This paper on university governance draws heavily on documents on this subject produced by the Center for Research and Development at the University of California at Berkeley. Some other works on governance are also discussed. The paper deals with: (1) confusion and flux in governance; (2) changing personal and social values, including shifts in university priorities, civil authorities at the university, and the disaggregation of all but the university's essential functions of teaching and research; (3) internal redistribution of power, including faculty accountability to administration and trustees, reconstitution of governing boards, faculty unionism and academic senates, student role in governance, representative governance challenged, decentralized governance, and characteristics of new administrative styles; and (4) the resolution of conflict. (AF)
The Redistribution of Power in Higher Education
The Redistribution of Power in Higher Education:
CHANGING PATTERNS OF INTERNAL GOVERNANCE

T. R. McConnell


Preface

The Center for Research and Development in Higher Education at Berkeley is pleased to present this first in a series of brief, topical papers which it plans to publish from time to time. It is highly appropriate that this first statement of fact and judgment be written by T. R. McConnell, founder of the Center and for many years both a practitioner and student of university and college governance.

When the Berkeley Center was designated as one of several university-based R & D centers in 1965, the study of power and authority in higher education became one of its priorities. The subject is to continue as one of the major phases of the Center's research program in the future.

Over the past several years the Center has published a number of investigations specifically concerned with governance, and numerous studies which have some bearing on the subject. Reflective papers on problems of governmental structures and processes have also been written by staff members with a background of administrative experience.

While this statement draws heavily on the documents that have emanated from the Center, it is not a digest, but rather an effort to place certain ideas drawn from them into the broader framework suggested by the title. While the paper makes no attempt to summarize all the relevant work on governance, writers not connected
with the Center have also been drawn from, albeit to a more limited extent.

This paper does not deal with problems of statewide planning and coordination of higher education, which has also been a field of extensive study by the Center. Several members of the staff are now working with other individuals and agencies involved in research on the governance of higher education at the state level, and publications of a summary nature on this increasingly important topic will become available from time to time.

A valuable companion to this paper will appear shortly in the form of a monograph prepared by T. R. McConnell and Kenneth Mortimer, based on extensive studies of faculty organization and governance in three large complex institutions.

The current problems and issues pertaining to institutional governance are many and complex. Hopefully, this and other statements will be helpful to the many who are seeking clarification of the issues and viable procedures for their own institutions.

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### THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT

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The great confusion, even disorder, that characterizes the governance of colleges and universities today has been aptly described by Martin (1970):

On the campuses, many administrators are feeling the need for a clarification of their roles and 'sufficient power' to carry out their responsibilities, some faculty seem to be losing influence in the formulation of policies that formerly were delegated to them, and others are moving aggressively to improve their influence. Recent challenges to the concept of academic freedom and tenure appear to be expressions of the former development, while the rise of faculty unionism may be evidence of the latter. Students, no less than administrators or faculty, are by their questioning and agitation showing an unwillingness to conform to traditional governance patterns...Meanwhile, in the general society, and within the constituencies of both public and private educational institutions, there is sentiment in favor of changes that would make policies and practices more accountable to external interest groups [p.27].

The most unchallengeable thing that can be said about the present pattern of authority, power, and influence in American higher education is that it is in flux. I do not know what configuration will emerge in the
next decade. I am not even sure what pattern I think should emerge. But certainly there will be a continuing struggle for power, and the contenders will be numerous. The contestants will bring new means of influence to bear and, as the opening quotation suggests, they may operate from new bases of power.

The struggle will not be just internal; external forces are increasing their pressure on colleges and universities. Legislatures are considering punitive laws for controlling disruption and violence, and in California, at least, the state legislature is not concerned with student rebellion alone. In the last session it also visited its displeasure on the faculties of the university and the state colleges by refusing to appropriate funds for general salary increases; the grounds were that some had supported or incited student disruptions. Throughout the country, a number of governors are asserting political or personal power, or both, over public institutions. And many pressure groups—from left or right, from the influential elites to the dispossessed minorities—are trying to use universities to protect their interests or realize their aspirations. Many are openly or covertly trying to stifle any dissent on campus that is inimical to their special interests, and are ready to try to force compliance and punish heresy.

Perhaps the pressure is always on, albeit at some times more relentlessly than at others. More than a decade ago, President J. L. Morrill (1960) of the University of Minnesota said:

This pressure comes from government, and from organized business and industry; it comes from organized labor, from the tyrannical mass mind of powerful political majorities, from earnest and excited, fearful and prejudiced citizens in public life and private. (p.51).

To "powerful political majorities" he might well have added indomitable and sometimes ruthless minorities.
Changing Personal and Social Values

The membrane separating the university from society has always been a permeable one, and in the United States especially, the universities have been intimately related to their environment and to their constituencies. But now more than ever before, colleges and universities are in and of the world. The ivy walls came tumbling down as the waves of student protest and civil reaction flowed back and forth across campus boundaries, and the clash of political, social, economic, moral, and cultural values which is tearing society apart has spread to the university to set student against student, faculty against faculty, faculty against student, trustee against trustee, and sometimes most of them against the administrator. Whatever was left of the academic community before the Free Speech Movement—before Berkeley, as the students put it—has disintegrated.

Colleges and universities, even if they try, cannot retreat from the hurly-burly world of social disorganization and conflicting values. The traditional image of higher education was that of a college or university in an idyllic small town or small city setting, remote from the clang and clatter of commerce and industry, unsoiled by grubby politics, serenely unaware of racial injustice, and culturally self-contained. Most of the land-grant colleges and many of the state universities—among them Iowa State College and the University
of Iowa, Oregon State and the University of Oregon, the University of Wisconsin, and the University of Illinois—were placed in the country. And even after World War II, the new British universities, including some of the technological universities, looked for sites in cathedral towns. By determining to remain and expand in the inner city, the new University of Aston in Birmingham, England, became unique.

The traditional image is rapidly changing, however. In the near future, Portland State College, not the University of Oregon at Eugene, will be the center of action. Nearly all of the new public colleges and universities will be located in the cities and will participate intimately in the social, political, and cultural reconstruction of their urban communities. Where once public as well as private institutions responded primarily to the articulate, the influential, and the powerful in society, they will now come under great pressure to respond to a wider range of economic interests, to a pluralistic political constituency, and to a more diverse pattern of ethnic and cultural backgrounds and aspirations.

In the course of coming to terms with a changing world, colleges and universities will have to become sensitive to new, or at least different, values from those which have motivated personal behavior and social institutions in a technological, acquisitive, and materialistic society. This sensitivity will demand an inordinately difficult reorientation on the part of faculties themselves. The values of academic men have increasingly reflected the values of the market place and our epicurean culture; certainly, there are not many ascetics left in academe. And the Philistines have become increasingly numerous. The time is rapidly approaching, however, when academic men will have to evince a new set of values.

Academics find themselves caught between what Bennis (1970) has called the new and old cultures:
The old... is based on an old-fashioned scarcity-oriented, technological culture. The amorphous counter-culture that is growing to challenge it might be considered a person-centered culture... the old culture... has moral components which are authoritarian, puritanical, punitive, fundamentalist. When forced to choose it tends to give preference to property over personal rights, technological requirements over human needs, competition over cooperation, violence over sexuality, concentration over distribution, producer over consumer, means over ends, secrecy over openness, social forms over personal expression, striving over gratification, loyalty over truth. The new person-centered culture tends to reverse all these priorities [pp. 1-4].

The polarity of values of which we are at the moment so keenly aware is between the primacy of living experience and the search for abstract principles, between freedom and authority, between the person and the organization, between the immediate and the eternal, between the esthetic and the logical, between the moment and time, and between individualism and community.

Youth, impatient with all they find ugly, dehumanizing, and depersonalizing in the contemporary world, assume that these polarities are peculiar to our society and that it would be possible, once and for all, to replace the old with the new culture. Alas, each set of the alternatives listed above is the subject of an old scenario, and it is a play that will probably be continuously rewritten as men and institutions move now toward one pole and then toward the other. This is certainly true in the case of absolute and relative values. Already, new orthodoxies are being proclaimed and undeviating belief and obedience are being exacted. It is also true of individualism and community. Having won freedom, the person then submits himself to the collective will. Presumably having found himself, the individual then loses his individuality in the group. This is the age-old
drama, but it is a drama which now requires the university to change the cast and shift and perhaps repaint the scenery.

We are coming into a period of new priorities, as yet only dimly seen. But the broad setting of what has been called the post industrial society has already been sketched. The new world will be built on striking developments in science and technology which will require high levels of specialization, but on the part of a relatively small number of people. Kahn and Wiener (1967) have pointed out that this new economy will produce a vast increase in the availability of goods and of such services as transportation and communication: a great increase in leisure, with a concomitant reduction in the pressures of work; and dramatic changes in such fields as psychopharmacology, with radical consequences for culture and styles of life. They conclude that with greatly increased per capita income, the drastically reduced work week, earlier retirement, and longer vacations, leisure time and recreation and values controlling them will acquire a new importance.

The new post industrial affluence and leisure could be more dangerous than benign. The necessity of working has helped the individual to mature and relate to reality; leisure may encourage self-indulgence and irresponsibility. Kahn and Wiener (1967) suggest that a reduction in the restraints imposed by a harsher reality will produce large numbers of spoiled children. And they go on to say:

Thus there may be a great increase in selfishness, a great decline of interest in government and society as a whole, and a rise in the more childish forms of individualism and in the more anti-social forms of concern for self and perhaps immediate family. Thus, paradoxically, the technological, highly productive society, by demanding less of the individual, may decrease his economic frustrations but increase his aggressions against the society [pp. 198-199].
Fortunately, there are other possibilities. The authors also envision a possible future in which most of the people will expend a great deal of effort on self-development through sports, music, art, or serious travel, or through the study of science, philosophy, and other subjects, with a large minority becoming an elite of elites.

Galbraith (1967) has pointed out that if the industrial system becomes a relatively diminishing, albeit essential, part of life, esthetic goals and intellectual activity for its own sake will have “pride of place...the industrial system itself will be subordinate to the claims of these dimensions of life.” When that kind of society materializes, he concluded, colleges and universities will espouse the values and goals associated not with the production of material goods but with intellectual and artistic development.

**Shifts in University Priorities**

If technology is to be subordinated to human purposes and human values and social priorities are to be rearranged, educational priorities will have to be revised correspondingly. This will require, among other things, realigning the status and influence of the disciplines which comprise the university. After World War II, and especially after Sputnik, science and engineering rapidly gained preferential status in staff, budget, and research support. These departments and the professional schools, followed by the expanding social sciences, overshadowed the humanities and the arts. Professional education and specialization all but eclipsed the traditional values of liberal studies. Although it is clear that the post-industrial society will require vast amounts of scientific and technological knowledge, and that colleges and universities will have to supply it, the new society will call for much more that our educational institutions also will have to provide.
If society is to be reconstituted to assure the supremacy of human values, and if justice, dignity, and the opportunity for self-realization are to be extended not merely to the few, but to the many, the behavioral sciences must be given higher priority. Study and research in the basic social sciences must be substantially strengthened and the applied social sciences and the professions based upon them rapidly developed. These relatively new professional fields need the strength derived from organizational visibility, collaboration, and mutual support.

