This essay focuses on the politics of public education for the disadvantaged. Specifically, an attempt is made to describe the conditions under which the disadvantaged have sought to change the public schools by adopting one of two political strategies--integration or community control. The discussion of the first strategy, integration, includes an analysis of the chaos of large urban school systems, the specialized high school, and integration of small groups of disadvantaged children. The discussion of community control includes topics such as local resistance to integrated schooling, tracking, federal failure to enforce integrated schooling, and teacher accountability. It is held that although community control is no panacea for all the problems of public education, it is a very promising possibility. (Author/JW)
SCHOOLS AND THE DISADVANTAGED:
A Study in Political Strategy

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This paper was prepared pursuant to a contract with the Office of Education, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Contractors undertaking such projects under Government sponsorship are encouraged to express freely their judgment in professional and technical matters. Points of view or opinions to not, therefore, necessarily represent official Office of Education position or policy.

August 1971
The Washington school system is a monument to the cynicism of the power structure which governs the voteless Capital of the greatest country on earth.

Judge J. Skelly Wright 1967

The development of effective schools for the children of the poor is theoretically possible, but radical reorganization and redirection of the prevailing school system is necessary for its achievement; and this, in turn, can be brought about only through powerful political struggles.

Doxey A. Wilkerson 1970

When in the midst of the 1966 I.S. 201 controversy Preston Wilcox observed that "the educational system has for so long been perceived as being 'above' politics that its administrators are today alternately baffled and enraged to discover that they are squarely in the middle of it," he was in reality pointing to a situation that exists across the country, not merely New York. Indeed, one finds in America an historic unwillingness to admit that schools, like any public institution, are subject to political maneuvering and pressure. Even in the writing of those most concerned with school and society, the most intensely political vision of education is continually being presented without serious reference to political power or controversy. In the eighteenth century this pattern is readily apparent in Cotton Mather's Essays To Do Good:

If any children in the neighborhood are under no education don't allow them to continue so. Let care be taken that they may be better educated, and be taught to read, and be taught their catechism and the truths and ways of their only savior.

Two centuries later a similar tone of harmony is evident in John Dewey's The School and Society:
When the school introduces and trains each child of society into membership within such a little community, saturating him with the spirit of service, and providing him with the instruments of effective self-direction, we shall have the deepest and best guaranty of a larger society which is worthy, lovely, and harmonious.5

Since the Supreme Court's 1954 Brown decision, it has, however, become increasingly apparent that the only people for whom it makes real sense to pretend that the educational system in America is not political and partisan are those parents who have the power to make it serve their children's needs or those educators whose jobs are benefited by the absence of political pressures. Especially from the point of view of the disadvantaged--those who are most victimized by the public schools in America--the relationship of education and politics is an altogether different matter.

Who are the disadvantaged with regard to education in America? Rhody McCoy in speaking of the Ocean Hill school district has defined them in the following terms:

The people of Ocean Hill are, in fact, disadvantaged not only because they are economically poor and racially separated but because they have been denied equal employment opportunities. They are disadvantaged because their parents were "raised" under the separate but equal concept which was a sophisticated form of slavery. They are disadvantaged because of America's inability to resolve its racism.6

What is crucial in McCoy's description of the disadvantaged are two factors: First, it reflects both how class and race and culture have made it difficult for the disadvantaged to benefit from the public schools and how the public schools in turn are part of a larger political system. Second, it avoids what Kenneth Clark in Dark Ghetto has called "the cult of cultural deprivation"--the notion that children from certain environments are in fact unteachable.7
What follows in this essay is an attempt to describe the conditions under which the disadvantaged have sought to change the public schools by adopting one of two political strategies—integration or community control. The approach used here is practical rather than theoretical and concerned not only with the immediate past but a future in which what seems most certain about American education is that its deepest struggles will not be, as the title of Charles Silberman's Carnegie Corporation study suggests, a "crisis in the classroom" but a crisis outside the classroom.8

II

We want mixed schools . . . because we want to do away with a system that exalts one class and debases another.

Frederick Douglass 18729

Segregated schools perpetuate feelings of inferiority in Negro children and unrealistic feelings of superiority in white children. They debase and distort human beings.

Kenneth Clark 196310

As the response, particularly on the part of NAACP lawyers, to the Supreme Court's recent school bus ruling in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg makes clear, integration is by no means dead as a political and legal tactic for disadvantaged groups seeking to change the public school system. It is the success of integration, the occasions on which it has been and continues to be of practical use that remains in doubt. Indeed, one need only note that the Court's order to dismantle "dual school systems" was confined to schools in the South and that in the same week as the Charlotte-Mecklenburg decision, the Senate defeated a $1.4
billion school bill that would require large cities and suburbs in all parts of the country to integrate within twelve years.¹¹

That the Supreme Court and the Senate should provide so obvious an escape for affluent whites in the North is consistent with the way they have acted in the past. (At present 38.1 percent of black public school pupils in the South attend schools where whites are in the majority, while only 27.6 percent of black pupils in the North attend such schools.)¹²

The vested interests the Court and the Senate so conspicuously defended in their recent action may, however, also serve as indicators of what disadvantaged groups have hoped to accomplish with their integration strategy.

In this regard it is possible to distinguish four separate situations in which the strategy of integration has been adopted by disadvantaged groups. The first two situations are best understood in negative terms: as a response to the chaos of large urban school systems and as a response to the arbitrariness of smaller, manageable school systems. The second two situations are best understood in terms of limited but positive goals: benefits for minorities among the disadvantaged and access to special schools within a segregated system. To speak of integration strategy in these terms is not, of course, to deny the obvious: that integration has been an historic ideal in this country and within the last two decades received particular impetus from the Supreme Court and the civil rights movement. Such national feelings and attitudes must be judged, however, within specific political and economic contexts. As Thomas Pettigrew has warned in his recent *Study of Integration*:
Popular conceptions concerning racial change typically revolve around attitudes. In its most simple-minded form, the theory seems to be that change occurs when attitudes favor it and does not occur when attitudes oppose it. On reflection, of course, this lean model overlooks much of what we know about social change in general and racial change in particular.13

Integration strategy in America has been pursued (and in certain cases succeeded) long after it ceased to enjoy popular support, and the four situations in which its undertaking in schools are described in this section take into account this factor as well as the earlier favor integration enjoyed.

