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ABSTRACT

This bibliography is compiled from a survey of the literature on the subject received by the Library of Congress. Only those likely to be available in larger research and public libraries in the United States are included. Sources surveyed include books, monographs, publications of government agencies and international and national organizations, in addition to approximately 1,200 periodicals. Each issue contains English annotations of items published in English, French, and German, as well as annotations of items in all languages published in English translation. Entries are chosen under the assumption that arms control and disarmament encompass such related topics as weapons development and basic factors in world politics. The entries are organized into the following categories: (1) the international political environment; (2) the strategic environment; (3) institutions and means for the maintenance of peace; (4) general analyses of arms control and disarmament; and (5) specific problems and limited measures. The document is indexed by author and subject. (JLB)

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Arms Control

Disarmament

A QUARTERLY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
WITH ABSTRACTS
AND ANNOTATIONS

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VOLUME 7, NUMBER 1

WINTER 1970-71

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
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PRE-FACE

Arms Control & Disarmament attempts to bring under bibliographic control a large and growing body of literature in an important subject area. It is prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section of the Library of Congress, through the support of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Each quarterly issue contains abstracts and annotations of current literature in the English, French, and German languages, as well as abstracts and annotations of current literature in all languages published in English translation. Author and subject indexes appear in the first three numbers of each volume, with the fourth number containing cumulative author and subject indexes.

To facilitate the use of this bibliography the title of each foreign language entry is preceded by its English translation in brackets. For the convenience of readers in the Library of Congress, locations are shown by call numbers for cataloged items and by symbols for uncataloged items and materials held by custodial units of the Library. A list of these symbols appears on the next page.

Matters of fact and opinion presented in *Arms Control & Disarmament* are solely the responsibility of the authors of the items abstracted, and their inclusion does not constitute endorsement by either the Library of Congress or the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Information about the periodicals cited can in most instances be obtained readily from standard reference works.

The bibliography is compiled from a survey of the literature received by the Library of Congress that is likely to be available in the larger research and public libraries in the United States. Sources surveyed include trade books, monographs, selected government publications, publications of national and international organizations and societies, and approximately 1,200 periodicals. With the exception of materials delayed in arriving at the Library, the literature cited has usually been published in the 3 months preceding the month in which a number is sent to press. Entries are chosen under the assumption that arms control and disarmament is a subject area encompassing related topics such as weapons development and basic factors in world politics. The coverage is not exhaustive, however. It excludes articles in newspapers and the reporting of day-to-day events in newsmagazines.

The abstracts are written by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section, except that abstracts or summaries published with the articles to which they relate are, with the permission of their copyright owners, sometimes used verbatim or in modified form and are designated as "abstract supplied" or "abstract supplied, modified."

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Nr East.....	Near East Section
Sci RR.....	Science Reading Room
Ser.....	Newspaper and Current Periodical Room
Slav Rm.....	Slavic Room

CONTENTS

	Page
Preface.....	iii
 I. The international political environment.....	 1
Basic factors in world politics.....	1
Foreign policies.....	9
Tension areas.....	23
 II. The strategic environment.....	 31
Modern war.....	31
Modern weaponry and related technological developments.....	33
Defense policies and military strategies of nations and alliances.....	38
Consequences of defense policies and war.....	58
 III. Institutions and means for the maintenance of peace.....	 67
International law.....	67
International organization.....	70
International peace and security forces.....	72
Other processes, plans, and proposals.....	72
 IV. General analyses of, and comprehensive approaches to, arms control and disarmament.....	 78
The historical background.....	78
General analyses.....	79
Comprehensive approaches.....	82
 V. Specific problems and limited measures.....	 84
Reduction of the risk of war (command and control of weapons, escalation, accidental war, negotiation, disengagement, neutralization).....	84
Conventional arms transfers.....	87
Nuclear proliferation.....	87
Chemical and biological weapons.....	91
Strategic arms limitation.....	92
Regional arrangements.....	96
Special environments (ocean, seabed, space, etc.).....	99
Violation, inspection, verification, and enforcement of agreements.....	101
Consequences of arms control and disarmament measures.....	102
Other problems and measures.....	103
 Author index.....	 104
Subject index.....	108

I. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

BASIC FACTORS IN WORLD POLITICS

1
Barnett, A. Doak. THE NEW MULTIPOLAR BALANCE IN EAST ASIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES POLICY. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. A new American posture toward Asia. Philadelphia, 1970. (Its Annals, v. 390, July 1970) p. 73-86.

H1.A4, v. 390

A new four-power balance is emerging in East Asia. This is the product of the Sino-Soviet conflict, the reemergence of Japan, and the trend toward a reduced United States military role in the region. The balance will create new problems, but new opportunities as well. It will involve increased fluidity, competition, and maneuver. Yet, in a basic sense, the balance may prove to be relatively stable, because dramatic realignments among the major powers in the region do not seem likely in the next decade. Hopefully, the balance may tend to reduce the dangers of local conflicts escalating into confrontations between major powers. Some developments, such as a Sino-Soviet war, a decision by Japan to "go nuclear," or increased big-power confrontation in the Indo-China area, could upset the balance. However, if these dangers can be avoided, the new quadrilateral balance may over time prove to be an improvement over the bipolar balance of the past. Virtually every country in the region will have to reassess its situation, interests, and policies, in some respects. The United States should move to implement the Guam Doctrine and adjust its policies toward China. It should maintain its alliance with Japan and the stability of U.S.-Soviet strategic relations, but it should use what influence it can to prevent a Sino-Soviet war or a decision by Japan to acquire nuclear weapons. (Abstract supplied)

2
Basiuk, Victor. THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY IN THE NEXT DECADES. Orbis, v. 14, spring 1970: 17-42. D839.068, v. 14

Focuses on technology's impact on American society and domestic and foreign policies, the global projection of American influence through technology, and the implications of nonmilitary technology for national security in the next 25 years. Basiuk outlines such future technological developments as weather modification, global communications, and high-speed transportation, all of which can revolutionize man's political and social environment. He contends that technology is already producing rapid social, political, and institutional changes and notes that the traditional view of technology's effects as long term no longer applies. He calls for a strengthening of America's institutions, a more comprehensive approach to de-

termine priorities in science and technology, and a clearer understanding of technology's function as an instrument of foreign policy.

3
Clemens, Walter C. MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE: THE 1930S AND THE 1960S. World affairs, v. 133, Sept. 1970: 98-105. JX1901.W7, v. 133

The tactics and objectives of Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe in the 1960's can be compared to that of France between the two world wars. Both nations experienced a fear of Germany and a conqueror's wish to maintain a postbellum status quo. The Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia can be equated with France's thwarting of the customs union between Germany and Austria in 1931. Although the present Soviet policy is more dynamic than that of Paris between the wars, most of this dynamism is expressed outside of Europe. Soviet concern for the status quo in Central Europe is threatened by German economic expansion, which would alter the style and content of East European political life. Consequently the Soviet Union now scolds Austria for its interest in joining the Common Market or obtaining some kind of special arrangement. In the historical case, the great power working for retention of the status quo made a larger contribution to the denouement than the lesser parties whose immediate interests were more directly involved. Judgment of the political consequences of the status quo policies of the Soviet Union must wait the passage of time. The task for enlightened statesmanship remains the search for "peaceful change that will accommodate and not suppress the forces of human sentiment and of economic rationality."

4
Collier, David S., and Kurt Glaser. THE CONDITIONS FOR PEACE IN EUROPE; PROBLEMS OF DETENTE AND SECURITY. Washington, Public Affairs Press [1969] 204 p. (Foundation for Foreign Affairs series, no. 13) D843.C5774

"Based on papers presented at the fifth international congress on the problems of Eastern Europe, held in Chicago on March 21-24, 1968, under the joint sponsorship of the Foundation for Foreign Affairs of Chicago and the Studiengesellschaft für Fragen Mittel- und Osteuropäischer Partnerschaft of Wiesbaden."

Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--pt. 1. Peacemaking in historical perspective: European peace settlements from Vienna to Versailles, by Theodore Schieder.--pt. 2. Strategic problems of détente and peace: Soviet concepts of peace and security, by Boris Meissner. Peace attempts in the Far East, by Richard L. Walker. The strategy of détente and peace: détente

2 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

as method or goal?, by Kurt L. London.--pt. 3. Coexistence and peace through partition?: The problem of partition, by Jerzy Hauptmann. Frictions and frustrations of frontiers, by William R. Kintner. The case of Korea, by Dae-Sook Suh. Legal aspects of political partition, by Frederick W. Hess. Economic effects of the division of Germany, by Herman Gross. Peace through partition? by Gotthold Rhode. The impact of partition: a concluding comment, by Jerzy Hauptmann.--pt. 4. Détente and peace in contemporary perspective: A German contribution to the strategy of détente and peace, by Theodor Freiherr von und zu Guttenberg. Perspective on the Atlantic alliance, by Henry M. Jackson. The dynamics of a just peace, by Per Haekkerup.--pt. 5. Summary: Détente and its relation to peace, by Kurt Glaser.

Aspects of the problem of achieving temporary détente and permanent peace in Europe. The most obvious need is to terminate the present hostile division of Europe into Eastern and Western blocs. To this end, the West must make a major effort to communicate the urgency of the peace and security issue "to the new, young, somewhat critical and as we are told thinking Marxists, as a primary interest of man, sufficient to override Marxist-Leninism as an ideology and a tactic."

5

Eckhardt, William. COMMUNIST VALUES. Journal of human relations, v. 18, no. 1, 1970: 778-788. H1.J55, v. 18

White's method of value-analysis was applied to Communist writings in order to develop an operational definition of this ideology. Economic welfare and peaceful coexistence were top Communist values, with aggression and authoritarianism also valued as means to these ends. Communist militarism, like that of Conservatism and Liberalism, was defensive in nature as opposed to the offensive nature of Fascist militarism. Communist authoritarianism was directed toward democracy as opposed to Fascist denunciation of democracy. Communism was characterized by a high percent of welfare values as opposed to Fascist lack of concern for the welfare of others. Communism was defined as an aggressive and authoritarian form of welfarism. Ways of operationalizing these concepts were provided. Previous papers attempted to define political ideologies such as Conservatism, Fascism, and Liberalism in terms of the relative frequencies of their basic values. In this paper the same attempt was made in relation to Communism. (Abstract supplied, modified)

6

Edwards, David V., comp. INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ANALYSIS: READINGS. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston [1970] 452 p. illus.

JX1395.E49

Includes bibliographies.

Partial contents.--pt. 1. Elements of explanation in international politics: Domestic structure and foreign policy, by Henry Kissinger. The political order and the burden of external relations, by Paul Y. Hammond.--pt. 2. From explanation to theorizing; crisis and war as examples: the actual international crisis, by Charles A. McClelland. The movement from peace to war, by

Nicholas S. Timasheff.--pt. 3. Theorizing about international politics: Power politics, by Alan James. From balance to deterrence: a theoretical analysis, by Arthur Lee Burns. Some problems of international systems research, by Morton A. Kaplan. Bipolarity, multipolarity, and the future, by Richard N. Rosecrance.--pt. 4. Applications of international political theory: The logical structure of a policy position, by Robert A. Levine. Dare we take the social sciences seriously? by Kenneth E. Boulding.

Pulls together essays published during the past 15 years that reflect a variety of approaches to the study of international relations. Kissinger and Hammond explore the "impact on a state's foreign policy of the type of state that is making the policy or the competing pressures of domestic problems on scarce resources." McClelland studies the interaction between states in times of crisis, and Timasheff develops a proposition concerning the factors that lead to war. How interstate relations evolve over time is explained by Burns, and a number of models of the international system at various evolutionary stages are presented by Kaplan. Rosecrance predicts future trends in the international system, Levine emphasizes the role of theory in policymaking, and Boulding probes the application of social science to world problems.

7

Frankel, Joseph. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: CONFLICT AND HARMONY. [London] Allen Lane [1969] 263 p. JX1395.F67

Contents.--Preface.--Introductory.--pt. 1. States and international systems: States, international systems, and conflict. Evolution of the international systems. Modern international systems.--pt. 2. State behaviour: Values, ideologies and objectives. Power, influence and capabilities. Instruments and techniques of foreign policy. Restraints upon state behaviour.--pt. 3. International issues and prospects: Major international issues. Retrospect and prospects.--Index.

Considers war and peace "as the extremes of the two recurrent modes of social interaction, conflict and harmony." Frankel develops a model of international relations combining different theoretical approaches that stress power politics and peace and cooperation. Part 1 analyzes the concept of the international system and discusses its major historical forms. Part 2 examines various ideological and material factors that influence state behavior. Part 3 stresses the interaction between states and between the international system and individual states. The author concludes that "only a world government would be capable of controlling man's destiny."

8

Frankel, Joseph. NATIONAL INTEREST. New York, Praeger [c1970] 173 p. (Key concepts in political science) JX1395.F72
Bibliography: 163-165.

Contents.--Preface.--pt. 1. The meaning of the concept: Meanings, history and usages. Analytical distinctions and theories. Theories of na-

THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 3

tional interest. Dimensions of national interest: 1. Dimensions of national interest: 11.--pt 2. The formulation of national interest: The structure of decision making. Images, motivations and values. Dichotomies and choices.--pt. 3. National interest in perspective: Towards an assessment.--Notes and references.--Index.

A behavioral examination of the major aspects of the concept of national interest illustrated with examples based on present-day usage.

9

Honeywell, J. A. REVOLUTION: ITS POTENTIALITIES AND ITS DEGRADATIONS. Ethics, v. 80, July 1970: 251-265. BJ1.16, v. 80

A prevalent mode of formulating revolutionary activity assumes that there is a single revolutionary goal, which can be approached by only one avenue. The consequences of this monistic concept are a polarized confrontation of revolutionaries and conservatives, solidification of the opposition between revolutionary parties, and the over-emphasis of the single end to which each party is committed. An alternative mode, based on the assumption that there may be a plurality of legitimate revolutionary ends and a plurality of approaches to them, has been developed by Hannah Arendt and Albert Camus. The general characteristics of any pluralistic approach to revolutionary action include the distinction between creative activity and destructive violence, the recognition that any line of revolutionary action is only one among many possible lines of constructive innovation, and the emergence of the desired transformations of man and society within the pattern of revolutionary activity itself. This new way of reviewing the problems of revolutionary action provides the conceptual tools needed to locate the sources of power available in a revolutionary situation: the forces of production, strength of character, power of collective action, and spiritual power. The indication that revolutionary innovation turns on the conservation and augmentation of these sources of power suggests that there are four general lines of revolutionary action occurring simultaneously in any revolutionary situation. "If the more human use of human powers, which is the goal and justification of revolution, can be achieved only by activities which are themselves instances of their goal, then the justification of any revolutionary action is to be found in that activity itself."

10

Horn, Ruppert. [THOUGHTS ON THE REORGANIZATION OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE SERVICE] Gedanken zur Reorganisation des Militärattachéendienstes. Wehrkunde, v. 19, Aug. 1970: 409-410.

UJ.W395, v. 19

Studies on the reorganization of the foreign service bring into question the mission of the military attaché and the general relevance of his function in this age of "total communications." It is assured that this kind of military representation abroad is more important with friendly nations than neutral or hostile nations, but it is necessary even in those instances. Two alternatives can be considered. The first, the dispatch

of military officers with diplomatic status to the most friendly or allied nations wastes the officers' specialized training, and the information they collect duplicates materials easily available through diplomatic channels. In all other countries, the continued presence of the military attaché, with his historic duties and status, is in full accordance with present circumstances, particularly in view of the general diplomatic confrontation with the Eastern bloc.

11

Ingram, Derek. SINGAPORE 1971: THE COMMONWEALTH IN THE SEVENTIES. Round table: the Commonwealth quarterly, no. 239, July 1970: 235-240. AP4.R6, 1970

The choice of Singapore as the next meeting place of the heads of governments of the nations of the British Commonwealth recognizes the importance of Asia and perhaps presages the advent of Lee Kuan Yew as the outstanding Commonwealth personality. The basic problem will be the position taken by India, which in its worsening relations with England seems to have forgotten the other nations of the Commonwealth. Since the last convocation of this conference, much solid, unspectacular work has been done in many areas of interest to the Commonwealth nations. The record on such issues as Nigeria, Rhodesia, and immigration is mixed. Perhaps no other international body did better in working toward peace in Biafra. As for Rhodesia, it can be said that Commonwealth pressures have been most important in keeping Ian Smith in isolation. Failure is most conspicuous in immigration matters, since none of the member countries is sufficiently internationally minded to submit the control of its domestic policies to other members of the Commonwealth. The proposed Commonwealth information program is desirable and will doubtless prove as valuable in its way as the Commonwealth Technical Aid Scheme. What is urgently needed is a bolder commitment to the Commonwealth from those at the top.

