The empirical basis of this monograph is intensive case studies of faculty participation in the governance of one large multipurpose state college and two large complex state university campuses. The chapters are concerned with faculty oligarchies (who rules and how), faculty-administrative and faculty-trustee relationships, external constraints on faculty and institutional decisionmaking, decentralization of decisionmaking, and administrative leadership and style. The final chapter supports the principle of representative government, proposes means of strengthening the viability and accountability of academic senates, recommends that faculty members holding divergent views should be included in organs of faculty government, comes down on the side of shared responsibility and authority rather than separate faculty and administrative jurisdictions, and concludes that faculty unionism and collective bargaining may prove to be inimical to governance by joint participation and rational debate. However, the normality of contention and even conflict is assumed, and methods are proposed for institutionalizing conflict. A general political model of decisionmaking is set forth. (Author)
The Faculty in University Governance
The Center for Research and Development in Higher Education is engaged in research designed to assist individuals and organizations responsible for American higher education to improve the quality, efficiency, and availability of education beyond the high school. In the pursuit of these objectives, the Center conducts studies which: 1) use the theories and methodologies of the behavioral sciences; 2) seek to discover and to disseminate new perspectives on educational issues and new solutions to educational problems; 3) seek to add substantially to the descriptive and analytical literature on colleges and universities; 4) contribute to the systematic knowledge of several of the behavioral sciences, notably psychology, sociology, economics, and political science; and 5) provide models of research and development activities for colleges and universities planning and pursuing their own programs in institutional research.

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Erratum, p. 54, second paragraph.

The first two sentences should read:

The fact that the Berkeley Senate Committee on Committees is no longer required to consult the central administration (although the chairman may voluntarily do so) in preparing its nominations for committee membership could effectively forestall administrative effort to diversify the membership of senate committees with respect to age, rank, and educational points of view. Unless the senate governance structure can be opened to new ideas and new values, there is little chance of fundamental educational reform at Berkeley.
Resume

Center for Research & Development
in Higher Education - Berkeley

The Faculty in University Governance

T. R. McConnell & K. Modell

April 1971

The empirical basis of the monograph is intensive case studies of faculty participation in the governance of one large multipurpose state college and two large complex state university campuses. The chapters are concerned with faculty oligarchies (who rules and how), faculty-administrative and faculty-trustee relationships, external constraints on faculty and institutional decision making, decentralization of decision making, and administrative leaderships and style.

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College and university presidents and administrators at all levels; faculty committees; academic senates; boards of regent.; boards of trustees; student government groups; legislators; professors; civil liberties organizations represent target groups interested in reading the report.
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I

Academic Authority: Challenge and Conflict

The governance of colleges and universities is a delicate and often fragile pattern of authority, power, and influence. The framework of governance is rapidly changing. Many constituencies—governing boards, faculties, students, and, in many cases, government agencies—are vying for stronger voices in decisions that profoundly affect the character of their institutions, and the outcome of this contest is difficult to predict. The present volume is more an effort to identify the forces playing on the processes of governance than an attempt to propose a detailed model for the distribution of authority and influence. More particularly, the purpose is to explore problems of faculty government in a complex of administrative authority and leadership, control by governing boards, and growing constraints from external sources.

FACULTY POWER INCREASES

The historical trend over the last 25 years has been toward increased faculty power (Bundy, 1968; Platt & Parsons, 1970). Faculties in many institutions have obtained effective control over a wide range of academic
affairs, and the education and certification of entrance to the profession is largely in their hands. They staff graduate programs and establish requirements for degrees which in turn are prerequisites for faculty employment. Corporate faculties select their own members and determine criteria for appointment, retention, and promotion. Faculty members are virtually immune to evaluation by persons external to the profession; they set their own work schedules and have almost complete control over what they teach.

Faculties have derived their authority and influence from many sources. Some of it has been gained by explicit delegation from governing boards, while other prerogatives have been assumed with the tacit approval of the governors. Faculties have attained much of their influence by developing a strong sense of professionalism and by asserting and protecting academic values. Faculty professionalism has become so dominant that Jencks and Riesman (1969) concluded that a great number of PhDs now consider themselves almost as independent professionals, responsible primarily to themselves and their peers rather than to their institutions. Furthermore, they are committed primarily to their disciplines rather than to their universities. Nevertheless, they have gained enormous local influence, especially in complex institutions strongly oriented to intellectual standards and research. A recent study of faculty decisionmaking (Platt & Parsons, 1970) concluded that "formal binding power may lie with the administration or the trustees, but a great deal of policy is initiated, formed, suggested or more generally influenced by the faculty." This is especially true in the appointment and promotion of faculty members, in the control of undergraduate and graduate curricula, and even in the regulation of tenure and salary.

THE NATURE OF EFFECTIVE AUTHORITY

Platt and Parson's (1970) study of faculty decisionmaking distinguishes between power and influence and ascribes the faculty's role in distinguished insti-
Institutions as depending more on influence than power. In other terms, the faculty's control depends as much on functional as on formal authority. Formal authority is based mainly on hierarchical position and sanctions inherent in a particular office—on a grant or ascription of power. Functional authority, on the other hand, is based on competence, experience, human relationships, skill in leadership, and personal persuasiveness (Peabody, 1962, 1964).

Formal authority is often defined as potential power or the ability to evoke compliance from subordinates because of formal position in a bureaucratic hierarchy (Etzioni, 1964; Presthus, 1962). The exercise of hierarchical authority is increasingly difficult in many organizations, and especially so in colleges and universities where one cannot establish a correlation between formal position (rank) and ability (Caplow & McGee, 1965). Compliance in institutions committed to high standards of scholarship and investigation is the product of reciprocal relationships depending on collegial associations, on the sharing of information, and on discussion and persuasion (Platt & Parsons, 1970). In these institutions, for example, faculty members are more willing to be persuaded by their department chairman—and more able to persuade him in turn—because the chairman is viewed as a colleague who shares the faculty's academic and professional values. Reciprocal relationships in the university are more collegial and professional than bureaucratic and hierarchical. In the university, Anderson (1963) has said, "the roles of members are seldom articulated, although they may be well defined, and special competence which might confer authority on any member is only indirectly acknowledged [p.147]."

Although it is customary to contrast the monocratic, hierarchical structure of authority in the business corporation with the collegial character of colleges and universities (Millett, 1962), there are nevertheless many features of bureaucratic organization, even in the faculty structure itself, in large, complex academic institutions (Clark, 1963). The basic dilemma in the university is the appropriate balance between bureaucratic structure and formal authority, with their emphasis
on accountability and rationality, and functional authority and collegial organization, with their stress on informality. In other words, the dilemma is between power and influence.

WHO RULES AND HOW?

The second chapter of this volume is concerned with the organization of faculty government. It also asks the basic question, Who rules? Is there a group of faculty members who dominate the decisionmaking processes of academic senates? If there is such a dominant class, are some departments overrepresented? Are the rulers representative in the proportion of tenured and nontenured faculty members, younger and older age groups, and diversity of views on education and governance? How do academic senate committees exercise their authority? How do the senates and their committees create or reduce tension? How do they produce or resolve conflict? How accountable are the organs of faculty government?

SHARED AUTHORITY

Chapter III turns to the reconciliation of faculty and administrative authority. It asks the basic question of whether authority in the institution should be divided among the major groups of participants or shared among them. The academic senate of one of the institutions we have studied has insisted on separate faculty and administrative jurisdictions; the faculty wishes to speak with an unadulterated voice. A second institution, however, provides an example of close collaboration between faculty and administration. The chapter discusses the principles and processes of shared responsibility and shared authority. We agree with Platt and Parsons (1970) that:

In the "normal" operation of higher educational institutions, the problem lies in the inclusion of all segments in a collective
arrangement where each of the major sub-units, such as the faculty, students, and administration, will have the basis and capacity appropriately to influence each other and thereby to arrive at policy decisions integrating the various interests of the subgroups [p.176].

A governing structure may permit shared authority, but it does not assure it. Shared authority is based not only on organization, but also—and perhaps even more necessarily—on administrative and faculty orientations, attitudes, and traditions. Shared authority rests on a high degree of mutual trust, collaboration, and rejection of adversary relationships. The inevitably uneven course of joint participation in decisionmaking between faculty and administration requires effective means of resolving tensions. One of the institutions we have studied has been characterized by productive faculty-administrative relationships. The other two institutions, in different degrees, have been plagued in recent years by faculty-administrative conflict sufficiently intense to make it difficult to mobilize the resources of the institutions for the furtherance of their purposes.

There may also be a conflict of authority and influence between faculties and governing boards, a problem which is explored in Chapter IV. The history of confrontation between the governing boards of the University of California and the California State Colleges and their respective faculties is contrasted with the relatively harmonious history of relationships between the two groups at the University of Minnesota. In the former instances, the governing boards have provoked more faculty tension and contention than the administration, which has often been caught helplessly in the middle.

AUTHORITY AND LEADERSHIP

Jealousy over the distribution of authority and influence among faculties, administrations, and governing
boards puts central administrative leadership in jeopardy. A system of shared responsibility and authority does not preclude administrative leadership. In an institution with multiple functions, diverse interests, and a decentralized administrative and decision-making organization, administrative coordination and initiative are essential in charting the institution's purposes and holding it steadily on course. In the modern university, position or status no longer bestows leadership on the officeholder. Leadership is essentially a matter of style; it inheres in reciprocal relationships between administrators and faculty members. Chapter VII discusses organizational structures which provide the setting for leadership, but emphasizes that the act of leadership requires the purposive exchange of influence in decision-making. Chapter VI discusses the difficulty of exercising central administrative initiative and leadership in an institution in which authority is highly decentralized. This chapter also discusses the dilemma between institutional integrity and the autonomy of constituent colleges and departments. In many institutions faculty and student activists are pressing for greater decentralization of decision making to units small enough for their members to enjoy a sense of community and common purpose. Proponents of decentralization declare that it will encourage greater individual involvement and more responsive governance. Chapter VI suggests a means of reconciling institutional integrity and character with segmental diversity and authority.

EXTERNAL SOURCES OF POWER AND INFLUENCE

A variety of external forces is challenging the faculty's control over academic policies. One challenge to traditional authority relationships is increasing governmental intervention by both legislative and executive agencies. For example, in the summer of 1970 the California legislature granted cost-of-living increases, amounting to five percent, to all state employees except faculty members of the University of California and the California State Colleges. The Governor of California
has assumed a much more active and aggressive role as an ex officio member of the Board of Regents. The California State Department of Finance has exercised line-item budgetary control over the state colleges for many years (McConnell, 1966). Other instances of legislative interference in academic affairs in other states have been described in a recent study conducted for the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (Eulau & Quinley, 1970).

A second force impinging on the distribution of authority in higher education is the strong trend towards statewide coordination. As of October 1969, statutory or constitutional agencies for coordination and planning had been established in 40 states. Twenty-three states had completed master plans and 15 others had proposed to do so. In many cases, statewide planning and coordination move the locus of decisionmaking authority away from the individual campus or the particular system of institutions. For example, the final decisions on whether to adopt a new educational program, change standards of admission, or establish new campuses may be made by a statewide office rather than by institutional agencies, whether faculties, administrations, or governing boards (Academy for Educational Development, 1969; Palola, Lehmann, & Blischke, 1970). Another factor which challenges traditional patterns of governance is the organization of multicampus systems. Such systems are found in California, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Texas, North Carolina, and other states. The effects of such external constraints on individual institutions and on faculty government are discussed briefly in Chapter V.

NORMALITY AND RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT

A system of shared authority and reciprocal influence lays great emphasis on productive working relationships between faculty members and administrators, relationships which are by no means always achieved, as Chapter III documents. We argue in this volume that faculty-administrative relationships based on mutual
trust and confidence are crucial to an effective and legitimate process of governance. We concede, however, that discordant roles (Gustad, 1966), different adaptations to organizational life (Gouldner, 1958), and the basic incompatibility between formal and functional authority (Kornhauser, 1962) make a greater or lesser degree of conflict inevitable (Mortimer & McConnell, 1970).

Conflicts over role and authority occur because faculty and administrators perceive the educational enterprise from different vantage points and because they have different responsibilities. Simply put, administrators are accountable to the organization as well as to their faculties, while faculty members assume that they are mainly accountable to their colleagues. This disparity sets the stage for conflict of interests and possible confrontations over authority and power. The potential for conflict within the faculty itself is enhanced by the diverse adaptations which faculty members make to organizational life. Some of them express a strong loyalty to the institution and perceive their future success as intimately tied to the enhancement of their status within the organization; they adopt an internal reference group. Other faculty members evince a more cosmopolitan perspective and strive for status in their discipline or some external reference group. These diverse orientations easily induce strain in academic organizations and, under periods of special stress, may lead to an internal struggle for power and influence among faculty groups or factions. As one of the university’s constituencies presses for greater power, another may respond by asserting its authority or by reclaiming the powers which had previously been delegated or tacitly given to other groups. Thus, the struggle for power may lead to confrontations among students, faculties, administrations, governing boards, and state governments, as this volume illustrates. Faculties often assume that authority, once delegated by their governing board, will not be rescinded. Such is emphatically not the case, as Chapter IV demonstrates.

Adversary relationships are further complicated by the movement toward faculty unionism and collective bargaining, which have grown most rapidly in community
colleges and state colleges (American Association for Higher Education, 1967; Dunham, 1969). Collective bargaining relies on formalized or bureaucratic authority, while shared authority relies heavily on reciprocal influence. Collective bargaining introduces coercive methods which appear to be antithetical to the principle of shared responsibility and authority. When a faculty opts for collective bargaining, it chooses to place primary reliance on power in confronting the administration or the governing board (American Association for Higher Education, 1967). The consequence has been described by Duperre (1969) as nonintegrative conflict: "in which at least one of the parties perceives the other as an adversary engaging in behavior designed to destroy, thwart, or gain scarce resources at the expense of the perceiver [pp.182-83]." The critics of collective bargaining believe that such conflict is dysfunctional to the institution because the adversaries tend to channel much of their energy in resisting the threat rather than in the constructive criticism and resolution of controversy (Livingston, 1968).

These examples suggest that conflict is not only almost inevitable, but that it is likely to become endemic. The final chapter first recommends means for restoring academic senates as deliberative bodies, and then proposes that colleges and universities should recognize the normality of conflict and adapt their structures and functions in ways that will make controversy serve organizational purposes. The great problem of governance in the next decade will be to devise means for translating competitive interests and internal conflict into constructive educational policy and appropriate educational action.

THE BASIC STUDIES

This volume is based on three intensive case studies of college and university governance made under the auspices of the Center for Research and Development in Higher Education of the University of California at Berkeley. The original reports of these investigations
are available from the Center. The three institutions are Fresno State College, the Twin Cities campus of the University of Minnesota, and the University of California at Berkeley (Deegan, McConnell, Mortimer, & Stull, 1970; Deegan & Mortimer, 1970; Mortimer, 1970).

It seemed to the investigators that some of the fundamental problems of governance, together with the culture and traditions surrounding them, could be identified and explored more effectively through in-depth studies of a limited number of institutions than through a broader and more superficial survey. It was considered crucial to be able to report how participants in governance interacted and to reveal the variety of structures, functions, and informal behavior which defined the relationships of authority, power, and influence in the three institutions and which presumably reflect the patterns of governance in many other colleges and universities.

There were three principal sources of data for the three case studies. The first comprised books, articles, and research reports about the three institutions. The second was the constitutions, bylaws, formal institutional plans, committee minutes, and other institutional documents. The third, perhaps the most important source of data, was over 200 in-depth, semistructured interviews conducted with faculty members and administrators on the three campuses. Preliminary interviews were conducted with knowledgeable informants selected on the advice of persons in the participating institutions. In the course of these interviews, other individuals were identified as influential, or as valuable informants on particular problems or issues. Finally, many, but not all, occupants of key positions in the organization—presidents, deans, chairmen, and members of faculty committees, and other faculty members—were interviewed. In certain instances, persons were interviewed in order to corroborate responses to questions to which the interviewers had received conflicting replies.

The intensive study of the University of California, Berkeley, was completed in June 1967; of Fresno State College in May 1969; and of the University of Minnesota in January 1970. At some points in the text, events
which occurred after these dates have been included; in most instances, the times of occurrence have been noted.

It is obvious that the three institutions do not represent all large, complex colleges and universities nor all administrators and faculty members in the institutions studied. The authors are confident, however, that they have reported fully and analytically on the composition and operation of faculty senates and on the patterns of decisionmaking on educational policy and planning, curriculum, faculty personnel, and budgetary procedure in the basic studies.

They believe that the variations in the structure and processes of governance at the three institutions highlight more generally the changing patterns of authority, power, and influence, and especially the faculty's role in decisionmaking in American higher education.

The conclusion has been well stated by a recently resigned college president cited by Rosenzweig (1970): "inescapably, if universities are to be well governed, their faculties bear a central responsibility for making them so."
II

Faculty Government: Who Rules, and How?

The internal operation of faculty senates is unknown to all but a small group of faculty and administrators who actively engage in senate activities. Over the years a series of articles generally titled "Faculty Participation in the Government of the University," which appeared in the AAUP Bulletin, described the structure of some faculty senates but gave little attention to informal factors and functions (Adams, 1963; Eckert, 1959; Eley, 1964; Morrow, 1963; Jones, 1966). To our knowledge, there is little, if any, research which compares the structures and functions of faculty senates in different institutions. Such is the task of this chapter.

The faculty senate has been nostalgically described as the "voice of the faculty," the central policymaking body of the institution, and a forensic society where issues of educational substance are debated. Our research was directed towards determining if any of these descriptions were accurate when contrasted with how senates actually operate.

Some of the questions we asked were:

How are senates organized? Are they bureaucratic, collegial, or a mixture of these or other organizational patterns?
How do senates actually accomplish their tasks? Are they run democratically? What does democratic mean when applied to faculty senates?

Who participates on senate committees? Are committee participants representative of the faculty constituencies?

How does senate machinery resolve conflict and reduce tension within the faculty?

The chapter is divided into five major sections. The first section documents and discusses what we have called bureaucratic behavior in academic senates; the second section describes the oligarchic pattern which characterizes senates; the third section presents a discussion of informal political behavior; the fourth section deals with the representativeness of senates; and the fifth section contains a discussion of the problem of internal senate accountability. Throughout the chapter we have attempted to relate our data to theories of political behavior.

BUREAUCRATIC BEHAVIOR IN ACADEMIC SENATES

When the study was made, the senates at Minnesota and Fresno were representative bodies, but the senate at Berkeley was a town meeting form of government. At Minnesota and Fresno, the senates were composed of representatives elected by the faculty in the constituent departments, schools, or colleges, plus selected members of the administration. The Minnesota senate had approximately 200 members in 1968-69 and the Fresno senate had 74 members. As of July 1969, the Twin Cities campus of the University of Minnesota was reorganized into separate faculty and student units, which together comprise the Twin Cities Assembly. Faculty members are elected by faculty constituencies and students by student constituencies from the various colleges.

From 1953 to 1963, the statewide senate of the University of California was organized into northern (Berkeley, Davis, San Francisco, and Mount Hamilton) and
southern (Los Angeles, Riverside, and La Jolla) representative assemblies. The assemblies were elected by wards, which were broadly representative of the various academic areas (Cline & Hutson, 1966; Fitzgibbon, 1968). The 1963 reorganization of the senate created one statewide representative assembly and nine autonomous divisions, one for each campus.

At Berkeley, two proposals for creation of an elected representative body have been defeated in recent years. At the time our study was concluded, another such proposal was being considered, and it was later approved by a vote of 813 to 159.

Berkeley had approximately 1750 senate members which included the chancellor, the vice chancellors, the academic deans, and all faculty members from the rank of instructor through full professor. Research associates and a wide range of research personnel in the 53 organized research units on the Berkeley campus were excluded from senate activities, whereas research associates were not excluded at Minnesota. There has been a great deal of concern about the appropriate representation for these nonsenate, academic personnel at Berkeley, and a special committee has reported on the matter. The growth of organized research units has created a whole series of professional academic personnel who are not members of the senate; Kruytbosch and Messinger (1970) have referred to them as Berkeley's unequal peers.

Committee Structure and Functions

The detailed work of academic senates is normally done through standing and special committees. The number, size, and structure of senate committees vary greatly among institutions. In 1968-69 Berkeley had about 32 standing senate committees, while Minnesota had about 22. Fresno had a large number of standing subcommittees which reported directly to parent committees, and when the number of standing subcommittees was added to standing senate and college committees the total was 25. (There were, of course, a substantial number of ad hoc special committees or task forces in operation.) Fresno's
subcommittees reported to parent committees which in turn reported to an executive committee.

In order to take into account the multiple campus structure of the University of Minnesota, the senate there reorganized in 1969 into a University Senate--representing the Twin Cities, Duluth, Morris, and Crookston campuses--and a Twin Cities Assembly, which dealt with problems pertaining to the Minneapolis-Saint Paul campuses. The reorganization established a twofold classification of committees. Those committees which operated in the Twin Cities Assembly were either assembly committees or campus committees. Campus committees were to have a relationship, the nature of which was yet undefined, to assembly committees. The Assembly Committee on Educational Policy was designed to coordinate the activities of four campus committees, which could still report directly to the assembly. Berkeley's committees all reported directly to the senate, whereas Fresno's committees reported to an executive committee.

**Senate Committee Activities**

The range of senate committee activities was rather broad, as shown in Table I. All three senates had committees which can be classified under the general headings of educational policy, senate operations, and student affairs. Faculty affairs was a separate classification at Berkeley and Fresno, whereas Eckert (1970) classified the Minnesota Faculty Welfare Committee under Educational Policy and Planning. The Berkeley senate's activities differed from those of the other two in that it had committees which dealt with curriculum and awards. Neither Minnesota nor Fresno had counterparts for Berkeley's Committee on Courses of Instruction, which exercised central faculty review of requests for course changes, and its committees on Subject A (English composition), and Teacher Education.

The administrative and consultative classification at Minnesota and Fresno refers to committees which had as their major function the administrative details of senate operation and which also had responsibility for
Table 1
Classification of the Standing Committee Structure of Three Faculty Senates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University of California, Berkeley</th>
<th>University of Minnesota*</th>
<th>Fresno State College**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Committee classification</td>
<td>Number of committees</td>
<td>Committee classification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational policy</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Educational policies &amp; planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculty affairs</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Educational service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate affairs</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Senate operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student affairs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Student relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curriculum</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Administrative &amp; consultative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awards</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Includes standing senate and college committees, but not standing subcommittees.
maintaining liaison and consultation with central campus administration. This classification included Fresno’s Executive Committee and Minnesota’s Consultative Committee. The Berkeley senate had no comparable executive and consultative committee, although the Senate Policy Committee was recently given a broader charge for administrative liaison and senate committee coordination. The problem of senate-administrative relations will be discussed in detail in Chapter III, but we wish to point out here that one of the central differences in the committee structure of the Berkeley senate, as contrasted with the other two, was the fact that the Berkeley senate devoted relatively less attention to executive and consultative functions.

Committee Coordination

The large number of committees, the complexity of senate activities, and the need for relatively fast action in times of crisis resulted in pleas for some type of central executive or coordinating committee. This was a relatively recent development in all three institutions.

The Berkeley senate had a long-standing tradition of unwillingness to delegate the power to act to any one group, with very few exceptions. In the 1964-65 academic year, during the Free Speech Movement (FSM) crisis, the senate, with 1200 members present, created an ad hoc executive committee to be elected by and to represent the senate during and immediately after the crisis. Another special committee was appointed to examine the feasibility of a permanent executive committee. The special committee rejected the concept of an executive committee in favor of a senate policy committee which was charged to crystallize, clarify, and anticipate problems and issues which the senate should consider. The Policy Committee was given some agenda-setting duties, was charged to collaborate with other committees, and was directed to report annually to the senate on the state of the campus. The important point was that the special committee, in its own deliberations, specifically rejected the creation of an executive committee.
Subsequent crises seem to have weakened this rejection, however, and the Policy Committee has taken a more active role in the resolution of campus conflict. At various times it has drafted and presented resolutions to the senate, and has often been charged to represent the senate to the Regents, the administration, and the public. This was still not strictly an executive role because all committee reports still went directly to the senate, and the Policy Committee was not empowered to speak, act for, or represent the senate.

Recent legislation enlarged the scope of the Senate Policy Committee so that it will be able to collaborate with other senate committees, make inquiries, and develop recommendations on any urgent issue of policy that requires immediate action (Minutes, November 17, 1969). This was merely a formalization of activities which the committee had already been performing. The legislation also empowered the committee to act as a coordinating agency between the administration and senate committees, but this still fell short of the executive functions performed by Minnesota's Senate Consultative Committee and Fresno's Executive Committee.

Minnesota had been operating under an executive committee since July 1969. The seven faculty and five student members of the Assembly Steering Committee were elected from their separate faculty or student constituencies. The Committee was charged to be a coordinating device between administrators and the Assembly, to be responsible for organizing agenda, to allocate issues to the faculty, student or joint assemblies, and to perform other functions appropriate to an executive committee. Previously, there was little specification of the executive function, and much of it was performed informally by the Committee on Business and Rules. Other functions of the Steering Committee presumably included rendering advice to the administration in times of campus crises.

The senate at Fresno had a formal Executive Committee which was elected from the membership. These elections were highly politicized between majority and minority factions. Indeed, the existence of severe and fairly rigid opposing groups at Fresno was one of the major confounding factors in the entire senate and
college governance system. In many cases the personal animosities of individual members of opposing factions were so intense that productive debates and/or deliberation were impossible. One of the leaders of the majority defended the practice of organizing politically to deny a seat on the Executive Committee to the minority on the grounds that he already knew their position anyway and that personal debate took too much time. The Fresno Executive Committee received the reports from senate and college committees and followed four courses of action. Normally, the report was ratified and forwarded to the president or the senate for action. Occasionally the report was referred back to the originating committee with instructions for change or requests for clarification. The Executive Committee also might refer the report of one committee to another committee for reevaluation. On at least one occasion the Executive Committee unilaterally changed a report without consulting the original committee.

A careful analysis of college documents revealed that the Executive Committee had exceeded the bounds of authority delegated to it in the constitution and bylaws of the senate when it altered the substance of committee reports. This illegal centralization of authority was adamantly opposed by the minority political faction who regarded it as an attempt to circumvent the extensive consultative procedures in operation at the college.

The Executive Committee served two important functions at Fresno. First, it was an important vehicle for faculty-presidential contact. The president was a member of the committee, attended its meetings regularly and participated in the discussion, although he did refrain from voting on issues on which he eventually had to rule. Second, the Executive Committee coordinated the activities of college and senate committees and was responsible for the details of senate operation.

Conclusions on Senate Coordination

The large number of standing committees and the great scope of senate activities has led to the creation
of coordinating or executive committees. All three institutions were experimenting with committees to accomplish such coordination, but Berkeley had been least successful in creating and maintaining a permanent mechanism to accomplish what the senate leaders regarded as an important function. The Berkeley faculty was reluctant to delegate executive authority to any one committee or group, except in times of emergency.

The failure to delegate authority to an executive committee was an important aspect of senate behavioral patterns, and it deserves further discussion because the issue has occurred repeatedly at Berkeley over the years. The Berkeley interviews were conducted close to a time when the senate had rejected a proposal to create a representative body. Although 534 (60.9 percent) of those voting were in favor of it, a two-thirds majority was necessary for passage. Many Berkeley interview respondents discussed their reasons for resisting the proposal for a representative body and why they opposed the creation of a strong executive or coordinating committee.

Some respondents feared that a representative senate would hamper the right of individual expression in senate meetings, especially if a member were not an elected senator. In a representative senate, committee reports would tend to be received or acted upon well in advance of their release to the entire faculty. Some felt that this would decrease the importance of individual committees, create an artificial committee hierarchy, and in effect disenfranchise a large number of individual faculty members. In short, a representative senate would place decisionmaking responsibility in a much smaller group than the town meeting, and it would locate power in a body remote from the electorate.

Presumably, faculty members who oppose a representative body base their objection on their perception of the individual's place in the academic community. They put a great deal of emphasis on the individual's right to selectively monitor all elements of senate activities. The argument that the increasing size of the faculty and the complexity of senate affairs demand new or different concepts of individual involvement is not
persuasive or urgent enough to overcome this nostalgic pull for an organization which emphasizes individual participation rather than representative membership.

The reliance on individualism and the claim to right of participation in a wide range of activities is a persistent observation of those who conduct research on faculty governance. Dykes (1968) reported that:

The faculty members interviewed overwhelmingly indicated the faculty should have a strong, active and influential role in decisions, especially in those areas directly related to the educational functions of the university. At the same time, the respondents revealed a strong reticence to give the time such a role would require...Reluctant to assume the burden of guiding institutional affairs, they seemed unwilling to accord others the responsibility for doing so. And while quick to assert their right to participate, they recognized less quickly the duties such participation entails [p.38].

Corson (1960) also reported that 'faculties claim wide areas of competence and a catholic concern coupled with indifferece and unwillingness to become informed [p.947].' It is important to note that scholars of political behavior in democracies have documented a similar relationship between a high frequency of expressed obligations and/or competence to participate in government and the relatively low priority placed on actual participation (Mortimer & McConnell, 1970).

Research in political behavior has indicated that political participation on the part of the general populace falls into three categories (Milbrath, 1965, pp.5-38). About one-third of the adult population are political apathetics who do not even vote. Another 60 percent are classified as political spectators; they usually vote, expose themselves to political stimuli, engage in political discussion, and occasionally try to convince others of their political views. Political gladiators, or activists, comprise less than ten percent of the
population; they actively engage in soliciting and contributing monies to political campaigns, attend political meetings, and stand for political offices.

In a democracy spectators appear willing, in the absence of crisis, to delegate the responsibility of governing to gladiators. Within general boundaries of acceptable administrative discretion, a political democracy gains its flexibility by such delegation or deference to those in authoritative positions.

At Berkeley, many interview respondents were not willing to delegate or defer to authority. At Fresno, one of the consistent minority criticisms of the majority faction was that the latter deferred to administrators too much. This leads us to suggest that a lack of deference to authority may be one of the confounding variables in future patterns of faculty authority and power. The point deserves further elaboration.

Dahl (1961) has argued that a basic characteristic of pluralist political systems is the presence of a great deal of political slack. Such slack is present because most citizens do not consider governmental activities to be of crucial importance in their lives—they are political apathetics or spectators. These people use their potential political resources—e.g., time, money, and personal influence—at a low level. While they may possess the potential to influence the governance process, they seldom attempt such influence. Slack in the system results from this gap between the potential and actual influence of the individual on the governance process. (Almond & Verba, 1965).

Slack allows gladiators sufficient discretion to make decisions and, as long as the spectators are not motivated to convert their potential into actual influence, gladiators are relatively free to govern and control the detailed operation of the system. When spectators become concerned enough about governance, they activate their potential influence—that is, they take up the slack, and gladiatorial discretion is restricted until such time as spectator activity decreases.

This analysis of the elements of a democratic political system raises serious questions about the internal governance of faculty organizations like academic
senates. If, as we have noted, there exists a significant lack of deference to, or lack of trust in, the gladiators in an academic governance system, then the slack necessary for effective action is threatened. In the absence of sufficient slack (the gap between potential and actual influence), there will be little opportunity for administrative or gladiatorial risk-taking and/or mistakes because every administrative act will be carefully scrutinized. We are suggesting here that lack of deference to authority may be a fundamental difference when academic governance is compared with political governance. One might hypothesize that authority, based solely on position (formal authority), is not sufficient to secure a reasonable amount of deference from individual faculty members. Positional authority will probably have to be supported by authority of competence (functional authority) if there is to be enough deference to allow the system to function effectively.

Research is needed on the balance between formal and functional authority which might lead to a satisfactory accommodation between spectator involvement and gladiatorial discretion. One could argue that formal position only has to be supported by functional authority when there is high issue salience. That is, committees which make decisions or give advice on critical issues, such as personnel or educational policies, should have a high degree of functional as well as formal authority. Those committees which deal with routine activities, such as counting votes or scheduling rooms, can rely more on formal authority. Further research should examine whether such is currently the case or whether attempts to differentiate between those issues which are critical and those which are routine would be likely to increase deference to authority on significant matters and thereby create more slack in the governance system.

An example of a more easily documentable relationship between political and academic governance lies in the oligarchic control of organizations. Presthus (1965, p. 39) has defined an oligarchy as rule of the many by the few. We have argued elsewhere (Mortimer and McConnell, 1970) that oligarchic behavior is a highly probable, though not inevitable, feature of organizational life.
We do not infer that such behavior is bad or good. Oligarchies are evidence of unequal distribution of power, not necessarily of Machiavellianism. It is possible that such inequalities could operate to enhance the general welfare.

Our data on faculty governance tend to show that there is little, if any, clear-cut distinction between faculty and administrative activities, as some people claim (Lunsford, 1970a). The theoretical gap between teaching or research activities and administrative work is bridged by a group of faculty oligarchs or gladiators. Oligarchic behavior appears to be a basic characteristic of the internal politics of faculty senates.