Integration and the chaos of large urban school systems: In some sense the educational problems disadvantaged children face in any city are the same: a reflection of overcrowding, of a dwindling tax base, of a shifting population. Yet, in the great Northern cities—most obviously New York—these problems are on such a scale that they constitute a separate category, one in which geography is not nearly as important as size. For what one has in these cities is not merely an educational system with reduced effectiveness and built-in prejudices but an educational system in the process of collapse by virtue of the magnitude of the problems it faces. In circumstances like these the efforts of disadvantaged groups to achieve integration are not so much an attempt to become part of a coherent educational system as an attempt to make inroads on a chaotic situation that falls especially hard on them.

The case of New York is described in the Bundy report as follows:

The causes of the decline [of the New York City public schools] are as diverse and complex as the school system itself and the
city that created it. But one critical fact is that the bulk and complexity of the system have gravely weakened the ability to act of all concerned--teachers, parents, supervisors, the Board of Education, and local school boards.14

From 1954 to 1965 black and Puerto Rican groups made extensive efforts to change this situation and bring about the integration of the New York City schools. There were, to be sure, incidents of nonwhite opposition to their efforts--for example, on the part of middle-class blacks in Brooklyn who had moved out of Bedford-Stuyvesant and feared integration.15 But these were isolated incidents. During this eleven-year period, there was virtually no other consistent strategy pursued by black and Puerto Rican groups seeking to change the education their children were getting.

David Rogers, whose 110 Livingston Street provides the clearest analysis of the struggle to integrate the New York City schools, has divided the period from 1954 to 1965 into three stages: an academic stage from 1954 to 1960, characterized by reports and policy statements, a voluntary stage from 1960 to 1963 with limited attempts at open enrollment, a nonvoluntary stage from 1963 to 1965, in which civil rights groups made active efforts to achieve integration.16 These stages reflect not only a growing commitment on the part of civil rights groups to direct political action but a belief that any less intense strategy was bound to be ignored. As Milton Galamison observed to a Hofstra University student who questioned his militancy:

[Your] question assumes that we are not utilizing direct action tactics as a last resort, that we haven't sat around, trying to
negotiate in a civilized way, that we haven't been constantly frustrated at every turn.\textsuperscript{17}

By 1963 CORE, the NAACP, the Urban League, Harlem Parents' Committee, and the Parents Workshop for Equality were able to come together and form a Citywide Committee for Integrated Schools. The Committee threatened a boycott for the opening day of schools in 1963, postponed it when the new Superintendent of Schools, Dr. Calvin Gross, promised to come up with a plan and a timetable for integration, and then in 1964, under the direction of Milton Galamison and Bayard Rustin staged a boycott in which 464,000 pupils--practically the entire minority-group enrollment--stayed out.\textsuperscript{18} This was the high point of unity among the New York integration forces. Yet, even with divisions among themselves, a boycott staged one month later, in March, 1964, was able to keep over 350,000 pupils out of school and conclude with a march over Brooklyn Bridge led by such diverse figures as Galamison, Malcolm X, and Adam Clayton Powell.\textsuperscript{19}

Clearly, no amount of differences over tactics could reduce the desire disadvantaged groups had at this time for integrated schooling; nor could such differences change the fact that both moderate and militant groups saw in integration a chance for quality education, a way out of the general and specific chaos of the New York City schools. Their belief in integration was a reflection of their response to a system with a budget of more than $1 billion, upwards of 56,000 teachers, and 1,100,000 pupils, a third of whom were deficient in arithmetic and
reading and fell further behind the national average each year they remained in school.\textsuperscript{20} To emphasize this desire of disadvantaged groups for a way of controlling New York's educational chaos is not to deny the belief most of them had in integration itself. Rather it is to insist that they were not motivated to political action by this ideal nearly as much as by the hope that integration would produce a situation in which, with everyone in the same educational boat, enough pressure would get put on the city schools to make them functional.

The 1964 "Statement by New York CORE Chapters on School Integration" provides a perfect illustration of this toughminded approach. It begins by stressing the overall "dreary picture of a system that handicaps our children and then discharges them into the city streets with little preparation for meeting the harsh reality that they quickly come up against when they try to get a job." The report then goes on to emphasize the general deterioration of school buildings, the overuse of substitute teachers, and the growing size of classes, and finally to argue that these conditions fall especially hard on black and Puerto Rican students. It sees as a solution to this chaos the integration of all classes:

CORE insists that the education of children in this city be greatly improved, that the basic underlying problems be attacked, and that every child be provided with a decent classroom situation so that he can get the maximum benefits from his education. We believe that this can be accomplished for the children of New York City (black and white) only if the kind of classroom situation is created where all children are integrated without regard to ability-level (as established by artificial tests) and where Negro, White, Puerto Rican, and other minority children begin going to school together in the early grades.
The CORE position is clearly not unique and is repeated in the stance taken by groups both less and more militant than it. To quote from the NAACP:

Nor is there a choice between the twin issues of eliminating existing segregation and raising educational standards of neglected schools. Both are absolutely essential—together. A reorganization of neglected Negro, or white, schools... without a meaningful plan of desegregation is no more than the old separate-but-equal doctrine.22

To cite Milton Galamison and Parents Workshop for Equality:

Frankly, there is not too much education for the Negro children... The real issue is whether Negro and white children are going to go to school together and provide in the only way we can an equal education for every child in this city.

Either we have to continue to let our public school system continue to be a failure or we have to bring these kinds of dramatic changes into it in every major city across this country.23

This primary concern with the quality of education and the chaos of the New York City school system is, indeed, even reflected in the action disadvantaged groups took after they concluded, in the words of David Rogers, "that to continue working for desegregation within the existing structure was futile, given the combination of power blocs and lack of efficiency and accountability."24 For the turn to community control (although it reflects new conditions) stems from nothing so much as a deepened awareness of the magnitude of disorder throughout the New York schools.

Integration and manageable school systems: To move from an analysis of integration attempts in large urban school systems to an analysis of them in "manageable" school systems in smaller cities is not to write off a series of middle-range struggles, but to assert that the conditions for integration efforts at this level do not constitute a unique case so much as a variation on what happens at the two extremes. It is the
smaller cities (included here are suburbs and rural towns) that provide the key difference with the New York model, for they offer not only a racial situation on a vastly reduced scale, but school systems that, for all their problems, may be described as manageable, i.e., with a board of education that is known and visible, a staff and budget that nonexperts can deal with, a student body of reasonable size, and a fair degree of order. One does not, of course, have in these situations an automatic mandate for change, but he does have conditions in which integration is clearly feasible and segregation can be maintained only through blatant discrimination in a limited number of schools.

