This study was an attempt to determine whether, and to what extent: 1) there is disagreement about the nature and function of values and valuing among educators, and between social science educators and certain axiologists; 2) social science educators endorse valuation theories which are internally inconsistent or antithetical to the purposes of inquiry; and, 3) social studies curricula incorporate valuation theories, models, or strategies which are axiologically unsound. Thematic classification was of value theory performed on the periodical and book literature which reflects and influences the thinking and practices of social science educators. The themes were contrasted to one another and to the views of the axiologists. New social studies curriculum materials were then examined for evidence of valuation theories which are internally inconsistent with the views of the axiologists, or antithetical to the fundamental purposes of inquiry. The findings indicate significant and extensive disagreement between the various groups studied, and a generally unsound axiology within the materials analyzed. It is concluded that education is beset with a plague of misconceptions, contradictions, inconsistencies, ambiguities, and myths about valuing. (Author/DJB)
An Analysis of Valuation Strategies in Social Science Education Materials

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My interest in the subject of this study originated in 1965 when, as a high school social studies teacher, I observed that my students had difficulty sustaining and extending analyses in classroom discussions. Their attempts at analysis suffered most when the topic of discussion threatened, or had the potential for threatening, their belief and/or value systems. The breakdowns in the analyses could usually be anticipated; they were normally preceded by student comments like "that's just a value judgment," or "that's just your opinion," or "this is a democracy, and I have a right to believe what I want."

My attempts to solve this problem were originally organized around this question: How can students be taught to extend analysis beyond the point at which it is customary to conclude that the problem is "just a matter of values"? Or is it true that analysis cannot be extended beyond that point?

Initial inquiries into this question led me to the tentative conclusions that (1) there is limited consensus among social science educators about the nature and function of values and valuing, and (2) that a certain well established group of axiologists are in sharp disagreement with most social science educators regarding the nature and function of values and valuing. Many social science educators seem to be saying that matters of value are not matters of fact; that values cannot be inspected for factual, empirical, or other kinds of validity; that it cannot be said that a given value is either warrantable or unwarrantable; that value judgments rest, at least
ultimately, on untestable assumptions; that values are formed, and properly so, in the affect, rather than the intellect; that values have as much, if not more, to do with feelings than with thinking; that values are only relatively valid; that values are arrived at subjectively.

A number of well-known, highly respected axiologists seem to be saying just the opposite: that matters of value, excluding certain aspects of aesthetics, are matters of fact; that values, including moral, ethical values, can be inspected for empirical/logical validity; that under certain conditions it can be said of a given value that it is warrantable or unwarrantable; that all values do not, by their nature, rest on untestable assumptions; that value formation is properly an intellectual, rather than emotional, matter.

The realization that social science educators and certain axiologists were not in accord increased my interest in the matter, and a number of general questions began to take shape in my mind:

1. What do social science educators mean when they use the word "values" or "value judgment"?
2. What do social science educators propose regarding the teaching of values?
3. What do social science educators propose regarding the learning of values?
4. What are the implications of each position (social science education and axiology) for inquiry?

Preliminary inquiry into these questions produced a number of new, more specific questions, some tentative answers, and the base for this thesis.
Chapter I: INTRODUCTION

Objectives of this study

The general purpose of this study is to examine valuation theories in social science education. Specifically, this study is undertaken to determine:

1. The nature and extent of disagreement among social science educators about the nature and function of values, value judgments and valuing.
2. The nature and extent of the disagreement (if there is any) between social science educators and an established group of axiologists regarding the nature and function of values, value judgments and valuing.
3. The extent to which social science education theorists and curriculum developers endorse valuation theories which are (a) internally inconsistent, or (b) are antithetical to the purposes of inquiry.
4. The extent to which new social studies curricula incorporate valuation theories which are axiologically unsound.

Procedures

1. Identification of Data Sources. The data for this study will consist of three types and will be drawn from as many sources:

   (a) The Marin Social Studies Project has compiled a "New Social Studies Bibliography" which contains some 100 entries of prominent contributions to social science education literature. All the books in this bibliography, which was compiled by G. Sidney Lester, were
examined for references to values, value judgments, valuation theories, etc. In addition, a list of periodical articles on valuing has been compiled. The list includes all the periodical publications on values and valuing listed in the Education Index from 1955 through 1969.

(b) The curriculum materials examined in this study were selected from those listed in the Marin Social Studies Project "Directory of Research and Curriculum Development Projects in Social Science Education."

(c) The third source of data for this study is the writings of a group of well-respected axiologists, representative principals of which are Scriven, Lewis, Blackham, Moore, and Toulmin.

2. Data Collection. The data collected for this study were drawn from the three sources listed under (1) above. The data consist of (a) definitions and descriptions of values and valuing which appear in social science education literature and in the writings of the axiologists selected for this study, and (b) representative manifestations of value theories in recently developed social science curriculum materials.

3. Data Analysis.

(a) The descriptions of valuing, valuation theories, and proposed strategies for dealing with values found in social science education literature were examined for purposes of deriving a classification scheme by which
the nature and extent of the disagreement (see \#1 under Objectives of this study) among social science educators may be revealed.

(b) The points of view represented by the classifications were contrasted to the valuation theory of the axiologists selected for this study.

(c) The salient differences uncovered in Step (b) were examined in terms of the purposes of inquiry. The study was an attempt to determine whether, and if so, to what extent the purposes of inquiry might be served better by the valuation theories of the selected axiologists than by the valuation theories commonly found in social science education materials.

(d) Recently developed social science curriculum materials were examined for purposes of analyzing the valuation theories incorporated in those materials. The study was an attempt to determine the extent to which the underlying valuation theories are axiologically unsound.

**Need for Study**

A number of educators (and an axiologist, Michael Scriven) have expressed, either explicitly or implicitly, dissatisfaction with the valuation formulas found in social science education materials. Scriven has remarked that

"...the analysis and resolution of value disputes is one of the most difficult intellectual problems."
that we ever put in front of the child in the course of the entire curriculum. A tremendous job lies ahead of us in developing methods and materials to teach teachers and children how to deal with this complex matter." (1:127)

Simon has argued that

"Past efforts in the area of values have too often been clouded over by a spirit of rampant moralizing. There has been the ponderous tone of inculcation and indoctrination. The research in the field has been over-concerned with counting, measuring, and comparing...values. We have long needed a methodology which classroom teachers can use which would not be guilty of forcing one set of values upon all students." (2:111)

I argued, in the February 1970 issue of Social Education, that education has yet to incorporate in social science materials epistemologically defensible valuation methodologies; that common misconceptions about the relationship between facts and values have worked their way into social studies curricula and stunted the intellectual growth of the inquiring child.

There is some empirical evidence in support of the claim that the efforts of educators over recent years to affect the values of high school students have been unproductive. Lawhead reports a study which attempted to measure changes in student values between the freshman and senior years in high school. Getzels, who was involved as an experimenter in the study, explained that "although we found a difference in the values of the industrial and suburban schools, they were again only negligible differences between the freshman and the seniors in either the industrial or the suburban schools.

In short, on the average, whatever values a child brought with him when he entered a particular high school, he also took away with him when he left the high school—nothing gained, nothing lost, nothing changed, at least for the types of values represented in the instrument used." (3:315-16)
One needs to be cautious in interpreting these results because the causal connections between the school system and the formation of student values are not clear. In any event, it is unlikely that this finding is evidence that schools are effective in changing student values.

Although few educators seem to agree on the models which ought to replace those valuation schemes commonly found in social science curricula, most authorities would agree with Raths that "...there is general confusion about the meaning of the word value (4:35) and that modification of our approach to the whole matter of values is needed. Most articles on the subject include proposals for change (Axtelle, Arnett, Beck, Black, Blakely, etc.).

Nowhere in the literature, however, is there a comprehensive description, analysis or evaluation of the various proposed approaches to valuation; neither have the valuation methodologies in new social studies materials been assessed. Most noticeable is the nearly total absence, in social science materials, of reference to a single well-known axiologist.

This study is undertaken to fill those gaps: to provide curriculum developers with (1) an analysis and evaluation of valuation methodologies proposed by social science educators, (2) an assessment of the valuation methodologies presently incorporated in new social studies materials, and (3) an analytic, as well as descriptive, comparison of the valuation schemes proposed by educators and those proposed by a well-known group of axiologists.
Delimitations

The emphasis of this study is on the epistemological, rather than psychological, aspects of valuing. While a psychological approach to the study of values might be expected to entail the use of concepts like "emotion," "openmindedness," and "authoritarianism," the application of epistemological models to such a study requires such concepts as "warrantability," "evidence," "assertability," and "justification." I am not concerned here with the "growth and development" of value systems; this is not an investigation of the psychological evolution of value systems. Neither is this study oriented to the sociology of valuing; no attempt is made to relate specific values or even general value patterns to social status, economic well-being, or other environmental influences.

Further, this study is not concerned with the evaluation of specific values which a member of any group holds. It is not my purpose to identify, analyze, criticize or defend any political, social, religious or economic values. The orientation of this study is to the processes employed in making valuations. Of course it can be said, as a qualification to the above, that beliefs about the comparative validity, utility, and value of valuation processes are values in themselves, and in that sense this is a study of specific values.
Definitions

Most articles on "values" and "valuing" do not contain explicit definitions of those terms. Perhaps it is because so much has been written about values that many contributors to the periodical literature apparently assume there is wide agreement on the meaning of the concepts "value" and "valuing." The fact of the matter is, there is very little agreement; of those who do put forward explicit definitions, one or two suggest definitions found elsewhere in the literature. Everyone seems to have his own conception of valuing, and there is very little cross-referencing within the literature.

Massialas, for example, contends that a value judgment is a "normative judgment" and that the process of valuing consists of evaluating "actions or policies as good or bad on the basis of certain norms." (5:266) Douglas thinks values "are the standards held by individuals or groups." (6:121) Carey suggests that a value is a "subject appraisal of a situation, proposal, or event" (7:181) while Engbretson submits that a value is "a directive factor in human behavior." (8:259) Whether Engbretson means to define values to extend to and cover empirical value claims is not made clear by the article. Regardless, the definition he gives would include certain empirical beliefs as values, e.g., the belief that antibiotics are ineffective for treating cold viruses. Shaver, on the other hand, would call such a belief an evaluation. For Shaver, a value is a criterion: "Evaluating, or making evaluations, involves judging whether certain criteria are met.... Making value judgments is a matter of deciding what the criteria should be; that is, of deciding what is right, or what is important." (1:117)
These differences in definition are significant not only because they cloud, at the outset, the essential subject of this study, i.e., values, but also because they anticipate one of the findings of this research: there is confusion and disagreement, among social science educators, regarding the nature and function of values and valuing. Further, these differences require that the operating definitions used in this study be sufficiently broad to include most, if not all, of that which social science educators are writing about.

Therefore, by value I mean an assertable belief about the worth, goodness, preferability of an object, event, idea, act or other phenomenon; by valuation (or valuing) I mean the act of determining the goodness or worth of phenomena; by valuation model (or theory) I mean a system of processes which can be employed deliberately for the purpose of determining value.

Ethical claims, then, are included in this definition of "values" and "astrological charts" qualify as valuation models. I am aware that the definition of valuation model given here is broader than those found in most epistemological texts. It is necessary, however, to the first section of this study in which a wide variety of conceptions of valuing is considered. Other definitions were considered; they were rejected simply because they would have eliminated from this study a great many points of view held by educators recognized, at least within education, as authorities on values.
Background

It is worth noting that the subject of this study is not found exclusively within education. The question, How should one teach valuing? is a derivative of the question, How should valuing be learned? And that question is an immediate relation of the larger question, What is knowable? and, How can that which is knowable be known? Consequently, the questions upon which this study is based lead to major disputes in theology, epistemology, and other sciences, particularly the social sciences.

Although it is not the purpose of this study to trace the question from its occurrence in social science education to its roots in other fields, some description of the problem as it occurs in other fields should serve as a context within which to view the disputes analyzed in this thesis.

The problem is much older than Bertrand Russell, Charles Beard, Jules Ayer, and David Hume, all of whom decided the issue in favor of some brand of subjectivism. It is at least as old as modern theology, where the genesis of the problem is found in such questions as: What is religious truth? How can religious truths be known? Can religious truths be known? Of what utility is rationality in acquiring knowledge of God? Is God's existence an objective one? and so on. (These queries are not far removed from the questions: Can the value of X be known? Can the value of X be objectively, rationally determined? Is the world of value contained by the world of fact?) Indeed, the question may be as old as Christianity—perhaps older. It is of some interest that "Jesus declared, 'I thank thee, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that thou hast hidden these things from the wise and understanding and revealed them to babes.'" (Matthew 11:25)
er that declaration is a presage of modern subjectivism is perhaps
portant, and certainly not easily answered. It is not impossible,
er, that that point of view was the early paving of the way for
or: "Why do Christians make use of their natural wisdom and under-
ing, seeing it must be set aside in matters of faith, as not only
understanding them, but striving against them?" (9:4)
Although Calvin sees reason as having an important place in deciding
ious questions, it can be shown that he supported Luther in the belief
reason is not enough to find God. (10:46) Apparent support for
r's position comes from Kierkegaard who believed that God is "known"
wardly, through revelation. But Kierkegaard was not an anticipation
dern subjectivism:

"This does not mean for Kierkegaard that there
are no truths that are independent of the
kower....All the facts of life and history
exist in time and space independently of being
known by any particular individual. Above all,
God is what he is, and he did what he did for
man's redemption whether anyone believes it or
not. In the moral realm it does not mean that
each individual man is the measure of all
things and that beauty is only in the eye of
the beholder; there are ethical universals
binding on all men." (11:139)

This is, of course, the trap the objectivist hopes will ensnare the
ctivist: the concession that questions are "decisional," as Aiken
put it, rather than analytic; that the individual is the ultimate
ion of truth. But Kierkegaard believed that the question, Is there
? is an objective question, but that neither the tools of logic nor
icism are suitable for revealing God's presence.
Kierkegaard's subjectivism consists primarily, then, in the belief that
God occurs inside, rather than outside, man, and rejects the objectivists' approach simply because his traditional subject matter has popularly been understood as that which is external to man. Kierkegaard's position does not, however, sum up to abject subjectivism because he does not believe that God's existence is dependent upon man's assertion that He exists; he does not believe that God is merely an extension of man; he does not believe that God's existence needs to be treated in the same way one might treat an aesthetic question. And these are some of the marks of subjectivism. The thorough-going subjectivist rejects altogether the idea of a firm reality independent of man—the authority of reason is very limited because reality is that which each man believes it to be, especially in ethics and metaphysics.

The denial to God of a real self-existence is so much suggestive of a subjectivistic conception of the problem, that one begins to wonder whether in an attempt to avoid the obvious contradictions of subjectivism and at the same time defend against the objectivists' attack, Feuerbach does not entangle himself in contradictions. God, according to Feuerbach, has no real self-existence apart from man; yet neither is God the "subjectivity of subjects." (13:199) Perhaps what seem to be contradictions are skeletal outlines of a new domain which is neither subjective nor objective. Feuerbach rejects the notion that God is whatever one believes Him to be. On that count Feuerbach's subjectivity is not anti-objectivity. God is internal—a part of man which cannot be thought of independently of man—yet God is real. Is it that God is internal, and only in that sense subjective, but at the same time another kind of firm reality? Is the joining of man and God, which Feuerbach intended to establish, the discovery,
and not the invention, of another domain? But perhaps such a far-reaching explanation is unnecessary:

"His (Feuerbach's) first conception was represented by The Essence of Christianity. In this work Feuerbach saw God as the result of man's abstraction from the characteristics of human nature—particularly the characteristics of the human race as a whole—and the subsequent establishment of this abstraction as a real entity. Men looked about them, saw that their ideals of perfection were not realized in particular human beings, and, supposing that these ideals must be realized in some being; created a God; in doing this they overlooked the fact that the locus of these ideals—justice, truth, love—was indeed apart from individual human beings, but was in the human race as a whole, not in a superhuman divinity." (14:9-10)

It does not follow from the denial of the conception of God as a superhuman divinity that any other conception of God must be derived or believed in subjectively. The abstraction is real—it has objective, though perhaps not corporeal, validity.

In the eyes of the scientists, however, this is not nearly enough to exonerate Feuerbach. The strict empiricist will be quick to point out that there is some slippage in Feuerbach's case. The objectivist is willing to rest his case, at least for the moment, once it is conceded that any two direct answers to the question, Is there a God? are mutually exclusive: there either is or there isn't, and unlike the matter of ice cream flavors, there is only one right answer. The empiricist is going to hold firm to the position that if God's identity is claimed to be real, there is but one way to verify the matter with any certainty at all: through logical—empirical analysis. There are no visitations, says the empiricist, there are no revelations. Revelations are but wishful thinking, aberrations of the mind which can be explained with the most basic of psychological models.
Further, if there is any reason to believe in God, that reason must not only be objective, but demonstrable—any claim to the existence of God must stand the test of empirical, logical, scientific scrutiny, just as any other assertion.

This scientific, rationalistic view had a marked effect upon the Church. The threat of science forced the Church into subjectivism:

"...the emphasis upon the inward (and individual) experience was often such as to make religious authority wholly subjective. Thus, the final court of appeal becomes one's own reason, conscience and intuition; the witness of the scriptures, of the creeds and traditions of the church, and of the existing Christian community, becomes subordinate to one's individual religious insight." (15:223)

Neither Kierkegaard nor Feuerbach believed that the final court of appeal is one's own reason because reason, whether it occurs within the individual or serves as a structure for dialogue within the community is irrelevant to revelation. It is not so much that reason is antithetical to faith, although it may interfere with attempts at successful reception of grace, as it is irrelevant. Reference to a "court of appeal" is suggestive of a decision to be made; but one does not make any decisions; there are no decisions to be made. God is received, not elected. On other matters reason, says Kierkegaard, is quite useful, and questions, even ethical questions, can be resolved through reason. One's own conscience is not the ultimate authority: reason is. Furthermore, it is absurd to speak of one's "own reason." Reason is not property; it is not private, and there are not "brands" of logic. Reason is apart from man in the same way geometric theorems are apart from man. Man uses reason and man uses geometry. But it makes no more sense to refer to one's own system of reason than it does to refer to one's own system of geometry.
These theological disputes about knowing, then, if not the precursors of the value disputes in social science education, at least parallel the arguments about teaching and learning values in education. The historical connections may be slim, or perhaps even nonexistent. And even though the disagreements in education are not as intricate or elusive as the theological disputes, they are both configurations of the same fundamental questions.
Related Studies

To my knowledge, there has been no attempt to contrast valuing theories popular in education to those promoted by the axiologists selected for this study. Of course, a great many studies on other aspects of values instruction have been undertaken. The demand for changes in the current approaches to values instruction has become overwhelming in the last ten to fifteen years (Abrahms, 1965), (Bain, 1958), (Bond, 1970), (Scriven, in Morrissett, 1967), (Dahlke, 1962), (Emil, 1965), (Gayer, 1964), and (Stoltenberg, 1963). Studies on the relationship between values and scholarship (Battle, 1957), (Brazziel, 1964), and (Grande, 1967), and on the relationship between values and critical thinking (Bledsoe, 1955) and on the relationship between values, guilt, suffering and conscience (Henry, 1963) have been conducted. Despite the abundance of material on the subject, despite the many studies which count, list, classify, and note changes in student values, there has been no treatment of the questions raised in this study. In fact, the literature is almost completely devoid of reference to any of the axiologists whose views are reported here (The exception is Michael Scriven, and he is largely responsible for bringing the questions raised in this study to my attention). However, Kelly recently completed an analysis of valuing strategies proposed by social science educators and an analysis of textbooks which reflect those proposals, and although our specific findings are different, our general conclusions seem to be the same: currently popular valuing strategies are inadequate (Kelley, 1970). Further, Kelly and I are mutually concerned that what is needed is a more fully-developed and thoroughly systematic approach to value issues. And so, it should be noted, are a good many other social science educators (Fraenkel, 1969), (Goldmark, 1968),

Order of Presentation

Chapter II, which follows immediately, consists of a description of the classifications derived from the review of the social science education book and periodical literature. The purpose of the review was to identify the major theories around which social science educators have grouped themselves; to sort out what appear to be the distinctive values instruction proposals for which there is some support among educators. The classifications are distinguished from each other.