12

Johnson, Frank J. THE END OF THE FAX AMERICANA. In American Security Council. Washington report, July 13, 1970: 1-4.

Ser

Although the United States possessed atomic monopoly in 1945, it attempted to create a stable world order independent of U.S. strategic superiority. Not only has the effort to establish Pax Americana failed, but the United States has lost its strategic superiority and is beset by increasingly serious domestic problems and a lack of will to fulfill its international responsibilities. The United States cannot simply withdraw from the world, however, for neo-isolationism is a philosophy of extinction. The Communists remain determined to achieve world domination by crushing the U.S. will in a vise of Communist power and internal division. President Nixon's efforts to delay this process do not alter the fact "that the tide of history has begun to run against us and that the day of our world preeminence is over." Only a few years ago, the United States could still exert its influence by the threat of force, but its enemies no longer take these threats seriously.

4 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

Whatever the differences between the Pax Americana and the Pax Romana, there is no certainty that the former will last even to the end of this century.

13

Lorenz, Konrad. ON KILLING MEMBERS OF ONE'S OWN SPECIES. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 26, Oct. 1970: 2-5, 51-56.

TK9145.A84, v. 26

Natural selection often produces species traits that are useful in some respects, detrimental in others. Such is the case with the aggressive instinct in man. Intraspecific aggression has played a crucial evolutionary role, but it now threatens to destroy the species. In nature, intraspecific aggression is regulated by instinctual inhibitory mechanisms--ritualized combat, submissive gestures, and a general inhibition against killing members of one's own species. The more powerful the animal, the more powerful the inhibitory mechanisms. These mechanisms are present in man but their effectiveness has been greatly reduced by evolution, which in man seems to have favored aggressive over inhibitory instincts; by the invention of weapons, which has upset the natural balance between the inhibition against killing one's own kind and the capacity to kill; and by the impersonal nature of modern warfare, which may deactivate the inhibitions altogether. To reinstate the inhibitory mechanisms, personal contacts between potential enemies ought to be intensified. Beyond this, ethology has no advice to offer, except that man must face the fact of his instincts. Moral goals cannot be achieved without insight into the causal structure of human behavior.

14

Lovell, John P. FOREIGN POLICY IN PERSPECTIVE: STRATEGY, ADAPTATION, DECISION MAKING. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston [1970] 370 p.

JX1407.L78

Bibliography: p. 355-362.

Contents.--Preface.--pt. 1. Foundations for analysis: Foreign policy analysis. Perspectives for analysis.--pt. 2. Strategic perspectives: Playing the game of international politics. American cold-war strategy and tactics.--pt. 3. The perspective of historical dynamics: The nation-state and its world environment. Continuity and change in American foreign policy.--pt. 4. Decision-making perspectives: The process of making foreign-policy decisions. The structure of foreign-policy decision making. Decision-making perspectives.--pt. 5. Normative analysis of foreign policy: The goals and means of foreign policy. The problem of reconciling demands for efficiency with the maintenance of democratic values.--Index.

A study of foreign policy focusing on three basic perspectives: strategy, history, and decisionmaking. In the first four parts Lovell constructs an analytical framework intended to facilitate the understanding and explanation of foreign policy, and in part 5 he applies this framework to purposes of evaluation, prediction, and preparation.

15

Mananov, Gerald S. CONFLICT AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: AN EXPLORATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF COMPARATIVE THEORY. [Athens] Ohio University, Center for International Studies, 1969. 22 p. (Papers in international studies. Southeast Asia series, no. 6) JF51.M43

Argues that Western policymakers' practice of monopolizing the right to define and claim the status of "modernity" is a major source of conflict between the so-called advanced or developed countries of the West and the developing countries of Southeast Asia and elsewhere. Western notions of modernity, which originate in currently popular theories of "modernization" and "political development" and which lay claim to objectivity or scientific detachment, are merely value-loaded hypotheses of strongly Western bias and doubtful validity in the non-Western world. Western leaders must recognize "that the goals of specific Asian countries will have to be set by their own leaders, defined in their terms, and pursued in their fashion which may or may not turn out to be the same as that of the West."

16

Matthews, Robert O. DOMESTIC AND INTER-STATE CONFLICT IN AFRICA. International Journal, v. 25, summer 1970: 459-485.

D839.I5, v. 25

Africa offers a ready field for testing the hypothesized link between domestic instability and international conflict. The findings are negative: instability in the new nations of the continent, whether a consequence of internal attacks on territorial integrity or of challenges to legitimacy, cannot be linked to either interventionist or displacement types of conflict on any significant scale. Exceptions to this finding do exist, but they are few in relation to the great opportunities. In general it would seem that domestic instability has had a negative or suppressive impact on the foreign policy behavior, including the conflictual behavior, of African states. The assumptions underlying the theory that nations tend to "displace" domestic disputes onto real or imagined enemies abroad need to be reevaluated.

17

Megargee, Edwin I., and Jack E. Hokanson, comps. THE DYNAMICS OF AGGRESSION; INDIVIDUAL, GROUP, AND INTERNATIONAL ANALYSES. New York, Harper & Row [1970] 271 p. BF575.A3M38 1970

Bibliography: p. 249-260.

Partial contents.--Preface.--pt. 1. Theoretical formulations: On aggression, by Konrad Lorenz. Why War?, by Sigmund Freud. Frustration and aggression, by John Dollard and others. Reinforcement patterns and social behavior: aggression, by Albert Bandura and Richard H. Walters.--pt. 2. The dynamics of aggression in individuals.--pt. 3. Aggression in social groups: Isolation, powerlessness, and violence: a study of attitudes and participation in the Watts riot, by H. Edward Ransford. The social psychology of violence, by Hans Toch. The precipitants and underlying conditions of race riots, by Stanley Lieberman and Ar-

nold R. Silverman. Groups in harmony and tension, by Muzafer Sherif and Carolyn W. Sherif.--pt. 4. International aggression: Aggressive behavior within politics, 1948-1962: a cross-national study. The Kennedy experiment, by Amitai Etzioni.

Theoretical statements representing four major schools of thought on the causes of aggression, together with the results of empirical investigations into the behavior of individuals, small groups, and nations. The theorists represented fall into two categories: those who attribute human aggression to innate factors, and those who classify it as learned behavior. The empirical studies were chosen not only for their substance but also for the light they throw on methodology.

18

Mitchell, C. R. CIVIL STRIFE AND THE INVOLVEMENT OF EXTERNAL PARTIES. International studies quarterly, v. 14, June 1970: 166-194.

D839.B2, v. 14

Examines the process by which external parties become involved in civil strife between contending groups within another country, resulting in a mixing of levels of conflict in such a way as to confuse issues and goals. The framework of the examination is established by classifying some types and levels of civil strife and the circumstances in which external parties are motivated to intervene. This is done by investigating the factors working within the disrupted state, the factors within the intervening state, the factors associated with the cross linkages between the domestic group and the external party, and the factors in the international scene making for disruption and intervention. Mitchell concludes first that much formal intervention takes place as the result of an existing involvement of external socioeconomic, religious, ethnic, or political groups in the system of the disrupted states. The domestic groups participating in violent civil strife seek out external allies among those who have already indicated their concern. The second broad hypothesis is that the larger part of "inter-state conflict behaviour since the end of the Second World War has been intimately connected with situations of internal strife, in the sense that the internal conflict originally existed apart from any international connexions."

19

Mitscherlich, Alexander. [WAR AND HUMAN AGGRESSIVENESS] Krieg und menschliche Aggressivität. Neue Rundschau, v. 81, no. 2, 1970: 217-232.

AP30.N5, v. 81

It has not yet been possible to avoid wars by transforming strong, aggressive, and destructive emotions into passionate activity toward constructive goals or by ritualizing frustrations or finding other outlets for them. War's horrors show the importance of understanding the spiritual processes that allow aggression to mushroom when an individual suffers from cultural frustrations. Understanding how to live with his aggression is man's only chance for survival. Strengthening the questioning ego by education to such a degree that it can stand up against civilization's propaganda and be strong enough to decide for itself would be

a better safeguard against war than the most powerful weapons. Pacifism would be transformed from a moral ideal to a modern science.

