This paper compares the structure, operation and representative character of academic senates at the University of California at Berkeley, the University of Minnesota, the Pennsylvania State University, and Fresno State College. The first section discusses the organization of the senates at the 4 institutions including senate structures, committee structures and activities and committee accountability. Section 2 deals with participation patterns and internal politics including committee service and committee composition by sex, rank, and academic field, as well as the operation of internal political networks. Section 3 examines the administrative involvement in senate affairs, including the presence of administrators on senate committees and the problems of separate jurisdiction or joint decision making. A concluding section raises the question of the optimum balance between the tyranny of the majority and the rights of the minority in a representative structure and makes some recommendations about senates. (AF)
"The Structure and Operation of Faculty Governance: Who Rules and How?"

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By:

Kenneth P. Mortimer
Assistant Professor
and
Research Associate
Center for the Study of Higher Education
The Pennsylvania State University

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INTRODUCTION

One of the more significant problems confronting institutions of higher learning today is the internal struggle for greater involvement in institutional governance. The rationales for existing governance structures and functions are being challenged with increasing vigor. The traditional concept of symbolic representativeness is being disparaged in favor of more direct representative or participatory processes. Hodgkinson has predicted that in the next decade faith in the idea of symbolic representative campus governance structures will decline.

Well over 300 institutions are said to be experimenting with a campus senate comprised of faculty, student and administrative representatives. Against this background the current effort to develop a mixed campus senate would seem to be the last gasp of our traditional concept of symbolic representative participation... (1970, p. 6).

Senates have been one of the traditional mechanism through which colleges and universities have attempted to achieve more representative participation in governance at the campus level. Little of a comparative nature is known about the actual structure and operation of these bodies, however, and serious questions are being raised about their continued viability as representative campus governing mechanisms.

A Framework for Analysis

Before proceeding to a description of some comparative research on senates, however, it is necessary to describe behavioral patterns in American representative government. The purpose of this discussion is to provide a framework for analysis of participation patterns in the governance systems of colleges and universities.
Research on political behavior has indicated that political participation on the part of the general populace falls into three categories (Milbrath, 1965, pp. 5-38). About one-third of the adult population are political apathetics who do not even vote. Another 60 percent are classified as political spectators. They usually vote, expose themselves to political stimuli, engage in political discussion and occasionally try to convince others of their political views. Political gladiators, or activists, comprise less than 10 percent of the population. They actively engage in soliciting and contributing monies to political campaigns, attend political meetings, and stand for political offices.

In a political democracy spectators appear willing, in the absence of crisis, to delegate the responsibility of governing to gladiators. Within general boundaries of acceptable administrative discretion, a political democracy gains its flexibility by such delegation or deference to those in authoritative positions.

Dahl (1961) has argued that a basic characteristic of pluralist political systems is the presence of a great deal of political slack. Such slack is present because most citizens do not consider governmental activities to be of crucial importance in their lives—they are political apathetics or spectators. These people use their potential political resources—e.g., time, money and personal influence—at a low level. While they may possess the potential to influence the governance process, they seldom attempt such influence. Slack in the system results from this gap between the potential and actual influence of the individual on the governance process (Almond and Verba, 1965, pp. 346-348).
Slack allows gladiators sufficient discretion to make decisions and, as long as the spectators are not motivated to convert their potential into actual influence, gladiators are relatively free to govern and control the detailed operation of the system. When spectators become concerned enough about governance, they activate their potential influence, that is, they take up the slack, and gladiatorial discretion is restricted until such time as spectator activity decreases.

Organization of the Paper

This paper compares the structure, operation and representative character of academic senates at the University of California at Berkeley, the University of Minnesota, the Pennsylvania State University and Fresno State College. The data on which the paper is based are reported in more detail in four separate reports and a comparative monograph which are or will be available from the Berkeley and Penn State Higher Education Centers (Deegan, et al., 1970; Deegan and Mortimer, 1970; McConnell and Mortimer, 1971; Mortimer, 1970; Mortimer and Leslie, 1971).

The paper relates theories of representative American democracy to three basic questions about senates.

1. How are these organizations structured?
2. What are the dynamics of their formal and informal operation?
3. Who participates in their decision making processes?

The paper begins by describing senate structures and recent senate committee activities in the four institutions. There is a long history of senate activity at three institutions and a strong support for faculty autonomy at Berkeley. Representative government involves a degree of oligarchic behavior and this fact serves as the major focus of the next
section. This includes a description of the committee appointment process and an analysis of the composition of senate committees. The basic question here is who is represented on these committees. Such variables as sex, rank, academic area and administrative responsibility are considered. The Senate's relations with the administration are then discussed and some of the informal practices of senate operation are described. A concluding section raises the question of the optimum balance between the tyranny of the majority and the rights of the minority in a representative structure and makes some recommendations about senates.