Chapter III sets forth the views of the axiologists selected for this study, and chapter IV is an analysis of the views of the educators contrasted to the views of the axiologists. Chapter V is an analysis of seven recently developed social studies curricula in terms of the findings of the preceding chapters, particularly chapter IV. The final chapter presents the findings, conclusions of this study, and recommends a number of problems for further investigation.
Chapter II: THE CLASSIFICATIONS

The purpose in developing the following classification was not to quantitate educators' views on valuing. That is, the purpose was not to determine the frequency of various views, or the percentage of educators who support one approach rather than another. The purpose was to identify the major "theories" around which social science educators have grouped themselves; to sort out what appear to be the major value teaching proposals for which there is some support among educators.

Most of the materials reviewed, all of which are listed in the bibliography, were unclassifiable because although they may have contained references to values and valuing, there was no recommendation, either explicit or implicit, for teaching or learning values. Many of the articles reviewed consisted of reports of research experiments in which specific values were counted, or measured, or explained in terms of various environmental influences which may have been conducive to their development, etc. Others were studies of changes in values among specific populations of students. Others were exhortations to teach values more effectively than they have been taught in the past. A number of articles were simply distress signals, warnings that education is failing to provide effective instruction in values. All of these were excluded from this study for the same reason: they did not set forth, either explicitly or implicitly, theories or models of valuing which could be recommended as paradigms for arranging instruction in valuing.

Journal articles on valuing as it applies to art criticism were excluded for two reasons: (1) the philosophical problems of aesthetic valuing do not fall within the scope of this paper, and (2) only those articles which directly, or very clearly indirectly, bear on social studies or social studies values were classified. I have been concerned here with that portion of the literature which influences the thinking
of social science educators. This meant, of course, that the data for this study could not be drawn from Social Education and Social Studies exclusively; journals like Childhood Education, The Elementary Principal, Clearing House and the like contain articles on social science curricula. Following are the ten categories, with descriptions and instantiations of each.
Category I: The Universals School

The major characteristic which distinguishes this school of thought from the other nine is the belief that students should come to adopt a number of basic conclusions about what is good. The conclusions are selected and incorporated into the curriculum by the educational institution, and presented in much the same way one presents school rules which govern student conduct. Adherents to this line of thought customarily propose a list of generalizations, or "universals," stated, depending upon the educator, in varying degrees of generality. Not infrequently, the list consists of concepts, e.g., "honesty," with the implication that one is to teach (or learn) the conclusion, "Honesty is good" or "One ought to be honest." Millis, for example, is emphatic about the need for teaching personal integrity and respect for others:

"That the school should teach the fundamental, traditional skills is, of course, obvious. They must also teach the democratic values of personal integrity and respect for others." (16:244)

Millis says nothing about the way in which students are to learn "personal integrity and respect for others"; nothing is said about the way in which students are to absorb those values.

Estvan argues that a proper purpose of social studies is to preserve "core values." (17:56-57) The core values of which he speaks are "democratic principles" (17:57) and although he suggests no comprehensive list for social studies curricula, he does offer "regard for the individual, group welfare, and the use of reason" as examples of core values which the social studies may legitimately strive to "ensure." (17:57)

Drummond argues that educators do, and must, decide which values to teach. He lists six generalized values as suitable guides to making decisions about
what to teach:

"It seems to me...that we want our children to be loyal to country and mankind, to be literate, to be creatively imaginative, to be healthy, to be thoughtful, to be courageous." (18:11)

Fraenkel argues that "our culture is so pluralistic, any attempt to develop one set of values as the set which all individuals should hold seems doomed to failure from the start." (19:457) Still, the school is responsible, according to Fraenkel, for selecting values: "The question is...what values do we want to develop in our students?" (19:457) Fraenkel then submits a list of 14 generalizations and suggests that it is a list which "one may find...difficult to object to." (19:457-458)

A similar position is held by Bain who says,"We have tenaciously held to the ideal of liberty and have endeavored to protect our freedoms by clarifying the values which should be maintained in order to ensure it." (20:400) What Bain means by "clarifying" is not made clear in the article, although one is encouraged, given the whole of the essay, that he means more than simply what the word "clarify" literally conveys. Bain wants values clarified, it seems, so that students will understand and believe them. Bain then refers to a list of values (generalizations) prepared by the Educational Policies Commission, and specifies those which he "likes best." (20:400)

Gayer argues that with regard to teaching American values, "the nature of even the most democratically administered authority is such that when neither party is persuaded of the rightness of the other's view, the decision of the one in authority prevails, for that is what it means to be 'in authority.'" (21:46) Although Gayer doesn't present a list of values for schools, he gives the distinct impression that it is the school's
(or society's) responsibility to select the values to be taught:

"Values can be explained to our pupils, and the enforcement of them justified...Within the limits of the mandatory, we can extend as much as possible the area in which we invite the pupil to use his own judgment and decide on a course for himself."*

(21:46)

Heffernan also proposes a list of values to be taught, and specifies "the principle and quality of human freedom," "the affectionate and mutually supporting relationships which make a worthy family unit" and "wholesome, happy shared experiences" as values which the teacher ought to continually "emphasize." (22:247)

Wimpey's view is that the educator must decide on "acceptable values" and then simply find the most effective way of teaching them (23:290), and Smith contends that "the mature, adult members of any society dare not turn, for whatever reason, from the responsibility of inducting the young successfully into the value system they wish to sustain and extend if the core values of that society are to be preserved in the lives of its people." (24:45)

It is important to note that the lists of values put forward by the educators grouped in Category I are not merely topical guides. Nor are the listed values recommended subjects for inquiry, questions for analysis, or the like. The possibility that the various values listed might be approached as material suitable for analytic inquiry is not entertained by Category I educators. Values are—and there is, from the viewpoint of Category I educators, apparently no other word for it—simply values, and

*Though Gayer alludes, here, to providing students with freedom in value learning, he was classified in Category I, instead of Category II, on the basis of his reference to "authority," "enforcement" and "the mandatory."
they must be "absorbed" (Millis), or "preserved" (Estvan) or "ensured" (Estvan) or "developed" (Fraenkel) or "maintained" (Bain) or "emphasized" (Heffernan). The writings of these educators are totally free of the language of inquiry or analysis;* the student, as Smith put it, is to be "inducted" into the core values of society. Although very little is said about the specific strategies the teacher ought to employ in teaching the specified values, it is difficult to understand how a teaching approach conducive to inquiry would be consistent with the objectives of this kind of values instruction. The students' role is to acquire the values promoted in the curriculum, not decide whether such acquisition is desirable or justified. This does not preclude some kind of active participation in the learning process; it simply means there are limits, i.e., the prescribed values, beyond which the student is not encouraged to inquire. Gayer makes the point explicitly, and I quote him again:

"Within the limits of the mandatory, we can extend as much as possible the area in which we invite the pupil to use his own judgment...." (21:47)

Whether the other educators in Category I are aware of it or not, this approach to valuing is consistent with and seems to follow from their conception of values.

*Fraenkel is the exception. He endorses both a specific set of value conclusions and free inquiry into value problems.
Category II: Decisional Valuation

This category is characterized by the belief that students ought to be free to make their own value decisions. While the prominent emphasis of Category I positions is on identifying sets of values the student will be required to learn, the emphasis of Category II positions is on providing students with decision-making freedom. Some of the educators grouped in Category II have, like those grouped in Category I, put forward lists of values. These lists, however, are of open-ended topics or questions. While Category I proponents are concerned with teaching students that it is good, for example, to be honest, Category II educators are interested in providing students with opportunities for deciding whether it is good to be honest (honesty! vs. honesty?). Gibson has commented that "The advent of progressive education launched a trend toward encouraging students to arrive at their own conclusions with respect to societal values;...many feel that this position is sound and actually reflects what is taking place in the classroom..."* (25:26-27)

Edwin Fenton distinguishes between "procedural and substantive" values. "Procedural values involve a way of thinking central to a discipline." (26:18) Students may be legitimately required, according to Fenton, to employ discipline processes which are necessary to inquiry: "If a student defends his prejudices with Father's ex cathedra pronouncements from the dinner table, he should be required to search for better evidence." (26:18) But such is not the case with nonprocedural values, values which do not claim the appropriateness of some process:

*Gibson is quoted here not because he endorses decisional valuation; in fact he rejects it. Rather, he is quoted here because he describes, however briefly, what is meant by decisional valuation.
"But substantive values are another matter. We are among the world's most pluralistic societies. Our population stems from every cranny on the globe; our religious and our political faiths span the entire spectrum. Diverse value systems accompany this pluralism. Among some American religious groups, divorce is anathema; yet serial monogamy has become a way of life in the entertainment world...We cannot give teachers the right to tell children that one set of values underlying these diverse behaviors is correct for everyone." (26:18)

Fenton's position is more than an objection to the sort of values instruction popular among Category I educators; it is, at least implicitly, a denial of what might be called rational determinism, the idea that if one is held responsible to certain rational processes it is inconsistent to free him entirely from the responsibility of using them properly. But Fenton has made such a denial only if he believes that one can use those processes to analyze value problems. And on that point, because of his use of the words "inculcate" and "think," we are left in doubt:

"Rather than try to inculcate (italics mine) a single set of values in all students, a number of social studies projects challenge students to think about the implications of alternative values underlying public policies...Instead of striving for unanimous agreement, the teacher invites each student to think about his position, either to change it if he finds it distasteful or to hold it at the end of the exercise with its implications clear and with new evidence marshalled in support." (26:19)

Fenton is not easily understood on this matter, and his use of the word distasteful in the above is of little help in sorting out his position. The word distasteful is suggestive of a subjective approach to value issues, an approach that is not a part of what he has called "a way of thinking central to a discipline." (26:18) An interesting question here is whether Fenton has taken a position which is analogous to saying, "I insist
that you follow these procedures in computing probabilities; of course you are free to come up with whatever answer you feel is right." For if rational processes are applicable to value problems, one cannot, and at the same time be consistent, after having insisted on the proper use of the tools of analysis, accept whatever is put forward as a product of an analysis. But I am getting ahead of myself. This section of the study is meant to be a description, rather than an analysis, of social science educators' views, and I ask the reader to excuse the digression.

Fraenkel is critical of systems because of which "either deliberately or by default, students receive their values from a source outside themselves. They acquire what 'society' deems to be important rather than determining this for themselves." (19:460) Like Fenton, Fraenkel is not precisely clear on this matter, partly because the phrase "determining this for themselves" is open to at least two interpretations: it can be taken as a reference to relativism (the validity of any argument is dependent upon the person reviewing it) or as a reference to "decisionalism" (in the end, each person does, should or ought to make up his own mind, without interference from anyone or anything). The latter seems the more likely of the two interpretations, and for that reason Fraenkel was placed in this category (as well as some others). Even if that interpretation is accurate, however, the matter is not cleared up. For while Fraenkel seems to be saying here that students ought to be free to make decisions themselves, elsewhere in the same article he remarks that "Thus, it would seem to make both logical and psychological sense to devise a number of instructional strategies which teachers can use to influence value development in directions which they desire." (19:460)
If Fraenkel means that some mixture of these not altogether consistent approaches to value instruction is what is needed, he fails to give any advice as to the right proportions.

Jeffreys suggests that "the good teacher can (and indeed must) reveal his opinions on matters of moment, but also can and should cherish the pupil's freedom to do his own thinking about what is offered to him." (27:376)

Lang argues that "...valuing, then, is a personal process in which individuals learn to make choices and they themselves are the only ones who have the 'right' answers to questions of value..." (28:124)

Rath devotes an entire article to "a strategy for helping children develop their own values." (29:509)

Hunt and Metcalf make two comments relevant to this point:

"The role of a democratic teacher...is not to strive to make students agree with him on all value judgments. A value judgment that is in harmony with my basic character may not be in harmony with yours, and your basic character may be as good as mine." (30:141)

and

"Ultimately, every student has to decide whether his basic character is to be democratic-reflective in its central values. Such a decision is highly personal... Whether they (students) choose to subscribe to a democratic philosophy is their decision to make."(30:141)

And Wells argues that students ought to be free to make their own value decisions because when it comes to values there are no "authorities." (31:54)

Hemming argues that "...a child growing up in a changing society needs to... select between alternatives and values and accept as his standard whichever seems the more worthwhile."(32:83) Gordon says that "having to choose among values is inevitable. Science cannot tell us what to value. It can
only help us with the realization of the values we have subjectively chosen." (33:32)

Rich has had this to say:

"If the individual wishes to maintain moral autonomy (sic), he may seek factual data bearing upon the decision to be made, as well as various moral evaluations from knowledgeable persons, but the final choice must be his own, made after weighing and appraising the evidence. He can of course decide not to weigh the evidence but to act on what he 'feels' is right. He can make an existential choice whose correctness can be evaluated later during the process of moral justification." (34:102)

Rich's position is also difficult to understand, principally because of his use of the word "can" in the sentence, "He can of course decide not to weigh the evidence but to act on what he 'feels' is right." If he means by that "legally entitled" or "capable of" then Rich probably does not belong in this category. If he means "is justified" then he does deserve placement in this group because he has argued that one is justified in not weighing evidence but simply making a "decision" based on some feeling.

Simon is more explicit and, consequently, easier to understand:

"There would seem to be no more individualistic facet of a human being than his personal value system, for it is his values, finally, which give him the stars by which he steers his life."

"Basically, the process of value clarification involves the following elements: students values are elicited, often through the use of some highly provocative or controversial material. The students are helped to examine their value-oriented statements through a series of clarifying questions. It is then left up to the student to ultimately eliminate, add to, or change some value type response he has made."

"The student also has the option of doing nothing..." (2:124)
Finally, there is Shaver who, relying on Charles Beard for part of his position, says

"...empiricism has no way of evaluating a value without positing value or setting up a frame of value." (1:120)

Given this, Shaver then concludes that

"The emphasis upon important conflicting values will often cause students to shift positions. Note that this is a personal decision. The teacher obviously cannot tell the student where he should shift." (1:122)

The characteristic common to the educators grouped in Category II, then, is the belief that students must be free to make their own decisions. None of the educators grouped in Category II mentions a single restraint or kind of restraint on the student: neither religion, nor social mores, nor the school board, nor curriculum guides, nor the teacher, nor—and this is of particular importance—reason should be allowed to interfere with the student's right to make up his own mind about value questions.
Category III: The Fact-Value Separation

The belief that students should be free to "make their own value decisions" derives, at least partly, from another belief: that there is a difference between "facts" and "values"; that there is no logical, empirical procedure for validating value judgments; that the gap between what is and what ought to be cannot be closed by reason; that statements about what ought to be cannot be logically or empirically derived from statements about what is. This conception of the distinction between matters of "is" and matters of "ought" is contrary to the notion that the statement "Law X is a bad law" is as much an "is" statement as it is an "ought" statement. Adherents to this view are inclined to view the world of value as apart from reality.

The view which separates the world of fact from the world of value was argued by Feigl at the Purdue Conference:

"Nothing could be more interesting and more important than the evaluations that individual people and certain groups of people make. But such judgments are not made by social scientists qua scientists. Evaluation depends ultimately on personal commitments and is not derivable from factual statements alone."

(1:17)

At the same conference, Shaver made essentially the same point. Shaver adds: a wrinkle of his own, however, i.e., a distinction between valuing and evaluating:

"I also want to make a distinction between making evaluations or evaluating and making value judgments. Evaluating, or making evaluation, involves judging whether certain criteria are met. It is basically an empirical process. It includes, for example, the scientist's comparison of data against the standards of investigation; or, at a higher conceptual level, deciding whether a hypothesis is to be accepted or rejected at a given level of probability. Making
value judgments is a matter of deciding what the criteria should be; that is, of deciding what is right, or what is important." (1:117)

and,

"I maintain, as Professor Feigl pointed out, that there is no empirical procedure for such decisions unless a value or values are assumed." (1:117)

Oliver and Shaver are of similar mind, as evidenced by "Teaching Public Issues in the High School," a book which they co-authored:

"It is important to distinguish between factual issues or beliefs, which are subject to the methods of objective verification, and values or valuations, which require a different kind of analysis and justification." (35:23)

Fenton is not as explicit on this question. His comments that it is inadvisable to "try to inculcate a single set of substantive values in all students" (26:19), his reference to the affective domain in which the development of attitudes and values takes place (26:17), and the distinctions he draws between "values, inquiry skills and knowledge" encourage one to infer that he separates, to some degree, matters of fact from matters of value.

Fenton is by no means unique in this respect. Perhaps it is because so many educators agree that there is a difference between factual considerations and judgments of value that few contributors to the literature treat the matter explicitly. In Fenton's case, the inference that he sees a difference between facts and values seems warranted; if he believes that the results of inquiries into questions of value may be regarded in much the same way one regards inquiries into questions of a strictly empirical nature, and if he believes that social science value questions are, in many, many instances empirical, logical and objective (as opposed to subjective, preferential or decisional), then he would not classify values as material
for the affective (as opposed to cognitive) domain. For the two are somewhat inconsistent views. Neither would Fenton separate values and knowledge, if this were his view, because the outcome of an inquiry into a question of value would carry the same authority as an inquiry in, say, physics.

Lawson qualifies for inclusion in this category by suggesting that "At present, the writer believes that neither philosophy, nor science can make final statements in the value field. One feels values, but is it possible to apply methods that offer verification for value statements? It appears that such statements are not provable—not by logic, by mathematical formula, by science or by any other available means. As some logical positivists have pointed out, verifiability does not lie with claims of ethical values, moral values or aesthetical values, nor does it seem possible to make statements of demonstrable truth about ultimate truths." (36:91)

There is a tentativeness about Lawson's position on this question, and interestingly he reports, in a following paragraph, that "the writer finds that he cannot escape the compelling attraction of the questions that axiology offers." (36:91)

Green is equally explicit on the question, but gives no indication of being somewhat undecided:

"The tested and intellectually responsible methods of inquiry cannot help us very much where the really significant existential problems are concerned."* (37:416)

Goldmark also sees a difference between facts and values:

"The language we use to express values is the language of opinion. We use such words as most important, best, good, right, and should. The language of assumption is the language of facts. Assumptions are stated in the form 'X is Y.' Thus, if a value is stated as 'The federal government*

*Green uses the words "existential problems" and the words "moral problems" to mean the same thing.
should pass laws to protect the voting rights of the Negroes,' the assumption is 'Federal laws do protect voting rights.' The value statement expresses opinion; the assumption statement states what is believed to be a fact. It can be seen, in this example, that the assumption is open to doubt and questioning and, therefore, open to reconstruction." (38:

There is, according to Goldmark, a language of facts and a language of values because there is, equivalently, a world of fact and a world of value.

Sanders, whose book "Classroom Questions" has been among the more popular recent publications, asserts that

"By values we refer to objects or situations or activities which are liked or desired or approved by human beings. Facts can be determined to be true or false, but values cannot. We endorse democratic values in this nation, although neither inductive nor deductive logic can prove that they are best." (39:143)

Unlike some educators, Sanders seems acutely aware of the claimed need for the distinction between facts and values:

"One of the lessons to be learned in evaluation is that facts and values are not the same and should not be treated alike in reasoning. This lesson is most difficult for the person who holds values to be absolute and who has great confidence in the truth of his values. As a minimum, he must learn that... values cannot be proven to be true by logical or scientific process." (39:143)

In the preceding section (see Category II: Decisional Valuing) I suggested that the belief that students must be free to make their own value decisions without any kind of interference is a response to the absolutist approach to values instruction. Here, in Sanders' comment, is evidence that the fact-value distinction is a part of that reaction, for, according to Sanders, who may we expect to react most strongly to the claim that "values cannot be proven..."? The one who "holds values to be absolute." (39:143)
Carey argues that we need not eschew valuing simply because science has no business making "pronouncements as to what is right or proper." (7:181) If not for the reason that questions of value are not matters of fact, why would Carey insist that "teachers should describe the economic situation and make people aware of the alternatives and their consequences, but...refrain from ethical pronouncements as to what is 'right' or 'proper'?" (7:181)

Bauer's comment that teachers must not tell students which of several data about an event are most important because to do so "would be to feed them the results of someone else's value judgments as if they were objective data" indicates a belief in the commonly made distinction between facts and values. (40:44) That comment is also suggestive of the extent to which the distinction between facts and values can be pushed. Although none of the educators reviewed in this study carries the distinction much farther than does Bauer, it would seem to follow from the belief that judgments about the relative importance of several data are subjective that even the selection of problems to work on is subjective. So too would be the decision to work on any problem at all, and so on back to Noah's Ark. (Shaver comes closest to proposing a limit to implications of this distinction [see Shaver's distinction between valuing and evaluating (1:117)], and in a later section of this study we shall see whether that limit does hold back the flood of implications of the belief that values are not factual considerations.)