20

Morgenthau, Hans J. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1965-1969. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. Annals, v. 390, July 1970: 114-119. H1.A4, v. 390

Surveys the literature on international relations from 1965 to 1969. Contributions to international relations theory and to the study of world politics, foreign policy, military policy, communism, the new nations, and international organization are cited. Overall, there was little change during the period covered: the discipline still has "no common focus of intellectual interest, nor a common method, and . . . is, in consequence, divided into a multiplicity of different approaches and subject matters that have only one quality in common: to understand, either for theoretical or practical purposes, phenomena that transcend the boundaries of a particular nation." Perhaps the only significant trend was the continuing decline in popularity of systems analysis, resulting from its failure to make a significant contribution to worthwhile knowledge.

21

Neumann, Erich P. [HOW DO THE WEST GERMANS FEEL ABOUT NATO IN 1969?] Die Deutschen und die NATO. [Allensbach] Verlag für Demoskopie [1969] 67 p. (Allensbacher Schriften, 10)

UA646.3.N47

Added t.p. in English, text in German and English.

Presents West German public opinion about NATO in the combined results of surveys conducted between 1955 and 1969. The author places the results in their historical context and describes the mentality of a nation that became a NATO member before it had its own military forces and was forced into general compulsory military service immediately after it had lost a condemnable war. The German people generally accepted their new role of safeguarding freedom with understanding and loyalty, and the public has become better informed over the years. From the survey results, both positive and negative sides of current opinion on NATO can be assessed. Most people favor continued membership in the Atlantic alliance. Germany is aware of the risks endangering its existence and objects to the American presence in Europe less than other nations do. Nevertheless the population has some doubts regarding NATO and questions its ability to provide adequate protection in an emergency. Yet an alliance with the Western powers seems to be the only way to guarantee the present form of state and society, and its preservation is favored by the majority of the German people. A large section of the population opposes any weakening of the military forces of the alliance; many wish to strengthen them; and only a minority considers them potentially ineffective.

22

Penrose, Ernest F., Peter Lyon, and Edith Penrose, eds. NEW ORIENTATIONS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. [London] Cass, 1970. 136 p.

D843.P473

6 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

Contents.--Introduction.--Notes on contributors.
--The great globe itself: continuity and change, by Peter Lyon.--Britain's place in the changing structure of international relations, by E. F. Penrose.--Vietnam: the real issues, by Jacques Decornoy.--International economic relations and the large international firm, by Edith Penrose.

First of a series "devoted to critical essays on international relations." Lyon reviews the origins of the present global-states system, identifies the more important elements of continuity and change in this system, and discusses some of the basic problems posed by it. Ernest Penrose examines British foreign policy since World War II, focusing on Britain's relations with the superpowers on one hand and the Third World on the other. He concludes that "Britain still has a supremely important rôle to play in the world as a whole, but that only after a far-reaching critique and reorientation of her international policies can she play that rôle." Decornoy assesses the political significance of U.S. intervention in what he regards as basically a civil war. In Edith Penrose's essay, she analyzes, "with particular reference to the underdeveloped countries, the nature of some of the political and economic problems that bedevil the relationship between an international firm and the countries in which it operates."

23

Salzburger Humanismusgespräch, 4th, 1968. [PEACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE; A CONTROVERSY BETWEEN REALISTS AND UTOPIANS] Der Friede in nuklearen Zeitalter. Eine Kontroverse zwischen Realisten u. Utopisten. 4. Salzburger Humanismusgespräch. Mit Beitr. von Hans J. Morgenthau [u.a.] hrsg. von Oskar Schatz [München] Manz [1970] 278 p.

JC1952.S3526 1968

Sponsored by Oesterreichischer Rundfunk.

Contents.--Editor's foreword.--pt. 1. Reports: Theory and strategy of peace, by Erich Fromm. Peace in the nuclear age, by Hans J. Morgenthau. The future of war, by Bert Röling. The limited peace, by Hans Speier. Peace as a form of social life, by Herbert Marcuse. Force against peace, by Ernst Fischer. The peace problem in East-West conflict, by Christian Graf von Krockow. Peace through development: a new view of peace in modern Catholicism, by Alexander Schwan. Peace through political revolution: on the controversy "theology of revolution" versus technocracy, by Hans-Eckehard Bahr. The rights of men and the world peace order; a juristic aspect of the theory and strategy of peace, by René Marcic. Manipulated peace propaganda and the true peace: on the psychopathology of force, by Friedrich J. Hacker. Collective aggressiveness and mass complexes, by Gaston Bouthoul. Goals and missions of peace research, by Nicolaus Sombart. The development processes of science and technology and their social and spiritual consequences, by Arnold Buchholz. Anticipation of peace, by Robert Jungk.--pt. 2. Main points of discussion: Peace as a challenge. "Realists" versus "Utopians." Peace through social changes. Peace and democracy. Possibilities and limits of peace research.--Conclusion, by Gottfried-Karl Kindermann.

Talks describing the sociological dimensions of peace. The assumption common to the talks in this

series is that peace is an intrapolitical, intra-societal, and quasi-anthropological problem that cannot be studied from the viewpoint of the political scientist alone. The announced object of the series is to make a beginning on a theory of peace appropriate to our times. This theory is characterized as recognizing existing realities but also as realizing the possibility of changing these realities in the light of the radical humanism manifested today by student unrest and the opposition of the intellectuals. The realists generally seek to assure and maintain peace through applying the classic means of political power to the new conditions of the atomic age. The utopians condemn the realists for seeking a negative peace, a more or less casual absence of war, and leaving untouched the causes of war. They think a positive peace attainable only through radical, even forced, change of the prevailing power structure. Herbert Marcuse condemns modern society for making aggression socially useful, so that it is always available for mobilization in the event of war. Hans Speier answers that the goal of politics must be to widen the areas of peace without following the will-of-the-wisp of eternal peace, and that this goal can be achieved by correcting injustices without the use of force.

24

Schmitt, Hans A. EUROPEAN UNION: FROM HITLER TO DE GAULLE. New York, Van Nostrand Reinhold Co. [1969] 159 p. (An Anvil original, 103)

D1060.S316

Bibliography: p. 155-158.

Contents.--Preface.--pt. 1. European union: from Hitler to de Gaulle: The historic roots of the European community. Hitler unites Europe. Toward a European union in freedom--the postwar years. First breakthrough--the Schuman plan. The European Coal and Steel Community at work. New battles for European union. Charles de Gaulle--destroyer of Western unity.--pt. 2. Documents.--Index.

History of the movement for European union, focusing on the period since the early 1930's. Schmitt recounts Hitler's attempt to unite Europe by force, examines the postwar beginnings of economic and political cooperation, and assesses the prospects for European federation as of the late 1960's.

25

Scott, J. P. BIOLOGY AND HUMAN AGGRESSION. American journal of orthopsychiatry, v. 40, July 1970: 568-576. RA790.A1A5, v. 40

Agonistic behavior is defined as a system of related behavior patterns having the common function of adaptation to situations of conflict between members of the same species. It is highly probable that biological bases for this kind of behavior do exist for the various species. It is equally probable, however, that because of man's unique genetic composition no direct analogies from any other species to man are justified. (Abstract supplied)

26
Sen, Chanakya. THE FULCRUM OF ASIA; RELATIONS AMONG CHINA, INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND THE USSR. New York, Pegasus [1970] 383 p.

DS35.S385

"Prepared under the auspices of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs and the East Asian Institute, Columbia University."
Includes bibliographical references.

Examines international relations in South Asia, with emphasis on the Sino-Soviet rivalry in the 1960's. The author concludes that "the most mystifying drama that is being played on the world stage is the drama of modernization of the traditional societies of Asia, Africa, and Latin America." No one knows exactly how the forces of modernization will affect the Asian societies, but the foreign policies of China, India, and Pakistan, which are entering the most difficult and complex phase of modernization, will almost certainly be as unstable as their internal politics, especially during a period of uncertain change in the global power system.

27
Shortell, James, Seymour Epstein, and Stuart P. Taylor. INSTIGATION TO AGGRESSION AS A FUNCTION OF DEGREE OF DEFEAT AND THE CAPACITY FOR MASSIVE RETALIATION. Journal of personality, v. 38, Sept. 1970: 313-328. BFLJ66, v. 38
"References": p. 327-328.