The Organization of Senates

Senate Structures

Three of the four senates elected representatives from constituent schools or colleges, although Fresno had some provision for departmental representation and Penn State and Minnesota provided for representatives from other campuses of the University. The Berkeley Senate was a town meeting structure in that all of the approximately 1700 faculty, instructors through full professors, were also senate members.

Berkeley had, as do many large complex universities, a rather large number of academic research appointments which were excluded from senate membership. These numbered in excess of 1000 persons who were, according to Kruytbosch and Messinger, "academic people in terms of background, qualifications, scholarly accomplishments and aspirations" (1970, p. 263). Research associates and similar appointments were included as part of the senate electorate at Minnesota and Penn State and librarians were included at Penn State and Fresno.
On July 1, 1969 Minnesota's Senate was reorganized and the Twin Cities Assembly became one part of the University Senate. Minnesota's long history of student membership on senate committees (Eckert, 1970, pp. 309-310) had evolved to the point where students comprised approximately one third of both the 155 elected members of the Twin Cities Assembly and the 180 elected members of the University Senate. A similar proposal for student voting membership failed to win trustee approval at Penn State but students remained on nine of ten senate committees. Berkeley and Fresno had students on approximately one-third of their committees.

In effect principal administrative officers at the three universities were regular or ex officio senate members. Fresno did not include deans among its 74 senate members although they were members of the various school electorates. Ex officio status at Minnesota denied a vote in the Senate to the deans whereas the only restriction at Penn State was that no ex officio member could chair a senate committee. Penn State's President could appoint additional ex officio members, up to fifteen percent of the entire senate membership of approximately 240.

In summary, Berkeley had the largest number of Senators because of its town meeting structure but the most restrictive body when membership of "non-faculty" persons was considered. The Senates at Penn State and Minnesota were comparable in size but Minnesota had students as voting members. Senates were not, in these four institutions, structured to be representative of non-academic employees, and certain quasi academic appointments (e.g.: part time teaching and research assistants). Except at Minnesota, students were represented on committees rather than as voting members of the Senate itself.
Committee Structures and Activities

The detailed legislative and advisory work of academic senates is normally done through committees. In 1968-69 Berkeley had approximately 32 standing committees, Minnesota about 22 and Penn State only ten. Fresno had only five senate committees but there were seven other college wide committees with twelve standing subcommittees.

All four senates, including Fresno's College committees, had committees which could be classified under the general headings of educational policy (e.g. admissions, instruction or planning), senate operations (e.g. rules and committee appointments), student affairs and faculty welfare and/or benefits.

According to Eley (1964, p. 6) the Academic Senate at the University of California is generally regarded as the most powerful such institution in the country. The Berkeley Senate was unique when compared to the other three because its committees exercised greater faculty review at the campus level and over a broader range of issues. Berkeley's senate committees exercised substantive faculty review over the following important areas: actual personnel cases pertaining to merit increases, appointments, promotions and tenure; the preservation of academic freedom; reorganization and periodic review of existing and proposed instructional and research units; research policy; graduate study; course changes; libraries; admissions and enrollments; and university extension.

The large number of standing committees, the scope of senate activities and the need to have one committee "speak for" or represent the Senate (or faculty) during times of campus crisis led to the creation of
coordinating or executive agencies. All four institutions were experimenting with committees to accomplish such coordination.

The executive or coordinating committees at Penn State and Fresno served as important mechanisms for senate-presidential liaison. The President was a member of the committee at Penn State and Fresno, attended the meetings regularly and participated in the discussion, although at Fresno he refrained from voting on issues on which he eventually would have to rule. The President at Minnesota also consulted with the Consultative and/or Steering Committee although he did not attend meetings regularly. A certain reluctance to delegate authority to an executive committee, and in Berkeley's case to a representative senate, was an important aspect of senate behavioral patterns, however, and deserves further discussion because a degree of delegation is presumably required to make representative governance viable.

Many Berkeley interviewees feared that a representative senate would hamper the right of individual expression in meetings, especially if one were not an elected Senator. In a representative senate, there was the danger that committee reports would be received or acted upon well in advance of their release to the entire faculty. Some felt that this would decrease the importance of individual committees, create an artificial committee hierarchy, and, in effect, disenfranchise a large number of individual faculty members.

Presumably, faculty members who opposed a representative body, and in some cases "strong" executive committees, based their objections on their perception of the individual's place in the academic community.
They put a great deal of emphasis on the individual's right to selectively monitor all elements of senate activities. The argument that the increasing size of the faculty and the complexity of senate affairs demanded new or different concepts of individual involvement did not appear persuasive or urgent enough to overcome this strong support for an organization which emphasized individual participation rather than representative membership.