Essential as education may be for managing the social and natural environment, it will not deserve the highest priority. If colleges and universities are to give first place to man’s humanity and his artistic development, they will have to reverse their values. They will need to give preeminence not to professional education, but to liberal studies, and especially to the humanities and the arts, which once again come into their own after a long period of eclipse under professional and scientific studies. But if the revival of the humanities means merely the restoration of the old pedantries, students will have none of them. It is worth remembering at a time when students are demanding relevance that in the hands of pedagogues literature too often seems juiceless and unrelated to the human spirit. Great humanists themselves have declared that teachers too often gave students “the husks of literary history and professional scholarship,” that they remained “aloof from the conflict of ideas, unrelate to the deepest issues of the times,” and that they were interested in the “pastness of the past,” until literature became “a refuge from life rather than a lamp to illumine its ways.”

And what of philosophy? One would have to reply that all too often the philosopher, like “the idealist, feels strong in the abstract world, but weak among the claims of manhood and womanhood (Rooth, 1937, p. 368).” Tragically, but perhaps inevitably, the questions
students raise today have been raised many times before by both students and sensitive teachers. Of the unworldly orientation of philosophers, a more worldly one (Otto, 1940) once asked:

After all, of what advantage to men is a theoretically luminous universe if in their daily lives they must stumble on without light? What has been gained for mankind when the scholar has pictured the harmony, perfection, and beauty of the cosmos, if on our planet millions of human beings must continue to endorse squalor, poverty, and strife?...Or is the hunger of a thinker for intellectual triumph of such worth that the hunger of men and women for a life that tastes good is nothing in comparison [p.24]?

Unless philosophy can be transformed, as John Dewey said, from “a device for dealing with the problems of philosophy” into “a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men,” unless, with other humanistic studies, philosophy accepts the responsibilities of our civilization, it will exert little impact on the great majority of students.

The arts, too, must be saved from the pedantries which have beset them in formal education if they are to become carriers of another educational renaissance. Historians and critics have created barriers between us and painting, sculpture, and music. They did this, as Whitehead said, by overlaying the arts with excessive intellectualism (Price, 1954). Richard Livingston (1952, p.87), the great Oxford humanist of the last generation, wrote eloquently of the limitations of analysis in the study of all subjects. The habit of analysis, he said, contributes to our materialism by destroying our sense of wonder, and he quoted Whitehead, who observed, “When you understand all about the sun, and all about the atmosphere, and all about the radiation of the earth, you may still miss the radiance of the sunset.”
In attempting to make the arts academically respectable, teachers have discouraged the immediate and direct apprehension of beauty and meaning. It is time to restore the intimate relationship between the person and the work of art, unmediated whenever possible by formal scholarship. This is not to say that criticism and analysis are never helpful; on occasion they may be necessary for full comprehension. Nor is it to say that painting and music should never be seen in their historical or social setting; history and criticism can facilitate and deepen esthetic response, but they should not be used to obscure it.

Fortunately, creative activity in literature, art, and music has finally begun to find a home in the university. At least in some universities, painting, creative writing, and musical composition have found a place alongside history and criticism. But scholars have accepted creative activity grudgingly, partly, I think, because they have a deep suspicion of other means of thought and expression than the verbal and mathematical ones most of them use. To give advanced degrees for creative performance is still unusual; only a relatively few institutions do so. A distinguished art historian once tried to secure my support for his opposition to advanced degrees in creative production. He purported to believe that the academic atmosphere of a graduate school would stifle creative talent. But this was only an excuse. The feeling still persists that creativity is inferior to history and criticism; that painting, sculpture, musical composition, and writing are intellectually barren and therefore unworthy of replacing a conventional dissertation. Do critics and historians think that their gloss on a work of art is superior to the creation itself? I should think it is not. I should think that analyses, explanations, and annotations would be useful only as they enriched the experience of art, literature, and music. No doubt criticism sometimes does this, but I am convinced that on many occasions beauty and meaning wither and decay.
under verbal analysis. As Whitehead put it, artistic creations are "pickled in a donnish society."

Some years ago, looking idly through the prints at a London shop, I came across a striking colored lithograph by "Petit Pierre." I knew nothing about the artist, but purchased the print. Afterwards I tried to find out who Pierre was. I discovered it was the pseudonym of the illustrator and printmaker, Steinlen. Pierre was the name under which Steinlen signed the biting pictorial commentaries on the way in which, at the turn of the century in France, the wealthy, the politically powerful, and the grasping petty bourgeoisie exploited the peasants and unfeelingly ignored the poor and the miserable. I began to collect Steinlen prints. I found not only biting critical ones, but also ones showing great compassion for the ill, the poverty stricken, the hopeless. I found others which expressed sensitive feeling for peasants going down the street arm in arm, or sitting on a park bench, oblivious to all but their own lovemaking.

Steinlen was not a great artist, although he was known as a kind of artists' artist who influenced the work of many others. Nevertheless, I found a good deal about him in the university library, and, discovering that the Louvre had had an exhibition of his drawings not long before, I secured access to the museum's collection. I not only read about Steinlen and his family, but also about his time. I talked to a niece who is writing his autobiography. I visited the apartment where he died, and bought a small drawing off the wall. I saw the atelier behind the apartment in which Toulouse-Lautrec and Renoir also had their studios. And so I could feel myself into Steinlen's life in Montmartre where he found his subjects in the cafes, on the streets, and in the hovels where so many of his sad people lived. Seeing his pictures led me to the library, to the work of other artists of the time; to reading about the economic, political, and social conditions under which Steinlen's people lived. Of course, my interest could have developed in the other
direction. I might have found a discussion of Steinlen in a history of modern art and turned to his drawings and prints. It doesn't matter, really, which way one goes, but both ways ought to be open. Neither way will be educationally profitable unless it leads to an intimate relation between the student and the work.

To see literature and the arts as reflections of human experience in all its diversity and, at the same time, in all its universality; in all its personal intensity and likewise in all its strong social consciousness; to discern through examination of the record in literature, art, music, history, and philosophy the values that men have forged out of the welter of human experience through the ages; to sense the unrealized possibilities in human nature and human society; and above all, to think clearly, and most of all to feel deeply about these things should be the purposes governing the study of the humanities and the arts.

It will be of no value to attempt to revive humanistic and artistic studies, however, if they are still the province of narrow minds, the instruments of intellectual authority, and places where scholars may retreat from their world. Teachers should welcome youth warmly in a cooperative search for meaning, value, beauty, and truth, because students will ignore teachers who are impersonal and didactic when they should be engaged in sharing the excitement of discovery. If the liberal arts are to be preeminent in tomorrow's world, they must come alive in the minds and hearts of men—students and faculty alike. This will call for great teachers of the kind that pedants and research-oriented scholars in great universities are unlikely to choose or promote, or even produce. They will be found and nurtured only through the intervention of the small cadre of humane scholars we now have, and through the initiative of sensitive administrators.

If science and technology are to yield at least some of their preference to the benefit of social sciences,
humanities, and the arts, the university also will have to realign its resources and bring about a new balance of power and influence. Since this redistribution of resources will have to be effected in a period of financial stringency, the competition for personnel, research support, and capital funds will pit each division of the university against the others in fierce competition. When demands for support far outstrip available funds, faculty bodies are notoriously ineffective in dividing up the pie. While the repatterning of the university must proceed with full consultation between faculties and administrators, and in the light of clearcut priorities, the president and the governing board will have to take final responsibility for the allocation of resources and evaluation of the effectiveness with which they are used. It will be essential that the priorities and other criteria which have governed decisions be clearly communicated.

It is doubtful that the University of California at Berkeley would have enjoyed its renaissance of the fine arts in the late 50s and 60s without the initiative and persuasion of Chancellor, later President, Clark Kerr. With his leadership, the creative arts—painting, sculpture, music, the theater, and architecture—were especially strengthened. In what was Berkeley’s final period of growth before reaching its enrollment ceiling of 27,500, Kerr stimulated the development of new programs, the appointment of creative staff, and the construction of new buildings. The culmination of the building program is the new University Art Museum, recently completed. Through this center for the fine arts, the university will serve not only its own students and staff, but the interests and activities of the entire San Francisco Bay Area.

Civil Authorities in University Governance

Universities will rearrange their priorities not only from inner conviction, but also, as noted above, from
intimate relationships with the world around them. It is increasingly difficult to find the border between the campus and the community. In a real and increasing sense, there is in fact no boundary. This is especially true in the regulation of student and even faculty behavior. For a long time college and university campuses were sanctuaries of a sort where, by unspoken consent, civil authorities let the institutions take care of all but serious infractions of law by students and faculty members. That sanctuary has now been lost, and students are not the only members of the academic community who have lost it: in some institutions police have arrested faculty members as well.

The presence of the community police, the highway patrol, and the National Guard, and the raids on student residences made by police without prior consultation with university administrators, all symbolize the fact that colleges and universities have increasingly surrendered the privilege of self-regulation to the external authority of the police and the courts. The famous resolutions of the Berkeley faculty on December 8, 1964, which brought an end to the crisis precipitated by the so-called Free Speech Movement, provided in essence that the only control by the university over on-campus speech and political advocacy would be regulations concerning “time, place, and manner.” What is true of Berkeley is increasingly characteristic of other institutions. The behavioral sanctions of the university, except for narrowly defined academic affairs, have become the sanctions of the society at large. Most discipline, in fact nearly everything that has been subsumed under _in loco parentis_, will be surrendered to the civil authorities. Never again will colleges and universities in this country be relatively independent enclaves permitted to monitor most of their members’ behavior, and it is worth noting again that the term “members” includes both students and staff.
The university sanctuary was once thought to be an essential means of protecting the institution, its faculty, and its students from repressive external control, and from invasions of its intellectual freedom. There are those who believe that the campus sanctuary should be abandoned along with the elitist conception of the university. We should then be able to discover whether there are any special privileges necessary for preserving the rights to criticize social institutions and pursue the truth wherever the search may lead.