Carpenter argues that educators should "stress values as well as the acquisition of subject matter" and in so doing suggests, however vaguely, that there is a difference between factual considerations and judgments
Massialas uses Krathwohl's explanation of the affective domain to introduce a section on the measurement of attitudes and values, and suggests that "preoccupation with imparting knowledge, coupled with the relative difficulty of measuring growth in the area of values, partly accounts for the erosion or the neglect of the affective objectives." (42:269)

Other contributors to the literature have expressed this fundamental belief in the difference between facts and values in a variety of ways:

"Man is not only a knowing organism; he is also a valuing organism." (43:7)

"...it is a mistaken inference to suppose that since there are authorities in matters of fact, there are authorities in matters of values." (31:54)

"There is belated awakening to the fact that knowledge is not enough." (44:289)

"The psychologist has to begin to concern himself with...preparing him (the student) to meet contingencies and crises that call for value judgments rather than facts or logic." (45:145)

"A statement of fact is a statement reporting actual events and objects, telling how something actually is; and a value judgment is a statement telling how the world ought to be. More simply, statements of fact pertain to the world of facts, and value judgments pertain to the world of value." (46:196)

"...any educational system which is built on a theory of knowledge must specifically deny value as a prime motivating factor, and this is surely an absurdity." (47:92)
Category IV: Analytical Valuation

Within education, proponents of the view that the commonly made distinctions between facts and values, and the implications of those distinctions, are invalid are relatively few in number. The view that value judgments are in many instances empirical, logical judgments is unpopular. Nevertheless, there are those who contend that even though value judgments are sometimes arrived at subjectively, they should not be; that the methods of empirical and logical analysis can be applied to questions of value; that value conflicts can be resolved—or at least are resolvable—in substantially the same way strictly empirical claims are settled; that excepting certain kinds of formulations involving psychological reports and matters of aesthetics, value judgments are verifiable, even those which, for lack of evidence, have not yet been verified; that the distinction between facts and values can only be made in specific problem contexts and that usual application of the fact-value distinction and the implications which follow from those applications are invalid. This view maintains that most value problems in social science are not personal or subjective. Rather they are properly subject to wide-open, scientific investigation. Further, according to this view, valuation is not decisional; that is, determining the value of some phenomenon no more requires a decision than does, say, summing numbers. One calculates the sum of a series of numbers, and one analyzes and evaluates a value claim. And this is true, according to at least one proponent of this view, even when dealing with ethical considerations:

"Now the illusion prevails in certain quarters, that the tasks of substantive ethics are, at bottom, not
intellectual but decisional. On such a view analysis can have little or no bearing upon substantive problems." (48:41)

Arnett makes roughly the same point:

"...the process of discriminating among values is no less a process of judgment than is the prediction of the flight of a projectile or the decision on how to vote in an election." (49:103)

And to make sure he is not misunderstood, Arnett describes the position to which he is opposed, and identifies what he thinks may be one of its original sources:

"Our century has also been plagued with the notion—derived, or at least promoted, from an erroneous interpretation of the theory of relativity in physics—that all judgment is eventually the product of an isolated and unique individual and that consequently one judgment is as good as another." (49:106)

Beck, although he does not explicitly distinguish between decisional ethics and analytical ethics, is after the same idea:

"What is evaluation? By this term is meant the judging of a (presumed) causal connexion between a reference and a solution of a problem. Savages do not value witch doctors because they wish to be absurd, believe in myths, or provide interesting material for visiting social anthropologists. They value their witch doctors because they believe in a causal connexion between his actions and the health of their community." (50:122)

"The fact that causal connexions are at the heart of value judgments is what makes them amenable to the logic of scientific inquiry." (50:122)

Beck maintains, then, that claims like "one ought to be patriotic," "one should tell the truth in situations like this," or "it is good to be moral" are implicit causal assertions; that if the person who asserts that "honesty is good" is pressed to elaborate, something like "honesty contributes to community well being" will emerge. "Good" in this example
translates to "well being" and the result is a causal claim:

\[ \text{Honesty} \rightarrow \text{Well Being} \]

Beck's case has prima facie validity, at least, if it can be shown, as he maintains it can, that all causal claims are properly subject to logical analysis and scientific, empirical investigation. If one were interested in determining whether, for example, a given emulsion promoted the growth of rose plants, it would be sensible to conduct a controlled experiment in which a number of randomly selected rose plants are treated with the emulsion. A statistical analysis of the data collected from both treated and untreated rose plants would *dictate* an answer to the question, "Does the emulsion affect the growth performance of the plants?" In this sense, there is no room for the experimenter to make a "decision" about the effect of the emulsion; the decision is dictated by the analysis of the data. One might say that the common phrase "come to a conclusion" (or decision) is misleading, for the conclusion really "comes to us."

Aiken is willing to argue that ethical problems are also subject to analysis, and that unless we are willing to conduct analyses, rather than make decisions, there is no reason to undertake an analysis in the first place, for it can have no bearing on the problem. Analysis, in Aiken's view, *squeezes* answers out of problems, even ethical problems.

Ezer gives fundamental support to this view, the view that value problems are amenable to scientific test. Ezer argues that it is the responsibility of the middle and upper grade teacher to teach children to become proficient in such skills as clarifying issues, verifying information on which values are based, and analyzing the logic inherent in the solutions of problems." (51:39) "Underlying this position of value teaching..."
the assumption that value disputes can be settled by rational means..."  
(51:39) The key words in this sentence are "settled" and "rational means": value disputes, according to Ezer, are resolvable, and their resolution is sought through rational procedures. Ezer makes no reference to "making choices," "arriving at decisions," "indicating preferences," or "selecting solutions."

Hannaford argues that our values should be fully open to inspection by science. Hannaford is not at all afraid of the consequences of bringing the methods of science to bear on value problems. Values invalidated by scientific analysis are not worth believing in for precisely the same reason purely empirical claims invalidated by science are not worth believing in: the evidence indicates they are not true. Those values that are worth maintaining will find support from the methods of analysis. But implied in this view is still another view: a conception of values not commonly suggested by educators, a conception which treats values as beliefs, as fully utterable assertions about the world and the various relations in it. With this view in mind, the notion that science offers a method for the analysis of value problems is not as startling as Hannaford suggests:

"To suggest that science offers a set of moral values may seem an attempt to be startling. We commonly assume that science and scientific method have nothing to do with morals or moral judgment. We take it that science is a quest for facts and the relation between facts." (52:26)

Dewey's position on values and valuing has been given, in light of his reputation and stature, relatively little attention by contemporary contributors to educational literature. Among those who have said something about Dewey's views on valuing there is, as one might expect, not much agreement about how to interpret what the man said.
Kennedy claims there is a "hidden link" in Dewey's theory of valuing which qualifies Dewey for inclusion in the group of educators who believe value problems are analytically resolvable. That link, according to Kennedy, is the belief that there is a connection between descriptive and prescriptive statements which makes the latter properly subject to rational examination. Kennedy sets out to show that a "set of descriptive statements may, within the context of an evaluative process, become prescriptive." (53:421)

Smith, in an article aimed at clearing up a variety of misunderstandings of Dewey's thinking, contends that Dewey's valuation theory has been frequently misinterpreted:

"A third common misunderstanding of Dewey's conception of reflective thinking concerns the applicability of his complete act of thought to problems of value or so-called 'practical' judgment in contrast to so-called 'intellectual' or 'scientific judgment.' Unfortunately, more than a knowledge of traditional logic is needed to correct his misunderstanding. We noted in the case of approximate subject matter of logic that some may have supposed that Dewey's thinking was much more revolutionary than it actually was. But in the case of valuation or judgments about what is right or what ought to be done, Dewey's thought really was revolutionary, so revolutionary that evidently many of his followers can't seem to believe that he meant what he said. In a nut shell, Dewey, applying his principle of the continuity of experience, held that the logic of sound judgment or warranted assertability was the same regardless of what the judgment was about; whether the judgment was about some common sense or practical matter, or about what is worthy of being valued, or about some scientific problem, or about some purely intellectual question. The difference is one of content or of categories and instrumentalities, not of logical method." (54:417)

"From the standpoint of Dewey's thought the notion that personal conviction is the fundamental basis for judgments about values, or about anything else, is either a truism or else false...the main thrust of Dewey's theory of valuation was that decisions about
good and bad, right and wrong, could and should be made objectively. That is to say, that one should carry through a complete act of thought when in a problematic situation with respect to values just as in any other problematic situation. The difference between value problems and other kinds of problems is, again, difference in subject matter. More specifically, it is precisely the conviction, the disposition or character of the investigator that is at issue in this kind of problem. The fact that different persons hold different convictions about what is right or wrong, beautiful or ugly, is no more relevant to Dewey's theory of inquiry than is the fact that different persons hold different beliefs about what is true or false or what is the best way to get rid of a common cold. Dewey's analysis of the complete act of thought sets forth what he took to be the essential characteristics of objective or controlled inquiry regardless of subject matter." (54:419).

I include the above not for the purpose of classifying Dewey; rather for the purpose of classifying Smith. Whether the preceding is an accurate interpretation of Dewey is not the central question here. The foregoing does serve, however, as more than just a mirror of Smith's views, and it seems apparent that Smith agrees with what he claims Dewey believed.

Ratner agrees with Smith that the difference between problems of value and purely scientific problems is not found in the methodologies employed for reaching judgments about those problems. Ratner observes that "some scholars argue strongly that values and facts should be sharply separated," and suggests that "This counsel seems sound, but is unwise..." (55:429). Ratner's view is quite straightforward: "One should state his value judgments as postulates" and treat them accordingly. (55:529).

Hunt and Metcalf also adhere to this position, although their grip on the various conceptions which make it up is not as firm as that of some others. (Indeed, there is a major inconsistency in their position. On
pages 123-24 of *Teaching High School Social Studies*, Hunt and Metcalf reject relativism and subjectivism, while on page 141 of that same book, they seem to embrace it. See page 27 of this study.) Hunt and Metcalf reject both "moralism" and "relativism," the former because it fails to prepare students for situations in which "goods," as opposed to a good and a bad, compete for recognition, and the latter because it renders the student morally helpless. (30:123-24) With regard to what Hunt and Metcalf call "moralism" they ask "how does one proceed when he has a conflict between honesty and loyalty, and his moral training has uncritically inculcated an absolute valuing of both? His moral training has made moral responsibility impossible and rationalization a necessity." (30:125)

Hunt and Metcalf's rejection of moralism, of setting forth general moral principles to be "instilled" in the student, is immediately followed by a denial of the validity, as well as the utility, of logical positivism, "a philosophy that continues to dominate much of the thinking in social science." (30:127) Hunt and Metcalf observe that one of the contentions basic to logical positivism is that only "judgments of fact are verifiable" (30:127), and then proceed to argue that certain kinds of value claims can be properly subject to objective, scientific test, and that certain kinds of value statements can be verified as factual statements. Although Hunt and Metcalf do distinguish between facts and values, the distinction they draw is more like that of the difference between fruits and oranges than fruits and vegetables: the two categories are not mutually exclusive; certain value claims are contained in the larger category factual claims. The distinction Hunt and Metcalf draw between facts and values does not
serve to exclude the latter from the domain of scientific inquiry; they
do not think valid the distinctions "commonly made between judgments
of fact and judgments of value." (30:130)

Beck, who was quoted earlier in this section, has a comment
appropriate to the summary of this section:

"Values are an integral part of the social sciences.
In the domain of the social studies, what should be
is inextricably bound up with what is." (50:122)

Beck's comment should not be taken to mean that subjectively arrived at
determinations of value carry the same authority as facts, or that subjective
values (which if indeed subjective carry a validity and authority of their
own) are bound up with facts; rather, that certain value claims are primarily
factual claims with a value aspect.

The characteristic contentions of supporters of analytical valuing, then,
are (1) value claims are factual claims in many, many social science contexts,
(2) value claims should, therefore, be the product of analysis, and not in-
dependent, subjective decision, (3) value disputes are resolvable—that is,
the value of X is independently real, and one's inability to resolve a
dispute over the value of X does not mean the dispute is unamenable to
scientific inquiry.
Category V: Values Understood as Feelings

While those educators classified under Category IV see valuing as a properly cognitive process, a process which involves the intellect and requires analysis and judgment, the following group of educators view valuing as an essentially affective process. For this group of contributors to the literature, valuing is an essentially personal, private operation. Values are primarily a function of feeling, rather than thinking; values are indices of emotion rather than products of intellectualization. According to this view, it makes little sense to measure a value for empirical or logical validity; rather, measuring a value amounts to assessing the strength of a feeling or set of feelings.

Krathwohl is one of the original mainstays of this point of view. The Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, Affective Domain is an elaborate exposition of values understood as feelings, and undoubtedly a good many educators have used that "Handbook" as a departure point for subsequent studies of the valuing process.

Fenton's discussion in "The New Social Studies" of the development of inquiry skills is separated from the section on values and valuing. Fenton introduces the topic on values by saying, "All teachers also share responsibility for what psychologists call the affective domain: the development of attitudes and values." (26:17) Further, and more significant, Fenton says

"A chemistry teacher should require his students to use a scientific method rather than accept conclusions based on authority, superstition or faith. The behavior he demands endorses a value, perhaps the most important value of a scientific society, a preference (italics mine) for rational thought processes." (26:17)
Fenton's position on this question is not easily understood. Are we to understand that the "preference for rational thought is affectively derived"? The impression given throughout this section is that the utility of rational methods cannot be demonstrated in experience, cannot be proven. Is it Fenton's view that one cannot prove rationality because to do so one must assume it in the first place? Is the decision to be rational an emotional one? Does this mean that rationality must be based on emotionality? The section on values in "The New Social Studies" does not clarify what Fenton thinks to be the relationship between the affective and cognitive domains, and the reader is left with this imprecise formulation: the value rationality (since one needs to assume it in order to prove it) must be asserted somewhat arbitrarily; one must commit himself affectively to the value rationality and proceed from there.

Estvan also believes valuing to be an essentially affective process:

"...an interest is what one attends to. An attitude is a predisposition to act in a certain way. Values are reflected in the choices one makes among different goals. A philosophy is expressed in consistent and well-integrated responses to life situations. All these terms and meanings may be subsumed under the general term affective behavior." (17:302)

Estvan's position on the relationship between valuing and the affective domain is clarified somewhat in subsequent sections:

"Even though pupils are assured that there are no 'right' answers...it is not unusual for them to resort to conventional responses or what they think they are expected to feel, rather than their true feelings." (17:321)

And

"The evaluation of affective behavior consists primarily in determining the positive or negative nature and the intensity of the feelings associated with certain ideals." (17:321)
From the first of Estvan's comments quoted here we see that values are subsumed under the affective domain, and from the last two comments we see that evaluating affective behavior involves measuring the direction and strength of feelings. It would seem to follow, then, that Estvan views values as feelings.

Although Massialas identifies strong connections between the affective and cognitive domains, he apparently views valuing as a predominantly affective process:

"Social Studies teachers have verbalized an interest in the development of appreciations, attitudes and values. It is indeed rare to find a statement of objectives in this field that does not include references to affective outcomes of teaching. For example, among the important goals of social education developed by a committee on concepts and values of the National Council are the following: The intelligent use of the forces of nature; intelligent use by individuals and groups of responsibility for achieving democratic social action; the effective development of moral and spiritual values." (56:269)

Massialas proceeds from here to outline Krathwohl's Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, Affective Domain, as a detailed explanation of the processes involved in valuing, and gives examples of very specific objectives and corresponding test items for each level in the taxonomy. And again, although Massialas does refer to the "intellectual tasks" (56:269) involved in valuing, one must conclude from his extensive use of Krathwohl's Taxonomy in explaining valuing, that he, Massialas, does not view that process as primarily cognitive in nature. Massialas makes no reference to Bloom's Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, Cognitive Domain, in explaining valuing he makes no reference to any paradigm of rational, analytic procedures for valuing.
Lawson contends that one "feels values" and he doesn't believe that it is possible to apply "methods that offer verification of value statements." (36:91)

Benjamin's discussion of the relation between values and feelings is, in part, a warning of "what may happen to scholarship when it is employed as an instrument for the attainment of certain non-cognitive values." (57:472) According to Benjamin, patriotism is an example of values which are essentially non-cognitive, and although he does not refer to the affective domain, it does not seem excessively speculative to say that by "non-cognitive" Benjamin means something similar to what Krathwohl means by "affective."

While Fraenkel rejects the views of the moralist and the relativist—the former because it encourages "uncritical acceptance...of values" (19:439) and the latter because it "provides no guides whatsoever" (19:460) to the student in search of values; and while he is critical of those who insist there are no logical, empirical procedures for value analysis (19:459) when it comes to proposing a strategy for teaching values, he turns to the affective domain for pedagogical and psychological models. He describes the strategy as "An Affective Strategy That Develops Empathy for and Identification with Individuals Placed in Conflict Situations." (19:460) One of the critical steps in the model Fraenkel sets forth—the step which is designed to effect empathy for the individual in the situation—asks the student to describe how he would feel if he were faced with the situation at hand. (19:460) The model is organized not around questions like "what are the consequences of this act?" or "How should one go about analyzing this argument?" or "Does this judgment stand the test of analysis and evaluation?" but around eliciting feelings, e.g., empathy, upon which a conclusion is
The degree to which a number of other educators subscribe to this view is difficult to determine because of seeming inconsistencies and ambiguities in their arguments. For example, Morris defines a value as "the esteem which a person feels for an object or for an individual, his attitudes, and his behavior" (58:224) and then suggests that "education can be designed deliberately toward helping each child to make better and more consistent value judgments." (58:224) Morris also believes that "the judgment of esteem is...a matter of comparison and evaluation." (58:224) On the face of it, it seems Morris has made no distinction between objectivity and subjectivity, between, on the one hand, comparing and evaluating, which is intellectual or cognitive, and on the other, esteeming and feeling which is emotional or affective.

Meek argues that value systems are "personal" and "unique" (59:224); that value systems evolve from "experience in satisfying needs" (59:224); that values are a function of one's personality as opposed to his philosophy, and that psychotherapy, as opposed to inquiry, offers a powerful means of changing a value system. (59:228)

The relationship of the affective domain to valuing is in many books and periodicals not clearly specified. In fact, in not one of the references on valuing as an affective process is any of the critical questions answered. For example, Wetzler, who uses the words "values" and "attitudes" interchangeably, says that "to many teachers...students can learn facts, skills, understandings, and the like," but deliberate attempts to change attitudes and values are certain to fail. (60:424) Are we to take it, then, that values are not "understandings" and cannot be understood? Are we to
take it that values are, as Wetzler seems to imply, affective products of feelings? And what sort of authority do feelings have as the basis for deciding social issues? If valuing is an emotional process with cognitive overtones, to which parts of the total valuing process is each relevant? Is it that values are feelings, or is it that we respond emotionally to the judgments we make about issues that matter? Is it that values are the products of feeling but should be the outcomes of analysis? Is there no escape from bias and prejudice, because valuing can never be anything but a reflection of the way we want the world to be? None of these questions is entertained, and they are among the questions to which we must address ourselves if we are to put together courses of study which can be used to teach students the valuing process.
Category VI: Values as Preferences

Insofar as the state of preferring something is an emotional state, or a feeling, the views of this group of educators are not much different from those who contend values are, that is, consist of, feelings. But this point is not clarified by educators in this category; they are not explicit about the relationship of "preferring" to either the cognitive or affective domain. The act of preferring something is not clearly defined, and we are left to speculate about its relation to other mental and emotional functions.

