighting vessels to use the Lüderitz facility. None of the territory’s rivers were navigable except for short distances during periods of heavy seasonal rainfall.
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Appendix—South West Africa

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GLOSSARY

Afrikaans—Locally developed dialect of seventeenth-century Dutch; mother tongue of Afrikaners (q.v.); one of two official national languages of South Africa.

Afrikaner—White descendant of early Dutch and assimilated French Huguenot settlers; term in earliest use at end of seventeenth century to distinguish settlers from Dutch officials on temporary duty, but most widely used since World War I.

ANC—African National Congress; major African nationalist political organization until banned in 1960 along with its president, Nobel Peace Prize winner Albert Luthuli.

apartheid—Literally, separation; refers variously to: (1) ruling Nationalist Party’s doctrine that the races should be geographically and socially separated to maximum feasible extent and (2) structure of policy and law resulting in racial segregation and white domination; doctrine was called separate development in 1960’s and multinational development in early 1970.

ARMSCOR—Armaments Development and Production Corporation; state-owned corporation responsible for satisfying national defense equipment needs; established by Armaments Development and Production Act No. 57 of 1968.

Asian—A person chiefly of Indian ethnic origin, although the term is also applied to others of South and East Asian ancestry; official South African term is Asiatic, considered somewhat pejorative by those of Asian background.

baasskap—Afrikaans word meaning literally “white man’s rule”; generally accepted sociopolitical doctrine of white supremacy in South Africa.

Bantu—General term for languages spoken by black Africans in areas south of equator; officially used by South African government to describe all black persons, who regard usage as pejorative and inaccurate and prefer term African.

Bantustan—Term applied to sociopolitical experiment in government’s policy of separate development (q.v.) in which persons of common ethnic origin are placed in national units and given opportunity to develop as self-governing entity; as of 1970, the sole Bantustan in the Republic, Transkei, operates under white supervision.
Bastards—Historic term for persons of mixed Boer (q.v.) and Khoikhoi (Hottentot—q.v.) descent; still in use as “Baster” by those living in Rehoboth area of Namibia (q.v.); government categorizes these people as Coloureds (q.v.).

black spot—Term applied by government to land outside reserves (q.v.) owned by Africans who acquired property before 1936 parliamentary prohibition; because these plots are within white areas (q.v.), Africans are required to dispose of them.

Boer—Literally, farmer; term for most white South African settlers of Dutch and French Huguenot origin; used until term Afrikaner (q.v.) came into general use.

border areas—Government-designated regions contiguous to borders of African reserves; so sited that African workers can live in reserve townships and be employed in white-owned and -developed border industries (q.v.).

border industries—White-owned industrial concerns located within government-designated border areas (q.v.); a basic feature of government concept of separate development (q.v.).

BOSS—Bureau of State Security; suprapolice agency established in 1969 responsible for all matters of internal security, including military intelligence; eventually, will supplant Security Branch of South African Police (SAP).

Broederbond—Literally, brotherhood; semisecret Afrikaner (q.v.) political organization; established in 1918; aim is national economic, cultural, and political control.

bywoner—Afrikaans term meaning tenant farmer; generally applied to persons who in English would be termed “squatters.”

Cape Malay—Category of Coloureds (q.v.) distinguished by slightly larger Malay biological component and characterized by adherence to Islam.

Coloured—Generally accepted, official designation of persons of mixed racial origin; usually European and Hottentot (q.v.), sometimes Asian (q.v.) and African.

commando—From the Afrikaans kommando; the citizen-soldier militia; first organized during Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902 and applied to Boers (q.v.) who operated as vigilantes; South African Defense Force (SADF) retains similar part-time paramilitary groups.

Coolie—Term often used by white South Africans to designate Asians (q.v.); highly pejorative because it connotes slave origins.

dagga—African herb similar to marijuana and smoked like tobacco.

endorse out—Procedure under influx control laws whereby Africans deemed surplus to labor needs can be removed from prescribed areas (q.v.) and returned to the reserves (q.v.).

European—Standard term applied to whites, regardless of their country of origin.
Executive Council—National governmental cabinet; consists of prime minister and eighteen departmental ministers.

Group areas—Official term for sectors of cities, towns, and villages designated for occupation by specified ethnic groups; established by Parliament through Group Areas Act No. 41 of 1950 and subsequent amendments.

High commission territories—Term applied in 1906 to British-controlled areas of Basutoland (Lesotho), Bechuanaland (Botswana), and Swaziland; collective term used until territories' emergence as independent states.

Homelands—Specifically designated land reserved for African settlement; variations of term include use of prefixes Native, Bantu, and African; generally interchangeable with term reserves (q.v.).

Hottentot—Term usually applied by fifteenth-century European sailors and explorers to African ethnic group living in Cape of Good Hope area; sometimes considered pejorative; correct ethnic designation is Khoikhoi.

ISCOR—South African Iron and Steel Corporation; controlled and largely owned by the state.

Jatis—Indian occupational castes.

Kaffir—Term derived from Arabic word meaning “heathen”; often used by whites to designate black person; term is highly pejorative, and Africans resent its use.

Kommando—See commando.

Kraal—Traditional residential area for an African family; livestock may also be kept within it.

Kwashiorkor—Severe malnutrition in infants and children caused by diet excessively high in carbohydrates and extremely low in proteins.

Laager—Term descriptive of historic pioneer defense tactic of forming a circle with ox carts when attacked; often used by contemporary critics to refer to Afrikaner (q.v.) defensiveness and isolation.

