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ABSTRACT

This report compiles data that describe education vouchers, discuss how an education voucher experiment such as OEO's proposed project would function, and present advantages and disadvantages of vouchers. The report presents OEO specifications for its proposed Longrange experiment and explains variations in other voucher systems. Problems of educational voucher systems are also discussed from administrative, legal, and fiscal aspects. (JF)

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ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION VOUCHERS

An Analysis

The University of the State of New York
THE STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT
Bureau of Occupational Education Research
Albany, New York 12224
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ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION VOUCHERS

An Analysis

In May 1970, the Office of Economic Opportunity announced that it hopes to fund an experiment which would provide parents with vouchers to cover the cost of educating their children at the school of their choice. This news has received considerable publicity, and it has raised a number of questions: for example, What is an education voucher? Why does OEO want an education voucher system? How would such an experiment function? Would this create more problems than it solves? What do the experts say about vouchers? What are the advantages and disadvantages of vouchers?

All of these questions can be found in newspapers and magazines between May and October 1970. This report is an attempt to gather data to answer these and other questions about education vouchers.

What Is an Education Voucher System?

The classical education references give little information about education vouchers beyond a vague and undocumented reference to Adam Smith's speculations about educational accounts in the 1770's. Newspapers and periodicals give a mixture of fact and theory concerning voucher systems. Since there is no universal definition of the voucher system, this report has focused on Christopher Jenck's concept published by the Center for the Study of Public Policy under the title, Education Vouchers, Financing Education by Payments to Parents. This education voucher system is a regulated system of financing education that uses public funds and parental choice in a new structural relationship. This proposed system is experimental, i.e., it is an examination and testing of an alternative scheme of financing, controlling, and managing schools and other educational institutions. It is an attempt to change educational institutions to meet the needs of the 1970's; in many ways it is similar to the G.I. Bill, with the differences being that it is for all children and that it is not restricted to higher education. In contrast to the education technology changes of the 1960's, an educational voucher system is an example of institutional and structural revolution to improve equality of learning and equality of educational opportunity.

Unless local boards of education become education voucher agencies, they could have far less financial control over the local public schools. The local boards, however, would continue to hire personnel and to maintain physical plants to accommodate every school-age child attending public schools in the district. An educational voucher agency (EVA) would be established to administer the vouchers. The EVA would receive all Federal, state, and local education funds for which children in the area

were eligible.

The EVA would issue a voucher to every family in its district with school-age children. The value of the basic voucher initially would approximate the current annual expenditure per pupil in the public schools of the area served by the EVA. Parents would then use the voucher to "shop" for schools of their choice. In order for a school to be eligible to cash vouchers, it would have to abide by the rules and regulations established by the EVA.

This generalized definition of an educational voucher system is developed more concretely in the specific details given on pages 7 to 14.

Why an Education Voucher System?

A. Parental Choice

Presently, effective control over the character of public schools is largely vested in legislators, school boards, and educators, not parents. An education voucher system would allow parental choice of schools for their children.

An education voucher system would make it possible for parents to intimately concern themselves with the control of their children's education. Increasing parents' control over the kind of education their children receive should also increase the chances that their children get a good education. The more control parents have over what happens to their children, the more responsible they are likely to feel for the results. This could easily make them take a more active role at home in educating their children. In addition, parents tend to have broader responsibilities than others for making sure that their child gets whatever he needs. The intensity of the typical parent's concern is, of course, often partially or entirely offset by his naivete to get what would actually be good for his child or by his inability to get what he thinks the child needs. Nonetheless, proponents of the education voucher system feel that, on the average, parents are unlikely to make choices that are any worse than what their public schools offer now.

B. Competition among Schools

The education voucher could be turned over to any school which had agreed to abide by the rules and regulations established by the EVA. Therefore, parents would no longer be forced to send their children to the neighborhood school simply because it was in the neighborhood. If the

school was attractive and desirable, it would not be seriously affected by the institution of the voucher system. If not, attendance might fall, perhaps forcing the school to improve or eventually to close.

Even if no new schools were established under the voucher system, the responsiveness of existing schools would probably increase. The possibility exists, however, that new schools will be established. Some parents will get together to create schools reflecting their special perspectives or their children's special needs. Educators with new ideas, or old ideas that are now out of fashion in the public schools, will also be able to establish their own schools. Entrepreneurs who think they can teach children better and cheaper than the public schools will have an opportunity to establish their own facilities.

An education voucher system could establish a publicly regulated market in education for everyone concerned.