What does seem clear is that members of this school of thought believe that phenomenon X has value if and only if someone prefers it. The value of phenomenon X is not to be found in my relation to it, or in the phenomenon itself, but is defined as my preference for it. Phenomenon X has value, it would follow, if I prefer it. There seems to be no way of determining whether adherents to this view have inadvertently reversed the function "valuing" and "preferring." That is, instead of valuing something because I find myself preferring it, I ought to prefer it because it has value.

Implicit in this view is the notion that our preferences are non-cognitive; while the discovery of value in an object, or in its relation to someone (which might warrant desiring the object) is essentially an intellectual process, preferring an object is an emotional process, an affective state which involves feelings. One's preferences are understood, according to this view, as closely linked to, if not the same thing as, one's feelings.

Fenton, therefore, speaks of the need for establishing a "preference" for rationality, and calls that preference "perhaps the most important value
of a scientific society." (26:17) The value "rationality is not to be found in rationality itself, or in the consequence of my relationship with rationality (e.g., using it); rather, rationality takes on value only if I prefer it.

Brackenbury suggests that "man is not only a knowing organism; he is also a valuing organism--he likes some things more than others, i.e., he has preferences." (43:7)

It is entirely possible that this category is nothing more than a short extension of the system of beliefs described in the preceding section (see Category V, Values as Feelings), and has no validity as a category independent of the others. If for example Brackenbury means that man likes some things more than others because of what he knows about those things, there may be little difference, or at least not much incongruity, between that view and the view that value judgments ought to be arrived at analytically. If Brackenbury means by liking nothing more or less than a feeling that arises independently, and is not the consequence of conclusions produced through analysis, then this view is simply a part of that view which understands values as feelings. Both these possibilities are just that, however: possibilities, and this category is described separately in the event there is a view here that can be analyzed apart from the others.
Category VII: Values as Subjects for Limited Analysis

This category is a hybrid of several other categories. Members of this school believe that students should learn how to analyze value problems because there is a factual component in value issues which make them amenable to analysis. Adherents to this point of view may distinguish between facts and values and at the same time argue that the latter can be based on the former. According to this view values themselves cannot be verified through logical or empirical analysis, but that the facts upon which values rest are properly subject to such investigation. This point of view can be understood, at least in part, as the middleground between two clearly opposing positions: subjectivism, in which it is held that independent analytic procedures have no bearing on value questions, and analytical ethics in which it is argued that only analytic procedures have a bearing on questions of value. Proponents of the view described in this section differ from those who insist that questions of value (excluding certain kinds of aesthetic questions) can only be resolved through analysis in that the latter do not view values as anything less than truth claims. According to the view described in this section, there is a final step in valuing which cannot be accounted for by logic or empiricism, and that step is the claimed limit on the utility of rationality. Rationality must be, according to this view, assumed as a first principle, a principle which must be simply accepted. The authority awarded to rationally based value claims is limited because the validity of rationality must be assumed. But then proponents of this view have not explained why values may be regarded as having less authority than facts if assuming rationality is a prerequisite to accepting facts as well as values. Still, values should
be inquired into; students should reflect on values consciously; values should be treated as stuff for the intellect, rather than the affect.

Even though values are to be dealt with in the cognitive domain, however, they cannot, no matter the intensity of the inquiry to which they are subjected, be given the same status or authority as statements of fact, statements which in their entirety may be subjected to analysis and the validity of which resolved. Members of this school of thought view valuing as an objective, logical process in the early stages of value analysis, and become, in the latter stages, logical positivists.

For example, Goldmark explains in great detail the processes involved in an inquiry into a value problem. Goldmark stresses the importance of identifying and evaluating the criteria used in reaching a judgment (38:5) of gathering evidence which may bear on a value issue (38:5) and so on. The "Experimentalist" method put forward by Goldmark does not include procedures for validating values themselves, however. Values, according to Goldmark, can be identified and distinguished from assumptions. But one is not, once the values relevant to an inquiry have been isolated and defined, dealing with material that can be treated as factual considerations:

"The language we use to express values is the language of opinion. We use such words as most important, best, good, right and should. The language of assumptions is the language of facts. Assumptions are stated in the form 'X is Y.' Thus, if a value is stated as 'The federal government should pass laws to protect the voting rights of the Negroes,' the assumption is 'Federal laws do protect voting rights.' The value statement expresses opinion; the assumption statement states what is believed to be a fact. It can be seen, in this example, that the assumption is open to doubt and questioning and, therefore, open to reconstruction." (38:146)
In this way, then, can the analysis of factual matters affect questions of value. But Goldmark does not recommend that such procedures should be applied to value claims, e.g., "The federal government should pass laws to protect Negro voting rights." And although Goldmark claims that there ought to be "open inquiry into all values" (38:224) it would be more consistent for her to say that there ought to be open inquiry into all the 'factual' considerations which bear on value questions.

Oliver and Shaver believe that value problems can be properly subjected to analysis, but deny that all nonaesthetic value conflicts are resolvable through rational means. Teaching Public Issues in the High School is a detailed account of how teachers can teach students how to inquire into public issues. The book is not a treatment of how the affective domain operates, or how it could operate in face of value conflicts; values, for Oliver and Shaver, are subjects for the cognitive domain, and although they do not deny that involvement in value conflicts necessarily leaves emotional tracings in the affect, they do agree that students ought to come to value decisions via the intellect rather than, say, the heart.

There are, however, anticipatable limits to inquiry into values. According to Oliver and Shaver a given value system has within it both general and specific values, and these are, somewhat loosely, hierarchically arranged. (35:23) As one goes about analyzing a value problem, he finds himself ascending this hierarchy, moving from specific to general values, and from evaluations to valuations:

"I also want to make a distinction between making evaluations or evaluating and making value judgments. Evaluating or making evaluations, involves judging whether certain criteria are met. It is basically an empirical process. It includes, for example, the scientist's comparison of data against
the standards of investigation; or, at a higher conceptual level, deciding whether a hypothesis is to be accepted or rejected at a given level of probability. Making value judgments is a matter of deciding what the criteria should be, that is, of deciding what is right, or what is important.

"Some people...act as if all value questions were of the first sort, that is, of the evaluating type, involving only testing against criteria. To these people, the value problem is one of testing the consequences of an act or policy to decide whether it is right or not. There remains, however, the problem of deciding what criteria the act or policy will be tested against. I maintain...that there is no empirical procedure for such decisions unless a value or values are assumed." (1:117)

For Shaver, then, there is a level at which valuing is no longer a logical or empirical matter; higher order values—the values which serve as criteria for the evaluations we make—are posited, asserted, "assumed," but not proven.

Chapter Three of Teaching Public Issues in the High School is a discussion of "Alternative Approaches to Value Conflict." Oliver and Shaver pointedly reject what they call "The Pragmatic Position" or, as it is referred to in this study, "analytical ethics." (35:32) Some half-dozen paragraphs prior to that rejection they comment briefly on the weaknesses of a particular brand of relativism (35:31) and conclude the chapter with a criticism of the "natural rights" position. (35:50) Like Hunt and Metcalf, who are in Shaver's and Oliver's terminology "pragmatists," Oliver and Shaver outline their position by describing points of view to which they are opposed. And they are opposed, it would seem, to analytical ethics, subjectivism, relativism, logical positivism, and the natural rights philosophy. There is no commonly known name for their views, but given the meaning of what they say, it would not be inaccurate to call them "analytic-subjectivists," even though that name does suggest something of
a contradiction.

There is considerable similarity among the views of Fraenkel, Oliver and Shaver. Fraenkel rejects exhortation as an ineffective method of teaching values (19:459) rejects moral relativism because it denies that a given value might be better than some other (19:459) and rejects logical positivism because, contrary to that theory, under certain conditions values can be submitted to "public test": (19:459)

"...statements of value can be submitted to public test, if we can get some agreement on the value terms involved. For example, if I were to say that Nancy is a beautiful girl, this statement is testable enough, if all of those concerned can agree on the meaning of beautiful. The key question seems to be: Can the concepts in the proposition be defined in ways that (according to defining criteria) are clear? Can we agree on the properties of a value concept and state, whenever possible, such properties in behavioral terms?" (19:459)

Fraenkel does not explain how or whether an inquiry is to proceed if the condition of agreement is not met. Does he mean to say that there is no recourse if agreement on the meaning of the terms is not reached? Is this the "limiting factor" in inquiry into values? Is this the point beyond which rational inquiry cannot proceed? If this is the case, then Fraenkel differs, in this respect, with those who support analytical ethics, because for them agreement is neither a limiting factor nor a significant condition of inquiry. Nevertheless, Fraenkel does believe that values can be "inquired" into—he does reject moralism, along with logical positivism, relativism, and subjectivism.

There are many other educators who, in various ways, express this same theory: the view that value problems can be analyzed even though values per se are immune to the tools of rational analysis. Bauer argues that to be
"a rational human being requires not only a life study of changing academic knowledge but a life long commitment to an internally consistent and rationally based value system." (40:44) Bauer makes two significant distinctions in that line: (1) that there is a difference between one's knowledge and one's value system, and (2) value systems can be made internally, but not externally, consistent. An internally consistent—and by this I take it Bauer means one which fits the assumptions, or first principles on which it is based—value system is one of the requirements of rational existence, according to Bauer; but there is no discussion of the need for external consistency in value systems, not, one supposes, because such a system wouldn't contribute to a man's rationality, but because there is no such thing as an externally consistent value system. Value systems cannot be made, it would seem, externally consistent because of the impossibility of verifying first principles, basic assumptions, or premises. Nevertheless, it is clear that Bauer thinks value problems can be inquired into rationally. The backbone of the Bauer article is a description of a model which would influence students to delay making "value judgments until they have collected the raw data and recognized how many kinds of problems co-exist..." (40:44) Bauer strongly advises that we should "let (n)either the materials (n)or the teacher make value judgments before the pupils have collected and classified the data and drawn some conclusions." (40:44)

Rich believes that "what is needed is an attitude recognizing that individuals, situations, and cultures are not identical, while at the same time seeking grounds for values in their situational contexts that are more objective than personal." (61:29) For Rich, too, however, there are limits
to which an inquiry can be purely factual, purely rational. "The fathering of relevant factual data bearing on the situation, although a necessary procedure in arriving at moral judgments, cannot by itself lead to a moral decision. An assessment of the values in a situation is always needed for reaching a decision on a course of action." (61:103)

For many educators, it is the separation between facts and values (the claimed separation) which imposes the limit on rational inquiry. If Rich, Fenton, Shaver and the rest were to begin their analyses of valuation by defining values as truth claims, as postulates, inquiry into value problems would be limited only by the availability of information resources, our willingness to engage in very demanding intellectual tasks, and the power of our minds. If values are understood as simply truth claims, as postulates, there is nothing inherent in value issues (excluding certain aspects of aesthetics) that would truncate an attempt to study them.

Stoltenberg is equally interested in promoting inquiry into values, in treating them as cognitive material suitable for the intellect. Stoltenberg reasons that "If values are ideas, there seems no reason why they can't be discussed as other conceptual material." (62:25) Further, says Stoltenberg, "All of the great values of our heritage can be stated objectively, and in this sense can be taught as other materials are taught." (62:25) However, "to give men only factual knowledge would be in some sense to dehumanize them, to see them as automatons..." (62:25) Now this point, if taken literally, puts no real distance between Stoltenberg and those who endorse analytical ethics. But the reader is right to suspect that Stoltenberg means to say that there is a kind of knowledge which is not factual, and that value claims are fundamentally different from factual...
claims:

"...teaching values can be frustrating because of the impossibility of measuring results," (62:24)

and

"...there is no widely agreed upon authority for the values taught." (62:24)

Whether Stoltenberg is caught in an inconsistency here is a question saved for a later section of this study; the point to recognize here is that while Stoltenberg has endorsed an objective, reasoning approach to values, he has also given indications that the outcomes of values instruction cannot be measured (a position he would not take if he understood and endorsed analytical ethics) and that there is uncertainty in the enterprise because there is no widely agreed upon authority for the values taught (another position he would not take if he supported analytical ethics). Stoltenberg has made, or by implication is on the verge of making, the common distinction between facts and values.
Category VIII: Values in Hierarchical Arrangement

The belief that one's value system can be understood as a hierarchically arranged set of beliefs (or feelings, attitudes, etc.) is so common that many educators make no explicit reference to it, taking it for granted that everyone, on that point at least, is in accord. According to this view, value conflicts can be resolved by (1) identifying the various values involved in the conflict, and (2) locating their positions on the hierarchy; issues are decided in favor of the higher ranking values.

Eberman believes that values, which are "a judicious mixture of fact, common agreement, and sheer belief," are arranged hierarchically. In fact, he suggests that a "hierarchy is inherent in a system of...values." (63:195)

Wiles believes that values are arranged vertically, and that unless we rethink those "priorities," "all opportunities for improvement of the present situation will be lost." (64:502) Specifically, "our first value must be the continuation of the human race." (64:502)

Axtelle, too, is interested in finding a super-ordinate value. While Wiles believes that we need to settle on a new priority of values "if we are to fulfill a destiny of leadership in helping to achieve a world culture" (64:504)

Axtelle's purpose is no less modest:

"Increasing interdependence of peoples and interaction of cultures has made us one world in fact. What happens to that world depends fundamentally upon the possibilities of cooperation, compromise and mutual persuasion. These possibilities are contingent upon the development of a common ground of values which would be applicable and relevant to all peoples and cultures." (65:240)

Hierarchies establish priorities among values and, according to this view, thereby serve to resolve value conflicts, whether those conflicts are
within or between individuals or groups. One simply behaves in ways consistent with higher order values when higher and lower order values conflict.

There are a variety of ways to refer to this architectural conception of value systems; Shaver refers to the difference between general and specific values; others refer simply to higher and lower values, and so on. And although most educators described in this study make no explicit mention of "hierarchies," this conception of value systems is entirely consistent with, and implicated by, what they do say about the nature of values and valuing.
Category IX: The Contextualists

One of the less popular, less frequently discussed themes is the belief that value problems cannot be intelligently solved in the abstract. What I have chosen to call contextualism is a kind of "anti-absolutism"; that is not to be taken as relativism. This view consists, at least in part, in the belief that values such as honesty and generosity cannot be understood in the abstract; that is, it makes no sense to resolve an anticipated conflict between generosity and honesty except in very specific situations.

"...the problem with using a hierarchy of values is that it induces a neglect of the concrete situation in which values inhere and decisions are made. If a religious value is in conflict with a material value, such as the need for food, the material value would seem to take precedence in the situation. Things are valued not in the abstract, but in relation to particular situations. Or they are valued by appraising patterns of values in situations, and their meaning and import can be grasped only within the framework of the situation. Each situation has its own intrinsic good, which is irreplaceable and incomparable...The weight to be ascribed to any value cannot be known apart from the circumstances in which it is found; and although every situation may share certain characteristics with other situations, each has certain features which must be appraised on their own merits." (61:103-4)

In other words, the relative value of X and Y cannot be determined in the abstract. Is emotional security to be valued more highly than honesty? Is obedience to the law more important than kindness? The answer, according to the "Contextualist" is "Sometimes; it depends upon the conditions of the specific situation in which those values conflict." Similarly, moral imperatives like "Do not kill" cannot be accepted in the abstract—commands of that kind, if accepted in the abstract, will lead one to all sorts of absurd behaviors.
"A moralist who has no reflective sense will teach children to be honest and kind. Obviously one can be honest in many situations without being unkind, just as in a host of circumstances one can be kind without being dishonest. But let us suppose that Mr. and Mrs. Brown and their small son, Johnny, have been invited to dinner by the Joneses. Mrs. Jones asks Johnny how he likes the soup. Johnny, if he is honest, will say that it is the worst soup he has ever tasted. The answer is anything but kind, and is very likely a response that none of the adults want him to make. If Johnny has been taught always to be honest, and always to be kind, he is likely to be tongue tied. Should he be honest, or kind?" (30:124)

Hunt and Metcalf, like Rich, not only argue strongly in favor of in-context analysis of values, but reject hierarchies as a solution to the problem of resolving conflicting values:

"This is no a problem that can be solved through a fixed hierarchy of values—higher values invariably being preferable to lower ones. Any value hierarchy would have to be flexible enough to permit values to move up or down a scale according to qualifying circumstances." (30:124)

But then if the values moved up or down the scale, the whole arrangement of values would look less and less like a hierarchy, and, depending upon the amount of movement, more and more like a solar system, or galaxy.

Fraenkel also believes that values should be treated contextually, and has spent considerable time developing strategies which students can use to work on value problems as they occur in specific situations. (19:460-61). This is also true of many of the developers of new social studies curricula. It is a mistake, according to the contextualists, however, to ask students to analyze values in specific situations if the purpose of that study is generalization; that is, there is a self-defeating aspect of the curriculum which helps a student to discover that in situation #4567 honesty is good, and then encourage him to conclude that honesty is a general value which he
ought to adhere to in all situations. The "Contextualist" is interested in seeing the student develop the ability to determine when honesty is warranted, not bring the student, through a study of specific situations, to the conclusion that honesty is always a good policy. In fact, the supporter of a contextual approach to value analysis would not be reluctant to confront the student with a situation that requires dishonest behavior.
Category X: The Psycho-Social Acculturation View

The principle characteristic of this category is the belief that values are acquired through processes other than direct, conscious analysis and evaluation of the values themselves. The values a person holds, that is, his beliefs regarding what is good, right, preferable, etc., are acquired not, primarily, through reasoned examination of the objects of those beliefs, but through subtle influences in the environment. If I value X it is probably not because I have carefully evaluated the claim "X deserves to be valued." Rather, according to this view, I shall have come to value X, especially if X is an ethical, moral matter, because I respect or admire another person who values X (identification); or because there are influences of such overwhelming power in my environment that it simply never occurs to me to devalue X; or because there are social inducements to believe in the value of X; or I unconsciously associate X with other things I like, and there is leakage of desire from one to the other; and so on. One acquires values, then, not through the processes familiar to philosophy, but through the processes explained by sociology and psychology: "identification," "inculcation," "nurturing," "association," etc. This belief, the belief that values are acquired by acculturation, is conjoined with another belief: that if this is the way values are acquired, the job of education is to discover ways in which the process can be made more efficacious.

Getzels contends that there is sufficient research to show that "The fundamental mechanism by which we interiorize values is identification." (66:237) Getzels is interested in discovering ways to facilitate
the identification process:

"...we can provide the child with a realistic model for identification and growth, a model which is consistent with his own personality and the values of the world of which he is a part." (66:237)

Getzels does not elaborate on the model of which he speaks. It is not, however, an epistemological model, because the model is such that the child will identify with it, emulate it, want to be like it, ascribe to himself the qualities in the model. Neither is Getzels clear about the meaning of the word "interiorize"; apparently he means that if a child interiorizes a value he gives more than lip-service to it.

Ekstein, who takes much the same position taken by Getzels, gives us a bit more detail:

"The transmitting mechanism of value is the child's identification with the adult generation. The survival of values rests on available opportunity for their fulfillment. Our school system, then, must accept the need, provide the opportunity and the techniques for identificatory learning, and offer the skills and the knowledge which will maintain the continuity of the individual and the society within our value system which guarantees life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." (67:523)

It is clear that Ekstein, whether he is aware of it or not, believes in something less than total freedom of inquiry into values: the status quo—the adult generation—is the model, and the educational problem is to figure out a way to get students to identify with "what is" as opposed to "what ought to be."

Engbretson agrees that values are learned mostly through nonanalytic processes, and although he makes no explicit recommendations for teaching values, he does specify the psychological, social processes through which values are acquired.
"Children appear to learn initially by imitation, identification, example, and contagion." (8:261)

Engbretson is aware that values can be learned through "consciously reasoned actions" but does not identify that process as the one to exploit in teaching values. (8:259)

Botkin believes that values are learned through psychological, rather than epistemological, processes, and argues that the task is to develop effective methods for "nurturing" values. (68:189-96)

Schiavano believes that it is through "example" that we can develop in our youth the factors which contribute "to strength of character and the pursuit of happiness..." (69:90) Indeed, unless we "implant...patriotism, love of God, responsibility toward mankind, sound morals and values" (69:89-90) society may collapse.

Millis uses the words "absorbed" and "transferred" to refer to the ways in which students learn values, and argues that "exposure" is not enough.