Reports the results of an experiment to test the frustration-aggression hypothesis and determine the effect on overt and covert aggression of a subject's belief that he and other participants in a conflict situation have "among their repertoire of punishing responses one that [is] far more devastating than all the others." The findings suggest that "frustration, strictly defined--i.e., as the thwarting of goal-directed activity . . . --is a relatively inconsequential variable in comparison to learned social attitudes as a source of instigation to aggression." They also indicate that "the capacity for mutual massive retaliation produces a reduction in aggression, but only at the price of an increase in tension, suspicion, and sensitivity to temporary defeats."

28
Sigal, Leon V. THE 'RATIONAL POLICY' MODEL AND THE FORMOSA STRAITS CRISES. International studies quarterly, v. 14, June 1970: 121-156. D839.B2, v. 14

Tests the assumption that actions are the consequences of a rational (value-maximizing) decision made by the nation-state "as if 'she' were a unitary actor" through an examination of Communist Chinese actions during the Formosa Strait crises of 1954-55, 1958, and 1962. This "rational policy" model is briefly contrasted with the "organizational processes" and "bureaucratic politics" models, with the reminder that actions may originate not in value-maximizing decisions but through organizational routines and intragovernmental bargaining. The rational-policy model is applied to infer the intentions motivating Peking's actions and to explain the outcomes of the crises by means of these intentions. The common pattern of Commu-

nist Chinese action was to probe Nationalist Chinese and American intentions while making preemptive moves and reprisals against the Nationalist-held islands. Sigal concludes that the rational-policy model would not be likely to disclose this pattern by inferring China's intentions from its actions without also inferring America's intentions as Peking might have perceived them. "The relationships between conclusions about Chinese intentions in the Formosa Straits crises and the assumptions and methodology of the 'rational policy' model suggest the need to apply the sociology of knowledge" to this type of analysis.

29
Siverson, Randolph M. INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND PERCEPTIONS OF INJURY: THE CASE OF THE SUEZ CRISIS. International studies quarterly, v. 14, June 1970: 157-165. D839.B2, v. 14

Investigates the perception of injury by the foreign policy decisionmakers of the nations involved in an international crisis, using as an example the 1956-1957 Egypt-Israel conflict over Suez. Siverson compares the Egyptian and Israeli perceptions of injury with those established for the participants in the events leading to the outbreak of the First World War. Egyptian and Israeli perceptions of the injury directed at the United Nations as the mediating third party are also analyzed. Unlike the 1914 situation, in the Suez crisis perceptions of injury were still rising when actual violence between Egypt and Israel was decreasing. The research confirms previous findings that decisionmakers tend to perceive their nations as highly injured, their allies as less so, and their enemies as operating in a favorable international environment.

30
Solomon, Robert L. BOUNDARY CONCEPTS AND PRACTICES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. World politics, v. 23, Oct. 1970: 1-23. D839.W57, v. 23

Analyzes Western and Southeast Asian approaches to territorial issues through historical examples that demonstrate the influence of the local environment on the development and interaction of two distinct ways of thinking about boundaries, territory, and sovereignty. Solomon describes as unrealistic the expectation that Southeast Asian governments should attempt complete control of population movements in frontier areas in view of the absence of Western boundary concepts and the required administrative capabilities. The examples show that boundary policy is a complicated set of interrelated, but not necessarily consistent, elements, each of which must be analyzed in its proper context. "In some cases, it would be wrong to regard specific elements of boundary policy as representative of national policy in general."

31
Swingle, Paul G., comp. THE STRUCTURE OF CONFLICT. New York, Academic Press, 1970. 305 p. (Social psychology series) BF637.N4594

Contents.--Conflict resolution in the light of game theory and beyond, by Anatol Rapoport.--Determinants and consequences of toughness, by Otton J. Bartos.--Conflict and power, by Bertram H.

8 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

Raven and Arie W. Kruglanski.--Social power in interpersonal negotiations, by Charles L. Gruder.--Threats and promises, by James T. Tedeschi.--The effects of personality in cooperation and conflict, by Kenneth W. Terhune.--Dangerous games, by Paul G. Swingle.--Deterrence games: from academic casebook to military codebook, by Irving Louis Horowitz.

Offers "an oblique slice through the conflict literature, the major emphasis being on psychological gaming and the structure of conflict." Swingle calls attention to the newness of conflict study as an academic discipline. He notes the dangerous pressures placed upon investigators to extend their findings prematurely from the laboratory to the real world and also the criticism that formalized treatments of the type used in gaming oversimplify and thereby misrepresent actual conflict situations. He is hopeful, nevertheless, that "a discursive nomenclature for describing the structural dimensions in bargaining situations" and a theory of interpersonal conflict will soon be developed.

32

SYNERGY: SOME NOTES ON RUTH BENEDICT. Selected by Abraham H. Maslow and John J. Honigmann. With an introduction by Margaret Mead. American anthropologist, v. 72, Apr. 1970: 320-333.
GN1.A5, v. 72

Excerpts from 1941 lectures by Ruth Benedict call attention to the correlation between social structure and character structure, especially aggressiveness. Social orders characterized by high or low synergy, by a syphon or a funnel system of economic distribution, are compared for their different capacities to support or humiliate the individual, render him secure or anxious, or to minimize or maximize aggression. Religion, an institution in which people apotheosize the cooperation or aggression their cultural life arouses, differs between societies with high and low synergy. (Abstract supplied)

33

Terhune, Kenneth W. FROM NATIONAL CHARACTER TO NATIONAL BEHAVIOR: A REFORMULATION. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 14, June 1970: 203-263.
JX1901.J6, v. 14

National character is rarely considered in theories of international behavior. This monograph takes a new look at the subject to see if, despite the various objections, it may still be useful for understanding and predicting national behavior. Topics reviewed include the background of national character study; concepts of national character; its measurement; and an evaluation of the construct. Core personality, social personality, and "mentality in national products" are discussed as components. A central problem in reformulating the concept of national character is to take proper account of cross-national homogeneity (i.e., not every nation may have a unique character) and of intranational heterogeneity (i.e., the masses and elites of a given nation may display different character "profiles"). Examples from the existing literature are provided throughout. In the second half of the monograph a reformulation is suggested

and applied to additional problems (e.g., change and stability) to sharpen its usefulness in the partial prediction of national behavior. The concluding section deals with problems amenable to further research. (Abstract supplied)

34

Terhune, Kenneth W., and Joseph M. Firestone. GLOBAL WAR, LIMITED WAR AND PEACE: HYPOTHESES FROM THREE EXPERIMENTAL WORLDS. International studies quarterly, v. 14, June 1970: 195-218.
D839.B2, v. 14

Presents the results of an intergroup gaming experiment with the Princeton International Game in terms of the relevance of these results to political systems theory. The characteristics of three experimental worlds that were initially constituted in similar ways but that develop into rather distinct political types are summarized. The types are designated as global war, limited war, and peace. After a comparison of the behavioral aspects of these three worlds, the results are recast into hypotheses about international political systems. Terhune and Firestone conclude that the major hypotheses generated confirm hypotheses already extant in international relations theory. The role of hostility and mistrust is clarified by the hypothesis that these psychological variables are important not as initial causes but as contributing factors in conflict escalation. Game theory has demonstrated its special value through its ability to suggest new ways of concretizing abstract hypotheses, specifically, hypotheses pertaining to goal configurations as an initial cause of peace or conflict processes.

35

Thiess, Frank. EAST AND WEST--CAN THEY EVER AGREE? Central Europe Journal, v. 18, July/Aug. 1970: 235-242.
DB200.7.S74, v. 18

History demonstrates that the difference between East and West is not merely the temporary product of present political complications but the culmination of a multiplicity of historical encounters based on essentially differing concepts of public law and human rights. By adopting the Justinian corpus juris the new states of the West assumed the responsibility for ensuring that Christian teaching and legal thought were in agreement. While the eastern church flourished under the direct protection of the nation-state, it was unable to influence the juridical thinking of the royal despots. Russia's present alienation from the West, for which it is itself not completely responsible, is a reversion to its historical position as a Mongol state. There can be no agreement with the East in the absence of a common morality.

36

VIOLENCE--WORLDWIDE PROBLEM. U.S. news & world report, v. 69, Sept. 28, 1970: 24-26.
JK1.U65, v. 69

Examines the problem of mounting political terrorism in North and South America, Western Europe, and Asia. As other expedients fail, dissidents turn increasingly to violence, augmenting the traditional terrorist devices of bombing and arson with the newer techniques of diplomatic kidnap-

pings and airliner hijackings. Communism and allied underground movements assist the terrorists with organizational and technical expertise and help to speed the disease across international boundaries.