This reliance on individualism and the claim to right of participation in a wide range of activities is a persistent observation of those who conduct research on faculty governance. Dykes (1968) reported that:

The faculty members interviewed overwhelmingly indicated the faculty should have a strong, active and influential role in decisions, especially in those areas directly related to the educational functions of the university. At the same time, the respondents revealed a strong reticence to give the time such a role would require. . . Reluctant to assume the burden of guiding institutional affairs, they seemed unwilling to accord others the responsibility for doing so. And while quick to assert their right to participate, they recognized less quickly the duties such participation entails (p. 38).

Scholars of political behavior in democracies have documented a similar relationship between a high frequency of expressed obligations and/or competence to participate in government and the relatively low priority placed on actual participation (Mortimer and McConnell, 1970.

At Berkeley many interviewees were not willing to delegate or defer to a system of representative authority even if the representatives were elected. At Fresno one of the consistent minority faction criticisms of the majority faction was that the latter deferred to administrators too much. As evidence of the dangers of too much deference, some Penn State faculty argued that the Senate Council (the coordinating committee) did
not accurately represent the faculty viewpoint to the President and Board of Trustees during the disruptions of Spring, 1970. A lack of deference to elected representative authority may be one of the confounding variables in future patterns of faculty governance and may be one of the differences between academic and societal political systems. The basic problem is whether any political system can operate effectively without substantial slack.

In the absence of slack, the earlier analysis of the elements of a democratic political system raises serious questions about the internal governance of faculty organizations like academic senates. If there exists a significant lack of deference to, or lack of trust in, the gladiators in an academic governance system, then the slack necessary for effective action is threatened. In the absence of sufficient slack, there will be little opportunity for gladiatorial risk-taking and/or mistakes because every act will be carefully scrutinized. Lack of deference to authority may be a fundamental difference when academic governance is compared with other forms of (political) governance. Possession of formal authority, does not secure enough deference from individual faculty members to allow more than a minimal degree of risk taking. Formal authority will probably have to be supported by functional authority if there is to be enough deference to allow the system to operate effectively.²

Research is needed on the balance between formal and functional authority which might lead to a satisfactory accommodation between spectator involvement and gladiatorial discretion. One could argue that formal
position has to be supported by functional authority only when there is high issue salience. That is, committees which make decisions or give advice on "critical" issues like personnel or educational policies should have a high degree of functional as well as formal authority. Those committees which deal with "routine" activities, such as counting votes or scheduling rooms, can rely more on formal authority. Further research should examine whether such is currently the case, or whether attempts to differentiate between those issues which are critical and those which are routine would be likely to increase deference to authority on significant matters and thereby create more slack in the governance system.

Committee Accountability

One of the most severe criticisms of academic senate committees is that they are not held accountable for performance by either their faculty constituencies or the university (Lieberman, 1969). Reports are a principal means of committee accountability to the constituent faculty body. At Berkeley major committee reports were sometimes infrequent (the Curriculum Committee reported on its activities once in a ten year period) usually perfunctory in that they dealt with procedural matters rather than substantive questions, sometimes confidential and seldom debated on the floor unless specific action was required. There has been some improvement in these practices since the Free Speech Movement of 1964-65 but standards on the frequency and substance of these reports have yet to be developed.

In 1968 Minnesota's Committee on Committees recommended annual reports from all committees and a review of committee minutes by the
Committee on Business and Rules, presumably to begin to develop better standards of committee accountability. The Penn State Senate Chairman reported annually on the activities of each committee. Formal standards of committee accountability appeared to be more effectively developed at Fresno. Although committee reports went directly to the Executive Committee, the minutes of most major committees received wide circulation among the faculty and administration.

Informal mechanisms of accountability, in contrast to formal committee reports, may have existed on all four campuses. The informal political organizations at Berkeley and Fresno may have been important factors in monitoring committee activity, but the research was not directed towards a detailed analysis of the internal functioning of these voluntary groups. Further research should attempt to assess the degree of influence exerted on specific committee operations by informal associations.

The research reported in this document did not study questions of faculty accountability to the university and/or the public, but as the interviews and analysis progressed we came to realize that this is an important question, especially in public institutions (McConnell, 1969). Traditionally, public control of higher education is exercised through Boards of Trustees and state legislatures, but the increasing polarization between such agencies and faculty bodies reported by Livingston (1969) was apparent in our own experience, especially at Berkeley, Penn State and Fresno. We uncovered little evidence that senates have faced the issue of public accountability, except when they encounter
severe encroachment on what they believe to be faculty prerogatives.