"It is these important aspects of our democratic tradition, our system of values, which can not be transferred by mere exposure by the teacher, but must be learned by our acting upon them." (16:244)

Lodge argues that one of the important implications of the research on value acquisition is that "Through the process of identification with significant adults whom he has selected, the young adolescent is working through the problems of finding a satisfying role in future relationships which he projects for himself." (70:237) Lodge, in contrast to others included in this Category—and perhaps this is good reason to exclude Lodge from this Category—is concerned that "students become more aware of the many-sidedness of problems, the consequences of choices made, and the implications and significance of models chosen." (70:239) Nevertheless, Lodge thinks that identification is the principal process through which
values are learned, and concludes that for that reason, apparently, models for identification should be provided for the students. (70:239-40)

And that sort of reasoning typifies those who believe that students should acquire values through identificatory processes. It is as though the discovery that values are learned through identification is the uncovering of an immutable principle of the universe.

Lawhead arrives at the conclusion that students ought to have identificatory models. He reasons that

"If central emphasis is given to the theory that students acquire their values by identification, consideration may be made of the roles of the teacher and other school personalities in this process. Two concerns should be paramount in the minds of the teachers in regard to transmitting values through appropriate personality models. First, we can ask, who ought to provide the models for identification; and the second, what are the optimum conditions for fostering appropriate identification?" (3:515)

Jeffreys believes that, among other things, we ought to set for students "inspiring examples," and that the greatest contribution "the teacher can make is to be in himself a person of stable character, with deep-rooted convictions and a coherent system of beliefs." (27:377)

Heffernan is explicit in rejecting cognition as the important process in value formation:

"Values are not achieved by percept but through satisfying experience in living and working and playing with other people." (22:252)

Consequently, Heffernan speaks of "creating an environment favorable to learning values." (22:247) Very little is said about the nature of the environment Heffernan encourages us to arrange, although the whole of the article gives the impression that Professor Heffernan is concerned with those subtle conditions which affect our psychological, rather than
analytical processes.

Hemming has this to say:

"From the moment the child becomes aware of the independent existence of others, he begins to absorb the culture through the mediation of his parents or his parent substitutes, and, later, through contact with other members of his family group. Imitation, emulation, and identification are all a part of this process of absorption." (32:78)

Given this understanding of the valuing process, Hemming says there are three conditions of early moral growth: "(1) genuine, unstinted, undemanding parental love; (2) the formation of a right evaluation of the self in relation to others and in relation to life; and (3) sufficient elbow room for the uniqueness of individuality to manifest itself." (32:80)

What Hemming means by the "formation of a right evaluation of the self in relation to others and in relation to life" is unclear. Excessive liberality would be required to interpret that line as any sort of reference to an analytic approach to valuation, and it must be concluded that Hemming does not perceive ethics as an analytic study.

Wimpey is more direct in his support of what seems to be a kind of conditioning. He proposed that "value learning can be accomplished through a system of threats, punishment and rewards for the individual." (23:290) He does not give full endorsement to that approach, but not because it is in itself unethical, but because it may not be as effective as some other alternatives.
The Educator's Views Contrasted to One Another

Most of the disagreements among educators should be apparent from the foregoing. Those who support the view that values should be taught as large generalizations which the student must accept on the authority of the teacher, the school, or society (Category I) will find little agreement coming from those who believe students have the right to make their own decisions about values (Category II), primarily because the latter are unwilling to acknowledge anyone as having proper authority for deciding value questions: when it comes to valuing, there should be no limits on the student's right to believe what he wants to believe. Those who support analytical ethics (Category IV) could be expected to disagree with at least one of the assumptions underlying the principles (Category I) point of view, i.e., the belief that since there is no accounting for values, the school must assume the authority for the values taught. Further, those who support analytical ethics are more likely to agree with those who endorse a situational or contextual, approach to values, than with those who believe value claims can be understood as general concepts. There is a very significant difference between teaching the value concept "equality" (i.e., always treat people equally) and demonstrating the case for the prima facie equality of rights rule (treat people equally unless you have good reason not to); the former makes no attempt to account for variations in conditions which bear on problems. But this is not to say that those who support an analytic approach to value analysis object to teaching students value conclusions for which there are good reasons and good evidence; the difference is in the source of the authority for the conclusion. For Category I educators the source of the authority is the school and
society; for those who think values should be treated analytically, the authority is the analysis and the reasons and evidence which come out of it.

The disagreement between those who think values should be treated as immutable rules (Category I) and those who think values should be studied in specific contexts is obvious: the former would not agree that students should learn, for example, that honesty is not always the best policy. Further, there is an incompatibility between Category I and Category VII educators; the latter believe that when analysis does break down (because the inquiry has been reduced to an argument over indisputable first principles, or as Shaver puts it, "criteria"), adjudication of the dispute should be turned over to the student, and not the teacher, the school, or society.

Finally, there is significant disagreement between Category I and Category X educators, since the latter might be expected to argue that values are not acquired through direct instruction, but through the more subtle processes of acculturation.

Those who support "Decisional Valuing" (Category II) will encounter disagreement from (in addition to Category I educators) those who believe that (1) valuing is properly analytic, involving judgments instead of decisions; (2) valuing is a psychological process that involves identifying instead of deciding (Category X).

Those who believe there is a difference between facts and values (Category III) are relatively safe from attack within education; only those who support analytical valuation and perhaps, but not necessarily, those who support context will be critical of that position (Category IV)
because they reject the fact-value distinction as it is commonly made.

Those who endorse analytical valuation are at odds with nearly everyone else in education; the disagreement starts with a fundamental philosophical difference about the nature of values and valuing. In fact, with the exception of those who believe values should be treated within very specific contexts, or situations, every category of views described in this study is in some way, and to some extent, an extension of the fact-value distinction, or a representative of subjectivism, relativism, logical positivism, or absolutism, and all those philosophies are rejected by those grouped in Category IV.

The belief that values are feelings is easily contrasted to all those views which hold values to be cognition, instead of emotive, and the same is true for those who conceive values as simply indications of preference.

Those who support Limited Analysis of Values are caught between those who insist values cannot be analyzed at all and those who believe that only analysis is appropriate to the resolution of value disputes.

The disagreement between those who support the idea that values are arranged in hierarchical orders (Category VIII) and those who are referred to here as "Contextualists" has already been described. It should be recognized that the point of view I have here referred to as "Contextualism" is not a kind of relativism; those who favor an in-context treatment of values do not believe that the validity of a claim is relative to the person making it; rather, that value claims should be stated as specifically as possible.

Finally there are those who believe valuing is a psycho-social process (Category X), rather than an epistemological process; and they find little
support from those who see valuing as an intellectual operation. Their estimation of the view that students ought to acquire values through intellectual processes is simply that value acquisition does not occur that way. Category X educators have not, however, openly addressed themselves to the question, Should values be acquired intellectually.
Chapter III: THE VIEWS OF THE AXIOLOGISTS

Blackham, Lewis, Moore, Scriven and Toulmin share this purpose: to establish ethics as a science. G. E. Moore sets out, in Principia Ethica, to write "Prolegomena to any future Ethics that can possibly pretend to be scientific." In other words, I have endeavored to discover what are the fundamental principles of ethical reasoning; and the establishment of these principles, rather than any conclusions which may be attained by their use, may be regarded as my main object." (71:18)

Those who labor to uncover the principles of scientific—or as it is sometimes referred to, analytical—ethics are not, as axiologists, principally concerned with identifying specific behaviors, or classes of behaviors, which qualify as ethical conduct. Rather, they are interested in discovering how one may reliably go about determining what right conduct is; they are interested in the process more than the product which may come as a result of using the process; they are interested in finding out how one may use the methods of science, of reason, to decide ethical questions.

The definition Moore gives to the word "ethics" is much broader than the definition found in common parlance:

"I am using it (Ethics) to cover an inquiry for which, at all events, there is no other word: the general inquiry into what is good." (71:2)

"Ethics is undoubtedly concerned with the question what good conduct is; but being concerned with this, it obviously does not start at the beginning, unless it is prepared to tell us what is good as well as what is conduct. For 'good conduct' is a complex notion: all conduct is not good; for some is certainly bad and some may be indifferent. And on the other hand, other things, besides conduct, may be good; and if they are so, then good denotes some
property, that is common to them and conduct; and if we examine good conduct alone of all good things, then we shall be in danger of mistaking for this property, some property which is not shared by those other things: and thus we shall have made a mistake about ethics even in this limited sense; for we shall not know what good conduct really is." (71:2)

"If, for example, each of us were to say 'I am doing good now' or 'I had a good dinner yesterday' these statements would each of them be some sort of answer to our question...So too, when A asks B what school he ought to send his son to, B's answer will certainly be an ethical judgment." (71:3)

I include the preceding passage, even though it is lengthy, for two reasons: (1) to show that Moore is addressing himself to a question that encompasses much more than that which we in education customarily mean when we refer to "ethics"; and, thereby, to show that Moore's discussion of what is good is relevant to most social value issues, and (2) to show that in social science, which is a study of human behavior, most considerations of value are either ethical considerations in themselves or are very clearly closely tied to ethical considerations. Is this a good law? and, Should this policy be adopted? and, Should this constitution be changed? all involve, if they are not such themselves, ethical judgments. There is no escaping ethics if those questions are to be seriously considered. In any event, to understand ethics, which is the intersection, according to Moore, of the concepts "good" and "conduct," one must understand each of those primary concepts separately.

Toulmin has much the same purpose as Moore, even though he disagrees with Moore about "good" being a property: To discover the place of reason in ethics:

"Is ethics a science? How far...is the function of ethics like that of science? 'Well, for a start' someone may say, 'both ethics and science aim at the
discovery of Reality—separate Realities, different aspects of Ultimate Reality, maybe, but Reality nevertheless." (72:121)

The point here is that an investigation into what constitutes ethical conduct is no less an investigation into what is real than is a preoccupation with the real color of the sun. Furthermore,

"...what we call 'fully-developed moral judgments' are concerned, not with the things we like or the actions we feel to be right (since we may be misled as to their value), but with what is really good or right;..." (72:121)

To say that something is really good is not fatuous, any more than to say of a stick that appears to be bent (because it is in water) that it is really straight. Just as we confuse appearance for reality in science, so are we susceptible to that same confusion in ethics. What appears to be right conduct, or what I feel to be right conduct may be, on close inspection, just the opposite.

"The scientific distinction between appearance and reality reflects the function of science—'to correlate our experiences in such a way that we know what to expect.' Can we now, from an analogy between science and ethics, define the function of ethics similarly? If so, it will be to correlate our actions and responses in such a way that...,' but here we must leave a blank, for we have reached a point where the parallel between ethics and science breaks down." (72:125)

While science functions to predict, that is to bring our expectations into accord with the progress of real events, ethics functions to change our "dispositions and attitudes," our "feelings and behavior." (72:127–28)

The significance of this distinction is simply this: science cannot be separated on the basis that reason plays a more important role in one than the other; that ethical judgments ("fully developed") are no less the product of reason than are scientific conclusions; that differences in
opinion over the value of phenomena (including actions) "cannot be put down to differences in 'attitude' or 'disposition': if one were asked, 'How is it that you say this is red, and he says it's green?,' to say 'we just feel differently about it,' would be no answer." (72:126-27)

Ethical judgments, then, are properly subject to the same reasoned scrutiny as scientific judgments; similarly, "fully developed ethical judgments" may be regarded as having no less authority than carefully arrived at scientific conclusions, because ethics is a science. More precisely, it is a social science.

This similarity between ethical judgments and what all of us would agree are purely empirical judgments is important, because on questions of less importance to this study, Moore and Toulmin disagree. Moore is what Toulmin calls an "objectivist," and the latter rejects that position because "goodness" and "rightness" are not, in his view, properties of objects. This disagreement in no way alters the validity of their common purpose, which in Toulmin's words is to give an "account of what is a good reason for an ethical judgment, or provide...(a)...standard for criticizing ethical reasoning." (72:29) Moore and Toulmin disagree, for example, about the defects of subjectivism:

"...if it (subjectivism) were true, there would be nothing to be said when two people asserted opposite views about the value of any object or action."

"This weakness so far infects the subjective doctrine, that its supporters regard our central question as trivial, treat the difference between good ethical reasoning and bad as a matter of personal preference and refuse to help us in our search at all." (72:29)

Toulmin might have pointed out that it is grossly inconsistent for a subjectivist to regard an opposing theory as "trivial," because to say of a doctrine that it is less important, or less significant than some other is
to assign it value, that is, to assess its value. But if the sub-
jectivist expects us in the first moment to agree with him, he must in
the second moment expect us to disagree (or vice versa), because by his
own admission, he has given us an idea we cannot evaluate. We can neither
agree nor disagree, because he cannot escape this implication: that it is
trivial to disagree with what is trivial.

Referring to the question, What kinds of actions ought we to perform?
Moore says:

"...it becomes equally plain, that any answer to it
is capable of proof or disproof..." (71:viii)

It is this question which bears most relevantly on the valuation strategies
classified in this study, and it is this question which points up the
sharpest contrast between Toulmin, Scriven, Moore, Lewis and Blackham on
the one hand; and social science educators, excluding those grouped under
Category IV, on the other: What is the place of reason in the world of
value? Or, said differently, can value claims, even ethical claims,
be verified in the same way other claims are verified, and can value claims
be said to carry the same authority as propositions which everyone, sub-
jectivists, logical positivists, relativists, and the rest, would agree are
purely empirical? It is the affirmative answer which the axiologists
selected for this study give to that question which cuts so deeply into
the value theories popular among educators.

C. I. Lewis is equally plain in his response to those questions:

"Evaluations are a form of empirical knowledge, not
fundamentally different in what determines their
truth or falsity, and what determines their validity
or justification from other kinds of empirical
knowledge." (13:365)

"This fact has often been obscured by failure to
distinguish mere apprehensions of good or ill in
experience from predictions of the possible relations
Lewis, then, agrees with Moore and Toulmin that judgments of value are properly subject to the test of evidence and reason, because they are causal claims, or, as Lewis puts it, "predictions," which are based on knowledge of causal relationships. And like Toulmin and Moore, Lewis rejects subjectivism:

"The contrary conception has, of course, been frequent. It has been held that value apprehensions are subjective or relative in a sense which is incompatible with their genuinely cognitive significance. Or it has been maintained that value apprehensions are not matter of fact statements at all, being merely expressions of emotion and hence neither true nor false.

"But this is one of the strangest aberrations ever to visit the mind of man. The denial to value apprehensions in general of the character of truth or falsity and of knowledge, would imply both moral and practical cynicism. It would invalidate all action; because action becomes pointless unless there can be some measure of assurance of a valuable result which it may realize. And this negation, if it be carried out consistently, likewise invalidates all knowledge; both because believing is itself an active attitude which would have no point if it were not better to be right than wrong in what one believes, and because knowledge in general is for the sake of action. If action in general is pointless, then knowledge also is futile, and one belief is as good as another." (73:365-6)

What, then, of Blackham?

"What, now, is the relevance of science or rational procedures to the choice of values? Some philosophers would seem to say, none. David Hume in the eighteenth
century was one of the first to call attention to the logical point that a proposition which states what ought to be cannot be inferred from a proposition which states what is the case. Value cannot be derived from fact. How, then, are judgments of value and judgments of fact to be related? 'Reason is and ought only to be' said Hume, 'the slave of the passions.' In our century, Bertrand Russell has explicitly reaffirmed this dictum: 'It expresses a view to which I, like every man who attempts to be reasonable, fully subscribe. "Reason" has a perfectly clear and precise meaning. It signifies the choice of the right means to an end that you wish to achieve. It has nothing to do with the choice of ends.'

"Here are two eminent and highly respected philosophers who are exemplary humanists committing themselves unreservedly to an extreme position on a point of fundamental importance to humanists as rationalists. They are plainly wrong if what they say is taken literally...As to Russell, reason, that is to say attested information, has almost everything to do with the choice of ends, and of values." (74:36)

According to Blackham, ends, as well as means, are chosen. Choosing is a cognitive behavior, and "Choice is logically dependent upon knowledge (established by reasoning from experience) although it does not follow logically from knowledge...I choose something which I know (am informed about), I choose it by comparison with alternatives about which I am also informed, and I choose it in light of what my choice will involve as far as my best judgment can determine." (74:36)

Scriven's position on morality, values and ethics is introduced, in Primary Philosophy, by a series of questions:

"Are moral judgments any more than an expression of the attitudes we acquire from the society in which we live? Are they not, therefore, highly relative and subjective—not objective—claims at all but just sales talk in Sunday dress?...Is there some kind of ultimate distinction between facts and values?" (75:229)

Scriven argues, in Primary Philosophy, that the answers to those questions
are, respectively, "yes," "no," and "no." It is Scriven's position that "there is a particular conception of morality which can be shown to be an extension of rationality." (75:230) Scriven rejects both God and conscience as reliable guides to ethical judgment, the first because "there is no God" (75:232) and the second because (1) consciences are inconsistent both among and within persons, and if "support by conscience were the ultimate basis for morality, both views would be equally true (i.e., there would be no objective moral truth)," and (2) "even if all persons' consciences were always in agreement, this would not rule out the possibility that all were in error." (75:233)

How, then, according to Scriven, shall inquiry into ethics and values proceed? Under the rules and "total authority of facts and reason." (75:232)

"The objectivity of moral judgments, in terms of the system just described, is exactly that of any very complex solution of an important practical or theoretical problem." (75:232)

This line alone gives indication of the positions Scriven takes on the questions posed in the introduction to the chapter of morality (Ch. VII): moral judgments are more than an expression of socially acquired attitudes. They are not highly relativistic or subjective, and there is not any ultimate distinction between facts and values. The class of claims commonly referred to as facts and the class of assertions known as values are not mutually exclusive categories.

Therefore, Toulmin, Moore, Scriven, Blackham and Lewis may be regarded as in a state of fundamental agreement when it comes to the question at the fore of this study: Can and should the search for values be an objective search, guided not by the dictates of heart and conscience, but by the rules and procedures of reason and logic? And now we shall see whether the view...
is consistent with those expressed by the educators whose views were classified and described in the preceding section.
Axiologists Contrasted to Social Science Educators: Category I

It is not clear whether the proposals for teaching values found in Category I amount to endorsements of propagandizing, because the educators who put forward these proposals are vague about how the values they would teach ought to be taught and learned. One educator speaks of "continually emphasizing" certain values (Heffernan), another thinks the critical teaching process is "clarifying" (Bain), and another believes the young must be "inducted" (Smith) into the values of the culture. Unfortunately, very little can be reliably inferred from these terms—they simply encompass too many possibilities. Perhaps it is significant that none suggests that two lists of values be drawn up for students to study, one list consisting of direct contradictions of the other. This much does seem clear, however: the process by which students shall learn the specified values is deductive (if it is at all analytic), rather than inductive. Instead of examining sets of alternatives, which could be inquired into, the student is to be given a conclusion about the value of some phenomenon and, if it is strategic to do so, the arguments in support of it. The conclusions are "emphasized" or "clarified" for purposes of persuading the student to accept them. Instead of supplying students with the tools of value analysis, they are to be provided certain assumptions which, at least from one educator's point of view, will serve as "the limits of the mandatory" and shall be verified, if sticky disagreements arise, by the authority of the teacher. (21:46)

Because so little is said by these educators about how students are to learn values, the axiologists selected for this study qua axiologists have little to say in response. The questions implicit in the proposals for
teaching values found in Category I are not so much axiological (no explicit reference is made to the nature or function of values or valuing) as they are ethical, legal and educational. Some might well argue that it is unethical to teach values by the persuasive force of anything other than reason; that it is unethical to put forth a conclusion and then report only the evidence which seems to support it. Some might, consequently, even argue that it is illegal to do that in a public institution, even if the probability of persuading a court of same is small. Still others might argue that these educators have offered a method of teaching values which is, both in the short and long run, simply ineffective; that such values-instruction, like a poorly administered vaccine, will not "take."

The axiologists selected for this study, however, might have something to say about the sources of this view, and be highly critical of the assumptions underlying it. It may be—and admittedly, this is somewhat speculative—that this view of how values ought to be taught proceeds from the assumption that values cannot be analyzed, that they are simply immune to any attempt at rational examination. But not one educator grouped in Category I has openly entertained this question, i.e., can value issues be subjected to the same basic inquiry processes used in validating "empirical" claims?

