Actual attempts to justify curricula are differentiated from attempts to characterize the justification. Consideration of these first and second order types of justification reveal three phased components. These are: evaluation of curricular effectiveness in attaining proposed goals; examination of the compatibility of these goals with a given value system; criticism of the value system itself. An attempt is made to outline and use such second order curricular justification. Recent works which have presented the basis for a more explicitly differentiated and coherent second order characterization of curricular justification are discussed and the logic of justification is considered with an analysis of four stages of justification: verification, validation, vindication, and rational choice. This analysis provides seven possible moves in attempting to justify something. One of these, the transcendental argument, is discussed in detail. The "grammar" of curriculum and some perspectives from which curricula can be evaluated are considered in conjunction with this type of justification. A comprehensive list of references is included for further exploration and research. (TA)
THE JUSTIFICATION OF CURRICULA *

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I. INTRODUCTION

I want, at the outset, to distinguish between actual attempts to justify curricula and attempts to characterize what such justifications typically do and what they ought to be like. Starting at least as early as Plato, the former first-order attempts at curricular justification have frequently been made but, as I see it, not much has been done with respect to the latter second-order type of accounts of curricular justification. To the best of my knowledge there are four systematic attempts to produce second-order characterizations of curricular justification, although there have been other attempts to do so for education in general which have obvious relevance for curricular justification. In addition to these systematic attempts one can read certain second-order accounts into discussions about curricula. One stimulating article by Professor Huebner combines both a second-order discussion of curricular justification and a first-order use of justification procedures. The heart of his comments of the former type can be seen in this quotation:

"The problem of value is the most significant one faced by the curriculum worker. Unfortunately, most discussions of the problem are subsumed under this heading of purpose or objectives. The problem of value is closely tied to the processes of criticism. It is frequently through acts of criticism that implicit values are made explicit (art criticism) or that the need for new values is realized (social criticism). The major source of educational criticism internal to the educational process is evaluation. Almost the sole criterion for measuring the value of a school or curriculum is "How well were the goals achieved?" As the conceptual model of learning is thought by some to provide a model for teaching, so the conceptual model for evaluation is thought by most to be the model for curriculum planning. The existing model for evaluation, technically conceived, is fine and very productive. As a model for curriculum, the evaluation model is inadequate. Furthermore, evaluation is not the only form of valuing which may be brought to bear on educational processes. It could well be that the failure to provide other valuing procedures, or preferably, other forms of criticism, has led to the desire for a national testing program. It is so easy to criticize on the basis of ends achieved or not achieved, for this requires no discipline except for the instrument maker. To use other forms of criticism in the search for other values requires much more skill and knowledge."
In section V of this paper I will consider Professor Huebner's paper in more detail. For now, let me simply say that from the first and second order kinds of discussions the following picture of the elements of curricular justification seem to emerge:

**Phase 1** - The curriculum is subjected to tests to discover whether or not it enables students to attain the goals for which the curriculum was designed.

**Phase 2** - The goals, which serve as criteria in Phase 1, are themselves examined to see whether or not they are acceptable within a particular "value system" usually characterized in the English-speaking world as the "democratic way of life."

**Phase 3** - But surely, it is sometimes argued, that value system itself is, at least under certain conditions, open to challenge and must, itself, be justified. In other words, there is a third sort or level of test of some kind which needs to be applied. This test is variously described, but is often rather vaguely referred to as "criticize the value system itself" or evaluate in terms of a "philosophy of life" or "philosophy of man."

It seems to me that in some recent philosophical works are the seeds of a more explicitly differentiated and coherent second order characterization of curricular justification. This paper is an attempt to sketch that second order characterization and to make a bare beginning in using it.
II. THE LOGIC OF JUSTIFICATION

Overview

If person A makes a value judgment (X is good) or a prescription (you should do X) and person B asks, "Why is X good?" or "Why should I do X?" then person A is under an obligation to come up with an argument to support his value judgment or prescription. To do this, he must produce a special kind of argument sometimes said to be the result of a special kind of reasoning called "normative reasoning".

Let us distinguish between partial and complete justification and ask ourselves what kind of argument one would have to have to produce a complete justification. The best answer I know of to this question is contained in a book by Paul W. Taylor. It is Taylor's contention that a complete justification would consist of four steps or stages, which he labels "verification", "validation," "vindication" and "rational choice." We can get an overview of the four stages by giving a brief characterization of each stage:

a) Verification. In evaluating something, what we do is to adopt a criterion (eg. respect for free speech) and decide whether or not the thing we are evaluating fulfills the criterion or fails to fulfill it. Finding out whether or not it does fulfill the criterion involves the procedures of verification.

b) Validation. Here we attempt to show that the criterion adopted in evaluation was a good criterion. This we do by appealing to a "higher" or "more fundamental" principle or principles (egs. freedom of speech and respect for persons) which we believe would show clearly that our criterion is a valid one.

c) Vindication. If we are still pressed for further justification the next stage involves trying to show how we arrived at our evaluation and our validation. We explicate our reasoning in an effort to show that it is good reasoning.
d) **Rational Choice.** We are now at the final or highest stage of justification. What we do here is try to show that carrying out the other three stages, and reaching the conclusions we have, fits into a way of life which, under the best conditions for choice we can attain, we have chosen to follow.

Thus, the four stages differ in the kind of thing we do at each stage:
Stage one consists of matching results with a criterion; stage two consists of appealing to higher principles; stage three consists of displaying reasoning; and stage four consists of an appeal to a whole way of life. In curriculum books in which careful attention is given to justification, the author often presupposes a certain way of life, for example, the way of life characterized as "democratic," and does not therefore devote much time to a defense of choosing that way of life. Nor, in most cases, is the author usually concerned to vindicate his methods of reasoning—he is more concerned to use the methods than to explain what they are. He may make use of verifications that have been made of curricula but these do not provide his main focus. Usually, the chief interest of a curriculum justifier is to show that the criteria a curriculum fulfills are at least compatible with the principles implicit in the way of life which has been accepted.

A. **Verification**

Verification is one part among four in complete justification. It is, as it were the "lowest" stage in justification. What one does in making a verification is to discover whether or not the thing being evaluated fulfills a criterion. Actually, there is more to verification than that and it is our task here to explore just a bit further.
Like the word, "justification," the word, "evaluation" may be used to refer to a procedure or to the product of a procedure. Usually, the product of a verification procedure is a value judgment like "X is good," or "X is right." In order for a value judgment to be a value judgment, five conditions must be fulfilled:

(1) There must be a class of comparison
(2) There must be a criterion.
(3) The thing being evaluated must have characteristics which enable us to tell whether it fulfills or fails to fulfill the criterion (fulfillment characteristics).
(4) The judger must take some sort of attitude toward the thing being evaluated (pro, con or neutral).
(5) The judger must have adopted a point of view.

If someone (call him Mr. A) were to make a value judgment, "This is a good social studies curriculum", what would be the class of comparison? Usually the curriculum is being compared with other social studies curricula, perhaps to all other social studies curricula. In making this value judgment Mr. A. could use, as at least one of his criteria, the standard of respect for freedom of speech. A social studies curriculum which created, on the part of students following it, respect for free speech, would fulfill the criterion. But the fulfillment characteristics displayed by the students as a result of following the curriculum might be such things as:

(a) The students insisted that everyone get a chance to have their say in discussion groups.
(b) The students argued for low taxes on newspapers.
(c) The students favored laws which support "equal time" for political candidates.
--- and so on.
Finally, it is rather obvious that Mr. A took a pro attitude toward the curriculum and that, at least in part, his point of view was a double one--both social and moral--or, to put this another way, the curriculum was deemed a good one from both points of view.

Thus far, we have talked as if evaluation takes only one form. However, three different basic forms (or kinds) are possible:

Form 1  Grading according to standards. (Let us call this S-grading.)
Form 2  Grading according to rules. (Let us call this R-grading.)
Form 3  Ranking.

Before we see how these three forms, S-grading, R-grading and Ranking, could be used to evaluate curricula, let us look at each in a somewhat simpler context.

**S-grading:** Suppose we are judging cars for their comfort. It makes sense to say that Car 1 is uncomfortable, Car 2 is fairly comfortable, Car 3 is comfortable, Car 4 is very comfortable and Car 5 is extremely comfortable. This shows us the two main features of S-grading: a) The criterion we use as the basis for our evaluation is a standard. b) Things can fulfill standards in differing degrees. Thus, we can evaluate things on a simple two-part scale (e.g., comfortable or uncomfortable) or on a multiple-level scale (as in our example of the five cars).

**R-grading:** Suppose, however, that we are concerned to discover whether or not the headlights on our cars are correctly adjusted as set down by a law. Now we are evaluating according to rules and the notion of degrees is not applicable; either the headlights conform with the rule or they do not; they are right or wrong, correct or incorrect.

**Ranking:** In order to rank things we must go through two steps: a) we first of all S-grade the things to be ranked, as we did for instance with the five cars. b) We then compare the degree to which the things fulfill the standard (R-grading cannot be used for Ranking), and rank them. Thus, in ranking our cars from the point of view of comfort, we might say something like the following: Car 1 - worst, Car 3 - average, Car 5 - best.
In the examples we have just dealt with, it is very unlikely that someone would become confused about which form of evaluation we were using. But in some cases it is not always clear whether a person is S-grading, R-grading or ranking. One reason for this confusion is that some words typically are used to announce the results of any of the three forms. This is true, for instance, of the words "good" and "bad." It can, of course, be important in curriculum evaluation to know, when a curriculum is said to be "good," whether it has been S-graded, R-graded or ranked.

We cannot tell for certain, on the information given, whether Mr. A was ranking the Social Studies curriculum as well as S-grading it, but if we assume that Mr. A was an experienced educator who had used more than one Social Studies curriculum, then it would seem likely that he was, at least implicitly, ranking. He was, as it were, perhaps unconsciously, comparing that curriculum to others he had used. It is important to notice how much difference it would make in our attitude toward a curriculum if it were rated as "good" on the one hand by S-grading or on the other hand by ranking. If S-grading were used, the evaluation would tell us that the curriculum had fulfilled the criterion to a fairly high degree. If, however, the evaluator was ranking it and called it "good" he could be ranking it within a group of curricula the others of which were very bad. In such a case, "good" would only mean something like "the best of a bad lot." Because there can be a world of difference between "fulfills to a high degree" and "best of a bad lot" it is obviously of great importance to know whether the evaluator is S-grading or ranking.

