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Campus Governance

The Amazing Thing Is
That It Works At All

REPORT 11
COLLEGE GOVERNANCE

The Amazing Thing is that it Works at All

Harold L. Hodgkinson

Report 11

ERIC Clearinghouse on Higher Education
The George Washington University
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FOREWORD

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The eleventh in a series of reports on various aspects of higher education, this paper represents one of several types of Clearinghouse publications. Others include annotated bibliographies and short reviews based on recent significant documents found both in and outside the ERIC collection. In addition, the current research literature of higher education is abstracted and indexed for publication in the U.S. Office of Education's monthly volume, Research in Education. Readers who wish to order ERIC documents cited in the bibliography should write to the ERIC Document Reproduction Service, Post Office Box Drawer O, Bethesda, Maryland 20014. When ordering, please specify the ERIC document (ED) number. Payment for microfiche (MF) or hard, photo copies (IC) must accompany orders of less than $10.00. All orders must be in writing.

Carl J. Lange, Director
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I. INTRODUCTION

On almost any campus, the processes of campus governance are dictated largely by intuition, irrational precedent, and from-the-hip responses, with perhaps a tiny fraction based on fact. Although we have feelings and hunches about governance, we have learned precious little since Machiavelli wrote his classic handbook for all who would play the power game.

There is probably much to be learned from history on the question of governance. Where could we find a more astute political case study of today's governance problems than Shakespeare's "Julius Caesar?" And, Plutarch commented:

It is an observation no less just than common that there is no stronger test of a man's real character than power and authority, exciting as they do every passion and discovering every vice.

Take, for example, the question of age requirements for those who govern. The Roman Senate was for the most part a council of elders (the root is Senectus, meaning aged, elderly, or infirm). Its original purpose was to provide the ruler with an advisory council, but by the time of Cato, it had come to dominate the decision-making process, much as some faculty senates have in our own time. (There may even be a historical tendency for senates to begin as counseling groups only to end in a power struggle with the ruler.) At any rate, the Roman Senate was intended to consist of the elders, speaking mostly for themselves, they did not really represent anybody else. But history indicates that others have long felt that the young should have a big hand in the process, as the Orders of Saint Benedict stated in 529 A.D.:

Chapter Three: Of calling the Brethren to Council. As often as any important business has to be done, the monastery, let the abbot call together the whole community and himself set forth the matter. And, having heard the counsel of the brethren, let him think it over by himself and then do what he shall judge to be the most expedient. Now the reason why we have said that all should be called to counsel is that God often reveals what is better to the younger... But if the business to be done in the interests of the monastery be of lesser importance, let him use the advice of the seniors only.

It is written: Do all things with counsel, and thy deeds shall not bring thee repentance (151).*

This material is presented with some sense of humility for with all the knowledge of social science at our disposal, we have gained little in our understanding of governing over the years. One might well ask, why is there so little solid research on the processes of governing? Why do we know more about the Hopi Rain Dance than we do about how and why college and university presidents are selected? I have suggested several reasons why higher education seems to study everything except itself:

Governance is very hard to study, for some of the same reasons that sexual behavior is hard to study. In our culture, both are considered private acts, not to be performed in public to be observed and commented upon by others. Warren Bennis relates the incident in which a university president asked a group of his most prestigious professors to make a list of the most pressing problems facing the nation. After several weeks of working, the professors came up with a list of about ten; heading the list was the topic of university organization. Then the president asked the group to rank order the list in terms of those problems which the university should actually work on. University organization came in last (17).

This paper will present what we do know: nose-counting surveys of who participates in governance and how these patterns of participation are changing for various constituents; attitude surveys of what people say about participation; and a descriptive account of several of the new organizational structures now being tried. There will also be some discussion of such necessarily related problems as accountability, decentralization and centralization, representation, and the impact of such forces as statewide coordination and the courts on on-campus governance processes in higher education. The paper will conclude with recommendations for needed research in the field, and a bibliography. I will concentrate on the literature, both published and fugitive, from 1965-70.

*Numbers indicate the source in the bibliography.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF GOVERNANCE

The word "governance" is a relative newcomer on the educational scene, first brought into popular usage by John Corson (249). Interpretations of the term have since become diverse, although there is almost always a juxtaposition possible between government, which has come to mean the structures of positions and roles which can be seen on an organization chart, and governance, which is descriptive of the processes through which individuals and/or groups set and control policy, implement decisions, allocate resources, etc. The word suggests a dual focus: on structures and on the patterns of human interaction within the structures. This duality helps to explain why research on governance is so hard to do, as research techniques which are used for structures are not often compatible with those for analyzing interaction patterns.

One reason we need a word like governance today is that patterns of participation in governing an institution of higher education have become so dispersed that organization charts are seldom accurate descriptors of what really happens. In the early days of higher education, the word government was enough, as the president typically ran the institution with an iron hand, and administrative structures were so simplified that anyone who could read the abbreviated organization charts knew what was what, especially at the top. Partly because many of the earliest colleges in the United States were related to some religious group, American higher education, even today, is distinguished by the power given to lay boards. The increasing politicization of the University Grants Committee in Britain suggests that other countries may follow our lead (31,192). But the arguments for having the laity represented on a church-governing board and the present reality of trustee boards consisting almost entirely of lawyers and bankers who are virtually all white and wealthy, picked for their economic and political savvy and their almost complete ignorance of the specific operations of higher education are two very different things (47,48,52). Most likely, this faith in the lay board in education came to us from Scotland, certainly not from the other nations from which we borrowed many ideas, such as England, France, Germany, and Italy. It is ironic that in order to be selected for trusteeship of an American college or university, one must often profess ignorance of the actual nature of college governance. Faculty traditionally have had little place on boards (although the custom of a single faculty chair on the board was not unknown in private colleges in the nineteenth century), and except for the president, the role of other college administrators vis-à-vis the board has been minimal and exceedingly ambiguous.