If little criticism can be made from an axiological point of view (perhaps because the views of Category I educators do not qualify, even in a minimal sense, as axiological theories at all), a rather fundamental epistemological objection can be raised: students who are persuaded to believe value X through "emphasis" or "clarification" or "induction" will not understand, in an epistemological sense, value X. In order to know
value $X$, two criteria must be met: (1) $X$ must be true, and (2) why $X$ is true must be understood. No amount of "emphasis," "clarifying" or "inducting" would be enough to satisfy the second criterion. Table-pounding has nothing to do with proof processes.
Axiologists Contrasted to Social Science Educators: Category II

The axiologists selected for this study are in sharp disagreement with the educators whose views are described in Category II (Decisional Valuation). The common characteristic of the Category II views is the belief that students must be free to make their own decisions about values. From the axiological point of view described earlier, there are no "decisions" to be made. The axiological position derives directly from the notion that values are properly subject to logical-empirical test; consequently, making a decision about a value issue is no more pertinent than making a decision about a hypothesis tested in a chemistry laboratory: either the evidence supports the hypothesis or not. The final court of appeal is not one's conscience when it comes to determining whether, for example, chemical solution A is a catalyst of event B; rather, certain empirical tests will "dictate" the answer.

If the evidence indicates that A is not a catalyst of B, there is no justification for believing that A is a catalyst of B. It may be, of course, that A is, in fact, a catalyst of B, and that the experiment was conducted improperly. That possibility, however, is in no way a convincing argument against the claim that one ought to believe what the evidence indicates. Of course, if one has good reason to believe that the experiment was faulty, then he ought to believe it was faulty.

And so it is with analytical ethics, or scientific ethics: one is not justified in believing that Law 17 is a good law if the evidence and the arguments indicate that it is not, because, according to the views expressed by Scriven, Lewis, et. al., investigation into value claims proceeds in a methodologically the same way as other investigations. It is probably true
that the belief that students must be left free to make their own value decisions is the product of two other beliefs: one, that valuation is a subjective process, or relativistic process, and that there is no way to demonstrate the logical or empirical validity (or invalidity) of any given valuation. Given this view, it makes no sense—and is furthermore tyrannical—for anyone to tell, let alone coerce, anyone else what to believe, especially when it comes to ethics and morality. Therefore, the teacher must provide students with the freedom to believe what they choose to believe. From the view of those axiologists who endorse analytical ethics, no one need tell anyone else what to believe about value claim X; indeed, no one need tell himself what to believe. The evidence from the analysis will "tell" one what to believe, what is worth believing in. With regard to value disputes, then, the question, Who will decide? is not relevant. Rather the question is, What will decide? And the answer is the findings, reason, the results of analysis. The dispute is handed over, so to speak, to the "total authority of facts and reason." (75:232)

The other belief which has encouraged development of the decisional valuation theme is the claim that much of what has taken place in the name of "values instruction" is little more than indoctrination. To determine whether, or if so to what extent, schools have engaged in indoctrination is not the purpose of this study; I simply note that acceptance of the conclusion that schools have indoctrinated students may have helped promote the development of the several varieties of subjectivism and relativism. The important point here—the idea which separates those who support analytical ethics from those who endorse Decisional Valuation—is that if one is going to make a decision about a disputed value claim, there is no
need to even begin an analysis.

Decisions preempt analyses. If a decision is to be made, there is no need to undertake any time-consuming study, for either the decision will confirm what is indicated by the results of the analysis—in which case the decision is superfluous and redundant—or the decision will deny the evidence produced, in which case the inquirer has behaved, by definition, irrationally. One of two conclusions may be drawn, then, about Category II educators: either they are subjectivists (or relativists), and reject the authority of reason in settling value problems (in which case there is clear disagreement between them and the axiologists selected for this study), or they do in some sense believe that values can be treated analytically, in which case there are internal contradictions in their position.

A word or two needs to be said about some of the specific claims made by Category II educators: There is a sizeable contradiction built into Fenton's distinction between substantive and procedural values. (Whether the distinction itself is a useful one—like the distinction between process and content—is open to question). The major inconsistency is found in the implications of the substantive-procedural distinction. Since substantive values are the products of rationality (a procedural value Fenton says we are justified in teaching), it makes no sense to (1) first insist of the student that he use the methods of science and (2) then entitle him to believe whatever he wants to believe. Implicit in the acceptance of the value of rationality is the fact that some value beliefs are simply not justified. Analogously, it would make no sense to say to a student, "You must learn how to multiply, and when you go about working
on your multiplication problems you must adhere to these rules; of course whatever numerical products you come up with are fine—that's up to you as long as you follow these procedures." Now, such an approach is either (1) contradictory, or (2) a clumsy attempt at deception ("I'm going to let you think you are an independent intellectual agent when in fact you are responsible to reason."). For if the student does use mathematical principles correctly in doing multiplication problems, he cannot help but come up with correct answers. And so it is with the methods of analysis and valuation. If we are justified, as Fenton says we are, in requiring students to learn and use the methods of rational analysis, then we are not justified in giving them license to disregard the outcomes of analyses.

Further, it would follow from the premise "students ought to use the methods of science in their studies of value issues" that they could arrive, justifiably, at the same conclusion. Unless we intentionally want some of our students to hold unjustified beliefs, we would want them to use analytic processes correctly and, therefore, come to substantially the same conclusion. This excludes certain aspects of aesthetics of course.
Axiologists Contrasted to Social Science Educators: Category III

It was suggested in the preceding section that the theme decisional valuation derives from a subjectivist or relativistic outlook on value judging. In various places in this study reference is made to a belief which may be the principal premise upon which subjectivism rests: the idea that value claims are not factual claims; the notion that the class of assertions known as "value claims" is parallel to, rather than a subset of, the class of assertions known as factual claims; that the ought cannot be derived from the is. The disagreement between educators and axiologists on this point is both sharp and apparent. According to Scriven, Lewis, et. al., there are many, many assertions which are both value claims and factual claims. Scriven has argued that:

"One of the main sources of confusion in the social studies curriculum, particularly those which get the students to deal with values, is a fundamental logical hang-up about the nature of the difference between facts and values, between describing and prescribing....I'd be inclined to start off with something like this: there is absolutely no intrinsic distinction between facts and values; the distinction can be made only in a specific context where specific claims are being made. For example, it's just a fact that pin-lever watches are lousy timepieces. It's a fact that that value judgment is true. Value assertions are factual assertions in many, many social science contexts.

"There's some fascinating research on teacher attitudes which exemplifies this. In one account I read recently, the author reported at the end of his teacher training experiment that the whole thing had been a disaster; that the teachers were unable to understand that when they said there is good evidence for the conclusion that democracy is a good form of government, they had failed to understand the distinction between facts and values; they had failed to understand, as the line goes, that there can't be factual evidence for a value conclusion. Now some 60-70 percent of the teachers in the study thought there really is good evidence that democracy is a
good form of government, and they were, says the study, completely confused. They couldn't understand that when they said democracy is a good form of government, they were expressing an attitude that 'has no cognitive content.' Well, that's a lot of crap. If there isn't good evidence that democracy is a good form of government, what in God's name have we got it for? If it's really an arbitrary matter, how tyrannical it is of us to penalize people for attacking this American system by revolutionary means. If it's really arbitrary, we should simply divide up into the two groups, those who like democracy and those who don't, put the Mississippi between us and go our separate ways. But nobody really thinks it's an arbitrary matter, and they're right. There are very good reasons for democracy, and if it's our methodologists, social scientists, and curriculum developers who think that you can't give good, objective reasons in support of democracy, then educational reform is going to have to start with them, not with the teachers, who are right."

(From the unpublished transcripts of the Marin Conference held at the Hotel Claremont, November, 1969)

Of the axiologists selected for this study, Scriven brings into sharpest focus the disagreement between axiologists and educators, and although his criticism is pointed directly at education, he is by no means alone in rejecting the belief that the world of fact is separated from the world of value. Lewis' comment that the belief that value apprehensions are not matter-of-fact statements at all "is one of the strangest aberrations ever to visit the mind of man" certainly lends support to this criticism. And Toulmin could not possibly have as his aim the establishment of ethics as a science if he believed that value judgments are incapable of being verified. And the same, then, is true of Moore, who had the same purpose (to show that ethics is a science). Blackham's position is altogether consistent with Scriven's criticism, and that is made clear by his insistence that "reason has almost everything to do with...values." (74:36)

How, then, might this controversy be viewed? To argue that the worlds
of fact and value are separated; to argue that there are no value claims which may be considered proper material for logical and empirical investigation, is to argue that value claims are deficient in a way purely empirical claims are not. And that is analogous, in structure at least, to arguing that there are no intelligent life forms outside this solar system. The two are similar in that they require similar strategies for inspection. The surest way to resolve the question, Is there intelligent life elsewhere? is to go in search of it. Now, one might not be able to conclude, having come up empty-handed, that there is no intelligent life outside this system, unless he were confident that his observations had taken in the entire universe. On the other hand, discovery of some phenomenon which fit the various definitions with which he undertook the inquiry would surely be more than sufficient experience to answer the question affirmatively.

A nearly identical strategy may be used for answering the question, Are some value claims also factual claims? One simply searches for a statement which satisfies both criteria. That is, one might search for a value claim which is also a factual claim (or to clinch it, a value claim which everyone agrees is a fact). Although Scriven has not, at least in print, explained the strategy in these same terms, he did set out to identify a claim to value which is also a claim to factual truth. Ergo:

"For example, it's just a fact that pin-lever watches are lousy timepieces. It's a fact that that value judgment is true." (76)

But what of Shaver's argument that this is an example of evaluation, but not of valuing? According to Shaver, valuing is establishing the criteria by which evaluations are made. (1:117) In Scriven's pin-lever watch example, then, the word timepieces suggests that a watch ought to be judged
according to its ability to keep time. The assertion, "a watch ought to be judged by its ability to keep time," fits Shaver's definition of valuing:

"Making value judgments is a matter of deciding what the criteria should be; that is of deciding what is right or is important." (1:117)

The next question, then, is whether the assertion, "the set of criteria used to judge timepieces ought to include time-keeping ability," is equally subject to logical-empirical test. It could be argued that any claim to the opposite is simply an open contradiction, because to begin with the assertion, "the set of criteria used in judging watches ought to include time-keeping ability," is so tightly constructed that it is very nearly tautological. In this case, any argument to exclude time-keeping ability as a criterion becomes nonsensical, baffling, absurd. One need not rely, however, on this sort of analysis in order to understand the two arguments. Such reasoning is simply an attempt to short-cut experience anyway, and the acid test is to be found in the consequences the two points of view have for our lives. Suppose we set out to purchase a watch. Suppose also that it is our purpose to own a device which, among other things, will keep time. Should we compare the various instruments available according to their time-keeping ability?

Unfortunately, this line gives renewed energy to those who would argue Shaver's point in the extreme, for it provides them an opportunity to inquire whether time ought to be kept at all. They might further argue that in order to show that one should evaluate a watch to be purchased against its ability to keep time, one would have to first demonstrate the desirability of keeping time at all. This is essentially the same argument, even though it
means to lead us back to Noah's Ark. That poses no real problem for Scriven, however, because it can be shown that Noah's Ark is not an untestable assumption; rather, Noah's Ark is a set of facts, e.g., I want to live. In any event, the important point is that in most disputes of this kind we need not go far at all before the real differences in opinion dissolve. If one seriously wanted to press the question, Why keep time at all? the strategy for thinking about it is much the same: what are the consequences, in terms of our lives, of not keeping time? The argument becomes a bit more complicated simply because although it may be desirable for all watches purchased to keep accurate time, it may not be desirable for all those who could wear watches to be time keepers. The question may be considered as a general one, however; that is, should time be kept by anyone? The proof, then, is found in experience: what would happen if no one kept time? The course of the argument from this point on is clear: the objections to the claim "the value of a watch as a time-keeping instrument may be empirically known" border on and invade tedium, and become, for anyone's living purposes, inane.
Axiologists Contrasted to Social Science Educators: Category IV

There is little to contrast between the educators grouped in Category IV and the axiologists selected for this study because the two are in agreement about the nature and function of valuing. The belief that the tasks of substantive ethics are not decisional (48:41) and the belief that "causal connexions are at the heart of value judgments" and, therefore, "amenable to the logic of scientific inquiry," are quite compatible with the views of the axiologists. It is true that Axtelle did not, in the article cited, distinguish, as does Moore, between value judgments of a causal nature and value judgments which assert that some thing (sic) is good in itself (71:23); nevertheless, they both reject subjectivism, relativism and other brands of nonanalytical ethics, and they both endorse the view that values are amenable to the logic of scientific inquiry.
Axiologists Contrasted to Social Science Educators: Category V

While Toulmin has argued that the function of ethics is to change our feelings, the educators grouped in Category V support the view that it is the function of feeling to decide questions of value. The disagreement between the educators and the axiologists on the relation of feelings to values is not easily understood, partly because the axiologists have not answered the specific claims put forward by educators (there is very little communication between the two fields), and partly because the positions held by educators are not always clear. If it is held that values are feelings, then one of the differences is that axiologists claim a distinction between feelings and values, a distinction not made by Category V educators. Or if the educators mean to say that it is our feelings, our emotions, e.g., anxiety, love, hate, etc., that play the major role in shaping what we believe about values, Scriven, Lewis, and the rest might, if they were in a pessimistic mood, agree. They would be quick to observe, however, that even though one might let his feelings determine what he believes to be valuable, he will not have found a reliable method of determining what is valuable, simply because the feelings one has for phenomena are neither a complete nor reliable measure of their real value. Whether a particular serum is valuable for inoculating against smallpox is a question quite independent of the revulsion I may experience when I learn how the serum is made.

More directly to the point, however, is Toulmin's view that expressions of feeling are not "fully developed judgments" at all:

"The starting point of this (the imperative) approach is the doctrine that, in calling anything good or right, we are only evincing (displaying) our feelings towards it. In saying 'You ought not to steal' for
example, we are (it is said) doing no more, from the logician's point of view, than if we cried 'Stealing!' in a peculiarly horrified tone."

(72:46)

About this weakness in the imperative approach, Toulmin concludes:

"Sometimes when we make ethical judgments, we are not just ejaculating. When we say that so-and-so is good, or that I ought to do such-and-such, we do so sometimes for good reasons and sometimes for bad ones. The imperative approach does not help us in the slightest to distinguish the one from the other—in fact, by saying that to talk of reasons in this context is nonsense, it dismisses our question altogether. However, the doctrine is not only false but innocuous, for it draws its own fangs. If, as we must, we still refuse to treat ethical judgments as ejaculations, its advocate can produce no further reasons for his view. By his own account, all he can do is to evince disapproval of our procedure, and urge us to give it up, it would be inconsistent of him to advance 'reasons' at this stage. And if, instead, he retorts, 'Very well; but nothing else will get you anywhere,' that is a challenge worth accepting, a prediction worth falsifying."

(72:60)

Toulmin's argument is very persuasive, especially the sections which follow his acceptance of the hypothetical challenge; so persuasive, in fact, that to do other than reject the imperative approach would be inconsistent with the aims of this thesis and the intellectual standards to which it is responsible. In order to accept the imperative doctrine (as a theoretical base for the development of curricula which deal with values), I must have reasons in support of it. Yet by their own admission, no reasons can be given in support of the Imperativist's view.

Toulmin's criticism of the subjective doctrine, of which Imperativism is a part, is relevant to this point:

"In its simplest form, the subjective doctrine has an obvious defect: If it were true, there would be nothing to be said when two people asserted opposite views about the value of any object or action. Once again, however, ingenious emendations are offered in the hope of saving the doctrine: these I shall have
to consider in detail. I shall show that any theory based on the subjective doctrine must have one fatal weakness; that the concept of 'attitudes' (or whatever concept the new theory relies on in place of 'feelings') cannot, as long as it retains a special reference to the speaker, do what is required of it—for no subjective theory can give any account of what is a good reason for an ethical judgment, or provide any standard for criticizing ethical reasoning." (72:29)

The Imperativists treat ethical questions in ways that are perhaps more appropriate to the consideration of aesthetic questions. Emotive responses are appropriate when dealing with certain kinds of aesthetical questions, but only in a much more limited and entirely different way when dealing with ethics. Interestingly, the distinction between questions of ethical value and of aesthetical value is not made by any of the educators reviewed for this study.*

Axiologists Contrasted to Social Science Educators: Category VI

Closely allied to the belief that values are feelings, or derived from feelings, is the notion that values are simply indications of preference. As I mentioned earlier, this group of educators may not be distinguishable from those classified in Category V; it is not clear whether the views put forward by Category VI educators are simply insignificant deviations away from the larger theme, that values are feelings. In any event, the disagreement between the axiologists and these educators, regardless of their proper group placement, is quite sharp: if values are simply indication of preference, then any inquiry into values cannot be scientific in the least. If the world of values is simply the world of preference manifest, then all questions of value must be decided by individual test, in which case the world of value is a world of subjective relations. Just as important, if questions of other-than-aesthetic value are to be decided by preference, one would never know whether to believe that they should be so decided. For this point of view falls prey to the same criticism as that made of the belief that values are feelings (the Imperative approach). Further, I frequently prefer that which is bad, both for me and for others, and disdain that which is good, and an individual's sense of preference is not always a sufficient basis for predicting the value of an experience. For example, one's immediate preference might be to put off reading a difficult book, when in fact reading the book would prove to be very valuable. Said differently, there are many things in this world which I do because they are good for me, even though I prefer to avoid them.
Axiologists Contrasted to Social Science Educators: Category VII

The view that values have a factual component, that there are factual considerations involved in many value issues, but that the value issue itself is "a matter of opinion" (Goldmark); the view that any attempt to analyze a value claim must eventually wind down to a subjective question is not explicitly dealt with by the axiologists selected for this study, because it is not a popular argument in philosophy. The axiologists discussed here have considerable to say about subjectivism, and considerable to say about analytical ethics; but they have only by implication something to say about those who declare themselves objectivists during the first three quarters of play and subjectivists (when the going gets rough) during the last quarter of play.

Nevertheless, there is at least clear, if not explicit, disagreement between the educators and the axiologists on this point, and it may be understood. The objection raised to decisional valuation is appropriate here; that is, if any inquiry into values must, whether it is undertaken analytically to begin with, dissolve, in the end, into subjectivism, there is no reason to begin the inquiry in the first place. If the results of an analysis of a value question do not indicate clearly what should be valued, there is no need to undertake the analysis at all, unless it is to use the analysis to strip away the chaff so that the essence of the problem (the value question itself) may be understood. But why, then, bother to understand the problem? If the answer is elusive whether the question is clear or not—indeed, if there is no answer—why should one put himself out to do a lot of tough intellectual legwork? There is no
profit in it. But even here there is sharp disagreement between the educators and the axiologists: Toulmin, Lewis, Scriven and the rest all contend that value questions are fully amenable to scientific inquiry, and that analytical treatment of a value question will indicate what ought to be believed about it.
Of the axiologists referred to in this study, Scriven is most direct in objecting to the idea that one's values are arranged in a vertical hierarchy. This is not to say that some values are not more or less important than others; rather, it means that if one set out to diagram his value system, the schematic would look more like a constellation of stars than readings of a thermometer, or as Scriven puts it, more like a "net":

"The system of a man's values is a net and not a knotted string. It is a web that stretches across our lives and actions and connects them with the threads of reason. It may be that a net only ties holes together, but it still has to have some points of attachment. The rational tension in the cords often makes it necessary to adjust these points of attachment, as we add new connections or the old holding points move around, but this internal tension is not self-supporting. There must be points of attachment, and they should be secure ones. No point of attachment is immune to these adjustments; so there are no ultimate values, in the sense of unquestionable or indefensible ones. But certainly some values are more important than others; that is, more numerous threads run from them." (76)

It may well be that it is impossible to arrange in any manner values like "it is bad to lie," "killing is wrong conduct," or "it is good to treat others equally." Those judgments can surely be shown to be wrong in some instances, and therefore, if taken literally, completely wrong. Surely there are situations in which it is wrong to tell the truth and right to treat others unequally. But proponents of such views do not mean for those expressions to be taken as anything more than indications of general intent. As indications of general intent they are so ambiguous as to border on meaninglessness, and one would have to do a lot of coin-flipping in order to decide the relative value of equality, honesty,
integrity, and respect. Concerning lying, then, one might be said to have many values, e.g., that in some situations lying is wrong, in others right, and in still others irrelevant. The notion that one can hierarchically stack his values, one on top of the other, is closely connected to the belief that values are principles, universals, massive generalizations that should be followed to the letter regardless of the situation. But this is the surest way to make unethical behavior inevitable.
Axiologists Contrasted to Social Science Educators: Category IX

The belief that values should be analyzed in specific contexts is very much consistent with the axiological views described in this study. At the Marin Conference, Scriven argued that massive generalizations like, "Killing is wrong," should be taken as first place indicators, as starting places for analyses of very specific claims about very specific situations. The assertion, "Killing is wrong," must be accepted as an initial indication of one's general attitude toward killing, or it must be rejected as literally false. The "prima facie equality of rights rule," for example, reads "people should be treated equally unless there is good reason for treating them unequally"; it is not an unqualified endorsement of equality.