The “Essential” University

Some students of the organization and governance of colleges and universities, having seen institutions turn the regulation of conduct over to the police and the courts, now propose to disaggregate the university, that is, spin off a variety of functions and activities that have grown up around the central function of teaching and basic research (Kerr, 1970). An institution might thus withdraw from housing and feeding students, leaving these activities, somewhat after the manner of the traditional continental university, to students themselves or to private enterprise. For example, student unions in the Swedish universities operate and control student housing, student buildings and recreation, food services, health services, and academic registration (Duster, 1970). The administration might dispense with recreational activities, and the health service might be closed, leaving students to depend on private clinics, public health agencies, or personal physicians. Military research, such as that conducted by the University of California at the Atomic Energy Commission laboratories at Livermore and Los Alamos, to which many students violently object, could be turned over to government research laboratories, and much of the university's other applied research and service enterprises could be transferred to
independent institutions such as the Rand Corporation and the Stanford Research Institute, or to quasi-university organizations devoted to the study of urban problems and to participation in community action programs (McConnell, 1968).

Having thus pruned away all of its typical American elements, a college or university could then concentrate, presumably, on the organization and governance of its "essential" business. If anyone assumes that this inevitably is the way to peace, however, he should recall that institutions like the Sorbonne, which have never taken responsibility for the great range of activities characteristic of the American university, have had their full share of student disruption.

If disaggregation becomes the mode, we will not hear very much in the future about educating the whole man or about education as self-actualization. Presumably, an institution pared down to its "essentials" would disclaim responsibility for anything but the student's narrowly defined academic accomplishments. Already, in 1970, the following statement (The Committee on the Student in Higher Education, 1968), written only two years before, has a quaint ring:

"Whether it realizes it or not, the college has a major effect on the development of the whole human personality for the student between the ages of 17 and 25. Moreover, the young person becomes what he becomes not only because of what he hears in the classroom and not even mainly because of what he hears in the classroom. His interaction with teachers, his encounter with the social structure of the college administration, the friendship groups in which he becomes integrated, the values he acquires from student culture, the atmosphere of flexibility or rigidity which permeates the school environment...all these have an immense, if not yet precisely measured, impact on the evolution of the young person's self view and world view, on his confidence and altruism, on his mastering the needs for"
identity and intimacy... By the very fact that it presumesto inform the minds of the young, the college becomes involved in the development of the whole person, of which the intellectual faculties are but a part [pp.5-6].

Perhaps some small liberal arts colleges, still capable of being academic communities, may continue to take an interest in, and some responsibility for the student as a person, and express a concern for the influence of the whole of his experience on his individual development. Such institutions, however, will touch relatively few students.

Internal Redistribution of Power

Two aspects of the redistribution of power and authority have been discussed—one external, the transference to civil authorities of the regulation of conduct, and one internal, the reallocation of resources among academic fields. Another internal change, which represents one of the most significant changes during the last quarter of a century is the great growth of faculty control over academic affairs, even in institutions in which the president, as executive officer of the governing board, has formal administrative control over all phases of college or university operation (Deegan, McConnell, Martimer, & Stull, 1970).

Authorities differ on the extent of faculty authority. Although Kerr (1963) concluded that faculties generally have attained authority over admissions,
approval of courses, examinations, and awarding of degrees, he nevertheless concluded that faculty control over the general development of the American multi-university has been quite limited. Bundy (1968), on the other hand, declared that, “When it comes to a crunch, in a first class university it is the faculty which decides.” Perhaps the critical qualification is Bundy’s phrase, “in a first class university,” because it is in these institutions that faculties exercise effective control of the education and certification of entrance to the profession; the selection, retention, and promotion of their members; the content of the curriculum; work schedules; and the evaluation of performance.

These prerogatives do represent a high degree of professionalization and no small degree of power over the primary activities of the institutions, and there are signs that faculties in other than first class universities also are reaching for more authority of this kind. One of these signs is that the directors of the American Association of State Colleges and Universities (1970) have felt it necessary to respond to faculty pressure for greater influence and power by issuing a statement asserting the responsibilities and authority of the president and the governing board. It has been reported that at its meeting in November 1970, the association withdrew its previous endorsement of the 1940 AAUP statement on academic freedom, adopted a resolution stating that academic responsibility is as important as academic freedom, and appointed a special committee to study problems of academic freedom, responsibility, and tenure (Berkeley Gazette, Nov. 18, 1970).

British university faculties have probably attained greater autonomy than those in the United States. Sir Sidney Caine (1969, p.159), erstwhile Director of the London School of Economics, has declared that, “All the universities have tended therefore to move, so far as detailed administration is concerned, in the direction of full academic self-government...and even toward greater
influence in broad financial policy." Faculties in the British universities have gained power, however, mainly at the expense of lay control and influence. Another student of British academic government (Rowland, 1969) has pointed out, for example, that the lay-dominated governing council has not exercised any initiative in university government for many years, and that although budgets have to be approved by finance committees of the councils, which have less academic representation than most other council committees, there is little evidence that the committees examine the academic policy behind the financial arrangements.

Actually, the power of both laymen and academics over university affairs in Britain is declining. Academic decisions increasingly have to be made according to guidelines established by the University Grants Committee. And behind the University Grants Committee the central governmental authority, through the Department of Education and Science, is intervening increasingly in university affairs. More and more decisions concerning university development lie outside the hands of the governing bodies and the faculties, even the faculties of Oxford and Cambridge.

**Faculty Accountability to Administration**

In the United States, faculty authority and influence will face challenges from many sources. Faculties are rediscovering that they are accountable to a variety of constituencies, and that consequently their autonomy is not absolute, but limited. Elsewhere I have discussed faculty members' accountability to personal standards, to their peers, to their students, to the administration, to the governing board, and to the public at large (M. Connell, 1969). The discussion here will be confined to faculty accountability to administrators and governing boards.
As a case in point, the issue of relationships between faculty and administration at the University of California, Berkeley, was precipitated most recently by alleged faculty irresponsibility in "reconstituting" the university immediately after the Cambodian invasion. Although the Senate Committee on Courses, with the concurrence of department chairmen, approved the modification of a number of courses for the remainder of the year, stories abounded in the press, possibly exaggerated, of politicization, improper conduct of courses and grading, abandonment of academic standards, cancellation of classes, and widespread student absenteeism. After investigation, the chancellor reported to the Board of Regents that instances of abuse of authority had actually been few, but many observers feel it was such public criticisms which led the California legislature to delete funds for faculty salary increases and support of the Academic Senate. (A portion of the budget request for the senate was subsequently restored.)

President Hitch (1970) responded to these criticisms in memoranda to the Assembly of the Academic Senate and to the Committee on Educational Policy of the Board of Regents. "At the heart of the problem of administrative governance of the university," said the president, "is the relationship between the administration and the faculty, and the role played by each in determining what things are done and how they are done in the university." He went on to say that over a period of many years the Academic Senate had moved toward more and more separation between its working committees and the administration. This division has been thoroughly documented by a study of academic government at Berkeley (Mortimer, 1970) which reached the following conclusion:

...the faculty have almost absolute control over the operation of the Academic Senate. Although some administrators are members of the senate, as provided in the Bylaws, few
central administrators are members of senate committees. The Committee on Committees tries not to appoint even department chairmen to senate committees [p. 172].

The report of the Berkeley study went on to point out that except in the instances of the Board of Educational Development and the Graduate Council, both of which do have administrative members, the faculty has almost absolute control over the curriculum. The Committee on Courses has made final decisions and has seldom consulted with the central administration, and while the Senate Budget Committee, which makes recommendations concerning appointments, promotions, and tenure, is advisory to the chancellor, the records show that the administration has sustained approximately 95 percent of the committee's recommendations.

On questions of educational policy, such as the evaluation of academic units or proposals for new ones, the faculty attempts to maintain a clearly separate view. Although the Committee on Educational Policy consults with the central administration on various matters, it is careful to protect the integrity of its own views when advising the administration on specific problems. "In summary," said Mortimer's (1970, p. 174) Berkeley report, "the governance system as it operates in personnel, educational policy, curriculum, and senate affairs is largely one of separate faculty jurisdictions." This jurisdictional separation at Berkeley between faculty and administration is in sharp contradistinction to the principle of joint participation and shared authority recommended by the American Association of University Professors (1969, pp.26-30).

There are many reasons for faculties to want independence from administrative control and to resist even administrative participation in faculty government. Some of these reasons may be found in the traditions of particular institutions, others in a growing sense of faculty professionalism, and in the unwillingness of
academics to consider expertise in administration an academic "specialty." Many faculty members assert that administrators should not manage, but should simply provide suitable conditions for academic work or merely carry out the directions given them by faculty bodies. Perhaps the extreme expression of this attitude is to be found in Britain, where, as Eustace (1969) has put it, "A key characteristic of our administration is that its formal function is to record and carry out decisions of committees composed of nonadministrators. It is a nonvoting civil service." Finally, the association of university executives with university trustees, legislators, alumni, federal agencies, and other external individuals and groups accentuates the separateness between faculty members and administrators. A major effect of the diverging worlds of the two groups, wrote Lunsford (1969) "has been to erode the informal relationships between administrators and faculty members, relationships which engendered and sustained the trust necessary for an easy exercise of administrative authority, and which muted the potential conflict between administrators and academics in the university of an earlier day."

President Hitch's (1970) memorandum to the Regents' Committee on Educational Policy called for the restoration of a close working relationship between the senate and the administration. To that end he took the position that, "It is the administration's responsibility to allocate the resources, and it is a joint responsibility of the administration and the faculty to work out the best means of accomplishing desired educational objectives with the available resources." According to the president, the administration should play a part in curricular planning only to the extent necessary to insure that courses and curricula are consistent with the goals and available resources of the university. Even this degree of administrative surveillance over the curriculum would be resisted by many faculties; it has evoked faculty criticism at Berkeley.
Turning to the disciplining of faculty members, the president noted the desire of professionals to discipline themselves and agreed that it would be salutary for faculty members to adhere voluntarily to a code of academic responsibility formulated by the Academic Senate. He pointed out, however, that the present Senate Committee on Privilege and Tenure seemed to regard its main duty to be that of defending the right of the faculty member without expressing a corresponding concern for the university's welfare. Consequently, he declared, it is essential for the administration to become involved in individual cases, and he reported that to that end he had appointed a committee of four chancellors and four members of the Academic Council (statewide) to work with members of his staff in examining ways of improving procedures for deciding when disciplinary action is necessary, what action is appropriate, and how to carry out the decision. At the same time President Hitch asked the senate "to develop an effective code of professional ethics for all its members."

The Committee on Senate Policy of the Berkeley Division of the Academic Senate, after holding open hearings on the draft report of the committee appointed by the president, took exception to that draft because it declared that a code of faculty conduct must be a "precise delineation...in proscriptive terms of what constitutes 'cause,' or misconduct, not only in relation to dismissal but to the imposition of less severe penalties."