Styles of leadership

Administrative styles in higher education have roughly followed those of industry over the years, with a delay period of several decades. When industry was dominated by the empire builders and captains of industry, these powerful men, sitting as trustees, naturally selected men like themselves for the presidency of colleges and universities. If autocracy worked in a factory, why not on campus? Thus, the faculty were often seen as hired hands, subordinate to the whim of the president. In such a climate, structures and programs could be quickly changed through the now famous "get it done and let them how!" style of leadership. The Western Electric experiments in their Hawthorne, Massachusetts, plant, began to change all that, as the relationship between worker morale and productivity began to be explored. The idea that management could be humane without dropping production was a revolutionary idea which moved into higher education more slowly than it moved into industry, and neither form of organization has totally accepted the idea today. Indeed, there is considerable evidence that participatory governance is effective in only a limited range of situations, and is extremely detrimental in others (1). There is more concern today, both in industry and higher education, for adjusting the structures of the unit so the functions that unit is striving to achieve. The unit with a highly ambiguous mission, such as a basic research center, tends to arrive on "flat" participatory governance, e.g., while the manufacturing unit making thousands of identical items does not. Some people have also come to believe that the fundamental analogy between the industrial model and the university is completely incorrect.

The coming of age of the American faculty member has been well documented elsewhere, but it is worth mentioning that the major changes in faculty power took place by revolution, or relatively slow additive changes, while the student entrance into the power arena in higher education has come with great rapidity, dating only from the beginning of the sixties (14,15,29). During this period of increasing student power and influence, there was a corresponding increase in the influence and control of education by statewide commissions of higher education, boards, and "superboards." Indeed, one aspect of virtually every dimension of contemporary American life is that increased authority is going to the state-level super-system, while more power is going to the people (at least to some of the people). During the sixties, boards of trustees have become slightly more diverse in terms of race, sex, social class and occupation, but in most cases the diversity is so small— one woman, one black—that it implies patronization (15).

External agencies

During the twentieth century, we have witnessed a great growth of the influence of external agencies on educational policies. Included here must be the federal government.
Present realities

The seventies have opened in a burst of experimentation with diverse governance patterns and practices. But through this diversity, some common threads have emerged.  

1. There seems to be, in some student and faculty circles, declining interest in the concept of representation—a feeling that participation means direct action on your own, not voting for someone to speak for you. The one exception to this might be the union locals which are able to represent the faculty in salary negotiations. But if industry is anything like they might be the union locals which are able to represent the faculty in salary negotiations: but if industry is any example, the wildcat strike—an expression of lack of faith in representative leaders—may come to higher education unionism as well.  

2. There is a move toward decentralization of many functions, particularly those directly related to the educational processes. Whether authority and accountability have been decentralized is another question which is much more difficult to answer.  

3. There is a move toward decentralization of many functions, particularly those directly related to the educational processes. Whether authority and accountability have been decentralized is another question which is much more difficult to answer.  

4. Partially as a consequence of some of these innovations, the role of the president as the only spokesman to the board for on-campus groups has shifted considerably. In McGrath's study of student participation, 175 of his 177 institutions reported that students sat in on trustee meetings, although only a handful had given students voting rights on the board (127). At Stanford, students serve on all major committees of the board—with vote—although they do not vote in the full meetings. The new American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) study (132) of student participation corroborates the McGrath data.  

5. There is a significant new concern for accountability in governance, particularly on the part of the administrator who implements policy decisions made by others.  

6. On some campuses, there is a decline of interest in the "separation of powers" implied by having an independent faculty senate and student senate or government, with no linkages between them. On most campuses that have moved to a single campus senate or council, student government has ceased to exist, and on others one hears references to "kiddie" or "sandbox" government in talking about the student council.  

7. Undoubtedly, the greatest single shift in the structure of governance is unionism, both of faculty and teaching assistants. (In Michigan, even community college administrators have unionized). It is too early to appraise the impact of this movement, but after a perusal of some work rules contracts, the most likely consequence seems to be greatly increased pay and greatly reduced professional autonomy for the teacher. It is likely that unionization at the faculty level, will hit all types of colleges by the end of the decade administrators may also organize, as they now have no professional organization to speak for their interests. Certainly a university campus at which the faculty, students, teaching assistant, and administrators belong to unions, and where the only interaction is through collective negotiation, would be a very hard place to change. Both unionism and broadly based campus senates are, of course, decreasing the authority of the faculty senate.  

Before proceeding to the analysis of several governance models, it might be well to look in slightly greater detail at a few of the central concepts now in use, including accountability, student participation, and the meaning of participation itself.
III. ACCOUNTABILITY

There is a movement afoot today in American education which has some resemblance to the movement that took place in American medicine immediately after the publication of the famous Flexner report (1910). Citizens are now aware of the amount they are paying for educational services, and are demanding that educators justify their requests for financial support in concrete ways. Accountability has a retroactive ring for many educators: "When they find out how little I'm doing for these students, I'll get fired." One seldom hears the reverse—that accountability will lead to greater rewards for the teacher's successes. Kingman Brewster, among others, has argued that students cannot be held accountable for the state of the campus—that power or obligation is usually delegated from the board of control to the president, as contained in the charter of the institution. A few institutions, including Antioch, have modified their charters to give responsibility and accountability for daily affairs of the campus to a group representing students, faculty and administrators. Charter modification is a possible reform, but one that takes a great deal of time and energy to accomplish, and might not be worth it in some states.

The problem of accountability is especially perplexing in academic institutions like colleges and universities, in which the president is not considered the faculty's boss, but rather as a colleague—the first among equals according to the mythology of academy. In this sense, then the "chain of command" kind of accountability practiced in military and manufacturing bureaucracies is probably inappropriate in education where decisions do not always go from the top down. Indeed, the most vital decisions—curriculum and tenure are generated in the department and move up to the dean and up to the department and move up (14,15,16,18,29). On many campuses, the president or dean is empowered simply to implement decisions made by the departments or the faculty/campus senate. Thus, there is a major problem: How do we hold an administrator responsible or accountable for implementing a decision which he did not make? This problem is caused in part by our insistence on looking at governance as the process of making decisions without regard for the reciprocal process of implementing them. Accountability must encompass the total process from policy formation to implementation.