Participation Patterns and Internal Politics

Committee Service

The data tend to confirm an apathetic-spectator-gladiator pattern of participation on senate committees. Gladiatorial or oligarchic participation appeared to characterize the internal politics of three of the four Senates.\(^3\)

Approximately 65 to 80 percent of those eligible to participate on senate committees did not do so. The majority of faculty members who did serve on senate committees did so only once, although the time period of the samples was not constant.\(^4\) At the other end of the spectrum, at Berkeley, Minnesota and Fresno from 10 to 20 percent of those who served on these committees did so three or more times.

The Berkeley data were computed over a longer time span and illustrate this point in more detail. From 1957 to 1966, 590 persons served on at least one senate committee. Sixty percent served on one committee, 23 percent served on two and another 10 percent were on three committees. The remaining seven percent were on from four to seven senate committees during the ten year period.

The Penn State Senate had only ten standing committees and 200 elected Senators and therefore the opportunity for committee service was more limited. During the three year period 45 percent (N=135) of the elected Senators did not serve on a senate committee, 50.3 percent (N=151) served on one committee and 4.6 percent (N=14) served on two or three committees.
It remains to be seen whether a greater number of senate committees or a longer time span will result in Senators serving on more than one committee at Penn State.

The data at three of the four institutions supported statements (Clark, 1963, Mortimer and McConnell, 1970) that the structure of participation in faculty governance paralleled that of society at large. There was a body of apathetics or non-participants, a group of spectators who remained marginally active in senate affairs but who could be aroused when the issue became salient, and a small group of political gladiators who presumably did a large share of the work.

Another important factor in the oligarchic pattern of senate behavior was the committee appointment process. All four institutions had Committees on Committees. Members of the Berkeley Committee on Committees were asked what criteria they used in making committee appointments and the responses were summarized into four general categories: interest, personal qualities, representativeness and ability. Personal qualities is the most subjective of the categories and the respondents tended to rely heavily on their personal judgment of the individuals being considered, especially when important committees were appointed. This meant that in a faculty of 1700-1800 members important senate committee appointments often depended on the personal contacts of committee members. Seven of the 12 respondents spoke of the almost absolute veto that each member of the committee had over any suggested appointee. One person referred to it
as a blackball, another as senatorial courtesy, while others simply stated that any strong objection to an individual by a member of the committee was sufficient to deny the appointment.

The creation of a Committee on Committees at Minnesota in the early 1950s was an attempt to broaden the membership of senate committees and make them more representative, but a major conclusion of Eckert's (1970) study was that there was a relative decrease in participation by junior faculty on senate committees after the Committee on Committees was created.

At Fresno the appointment process was controlled by the majority political faction which dictated the nomination and appointments to the Committee on Committees. One of the majority's specific concerns was to deny control of any committee to the minority.

As a committee increased in importance the informal criteria for membership on it became more restrictive. At Berkeley the Committee on Budget and Interdepartmental Relations was an important committee in appraising qualifications for merit salary increases and for appointment, tenure and promotion. All other personnel committee reports were substantively reviewed by the central Budget Committee, which made its own independent evaluation of the candidate. Interviews with members of the Committee on Committees, revealed that only senior scholars with superior definition of "superior research productivity" was restrictive enough so that only a handful of Berkeley's 1700-plus senate members were eligible
for appointment to the Budget Committee. The informal criteria for membership on this committee were very restrictive indeed:

Another example of informal criteria for committee membership was the elections to the Executive Committee at Fresno. The majority political faction controlled enough votes so that it could elect any of its members and deny a seat on the Executive Committee to a member of the minority faction. No identification of faction was made on the ballots, so the system worked through the informal communication network at the college. The point is that membership in the "right" faction became the principal criterion for election.

Committee Composition

The research also analyzed some of the characteristics of senate committee members to determine whether the formal or informal criteria of sex, rank, academic area and administrative responsibility were significant factors in the composition of standing committees. The data were not always comparable between institutions, but some similarities were found.

Sex. Discrimination against women, if it exists, was probably more a matter of initial appointment to the faculty than one of appointment to senate committees. Nevertheless, during the 10 year period women were not represented on the Budget, or Educational Policy committees at Berkeley, nor was a woman elected to the Committee on Committees. Of the 237 people who were members of six key senate committees during this 10 year period, only three were women.

Women constituted about 17 percent of Minnesota's professional staff but only 4.1 percent of senate members and 6.6 percent of the faculty
appointments to senate committees were women. From 1965 to 1968 seven committees had no women faculty members and some others had only one. No woman has ever chaired a senate committee at Minnesota (Eckert, 1970 p. 313).