OLIGARCHIC BEHAVIOR IN FACULTY GOVERNANCE

The emergence of oligarchies can be seen in patterns of faculty membership in the committee structure. Participation by individual faculty members on senate committees followed a similar pattern across the institutions studied. Approximately 65 to 80 percent of those eligible to participate on senate committees did not do so. Table II shows that most faculty members who served on senate committees did so only once, although the time period of the samples was not constant. At the other end of the spectrum, at each institution from 10 to 20 percent of those who served on these committees did so three or more times. The Berkeley data were computed over a longer time span and illustrate this point in more detail. A representative sample of Berkeley faculty from 1957-1958 to 1966-1967 (N=751) was drawn, and the senate committee service of each was compiled. Two-thirds (502) of the sample did not serve on a senate committee during this period, and 20 percent (150) served on only one committee. However, 10 percent (78) were on two or three committees, and three percent (21) of the sample were on four or more committees during the ten-year period.

The data at each institution supported statements (Clark, 1963; Mortimer & McConnell, 1970) that the structure of participation in faculty governance paralleled
Table II
Frequency of Senate Committee Service
in Three Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Origin of Committees</th>
<th>Number and Percent of Faculty Who Served on One or More Committees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Berkeley</td>
<td>1957-58 to 1966-67</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>357 60.5 136 23.1 97 16.4 590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>1965-66 to 1967-68</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>204 69.2 62 21.0 29 9.8 295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fresno</td>
<td>1966-67 to 1968-69</td>
<td>Senate &amp; College</td>
<td>126 52.7 57 23.8 56 23.4 239</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
that of society at large. There was a body of apathetics or nonparticipants; there was a group of spectators who remained relatively well informed and marginally active in governance affairs, but who could be aroused when the issue became salient; and there was a small group of political gladiators who did a large share of the work. This last group tended to control the machinery of governance, in the absence of crisis, and constituted the professional-amateur administrative cadre which tended to blur the distinction between faculty and administrators.

The basic point is one of some contention among those who see a dichotomy between administrators and faculty members. Our data indicated that there were no discrete categories of pure faculty as opposed to administrators. A more accurate description would be that the faculty-administrative phenomenon was a continuum ranging from those who were engaged entirely in teaching and research to individuals, still nominally called faculty, who were engaged entirely in administrative work. Our data confirmed the statement that there was a group of professional-amateur or part-time faculty administrators who engaged in both some teaching-research and extensive administrative work.

A corollary of the oligarchic pattern of apathetics, spectators, and gladiators was that, as a committee increased in importance, the formal and/or informal criteria for membership on it became more restrictive. At Berkeley, the Committee on Budget and Interdepartmental Relations was the important committee in appraising qualifications for merit salary increases and for appointment, tenure, and promotion. All other personnel committee reports were finally substantively reviewed by the central Budget Committee, which made its own independent evaluations of the candidates. Interviews with members of the Committee on Committees, which appointed the Budget Committee, revealed that only senior scholars with superior research productivity could be appointed to the Budget Committee. The definition of superior research productivity was restrictive enough so that only a handful of Berkeley's 1700-plus senate members were eligible for appointment to the Budget Committee. The informal criteria for
membership on this committee were very restrictive indeed!

Another example of informal criteria for committee membership was the practice of election to the Executive Committee at Fresno. The majority political faction controlled enough votes so that it could elect any of its members and deny a seat on the Executive Committee to a member of the minority faction. No identification of faction was made on the ballots, so the system worked through the informal communication network at the college. In effect, membership in the right faction became the principal criterion for election.

The research provided for analysis of some of the characteristics of senate committee members to determine whether the formal or informal criteria of sex, rank, and academic field were also significant factors in the composition of committees. The data were not always comparable between institutions, but some similarities were found to exist.

Sex

Because only three percent of the 1966-67 Berkeley faculty were women, discrimination, if it existed, was probably more a matter of initial appointment to the faculty than one of appointment to senate committees. Nevertheless, for the ten-year period from 1957-58 to 1966-67, women were not represented on the Budget, Educational Policy, or Academic Planning Committees at Berkeley, nor was a woman elected to the Committee on Committees. Of the 237 people who were members of six key senate committees during this ten-year period, only three were women.

Women constituted 17.5 percent of Minnesota's professional staff but less than 5 percent of senate members and 6.6 percent of the faculty appointments to senate committees from 1965 to 1968. Women comprised 21.2 percent of Fresno's faculty and 15.2 percent of its senate. Women were represented on most committees at Fresno.
Rank

When the academic ranks of committee members were examined, a quasi-hierarchical system was revealed. In practice, membership on personnel committees at both Berkeley and Fresno was limited to full professors—which was apparently a normal phenomenon. A more significant generalization which applied to both Berkeley and Minnesota was that there appeared to be a group of committees whose membership was drawn almost exclusively from the upper ranks. These committees tended to be the more important ones and dealt with issues such as personnel, educational policies, the appointment of senate committees, faculty rights and benefits, and senate operations.

The three institutions varied in the extent to which associate professors and assistant professors were concentrated in specified committees. At Berkeley, there was a group of five committees whose ten-year membership was largely drawn from these two ranks—117 out of a total of 139 members were assistant professors and associate professors (84 percent). Minnesota's lower ranks, which were comprised of persons holding the rank of instructor, lecturer, teaching or research associate or assistant professor and accounted for 7.6 percent of all senate committee appointments from 1965 to 1968, tended to be spread thinly over a range of committees. There were five committees which had no membership from these junior ranks: the Administrative Committee, the Consultative Committee, the Committees on Business and Rules, the Committee on Committees and the Judicial Committee. If persons of junior rank were on a committee at all, they tended not to dominate its membership.

Sex and Rank

It is clear that existing decisionmaking structures represented women and assistant professors only indirectly. They may have participated in elections, but there were few data to support a contention that they actually did participate in campuswide decisionmaking processes.
Nothing in these data on the participation of women or junior faculty on senate committees indicates whether or not the outcome of senate policies or committee reports would differ if the participation levels of women or junior faculty were increased. Would a committee of women faculty members have produced a different solution to a problem than a male committee or one composed of both males and females? Would a senate or a committee with greater representation from the lower faculty ranks be more responsive or relevant to the forces of change? Our data did not speak to these pertinent questions. It is possible that the preponderance of older faculty of high rank on major senate committees leads to resistance to educational reform—a conservatism now under heavy student fire.

It seemed clear from the interview data at Berkeley that the senior faculty expected assistant professors to concentrate on qualifying for tenure; this meant devoting themselves to research or other demonstrable creative activity. In the absence of adequate credit for senate committee service when tenure decisions are made, it is difficult to see how assistant professors could afford to effectively increase their participation in senate affairs even if they were co-opted.

Academic Field

When the academic college or discipline of committee members was analyzed, both Minnesota and Fresno appeared to have fairly representative committee structures. The senates in both institutions were representative by definition.

In the committee structure of the Berkeley senate, however, some fields were seriously overrepresented and others were underrepresented when compared with a representative distributive sample of faculty over a ten-year period. In some cases the imbalances were statistically significant. The departments of chemistry, physics, and English were overrepresented among committee chairmen, and the foreign language departments as a group were...
underrepresented. The School of Business and the Department of English were overrepresented among committee members and the foreign languages, again, were underrepresented.

A closer analysis of the Berkeley data revealed that departmental or school imbalance was greater on certain committees. The Budget Committee substantively reviews every departmental recommendation for appointment, promotion, tenure, and merit increase, and it issues independent recommendations to the Chancellor. These recommendations were accepted more than 95 percent of the time from 1962-63 to 1966-67. The only professional school representation on the committee from 1957-58 to 1966-67 was from the colleges of Engineering, Agriculture, and Business. The schools of Public Health, Social Welfare, Education, Criminology, Environmental Design, Optometry, Forestry, and Librarianship were not represented on the Budget Committee during the ten-year period. The Law School only recently came under the review of this committee, but it had had no representation. These professional schools accounted for 17.3 percent of the faculty members in the ten-year representative sample.

There is a growing realization that professional schools are different from the traditional academic units in many respects. Many professional schools, such as law, medicine, and business, argue for and often receive special consideration in certain personnel matters. For example, the Law School at Berkeley had its own special salary scale which was supposed to narrow the gap between the salary a lawyer could have received in the corporate marketplace or private practice and that which the university could pay. Both the Minnesota and Berkeley Law Schools made relatively few, if any, initial faculty appointments below the rank of associate professor. The salary of an assistant professor was simply too low to attract good lawyers to the universities.

The nature of instruction offered in some professional schools is largely limited to graduate study. This is true of law, optometry, medicine, and in some instances, education. Professional schools also tend to place greater emphasis on community service and related
activities when contrasted with academic disciplines which are oriented towards pure research.

The interviews provide a basis for speculation about the possible consequences of not having direct professional school representation on a central personnel committee. According to some Berkeley professional school deans, it was extremely difficult to obtain proper credit for nonresearch activities, such as teaching, service, or consulting, when documenting cases for the Budget Committee. One dean drew up a written statement of the criteria which he believed his school should use in the evaluation of personnel, and he presented this statement in person to the committee. He attempted to make a persuasive argument for the more than ordinary emphasis in his school on consulting and community activities. Two other professional school deans reported that they sought to make sure that the ad hoc review committees, appointed by the Budget Committee, had members who were likely to appreciate the professional service of the candidates.

It should be stressed that inadequate direct professional school involvement on this key committee appears to have hindered the development of nonresearch criteria for advancement. Furthermore, the Berkeley interviews revealed that the criteria for appointment to the personnel committee were research productivity and research reputation, and these, according to some respondents, were not and should not be the strong points of professional schools. The basic point made by many of these respondents was that the standards of evaluation for personnel decisions should be more flexible and should include, but not be limited to, greater consideration of the teaching and service of professional school faculties.

One possible effect of the reliance on research-oriented criteria is unbalanced institutional development which favors academic disciplines at the expense of professional schools. While it is difficult to assess the optimum balance between professional schools and the usual academic departments, it would seem logical to argue that the standards which lead to excellence in research may not lead to excellence in professional
performance. If there are substantial differences between excellence in research and in professional practice, then the standards of the one should not be imposed upon the other.

There is also a serious question as to whether research-oriented criteria for advancement are sufficient to encourage the development of excellence in undergraduate liberal education and in teaching. After the Free Speech Movement, the Berkeley senate created a Select Committee on Education (1966), also known as the Muscatine Committee, which had as its purpose "to find the ways in which the traditions of humane learning and scientific inquiry can be best advanced [p.117]". The Muscatine Committee argued that

While there are individuals and even whole schools and departments that are distinguished for the quality of their teaching, the campus as a whole has not yet achieved that atmosphere or ethos of devotion to teaching that it must have in order to maintain its scholarly excellence [p.407].

Committee Appointments

Another important factor in the oligarchic pattern of senate behavior is the committee appointment process. At Fresno the process was controlled by the majority political faction which controlled the nominations and appointments to the Committee on Committees. One of the majority's major concerns was to deny control of any committee to the minority. As we have said, there was no member of the minority faction on the Executive Committee in 1968-69.

At Berkeley, senate committee members and chairmen, with only four or five exceptions, were appointed by the Committee on Committees. The Committee on Committees was elected from the entire membership, and ordinarily it was regarded as a committee composed of moderate or conservative faculty members. In recent years there have been unsuccessful informal campaigns, political in tone,
which have attempted to alter the conservative nature of this committee, which has had complete control of the appointment process.

Members of the Berkeley Committee on Committees were asked what criteria they used in making committee appointments, and the responses were summarized into four general categories: interest, personal qualities, representativeness, and ability. The most subjective of the categories is personal qualities, and the respondents tended to rely heavily on their personal judgment of the individuals being considered, especially when important committees were appointed. This meant that, in a faculty of 1700-1800 members, important senate committee appointments often depended on the personal contacts of committee members. Seven of the 12 respondents spoke of the almost absolute veto that each member of the committee had over any suggested appointee. One person referred to it as a blackball and another as senatorial courtesy, while others simply stated that any strong objection to an individual by a member of the committee was sufficient to deny the appointment.

Minnesota's Committee on Committees was elected by the senate and assisted the president in his appointment of committees by providing him with a slate of twice the number to be appointed. The creation of a Committee on Committees in the early 1950s was an attempt to broaden the membership of senate committees and make them more representative, but a major conclusion of Eckert's study (1970) was that the Committee appeared to have done little to lessen the influence of the oligarchy. In fact, relative committee control of the appointment process may have increased the hold of the oligarchy because Eckert documented a relative decrease in participation by junior faculty on senate committees after the Committee on Committees was created.

Oligarchic Behavior: Summary

The research shows that there is a small group of faculty who are highly active in senate affairs and that a larger group is not active at all. Other character-
istics of the oligarchic model include a relatively senior group in control of important committees, a disciplinary imbalance at Berkeley, and a subjective or personalized committee appointment process. Many of these phenomena were supported by the informal politics of senate operation.

INFORMAL POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

An important factor in the organization and operation of the three faculty senates was their internal political networks. Fresno's opposing factions were overt, well known to the participants, and fairly rigid. There was disagreement among the respondents over the extent to which a middle ground existed between the two factions. The liberal faction had developed the practice of caucusing every Wednesday noon to discuss senate and campus affairs; the conservative faction controlled a majority of votes in both the college and the senate and felt no need to caucus weekly. Leaders of the conservative faction reported that they controlled enough votes and were well enough organized so that a few telephone calls could muster the votes necessary to pass or block legislation.

During times of crisis at Berkeley, the emergence of formal and informal groups has affected the operations and resolutions of the senate. Searle (1965, pp.93-104) has described how the Committee of Two Hundred met over a weekend, during the Free Speech Movement crisis, to consider two resolutions to be presented to the senate. The three major crises which rocked the Berkeley campus in 1968-69 (to be discussed in Chapter III) saw the formation of a Berkeley Faculty Alliance to organize faculty support for the liberal or radical faction. A moderate counter committee to the Committee of Two Hundred was called the Faculty Forum.

At Minnesota, there have been relatively few informal groups when compared to those at Fresno and Berkeley. The advocates of a strong student voice on the senate were opposed by an informal group of concerned faculty who forced a substantial modification in the
July 1969 Constitution and Bylaws. The opposition coalesced around a position paper written by a professor of law. The spring and fall of 1969 saw the formalization of a group to represent radical faculty—the Faculty Action Caucus. A resolution, stimulated by Caucus members, expressing opposition to the Vietnam War, passed the faculty-student senate in October, 1969. Some Minnesota interview respondents expressed the view that a coalition of radical faculty and students had pushed the resolution through the senate. The prospects were for more coalitions of this nature because the Caucus expressed an intention to politicize the university senate. Organized attempts such as this will undoubtedly result in counterorganization by faculty and student moderates.

There are some important implications which may be drawn from the informal political behavior in academic senates. First, debate on issues which came to the senate was often over political considerations rather than educational substance. For example, at Fresno candidates for the Executive Committee were judged on party or faction membership rather than on their educational views and/or competence. As one respondent at Fresno put it, "At times we become so political that we forget the educational mission of the College." Often the debate was a power conflict with both sides attempting to control the outcome and with little attention given to the integrity of the college or its educational mission.

In many cases at both Fresno and Berkeley, especially in times of crisis, party positions became rigid and alternatives severely limited because resolutions were hammered out in caucuses. There the language of resolutions was determined, compromises reached, and positions taken well in advance of senate debate. Lengthy debate did occur on the floor, but often it was unheard or was directed toward parliamentary detail with only slight consideration given to substance. The traditional belief in senates as forensic organizations in which logic and reasoned dialogue prevail was seriously compromised when positions were solidified and alternatives limited before the senate met and open floor debate began.
Another important feature of the informal political behavior of senates is the fact that attendance figures at senate meetings were ordinarily low, regardless of whether town meetings or more representative structures were involved. In the absence of crisis, Berkeley averaged about one member attending for every 14 or 15 senate members in 1966-67, and some meetings had to be adjourned for lack of a quorum of 75 members. Minnesota often had trouble getting a quorum of 50 percent, and attendance at Fresno averaged about 65 percent of the membership.

The town meeting structure of Berkeley's senate, coupled with its ordinary mediocre attendance, encouraged attempts to muster attendance on the part of those who would like to see a particular proposal defeated. A proposal to reject classified research projects on the campus motivated the engineering faculty to attend the senate meeting practically en masse. The proposal was defeated.

Observations and data such as these lead one to conclude that in many respects academic senates function more like legislative than forensic or collegial bodies. The detailed and routine work is done through senate committees and through the informal political communication networks which are part of senate operation. While more detailed comparison with the structures and functions of political legislatures is needed, it does appear that the seniority-based committee system which tends to dominate the national legislature is also operative in academic senates. As in the national legislature, the votes that a senate takes may be important; but it is questionable, given political maneuvering before the meeting, that the debate is meaningful or changes the outcome on an important issue. This pattern of activity is common to national and state legislatures where few expect debate on the floor to affect too many votes. Future research should analyze further this analogy between academic senates and legislatures.
Gladiatorial participation patterns, seniority on senate committees, occasional disciplinary imbalance, subjective standards for committee membership, and informal politicization in academic senates raise serious questions as to their viability as representative faculty bodies.

Our own observation is that senates represented only those who participated in and controlled their decisionmaking processes. Perhaps the most significant finding was that senates tended to exclude certain segments of the faculty from membership on important committees. Data already cited showed some imbalances in rank, sex, academic discipline, and political factions. Another, and perhaps the most important, variable illustrating the imbalance in the representative character of senates was that of educational viewpoint.

The research at Berkeley characterized the prevailing model of internal committee decisionmaking as an effort to achieve consensus. Public minority reports were rare, especially from the important Budget and Educational Policy committees. Yet there appeared to be considerable variation in faculty viewpoints about criteria for personnel and about educational policies. For example, those who would give priority to teaching over research performance in personnel cases were not represented in the Budget Committee, and those who would lower quality standards in order to hire black faculty were not on the Educational Policy Committee. The subjective nature of the committee appointment process almost assured that radicals would not be appointed to these committees. A common view was that the committees were too important to take chances with "poor" appointments.

The political system at Fresno resulted in the exclusion of minority views from the Executive Committee, although most meetings were open to observers. The fact that most of the minority group were from the School of Arts and Sciences added the traditional academic-professional split to the problem.

These data on the exclusion of certain groups or views from major committees raise serious questions as
to the adequacy of traditional standards and criteria of representativeness in faculty bodies. Traditional reliance on subjective criteria, such as personal qualities, appears to exclude an increasingly important variable—that of educational values. If it is true, as we suspect, that important differences in educational viewpoint are not directly considered in the committee decisionmaking process, it is probably axiomatic that the minority will attack the legitimacy of decisions made by these bodies.

Three arguments were offered by our interview respondents as a justification for excluding those with dissenting views from committees or for not electing them to senates. First, many said that minority viewpoints were well known to committees and that direct membership of these people on committees was unnecessary for their attitudes to be considered. Second, there was not enough time to debate all viewpoints in committees. Third, by remaining active in general senate and campus affairs, minorities were able to gain occasional political and/or educational victories; these occasional triumphs actually tended to give minorities more influence than their absolute numbers warranted.

The question at stake here is not a new one to those familiar with democratic political thought. Our data and our observations in all three institutions lead us to suggest that attention needs to be given to what concessions the majority in a democratic system are willing to make to the minority in order to maintain the viability and/or legitimacy of faculty senates in a time of growing educational and political polarization. Two hundred years ago De Tocqueville warned of the danger of a tyrannous majority imposing its will on the dissenting minority. The problem is still relevant to governance systems, including those in universities.

Our data and judgments lead us to point out that token inclusion of minority viewpoints will often inflame a situation rather than calm it. The balance between the tyranny of the majority and a situation in which a minority has de facto veto power is precarious indeed. Too much majority control is likely to sap the vitality and legitimacy of governance structures, but too much concern
for minority views may result in a situation in which any organized minority can block action favored by the majority.

We do not suggest that there are easy answers to the problem of providing diverse inputs into committee and senate decisionmaking processes. We are convinced, however, that the legitimacy, and hence ultimate viability, of these faculty decisionmaking structures is at stake. Eventually the solutions will lie in a better reconciliation of the ideally competing needs for an efficient as opposed to a more representative-responsive structure, with the forces of bureaucracy stressing the former and the force of collegiality favoring the latter.

The inherent danger in an imbalanced or nonrepresentative committee system is that of conformity in values. Martin (1969) argues that lack of diversity in values is a fundamental problem in American higher education. "Beneath diverse structures and functions we found uniformity in educational assumptions and sociopolitical values across major interest groups and in various types of institutions (p. 216)," he says. One of his main findings, that complexity of structures and functions has concealed a high degree of rigidity in values, is important when evaluating the lack of diversity in senate-committee membership. Mere balancing of committee representation by discipline, rank, or sex may not result in a balance of educational orientations or priorities. Our research tends to support the conclusion that the diversity of values and educational priorities represented on committees is inadequate and that it seriously cripples debate on substantive educational issues.

THE ACCOUNTABILITY PROBLEM

One of the severest criticisms of academic senates is that they lack accountability to their faculty constituencies and to the university (Lieberman, 1969b). Reports are a principal means of committee accountability to the constituent faculty body. At Berkeley, major committee reports were sometimes infrequent, usually perfunctory in that they dealt with procedural rather than
substantive questions, sometimes confidential, and seldom debated on the floor unless specific senate action was required. The Curriculum Committee reported on its activities only occasionally in a ten-year period. The research discovered few standards on how often committee reports should be issued, and what they should contain. In 1968, Minnesota's Committee on Committees recommended annual reports from all committees and a review of committee minutes by the Committee on Business and Rules, presumably to begin to develop better standards of committee accountability.

Formal standards of committee accountability appeared to be more effectively developed at Fresno. Although committee reports went directly to the Executive Committee, the minutes of most major committees received wide circulation among the faculty and administration. There was some concern by the respondents that there may have been too many such reports and that a particular report often got buried in the pile; the problem was one of how to separate important substantive reports from minor or procedural ones. As noted earlier, there was also some concern about the way the Executive Committee handled these reports.

However, informal mechanisms of accountability, in contrast to formal committee reports, may have existed on all three campuses. The informal political organizations at Berkeley and Fresno may have been important factors in monitoring committee activity, but the research was not directed towards a detailed analysis of the internal functioning of these voluntary groups. Further research should attempt to assess the degree of influence exerted on specific committee operations by informal associations. The presence of overlapping and multiple group membership (Verba, 1965; Mortimer & McConnell, 1970) may be an important informal mechanism through which committee accountability is exercised.

The degree and substance of committee and senate accountability are important questions. Lieberman (1969b) points out that when the faculty itself, through its committees, becomes the decisionmaker, an aggrieved faculty member has no place to go for relief. How is the individual faculty member protected against unjust or arbitrary
action by his fellow faculty members? Fresno had developed extensive appeal procedures in personnel cases, and Berkeley had two standing committees to handle cases when questions of privilege and tenure or academic freedom were involved. However, Berkeley had no effective appeal procedures for individuals who had been denied promotion, tenure, or merit increases. Indeed, the personnel process was so confidential at Berkeley that the individual often had to guess at the reasons for his failure to advance.

Our research did not study questions of faculty accountability to the university and/or the public, but as the interviews and analysis progressed we came to realize that this is an important question, especially in public institutions. Traditionally, public control of higher education is exercised through boards of trustees and state legislatures, but the increasing polarization between such public agencies and faculty bodies, reported by Livingston (1969), was apparent in our own experience, especially at Berkeley and Fresno. We uncovered little evidence that faculties have faced the issue of public accountability, except when they encounter severe encroachment on what they believe to be faculty prerogatives.

We will discuss the constraints which make public accountability a serious problem for future consideration in academic senates in a later chapter. As this was written, the California State Assembly substantially reduced the appropriation for the operation of the universitywide University of California Academic Senate and the campus divisions. This incident was in part punitive, reflecting annoyance or anger with some of the senate’s actions, but it also shows how great is the need for better public understanding of the senate’s functions.

This chapter has discussed the internal operation of faculty senates. Of equal importance are the structure and operation of relationships between senates and other faculty agencies and the campus administration. The next chapter discusses this important aspect of the dynamic patterns of power and authority in higher education.
III

Faculty-Administrative Relations

While the preceding chapter has been concerned primarily with the organization of faculty government, this chapter will discuss the broader question of whether authority should be divided among the major groups of participants in the university or shared among them. In many institutions student disruption, often accompanied by faculty discord, has stimulated proposals to apportion authority formally among the elements of the organization as a means of avoiding or minimizing conflict. This trend toward redistribution of authority has led to a struggle for power among faculty, students, administrators, and governing boards.

SHARED VERSUS SEGMENTAL AUTHORITY

The American Association of University Professors (1966, pp.375-79), in company with the American Council on Education and the Association of Governing Boards of Colleges and Universities, has taken a position against segmental authority. In their joint statement on the governance of colleges and universities, these organizations came out forthrightly on the side of shared authority. Their statement declared:
The variety and complexity of the tasks performed by institutions of higher education produce an inescapable interdependence among governing board, administration, faculty, students and others. The relationship calls for adequate communication among these components, and a full opportunity for appropriate joint planning and effort.

The statement did not take the position that the several elements of the community should share equally in all decisions. On the contrary, it pointed out that "differences in the weight of each voice...should be determined by reference to the responsibility of each component for the particular matter at hand."

Each group in the academic community, whether students, faculty, administrators, or trustees, often presses for the right to make final decisions with respect to matters of particular interest. Students increasingly insist on the right of final authority over residential regulations, disciplinary rules, and disciplinary action. Faculties have come to take for granted their final power over curriculum and academic personnel.

With such questions of jurisdiction in mind after a student strike in 1966, the Berkeley Division of the Academic Senate of the University of California established a Commission on University Governance and directed it to determine the areas in which policymaking and administration "should be delegated wholly to students or wholly to faculty or administrative officers" and the areas in which either students or "faculty members and administrative officers" should have "primary responsibility" with "appropriate participation" by the other groups (Foote, Mayer, & Associates, 1968, pp.1-2).

If the Commission on University Governance had followed this charge, it would presumably have recommended a combination of divided and shared authority. In its report, however, the commission rejected the separatist model in favor of one based on the interaction of all elements of the community and on shared responsibility. The commission held to this position even in the case of student participation in university affairs. It concluded (Foote et al., 1968) that:
There are few student interests which can be successfully acted upon by a separate student organization removed from the general process of campus decisionmaking. Our task, then, is to overcome such segregation by devising a variety of institutional means through which students can be incorporated into the decisionmaking process rather than confined to haggling over the extent of peripheral powers delegated to a separate organization (pp. 40-41).

Presumably, shared authority rests on a high degree of mutual trust—meaning confidence in one another's integrity, rather than full agreement with views—among the parties concerned, however vigorously they may pursue their interests and points of view, and on rational methods of resolving differences. But on an increasing number of campuses, adversary relationships among students, faculty, administrators, and boards of trustees are displacing cooperative efforts in decisionmaking. Livingston (1969) comments: "We seem destined...to move increasingly toward relations of an adversary type, characterised by confrontation and bargaining, backed by force, by threat and intimidation (p. 170-71)."

STRUCTURE FOR JOINT DECISIONMAKING

If one believes, as the present authors do, that joint participation and shared decisionmaking are preferable to segmental authority, it should be useful to consider the structure that would make such sharing possible. Although formal organization will not assure fruitful collaboration, the system should not only permit, but should also require, joint effort. It is therefore appropriate to ask to what extent the formal structure of internal governance in the three institutions studied provides for joint decisionmaking between faculty and administration.*

*Since this book is concerned mainly with faculty
The constitution of the Assembly of Fresno State College provides that the academic and executive administrators shall be members of the assembly. The constitution also provides that the president, the executive vice president, and the vice president for academic affairs shall be ex officio members of the Academic Senate, a representative body.

The Berkeley Division of the Academic Senate of the University of California includes the president and the chancellor at Berkeley, together with the deans, the directors, the registrar, and the chief librarian. The vice presidents, the deans, and the directors of statewide units who choose to do so may also enroll in the Berkeley Division.

The reorganization of the senate at the University of Minnesota in July 1969 provided for a universitywide senate and a Twin Cities campus assembly. The president of the university is chairman of the universitywide senate. Members of the All-University Administrative Committee (composed mainly of deans and other major administrative officers) serve as ex officio nonvoting members. The president of the university likewise is chairman of the Twin Cities assembly, and the Twin Cities campus members of the All-University Administrative Committee are ex officio nonvoting members of the assembly. The members of the Administrative Committee had also been ex officio nonvoting members of the senate which the assembly replaced.

At Fresno State College, central administrative officers are ex officio members of certain key committees. The constitutional documents provide for senate committees and colleg committees. The senate committees are appointed

government, it will for the most part ignore student participation. This omission should not be taken to reflect the authors' attitude toward students; in fact, they believe that students should be involved not only in what has ordinarily been called student government, but also in decisions affecting the academic programs, the nature of the college or university community, and the relationships of the institution to society. This belief is incorporated in the proposals made in the concluding chapter.
by the senate and include no administrative officers, except that the Executive Committee is elected by the senate and includes the president as a member. These committees include a Committee on Elections, a Committee on Rules, a Committee on Consultative Procedures, and a Committee on Committees. The Committee on Committees is obviously one of the most powerful in the institution. Although this committee does not include any members of the central administrative staff, the senate constitution provides that the senate shall consult with the president of the college in appointing the members of college committees. In practice, there has been considerable controversy over the form and method of consultation with the president. The Committee on Committees has submitted its nominations simultaneously to the Executive Committee of the senate and to the president. It has been the custom of the Executive Committee to put the nominations on its agenda for consideration approximately one week after receipt, an interval which presumably gives the committee and the president an opportunity to review the nominations. The authority of the Executive Committee to change the nominations of the Committee on Committees in transmitting them to the senate has been the major point at issue. The Rules Committee has determined that the Committee on Committees should report its recommendations directly to the senate, rather than through the Executive Committee, but that at some point prior to submission the Committee on Committees should consult with both the president and the Executive Committee. There are those who insist that this consultation should be entirely pro forma and that neither the president nor the Executive Committee should make changes in the roster.

The survey team of the Center for Research and Development in Higher Education which studied faculty government at Fresno took the position that the Committee on Committees should truly consult with the president before submitting its nominations. The team observed that information is not equivalent to consultation, which should involve full and free two-way discussion between administrative officers and faculty bodies. Furthermore, the survey team pointed out that the president's opportunity for educational leadership depended
to a significant degree on the balance and quality of membership on the principal senate and college committees. Consequently, the team proposed that the Committee on Committees should be composed of seven members, five of whom should be elected by the senate and from its membership and one of whom should be appointed by the president; the seventh member of the committee should be the president or his representative ex officio. The president's ex officio membership would assure consultation but not give him the privilege of vetoing proposed nominations.

At Fresno, by constitutional provision, the president is a member of the Executive Committee of the senate, and the academic vice president serves as an ex officio member of the Committee on Academic Policy and Planning. The academic vice president likewise serves ex officio as a member of the Personnel Committee, and the Budget Committee includes the chief financial officer of the college ex officio. The structure of faculty government at Fresno thus provides for joint participation between faculty and administration in major decisions affecting the institution.

The membership of the president and other central administrative officers on major college committees at Fresno has not always assured resolution of controversies acceptable both to the faculty and the administration. For example, two personnel cases, both in the School of Arts and Sciences— one involving reappointment of a member of the English Department and the other the appointment of a member of the Department of Ethnic Studies— precipitated an acrimonious division between the departments concerned and the president, who had vetoed the recommendations of the departments and the dean involved. In the first instance the faculty member, after failing to secure favorable action under the grievance procedures, took the matter to the court, which at this writing had not acted on the case. The president had already announced his resignation to take effect at a later date, but dissension over the second personnel case led him to announce that he was resigning immediately. Subsequently, a majority of the faculty at large expressed support of the president's veto. The president, in fact, had exercised his power of veto over faculty personnel matters in very
few instances. Therefore, one might have concluded that the two vetoes in question constituted normal examples of the exercise of statutory presidential authority. However, the discord over the two cases went beyond the question of final campus authority over personnel decisions; it also raised a fundamental issue concerning the stage at which administrative participation in decisionmaking should occur. (We will return to this question at a later point in this chapter.)

In contrast to the situation at Fresno State College, the Berkeley Division of the Academic Senate of the University of California systematically excludes administrators from simultaneous service on Division committees. The manual of the Division does not formally prohibit the appointment of administrators to its committees; in practice, however, with few exceptions, the Committee on Committees has excluded administrators. The committee even goes so far as to avoid the appointment of department chairmen to committee membership. There are numerous instances in which faculty members have been in a position of choosing between senate committee service and appointment as department chairman. Former administrators may receive committee appointments; presumably, therefore, the exclusion of administrators from simultaneous committee service does not produce a sharp separation between faculty and administrative points of view. Nevertheless, there is a conscious effort to hold the line between senate committee autonomy and administrative authority. The pattern at Berkeley, Mortimer (1970) says, is "closer to a model of separate faculty-administrative jurisdictions than to a model of shared faculty-administrative authority [p.153]." The Berkeley Governance Commission went so far as to say that the chancellor should remain aloof from senate debates and committee deliberations. This separation, said the commission (Foote et al., 1968), "would achieve two objectives: it would encourage forthright debate, yet it would protect the 'distance' and comprehensive perspective that we regard as the essence of the chancellor's leadership [p.93]."
FACULTY-ADMINISTRATIVE LIAISON

Under the system of separate faculty and administrative jurisdictions at Berkeley, it has been difficult for the administration to influence the decisions of senate committees and the senate itself, or even to feed into the deliberations of these bodies relevant information which the committees and the senate may not otherwise possess. Frequently a particular decision or recommendation made by a senate committee has ramifications far beyond the specific matter in question. There has been limited opportunity for administrators to stress this broader context before the senate votes on committee recommendations or before senate committee recommendations reach the administration for final action. Furthermore, the exclusion of administrators from senate committees has made it difficult for the chancellor or his staff to make proposals or to suggest alternate courses of action. The Senate Committee on Courses retains almost absolute control and seldom consults with the central administration in making its decisions. Unless the administration has asked the Senate Committee on Educational Policy for advice, this committee has traditionally acted independently, since until recently there has been no regular system of consultation with the chancellor or the vice chancellors. Even when asked by the administration to offer counsel, the committee has been careful to protect the integrity of its own views. Thus, actions of the Committee on Educational Policy--for example, a recommendation to organize an academic unit--could reach the chancellor's desk with limited or no prior administrative consultation.