In R-grading, the criterion used is a rule, law or principle. It seems to me that R-grading is not so likely to occur in curriculum evaluation, except in two sorts of circumstances:

(a) With respect to the content used: if, for instance, one wondered whether a curriculum was being used to propagandize students. In cases like this an evaluator would grade the curriculum as wrong (if indeed it was used
for propagandizing) because within our way of life it is considered to be immoral to tell lies of certain kinds. This principle (rule) is at least as old as Plato, who averred that deceivers about truth are the very worst kind of deceivers. (b) A curriculum might also be graded according to rules if it were thought to be illegal in its content (à la Scopes, for instance.)

In addition to other oversimplifications we have permitted ourselves so far, there is one we must now discard. We have talked as if a curriculum was a unitary uncomplicated sort of thing which could be evaluated in a rather straightforward way. But this is obviously misleading, for curricula are typically very complex constructions indeed, consisting, at least content-wise, of many parts--each of which could be evaluated. To have the conceptual tools to handle complexities of this sort we must introduce the concept of good or bad "on the whole" and also take note of three "types of value." The verification of something as good or bad "on the whole" is easy to understand but extremely difficult to carry out in practice. In fact, as far as evaluation is concerned, it is what presents curriculum evaluators with one of their greatest difficulties. Curricula typically have many parts and the parts themselves have parts. Aside from the difficulty of deciding, as it were, upon the size of the parts to be evaluated, the curriculum evaluator then is almost certain to run into the problem that some parts of the curriculum can be evaluated as good while other parts turn out to be fair or poor. He may then be asked to answer a question like "Is it good--on the whole?" And that sort of question is further complicated if he is ranking the curriculum, for he then may need decide whether the other curricula are themselves good or poor on the whole.

Many of those who have made a study of the difficulties of curriculum evaluation constantly insist that the aims and objectives of curricula be made explicit. One of the chief reasons for this should now be easy to see--in evaluating a curriculum one tries, in part, to decide whether the use of curriculum fulfills the intentions of the designer or user of the curriculum.
Not only do curricula have complex parts as far as content is concerned but they also usually consist of a complex set of intentions. The only way that an evaluator can tell whether or not a curriculum is good on the whole is to have a clear idea about both intentions and content, for it is often the intentions which provide the criteria for verification. It may be because this is such a complex task that so much of the current literature on curriculum theory is about systems analysis or computers, for it would seem to require the use of such techniques if one's evaluations about the "on the whole" quality of curricula are to be based on anything like adequate sub-evaluations.

Historically, curricula have usually been judged for their "instrumental" value. Instrumental value is one type of value things can have. Other relevant types of value are intrinsic value, inherent value, and contributive value. If, as with curricula, a thing has parts then those parts can be evaluated according to the contribution they make to the on-the-whole goodness or badness of the thing. Thus, a curriculum evaluator could assess the contributive value of the parts of a curriculum. A thing has instrumental value if it can be used to obtain some thing or condition other than itself which is, for some reason or other, considered to be of value. Thus, Mr. A. might have judged that the Social Studies curriculum had instrumental value because it had been useful in enabling students to fulfill the standard of respect for freedom of speech. Things which are, on the other hand, valuable in and for themselves are said to have intrinsic value. Actually, only one sort of "thing" can have intrinsic value-viz.-experiences. Because a curriculum is not an experience but is rather something used to produce experiences it cannot have intrinsic value. However, as has been pointed out by at least one writer, there is a tendency on the part of educators to think of school experiences as themselves having only instrumental value--i.e., as leading to learning? It may be that we should be evaluating experiences which result from the use of curricula for their intrinsic value. If we were to look at a curriculum this way, we
would then be trying to decide whether it has inherent value. Something is inherently good if it typically produces in people experiences which are judged as intrinsically good. The idea that curricula should have inherent value is not a new one. Traces of it can be found in Plato's recommendations about early childhood education. It is a dominant theme in the educational writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau and also plays a very large role in the education theory of John Dewey. It may be the root of the demands by student "radicals" for what they like to call "real education." In any event, not only do we have different types of evaluation (S-grading, R-grading and ranking), but one can also evaluate something according to different types of value standards, contributive, instrumental and inherent. Questions about all of these are relevant whenever someone says, "This is a good curriculum." Indeed, until we find out which combination of these categories he is using, we do not fully understand what he is saying.

B. THE PRACTICAL SYLLOGISM AND VALIDATION

1. The Practical Syllogism

Here is the form a syllogistic argument takes:

(a) All A's are B's. (Major premise)

(b) This is an A. (Minor premise)

(c) Therefore, this is a B. (Conclusion)

A "practical" syllogism (so named by Aristotle) contains, as the major premise, an evaluative statement, usually a prescription; as the minor premise, a statement of fact; and, as its conclusion, a second normative statement. Thus, for example:

(a) One ought to promote respect for free speech.

(b) This curriculum promotes respect for free speech on the part of students who follow it.

(c) Therefore, one ought to use this curriculum.

As you can probably see, Mr. A made use of the practical syllogistic form of argument.
This example of the practical syllogism shows how such a form of argument is used to carry out the lowest stage of justification. Consider its use in relation to the five conditions for an evaluation (class of comparison, criterion, attitude, fulfillment characteristics and point of view). The conclusion is a prescription and the premises are used to justify the conclusion. In effect, the major premise expresses the attitude of the speaker and states the criterion he is using to justify the conclusion. The minor premise establishes that the thing being evaluated has the needed fulfillment characteristics. If someone accepts the major premise as a valid one and believes that the minor premise is true, then he is bound, other things being equal, to agree with the conclusion.9

2. Validation

Not only is the practical syllogistic form of argument used at the lowest level of justification, it also is the form of argumentation used in the validation stage of justification. Mr. A made use of it in his argument in an effort to validate the criterion he had used to evaluate the curriculum. In validation one shows that by fulfilling the criterion one has adopted, one is able to fulfill a still higher criterion. Thus, Mr. A's argument can be seen to have taken this form:

(a) Major premise: We ought to have freedom of speech in our society.
(b) Minor premise: The promotion of respect for free speech in our society helps to maintain free speech in our society.
(c) Conclusion: Therefore one ought to promote respect for free speech.

Now we can put the two stages of Mr. A's argument together as follows:

(a) We ought to have freedom of speech in our society.
(b) The promotion of respect for free speech in our society helps to maintain free speech in our society.
(c) Therefore one ought to promote respect for free speech.
(d) This curriculum promotes respect for free speech on the part of students who follow it.
(e) Therefore, one ought to use this curriculum.
In effect, validation consists of appeal to higher and more general principles to support criteria. This procedure could continue "upward" until one reaches the ultimate criteria (principles) of one's value systems. At that point the justifier must switch to vindication.

We have talked thus far as if validation consisted only of appeal to higher criteria. Actually it also must involve three companion types of argument whose task it is to further shore up the appeal to the higher principle. One must show that not only does the criterion (respect for free speech) help to fulfill the higher criterion (free speech) but in addition leads to beneficial consequences for people. Also, one must show that there are no reasons why an exception should be made to the rule of free speech and, finally, one needs to show that by fulfilling the criterion of free speech we would not, at the same time, be acting in conflict with another principle of our way of life which is of importance to us. If one can show that fulfilling a criterion enables us to fulfill a higher criterion, does not conflict with other important criteria, leads to beneficial consequences and that there are no grounds for making an exception in this case, we have then fully validated the criterion. Carrying out all of these aspects of validation in the justification of curricula is extremely difficult, chiefly because it is so difficult to know what the consequences of its use are likely to be and because the fulfillment of some criteria seems to lead to conflict with other criteria. Yet any adequate attempt to justify a curriculum must include a serious effort to handle these difficulties.
C. VINDICATION AND RATIONAL CHOICE

1. Vindication

Most adults have a fairly adequate intuitive grasp of logic. That is to say, they have a grasp of rules which tell us whether arguments are good ones or bad ones. What logicians do is to state such rules as precisely as possible, label them and try to utilize them in systems constructed with much greater than ordinary care. Most people, and curriculum workers are no exception, are more interested in using rules of inference than in stating the rules. Nevertheless, when one is trying to justify something like a curriculum it is very likely to be the case that one will be challenged about the correctness of his reasoning. This can happen at any stage of argumentation but it becomes a critical issue when the justifier has failed to convince others even though he has appealed to the ultimate standards or principles embodied in the way of life he presupposes in trying to carry out the justification. Then the justifier must vindicate his points of view.

Suppose, for instance, that Mr. A has verified the social studies curriculum as good because it encourages respect for free speech among students who follow it, and that he validates his criterion respect for free speech) on the grounds that it fulfills a more general principle of his, namely, that people ought to be allowed to speak freely. Suppose, further, that he in turn validates this criterion of free speech by showing that free speech fulfills a higher criterion, respect for persons. Suppose that this latter criterion is, for Mr. A, an ultimate criterion. Finally, suppose that someone now challenges Mr. A to justify this ultimate principle. Mr. A cannot answer by appealing to a higher principle. He does not have one. He must now switch his tactics. His justification takes on a new form, which Taylor calls vindication. Perhaps the following diagram will help to show how and when vindication becomes appropriate.
THE STAGES OF JUSTIFICATION

Rational Choice

Explication of Canons of Reasoning

Vindication

Respect for persons (Ultimate Principle)

Step two

Validation

Free speech (Lower-order Principle)

Step one

Respect for free speech

Verification

Value judgment
When Mr. A used the principle of respect for persons he had gone as far as he could in appealing to higher criteria. Respect for persons was for him an ultimate principle. When challenged to support his use of that principle he cannot appeal to a higher one because he has no higher ones. He must, therefore, change his tactics and try to vindicate the point of view he has adopted in using that principle in his argument. How does he do this? He does it by showing that his reasoning is sound and he shows that his reasoning is sound by doing two things: (a) By displaying the rules he follows in his reasoning. (b) By showing his challenger that he (the challenger) also accepts those rules of reasoning. Thus, vindication, although it is always the explication of rules of reasoning, may deal with the rules of reasoning of different people.

How is it that vindication can help to justify anything? It can do so because in using it the justifier appeals to rules. These are, of course, rules of reasoning. Whereas in validation the justificatory power of the principles appealed to depends upon the content of the principles used in the argument, in vindication the power comes not from the content of the argument but from showing that the way of arguing is a good way of arguing. The justifier shows that he has followed a good way of arguing by revealing his method of arguing to enable any critics to judge the argument in accordance with the rules of logic.