What is just as important is the fact that out-of-context generalizations do not lend themselves to analysis. The best one can do if asked to respond to a question like, Is it wrong to steal? is to say, "sometimes," because the claim, It is wrong to steal, is as most people mean it, many, many separate assertions ambiguously wrapped up into one. Either it is that, or it is the easiest question to answer ever asked. To ask students to accept as literally true such massive generalizations as "It is wrong to steal" is to paralyze them, render them helpless when it comes to real world problems.
Axiologists Contrasted to Social Science Educators: Category X

The view that students do acquire values through such processes as "identification," and that it is, therefore, the job of the educational system to discover efficacious ways of assisting those processes has at least one very serious defect: the conclusion does not follow from the premise. It does not follow from the observation that students do acquire values through nonanalytical processes that they ought to acquire values through nonanalytical processes. Indeed, the opposite conclusion seems more reasonable. It is as though once having discovered that students are being made the victims of subtle influences, educators concluded that we ought to make the influences insidious as well as subtle, and the students vulnerable as well as receptive.

From one angle, none of the theories put forward by educators is more antithetical to scientific ethics than the "Psycho-Social Acculturation" line; for it is precisely that which analysis resists; it is precisely because we are conditioned and subjected to various influences we do not fully understand, that we ought to learn how to consciously, and deliberately analyze and evaluate the various belief candidates put before us. Anything less, i.e., identificatory learning, is nothing less than sophisticated technique for brainwashing. To teach students to value X by identifying with respected "others" who value X is to set them up like clay pigeons for the thousands of commercial advertisements which rely on that technique to sell their products. To provide students with models with which to identify may sell the product (whether it is an idea, a deodorant, or a ride in the friendly skies) but it won't help the buyer decide whether it ought to be bought.
Chapter V: ANALYSIS OF CURRICULUM MATERIALS

This chapter is an analysis of seven secondary social studies curricula which are described in the Marin Social Studies Project "Directory of Research and Curriculum Development Projects." The purpose of this analysis is to determine the extent to which these materials incorporate valuation theories which are axiologically unsound, i.e., the extent to which these materials contain valuation theories which are inconsistent with the fundamental purposes of inquiry and the positions endorsed by the axiologists selected for this study.
Curriculum: The Amherst Project
Director: Brown, Rich. H.

Materials:

1. Collective Security in the 1930's (student text and teacher's guide)
2. Korea and the Limits of Limited War (student text and teacher's guide)
3. Hiroshima (student text and teacher's guide)
4. Communism in America (student text and teacher's guide)
5. Freedom and Authority in Puritan New England (student text and teacher's guide)
6. What Happened on Lexington Green? (student text and teacher's guide)

These materials are noticeable lacking in reference to values and valuing. The questions in the materials are analytic rather than evaluative. There seems to be nothing built into the materials which would either discourage or assist either an objective or subjective approach to using them. The teacher's guides make no explicit reference to values or valuing.
This anthology is a collection of short readings from a variety of sources. The authors make no recommendations regarding valuing strategies.
Curriculum: Sociological Resources for the Social Studies

Director: Angell, Robert

Materials:

1. The Incidence and Effects of Poverty in the United States (teacher's guide)
2. Images of People (teacher's guide)
3. Leadership in American Society (teacher's guide)
4. Testing for Truth (teacher's guide)

The following statement appears in the preface of each of the above titles, as part of the author's introduction to the material:

"It may be wise to point out to students that SRSS materials are concerned primarily with the way things are, not the way they ought to be. SRSS episodes are concerned with facts of social life, with the concepts and methods which these facts can best be uncovered and analyzed, and with general statements of the relationships and processes that flow from such analyses. Occasionally students are encouraged to examine and critically weigh action alternatives that may be potential solutions to social problems. This is what they will have to do as citizens. But SRSS takes no stand on preferred solutions. Careful study of this episode should help the students in analyzing action alternatives since the episode is designed to deter discussion based solely on opinion." (p. 1)

This paragraph is suggestive of the commonly made distinction between facts and values; that statements of what "ought to be" are somehow sharply separated from the "facts of social life." One would expect to find in the materials, given this introductory reference to the difference between the "is" and the "ought," evidence of a subjectivistic or relativistic approach to the social problems students are encouraged to "examine and critically weigh."

Lesson eleven of "The Incidence and Effects of Poverty in the United States" is entitled "What's Best?" The following statement is given as the
objective of the lesson:

"To have students use their knowledge of poverty gained from the study of this episode to assess the relative merits of the two types of poverty programs—those providing cash benefits and those providing goods and services." (p. 74)

The authors recommend, as a "suggested teaching procedure," that

"Before any discussion takes place of this question, have the students indicate which type of program they are supporting. Record the results of this vote on the board under the appropriate headings—cash or goods and services. (The results of this vote will be compared with the results from a second vote to be taken during Lesson 12, after students have been exposed to conflicting viewpoints on this question.) Following the vote, have those students supporting cash benefits move to one side of the room and those supporting goods and services to the other. Then place the following headings on the board.

ARGUMENTS FOR CASH BENEFITS

ARGUMENTS FOR GOODS AND SERVICES

"Starting with one side of the room, have a student present an argument in favor of the program he is supporting and write the key points of this argument on the board. Then move to the other side of the room and see if you can get a counterargument. This kind of argument-counterargument discussion should result in a lively debate between supporters of the two kinds of programs.

"Keep in mind that there are no firm answers. Students should be allowed to discuss freely and should feel free to challenge the statements of their classmates. Your job as discussion leader is simply to elicit as many and as full responses as you can from the students. This lesson should end with many loose ends as far as positions are concerned." (p. 74)

Aside from the matter of the discrepancy between the recommendation that

"Before any discussion takes place on this question, have the students indicate which type of program they are supporting" and the orientation statement in the "overview" ("...the episode is designed to deter discussion based solely on opinion"), there are a number of observations that can be made about this lesson:
1. The statement, "Keep in mind that there are no firm answers," is suggestive of a relativistic or subjectivist (but more likely the former) view. If we take the authors literally, that there are no firm answers, then it can be said that they have given us a very powerful reason for not using the materials. (The word "firm" is somewhat lacking in precise meaning, but it doesn't seem unreasonable to infer that they mean something like "reliable" or "factual" or "right") because if all the materials hold out is a promise of an answer which cannot be relied on, why undertake the inquiry? The impression one gets from this lesson is that the authors believe that two people can be equally entitled to hold contradictory views. Scriven argued at the Marin Conference that 

"...the trouble with that position is that it's inherently contradictory. You cannot both teach students that they are entitled to alternative views and that they are not entitled to alternative views. You can't teach them that they are justified but not right. If they are equally entitled to alternative views, they are not entitled to them. How can I sit here and say, 'Of course I'm right; he says I'm perfectly entitled to this view; of course, he also says he's perfectly entitled to his.' Now on what basis do I decide what to do?" (76)

But what sort of conception might bring one to believe that two people are equally entitled to hold contradictory views? Quite likely, it is this: that the purpose of social studies lessons of this kind is to give students an opportunity to
defend their views as opposed to analyzing and evaluating various points of view they could adopt. And that leads me to the second point:

2. By asking students to take a position and then hear other views and arguments (which is what this lesson calls for), one increases the probability that when they hear the opposing views they won't understand them. Because there is something contradictory, and unfair, about asking a student to both defend his existing views and analyze and evaluate opposing arguments; it is unreasonable to ask a student to simultaneously show why he is right and at the same time find out whether he is wrong.

3. The comment, "This lesson should end with many loose ends as far as positions are concerned," can be taken as an endorsement of either subjectivism or relativism, if the authors mean there should be no concerted attempt to resolve the various disputes which arise. But this looks more like intellectual nihilism than a tolerant attitude toward discussion, and Scriven's comments about "equal entitlement" are appropriate to this point. In another place on the same page, the author comments, "Both views can be defended, as the students will see in their next homework assignment." But are we to infer what is implied, i.e., that both views can be defended equally well? And if this is the case, if it is in fact true that both positions can be supported equally strongly, then we have but another good reason for
for not using the materials. For on what basis will
the student come to a decision about what he believes?
If he examines thoroughly the merits of the opposing
views, he will, according to the author, discover that
both sides are justified. Would we then be guilty of
playing games with the student's mind?

The other guides produced by this project have some of the same
characteristics as this one, and users should be alert to the sorts of
difficulties described above.
Curriculum: Your Rights and Responsibilities as an American Citizen from the Committee on Civic Education

Director: Quigley, Charles and Richard Longaker


The student materials consist of "situations and cases involving most of the important principles of constitutional democracy, and those concepts in the Constitution and Bill of Rights that are designed to preserve the essential values of American democracy." (p. 1, teacher's guide) Quigley's conception of the proper way to treat the materials is set forth in the first several pages of the teacher's guide:

"These units deal with controversial issues. A particular philosophic position concerning the proper role of teachers in the public schools in a free society underlies the development of the teaching methods and materials presented in this guide and in the Civics Casebook. According to this position, instruction concerning issues about which there is a wide range of learned opinion should not be a teaching of the truth or falsehood of opinions, but should be concerned with an identification of issues and of the values involved, an understanding of considerations relevant to the issues, and a discussion of the probable consequences of different solutions to issues.

"This position is based upon a belief in the dignity of man and a faith in his intelligence. That is to say, a belief that in a free society it is the right of each individual to use and interpret experience in his own way, and a faith that, given the opportunities to gain knowledge and the freedom to choose between alternative courses of action, most men will choose wisely most of the time through the use of their own intelligence.

"Thus, it is not the proper role of the teacher when presenting a controversial issue to attempt to make choices for the students or to teach in such a manner that choices are not open to them. The teacher should not try to develop a consensus of opinion on the many issues covered in these units. Students should leave the class with differing opinions. However, as a result of these units, their opinions should reflect a more profound understanding of the issues than they did when the students entered the class. The teacher can and should play the invaluable role of helping students deepen this understanding.
There are three major points in the foregoing with which the axiologists reported in this study take exception:

1. If Quigley means by the comment there "should not be a teaching of the truth or falsehood of opinions" that teachers should not dictate conclusions to the students, then there is, on that point at least, no inconsistency between Quigley's position and the axiological position set forth in this study. If, on the other hand, Quigley means that the purpose of instruction should not be to teach students how to resolve those disputes, that there should be no conclusions, that there should be no teaching of the truth or falsehood of opinions because opinions cannot be said to be true or false, he has placed himself in direct opposition to the view that ethics is a science. From the axiological views reported earlier it is futile to "be concerned with an identification of issues and of the values involved, an understanding of considerations relevant to the issues, and a discussion of the probable consequences of different solutions to issues" unless one has some expectation of resolving those issues, some expectation of showing that some conclusions are unwarrantable, and others valid. To deny the validity of such expectation is to truncate the inquiry process and make it pointless. It may well be Quigley's purpose to build into the curriculum protection against indoctrination. And well it should be. Unfortunately, taking out this sort of
insurance emasculates the process altogether
and destroys whatever rationale one might have for engaging
in it. Why should a student undertake an examination of
a controversial issue if he knows at the outset that there
is no way to tell whether one opinion is any more or less
valid than another?

2. In the second paragraph, Quigley says that "this position
is based upon a belief...that in a free society it is the
right of each individual to use and interpret experience
in his own way...." From the axiologists' point of view,
man is not and should not be free to interpret experience
"in his own way." Rather, the inquirer must be responsible
to the dictates of the scientific method, to the rules of
reason, and not, for example, to his conscience. A word
here about the source of this view is appropriate: Quigley,
like many social science educators, is rightly concerned
with preventing indoctrination. The view that students must
be free to make their own decisions derives from a faulty
conclusion, i.e., that if it is judged improper for someone
to tell another the right and true conclusion to a problem,
then it must follow that each person must be free to make
up his own mind. The possibility that there is another
alternative has apparently not occurred to many educators.
That is, that some thing, as opposed to some person, can be
relied on to arrive at correct judgments. That thing, of
course, is reason.

3. The third point that needs examination is Quigley's remark in the third paragraph that "Students should leave the class with differing opinions." One need have little doubt that if the teacher follows Quigley's advice in the two preceding paragraphs, students will leave the class with a great variety of opinions. But it follows from the claim that if ethics is a science, that students should no more leave the classroom with differing opinions about an ethical issue than they should leave a biology classroom with different opinions about the effect of carcinogens on the regeneration of lung tissue. Possibly they will, of course, but not because the problem in biology is a scientific problem and the other not. If they leave the classroom with differing positions, each position valid relative to the person who takes it, very little has been gained. Furthermore, it is likely that the students have not learned how to analyze value issues.
Curriculum:  Holt Social Studies Curriculum
Director:  Fenton, Edwin, general editor

Comparative Political Systems, the student text, makes no reference to value analysis, values, value judging, value problems, etc. The teacher's guide contains but a single paragraph description of the underlying conception of the valuing process. None of the recommended discussion questions in the teacher's guide requires valuing. Each of the six sections in that guide is preceded by a list of some three or four specific value judgments which the student is expected to acquire.

Consequently, very little can be said about the ways in which the valuing processes in this curriculum contrast to the valuing processes employed by axiologists. It is not that the valuing strategies are implicit; rather, they are missing. There is, however, the one paragraph:

"The good citizen also has a set of values consistent with a democratic creed. The Holt Social Studies Curriculum presents controversial issues which challenge the student's values and which encourage him to reflect upon his values and to resolve value conflicts in the light of evidence. The goal is reflection, not consensus. If a student emerges from the curriculum with the same values he held at the beginning of his study, he still will have learned how to support his values intelligently. If, on the other hand, he finds that some of the values he has held have failed to pass the test of evidence, he can abandon them for others. In either case, he will gain a better knowledge of himself and the world around him."

There are a number of points in the above which contrast to the position taken by the axiologists selected for this study:

1. The goal of value analysis is neither reflection nor consensus: rather, it is resolution. Reflection is a means to the end. To say that the goal is reflection is to say that there is no product of the process other than engagement in
the process itself. There is no reason to begin an analysis of value problems if the only anticipated outcome is the knowledge that one has engaged in the analysis. One undertakes an analysis of a value problem with the reasonable expectation of working toward the resolution of a problem; and one does that in order to know how to act. Now it may be that one will not be able to resolve satisfactorily the question asked; but that is certainly what must be hoped for if the analysis, the inquiry, is to have other than recreational value. It may be that there is a contradiction in that paragraph. Fenton declares reflection as the goal and at the same time claims the Holt Social Studies Curriculum will "encourage" the student "to resolve value conflicts in the light of evidence." If resolution is the central aim, then reflection is simply a means to that end, and not a goal in itself.

2. The second point that needs to be looked at is found in Fenton's claim that "If a student emerges from the curriculum with the same values he held at the beginning of his study, he still will have learned how to support his values intelligently." There is an interesting, and highly suspect premise underlying this claim, i.e., that such a student would have been right in all his conclusions from the beginning, and simply lacking the necessary support for those conclusions. What is more likely is that Fenton's remark derives from a subjectivistic view of values, and that it
matters not which conclusions the student comes to so long as he is able to "argue" in support of those conclusions.

There is some reason to believe, given the tone of the paragraph statement on values, that the statement is not so much intended as a description of a basic conception of values, as it is to reassure potential buyers of the Holt Social Studies Curriculum that the materials would not be used to influence improperly the values of the students.

Equivocation appears throughout the paragraph: the purpose of any study of values is one moment resolution and the next simply reflection; is one moment to encourage students to expose their values to the test of evidence and the next to provide the student with room to believe whatever he wants. Such purposes are incompatible: if one is willing to submit his values to the test of reason, he must abandon altogether license to believe what he wants to believe.
"People often believe that matters of 'opinion' on such topics as religion or politics, have no right answers and cannot be resolved through rational discussion. This assumption, strengthened by contact with people of strong opinion, leads to the tolerant notion that each is entitled to his opinion, with the implication that all opinions are equally valid.

"We disagree. 'Opinion' issues can be resolved through rational discourse. There are objective standards for judging the rationality and validity of positions and thereby showing that some opinions are better than others...Briefly, a position or opinion that is supported by reliable evidence, that is consistent, that takes into account analogous situations, and that offers useful definitions of vague terms is more valid than a position that is unsupported by evidence, inconsistent, insensitive to analogies, and uses ambiguous language." (p. 7, "Cases and Controversy," the teacher's guide)

Taken at face value, this statement of position would encourage one to conclude that Oliver and Newmann's position on value analysis is largely consistent with the views of the axiologists selected for this study. It is not, however, an explicit reference to value treatment, and a careful reader has difficulty understanding precisely the position Oliver and Newmann take on the question of the relation of facts to values.

There are a number of passages in the Teacher's Guide and in the Student Manual, "Taking A Stand," which further obscure the matter. In the paragraph following the above quotation, Oliver and Newmann say that

"The assumption that most issues can be settled by acquiring factual information (as opposed to discussion) is unacceptable. First, discussion is an important vehicle for communicating
'factual' information and for deciding at what points more information is needed. Second, we would argue that it is humanly impossible, for the student as well as the citizen, to gather all relevant information before making most decisions. We are inevitably forced to decide before we can muster enough information. Discussion can make our 'uninformed' decisions more rational. Finally, even assuming that it would be possible to settle factual issues through the accumulation of evidence, there still remain ultimate questions of value and meaning. Such questions cannot be resolved simply by gathering information. What we consider to be valid evidence is itself largely determined by our positions on nonfactual issues." (p. 7, "Cases and Controversy, Guide to Teaching")

There are a number of points in this paragraph which contrast sharply to the position taken by axiologists selected for this study:

1. Discussion is not, as Oliver and Newmann parenthetically imply, a tool of analysis and valuation. There is nothing inherent in the methods of group discourse appropriate to the analysis and valuation of value issues. Discussions are useful in value analysis only indirectly; that is, the interactions may prompt an analysis of a previously unconsidered point of view, or the interactions may result in the evaluation of new evidence not previously brought to the attention of the participants, or the interactions may cause one to detect a bad analogy which otherwise would have gone unnoticed. But the interaction is not the analysis, is not the evaluation, is not the detection. At best, it can be as said that discussion—and this itself is open to debate—creates an environment in which one can proficiently go about analyzing and evaluating an issue. The implication that discussion, as opposed to information acquisition, can produce settlements of issues is either true in a trivial sense, or
not true at all. It is true in the sense that discussions may produce agreement. But agreement is neither equivalent to nor tantamount to resolution. The degree to consensus one gets on an issue is a weak indicator of the validity of the conclusion reached. And agreement, which may be one of the aims of group discussion, is not one of the aims of the inquirer qua inquirer (because it is not a reliable test of validity). The comment then, that "discussion can make our 'uninformed' decisions more rational" is true only in the same sense that "reading will make one a better cook" is true: the connection is indirect (reading makes it possible to understand many more recipes, which in turn makes it possible to prepare a greater variety of dishes), and the two are distinct (reading is not cooking).