The same general process has characterized the relationships of the administration and the Senate Committee on Budget and Interdepartmental Relations in decisions on faculty appointments and promotions. The Budget Committee nominates the members of ad hoc review committees which are appointed by the chancellor's office. Ordinarily, neither the chancellor nor the vice chancellor for academic affairs participates in the deliberations of a review committee or of the Budget Committee, to which the review committee reports and which makes the final recommendation to the chancellor. It is customary
for the chancellor or the vice chancellor, if he questions the committee's recommendation, to consult with the committee before making his decision, but he will ordinarily have had no opportunity to participate in the discussion of an appointment or promotion prior to the submission of the committee's recommendation.

As a consequence of its exclusion from the deliberations of senate committees, the Berkeley administration was often left with a decision which put it in an untenable position. For example, the administration had to bear the brunt of a senate decision, taken in a meeting eventually terminated due to lack of a quorum, not to include students on the Committee on Teaching (although the senate has since added student members to this committee).

Thus, the Berkeley administration often finds itself in the position of having to react to recommendations without an opportunity to engage in their formulation. Exclusion sets the stage for confrontation; committees face responsible administrative officers with ready-made decisions which the latter must either accept, attempt at this late stage to have the committee reconsider, or veto. The strict separation of jurisdictions enables the senate and its committees to maintain an unadulterated faculty voice. We do not suggest that an academic senate should never take a clear-cut faculty position, or that it should never forthrightly oppose an administrative point of view; we do suggest, however, that joint deliberation, negotiation, and shared decisionmaking are preferable to disjunctive and adversary relationships.

Various attempts have been made to establish means of continuing consultation between the administration and major senate committees. In the 1950s one chancellor created an Academic Advisory Council, composed of the chairmen of senate committees concerned with educational affairs. In a long series of meetings, the chancellor and the council worked out a long-range academic plan and a program for the physical development of the campus. The production of the plan and program did not require administrative authority, but it did require administrative initiative. The methods by which the chancellor proceeded to carry out the academic plan will be discussed in Chapter VII; suffice it to say here that,
by informal methods, he supplied the administrative liaison, initiative, and leadership for which the formal structure did not provide. Other chancellors, even those who came out of the Berkeley system of faculty government, were not so successful in stimulating senate action.

Later, some faculty members became somewhat suspicious of the Academic Advisory Council, and advised a subsequent chancellor that he should discontinue the council and broaden his consultative contacts with members of the senate. However, the chairman and officers of the senate, recognizing the need for better coordination among committees and for consultation with the chancellor, organized the Berkeley Academic Senate Inter-Committee Council (BASIC), composed of the chairmen of some ten committees concerned with academic matters, and invited the chancellor or his representative to attend the council's meetings.

Still later, the Senate Policy Committee introduced legislation to replace BASIC with a formal Council on Educational Affairs composed of one member of each of the ten committees. The purpose of the proposed council was to serve as a coordinating agency, to examine committee structure in the realm of educational policy, and to devise methods of working closely with the chancellor on educational affairs. However, the senate failed to approve the proposal by a margin of one vote.

In the meantime, the administration had created an Educational Policy Council comprised of academic deans, some members of the chancellor's staff, and the chairmen of leading senate committees. This was a device to include deans in the policymaking process and to improve the liaison between the senate's committees and the administration.

As this was written, the Educational Policy Council--consisting of deans, other administrators, and chairmen of major senate committees--was still in existence. To provide further liaison between these committees and the administration, the current chancellor also has devised a system in which each member of the central administrative staff is assigned to a group of senate committees. The acceptability of this system to the senate remains to be seen. In the beginning, some com-
mittees welcomed it while others accepted it reluctantly. The Berkeley senate is inherently suspicious of any organizational device which might subject it or its committees to administrative influence.

In an effort to develop closer working relationships with senate committees, the central administration at Berkeley has appointed many so-called administrative committees (as noted in Chapter II). The chancellor ordinarily solicits the advice of the Committee on Committees in choosing the members of his committees. There are few instances in which the mission of the administrative committees greatly overlaps the jurisdiction of senate committees. Again, the senate has been jealous of its prerogatives. In one of its state-of-the-campus messages, for example, the Policy Committee questioned the need for the parallel senate and administrative committee structure. Some faculty members believe that the presence of administrators on administrative committees mutes the faculty voice and compromises the faculty's independence. On its behalf, the administration counters with the need for faculty-administrative consultation throughout the process of decisionmaking rather than only at the end. The administration points out that matters under the senate's jurisdiction ultimately have to be presented to the senate for action, in any case, and that administrative committees cannot usurp the powers of the senate. The administration has expressed the need for informal and confidential consultation with faculty members, but has discovered that in many instances senate committees are reluctant or unwilling to play this role. Since administrators can, and often do, serve as members of the administrative committees, these bodies provide the major formal means of two-way consultation and communication and of joint participation in deciding questions of policy or administration. In some instances (e.g., the campus architect), administrators are not members of the senate but have important, and often essential contributions to make to policy decisions. Furthermore, during the period when the senate was reluctant to include students in its committees, the administration could give a voice to students by appointing them to administrative committees.
EXCLUSION OF MINORITY VIEWS

One of the most significant consequences of the Berkeley Senate's determination to keep its distance from the administration and to preserve the unalloyed identity of the faculty point of view was to perpetuate control of faculty governance by a ruling elite (Mortimer, 1970, pp.161-62). The existence of a loosely defined group of oligarchs which tends to control senate affairs at Berkeley, except in periods of crisis, has been noted in Chapter II. The composition of this ruling elite varies from one time to another or from issue to issue. Generally speaking, however, certain departments or divisions of the university are overrepresented; the most powerful committees are composed almost entirely of full professors and faculty members with a relatively long tenure at Berkeley; and the members of the power structure tend to have similar values. In periods of crisis, conflict, or intense controversy, the faces on the committees may change, but the establishment maintains control.

Perhaps the most far-reaching effect on the character of faculty governance was the success of the Berkeley oligarchs in systematically excluding faculty members with minority views from membership on key senate committees. As pointed out in Chapter II, by confining committee appointments to faculty members with similar values and by managing committee deliberations so as to soften or deflect internal dissent, senate committees almost always avoid minority reports.

The tendency of majorities to override or suppress minority views has long been of interest to political scientists. One may learn from them how to avoid arbitrary majoritarian domination of academic senates. The sum of the solution is to make conflict functional--first, by recognizing that there are diverse values and points of view in a faculty, and second, by attempting to incorporate dissenting members in both the senate itself and in its committees. This, Mortimer (1970) pointed out, is a better means of coping with dissent than "covert attempts to produce senate committee consensus on issues where consensus does not exist."
model of democratic governance presupposes conflict among faculty groups.

Some of this conflict will be over consistently differing views of what a university ought to be doing, some over conflicting academic roles or different orientations to academic life. These conflicts should be overt ones directed toward the substance of the educational issue involved, not covert discussions among a small cadre of ruling faculty elders, or voluntary pressure groups.... Those in positions of power must respond visibly to the internal pressures of various groupings if the legitimacy and viability of existing governance structures are to be sustained [pp. 181-182].

In the final chapter we will return to the problem of making conflict functional.

The fact that the Berkeley Senate Committee on Committees is no longer required to consult the central administration (although the chairman may voluntarily do so) in preparing its nominations for committee membership diversify the membership of senate committees with respect to age, rank, and educational points of view. Unless the senate governance structure can be opened to new ideas and new values, there is little chance of fundamental educational reform at Berkeley. The administration may wish to give greater emphasis to teaching effectiveness as a qualification for promotion, but it will make little headway so long as the Committee on Budget and Interdepartmental Relations, as it has over the years, makes research the primary qualification for advancement. In September 1969, taking cognizance of the proposal of the president of the university to delete from the criteria for appointment and promotion the requirement that "superior intellectual attainment, as evidenced both in teaching and in research or creative achievement, is an indispensable qualification for appointment or promotion to tenure positions," and also of the proposal of the
Berkeley Senate Committee on Teaching that annually a certain number of faculty members be promoted primarily on the basis of teaching, the Budget Committee refused to accept teaching as a primary basis for promotion, and in effect reasserted that research or its presumed equivalent, creative accomplishment, will continue to be the indispensable qualification for permanent membership in the university faculty (Minutes, October 21, 1969).

A college or university administration may, of course, wish to influence the selection of senate committees to secure support for its own position rather than to assure a free market place for educational ideas. Nevertheless, wise administrators are often more interested in reforming the educational program and the processes of internal governance than are the conservative faculties over which they preside. Instances in point at Berkeley were the chancellor's desire to include students in decisionmaking and to establish a viable program of ethnic studies in the face of faculty resistance or apathy. Unless the composition of the ruling faculty elite can be changed substantially, there is probably relatively little hope of far-reaching reform in education or governance on the campus.*

*There have been scattered educational innovations. The Tussman experimental two-year college, modeled essentially on the old Meiklejohn College at the University of Wisconsin, enrolls a small number of students. The Board of Educational Development has sponsored experimental or special courses, many of them proposed by students. The Board has turned to long-range educational planning and the development of new educational ideas which will be executed by a new Division of Experimental Courses responsible to the chancellor. The chancellor has received a foundation grant to encourage educational experimentation. Also, the regents have appropriated more than a half-million dollars to underwrite instructional innovation by faculty members. In spite of these constructive developments, however, there are as yet no signs of wide-scale educational reorganization.
Unlike the situation at Berkeley, there has been a long history of administrative participation in senate committees at the University of Minnesota. First of all (as noted in Chapter II), the president, who is the chairman of the recently established Universitywide Senate and Twin Cities Campus Assembly, participates in the appointment of senate and assembly committees. The new constitution provides that the Committee on Committees shall furnish the president with a slate of twice the number of faculty and student members to be appointed to the standing committees, with the admonition to pay attention to such factors as representation and rotation. Faculty members of the university senate submit the slate of faculty nominees, while student members submit the roster of student nominees.

As in the case of the Universitywide Senate, the Campus Assembly Committee on Committees is directed to furnish the chairman of the assembly, who is the president of the university or his designee, a slate of twice the number of faculty and student members to be appointed to the standing committees. Thus, the president of the university has been accorded an influential role in manning the instruments of faculty, and now faculty-student governance.

In the period preceding the Minnesota reorganization of 1969, the members of the University Administrative Committee—which included the president as chairman, the vice presidents, the deans, and the directors—were non-voting members of the senate. As pointed out in Chapter II, the new senate and assembly carried forward the same arrangement; that is, the members of the All-University Administrative Committee are ex officio nonvoting members of the university senate, and the Twin Cities Campus members of the All-University Administrative Committee serve as ex officio nonvoting members of the Twin City Assembly. Thus, the principal administrative officers of the university have a voice, if not a vote, in senate and assembly deliberations. Furthermore, they are eligible for membership on senate and assembly committees.

A recent study (Eckert, 1970) of the composition of senate committees at Minnesota during the period 1965-68 showed that 8.6 percent of the total number of appointments, excluding students and alumni, were members...
of the central administrative staff. Another 41.1 percent of the committee members were deans, associate or assistant deans, or directors of special programs. When department chairmen were included in the administrative personnel, 66.4 percent of all non-student members of senate committees held some administrative position. The comparable figure for 1945-48 and 1953-58 was 64.9 percent.

Although there have been some rumblings of discontent with the Minnesota senate power structure and, from time to time, some tension between the central administration and a relatively small number of faculty members, there has been no concerted effort to change the power of the president to participate in the selection of members of senate committees.

Fresno State College and the University of Minnesota differ markedly from the University of California at Berkeley in the opportunity for central administrative officers to participate formally in the decision-making activities of the Academic Senate. It is true that in all three institutions these officers, together with the deans and other major administrators, are members of the senate, although at Minnesota they do not have the right to vote. At both Fresno and Minnesota, administrative officers serve as members of senate committees. At Fresno, the senate constitution makes the president, the vice presidents, and the chief financial officer members of specified college committees. No such formal membership has been conferred on members of the central administration at Minnesota; in the past, however, these officers have frequently served on senate committees, and there is no reason to believe that they will be excluded under the new constitutions of the senate and the Twin Cities Assembly. At Berkeley, as noted earlier, it has been the practice of the Senate Committee on Committees not to appoint members of the central campus administration to senate committees, and the exclusion has, with recent exceptions, been extended to deans and other principal administrators. At Fresno and Minnesota the organization provides the opportunity for joint faculty-administrative participation in decision-making, presumably at all stages of the process so far as the top layer of major committees is concerned.

At Fresno, however, the faculty does not unani-
rously favor administrative participation throughout the deliberative process. A relatively small proportion of the faculty members who were interviewed took the position that consultation should occur only "at the end and at the top," when a fully developed recommendation is placed before the administrator for his approval or disapproval. The larger proportion, who held that administrators should become involved in deliberations at early stages, recognized that the point at which administrative participation should occur varies with the matter under consideration and with the level at which it originates. The stage of administrative involvement, of course, varies among the levels of the administrative hierarchy. For example, in the appointment or promotion of faculty members, deans presumably participate at relatively early stages and the central administrator at a later point. In curricular matters, deans may be expected to participate at early stages and the vice president for academic affairs subsequently. In practice, there is little central review of courses by either faculty committees or administrators at either Fresno or Minnesota. At Berkeley, however, the senate Committee on Courses acts on all course proposals. The committee's action is in most instances final. Except in extraordinary circumstances, central administrators neither participate in the committee's deliberations nor review its decisions.

Conceivably, and we think appropriately, central administrators might consult with deans, department chairmen, and appropriate faculty committees concerning personnel problems. These might involve the balance among specialties and scholarly positions, or new fields of knowledge and investigation that should be developed. Experience has shown that departments seldom improve themselves (Dressel, Johnson, & Marcus, 1970); consequently, administrators may be properly concerned about the quality of teaching and research. This review of quality and modernity may need to be extended from entire schools or colleges to divisions and departments.

Although the consideration of appointments and promotions should originate, in most instances, in departments and reach central administrative officers in due course for final action, there may be instances in
which central administrators should become involved much earlier. These include especially sensitive or controversial appointments, appointments which do not conform to usual standards, or disputed qualifications for appointment, retention, or promotion. Reference has already been made to two such cases at Fresno, one in which the president vetoed a department and dean’s recommendation for retention, and one in which the president declined to approve a recommended appointment. The president’s decisions created a great amount of dissension in both cases. In a letter commenting on the report of the present governance study, the president of Fresno State College wrote:

The most serious personnel problem in my five years could probably have been averted if the initiators of the appointment had either investigated thoroughly enough or shared their knowledge with the administration. What happens now is that by the time the recommendation reaches the Academic Vice President’s office, we are almost obliged to approve it or risk serious conflict.

In any event, at both Fresno and Berkeley, recommendations on appointment and promotion are seldom vetoed. For example (as reported in Chapter II), in 95 percent of the cases the recommendations of the senate committee at Berkeley have been accepted. The tradition of faculty control over personnel matters is so strong that normally the only consultation between the Budget Committee and the administration occurs when administrative reversal of a committee judgment is contemplated. The only opportunity for central administrative input into this vital decisionmaking process is to threaten a veto at the final stage of the decision. We believe that such confrontations should be avoided if at all possible, and that joint faculty and administrative participation throughout the course of decisionmaking would avoid administrative vetoes except under the most extraordinary circumstances. Even in these cases, there would have been an exchange of views and a consideration of conflicting positions.
which might have bolstered mutual trust and respect in spite of vigorous disagreement.

FACULTY-ADMINISTRATIVE TENSIONS

Enough has been said about the tension between the general administration and a sizeable segment, though not a majority, of the faculty at Fresno to suggest that joint participation in decisionmaking will not prevent conflict between faculty and administration. If the three institutions were placed on a tension scale, Fresno State College would have the most and the University of Minnesota the least, with the University of California at Berkeley in an intermediate position but much nearer Minnesota than Fresno. The tension at Fresno has escalated into acrimonious conflict. At Minnesota, except for periodic controversies that have not been seriously disruptive, there has been little tension between faculty and administration, although there are signs of growing dissatisfaction on the part of a small faculty group. Under normal conditions at Berkeley, the faculty maintains its separate jurisdiction and expects the administration to keep its distance. In exceptional circumstances --such as the crises generated by the Free Speech Movement, the strike of 1966, the Cleaver case, and the Peoples' Park controversy--the tension between the central administration and the faculty heightens and may break into militant opposition to administrative policy or administrative action. Ordinarily, however, the dissident faculty group is unable to outvote the conservative-moderate coalition, which usually supports, although sometimes grudgingly, the administration's position. In only a limited number of instances has a conflict at Berkeley been precipitated by clear-cut division between faculty and administrative views. Actions of the Regents of the University of California have frequently complicated and often exacerbated faculty-administrative differences. Policies and actions of the State College Board of Trustees and the central administration of the state colleges have likewise confused the relationships between faculty and administration at Fresno. We shall return
later to a discussion of these and other external influences on internal relationships.

Relationships between faculty and administration at any one time depend not only on issues of the moment, but also on the history—at least the relatively recent history—of interaction among the elements of the academic community. For example, the academic reorganization which occurred at Fresno State College in 1966 was a reaction against a period of centralized administrative authority. Fresno and the other California state colleges (together with teacher training institutions and former state teachers colleges elsewhere, even after they became multipurpose institutions) had endured a period of strong and sometimes arbitrary administrative rule, often accompanied by a dominating board of trustees (Harcleroad, Sagen, & Molen, 1969, pp.30-49). The academic reorganization at Fresno was adopted against a background of distrust and faculty-administrative tension. The reorganization of necessity had to recognize the legal and formal authority of the president, since the California Administrative Code gives the president of each state college, under the board of trustees and the chancellor of the state college system, authority over a wide range of college affairs, including curriculum, academic personnel, business administration, and public relations. Nevertheless, the constitution of the Academic Assembly at Fresno State provides that "the faculty body should have responsibility and authority to develop and recommend policies and should be consulted on all academic policy matters by the President of the College."

The Fresno faculty was not content to let the matter rest on a general requirement of consultation. After the Academic Assembly and the Academic Senate were established, the faculty adopted, and the new president of the college accepted, a complicated set of consultative procedures which attempted to specify in detail the methods by which consultation between the central administrators and the faculty should be conducted. For example, four types of decisions or recommendations were defined, and the interaction of faculty bodies and administrative officers in the consideration, possible revision, and final action under each type of recommendation was specified. The most
complicated procedure was required in the case of a "decisional recommendation," which was defined as the type of action in which a recommendation was forwarded to higher levels (for either faculty or administrative review), but which, if not approved by the administrator or consultative body responsible for the decision, must be referred back to the recommending body for further consideration. A decisional recommendation could not be amended until 1) it had been referred back to the originating body; 2) that body had refused to change its recommendation; and 3) the president or his representative stated that in his opinion the matter was of such importance that orderly administration of the college (or of any school or department) could not proceed until the issue was resolved.

Critics of the formal consultative procedures complained not only that they were too complex and sometimes ambiguous, but that they provoked procedural wrangles rather than substantive debate. The critics also declared that certain faculty members or administrators tried to use the procedures as a weapon to inflame small issues into great controversies through charges of circumvention of the documents.

Faculty members who supported the formal consultative procedures insisted that it was imperative to redress improper administrative control over matters which should be decided jointly and to provide structural assurances that such an imbalance would not recur. The survey team concluded (Deegan, McConnell, Mortimer, & Stull, 1970):

Against a background of distrust and faculty-administrative tension, what in many institutions is accomplished through mutual understanding and often through informal relationships, has at Fresno become highly formal and documentary. The distinctions among types of action, for example, are more complicated, legalistic, and rigid than either the statutory procedures or the informal practices of joint decisionmaking in other academic institutions with which the members of the survey team are familiar ....The team
also believes that the formal use of decisional recommendations has much to do with inducing a psychology of confrontation between faculty and administration (p. 53).

Recently, however, the acting president promulgated new and simplified consultative procedures which eliminated "decisional" and other specified types of recommendations.

Perhaps it will take a long period of sincere consultation to supplant the suspicion and distrust of earlier periods with confidence in both faculty and administrative integrity.

When issues of administrative authority arise at Fresno State, some faculty members were likely to accuse the central administration of violating consultative procedures. Subsequent to the premature resignation of the president of the college in the early fall of 1969 after the controversy over the presidential veto of a recommended appointment in the Ethnic Studies program, the chancellor of the state college system appointed an acting president. After five days in office, the acting president replaced the dean of the School of Arts and Sciences and the executive vice president of the college with new appointees. (The acting president announced later that these were acting and not necessarily permanent appointments.) A faculty group organized as the Committee for Constitutional Government charged that the acting president had been appointed without appropriate campus consultation and that the dismissal of the dean and vice president and their replacement had violated the formal consultative procedures outlined for the nomination of such officers (Committee on Constitutional Government, 1969). On the other hand, three faculty members, including the acting dean of the School of Arts and Sciences, writing as "designated representatives" of the acting president, asserted that the administrative officers removed by the acting president had no tenure in their administrative positions, that the consultative procedures as stated in the Faculty Handbook were not legally binding because they had never been formally approved by the chancellor or the Board of Trustees of the state college system, and that in any case the
consultative procedures did not cover the appointment of acting occupants of academic-administrative positions (Walker, Wardle, & Wilcox, 1969).

The deposed dean of the School of Arts and Sciences appealed his removal, and a three-member board chaired by the Vice President for Academic Affairs of one of the other California state colleges was appointed by the State College Board of Trustees to hear the case. The hearing board decided that the only sections of the State Education Code that were pertinent had been followed, and it recommended that the State College Board should affirm the dean's reassignment to a faculty position. (The appeal board based its finding on sections of the State Education Code, and not upon the consultative procedures that had previously been adopted by the college.) The Committee for Constitutional Government then issued a second report objecting to the appeal board's action. As this was written, the controversy still agitated the campus.

Although the survey team considered the formal consultative procedures to be unnecessarily legalistic and detailed, it emphasized the necessity of adequate consultation between faculty and administration (Deegan, McConnell, Mortimer, & Stull, 1970).

Full, two-way consultation between faculty bodies and administrative officers is imperative... The members of the team concur fully with the basic premise of the present consultative procedures, which requires full participation by faculty and academic administrators in the formulation of policy and procedures affecting administrative and academic affairs.

In an institution with the standing of Fresno State College, arbitrary administrative action is obviously unacceptable. Constitutional documents properly require the president to consult the faculty on all matters of academic policy, and the spirit, if not the letter, of these documents requires the president to consult on all other matters...
which significantly affect the members of the institution. What is required of the president should be required of all other administrative officers. What is required of administrative officers should be required of the faculty as well. If either of these parties finds the other derelict in its duty to consult, it should call the negligent partner to account.53-54.

The issue of faculty versus administrative authority is not the only one which creates controversy at Fresno, but it is an issue which divides the faculty into opposing factions. Another divisive issue is decentralized control versus collegewide review of the recommendations and decisions of departments and schools. These and other disputes inflamed by dissension over retention or appointment of faculty members have polarized and politicized the academic community. Recent events—especially the manner of appointment of an acting president and his subsequent removal of two major administrative officers—have served only to widen and deepen the division between the two principal faculty factions. One wonders whether a return to civility and rationality, to vigorous but disciplined debate, is any longer possible. We shall return to this subject in the final chapter.

The contrast between Fresno State College and the University of Minnesota is so great as to be startling. At Minnesota there is a tradition of good relationships. There have been disagreements, however, and on occasion faculty members have accused the administration of arbitrary action. In many past instances the president has been less the object of attack than the vice president for business affairs; and the controversies between president and faculty have seldom been over educational policy or matters of appointment and advancement of faculty members. The difficulties have been over important issues but not over questions which have raised militant questions of faculty authority. One issue was participation in the Rose Bowl, which the administration favored and the senate opposed. (The administration prevailed.) On a more significant issue, some faculty members claimed that, without faculty consultation, the
administration decided to build a new campus across the Mississippi River from the main Minneapolis campus. The senate reorganization of the early 1950s reflected the faculty's desire for more participation in significant decisions and a more decisive and influential faculty voice in university affairs. Before that reorganization, the only formal advisory body to the president was the Administrative Committee composed of the president as chairman, the vice presidents, the deans, and certain other major administrative officers. Influential faculty members believed that the president needed another advisory body representing faculty rather than administrative points of view. To provide such an advisory body, the new senate constitution established the Faculty Consultative Committee composed of seven elected faculty members from the Minneapolis campus, plus representatives from the St. Paul and Duluth campuses. The president served as chairman of the new committee, and either he or the faculty members could place items on the agenda. The Faculty Consultative Committee discussed such matters as budgetary policies, student representation in university planning, and the functions and policies of the office of the vice president for business affairs. The Committee was also used to advise the regents in the selection of a new president. The bylaws of the new university senate, established in July 1969, provide for a Senate Consultative Committee—composed of nine elected faculty members and seven elected members of the student body—and the vice chairman of the senate ex officio. The elected faculty representatives comprise the Faculty Consultative Committee, and the student representatives the Student Consultative Committee, both representing the several campuses of the university. The senate bylaws provide, further, that the Senate Consultative Committee shall meet with the president at least quarterly to discuss questions of educational policy, personnel, university service, and the budget. The Faculty Consultative Committee may meet separately with the president to discuss matters of primary faculty concern, and the Student Consultative Committee may meet separately to discuss matters of primary interest to the student body.
The bylaws of the new Twin Cities Campus Assembly provide for a steering committee composed of seven elected faculty members, five elected students, and the vice chairman of the assembly ex officio. The faculty and student representatives serve as the executive committees of their respective assemblies. The Twin Cities Assembly Steering Committee serves as coordinator between administrators and the assembly. Presumably the committee is available to act in an advisory or consultative capacity to the president of the university.

There are differences in point of view among active members of the senate at Minnesota concerning the past effectiveness of the Faculty Consultative Committee. There seems to be a general feeling among faculty members interviewed that the president may consult the committee if he chooses, but that he also may ignore it or may inform the committee after he has made a decision. At one meeting, for example, the president began to read to the committee a statement concerning the appointment of a new vice president. A member of the committee interrupted to ask what document the president was reading. The latter replied that he was reading from the press release announcing the appointment. The committee had had no part in the choice of the first incumbent of an important new university office.

Although the relationships between faculty and administration at Minnesota have not always been serene, the differences have not led to disruptive confrontations. Perhaps the attitude and style of administrative officers have been in part responsible for good relations, but the style of faculty leaders, while forthright, has been equally civil and conciliatory. An even more important reason for the absence of conflict may be the high degree of decentralization in matters of curriculum, academic personnel, and allocation of funds within the constituent schools and colleges. There is a long tradition of strong college and departmental autonomy, and thus there are few occasions to pit a school or college faculty committee against a universitywide faculty review body, and equally few occasions in which there is a conflict between the authority of deans and the central administrators.

This high degree of decentralization may produce a multiversity rather than a coherent and well-integrated
institution; nevertheless it also reduces the occasions for confrontion and conflict by tacit agreement to divide authority and to avoid invading other jurisdictions.*

*Although the subject under discussion is faculty authority and faculty-administrative relationships, it is worth noting that the new bicameral system of governance established at Minnesota in 1969 is the culmination of a long history of student participation in university affairs. In 1913, student representatives were included on five of the eleven senate committees (Eckert, 1970). Nearly 20 years ago the Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota adopted the following resolution:

> Without implying that the ultimate authority for responsible decisions rests elsewhere than in the Board of Regents itself, by provisions of its basic charter, the Regents look with favor upon all efforts that are designed to improve the consultation, communications, and relationships between staff members and responsible student leaders.

The policy of participation went beyond informal consultation. In the same year, 1951, a subcommittee of the senate Committee on Education asked the senate to endorse the proposal that "the President explore with each of the standing committees of the Senate the desirability of adding student members or increasing the number of student members on each committee and in other ways establishing a greater degree of communication with student organizations." Thus, student membership on the new University Senate and Twin Cities Assembly and on senate and assembly committees is the culmination of a long process of consultation among students, administrators, and faculty members and the legitimization of a continuing process of cooperative decisionmaking. The new Student Senate and Student Assembly and the representation of these bodies in the new University Senate did not come about as the
One might hypothesize that the separate faculty and administrative jurisdictions and the general absence of formal joint participation in decision-making which characterize the Berkeley campus would be conducive to tension and conflict between the two parties. The relationships have been strained from time to time, but considering the number of student disturbances that began in 1964, it is surprising that there has not been more overt conflict between faculty and administration during the latter half of the past decade. In the early 1960s there had been a controversy over the adaptation of the university to year-round operation; the Berkeley faculty was opposed to this plan and resentfully accused the statewide administration of the university of going forward with the reorganization in the face of faculty disapproval.

But such controversies were minor compared with the discord which attended the so-called Free Speech Movement (FSM) in 1964. The precipitating episode in a long series of events was the Berkeley administration's announcement on September 16, 1964, that henceforth it would strictly enforce the long-standing rule against political advocacy, including the solicitation of funds on campus and campus recruitment for off-campus political or social action. The students immediately protested what they considered to be a violation of their constitutional rights and continued to man tables at one of the principal entrances to the campus for the purposes of distributing pamphlets and handbills and raising funds for off-campus activities. By the end of September, the result of a demand by students for participation in university and campus governance. During the academic year 1968-69, the president of the university, upon the recommendation of the Senate Committee on Committees, appointed a task force composed of faculty, students, and administrators to propose ways in which students might participate. Although the recommendations of this task force were not entirely approved by the senate, a system of faculty-student governance was adopted in 1969, as we have described in Chapter II (McConnell, 1969c; Deegan & Mortimer, 1970).
chancellor had suspended eight students indefinitely for flaunting the regulations. From this point, the conflict between students and administration escalated rapidly.

The Free Speech Movement was organized in early October, and it carried on the protest and opposition to the administration. The FSM held rallies, collected money in violation of university regulations and demanded that "in the area of First Amendment rights and liberties" students be "subject only to the civil authorities." By this time the students had won the sympathy and active support of a large number of faculty members. On October 13, 1964, the Berkeley Division of the Academic Senate (Minutes) took the following action:

We therefore direct the Committee on Academic Freedom to inquire immediately into the recent university rulings on student political activity in the Bancroft-Telegraph area, the students' protests against these rulings, and the larger problem of students' rights to the expression of political opinion on campus and in the living and dining halls, and to report to the Senate as quickly as possible what action on the part of the faculty may be advisable.

At the same meeting, in response to a suggestion from the president of the university, the division instructed its Committee on Committees to appoint a five-man ad hoc committee to hear and make recommendations on the cases of the eight suspended students. Then the Division passed the following resolution:

Whereas, the Berkeley Division recently has gone on record as favoring maximum freedom for student political activity and the use of peaceful and orderly procedures in settling disputes; and

Whereas, the attitude of the Division has been widely misunderstood as condoning lawlessness,
Now therefore, this body reaffirms its conviction that force and violence have no place on this campus.

The campus Committee on Political Activity—composed of faculty, administration, and students appointed by the chancellor to make recommendations to the administration concerning campus political behavior—failed to resolve the controversy with the Free Speech advocates and was dissolved. The students continued their protests and demonstrations. The ad hoc senate committee appointed to advise the chancellor on the case of the suspended students recommended that they be reinstated during the course of the hearings, but the chancellor refused to do so. Later, this committee won the praise of the FSM leaders by recommending that six of the eight suspended students be reinstated as of the date of their original suspension, with "censure" of no more than six weeks to be noted on their records.

In late November the chancellor preferred charges against Mario Savio and three other leaders. Immediately, the FSM threatened direct measures if the administration did not drop the new disciplinary action within 24 hours. The chancellor again refused. On December 2 and 3, students packed the administration building and refused to leave when told to do so or face disciplinary action. Then, acting on orders of the governor, more than 600 police officers began arresting demonstrators who refused to leave. In all, 768 persons were arrested.

On the following day, an impromptu meeting of more than 800 faculty members voted to urge that all disciplinary action against students to that date be dropped, that an Academic Senate Committee be created for final appeal of all discipline involving political action, and that the Regents not prosecute students for advocating illegal off-campus action.

Pickets urged students and faculty members to stay away from classes, demonstrators picketed major classroom buildings, and many faculty teaching assistants and students respected the picket line.

On December 6, it was announced that the chancellor had been hospitalized. The next day a great crowd of students, faculty members, and staff gathered in the
outdoor Greek Theater to hear a proposed settlement by the newly organized Council of Department Chairmen. The president of the university accepted the proposal as effective immediately. As the meeting ended, Mario Savio took over the microphone but was taken backstage by university police officers, although he was soon released and permitted to speak. He announced an FSM rally for the same day, at which the students, by acclamation, rejected the proposals of the Council of Department Chairmen. However, the strike was called off in anticipation of a meeting of the Academic Senate the next afternoon.

