By using this holistic approach the author believes that men will be able to construct a view of the development of man that synthesizes many existing separate human science approaches. The purposes of this conference paper are fourfold: 1) to give an example of how to begin to reformulate current intellectual interests in terms of a humanistic scheme by using developmental psychology; 2) to contribute to one train of educational thought which emphasizes self-development, the affective domain, and new images of man; 3) to construct a holistic framework for understanding man, by closely interweaving the separate views of human life; and, 4) to humanistically ask what sort of cultures result in what sorts of children and what sorts of society do these children form when they mature. (Author/WWW)
BEGINNING A HUMANISTIC NORMAL SCIENCE:

DEVELOPING THOUGHTS ON DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT

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As I look through our program for these Wurzburg meetings, I remember the story of the blind men and the elephant. Each man felt a different part of the beast -- a leg, the trunk, a tusk, and so forth -- and, consequently each described an elephant as a very different sort of animal. But when the partial descriptions were put together, the image of a magnificent pachyderm emerged.

THIS MOMENT IN HUMANISTIC CONCEPTUAL HISTORY

Something very exciting is going on in the world, something similar to what the blind men did. This conference is part of it. Here too we are collecting, combining, and refining partial images. From our papers another image of a magnificent being is emerging. We are creating the image of healthy, self-actualizing, multi-potentialled man. And when the image changes, all else changes. This theme runs throughout the new psychological humanism.

From his psychological orientation, Abraham Maslow called this emerging image "a new zeitgeist" (1). From within the human potential movement Willis W. Harman compares our new image of mankind to the reconceptualization of man that occurred with the Darwinian and Copernican revolutions by calling this "The New Copernican Revolution" (2). From a theological bent Michael Novak calls for a new theology (3,4).
These three, and others, all point to a switch in image, theory, and conceptualization that marks a scientific revolution, what Thomas Kuhn calls a new "paradigm" (5). Each of us here at Wurzburg, and others who aren't here, are fellow collaborators on this paradigm of man. In our own ways, we are all helping to enlarge, build, create, and revise this new and still growing paradigm of humanity. We may, in fact, be building a multi-paradigmmed image, and/or a constantly changing group of paradigms. I will use the singular, but the plural may be more accurate.

When a new paradigm bursts against the scientific sky, it signals a trend of scientific activity to follow. This new "normal science" consists of reinterpreting existing studies, reformulating old questions, asking new ones, and embarking on new studies and research. At this moment in the humanistic social sciences, we have done a fair amount of work on our paradigm (although more is to be done), and we are, in my opinion, ready to embark on a new normal science. This paper is one step on the journey to a humanistic normal science.

**Purposes of this paper**

My purposes in this paper are fourfold. First, I want to give an example of how we can begin to reformulate current intellectual interests in terms of part of our emerging humanistic paradigm. This paper selects developmental psychology to exemplify one way we might start making our normal science to complement that paradigm and to help in its construction and refinement.

Second, I feel that developmental psychology is itself especially relevant to humanistic concerns. As people who want to increase our human potentials for brotherhood, cooperation, peace, and social and self fulfillment, we naturally ask, "How do we encourage these qualities in ourselves and in our
society? How do children become fully human, in the best senses of the word human? How can we help them and ourselves?" A new image of man reformulates these questions and suggests new answers. There are many partial answers to these questions. One set of them concerns the education of the young. In this paper I hope to contribute to one train of educational thought. This train, which emphasizes self-development, the affective domain, and new images of man, is already rolling along humanistic lines at high speed (6,7).

My third intent in this paper is inspired by the trait of holism that our new paradigm contains. If we are to have a holistic understanding of man, we assume that what we formerly thought of as separate sections of human life are instead closely interwoven with each other. Our paradigm and its normal science must allow us to connect the parts of human life with each other. This paper on the psychological development of each person and its companion piece on the development of whole cultures are together an attempt to reduce intellectual fragmentation. We will look at the individual microcosm and the cultural macrocosm from one conceptual perspective.