The Policy Committee objected to a code "in terms analogous to a criminal code" and to "any attempt to codify forbidden conduct in precise terms," and recommended to the Berkeley Division of the senate that the division should affirm its belief in the concept that the faculty has a self-governing function embodied institutionally in the Academic Senate, and should recommend to the senate that the latter clarify its traditional principles of professional ethics and their relation to the imposition of discipline upon members of the faculty.
The Policy Committee also proposed a study of machinery which would enable the faculty to participate in disciplinary procedures, safeguard the rights of the individual, and minimize tension and conflict between administrators and faculty. The Berkeley Division accepted these recommendations at a subsequent meeting (Minutes, Nov. 10, 1970).

On October 31, 1970, the Council of the American Association of University Professors issued a new statement on "Freedom and Responsibility," which declared that "the faculty should take the initiative, working with the administration and other components of the institution, to develop and maintain an atmosphere of freedom, commitment to academic inquiry, and respect for the academic rights of others." It also asserted that "there is need for the faculty to assume a more positive role as guardian of academic values against unjustified assaults from its own members," and that "rules designed to meet these needs for faculty self-regulation and flexibility of sanctions should be adopted on each campus..." One concludes that the AAUP has recognized the need for emphasizing faculty responsibility, and that it believes faculties should assume the obligation of establishing norms of faculty conduct and of disciplining their own members when appropriate, rather than leaving these tasks to administrators and governing boards...

As a means of protecting academic integrity, President Hitch proposed that the role of department chairmen should be strengthened in assigning academic personnel, reporting failures of staff members to carry out responsibilities, and recommending appropriate disciplinary action. He declared also that academic deans, whose administrative status has been uncertain at Berkeley, should have more authority and responsibility in planning, initiating, and conducting educational programs under their jurisdiction, and also in supervising personnel.
The implication of the president's report was that there should be more direct lines of administrative responsibility and authority from department chairmen to deans to central administrators. According to Lunsford (1969), the faculty is not likely to accept without opposition such strengthening of bureaucratic authority and hierarchy in major universities.

President Hitch has come close to asking for authority commensurate with that of the presidents of the California state colleges. Under the Board of Trustees and the chancellor of the state college system, presidents exercise authority over a wide range of college affairs, including curriculum, academic personnel, and business administration. In accordance with this grant of presidential authority, the constitution of the Fresno State College Academic Assembly states that, "...the President of the College is authorized to delegate functions to and consult with the faculty, but is charged with final responsibility for and given final authority over the college." Deegan et al. (1970) have pointed out, however, that the constitution also provides that, "...the faculty body should have responsibility and authority to develop and recommend policies and it should be consulted on all academic policy matters by the President of the College." This relationship between faculty and administration has by no means been accepted equably by the faculty, however, and at Fresno State and other state colleges in the system, both the nature of presidential authority and the way it is exercised have generated a strong and sometimes explosive tension between faculty and administration.

Nevertheless, we may expect faculties, even in the major universities in which they have won a high degree of autonomy and authority, to become increasingly accountable to administrative authority. Faculty behavior which evokes widespread public censure, much of which may be reflected in punitive legislative attitudes and the disaffection of governing boards, will hasten stronger
administrative control. There are some students of higher education who believe that this is long overdue.

McGrath (1969) has observed that the college and university presidency has changed from a position of near omnipotence to near impotency, and it is his contention that appropriate presidential power should be restored. He proposes that after reconstitution of the two principal policymaking bodies, the faculty, and the board of trustees, as many final decisions as possible should be placed, under appropriate safeguards, in the hands of the chief administrative officer. These safeguards, in McGrath's view, are wide participation and consultation in policymaking, accountability of the president to the bodies from which he secures his delegated authority, and a renewable five-year appointment.

Howard R. Bowen (1969), president of the Claremont Graduate School, has taken the same position. "The need," he wrote, "is for a strong executive combined with workable participation by the several groups within the university and of course with due process in all personnel actions and other adequate safeguards for academic freedom." He pointed out that students, faculty, and nonacademic staff often press for special and sometimes conflicting benefits, frequently with an insensitivity to the general public interest. Since someone must resolve these diverse interests in accordance with institutional goals, Bowen says that "The role of umpire, coordinator, and link with the public inevitably falls to the president and his administrative colleagues." He admitted, however, that administrators, too, have special interests, and that it is therefore to the governing board that one must look for adjudication between the special concerns of the administrators and the other constituencies. When one or more of the parties resort to coercion, Bowen believes that it is particularly essential that final authority should rest with the president and the lay governing board; otherwise the institution will either fall apart or fall into the hands of a
group unresponsive to the public interest or the legitimate concerns of the other interest groups.

It should be noted, however, that not all observers accept at face value the notion that the president acts to guard the institution's goals and protect the public interest. Lunsford (1970) has noted that student activists have charged that campus executives often are simply guarding their own vested interests and violating values which they themselves have espoused when they profess to be protecting "the institution." He also pointed out that university executives consider themselves more capable than others of protecting the institution because their greater access to information gives them a unique overview. Since fundamental institutional interests presumably are at stake, and the president professes to have a superior understanding of them, he may make more and more decisions in the light of his presumed special insight. Thus, said Lunsford (1970, p.169), "the 'leader' becomes at once the embodiment of organization, protected by its complexities from effective restraint by others, and a free, separate force 'outside' the organization, manipulating the incentives of its members, the operative meanings of its goals, and its loose organizational rules—all for 'its' own good."

The fact remains, however, that conflicting interests and pressures have to be resolved and issues have to be decided in accordance with the institution's purposes. I think that Bowen and McGrath are right in placing the responsibility for final decision, after encouragement of wide participation and consultation, into the hands of the president, and ultimately the governing board. But Lunsford's point also is well taken: that the president should clearly state the relevant information which he took into account, and the principles, policies, and criteria that guided his decisions.

There are signs that faculty members will again become accountable to the administration and the governing board for their work load and the proportion
of time spent on teaching, research, and other services. President Hitch of the University of California recently reported to the Assembly of the Academic Senate that between 1960 and 1968, while the time spent by the regular faculty on lower division instruction, course, and tutorial activities decreased from seven to four hours per week, and on upper division teaching from 12.8 to 9.3 hours, time given to graduate instruction increased from 11.6 to 14 hours. Overall, during a period when the faculty-student ratio had risen, there was a net drop of four hours per week on course and tutorial teaching for all students combined. These data seem to justify what President Hitch (1970) called "the widespread belief that the faculty has increasingly neglected what the public considers its most important function—teaching."

To repair this neglect, President Hitch pressed for a new commitment to undergraduate teaching, and asked the chancellors of the university campuses to submit plans for the improvement of undergraduate instruction. To that end he laid down guidelines which he said he expected to be followed. These guidelines called on department chairmen to ensure "substantial involvement of faculty of all ranks in instruction at all levels, including the lower division," and to provide an opportunity for every freshman to participate in at least one small class taught by a faculty member from the professorial ranks. He directed that evaluation of teaching performance be improved by such devices as the appointment of departmental or faculty teams to evaluate quality of teaching by faculty at all levels, with particular attention to those being considered for appointment to tenure rank, and that systematic evaluation of teachers by students should be encouraged (University Bulletin, 1970).

*One of the clauses of collective bargaining agreements is certain to be devoted to work load. Although the agreement recently negotiated by the City University of New York makes only a vague reference to work load, more definite specifications are likely to be made in many institutions in the future. At first glance, one might assume that work load provisions will always work out to the benefit of faculty. On second thought, however, one realizes that collective bargaining agreements specifying work loads may well give "management" leverage over amount and allocation of faculty services.*
President Hitch seemed to be reasserting an earlier directive to the effect that research alone would not justify promotion to tenure, a position to which the Berkeley senate committee which recommends appointments and promotions took immediate exception. This time, however, the chairman of the university's statewide Assembly termed the president's call for improved undergraduate instruction sound. Other faculty members expressed informal approval, but some pointed out that the proposal would require an extensive reallocation of resources—presumably at the expense of research—and that the university did not have the funds to maintain its commitment to research and at the same time give greater financial support to undergraduate education (San Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 22, 1970). However, the Berkeley chapter of the American Federation of Teachers, a relatively small faculty group, denounced the president's "directives," and declared that its members "refuse to surrender our authority and responsibility to determine what good teaching is and how to strive for it by non-coercive means."

Perhaps for the moment the line between faculty and administrative control over faculty services is being more sharply drawn at Berkeley than elsewhere, but the issue is likely to arise at other universities with faculties much more heavily committed to research and public service than teaching. If so, these faculties may also find themselves under strong administrative pressure to reallocate their time and interest.

Faculty Accountability to Trustees

The movement to make the faculty more accountable to administrative officers will, of course, both reduce faculty autonomy and accentuate the tension between faculty and administration. There are, in addition, signs that boards of trustees also will demand
greater faculty accountability, and this will intensify the faculty's basic suspicion of lay governance.

At the University of California, for example, recent actions of the Regents have revived a longstanding point at issue between the faculty and the Regents, namely, the prerogative of the faculty to determine its own membership. This issue goes back to the notorious Loyalty Oath controversy of 1949, during which groups of faculty and other university employees refused to sign an oath swearing their loyalty to the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California, and disavowing belief in, advocacy, or teaching of the overthrow of the United States government by force or other illegitimate or unconstitutional methods. In the course of determining its position toward the nonsigners, the interests of the Regents turned from the loyalty oath itself, according to Gardner (1967), to "the next and final point at issue, namely, the authority of the Board of Regents and the Senate in the governance of the university, particularly in relation to the appointment, promotion, and dismissal of members of the faculty [p.143]."

Although the Committee on Privilege and Tenure of the Academic Senate found favorably in the cases of 64 out of 69 regular members of the statewide Academic Senate, the Regents, by a vote of 12 to 10, and against the president's recommendation, dismissed the last diehard 31 senate members who would not sign.

The Northern Section of the Academic Senate rebuked the Regents for dismissing faculty members, for revoking reappointments lawfully made by the board, and for violating the principle of tenure, "an absolutely essential condition in a free university (Gardner, 1967, p.213).""

On appeal, the District Court of Appeals decided unanimously in favor of the nonsigning petitioners, on the ground that the university was by state constitution independent of all political influence, and that the
faculty therefore could not be subjected to a narrower test of loyalty than the oath prescribed in the constitution, which members of the faculty had regularly signed. The court ruled that the Regents' oath with its special disclaimer was narrower than the one prescribed in the constitution. The Regents were ordered to issue letters of reappointment for the current academic year to those nonsigning members of the faculty whose rights of tenure were otherwise unquestioned. In the meantime, the state of California had enacted what was known as the Levering Oath, to be signed by all state employees, "which in spirit if not in wording very nearly duplicated the one exacted by the Regents." The Regents accepted the Levering Oath as binding on the university.

The State Supreme Court, to which the lower court's decision was appealed, struck down the Regents' anti-Communist oath on the grounds that the Regents did not possess the power to require any other oath of loyalty than the state's Levering Oath. A writ directed the university to issue letters of appointment to the nonsigners, subject to the prescription of the Levering Oath. (The disclaimer clause of this Act also was ultimately declared unconstitutional.)