Throughout the conflict between the students and the administration, individual faculty members had intervened with both students and administration to resolve the controversy. As the turmoil grew, a voluntary group of faculty members constituted themselves the Committee of 200, both for the purpose of bringing about a resolution of the conflict and of assuring the constitutional rights of free speech and advocacy on the campus. With the virtual breakdown of campus administration, the Committee formulated proposals which were placed before a special meeting of the Berkeley division of the Academic Senate on December 8. By a vote of 824 to 115, the Division resolved that there should be no university discipline for political actions prior to December 8; that the university should place no restrictions on the "content of speech or advocacy" or on "off-campus political activities"; that the "time, place, and manner" of on-campus political activity be regulated only to protect "the normal functions of the university"; and that future discipline in "the area of political activity" be determined by a committee of the Academic Senate (Lunsford, 1965).

The FSM and its supporters considered the senate's resolution to be a full vindication of their cause. Not only had the Berkeley faculty supported the students in their crusade for free speech and especially for political advocacy, it had also repudiated the policies and actions of the administration throughout the long conflict. Soon after the historic Senate meeting of December 8, the chancellor was granted a leave of absence and his resignation was subsequently accepted.
The disruptions connected with the Free Speech Movement uncovered serious deficiencies in campus governance. One of the most glaring flaws was the lack of a senate-student—or better, a senate-administrative-student committee or committees on campus regulations and student discipline. The inability of both faculty and administration to deal effectively with such emergencies as violent demonstrations and student strikes revealed that the Academic Senate was not organized to respond quickly and efficiently to campus crises. Even more significantly, perhaps, the continuing turmoil exposed the ineffectiveness of sharp separation between faculty and administrative authority. The structure of the senate and the methods by which its committees traditionally operated were designed more to protect the integrity of the faculty’s position than to promote faculty-administrative cooperation in solving the institution’s problems and in attaining its goals.

The lack of close continuing collaboration between faculty and administration—and representative students—was exposed again in the strike of students and teaching assistants which occurred in December 1966. The sequence of events began when a Navy recruiting table was set up in accordance with campus regulations. A little later, a nonstudent, without university permission, set up a table nearby to distribute anti-draft literature. The police removed the nonstudent’s table and, subsequently, a large crowd gathered in the area and the adjacent bookstore was closed. University officials repeatedly asked students to disperse, and the Dean of Students promised them amnesty if they would leave. The crowd moved to the nearby Student Union ballroom where it was addressed by several nonstudents. The crowd refused to leave the Student Union, and police officers arrested six nonstudents and three students. Students then assembled in the Union auditorium and called a strike from classes. A local chapter of the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), composed mainly of teaching and research assistants, struck in sympathy with the students. The faculty AFT chapter supported the student strike "as a reasonable and justifiable response of outrage to the administration’s action [Berkeley Barb, December 5, 1966]."

Meeting on December 5, the Berkeley Academic Senate
slapped the chancellor on the wrist by resolving that it "joined the Chancellor in recognizing that the use of external police force except in extreme emergency and of mass coercion is inappropriate to the functions of a university." Other parts of the resolution called on the students and teaching assistants to end their strike immediately and urged the chancellor not to institute university disciplinary proceedings against students or student organizations for activities engaged in prior to December 5. The resolution went on to affirm the senate's "confidence in the Chancellor's leadership" and to pledge its "continued support and cooperation." Finally, the resolution charged the Senate Policy Committee to "explore new avenues for increasing student participation in the making and enforcing of campus rules" and called for "the creation of a faculty-student commission to consider new modes of governance and self-regulation appropriate to a modern university community." The resolution carried by a vote of 795 to 28, with 143 abstentions (Minutes, December 5, 1966).

It is significant that the Senate's resolution called for the creation of a faculty-student committee to consider new modes of governance and self-regulation, rather than a committee which included administrators as well as faculty members and students.

On December 6, the university Regents declared that it was their

Firm policy, effective as of today, that University personnel, including all levels of faculty and teaching assistants, who participate in any strike or otherwise fail to meet their assigned duties in an effort to disrupt University administration, teaching or research, will thereby be subject to termination of their employment relationship with the University, denial of re-employment, or the imposition of other appropriate sanction [University Bulletin, December 12, 1966].

The regents also announced their support of the efforts of the chancellor and his administrative staff to deal
with disruptive activities "by students, faculty, employees and outsiders."

With respect to faculty-administrative relationships, Chancellor Roger Heyns made a significant statement in addressing the Berkeley senate on December 5. He said, in part:

As Chancellor, I have the formal power to take appropriate measures for dealing with the problems that face us. What I need in addition, however, is the support of this faculty in the fulfillment of our obligations ... The situation calls for decisive leadership with firm faculty support. The Chancellor must be prepared to account for his stewardship from time to time. He must expect to be criticized and evaluated. But, in the interest of conserving our collective energies, he must be given the support to do what he has to do. This support cannot be ephemeral, quickly withdrawn, and at the first sign of trouble. I am asking no more from you than I have been given by the Regents—the chance to go ahead and make decisions that I and my advisors (and that includes you) have deemed appropriate. I can assure you that the Regents have allowed me to exercise this power in fact as well as in law. I need an equivalent expression of confidence from you if I am to govern the campus effectively /University Bulletin, December 12, 1967/.

In asking for the chance to make decisions that he and his advisors, including the academic senate, considered appropriate, the chancellor in effect called for breeching the separate faculty and administrative jurisdictions. But the structure of the senate, the exclusion of principal administrative officers from senate committees, the faculty's insistence on maintaining the integrity of its point of view, and its desire for the chancellor to keep his distance, all militated against joint participation and shared authority in coming to grips with campus disruption and dissension.

The same need for collaboration between faculty
and administration had been expressed by Acting Chancellor Martin Meyerson soon after he assumed office following the Free Speech Movement and the chancellor's resignation. Chancellor Meyerson told the Berkeley Senate (Minutes, March 18, 1965): 'The gap between faculty and administration saps the morale of administrators, and has a negative effect on both faculty and students.'

The chancellor easily survived another challenge by students and a faculty minority in connection with students' "Stop the Draft Week" activities in 1967. In October of that year, a student group asked for the overnight use of the Student Union in organizing planned demonstrations at the Oakland induction center. The administration refused the use of the Union for this purpose, but did approve an all-night teach-in on the draft, organized by the Associated Students, with speakers representing diverse points of view. However, the Alameda County Superior Court issued an order restraining the university from permitting any of its property to be used as a meeting place or a staging area for on-campus advocacy of off-campus violations of the Universal Military Training and Service Act. The university then announced compliance with the restraining order and cancelled the teach-in. The chancellor urged students not to participate in illegal acts involving opposition to the draft, and he also admonished students to respect the university's rules for student action. Student groups then violated a campus rule against use of sound equipment and held what were said to be illegal rallies. As a consequence, approximately 100 students were cited for violation of the rules, and certain students were subsequently disciplined. Some students protested that due process had not been observed and a small number of faculty members called on the administration to desist from punishing any of the cited students. At a meeting of the Berkeley Division of the Academic Senate on December 4, 1967, a resolution was introduced to the effect that

The suspensions of two students...represent excessively severe disciplinary action; insufficient weight was given to a) the
widespread indignation and other extraordinary circumstances created by the Superior Court's injunction and b) the fact that no serious substantive interference with the good order of the University occurred.

Although the resolution went on to assert that disruption and intimidation were alien to the spirit of the university and could not be countenanced, the resolution lost by a vote of 271 to 97 (Minutes, December 4, 1967). Again, the senate supported the chancellor's action, but again a sizeable minority of the faculty opposed it, in spite of the fact that the chancellor had voiced his disagreement with the court's restraining order and in spite of the fact that the senate had earlier passed a resolution commending the chancellor for his forthright decision to permit the use of campus facilities for educational and lawful debate (Minutes, October 16, 1967).

In another disturbance connected with minority students' demands for programs in ethnic studies, the senate condemned the use of force, violence, and disruption, including physical obstruction of campus entrances, noisy and disruptive marches through the campus and in the buildings, interference with the conduct of classes, physical violence against faculty members and students, intimidation of faculty members and students, and physical damage to university facilities. At the same time the senate recorded its view that students had the right to engage in peaceful nondisruptive picketing. The senate also urged students and faculty members to support the administration in its efforts to establish a Department of Afro-American Studies and in its consideration of the possible advantages of a College of Ethnic Studies. These resolutions passed with few negative votes. Later, the senate, by resolution, favored the establishment of an Ethnic Studies Department reporting directly to the chancellor.

The celebrated Peoples' Park incident in the spring of 1969 became another issue between the faculty and the administration. In accordance with a development plan approved a decade earlier, the Regents in 1967 had approved the purchase of a block of land for construction
of a residence hall, but the Regents designated the site for athletic fields until long-range plans for student housing could be realized, and the area remained unused and unsightly. Early in 1969 people in the area spontaneously and creatively, so it was said, began to turn the land into a Peoples' Park. Soon afterwards the campus Public Information Office announced that a recreation field would be built on the property immediately, and that further work on the Peoples' Park should cease; leaflets were then circulated in the general area pledging "war" if the university began to move against the Park. Efforts by the chancellor and administrative committees failed to produce a constructive solution. Finally, the chancellor announced that the park would be fenced to allow time for consultation and to reestablish the university's ownership of the field, and two days later in pre-dawn hours the fence was erected. At noon that day students held a rally on campus and then marched down the street to the Park. A riot ensued during which the County Sheriff's deputies used firearms. A nonstudent died after being wounded by police. The National Guard moved into Berkeley. In subsequent clashes with police and the National Guard, an aerial barrage of tear gas was laid down over the campus plaza, and it spread to buildings and open areas well beyond the plaza (University of California, Berkeley Centennial Fund, 1969).

Meeting in emergency session on May 23, the Berkeley senate condemned as "responsible the police and military reaction to the civic disturbance, the use of firearms as a means of mob dispersal, and the indiscriminate tear-gassing of demonstrators and innocent persons. The senate action called for cessation of the use of firearms and gas and for the immediate withdrawal of the "massive police and military presence" on the campus, as well as the cessation of belligerent and provocative acts by demonstrators. The senate also requested the chancellor to work with representatives of the townspeople, students, and city officials to settle the dispute and urged that a part of the lot in dispute be used as an "experimental community-generated park." The resolution also called for a plan for the use of the field which would include the prompt removal of the fence (Minutes, May 23, 1969).
During the course of the debate on the motion incorporating the points listed above, a motion to amend was made calling on the president of the university to initiate procedures for the immediate removal of the chancellor. The amendment lost, with 737 voting no, 94 yes, and 99 abstentions. Dissatisfaction with the Berkeley administration's failure to remove the fence led the senate in emergency meeting four days later to request the chancellor, by a vote of 250 to 206, to take "all steps necessary to guarantee that the fence is removed from a suitable portion of the land in question this week (Minutes, May 27, 1969)."

Ever since the days of the Free Speech Movement in 1964, relationships between the faculty and central administration at Berkeley have often been tense, and there has been a dissident faculty group throughout the period. However, when controversy and turmoil reached a critical point, the chancellor could win a vote of confidence in the senate, even if it was accorded at times with explicit or implied criticism of some of his decisions.

Although the chancellor won a large formal vote of confidence during the Peoples' Park controversy in 1969, there remained widespread uneasiness among the members of the senate over its ineffectiveness in coping with campus conflict and in coordinating its efforts with those of the campus administration. Five years after the Free Speech Movement, the senate still was not effectively organized to deal with crises and to work with the administration in determining policy and guiding operation. Perhaps it was in frustration over this ineffectiveness that, at an emergency meeting (Minutes, May 23, 1969) the senate directed its Policy Committee to report at its next meeting "on means of increasing broad campus participation in decisionmaking." The senate's expressed concern for "broad campus participation in decisionmaking" would seem to raise into question the two jurisdictions—faculty and administrative—which the senate had previously so jealously guarded. One of the outgrowths of the Free Speech Movement, during which the senate created a temporary Executive Committee as a means of responding more quickly to campus crises, was the Senate Policy Committee established on April 5, 1965. The senate was not only
jealous of its powers and responsibilities vis-à-vis the administration, it was also jealous of its powers as a full deliberative body—it had repeatedly declined to delegate decisionmaking prerogatives to its own committees. The new Senate Policy Committee was not an executive committee empowered to speak or act on behalf of the senate; its function (as stated in Chapter II) was "to crystallize, clarify, and anticipate problems and issues which the Senate should consider."

Although advising the administration or otherwise working closely with administrative officers was not a part of its formal charge, in 1966 the Policy Committee nevertheless stressed the need for close and effective working relationships between the senate and the chancellor, and objected to the parallel structure of senate and administrative committees. Subsequently, there were recurrent but unsuccessful efforts to strengthen the Senate Policy Committee. As late as June 2, 1969 the senate declined to accept a proposal to make the senate Policy Committee the main consultative agency of the faculty whose advice could be regularly sought by the administration. It did agree, however, that the committee, in initiating inquiries and developing recommendations for the division, should consult with the campus administration as well as standing senate committees and other agencies (Minutes, June 2, 1969). Finally, on November 17, 1969, at the end of five years of student disruptions and inadequate communication and ineffective or at times nonexistent faculty-administrative collaboration in managing the campus community, the senate finally empowered its Policy Committee "to act as a coordinating agency in facilitating consultations between the campus administration and appropriate committees of the Division and to act as the consultative agency of the faculty in matters that do not lie within the jurisdiction of existing committees [Minutes, November 17, 1969]." This was a grudging and probably inadequate delegation of consultative responsibilities, but it was a final admission, in effect, that the system of separate jurisdictions was no longer workable.
SUMMARY

For the purpose of internal governance, responsibility and authority may be divided or shared. Colleges and universities can be organized into separate jurisdictions with little interaction, or they can be organized for joint participation in decisionmaking. In the one case, administrators are likely to be excluded from the instruments of faculty government, especially from major committees of the Academic Senate. In the other, faculty members and administrators share responsibility and serve together in deliberative and decisionmaking bodies.

A system of separate jurisdictions sets the stage for confrontation when recommendations reach administrators who must act on them without having had any voice in their formulation. An organization of separate jurisdictions puts more emphasis on an unadulterated faculty voice and the integrity of the faculty's position than on collaboration between faculty and administration in attaining institutional goals and in resolving controversies or crises. The University of California at Berkeley is an example of separate faculty and administrative jurisdictions. Fresno State College and the University of Minnesota are examples of joint faculty-administrative participation in decisionmaking.

It is clear from an analysis of governance in these three institutions that joint participation may not preclude conflict between faculty and administration. The University of Minnesota is notable for the absence of tension between the two groups, but Fresno State College has been torn by internal dissension. There are many determinants of the atmosphere of a campus. Tradition plays a significant role, while another factor of great importance is administrative manner and faculty orientation. At Minnesota, good relationships have been the product of both administrative style and a forthright but civil and conciliatory faculty attitude.

Formal organization should provide for shared responsibility and authority, but structure alone will not assure effective joint participation. Informal relationships may support or undermine formal arrangements. Even under Berkeley's separate jurisdictions,
informal communication and personal intervention have compensated in varying degrees over time for segmental organization. Shared responsibility rests on a high degree of mutual trust, collaboration, and negotiation, and a rejection of confrontation and adversary relationships.

Important as informal associations are, they are likely to be insufficient to assure concerted action under conditions of stress and conflict which tend to heighten existing differences rather than strengthen informal relationships. The difficulty which faculty and administration at Berkeley experienced in uniting for constructive resolution of discord on the campus is presumptive evidence that the system of separate formal jurisdictions that exists there is unworkable.
IV

Relations Between Faculties and Governing Boards

The previous chapter has emphasized the importance of joint responsibility and participation between faculty and administration in college and university governance. To share responsibility and authority is not easy; structure alone, we have emphasized, is not sufficient to assure joint participation. Shared responsibility and joint decisionmaking require a high degree of mutual trust and a continuing effort to collaborate in attaining an institution's goals. Perhaps with the best of intentions on the part of both faculty members and administrators, tension is inevitable. Sometimes the tension becomes great enough, as we have seen, to endanger the effective mobilization of an institution's educational resources.

Joint participation does not end with faculty members and administrators. The American Association of University Professors statement on governance (1966) asserts that, "The variety and complexity of the tasks performed by institutions of higher education produce an inescapable interdependence among governing board, administration, faculty, students, and others."

Governing boards in the United States ordinarily have final legal institutional authority, as the AAUP statement points out, but the wiser boards delegate major elements of this formal authority to the presidents.
and faculties of their institutions. Some boards, however, have intervened unwisely in matters which through custom, and in many instances, through formal delegation, have become the prerogatives of faculties and administrations, and they have, in consequence, created no small degree of internal tension.

The Regents of the University of California* have provoked more widespread faculty opposition and resentment than has the administration. The most notorious dispute between the Regents and the senate was the Loyalty Oath controversy of two decades ago. The intricate details of this controversy, its effect on the parties to the dispute, and its tragic consequences for certain individuals and for the university itself have been brilliantly recounted by Gardner (1967), and we shall offer only a brief summary.

Against a background which need not be sketched here, the Regents of the University on March 25, 1949, resolved that all faculty members and employees of the university would be required to subscribe to the following oath and special disclaimer:

I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of my office according to the best of my ability;

*The Constitution of the State of California provides that the Regents of the University of California shall be composed of 1) eight ex officio members—the governor, the lieutenant governor, the speaker of the Assembly, the superintendent of public instruction, the president of the state board of agriculture, the president of the Mechanics Institute of San Francisco, the president of the alumni association, the president of the university, and 2) sixteen members appointed by the governor for 16-year terms.

Recent proposals to a commission on constitutional revision have included one to eliminate elected state officials from membership and one to reduce the length of term for appointed members.
that I do not believe in, and I am not a member of, nor do I support any party or organization that believes in, advocates, or teaches the overthrow of the United States government, by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods.

University employees had taken since 1942 an oath of allegiance that was identical in wording to the one required by the State Constitution for all public officers. Furthermore, in 1940 the Regents had declared that membership in the Communist Party was incompatible with objective teaching and with the search for truth, and that consequently no member of the Communist Party would be employed by the university.

At a special meeting on June 14, 1949, 400 members of the Northern Section of the Academic Senate met in Berkeley to consider the oath. (At that time the senate of the university was organized into northern and southern sections; currently it is organized as one statewide senate and nine divisions.) The senate requested the president of the university to request of the Board of Regents that the disclaimer in the second half of the oath be deleted or revised in a manner mutually acceptable to the Regents and the members of the Academic Senate before the new oath was required for obtaining 1949-50 contracts by members of the faculty and other employees. The senate also instructed its Advisory Committee to consult with the president in working out details.

The following fall, the Northern Section of the senate passed a resolution to the effect that it wholeheartedly concurred in the university policy which prohibited the employment of persons whose commitments or obligations to any organization, Communist or other, prejudiced impartial scholarship and the free pursuit of truth. The resolution also stated that the members of the senate requested the privilege of affirming their loyalty to the principles of free constitutional government by subscribing voluntarily to the oath of loyalty required of officers of public trust in the State of California (Gardner, 1967, p.59).
Later, in the course of three-way negotiations between the President, the Regents, and the Senate Advisory Committee, the senate expressed its agreement with the "objectives of the University policy excluding members of the Communist Party from employment," but emphasized "that it is the objectives of 'impartial scholarship and the free pursuit of truth' which are being approved, not the specific policy barring employment to members of the Communist Party solely on the grounds of such membership /Gardner, 1967, p.867."

By the spring of 1950, the senate, hoping thereby to persuade the Regents to withdraw the disclaimer, voted overwhelmingly by mail ballot that proved members of the Communist Party were not acceptable as members of the faculty.

In the meantime, a group of faculty members (and also a group of other university employees) had refused to sign the oath. In the course of determining what action to take on the continuing employment of the non-signers, the interest of the Regents turned from the loyalty oath itself to "the next and final point at issue, namely, the authority of the Board of Regents and the Senate in the governance of the University, particularly in relation to the appointment, promotion, and dismissal of members of the faculty /Gardner, 1967, p.1437."

The Regents postponed action on the non-signers and provided that in the interim they would have the right to petition the president of the university for review of their cases by the Committee on Privilege and Tenure of the Academic Senate. This committee found favorably in the cases of 64 out of 69 regular members of the Academic Senate (statewide). Subsequently, President Sproul stated to the Regents that if they flouted the recommendations of the Committee on Privilege and Tenure, the result would be tragic. Then he recommended that the members of the senate reported favorably by the committee be confirmed in their appointments, and that the employment of those who did not gain favorable recommendation from the committee be terminated (Gardner, 1967, p.179). (Later, the Northern Section of the Academic Senate instructed its Committee on Privilege and Tenure to review the cases of the five persons it had
previously not recommended favorably; after reconsideration, the committee asked that the five be reinstated.)

Faced with dismissal, some of the nonsigners took the oath. The remaining 31 organized as a Group for Academic Freedom with various purposes in view, including suit for reinstatement in the courts. The President urged the Regents to retain the nonsigning members of the senate recommended favorably by the Committee on Privilege and Tenure, but the Regents refused to follow his recommendation. At a later meeting of the board, the President again recommended that the senate nonsigners on whose cases the Committee on Privilege and Tenure had acted favorably be confirmed in their positions. The Regents defeated the President's proposal by a vote of 12 to 10. Thirty-one senate members were dismissed.

After the dismissal, the Northern Section of the senate recorded a vote of thanks to the President of the university and other members of the Regents who had steadfastly voted against the imposition of the special oath for their "defense of those elemental principles that alone make a true university possible in a free land." Then the section rebuked the Regents for dismissing faculty members not one of whom had been charged with being a Communist, for revoking reappointments lawfully made by the Board, and for violating the principle of tenure, "an absolutely essential condition in a free university [Gardner, 1967, p.2137]."

In the fall of 1950, after the long dispute between the Regents and the senate in which the Regents had prevailed, the State of California enacted what was known as the Levering Oath, "which in spirit if not in wording very nearly duplicated the one exacted by the Regents." All state employees were required to sign the oath. In spite of some doubt that it could be imposed on university staff because of the institution's constitutional status, the regents required all university employees to sign (Gardner, 1967, p.223).

On April 6, 1951 the District Court of Appeal decided unanimously in favor of the nonsigning petitioners on the ground that the university was, by the California State Constitution, independent of all political or sectarian influence and that the faculty therefore could not
be subjected to a narrower test of loyalty than the oath prescribed in the Constitution. The court ruled consequently that the special Regental oath was invalid because it was narrower than the one prescribed by the Constitution. The regents were ordered to issue letters of appointment for the current academic year to the nonsigning members of the faculty whose rights of tenure were otherwise unquestioned.

The State Supreme Court took the case under appeal and thus suspended the decision of the lower court. The Regents were no longer obliged to reappoint the nonsigners, and they did not do so. Meanwhile, before the Supreme Court could make its ruling, the Board of Regents, whose membership had by then changed sufficiently to alter its voting balance, restored the conditions of employment existing prior to March 25, 1949 when the special oath was imposed—except that the state-required Levering Oath would still have to be taken. The board also reaffirmed its policy of barring Communist Party members from employment.

Then the Supreme Court struck down the Regents' anti-Communist oath on the grounds that state legislation (the Levering Oath) had fully occupied the field, and that the Regents did not possess the power to require any other oath of loyalty than that prescribed for all state employees. The Court also issued a writ directing the university to issue to the nonsigning petitioners letters of appointment to their posts on the faculty, subject to the prescription of the Levering Oath.

The final irony in the whole tragic episode was the later action of the Supreme Court which invalidated the disclaimer section of the Levering Oath which was comparable to that in the Regents' special oath for university faculty members.

Gardner (1967) has called the State Supreme Court decision reappointing the nonsigners to their positions a hollow victory:

Not only was their reinstatement conditional on their swearing to an oath more offensive than the one they had fought earlier (and, not incidentally, almost all the non-signers were willing to swear to this new oath) but the
principles for which they had been willing
to be professionally injured, financially
harmed, and personally hurt had been utterly
disregarded by the Court. Theirs had been
a futile struggle, and mostly a lonely one,
to gain what they had regarded as essential
intellectual and academic freedom.

As Gardner has pointed out, the university lost
distinguished faculty members in some of the nonsigners
who did not return. It lost prestige when other dis-
tinguished scholars resigned in protest during the con-
lict. It suffered the loss of still other scholars
who declined to join the university faculty. It has
taken years to heal these wounds.

The State Supreme Court, Gardner says, failed to
"pass judgment on tenure rights, academic freedom, faculty
self-government, and political tests for appointment to
positions of academic responsibility." The issues
of Communist Party membership and the faculty's control
over appointments and promotions remained unresolved,
and these very issues would again come to the fore 20
years later.

One of the more recent controversies between the
Berkeley faculty and the Regents was over the now cele-
brated Eldridge Cleaver case in 1968. The Board of
Educational Development at Berkeley, which was established
to sponsor experimental courses, and which was empowered
by the senate to approve the courses given under its
auspices, authorized a course known as Social Analysis
139X in which Mr. Cleaver was scheduled to give ten of
the 20 lectures. Four regular members of the Berkeley
faculty were to conduct and supervise the course. Mr.
Cleaver was not to be appointed to any academic title,
and the chancellor informed the Board of Educational
Development that he would not allocate any university
funds to pay for the costs of instruction. In 1920 the
Regents had provided in their Standing Orders that "the
Academic Senate shall authorize and supervise all courses
and curricula," but now, confronted with the so-called
Cleaver case, they took the following action:

Effective immediately for courses offered
in the fall quarter, 1968-69, no one may
lecture or lead a discussion for more than one occasion during a given academic quarter on a campus in courses for University credit, unless he holds an appointment with the appropriate instructional title. This applies whether or not the speaker is paid by the University. 

The Regents went on to "censure those within the Berkeley Division of the Academic Senate and the Board of Educational Development who were responsible for this action" --that is, approval of the course, Social Analysis 139X.

The Berkeley division of the senate reacted quickly (Minutes, October 3, 1968). It resolved that "the Regents' hasty and ill-considered action was a violation of the academic freedom and autonomy of the Senate, of the Board of Educational Development, and of the faculty members responsible for course 139X." The resolution went on to declare that the Regents' action was an encroachment on the right of the senate to authorize and supervise all courses as specified for half a century in the Regents' Standing Orders, that their action retroactively invaded a jurisdiction legitimately exercised, that the Regents had usurped faculty members' educational judgment, and that they had violated the academic freedom of students by preventing them from taking a duly authorized course for credit.

The senate charged its Policy Committee and the Committee on Academic Freedom to consult with the chancellor, the president, and the Regents in an attempt to persuade the latter to rescind the substance of their resolution on outside lecturers. Furthermore, the senate resolution encouraged those responsible for course 139X to conduct --as authorized by the Board of Educational Development, on campus or off campus, and directed the Senate Committee on Courses to take all appropriate steps necessary to assure credit for the course.

After a series of negotiations, the Regents amended their policy on limitation of guest lecturers in academic courses by giving the president of the university authority to make "exceptions which do not involve substantial responsibility for the conduct of instruction." At the
same time, they reaffirmed their previous denial of academic credit to Social Analysis 139X.

The senate committee appointed to negotiate with the Regents continued to press for the revocation of the Regents' resolutions concerning guest lecturers and credit for course 139X. The senate also directed those responsible for the course to complete it as authorized by the Board of Educational Development, directed the instructors to record grades for the course and send them to the Senate Committee on Courses of Instruction, instructed the Committee on Courses to maintain a record of grades and credits, and further directed the Committee to count up to five units work successfully completed in 139X in recommending candidates for degrees. The senate also instructed its Academic Freedom Committee to consider the possibility of legal action to secure credit for the course (University Bulletin, December 16, 1968). Later, the chairman of the special Senate Committee on Regental Consultation reported that the Committee on Academic Freedom had retained legal counsel and had decided to support legal action for course credit brought by individuals (Minutes, May 6, 1969).

On January 8, 1970 the Alameda County Court, in a suit by 16 students and six faculty members against the Regents, upheld the power of the Regents to deny credit for Social Analysis 139X. Once again the faculty was reminded "that privileges which the Regents gave, the Regents could take away /Gardner, 1969/." The faculty members and students announced that they would appeal the County Court's decision (Daily Californian, January 9, 1970).

The Regents of the University of California have long exercised detailed control over matters that governing boards of distinguished institutions have either delegated to administrative officers or handled in pro forma fashion. During his administration, President Clark Kerr persuaded the Regents to delegate greater authority to the central administration of the university and to the chancellors of the several campuses. For example, the Regents authorized the chancellors to approve appointments and promotions to tenure positions. But
three years later, after controversy over the reappointment of Professor Herbert Marcuse on the San Diego campus, the Regents withdrew the authority of the chancellors to approve appointments and promotions to tenure status. (The Marcuse reappointment, however, did not involve tenure. It was submitted to the Regents for approval because Professor Marcuse was beyond retirement age; all such appointments had to be approved by the regents.) At the same time, the Regents resolved that "no political tests shall ever be considered in the appointment or promotion of any faculty member or employee."

Fearing that this action, which was taken during public controversy over Professor Marcuse's political views, portended "Regental vetoes of faculty appointments and promotions which members of the Board consider improper on the basis of political and nonacademic considerations," the Berkeley Division of the Academic Senate passed a resolution (Minutes, May 6, 1969) urging "in the strongest possible terms that the Regents, in the interest of preserving this University, find the wisdom not to use the power so ominously reassumed and to reverse their ill advised action." The Division instructed its Academic Freedom Committee "to investigate any Regental failure to accept the chancellor's appointment and promotion recommendations and to report to the Division, with recommendations for action, any case in which it finds reason to believe that the Regental action constitutes a violation of academic freedom." At this writing, the Regents have not restored the chancellor's power over tenure appointments and promotions. The Berkeley faculty has thus been reminded yet again that the Regents can take away what they bestow.

The latest confrontation between the Regents and the faculty of the university was over the appointment of Miss Angela Y. Davis as Acting Assistant Professor of Philosophy at UCLA. Subsequent to her appointment, effective July 1, 1969 she was accused of being a member of the Communist Party. Miss Davis admitted to such membership. On September 24, the Regents directed the president of the university to take steps to terminate her appointment in accordance with regular procedures which included a hearing before the Senate Committee on Privilege and Tenure (University Bulletin, September 29,
1969). The Regents cited three grounds for the dismissal: 1) the Regents' resolution of 1940 to the effect that "membership in the Communist Party is incompatible with membership in the faculty of a state university;" 2) the Regents' action of July 24, 1949 stating that "pursuant to this policy, the Regents direct that no member of the Communist Party shall be employed by the University;" and 3) the resolution of both Northern and Southern Sections of the Academic Senate on March 22, 1950 providing that "proved members of the Communist Party...are not acceptable as members of the faculty."

On October 3, 1969, finding that Miss Davis had been assigned to teach a course during the fall quarter, the Regents prohibited her from engaging in teaching activities while her case was being heard before the UCLA senate Committee on Privilege and Tenure, but they also provided that during the hearing her salary should be continued. On October 6 (University Bulletin), the president of the university stated that "the Chancellors and I are firmly committed to the preservation of the University as a free institution open to the expression of all views, right and wrong, radical and conformist, sensible and ridiculous.... The fundamental test of a faculty member's qualifications must be his intellectual capacity and his commitment to the free pursuit of learning by himself and his students."

In the meantime the Statewide Assembly of the Academic Senate, having taken cognizance of the Statewide Academic Council's assertion that decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of California had invalidated the Regents' resolutions of 1940 and 1949 prohibiting faculty membership of Communist Party members, disavowed the Academic Senate's action in 1950 confirming the Regents' policy on Communist Party membership. The Assembly went on to resolve that "no political test or mere membership in any organization shall ever be considered in the appointment, promotion, or dismissal of any faculty member or employee." The Assembly then provided for reference of its proposed memorial to the Regents to the several campus divisions of the Academic Senate for recommendations before arranging for a mail ballot of the entire membership of the statewide Academic Senate (University Bulletin, October 20, 1969).

The membership of the statewide senate subsequently
voted by mail ballot to disavow its resolution of 1950 confirming the Regents' policy on Communist Party membership. The vote was 2487 to 1128, with 44 abstaining (University Bulletin, January 19, 1970). Faculty members who led the movement to rescind the senate's earlier action also contended that the Davis dismissal was a violation of the Regents' own Standing Order of 1969 declaring that "no political test shall ever be considered in the appointment and promotion of any faculty member or employee."

The issue soon took a new turn, however. A group of faculty and students, later joined by Miss Davis, brought suit in the Los Angeles Superior Court asserting that the dismissal was unconstitutional. Before the hearings by the UCLA Committee on Privilege and Tenure had been completed, the Court, on October 20, held that the Regents' policy on the employment of Communists was unconstitutional and that membership in the Communist Party was not sufficient cause for terminating the appointment of a faculty member at the university. The Court issued an injunction enjoining the Regents from using university funds to enforce the Davis dismissal. The president and the chancellor at UCLA immediately announced that, in accordance with the court's ruling, restrictions on registration in Professor Davis's course would be removed. The counsel for the Regents declared that the Superior Court's "ruling denied the Regents the opportunity to present evidence why an admitted member of the Communist Party is unable to teach objectively and that the Regents' policy was based solely on fitness to teach in an educational system dedicated to the principle of rational and objective search for the truth," and not "based on testing the individual's loyalty, personal political convictions, or affiliations." He then announced that the Regents would take steps to secure a reversal of the Los Angeles Court's decision. In the Superior Court case, the Regents had interposed a motion for change of venue to Alameda County, where the headquarters of the statewide university are located. This the Court denied. The Regents then appealed the venue question to an appellate court, which directed the Los Angeles Superior Court to set aside all orders and transfer the case to Alameda County. However, the plaintiffs
in the original suit petitioned the California Supreme Court to rule both on the question of change of venue and on the question of the constitutionality of the Davis dismissal. The Court subsequently ruled that the case must be tried in Los Angeles County, but did not rule on the constitutional question (Berkeley Gazette, November 14, 1970). As this was being written, the Regents were preparing to appeal the constitutionality of the dismissal. Thus, the legal issue concerning Communist party membership was still to be resolved.