Whether one thinks of this desire for holism as a general systems approach (e.g. 8 or 9), as an attempt to practice Piaget's "reflective abstraction" (10), as a period of synthesis in social theory (11), or as a broader paradigm (5), the desire to build more inclusive conceptual structures and the desire to combine the human sciences express this holistic bent. I think we are on the verge of this fusion in several intellectual fields (32).

Fourth, one of the characteristics of some humanistic approaches to mankind is the idea of synergy. This is the idea that a healthy person and a healthy society are reciprocally beneficial (12). What sort of cultures result in what sorts of children? What sorts of society do these children form when they
mature? I hope this paper and its companion piece will begin to recast these questions in terms of our humanistic paradigm.

Organization of this paper

I have pointed out that humanistic thought stands ready to start developing a normal science. In the next section I briefly summarize a theoretical approach I've found useful for thinking about human development from infancy to adulthood. I'll use this theory to outline a general line of normal, healthy development. Westheimer is using this approach to study psychopathological development (13). Then I'll show how we can use this wider approach to development to study one topic, moral development.

A THEORY OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

The theory I've found useful is an adaptation of Abraham H. Maslow's theory of motivation (14). It is my opinion that as a child grows older he tends to pass through a chain of stages. At each period of transition the child and his world become transformed. I have called these stages types of consciousness. This is consciousness in a social-developmental sense and should not be confused with consciousness as in physiological altered states of consciousness (33). How a child's personal history, his family, and social interactions may help or retard this passage from one consciousness to another provide a series of new questions for humanistic developmental psychologists.

Maslow's types of motivation and my adaptations of them are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MASLOW</th>
<th>TYPES OF CONSCIOUSNESS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>physiological</td>
<td>survival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>safety</td>
<td>stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>love</td>
<td>sociability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>esteem</td>
<td>expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>self-actualization</td>
<td>self</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I have used broader categories in order to include more human action within this theoretical framework. (For details see 7 and 32). Adapting Erikson's epigenetic chart, we come to a matrix of usual, healthy human development (15).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>self</th>
<th>expertise</th>
<th>sociability</th>
<th>stability</th>
<th>survival</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>age</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>8-9</td>
<td>16-17</td>
<td>20's --?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>infancy</td>
<td>childhood</td>
<td>adolescence</td>
<td>young adult</td>
<td>healthy maturity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Survival stage -- infancy**

From birth through infancy a child's main "work" is learning to control his own body. Of course one continues to learn to use one's sensory-motor apparatus throughout life, but it is the main concern of infancy. Maslow's "physiological" fits this stage well.

**Stability stage -- childhood**

The stability stage is marked by learning the rules and mores of one's family and society. A child learns what his roles are and what others' are. He learns what he is allowed to do and not allowed to do. Characteristics of stability consciousness are seeing society as given, a set structure which does not change. Childhood manifestations of stability consciousness are the childhood rituals, for example bedtime rituals, a security blanket, the desire for an orderly and predictable world, fixidity in game rules, and so forth.

One of the most important tasks of the stability world is learning one's
Language. Language is, for one thing, a set of rules for conceptualizing, categorizing experience, naming things, and forming certain sorts of relationships among them. This structures a person's world, and the desire for form and structure is primarily a stability trait.

Sociability stage -- adolescence

As late childhood ripens into adolescence, a person's conceptual, emotional, and social development become rearranged away from a given set of rules and forms and towards an other-directed world. Instead of a world that is set, formalized, and predetermined, the adolescent discovers a world of social convention, social contract, and mutual agreement. People outside the family take on a new and stronger significance. This is clearest in the well-known peer orientation of adolescence. Parents, teachers, and siblings become less significant. An adolescent typically desires popularity.

James Coleman in his study The Adolescent Society (16) reports that typical American high school students want to be popular, leaders in activities, and/or athletes. Within a teenage subculture, he says, these all are forms of social recognition. Coleman, however, laments this preference for sociability values and wishes that adolescents wanted to be more intellectual, or brilliant students academically. Coleman's preference for intellectuality is understandable when we remember that he is speaking from an expertise value system that emphasizes knowledge and specialization one's field. Although his position is understandable, my evaluation is opposite. Just as the "work" of infancy is learning to use and control one's body, the tasks of adolescence are, in my opinion, to develop one's relationships with others. Otherwise this need may remain unfilled and interfere with one's further development. Perhaps one origin of the other-directed society in the U.S. (17) is a school system that tries to make
adolescents into experts before they are ready for it. Perhaps instead of teaching Johnny to think like a teenage mathematician or like a teenage historian, we should teach him to think like a teenage teenager. Then when he gets to be an adult, he won't continue to be an adolescent adult.