37

Whetten, Lawrence L. RECENT CHANGES IN EAST EUROPE--AN APPROACHES TO EUROPEAN SECURITY. *World today*, v. 26, July 1970: 277-288.

D410.W63, v. 26

Recent years have witnessed a variety of Communist proposals for the establishment of a European collective security system. Realizing that their own freedom of action is dependent upon the strengthening of East-West détente, the smaller Communist regimes--most notably, Rumania--have been particularly active on this question. Communist proposals have often lacked consistency, and over the years there has been a noticeable evolution in policy. For one thing, the tendency to put undue stress on the complexity of the security problem or, conversely, to invoke panaceas, has given way to practical concern with the more concrete aspects of an eventual security conference. For another, the earlier dogmatic insistence on the dissolution of military blocs has been dropped, as have the polemics against the United States, West Germany, and NATO. The East also seems more willing to acknowledge the influence of neutrals, has relegated military disengagement to a lesser place in its security schemes, and now puts more stress on the possibilities of nonmilitary cooperation. The reasons for these shifts are complex, but, in general, competing national priorities and unforeseen developments abroad are responsible. So far the West has resisted proposals for multilateral discussion. Clearly the Soviet aim in all this is to consolidate and extend its own political position in Europe. The West, however, is not likely to make political concessions in East Europe except in return for joint Great Power force reductions. Whether a formula for such an exchange can be worked out depends on the outcome of negotiations on the recognition of East Germany and status of Berlin.

38

Wriggins, W. Howard. THE PRESENCE IN SOUTHERN ASIA OF OUTSIDE POWERS. In *American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia*. A new American posture toward Asia. Philadelphia, 1970. (*Its Annals*, v. 390, July 1970) p. 48-62.

ML.A4, v. 390

In considering the presence of outside powers in South and Southeast Asia, this discussion covers a spectrum of phenomena included in the often-used but highly ambiguous concept of "presence." It examines the major different forms of outside "presence" in Pakistan, India, Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. It then notes the shifting preponderant foreign presence in Pakistan, the diminishing American presence in both Pakistan and India, the rising Soviet military assistance presence in India, and the lack of foreign presence in Burma. There is an expectation that the American presence in Thailand will decline and growing anxiety there about likely Vietnam presence in the future, particularly among

ethnic minorities on Thailand's frontiers. A Japanese presence, in the form of commercial activity, at the very least, is growing rapidly--in Thailand and Indonesia, particularly--and will grow further. The Chinese presence is more a problem for the eighties than for the seventies, except in countries with Chinese minorities, where anxieties persist and may increase. The Soviet presence is also widely expected to grow, both militarily and in terms of economic activity over the decade. (Abstract supplied)

39

Zbinden, Hans. [WHITHER EUROPE? SPIRITUAL AND POLITICAL PREREQUISITES FOR A VIABLE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY] Europa wohin? Geistige und politische Voraussetzungen einer lebensfähigen europäischen Gemeinschaft. Bern, München, Francke [1969] 79 p. D1060.Z34 1969

"Anmerkungen" (bibliographical): p. 73-78.

Contents.--Preface.--From cosmopolitanism back to nationalism.--Constructive forces in the formation of Europe.--From the cultural to the political community.--Inducements to political integration: German-French understanding as the focus for crystallization.--The European Economic Community.--Centralized or federalized Europe?--Conditions of political unification.--Impulse of the young.--And East Europe? The significance of the Slavic world for Europe.--Community of practical help.--Notes.

Describes the spiritual forces revealed in European history that will permit future European unity in the face of such countervailing forces as nationalism. Zbinden thinks that the integration of Eastern Europe is necessary if Europe is to escape the desiccating effects of the American technological spirit. The unification of Europe is part of a larger ideal--the creation of that community of nations that the United Nations merely "caricatures."

FOREIGN POLICIES

40

Badgley, John H. THE AMERICAN TERRITORIAL PRESENCE IN ASIA. In *American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia*. A new American posture toward Asia. Philadelphia, 1970. (*Its Annals*, v. 390, July 1970) p. 38-47.

HL.A4, v. 390

The system of states that has evolved since World War II has not resolved the basic political problems facing Asia. Furthermore, American efforts to sustain, and hopefully stabilize, the non-Communist regimes have entangled the United States unnecessarily in the domestic political processes of several Asian countries. Resurgent forces of ethnic and local identity increasingly challenge the authority of central governments and bring into question the efficacy of anti-pluralist, nationalistic schemes. The foreseeable future appears laden with struggles by these classic forces, which dominated pre-colonial Asia and now underlie ideological and nationalist conflicts. Regional competition between traditional ethnic enemies, as well as between larger Asian powers,

10 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

is reasserting itself, calling into question the efforts by the superpowers, and the United Nations, to play dominant roles in the settlement of these conflicts. More certain is a constant secondary role by the United States, due to its technological superiority, economic abundance, and cultural vigor. The kind of American presence in Asia over the next two decades will be significantly modified. While military assistance may, in many cases, continue, termination of alliances on mainland Asia may eventually follow the withdrawal from Vietnam. The major motive for the American desire to disengage flows from domestic pressures. However, the quest for relaxation of tension with China will help account for the new American tolerance of political change in Asia. (Abstract supplied)

41

Bechtoldt, Heinrich. [RENUNCIATION OF FORCE AND THE RENUNCIATION OF GOALS] Gewalt-Verzicht und Ziel-Verzicht. Aussenpolitik, v. 21, July 1970: 389-392. D839.A885, v. 21

Argues that the Soviet purpose in accepting a renunciation-of-force agreement is to compel West Germany to abandon its national goals and accept the status quo. Bechtoldt calls for Soviet renunciation of the enemy-state clause of the United Nations Charter and for security guarantees for West Berlin. A formal renunciation of force does not in itself cause tensions to disappear nor in any sense relieve West Germany of the threat of Soviet violence.

42

Berghes, Ingeborg von. [SPAIN ON THE WAY TO EUROPE] Spanien auf dem Weg nach Europa. Aussenpolitik, v. 21, June 1970: 376-383. D839.A885, v. 21

The personnel of the new Spanish cabinet and its agenda may suggest the shape of Spain's non-Franco future. The 1957 embarkation on the apertura policy, the political and economic opening up, and the subsequent decisions to plan a 6 percent annual rate of increase in the gross national product marked the beginning of a transition from an agricultural into an industrial state. The liberalization of Spain's economy may be extended to include eventual participation in the European Common Market. The understanding with the Americans over military bases suggests that although immediate entry into NATO is not probable, bilateral treaties with individual members of the Atlantic Alliance might effectively bring Spain into Western Europe. An agreement with England over Gibraltar would be part of the price paid for admission into NATO. The exchange of consular personnel with the East bloc and the rumors of approval of Soviet use of the strategic island of El Albarón probably can be interpreted as Spain's effort to maintain a bargaining position.

43

Bresler, Robert J. ILLUSIONS OF CONTROL: THE WAR-MAKING MACHINERY. Nation, v. 211, Aug. 17, 1970: 105-109. AP2.N2, v. 211

Presidential war-making powers must be dismantled, not merely limited, if the American people

and their political representatives are to regain control over U.S. foreign policy. An odd coalition of dovish liberals and legalist conservatives has suggested the right approach to this problem by challenging the basic assumptions of the prevailing doctrine of liberal internationalism. The traditional liberal argument in favor of a strong executive--the necessity for expertise and bipartisanship in the conduct of crisis diplomacy--rests on a deep-seated fear of congressional and popular opposition to an active U.S. role in world affairs. The failure of this elitist outlook has made apparent the need for greater control over the uses of destructive technology and for the conversion of expertise from executive prerogative to public resource. The liberals' fascination with executive power led them to equate strength with military involvement and peace with compromise. Congress may be something of an anomaly, but as an open democratic assembly it remains the bane of the managerial, manipulative mentality characteristic of liberal internationalism and offers the best hope for a sane foreign policy. Yet a radical redirection of U.S. foreign policy cannot be effected by imposing legal limitations on presidential power, since the executive can ignore these limitations if he so chooses. "If the Congress is to reclaim its war-making authority, it must seek to control the war-making machinery and to slow down the process of decision making. The challenge then is to develop procedures which insinuate Congress deep into the very fabric of policy making and, in a sense, force it to accept its constitutional mandate. To do this requires making expert opinion a public resource and information a public commodity."