Another difficulty with the issue of accountability is the relative vagueness of most administrative roles in education. (E.g., except for eating and breathing, what activities do all people with the title of dean perform?) In speaking of accountability, we are speaking of a system of assessment or evaluation that will tell us which people and groups are doing their jobs and how well. The process of evaluating the performance of educators is rather primitive at the moment, although most campuses use such devices as student evaluation forms, in-class observations by colleagues, and publications to decide which members of the faculty are good enough to receive tenure. How do we assess the quality of administrators or, for that matter, student decision-makers in a campus senate? Should trustees be exempt from evaluation? If not, what is to be done with a trustee who is found wanting? How do we assess the performance of a group rather than an individual, and whom do we hold accountable if a group is not performing well? The concept of accountability will be meaningless until we have some agreement on each campus about how it should be assessed and who should participate in the assessment (25).

IV. STUDENT PARTICIPATION

When the decade of the sixties began, only a few colleges and universities had moved to include students in the decisionmaking machinery of the institution, and the idea of high school and junior high students participating in decisionmaking was unheard of. By the end of the decade, the participation of college students on campus-wide decisionmaking bodies had become the normal procedure, according to McGrath, and some high schools had begun to recognize the meaningful student participation in the governing of their schools (127).

The major arguments against student participation run as follows:
1. Students are too young, too self-interested, too naive about politics and institutions.
2. Students are present for too short a time to be effective.
3. The student body is generally too diverse to be well represented.
4. Colleges and universities are not egalitarian; participation must be limited to the best and most knowledgeable people. Faculty just plain know more than students.

The arguments in favor of student participation are:
1. If education is to have something to do with learning, then the student is the only one who really knows when education has taken place.
2. Teachers can find out some things about student learning by testing, but students often learn things the teacher didn't intend and therefore cannot test.
3. From studies, it appears that students are more concerned about the quality of teaching than are either administrators or faculty.
brief history of student participation

the history of student participation is usually described in standard sources as beginning with bologna. but what role did students play in Plato's academy? in American higher education, students have been regarded primarily as consumers, and thus not interested in questions of governance. the pre-civil war college was, in sociological terms, a "total institution"—much like a jail or mental institution, in that it had nearly total control of the inmate's behavior. these institutions were often placed in rural settings, not particularly because of opportunities for reflection and contemplation, but for better control over the students. social patterns were much like those of the small rural town where everyone knows everyone else. the land-grant institutions, particularly those in urban settings, began an era of loosened control over student behavior by default (190). the commuter student represents a very different type of responsibility, particularly if he can get on a subway and disappear. institutional size brings anonymity and transience, which are both good and bad in their consequences.

the beginning of the elective system in the late nineteenth century allowed students a much greater influence, for they could vote with their feet. however, theirs was still the passive role of the consumer, not the participant. in addition, students in Eastern colleges formed "governance" roles outside the formal system. thus, fraternities developed because of the institution's mismanagement of dormitories; literary clubs and guilds because of uninspired teaching and meagre library services (many of the clubs had far better book collections than did the campus library); and inter-varsity athletics because of the college's sole interest in cognitive matters. the president of Williams wrote to the president of Amherst to ask if there were anything that could be done about these developments; the reply was not.

student governments began in earnest about the time of the student personnel movement; and the dean of students often served as watchdog and coordinator of student government activities. with few exceptions, students shed away from the major business of campus governance and seemed happy to select homecoming queens, school songs, mottoes, and the senior class play. even more interesting, students, for the most part, accepted this arrangement with the passive role of the consumer, not the participant. the commuter student represents a very different type of responsibility, particularly if he can get on a subway and disappear. institutional size brings anonymity and transience, which are both good and bad in their consequences.

V. changing concepts of participation

until very recently, America was a nation governed largely by the process of representation, that is, the legitimacy of most public officials came from the fact that they represented people who elected them. the job of the electorate was to do just that: elect people who could represent their wishes and interests. this model could function well in an agrarian society where rates of social change were slow, populations remained 'airly stable and were situated mainly in small towns. but in an urban, industrialized nation with rapid population shifts undergoing "future shock," it is virtually impossible for any official to say he is representing the needs of his expanded constituency.

we have also been a nation organized under the notion of rather strict separation of powers into executive, legislative and judicial roles and functions. the stress points in these three systems occur mainly at their interfaces in jurisdictional disputes, and frequently each plays the other's role. the Supreme Court acts like a chief executive in deciding the nation about segregation; the chief executive acts like the legislature by creating legislation; and the legislature judges the constitutionality of certain issues.

these matters have impinged on campus governance. the traditional approach has been that committees and senates make policy decisions and the administration implements them. However, the system has never really
Some social cement is still needed to create a group out of a collection of individuals, necessary to make a group effective in accomplishing its goals. The separation-of-powers doctrine is misleading when applied to higher education unless we first have a clear idea about what powers and functions are to be separated and why.

Basic to the question is the concept of participation. If the president can truly represent the faculty in meetings with the board, there is little need for the faculty to be present at board meetings. (Indeed, on many campuses, there is widespread feeling among faculty that the faculty senate does not represent their personal views, much less the president's.) Students certainly seem to feel that the student council does not represent them, just as local fraternities have ceased believing that the national office can represent their views.

Ad hoc committees

Consequently, there is a parallel in higher education to the concept of participation now creeping into some community action programs—each man for himself alone, with little or no dependence on or loyalty to groups. When a group begins by saying "We, the members of the community, demand..." they are often speaking only for themselves. In higher education similarly, the ad hoc task force is now in vogue. It is made up of everyone interested in working on a particular problem, and functions with the understanding that the group will dissolve after the problem is dealt with. Each individual represents himself, which of course decreases the effectiveness of the group if the different selves cannot work toward common goals, which is often the case. The effectiveness of this new "community action" participation, style is also mitigated by the fact that the group rejects organization according to specialized tasks. Specialization implies bureaucracy, which is a dirty word.

In my view, this anarchistic concept of "community" participation will get us nowhere. However, the ad hoc task force concept can work well if people are loyal to the task force and work collectively for its success, both in cities and on campuses. It will fail in both places if participation does not allow the minimum level of centralization necessary to make a group effective in accomplishing its goals. Some social cement is still needed to create a group out of a collection of individuals.