The only distinction that must be made about school systems of this sort has to do with their location. As James Coleman has noted, "Segregation exists in the South as a residue of the traditional dual systems, but in the North as a result of neighborhood school boundaries, and . . . the freedom of white families to choose their place of residence, and the absence of such freedom for Negroes." In practice this has meant that disadvantaged groups dealing with such school systems have adopted somewhat different integration strategies in the North and South. But as the cases of Berkeley and Savannah reveal, these differences are generally minor, reflecting as they do, a willingness to share in a system that is not thought by disadvantaged groups to need overhauling before it can be used to advantage.

Berkeley, a city of 121,000 people, which by 1968 completely integrated its schools, provides the classic case of Northern integration
of a manageable school system. The Berkeley struggle, while successful, was, however, by no means easy. In terms of the white community there was, of course, a strong liberal group from the University but also enough conservatives to have defeated a local fair-housing ordinance and a school-bond issue.27 The black community in Berkeley, although somewhat better off than blacks in other East Bay cities, was still plagued by job and housing discrimination. In a city with an unemployment rate of four percent, blacks had an unemployment rate of twenty percent; in a city where the most fashionable homes are in the hills above the University, blacks are located in the "flats" near Oakland.28

Berkeley's school population of 17,000 was one in which whites were approximately 50 percent, blacks 41 percent, and Orientals 8 percent, figures which indicate that Berkeley school integration did not occur because of a negligible nonwhite population.29 Indeed, the key to the Berkeley situation is, to repeat, the manageability of its school system. Integrationists in Berkeley were never forced to assert, as Milton Galamison finally did, "We're living in a society where it's increasingly hard to find who is responsible. It's difficult to determine at whom you should direct your protests."30 They are able to function in a situation in which, as one long-time Berkeley resident argued, "It's not hard to learn who controls what. The city is so small and its leaders so damned talkative, you know everything you need to know in a few months."31

The belief on the part of disadvantaged blacks in Berkeley that the city's school system was excellent and could be reached is reflected
in the strategy they used to achieve integration. The movement stayed within conventional bounds for its entirety. It saw to it that pro-integration leaders were elected to the school board, supported school bond issues, and constantly met with school officials. The progress made was slow, but at no time did it reverse itself or did a situation arise in which integration seemed out of the question. It was possible in Berkeley to arrange a busing system for all pupils (both white and black changed schools) and to keep integration costs at 2.67 percent of a $19,371,616 school budget.32

The strategy of integration forces in Berkeley centered on three efforts: 1) Changing the school board from conservative to liberal through an election campaign; 2) Getting reports made and listened to on the extent of segregation in the Berkeley schools; 3) Putting pressure on the school board and school officials to carry out integration plans. The first real integration efforts began in the late 1950's when the NAACP, led by the Reverend Roy Nichols, helped elect Berkeley's first prointegration school board member. The victory was followed up on six months later when the NAACP got the Berkeley School Board to make a study on "Racial Problems in the Berkeley Schools and Their Effect on the Community." The study, published in 1959 and known as the Staats report, showed serious racial inequities in the Berkeley schools and appeared at a time when the Berkeley School Board had just acquired its second liberal member and selected a new and progressive school superintendent, C. H. Wennerberg. It was not, however, until eighteen months later,
after the NAACP-led integration forces acquired a 4 to 1 majority on the school board that changes began to happen. Under pressure from CORE, a Citizens' Committee on De Facto Segregation was formed to develop a plan to integrate the Berkeley junior high schools (there was only one high school for the town). Getting an acceptable plan was not easy, and it was not until 1964 that one was put into effect. Even then the integration forces had to remain vigilant and fight off efforts to scuttle integration through a proposal by town conservatives to recall the school board.33

The integration of the Berkeley junior high schools did not, of course, end the formal racial problems in Berkeley schools. There remained the elementary schools to integrate and a high school tracking system, described by blacks in the following terms:

The smart white kids get steered up into the top tracks, the black kids down into the 'dumb' tracks. The Negro girls can take Home-making and maybe music... The Negro boys can go down in the shop to run the saws and push the buttons.34

It was not until 1968 that these inequities were ended. The struggle, movingly described by Berkeley Superintendent Neil Sullivan in *Now Is the Time*, did not, however, differ significantly in tone or strategy from that which led to the integration of the junior highs. More complicated problems in pupil placement and busing were solved by computer, and once again the course of action pursued by disadvantaged blacks was guided by the appraisal of Berkeley school conditions made years earlier by the NAACP:
We are sympathetically aware that school administrators under these circumstances are "hard put." But here . . . we have our resources, we have intelligence, we have unlimited possibilities for cooperation.35

When one turns to the South, it is clear that the results of the Berkeley situation are not to be duplicated. Yet, even in the South a "manageable" and functioning school system does provide the conditions in which a meaningful struggle for integration can be initiated as well as followed through on. Savannah, Georgia, a city slightly larger than Berkeley with a population of 149,245, provides a case in point. As in the Berkeley situation--and in contrast to the New York situation--the Savannah integrationists had every belief that the city's school system did work for whites. As a Savannah minister and integration leader observed:

If our [black] students are going to qualify for jobs that are opening up to them, it is essential that they get the best education, and the best happens to be "white" right now . . . . 36

The contact Savannah blacks had with white schools on the few occasions their children did get into them served in general to reinforce this view. As a black mother of four noted:

In their present school they cover twice as much material as they did in their former school . . . in the same period of time. When they were attending . . . they would come home and listen to records, hardly looking at a book. Now they are doing much more reading.37

Prior to the integration struggle, the Savannah-Chatham schools (45,000 students, 39 percent of whom were black) had the same history as all other schools in Georgia: they were part of a dual system, in which at least twice as much money was spent on whites as blacks. Not
until 1956 did the Savannah system come under attack from those whom it had placed at such a disadvantage. In that year the Savannah branch of the NAACP petitioned the school board to formulate plans for integration. Their petition was ignored, and another one filed in 1959 received virtually the same treatment. It was not until 1963, when the U.S. Court of Appeals upheld a suit filed by the Reverend L. L. Stell, Chairman of the educational committee of the NAACP, that school integration got off to a start in Savannah.38

The Savannah School Board had no legal choice about coming up with an integration plan, but its decision to go ahead was deeply influenced by other action on the part of blacks in Savannah. In the early months of 1960, sit-in demonstrations began in the city, and subsequently an eighteen-month boycott of downtown merchants was launched by the NAACP and resulted in the desegregation of lunch counters and the hiring of Negro employees. At this time a Voters Registration League was also formed by blacks and succeeded in registering enough black voters to make an important difference in city and county elections. Thus, at the time of the first integration efforts in Savannah, black political and economic influence was on the rise and stronger than any time since Reconstruction.39