**Expertise stage -- young adulthood**

Late in secondary school, in higher education, or on-the-job we expect youths to become proficient in their future occupations. Young adulthood in our society (I mean in the advanced industrialized nations for the most part) is predominantly an expertise society, the "technological society" as Jacques Ellul calls it (18). Most people (mistakenly) think of adulthood in terms of taking one's place in the vocational structure and becoming proficient in one's occupation. This is the way things are now; however, I think they are changing. Part of the new image that humanistic social scientists are building is a new idea of healthy maturity. Freud's definition of health as love and work, may be all right for societies in a sociability and/or expertise stage, but for us it is incomplete. The new definition and ways to complete it are part of what we are working on at this conference. Shall we add something to working and loving? These two are helpful, but not enough.

**Self stage -- maturity re-envisioned**

I'd like to add "self-fulfillment" or "self-actualization" to work and love. And I am including the goals and activities of transpersonal health too (19). Although, there may be reason to believe that transpersonalism is actually a sixth stage or state of consciousness. Maslow says that self-actualizing people tend to be middle-aged or older adults (20). The few who make it beyond expertise in our technological society are exceptions. Suppose we were to recognize the goals of self-actualization as the ultimate priority
for our culture. How could we build a culture which would make it possible for more people to become self-actualizing?

When we switch this image of man and society, our view of social institutions, such as education, changes too. Many people now see a good education as one that prepares students for success in our technological society. As we evolve into a self society, however, these institutions may lag behind society and seem to be dehumanizing our youth. Our current schools aid children as far as expertise development, but interfere with their self-fulfillment as human beings, (6,7).

In this section I outlined some characteristics of what I estimate will be the developmental aspect of our humanistic paradigm of man, and I've tried to show that developmental psychology is one site on which to build a new normal science based on that paradigm. This was the first purpose of this paper, and this approach is beginning to be followed. Westheimer's work on the development of psychopathologies suggests that conditions which lie above the diagonal of normal, healthy growth are adaptive, encouraging, or beneficial to healthy development. Those that fall below the diagonal are maladaptive, retarding, or deleterious, (13).

The second purpose of this paper was to breed a hybrid from developmental psychology and humanistic psychology. I hope I've pointed out some possibilities to you so that we can get a full-fledged humanistic developmental psychology started. If so, perhaps we can influence child-rearing and education.

So far I've found that when we view human development by this overall scheme, many previously unconnected bits of information assume new and meaningful
relationships with each other under the organization of an encompassing theory. For example, in this paper I've connected the learning of language with stability-childhood and have connected peer orientation with sociability-adolescence. Thus language and the adolescent peer orientation become related to each other within this theory. Here, at least, is one step toward holism, the third purpose of this paper.

How can we increase the synergy between an individual and his society? When this question is applied to developmental psychology, it becomes, "How can we help each child develop fully in each stage and progress on to the next stage?" I certainly don't have the answers, but I hope we are beginning to ask some of the right questions. And that is another function of a new paradigm and its normal science.

MORAL DEVELOPMENT

The general humanistic theory of types of consciousness gives us an approach to overall development. We can use this approach to reinterpret some topics within developmental psychology. I think this approach is equally applicable to socialization, language development, types of parental discipline, some aspects of applied reinforcement theory, ethnic and social class differences in socialization, and other topics (7,32).

In this section I concentrate on moral development. This topic is especially interesting because the metamorphosis our society is going through seems to be in large part a value-shift. Moral development, especially among youth, shows this overlay of an additional set of values — the self values (6).