The Department of Philosophy, by a vote of 14 ayes, with three abstentions, recommended that Miss Davis be reappointed for the academic year 1970-71. The department's recommendation was reviewed by the Dean of the Division of Humanities and the Dean of the College of Letters and Science. The former, in writing to the dean of the college, observed that if additional faculty positions were secured to offset reductions which had been made because of financial stringency, "the needs for which they were intended would...claim priority over the proposed reappointment of Miss Angela Davis." The dean of the college, writing to the vice chancellor, declared that if additional faculty funds became available, they should be applied to a reduction of staffing needs already established, and not used for Miss Davis's reappointment. Asked by the vice chancellor to appraise Miss Davis's qualifications without reference to budgetary considerations, the dean of the college replied that in his judgment her qualifications were "unquestionable." However, the senate Committee on Budget and Interdepartmental Relations declined to accept the argument that she should not be reappointed for budgetary reasons, and recommended reappointment for a one-year term.

The chancellor had appointed an ad hoc faculty committee to investigate Miss Davis's conduct in and beyond the classroom. This committee concluded that she had not utilized her classroom position to indoctrinate students, and that there was no evidence that her outside commitments and activities had interfered with her teaching responsibilities. The Regents' committee (of the whole) to review the case accepted these conclusions.

But after examining transcripts of some of Miss Davis's speeches, the ad hoc committee concluded that
her concept of academic freedom "carries obligations that are qualitatively different from those identified by the AAUP and by the Academic Senate of the University." namely, that "academic freedom is meaningless unless it is used to espouse political and social freedoms." The committee also found "that she does not hesitate to attack the motives, methods, and conclusions of those with whom she disagrees," and that "she has been less than fair in her characterization of the views of fellow scholars whom she has denounced." The committee likewise concluded that "her public speeches...have been characterized by notable lack of restraint and the use of... extravagant and inflammatory rhetoric" and that her "choice of language in some of her public statements is inconsistent with accepted standards of appropriate restraint in the exercise of academic freedom, even though the statements themselves are not likely to lead to the destruction of those standards." The committee recommended that Miss Davis's utterances be taken into account, together with other relevant factors, when the appropriate agencies considered her reappointment.

The Chancellor at UCLA recommended that Miss Davis be reappointed for 1970-71. A group of 23 faculty members declared in a telegram to the President of the University (San Francisco Chronicle, June 19, 1970) that a Regental reversal of the Chancellor's recommendation to reappoint Miss Davis "would create tensions within the University which the moderate faculty, for whom we regard ourselves as spokesmen, could not survive as an effective force." It was also reported that, of 54 students who turned in evaluation forms on her last quarter's classes, 47 rated her as excellent while only one rated her as poor.

On a mail ballot, the UCLA Academic Senate voted 629 to 594 to create committees to arrange for raising funds for Miss Davis's salary and for accrediting her classes for 1970-71 if the Regents did not reappoint her (San Francisco Chronicle, June 12, 1970).

The Regents moved to take power over the Davis appointment into their own hands (University Bulletin, May 25, 1970). On May 15, 1970 they passed the following resolution by a vote of 15 to 6:
The Regents hereby relieve the President of the University, the Chancellor of the Los Angeles campus, and all other administrative officers of any further authority or responsibility in connection with the reappointment or nonreappointment of Acting Assistant Professor Angela Davis, and that the Board of Regents, acting as a committee of the whole, review the record relating to this matter and recommend appropriate action to the Board at its next regular meeting.

This regental action rescinded, if only in the Davis case, a delegation of authority over nontenure faculty appointments that had been in force for half a century. The president of the university voted against the regents' resolution and declared that he believed that the chancellors of the campuses should have final authority over nontenure appointments.

In spite of the actions of the faculty and the chancellor's recommendation for reappointment, the regents, reportedly led by Governor Ronald Reagan, on June 19, 1970, voted 15 to 6 not to reappoint Miss Davis (San Francisco Chronicle, June 20, 1970; University Bulletin, June 29, 1970). The decision was based, purportedly, not on her admitted membership in the Communist Party (which the lower court had held was not sufficient cause for terminating the appointment), nor on her classroom teaching, but on "irresponsible" utterances outside the classroom. The regental majority held that four speeches were "so extreme, so antithetical to the protection of academic freedom, and so obviously deliberately false in several respects as to be inconsistent with qualifications for appointment to the faculty of the University of California."

The regents, it was reported, relied on the AAUP statement on extramural utterances (American Association of University Professors, 1969) which the faculty ad hoc committee had also considered. The chairman of the regents was said to have referred to the section of the statement which "asserts the faculty member's right to speak or write, as a citizen, free from institutional censorship or discipline" but also "calls attention to the faculty member's special obligations arising from his position in the community: to be accurate, to exercise
appropriate restraint, to show respect for the opinions of others and to make every effort to indicate that he is not an institutional spokesman." Presumably the regents' refusal to reappoint was on the ground that Miss Davis had not shown the restraint which could have been expected (San Francisco Chronicle, June 12, 1970).

Immediately after the regents' decision not to reappoint, the chairman of the Committee on Academic Freedom of the Berkeley Division of the Academic Senate issued the following statement (Berkeley Gazette, June 20, 1970):

The Regents' termination of Angela Davis as a faculty member is both unconstitutional and a violation of academic freedom.

In view of the way Miss Davis' case has been handled to date, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the reasons now given by the Board of Regents are a pretext and that the real reason for her termination was merely her lawful membership in a political party.

Termination on this ground is unlawful; independently of its unlawful character, such termination is a violation of academic freedom.

If the other reasons given by the Regents (namely her extramural statements) were genuine, termination for those reasons is in itself incompatible with the first amendment protection of free speech and within a proper conception of academic freedom.

Nationally, the AAUP also entered the Davis controversy. The general secretary of the association in Washington wired the chairman of the regents and the president of the university that the board's action "raised serious questions related to academic freedom and institutional government which warrant special inquiry." The general secretary appointed two members of the association to conduct an inquiry. Again, history partially repeated itself; the University of California was on the AAUP black list from 1936 to 1958 for violations of academic
freedom over the loyalty oath controversy (San Francisco Chronicle, June 26, 1970). The battle between the regents and the faculty was joined again.

Late in the summer of 1970, the Davis case took a sudden unexpected turn. A 17-year-old boy entered a Marin County, California, courtroom in which a convict from San Quentin prison was being tried on charges of stabbing a prison guard, took a gun from under his coat, and passed pistols to the defendant and two other San Quentin prisoners serving as witnesses. The four took the judge, the prosecutor, and three women jurors as hostages, and as they led the hostages from the courtroom, they announced that they wanted the three "Soledad brothers" (who were charged with the murder of a guard at the Soledad prison) released from San Quentin by 12:30 that day. The boy who brought the guns was a brother of one of the Soledad trio.

Guards attempted to stop the rented van in which the kidnappers were trying to escape with their hostages. Shots rang out, and when the van's doors were opened, the judge, the defendant, one other prisoner, and the youth were dead.

Subsequent investigation, according to newspaper accounts, showed that all four guns used in the attempted kidnapping and escape had been purchased by Angela Davis, one of them only two days before the shooting. The district attorney of Marin County issued a warrant for Miss Davis's arrest as an accomplice to the crime (as allowed under California law) and issued an all-points bulletin for her arrest. The FBI put her on its ten-most-wanted list. She was later apprehended in New York City.

After the regents declined to reappoint her, Miss Davis filed suit in the Federal District Court of San Francisco claiming that the denial of her reappointment was unconstitutional and asking that the court order the regents to reappoint her for another year. The regents opposed this petition and the court subsequently dismissed it on the ground that in any case as a (then) fugitive, she was not available to perform the duties of the position in question.

When the regents refused to reappoint Miss Davis, the UCLA academic senate created a committee to raise funds to pay her for a series of lectures on campus.
during 1970-71. After the warrant for her arrest for alleged complicity in the Marin County affair, the faculty committee suspended payments to Miss Davis because, it was reported, it had not received assurances that she would make her lecture appearances in the fall (San Francisco Chronicle, September 1, 1970). The chairman of the committee announced, however, that the group would continue to raise funds to fight the original Regental decision not to reappoint her (San Francisco Examiner, August 26, 1970).

The Marin County episode confuses the academic aspects of the Davis case. To the public it probably completely vindicates the Regents' dismissal, if indeed the public considered any more justification than Communist Party membership necessary. But the warrant for Miss Davis's arrest, unhappy development though it is, should not be allowed to confuse the issues connected with her dismissal by the Regents, her reinstatement by the Los Angeles Superior Court, and the Regents' subsequent refusal to reappoint her for 1970-71. So far as the governance of the University of California is concerned, in question in the Davis case is not only the constitutionality of the Regents' policy against the employment of members of the Communist Party (which is likely to be considered by the higher courts), but also what may have been the actual (rather than the announced) reasons of the Regents for refusing to reappoint. At issue, too, is the power of the Regents to determine the membership of the faculty.

Thus, the confrontation of the late 1940s over the loyalty oath and the Regents' control over faculty appointment, promotion, and retention became, in modified form, the faculty-Regental confrontation of 1969-70. If the courts rule only on the question of Communist Party membership in the Davis case, the question of the faculty's control over its own membership will remain to be determined. The latter issue is almost certain to reach the courts ultimately, and its legal resolution, when it does come, will have far-reaching consequences for patterns of government and authority not only in the University of California, but in other institutions as well. Without a court ruling, it is doubtful that the delegation of authority over appointments and promotions to the senate
and the Chancellor, or the senate and the President of the University of California, will be restored for a long time to come. The University of California Senate, which enjoyed control over its own membership for a relatively brief period, will not soon regain it. The Regents have asserted the accountability of the faculty to the governing board.

Conflict between the Regents and the faculties of the University of California has been a divisive force in the life of the institution's campuses. The controversies, not all of which are chronicled here, have pitted the two groups against each other when they might otherwise have worked together to carry the university through difficult periods. The differences between the two groups have also strained relationships between faculty and administration. Thus, President Robert Gordon Sproul, who first favored the adoption of the loyalty oath but later sided with the faculty in opposing it, never fully regained, either among the faculty or a large number of Regents, the influence he once enjoyed (Gardner, 1947). Recently, by withdrawing the power of the chancellors of the campuses to make tenure appointments and promotions, the Regents have given the chancellors and the President what amounts to a vote of no confidence, and have placed them in a difficult position vis-à-vis the faculty, which expects to have its recommendations on promotions approved. The enormous cost to the university of the turmoil over the loyalty oath could be repeated again in a new conflict over the right of the faculty to determine its own membership. And the issue of Regental violation of academic freedom has now been raised. It is ironic that only during major crises have representatives of the Regents, the Academic Senate, and the administration conferred. Is it too much to hope that on some future day the three groups might begin to work regularly together in promoting the university's welfare?

At Minnesota, in sharp contrast to the University of California, there has been a marked absence of regental intervention in matters which the faculty has considered its primary prerogatives. (The Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota is composed of 12 members chosen by the state legislature for six-year terms; the President of the University is ex officio president of the Board
of Regents.) Perhaps the Minnesota Regents learned the value of restraint in personnel matters many years ago. During the tensions of the first World War, the Regents dismissed a professor of political science with the charge that "his attitude of mind whether due to conscientious considerations or otherwise and his expressed unwillingness to aid the United States in the present war render him unfit...to discharge the duties of his position [Gray, 1951, p.247]." Some 20 years later, influenced by editorials in the student newspaper, Minnesota Daily, and the desire "from the President's office down to the fraternity dormitory" to redress a mistaken and unfortunate dismissal, the Regents with but one dissenting vote expunged the original charges, made the dismissed faculty member (who had joined another university) a professor emeritus, and voted him a sum of money equivalent to the salary lost during the year he was discharged (Gray, 1951, pp.388-389).

At the same meeting the Regents adopted a resolution binding the university "to impose no limitations on a teacher's exposition of his subject in the classroom and to put no restrictions on his choice of research problem." On the other hand, it asked the teacher not to "claim the privilege of discussing in his classroom 'controversial subjects not pertinent to the course of study being pursued,'" but "recognized that 'the teacher in speaking or writing outside the institution on subjects beyond the scope of his own field of study is entitled to the same freedom and is subject to the same responsibilities as attached to any citizen but in added measure.'" Furthermore, the Regents resolved that, should a question of a teacher's fitness arise, the issue would be submitted first to a faculty committee, and that any decision on the case would be subject to open review before the Board after sufficient notice (Gray, 1951, p.388).

Individual members of the Minnesota Regents have been known to grumble from time to time about some faculty members' classroom teaching or public statements, but the present writers know of no instances in which the Regents have violated the principles of academic freedom and due process enunciated in 1938. There have been few exceptions to the generally amicable relationships between faculty and Regents; one exception was the senate's sharp criticism of the Regents for failure
to consult the senate committee to advise on the choice of a president. But the Minnesota Regents have not generally interfered with the administration of the university or exercised detailed supervision of its affairs, although there is some evidence of recent Regental restlessness. A Minnesota Regent once said, somewhat plaintively and wistfully to one of the present authors, that it would be nice if the president would at least let the board know whom he was appointing to one of the deanships before he made the public announcement. This policy, again, is in marked contrast to the practices of the Regents of the University of California. The latter have consistently acted on detailed matters and kept in their own hands, or that of their committees, authority that should have been delegated to administrative officers. For this the California Regents have been repeatedly criticized in studies and reports (Holy, Semans, & McConnell, 1955, pp.222-230). One of the most recent of these reports, the Byrne Report (Foote et al, 1968, pp.253-60), declared that "the Regents should clearly distinguish between matters of policy in University government and matters of operations and firmly refuse to make operational decisions on behalf of any office or official of the University." The Regents of the University of Minnesota, on the other hand, have delegated administrative authority to the President of the University and, generally speaking, waited on his recommendations. This practice has been as consistent in personnel matters as in financial affairs and other phases of the life of the university.

Without a more intensive study of the Board of Trustees and central administration of the California State Colleges than we have been able to make, it would be difficult to disentangle the attitudes and policies of the chief executive officer, the chancellor, from those of the board. (The Board of Trustees of the California State Colleges is composed of 16 members appointed by the governor for eight-year terms, and the following ex officio members: the governor, the lieutenant governor, the superintendent of public instruction, the speaker of the Assembly, and the chancellor of the system.) Both the board and the chancellor have been subjected to criticism and opposition by faculty members, the statewide
Academic Senate of the colleges, and faculty associations—particularly the Association of California State College Professors. On March 13, 1968, the Executive Committee of the Academic Senate of the State Colleges issued a "Review and summary of the relation between the Academic Senate CSC and the Chancellor, 1962 to present /Voice of the Faculties, November 1968/". In this report the senate charged that, although the Chancellor had pledged that he would forward recommendations of the Academic Senate to the Board of Trustees, there had been repeated instances in which he had not done so. The report also asserted that the Chancellor had failed to consult the Academic Senate on matters of central professional concern to the faculties and to the senate. It cited the Chancellor's failure to consult with the senate on a salary cut which was assessed against the faculty to cover a budgetary deficit, lack of consultation in appointing major administrators in the chancellor's office and in appointing presidents of new colleges, and adoption of the policy of year-round operation without adequate discussion. The report also asserted that the Chancellor had made little progress in delegating authority and responsibility to the several campuses and the several faculties. It expressed disappointment in the Chancellor's lack of leadership, especially in protecting the colleges and the Board of Trustees from political interference and from pressure by extremist groups in the state. It charged the chancellor with having suspended a faculty member without due process. Subsequently, the State College Academic Senate passed a motion of "no confidence" in the Chancellor by a vote of 35 to 5 with 2 abstentions. It then called for his resignation by a vote of 30 to 10 with 2 abstentions.

After expressing its own lack of confidence in the Chancellor, the Academic Senate submitted its vote of "no confidence" to a referendum of the entire faculty of the state college system. Some 65 percent of those eligible to vote cast ballots. Of the 5986 faculty members who voted, 3743 (62.7 percent) supported the Academic Senate's resolution of "no confidence" and its request for the chancellor's resignation. In only one out of the 18 colleges was there a plurality in favor of the Chancellor (Voice of the Faculties, March 1969).
The Board of Trustees and the Chancellor have been charged with ignoring the faculties in dismissing or appointing college presidents. Critics of the board have charged that it appointed the Chancellor himself without appropriate faculty consultation and in spite of strong faculty opposition. According to the Association of California State College Professors publication, The Voice of the Faculties (June 1968), "The Chancellor and several Trustees relieved John Summerskill of his duties as President of San Francisco State College... several months in advance of the date planned for his voluntary resignation" without "full and formal faculty consultation, in violation of established standards of academic due process."

President Summerskill's successor as president was chosen under a system, agreed upon by the Trustees and the Chancellor, in which an elected faculty committee was authorized to prepare a slate of three to five nominees from which the president might be chosen. The Voice of the Faculties (September 1969) declared, however, that Dr. Samuel I. Hayakawa was appointed as Acting President following President Smith's resignation without adherence to the procedure for consultation and nomination. The presidential selection committee at San Francisco State nevertheless continued its work and submitted to the Chancellor a slate of candidates for a regular presidential appointment. Instead of recognizing this committee, however, the Chancellor appointed a "rainbow committee" consisting of two trustees, the Chancellor, a member of the Advisory Board of San Francisco State College, and three members of the college faculty. Subsequently, the Trustees appointed Dr. Hayakawa as permanent president of the college, although it is understood that his name was not on the slate submitted by the original presidential selection committee.

Apparently, the Board of Trustees of the state colleges again violated its regular procedures for the appointment of college presidents when it chose an acting president of Fresno State College on October 30, 1969. Even though the Chancellor is known to have discussed the appointment with certain individual members of the staff at Fresno, he has been charged with not following the normal processes of faculty consultation before announcing
the appointment of the acting president.

In fairness, it should be noted that other recent presidential appointments in the state college system have been made in consultation with regularly constituted faculty committees, although the device of appointing a "rainbow committee" for final screening and recommendation seems to have been adopted. (Recently this committee has included three members of the local college presidential committee; in a recent presidential search, the Chancellor ruled that the local committee was not to interview candidates.) However, the action of the Chancellor and the Trustees in the San Francisco presidential appointment and in the appointment of an acting president at Fresno exacerbated the already strained relationships between the faculties and the Trustees, as well as between the faculties and the Chancellor.

The relationship between the faculties and the State College Trustees was not improved by a proposal to give the latter more explicit surveillance over tenure faculty appointments. One of the trustees introduced—but later withdrew—a resolution to the effect that the chancellor shall review all recommendations for tenure appointments and shall transmit them with his recommendations to the Board of Trustees. The resolution also specified that the Board shall receive all recommendations for appointments which confer tenure, and that if the board takes no action with respect to any of these recommendations by a certain time, the appointment may then be made; otherwise it may be made, if at all, only in conformity with such action as the board may take. This proposal was in essential respects comparable to the action of the Regents of the University of California in withdrawing from the chancellors' and taking into the Regents' own hands the approval of appointments and promotions to tenure status. The proposal of a state college trustee to revoke the authority of the faculties to determine their own membership was a threat to the prerogative which they consider central and essential to their professional role. This prerogative was again challenged when the Chancellor took into his own hands the decision on reappointment of a faculty member at one of the colleges. The faculty member in question, who had tenured status as associate professor, was president of...
the local chapter of the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) when it went on strike in support of the strike of the AFT local at San Francisco State in the fall of 1968. The appointments of the chapter president and others were terminated on the ground of absence from duty during the strike, but all permanent faculty members except the AFT president were subsequently reinstated. The latter was reappointed only for the academic year, an action which placed him technically in the status of a first-year probationary faculty member. His reappointment was recommended by his department, by the Committee on Retention, Promotion, and Tenure of his school, by the school's dean, by the college Committee on Promotions, and by the academic vice president; the acting president of the college also indicated his concurrence. It was at this point that the chancellor took the case into his own hands and vetoed the reappointment. The Chancellor's action was protested by the statewide Academic Senate of the State Colleges (Voice of the Faculties, April 1970; Academic Senate of the California State Colleges, 1970). Subsequently, the Chancellor appointed a grievance committee to review the case. This committee found that the Chancellor had erred in not following the favorable recommendation of the local college grievance committee and that the Chancellor's action was untenable (San Francisco Examiner, August 12, 1970). Nonetheless, the Chancellor refused to reinstate the faculty member.

At the end of the 1969-70 academic year the statewide Academic Senate of the colleges had been in contention with the Chancellor and the Board of Trustees over these grievance procedures. Both the college presidents and the trustees had questions about faculty grievance and disciplinary procedures which had been devised. The Trustees directed the Chancellor and his staff to draft new procedures. The statewide Academic Senate of the colleges met the proposed new procedures, which took the final decision out of the hands of the faculty, "with shock and dismay," and the senate urged the trustees to defer action until there was an opportunity for full consultation among all parties concerned (Chairman of the Academic Senate, 1970). In the meantime, the college presidents authorized the appointment of a committee to review the Chancellor's draft of grievance procedures.
The presidents named four of their own number and invited the chairman of the academic senate to appoint an equal number (Committee on Faculty and Staff Affairs, 1970). Finally, in the fall of 1970, the Board of Trustees delegated to the Chancellor final authority over faculty grievances and discipline (San Francisco Chronicle, December 12, 1970).

And so, as the academic year 1969-70 ended and the 1970-71 year began, the tension between the Academic Senate and the Chancellor and Trustees of the California State College system continued at a high level. In the midst of the turmoil, there was an admission that the faculties should reconsider their responsibilities. Conceding that it was likely that there had been cases of faculty misconduct that had not been properly dealt with, the chairman of the statewide academic senate issued a statement calling for faculty leaders "to explore the desirability of developing a new code of conduct" more explicit than the one previously drafted by the AAUP. "While there is some obvious risk of our seeming to reinforce demagogic claims about faculty abuses," he said, "I think it is essential that the faculty itself should play a leading role in developing policies to deal with whatever cases there may be that properly warrant our professional indignation." At the same time he warned that academic freedom is "in more serious jeopardy now than at any time in history (San Francisco Chronicle, October 27, 1970)."

The question of faculty "freedom and responsibility" was also raised at Berkeley. After there had been strong criticism of "reconstitution" of curriculum and instruction following the Cambodian incursion, the president of the university appointed four faculty members and four members of the statewide Academic Council to work with his staff in considering means of deciding when discipline of faculty members is necessary, and in formulating disciplinary procedures. At the same time the President asked the Academic Senate "to develop an effective code of professional ethics for its members." The Committee on Senate Policy of the Berkeley division of the senate objected to the draft report of the committee appointed by the president, but recommended to the division that it should affirm "its belief in the concept that the faculty
has a self-governing function" and recommend to the statewide Senate that it "clarify a) its traditional principles of professional ethics and b) their relation to the imposition of discipline upon members of the faculty." The Division accepted these recommendations on November 10, 1970.

The Council of the American Association of University Professors has also issued a new statement on freedom and responsibility which asserts that "there is need for the faculty to assume a more positive role as guardian of academic values against unjustified assaults from its own members," and that "rules designed to meet these needs for faculty self-regulation and flexibility of sanctions should be adopted on each campus...

The future holds continuing tension between faculties, administrations, and governing boards over the complicated problems of authority, professional autonomy and accountability, academic freedom and faculty responsibility.

SUMMARY

The Regents of the University of California have provoked more faculty contention than the administration and, in the process, have often aggravated the relationships between the administration and the faculty. The controversies between the Regents and the faculty have been a divisive force in the life of the institution.

The most serious discord has been over the prerogative of the faculty to determine its own membership. The oath controversy of 20 years ago began as an attempt of the Regents to couple with an oath of allegiance to the constitutions of California and the United States a special disclaimer of membership in any organization that "believes in, advocates, or teaches the overthrow of the United States government, by force or by illegal or unconstitutional methods." Before the controversy ended, the Regents became less interested in the oath itself than in asserting their authority (over that of the Academic Senate of the university) to appoint, promote, and dismiss members of the faculty, and assert this authority they did.

The Regents again precipitated the issue of power over faculty membership 20 years later by withdrawing the
authority it had delegated three years previously to
the heads of the campuses to make tenure appointments
and promotions.

The California Regents also intruded into a
jealously guarded faculty right to control the curriculum
when they legislated against credit for the celebrated
"Cleaver course." Furthermore, the Regents have a long
record of intervening in the administration of the uni-
versity by exercising detailed control over matters that
most governing boards have, by custom or explicit dele-
gation, left to administrators and faculties.

The Chancellor and Board of Trustees of the
California State Colleges have also been subjected to
faculty criticism for failure to protect the colleges
from political interference, to consult regularly with
the faculty in appointing college presidents, and to
delegate adequate responsibility and authority to the
presidents and the faculties. Recently a proposal was
made, but later withdrawn, that the Board of Trustees
would review all tenure appointments—a measure designed,
perhaps, to enable the board to keep pace with the
University of California Regents.

The Regents of the University of Minnesota, in
sharp contrast, have refrained from intervening in the
day-by-day administration of the institution and from
interfering in academic affairs. The Minnesota Regents
have not entirely escaped criticism—they have been
charged with failing to consult with the faculty in
selecting a president—but their actions have never been
a source of the kind of faculty alienation that has been
provoked at Berkeley.

The attitudes and actions of the California govern-
ing boards bolster recent challenges to the very concept
of lay governance and to the investiture of full legal
authority over colleges and universities in lay boards of
trustees. They have also raised anew fundamental ques-
tions of faculty freedom and responsibility.

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Public institutions—and many private ones, for that matter—are subject to external constraints from many forces. In a sense, the governing boards of multi-campus systems, like the California State Colleges and the University of California, are forces external to the particular campuses. Constraints imposed by these boards have already been discussed at some length, but it may be noted here, in addition, that a system itself is an important constraint. It limits the freedom of decision-making by both administrative officers and faculties, and it sets limits within which institutions or programs may develop. Each member institution is expected to conform to a general policy of the system at large.

(For an intensive study of the administration of multi-campus systems of colleges and universities see the forthcoming report by Eugene Lee and Frank Bowen for the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education.)

Beyond the particular system, such as the University of California or the California State Colleges, is the statewide plan for higher education. The California Master Plan for Higher Education assigns to the University of California major responsibility for research and for graduate education at the doctoral level. It allocates to the university exclusive responsibility for education in such professions as law and medicine, and
it also authorizes the university to accept students in the highest eighth of their high school graduating classes.

According to the California Master Plan (California State Department of Education, 1960), the primary function of the state colleges is to provide instruction for undergraduate students (in the highest third of their graduating classes) and graduate students through the masters degree in the liberal arts and sciences and in certain applied and professional fields, such as teaching and social work; many of these professional fields are shared with the university. Doctoral degrees are given jointly with the University of California, although it is the latter which actually awards the degree. Faculty research in the state colleges is authorized only to the extent to which it is congruent with the primary functions of these institutions.

Presumably, there could be a substantial degree of differentiation from institution to institution within a system. When Clark Kerr was President of the University of California, he encouraged the newly established campuses to develop different kinds of internal organization and distinctive undergraduate and graduate educational programs. The Santa Cruz campus was designed as a cluster of undergraduate colleges, many of which were to have a special emphasis, such as the sciences, the social sciences, urban studies, or the arts. The leaders of the new campus determined to give more emphasis to undergraduate teaching than characterized the older campuses at Berkeley and UCLA. The new university campus at Irvine created an innovative department of administration instead of establishing conventional separate departments of business administration, public administration, and educational administration.

But initial distinctiveness has proved very difficult to maintain. For example, one sees signs that the emphasis on undergraduate teaching at Santa Cruz may turn out to be expendable, in no small part because the qualifications for appointment and advancement are assumed to be essentially uniform throughout the university system. This means that the primary basis for tenure appointments is research and creative scholarship. In practice, this has meant that effective teaching has become a secondary
and, on some campuses, an essentially perfunctory consideration. At Irvine, too, it has been difficult to maintain a general and inclusive division of administration against the apparently almost inevitable desire for specialists to split off into their own enclaves. A recent study of the history of innovations such as those at Santa Cruz has shown that, in spite of professed desire for distinctiveness, the actual constraints, formal and informal, of a system like the University of California exert powerful pressure toward conformity. Professionalism also is a conforming influence. Against a background of evidence of "increasingly convergent goals adhered to by ever more similar means," the director of a recent study of distinctiveness in institutional character (Martin, 1969) came to this conclusion:

Our data suggest that, lacking alternative models...faculties at liberal arts colleges will press their institutions into professionalism and toward success measured by the Standard as fast as the school's resources and their own persuasiveness permit, even as the majority of faculty in innovative colleges may be expected, when things get rough as they always do in prototype situations, to revert to conventionalism /pp.228-237/.

In spite of conforming tendencies, there are, in fact, many differences among the California State Colleges. Some of this distinctiveness has been summarized by Dunham (1969):

Cal Poly at San Luis Obispo emphasizes applied occupational programs, specifically middle-level engineering. Chico, on the other hand, is rapidly becoming a liberal arts college. San Francisco State is in sharp contrast to both with its cosmopolitanism and sophistication, together with professional emphasis on the arts and humanities. Cal State at Los Angeles is a lusty commuter college. Humboldt State, on the redwood coast line, with its
curricula in areas such as marine biology and lumber, appeals to a different kind of student. San Diego, until recently the only major public institution in the area, has something for just about everybody.

Yet uniform procedures and controls seem to be as onerous, if not more so, in the state college system as in the University of California. Dunham's account also says:

An inordinate and crippling set of bureaucratic controls besets the state colleges—preauditing and postauditing of a 27,000-line-item budget and silly out-of-state travel regulations, for example. Apparently, many of these petty controls originated with the state budget office but have now been transferred to the Chancellor's office, where, according to many faculty and administrators, they still continue.

Although the controls are still onerous, somewhat greater flexibility in fiscal administration and somewhat greater autonomy for the governing board, the chancellor, and the presidents of the state colleges have in fact been attained. For example, on the basis of the staffing formula, the State Finance Department allocates instructional positions in a block to the state college system, and the chancellor in turn allocates a total number of faculty positions to each institution, which can then distribute these positions as it sees fit. On the other hand, there is still excessive central control in the Chancellor's office and in the State Finance Department over transfer of funds (Deegan, McConnell, Mortimer, & Stull, 1970, pp.25-26). An example of the resulting inflexibility was the hassle several years ago over a deficiency in the faculty salary budget. The Chancellor's office had underestimated the sum needed for faculty salaries in the system by 1.8 percent. Although there was a surplus in other parts of the budget from which the deficit could have been covered, the State Department of Finance
refused to make the necessary transfers. Therefore, the colleges were forced to withhold an equivalent sum from the salary checks (Orrick, 1969, p. 11). This is only a sample of the frustrations which administrative officers and faculty members of the state colleges suffer from a combination of insufficient delegation of administrative prerogatives from the Chancellor's office and external control by the State Finance Department.

For a time the Chancellor delegated to the state college presidents the power to appoint college administrative officers and faculty members. In practice, this delegation turned out to be tenuous and uncertain. In the recent case of a disputed appointment to the ethnic studies program, the President of Fresno State College found himself caught between pressure from the ethnic studies staff and the Dean of the School of Arts and Sciences to approve the appointment and pressure from the Chancellor's office to veto it. In a memorandum on October 2, 1969 to the faculty and students of the college, the President wrote that "it was made clear that, although the Chancellor seeks to avoid interference with campus decisions, the appointment of this candidate would not be acceptable to the Chancellor's office." The President, who had resigned as of a date later in the academic year, vetoed the appointment and then asked to receive his resignation take effect immediately. Ordinarily the college presidents make decisions on faculty personnel but the Chancellor can—and in this case did—intervene.

Control at the center of the state college system over personnel matters and line-item budgets piles frustration on frustration, both for administrative officers and for faculty members who believe that a reasonable degree of institutional autonomy within broad systemwide guidelines is essential to morale and to educational effectiveness.

As we have pointed out earlier, the Regents of the University of California have traditionally been reluctant to delegate sufficient administrative authority to the President of the university, and only in recent years was the latter endowed with sufficient power to delegate greater responsibility to the heads of the several campuses for personnel and fiscal administration. But the Regents (as we have also pointed out) have now
withdrawn from the chancellors the power to make tenure appointments and promotions. There is reason to believe, too, that the decentralization of budgetary administration which had occurred under President Clark Kerr may now be recentralized under an administration committed to some adaptation of cost-benefit analysis to university operation.

Although the University of California possesses constitutional autonomy, its authority over its own affairs has been continuously eroded by the State Department of Finance. The department, and the legislature as well, have eliminated or altered line-items in proposed budgets. Some years ago the Finance Department began to question nonacademic staffing patterns, and no one would be greatly surprised if their surveillance spread to the distribution of academic personnel. Many other examples could be given of the loss of the university's constitutional independence.