But a skeptical challenger may still press for further justification. All that is left to challenge (if the justifier has adequately handled the earlier stages) is the entire way of life presupposed by the justifier. The justifier must again switch tactics. He now must show that his choice of a particular way of life is a rational choice.
2. Rational Choice

What is a way of life? I know of no more concise and lucid way of expressing it than Professor Taylor's, hence a rather lengthy quotation:

"I have defined a way of life as a hierarchy of value systems in which each system belongs to a different point of view. Since a value system is nothing but a set of standards and rules arranged according to their relative precedence, it follows that a way of life is simply an organization of different sets of standards and rules. These sets (value systems) are in turn arranged according to their relative precedence. How is their relative precedence determined? In order to answer this question we must first consider what it means for a value system to be relevant to a situation and to be in conflict with another value system. It is only when two value systems are both relevant to a situation and are in conflict with each other that one can be said to take precedence over the other.

In Chapter 5 I gave as an example a situation to which an aesthetic value system and an etiquette value system are irrelevant and to which a moral value system and a prudential value system are both relevant. It was a situation in which one's own life and the lives of others are in danger and one is confronted with the choice of whether to risk one's life to help others. Now the fact that aesthetic considerations and considerations of etiquette are not relevant to such a situation is a fact about a person's way of life. Another person with a different way of life might hold that they are. In the act of committing himself to a way of life, a person subscribed to the principle that, if his own life and the lives of others were in danger, it would be irrelevant to use the standards and rules of aesthetics or of etiquette in deciding what to do. Another person, in committing himself to a way of life, may have subscribed to the opposite principle. We cannot say whether such value systems "really" are relevant or irrelevant to the situation. We can only decide the question on the basis of a given way of life and different ways of life will yield different answers.

What, then, does it mean to say that a value system is relevant to a situation? It is to say that, according to a certain way of life, the standards and rules of that system are to be used to guide the choices and regulate the conduct of those in the situation. And this means simply that the standards and rules in question include the situation in their range of application. According to the given way of life, it is legitimate and proper to judge the choices and conduct of people in the situation by the standards and rules of the value system. Conversely a value system is irrelevant when its standards and rules do not cover the situation in their range of application, and so cannot be used to judge choices or conduct in the situation.
It is possible for two value systems, each belonging to a different point of view, to be relevant to a situation but not to be in conflict. They do not conflict when it is possible for a person's choice and conduct to be in accordance with the standards and rules of both systems. Two relevant value systems are in conflict, on the other hand, when a person's adopting one system in the situation prevents him from adopting the other, that is, when the standards or rules of one system are in conflict with those of the other. From Chapter 3 we know that one standard conflicts with another when a feature of something which is good-making according to one will be bad-making according to the other. That is, in so far as an object fulfills one standard it fails to fulfill the other. And we know that one rule conflicts with another when acts which are right according to one are wrong according to the other. There are different degrees to which two value systems may be in conflict, depending on how many of the standards and rules of one are in conflict with those of the other. ---

It should be noted that the decision as to whether two value systems conflict in a given situation does not depend on a way of life, but on the nature of the value systems themselves. They conflict when their constituent standards and rules conflict, regardless of the way of life that contains them. It is true that conflict does not arise unless the way of life allows the two value systems to be relevant to the same situation. But once this is so, then whether or not they conflict is not determined by a way of life.---

The commitment to a way of life involves the decision to make one value system take precedence over another when they are in conflict.

In summary, to commit oneself to a way of life is to subscribe to certain principles. These principles are of two types: principles of relevance and principles of relative precedence. When we subscribe to a principle of the first type, we decide which value systems shall be relevant to a certain kind of situation and which shall not. In choosing a way of life we make a given system relevant or not relevant to a given situation. Similarly, when we subscribe to a principle of the second type, we decide that one value system shall take precedence over another in a situation where they conflict and to which they are both relevant. In choosing a way of life we stipulate the relative precedence of our value systems. Thus we cannot answer the question why a certain value system is relevant or why it takes precedence over another. We can only say that these simply are the principles to which we subscribe in virtue of the fact that we are committed to a particular way of life. In the very act of committing ourselves, we make value system V relevant to situation S and we make value system V take precedence over value system V'. We cannot give reasons for claiming that V is relevant to S or that V takes precedence over V'. We can only say we have chosen that way of life. Such a choice is our ultimate normative commitment. The only kind of reasons which can be given to justify the principles of a way of life are reasons which justify the way of life as a whole. As we shall see, such reasons consist in showing that the way of life is rationally chosen. ---
But what would be involved in rationally choosing a way of life?

We have seen that some words are used to refer either to procedures (processes) or to the products of procedures. It is tempting to think that this is so for the word, "choosing." When we say, for example, "She's choosing a new dress," it's not entirely clear whether she is now in fact finally making up her mind or whether she is still going through whatever it is that precedes the making up of one's mind. Notice that I say "whatever it is." We do not have anything like an adequate account of what the procedures (processes) of choosing usually consist of. In fact it may not even be sensible to try to produce such an account. The reason is that what makes a procedure a "choosing procedure" is not what we do but rather the circumstances in which it is done. If we choose we always choose between (or among) alternatives. In effect, when we say that someone is choosing or has chosen or has made a choice, what we are saying is that she has been placed in a circumstance where more than one course of action is possible. Often, we are also saying that the differences between the results of selecting one course over another are not entirely clear. When this is the case, we then may do any number and a great variety of things to try to help us decide. For example, we may talk to ourselves (aloud or silently), ask our friends about it, consult books, argue with others, daydream, etc., etc. - choosing as a procedure is not the doing of any one particular kind of activity; it is, rather, doing any number of things in a circumstance where there are alternative courses which can be followed.

It is important to note that a choice (as a product) is always a decision to do something. Choices are always choices between (or among) various actions that one can perform.
What would we mean then if we were to say that someone had made a rational choice? Clearly, we would be saying that the person could give us reasons for choosing to do whatever she did choose to do. Also, and this is most important, we would be saying that the reasons were good reasons. The word "rational" is itself an evaluative word. Its use in a sentence makes the sentence a value judgment, an evaluation. If this is so then to say, "She made a rational choice," is to say something like, "She made a good choice." As a result, the five conditions for the making of an evaluation must be fulfilled (criterion, class of comparison, attitude, fulfillment characteristics and point of view).

When one says that something is rational, the point of view one takes is, roughly-speaking, the logical point of view. One is saying that it is the most reasonable choice one could make; that the actions one has decided to carry out are the most sensible ones available. But how, before they are carried out, can we determine which are the most sensible? Of course, we cannot ever be completely sure. And while this uncertainty holds for even simple choices, it is far more so where what we are choosing is a whole way of life. In such decisions we are deciding which complex set of rules and principles we intend to follow in all that we do. Thus, for example, a man might choose to follow a miserly way of life -- then his every action would be concerned to maximize his hoardings; another might choose an ascetic way of life and shun all the pleasures of the flesh, and so on. The decision seems to involve so many complex factors -- how could anyone make a rational choice of a way of life?

Obviously such a choice is fraught with difficulty. But while we do not have a specific answer to the question, "Which way of life is best?" we do have guidelines for making such a decision. These guidelines are derived from the experiences of both ordinary and not-so-ordinary life. As a result of generations of making foolish and wise decisions men have some idea of the conditions under which the best choices are made. These are the conditions for rational choice. Professor Taylor refers to these as freedom, impartiality and enlightenment. Each of these conditions is extremely difficult to attain.
A person who is under some form of impulse or strong desire (e.g., drug addict) is not free, nor is the person who cannot speak as he wishes for fear that his boss or his government will disagree. But some societies permit, and people have, and do approximate, freedom of this sort. One of the fundamental tenets of democracy is, of course, to provide as much freedom as political means can devise. It is already a part of our way of life, then, to establish and maintain this condition for rational choice.

Impartiality is itself divisible into at least three major sub-conditions; absence of bias, detachment and disinterestedness. Thus, we know that, other things being equal, a person whose only experience of social life is that of a particular community and a particular class is likely to have a bias against other ways of life; and a person brought up under way of life A is more likely to make a detached choice between ways of life B and C than is someone raised under way of life B; and that a judge who does not hold shares in a company is more likely to make a disinterested decision about a case involving that company than would one of its shareholders. As we will see, this has bearings with respect to who should evaluate curricula.

As for enlightened choice, this condition involves not only what might be called "intellectual knowledge" but also practical and imaginative involvement in the various ways of life open for the choosing.

Of course, no one man can attain the freedom, impartiality and enlightenment to completely fulfill the conditions for rational choice. But men live on through their literary, and other, products and other men can share their experiences and do have workable imaginations. This broad community of thought enables us to approximate the conditions. It is the result of this sharing which is sometimes called the 'cultural heritage.' Within this cultural heritage are the thoughts of people who were as free, enlightened and impartial as we have thus far been able to attain. As inheritors of that tradition we do not have to start from scratch in seeking to make a rational choice of a way of life.
However, none of the people whose ideas are preserved in that heritage were completely free, enlightened or impartial. Consider, for example, Aristotle. Few, if any, men have been as enlightened in all its senses (theoretical, practical and imaginative) as was Aristotle—for his time. But, of course, enormous amounts of knowledge have accumulated since his time. Again, Aristotle was free—chiefly because of the protection of powerful people and because of the freedom permitted by the political institutions of Athens of his day. Aristotle was, in fact, almost as free as any man in history until the maturing of modern democracies. Yet even he was hounded for political-social reasons during the last years of his life. It also appears to be the case that he was indeed impartial, relatively-speaking, at least insofar as his writings were concerned. For example, he wrote a great deal on political institutions. He did his writing in Athens, which was to him rather like a foreign country. By analogy, he was in a position rather like Gunner Myrdal (a Swedish sociologist) when Myrdal did his extensive study of racial problems in America. In addition to the impartiality provided him by his origins, Aristotle provided his own basis for impartiality in political affairs by collecting more than two hundred constitutions from many states and made use of these in producing his political works. But, once again, he had his limitations. He was unable to shake off the acceptance of slavery of his Greek culture and he fell behind even his great teacher, Plato, in his ideas about the status of women. But notice, the very fact that we are able to grade and rank Aristotle as free, enlightened and impartial, and to recognize his limitations, shows that we do have standards which we use to do the grading and ranking. In fact, the principles which make up documents like the U.S. Declaration of Independence and the Magna Carta are principles whose function it is to establish general political rules and institutions to guarantee that, as far as possible, people who try will be able to fulfill the standards. And it is precisely the claim of some critics of modern society that its institutions enable us to fulfill the standards only to a limited degree and, for some people, not at all.
It is perhaps obvious by now just how enormous is the task of approximating rational choice. And, to be a complete justification, any justification of a curriculum would have to include not only an explication of a way of life, but also some evidence that the way of life had been rationally chosen. In fact, many of the attempts to justify curricula do not go that far. Often they may include a brief explication of the "democratic" way of life, usually accompanied by an exhortation of the sort so aptly criticized by Professor Scriven:

Some marvelous statements are made about the social studies and moral behavior: 'All education, we may assume, is aimed at the transmission of the values of our culture, and the development of socially acceptable attitudes towards problems and conflicts.' That's the opening sentence of a paper by Preston James, an academician, in the volume that the American Council of Learned Societies and the National Council for the Social Studies produced in the social sciences and social studies....