Lobolo—Traditional African bridewealth, usually in form of livestock, paid by bridegroom to bride's family as mark of respect and compensation for family's loss of girl.

Locations—Special areas set aside by the government on the outskirts of all cities and towns for occupation by Africans; represents popular usage; official term is group areas (q.v.).

Malay—See Cape Malay.

Morgen—South African land measure; 1 morgen equals 2.11654 acres.

Multinational development—See apartheid.

Namibia—Name given to South West Africa by United Nations General Assembly in 1968, after creation of eleven-nation council authorized to administer area as trust territory; South Africa refused to recognize United Nations action.
Nationalist—Member of Nationalist Party, ruling political organization generally composed of Afrikaners (q.v.).

Native—Term used by many white persons to designate country’s black inhabitants; although not as insulting as Kaffir (q.v.), term has historic derogatory connotation and is resented by many Africans; government has come gradually to adopt use of term Bantu (q.v.).


PAC—Pan-Africanist Congress; African nationalist political organization formed by group favoring greater militancy and racial assertiveness than ANC (q.v.), from which it separated in 1959; outlawed along with ANC by government after Sharpeville (q.v.) incident in 1960.

Pass laws—Popular usage for regulations consolidated by Natives (Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents) Act of 1952; serve as system of influx and labor control of Africans within areas designated for white occupation.

Poqo—Secret group within African nationalist PAC (q.v.); established in 1962 to carry out program of sabotage and terrorism in South Africa.

Prescribed areas—Those geographic areas prescribed by the government for occupation solely by white persons; virtually synonymous with white areas (q.v.); under pass laws (q.v.), Africans and other nonwhites permitted in prescribed areas if authorized as registered jobholders.

Rand—National currency; 1 rand equals US$1.40; divided into 100 South African cents.

Rand—Local contraction of Witwatersrand (q.v.).

Reef—Popular local term for gold-bearing reef of the Witwatersrand (q.v.) and, by derivation, for entire mining area of southern Transvaal.

Reference book—Comprehensive identification document required of all Africans from age sixteen; established by so-called pass laws (q.v.) of 1952; includes identity card, personal history, employment record, work permit, and tax payment record; must be carried on person at all times and surrendered for examination on demand of police or other authority.

Reserves—Land reserved by government for nonwhite settlement; most are designated for separated occupation by eight African ethnic groups; term generally interchangeable with homelands (q.v.); a few are designated for occupation by limited number of Coloureds (q.v.).

Rondavel—Traditional African round hut with conical roof; often referred to as “beehive” hut because of shape.

SAA—South African Airways; state-owned national airline.
SABC—South African Broadcasting Corporation; state owned and operated.
SAP—South African Police.
Satour—South African Tourist Corporation; state owned.
separate development—See apartheid.
Sestigers—Literally, men of the sixties; term applied to school of younger Afrikaner (q.v.) novelists and poets whose writings in the 1960s were critical of traditional Afrikaner social and cultural attitudes.
Sharpeville—African township twenty-three miles south of Johannesburg, where on March 21, 1960, during nonviolent African campaign against pass laws (q.v.), South African Police (SAP) fired on large crowd of Africans, killing 67 and wounding 186; African workers launched strikes; government proclaimed state of national emergency; Parliament outlawed PAC (q.v.) and ANC (q.v.); after Sharpeville incident, African nationalists abandoned nonviolent tactics and adopted policy of direct action.
skollie—Coloured (q.v.) version of the African tsotsi (q.v.).
Springbok—Symbolic name implying South African nationalism; derived from local specie of gazelle that is incorporated in official national emblem; term is applied to members of sports teams, armed forces, government radio service, express flights by South African Airways (SAA); also name of town in northwestern Cape Province, the capital of Namaqualand.
SWAPO—South West Africa People’s Organization; African nationalist political group; basic aim is elimination of South African control over Namibia (q.v.); organization is self-exiled to avoid prosecution under Terrorism Act of 1967.
Trekboer—Nomadic herder of Dutch origin.
tsotsi—Young urban Africans, often organized in gangs and participating in criminal activity; generally regarded by South African Police (SAP) as criminals.
uitlander—Afrikaans (q.v.) word for foreigner; often used pejoratively by Afrikaners (q.v.) in referring to white English speakers.
Umkonto We-Sizwe—Zulu term meaning Spear of the Nation; African terrorist organization with ANC (q.v.); secret membership engages in sabotage activities within South Africa.
veld—Literally, a grassy plain; generally used to describe all open country.
veld food—Various species of wild plants, insects, game, and fish that play a decisive role in the diet of nomadic Bushmen.
verkramptes—Literally, the cramped ones; those Afrikaners (q.v.) who insist on continued Afrikaner isolation or exclusiveness in political, religious, educational, and other matters; contrasted with the verligtes (q.v.).
verligtes—Literally, the enlightened ones; those Afrikaners (q.v.) willing to make limited adaptations in political and other matters while retaining basic concept of white domination; contrasted with verkramptes (q.v.).

Voortrekker—Afrikaans (q.v.) for pioneer; used by Afrikaners (q.v.) to refer to ancestral Boers (q.v.) who participated in Great Trek of nineteenth century.

white areas—Government-designated geographic areas limited to permanent occupation by white persons.

Witwatersrand—Literally, “Ridge of White Waters” in Afrikaans (q.v.); name applied to country’s richest and most extensive mining region in southern Transvaal; known chiefly for gold but also producing various other minerals.
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