In 1969-70, 9.6 percent of Penn State's faculty were women and they held about six percent of the senate seats and ten percent of committee memberships. Two of ten standing committees had no women members from 1967-68 to 1969-70 and three others had only a single woman member during this period.

Women comprised 21.2 percent of Fresno's 1968-69 faculty and 15.2 percent of senate members from 1966-67 to 1968-69. During this same period women were not represented on two of eight college and/or senate committees and three other committees had only one woman member.

Rank. Senate committee members were drawn heavily from the ranks of full professors at all four institutions. In 1966-67, 46.9 percent of a sample of Berkeley's faculty were professors but 62.1 percent of its committee members held this rank. Penn State and Fresno both had 25.4 percent of their 1968-69 faculty in this top rank. At Penn State 55.2 percent of 1968-69 committee appointments were professors whereas 62.1 percent of Fresno's 1966-67 to 1968-69 faculty committee appointments were full professors. In short, approximately sixty percent of senate committee appointments at all four institutions went to full professors.

When the academic ranks of members of specific committees or groups
of committees were examined, a quasi-hierarchical system was revealed. In practice, membership on personnel committees at both Berkeley and Fresno was limited to full professors — which is apparently a normal phenomenon in institutions of higher learning. A more significant generalization which applied to both Berkeley and Minnesota was that there appeared to be a group of committees whose membership was drawn exclusively from the upper ranks. These committees tended to be the ones which dealt with issues like personnel, the appointment of senate committees, faculty rights and benefits, and senate operations.

The institutions varied in the extent to which Associate and Assistant Professors were concentrated in specified committees. At Berkeley there was a group of five committees whose membership over ten years was largely drawn from these two ranks — 117 out of a total of 139 members were Assistant and Associate Professors (84 percent). Minnesota's Assistant Professors (5.1 percent of all senate committee appointments from 1965 to 1968) tended to be spread thinly over a range of committees except that they were excluded from committees dealing with senate operations.

Academic Field. When the academic college or discipline of committee members was analyzed, Minnesota, Penn State and Fresno appeared to have fairly representative committee structures during the three year periods. The senates themselves in these institutions were representative by definition.

However, in the committee structure of the Berkeley Senate some fields were seriously over-represented and others were under-represented when
compared with the representative sample of faculty over a ten year period. In some cases the imbalances were statistically significant. The departments of chemistry, physics and English were over-represented among committee chairmen and the foreign language departments as a group were under-represented. The School of Business and the department of English were over-represented among committee members and the foreign languages, again, were under-represented.

A closer analysis of the Berkeley data revealed that departmental or school imbalance was greater on certain committees. The only professional school representation on the Budget Committee from 1957-58 to 1966-67 was from the College of Engineering, Agriculture and Business. The Schools of Public Health, Social Welfare, Education, Criminology, Environmental Design, Optometry, Forestry and Librarianship were not represented on the Committee during the ten year period. The Law School only recently came under the review of this committee, but it had had no representation. These professional schools accounted for 17.3 percent of the faculty members in the ten year representative sample.

It is clear that some existing decision-making structures represented women, junior faculty and certain academic areas only indirectly. These persons may have participated in elections, but there were few data to support a contention that they actually did participate in substantial numbers on senate committees.

The data on committee service, committee appointments, and the composition of committees do not indicate whether the substance of senate
policies or committee reports would differ if the participation were broadened or appointment practices changed. Would a committee of women faculty members have produced a different solution to a problem than a male committee or one composed of both males and females? Would a senate or a committee with greater representation from the lower faculty ranks be more responsive (or "relevant") to the forces of change? The data did not speak to these pertinent questions. It is possible that the preponderance of older faculty of high rank on major senate committees leads to resistance to educational reform—a conservatism now under heavy student fire. It does seem that the continued legitimacy of senate committees will depend on criteria other than direct representation of the lower ranks and women—e.g., symbolic representation.

Informal Political Behavior

An important factor in senate organization and operation was their internal political networks. Fresno's opposing factions were overt, well known to the participants, and fairly rigid. There was disagreement among the respondents over the extent to which a middle group existed between the two factions. The "liberals" had developed the practice of caucusing every Wednesday noon to discuss senate and campus affairs. The "conservative" faction controlled a majority of votes in both the College and the Senate and felt no need to caucus weekly. Leaders of the latter faction reported that they controlled enough votes and were well enough organized that a few phone calls could muster the votes necessary to pass or block legislation.
During times of crises at Berkeley, the emergence of formal and informal groups have affected the operations and resolutions of the Senate. Searle has described how the Committee of Two Hundred met over a weekend during the Free Speech Movement to consider the two resolutions to be presented to the senate (1965, pp. 93-104). The three major crises which rocked the Berkeley campus in 1968-69, saw the formation of a Berkeley Faculty Alliance to organize faculty support for the liberal or "radical" faction.