In this regard, the University of Minnesota again has been more fortunate than the University of California. Speaking a decade ago, a former Commissioner of Administration for the State of Minnesota, Naftalin (1959), stated an enlightened policy concerning the state's fiscal control over state-supported higher education. Once the legislature has decided what portion of the state's resources should be allocated to higher education, said the commissioner,

Fiscal control should become the responsibility of the academy itself, as represented and symbolized by the Regents or Trustees or college board. It should be their responsibility to determine how the limited resources available shall be distributed among the infinite number of competing academic needs. To impose upon this process the will and direction of state fiscal officers constitutes an encroachment that is potentially extremely dangerous [pp.14-15].

It is probable that the fiscal controls of the Minnesota state government over public higher education have become more specific over the last decade, a move-
ment that many believe has occurred in many states. In fact, there is a tendency for the Minnesota legislature to attach riders to budget items qualifying the apportionment of funds or requiring accounting for expenditures. Nevertheless, the University of Minnesota has probably retained in fact a large measure of the autonomy with which it was constitutionally endowed.

Although the University of Minnesota has had a Duluth branch for some years, and a more recently established one at Morris, its faculty government has just been reorganized on a universitywide basis. The basic study of faculty government at the University of Minnesota was confined to the Minneapolis-St. Paul campus; therefore, no data on the relationships of the other campuses to the parent university are at hand. The effect of the organization of the universitywide Senate and of assemblies on the several campuses on faculty government and faculty-administrative relationships is a problem for the future.

One of the most important external constraints on both individual campuses and systems of institutions is the influence and the control exerted by statewide coordinating agencies. The California Coordinating Council for Higher Education, which has less authority than the Board of Higher Education in Illinois or the Regents of Higher Education in Ohio, serves in an advisory capacity to the governing boards of the university, the state colleges, and the junior colleges, and to state officials as well. The functions of the council as set forth in the Master Plan (California State Department of Education, 1960, pp.43-44) are as follows:

1. To review the annual budget and capital outlay requests of the University and the state colleges and to comment to the Governor on the general level of support they seek,

2. to interpret the differential functions of the publicly supported institutions as set forth in the Master Plan, and

3. to develop plans for the orderly growth
of higher education and to make recommendations to the governing boards on the need for new facilities and programs.

In order to perform these functions, the council has been given power by the legislature to require public institutions to submit data on costs, selection and retention of students, enrollments, capacities, and other phases of effective planning and coordination.

Broadly speaking, the California Coordinating Council, although it lacks the power to approve budgets and programs, and theoretically acts only in an advisory capacity, nevertheless monitors the development of the university, the state colleges, and the junior colleges in accordance with the provisions of the Master Plan as incorporated in legislation and in the Education Code. In effect, one of the principal purposes of the council is to keep the three groups of institutions on course, as their common and differential functions are defined in the Master Plan.

The state colleges have become increasingly resentful of what has been called the "invidious treatment" which they have received under the Master Plan in comparison with the University of California. A report issued some years ago (Tool, 1966) documented the alleged discrimination under categories of general support, library support, faculty remuneration, sabbatical leaves, faculty research, capital outlay, and other categories. This report asserted in conclusion that "the Master Plan, by design and by interpretation, has become a vehicle through which the California State Colleges have been relegated to an inferior and subordinate position relative to the University of California." The report also declared that "the Master Plan in its statement of differentiation of function and admission rules creates an educational caste system among the segments of California public higher education and thereby bestows on the few, educational benefits and prerogatives which are denied to the many (p. 4087)."

As an outside observer (Dunham, 1969) put it more recently, "The main issue with the state colleges is clear: second-class citizenship alongside the University (p. 537)."
Without question, the California Coordinating Council, to the extent to which its recommendations and advice are accepted by public officials and the three tiers of institutions, and the Master Plan which presumably controls the development of higher education and the functions and relationships of public institutions, not only limit systemwide planning and development (especially in the case of the state colleges), but also institutional planning and faculty prerogatives. For example, under the Master Plan Fresno State College cannot look forward to the attainment of university status, especially in establishing professional schools that are now the sole province of the university, or the extension of graduate work to the doctoral level except in association with the university, an arrangement which has not proved very feasible. Thus, in no sense is the institution or the faculty the master of its educational destiny.* It is no wonder that under what has been called the "layer-cake system" (Dunham, 1969, p.31), both the statewide academic senate of the state colleges and the senates of the particular institutions often feel impotent.

Many observers believe that two fundamental changes are necessary in the California scheme. First, the state college system should encourage greater differentiation among the 19 institutions it comprises, colleges which, as illustrated above, already vary in program, character, ... 

*We have not attempted a detailed study of the effects of statewide coordination on faculty government. That coordination significantly influences faculty prerogatives is suggested by the appointment of a committee on Relationships of Higher Education to Federal and State Governments by the AAUP.

For recent studies of the bearing of coordination on institutional and faculty autonomy, see the forthcoming report on statewide coordination by Robert O. Berdahl under the auspices of the American Council on Education, and the study on statewide planning by Palola, Lehmann, & Blischke (1970). The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education expects to release a study on the administration of multicampus systems.
and style. Second, the Master Plan should be revised to provide for planned movement in the state college system. Obviously, not all the state colleges can become major comprehensive universities like UCLA, Michigan, or Wisconsin. Nevertheless, those strategically located with strong foundations in faculty and educational programs might be designated as institutions to be moved toward university status. This might be done under a variety of auspices: the new universities could remain in a differentiated state college system; they could be taken into the university system; or they could be placed under a new governing board, much as two of the former Illinois state colleges which have progressed to the point of giving doctoral degrees in a limited number of fields have been placed under a separate governing board, to which presumably other institutions may ultimately be transferred or assigned. Such institutions might be among those to offer the degree of Doctor of Arts for college teachers who would be employed in community colleges, private undergraduate colleges, and the great number of public institutions which will not become research-oriented major universities, but institutions devoted primarily to undergraduate teaching (Dunham, 1969, pp.155-166; Heiss, 1970).

Among other external influences and constraints on faculty government and faculty-administrative relations are faculty associations. In the California State Colleges, five organizations have competed for faculty membership, including the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), the Association of State College Professors (ASCP), the California College and University Faculty Association (affiliated with the California Teachers Association), and the California State Employees Association. (The AFT and the ASCP have recently merged into a new association, the Union of Associated Professors.) These external-internal associations obviously may have a profound effect on faculty government and administrative relationships. The studies on which this book is based explicitly excluded an investigation of professional faculty organizations and their role in institutional governance. This would be but one chapter in a book on the effects of external decisions on faculty government and institutional
autonomy. These decisions are taken by manifold agencies—professional associations, accrediting bodies, governmental agencies, special interest and pressure groups, and a host of others. No college or university—and no faculty—stands alone.
VI

Decentralization

Systems like the University of California and the California State Colleges, statewide coordinating boards, and governmental agencies are exerting greater control over particular institutions. Nevertheless, many of the changes proposed by critics of academic governance are directed at achieving greater internal decentralization of authority. Clark (1968, p.199) suggested that greater involvement in governance is possible only if universities decentralize to smaller units. The Foote Commission at Berkeley (Foote et al., 1960) embraced decentralization as a major step in the solution to that institution's governance problems. The Commission wrote:

Decentralization recommends itself because it represents an attack on size and scale. Decentralization offers a method for transforming the structure of the university from an obstacle to a positive realization of the values and commitments of its members... Just as there is an urgent need for a renewal of efforts to secure genuine campus autonomy, there is an equally pressing need for a thorough reconsideration of the centralized educational structure at the campus level /pp.57-587/. 
While we are sympathetic to as much freedom as can reasonably be assured to individual campuses in coordinated systems of higher education, and to wide participation in university government, pleas for increased segmental autonomy in particular institutions require a closer analysis of the possible effects of such decentralization. This chapter describes the extent of decentralized decisionmaking at the three institutions studied and discusses some of the problems it has created.

For each of the four aspects of institutional operation analyzed—curriculum, educational policy, personnel, and budget—the level of effective decisionmaking differed among the institutions. Not one of these four phases of operation was controlled at the same level in all three institutions.

CURRICULUM

The structure for curricular decisions at Berkeley provided for substantive, central faculty review of every proposal for a course change or for new courses. In most schools or colleges the department sent its requests to a college committee for substantive review and comment. The college committee, if it acted affirmatively, sent the request to the Senate Committee on Courses, which had final authority to accept or reject the proposal. (The central administration was not involved in this process.) The operation of the Committee on Courses was analyzed in detail in one of our case studies. In its role as a central faculty review agency for course requests, the committee handled from 1300 to 1500 requests each year. Prior to 1966-67, the committee exercised detailed scrutiny of each request and denied those which it deemed ill-planned or which represented significant overlap with existing courses in the same or other departments. The operation of the committee changed during the 1966-67 academic year under the leadership of a new chairman. Mortimer (1970) has reported:

Under this dynamic chairman, the committee issued its first detailed report (in ten years)...Now the committee members report
that they no longer actually deny a request but rather attempt to consult with departments to find a mutually acceptable solution. The committee is likely to suggest an alternative, such as using an experimental course number instead of a new course when there is some question as to whether the course should be permanently placed among the department's offerings. The committee also encourages interdepartmental consultation when possible conflicts occur \( \text{pp.130-317} \).

In short, the committee changed its operations to bring a broader perspective to individual department and college requests for course changes. Here again, the campus administration was not involved.

Minnesota's procedures for processing course proposals are an example of strong departmental, school and/or college autonomy. Many departments had their own curriculum committees, but in any case substantive review of curriculum proposals seldom was performed by central agencies. College curriculum committees did exist, and our respondents reported that the knowledge that departmental recommendations were going to be reviewed helped to keep departments honest. Once the college or school committee reviewed a course request, it was not reviewed at a higher level.

Fresno had also achieved a great deal of departmental control over courses, and there was no central faculty review agency. Each school had either a standing curriculum committee or a curriculum subcommittee, but the substance of review differed among them. The deans passed the proposals on to the Academic Vice-President and normally entered into curricular deliberations only in relation to budget and staffing. Formally, final decisions on curriculum were made by the Academic Vice President, acting for the President, but his actions were essentially pro forma.

From these analyses of curricular de jure and de facto decisionmaking procedures, it seems clear that faculty agencies controlled curricular affairs virtually independently of the central administration or the academic senate. This is an important point, and its
implications will be discussed later in this chapter. It was also apparent that the forces of departmental and/or college (school) autonomy were strong at Minnesota and Fresno, but that centralized faculty review was a distinguishing feature at Berkeley. Berkeley's departments and colleges had more and stronger constraints on their curricular autonomy than those in the other two institutions. This pattern was fairly consistent in two of the other three decisionmaking fields analyzed--educational policy and personnel.

**EDUCATIONAL POLICY**

In matters of educational policy, such as proposals for new academic units, research centers, or the evaluation of existing units, Berkeley's structure provided for substantive faculty review at the departmental, school or college, and campus levels. The senate also had committees on admissions and enrollment, athletic policy, libraries, and research.

The principal agency for central faculty review of proposals for new administrative structures or changes in existing ones, teaching or research units, and periodic reviews of existing units was the Committee on Educational Policy. When evaluating proposals or reviewing existing units, the committee's members believed its function was the maintenance of traditional standards of excellence. The important point was that the Committee on Educational Policy provided an agency for substantive faculty review of such matters at the campus level.

At Minnesota there was central faculty review only on matters which concerned more than one college. The autonomy of the individual schools and colleges to monitor their own internal development remained inviolate, except that liberal education was defined as an intercollege matter. The proposal for a Department of Afro-American Studies was debated entirely within the College of Liberal Arts and was sent to the administration and the Regents for approval. The guidelines as to what was an internal college matter and what was a campuswide matter were not clearly codified. The senate did exercise an important review function over such matters as campus research
policies, university schedules, athletics policies, and student affairs (see Chapter II). But at Minnesota no faculty agency exercised periodic review of existing teaching and research units, and these units could be reorganized internally without significant participation by agencies external to the college. The only systematic administrative review of these agencies was in allocating budgetary increments.

Fresno exercised central faculty review of some matters of educational policy through a collegewide Academic Policy and Planning Committee. The committee was charged with the responsibility (Deegan, McConnell, Mortimer, & Stull, 1970) "for recommending collegewide policies on such matters as, but not limited to, admissions, curriculum, research, staffing, space and campus development [p.19]." Subcommittees of the main committee developed the Educational Opportunities Program, the Experimental College, and the Black Studies and La Raza chairs.

The development of academic plans was one of our special concerns, and we found some variance as to their existence and their origin. Berkeley had an elaborate administrative committee structure, and it was to this type of committee that the administration turned for help in preparing a plan. The committee was composed of both faculty and administrators, a balance that would have been very difficult to achieve within the Senate committee structure. In this case, the administrative committee provided an important avenue of administrative input without which a comprehensive plan would be of doubtful worth. The plan was debated at length on the campus (Senate Policy Committee, 1969, pp.3-9). The Policy Committee urged that the Senate take a more active role in this debate.

Fresno's somewhat perfunctory plan was merely an extension of departmental projections compiled in the Academic Vice-President's office with little or no prior faculty consultation. No comprehensive statement of educational policy for the university was uncovered at Minnesota, although there was a vice-presidential document devoted to the development of the St. Paul campus. A long-range planning committee was included in the new university senate, but its role is unclear at this
writing. Presumably it will be given leadership through the office of the newly established vice-presidency for planning and development. The lack of faculty or senate involvement in the formulation of institutional plans constituted a breach of accepted procedures at Berkeley and Fresno.

PERSONNEL

As mentioned in Chapter II, the Berkeley senate's Budget Committee substantively reviewed the recommendations made by departments, deans (with one major exception), and ad hoc review committees and came to an independent judgment on the merits of each appointment, tenure, promotion, or merit increase case. The Committee's recommendations were upheld by the administration more than 95 percent of the time.

At Minnesota there was little, if any, substantive central review of appointment, promotion, or tenure decisions above the school or college level, except where the decision also involved the Graduate School. In these cases the graduate dean had to concur. In the deliberations of constituent colleges or schools, departmental votes were of major importance.

Departments had also achieved effective control of appointment, retention, and tenure decisions at Fresno, but promotions were substantively reviewed at the school level. Administrative review was performed by the constituent deans and, formally, by the central administration, but reversals of departmental recommendations were rare. Indeed, in two crucial cases in which reversals did occur, the campus was thrown into turmoil. As noted above, final approval of promotion and tenure recommendations has recently been transferred from the college presidents to the Chancellor.

BUDGETS

At Berkeley and Minnesota, faculty involvement in the formulation of budgets at the universitywide level was limited to broad policy considerations. The Budget
Committee at Fresno was not involved with anything but trivial allocation of travel funds; major allocation of resources was handled in administrative offices. The Minnesota Vice-President's group was the central budgetary decisionmaking unit on that campus, although there was some consultation with other administrative and faculty committees. In most allocation of personnel funds, the deans retained a small discretionary fund for their own use. Supposedly such monies were used to strengthen weak departments, keep strong departments strong or make them stronger, and to gain some flexibility in meeting contingencies.

CONCLUSIONS ON DECENTRALIZATION PRACTICES

The faculty at Berkeley exercised more central review of curriculum, personnel, and educational policy than the faculties at either Minnesota or Fresno. Minnesota had a strong tradition of departmental and/or school autonomy, and at Fresno there was a strong trend toward greater departmental authority. The faculty was not involved in the details of the budgetary process in any of the three institutions. External constraints (see Chapter V) also may have limited effective budgetary involvement by the faculties.

Lack of faculty involvement in the budgetary process confirms a pattern of interest and opinions which other writers (Dykes, 1968; American Association of Higher Education, 1967) have noted. Dykes (p.2) reported that the liberal arts faculty of a large midwestern university felt that it ought to be involved in curricular, personnel, and educational policy matters more heavily than in fiscal affairs.

There remains, however, the question of the possible effects of the different decisionmaking traditions which exist among institutions on those matters in which the faculty is involved—namely, curriculum, personnel, and educational policy.
POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF DECENTRALIZATION

One of four trends in the social organization of the campus identified by Clark (1963, p.39) was from a unitary to a composite or federal structure. The increasing size of the individual institution contributes to this development, but plurality of purposes and goals may be as important. We may well ask whether the multiplicity and ambiguity of academic goals, together with extensive decentralization of authority, heighten the danger of institutional fragmentation and hinder the development of an institutional perspective.

Our data tend to confirm Litchfield's (1959) and Clark's (1963) observations that one of the principal effects of decentralized authority is that it encourages the development of fragmented and segmental viewpoints and hinders the flow of communication from one area of knowledge to another. Kerr (1963) called this fragmented institution the multiversity—from which a part can be severed with little loss to the whole.

What are some of the possible consequences of this fragmentation? In educational terms, segmental decisionmaking often furthers the development of natural conflicts between humanists and scientists, between the professional school and the academic disciplines. The educational danger is that such splits may lead to the unbalanced development of the liberal arts and the professions. The institution could suffer departmental imbalance resulting in a disruption of functional relationships among disciplines and a distortion of the learning experience of students at both undergraduate and graduate levels. According to Spurr (1968):

The students suffer the most, not those who have a commitment to a particular field of specialization, to a particular professor, or to a particular group of fellow students; but the much larger number who are searching for an ideology, a direction—yes for an education [p.127].

In the light of the trend to segmental autonomy, those in positions of responsibility are confronted with
the question of what kind of general or liberal undergraduate education is possible. Will it continue to be possible, if indeed it ever was, to offer the opportunity for a coherent, integrated education to undergraduates in a multiversity? The trends toward specialization and departmentalization are powerful forces which work against unified, coherent, and viable programs of liberal education and against unified institutions of higher education.

The question of how to obtain and maintain coherent, integrated programs which are consistent with institutional goals and purposes is of fundamental importance in governing organizations. The apparent danger in an organization with multiple goals is that one goal will be displaced by another or that there will be serious imbalances among them. In a university there is the real danger that the goal of research will completely overwhelm the goal of undergraduate education.

But the problem is not apparent in higher education alone; scholars writing about other organizations have discussed how goals get displaced. Etzioni (1964, pp.10-14) explains that an organization tends to displace, modify, and expand its original goals so that the result is something very different from the original intent. He illustrates three kinds of goal displacement, all of which we believe are relevant to colleges and universities.

First, the subsequent substitution or substantial modification of original purposes can occur when leaders seek to further their own vested interests rather than the goals of the organization. This type of goal displacement is evident when the leaders of a political party consider it more important to remain in office than to pursue the party's philosophy or advance its program. So it was that European socialist parties and labor unions in the early 1900s became more concerned with maintaining their positions than with prosecuting the Socialist Revolution. In a university, goal displacement can occur when leaders show more concern about their position or status than about educational issues when they make decisions. In such a situation, behavior is directed toward finding out what one's constituency wants rather than what is a good educational decision. When a member of Fresno's competing factions served on a
committee or in a position of responsibility, one of the important elements in his consideration of issues was whether his vote was consistent with the party's position. In effect, he displaced educational goals with social criteria, especially approval by peers.

A second type of goal displacement can occur when parts of an organization begin to act in a manner not consistent with announced organizational ends. Etzioni, quoting Merton, points out that individuals and other subunits of an organization often adhere rigidly to rules and regulations rather than deal with the substance of the situation. The procedures become goals in themselves rather than means to achieve some organizational end. Much of the extensive polarization and bitterness between faculty factions at Fresno centered around the extensive set of formal consultative procedures adopted by the college. The rather detailed classification of decision-making procedures often resulted in bitter accusations that a matter was not handled according to proper regulations. Debate then occurred over the legality of the way in which the decision was reached rather than whether the decision was consistent with the goals and purposes of Fresno State College.

A third type of goal displacement is fixation on the internal problems of any one operating unit of an organization, which can lead to an overemphasis on that segment's goals, with an accompanying displacement of institutional goals. University departments, in their professional and/or organizational status, often develop a pattern of autonomous behavior which is inconsistent with institutional purposes. A faculty member at Minnesota explained, with obvious pride, how his department had completely changed its requirements for graduate degrees. The department, without consulting the college or any other body, passed a ruling that graduate students would not get credit for courses numbered below 100. The department also cut the admission of graduate students by 50 percent. At Fresno, a faculty member reported that his department was not interested in obtaining any mathematically oriented social scientist, in spite of the fact that the acknowledged trend in his discipline was towards greater use of mathematical models. Apparently, no agency in the School of Arts and Sciences or the
institution as a whole reviewed this decision.

We believe it is possible, and even likely, that the decisions in both of these cases were incompatible with the general educational mission of the institutions. Certainly any graduate of the Fresno department in question will be at a severe disadvantage should he wish to undertake graduate training, for he will have had little exposure to a major development in his discipline. A basic point about the Minnesota department's actions is that institutional goals apparently were not a factor in the decision.

The fundamental issue here is whether the sum of individual departmental decisions will add up to a coherent institutional whole. We believe some means for balancing the interests of faculty, student, administrative, and public constituencies needs to be interjected. Dressel and his colleagues (1970) explain why. They refer to the process whereby university departments achieve and maintain a decentralized decisionmaking structure as the confidence game:

The outcomes of the confidence game are not always in the best interests of higher education. The major concerns are not so much with the game as with the manner in which it is played, and the ends to which it is directed. New rules and a different concept of winning are required, for what is regarded as good by the department is not always best for the institution or for higher education. And what is regarded as good for the university may not always be best for higher education or for society.

In short, goal displacement of many kinds is likely to occur in colleges and universities. Organizational theorists identify goal displacement as a fundamental characteristic of organizational behavior, and its incidence in the institutions under study was readily apparent. We return now to our earlier questions: What kind of general or liberal education is possible under conditions of segmental autonomy? Given the likelihood of some goal displacement, how can an institution secure the active
cooperation of the sciences and humanities in the education of undergraduates in the professional schools? In a divided institution with relatively autonomous parts, will the professional schools be forced into creating and maintaining their own English, mathematics, statistics, and social and natural science courses or their own programs in general education? If so, is this a wise use of scarce resources?

The research at Fresno uncovered a recently adopted report that gave each department the right to determine which courses it would designate or accept as meeting the requirement for general education. The responsibility for an integrated general education at the undergraduate level was left to individual and autonomous departments or schools. But there was little assurance that departments would commit themselves to the task or that their programs would be subsequently monitored. Departments in the School of Arts and Sciences were beginning to drop service courses for the professional schools. One could envision the latter offering their own cognate courses (e.g., social sciences in the School of Business). Without integrated planning, and in a system of departmental or school autonomy, it might not be long before the professional schools were maintaining their own English, mathematics, statistics, science, and social science courses—or even departments.

A possible effect of this decentralization is the unwise dispersion of both human and financial resources. Separate and autonomous units tend to compete with one another for scarce resources and often squander their funds by duplicating courses and services.

The budgetary effect of decentralization is a case in point. At Fresno the respondents reported that the individual school deans bargained vigorously for their proportional share (based on such factors as enrollment) of all new monies, regardless of whether or not this was a wise dispersal of resources in the light of institutionwide educational purposes. The basis for allocation had become political rather than educational. The debate was strictly on the basis of mathematical formulae rather than on the educational substance towards which new funds should be directed. In such cases as this, the allocation of funds for educational purposes is displaced by
the goal of school or college aggrandizement. Each time the standard of a fair share of the increment is used, it becomes increasingly difficult for the next set of allocations to modify or change this precedent. The pattern of political rather than substantive decisionmaking is also part of the federal government's budgetary process (Wildavsky, 1964, p.176), and the pattern is difficult to break. The danger to academic organizations is that political rather than educational goals will determine allocations.

The tendency toward dispersion of authority over curriculum, personnel, and educational policy makes the definition, much less the attainment, of institutional goals extremely difficult. Individual departments, schools, and/or colleges are often the key decisionmaking units. Not until recently did the three institutions under study begin to plan their educational development. Diffusion of decisionmaking authority, goal displacement, and increased segmental autonomy make comprehensive, jointly formulated educational plans of major importance to future patterns of campus governance for a number of reasons.

First, it will be increasingly difficult to get agreement on what functions and activities an institution should perform. For example, the resolution of conflict between the advocates of increased enrollment in graduate as opposed to undergraduate programs will be a political process of no small moment. This will be particularly difficult at institutions which, like Berkeley and Minnesota, face relatively fixed enrollments and increasingly scarce resources. Any adjustments in priorities will have to be made in existing programs rather than from the expected increments in either enrollments or funds. It is easier to allocate additional resources than to take resources from one program and give them to another. Yet this is the prospect that many institutions face.

Second, statewide coordination may place important constraints on such things as enrollment levels, undergraduate-graduate student ratios, and educational programs. A major problem involved is the development or maintenance of institutional integrity which is also consistent with state plans, especially when the institutions involved
are convinced that the state plan dooms them to second-class status (Eulau & Quinley, 1970, p.3). We have already noted (see Chapter V) that the California State Colleges regard the California Master Plan for Higher Education as a rigid document to be circumvented if it cannot be changed. Yet, planning by faculties, administrators, and students necessarily must be done within the constraints of master plans and coordinated systems. We think, however, that plans for increased differentiation among institutions in a statewide system would be more persuasive if they were accompanied and supported by a comprehensive plan for the internal educational development of each institution (Palola, Lehmann, & Blischke, 1970).

Even though the development of institutional plans is likely to be a difficult process, we believe it can result in an educational dialogue of great value to the institution. If the debate were directed toward educational priorities rather than to political boundary maintenance, the joint involvement of administrators, faculty, and students in planning could provide institutional direction and a framework for future development. We emphasize educational priorities, and by this we mean answers to such questions as: 1) What should be the ratio of graduate to undergraduate enrollments? 2) What new educational programs should be developed? 3) What existing programs should be cut back or otherwise deemphasized? 4) What programs should be developed for the evaluation of instruction? 5) What system of student advising is best suited to the individual institution?

These are questions which should be considered at the campus level as well as at the college and department levels. To leave the evaluation of instruction to the dictates of individual departments, for example, will almost certainly result in great disparities in instructional performance.

The existence of a plan of educational priorities will allow a process of purposive decentralization. Departments should be encouraged to consider broader institutional purposes when making decisions on curriculum and educational policy. The process of budgetary allocation could conform to educational priorities rather than a proportional division of the incremental pie.
It is imperative in our discussion to be aware of the distinction between planning for budget and plant and planning for educational development. It is, of course, necessary for an institution to plan its fiscal and physical growth. But we urge that institutions plan their educational development with as much, if not more, diligence than they devote to fiscal and physical projections. We believe that faculty, administrators, and students ought to be especially engaged in charting the educational direction of their institution. Broad involvement in other types of planning is, of course, desirable but is not as crucial as is educational planning. It is in the educational realm that faculty-student input is most crucial.

When comprehensive, flexible, jointly formulated, periodically revised educational plans for institutional development have been made, the process of selective educational decentralization can proceed. Appropriate joint faculty, student, and administrative agencies should be expected to review the substance of major decisions in the light of the institution's educational priorities.

Although some may argue that the plan itself will be displaced by the interests of its subsequent interpreters, this is not sufficient to discourage planning. Plans will have to be flexible enough to take new realities in university and social climate into account. Any plan should have adequate provision for periodic reevaluation of priorities. Regularized reevaluation itself should be jointly accomplished.

Educational planning should also include what Hodgkinson (1969, p.144) calls the delineation of different purposes for different levels of the governance system. Our data show that academic senates, for example, often perform different functions and are organized differently in different institutions. That is as it should be. Greater attention must be paid, however, to what a campuswide senate in a particular institution should be doing and what activities other decisionmaking levels should perform. We believe that educational planning should lead to an understanding of what the faculty ought to be doing at each level in the governance process. Should faculties be making decisions which will change the balance of
graduate and undergraduate enrollments in a department or in the institution? Should a college be changing the requirements for a degree independently of institutional commitments to general education? We do not believe such departmental license furthers the best interests of the institution or the society which supports it.

Finally, we suggest that educational planning is a way to stimulate faculty debate on questions of educational substance and turn attention away from administrative detail. Some of our faculty interview respondents argued that one can only control educational policy by controlling administrative detail. As we have pointed out in Chapter II, this argument implies a lack of willingness to delegate administrative authority to administrators. We submit that a cooperatively developed plan, together with appropriate, periodic review and evaluation, would provide the framework for both appropriate decentralization of decisionmaking responsibility to constituent academic units and responsible delegation of administrative duties to accountable administrators.

Our major point is made in Selznick's (1957) discussion of decentralization in organizations:

Decentralization requires a preparatory period of training in which leadership has the opportunity to influence deeply the ideas that guide decisionmaking at lower levels. More useful than indoctrination and training is the collaborative development of plans and policies by as many levels of the organization as possible, so that a unified view, or at least understanding of the controlling viewpoint will be achieved (pp.114-115; italics added).

The substance of educational planning should be directed toward establishing greater understanding and acceptance of the controlling goals of the institution. The plan should provide a framework for determining the proper balance between teaching and research or the proper relationship between campus teaching-learning and off-campus activities such as political or social action programs.
Within the constraints of a cooperatively developed plan, we would argue for the central allocation of scarce resources and for centrally established standards of faculty quality and performance. Within these limits, decisionmaking on curriculum, personnel, and the deployment of financial resources should be decentralized to designated instructional units. (We believe that these units should ordinarily be larger, and more complicated than departments.)

Finally, there must be continuing, or at least periodic, joint, central review of the efficiency and integrity with which these units pursue their own stated purposes and contribute to the goals of the institution in their decisions concerning instruction, personnel, curriculum, organization, and utilization of resources. Without such periodic evaluation, there is no assurance that the parts will serve and advance the whole.
VII
Central Administrative Leadership

Does a system of shared responsibility and authority preclude administrative leadership? Presumably it does not, for the joint statement on the government of colleges and universities (American Association of University Professors et al., 1966, pp. 375-79) we have referred to earlier declares that "The president, as the chief executive officer of an institution of higher education, is measured largely by his capacity for institutional leadership." The statement goes on to say that "The degree to which a president can envision new horizons for his institution, and can persuade others to see them and to work toward them, will often constitute the chief measure of administration."

Structure may facilitate or impede administrative leadership; organization will not assure it. A structure which provides for joint participation in decisionmaking by central administrators and faculties at least offers the opportunity for administrative leadership. Whether this opportunity is seized depends on many factors—administrative style, administrative initiative, administrative attitudes toward faculty participation, faculty attitudes toward administrative roles, the existence or absence of mutual trust, and many other factors.

On the ground of structure alone, there would seem
to be a natural setting not only for joint participation but also for administrative leadership at Fresno State College and the University of Minnesota. There would seem to be much less opportunity at the University of California at Berkeley. As pointed out earlier, at the two former institutions administrative officers serve as members of major senate or institutionwide committees. At Fresno the organization gives the president and other central administrators ex officio membership on such committees. The senate organization at Minnesota has not bestowed such formal committee membership on administrators, but in practice they have frequently been appointed to senate committees as well as to ad hoc committees and special task forces. At Berkeley the practice has been to exclude major administrative officers from senate committees, although they have served on administrative committees appointed by the chancellor. In previous chapters we have emphasized the difficulty Berkeley administrators have had in penetrating the senate's decisionmaking bodies and processes.

These are, in brief, the structural conditions. To what extent in the three institutions have the central administrators exercised leadership? We turn first to Berkeley.

EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP AT BERKELEY

Clark Kerr (1963), who was Chancellor at Berkeley from 1952 to 1958, proposed in his Godkin Lectures a widely discussed and debated definition of the chief administrator's role. He said:

The president in the multiversity is leader, educator, creator, initiator, wielder of power, pump; he is also office holder, caretaker, inheritor, consensus seeker, persuader, bottleneck. But he is mostly a mediator 145.

The usual picture of the mediator, in industrial disputes for example, is a person who is especially adept in negotiating a resolution of conflicting interests. It is not an image of a leader who exercises initiative,
who enlists support for long-range plans, who guides an institution to greater stature. But in less-quoted passages, Kerr recognized the importance of encouraging innovation and promoting progress even if peace has to be sacrificed in the process. To express these attributes of the president's role, Kerr coined the term "mediator-innovator" [p. 397].

As Chancellor at Berkeley, to a large extent with the support of the faculty, Kerr played the role of initiator and significantly influenced the development of the campus. It should be instructive to recount briefly the methods by which he succeeded in penetrating a faculty structure which made intervention difficult and in stimulating progress in an essentially conservative organization.

When Kerr became Chancellor at Berkeley, the President of the university made administrative appointments on all the campuses, including department chairmen. In the complex and highly decentralized large American university, the department chairmanship is in many ways the key administrative position. Budget requests emanate from the departments. Faculty recruitment begins there, as do recommendations for faculty appointment and promotion. Recognizing that much of his influence would depend on the choice of department chairmen, Kerr pressed the President to delegate this authority, and he finally secured it.

It was Kerr who created the Academic Advisory Council, which included the chairmen of the major senate committees; the chairman of the Committee on Building and Campus Development, an administrative committee; and the Dean of the College of Letters and Science. Since the President then had control of the budget, Kerr could not use it as an instrument for shaping the development of his campus. But there had been no real planning at Berkeley, and it was into that vacuum that he moved. Through the new Academic Advisory Council, and with the cooperation of the senate committees, he devised a long-range academic plan for Berkeley and a correlated plan for its physical development. While working with the Academic Advisory Council, he also discussed questions of major policy with the Council of Deans. Many of these questions were relevant to the entire university, and subsequent recommendations were adopted for the institution as a whole.
Kerr turned to the improvement of weaker departments. He asked the Committee on Budget and Interdepartmental Relations (which was responsible for recommending appointments and promotions) to give him its confidential evaluation of departments and to work closely with him in making plans for strengthening the weaker ones. Using his authority to appoint department chairmen, Kerr employed various means of regeneration. On occasion he appointed a chairman from outside the department or from outside the University. In some instances he appointed a faculty member from the department who had not been nominated by its tenure members. In extreme cases he in effect declared the department bankrupt and appointed a committee of three to take charge of it. He discussed these plans in advance with the Budget Committee and was careful to obtain this group’s support in securing new departmental leadership. He also worked closely with the Committee on Educational Policy, whose chairman, of course, was a member of the Academic Advisory Council. It was the concerted effort of Kerr and these key Senate committees to strengthen departments, particularly in the humanities and the social sciences, that laid the basis for concluding in Cartter’s (1966, p.107) study of graduate education that Berkeley was the best balanced distinguished university in the country. (The Berkeley campus also rated first in a followup study reported in 1970 [Roos and Andersen, 1970].)