Stability to sociability — Piaget

Piaget believes that moral development in children is predominantly a switch from unquestioned acceptance of adult authority to concern with equality
and a sense of autonomous justice. In the early stage of moral development, children show what is, in humanistic interpretation, a stability orientation to the sense of justice. Piaget calls this a "heteronomous" attitude, and this consists of the following stability attitudes as opposed to the "autonomous" attitudes, which are more characteristic of sociability and the upper end of the humanistic continuum (22). In the ten comparisons below, we see that the younger stage is characterized by an authoritarian orientation, while the older stage is characterized by an awareness of other people.

To point out one possible relationship with studies of social class, it is interesting to note that Cohen and Hodges note this same difference between the lower blue-collar class and the lower middle-class. Middle-class people are required by their socialization and their occupations to consider themselves in the position of other people. This may be one of the origins of middle class sociability, (24, 25).

Kohlberg reports that some of these transitions are found and that others are not found. Most important for this theory, however, "Piaget is correct in assuming a culturally universal age development of a sense of justice, involving progressive concern for the needs and feelings of others," (23, p. 489). Piaget notes the following ten differences:

1. conformity to rules rather than to intent
2. unchangeability of rules rather than flexibility
3. absolutism of value rather than relativism
4. moral wrongness defined by sanctions rather than made independently of sanctions
5. duty as obedience to authority rather than conformity to peers

(21, 22, 23)
6. ignorance of reciprocal obligations rather than contract and exchange
7. severe, painful punishment rather than restoration to victim
8. culprit injured by natural consequences of misdeed rather than nature and physical laws being morally neutral
9. punishment by authority rather than retaliation by victim
10. favoritism of authority in distributing goods rather than impartiality, equality, and distributive justice

With increased interaction with other children (sociability) as a child grows older, the stability orientation is replaced by one of interpersonal reciprocity, equality, and justice. This transition, Piaget reports, usually occurs from ages 8 to 10.

An example he gives is children's reactions to a story in which a scoutmaster tells a boy who has already done his chore for the day to do an additional one. Do children think that the request was just and that it should be obeyed? These are the results Piaget reports (21, p. 278):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Obedience (Stability)</th>
<th>Equality (Sociability)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>66.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
<td>83.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of the humanistic theory we see Piaget documenting the transition from
a stability stage to a sociability stage.

Sociability to expertise and self

Piaget reports that one of his investigators discovered a third step. In this story a mother gives her children a roll to eat. The youngest drops his into a river. What do the children who hear the story think should be done? The investigators interpreted not giving him a roll as punishment. Giving him a roll because everyone should have a roll was interpreted as equality. And giving him a roll because he was small was called equity; it allowed for his special circumstance as different from the older children. This is what the investigator, Mlle Rambert, found (21, pp. 268-269):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Punishment (Stability)</th>
<th>Equality (Sociability)</th>
<th>Equity (Self)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6-9</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-12</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-14</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Equity is interpreted as associated with self, because it suggests that individual circumstances and differences are important in deciding what should be done rather than strict rule enforcement or equality which is based on blindness to individual differences.

Kohlberg presents 3 major stages of moral development with 2 substages in each (23, 26). In the pre-moral or pre-conventional stage (survival) a person is out to get whatever he can for himself regardless of others. In the conventional stage (stability and sociability) he is very rule conscious and internalizes the rules of his society. In the principled stage (possibly expertise and probably self) he is more interested in the values that the rules are made to promulgate. If existing rules do not lead to the achievement of the values, they should be changed and/or not followed.

The first of the pre-moral substages is an obedience-punishment orientation.
"Whatever I can get away with is right." Kohlberg's second premoral stage is naive instrumental hedonism (23) or instrumental relativism (26). In this substage a right action still satisfies one's own needs and occasionally others'. Here one conforms to obtain rewards and to have favors done in return. There still is no idea of rules being right or good themselves or as expressing a social contract or a set of abstract values.

In the conventional stage the humanistic theory and Kohlberg's observations diverge. This may be due to problems of transposing Kohlberg's descriptions into humanistic terminology. Kohlberg's first stage under conventional morality is "personal concordance." In this stage a person wants to maintain the approval of others by fitting a "good-boy" or "good-girl" image. Conformity to majority stereotypes and judgment by intentions suggests more of an other-directed sociability approach than a stability approach. The second premoral stage is the authority maintaining stage, or the "law and order" stage. Here one follows the rules to avoid censure by legitimate authorities. Interest in the earned regard for others' expectations suggests sociability, but "authority and social-order maintaining...doing duty and showing respect for authority" suggest stability. In terms of the humanistic differences between stability-authority, which is based on rules, eternal truth, power, compliance, and orderliness, and sociability-authority, which is based on democratically derived laws, social consensus, and conformity to the majority, Kohlberg's third and fourth stages are mixtures of stability and sociability.