The National Council for the Social Studies itself is on record as saying that the ultimate goal of education in the social studies is the 'development of desirable socio-civic behavior.'

Rubbish! Not only rubbish, but 'socio-civically' repulsive. If we are concerned with ethics, as those authors assert, then a basic theorem in ethics asserts the right of the individual to make up his own mind on fundamental issues of conduct. That gives us as teachers only the right, indeed in our society the duty, of placing in front of the individual certain facts about the alternatives that are open to him politically and socially, and teaching him the skills that are necessary to assess those facts. It does not give us the right, let alone the duty, to stuff our solution down his throat or in any way to force it on him, except insofar as the facts themselves sell it to him. The remarks quoted are objectionable because in the name of morality they advocate immoral behavior.

How is one who is already committed to a certain way of life going to refrain from getting some of it across? He is not. It's fine if he does. Students should be taught by persons with enthusiasm for their particular solutions to problems. But it is not impossible for a man to have great enthusiasm for his solution to a problem and yet to represent the other side fairly; nor is it impossible to have supporters of different views present their points of view with equal enthusiasm to the student.
This is certainly not a novel position, yet it ought to be something on which the citizens of a democracy take a very strong stand. What is it that we think to be the crucial difference between the school system in our country and that in totalitarian countries? It is that in those countries propaganda is put across in the classroom. The remarks quoted earlier are explicit encouragement to propaganda, as opposed to explicit commitment to learning. Education is not 'aimed at the transmission of the values of our culture.' It is aimed at the transmission of the facts about our culture and other cultures, and the skills that are needed to make the choices a responsible citizen must make. It is also aimed at getting across the facts about what happens if you mix sodium chloride with all sorts of other dull things, which has nothing to do with the transmission of our values. It is dedicated to a great many things; but to say that the purpose of education is to convert children to our way of thinking is to say that the purpose of education is to deny them the right of choice. It is to say that we must abandon the principles of democracy in order to instill them.

Well, enough of that particular anti-slogan sloganeering; I'm only anxious that you see the importance of that particular side of the debate about what the social studies are supposed to do. Selling the principles of democracy and socially acceptable behavior by giving good reasons for them is an admirable undertaking, provided that you also give good reasons, the best reasons, for the alternatives. Selling them by brainwashing is to sell them out.13

What Scriven says about the justification of democracy applies as well to the justification of curricula. In fact, the justification of democracy is the justification of a way of life, which can only be done by showing that one who chooses that way of life is making a rational choice. To completely justify a curriculum one would have to show that the principles it embodied and the way of life it could be used to teach is a way of life one would choose under the conditions for rational choice.
III. The Grammar of Curriculum

This brief summary of Taylor's analysis of justification enables us to pick out at least seven distinguishable kinds of moves one can use in attempting to justify something: (1) verification, (2) validation by appeal to the principle of benevolence, (3) validation by appeal to other principles, (4) validation by showing the absence of conflict among principles, (5) vindication by explication of one's canons of reasoning and relevance, (6) vindication by what is sometimes called a "transcendental argument", (7) display of the rationality of one's choice of a way of life.

While examples of each of these moves can be found in literature about curricula, one type has begun to be deliberately used only recently, the so-called transcendental argument. Its use, and the notion of points of view shall be the main topic of the rest of this paper. In this section I shall discuss, for reasons which I hope will shortly become apparent, the "grammar" of curriculum, and in Section IV discuss some of the points of view from which curricula can be evaluated. The point of all this will be to show partly by using the transcendental argument form, how adopting the educational point of view commits us to using certain sorts of criteria in verifying and validating curriculum evaluations. But first, let me pin down, in terms of curriculum issues, what I intend to try to deal with.

Justification usually arises in a situation where someone challenges someone else to give reasons for deciding to do whatever he has done,
is doing or is going to do. If Mr. B. challenges Mr. A. in this way, one sort of move which Mr. A. can make is to show to his challenger that something he (the challenger) has done or said already commits him to support what Mr. A. has chosen to do. In rough outline this is the sort of move sometimes labelled a "transcendental" argument.

In the field of curriculum, two sorts of decisions can be justified: decisions to make or to use a curriculum. Making a curriculum consists of two sorts of acts, selecting from the cultural elements and arranging the selections. Thus, one can be asked to justify the arrangement or the content of the curriculum he is making, or has made. When one is asked to justify his decision to use a curriculum, other questions arise, such as - why use it with these students at this time, but the questions of arrangement and content remain.

Ignoring the question of arrangement, several types of justification questions can be asked about content, two of which are: (1) Within a class of comparison, all of whose members are of the same type (eg. - all are mathematics curricula), how does this curriculum rank? (2) Within a class of comparison, wherein the members are of markedly different types, how does this curriculum rank? For example, is mathematics more important than sensitivity training? The latter kind of question is far more difficult to answer than is the former. One reason why this is so is that the latter question more obviously drives one to levels of justification beyond verification. It is this question which comes up whenever one asks about the balance or the worthwhileness of a curriculum. I shall try to indicate how a transcendental form of argument could be used in an effort to answer the balance question.
The answer which the transcendental move seems to indicate unavoidably connects with another important issue in education which has much bearing on curriculum - viz. - is schooling supposed to revolutionize or reshape society, or is it supposed to conserve and preserve society? 

It is obvious that there are different ways in which we commit ourselves to doing and supporting things. Sometimes, as when we knowingly sign a contract, we deliberately and explicitly commit ourselves. Sometimes we commit ourselves by accident, which is why people are careful not to scratch their heads at auctions. Certainly there are many ways in which we unconsciously or implicitly commit ourselves. Analytic philosophers have done much study of the implicit commitments we make when we use certain terms or speak in certain sorts of contexts. For example if someone asks, "Why should I study ethics?" he has, in effect, by the very asking of the question, committed himself to the study of ethics. Roughly, he has done so because of the implicit commitments he has made in asking the question. Unless he asks it as a joke or in a state of drunkenness; in other words, if he asks it seriously, he presumably wants an answer and not only that but the best answer possible. Otherwise, as Professor Peters puts it, there would be no point to the question. Because he uses "should" he probably wants a normative answer, and since ethics comprises at least one part of man's best efforts to answer normative questions, the man implicitly commits himself to the study of ethics.
By using the same form of argument Professor Peters shows how we can implicitly commit ourselves to various moral principles. Once a challenger has been shown what he is committed to by this form of vindication, then the way may be cleared to use such principles in validation of criteria.

We can commit ourselves as individuals by word or deed (of commission or omission). Is there something analogous to this at the level of cultures or societies? It seems obvious to me that there is. The ovens at Dachau and the canyons of Manhattan are both evidence of the sorts of commitment made by societies. One of the major indices of its commitments is a society's institutions and, along with them, the language it uses to talk within and about those institutions. Schooling is one such institution and a major part in it is played by curricula. Let us try to see what this institution and the language used to talk about it seem to commit us to. It was characterized through a biological metaphor by Dewey early in *Democracy and Education*. The characterization I give here is pretty much the same as Dewey's, but issues from a different metaphor. Professor Schwyzer talks of the "grammar" of a practice. His notion of the "grammar" of a practice can be explicated in three ways: (1) "What sorts of things are, in a logical sense, relevant or appropriate to say with regard to ..." the practice, (2) the occasions and purposes of a practice, and, (3) the "... 'role' of an activity in the lives of those for whom it is a practice."

Contrast two activities which are, at least for some people, practices, non-competitive jogging and competitive amateur soccer, for the sake of brevity, referred to, respectively, as jogging and
soccer.) The role of these is, respectively, exercise and recreation. The occasion for jogging is a sedentary life; for soccer the social distinction between work and leisure. What sorts of things can we sensibly say about each of these activities? Soccer we would call a game; jogging an exercise. In describing them differently as a game or exercise, we indicate their differing grammars. The most obvious difference between them is that while it makes sense to talk of winning in soccer the same notion is irrelevant and inappropriate when applied to jogging. The occasion for soccer is a society in which people are tied for certain portions of their life to a job and the 'need' (want?) to get away from it. The point of soccer is to get away from it by taking part in non-serious rule-governed competitive play. Not all recreational activities are rule-governed or competitive (consider beach combing) but all recreations derive from the work-play occasion and have "getting away" as their point: Games are a sub-category of recreations. Their differentia within that category is that the notion of winning is relevant. Jogging's occasion and point make the notions of winning or getting away irrelevant but, because it is an exercise, notions of adequacy and stress are relevant in important ways. The grammar of a practice determines what is logically relevant. A person who confounds grammars may say something that is logically odd about a practice - for example, who won at jogging today?

When a practice has spread very widely in a culture and/or has become more or less officially organized, we then call it, or the facilities organized to carry it on, institutions. It seems to me that the notion of a grammar applies to institutions as well as to practices. It has traditionally been argued that a triad of institu-
tions, the family, the church and the school all share a common occasion, the fact of immaturity - but only the school has been, as it were, expressly designed for this occasion.

What is the grammar of schooling? As Dewey saw it, and I think he is right, the occasion for schooling has four aspects: (1) birth and death of each constituent member of a society. (2) the great contrast between the mature and immature members of society. (3) the fact that man can exist at only a primitive level without a social order. (4) the fact that intentional agencies can best promote learning. Of course, as Dewey saw it, the first three form the occasion only for education; the latter is required, in addition to those three, to provide the occasion for schooling. The distinction between schooling and education is, as we shall see, significant in considering the purposes of schooling.