When the school board arrived at a voluntary transfer plan that would integrate the schools one grade at a time, starting with the last year in high school, the NAACP felt it was in a position to object and through legal and political pressure achieved a situation in which by 1966-67, all students had the freedom of choice to select the nearest "formerly white or formerly Negro school."40 Even more to the point, the NAACP
position was not one that "gratefully" accepted this result or imagined that Savannah's manageable school system could not be made more responsive to the black community. As the Reverend W. W. Law, President of the Savannah NAACP commented, "What Negroes have achieved thus far merely penetrates the surface. . . . we will continue the fight."41

Integration for minorities among the disadvantaged: The opportunity for small groups of disadvantaged urban children to go to integrated schools, while the majority of their peers remain in segregated schools, is an unusual situation but one that occurs often enough to merit analysis. The efforts of disadvantaged groups to take advantage of such opportunities have never been as extensive or as passionate as when integration involved a whole community, but then they have not had to be. "Minority" integration has never received massive opposition from urban whites precisely because it has never been seen by them as threatening. It has come about through suburbs voluntarily taking on a limited number of inner city pupils, although never in numbers sufficient to alter the character of their schools or put a burden on their taxes.

That active support for minority integration by disadvantaged groups can be extremely limited and still have it go into effect is illustrated by Project Concern in Hartford. In its first year, 1966, Project Concern involved the busing of 225 disadvantaged children to schools in five Hartford suburbs, and two years later the number of children had risen to 640 and the number of suburbs involved in the program had increased to fourteen.42 The project itself was born of a situation in which
Hartford's nonwhite school population had suddenly doubled to 56 percent and inner city schools proved increasingly unable to provide quality, integrated education. Even before the project went into effect, the Hartford NAACP was on record favoring such a plan, and in the actual development of Project Concern, the Executive Secretary of the Hartford Urban League played an important role. But there was never any grass-roots involvement in the organization of the project by disadvantaged groups; nor did representatives of the NAACP and Urban League have any more significant a role at the start than the Hartford Chamber of Commerce. The result is that, despite its excellent academic results, Project Concern has never gone beyond its carefully limited scope or even included the estimated 4,000 to 5,000 additional elementary school children the Hartford suburbs might take on without any significant change in their day-to-day operations.

Boston's METCO plan, which at its beginning included 220 students, provides a case of more active involvement on the part of disadvantaged groups in minority integration, but again it reflects a situation in which integration as a whole had failed in the inner city and suburbs were willing to make a symbolic gesture toward relieving some of the injustices they saw around them. The seeds of the METCO plan were sown in 1963 when blacks in Roxbury challenged the Boston School Committee report that segregation did not exist within the schools of the city. (A state-prepared "Report on Racial Imbalance in the Boston Public Schools" later fully confirmed these segregation charges.) In 1964 positive
action was taken by black parents in Roxbury after 200 of their children were ordered to begin classes at the William L. P. Boardman School, located in a section of Roxbury undergoing demolition. The group, calling themselves the "Boardman Parents Group," decided to make full use of Boston's open enrollment policy, whereby any child may attend a school outside his neighborhood as long as it has seats available. Although given no help by the Boston School Committee (already reflecting the political leanings that would make Louise Day Hicks a Mayoral candidate and later carry her to the House of Representatives), the Boardman Parents were able to scrape together enough money for a bus and began taking their children across town to the Peter Faneuil School near Beacon Hill. A year later other black parents began organizing on the Boardman example, and Operation Exodus was under way within the confines of the city.

It was out of these conditions that METCO grew, with six Boston suburbs, Brookline, Newton, Lexington, Wellesley, Braintree, and Arlington opening their classes to disadvantaged children from Boston. Aided by grants from the U.S. Office of Education and the Carnegie Corporation, METCO began full force in the fall of 1966. It could, however, take less than half its applicants, and like Project Concern it was limited at the start from expanding very much. Although its directors asserted, "METCO is expected to focus steadily increasing attention on Boston's schools," the success of METCO in achieving significant results along this line has been virtually impossible to see. More to the point
is that METCO has helped a limited group of disadvantaged children—particularly those with concerned and ambitious parents, like the METCO director who freely admitted, "This is an education program, not a civil rights program. . . . Negro parents want their children to get what the majority is getting, and that's better education."  

Integration and the specialized high school: The specialized high school presents conditions in which the strategy of integration is virtually the only tactic open to disadvantaged groups wishing to make such a school serve them in greater degree. By their very nature, such schools are difficult to duplicate or to subject to neighborhood control. They are expensive, they are showcases for an entire city, and they must, at least in theory, be open to students from a wide geographic area. What has happened with specialized high schools is, of course, that over the years many of them have not only developed certain traditions but come to exclude disadvantaged youngsters. This is true not only of college preparatory schools but in many cases of trade schools. In economic and social terms, the results are the same, however. Disadvantaged children are denied the accreditation and job skills that would allow them to change their situation.

Bronx High School of Science in New York presents a classic situation of a prestigious high school that excludes disadvantaged youngsters (it is 81 percent white), and that disadvantaged groups have recently tried to integrate, despite an overall move in the city toward community control. The biases of Bronx High admission policies are dramatically
reflected in the 355 freshmen it admitted in 1970. Of this number, 258, or 73 percent, did not even come from public schools in New York but were parochial or private school graduates. In a city in which these schools are predominantly white and the intermediate schools are not, it is difficult to think of more flagrant proof of the biases of the Bronx High School admission tests.\textsuperscript{53}

In New York the opposition to this situation has been voiced most strongly at the community level by the School Board of District 3 on the West Side of Manhattan. Their complaint does not deny the value of specialized high schools but rather insists that if they are to continue they must serve greater numbers of blacks and Puerto Ricans. The complaint, made public by Alfredo O. Mathew, Jr., the Superintendent of District 3, has had certain positive results, the most important one being forcing Chancellor Scribner to appoint a commission to investigate "cultural bias" in admission tests at Bronx High, as well as at Brooklyn Technical High School, Stuyvesant High School, and LaGuardia High School of Music and Arts. It is, however, at the state level, where the attempt to integrate Bronx High has been most severely opposed. In a bill passed 107 to 35 (debate led black Assemblyman Vander L. Beatty of Brooklyn to charge the bill was sponsored by "racist conservatives"), the New York State Assembly recently voted to continue the present competitive exams in all four schools and to limit to 14 percent the number of "gifted disadvantaged" students admitted under the Discovery Program.\textsuperscript{54}
The case of Washburne Trade School in Chicago involves a much more prejudicial situation, one in which even the claim of "objective" admission procedures cannot be employed. In their 1965 complaint to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the Coordinating Council of Community Organizations of Chicago noted:

The Chicago Board of Education collaborates with certain trade unions in the operation of Washburne Trade School, a skilled-trade-apprentice-program that maintains a policy of Negro exclusion, thereby limiting greatly the opportunity of Negro youth to receive the training necessary for them to compete in the skilled labor market.55 The CCCO complaint was based on figures that showed Washburne (the only school in the city with such an apprenticeship program) to be 97 percent white and 2.5 percent black.56 The CCCO attack against the Washburne racial situation was joined by, among other groups, the Negro American Labor Council and the NAACP, and was part of a general attempt to integrate Chicago schools. It has, however, born only minor benefits and received no positive support from the Chicago building trade unions, on whom the Washburne program ultimately depends.57 As in the case of Bronx High, what remains is a tempting target to try to integrate, but conditions that make such a strategy as difficult as it is desirable.