At Minnesota there have been relatively few informal groups when compared to those at Fresno and Berkeley. The advocates of a strong student voice on the senate were opposed by a rather informal group of concerned faculty who forced a substantial modification in the proposals which resulted in the July, 1969 Constitution and Bylaws. The opposition coalesced around a position paper written by a professor of law.

The Spring and Fall of 1969 saw the formalization of a group of radical faculty -- the Faculty Action Caucus. A resolution, stimulated by caucus members, expressing opposition to the Vietnam War passed the faculty-student Senate in October, 1969. Some Minnesotans expressed the view that a coalition of radical faculty and students had pushed the resolution through the Senate. The prospects were for more coalitions of this nature because the caucus expressed an intention to politicize the University Senate. Organized attempts such as this may result in counter-organization by faculty and student moderates.
At Penn State the senatorial delegations from several colleges had developed the practice of caucusing about one week before the monthly Senate meeting and one week after the Senate Council meeting. The College's representative to the Council would discuss the coming agenda with his delegation but to date there have been few attempts to develop rigid positions for the entire delegation.

Another important feature of the informal political behavior of senates is the fact that attendance figures at meetings were ordinarily low regardless of whether town meetings or more representative structures were involved. In the absence of crisis, Berkeley averaged about one attender for every 14 or 15 senate members in 1966-67 and some meetings had to be adjourned for lack of a quorum of 75 members. The town meeting structure of Berkeley's Senate encouraged attempts to muster attendance on the part of those who wanted to see a particular proposal defeated or passed. Minnesota often had trouble getting a quorum of 50 percent, and attendance at Penn State and Fresno averaged about 65 percent of the membership.

There are some important implications which may be drawn from the informal political behavior in academic senates. First, debate on issues which came to the Senate was often over political considerations rather than educational substance. As one respondent at Fresno put it, "At times we become so political that we forget the educational mission of the College." Often the debate was a power conflict with both sides attempting to control the outcome and with little attention given to the integrity of the College or its educational mission.
In many cases at both Fresno and Berkeley, especially in times of crisis, "party" positions became rigid and alternatives severely limited because resolutions were hammered out in caucuses. There the language of resolutions was determined, compromises reached and positions taken well in advance of senate debate. Lengthy debate did occur on the floor, but often it was unheard or was directed toward parliamentary detail with only slight consideration given to substance. The traditional belief in senates as forensic organizations in which logic and reasoned dialogue prevail was seriously compromised when positions were solidified and alternatives limited before the Senate met and open floor debate began.

Administrative Involvement in Senate Affairs

Administrators on Senate Committees

Some critics have argued that academic senates are too heavily weighted with "administrative" views. The extent to which administrators were on senate committees was a subject of investigation in the three universities.

These three institutions included academic administrators in the Senate from deans up to the chief campus or university officers. Directors of research institutes or centers were not specifically included as senate members nor were administrators, below the college level, such as department chairman.

Berkeley's Committee on Committees had an informal policy of not appointing department chairmen, deans or central campus administrators to senate committees. There were a few exceptions to this policy (The dean of a professional school was elected to the Committee on Committees).
Several interviewees told of being in a position to choose either a Senate committee assignment or a department chairmanship. At Minnesota, 66.4 percent of non-student appointments to senate committees from 1965 to 1968 involved persons with concurrent administrative responsibility. Eckert's study stated that this proportion had not changed significantly when compared with the 1945-48 and 1955-58 periods (1970, p. 312). Approximately half (49.7 percent) of all non-student committee appointments at Minnesota involved persons from the President's office or from deans or director's offices, including assistant or associate deans, during the 1965 to 1968 period. Figures for the three year period showed that 67.2 percent of committee chairman had administrative responsibility, predominantly at the school or college level.

At Penn State approximately 35 to 40 percent of all non-student committee appointments had concurrent administrative responsibility. Campus and college level administrators accounted for approximately 15 percent of these appointments with the remaining 20 to 25 percent being at the department level.

Separate Jurisdictions or Joint Decision Making?

The extent of administrative participation in Senate affairs or lack of it was a problem with different implications at Berkeley, Minnesota and Penn State. The Berkeley Senate has long been jealous of its autonomy and has been very careful to maintain a distinct separateness from the campus administration. The Chancellor and his staff were not committee members and participated very little in committee deliberations.
According to one campus official, one of the administrative problems in trying to manage the University at Berkeley is how to penetrate the committee structure of the Academic Senate. Matters which have importance far beyond the Senate itself are considered in committees, and they are entirely devoid of formal administrative representation (Mortimer, 1970, p. 140).