I am sure that one could find a great variety of purposes which govern activities called "schooling". Because they seem particularly relevant in the justification of public school curricular practices, I want to draw attention to three distinguishable sorts of purposes which are usually the major ones for schools. Because our terms are ambiguous, it is not easy to select ones which unequivocally pick out these purposes, but I have chosen to call them "training", "socialization" and "education". Insofar as the term is applied to practices having to do with humans, it is appropriate to apply the term "schooling" to the activities of any intentional agency (institution) occasioned by four factors mentioned, and whose aim is any one or all three.
The point of schooling can be to train or socialize or educate people, or any combination thereof. In effect, what we call schooling is usually a mixture of the three sorts of practices, all with a common occasion but differing points.

Successfully trained people are those who have developed or acquired, partly or wholly, as a result of the deliberate activities of the agency, know how, skills and propensities needed for their own or society’s productive endeavours. As used here, therefore, “training” is intended to pick out vocational preparation. “Socializing” is used, on the other hand, to pick out minimal attainments in what might be called moral or normative preparation. It is quite possible to distinguish between a moral system and morality. Socialization is achieved when a person has internalized a moral system by accident or through the deliberate activities of an agency. What so often is called “moral education” or (more appropriately), “moral training”, is aimed at what I have called here socialization. It can be attained, in principle at least, without student or teacher ever taking the moral point of view; it could be achieved, that is, via such means as conditioning or propaganda.

Now I want to argue that the grammar of both training and socializing lack features found in the grammar of education. These features have to do with the point or purpose of the three sorts of practice. Both training and socialization aim at behavior, as Aristotle would call them, productive and practical behavior. Education aims at much more — it aims at behavior on good grounds or for the right reasons and it aims at appreciation and it aims at breadth.
In the productive realm, the grounds or reasons come from an understanding of relevant theory, are the result of going beyond technical attainments to theoretical attainments. It is chiefly on this basis that we distinguish between the technician and the professional. His knowledge of the theoretical enables the professional to do what he does on the basis of an explanation of the phenomena with which he deals. But it is not enough that the person know the explanation, he must also have what Professor Peters calls "commitment." I think that term is too strong. Commitment suggests proselytizing, or something very near it. It seems to me to be enough for the person, in addition to knowing the relevant theories to know also what counts as evidence in that area, what, as Professor Schwab puts it, the syntactical structures of the area are, that the person appreciates high quality or sophisticated use of the syntactical or substantive structures and that he is to some extent "possessed" by those structures, i.e., that when he views the world he does so with and through those structures.

Knowledge, appreciation and possession are enough to warrant calling the procedures which produce them "education", as long as that term is modified by the name of a specified field of study - for example, medical education. But before the whole person, as it were, can be labelled "educated", without restriction, there must be a certain (vaguely defined) multiplicity of areas in which he has attained knowledge and appreciation and become possessed. This is the breadth factor in education. It is interesting to note that a person needn't be a professional to be said to be educated - even within a specific field. Both the technician and the professional have the relevant
skills; the professional has in addition the theoretical knowledge. But someone could be educated in that field and lack the skills possessed by either. In other words, a high degree of interpretive knowledge is enough to warrant being called "educated". Were this not so the breadth aspect of education would be difficult indeed to attain. Most educated people attain applicative knowledge in only one rather restricted area; in the others they do well to be able to use their knowledge to interpret and appreciate the applicative operations of professionals. Of course, faced with the need to do something, they would presumably act out of the knowledge they had. This is part of what is meant by "being possessed".

This has important bearings as I see it on the practical realm, for unlike the various special disciplines, each of us is continually forced to choose and act in situations where normative and moral considerations are paramount. Specialization is the order of the age in the productive realm; we are all general practitioners in the normative realm. In spite of this difference the role of education vis à vis socialization parallels its role vis à vis training. In both cases education is concerned to carry the learner on to an understanding of the grounds for behavior. In training, the grounds are derived from explanations of phenomena; in socialization the grounds grow from justifications of behavior. Just as it is the purpose of education as a practice to enable the learner to obtain a grasp of the substantive and syntactical structures of various disciplines, so it is the role of education to lead the learner to an understanding of substantive theories of ethics and the syntax of normative discourse.
Are there in the practical realm analogues to those of appreciation and possession in the productive realm? It seems to me that there are, but that here the task of education is far more difficult because, as mentioned earlier, in our way of life it is at least the ideal that every adult be his own normative practitioner. This demands reaching the applicative level. Here Peters' term is the right one – commitment is the goal – not to a moral system but to the use of rationality in practical affairs. And breadth in the productive realm is matched in the practical realm by the need to know and attain as far as possible the conditions for rational choice. Is it realistic to expect public schools to get students to attain such commitment to and understanding of rationality in practical affairs? As presently organized, I doubt it. Quite apart from the opposition that schools would meet on the part of religious groups and many individual parents if they tried to achieve this, it seems unlikely that there are enough teachers who know enough about ethics and normative discourse to be able to guide students even to interpretive appreciation and some degree of rationality in normative matters.

Within the practices of schooling what is the role of the curriculum? As I have explicated more fully elsewhere, someone who says that he has a curriculum, says two interrelated things – that he has an intention of a particular kind and that he has found or worked out some sort of subject matter designed in an attempt to fulfill the intention. A curriculum maker has the intention of getting somebody to learn something and he selects certain cultural content in an effort to have his target group learn what he intends. He selects the means as a result
of his implicit or explicit acceptance of certain "bridging beliefs". For instance, a curriculum maker whose intention was to induce moral behavior might use as a means the reading of certain passages from the bible. His bridging belief, stated at a fairly high level of generalization, would be: The reading of religious tracts will produce moral behavior. This bridging belief, although it appears to be false, has had, historically at least, many adherents.

In addition to what the term "curriculum" says (in ordinary language), its use also presupposes that certain conditions hold. It presupposes that the content requires a fairly high degree of cognitive involvement on the part of the target group and, more importantly to our purposes here, it presupposes at least a quasi-official or institutional situation - in Dewey's terms the occasion for the concept of curriculum consists in part of the existence of an "intentional agency" established for the purpose of getting someone to learn something. In other words, the occasion for the concept of curriculum is the same as that for schooling. In effect the concept is used to state that we have intentions and to refer to the means we use to carry out the intentions of the agency. It does not make sense to talk about a curriculum in a situation where people do not intend to get someone to learn something or where someone does not have some sort of subject matter in mind with which he thinks the intention can be fulfilled.

Fundamentally then, as Professor Stake has pointed out, there are two evaluation questions which can logically be asked about any curriculum: (1) Does it achieve what its maker intends? (2) Is what it is intended to achieve worthwhile? The procedures we use to answer these are what
Taylor calls, respectively, verification and validation (backed perhaps by vindication and rational choosing.) Asking the latter question of course gets one into the heart of justification; the former involves chiefly empirical procedures. Given, then, that what I have said above gives us a rough indication of the grammar of curriculum, what does the acceptance of that grammar commit us to? This can be seen by seeing how the notion of points of view can be applied to curriculum evaluation.
IV. POINTS OF VIEW

As previously mentioned, whenever one evaluates, one adopts a point of view. Which, among the many points of view possible, seem to be the ones most relevant in curricular evaluation? In part, it depends whether the curriculum is designed to produce training, socialization or education. First, the prudential point of view: In adopting the prudential point of view, a person is, in effect, seeking to discover precepts of the form, "If, under the given circumstances I want to achieve the greatest possible happiness, then I must etc." Each would be asking, as it were, what's in it for me? The following types of people seem likely to be ones for whom, in adopting the prudential point of view, a curriculum or its use might be of some importance: students, teachers, curriculum makers, school equipment suppliers and school board members. The reader can undoubtedly think of others. Each such person, in preparing to take the prudential point of view, would ask himself, "If this curriculum were to be used, what effects would it have on me?" If each has adopted the prudential point of view, there could be an enormous difference in criteria used, for example, by a student and a school board member, even if both say of a particular curriculum, "that's a good curriculum." The student might have in mind the degree to which his use of the curriculum would enable him to become trained enough to obtain a certain job; the school board member might be evaluating the extent to which the use of the curriculum in the schools of his district will increase his popularity at the polls. Someone adopting the prudential point of view will usually presuppose that the curriculum will enable students to learn what is intended. The person then asks a further, and now prudential, question, "Will my (if the questioner is a student) or his (if he is someone else) learning x lead to the furtherance of my happiness?"

Normally, for reasons explicated by Professor Baier, self-regarding criteria legitimately take precedence over other - regarding criteria. But schooling is, by intent, an institution in which other-regarding considerations are made paramount over prudential considerations for the officers of the institution.
Schooling has as its occasion the facts of mortality, immaturity, the advantages of social life and of institutional life. The point of schooling is to institutionalize the efforts of the mature to help the immature in certain ways. Thus, schooling is, and teachers and all those organizing the institution are, by role, other oriented.

There is an institutional analogue to the prudential point of view which was revealed in Mr. Wilson's infamous "What's good for General Motors is good for the country" blunder. In adopting this point of view, the vested interest point of view, the members of a group ask what benefits will accrue to their group, not as individuals but for the organization, if such and such an action were to take place. This point of view also is deliberately reduced in weight by the institutional arrangement of schooling. These facts are usually fairly well recognized, at least at the verbal level, in dialogues about schooling, where the concern for the welfare of students is always presented as the reason for supporting policy x or y. However, it is often difficult to distinguish between reasons and rationalizations.