III

In the concept of the community-centered school, we have, it seems to me, the ultimate objective of all education, because it deals with the child in connection with his social background and in relation to all forces, disruptive as well as constructive, that contribute to his education.

Leonard Covello 193558
A new concept of a partnership in education, one that incorporates community investment is beginning to emerge in the educational schools of our country.

Rhody McCoy 1968

In its 1967 report, Racial Isolation in the Public Schools, the only conclusion the U.S. Civil Rights Commission could draw was that racial segregation had increased rather than decreased since the Supreme Court's 1954 Brown decision. This trend, the Commission found, was true for all sections of the country:

Racial isolation in the public schools has been increasing. Over recent years Negro elementary school enrollment in Northern city school systems has increased, as have the number and proportion of Negro elementary students in majority-Negro and nearly all-Negro schools.

In Southern and border cities, although the proportion of Negroes in all-Negro schools has decreased since the 1954 Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education, a rising Negro enrollment, combined with only slight desegregation, has produced a substantial increase in the number of Negroes attending nearly all-Negro schools.

Negative reasons for community control: The failures the Commission describes, specifically those in urban areas, provide the first and most obvious explanation for the move by disadvantaged groups to a strategy of community control of schools. (Thomas Pettigrew's 1970 Study of School Integration gives a detailed analysis of the individual political psychology surrounding this move in a section on "Attitudes Towards Parental Control of Schools.") To point out the urban nature of community control efforts is not to suggest that in the future community control may not become just as important an issue in rural areas and some small towns. Indeed, during the civil rights period, the free schools of Fairfax County Virginia and the Community Development Group of Mississippi showed many of the characteristics of community-controlled schools. And more
recently blacks in Greene County, Alabama, and Mexican-Americans in Crystal City, Texas, have asserted community control of their schools after seizing political power in areas where they constitute an overwhelming local majority. But these rural examples of community control efforts are the exception rather than the rule. It is the large inner cities where community control has been the burning issue and where it has arisen from four basic developments: demographic change, resistance by local government to integration, failure by the federal government to enforce integration, and tracking.

Demographic changes: In their 1964 report, Desegregating the Public Schools in New York City, the State Education Commissioner's Advisory Committee on Human Relations and Community Tensions wrote, "It should be obvious . . . that integration is impossible without white pupils. No plan can be acceptable, therefore, which increases the movement of white pupils out of the public schools." What the Committee failed to note is that the population imbalance it is worried about has been going on for some time and merely accelerated in recent years. As George Brain has pointed out in his "Pressures on the Urban School," between 1940 and 1960 New York had a 139 percent gain in nonwhite population, Baltimore 97.4, Philadelphia 111.7, and San Francisco 326.9. There is no evidence that any plan of integration the cities might come up with could stop this trend (Washington, Baltimore, St. Louis, and Philadelphia now have nonwhites as more than 60 percent of their school population). Nor is there any evidence of a stoppage of the other developments that help isolate blacks in the central city: housing that
reinforces segregation patterns and urban job losses (88,000 in New York in 1970) that send more whites to the suburbs.67

**Local resistance to integrated schooling:** In Chicago, when someone as overtly hostile to integration as was Benjamin Willis, Superintendent of Schools, it came as no surprise that integration did not take place. But as New York shows, even in situations where such obvious hostility is not present, bureaucratic reluctance to pursue integration is enough to stop it from occurring. As David Rogers has graphically shown in Livingston Street, in the years between 1960 and 1965 New York City school officials managed to sabotage virtually every integration plan made. When Open Enrollment was instituted, school officials did little to publicize it or tell parents what schools they might send their children to. When Princeton plan pairings were made, only five were put into effect and fifteen were dropped. When a plan of integration for intermediate schools and high schools was reached, nearly all new schools were built away from fringe areas that would have made integration possible.68 This sort of internal resistance to integration, combined with the reluctance of the Mayor's office to get involved in school controversy, was enough to scuttle any possibility integration had in New York.

**Federal failure to enforce integrated schooling:** In the face of local opposition to integrated schooling, disadvantaged groups still held out the hope in the middle 1960's that the federal government might come to their aid by denying cities Title VI school funds when they
maintained racially discriminatory education. The classic case arose in Chicago in 1965 when the Coordinating Council of Community Organizations sent out what U.S. Education Commissioner Francis Keppel called, "the most detailed and documented of any complaint received by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare."69 The results of the CCCO complaint were, however, a total defeat for Chicago blacks. In the face of opposition by Mayor Richard Daley to strict adherence to Title VI requirements, HEW officials in Washington proved unwilling and unable to act and set a pattern for the future. As Gary Orfield has written in his study of Chicago integration efforts, "After Chicago, discussion of Title VI to combat de facto segregation ended."70 Particularly in the North, the federal government lapsed into a position where, as the U.S. Civil Rights Commission recently noted, it "virtually abandoned its responsibility in civil rights enforcement."

**Tracking:** Even in situations in which inroads have been made against segregation, it has been possible to neutralize these gains at the classroom level through tracking. The Washington, D.C. schools provide a perfect example of a situation in which a school superintendent with a national reputation as a prointegration administrator was also the creator of a tracking system in which the upper levels were admittedly for college-bound students and the lower levels for blue-collar students. No effort, as Judge J. Skelly Wright pointed out in his Hobsen v. Hansen ruling was made to examine testing procedures created with middle-class white children in mind or to correct the way the Washington tracking system invariably sorted itself out with nonwhite and poor children at the lower levels.
and white and middle-class children at the upper levels. Judge Wright's observation that tracking "amounts to unlawful discrimination against those students whose educational opportunities are limited on the erroneous assumption that they are incapable of accepting more" has, indeed, been born out with special vengeance in the Washington system. For there, as in New York, the longer poor, nonwhite children remain in school, the further they fall behind national academic norms.  