It is important to note, however, as Gardner (1967, p.250) pointed out in his history of the oath controversy, that the Supreme Court failed to "pass judgment on tenure rights, academic freedom, faculty self-government, and political tests for appointment to positions of academic responsibility."

After having long exercised detailed control over matters that governing boards of nearly all distinguished institutions had delegated to administrative officers, the California Board of Regents was persuaded by President Clark Kerr to authorize the chancellors of the several campuses of the university to approve appointments and promotions to tenure positions. Three years later, after controversy over the reappointment of Professor Herbert Marcuse on the San Diego campus, the Regents withdrew
the authority of the chancellors to approve appointments and promotions to tenure status. (The Marcuse reappointment, however, did not involve tenure. It was submitted to the Regents because Professor Marcuse was beyond retirement age, and all such appointments had to be approved by the Regents.) At the same time, the Regents resolved that “no political tests shall ever be considered in the appointment or promotion of any faculty member or employee.” Fearing that this action portended “regional vetoes of faculty appointments and promotions which members of the Board consider improper on the basis of political and nonacademic considerations,” the Berkeley Division of the Academic Senate passed a resolution urging “in the strongest possible terms that the Regents, in the interest of preserving this university, find the wisdom not to use the power so ominously reassumed and to reverse their ill-advised action.”

The issues of academic freedom, political tests for appointments, and faculty control over its own membership surfaced again over the appointment, as Acting Assistant Professor of Philosophy at UCLA of one Angela Y. Davis. Subsequent to her appointment, effective in July 1, 1969, she was accused of being a member of the Communist Party. She admitted such membership. Some three months after her appointment, the Regents directed the president of the university to terminate the appointment, in accordance with regular procedures, on three grounds: the Regents’ resolution of 1940 to the effect that “membership in the Communist Party is incompatible with membership in the faculty of a state university”; the Regents’ action of July 24, 1949, providing that “pursuant to this policy the Regents direct that no member of the Communist Party shall be employed by the university”; and the resolution of both Northern and Southern sections of the Academic Senate in 1950, which declared that “proven members of the Communist Party are not acceptable as members of the faculty.”
Reacting to the Regents' directive, the statewide Academic Senate disavowed its 1950 position against the hiring of Communist Party members and a group of faculty members and students brought suit in the Superior Court, pleading that the dismissal was unconstitutional. The court ruled the Regents' policy on the employment of Communists was unconstitutional, and declared that membership in the Communist Party was not sufficient cause for terminating the appointment of a faculty member at the university. The court also denied the Regents' motion for a change of venue to Alameda County, where the statewide headquarters of the university are located. The president and the chancellor at UCLA immediately reinstated Miss Davis. The Regents then appealed the venue question to an appellate court, which directed the Los Angeles Superior Court to set aside all orders and transfer the case to Alameda County. However, the plaintiffs in the original suit petitioned the California State Supreme Court to rule both on the question of change of venue and on the question of the constitutionality of the Davis dismissal. The Supreme Court subsequently ruled that the case must be tried in Los Angeles County, but did not rule on the constitutional question. As this was being written, the Regents were preparing to appeal the constitutionality of the dismissal.

In the spring of 1970, the chancellor at UCLA recommended Miss Davis' reappointment for 1970-71. At this point the Regents moved to take power over the appointment into their own hands, and passed the following resolution:

The Regents hereby relieve the President of the University, the Chancellor of the Los Angeles campus, and all other administrative officers of any further authority or responsibility in connection with the appointment or nonappointment of Acting Assistant Professor Angela Davis, and that the Board of Regents, acting as a committee of the whole,
review the record relating to this matter and recommend appropriate action to the Board at its next regular meeting.

This action of the Regents rescinded, if only in the Davis case, a delegation of authority over nontenure faculty appointments that had been in force for half a century. Ignoring the positive recommendation of the faculty member's department, the chancellor's recommendation, and clearance by an ad hoc faculty committee and the appropriate administrative officers, the Regents, reportedly led by the governor, voted not to reappoint. The stated rationale for the action was that four speeches had been "so extreme, so antithetical to the protection of academic freedom, and so obviously deliberately false in several respects as to be inconsistent with qualifications for appointment to the faculty."

In making their judgment the Regents presumably relied on the AAUP statement on extramural utterances, particularly the section which calls attention to the faculty member's specific obligations arising from his position in the community: "To be accurate, to exercise appropriate restraint, to show respect for the opinions of others and to make every effort to indicate that he is not an institutional spokesman." The AAUP, however, entered the controversy by appointing a committee of inquiry and wiring the chairman of the Regents and the president of the university that the board's action "raised serious questions related to academic freedom and institutional government which warrent special inquiry." The General Secretary announced the appointment of a committee of inquiry.

Late in the summer of 1970, the Davis case took a sudden unexpected turn. A 17-year-old boy entered a Marin County, California, courtroom in which a convict from San Quentin prison was being tried on charges of stabbing a prison guard, took a gun from under his coat, and passed pistols to the defendant and two other San Quentin prisoners serving as witnesses. The four took the
judge, the prosecutor, and three women jurors as hostages. As the teenager and the three prisoners led the hostages from the courtroom, they announced that they wanted the three "Soledad brothers," charged with the murder of a guard at the Soledad prison, to be released from San Quentin by 12:30 that day. The boy who brought the guns was a brother of one of the Soledad trio.

Guards attempted to stop the rented van in which the kidnappers were trying to escape with their hostages. Shots rang out, and when the van's doors were opened, the judge, the defendant, one other prisoner, and the youth were dead.

Subsequent investigation, according to newspaper accounts, showed that all four guns used in the attempted kidnapping and escape had been purchased by Angela Davis, one of them only two days before the shooting, and that she and the 17-year-old had been together on many occasions, although there was no allegation that she had been in the vicinity of the shooting. The district attorney of Marin County issued a warrant for her arrest, under the California law, as an accomplice to the crime. The FBI put her on its ten-most-wanted list. She was subsequently apprehended in New York City.

After the Regents declined to reappoint her, Miss Davis filed suit in the Federal District Court of San Francisco, claiming that the denial of her reappointment was unconstitutional and asking that the court order the Regents to reappoint her for another year. The Regents opposed this petition and the court subsequently dismissed it on the ground that in any case she was not available to perform the duties of the position in question.

The Marin County episode confuses the Davis case. In the public's mind it probably completely vindicates the Regents' dismissal, if indeed the public considered any more justification than Communist Party membership necessary. But the charges against her should
not be allowed to confuse the issues connected with Miss Davis' dismissal by the Regents, her reinstatement by the Los Angeles Superior Court, and the Regents' subsequent refusal to reappoint her for 1970-71.

So far as university governance is concerned, in question in this case is not only the constitutionality of the Regents' policy against the employment of members of the Communist Party, but the power of the Regents to determine the membership of the faculty. Thus, the confrontation of the late 1940s over the loyalty oath and the Regents' control over faculty appointment, promotion, and retention became, in modified form, the faculty-Regents confrontation of 1969-70. If the courts rule only on the question of party membership, in the Davis case, the question of the faculty's control over its own membership will still remain to be determined. The latter issue is almost certain to reach the courts ultimately, and its legal resolution, when it does come, will have far-reaching consequences for patterns of government and authority not only for the University of California, but for other institutions as well. Without a court ruling, it is doubtful that the chancellors or the president of the University of California will regain their authority over appointments and promotions for a long time to come. And the University of California Senate, which enjoyed control over its own membership for a relatively brief period, will not soon regain it. At least in California, the Regents have asserted the accountability of the faculty to the governing board.

Although the Regents of the University of California have often been more extreme in their actions than the governing boards of most other public institutions, other boards can be expected to reclaim elements of their legal authority either delegated or informally entrusted to faculties and administrative officers. That this is a trend is, in fact, suggested by the recent statement of the American Association of State Colleges and Universities (1970) on "Basic Rights and
Responsibilities for College and University Presidents.

Affirming that the many constituencies of an institution—faculty, staff, students, alumni, and parents—all should be provided with an opportunity to be informed and heard, the statement nevertheless declares that, "legally defined, a college or university does not consist of any one or combination of these constituencies. In the eyes of the law, a college or university is its governing board, most commonly known as the board of trustees." It then asserts the authority of the president: "Although the president listens to the voices of all constituent groups, it must be recognized that he functions primarily as the administrative arm of the board." There are those who believe that this reassertion of the power of the trustees is overdue. McGrath (1969) wrote recently:

If order is to be restored in the house of learning and if the educational needs of society are to be met, some of the trustees' legal powers will have to be reclaimed and generally acknowledged. The trustees must assume the role of representing the needs of society for various kinds of educational service. To discharge this function responsibly they must continuously appraise educational policies and practices in terms of emergent social needs. They may, and because of the complexity and scope of the matters with which boards deal, they will have to delegate much responsibility for the determination to faculties and students. They cannot legally or morally divest themselves of the obligations of determining the essential purposes and character of the institutions which they hold in trust (pp.51-60).

This quotation is not included to suggest that governing boards should intrude into administrative affairs, intervene in curricular matters, take faculty appointments and promotions out of the hands of faculty and administration, or channel political and other external pressures on their institutions. It is important to
note that McGrath said that trustees should determine the essential purposes and character of the colleges and universities for which they are responsible. Intelligent trustees will do this with the widespread participation of administrators, faculty members, students, alumni, and other constituencies. But theirs is the obligation to formulate institutional mission and to appraise the integrity with which this mission is pursued.

Reconstitution of Governing Boards

If trustees activate their latent powers, it is not likely that faculties and students will supinely acquiesce. Following Galbraith's (1967) lead, faculties may challenge the whole concept of lay governance, and agree with him that lay trustees are no longer capable of governing, and that it is only the faculty which can do so. Students also may be expected increasingly to oppose the power of trustees and regents, but they are unlikely to accept complete faculty control either; many of them, indeed, are demanding equal power with the faculty.

Since it seems clear that few institutions will be given the right of complete internal self-governance, the time has come to reconstitute governing boards. A study of the composition of governing boards of member institutions of the American Association of Universities (Duster, 1970) showed that of 306 trustees who responded to a questionnaire, their median age was 60, their median and modal annual income was between $50,000 and $75,000, and they included one labor official, but not a single representative of the working class. The sample included one Negro, eight clergymen, and ten professors. It is not surprising that one-third of the trustees of private institutions and nearly one-half of those in public institutions expressed disapproval of full academic freedom on political questions. Almost one-third of the group agreed that a university should be conducted as a business, and of these, 40 percent believed
that there was too much academic freedom in the United States. An overwhelming proportion of the trustees supported the position that the administration should determine who should be permitted to speak on campus. They also predominantly believed that the power to hire and fire faculty members should be placed in the hands of the administration.