Throughout this period there was frequent consultation between the chairman of the Committee on Committees and the Chancellor, not only concerning chairmanships of senate committees, but also concerning the chairmen of most administrative committees. With the exception of a limited number of meetings held during his term, the Chancellor did not sit with the Committee on Committees and did not consider it necessary to do so.

Although Kerr had neither the authority to make budget decisions nor to approve the appointment and promotion of faculty members,* he brought the Committee on

*Although the responsibility for submitting appointments and promotions to the Regents lay with the President, Kerr did have the prerogative of holding up
Budget and Interdepartmental Relations into an office on the same floor as the Chancellor's office. Furthermore, he provided assistance to the committee, which was responsible for a vast amount of detailed analysis. The physical proximity of the offices of the Chancellor and the Budget Committee, the provision of administrative assistance by the Chancellor, the membership of the chairman of the committee on the Academic Advisory Council, and the informal relationships between the chairman and the Chancellor laid the foundation for the gradual assumption by the Chancellor of the responsibility and the authority for detailed budgetary decisions (which we have discussed in Chapter III).

In working with the Academic Advisory Council, the Deans' Council, and senate committees, Kerr kept the initiative in his hands. If he wished to have the Committee on Educational Policy consider a matter, he did not ask the committee to prepare a draft for discussion. He prepared the draft, asked the committee to react to it, and revised it in light of the discussion. He tried to avoid being confronted by a committee report in which he had had no hand. Instead, the Chancellor recommended; the senate committee advised; the Chancellor revised his proposals in the light of the senate's counsel; and then the administration acted. Throughout his administration, Kerr held to the conviction that the Academic Senate was the basic instrumentality of the university, that the advice of senate committees was ordinarily sound, and that it was essential for the administration to work for and with the faculty. Perhaps the facts that Kerr came to the Chancellorship from the senate, so to speak, that he was one of those nominated for the position by a senate committee, and that he had been staunchly on the senate's side in the oath controversy, account in considerable part for the close working rela-

campus recommendations. Thus his power to say no was of some consequence in influencing faculty personnel matters. On the positive side, he won faculty confidence by defending faculty members from unwarranted attacks from outside the campus.
tionships he was able to establish with the senate and its committees. Kerr's leadership depended not on authority—it was only after he became President that the chancellors were given a substantial degree of responsibility and authority over their campuses—but on informal relationships. His success in working with the faculty was founded on informal associations. Students of organization have pointed out that formal authority must be legitimated through constructive relationships based on mutual understanding and respect. A recent study of presidential leadership (Regents Advisory Committee, 1967) concluded that the president "must be able to meet the faculty on their own grounds when he becomes involved in educational issues; he cannot make his point on the basis of institutional authority [5, 7]."

Perhaps the close informal relationships between the Chancellor and senate committee chairmen led to the fear on the part of some members of the senate that the senate's independence might be eroded and the integrity of its position compromised. In spite of the fact that subsequent chancellors apparently did not consult so closely with either the Academic Advisory Committee or the Deans' Council on matters of policy and administration, the new Chancellor who came to the campus in 1965 was advised that he should not consider the Academic Senate Advisory Council as indicative of the voice of the faculty, and he was urged to broaden his consultation. The Academic Advisory Council was then disbanded and it took several years (as recounted in Chapter III) for the senate to instruct one of its own agencies, the Senate Policy Committee, to serve as its liaison with the central administration.

Chancellor Kerr's immediate successors took less initiative, worked less closely with senate committees, and gave less evidence of educational leadership. During the late 1960s, the central administration was so plagued by student disruption that it had little time to devote to constructive educational reform. Some important changes have occurred. The Tussman Two-Year College was established, and the Board of Educational Development was created to approve and sponsor student-initiated experimental courses. The Regents allocated funds for a program of innovative instructional projects; during the first
two years of the program, 75 projects were supported. However, no large-scale educational reorganization has occurred (Ladd, 1970, pp.13-24). The senate referred relevant recommendations of the Student-Faculty Governance Committee to various committees of the Academic Senate for study, but to date the Senate has given little thorough or systematic consideration to the Committee's recommendations. Although there is greater student participation in disciplinary proceedings, although student members have been added to certain senate committees, and although undergraduate and graduate students have a greater voice in some departments, there is still no systematic, comprehensive organization for joint student-faculty-administrative consultation, deliberation, and decisionmaking. There has been no evaluation or realignment of educational priorities, for example, and no decisive effort to redress the imbalance between teaching and research. The failure to progress on all these fronts is indicative of the dearth of educational leadership, as well as oligarchic faculty control of committees and structural rigidity. However greatly central administrators at Berkeley may wish to influence the institution's development, the traditions and attitudes of the faculty will make it difficult for them to do so. And the jealously guarded separate jurisdictions of faculty and administration will impede the exercise of leadership. Finally, continual conditions of crisis have required constant administrative attention and have thus hindered administrative initiative. In spite of these handicaps, however, the present chancellor has given support to the Board of Educational Development, and he has interested himself in the organization of the Department of Experimental Courses and the organization of programs of ethnic studies.

EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP AT FRESNO

The authority structure at Fresno State College presumably provides the setting for administrative leadership through joint participation of central administrators and faculty members in decisionmaking bodies. As we have noted previously, the academic and executive
administrators were members of the Academic Assembly, which was the inclusive faculty organization, and the president and the vice presidents were also members of the representative Academic Senate. Furthermore, the president was a member of the Executive Committee; the academic vice president served on the Committees on Personnel and Academic Policy and Planning; the executive vice president was a member of the Public Affairs Committee; the Dean of Students was on the Student Affairs Committee; and finally, the business manager was a member of the Budget Committee (which is relatively inactive). The constitution of the Academic Assembly required the Academic Senate to appoint members of college committees in consultation with the president. In practice, however, this consultation was essentially pro forma, since the Committee on Committees nominated committee members directly to the senate.

Although the formal structure at Fresno offered the opportunity for central administrative leadership and for administrative participation throughout the deliberations of collegewide committees, there was little evidence of administrative initiative or administrative guidance in academic affairs. The Faculty Handbook states that the Academic Vice-President "is the president's principal consultant on educational policy and academic personnel matters, is responsible for academic planning, and is the principal officer responsible for the development, quality, and evaluation of the instructional program." However, there was no central curriculum committee in the college and the office of the vice president traditionally gave only cursory attention to the course changes that finally reached his office from their departmental origins. There was little evidence that the Academic Vice-President played a leading role in the work of the Committee on Academic Policy and Planning, which took responsibility for recommending the establishment of new majors, departments, divisions, and schools. One faculty member who criticized the lack of educational leadership by the central administration declared that few major educational proposals had emanated from the offices of the president and his close administrative associates. That this criticism may not be entirely valid is suggested by the fact that the central administration
was at least involved at early stages in the development of such activities as the Educational Opportunity Program and the Experimental College.

The chancellor of the state college system recently asked Fresno State to submit a revised master plan. The revised plan was drawn up in the office of the academic vice president after some consultation with the several schools, but with little consideration by the Committee on Academic Policy and Planning, which gave it only token approval. The plan appeared to be little more than a compilation of proposed majors and graduate programs agreed on at any time by the schools and the administration. Thus, the institution had no fundamental basis for deciding that a particular educational program or service should be reduced, eliminated, or maintained while another should be expanded, strengthened, or created from funds provided for faculty positions, program augmentation, or program development.

The Personnel Committee, of which the Academic Vice-President was a member, was responsible for recommending personnel policy, operating faculty grievance procedures, and reviewing recommendations on retention, promotion, and tenure of faculty. In practice, the Committee concerned itself with procedural rather than substantive review of recommendations concerning retention, promotion, and tenure. Neither the Personnel Committee nor the Academic Vice-President had made a systematic analysis of faculty quality, department by department, such as that inaugurated by Clark Kerr when he was Chancellor at Berkeley. Neither had the committee established broad policies with respect to faculty recruitment, appointment, and evaluation. Had it done so, the college might have been saved the intense turmoil which accompanied the president's veto of two recommendations for appointment and retention. The Academic Vice-President did draw proposed guidelines for hiring professional staff for approval by the Personnel Committee. These guidelines, however, were mainly procedural and had little reference to broad personnel policy.

One concludes that the central administrators at Fresno had taken little opportunity for exercising the educational leadership which the formal faculty-administrative organization offered them. With very few excep-
tions, faculty members interviewed at Fresno either accepted or emphasized the importance of educational leadership by major administrators. One respondent, for example, stated that faculties should sense strong leadership on the part of president, vice presidents, and deans who, he said, should set the tone of the college and articulate its purposes. Another respondent criticized the central administration for not freeing itself sufficiently from detail and from outside contacts to exercise imaginative educational statesmanship. The respondents who asked for more administrative initiative, however, did not mean administrative direction or arbitrary authority. (The nature of administrative leadership in an academic community will be the subject of the concluding section of this chapter.)

ADMINISTRATIVE LEADERSHIP AT MINNESOTA

Although, as pointed out earlier, there has been no formal arrangement for ex officio membership of central administrative officers on senate committees at Minnesota, there is nevertheless a long history of administrative membership on these committees among department chairmen, deans, and vice presidents. In spite of this participation, however, there is little evidence over the last 20 years of central administrative leadership in the educational development of the university. The university is highly decentralized administratively. It has been characterized by a high degree of departmental autonomy and initiative and varying degrees of enterprise by the deans of schools and colleges. There has been a relative educational vacuum at the top, a condition acceptable to a faculty accustomed to wide dispersion of authority and to segmental autonomy. There are indications, however, that the current president of the university will take a stronger hand in guiding the university's future development. He has recently appointed a vice president for planning and development, and there is evidence of some movement toward long-range projection. These indications of greater initiative have stirred some unrest among young faculty members. The dissident Faculty Action Caucus, for example, has objected to what it considers the
president's effort to establish policy without faculty consultation by making policy statements in public addresses. Responding to an address by the president in which he expressed the view that the university should not take an institutional position on partisan and controversial issues, two members of the Faculty Action Caucus commented as follows on the President's address (Dworkin & Maxwell, 1969):

We are distressed both by its content and by the impression that its approach to the so-called politicization of the University is becoming de facto policy without at least a minimum debate by the members of the University community. Such policy is not to be handed down from on high but should emerge as the debated collective will of the entire University community.

Although the President declared that the university should avoid political partisanship, he nevertheless moved to increase the interaction of the university with the community. To this end he coined the term "communiversity." In accordance with a policy of involvement in public affairs, the administration responded to a legislative request for the university to consider the introduction of a curriculum in law enforcement by appointing a study committee which recommended a two-year curriculum on law enforcement, a proposal which was not acceptable to the administration because it was vocationally oriented and too modest in scope. The President then appointed a blue-ribbon committee for further consideration of the question. This committee recommended the creation of a Department of Law Enforcement Sciences under the auspices of the Academic Vice-President. The name of the proposed department was changed to Criminal Justice Studies and it was made responsible temporarily to the Vice-President. The Social Sciences Divisional Council of the College of Liberal Arts first declined to approve the department, but later granted it temporary accreditation. The department was scheduled to apply for a permanent place within an existing college sometime in the spring of 1970.

Responding to pressure from black students and
sections of the Twin Cities community, the president established a committee to consider a program of Black Studies. The committee recommended to the dean of the College of Liberal Arts that a program of Afro-American Studies be established in the college. The divisional councils of the social sciences, the humanities, the College Committee on Educational Policy, and the Executive Committee of the college approved the recommendation, which was referred to the central administration for budgetary support.

Neither the Department of Criminal Justice Studies nor the Afro-American Studies program was referred to the Senate Committee on Educational Policy, or any other senate committee, presumably on the ground that the creation of the new departments was a college and not a universitywide matter.

Much more far-reaching organizational changes have occurred in the University of Minnesota under the same pattern of administrative response to proposals or pressures initiated elsewhere. In the early 1950s, the departments of mathematics, physics, and geology were transferred from the College of Liberal Arts to the Institute of Technology. In the late 1950s, biologists in the College of Liberal Arts, feeling that they were inadequately represented in the administration of the college, joined with biologists in certain other parts of the university to press for the creation of a College of the Biological Sciences. Under this pressure, the central administration appointed an ad hoc committee to study the problem. The committee recommended that a separate College of the Biological Sciences be established, a proposal that was strongly supported by the Vice-President for academic affairs. The recommendation was submitted to the Senate Committee on Educational Policy, which approved the proposal, and the college was then created.

The organizational changes sketched above were made without benefit of any long-range academic plan for the university or the Twin Cities campuses. Recently, a newly created senate committee interested itself in faculty participation in long-range institutional planning, but it was unable to secure the funds it considered necessary for effective faculty effort. Furthermore, there was no central agency charged with the development of a long-
range program. That such a formal planning unit may be created, however, is suggested by the recent appointment of a Vice-President for planning and development.

Work on a long-range academic plan for the university may stimulate greater administrative initiative. Although there have been relatively few instances of central leadership, the vice president for academic affairs has on occasion taken significant steps toward educational innovation. He encouraged the formation of a universitywide Council on Liberal Education under the chairmanship of an assistant vice president for academic affairs. The council, in turn, with the encouragement of the academic vice president, stimulated the creation of the Center for Curriculum Studies which was to coordinate and sponsor projects for the improvement of elementary and secondary education and of undergraduate studies in the university. The center administered a Small Grants Program initiated by the all-university Council on Liberal Education for the support of innovations in undergraduate education in a wide range of departments and on all campuses of the university. The director of the center was assisted by an administrative committee chaired by the academic vice president or his designee.

Leadership at successive administrative levels at Minnesota is accomplished to some degree through discretionary budgetary allocations. All but a limited portion of the total amount available for academic purposes is allocated among the schools and colleges or other major academic units of the university, according to formula. A group of vice presidents then adjust the allocations according to their knowledge of the particular needs of the several divisions. Then the central administration retains a sum for contingencies and special appropriations. The deans or other major administrators will in turn distribute most of their appropriations among their departments, but again are likely to withhold a portion for discretionary purposes. These discretionary funds at the college and university level enable administrators selectively to support requests for new programs, additional staff, or other special purposes—or, perhaps, to finance projects in which they themselves are especially interested. These discretionary funds have been variously described as honey pots, or as the Jesus factor in budget
making. These sums are useful but extremely limited means by which administrators can influence the course of educational development.

The form of the University of Minnesota, then, has been shaped over the past two decades less by central educational imagination and direction than by decisions taken in its many parts. Presidents and vice presidents have only cursorily reviewed curricular changes or faculty appointments and promotions. And there has not been any central faculty—that is to say, senate—review of decisions on personnel and there has been no review of curricular proposals unless they somehow were deemed to affect other major divisions of the institution or the educational policy of the university as a whole. This decentralization of initiative and decisionmaking puts a heavy burden on leadership at the lower levels of the university. The quality of leadership at these levels has varied from college to college and in the same college from period to period. In one of the principal colleges of the university, administrative action has ranged from aggressive promotion of imaginative and innovative programs of general education, interdisciplinary studies at undergraduate and graduate levels, and interdisciplinary research programs, to little more than the servicing of departments. It has been said that the dean now thinks of himself as having the primary function of finding resources to enable departments to do what they wish; consequently, he exercises very little direction or leadership but considers the purpose of his office to be that of expediting the wishes of the faculty.

The consequences of uneven leadership are a university of uneven quality, irregular profile, uncertain direction, and limited inner unity and coherence.

Although it has been a very large institution for a long time, the University of Minnesota has had a relatively small central administrative staff. Perhaps this is one reason for the lack of strong central leadership. The recent expansion in the president's immediate staff may signal greater initiative and more frequent intervention. This staff now includes a panoply of nine vice presidents and an array of assistant vice presidents and executive assistants.
LEADERSHIP AND COORDINATION

Clark (1961) has pointed out that in large non-academic organizations in which work is highly specialized administrators must emphasize coordination and integration if the work of the many specialists is to materialize in an array of completed products. It is his view that the need for coordination and integration in colleges and universities is much less. In these institutions, Clark asserted, "the work of the professor is indeed specialized, but rationality centers more on leaving him alone than on coordinating his efforts." Clark conceded that institutions vary in the extent to which they need coordination. Those committed heavily to research and scholarship require less coordination, "for here each man can largely go his own way." On the other hand, more coordination is necessary in institutions committed primarily to teaching.

But there are serious reservations to letting each faculty member do his own thing. As resources become scarcer, duplication of activities becomes too costly and marginal enterprises are less defensible. Furthermore, the traditional picture of the university as a collection of independent scholars is no longer realistic. Large-scale research requires the collaboration of many specialists. Both research and teaching in such fields as urban studies, environmental design, and community organization call upon many disciplines and require the cooperation of many specialists. One of the principal functions of educational leadership is to mobilize resources in staff and finance toward the attainment of institutional purposes. In a college or university, these goals need not be as precise or as detailed as they must be in industry. Nevertheless, they should be sufficiently explicit to give direction to the institution's activities and deliberate balance to its several functions. It is increasingly clear that no institution can be all things to all men; scarce resources will see to that. On more positive grounds, public institutions will increasingly play designated roles in coordinated systems. We may agree with Clark that academic organizations do not need to be as closely knit or as hierarchical as most other organizations. We would also agree that the university
ought to offer to many of its members the opportunity for independent scholarship and research. But it is our judgment that in the future every institution's boundaries will have to be more clearly defined and the services for which it is particularly responsible more deliberately and economically organized.

AUTHORITY IN THE UNIVERSITY

It is paradoxical that it was in the institution characterized by the greatest degree of tension between faculty and administration—Fresno State College—that we found faculty members who asked for more administrative initiative in educational affairs. The number, it is true, was not large, but neither at Berkeley nor at Minnesota did faculty members who were interviewed express a desire for greater administrative intervention. The faculty members at Fresno who asked for more administrative initiative certainly did not mean administrative direction or arbitrary authority. As a matter of fact, most acts of leadership are not dramatic; the era of the administrative giant who remade a college or university entirely to his own design is long since over. So, also, is the time when leadership could be equated with authority. In colleges and universities, authority no longer inheres in position or status. Therefore, administrative authority can no longer be imposed; it can be exercised only through the acceptance of those who are subject to it (Presthus, 1962).

METHODS OF LEADERSHIP

No longer can a college or university president speak of "his" institution. Furthermore, leadership inheres in reciprocal relationships between administrators (many of whom also hold academic appointments) and faculty members who are engaged entirely or primarily in teaching and research. How, under these circumstances, can the president or other administrators exercise leadership? Methods which have been used include the following:
. Keep the entire institution informed of statewide and systemwide policies and developments as well as of significant changes in higher education in the United States and in other countries.

. Stimulate a thorough analysis of the problems facing the institution and search out possibly fruitful alternatives for solution. Failure to deal with problems imaginatively is often the result of a poverty of ideas.

. Emphasize institutionwide interests rather than segmental ambitions. Although, in a college and university, leadership should be widely dispersed and initiative throughout the organization should be encouraged, a mere collection of the aspirations of particular and diverse interest groups will not add up to a coherent educational program or to an institution with integrity of character and purpose.

. Stimulate a high degree of lateral communication as a means of breaking down departmental insulation, bringing about greater contact among disciplines, and enabling inventive minds to find their counterparts in other sections of the institution. How can this be accomplished? By both formal and informal means, information concerning educational innovations in one department or division should be widely disseminated and may stimulate change elsewhere. Special task forces may bring together teachers and researchers who would otherwise not collaborate on educational problems. If an academic organization is to change, it is not enough for information to move downward and upward (in the hierarchical structure, the movement was almost always downward); information must move easily across the organization at many levels. Furthermore, information should be freely disseminated.
In too many instances, both administrative and faculty groups keep information within a select circle. These boundaries need to be breached (Hodgkinson, 1969.)

- Search for new ideas wherever they may be found, and help bring them to fruition. It has been said that the major role of academic leadership is to release the imagination and the inventiveness of teachers, scholars, and students. The search should take administrators into faculty members' offices. Innovative ideas may be discovered more easily through informal face-to-face relationships than through formal procedures. Some years ago in one of the three institutions studied, informal discussion elicited a faculty member's ideas for teaching and research in American studies, ideas which had never been formally proposed to a department or a faculty committee. The administrator gave encouragement, found faculty members of like mind in other departments, and provided initial support for a program which later received one of the largest foundation grants given to universities for studies in American life and civilization.

- Help innovators find allies. Most proposals for change need the support of many individuals and many groups, especially if the innovators are younger faculty members. In other words, administrators can help recruit established and distinguished teachers to new educational projects as a means of reducing the risk to those promoting change. The administrator can often play a key role in mobilizing support in what is usually a relatively conservative organization.

- Propose means of improving the institution,
suggest new programs, and adapt the organization to new purposes and activities. Although perhaps more often than not administrative leadership will take the form of selective encouragement and support of ideas proposed by others, administrators should not hesitate to take the initiative in appropriate ways and on favorable occasions. In one of the three institutions, the graduate dean and the dean of arts and sciences, with the president's support, won faculty approval for the organization of what proved to be a productive laboratory for research in social relations, and placed budget items in several departments earmarked especially for new staff with particular interests in the interdisciplinary study of social behavior.

The timing needs to be right for administrative initiative. The Free Speech Movement at Berkeley provided an opportune occasion for Acting Chancellor Martin Meyerson to propose to the Academic Senate that it should establish a "commission on the state of education at Berkeley...to bring together and clarify the many ideas being suggested on the campus" and develop "specific proposals for the revitalization of our educational aims and practice [Select Committee on Education, 1966, p.iii]."

There are many conditions in the three institutions studied which hinder educational leadership, conditions which are frequently found in other institutions as well. Vested interests in educational program and budget abound. Oligarchic control, which usually reflects prevailing campus views and systematically excludes dissent and proposals for change, seriously restricts the invention and consideration of alternative modes of action. An innovative organization is one with a variety of inputs and diversity in background and experience, and a lively interchange of ideas and attitudes is conducive to identification of problems and to ingenuity in proposing possible fruitful alternative solutions (Thompson, 1965).
Extreme decentralization also makes central leadership difficult. When, for all practical purposes, budgetary decisions are widely dispersed, central administrative flexibility in promoting or supporting innovation is seriously limited. Furthermore, policies formulated at lower levels often give central administrators little opportunity for discretion; they are faced with accepting or rejecting proposals without having had any voice in their development. Segments of the organization tend to resist initiative and influence from outside their own territory. This phenomenon is familiar to organizational specialists as "boundary maintenance."

One of the greatest obstacles to administrative leadership is the existence of essentially separate faculty and administrative jurisdictions. We have already discussed at considerable length the difficulties which central administrators at Berkeley face in penetrating the senate's policymaking committees. Joint participation and shared authority at least provide the opportunity for administrative initiative and influence. Separate jurisdictions accentuate the boundaries between faculty and administrative roles and prerogatives, and they make joint deliberation and exchange of ideas and information difficult. Administrators are left with little to do but react to what others propose or decide.

Finally, excessive external control by state coordinating boards--systems like the University of California or the California State Colleges--or state agencies--such as the California State Department of Finance, which often extends control over detailed budget items, restricts the president's power to allocate resources, support innovation and experimentation, and reward faculty participation in new educational enterprises. Without a substantial degree of budgetary flexibility and discretion, university presidents will have limited influence in the development of their institutions.

Joint participation in decisionmaking, the availability of uncommitted resources, and the lively interchange of information and ideas, however, will not be enough to support administrative leadership. Mutual respect and trust are essential. "Any social structure," it is said (Hodgkinson, 1971), "is bound together by a social cement which consists of equal parts of reciprocity
and trust." Structure may facilitate reciprocity, openness, respect, and trust, if not always accord. But in the end, trust depends upon the quality of human relationships. Such relationships at Fresno State College suffered from a tradition of autocratic administration, circumscribed information, and inadequate communication. This background of distrust made administration and leadership difficult for a new president disposed toward faculty participation in decisionmaking and committed to the formal methods of consultation which the faculty had devised. Berkeley's separate jurisdictions make reciprocity between faculty and administration difficult and would seem to set the stage for more distrust than actually develops in the uneasy faculty-administrative relationships which have been discussed in Chapter III. Perhaps the greatest degree of mutual trust was found at Minnesota, together with the least effort of the central administration to use it in guiding the university toward the attainment of well-defined institutional purposes.

CABINET GOVERNMENT

Although he should accept responsibility for broad educational leadership, the president of a large complex institution will have to exercise it in large part through his central administrative staff, as well as through deans and other principal administrators. The cabinet system of college and university government has become necessary because the range of decisions is now so great as to require a division of labor in administration and a very considerable degree of delegation of responsibility and authority. The Faculty Handbook at Fresno State College appropriately provided that the Academic Vice-President "is the president's principal consultant on educational policy and academic personnel matters, is responsible for academic planning, and is the principal officer responsible for the development, quality, and evaluation of the instructional program." It is apparent that the president needs at his side not only an able vice president for academic affairs, but also other immediate associates who are sensitive to
the need for educational change and who are capable of mobilizing the efforts of many individuals and organizations to that end. These close associates need not be faithful copies of the president; in fact, they should make certain that all sides of a key issue are fully discussed in the cabinet. Nevertheless, they should be in fundamental agreement with the president's educational and administrative policies. They will be full-fledged members of a working team to whom the president will be able to delegate a large degree of discretion and authority, and who will know when to defer action until they have consulted with the president. Such relationships should inspire trust and confidence among those whose activities must be closely articulated, as well as confidence on the part of other administrative officers and faculty members in the consistency and integrity of administrative action.

SELECTION OF ADMINISTRATORS

The procedures for the selection of vice presidents and other principal administrative officers were formally specified only at Fresno State College, among the three institutions investigated. The procedures provided for a consultative committee on the nomination of vice presidents and the chief financial officer. The regulations specified that the selection committee should consult with the president in reviewing qualifications and in insuring a thorough canvass for candidates, but the president was not a member of the nominating committee. The team which studied faculty government at Fresno took the position that the president should play an active role in the choice of his immediate administrative associates. The team therefore considered that the president's remoteness from the nomination of these associates was a basic lapse in the general practice of joint faculty-administrative participation in decisionmaking in the college. The team recommended that the president be made a member ex officio of the consultative committee for the nomination of vice presidents.

In institutions as large and complex as the three
under consideration, central administrative officers will of necessity share educational leadership with the deans of the schools and colleges. The relationships between the deans and the president are, by the peculiar status of the deanship, somewhat different from the relationships between the president and his vice presidents. To be effective, vice presidents must be acceptable to the faculty. But deans have more intimate faculty relationships. An experienced administrator (Wicke, 1963) has described the dean as the man in the middle. "The academic dean," he said, "must construe whatever authority he may have as delegated from president and faculty." This writer went on to say that the phrase "man in the middle" precisely designates the dean's function—"to be a potentially creative link between faculty and administration." He added that once the dean moves out of the middle position, he is no longer useful because he now finds it impossible to work with both president and faculty.

A recent study (Lunsford, 1970b, pp.171-209) of the views on authority of top administrators in 69 major universities revealed some significant differences in the orientations of presidents and what were called "academic administrators"—vice presidents for academic affairs and academic deans. For example, the academics were less likely than presidents to agree that flouting of rules was always wrong or to take a stand against all lawbreaking. They were also less likely to give special weight to "publics" whose support was needed, to review faculty for university "citizenship," or to take the position that there were no interest conflicts between the university and individual members. They were also less likely to say that administrators tend to be more loyal to their institution than faculty or students, that university executives have more natural talent for decisionmaking, or that the president is the most nearly impartial decisionmaker on the campus. The academics were more likely than presidents to take the position that student power is sometimes necessary, and that civil disobedience can sometimes rejuvenate a campus.

The differences in attitudes between presidents and deans may make administrative policy decisions
difficult at times, but we consider it highly important to have the views of the academic administrators represented in the administrative councils.

At Fresno, the regulations concerning the nomination of the school deans stated explicitly that administrative officers above the school level were excluded from the nominating committee. The surveyors concluded that this exclusion was inconsistent with the general policy of faculty-administrative participation, and especially with the deans' dual accountability. Therefore, they recommended that the president or his representative should serve as a member ex officio on committees to nominate deans.

The Fresno consultative procedures specified that selection committees for vice presidents and deans should forward one or more names to the appointing officers. The survey team believed that a single nomination might give the president insufficient discretion in making an appointment acceptable to all parties. Therefore, the team recommended that the procedures be amended to provide that the selection committees should make at least three nominations unless the appointing officer agreed in advance of formal action that a single nomination was acceptable. Such revised procedures would sensibly share responsibility while strengthening the president's leadership and statesmanship.

THE NECESSITY OF AUTHORITY

The need for leadership does not preclude the exercise of authority when a decision must be made. Faculty participation in college and university governance is now taken for granted. In higher education, as in business and industry, there is a new emphasis on democratic processes. One of the leaders in humane and democratic management was Douglas McGregor, who served as President of Antioch College and also as Professor of Industrial Management at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Antioch College is widely known for its emphasis on community participation and responsibility. Its central administrative committee, which is formally
only advisory to the president but which actually exercises a great deal of power, has long been composed of administrative officers, faculty members, and students. At Antioch, McGregor tested his theories of democratic management. In the process, he discovered that administrators must make decisions. At the time of his resignation at Antioch, looking back on his administrative experience, he wrote (Bennis & Schein, 1966):

Before coming to Antioch I had observed and worked with top executives as an adviser in a number of organizations. I thought I knew how they felt about their responsibilities and what led them to behave as they did. I even thought that I could create a role for myself that would enable me to avoid some of the difficulties they encountered. I was wrong!

I believed, for example, that a leader could operate successfully as a kind of adviser to his organization. I thought I could avoid being a "boss." Unconsciously, I suspect, I hoped to duck the unpleasant necessity of making difficult decisions, of taking the responsibility for one course of action among many uncertain alternatives, of making mistakes and taking the consequences. I thought that maybe I could operate so that everyone would like me—that "good human relations" would eliminate all discord and disagreement.

I could not have been more wrong. It took a couple of years, but I finally began to realize that a leader cannot avoid the exercise of authority any more than he can avoid responsibility for what happens to his organization. In fact, it is a major function of the top executive to take on his own shoulders the responsibility for resolving the uncertainties that are always involved in important decisions. Moreover, since no important decision ever
pleases everyone in the organization, he
must also absorb the displeasure, and some-
times severe hostility, of those who would
have taken a different course /p.67/.

Patterns of authority and influence in higher
education are changing rapidly. Faculties have gained
in power at the expense of administrators and governing
boards, and in many institutions faculties will continue
to challenge administrative authority. Students have
attacked faculty prerogatives, but they have especially
assailed presidents and other central administrators.
Both faculty and students have challenged the represen-
tativeness and the authority of boards of trustees.
Some governing boards have responded by including faculty
members and students as voting members. In many insti-
tutions, joint faculty-student-trustee committees or
special task forces have been established for joint con-
sideration of a wide range of institutional affairs.
These direct relationships between faculty members and
students with trustees may make the president's position
extremely difficult, and in some cases almost untenable.
A student of governance (Hodgkinson, 1971) observed
recently that

...with informal contacts established, faculty
and student groups can go directly to the
board without going through the president,
causing considerable erosion of the president's
position. A subjective guess about trustees
is that they too are less trusting than in
the past and that they no longer feel the
classic responsibility of the board to protect
the manager. This change will cause a further
decline in the power of the president, and will
further the factionalism which is already wide-
spread [p.146.7]

While we favor joint participation in decision-
making and wide sharing of authority, our study of inter-
nal governance in the three institutions, as well as our
analysis of organizational behavior, leads us to con-
clude that an administrator may have to reach an inde-
pendent judgment which may sometimes not satisfy all
parties—many of whom have conflicting interests. The
administrator should not act arbitrarily, and he should
take full responsibility for his decision. The wider
participation in decisionmaking that is emerging on
many campuses will not make administrative authority
obsolete, even if it makes it more difficult to exercise.
The participation of many constituencies may even make
administrative authority more essential—and also more
visible. These constituencies will also require admin-
istrators to state the policies that guide their decisions.
We do not believe, either, that administrators
should renounce all initiative. Faculty members and
trustees, even students, should hesitate to invalidate
the president’s leadership and to destroy his central
position in the institution, for "leadership is the
fulcrum on which the demands of the individual and the
demands of the organization are balanced [Bennis, 1966,
p. 77]."