It is this combination of factors that has served not merely to retard integration in Northern cities but to make it seem so unlikely that the only alternative disadvantaged groups have had in such cases is to seek community control. The situation has been summarized very accurately by the New York Civil Liberties Union in its description of the I.S. 201 controversy:

Disenchanted black parents decided that since they were once again stuck with a segregated school, they might at least run it themselves. Thus was born the movement for community control of black schools. It is crucial to remember that integration was not abandoned by black parents but by the Board of Education, which consistently failed to deliver on the promise of integrated schools. It is also crucial to remember that the demand for community control was a direct response by ghetto residents to the lack of access to decision-making processes that vitally affected the lives of their children.

To the description of the negative factors that have led to the community control movement must then be added the positive factors--cultural and political--that have given it such specific direction.

Cultural reasons for community control: At the heart of the cultural drive for community control lies not only dissatisfaction with the academic
results of the public schools but anger at the feelings of personal and collective shame most schools inflict on disadvantaged children. As Charles Hamilton has written:

educational achievement must be conceived more broadly than as the mere acquisition of verbal and mathematical skills. Very many black parents are (for good reason) quite concerned about what happens to the selfimage of their black children in schools which reflect dominant white values and mores.74

The concerns Hamilton describes are in tune with statements voiced not only among disadvantaged communities but with the findings of the Coleman Report that showed, "Of all the variables measured in the survey, the attitudes of student interest in school, self-concept, and sense of environmental control show the strongest relation to achievement."75

The specific conditions that lead to the cultural reasons for community control may be divided into four areas: language, history and textbooks, neighborhood environment, and the role of the teacher.

Language: In most school settings involving disadvantaged children, there exists an initial language difference between the standard, middle-class English of the classroom and the English the pupil is accustomed to hearing and using away from class. This difference is particularly serious with regard to the question of "black English," and the unwillingness of teachers to let it become part of the black educational experience.76 But the dilemma of black English v. standard English is minor in comparison to the situation in which English is at best a student's second language. In the Southwest, where often "English is prescribed by law as the official language of instruction, and Mexican-American students are
expressly forbidden to speak Spanish," this situation exists at its most extreme. But the Southwest situation is not without its parallels in New York, where despite a population of one million Puerto Ricans, the city has less than 200 Puerto Rican professional educators in its schools. The meaning of this imbalance becomes much clearer when one notes recent statistics showing that, although the city has 317 schools with 100 or more non-English-speaking students (61 of the 317 schools have 400 or more non-English-speaking students), the number of non-English-speaking staff available to such schools has usually averaged about two. Thus, thousands of students have in effect been sent to schools where communication between them and their teachers was literally impossible in any meaningful way.

Significantly, the most vigorous attack on these conditions was carried out in the Ocean Hill-Brownsville demonstration district, where Luis Fuentes (the first Puerto Rican principal in New York) was able to institute an extensive Spanish language program at I.S. 155. Fuentes, who time and again has had to overcome the opposition of the Board of Education and Board of Examiners to get the teachers he wanted, has not, however, hesitated to see his success in political terms. As he noted in a radio interview, "Now mind you, none of this could have taken place, as far as I am concerned, if it were not for this community involvement, community control." 

History and text books: The black experience in this area is a paradigm for what in varying degrees has happened to all minority groups in this country. They have either gone unrepresented in text books or
been portrayed from a perspective different or even inimical to their own. The causes of such a situation need not be deliberate. As James Oliver Killens has written:

We (black Americans) even have a different historical perspective. Most white Americans, even today, look upon the Reconstruction period as a horrible time of "carpetbagging" and "black politicians" and "black corruption" . . . .

We black folk, however, look upon Reconstruction as the most dramatic period in the history of this nation, a time when the dream the founders dreamed was almost within reach and right there for the taking; a time of democratic fervor, the like of which was never seen before and never since. . . .

But whether blacks are slighted accidentally or deliberately in textbooks is still of secondary consequence when in the absence of community control they have no chance to make the changes they want, cannot do as the National Association of Afro-American Educators recommended at their 1968 conference:

In each local community black educators must develop a criteria for selection of materials which will be presented to the Board of Education, to local textbook committees, and to the major publishing houses which provide text and supplemental materials to that community. It is incumbent upon us, if we are to serve this society, that instructional material which we select be both educationally sound and incorporate a strong black orientation.

What community control provides is a situation in which (through their purchasing power) local school boards could specify the texts they desired and the emphasis they wanted given their own history. In addition it also offers a safeguard against the more obvious forms of cultural exploitation, i.e., Dick and Jane textbooks with nothing more than a dark Dick and Jane, or, as in the Southwest, Anglo-American stories translated into Spanish rather than Spanish stories in their original text.
The neighborhood: Even more important than the struggle to make the past history of disadvantaged groups part of the school curriculum is the struggle to make the neighborhood and the community part of the classroom. This need is gaining more and more general recognition. One sees it advocated, for example, in comparative educational studies like Urie Bronfenbrenner's *Two Worlds of Childhood: U.S. and U.S.S.R.* and reflected, however feebly, in a television program like Sesame Street. Among community control advocates, the argument for making the neighborhood part of the classroom has been spelled out most strongly by Preston Wilcox, an Assistant Professor (of community organization) at Columbia School of Social Work and a key figure in the I.S. 201 controversy:

Of particular significance to predominantly Black schools is the need to deliberately work out a meaningful linkage between the school and the community. The content of the in-school curriculum should draw heavily upon the content of the community experience. Wilcox's argument centers on two factors: first the idea of the ghetto community containing a richness in values and experiences that needs to be understood; second, the belief that students actively interested in their community will seek to change rather than escape the hardships in it. The first of these ideas is explored in Wilcox's "One View and a Proposal," a paper read at an early I.S. 201 meeting:

One can expect the school in the ghetto to become what schools in more privileged areas already are, a reflection of local interests and resources instead of a subtle rejection of them. For the operating philosophy of the existing system is too often manifested in a conscious or unconscious belittling of the values and life
styles of much of its clientele. By granting that clientele access to the direction of the school, a vicious circle of blame and rejection may be broken.85

The social thrust of Wilcox's cultural argument is most clearly seen in an essay on "Integration or Separatism" that was published some time after the I.S. 201 controversy:

The school must be an instrument of protest against society rather than a conveyor belt to get students into society. It must become a tool for the improvement of the Watts', Harlem's, and Hough's, rather than merely an instrument to help students evacuate them.86

One need not belabor the degree to which Wilcox's position grows out of a situation in which the New York Board of Education saw the Harlem community very differently than he. Their hostile view is dramatically reflected in the fortress architecture of I.S. 201, a school built on stilts with no windows facing the street.