The first part of the principled orientation also shows sociability characteristics, but with some expertise mixed in. This stage is the social contract stage. Here democratically accepted law is the basis for moral judgments. People recognize that many laws are social conventions and can be changed by group
agreement. Moral judgments may be made from the point of view of an impartial judge who has the welfare of the community in mind. This democratic basis of laws certainly indicates sociability.

The impartial judge may be considered an expert in community welfare and majority rule. The avoidance of interfering with the will or rights of others may mark the beginning of self, seeing importance in individuals and in individuation. This may be a forerunner of the self point of view. The last stage is one of individual principles. This is a self orientation. It is the "morality of individual principles of conscience." Universal values and principles of justice beyond written law overriding majority will, and transcending social convention indicate one of Maslow's "being values" (20).

**Radical morality**

Beyond merely trying to organize concepts and observations that have to do with moral punishment, the humanistic approach sheds some light on one kind of student activism. The Haan, Smith, and Block study (26) investigated the backgrounds of students arrested in the Free Speech Movement in Berkeley, California in 1964 and at San Francisco State College. They found that 88% of the nonprotestors were premoral or conventional; while among protesters 56% were post-conventional.
I mentioned earlier that part of our cultural metamorphosis might be best understood as a value-shift. The fact that only 12% of the nonprotestors were in the post-conventional stage and 56% of the protestors were in the post-conventional stage suggests that part of the generation gap is also a gap in a sense of morality. Within this humanistic theory we can think of it as the emergence of a new kind of consciousness.

In Milgrim's experiments he requested his subjects to shock a confederate for mistakes in learning even when the confederate reported the shocks were painful, that he wanted to leave, that he had a bad heart, and even after he stopped responding (feigning death?), (28). Kohlberg found that only 13% of the combined conventional and preconventional (survival through expertise?) subjects stopped the administration of shocks. But among the people in the
personal principled stage (self) 75% refused to administer the shocks, (29).

While some people interpret the "new morality" as an attack on middle-class, conventional morals, (30), they might more accurately see the "new morality" as post-conventional, or self morality, (31). Weirsma reports that self values form an important part of the value orientations in American communes, (35).

If our society is moving toward the self end of the humanistic continuum, then social planners, parents, educators, and lawmakers might want to take the values and behaviors of the self system into account in their decision-making.

In this section I have tried to show that using the humanistic conceptual framework derived from Maslow's theory of motivation helps us to understand some observations about moral development and to put them into a wider theoretical framework.

SUMMARY

I don't believe we are limited just to moral development, but a whole, integrated theory of child development may be derived from this approach. When we look at differences among groups, differences in consciousness show not only in moral development, but also in practices in socialization, the use of language, parental discipline, and dependency. When using this approach, it is important to realize that the means of categorizing we have used until now may have to be reformulated. Dichotomies may be best replaced by tri-, quad-, or quin-chotomies. "Authority" and "dependency," for example, have one meaning when talking about survival, a second for stability, another for sociability, a fourth for expertise, and a fifth for self. As a person grows older, how do the various sorts of dependencies change? If we look at someone at one moment in time, we can ask, "How is he successful/unsuccessful at meeting the different dimensions of dependency?"
When we wish to use the humanistic paradigm I've suggested here, we should ask ourselves, "How does the topic or behavior we are investigating differ from consciousness to consciousness?"

There is much to do using this approach—the reinterpretation of present studies, reasking old questions, asking new questions, and reformulating and reinvestigating the topics that interest us. By using this holistic approach, however, I think we may be able to construct a view of man that synthesizes our many separate approaches. It is time to make a start on a humanistic normal science.
CITED REFERENCES


9. See various works of Ludwig von Bertalanffy.