C. To Improve Education of Disadvantaged Youth

Proponents of the education voucher system adhere to the philosophy that improving the education of the disadvantaged means improvement relative to the education offered advantaged children. A program which seeks to improve education must, therefore, focus on inequality, attempting to close the gap between the disadvantaged and the advantaged. This implies that an education voucher system must be regulated so as to provide substantially more money to schools that enroll disadvantaged children than to schools which enroll only advantaged children. This would tend to expose disadvantaged children to a well-rounded school environment where they would have advantaged classmates. A student's classmates are probably his most important "resource" even though they do not appear in most

calculations of per pupil expenditure. Equally important, a student's classmates determine how much, if anything, he will get from his teachers. If, for example, a disadvantaged child attends a school in which most children never learn algebra, his teachers will not expect him to learn algebra, even if he is perfectly capable of doing so. It is possible for an education voucher system to help enhance the education of the disadvantaged by making it economically sound for schools to enroll on a regulated basis disadvantaged students as well as the more desirable students.

An Education Voucher System Proposal

Office of Economic Opportunity Specifications

The Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) has taken active steps in trying to seek innovative methods for financing public elementary and secondary education. In December 1969, a detailed study of education vouchers was supported by a grant from the OEO and conducted by the Center for the Study of Public Policy in Cambridge, Mass. Furthermore, the OEO plans to support a long-range experiment to evaluate the validity of the voucher system based on the findings of this study.

The specifications for the experiment are as follows:

A. Location

- 1) The demonstration should continue for a minimum of 5 years and probably should last for 8 years.
- 2) The demonstration area should be confined to the boundaries of a single municipality.
- 3) Because alternative schools might be difficult to establish even in an 8-year period, demonstration should probably be located in an area where a number of existing private schools are willing to become voucher schools for the duration of the project.

B. Eligibility of Pupils

- 1) Kindergarten through sixth grade.
- 2) All children of appropriate age in the demonstration area should be eligible for vouchers.

C. Vouchers

- 1) No voucher school should be allowed to charge tuition above the value of the voucher.
- 2) Pupils attending parochial voucher schools should receive vouchers worth no more than the cost of their secular education.
- 3) All schools should be eligible for compensatory funds if they enroll disadvantaged students.

D. Admission Procedure

- 1) Voucher schools should be allowed to fill a limited number or percentage of their places in any way they see fit.
- 2) Voucher schools should be required to fill at least half their places by a lottery among applicants.
- 3) Children should not be arbitrarily expelled from a school during the school year.

E. Administration

- 1) An agency should be established with overall responsibility.
- 2) All participating schools should be required to make information about themselves available for distribution.

In addition, the proposal needs at least 10 privately controlled, secular voucher schools, several parochial voucher schools, and several neighborhood public schools, this mix would allow the development of competition and product differentiation and would test the capacity of parents to discriminate among alternatives. If the average voucher school

enrolled 200 children, 2,000 families would need to be willing to remove their children from public or parochial schools for the experiment. In order to obtain 2,000 families interested in such schools, there would need to be at least 12,000 children between 5 and 11 years of age in the experimental area.

It is estimated that the annual costs of the above experiment would be in the range of \$6 to \$8 million.

One Typical Education Voucher System

A recent, and perhaps the most widely publicized, proposal for a voucher system has come from the Center for the Study of Public Policy, Cambridge, Mass. Their preliminary report proposes the following:

1. An Educational Voucher Agency (EVA) would be established to administer the vouchers. Its governing board might be elected or appointed, but in either case it would be structured so as to represent minority as well as majority interests. The EVA might be an existing local board of education, or it might be a new agency with a larger or smaller geographic jurisdiction. The EVA would receive all Federal, state, and local education funds for which children in the area were eligible. It would pay this money to schools only in return for vouchers. (In addition, it would pay parents for children's transportation costs to the school of their choice.)
2. The EVA would issue a voucher to every family in its district with school-age children. The value of the basic voucher initially would equal the per pupil

expenditure of the public schools in the area. Schools which took children from families with below-average incomes would receive incentive payments on a scale that might, for example, make the minimum payment for the poorest child double the basic voucher.