2. Oliver's comment that issues cannot be settled by acquiring factual information is supportable only if one ascribes to the terms "factual information" the most limited of meanings. In an equally limited sense, it can be said that issues can be settled only by reference to factual information, that is, good reasons. And here it is that Oliver and Newmann argue a point that contrasts sharply to the axiological positions reported in this study:

"Finally, even assuming that it would be possible to settle factual issues through the accumulation of evidence, there still remain ultimate questions of value and meaning. Such questions cannot be resolved simply by gathering information." (p. 7, "Cases and Controversy, Guide to Teaching")
beyond the reach of logical, empirical analysis. And that view is antithetical to the view that ethics is a science. If Oliver and Newmann mean to say that value questions cannot be resolved by the tools of logical, empirical analysis, then they have taken a position which is directly antithetical to the position taken by Scriven, Lewis, Toulmin, Etc. Equally strong will be the axiologists' objection to the claim that "What we consider to be value evidence is itself largely determined by our positions on nonfactual issues." Because if that point of view is accepted as a starting premise, everything that proceeds from it under the name of analysis is nonsense. If valid evidence is only that which I deem valid, if valid evidence is only that which fits the position I initially take, there can be no analysis, let alone discussion. Both analysis and discussion presume objective standards for the evaluation of evidence. In fairness, however, it may be that Oliver and Newmann simply mean to give us in that statement ("What we consider to be valid evidence... nonfactual issues") a brief description of the way some people do, but should not, treat evidence which supports points of view to which they are opposed; that their failure to point out that students should learn not to judge the legitimacy of evidence from the particular positions they take is an oversight. If this is the case, however, that description cannot be accepted as reason not to try to resolve issues through logical/empirical analysis; rather, it can be accepted simply as further reason
to get about the business of strengthening students' ability to gather and evaluate evidence objectively.

3. The third point, that "it is humanly impossible... to gather all relevant information before making decisions" and that "we are inevitably forced to decide before we can muster enough information" is either a truism or it is false. If Oliver and Newmann mean to argue that one needs all the information before a reliable conclusion can be reached, then they have argued a point of view which runs counter to the experience of science. The history of statistics is good evidence that in many, many instances, one needs less than one percent of the "evidence" in order to arrive at a conclusion which has a 99% probability of being right. If Oliver and Newmann do not mean to argue this point of view as an objection to the utility of evidence-collecting, then they have simply set forth a truism. All the evidence is not in on the question, Is the earth spherical in shape? It is not inconceivable that man will one day discover that he has been the victim of a hoax, that he has suffered under massive hallucination, and that in fact the earth is flat. In this sense, no one can gather all the evidence about anything. To say that one can is to preclude absolutely the possibility of being wrong. But the question has never been, Do I have all the evidence? (and if it has, the answer has always been the same: No). The question has been, What is the probability that I am wrong given the evidence that is
The view that certain value problems are immune to scientific analysis is found again in the student booklet "Taking A Stand." The section "Types of Issues" is subdivided into four parts: (a) Moral or Value Issues, (b) Issues of Definition, (c) Issues of Fact and Explanation, and (d) Two Broader Kinds of Issues. The separation of parts (a) and (c) is itself an indication that the authors believe the world of value to be apart from as opposed to a part of the world of fact. That separation is not precisely described, however; nowhere do Oliver and Newmann explicitly say, for example, that value problems cannot be resolved through logical, empirical analysis. The closest they come to making an explicit declaration to that effect is in "Cases and Controversy," the teacher's guide.

"Finally, even assuming that it would be possible to settle factual issues through the accumulation of evidence, there still remain ultimate questions of value and meaning." (Ibid.) Part (a) sets forth the basic valuation model which students are to use in their study of controversial issues. The model consists of five major strategies which students are encouraged to use to support or challenge value statements:

"1. Use of value-laden language. Moral or value statements can normally be phrased in 'loaded' words that give rise to strong personal feelings. Terms such as 'killing,' 'upholding the law,' 'impartial' tend to arouse in us positive or negative feelings. The use of value-laden terms is a shorthand way of reminding people that they have important value commitments." (Taking A Stand, p. 30)

Oliver and Newmann do not make it clear whether the use of value-laden language is a strategy appropriate to supporting or challenging a value statement. If they mean to say that one ought to be alert to others' use of emotional terms in an argument, then they have recommended a strategy not
at all inconsistent with the views set forth by Scriven, Lewis, et. al.

If they mean to say that one ought to "use...value-laden terms" as a technique for "reminding people that they have important value commitments" then they have recommended a device that has more to do with the dynamics of group interactions than inquiry. That is, using terms which register high on the emotional valence scale in order to point out that the opposition has done the same has very little, if anything, to do with the analysis and valuation of controversial issues. I am inclined to put little faith in that interpretation of the line, "The use of value-laden terms is a shorthand way of reminding people that they have important value commitments;" however, because employment of that strategy will not likely help clarify an issue; indeed, one might expect to arouse increased hostility from the opposition.

"2. Use of a respected or venerable source. Value statements may be justified by showing that they are supported by a source that most people consider sacred, respected, or venerable: the Bible, the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, or the words of a highly respected public figure."

From the view of the axiologists selected for this study, the use of "venerable sources" is largely irrelevant to the process of justifying value claims. The process of finding agreement among authorities is not a proof process. The fact that X says Y is true is not evidence in support of the claimed validity of Y. The collection of names of sources which claim Y is at least redundant (and perhaps tautological) because it amounts to an attempt to demonstrate Y by asserting, or in this case simply reasserting, Y. An increase in the number of times it is said that Y is true, regardless how authoritative the source, is not additional evidence in support of the claim that Y is true.
The importance of this point cannot be underestimated. Failure to recognize the difference between "quoting authorities" and proof processes results in the same effect which accrues to subjectivism: any attempt to analyze and evaluate an issue is preempted by the understanding that any position can be justified by simply finding a respected someone who takes a position on it. It must be obvious that the impartial observer to an argument in which authorities are marshalled first in support of one position and then in support of another is paralyzed: whom is he to believe? As Scriven remarked at the Marin Conference (in reference to a position taken by another participant), "the fact that you can produce one bright guy who denies it is nothing. I can produce ten who assert it." (from the unpublished transcripts)

The use of authorities, then, is not a legitimate, that is, analytic, approach to value analysis. And to say that one can justify a point of view by marshalling authorities who assert it is a serious deviation from the methods of value analysis set forth by the axiologists included in this study.

"3. Prediction of a valued consequence. Policy positions and value judgments are often used together to show that support of a particular policy will lead to a good end—a valued consequence."

This approach to value analysis is analytic, and to the extent this strategy is employed by students will their analyses reflect the views of the axiologists. In fact, predicting consequences is as much at the heart of scientific value analysis as any of the analytic processes commonly employed.

"4. Finding important values that conflict (p. 87). Policy positions are commonly supported by a value statement. But this often does not settle the issue, because in most public controversies we find moral-value principles that
conflict with one another. We could outline the value conflict in "The Mutiny Act" as follows:

Policy Stand: Billy Budd should be hanged.
Supporting Value: Obeying the law is good.
Opposite Policy Stand: Billy Budd should not be hanged.
Supporting Value: It is wrong to take a man's life.

Each policy stand is supported by a value statement. But which do we choose? If we choose to obey the law (and hang Billy), we violate the value of "Thou shalt not kill." If we accept the value of "Thou shalt not kill" (and excuse Billy), we violate the law."

It is certainly true that identification of values is important if analysis of value problems is to proceed. In the example above, however, the authors failed to do precisely that which they recommend themselves, and instead do precisely that which Scriven has recommended against.

The statement "Billy Budd should be hanged" is simply shorthand for the statement, "It would be good to hang Billy Budd." For that is what is meant by the line, "Billy Budd should be hanged." So point one is that in the above what is referred to as a policy stand is also a value judgment. And the conflict in the issue about Billy Budd is to be found in the opposing claims, "Billy Budd should be hanged," and "Billy Budd should not be hanged." The issue is not between the general values, "obeying the law is good" and "killing is wrong." To reduce the issue to a contest between "obeying the law is good" and "killing is wrong" is to ignore what Scriven has referred to as "Lesson One in analyzing general moral principles" and makes the problem unanalyzable:

"Lesson One in analyzing moral principles is abandon altogether the model of the scientific universe of generalizations. In the first place, "Thou shalt not kill," means killing is wrong in every instance, and it obviously isn't in any moral system. But we feel that there's some
sort of general intention imbedded in that imperative. We shouldn't feel that. In physics, for example, the general gas laws are known to have many, many exceptions. They are valuable because they are useful as beginning points, as first-place approximations. Okay, that's what Thou shalt not kill is. It tells you that the score for killing on the moral scales is, at first blush, on the negative side of the ledger. But it doesn't tell you what the final score is for particular acts of killing until you've added up the other side of the ledger, which may contain overwhelming reasons for actually killing in some particular case. We've got to stop trying to teach general value judgments and begin analyzing context-located problems." (From the Marin Conference Transcripts)

The weakness in the strategy recommended by Oliver and Newmann is that it suggests the student remove a value problem from a context, and reconstruct it as a problem in conflicting universal generalizations. Unless the student concludes that killing is wrong in every instance or that obeying the law is right in every instance, the problem, as reformulated, is insoluble. The conflict between the two values cannot be resolved outside a specific context, unless he is willing to accept one of the two values without any qualification. There is certainly no way the problem can be analyzed outside a context, and it would seem that Oliver and Newmann have set forth a strategy which will likely retard analysis instead of advance it.

"5. Empathetic appeal. Another way of supporting a policy stand is to link it not with a general value, such as saving life, obeying the law, or being impartial, but rather with the personal preference or feelings of another discussant. One might ask, "How would you like it if you were Billy Budd, and you were going to be hanged for something you really couldn't help?" or "If you were Captain Vere, would you risk your career or your ship just to save the life of a common sailor?"

"Questions like this may help to inspire genuine sympathy for the problems of individuals trapped in controversial situations. Yet the "how would you feel" approach to supporting a value statement has a serious shortcoming. It can be easily countered by this statement:
"We have to take more than the feelings of one person into account. His feelings may go against the wishes of society. Someone with opposite feelings may have a legitimate case."

From the axiologists view, this strategy for analyzing value problems is altogether irrelevant, unless the value in question is aesthetic. Effecting empathy in the opposition may be an effective technique of persuasion, but it is not a legitimate approach to value analysis. The intensity of feeling one has for Billy Budd in no way lends weight to the claim that Billy Budd should not be hanged. Any approach to ethics which claims to be scientific must reject at the very beginning, the use of emotional appeals, not only because emotional appeals may well be immoral (interfering with the opposition's attempt to deal rationally with the problem) but also because it is the very purpose of the analytic approach to make emotional appeals unnecessary.
Curriculum: Contra Costa County Social Studies Curriculum Revised 1970. (The Taba Curriculum)

Director: Wallen, Norman E.

Materials: Grade Eight: United States: Change, Problems and Promises. (a teacher's guide)

The introduction (see Key Concepts in this Curriculum) includes the following definition of values:

"Those objects, behaviors, ideas, or institutions which a society or an individual considers important and desires constitute values." (p. vi)

Aside from the peculiar notion, implicated by that definition, that phenomena are values, rather than have value; that values are those objects, behaviors, etc., which an individual desires and considers important, there is but one significant point to be made about that definition: If the authors are taken literally, nothing has value independent of one's desire for it. It is not enough for some phenomenon to be important; it must be desired as well. And this is not a minor point if it is true that there are important things in this world, things which are important to me, which I don't want. The implication of the definition offered is that if phenomenon X is not desired, it has no value (or, in the words of the authors, is not a value). For the inquirer who wants to avoid the various traps of subjectivism, this definition is an unsuitable point of departure. Failure to recognize that there are many things which I ought to value, even though I do in fact eschew them at some moment, precludes the possibility that any inquiry shall lead me to answers which have independent validity.

On the following page, the authors remark that "values develop through both nonrational and rational process." (p. vii) Are we to take it that
values should be, as well as are, the outcome of nonrational processes? Is the teacher to infer from that comment that nonrational valuing should not be discouraged? There is no doubt that a great many values have been arrived at nonrationally. The question which needs to be confronted is should teachers and courses of study, given that values are frequently arrived at nonrationally, accept that process as a natural and inevitable part of the scheme of things? Or should we attend to the question how may we teach students to rely on reason as the sole authority for adjudicating value disputes? Nowhere in the materials is that question considered.

The body of the guide, which sets out the topics, questions and ideas for students to study, makes reference to the need for justifying responses to value questions, and the user is encouraged to require students to treat value issues rationally. There are insufficient restraints in the materials, however, to prevent one from following a subjectivistic approach to the value issues recommended for student study.
SUMMARY, FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

Summary

This study was an attempt to determine whether and if so to what extent (1) there is disagreement among educators about the nature and function of values and valuing, (2) there is disagreement between social science educators and a well known group of axiologists about the nature and function of values and valuing, (3) social science educators endorse valuation theories which are internally inconsistent and/or antithetical to the purposes of inquiry, and (4) social studies curricula incorporate valuation theories, models or strategies which are axiologically unsound.

The periodical and book literature which reflects and influences the thinking and practices of social science educators was examined for references to the nature and function of values and valuing. These views were then classified for purposes of finding popular themes about valuing. The themes were contrasted to one another and to the views of the selected axiologists. New social studies curriculum materials were then examined for evidence of valuation theories which are internally inconsistent, inconsistent with the views of the selected axiologists, or antithetical to the fundamental purposes of inquiry.

Findings

The analyses of the book and periodical literature, and the curriculum materials produced the following results:

1. The only significant area of agreement among educators is the widely accepted belief that there is a fundamental difference between facts and values. Aside from that, there is little agreement among educators about the nature and function of values and valuing. The
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disagreements reach even to basic conceptions and definitions of the term "value."

2. There is a fundamental philosophical disagreement between most educators and the axiologists selected for this study about the nature of the relationship between facts and values.

3. Because this disagreement is basic, the theories of valuing popular among educators are, in nearly all important respects, rejected by the axiologists selected for this study.

4. There are significant ambiguities, contradictions and inconsistencies in most of the conceptions of valuing found in the social science book and periodical literature.

5. With two exceptions, the curricula reviewed for this study reflect the belief in a fundamental difference between facts and values.

6. The purposes of inquiry are not served by those conceptions of valuing which proceed from the belief that there is an inherent difference between facts and values. Any inquiry which is based on the notion that the worlds of fact and value are mutually exclusive is pointless.

Conclusions

The primary conclusion of this study is that the conceptions of valuing commonly found in the literature and curricula of social science education need to be rethought; the commonly accepted notions of the nature and function of values and valuing make inquiry into value issues unreliable as well as pointless. We in education have become the unwitting victims of a plague of misconceptions, contradictions, inconsistencies, ambiguities, and myths about valuing. The implications of this confusion are very serious. We have, for example, come to treat values as though they were some kind of property, and valuing as though it were like homesteading (stake out a claim—any claim, as long as it suits you—
build an emotional fence around it, and resist invasions as violations of basic God-given democratic rights). If we continue to treat the study of values as a subjective, relative process in which reason has, at best, but a preliminary function (e.g., getting the "facts" of the matter straight, or "clarifying" the value conflicts in an issue); if we give to reason anything less than total authority for adjudicating value disputes, on what other-than-tyrannical bases shall the issues which beset us be decided?

Recommendations for further Study

This study can be understood as an examination of certain philosophical issues, the resolution of which is prerequisite to getting on with the main business at hand: developing curricula which teach students the methodology for analyzing and evaluating social issues. Any future success we have in teaching students how to rationally examine issues, however, shall go for naught if that instruction rests on the currently popular conceptions of the relationship between values and reason. For those conceptions are, as Scriven argued at the Marin Conference, built on sand.

There are, then, a number of studies which need to be undertaken:

(1) There is need to begin the compilation of a comprehensive list and description of processes appropriate to the analysis and valuation of social value issues. How one ought to go about identifying these processes is, of course, part of the problem. This much, however, seems clear: investigators who take on this task should not be reluctant to consider sources outside the social sciences. Philosophy, particularly epistemology and axiology, the physical sciences and even theology may turn out to be very profitable areas of investigation.
(2) The job of organizing these processes into models for value analysis which are suitable for incorporation into curricula is an enormous task about which we know very little. Nevertheless, the effort must be attempted if future approaches to value analysis in the classroom are to be systematic. And even though identifying the processes is pre-requisite to organizing them, this second step need not be delayed until a definitive list of processes has been compiled. Organization of the processes should be undertaken early in the going, even if the lists available are primitive.

(3) There is need to find out what kinds of issues are most appropriate for student inquiry. It is not enough to say that students must attend to the most "pressing" social value issues, not only because there are many more "pressing" issues than one could hope to investigate in a lifetime, but also because some value problems may serve better than others the central purpose: learning the methods of analysis and valuation.

(4) Research aimed at identifying the appropriate age and grade levels for beginning instruction in value analysis must also be started. Piaget's strategies for discovering optimal stages for introducing conceptual material of varying difficulty might prove very useful to the investigator undertaking this task.

(5) There is an immediate need to reconstruct those curricula which promote subjectivistic, relativistic treatment of value issues. A number of curricula could be strengthened considerably by eliminating those teaching/learning strategies which lead students into the various philosophical traps and blind alleys of subjectivism. The Harvard Social Studies Project materials (AEP Booklets), for
example, are essentially analytic, and would be consistently so if a number of mechanically minor adjustments were made. This task is not at all beyond our reach, and offers a number of possibilities for dissertation research.

(6) It is not too early (even though comprehensive lists of processes appropriate to value analysis have not yet been compiled) to begin developing micro units aimed at teaching students what is known about analysis and valuation of value issues. Such units could at least pave the way for the construction of entire courses on value analysis.

The analysis of value issues is one of the most difficult tasks we can put in front of the child, and yet it is not too much to say that there is no more important aspect of the social studies curriculum than that which affects the development of the student's values. The deficiencies in existing curricula are very serious, and a significant increase in the attention we give to the problems of developing defensible strategies for analyzing value issues is fully warranted.
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ABSTRACT

An Analysis of Valuation Strategies in Social Science Education Materials

David J. Bond

Summary

This study was an attempt to determine whether and if so to what extent (1) there is disagreement among educators about the nature and function of values and valuing, (2) there is disagreement between social science educators and a well known group of axiologists about the nature and function of values and valuing, (3) social science educators endorse valuation theories which are internally inconsistent and/or antithetical to the purposes of inquiry, and (4) social studies curricula incorporate valuation theories, models or strategies which are axiologically unsound.

The periodical and book literature which reflects and influences the thinking and practices of social science educators was examined for references to the nature and function of values and valuing. These views were then classified for purposes of finding popular themes about valuing. The themes were contrasted to one another and to the views of the selected axiologists. New social studies curriculum materials were then examined for evidence of valuation theories which are internally inconsistent, inconsistent with the views of the selected axiologists or antithetical to the fundamental purposes of inquiry.

Findings

The analyses of the book and periodical literature and the curriculum materials produced the following results:

1. The only significant area of agreement among educators is the widely accepted belief that there is a fundamental difference between
facts and values. Aside from that, there is little agreement among educators about the nature and function of values and valuing. The disagreements reach even to basic conceptions and definitions of the term "value."

2. There is a fundamental philosophical disagreement between most educators and the axiologists selected for this study about the nature of the relationship between facts and values.

3. Because this disagreement is basic, the theories of valuing popular among educators are, in nearly all important respects, rejected by the axiologists selected for this study.

4. There are significant ambiguities, contradictions and inconsistencies in most of the conceptions of valuing found in the social science book and periodical literature.

5. With two exceptions, the curricula reviewed for this study reflect the belief in a fundamental difference between facts and values.

6. The purposes of inquiry are not served by those conceptions of valuing which proceed from the belief that there is an inherent difference between facts and values. Any inquiry which is based on the notion that the worlds of fact and value are mutually exclusive is pointless.

Conclusions

The primary conclusion of this study is that the conceptions of valuing commonly found in the literature and curricula of social science education need to be rethought; the commonly accepted notions of the nature and function of values and valuing make inquiry into value issues unreliable as well as pointless. We in education have become the unwitting victims of a plague of misconceptions, contradictions, inconsistencies, ambiguities, and myths about valuing. The
implications of this confusion are very serious. If we continue to treat the study of values as a subjective, relative process in which reason has, at best, but a preliminary function (e.g., getting the "facts" of the matter straight, or "clarifying" the value conflicts in an issue); if we give to reason anything less than total authority for adjudicating value disputes, on what other-than-tyrannical bases shall the issues which beset us be decided?