44

Campbell, Alexander. UNBIND YOUR SONS; THE CAPTIVITY OF AMERICA IN ASIA. New York, Liveright [1970] 366 p. maps. DS35.C33

Contents.--Asian fetters.--Asia from West to East: the bird's eye view.--West Asia: Suez Canal to Persian Gulf.--Central Asia: Baghdad to Kashmir.--South Asia: Everest to Irrawaddy.--Southeast Asia: Bangkok to Hanoi.--The China Sea: Malacca to Manila.--Two Chinese islands.--China: red clay?--The two Koreas.--Japan and Okinawa.--People not dominoes.--Index.

Surveys political and economic developments in Asia and reviews U.S. Asian policy since World War II. Campbell finds the dominant issues for most Asian countries to be not communism or U.S. imperialism but nationalism and modernization. He argues that the U.S. obsession with "international communism," which was first articulated in the Truman Doctrine of 1947, has led to a futile but increasing military involvement in Asian affairs. The United States should drastically reduce its military commitments in Asia, an area destined to experience localized wars and revolutions at least to the end of this century regardless of U.S. policy, and concentrate instead on reducing the economic gap between developed and undeveloped countries.

45

CHALLENGE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA [editorial] United Asia, v. 22, May/June 1970: i-ii. DS1.U55, v. 22

The spread of communism in Southeast Asia is a serious challenge that India cannot ignore. While "Mao's technique of guerilla fighting is becoming more and more popular in more and more countries with more and more discontented people," India is alienating nonaligned and aligned countries alike by its policies of noncommitment and hesitation. This challenge is reinforced by China's growing nuclear capability, which the superpowers have failed to counteract. In addition to the growing challenge of Mao's thoughts, the Soviet Union and the United States are competing in a dangerous game to fill the power vacuum in the Indian Ocean left by Great Britain's withdrawal from East of Suez. India's pleas to keep the area free are pathetic in view of its total incapacity to influence the superpowers. Further, India's small Navy leaves its vast coastline vulnerable to Pakistani and Chinese naval action. To meet the Communist challenge India must create a strong central government that will unify the people and pursue progressive internal and external policies.

46

Clemens, Walter C. THE SOVIET WORLD FACES WEST: 1945-1970. International affairs (London) v. 46, July 1970: 475-489.

JX1.I53, v. 46

The prospects of achieving a European settlement compatible with the interests of peace and the security of the involved powers depend upon Soviet policy in Europe and the normalization of relations between West and East Germany. Soviet policy is molded by the desire to retain hegemony in Eastern Europe, contain West German political and economic pressures on the Soviet satellites, and maintain policy options vis-a-vis Western Europe while seeking strategic arms limitation agreements with the United States. Although the Soviet Union recently has expressed a more flexible European policy, based largely on the increased credibility of its strategic deterrent, it maintains its right to intervene in Germany to enforce the Potsdam principles, refuses to include its medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles among the strategic weapons covered by the strategic arms limitations talks (SALT), and threatens, by way of the Brezhnev doctrine, renewed military action in Eastern Europe. East Germany, which is the main opponent of normalizing relations with West Germany, "might welcome an all-European security conference, since this would bring them at least quasi-recognition without the need to make any concessions to West German influence." The Federal Republic, on the other hand, is seeking to remove the Oder-Neisse question as an obstacle to improved relations with Poland and Czechoslovakia, ensure that the nonproliferation treaty does not restrict its commercial opportunities, and secure Soviet and East European recognition of West Berlin's ties with West Germany. So far Bonn has achieved considerable rapport with Moscow and Warsaw but not with Pankow. Whether Russia and its allies seek to maintain the status quo or explore the chances for East-West interdependence, the Soviet Union will continue to assert its control over its satellites, deny West German access to nuclear weapons, and attempt to curb the arms race with the United States. The SALT talks will play a large role in Moscow's relations with Eastern Europe and West Germany: a negotiated freeze

would give the Soviet Union greater leverage in dealing with Eastern Europe, while a failure to negotiate could produce new tensions in European relations. Despite the obstacles, "all parties may still find that the best way to deal with European security and arms control problems is through an all-European arrangement with some form of super-Power participation."

47

Clissold, Stephen, comp. SOVIET RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA, 1918-1968; A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY. London, New York, Oxford University Press, 1970. xx, 313 p. JX1555.27L36

"Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs."

Includes bibliographical references.

Contains approximately 200 Soviet and Latin American documents pertaining to the Soviet Union's relations with Latin America in general as well as with individual Latin American countries, particularly Cuba. Although most of the documents apply to post-World War II relations, about one-fourth relate to the Comintern period and a few concern Tsarist contacts. These relationships are briefly summarized and analyzed in the introduction.

48

Cockram, Gail-Maryse. VORSTER'S FOREIGN POLICY.

Pretoria, Academica, 1970. 222 p. illus.

DT779.T.C55

Appeared originally as a series of articles in Background. Ser

Contents.--Foreword.--Introduction.--South Africa, South-West Africa, and the United Nations.--South Africa and Israel.--The defence of the Cape Sea Route.--South Africa and Latin America.--Immigration.--South Africa and gold.--The manufacture of weapons by South Africa.--South Africa and the neighbouring states.--South Africa and Malawi--The devil's disciple.--Terrorists--the racehorses of the apocalypse.--South Africa and Portugal.--South Africa and Rhodesia.--South Africa and the United States of America.--Unfair play--the Olympics.--Conclusion.--Notes.

Examines South Africa's foreign policy, emphasizing its relations with its African neighbors, Portugal, and the United States. Great Britain's withdrawal from East of Suez, particularly its abandonment of the Simonstown naval base, has placed on South Africa the major responsibility for defending the Cape route. Britain has refused to supply the Republic with the necessary arms, ships, and aircraft, seriously harming the relations between the two countries.

49

Congressional Quarterly Service, Washington, D.C. NATIONAL DIPLOMACY, 1965-1970. Washington, 1970. 156 p. E855.C65

Contents.--Introduction.--Pt. 1. Nixon administration, 1969-1970: Policy for the 1970's. Review of 1969. Military commitments. Arms sales. Laos policy. Cambodia. Communist China relations. Middle East policy. Vietnam.--Pt. 2. Johnson administration, 1965-1968: Summary. 1965

12 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

chronology. 1966 chronology. 1967 chronology. 1968 chronology.--Appendix: Text of Nixon statements. Index to statement on the 1970's.

A review of U.S. foreign policy under the Johnson and Nixon administrations. A major theme is that international politics and U.S. foreign policy have entered a period of transition, the final outcome of which is still very much in doubt. The Nixon administration apparently accepts most of the traditional postulates of U.S. foreign policy, particularly those relating to U.S. leadership of the free world. At the same time, it seems to envisage a more passive role for the United States than that assumed in recent years, the emphasis now being on caution and a "low profile," characteristics that tend to come to the fore in the policy of major powers in periods of transition. On balance, although indications are that the administration has "rejected an expansionist and aggressive role for America," no definite foreign policy has yet emerged.

50

Cooper, John M. THE VANITY OF POWER; AMERICAN ISOLATIONISM AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR, 1914-1917. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Pub. Co. [1969] 271 p. (Contributions in American history, no. 3) E766.C6

Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Introduction.--Prelude to an isolationist position.--Formulation of isolationist doctrines.--Support for isolationist policies.--Beginnings of an isolationist coalition.--Coalescence of the isolationist position.--Appendix: Statistical descriptions of congressional voting on preparedness and foreign policy, 1915-1917.--Bibliographical essay.--Index.

"Examines the emergence of isolationism as a distinct political position in the United States during the months leading to American intervention in the First World War." Cooper distinguishes two basic groups of isolationists: idealists, who favored isolationism because they believed this was the best way to further American ideals for peace, freedom, and justice; and ultranationalists, who contended that isolationism was in the interests of American power, prestige, and security. The coalescence of these two groups, which in many respects were more disparate than isolationists and internationalists, formed the core of the pre-war isolationist bloc. Idealists dominated this isolationist coalition prior to World War I and during the 1920's and 1930's, just as they later were dominant among those favoring a strong internationalist foreign policy. Critics of the Vietnam War have revived some isolationist arguments, but it is misleading to describe them as isolationists, since virtually no one advocates complete U.S. withdrawal from all nonhemispheric commitments.