These data and the data of other studies of trustees point strongly to the need for greater diversity of board membership. Lay membership should no longer be confined mainly to those who represent wealth, position, or political power, but should be extended to those who represent a wide range of economic and political interests and a diverse pattern of ethnic and cultural backgrounds and aspirations. Governing boards also should include a substantial proportion of faculty. From one-fifth to one-third of the membership of the governing councils of the British universities, with the exception of Oxford and Cambridge, is composed of representatives of their faculty senates, and many Canadian universities have recently reconstituted their governing boards to include faculty members.

While there are as yet few boards in the United States which include members of their own faculties, numerous proposals have been made for including both voting faculty representation and student membership, or at least for liaison with faculty and student representatives. Actual reconstitution of governing boards is, however, proceeding slowly. Hartnett’s (1970) survey of changes in governing boards during 1968-69 showed that only three percent of his national sample of institutions had added one or more students or faculty members to their boards during an 18-month period, and that few institutions had definite plans for such additions in 1969-70. Although more institutions had added students and faculty members in nonvoting capacities, the actual percentages were quite low. Increases from other groups were more substantial, however; Negroes, women,
persons under the age of 40, recent graduates, and people in educational occupations had been appointed in greater numbers; more of these changes occurred in private institutions, since public colleges and universities have less freedom to change quickly or to change at all. These data suggest that we may expect continuing opposition to present forms of lay governance and continuing contention between trustees and their campus constituencies.

**Faculty Unionism and Academic Senates**

Growing controversy, and possibly increasing conflict, between trustees and administrators on the one hand and faculties on the other, will hasten the spread of unionism and collective bargaining in higher education. Other factors also can be expected to strengthen the movement toward aggressive unionism: scarcity of resources will generate conflict over the uses, including faculty salaries and benefits, to which limited funds are put; legislators who threaten tenure rights or withhold salary increases, and executive budget officers who control detailed expenditures from state appropriations, will provoke faculties to organize both for protection and for coercive methods to secure benefits; and an oversupply of qualified applicants for college and university positions will stimulate efforts to assure security of employment.

Unionism will undoubtedly grow more rapidly in the less distinguished public institutions and in community colleges. But acts of governing boards such as those taken by the Regents of the University of California will finally provoke aggressive organizational behavior by the faculties of the most distinguished universities. If faculty members are treated like employees rather than professional colleagues, they will act like employees.

The consequences of unionism and collective bargaining to faculties will be complex; they will both
lose and gain power. Individuals will lose freedom of action if they are represented by an exclusive bargaining agent, and faculties will lose power corporately when an external organization serves as the collective bargaining agent, or when matters under contention between the union and the employer are submitted to external arbitration. Power may be gained, however, through negotiations over conditions of tenure, duration, and service.

In addition to the reordering of relative power, unionism and collective bargaining will have other profound effects on governance: the roles, posture, and authority of academic senates may well be affected. If the bargaining agency and the senate are separate bodies, it may be difficult to divide jurisdiction between them. Conditions involving appointment, promotion, and tenure, traditionally established and applied by senates or senate committees, will become subjects for negotiation with the union. The collective bargaining agreements will define grievance procedures and the parties to adjudication. The issues will be between union and "management," and the faculty senate may become relatively impotent. It is difficult, too, to separate all of the conditions covered by a collective bargaining agreement from fundamental questions of educational policy. Again, the senate may be the loser.

In some instances, senates have secured designation as faculty bargaining agents. Some students (Lieberman, 1969) of faculty unionism believe that senates are certain to be relatively ineffective in this role. In any case, the senate as bargaining agent would become very different from the senate as a professional self-governing organization concerned with educational policy and professional integrity. As senates take on the characteristics of external organizations in preparing themselves for effective bargaining, there is some concern that they will have great difficulty in reconciling their bargaining role with their professional claims to self-government (Livingston, 1969).
Oberer (1969) holds that in faculty unionism the principles of professionalism would be the first pawns in the struggle for power, and that the consequences

...might be expected to be a collective bargaining agreement containing standardized salaries, annual mandated increments, relaxed standards for tenure and promotion, with primary reliance upon time-serving—in short, a surrender of the environment of excellence, of tough-minded application of high standards through the traditional joint agencies of faculty and administration [pp. 132-150].

Another pawn in the power struggle is the principle of rational substantive debate in a deliberative body. Even if the senate became the bargaining agent, unionism and collective bargaining would introduce “relationships of an adversary type, characterized by confrontation and bargaining, backed by force, by threat and intimidation (Livingston, 1969).” Finally, the adversary relationships of unionism and collective bargaining would doom a system of governance based upon joint participation, joint responsibility, and shared authority. Collective bargaining would render obsolete the following provision in the 1969 policy statement of the American Association of University Professors:

The variety and complexity of the tasks performed by institutions of higher education produce an inescapable interdependence among governing boards, administration, faculty, students, and others. The relationship calls for adequate communication among these components, and full opportunity for appropriate joint planning and effort.

Admittedly, responsibility and authority are yet to be shared in significant degree on many campuses. However, if collective bargaining grows apace, a system of governance responsive to all of the constituencies of an institution—trustees, administrators, faculties, students, staff—may never be devised. This suggests that all
concerned should hasten the design of structures and processes of government which incorporate wide participation, functional representation, and sufficient authority to determine the goals of the institution and to keep it effectively on course.

There is another inherent difficulty in current discussions of collective bargaining—they leave out a significant and ultimately powerful party which has an important stake in the allocation and expenditure of an institution's funds, namely, the students. Meyerson (1970), president of the University of Pennsylvania, has taken a highly realistic view of students' influence on internal financial affairs in the future. Noting that various individuals and groups have proposed that grants and loans be made available to students to permit them to attend the institutions of their choice, he pointed out that if funds are made available for tuition, living arrangements, and possibly some cost-of-education allowance to the college or university, the students' choices will determine the financial viability of many institutions. It appears inevitable that students, from whatever sources their funds are drawn, are going to pay a higher proportion of the cost of their education. If so, we may be sure that they will insist on a voice, and a loud and influential voice, in how their money is spent. It seems unlikely that students will sit idly by while the faculty bargaining agent and the administration or governing board settle questions of work load, salaries, and other economic benefits. When the institution—including the faculty—becomes more accountable to students, the latter also will have something to say about the relative amounts of time and budget devoted to undergraduate instruction.

I predict that undergraduates will demand more service from the faculty, and that students will demand and get a review of the total work load of faculty members and of the distribution of faculty time. Collective bargaining will rapidly become a tripartite
rather than just a bilateral negotiation, and students will insist on being cut in when senate committees and administrators allocate resources to functions, priorities, and specific activities. It is easy to see why administrators and students may find it advantageous to combine against the faculty, not only in the distribution of the fund, but also in moving toward evaluation of faculty services and in establishing standards for appointment, promotion, and tenure. It is not inconceivable that on many of these questions students may ultimately acquire the balance of power.

Student Role in Governance

Student influence will, of course, extend beyond budgetary issues to educational questions. As Meyerson (1970) suggested, giving or lending students the money to provide for their own education will make colleges and universities far more responsive to student interests. While he concedes that students may choose the least demanding institution, he anticipates their attending institutions of high quality or institutions actively improving themselves. Perhaps Meyerson is too optimistic, but at any rate he concludes that when students become adult clients (they became adults legally when the voting age was lowered to 18) or, if you like, paying customers, institutions may become intellectually far superior to anything they had ever been before. I myself am not that sanguine. I think the record would show that the effects of student influence have sometimes elevated and sometimes degraded educational standards. Because of this uneven experience, it would seem ill-advised to give students the controlling voice over educational policy and program. That they should have a constituent and influential voice I am ready to concede.

The rationale ordinarily given for student participation in academic decisionmaking is the principle that
those who are affected by decisions should at least have a share in making them. McGrath (1970a) adds the following reasons:

Students believe that if education is of fateful significance to them, they should have a voice in its character and quality; students today have stronger social and educational motivation and could play a fruitful and facilitative role in educational reform; participation in governance is preparation for responsible citizenship in the larger society; students have asserted control over their personal conduct; and students can play a unique role in the improvement of institutions [pp.51-60].

In most institutions in the United States, nearly all of what was once subsumed under an institution's supervision in loco parentis has been or soon will be abandoned. Even Oxford students have recently managed to curb the arbitrary supervision of the proctors, who traditionally made the rules of conduct, apprehended and disciplined students, and conducted judicial reviews. The question of student participation, therefore, turns to curriculum, instruction, examinations, faculty appointment and promotion, the budget, and conceptions of the fundamental nature of the university. In these fields students may be expected to assert their interest, which may not coincide with those of the faculty or administration, as a means of attaining citizenship in the institution (Duster, 1970).

Reviewing the students' role in governance, Lunsford and Duster (1970) concluded that the demand for student participation is not merely fascination with participation, or even power, for its own sake. They pointed out that whereas the more active and militant black students seek greater influence in university governance and wish to use the institution to change the condition of blacks in the larger society, radical white students propose to use the university to change the entire social, economic, and political structure. There is
also a more moderate student constituency which is
concerned with educational reform. Students deeply
dissatisfied with their educational experience object
strongly to its irrelevance to the human condition in mass
society as well as its irrelevance to their own deep
personal needs and aspirations. They find faculty
members more concerned with their disciplines than with
students, more devoted to intense specialization than to
cultivation and enlightenment, more involved with the
marketplace or the governmental arena than with their
teaching.

Students find their teachers cool when they want
them to be impassioned, aloof when they should be
committed and involved, authoritative and didactic when
they should share the excitement of discovery, indif-
ferent or resistant to student initiative when they should
capitalize on student motivation. The rationale of the
student is, as Lunsford and Duster put it, that faculty
members do not know all there is to learn, and that
students should resist the faculty's preoccupation with
purely intellectual and abstract aspects of learning to the
exclusion of the personal and emotional elements of
human experience. Students believe that education
should be centered in the living experience rather than in
the disciplines which define the conventional curriculum,
and should be concerned with what is personal as well as
abstract, emotional and aesthetic as well as cognitive, the
immediate as well as the historical. They have no hope
that the faculty will spontaneously reform the academic
program. Their disillusionment is fully justified. A recent
study (Wilson and Gaff, 1969) of faculty attitudes
toward student participation in governance and academic
policy showed that two-thirds of faculty respondents in
six diverse colleges and universities were willing to give
students formal responsibility for formulating social
regulations, and that 60 percent would give them some
voice in academic policy. Only 36 percent, however,
would allow students to vote on educational issues, and
but 9 percent would give them an equal vote with the faculty.

If students want to change educational policy, it seems apparent that they will have to win the right to participate in making academic decisions. They are well aware that a purely advisory and consultative role will give them little influence. I therefore agree with Lunsford and Duster (1970) that “it will not be surprising if organized action for collective power as students on their campuses is a striking feature of American student life in the decades to come.”