The character of the Minnesota Senate was entirely different. Central campus administrators were well represented on committees, except those dealing with Senate operations. The President had significant opportunity to influence the composition of senate committees. Eckert's evidence was that the 80 percent of those who served on three or more committees were administrators at the program or college level and above, thus giving more weight to the accusation that administrators tended to dominate the Senate.

The development of Penn State's Senate as a mechanism for increased faculty involvement in campus decision making was hindered by the fact that the central administration had adopted a "hands off the Senate" policy. A major conclusion of the Penn State report was that the Senate's advisory committees had not penetrated the administrative governance structure in such crucial areas as research policy, graduate study, planning, the creation of new academic units and continuing education.

Administrative involvement in senate and college committees at Fresno was a point of some contention. Some faculty preferred to keep the committee decision making process separate from central administrative officers arguing that these officers would eventually have an opportunity to accept or reject committee proposals. This view did not prevail, however, and
central administrators were represented on most college wide committees at Fresno.

The principal issue at all four institutions was the degree to which administrators and faculty should be jointly involved in decision making or whether they should seek to define essentially separate jurisdictions and negotiate about overlapping areas. In general and rather cautious terms, the Senate decision making process at Berkeley and Penn State tended to favor separate faculty-administrative jurisdictions with the support for this model coming from the faculty at Berkeley and from the administration at Penn State. Minnesota and Fresno tended to operate more on a joint participation model although the tension among faculty and between the faculty and administration at Fresno may result in significant changes.

**Summary and Recommendations**

**Summary**

Lack of deference to or delegation of authority, exclusion or "token" representation of researchers, students and in some cases administrators, lack of accountability, gladiatorial participation patterns, seniority on committees, occasional imbalances among discipline, subjective standards for committee membership, informal politicization and occasional administrative imbalances all raise serious questions about the continued viability of academic senates. Perhaps the most important threat to the legitimacy of senates was that they tended to exclude certain segments of the university from their membership and some segments of the faculty from important senate committees.
The question at stake here is not a new one to those familiar with democratic political thought. In order to maintain the viability and/or legitimacy of senates in a time of growing educational and political polarization, attention needs to be given to what concessions the majority in a "representative democratic" system are willing to make to the minority in order to maintain the viability of the system. Two hundred years ago De Tocqueville warned of the danger of a tyrannous majority imposing its will on the dissenting minority. The problem is still relevant to governance systems, including those in universities.

"Token" inclusion of minority viewpoints, however, will often inflame a situation rather than calm it. The balance between the tyranny of the majority and a situation in which a minority has de facto veto power is precarious indeed. Too much majority control is likely to sap the vitality and legitimacy of governance structures. Too much concern for minority views may result in a situation in which any organized minority can block action favored by the majority.

It will not be easy to provide more diverse inputs into senate and committee decision making processes because gladiators often play a very useful role in representative or democratic systems of government. They enable a larger organization to function somewhat more efficiently. "They do this in part by saving most members of the organization the necessity of acquiring, analyzing and classifying information and also by acting expeditiously when it would be cumbersome and time consuming for the larger group to decide the issues" (McConnell and Mortimer, 1971, p. 275). But the danger in too much gladiatorial control is that
they will tend to become insulated from the feelings, perceptions and views of the organization as a whole and thus become less responsive to the changing moods of their constituents. They may also become divorced from particular segments of the faculty. The academic generation gap between professors over 50 and assistant professors under 35 is likely to be substantial on a wide range of educational and social values. (Semas, 1971, p. 2). Gladiators may be unaware of these discrepancies or unwilling to consider unorthodox views.

The inherent danger in an imbalanced or non-representative system is that of conformity in values. Martin (1969) argues that lack of diversity in values is a fundamental problem in American higher education. "Beneath diverse structures and functions we found uniformity in educational assumptions and sociopolitical values across major interest groups and in various types of institutions" (p. 210). One of his main findings, that complexity of structures and functions has concealed a high degree of rigidity in values, is important when evaluating the lack of diversity in senate committee membership. Mere balancing of committee representation by disciplines, rank or sex may not result in a balance of educational orientations or priorities. Our research tends to support the conclusion that the diversity of values and educational priorities represented in senates and on committees is inadequate and that it seriously cripples debate on substantive, educational issues.