In certain sectors of American society and on certain campuses, the concept of group coalition is creating many new styles of participation. It is conceivable that when two groups with real differences in background and attitude form a coalition, their impact could be greater than that of a coalition of two groups with no major differences. In other words, subgroup diversity can produce large group solidarity. Many techniques are now being developed in community action programs to encourage evolution. The charrette, a "pressure cooker" approach to community coalition, is particularly interesting. Such devices may find a place on campus if internal divisions become great enough. Even now, gaming and simulation devices are being developed in educational situations to train people to adopt more effective styles of participation. David Riesman has remarked that in joint meetings of automobile executives and faculty and administrators from higher education, the industrial leaders rarely got a word in edgewise. Perhaps because we in higher education have become such good talkers, our talent in the art of listening has not been fully developed. Participation requires skill in both areas.

Ombudsmen

There is great interest on many campuses today in the position of the campus ombudsman, an individual who can guarantee anonymity to all who come to him with complaints, and who has the mobility to do something about them (33,38,39). The ombudsman is, in my view, a symptom of a pathological organization, at least as far as participation is concerned. Just as a surgeon must cut away the cataract to help the patient see, the ombudsman must cut away certain organizational blocks that impede the accessibility of involvement of others. If the eye is working unimpeded by cataracts, you have no need for a surgeon. If the governance system is working well, you have no need for an ombudsman. It may be a problem of size, in that when organizations reach some sort of "critical mass" (not easily defined in terms of numbers), the ability of individuals to participate in matters concerning them rapidly declines (120,25,19,40). There are considerable data to support the contention that the smaller the size of the organizational unit, the greater the amount of individual participation. Even though students often say, "I want to go to a big campus just because there will be more things to do," the fact is that the student on a small campus will participate in more activities than the student on a large one.

Decentralization

After discussing participation and the impact of size, the next logical step is to consider ways in which organizations can do something about the sudden discovery that they are too large for effective participation of individuals. The enormous public university structures that will be the major pattern for tomorrow will not go away. They will continue to be vulnerable to disruption, since 30 leaders on a campus of 30,000 students can find 500 people who will support almost any cause, and 500 is enough to produce a great deal
of trouble, particularly if it is a different group of 500 people on a different issue every week.

Although it is after the fact, the best hope for such institutions (and perhaps for all institutions) is to consider various ways to decentralize governance functions in those areas directly affecting the quality of the participants' lives. Consider as an analogy the problem of class size. If one objective of a course is the personal encounter of student with student and student with teacher so that they can "rub off on each other," then the course must be limited to about 15 students. If the primary function of a course is to communicate objective information to which the student does not have to react, and to do so in the most economical way, then the sky is the limit and classes of 1,000 and over are feasible. (Whether this kind of class should be eliminated and replaced by technological methods is a question outside the bounds of this paper.) But given these two extremes, a class of 50 is precisely the wrong size for both objective--it is too big for interpersonal contact, and much too small for economical imparting of information. Our governance structures generally resemble the class of 50 students (126).

Revisiting existing institutions so that their governance can be both small and large simultaneously is the necessary task. Current writing on decentralization expresses the naive hope that the university will go away. Even if the cluster college concept (which has not caught on in a large way) were to dominate, a university of 30 autonomous campuses is still a university--there must be linkages across the colleges, and reciprocity between parts and whole. From the example of class size, we can say that the ideal governance structure would be a system in which decisions affecting individuals' lives and commitments would be made in the smallest possible units, while matters of logistics and support services would be made in the largest context available, possibly tapping into national networks.

Decentralization of everything is certainly no solution to the problems of governance. Selective decentralization might be at least a step in the right direction. For example, many campuses now practice what could be called "general education by the registrar's office," in which the curriculum of most students is determined to a large degree by certain requirements in general education. This area should be decentralized immediately to the level of the individual student and his faculty advisor. Standards for student social conduct are already being decentralized to the level of the individual dormitory, just as faculty promotion and tenure decisions have been decentralized to the departmental level.

This kind of selectivity could modify our governance systems in a manner that would increase an individual's trust and loyalty, not to the huge supportive super organization of the total university, but to the subunit in which he is involved. The trick is to begin thinking in terms of these two organizational scales--the very large and the very small simultaneously. Ideally, the individual should be provided with a social structure toward which he can give affection, energy, and loyalty, and with a macronetwork for goods and services. If we are to accept this model for the future, then the development of a whole new breed of administrators who can think and feel in both humane and logistics spheres at the same time is urgently needed. They will be, in the best sense of the term, cultural brokers, communicating the needs of each organizational dimension to the other.

**Governance roles**

Anyone perusing the governance literature will be struck by the tiny number of studies dealing with the way in which key people in governance perform their roles. The number of studies on campus presidents can be counted on one hand with a finger or two left over (54,55,58,60,64). Earlier books written about the presidency are based on opinion rather than carefully collected evidence. There is one large scale study of trustees, the data from which have been interpreted by two different authors (47,48,51,52). There are several interesting studies of academic departments and departmental chairmen and how they operate (74,80,81,82,83,84,90,91,93,94,95,97), and a few studies of student personnel officers. There are studies of numbers of students involved in governance, but almost nothing on how these students participate. And although on almost every campus the business officer, because of his budgetary control, is accused of making academic decisions he has no right to make, the process whereby this does or does not take place has never been systematically studied.

Studies of this sort are difficult to perform. If a business manager is making a lot of academic decisions by saying "yes" to one idea and "we can't afford it" to another, he will not be overjoyed at the prospect of being interviewed about it; and his president will be even more upset at the idea of making clear his relationship with the business officer. But it is the process or processes of governance in which our ignorance is greatest. For example, contemporary interest in large scale management information systems (MIS) for higher education completely neglects the way in which people in campus governance actually go about their jobs. As a consequence, the "systems" people who are to implement the MIS package encounter great difficulty because of their minimal understanding of (and maybe interest in) the area of governance. MIS has been in operation at Berkeley longer, perhaps, than on any campus in the country; yet knowledgeable people usually assume the system is not working, since it takes no account of the academic values or kinds of processes described by Rue and Meyer, that actually make the university run (255). If MIS is ever to function effectively, the creators will have to establish linkages between management systems and governance processes. Few such linkages are currently being planned.
Faculty senates

Management studies tend to be weighted against the role player. For example, McConnell and Mortimer's study on faculty senates conclude with this sort of indictment:

Lack of deference to or delegation of authority, exclusion or "token" representation of researchers, students and in some cases administrators, lack of accountability, gladiatorial participation patterns, seniority on committees, occasional imbalances among disciplines, subjective standards for committee membership, informal politicization and occasional administrative imbalances all raise serious questions about the continued viability of academic senates (91, see also 90,92).