If it seems reasonable to expect that administrators and students may well join forces during faculty collective bargaining negotiations, the two groups might also be expected to become allies in the interests of pressuring reluctant or resistive faculties to reform the educational process. In studying educational innovation in a group of colleges and universities, Martin (1968b) found that students, as a group, held the widest diversity of values, and that administrators, while not radical in their views toward the educational process, were nevertheless supportive of serious innovation. The structures and functions of higher education, Martin observed, were more negotiable with students and administrators than with faculty. “A faculty may be thought of as standing between the other two groups,” he wrote, “The squeeze toward conformity is in the middle. An hourglass seems the most appropriate model for organizational diversity.” An alliance between students and administrators has materialized in the Swedish universities (Duster, 1970). There the national and local student unions have supported the chancellor, the official of the Ministry of Education who is responsible for the central coordination and administration of the universities, in his effort to give greater emphasis to teaching, to reduce the time students spend in earning degrees, to make the curriculum more flexible, and to give students a greater voice in departmental affairs.
A student-administration alliance might, of course, be only temporary. During the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley in 1964, faculty support greatly strengthened the students' cause, and students have found sympathy and sometimes active support among certain faculty factions on other occasions of protest and disruption. In some instances, however, students have failed entirely to get effective faculty assistance. It is safe to expect that the allies may change with the issues in question.

A recent review (Robinson & Schoenfeld, 1970) of student participation showed that of all the groups involved in governance, trustees expressed the greatest resistance to changes in structure, the faculty was the next most conservative faction, and administrators were most sympathetic toward student demands for a role in governance. For example, a survey of 212 academic deans showed that 65 percent thought that students should participate in administrative and academic affairs as voting members of decision-making bodies, while 28 percent favored only an advisory role for them. Of the approximately 400 institutions which were studied (Hartnett, 1970) for changes in the composition of college and university governing boards during 1968-69, some 12 institutions reported that students had become voting members of their board of trustees, and about twice that number reported that students attended board meetings, but without voting privileges.

According to the studies summarized by Robinson & Schoenfeld, students are indeed becoming voting members of important senate and administrative committees, and even of academic senates themselves, but are far more likely to be permitted to participate in matters concerning discipline and campus life—the traditional activities of student government—than in determining educational policy, curriculum, faculty appointments and promotions, and budget.
Although the University of California at Berkeley probably represents one of the more conservative institutions in extending participation to students, it can be used as a case in point. Of the more than 20 committees of the Academic Senate, from one to three undergraduate and/or graduate students served on ten of them in the spring of 1970. And of these, students had the vote on only three—the Board of Educational Development, the Committee on Student Affairs, and the Committee on Teaching. Of the chancellor’s approximately 76 administrative committees, from one to 17 graduates and/or undergraduates served as members on 17 (University of California, 1970). The inevitable conclusion is that the senate has resisted student voting membership on its most important committees, and that students have not attained great power in academic decision making at Berkeley. The only student who regularly has the privilege of the floor at senate meetings is the president of the Associated Students of the University.

It is unnecessary to further summarize information concerning the extent and nature of students’ participation in the ordinary structures of academic government, since Robinson & Schoenfeld (1970), among others, have done so. The concern here is to consider the basic forms of student and faculty participation.

Representative Governance Challenged

To date, most efforts to involve students in decision making have consisted of giving them representation on mixed unicameral senates or on senate, administrative, college, and departmental committees. Advocates of “participatory democracy” consider this not only tokenism, but more fundamentally, an outmoded system of democratic governance. As Hodgkinson (1971) put it, it is “...a last gasp of our traditional
concept of symbolic representative participation, rather than a new configuration which would allow the participation of all of those interested in a problem.”

Hodgkinson (1968, 1969) also pointed out that members of a faction or group may refuse to be represented by another member and demand the right to vote on all issues that affect them.

An even more sweeping repudiation of representation appeared recently under the title (slogan), *Student Representation is Not Enough* (Perry, 1970):

> An individual cannot place his trust, the security of his future, and the integrity of his rights in the wisdom of just any representative government with any certainty that they will be protected....To be sure, such government works well enough for those who are in power, but it is seldom considered to work well enough by those who are without power [pp. 2-4].

The panacea, presumably, is to let all of those who are materially affected by a decision take direct part in making it:

> Those who argue for a near total involvement in a participatory democracy argue for a set of moral principles which would build each man to a competence where the opinion of each man would be desired in decision circumstance.

This means, presumably, “one man, one vote,” a system which, it seems to me, ignores the balancing of the interests of the several constituencies and the balancing of the functions which an institution performs. It also ignores the fact that the apathy or political ineptitude of those eligible to vote in the “town meeting” frequently results in a seizure of power by a shrewd and aggressive clique. Finally, the advocates of the “one man, one vote” system often, although not always, ignore the impracticality of government by town meeting in large-scale organizations.
What about the assertion that the individual cannot place his trust in "just any representative government"? The answer is that citizens do not, of course, have to accept just any representational system. A governmental system can designate the constituencies to be represented—and this is one of the most important issues in determining the nature of student representation in large complex institutions—and can establish methods of accountability. Further, the system can protect itself to an important degree by limited but reasonable terms of office, and by provisions for referendum and perhaps for impeachment and removal from office. It can also provide for assemblies of the whole electorate, or of various constituencies, to express views, to press their representatives to take certain kinds of action, and to hear reports from those holding elective office. There are thus many ways to assure widespread participation in debate on substantive issues, controversial questions, crises, and alternative solutions. This participation will be effective to the extent that administrative officers and elected representatives do not withhold information, but disseminate it fully; identify the critical issues which the institution or one of its constituent units faces; and give every opportunity for discussion and debate.

Consultation and participation may proceed in a variety of ways, formal and informal. They may take the form of special ad hoc task forces, organized to deal with special problems, composed of representatives of both on-campus and off-campus constituencies, and dissolved as soon as they have accomplished the purpose for which they were created—thus constituting, in Hodgkinson's (1971) phrase, a kind of "throw-away government." On a longer-range basis, participation might take the form of the Council of the Princeton University Community, composed of elected representatives of the administration, faculty, undergraduates, graduate students, professional staff, and alumni. That council, already established, proved to be an effective forum for
communication, debate, and plans for constructive action during the Cambodian crisis. Other college and university councils have incorporated trustees and representatives of the community. Without subverting the formal structure of decisionmaking and authority, such bodies can provide the medium for communication between all the elements of the community and for debate over issues of policy and operation.

Widespread discussion is no substitute, however, for decisionmaking by the officers or governmental bodies to whom responsibility and authority have been delegated, and it is essential that everyone knows who possesses this responsibility and authority, singly or jointly with other agents. Clark (1964) has pointed out that the college is a "loose ship" administratively, with authority dispersed, overlapping, and ambiguous. But colleges and universities cannot live with unlimited ambiguity. One large, complicated state university which has been torn by disruption has suffered from lack of definition of authority and responsibility to the extent that it is difficult and sometimes impossible for anyone in the institution at any level to determine who decides, or who should decide, what. The remedy is not to establish a tight administrative bureaucracy. An administrative organization chart implies far more hierarchy in decisionmaking and administration than exists, or needs to exist, even in a large, complex university. On many occasions and at many levels, communication and consultation often ignore neatly charted lines of authority. Furthermore, decisions from level to level are often made informally by faculty bodies or administrative officers. Department chairmen, deans, and vice presidents, if they enjoy the confidence of the faculties, the students, and their "superior" officers, often make decisions which exceed their formal authority. Yet administrators should be expected to make the decisions for which the system of governance makes them responsible and formally accountable, and on questions of critical and especially
controversial nature, the loci of authority ought to be
clearly designated, widely understood, and scrupulously
respected.

Decentralized Governance

A system of "selective decentralization" has been
proposed by Hodgkinson (1971) which would simplify
(or perhaps even partially obviate) the representational
system and give both students and faculty a greater
opportunity to participate in the decisions that directly
affect them. Under this structure, activities which
directly touch the lives and futures of individuals, such as
curriculum, student advising, faculty evaluation, and all
aspects of student life, would be handled with the least
decisionmaking machinery possible, while purely logistical
matters which have little reference to individual lives,
such as service and maintenance, for example, would be
handled in the largest possible network. Thus, in
Hodgkinson's view, the ideal governance structure would
be simultaneously large and small.

Martin (in preparation) has also discussed two
models of governance—the conventional one, which he
calls "hierarchical authoritarian," and the one towards
which he believes colleges and universities will move in
the future, which he characterizes as "egalitarian-
participatory." The latter is conceived as a means of
dispersing authority downward, and of permitting de-
cisions to be made by the people most likely to be
affected by them. While he is sympathetic to decentral-
ized decisionmaking, Martin nevertheless notes that most
attempts to establish the egalitarian-participatory model
have suffered from lack of explicit leadership; failure to
mount and sustain complex, interlocking programs; and
inability to reconcile individualism with community.
There is no such thing, Martin implies, as leaderless
leadership.
Martin (1968a), the first provost of Raymond College, the earliest of several cluster colleges established at the University of the Pacific, concluded in his study of educational distinctiveness that cluster colleges within a larger institutional setting hold great promise for personalizing education; reestablishing a community including students, faculty, members, and administrators; encouraging educational diversity; and creating a unit of governance small enough to permit and encourage the participation of all of its members in making decisions which determine its character and educational and administrative style.

The university college of liberal arts presents an excellent example of educational elephantiasis. Said Spurr (1968), "The single large college of sciences, humanities, and the arts in the great American universities has reached the point of excessive size, misorganization, and disorganization where it ceases to provide the intellectual and social leadership our culture needs." Spurr believes that numerous subcolleges might be established within the inclusive college of liberal arts, each with a distinctive character and distinctive educational emphasis. Each subcollege would determine its own distribution requirements, set its own admissions standards consistent with the institution’s general requirements, create its own pattern of general education, and devise appropriate courses for the nonmajor. In his scheme, departments or other specialized units would determine the concentration requirements.

A student-faculty commission on governance at the University of California, Berkeley, recently proposed establishment of a number of relatively small lower-division colleges with a high degree of autonomy with respect to admission of students, curriculum, staff, and budget. Only one such college currently exists on that campus, but the university's Santa Cruz campus has been built on the cluster college scheme. Michigan State University and other institutions also are experimenting
with learning-living units, and the University of Buffalo has a complicated system of differentiated colleges existing within a complex of faculties, an undergraduate institution called a university college, and many professional schools.