I find one of the most glaring lacunae in current discussions of curriculum evaluation to be systematic attempts to deal with those who carry out so-called informal curriculum evaluation. The literature seems to talk as if only "professional" evaluators count. This may be an ideal toward which we should strive; but it seems to me to be no representation of fact. Isn't the fact of curricular evaluation at least as aptly represented by the events leading to the Scopes trial as by the Eight-Year Study? If this is the case, it is not difficult to imagine that there have been situations where either the prudential or the vested interest points of view may be given undue weight. Salary negotiations, school referenda, higher standards for teacher certification, school board elections and the like all provide ample opportunity for these to happen. As far as curricula are concerned, the opportunities seem fewer, but nevertheless to be guarded against. Obviously, some person or group must do the evaluating. Considering the distinction between self and other oriented, three types of evaluation groups seem possible;
(1) A group consisting completely of people taking the prudential point of view. I shall call this the laissez-faire evaluation group type because the only rationale for such a group would seem to be a variant on the argument for laissez-faire capitalism - that is, that if all affected people have a say and each does so from a prudential point of view, somehow out of this the best possible curriculum choices will result. I find this view to be untenable on grounds that I think its key empirical claim is false. In case someone thinks otherwise, I would make the following point about it: If the prudential point of view is the one to be taken by evaluators, obviously the people with the strongest prima facie case for a say are the students. In fact, under such an arrangement, it is difficult to imagine how anything approaching the grammar of schooling could be preserved unless students were given the largest representation of any affected people. It is possibly the case that some free schools operate more or less in this manner. As I see it, the de-schooling proposals of Ivan Illich are in this genre. But even in A.S. Neill's Summerhill, curriculum evaluation is not given to the students. Of course, the mere fact that students are given a voice in curriculum evaluation would not necessarily mean that they would adopt the prudential point of view. It is at least claimed, for example, by many student radicals, that they have adopted the moral point of view. Many of the same people, of course, want to change the grammar of schooling to parallel the grammar of political institutions.

(2) A second type would be the vested interest group whose members represent and take the point of view of other social roles while also playing the role of evaluator. For example, it is common practice for a businessman to serve on a school board as a representative of business, and this role to act as a curriculum evaluator. Suppose, then, he is evaluating a curriculum which gives a clear hint that socialism is not only a tenable position but is actually in operation in some countries, or worse yet that some communist countries have managed to survive, or worst of all that his country itself can derive considerable benefits from economic
planning by government agencies. There is evidence that in North America such instances of evaluation by internal amateurs are common, that people who represent business interests dominate school policies and, in addition, that curricula are evaluated by such people from the business point of view (a good curriculum is one that supports laissez-faire doctrines of economics and that's good because it's good for business.) Because the evaluator is at the same time a member of the group whose point of view he adopts, it is at least possible that he is at the same time adopting the prudential point of view. What's good for G.M. is good for stockholders of G.M. Of course, as with students, the mere fact that someone is, for example, a businessman, does not mean that he necessarily takes either the prudential or a vested interest point of view. Nevertheless, it seems clear to me again that the only type of person who can, within the grammar of schooling, legitimately take such a point of view is the student.

(3) At the other extreme would be evaluators none of whom take the prudential or vested interest point of view, all of whom clearly take an other-oriented point of view. Perhaps the most extreme instances of this would be selfless missionary teachers who give their all to help their charges. The grammar of the role of a missionary is precisely designed to get the missionary to exclude from consideration any but other-oriented criteria. Teachers, principals, school board members and parents all play roles whose grammar is of this kind. For this reason, while they are playing the role, they cannot legitimately take either the prudential or vested interest points of view. Of course, not everyone who is institutionally labelled as a teacher or as a school board member, even while he is performing duties which are charged to those roles, is in fact following the grammar, any more than priests are always faithful to their roles. That is why, for example, groups which stand to make financial profit from curricular innovations or inertia obviously ought to be excluded from curricular evaluation. One ought also to take with large grains of salt the opinions of professionals who may, as a result of participation or previous training and education, have a vested interest in either change
or maintenance of the status quo. In short, the grammar of schooling makes it illegitimate for anyone but students to adopt a prudential or vested interest point of view in curricular evaluation. The practice of schooling is, by its basic assumptions, an other-oriented activity for those playing institutional roles other than that of student.

Next, consider the empirical curriculum research point of view, in short form the research point of view. In most of the curriculum literature that I have read, it is this point of view which is discussed under the heading "evaluation". Earlier I introduced the notion of a bridging belief which curriculum makers use (implicitly or explicitly) to guide their selections from the culture. Bridging beliefs are empirical beliefs. The curriculum maker believes that using certain cultural elements will, in fact, induce students following the curriculum to fulfill the intentions he has for them. In principle, these beliefs are testable; research could be done to discover which of these beliefs are true and which are false. But, because curricula are such complex things, in any actual curriculum construction there could be literally thousands of cultural elements, intentions and bridging beliefs. Attempting to discover whether the latter are true with respect to the efficacy of the cultural elements is, therefore, an appallingly complicated task. It would be foolish to expect, at the present stage of development of educational research, (or perhaps ever) that complete and clear-cut answers will be obtainable about bridging beliefs. However, to the extent that one tries to do such research, he takes an empirical, scientific point of view. He attempts to gather evidence using the techniques developed by social scientists. The techniques themselves are likely to come from sociology, anthropology or psychology; I will not attempt to discuss them here.
As far as justification is concerned empirical curriculum research fits in either at the lowest level of justification or at the highest. For the former, empirical research is the method used to tell whether or not a curriculum actually fulfills the criteria it was intended to fulfill by its constructor or user. As such, empirical research does not justify, rather it provides some of the information necessary to tell whether or not (at this lowest stage) a curriculum is justifiable. To be more accurate, what the evidence tells is whether or not the use of the curriculum is justifiable. It is not a normative point of view at all.

Curricula can also be evaluated according to standards of internal logical structure. About that empirical studies are virtually irrelevant, except where notions like prerequisite learnings are relevant. If we assume that the criteria on which a curriculum is to be verified are valid criteria, then one thing empirical research can tell us is whether or not in its use the curriculum does in fact induce the students to fulfill the criteria.

At the highest level of justification, rational choice, empirical research is chiefly of importance in helping one to achieve enlightenment by providing factual information on various ways of life people live. Actually, the gathering of information at this level is not curriculum research. Rather, the information in as broad a form as possible, is one of the necessary conditions for general enlightenment. If anything, getting this information is likely to be even more difficult than getting it at the lower level.

Now let us consider the moral point of view:

There has long been a dispute about what is meant when something (a system, an opinion, an action etc.) is said to be a moral something (a moral system etc.) I think it is not the case that the sufficient conditions for the identification
of moral x's have yet been worked out, but some of the necessary conditions are known and some of them are relevant here. It seems clear that moral x's are, or are importantly related to, a distinguishable type of rule. What distinguishes this type is that while they serve, like rules of prudence, as criteria in normative discourse, unlike rules of prudence they are "impartial as between persons" and are overriding with respect to other rules followed by their adherent.

These rules can also be identified by their function. They serve to settle disputes which arise from what some call "the human condition." This condition consists of such universal features as the existence of wants and desires, some elementary form (at least) of social relationships and the possibility of conflicting wants and desires. Of course, morality also is dependent upon the possession of a certain level of rationality. When we adopt the moral point of view, we commit ourselves to using this rationality as best we can to formulate rules which we can use prescriptively to prevent or settle the disputes which can arise. Notice that this does not mean that all moral rules followed by people are rational; it does mean that if we label, say, a belief, as a moral belief we are then committed to apply tests of rationality to it. The rules thus devised do not take into account any particular kind of social relationship. They are, rather, rules designed to settle issues which could be common to all kinds of social relationship, and are therefore intended to be followed by all people.
Social rules, on the other hand, refer to specific ways of misusing specific social institutions. Such rules may, of course, be socially-specific analogues of moral rules. Thus, equality of educational opportunity is an institutional embodiment of the moral principle of equality. A society may even devise specific laws to buttress or implement moral rules, but of course does not always do so. Social rules are not always analogues of moral rules. Many are devised from a vested-interest point of view. Nation states typically govern their actions on such rules. Maxims are adopted which are not designed to be impartial with respect to people but to benefit particular states. Nevertheless, because man must live in societies in order to fulfil most of his wants, it is, as Professor Baier puts it, "a social rule of reason accepted in our society that actions which are required by custom, law, manners, etiquette, conventions, and traditions have the support of reason, those which are prohibited by them are rejected by reason."43

If Professor Baier is correct, and I think he is, the onus of proof is, in our society, considered to be on those who would challenge extant social rules. However, social rules are, logically, as open to challenge as any other rules, and, it seems to me, education as a procedure consists, in part, of just such challenges. One reason why this is logically possible can be seen by contrasting formulated laws with moral rules: Whereas laws have an identifiable source (eg. a legislature), moral rules are "sourceless."44 This is another way of saying that, unlike social rules, validity is in no way dependent upon the official or social status of anyone espousing them. Rather, their validity is dependent upon their rationality. In their best form, they are those overriding, impartial rules which an objective, disinterested observer would choose under conditions for rational choice. There are varying degrees of rationality. In part, it is
itself dependent upon rules (eg. of logic) but also (and it is this which permits it to be a standard, not a rule) it depends upon the amount and completeness of information and enlightenment. The ideal of rationality could be achieved if the conditions for rational choice were completely fulfilled. Because we have not completely fulfilled these conditions, our present understanding and formulation of moral rules do not completely fulfill our standard of rationality. Nevertheless, as Baier puts it, "it is the very meaning of 'morality' that it should contain a body of moral convictions which can be true or false, that is, a body of rules or precepts for which there are certain tests.\(^4\)\(^5\) This does not mean that we can be certain of the truth or falsity of any particular moral rules. Rather, it means that whenever someone purports to be using moral rules, it is always logically sensible to demand that he justify them in terms of the tests. What are the tests? - in Taylor's terms, validation, vindication and rational choosing. In addition, and crucially, moral rules are rational only if they can be shown to be supportive of peoples' interests.\(^4\)\(^6\) These tests are not restricted to moral judgments or prescriptions, but the fact that they are relevant to moral judgments tells us that such judgments are, like the statements of science, but unlike emotive expressions, included in that part of human life we call "rational."

In schooling the use of such rules has differential bearing, depending in part upon what is being taught - ie. - on curriculum. In seeking training and socialization the chief role of the moral point of view is, as it were, defensive, restrictive - its function being to rule out certain kinds of methods which could succeed in training or socializing only at the expense of treating people as means not ends. H.G. Wells gives us the parody of this for training, while our justifiable antipathy to indoctrination and conditioning techniques reflect the intervention of the moral point of view between the school and the student.
In that part of education which carries students beyond training to a knowledge of theory and explanations, the same, as I see it, is true. Again the moral point of view is used chiefly to interpose a protective layer.