The faculty senate is perhaps the best example of how different the governance of higher education is from industrial counterparts that provide us with most of our theory and research. The notion of "collegiography" has few parallels in the world of industry. But, as studies show, the notion seldom works well within the faculty, primarily because of stratifications based on age, rank, sex, and discipline. There is much evidence that some faculty senates deliberately avoid certain segments of the faculty, both in terms of representation on the senate and in participation on senate committees (90,91,108,192). (In the U.S. Senate, this process is referred to as "geriatric oligarchy." ) Any outsider who makes this point, however, is immediately accused of ignorance of the faculty principle of collegiality. There is an essential lesson here - researchers have been studying faculty senates under the assumption that interaction patterns actually were different from those of industry, while evidence suggests this is not so that the "community of scholars" is considerably less than a full-fledged community in many cases.

Here may lie at least part of the answer as to why many campuses have accepted faculty unionism as quickly as they have, and with so little disturbance. At many, perhaps even most, institutions of higher education, the faculty never did function as a community of scholars; thus no conflict with syndicalist values or styles was warranted or necessary to establish faculty unions. Because much of the writing on faculty has been concerned with a few very prestigious universities, we may have accepted the idea that all faculties are that way. The truth may be that only a small handful can be classified as essentially "collegial" in outlook and loyalty, and they may be contained within only 100 of our 2,500 institutions of higher education. The loss of professional autonomy through unionization - which seems inevitable in view of the work rules contracts now being signed - may be far more of a problem for those of us who write about higher education than it is for faculty members, some of whom, as specified in the contract, may be perfectly willing to take a 12-minute coffee break, and leave the building only once during the school day. Certainly, if collegiality were the normal culture of faculties, unionization would have taken much longer and been much more painful than has, in fact, been the case. Collegiality may indeed characterize a deviant faculty culture, and the professional autonomy and personal responsibility engendered by the collegial culture may not be ardently desired by most faculty members. And the guild mentality surrounding, as it does, the rites and rituals of academic passage perhaps cannot survive in the kind of system of higher education prophetically described by Clark Kerr as a "modified quasi-public utility" (Chronicle of Higher Education, March 8, 1971, p. 1).

VI. MODELS OF CAMPUS GOVERNANCE

A central thesis of this paper is that there is no one model of campus governance that is clearly superior for all settings. Different institutions attract different kinds of people. Imagine what would happen if the faculties and student bodies of Antioch and those of a fairly typical military school or college changed places for a week. The Antioch students and faculty would find the rules of the military college intolerable, and the military students would find the Antioch scene chaotic and unproductive for them. Small institutions are different from larger ones, private from public, community colleges from universities. However, it is possible that when each is working well, it has similar characteristics; just as a good boat, a good plane, and a good car will have some things in common although their structures are different.

Shared authority

Although the concept of shared authority is a point of view rather than a model per se, it deserves special mention because of its ideological importance, particularly in terms of the forceful, analytical treatment it received in the recently completed report by Morris Keeton and his colleagues for the American Association for Higher Education (AAHE) (25; also see Appendix A). To a large degree, the notion of shared authority is one that could be applied to virtually any model of campus governance, as long as respect were given to the needs of various constituencies, and ways were provided to make their wishes known and heeded. Any structure could function as a shared authority system if it met Keeton's four stipulations:
1. It dealt with matters which were critically affected by the work of the campus.
2. It provided skills essential to the work of the campus.
3. It recognized the need for cooperation of the constituency.
4. It recognized the rights of sponsors and providers of resources.

's should be said that the major appeal of this concept is ideological; that is, there is precious little evidence thus far that the concept of shared authority actually works. Like the comment that Christianity is fine except that it has only produced one Christian, it may be that the notion of shared authority requires too much magnanimity of us humans. At any rate, it remains a relatively untapped idea. Because the alternatives to it, however, seem to be more negotiated factionalism or, on the other extreme, anarchy, we should, perhaps, pay more heed to shared authority, and make serious attempts to build it into our revised governance structures, even without empirical justification for its success. Campuses, both large and small, report that the increased sense of trust engendered by the idea of a broadly based campus senate makes establishment of some authority-sharing mechanism possible.

"Classic-tall" model

When one thinks of Max Weber's classic descriptions of bureaucracy, one thinks of an organization based on a rational arrangement between positions, not individuals, on an organization chart. Hierarchy is functional, and each increase in vertical position on the hierarchy increases one's power over those below. All relationships are based on superiority and subordination, and there is no ambiguity concerning the status of each position in relation to others. Individuals who occupy the positions are not the key to the organization; the key is the positional hierarchy itself.

In higher education, "classic-tall" means power is concentrated in the governing board but delegated to a strong chief executive. While he may allow the faculty to make certain decisions, it is always at his pleasure, and he can revoke their decisions immediately if he disapproves. Students, who are seen as passive recipients of the curriculum of "classic-tall" campuses, are naturally passive in their relationship to the governance of the institution as well. The one-campus authority structure resembles an equilateral triangle with the president at the top. Patterns of initiation and communication as well as decisionmaking are from the top downward. The budget is usually considered a confidential document; deans and department chairmen usually are familiar with their own allocations, but have little knowledge about the rest of it. Salaries represent also a confidential document, and have little knowledge about the rest of it. The president and each staff member. Faculty and students have no contact with the board of trustees at all, and no intelligence can get from these "subordinates" to the trustees except through the good graces of the president.