Desirable as a high degree of autonomy for cluster colleges or other subunits of an institution may be, this autonomy should not be absolute. A collection of little baronies might easily produce educational chaos rather than institutional coherence, ineffective dispersal of resources in faculty and finance, educational anaemia instead of academic quality, an amorphous hodgepodge rather than an institution with a distinctive character and the integrity of a well-defined mission. Hodgkinson (1969, 1970c) himself has observed that departments are effective in taking care of the interests of their own faculty members, but are reluctant to develop reciprocal relationships with other departments or with the institution as a whole. I see no reason to expect that a cluster college or a subcollege would be any more likely than a department to meet its obligations to the larger organization and harmonize its purposes with institutional goals. The phenomenon of goal displacement is familiar to students of organizational behavior. When any one operating unit of an organization concentrates on its own interests or purposes, its goals easily come to displace those of the institution as a whole.

The danger of goal displacement and excessive segmental autonomy makes it essential for a college or university, first, to formulate educational plans and priorities, and second, to require decisionmaking units, however distinctive and diverse in their particular ends and means, to fit appropriately into the grand design. Various structural and procedural devices can be adopted to assure the concordance of the parts and the whole.

One such strategem has been adopted to relate the constituent colleges to one another and to the central educational mission of the Santa Cruz campus of the
University of California. There, each college has a particular center of academic interest, such as the humanities, the natural sciences, the social sciences, the fine arts, international affairs, and the urban society. Each college determines the way in which its students will satisfy broad campuswide requirements in the humanities, the social sciences, and the natural sciences. Each college, headed by a provost, has a strong voice in faculty recruitment and promotion. Campuswide educational interests are the province of boards of studies in broad academic fields, each of which is headed by a vice chancellor. The colleges and the boards of studies together select faculty members who are both fellows of a college and members of the academic divisions of the university. The colleges control half of the budget for academic salaries, which gives them more than a purely advisory role in faculty recruitment and promotion as well as in the allocation of faculty time to undergraduate and graduate teaching, research, and other responsibilities. Furthermore, there are general standards of quality which the colleges and divisions must meet in appointing and promoting faculty members.

Each campus, in sum, is expected to develop in harmony with the overriding goals of the university. These common goals, however, do not preclude diversity in the ways they are pursued; there is wide opportunity for distinctiveness and differentiation. According to Martin (1969), however, differentiation and distinctiveness are endangered by the continuing tension between the needs and norms of the colleges and the pressures and standards of the boards of studies. The Santa Cruz colleges may in the end lose their special character. But this will be the continuing and perhaps confounding problem of innovation and renewal in a complex organization which, in its parts and as a whole, should adapt to the changing needs of students and the changing values and institutions of the society.
Experience argues that within the constraints of a cooperatively developed plan, scarce resources—resources which will get even scarcer in the immediate future—should be centrally allocated, and broad standards of faculty quality and performance should be centrally established. Within these limits, however, decisionmaking on curriculum, personnel, and the deployment of financial resources should be decentralized to designated instructional units. Finally, there must be a continuing, or at least periodic, joint central and segmental review of the "efficiency" and integrity with which the constituent units pursue their own stated purposes and contribute to the goals of the institution.

In summarizing the process of decentralization of responsibility and authority in the University of California, Kerr (1958) said:

Each campus is encouraged and aided by the university to develop its own personality, its own style, its own character, its own sense of destiny.

The whole university must be united in purpose and basic principles, united on such fundamental matters as the standards governing the appointment of faculty and the admission of students, united in academic planning to prevent unnecessary duplication and at the same time to assure that somewhere in the university system, there will be programs to meet even the most varied educational needs of our students.

But within this framework each individual campus should enjoy as much autonomy as possible. Initiatives that can be taken locally, decisions that can be made individually, belong on the local campus...

In practice, it is always difficult to define and achieve the appropriate balance, but in this administration, the burden of proof will always rest with the centralizers. Nothing
could be more appalling than the vision of ten
or more University of California campuses cut
from the same pattern.

This attitude is consistent with the one expressed
in a basic document (Holy, Seamans, and McConnell,
1955) which lays out the necessity for a coordinated but
diversified statewide system of higher education in
California. Referring to the University of California
particularly, the report declared, "This is an enterprise of
eormous magnitude and complexity which needs to be
unified in its overall purposes, yet decentralized and
diversified in its many educational and research activi-
ties." The same principles of overriding purpose and
differential segmental character can be applied
to individual institutions, to complex universities, and to the
statewide coordination of institutions or systems of
higher education.

Martin (1969) has suggested that each cluster
college—and presumably this would be appropriate for
other designated subunits—should be governed by a
college council, with membership drawn from faculty,
administrators, and students. He proposed also that the
constituent colleges and their faculties, administrators,
and students should be represented on a universitywide
council which would be the highest policymaking body in
the institution. The college council, it should be noted,
might be a representative body rather than a pure
democracy in which each member of the college,
whatever his status, would have one vote. Martin did
suggest that faculty members should serve as administra-
tive officers of the college on a rotating basis, for
two-year terms, except for the financial officer, who
would be a continuing employee. In the light of my
experience, I would think it unlikely that this system of
rotation would produce the leadership that even a cluster
college would need to develop its distinctive role with
high quality and integrity.
New Administrative Style

However desirable the ameliorants of communication, debate, and wider participation in decisionmaking, they will not produce an easy consensus. As Lunsford (1969) has pointed out, the modern campus is more likely to be characterized by dissension than agreement. Factionalism is the order of the day, and adversary relationships are mounting (Hodgkinson, 1968; Duster, 1970). Factionalism makes leadership difficult and complicated. Discord and competition for resources, influence, and power are not the only conditions which make the role of the administrator precarious and complicated. Once students and faculty communicated with members of the governing board only through the president; now, with students and faculty members participating with trustees on task forces and committees, communication is immediate and direct, and may easily bypass the president. If faculty members and students sit on governing boards or regularly attend their meetings, the president's position vis-a-vis the trustees will be materially changed. The lay members of the board will now have multiple sources of information, direct representation of diverse interests, and perhaps recommendations which differ or conflict with those of the president. Under such circumstances, the presidency will probably call for a decidedly different style of leadership and administration (Hodgkinson, 1971).

What are some of the characteristics of this style? Instead of withholding or circumscribing information, which is evocative of distrust, administrators should make full disclosure through systematic methods of communication and dissemination to all the institution's constituencies. Instead of attempting to hide controversies and conflicts, administrators should make them visible. Pressures exerted by powerful individuals and diverse factions can thus be exposed to public scrutiny.
The hope is that exposure of diverse interests, proposal of serious alternatives, and even disclosure of conflict will set the stage for critical decisions. Instead of being fearful that forthright policies will only evoke unmanageable disputes, university executives should state their policies clearly and straightforwardly, and explain how these policies governed their explicit decisions. This is the conclusion to which Lunsford (1970) came from his study of administrative orientations:

University executives must abandon their illusion that they are ‘keeping in position for effective choice’...by refusing public commitments on the many controversial issues of university policy. Leadership...is impossible for officeholders who perennially conserve their resources, waiting always to fight another day...Quite a different set of risks, but also new opportunities, would be involved if academic leaders undertook independently to raise controversial issues themselves, and took explicit public part in the resulting debates.

...The policies developed in such a process should be neither as abstract as the university's most lofty ideals nor as specific as individual decisions on programs, budgets, staffing, and procedures. Instead, policies must move between these extremes, giving purposive meaning to decisions of official agencies without disappearing into ambiguity when openly challenged.

...To provide a basis for leadership...policies must have more than an intelligible relation to members' concrete experiences; they must also give concrete meaning to avowed ideals and goals of the university as a specific institution [pp.266-267].

By this kind of leadership, administrators may hope to develop a positive constituency, which they now so often lack, and to legitimize their leadership and authority.
Kerr (1963) once said that while the president in the multiversity is “leader, educator, creator, initiator, wielder of power, pump...he is mostly a mediator.” Readers and critics quickly passed over the terms “leader” and “initiator” and concentrated critically on “mediator.” Later, Kerr (1969) said that he would not again use the word “mediator,” since it was the word most remembered, and he pointed out that the role of mediator is frequently misunderstood as being purely passive. What I had meant to suggest, and still believe,” he wrote, “is that the president must work mainly with persuasion and not with dictation and force.” For “mediator,” he proposed to substitute the phrase “campus leader,” which “emphasizes responsibility for the coherence, cohesion, integrity, and structure of the institution.”

Perhaps, considering the turbulence which characterizes our campuses and will continue to plague them for the foreseeable future, Kerr used the term “mediator” prophetically. If the endemic conflicts in our institutions are to be resolved, there will have to be an enormous amount of negotiation. But there will have to be more than negotiation. The effective mediator senses the time when a new proposal will bring the parties together. He may make it or he may encourage others to make it, but at a critical moment initiative is essential to a solution and to progress. Kerr himself said, and the record substantiates it, that as university chancellor and president, he concentrated heavily on the roles of innovator and gladiator. More recently (1970) he has said that the new presidential style will be that of academic statesman:

He will continue to be the chief persuader, the mediator, the community leader, the “unifying force” holding the campus together; the initiator, the policymaker seeking to move it ahead to meet its problems; and the defender, the gladiator seeking to protect it from internal and external attack; but he will also be the image-maker and the political
leader and the public relations expert trying to turn mass sentiment on campus and off in the directions he wishes to go.

He ascribed even more diverse abilities to the presidential statesman—so many that few aspirants could qualify. Not only is statesmanship essential, but different kinds and styles of it may be required at different times. A college or university which expects to find as versatile a president as Kerr said a statesman should be will almost certainly be disappointed. It should search for a leader who possesses the qualities which the institution needs at a particular stage in its development, and who, at the end of a reasonable term, would make way for a successor more nearly matched to the requirements of another time.

The Resolution of Conflict

This somewhat oversimplified discussion of the redistribution of power and influence in the university has confined itself almost entirely to internal affairs. But to look inward is to see only a partial view of the patterns of power and authority. External forces play a significant role in shaping institutions of higher education; neither the governing board, the administrative officers, nor the faculty of a college or university is free of a wide range of external constraints. Students will discover that they, too, must take outside forces into account if they wish to change the university.

Many of these external factors may gain potency at the expense of institutional autonomy, and single
Campuses with independent governing boards may become the unusual exception rather than the rule. Most institutions inevitably will become campuses of systems like the California State Colleges or the State University of New York. A system itself, however, may not be autonomous. It may be subject to varying degrees of regulation by statewide coordinating boards, and it should be recalled that legislative and executive departments of government are exercising greater control over a wide range of institutional affairs which affect the prerogatives of governing boards, administrators, faculties, and students. In the process, some hard won and never fully secure rights and privileges may be lost—such as tenure and academic freedom. The redistribution of power in higher education will not proceed smoothly or even amicably; a long period of turbulence, and even conflict, is in prospect. The great acts of leadership and statesmanship on the part of administrators and faculty will be those which turn contention and conflict of interest into shared purposes and concerted efforts to attain them.
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Minutes of the Berkeley Division of the Academic Senate, Nov. 10, 1970.


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