But in moral education the situation is different. Here adopting the moral point of view has two functions: (1) the protective role. (2) the role of cognitive supervision. The former leads to a problem recognized by Plato and Aristotle and termed by Professor Peters the "paradox of freedom". As Aristotle showed, because of their immaturity children up to a certain stage of development are not able to understand the significance or relevance of justifications. Yet they cannot be allowed to behave without some modicum of rule-oriented behavior. They must be socialized. Since they cannot understand the reasons for the rules they can only be conditioned or habituated to act in accordance with rules, be they social or moral rules. But, and this is the "paradox", isn't it immoral merely to condition people to act in accordance with rules?

The role of supervision leads to a different problem in any society where adult citizens in general do not appreciate, understand and are not themselves committed to, a rational moral point of view. This, I believe, describes, at least in part, every society. The problem is this: Societies have a way of life; socializing children to them is possible. Except where ways of life conflict, value systems; attempts by the school to socialize children are acceptable to most adult citizens. But moral education demands that value systems be challenged as to their grounds. At least for the mass of people, such systems do not contain even carefully constructed validations, let alone the other stages of justification, and those who have internalized the value systems generally fear and resent challenges to those systems for themselves or for their children. Yet such challenges are exactly what is demanded by education. At the very least, to be education in the task sense, the student must be exposed to the syntactical structures of normative discourse to the point where he could, if he chose, apply those to the value systems into which he has been
socialized. If schooling purports to lead to education it must, in both the non-normative and normative aspects of life, press beyond the aims of technical or socialized competence to the kinds of understanding and commitment relevant to the two areas. Curricula dealing with social phenomena are defective to the extent that they are purported to be for educational purposes and yet do not provide the tools and opportunities for the critical assessment of social and moral rules.

What I said above about education in the normative realm is simply one instance of adopting the educational point of view. As Professor Peters has shown, "education" is a term which can perhaps be used to tell us that a person has been through some specific sorts of processes or that some specific sort of product has been produced, but, more importantly, it is used to say that, whatever the product is, it is worthwhile.

"To ask questions about the aims of education is therefore a way of getting people to get clear about and focus their attention on what is worthwhile achieving. It is not to ask for the production of ends extrinsic to education which might explain their activities as educators." 50

Of course, in curriculum design, the crucial question is "What is worthwhile?" Professor Peters uses a transcendental argument to try to give at least a partial answer to this question.

In so far, therefore, as a person seriously asks the question "Why do this rather than that?" he can only answer it by trying this and that and by thinking about what he is doing in various ways which are inseparable from the doing of it. When he stands back and reflects about what it is that he is doing, he then engages in the sorts of activities of which the curriculum of a university is largely constructed. He will find himself embarking upon those forms of inquiry such as science, history, literature, and philosophy which are concerned with the description, explanation, and assessment of different forms of human activity. It would be irrational for a person who seriously asks himself the question "Why do this rather than that?" to close his mind arbitrarily to any form of inquiry which might throw light on the question which he is asking. This is presumably one of the basic arguments for a "liberal education." It is presumably, also, the logical outcome of Socrates' claim that the unexamined life is not worth living.
In terms of the disciplines, if someone has been well educated, he has mastered, to some noteworthy extent, the knowledge and skills of several of the disciplines. To be educated is to have gone into a reasonable variety of disciplines to some depth. Thus it is that the educational point of view is really a bundle of points of view—the points of view of the various disciplines. If a curriculum involves empirical, logical and normative content then it can (and should) be evaluated from all three points of view in terms of both its content (internal structure) and in terms of its ability to contribute to the development of the student toward the desired level in the relevant discipline.

Of course, all that was said earlier about contributive value and value on the whole applies here. In addition, the concepts of intrinsic, inherent and instrumental value are also relevant. It makes sense to ask why someone should learn, for example, physics. The answer could be that it has either inherent or instrumental value. Physics can have rather obvious instrumental value (or disvalue) depending on how it is used. It is unlikely, however, to have such value immediately for a typical high school student except in cases where, for example, it enables him to do a better repair job on his car or to do some electric wiring in his home. Rather, if it has instrumental value, it is likely to have it only in the long run. Yet, even if one sees physics as having only instrumental value, for psychological reasons, it is helpful if students believe and feel that what they are studying is of some value. But because the disciplines are such sophisticated structures, it takes lengthy study to reach even the interpretive levels of understanding. Therefore, it would seem to be rather crucial to evaluate a curriculum for its inherent value, its ability to produce,
for the students who follow it, experiences which they find to have intrinsic value. There are, of course, many types of intrinsically valuable experiences. The reason for this is simply that there are so many different things to do, to work with and on, or to experience--and in all of them it is possible to find satisfaction, pleasure or a sense of achievement. Any adequate taxonomy would need to be very complex. For our purposes, we shall use a simple five-part taxonomy:

(a) Type 1: physical or sensual pleasure
(b) Type 2: conventional excitement
(c) Type 3: intellectual satisfaction--replicative
(d) Type 4: intellectual satisfaction--interpretive
(e) Type 5: intellectual satisfaction applicative.

It seems clear that Type 1 is unlikely to occur in schools except in things like physical education, where it is perfectly appropriate and should be a criterion used in evaluating such curricula. However, for reasons which we will not go into here, my main purpose in introducing Type 1 is to have it serve to mark the differences between it and the other types.

Type 2 is undoubtedly a large group of experiences. These experiences often create an agitated state in a person, but it is not this which marks them off as a separate type, because agitation may be a part of any of the types. What marks Type 2 off is the type of context in which the experience occurs or by which it is caused. The context is conventional or perhaps social. As examples, consider the satisfactions a person feels when he becomes an accepted member of a group or when one feels he is doing the "in" thing. School spirit, pep rallies and fraternities are the sorts of things often connected with schools which can provide Type 2 experiences. Again, my chief point in mentioning them is to provide contrast with other types.
For our purposes, Types 3 and 4 are the most important. The intention of a curriculum maker or user is usually to get someone to learn. As Professor Johnson indicates, the source of what is to be learned (the content of a curriculum) is the culture, chiefly the developed disciplines.

The intention is that the student will come to have a grasp of the concepts, the produced knowledge and the techniques of the discipline, and develop the propensities required to sustain them. In the process of using a curriculum, three types of intrinsically valuable experience seem worthy of note and relevant in evaluating curricula, the satisfactions which come, respectively, from being able to successfully replicate the content, from being able to use the content learned to interpret the student's world, and sometimes, from actually applying it in solving problems in his world. Because of the lengthy period needed to attain the latter (Type 5) sort of satisfactions, it is probably more appropriate to expect a curriculum to produce Type 3 and Type 4 satisfactions.

Type 4 is perhaps the more interesting of these two types. Two versions of it are worth noting: (a) The satisfaction which comes from being able to follow (understand, appreciate) a complex argument, or proof. (b) The satisfaction which comes from discovering that the concepts one has learned can be used to understand what is going on in one's world. The former can occur without the student subsequently necessarily being able to reproduce the argument or proof. The latter represents a higher level of attainment, such as, for instance, when a person discovers that what he has learned in physics enables him to understand why a siphon works. It is possibly, in part, a belief on the part of some students that what they are expected to learn in schools cannot be used to attain these interpretive satisfactions that lead to the cry of "irrelevance" so often levelled at schools. I conclude, then, that, from the educational points of view, and as far as school outcomes are concerned, among the chief criteria used in evaluating curricula ought to be that of understanding the disciplines to sufficient depth to give them inherent value, particularly of Type 4.
In this final section of my paper I should like to make some slight use of the conceptual apparatus to show how it could be used to discuss some of the points made in Professor Huebner's article. His key negative points are summarized as follows:

"Let me recapitulate the discussion so far. I have proposed that current ways of thinking about curriculum are inadequate because they tie the teacher and the student to the self-augmenting world of technique. This invasion of the schools by technique is not the result of our use of new instruments or technologies of instruction, but a result of our basic means-ends approach to education. This means-ends approach is typified most directly by our uncritical acceptance of learning as our key working concept, and by the conception of value as an end state to be reached. As long as educational values are conceptualized only as goals to be reached or behaviors to be learned, the classrooms will continue to serve man's technique rather than man's spirit."

The two crucial defects in present curricular evaluation are, if Professor Huebner is correct: (1) The adoption of the means-ends approach. (2) The uncritical acceptance of learning as our key working concept. I believe that the latter may be at least partly correct; the former seems to me to be, as I shall try to show, a misguided interpretation.

It is not clear to me whether he is arguing that adopting the technical point of view (If its economically-technically efficient, it's good) is wrong because: (a) It "dehumanizes" students, that is, tends to produce conditioned people rather than to produce those capable of fulfilling and committed to fulfilling their project, or (b) Its assumption limits the teacher's choices (and hence, presumably, his project).

On the assumption that the grammar of schooling places the students' interests first, I shall ignore the latter.

His key point is that if one concentrates solely on evaluation as it is usually viewed (in our terms verification), one is thereby committed to the technical point of view. The reason is not far to seek; at that level of justification one presuppose that the goals (learning goals) are appropriate and one seeks simply to see whether or not the means used to attain them succeed. And if one ranks curricula, one may thereby be committed to the technical point of view even more deeply, seeking then to compare curricula on their efficiency in attaining specific goals.
The acceptance of learning as the key concept could be a mistake for any or all of three reasons:

(1) That is too simplistic, that is, that it overlooks other goals, the non-learning objectives discussed, for example, by Professors McClellan, Macmillan and Komisar. In this case, the error would be that of seeking an insufficiently rich variety of possible goals—the error of linear thinking. I do not think that this is Professor Huebner's main thrust.

(2) That it presupposes that one must be externally motivated, pushed from behind, whereas in reality humans inherently seek to complete their project, are naturally motivated, perhaps à la Dewey's notion of impulse. What then is needed is not a search for efficient motivators, but rather a search for roadblocks to be demolished.

(3) That in our overweening concern for upshots, we ignore the fact of man's temporal quality— he lives in time, and time is irreversible, that we sacrifice, in Rousseau's terms: "What a poor sort of foresight, to make a child wretched in the present with the more or less doubtful hope of making him happy at some future day."

It is here that he concentrates his concern.