There was a time in this century when the "classic-tall" model was predominant in American higher education. Indeed, it still exists in far greater numbers than one would first suspect. Analysis of long-term trends suggest, however, that its days are numbered, at least as far as the particular cycle of social change is concerned. It is still functional on large and small campuses in which the faculty and students are passive, dependent upon a system of rules and rewards, have few intrinsic motivations, and little concern for personal autonomy. We will probably continue to use this model on some campuses as long as there is a sector of our society who desire colleges to produce seniors who are identical to what they were as freshmen, except for increased age.

Bicameral or unicameral representative assembly

The bicameral model usually consists (in theory) of faculty and student senates with a negotiating group to work out differences in recommendations, much like joint senate-house committees in Washington. Its format involves separation of powers-faculty render unto the faculty things that are faculty's and the students do the same. Each senate has a certain amount of autonomy. But if their only authority is to make recommendations to the administration, then the problem mentioned earlier of the gap between decisionmaking and implementing is unsolved and critical.

The campus council or senate is a unicameral body representing faculty and students on equal terms, often including administrative representation. These central councils often begin as advisory for communication purposes and end up making many decisions. There are now at least 300 such central campus councils or senates. In one sense, these councils violate the concept of separation-of-power, but they have a better chance of forming a link between decisionmaking and implementation, since all phases of the processes are visible and those responsible for each segment are accountable. This model seems less efficient in many ways than the parallel-structure committee pattern of the strict separationist institutions—student committee on student discipline, a faculty committee on student discipline, an administration committee on student discipline, etc. In general, the comparisons with the federal government are not very helpful in campus governance; there is only one real supreme court. The unicameral council also has the advantage of making the best use of talent—students may serve very well in leadership roles on some questions, faculty on others, administration on others. Leadership can be more situational and less monolithic. (See Appendix: A few examples of a bicameral and unicameral model.)

The open hearing

One interesting idea which has widespread applicability is the open hearing. Under this arrangement, each group
must submit proposals to an open hearing before they are presented to the decision-making body. This means that even if the campus council is small, everyone who wishes to speak on an issue has a chance to do so. This makes the campus council, or any other form, more responsive to a larger selection of points of view. Some institutions are even stipulating that the open hearing is the only forum allowed. After the hearing, the council makes a recommendation to the faculty, administration, or student government. No debate is permitted, only a vote of yes, no, or return to committee. This makes for short faculty meetings in any size institution. (See Appendix B for an example of a model to reduce decision-making steps.)

Communitarian model

This model is usually based partially on a "town meeting" of either all the members of the community (often including faculty wives, secretarial, clerical, and maintenance personnel, etc.) or their representatives. In some cases, this body actually makes decisions on matters of policy; in others it is simply an open hearing to allow everyone to hear his views, after which a smaller group decides. Both approaches have been used in some experimental colleges since the 1930s. Generally, massive groups such as the community meeting function well in adversity only. If a decision has to be made which does not affect individuals directly (e.g., a change in investment policies from a lower blue-chip stock percentage to a higher investment in real estate trust funds), the community turnout will be small indeed. Because participation is severely modified by self-interest, major questions which do not impinge directly on individual lives are often left in limbo. Also, it is not clear that a place can be governed entirely by instant referenda. It is hard to tell who belongs in the community and why--if janitors are in, why not janitors' wives, secretarial, clerical and maintenance personnel, etc.) or their representatives. In some cases, this body actually makes decisions on matters of policy; in others it is simply an open hearing to allow everyone to hear his views, after which a smaller group decides. Both approaches have been used in some experimental colleges since the 1930s. Generally, massive groups such as the community meeting function well in adversity only. If a decision has to be made which does not affect individuals directly (e.g., a change in investment policies from a lower blue-chip stock percentage to a higher investment in real estate trust funds), the community turnout will be small indeed. Because participation is severely modified by self-interest, major questions which do not impinge directly on individual lives are often left in limbo. Also, it is not clear that a place can be governed entirely by instant referenda. It is hard to tell who belongs in the community and why--if janitors are in, why not janitors' wives, since faculty wives are in? These questions often take as much time as substantive discussion.

One appealing, yet threatening, definition of the community of a given campus is: "The community consists of those who teach and those who learn." This model seems most appropriate for small, residential colleges with a student body of around 1,000 to 3,000, and will produce a "community" of 1,700 to 4,000.

Urban community model

This model--patterned on Ocean Hill-Brownsville in New York--is being talked about for urban institutions, and involves participation of members of the city community who live in the immediate surroundings. In this structure, the essential criterion for participation is geographical--those who live in a certain area are affected by the campus and should have a say in what happens. This would mean that high school-age youth as well as college students would be engaged in governance. At the moment, no institution is fully given over to this approach, but Columbia, Chicago, State and Federal City College, as well as some community colleges, are exploring the concept of full community participation in the governing of the institution. It seems that the campus must stop being a social problem before it can solve social problems. Community colleges probably lead higher education by having strong community representation on their governing boards, but seldom have youth been represented on these boards. Many urban school systems are moving in this direction.

Ad hoc or "klecnex" model

Students often seem to like this style of participation. When a problem arises, everyone who is interested enough to work on its solution assembles, leadership and tasks are chosen, the problem is tackled and either resolved or not, at which point the group disbands. What could be more appropriate for American society than a disposable system of governance? The concept assumes that most standing committees, even with no functions, will create enough work to justify their continuation, and that groups must be forced to disband after completion of a given task. It remains to be seen whether such task forces can exist without centralized authority monitoring their every move. (The evidence from Columbia Community College and elsewhere is still vague.) There probably must be some central administration to handle necessary continuing functions. Task forces are crisis-oriented, since only a crisis would cause one to be created, and they tend to attract what Mortimer has called the "gladiators" (90,91).

Such a model is really not a model for student participation as such; indeed, students could be shut out of important issues, especially by the faculty. If it simply decided that no meeting needed to be called or no task force established. This model works more effectively in smaller institutions, both public and private; furthermore, public schools could use it as a problem-solving device.