Recommendations

How can senates move to develop more diversity in their participation
patterns? The comparative monograph on which much of this paper is based deals with this question in more detail but a summary of the major points will illustrate some favored directions (McConnell and Mortimer, 1971). The recommendations are based on an assumption that there is an appropriate function for campus senates in the total governance system - e.g. that there are decisions which are appropriately made at the campus rather than the state wide or department and college levels.

Senates and their committees should develop new and broader definitions of representativeness. Traditionally, representation in senates is based on academic instructional units and is not sufficiently in step with changing constituencies and interests. A new concept of representativeness should include such variables as academic rank, educational viewpoint, the different responsibilities of various persons on the campus and where relevant, campus factions. Some of these changes could be accomplished immediately by the Committee on Committees while others may require some constitutional revisions.

In keeping with the need for more diverse inputs, most senates should seek to simplify their committee structures and resort to more ad hoc or task force arrangements. The temporary nature of these mechanisms will allow, and may even encourage, participation by more diverse groups and may result in the participation of faculty members and students who would be reluctant to accept assignments on standing committees.

Senate bodies should begin to hold committees more accountable for their activities and the substance of their recommendations. The Committee
on Committees should be asked to report on the policies they use to appoint committees and be held accountable for greater diversity. Where possible executive and other committees should be held accountable for reporting on the substance of advice rendered to the administration and on the bases on which committees themselves make decisions.

Finally, senates must be encouraged to develop wider perspectives about their own role in university governance. More attention should be directed to whether or not the separation of senates from administrators and trustees exacerbates the tension and heightens conflict between them. If senates insist on excluding students, researchers or administrators from their membership and decision making processes, it may be necessary to create other mechanisms, such as Penn State's University Council, to ensure more representative governance.
Footnotes

1. Three of the reports are not limited to Senates but deal with the broader topic of faculty participation in governance.

It is clear that no representative sample of institutions of higher education is involved. The case studies draw on analysis of Constitutions, Bylaws and other relevant documents. The prime basis for observations made in these reports are over 230 semi-structured hour long interviews with faculty and administrators in the four institutions. Dr. William L. Deegan and Dr. T.R. McConnell participated in the interviews at Minnesota and Fresno, and Dr. Harriet Stull was part of the research team at Fresno. David Leslie was a vital part of the research effort at Penn State. A special word of appreciation goes to Ruth Eckert, Professor of Higher Education at Minnesota who made her data on Senate committee composition available to us. Dr. Eckert also served as a valuable resource person at Minnesota.

2. Formal authority is based on legitimacy, position and the sanctions inherent in office whereas functional authority is based on professional competence, experience and human relations skills. (Peabody, 1962, pp. 465-472).

3. Presthus defines an oligarchy as the rule of the many by the few (1965, p. 39). I have argued elsewhere that oligarchic behavior is a highly probable, though not inevitable feature of organizational life (Mortimer and McConnell, 1970, pp. 114-119). I do not infer that such behavior is bad or good. Oligarchies are evidence of unequal distribution of the resources of power, not necessarily of Machiavellianism. It is possible that these inequalities could operate to enhance the general welfare.

4. The Berkeley data represent a ten year period from 1957-58 to 1966-67. Minnesota, Penn State and Fresno data represent only three periods.

5. Berkeley's Committee on Committees was elected from the entire senate membership after nomination papers were filed. The Committee appointed the members and chairmen of senate committees.

At Minnesota the Consultative Committee nominated twice as many candidates as there were vacancies and then Committee on Committees' members were elected by the Senate (The Chairman was appointed by the President). The Committee was reconstituted during the 1969 reorganization to include 8 faculty and five students. It furnishes the President with a
slate of twice the number of committee members as there are
vacancies and he makes the final appointments to senate committees.

At Penn State the Senatorial delegation from each voting unit
elected one of its members to serve on the Committee on Committees
and Rules. This Committee then made committee appointments.

At Fresno the Committee on Committees was nominated from the
Senate's membership by the Executive Committee and confirmed by
the Senate. Previously there was substantial overlap between
the two committees (4 of 7 Committee members were also on the
Executive Committee in Fall, 1968) but this practice was dis-
continued.

6. Fresno also appointed non-Senators to its College-wide committees
but not to the five senate committees. Penn State's Committee
on Committees and Rules appointed elected Senators to senate
committees and each committee could make additional appointments
as it saw fit. All faculty members at Berkeley were also senate
members. At Minnesota about one third of 1965-68 senate committee
members were also members of the Senate.

7. The Committees were: Academic Planning, Budget and Interdepartmental
Relations, Committee on Committees, Courses of Instruction, Educa-
tional Policy and Senate Policy.

8. The analyses of Berkeley data were more detailed than at the other
institutions and over a longer time period. Similar imbalances
may have occurred if more detailed data were available on the
other three institutions.
References