Community teachers: In recent years, virtually every popular book on urban education written by a young, white teacher has centered on the conflict that arose when the teacher took the side of his students rather than that of the school administration.87 For the parents of disadvantaged students, this problem is even more acute. For it is clear that those who control their children's education are generally those whose time has been spent proving the "children could not learn rather than believing in their innate capacity to do so."88 (The destructive effects of such teacher expectation are graphically documented in Robert Rosenthal's and Lenore Jacobson's Pygmalion in the Classroom.)89

For community control advocates like Charles Hamilton and Preston Wilcox,
the key to changing these conditions lies in creating a situation in which teachers become advocates for their students rather than the current system.

Their writing on the relationship of the educator and the black community shows the former fulfilling three obligations. First, he is part of the community he serves:

Clearly, one source of constructive ideas would be black teachers... who not only teach in ghetto schools, but whose children attend those schools (in most instances), who, themselves, grew up in the black community, and who, for the most part, still live in black communities.90

Second, he is an example to his pupils:

Many black people are demanding more black principals in predominantly black schools, if only because they serve as positive role models for the children. Children should be able to see black people in positions of day-to-day power and authority.91

Third, he reflects the fact that his job depends on the community he serves:

The professional gate-keeping role that turns selected students into scapegoats must be replaced by one in which the community becomes its own gate keeper and teachers become turncoats against the system that has succeeded in pushing so many students out. The school exists because the community and the students exist; and not for teacher employment.92

It goes without saying that under present conditions the only teachers who fit such a description are rare individuals. But that point may, ironically, be used to summarize the cultural arguments for community control, which rest finally not on the development of a race of "superteachers" but on the removal of conditions that prevent ordinary teachers of good will from educating disadvantaged children as they might.
Political reasons for community control: In a number of areas the cultural reasons for community control tend to overlap with the political, but the latter may be distinguished from the former in that they primarily involve the relationship that the school and the community have to each other in matters of power that extend beyond the province of the classroom. What this means in practical terms becomes clear as soon as one turns to the three areas in which community control has been most important an issue politically: accountability, expanded school function, and economics:

**Accountability:** In a recent address to the Council of Supervisors and Administrators, Dr. Harvey Scribner, Chancellor of the New York City schools observed:

> In the name of good sense, good education, and democratic participation, it is time to begin to staff the schools of the country with the advice of those whom the schools serve and with the advice of those on whose skills they depend.\(^{93}\)

Dr. Scribner's proposal, branded "utterly silly" by the President of the Council he was addressing, provides a good indication of what lies behind the concept of accountability and the changes in power it threatens professional educators with. From the point of view of the community involved, accountability may, however, be seen in even stronger terms, as the following definition of it by Edmund Gordon reveals:

> By accountability, we mean a procedure through which all aspects of the school are subject to evaluation by the community served and through which this evaluation will result in change when deemed necessary.\(^{94}\)
From both perspectives, it is clear, however, that accountability cannot take place unless there is an actual change in the political control a community exercises over the schools in its midst. What this means in concrete terms is institutional change whereby channels exist for the community to determine school policy, and, if they wish, go against the practices of schools in other sections of a city, as, for example, Rhody McCoy's Ocean Hill-Brownsville district did in 1968, when it voted to keep open schools during a citywide teacher strike and elected to shut down schools on the day after Martin Luther King's assassination.95

In overall terms, the concept of accountability deals directly with a situation in which, as Harvard economist Samuel Bowles has noted, "Decision making in the educational system is a sensitive barometer of the power relations within a society . . . . reflect [ing] who really counts and who really governs."96 But for disadvantaged groups, particularly in nonwhite urban areas, accountability in addition provides a way out of a situation in which both segregation and integration have meant a loss of power. To quote Preston Wilcox again:

Both integration and segregation result in white control of both Black and white schools. The opposite of white control is Black control.

One must understand that the movement for black control of schools is not a racist movement; it is an effort to remove racists from positions of control over the lives of Black students.97

Indeed, in terms of practical analysis, it is impossible to separate the idea of accountability from the much broader racial struggle (in part reflected in the movement from civil rights to black power) for
the control of all institutions affecting the ghetto: from the police to the welfare system.

**Expanded school function:** In addition to wanting control over their schools disadvantaged groups have also wanted their school to serve a much broader purpose in the community than schools usually do. This broader purpose has obvious parallels with the desire to make the community relevant to the classroom, but it centers on the fact that conditions in disadvantaged communities make the potential of the school extremely relevant to adults. The most conservative aspect of this idea is reflected in the following proposal of Charles Hamilton:

> The educational system should be concerned with the entire family, not simply with the children. We should think in terms of a Comprehensive Family-Community-School Plan with black parents attending classes, taking an active, day-to-day part in the operation of the school. . . . A similar plan is already in operation in Chicago . . . [with] adult education, prevocational and vocational training, and work experience programs.\(^98\)

This expanded concept of school function is, however, only a limited extension of current practices. What is crucial about Hamilton's thinking on this subject is where his adult education views lead: to the idea of "the local school as a central meeting place to discuss and organize around community issues, political and economic."\(^99\)

The implications of such an expanded view of school function have been stated most fully by Rhody McCoy in his essay on Ocean Hill-Brownsville, "The Formation of a Community-Controlled School District":

> Thus, the stage is set for a revolution. People--black people--want control over their schools for self-determination,
for building a strong self-image, for individual and community
development, for economic stability, and for survival. Community
control means community growth and development, and the school
is the hub of this growth.100

As McCoy's description makes clear, only a local school board, repre-
senting a community that had everything to gain and little to lose from
a radical change in city government, could be expected to approve a
school so openly committed to political activism of this type.