Student syndicalist model

This model has as its major proposition the notion that student unions can provide a power base for students not contingent on the whims of either faculty or administration. In its most extreme form, it could entail a national legislative act establishing a student union for all students with compulsory membership. (Studenthood would become a closed shop.) All of the typical tactics of labor-management relations, from strikes to lockouts, would be available, along with compulsory arbitration, cooling-off periods, etc. This would give students a national power base from which to influence policies on each campus, with or without formal central monitoring participation. A modification of this form would be like the French student syndicalist model in which there are thousands of small local unions, unable to organize efficiently at the national level, but functioning effectively on certain local issues.

The central problem with models of this type concerns the protection of the rights of student minorities. Those
who don’t want to join, those who want to go to class when a strike has been called, etc. At the moment, the law is not clear as to whether a student can sue a college or university if it fails to offer the instruction he has paid for; one case says yes, another no.

The syndicalist model seems particularly suitable for large, public universities enrolling able students. The pressure tactics would be less effective on a campus of 900 students where everyone knows everyone else. A certain amount of political sophistication (at least a superficial knowledge of Marx) would be necessary, as well as a general knowledge of mass societies and how they work. Based on power tactics, it is a radical model, and it assumes a lack of trust across factions.

Implications of models

First, it should be made clear again that no one of the models sketched in this paper offers a solution to problems of governance on all campuses. Structures of governance are simply the means through which objectives of the institution (assuming that the institution has objectives) can be attained. But as so often happens, means have a tendency to become ends. If we have a stake in the present organization chart, we will strive to protect it, even though we may see that another form of organization might better attain the objectives. Because we become so involved with the structures, we tend to forget the functions they were meant to serve. Structures are no better and no worse than the people who operate within them. No structure generates trust; only people can do that. There is precious little knowledge in the behavioral sciences on the processes whereby interpersonal trust can be increased, although it is probably one of our biggest problems as a society. If there is a single reason for this pervasive distrust, it is probably that the size of decisionmaking units is too large to meet the needs of individuals. We can at least do something about that, in both secondary schools and colleges.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

Because this author has already developed his views on the next decade of campus governance, this section will consist of a brief comment on some needed research and some speculations based on what has been said thus far.

First, it would seem that we are now in a state of genuine ferment in higher education, as is true of most of the other social structures which comprise our culture. The social cement holding institutions together—the recipe for which is two parts trust, one part loyalty, two parts self-sacrifice, one part leadership—seems to be cracking everywhere. The decade we are entering will resemble the heyday of the Progressive Education Association, during which George Counts asked the crucial question—“Date the Schools Build a New Social Order? It seems clear that universities, after leaping into the fray in the affluent days at the close of the sixties, are now retreating from the question, mired in a retrenchment mentality that may last long after the economy begins an upturn.

But talk about options continues. The external degree, the cluster college, the voucher system, team learning, differentiated staffing, behavioral objectives, the inner college, the contract learning model, the mini-course, 4-14 calendars, peer counseling and teaching, the new divisional organizations, program budgeting and MIS, new centers and institutes, the college and/or university without walls—all these and many more indicate a genuine concern for alternatives. The concern and the ideas do not seem to be disappearing in this retrenchment era, just as dire predictions of the demise of 500 colleges in the decade of the seventies are not holding up. The success of these innovations will have great impact on academic systems of governance. For example, what if John Holt’s idea of schools (shared by the students to catch on?

For part of people’s lives, we tell them that they can’t get out of school. Once they are out, we tell them they can’t get back in. Let people of whatever age, use schools the way they use libraries, going in when they want, for their own purposes. All this talk about admissions requirements and standards has nothing to do with education or learning, but only with institutional vanity. The library, the theatre, the lecture hall, the museum, do not test people at the door to make sure they are good enough to use them. Why should schools?

Such an “open institution” (if that is not a contradiction in terms) would require a vastly different kind of governance, as the reader can easily surmise. In the opinion of the author, however, such innovative organizations and styles will remain marginal to higher education, at least for the next decade.

Needed research

1. There is little research to help us with the problem of evaluating the effectiveness of one system of governance over another at a given campus. Institutions now trying new forms of governance have no way of knowing whether the new structure is any better than the old. To perform such research is by no means impossible; instruments now operational, such as the Institutional Functioning Inventory of Educational Testing Service (ETS) have major implications for this kind of research (22; see also 2,3,13,37).

2. At the moment, much of the research on governance consists of large scale attitude surveys, done without corroborative interviews and field research to make sure that people behave as their attitude tests would indicate. Indeed, there is some evidence that people do not behave consistently with their attitude profiles. Research on governance needs to develop ways of integrating different kinds of data—clinical and statistical, questionnaire and interview, attitudinal and behavioral, factor analysis and ethnography—which deal with the same phenomenon from multiple perspectives.

3. Research on governance needs to be more useful to practitioners. This can be accomplished by getting practitioners involved in the research at the earliest stages of problem delineation, rather than after the research is completed; and helping practitioners to develop their own action-research techniques so that they are less dependent on professionals for evaluation. (The most meaningful form of assessment is probably self-assessment.)

4. There is a need for more studies of the roles played by various actors in governance, as well as of the processes by which people perform these roles.

5. There is a need for knowledge of the immediate and long-term effect of participation in governance on those who participate. Some have suggested that participation in governance or large university campuses is one effective way to produce campus radicals: the experience is so frustrating that students lose all faith in the system. The hypothesis cries out for testing.

6. Rather than concentrating on decisionmaking, research on governance should focus on the entire flow of behavior, beginning with the initiation of the idea, the translation of the idea into policy recommendations, their approval, ratification, codification, implementation, evaluation, and modification. Unlike research, governance never stops.

7. More needs to be known about the effects of the rapid shifting of power and authority away from on-campus power centers to state and federal sectors on the major functions of institutions—teaching, learning, and investigating.

8. Rather than drawing on models of governance developed by industry, we urgently need a systematic theory of campus governance which is indigenous to the campus. The concept of unobtrusive measures can contribute to this end, as can some structural-functional analysis, particularly emphasizing latent function analysis. For example, what are the latent functions of the grading system for teachers in terms of enhancing their self-image, power, status, and importance?