3. In order to become an "approved voucher school" eligible to cash vouchers, a school would have to —
 - accept a voucher as full payment of tuition;
 - accept any applicant as long as it had vacant places;
 - if it had more applicants than places, fill at least half these places by picking applicants randomly and fill the other half in such a way as not to discriminate against ethnic minorities;
 - accept uniform standards established by the EVA regarding suspension and expulsion of students;
 - agree to make a wide variety of information about its facilities, teachers, programs, and students available to the EVA and to the public;
 - maintain accounts of money received and distributed in a form that would allow both parents and the EVA to determine whether a school operated by a board of education was getting the resources to which it was entitled on the basis of its vouchers, whether a school operated by a church was being used to subsidize other church activities, and whether a school operated by a profit-making corporation was siphoning off excessive amounts to the parent corporation;

- meet existing state requirements for private schools regarding curriculum, staffing, and the like.

No participating school would be permitted to discriminate on the basis of race or religion, and revenue from the vouchers could be used only for secular instruction.

Control over policy in an approved voucher school might be vested in an existing local school board, a PTA, or any private group. No governmental restrictions would be placed on curriculum, staffing, and the like except those established for all private schools in the state.

4. Just as at present, the local board of education (which might or might not be the EVA) would be responsible for ensuring that there were enough places in publicly managed schools to accommodate every school-age child who did not want to attend a privately managed school. If a shortage of places developed for some reason, the board of education would have to open new schools or create more places in existing schools. (Alternatively, it might find ways to encourage privately managed schools to expand, presumably by getting the EVA to raise the value of the voucher.)
5. Every spring, each family would submit to the EVA the name of the school to which it wanted to send each of its school-age children next fall. Any child already enrolled in a voucher school would be guaranteed a place, as would any sibling of a child enrolled in a voucher school. So long as it had room, a voucher school would be required to admit all students who listed it as a first choice. If it did not have room for all applicants, a school could fill half its places in whatever

way it wanted, choosing among those who listed it as a first choice. It could not, however, select these applicants in such a way as to discriminate against racial minorities. It would then have to fill remaining places by a lottery among the remaining applicants. The schools with unfilled places would report these to the EVA. All families whose children had not been admitted to their first-choice school would then choose an alternative school which still had vacancies. Vacancies would then be filled in the same manner as in the first round. This procedure would continue until every child had been admitted to a school.

6. Having enrolled their children in a school, parents would give their vouchers to the school. The school would send the vouchers to the EVA and would receive a check in return.

The Office of Economic Opportunity hopes that a system of the kind just described would avoid the dangers usually ascribed to a tuition voucher scheme. Specific hypotheses to be tested include whether it would -

- increase the share of the Nation's educational resources available to disadvantaged children.
- produce at least as much mixing of blacks and whites, rich and poor, clever and dull, as the present system of public education.
- insure advantaged and disadvantaged parents equal chances of getting their children into the school of their choice.
- provide parents (and the organizations which are likely to affect their decisions) with whatever information they think they need to make intelligent choices among schools.

- avoid conflict with both the 14th amendment prohibition against racial discrimination and with first amendment provisions regarding church and state.

Variations in Education Voucher Systems

Variations of this voucher plan are many. Friedman (1962) offers a plan whereby parents can add tuition supplements to vouchers all having the same value. In Friedman's plan, a school may also choose its pupils. Siser (1970) has postulated a voucher plan whereby Title I ESEA funds would be redirected to individual students according to family income. Benson (1970) uses a political rationale for vouchers, while Sugerman (1970) proposes that the value of vouchers vary according to the tax structure. Sugerman analyzes the existing state structures, suggesting a model for testing the extent to which such systems permit variations in wealth to affect per pupil expenditure.

The report by the Cambridge Center lists seven alternative education voucher plans:

1. Unregulated Market Model: The value of the voucher is the same for each child. Schools are permitted to charge whatever additional tuition the traffic will bear.
2. Unregulated Compensatory Model: The value of the voucher is higher for poor children. Schools are permitted to charge whatever additional tuition they wish.
3. Compulsory Private Scholarship Model: Schools may charge as much tuition as they like, provided they give scholarships to those children unable to pay full tuition. Eligibility and size of scholarships are determined by

the EVA, which establishes a formula showing how much families with certain incomes can be charged.

4. The Effort Voucher: This model establishes several different possible levels of per pupil expenditure and allows a school to choose its own level. Parents who choose high-expenditure schools are then charged more tuition (or tax) than parents who choose low-expenditure schools. Tuition (or tax rate) is also related to income; in theory, the "effort" demanded of a low-income family attending a high-expenditure school is the same as the "effort" demanded of a high-income family in the same school.
5. "Egalitarian" Model: The value of the voucher is the same for each child. No school is permitted to charge any additional tuition.
6. Achievement Model: The value of the voucher is based on the progress made by the child during the year.
7. Regulated Compensatory Model: Schools may not charge tuition beyond the value of the voucher. They may "earn" extra funds by accepting children from poor families or educationally disadvantaged children. (A variant of this model permits privately managed voucher schools to charge affluent families according to their ability to pay.)