Economics: The economic issue of community control remains one
of the least discussed phases of it. Yet, it reflects a situation in
which the citizens of a local community stand to gain enormously from
decentralization. New York City, with its massive school budget of
$1.33 billion and 60,000 jobs that local boards could give out if they
had the power, provides the most dramatic case in point.101 In 1967
alone there were, as Jason Epstein has noted in his essay, "The Politics
of School Decentralization," some $69 million just in federal funds in-
tended for ghetto schools that local boards could have administered.102

The impact school money might have on nonwhites in disadvantaged
areas in New York has been examined in detail by James Haughton, Director
of Harlem Fight Back. As Haughton points out, within each New York
City school district there is immense profit to be made from maintenance
and construction contracts. Yet, few of these profits ever find their
way into the black and Puerto Rican communities. Between 1960 and
1968 two companies, once barred from building schools, have received
$205 million of the $320 million spent on schools. The workers used
by these companies are overwhelmingly white, and neither the companies
nor the workers' unions have made any real effort to change this situation.
In addition, board of education rules on any job over $2,500 are such
that it is impossible for small black and Puerto Rican companies to get
the needed credit or performance bond for taking on these assignments.103

The same kinds of conditions apply to the custodial situation in New York. This budget (approximately $87 million in 1968-69) is given out by school headquarters and administered by custodians, who are in effect contractors (they have an allowance based on the number of square feet in their building plus special payment for old or crowded schools). The custodian does the hiring and repairs that are necessary, keeping the rest—a figure that may vary from $25,000 to $50,000. While no city-wide figures are available on the racial make-up of custodians, statistics from the Borough of the Bronx, compiled by the United Bronx Parents, show that in 1966 of 876 custodians in the Bronx 2.1 percent were black or Puerto Rican.104 There is, unfortunately, no reason to believe that the tightly organized custodians, members of Local 891 of the International Union of Operating Engineers, have a basically different racial composition anywhere else in the city.

How difficult it will be to break the monopoly white workers and contractors have on profiting from the school system is illustrated by Rhody McCoy's failure to get I.S. 201 built with local labor. Yet, as Victor Riesel, among others, has pointed out, the support the various unions gave the United Federation of Teachers during their 1968 strike reflects doubts such groups have about their position. Indeed, the conditions that prevented McCoy from getting his way offer as strong and practical an inducement as possible for future grassroots community control efforts.105
IV

But when we have vaguely said that education will set this tangle straight, what have we uttered but a truism? Training for life teaches living; but what training for the profitable living together of black men and white?

W. E. B. DuBois 1903

A segregated school system produces children who, when they graduate, graduate with crippled minds. But this does not mean that a school is segregated because it's all black. A segregated school means a school that is controlled by people who have no real interest in it whatsoever.

The white man is more afraid of separation than he is of integration. Segregation means that he puts you away from him, but not far enough for you to be out of his jurisdiction; separation means you're gone.

Malcolm X 1964

In conclusion it is possible to agree with Marilyn Gittell's observation, "In the 1970's, the pressures for coping with the failures of urban education will shift from pleas for integration and compensatory education to demands for complete restructuring of city school systems and increased community control." Indeed, as the political examples of blacks in Greene County, Alabama and Mexican-Americans in Crystal City, Texas show, community control is also likely to become more important in certain rural areas where the nonwhite population is organized and in a clear voting majority.

There is, however, no reason to believe that increased community control efforts mean the adoption of a single-minded political strategy by disadvantaged groups. To begin with, community control is far from being a panacea for the educational problems disadvantaged people
face. It can be frustrated at the most basic electoral level, as the Institute for Community Studies at Queens College showed in its report on the 1969 New York City decentralization laws. (The laws are highly favorable to the tactics of conservative groups. Of 279 local school board members elected, 201 are white, 47 are black, 30 are Puerto Rican, and one is Chinese.)

Equally important, disadvantaged groups are in a position where they must still depend on state legislatures for many of their funds, and this means some form of alliances on their part. Only in California, where Wilson Riles is working for support of a state-wide property tax that would replace all local school taxes, is there a remote chance of disadvantaged urban groups coming in for a fair share of state funds.

To be sure, no state-wide coalitions between disadvantaged groups and other sympathetic to their situation have been put together yet with any consistency, but as the Spring, 1971 financial crisis New York City schools went through demonstrates, when there is a mutual interest coalitions can be formed between disadvantaged groups favoring community control and other forces—including the teachers' unions. While the New York Citywide Coalition to Save Our Schools did not end the desperate financial plight of New York Schools, it did prevent budget cuts that would have meant the loss of thousands of teachers, a postponement of repair programs, and a curtailment of free lunches and bus passes. The Citywide Coalition did show that when massive pressure is exerted, the state and the city can come up with needed money for schools. (At
the time of the school crisis the city was saying it could allocate $24 million for Yankee Stadium and the State Legislature was continuing to supply funds for Governor Rockefeller's $300 million Albany Mall.)

It is not, however, just the need for political alliances that promises to make community control efforts by disadvantaged groups more open-ended than their critics imagine but also the successes of community controlled schools. As black educators and politicians have continually pointed out, "one means of making integration of the schools a possibility is to raise the level of ghetto schools so that they will be competitive with schools in more affluent neighborhoods."112

Nicolaus Mills
Footnotes


8. Silberman is not insensitive to the relationship between politics and education, but his primary point still is, "In good measure, the defects and failures of the slum schools are but an exaggerated version of what's wrong with all schools." Crisis in the Classroom (New York, 1970), p. 113.


12. Ibid., p. 30.


16. Ibid., pp. 15-29.


23. Ibid., p. 27.


33. Ibid., pp. 34-58.

34. Ibid., p. 129.
35. Ibid., p. 37.


37. Ibid., p. 133.

38. Ibid., pp. 121-123.

39. Ibid., p. 118.

40. Ibid., p. 134.

41. Ibid., p. 137.


43. Carolyn Ralston, "Hartford, Connecticut," (Unpublished study in ERIC 
Center: Teachers College, Columbia University), p. 2.

44. Hartford Board of Education, This Is Project Concern (March, 1967), 
pp. 15-16.

45. Peg Shaw, "Project Concern," The Hartford Courant (February 12-17).

46. Howard Spergel, "Busing Kids to the Suburbs," American Education 
(April, 1967), p. 3.

47. Massachusetts State Advisory Committee to the United States Com-
mission on Civil Rights, Report on Racial Imbalance in the Boston 

48. Robert Coles, "Bussing in Boston," The New Republic (October 21, 


50. Ibid. Quoted on p. 135.

51. Quoted in Howard Spergel, "Busing Kids to the Suburbs," American 
Education, p. 3.


"Me and Brother Bill," The Village Voice (March 11, 1971), p. 32 

55. "The Chicago Title VI Complaint to H.E.W.," quoted in Integrated 
56. Ibid., p. 86.


60. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Racial Isolation in the Public Schools, p. 199.


68. David Rogers, 110 Livingston Street, pp. 30-35.


74. Ibid., p. 673.


91. Ibid., p. 678


99. Ibid., p. 683.


102. Ibid., p. 288.


104. Ibid., p. 171.

105. Ibid., pp. 172-173.


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In order to avoid excessive duplication of footnote material, in the case of collections from which more than one article has been taken, it is the collection rather than the individual article that is listed in this selected bibliography.


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