Some of this research will not be considered "proper." Purists will find it dirty, and will not want to share their Olympian heights with the practitioners and their pedestrian ways. Graduate students who suggest such research strategies for dissertations may have difficulties with their committees. Proposals based on these notions may not get past review panels. But, keeping in mind the impact of more conventional research on governance practices, one is struck with the next question: what is there to lose by trying new ways?

VIII. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Every attempt has been made to make this bibliography as useful to the reader as possible. Please refer to the categories of the bibliography in order to find what you want. Some qualifications are in order. This bibliography is not absolutely complete. The relevant literature is so vast and dispersed that a total bibliography would be an impossible task. But most of it is here, and certainly the most well-known items are included. Some readers may be struck with the smallness of the section on student protest. I have confined citations to those studies which made more or less direct relationships between protest and the on-campus system of governance. The bibliography leaves out the literature on planning and statewide coordination, unionization of faculties, the operation of multicampus systems, and the relationship of external to internal agencies. It also largely ignores writings on the finance of higher education.

Most of the items listed under "Typical Institutional Governance Statements" are plans for the reorganization of campus governance structures. They usually involve moves toward some form of centralized, unicameral campus council or senate, often with changes in patterns of participation of boards of control. An attempt was made to include various categories of institution by size, type of control, highest degree, etc.
Research-Based Material on Governance

The President and Other Administrators: Theory, Research and Opinion

64. ———. "Presidents and Campus Governance-A Research Profile." Educational Record 51, Spring 1970, pp. 159-65. ED 013 667. MF-$0.65. HC-$3.29.

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71. "...and Students in the Career of the College President". The Educational Record, Winter 1967, pp. 88-89.
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Research on Student Protest Having Implications for Governance


Participation in Governance


Policy Recommendations on Student Participation


General Articles on Student Participation in Governance


145. Faber, Gerald. "The Student as Nigger." In The Daily Bruin Spectra, Tuesday, April 4, 1967. (One of the truly influential pieces of fugitive literature.)


Legal and Political Dimensions of Governance


Major Policy Statements on Campus Governance


Compew: Sources which Bring Together Materials on Various Aspects of Governance


Typical Institutional Governance Statements

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198. Benovich, Joseph B. Report of the President's Committee on Student Involvement in the University. Cleveland: Cleveland State University, May 16, 1969. ED 035 360. MI-$0.65. HC-$3.29.
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236. Student Power at the University of Massachusetts. A Case Study. Amherst: Massachusetts University, April 1969. ED 034 492. MF-$0.69. HC-$3.29.

237. Task Force on University Governance. Proposed plan for the government of Kansas State University. Manhattan, Kansas: Kansas State University, April 1970.


General Works on Campus Governance


Appendix A. UNICAMERAL MODEL.

TRUSTEES

FACULTY | STUDENTS | ADMINISTRATORS | LAYMEN

PRESIDENT

FACULTY

STUDENTS

---

TRUSTEES

LAYMEN

PRESIDENT

TRUSTEES | FACULTY | STUDENTS | ADMINISTRATORS

CAMPUS SENATE OR COUNCIL

FACULTY

STUDENTS

ADMINISTRATORS
Appendix A. BICAMERAL MODEL

TRUSTEES

LAYMEN

President

FACULTY SENATE

STUDENT SENATE

FACULTY

STUDENTS

ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL

FACULTY COUNCIL

ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL

STUDENT COUNCIL

FACULTY

ADMINISTRATORS

STUDENTS
Appendix B. A MODEL FOR REDUCING DECISIONMAKING STEPS

REPORT OF AD HOC GROUP GOES DIRECTLY TO SENATE FOR DECISIONS, NOT BACK TO STANDING COMMITTEE.

SENATE VOTES YES, NO, OR RETURN TO COMMITTEE. NO DEBATE IS ALLOWED IN SENATE. AD HOC GROUP IS DISSOLVED WHEN THEIR REPORT REACHES SENATE.
Other ERIC/Higher Education Publications Related to Governance

COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY PLANNING (Current, May 1971), by James Harvey, 6 pp., reviews planning techniques related to college and university goals and considers some strategies in Planning-Programming-Budgeting (PPB) systems and other similar planning.

COLLEGE PLANNING (Current, June 1971), by James Harvey, 5 pp., describes new issues and presents an overview and suggests how to improve the performance of governing boards.

CORPORATE PLANNING MODELS FOR UNIVERSITY MANAGEMENT (Report 4, October 1970), by Juan Cauvaco, 14 pp., reviews the current status of corporate planning methods and explores their applicability to higher education. It is addressed to presidents of small or medium-sized colleges and universities with limited financial resources.

15. GOALS OF INSTITUTIONS: DEFINITION AND ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL GOALS (Report 5, October 1970), by Richard J. Poinset, 41 pp., discusses general and specific aims of institutional goals and considers the issues of autonomy and control. Various models are given for use of the Delphi Technique as a needs assessment strategy.

PLANNING FOR HIGHER EDUCATION (November, March 1971), by Carol H. Blackman, 22 pp., presents an introduction to the many techniques involved in the institutional role in higher education followed by an annotated bibliography of the various techniques used in the field. It also provides advice on the use of planning for maximizing education at the federal, state, and institutional levels. Order from ERIC Document Reproduction Service, ED 400 519; price: microfiche $0.65, hard copy $1.99.

GOVERNANCE (Compensation 1, May 1970), by Carol H. Blackman, presents listing and description of 61 ongoing or recently completed studies and projects, dealing with college and university governance.

THE MARXISM OF THE CAMPUS (November 1971, Winter 3, Number 5), by David G. Slipp, focuses on the position of the student as a worker in our society and as a citizen of the United States. The report underlines the need for and concludes from a study of the role of student unions in higher education.


PROBLEMS REMAIN IN和平CIVIL RIGHTS INSTITUTE (February 1, 1979), by Lee Robinson and Janet Thompson, offers an overview of the current state of civil rights in public schools. An annotated bibliography relates these trends to the future of civil rights in the United States. Order from ERIC Document Reproduction Service, ED 435 786; price: microfiche $0.65, hard copy $1.99.

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