Problems of Education Voucher Systems

In the normal usage of the word, a problem is a question raised for inquiry, consideration, or solution. Thus, each of the problems considered here is presented in the form of a question which hopefully will give the reader a few leads for structuring his thoughts towards a clarification of what it will actually demand to set up an operational voucher system from the administrative, legal, and fiscal point of view.

Administrative Aspects

1. Many studies have shown that large schools and large school systems can provide certain resources at less cost than small schools. The question naturally arises as to what effect cost consciousness will have on reducing the offerings of a particular small school which might in turn limit a free choice of curriculum by students.

2. Would the possibility of commercial concerns opening schools run as profit-making organizations introduce the necessity to police advertising claims made by schools and information sent to parents? Would this add the equivalent of an extensive regulatory function to the prime EVA function of equalizing educational opportunity for all children?

3. Many safeguards have been set up to avoid selective recruitment by participating voucher schools. Are these specific precautions adequate to do the job? Are these stipulations themselves so intricate and complicated as to defeat their own purpose?

4. It is conceivable that children now rejected by schools as uneducable for social and behavioral reasons may well be desired by schools

which employ noncertified teachers. What impact would this have on state-wide and local agencies which tend to be more or less credential-oriented?

5. Local boards of education have traditionally owned and operated their own schools. Under the voucher system, how would the board make the transition to becoming the local EVA with its new role of funding agency, supervisor, and impartial arbitrator?

6. Given the high geographic mobility and the resulting difficulty of communicating enrollment information to disadvantaged families, how can adequate enrollment information be made available to them to assure smooth functioning of the application procedure?

7. Will certain voucher schools be overapplied? If so, what provision will be made to choose impartially those accepted? Will such a situation work hardship on a highly mobile disadvantaged family?

8. Will the paperwork involved in an educational voucher system become unmanageable? Is it possible that the management of money would eventually take precedence as a practical necessity over the intended priority of assuring parental choice?

Legal Aspects

An analysis of the constitutional and legal implications of voucher systems is not within the scope of this study. However, two cases now before the United States Supreme Court, in which the validity under the United States Constitution of the payment of public funds to nonpublic schools is questioned, will undoubtedly provide guidance for the future. State constitutional considerations and other legal issues posed by any specific voucher system proposal must then be addressed.

Fiscal Aspects

Here are a few questions that present themselves when one considers the fiscal problems of vouchers. Some of these questions become interdisciplinary and philosophical in their assumptions and implications.

1. How would the value of an educational voucher be determined?
2. If the voucher system nurtures proprietary schools motivated by profits, will this fiscal motive be compatible with the goals of public education?
3. Would parents be allowed to supplement vouchers from their own funds?
4. How would new school construction be financed?
5. Will increased funds available by the voucher system dry up the funds coming to education from private donors?
6. Who draws up the tax and apportionment formulas which will decide the sources and distribution of voucher funds?
7. How would vouchers be used outside an educational voucher district?
8. Would an education voucher system increase the relative amount of the Nation's resources available to meet the varying needs of all children?

Additional Fiscal Considerations

There are a number of different proposals which fall under the heading of a voucher system. In order to have a benchmark from which to operate and to make a fiscal report feasible, the model voucher system described in this report on pages 7 to 14 is used as a basis for the following section.

The underlying financial intent of the proposed model is to redirect resources to disadvantaged children. A weakness is that those disadvantaged children living in a district characterized by a majority of disadvantaged pupils and low per pupil expenditures would stand to benefit little financially.

The total operating costs would increase by (1) granting more money to low-income children while maintaining present expenditure levels for other students; (2) including parochial and other private school pupils; and (3) providing what additional bussing would be needed. Local taxes would rise and rise most sharply in the districts with heavy concentrations of low-income children. However, a partial financial solution to this problem is to distribute state and/or Federal aid on the basis of disadvantaged and low-income students.

Staffing costs, building investments, and transportation costs under a voucher system would have less impact on schools with fewer low-income disadvantaged children. However, there is reason to think that the financial aspects can be worked out with some improvement to the educational process in at least some areas. That is, low-income students would enjoy the benefits of higher expenditures. For example, even if all pupils chose their present schools, more money would then be spent on these students;

that in itself would not necessarily bring about the required changes. However, there seems to be sufficient evidence to warrant a full-scale study of the financial considerations.