What he suggests instead is, in general, that schools should aim to abet man's transcendence, by which he means, I take it, the furthering of each one's unique project. How can one transcend; how can one's project be furthered? Through the use of conceptual schemata, person-to-person confrontation and the "confrontation of men with the non-man made ---." So instead of Rousseau's nature, men and things, we seem to have language, men and things as possible "vehicles of transcendence". More specifically, as far as evaluation is concerned, not only must we evaluate upshots, we ought also evaluate life in the interval and ought to do so using points of view we tend to overlook—the moral and the aesthetic.
In part, I find this latter suggestion ironic. Why? Because I believe that in order to argue this way one must presuppose a fundamental tenet of the technical point of view. The technical point of view is possible only when time is conceived of as clock-time. Only then, "it becomes possible to speak of 'wasting' time, 'using' time, letting time 'escape'." Under what Professor Green calls "diurnal time", "One does not really plan for the future --- except as one plans for much the same future as has already passed." With which concept of time is the concept of a project related? Clearly, it seems to me, with the former. And I believe Professor Huebner implicitly commits himself to it, for he says, "To waste time is not to waste a commodity, it is to waste one's life. To kill time is to say that life during those moments is of no significance and that the person might as well be dead. Time wasted in classrooms is an almost unforgivable crime because it is life and the precious eternal moment that are really being wasted."

What is this 'life' that is being wasted? I do not think it means life in the sense of biology. Would it be too presumptuous to introduce the notion of life as "experience" with all its admitted difficulties - which I shall mostly ignore? The point I want to make is this; whatever the concept of experience means or implies, it is an upshot-related concept; it is more closely related to the concepts of winning, seeing, touching and hearing than with those of running, looking, reaching and listening. "Experience" is a term used to refer to the series of upshots of which sensate and conscious life consists. One can talk about experience in general by talking about "life". This, I believe, is the sense of "life" as used by Professor Huebner. If so, then what he is doing is ranking one life as opposed to others; one set of experiences as opposed to others. What he sees in the schools is "the ugliness of dead routine" - a series of repetitive upshots. His concern is with the quality of such upshots. What standard or standards do they fail to meet?
Partly, aesthetic; but there seems to be more – they fail to help fulfill one's destiny, work on one's project. But what standard does this imply? From what Professor Huebner says, I believe that the standard is associated with the standards for creativity.

"Learning implies a determining of behavior while man's reactions in the world are partially indeterminate. Learning implies a destination; whereas living as a man implies a destiny. In some ways the discussions about creativity a few years ago pointed to this conflict, for the educator, between the determinateness of learned behavior and the freedom essential for creative behavior. And, of course, one is not possible without the other. But when learning remains the central concept in curriculum, we tend to focus on only one side of man's ambiguous situation in this world." 62

We presumably are, therefore, to switch emphasis from learning to that of one's project, from learning to creativity.

We shall return to this, but Professor Huebner has further recommendations. He avers that educators, curriculum people in particular, should undertake "political" action to create "in the school a just environment for all members of society." 63 This involves three sorts of activities:

1. Striving "to create an educative environment which represents the values and valued content of all involved social groups ---." 64
2. Acting as an advocate when "no one else speaks for an important or neglected group or set of values ---." 65
3. Acting as an educational adjudicator, as "dispassionately as the judge in the legal court, he must listen to all sides, including the prophets, and seek to build a just educative environment." 66

If we ask, "Why follow these recommendations?", What sorts of answers can be found in Professor Huebner's article? To begin with, let us draw explicitly the picture of the political-cum-educational arrangement which Professor Huebner seems to presuppose. It is a picture of a pluralist society in which two kinds of things compete to have a dominant say in schooling. There are, first of all, competing groups each, presumably,
characterizable, in Taylor's terms, as representing differing ways of life. They are, as I labeled them earlier, social groups. Presumably because of the acceptance of the democratic way of life, Professor Huebner sees the role of the educator that of an arbiter among these groups, yet also one who should act as advocate for those who do not or cannot speak for themselves. Note that even if there were not competing groups, there'd be competing points of view, the second type of competition. Here, rather than differing ways of life, we have different sets of values competing. In Taylor's terminology, we have competing value systems. The competing value systems belong to different points of view. Some of these, presumably, are represented within the political-social infrastructure of schooling by identifiable groups, but others are not, and yet are strongly influential.

If the educator is to act in his role of arbiter and advocate, what is he to use as criteria in his arbitrations or as standards for self-evaluation in his advocacy? In other words, what point or points of view should he adopt? In fact, Professor Huebner concerns himself with five points of view—the moral, the aesthetic, the educational, the technical, and, incidentally, the commercial. In an extended sense of the term the schooling can be said to have, or be, a way of life. As Professor Huebner sees it, that way gives too high a relative precedence to the technical point of view in the assessment of school curricula. Nor does he mean simply such obvious facts as the dominance of a training ethos, or the use of hardware in schools, or the dominant role of the businessman. As we have seen, he is getting at a more subtle point, roughly the role of the clock and the dominance of the concept of learning. What he proposes is a change in the way of life of schools; a change in which the moral, aesthetic and creative points of view become dominant.

Recalling that he is concerned to evaluate the time spent, not merely the upshots, there may be much in what he says about the adoption of the
aesthetic point of view to evaluate, for example, the school day, but it would require much more explication than he gives before the idea can be understood. The application of moral criteria to such evaluation is of course not new, but I find myself at a loss to know what a teacher or curriculum designer can do, other than what I sketched in Section IV, to fulfill the criteria. At least part of my puzzlement comes from what I take to be a lack of clarity on Professor Huebner's part about the relationships among one's project, the moral point of view, transcendence and creativity. As nearly as I can tell from Professor Huebner's paper, at least one rational moral principle is that one ought not to interfere with the natural propensity of each individual to develop his own project. This could, of course, but need not be, an instance of the naturalistic fallacy. But whether it is or isn't is not my chief interest here. What concerns me is what this principle suggests for educators to do. They are to remove roadblocks and evaluate not merely learning upshots but also the time lived, as it were, between upshots. The result of this would presumably be the elimination or diminution of means-ends reasoning. But what does the metaphor of roadblock-removal mean in something like literal terms? And consider even a more radical position than Professor Huebner's - that learning upshots should be completely ignored. Would either eliminate means-ends reasoning?

I think not, for I think that transcendence is linked just as much as is learning to education (as procedure) as end is to means. While it is true that the concept of learning implies a static state, i.e., what is learned must (conceptually) have some permanence (a trace), and the concept of transcendence is dynamic, i.e., implies going beyond a present state, it is no less true of the latter than of the former that one can sensibly ask, what, on empirical grounds, can I do to bring someone to the state wherein he can and will transcend himself? And when one does use this means-ends reasoning with respect to young people, one adopts at least the educational point of view. Additionally, what could it mean to transcend oneself as a
human? As Professor Huebner recognizes, it involves utilizing the conceptual schemes developed by man. To transcend oneself may be to go on to something very unique - unique not only to oneself but to mankind as a whole. Then it may be proper to call the transcendence "creative". On the other hand, it may be a lesser transcendence, new not to man but to oneself, perhaps to a more subtle conceptual apparatus, perhaps to a heightened sensitivity. Education as a procedure consists of whatever means is used by those who have gone further (empirically, usually those who are older) to reach back and assist those who have not gone as far. As Professor Oakeshott has put it:

"As civilized human beings, we are the inheritors, neither of an inquiry about ourselves and the world, nor of an accumulating body of information, but of a conversation, begun in the primeval forests and extended and made more articulate in the course of centuries. Education, properly speaking, is an initiation into the skill and partnership of this conversation in which we learn to recognize the voices, to distinguish the proper occasions of utterance, and in which we acquire the intellectual and moral habits appropriate to conversation."  

Educators are and education is the institution most obviously charged to support that point of view in the inevitable conflicts among points of view. Both training and socialization have their advocates elsewhere, in the market place and in the mores. It is probably folly for the schools to seek creative transcendence, as Professor White has cogently argued; it is part of their grammar to seek personal transcendence on the part of the students, to take the educational point of view. If educators are, indeed, to be arbiters and advocates, it is from that complex of points of view that they are to judge and press.

Where Professor Huebner is, I believe, therefore somewhat off the track, is when he decries means-ends reasoning in curricular discussion and argues instead for what he calls "other forms of valuing" or "other forms of criticizing." To have a curriculum is to have engaged in means-ends reasoning. That, I think, is unavoidable, conceptually unavoidable; its grammar. One does not choose between one form of valuing or a different form. One supplements, backs up or supports verification with different kinds of argument, validation etc. It is not a question of either-or but of something and.
Footnotes

1. a) Second Order Accounts:

b) Examples of general accounts:

2. For example:


4. As, for example, in times of rapid social change.


6. Most of the recent literature on curriculum evaluation concerns itself with verification.


9. Of course, this example is far more simplistic than one will run into in actual attempts to justify. In such situations, other factors may run so strongly against the conclusion (for example, students may not have time to follow this curriculum) that someone could see the conclusion as logically acceptable but reject it on other grounds. That is why I have included the expression, "other things being equal."


11. 42-43.


17. Of course, other activities such as formative evaluation may go on simultaneously, but they are not necessary conditions for us to be able to say that someone is making a curriculum.

18. Taba, pp. 18-27.

19. This account is based upon Professor Peters' eloquent uses of the technique in several places in his Ethics and Education.

20. Peters (1967), for example, p. 53.

21. Dewey (1916), Ch. I.


25. p.8. (If, indeed, it is a fact.)


30. Needless to say, there is far more to moral education than these. See, for example: Wilson, John et. al. Introduction to Moral Education. Harmondsworth, U.K. Penguin, 1967, Part I.

31. Granting massive exceptions- eg.- some religious groups.

32. Unpublished paper, "What is A Curriculum?"

33. Ignoring, for the moment, non-learning objectives.


37. Kimbrough, Ralph B. Political Power & Educational Decision-Making. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964. Not, of course officially, but it is well known why such people are there.

38. Kimbrough, Ch. 7.

39. I am thinking here of "moral" as a descriptive term, not of its use as an evaluative term, such as, for example, where it is used as a synonym for "good"- 'He's a moral man.'

40. I think also related to certain kinds of standards, but make no effort to consider such here.


42. Baier, p. 100.

43. p. 81.

45. Baier, p. 89.
49. Whether one or six merely complicates the issue, but does not alter the logic of the situation.
51. p. 88.
58. Green, p. 52.
59. p. 49.
60. Huebner, p. 105.
61. p. 114.
63. p. 118.
64. p. 118.
65. p. 118.
66. p. 118.
68. I am tempted to think that this is not so much a moral principle for Professor Huebner as it is the (or a) criterion of morality for him.