What Gardner (1965) said of the role of leaders
in the larger society can also be said of their role
in the university:

They can serve as symbols of the moral
unity of the society. They can express the
values that hold the society together. More
important, they can conceive and articulate
goals that lift people out of their petty
preoccupations, carry them above the conflicts
that tear a society apart, and unite them in
the pursuit of objectives worthy of their
best efforts [p. 127].
The pattern of authority, power, and influence in American higher education is changing rapidly. In such a period, the viability of faculty government becomes a matter of critical importance. The faculty's future role in governing colleges and universities will be significantly determined by how it manages its affairs as a corporate body; how it reconciles faculty authority with administrative authority; how it accommodates its professional interests to the comprehensive legal prerogatives of the governing board. These were the subjects of intensive investigation in three large, complex public institutions. We turn now to a consideration of ways in which faculty government might be organized and conducted more effectively, and particularly to possible means of restoring the academic senate as a deliberative body. One means of accomplishing this is to make the senate an effective representative agency.

SENATE SIZE AND EFFECTIVENESS

The size of the senate has much to do with its effectiveness in policymaking. It should be large enough to keep it from being monopolized by a single faction, yet small enough to permit vigorous debate on substantive...
issues. There were differences in perspective among our respondents concerning effective size. Some faculty members at Fresno State College believed that its senate of 75 representatives of a total faculty of approximately 600 members was too large to permit meaningful debate. A senate of 75 members would be too small to provide adequate representation of a faculty three or more times as large as that at Fresno. On the other hand, Berkeley's town meeting senate was too unwieldy in periods of crisis and too poorly attended under ordinary circumstances to be an effective deliberative body. During crises, attendance often reached 1200 members whereas ordinarily only about 125 members appeared, and frequently the quorum dissolved before the end of the agenda. The representativeness of the small attendance was often questioned. After several years of town meeting government, the Berkeley faculty voted in the spring of 1970 to establish a representative assembly.

REPRESENTATIVENESS AND PARTICIPATION

In some quarters it is now fashionable to disparage representative government and to advocate some form of "participatory democracy." The reason given for abandoning representation is "simply that an individual cannot place his trust, the security of his future, and the integrity of his rights in the wisdom of just any representative government with any certainty that they will be protected [Perry, 1970, pp.2-47]." The panacea, presumably, is to let all of those who are materially affected by a decision take direct part in making it.

We do not share the disenchantment with representative government. First of all, faculties do not have to accept "just any representative government." They can see that all constituencies have an opportunity to elect deputies. The electorate can protect itself to an important degree by limited but reasonable terms of office. It can further protect itself by providing for full faculty or senate review of the actions of a representative body, for referendum, and perhaps for removal from office. The faculty can also arrange for assemblies
of the whole membership, or of various constituencies, to express views, press representatives for certain kinds of action, and hear reports from those holding office. There are many ways to assure widespread participation in debate on substantive issues, crises, and alternative forms of action. One device is the appointment of special task forces with membership drawn from both the representative body and the faculty at large. Participation might take the form of the Council of the Princeton University Community, composed of elected representatives of all of the constituent parts of the university—administration, faculty, undergraduates, graduate students, professional staff, and alumni. This Council proved to be an effective forum for communication, debate, and plans for constructive action during the Cambodian crisis. Presumably, many of the proposals made by such an organization would have to be submitted to other bodies for formal action. However, without subverting the formal structure for decisionmaking, such institutionwide bodies can provide the medium for communication among all the elements of the community and for debate over issues of policy and operation.

Presumably, the alternative to representation is government by town meeting. Proponents of this method of decisionmaking usually ignore the fact that, because of the apathy or political and organizational ineptitude of eligible voters, a shrewd and aggressive clique often seizes control of, or paralyzes, the decisionmaking processes. Long experience has shown the impracticality of government by town meeting in large-scale organizations.

Another means of restoring the vitality of faculty government is to decentralize decisionmaking. The difficulty of assuring direct participation in large institutions led Hodgkinson (1971) to propose a system of "selective decentralization," in which activities directly affecting individuals should be handled in the smallest possible groups, while purely logistical matters of little individual significance should be managed on a larger, perhaps institutionwide scale. Our study of governance in three large institutions convinces us that this general proposal greatly oversimplifies the problem, which (as
we have observed in Chapter VI) is to fit the constituent parts of an institution into a coherent whole. This is difficult to achieve because departments or units of the university tend to promote their own interests and goals.

The phenomenon of goal displacement is familiar to students of organizational behavior. As noted in Chapter VI, when an operating unit of a larger organization concentrates on its own interests or purposes, its goals easily come to displace those of the institution as a whole. As was pointed out earlier, in order to avoid goal displacement it is essential for an institution, first of all, to formulate educational plans and priorities, and second, to require decision-making units, however distinctive and diverse in their particular programs and operations, to fit appropriately into the grand design. Within the constraints of a cooperatively developed plan, financial resources—resources which are already scarce and will get even scarcer in the immediate future—should be centrally allocated, along with broad standards of faculty quality and performance which should also be centrally established. Within these limits, decisionmaking with respect to curriculum, personnel, and the deployment of financial resources should be decentralized to designated instructional units. However, as was emphasized in Chapter VI, there must also be continuing, or at least periodic, joint central and segmental review of the efficiency and integrity with which the constituent units, while pursuing their own stated purposes, conform to the educational priorities of the institution and contribute to its goals. Centrally, this review of major decisionmaking at lower levels should be made both by the Academic Senate, usually by its committees, and by administrators. Defensible decentralization of decisionmaking requires clearly defined policies, consultation when policy needs to be clarified, cooperative reconsideration of policies which are challenged, fidelity of administrators and faculties to established educational priorities, and full communication between and across all levels of the organization.
COMMITTEE ACCOUNTABILITY

Another way for a senate to restore its vitality as a deliberative body is to hold its committees accountable. Although there has been some improvement during recent campus crises, senate committees at Berkeley have usually made the most perfunctory reports. Many decisions have not been reported at all, and when they have been communicated, the policies on which they were based, if any, have seldom been stated. This general lack of committee accountability was finally recognized by the Committee on Senate Policy, which declared:

These committees traditionally have acted on behalf of the Senate, but have rarely formulated and submitted to the Senate for action comprehensive statements of policy which could be used to govern their decisions...Consequently there has been little Senate debate and direct vote on some extremely important matters of policy (Minutes, October 11, 19657).

When time permits, committees, instead of acting for the senate, should lay before the parent body, for debate and action, the issue at stake, alternative courses of action, and the relevant questions of basic policy. If committees take over the senate's decisionmaking power, the latter will ultimately become impotent. We have pointed out in Chapter II that the Executive Committee of the senate at Fresno had indeed taken too much authority to itself, and in doing so had weakened the senate as a forum for debate and decision on substantive educational questions.

An effective senate will encourage broad participation in decisionmaking and decline to commit its power to a small ruling elite which ignores dissenting or minority views.

When committees typically act for the senate instead of engaging it in debate on substantive issues, one suspects that this procedure masks a concentration of power in the hands of a relatively small number of faculty members or in a faction of the senate membership. Our investigations showed that, in fact, this had happened
at all three institutions and especially, perhaps, at Fresno and Berkeley.

OLIGARCHICAL RULE

"Who says organization says oligarchy," said Michels (1959, p. 401). One might paraphrase this by saying that "Who says academic senate says oligarchy." Our investigation confirmed that members of academic senates could be roughly classified into gladiators, spectators, and apathetics, much as citizens can be so distinguished in the general polity. In other words, except in periods of crisis, faculty government is in the hands of a relatively small number of activists. These gladiators, or oligarchs, usually control—and sometimes withhold from the electorate at large—the information on which decisions are based. The possession of this information enhances their potential power to guide decisions toward specified ends. Oligarchs often play a useful role in representative or democratic systems of government. They enable a larger organization to function efficiently. They do this in part by saving most members of the organization the necessity of acquiring, analyzing, and classifying information, and also by acting expeditiously when it would be cumbersome and time-consuming for the larger group to decide the issues. Oligarchs as "amateur academic administrators" may provide a bridge between faculties and administrations.

But there are also dangers in oligarchic rule. Gladiators tend to become insulated from the feelings, perceptions, and views of the organization as a whole. Remote from their constituencies, they thus become less responsive to the changing moods of the body politic. Furthermore, they may become especially divorced from particular segments of the faculty. The data at all three institutions showed that the most important and powerful senate committees were composed predominantly, and sometimes almost entirely, of older faculty members in the tenure ranks. The academic generation gap between professors over 50 and assistant professors under 30 or 35 is likely to be substantial on a wide range of
educational and social values. The oligarchs are likely to be either unaware of these discrepancies or unwilling to consider unorthodox views (Trow, 1970).

We found in all three institutions that, with few exceptions, the most important senate committees were composed of people who subscribed to a dominant policy or position—to the views of the academic establishment. For example, at Berkeley the Committee on Committees almost invariably selected for service on the senate committee which made recommendations on appointments and promotions only faculty members who believed that research was the primary and indispensable qualification for advancement and tenure. If dissenters appeared at all on such powerful committees, they had only token representation. This concentration of views not only ignored an important constituency, it also deprived the committee of the diversity of inputs necessary for adequate consideration of issues and the formulation of alternative solutions. This both impoverished the committee's deliberations and attenuated debate on the senate floor. Such disregard of dissenting views could alienate liberal or radical factions and encourage them to use disruptive methods of breaching the system.

Therefore, we believe that the senate, ordinarily through its Committee on Committees, should make a deliberate effort to see that its committees are widely representative of both majority and minority points of view. It is possible that administrative participation in making committee appointments will assure greater diversity. At least, an administrator who wishes to encourage educational reform and innovation will discourage oligarchic monopolies and urge variety in age, representation of departments and schools, and especially educational philosophies. Administrative participation in committee selection will not guarantee variety, but it at least provides an opening for administrative persuasion.

Another danger in oligarchic or gladiatorial control is that the rulers will act to further the interests of their own departments or schools instead of the broader interests of the institution. This is not to say that gladiators are inevitably Machiavellian,
but that it is always difficult for those in positions of responsibility to separate their own interests from those of a larger constituency. Furthermore, it is natural for any group of rulers to act on behalf of the professional guild rather than on behalf of an ill-defined public interest. We believe, consequently, that faculty members should be joined on senate committees with administrators whose responsibility it is to articulate the institution's mission and to identify its relations with its many publics.

The efficiency of oligarchic rule was noted above as one of its advantages. No doubt senate committees can conduct their business with greater dispatch if their members are experienced in university affairs. But the value of detailed knowledge and organizational experience should be weighed against the benefits of wider involvement in the governmental process. Short of a revolt by the outsiders, the concentration of power in the hands of a few veterans will discourage the broader participation which we believe is essential for the viability of academic senates. Therefore, it may be desirable, except on occasions where quick response is essential, to sacrifice immediate efficiency for a sense of involvement and commitment on the part of the senate membership, and to stimulate debate in the faculty as a whole. The decisions of a representative senate need the support of widespread assent. There is little hope of avoiding or controlling serious campus disruption unless the great body of the faculty can agree on the necessity for nonviolent methods of dissent and protest. No such unanimity is either likely or necessary on proposals for educational change.* Here, too, however, the

*Research on political behavior has shown that while consensus—defined as 75 percent agreement—on abstract principles may be high, it is difficult or impossible to reach on specific questions. Most proposals for educational reform are unlikely to enlist 75 percent support; they may be fortunate to enlist a bare majority.
innovators must secure wide enough support to give legitimacy to proposals for change if these reforms are to be given an opportunity to prove their value.

While we underline the importance of broad faculty involvement in debating substantive educational questions, and while we are willing to sacrifice a degree of efficiency for wide participation, we also point out that the system of faculty government must provide for prompt initiative and response when emergencies break out. In such situations it may be necessary for a committee created for that purpose to act quickly on behalf of the entire senate.

As pointed out earlier, the Academic Senate at Berkeley traditionally has been reluctant to empower any committee to act for it in moments of extreme crisis, or even to consult with the administration on behalf of the Senate. The senate declined to establish an Executive Committee, and not until 1969, after the senate's inability to respond effectively in a series of campus disruptions, did that body authorize its Policy Committee to act and consult in emergencies. At Minnesota, on the other hand, the Faculty Consultative Committee and the Steering Committee of the senate have been used to expedite business and to consult with administrative officers. Presumably, the present Steering Committee, which is composed of both faculty and students, is empowered to act promptly when conditions require immediate response. The representation of dissenting views in executive committees is as essential as it is on other senate committees. An executive or consultative committee which ignores divergent views will be neither informative to administrators nor effective in mobilizing faculty support for actions taken without prior debate. The necessity of quick action does not justify secrecy with respect to the facts and policies which dictated the decision. An executive committee's continuing legitimacy will depend on full disclosure even if that necessarily occurs after the fact.

JOINT PARTICIPATION

Our research began with the assumption, and ended with the conclusion, that joint participation and shared
decisionmaking are preferable to segmented authority.
In Chapter III we discussed two alternative forms of
organization for governance: separate faculty and ad-
ministrative jurisdictions and integrated decisionmaking
structures. The formal organization at Fresno State
College and the University of Minnesota provided for
joint participation. At Fresno, for example, central
administrative officers were ex officio members of cer-
tain key senate and college committees; at Minnesota,
administrators have frequently served as members of
senate (and now assembly) committees by tradition and
custom. The University of California at Berkeley, on
the other hand, has operated under a system of separate
faculty and administrative jurisdictions, and until re-
cently there has been limited formal consultation and
liaison between the two spheres of authority. The evi-
dence indicated, as noted earlier, that a system of
separate jurisdictions sets the stage for confrontation
when recommendations reach administrators who must act
on them without having had any voice in their formulation
--as has occurred frequently at Fresno and Berkeley.
This system puts more emphasis on an unadulterated
faculty voice than on collaboration in determining edu-
cational priorities and resolving controversies. The
system also severely limits the input of relevant in-
formation and possible alternatives from both faculty
and administrative sources. Such considerations as these
lead us to support the principle of joint participation
and shared authority.

It was clear from our investigations, however,
that joint participation did not preclude conflict between
faculty and administration. Although the structure at
Fresno provided for joint faculty-administrative decision-
making, subject to the final authority of the president
or the chancellor of the state college system, the college
was torn by internal disension. On the other hand, the
University of Minnesota, where administrators frequently
served on senate committees, was characterized by good
relationships between faculty and administration. One
concludes that structure provides the opportunity for
constructive collaboration and peaceful resolution of
conflict, but that many other factors determine the
effectiveness of joint effort. These factors include administrative orientations and administrative style, faculty attitudes toward administration and administrators, the degree of polarization between faculty factions, the practice of civility or the prevalence of personal attacks, commitment to rationality or resort to coercion, openness or secrecy of operation, the tradition of autocratic administration or democratic participation, as well as the sensitiveness or provocativeness of governing boards and external agencies which influence the campus. Finally, the structure of joint participation offers the opportunity for administrative leadership although it cannot guarantee its effectiveness.

ADMINISTRATIVE LEADERSHIP

The administrator's position, title, or hierarchical status will not bestow on him the mantle of leadership or legitimate his authority. The essence of leadership in the university inheres in the reciprocal relationships between faculty and administrators in pursuing the goals of the institution. Leadership rests on mutual respect and trust. An administrator will not gain trust merely by asking for it. "The problem of leadership, as against mere officeholding," said Lunsford (1970b), "is how to win and keep affirmative support from followers, so that more than mere institution-guarding is possible, and ventures into organizational change, experiment, and risk-taking become compatible with executive 'survival' [247]."

The key phrase here is "to win and keep affirmative support." After studying administrative orientations, Lunsford came to the conclusion that administrators are often unable to lead because they have no constituency. The lack of an affirmative mandate and the absence of ready-made methods of collaboration often dispose administrators to shun controversy over substantive educational issues and to absorb themselves in administrative detail and day-by-day management of an essentially static organization. Lacking affirmative support, college and university presidents, or for that matter academic vice presidents and deans, are more likely to take refuge in high
abstractions than to encourage debate on concrete educational priorities. Instead of avoiding issues, the administrative leader will make them visible. Instead of camouflaging diverse and competing interests, he will bring them to the surface where they can be debated in the light of established policies or as a means of hammering out new guidelines for action (Lunsford, 1970b, pp.245-55). Our observations at various administrative levels strongly indicate that open involvement in matters of educational policy is a better way for administrators to achieve mutual trust and to influence educational decisions than to leave the field to oligarchic control of a "dissensual status quo." We agree with Lunsford that administrative leaders can exercise genuine statesmanship when they look beyond managerial efficiency "to the deeper efficiency of critical decisions based on serious and open debate (p.253)."

Admittedly, there are serious obstacles to leadership. Extreme decentralization encourages decisions inconsistent with the overriding values of the institution. Separate faculty and administrative jurisdictions hinder mutual consultation, discourage administrative initiative, and provide little opportunity for persuasive leadership. Under such circumstances (as has been pointed out in Chapter III), the administration is almost always in the position of having either to accept or to veto the recommendations of senate committees.

Ruling oligarchies, which tend to represent dominant factions and positions and to exclude proponents of decisive change, offer the administrative leader few options for selective support. One of the functions of leadership is to select fruitful ideas of other administrators and faculty members, help innovators find allies, and provide budgetary support for new programs. Innovative ideas, of course, need not appear only in committees; an alert administrator may find them among many other faculty members and students. But unless the formal committee structure encourages free criticism and unconventional ideas, administrative leaders may be hard put to find fresh and imaginative proposals to espouse.

Leadership, of course, is more than the selective support of others' ideas. Administrators need to take
the initiative in proposing new educational programs or new processes of governance. It is paradoxical that we found few instances of administrative initiative in the two institutions in which the governmental structure presumably provided the greater opportunity. It was at Berkeley, which was characterized by separate faculty and administrative jurisdictions, that we found the best example of presidential initiative and leadership. Chapter VII recounts briefly the way in which Chancellor Clark Kerr, working closely with committees of the academic senate, undertook a far-reaching program to rebuild the weaker departments. After Kerr left the chancellorship, however, the senate reverted again to more clear-cut jurisdictions and an independent faculty voice. For example, in 1964 the chancellor was removed from the Committee on Committees in order to "sharpen the distinctiveness" of senate as opposed to administrative committees. It is interesting that many of the respondents in the Fresno study asked for more administrative leadership, and that at Minnesota there has been growing evidence of administrative initiative in academic affairs.

We do not believe that administrative leadership is dispensable. Our conclusion from the admittedly limited but nevertheless intensive study of governance in three large institutions is that leadership is more essential than ever. A journalistic observer (Sale, 1970) wrote recently that in looking for new presidents, universities now seek men of low profile who are more likely to conciliate than initiate, to consolidate rather than innovate, and to mediate rather than to stimulate debate. A Berkeley faculty member was quoted as having said, "There are few dreamers and innovators on top...Rather, the goals of the administrators appear to be maintaining the multiversity system as a smoothly running machine."

And so universities are deliberately turning away from leaders and innovators to administrators who can maintain or restore peace on their campuses.

Other pressures are for presidents to become practitioners of management science. Large sums are now being spent on the development of complex information systems, methods of computing unit costs, instituting
productivity controls, and procedures for systems analysis in colleges and universities. When these methods are adopted, the president must have a staff trained in techniques of management, but he himself had better understand what goes into all of these systems and the limitations of what comes out. If he is ignorant about these matters, effective decisionmaking may devolve on an administrative and technical staff ill-equipped to act on questions of far-reaching academic significance or deep personal consequence to faculty and students.

College and university presidents can no longer escape the necessity for more efficient operation. And in calmer times Kerr (1963, pp.36-38) once said that the first task of the president is to keep peace among student body, faculty, administration, and trustees. Even then, however, he declared that it was sometimes necessary to sacrifice peace to progress. More recently (Kerr, 1969), he has recast his statement to read that "Progress is most important to peace." Only leaders who are capable of mobilizing the human and financial resources of the university in adapting it to new conditions can infuse it with a new vitality.

SENATES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

The growth of unionism and collective bargaining in higher education poses a serious threat both to academic senates as deliberative bodies and to administrative leadership in a system of shared responsibility. To date, the major emphasis on collective bargaining has been at the junior college level. (An informal survey conducted in New York State in the Fall of 1969 disclosed that 16 out of the 30 community colleges outside of New York City had negotiated contracts [McHugh, 1969].) However, unionism is spreading to other public institutions. The passage of the Taylor Act in New York has given impetus to unionism in that state. The City University of New York has been operating under a formally negotiated contract since September 1969. It was expected that an election to select a bargaining agent
would be held in the State University of New York in the Fall of 1970. In the Spring of 1970 the six New Jersey state colleges were negotiating contracts to be effective in the fall. At Rutgers University the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) has been elected as the bargaining agency. Collective bargaining has been gathering momentum in other states.

There has been competition among faculty organizations over which is to represent the faculty in the bargaining process. At the time of our study at Fresno State College, there were five faculty associations with external ties vying for preference. Recently, two of the more militant of these organizations have merged and may be expected to take an aggressive stance in promoting faculty interests. (It has since become affiliated with the AFL.) The initial hearings before the Public Employment Relations Board in New York in 1968 found six different faculty organizations contending for the right to serve as the bargaining agent. In such conflicts, the academic senate is normally a contender. However, whether or not the senate becomes the bargaining agent, unionism will profoundly affect its functions.

For example, if an agency other than the senate became the bargaining agent, it would be difficult to separate economic issues, such as salaries, work loads, and employment rights (normal aspects of union contracts) from questions of educational policy, curriculum, qualifications for advancement and promotion, and tenure (normal concerns of academic senates). Experience to date has been insufficient to suggest the ultimate effects on the senate, but its normal functions and its cherished independence from external control would seem to be jeopardized.

If the senate itself becomes the bargaining agency, it will almost certainly lose its character as a deliberative body whose sanctions are those of rational debate, and assume an adversary posture ultimately supported by coercive sanctions. The setting has been described by Kugler (undated):

The board of directors is the board of trustees; the managers are the president and the host of
deans. It is these groups that wield the power and authority and determine the destiny of a university. To be sure, they have woven a web of faculty senates and councils which simulate the original role of policymaking that university faculties once had. The adversary nature of these bodies provides them with some active role in curriculum and student affairs but virtually no part to play in securing the necessary finances to provide professional salaries, work load, and working conditions.

Governance based on adversary relations and coercive methods may prove to be inimical to governance by joint participation and shared authority. It is probably also inimical to the exercise of administrative leadership through widespread consultation and collaboration, because under collective bargaining, the president presumably would represent management, and instead of sitting with faculty committees around the table, he would face them across the table.

Unionism and collective bargaining were not phases of the investigation discussed in this volume. Furthermore, these forces are so new that their effects cannot yet be determined. The hypotheses suggested in the paragraphs above may be useful in further investigations of the influence of collective bargaining on the structures and processes of faculty and institutional governance.

NORMALITY OF CONFLICT

Those who yearn for peace in the university will find that it is a relative condition. Universities may hope to free themselves from serious disruption and violence, but it seems certain that they will have to live with controversy and conflict for the foreseeable future. There are many sources of discord. One is disagreement over the fundamental nature of the university. Opposed to those who insist that the university's purpose is to search for the truth, analyze the shortcomings of
society, and propose methods of social reform, but avoid direct social action, are those who would make the institution an active instrument of social revolution. The debates on the relative emphasis between teaching and research, and on the primacy of professional versus liberal education, will continue. On a more mundane level, there will be a struggle for scarce resources and demands for greater autonomy among the subunits of the institution. As illustrated in earlier chapters, there is growing tension between faculty and administration, faculty and governing boards, and there may be growing conflict between faculty and students. Unionism and collective bargaining will intensify adversary relations among faculty, students, administration, and trustees. There will be a continuing struggle for power among all these constituencies. These controversies and conflicts will be considered normal to the university, and the resolution of such dissension, rather than the management of violent disruption, will be the subject of the remainder of this chapter.

Students of organizational behavior have attempted, without great success, to formulate alternative models of university governance. They have discussed bureaucratic, democratic, collective bargaining, and other prototypes. (These, and other models, are discussed in an unpublished paper prepared by D. P. Hayes and J. G. March for the Assembly on University Goals and Governance.) Perhaps a general political model offers a useful framework for resolving conflicting university interests. The political system is essentially a mechanism for translating competitive interests and internal conflict into policy; Foster (1968) has said:

The central issue...is whether it is better to approach the university as an organization in which unity, harmony and consensus is the norm and the ideal, or whether it should be seen as a forum for permanent conflict.

Our assumption is that conflict should be regarded as a natural phenomenon in academic governance. Although conflict could be so intense as to destroy the university,
it may stimulate progress and innovation (Smith, 1966). Conflict can lead to greater understanding of substantive issues and to more rigorous debate about alternative courses of action. Social theorists have argued that institutionalized conflict is a stabilizing mechanism in loosely structured organizations and open societies. By permitting direct expression of conflicting claims, these societies can realign their priorities and procedures by eliminating sources of dissatisfaction and causes for dissociation. Thus, through tolerating and institutionalizing conflict, organizations may reestablish unity, or at least reach a tolerable solution to the issues that divide them (Coser, 1956, p.152).

INSTITUTIONALIZING CONFLICT

Institutionalizing conflict through open debate and democratic processes governed by accepted rules can serve the following purposes: 1) encourage not only orderly, but also reasonably rapid change; 2) promote more responsive organs of government representative of a broader range of constituencies; 3) stimulate more diverse inputs leading to the substantive consideration of a wider range of alternatives and more persuasive proposals for change; 4) reduce pressure on committees to reach artificial consensus, ignore or suppress dissenting views, and resist debate over opposing views and alternative courses of action; 5) strengthen the legitimacy of the structures and processes of governance and make them responsible to a wider range of constituencies, to the end that faculty and students may believe that governance is more responsive to diverse interests and may accept decisions openly arrived at as reasonable restraints on their behavior; 6) direct debate to substantive educational issues instead of toward relatively inconsequential administrative details.

These are some of the advantages to be gained.

By what methods can conflict be institutionalized in the university setting?

Institutionalization requires bases of representation designed to assure that decisionmaking and review-
ing bodies will include members holding diverse points of view. It is important for all major divisions of the institution to have a voice in governance (we found that certain departments and professional schools at Berkeley were underrepresented in senate committees), but this is not enough. In addition, those responsible for appointments to committees, task forces, and other deliberative or decisionmaking bodies should make certain that each major faction or position has more than token representation. Representation by point of view is probably more desirable than representation by faction, since the former may vary from issue to issue, and appointment by faction may encourage party rigidity and loyalty regardless of the substantive question at hand.

The major hazard in incorporating diverse points of view is that regularized conflict among constituencies in a university may lead the participants to believe that controversies between majority and minority groups are irresolvable. This could lead to greater rigidity and stronger polarization. This danger suggests that diverse representation should not include extremists who would only attempt to paralyze the decisionmaking process. The institutionalization of diversity and controversy underlines the necessity of devising mechanisms for resolving conflict.

Another means of institutionalizing conflict is to encourage committees to present alternative solutions or recommendations for consideration by legislative organizations such as academic senates, rather than to present only the final conclusion of the committees' own analyses and debates. Deliberative bodies should develop an attitude of skepticism about unanimous reports on substantive educational questions.

In order to discourage rigid and polarized views, standing committees should be few in number, and ad hoc committees or task forces should be used to investigate educational problems, formulate alternatives, and clarify educational policies. The new criterion of representativeness (by points of view) proposed above should be kept in mind in the selection of these task forces. For example, a committee appointed to consider qualifications for advancement and promotion that is composed
only of research-oriented faculty is unlikely to give adequate consideration to teaching effectiveness.

The responsiveness of representative agencies should not be left to chance. Methods for assessing their accountability and their performance should be established. Perfunctory reports which conceal more than they disclose, which was long characteristic of many senate committee reports at Berkeley, should not be accepted. Now and then committees may consider questions which require confidentiality, but such occasions are probably fewer than the proponents of secrecy claim. Too often confidentiality is a screen for resistance to change or for the protection of vested interests.

One of the most important tasks in institutionalizing conflict is to clarify lines of responsibility and authority. The responsibility of each level and structure of governance should be defined, and the kinds of decisions to be made by departments, schools, and colleges and by campuswide agencies should be specified.

A central element in the clarification of responsibility and authority is the recognition that both the product and the process of governance are important. Increasingly, people are insisting on the value of participation itself. This means that decisions will be evaluated not only on their substance, but also on how they were reached. This emphasis on involvement should lead to greater sophistication about how decisions are made and how they should be made. The Fresno study revealed that many faculty members were preoccupied with these questions. Against a background of autocratic administration, the faculty had adopted detailed regulations designed to guarantee joint participation by faculty and administrators in academic decisions. The Faculty Handbook went so far as to declare that "The appropriate consultative body shall be consulted on the manner in which it wishes to be consulted in the formulation of policy and the development of the administrative procedures."

The formal documents at Fresno specified grievance procedures which enabled any person to request a hearing if he believed that the consultative procedures had been violated in the formulation of any recommendation or
procedure. The investigators concluded that the regulations were excessively detailed and legalistic, and so cumbersome that there was more wrangling over detailed procedures than substantive questions (Deegan, McConnell, Mortimer, & Stull, 1970, pp. 74-86). Nevertheless, the regularized consultative processes and procedures for faculty or administrative review of decisions made at various levels is a necessary element of due process which is being applied increasingly to both student and faculty affairs. A system of institutionalized conflict must adapt itself to this requirement of defined relationships and shared information.

Finally, we believe that changes in the composition of governing boards will be necessary in order to institutionalize conflict. First, lay members of boards of trustees should no longer be confined mainly to those who represent wealth, position, or political power. Governing boards, as well as the institutions over which they preside, must become responsive to a wider range of economic interests, to a pluralistic political constituency, and to a more diverse pattern of ethnic and cultural backgrounds. Second, governing boards should be reconstituted to include a substantial proportion of faculty representatives. The British precedent may be instructive. As of 1962, the proportion of senate representatives on university governing councils ranged from about 20 percent to one-third. It would seem appropriate for faculty representatives to comprise a comparable proportion of the voting members of the governing boards of American colleges and universities. Third, either student representatives should become voting members of governing boards, or formal arrangements should be made for continuing liaison between students and the board. Fourth, to supplement the formal association of students and faculty members with governing boards, there should be numerous opportunities for joint discussion among administrators, faculty members, students, alumni, and other constituencies. To this end, either formal councils should be established or special task forces should be created, or both (McConnell, 1969a).

The future viability of traditional organs of faculty government is by no means assured. Dissident
groups have attacked the representativeness of academic senates, and especially of senate committees. Studies at the three institutions showed that this criticism was justified. Some system of better representation will have to be devised if majority sentiment is not to stifle minority dissent, discourage wide participation, and resist change. This problem is not peculiar to academic senates; political scientists have long been interested in methods of curbing the arbitrary power of majoritarian government. On the other hand, the system must be able to protect itself from the tyranny of organized minority interests. There is no easy solution to the balancing of commonly held and dissident views in the general polity, and the solution is no simpler in faculty government. Some suggestions for managing controversy and conflict, however, may be found in modern political theory (Dahl, 1963, pp.77-87).

First, constructive adjustment to conflict is more likely if the system of governance incorporates effective methods of consultation, negotiation, and exploration of alternatives. Second, controversial issues should not be papered over; instead, they should be made the subject of open debate. Third, if conflicts are allowed to become cumulative, peaceful revolution may become increasingly difficult. If individuals or groups are consistently at odds with one another, opinions may become polarized, party lines rigid, and attitudes uncompromising. Polarization between extreme factions at Fresno State College had reached this stage, which led the observers to say that if the polarization becomes so rigid that the votes on any issue can be predicted accurately in advance, it will be increasingly difficult to arrive at considered judgments on significant questions of policy (Deegan, McConnell, Mortimer, & Stull, 1970, p.86). One of the unfortunate consequences of continuing conflict is that some of the protagonists may become so personally and emotionally involved as to resort to invective. This also had occurred at Fresno, and it was sufficiently disruptive as to lead the investigators to suggest that the extremists who had resorted to personal abuse should retire from the conflict. Civility is essential to responsible government.
Fourth, it is imperative that all concerned—administrators, faculty members, and students—should be committed to orderly change. This means that majorities will have to abjure arbitrary domination of minorities. It also means that minorities will have to be willing to accept and abide by decisions made democratically until, through due process, these decisions can be superseded by more acceptable ones. When a faculty fails to follow orderly processes of governance and fails to resolve its differences without disruptive strife, it invites intervention by administrators and governing boards.

Fifth, if the rulers resist orderly change, they will invite coercion. If coercion is successful, it is likely to be repeated until it becomes the accepted pattern of action. Because collective bargaining relies on adversary relations and force, it is incompatible with the political process of institutionalizing conflict. It is doubtful that an effective academic senate can coexist with a separate bargaining agency. If the senate itself should become the bargaining agent, it is difficult to see how it could serve at the same time as an influential deliberative body. Senates as bargaining agencies would probably operate more like professional guilds than responsible and accountable policymaking bodies.

We believe, too, that coercive methods are inimical to greater involvement by all constituencies in a system of shared authority. It is essential for those involved in institutional governance to remember that colleges and universities are not syndicalist societies (except for Oxford and Cambridge). They do not exist solely to serve faculty and student interests. They have many constituencies. They perform numerous functions. Their accountabilities are multiple and sometimes conflicting. There is a struggle for influence and power among the groups which have a stake in the institution. Administration as bureaucratic management will be incapable of resolving these conflicts. Administration as leadership may be able to do so by encouraging trustees, faculty members, students, and administrators to explore together the deeper purposes of the university,
in the hope that the great majority of its members will come to share the attitudes and values essential to the attainment of these goals. Is it too much to hope that this continuing dialogue throughout the university will move faculty associations to articulate their interests with the legitimate claims of the rest of the institution and its publics?
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