Intercultural Considerations

The intercultural considerations of an education voucher system must include racial integration. A system which makes it harder to achieve integration cannot be feasible in New York State.

The pupil selection basis would tend to encourage a situation of like seeking like. Denominational schools, for example, could be expected to attract their own adherents and this would tend to segregate the school population along religious, class, or ethnic lines. On the other hand, in certain metropolitan areas where the public schools are in disfavor, denominational schools frequently have a waiting list of nonadherents who believe the quality of education is superior or that its social setting is more desirable than in the public schools. Such nonadherents are willing to accept the denominationally oriented instruction in order to gain the other benefits. In a similar way, a school in a community that strongly affirms the need for black solidarity might become in fact an all-black school. Also, blacks might avoid a community seen by them as hostile to blacks, thus fostering the development of all-white schools. It is difficult to see how regulation could prevent this. One might hold that placing a higher dollar value on vouchers for minorities would encourage schools to seek minority applicants. However, this might be offset by two factors: one, the possibility of higher cost for educating minority children, and two, the willingness to forego the additional income to maintain an elite image.

It seems inevitable that a voucher system will result in a relatively smaller role for the public schools, even though in many cases they will be in the preponderance. However, there will be communities in

which the overwhelming majority of families are of one religious affiliation. In communities like this, the public school may be of inferior quality or even nonexistent. This would make it virtually impossible for a nonadherent of the majority religion to have choice of schools, and his children would be virtually forced into a school program conducted in a religious atmosphere alien to him.

Another consideration is the education of the "least desirable, most difficult-to-teach" children. Success here would depend on the commitment and ability of a regulatory agency to protect the rights of such children to equality of educational opportunity.

Additional economic inequalities could arise in that an unregulated market would increase the expenditures of the rich more than it increased those of the poor.

Further, public school administrators fear that the present public schools would become the "dumping" ground for students no other school wanted. Additionally, some educators fear that parents are not qualified to decide how their children should be educated and that giving parents a choice would encourage the growth of bad schools, not good ones.

Success of the voucher system in bringing about greater educational opportunity for minority groups will depend on the accuracy with which parents can assess the capabilities of the schools from among which they can choose. Several factors are involved. A school may have earned a reputation for high quality which it no longer deserves, yet its high image persists in the community. On the other hand, a school may have a poor reputation which is no longer warranted, yet its poor image may persist for a period of time. This "information lag" as to the quality of schools

suggests the critical importance of disseminating information about the schools on a fair basis couched in terms which are comprehensible to all parents.

The Spectrum of Opinion For and Against Vouchers

In preparing this paper, the department received a wide range of opinions and positions relative to the voucher system.

Since this present report is a fact-finding document rather than a position paper, it would seem appropriate to present these divergent points of view in order to give the reader an idea of the different stances toward education vouchers taken by highly educated professionals and educators.

These have been presented in two sections, favorable comments and unfavorable comments, even though this dichotomy does not do full justice to the wide range of thought and reflection herein presented. However, it does reveal that the "experts" are far from reaching a consensus and that the reactions to vouchers are beginning to polarize.

Favorable Comments

1. Proponents of the voucher system feel it will actually improve public education. They feel that the proposed plan, if operated under the safeguards initiated in the preliminary report by the Center for the Study of Public Policy, Cambridge, Mass., can improve and strengthen the public school system by stimulating competition.
2. Instead of having to be all things to all children, a school could operate for slow learners, or gifted children, or for children who have a particular talent or bent.

3. Since all schools in the voucher plan must conform to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, segregated white academies or revolutionary black militant schools could only happen if the state education department completely abrogated its supervisory responsibility.
4. Nonpublic schools are essential to the American way of life to prevent the eventual development of a monolithic system of education which would eliminate desirable competition. The stress placed by vouchers on parental choice is a democratic safeguard.
5. These same nonpublic schools need some sort of constitutional support to survive financially. At present, their clientele pay two tuitions: one to support public education via tax dollars and another to the nonpublic school.
6. The traditional sources of support for these nonpublic schools may not be adequate in the foreseeable future without the voucher system or some equivalent to continue the financial support necessary to maintain their quality and services.
7. Tuition vouchers provide a realistic freedom of choice in education for parents who have become increasingly economically deprived from making such a choice.
8. Education would conceivably become more productive since inferior schools would suffer loss of enrollment through competition with more productive schools.

9. Even though it is statistically true that unproductive public schools, as well as unproductive private schools, would be forced out of business, it is reasonable to assume that the better public schools when faced with this competitive challenge would become centers of innovation and even better dispensers of quality education.
10. Needy students assisted by vouchers would be in a better position to profit from partial scholarships to private schools; in many cases, the needy student would attend, under a voucher system, a nonpublic school, not with the sense that he was receiving some form of charity but that his own way was paid by the voucher according to a system that treats all families equally.
11. Parental willingness to sacrifice a certain percentage of their income for education, and not merely parental gross wealth, would become the deciding factor in the type of education the child received under the voucher system.
12. Like every potentially valuable experiment, the voucher system needs a chance to validate or disprove itself as to its possible effectiveness.
13. If the public schools endorse such a program as the voucher system, this will help to dispel the public myth that those schools are afraid of competition. Such an attitude will project to the general public an increased confidence in the public school system which is not fearful of irreparable harm from friendly competition.

14. Experimentation is all the more necessary when one seeks to develop a viably legal and constitutional means of assisting parents in the education of their children in the midst of the fiscal crisis facing all educational systems.

Unfavorable Comments

1. A significant number of educators, particularly in the public schools, feel that the proposed OEO-funded demonstration of the voucher plan is a deliberate attempt to discredit and destroy the public school system.
2. The neighborhood school will possibly be wiped out and with it its record of significant growth and achievement, especially in educating the entire intellectual range of children assigned to these schools.
3. The voucher system might encourage the creation of all-black or all-white schools. Thus, education vouchers could be a divisive force in American life.
4. It would lead to direct support of church-related schools, possibly violating the constitutional principle of church-state separation.
5. The public schools could become the dumping grounds of children not wanted by other schools.
6. The parents' lack of knowledge and the possible lure of easy money might lead to the establishment of fly-by-night schools.
7. The education voucher is contrary to our long-standing

American tradition of local support and local supervision for education.

8. The safeguards written into the education voucher system are so complex and unwieldy that the system would be unworkable.
9. It would cost less money for the state to crack down on weaknesses, inefficiencies, or unproductivity in the present school system than it would to set up an untried voucher system.
10. Especially in the education of the disadvantaged, the safeguards in the voucher system are not adequate to offset the additional problems created by this expedient solution.
11. Vouchers will encourage the proliferation of nonpublic schools. Since New York State is only now beginning to reap the benefits of regrouping school districts to adequate size, this would be in effect a nullification of the savings made by such regrouping. Supporting all these new systems would very likely result in higher costs.
12. Whether by design or not, vouchers would most likely lead to the segregation of many children presently in comprehensive public schools into nonpublic schools according to race, religion, ability, and educational philosophy.
13. The average parent doesn't possess enough information to adequately choose the right school for his child. This would be especially true if faced with profit-making

schools which are adept at the techniques of image-making through mass media.

14. In the present economic crisis, the public is in need of more money to keep on offering its quality programs. The creation of the vast bureaucracy necessitated by the voucher system would siphon off badly needed funds.
15. At the present time, according to many state laws, educational vouchers are unconstitutional.
16. There is also the complex problem of Federal aid to private schools, all the more difficult when these private schools are often religious schools.
17. As of August 1970, there has not been any constitutionally legal voucher plan in operation.

Pros and Cons

Elementary-Secondary Vouchers

Here is a condensed and selective list of pros and cons relative to elementary and secondary vouchers. These indications of the relative advantages and disadvantages of vouchers are intended to give the reader some leads for personal thinking and reflection.

FOR

1. Tax saving is possible since some unneedy students attend public institutions and are subsidized by tax money.
2. Students could be redistributed among all institutions as the private institutions become more accessible to disadvantaged and lower-income youth.
3. A voucher system could expand the range of postsecondary opportunities to include other than degree-granting institutions.
4. Healthy competition could mean improvement in all schools, public and private.
5. Finance-free freedom of choice can make parents more involved in their child's education.
6. Eventually, inferior schools would suffer loss of enrollment.

AGAINST

1. Increased tuition fees at both private and public institutions could result.
2. Business and technical schools, whose primary aim might be to exploit students, could expand.
3. Public institutions which derive the greatest benefits under the present system might resist.
4. Polarization of minorities could result.
5. Choice of school could be difficult when the project begins.
6. The present State Constitution presents some legal difficulties.
7. Financial planning could be subject to much uncertainty.

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