51

Dellinger, Dave. REVOLUTIONARY NONVIOLENCE: ESSAYS. Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill [1970] xxiii, 390 p. E840.D4

Contents.--Introduction.--World War II.--The war against Vietnam.--Cuba and China.--Violence, nonviolence, and the movement.--The Chicago convention and after.

Essays on the theory and practice of nonviolence, U.S. foreign policy since World War II, the Vietnam War, and the American peace movement, written during the period 1943-1970. Dellinger focuses on the problems encountered in attempts to bring about social change by peaceful means, which he believes the United States has compounded by pursuing counterrevolutionary foreign and domestic policies.

52

Domes, Jürgen. THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT'S REPERCUSSIONS IN EUROPE. Central Europe Journal, v. 18, Sept. 1970: 307-309.

DB200.7.S74, v. 18

Open warfare between Moscow and Peking is not likely in the near future, despite the precariousness of the existing balance of terror. The Soviet Union fears being drowned in a gigantic Vietnam despite its overwhelming air and technical superiority, while Peking cannot be confident of the loyalty of the regional military commanders. However, the cleavage between the two Communist powers explains the urgency of Moscow's effort to ensure its Western frontiers, even at the price of accommodation with the United States. Overextended in the Middle East and disturbed by the nationalism of its East European allies, the Soviets will avoid open war in Europe. In Asia the interests of both superpowers increasingly converge on the containment of Communist China. West German efforts to play Peking against Moscow would injure German economic interests in non-Communist Asia and revive memories of the Berlin-Tokyo axis. West Germany must work for change through meaningful negotiation with both superpowers and with the East European countries. What is required today is the patience to wait until the conditions for such negotiations mature.

53

End, Heinrich. [RENOVATION OF DIPLOMACY. THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC, FOS-SIL OR INSTRUMENT?] Erneuerung der Diplomatie. Der Auswärtige Dienst der Bundespolitik Deutschland, Fossil oder Instrument? [Neuwied] Luchterhand [1969] 185 p. (Soziologische Essays) JX1796.A4E5

Bibliographical references included in "Anmerkungen": p. 125-152.

Contents.--Introduction.--Facts.--Definitions and goals of foreign policy.--The duties of the foreign service.--"Specialness" as a structural characteristic of the foreign service.--Sociological aspects of the foreign service.--"Role pressure" or the psychological problems of the foreign service.--Ideological aspects of the foreign service.--Reform.--Appendixes.

Presented as a contribution to current discussion of possible reform of the West German foreign service. The description of the tasks and methods of diplomacy is followed by a longer discussion of the concept held by foreign service personnel of their own role within society. The author does not touch upon possible structural or organization reform.

- 54 Foreign Policy Association. FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES, 1970-1971. Prepared by the editors of the Foreign Policy Association. Introd. by Samuel P. Hayes. [New York] Collier Books [1970] 96 p. E855.F6 1970

"Designed to contribute to a more informed and thoughtful dialogue between candidate and constituent" during the 1970 elections. Each of the 12 chapters deals with such key foreign policy issues as Communist China, the Middle East, arms control, Western Europe, Vietnam, and the Soviet bloc; discusses current U.S. policy; debates the alternatives; and cites a brief bibliography. The appendix permits the reader to indicate his policy preference with respect to the issues.

- 55 A FOREIGN POLICY FOR CANADIANS. In Canada. Dept. of External Affairs. External affairs, v. 22, July 1970: 221-224. JX351.A3, v. 22

Papers placed on the House of Commons agenda by Secretary of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp that present "the results of a special review of foreign policy announced by the Prime Minister in May 1968." The papers present a general survey of foreign policy, outlining six policy themes in terms of national interests and objectives, as well as detailed studies of Europe, Latin America, the United Nations, the Pacific, and international development. They suggest how "the main contours of Canada's external policies . . . are being reshaped to meet the challenges and opportunities offered by a rapidly-changing world."

- 56 France. Ambassade. U.S. Service de Presse et d'Information. FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY; OFFICIAL STATEMENTS, SPEECHES, AND COMMUNIQUÉS JANUARY-JUNE 1968. New York [1968] 184 p. DLC

A compilation of documents, treaties and agreements, and Ministers' reports pertaining to foreign policy. A chronology of the period covered, a subject index, and an index by country are also included.

- 57 Gardner, Lloyd C. ARCHITECTS OF ILLUSION; MEN AND IDEAS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1941-1949. Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1970. 365 p. E813.G27
Bibliography: p. 323-350.

Contents.--Preface.--William C. Bullitt: Thomas Jefferson in Moscow.--Franklin D. Roosevelt: the perils of second-front diplomacy.--Harry S. Truman: from San Francisco to Potsdam.--James F. Byrnes: collective security through public diplomacy.--Will Clayton, the British loan, and the political economy of cold war.--George C. Marshall: traditional policy in post-traditional China.--Bernard M. Baruch: atoms for peace.--Dean Acheson and the "holy pretense."--Lucius D. Clay: American decisions in Germany.--James V. Forrestal and George F. Kennan: will the real "Mr. X" please

stand up?--The cold war in history.--A note on sources.--Index.

Portraits of American political and military leaders who were instrumental in formulating U.S. cold war policy during the 1940's. Gardner focuses on the conditions and attitudes that led them to respond as they did to the challenges of increased world responsibilities and the perceived Soviet threat.

- 58 Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. Center for Strategic and International Studies. NEW TRENDS IN KREMLIN POLICY. Washington, 1970. 168 p. (Its Special Report Series, no. 11, Aug. 1970) DLC

Contents.--Foreword.--pt. 1. Panel findings.--pt. 2. The background paper: Introduction. The final years of the Khrushchev decade. The rise of the Soviet military-industrial apparatus complex. Changing modes of destalinization. The Stalin issue in perspective. Why restalinization? The contemporary crisis in foreign policy. New departures in foreign policy. The Sino-Soviet controversy. The triangulation of global power. The temptations and risks of strategic superiority. Eastern Europe since Czechoslovakia. Soviet policy aims in Eastern Europe. Soviet control tightened in Eastern Europe. The results of Soviet efforts. Some specific cases. Prospects in Eastern Europe.--pt. 3. Individual panelist comments.

Publishes the findings of two panels--one composed of European officials and academics, the other, of their American counterparts--appointed to make projections of Soviet foreign and military policy for the next decade, together with a background paper used by the panels in making their assessments. Neither panel could reach consensus on the prospects for Soviet-American negotiations. Some participants felt that ideological hostility will prevent meaningful talks, others, that the Soviet leadership is realistic enough to bow to the demands of expediency. The American panel, with some dissent, suggest that "restalinization" is the most significant development in Soviet policy since 1964.

- 59 Gurtov, Melvin. PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF UNITED STATES POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp., 1969. xiv, 120 p. (Rand Corporation. Memorandum RM-5910-ISA) Q180.A1R36, no. 5910
"This research is supported by the Department of Defense under Contract DAHCl5 67 C 0158." Bibliographical footnotes.

Speculates on the effects of U.S. withdrawal from Southeast Asia and selects four problem areas for detailed analysis: China's foreign policy and nuclear growth, Soviet interest in Southeast Asia, Japan's role in the region, and the problems of political integration and economic development. Gurtov postulates five elements of U.S. national interest for assessing U.S. policy in the region: security, economic resources, historical-psychological obligations, political-legal commitments, and the promotion of peace and stability. He concludes that the United States has no vital security

14 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

ty interests in Southeast Asia and that a Communist takeover of any single country in the area would not constitute a serious threat to U.S. security.

60

Hartmann, Frederick H. THE NEW AGE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. [New York] Macmillan [1970] xv, 399 p. maps. E840.H37
Bibliography: p. 379-388.

A historical and analytical study of U.S. foreign policy emphasizing the need for new perspectives and approaches in keeping with the Nation's capabilities. Hartmann is particularly concerned that alternative solutions to U.S. problems have received scant consideration, which he attributes to a failure to ask the right questions in the right order. He argues that the policy of containment can achieve U.S. strategic objectives only at excessive cost and risk and proposes in its place a policy designed to isolate opponents.

61

Holmes, John W. CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES: POLITICAL AND SECURITY ISSUES. Atlantic Community quarterly, v. 8, fall 1970: 398-416.
D839.A85, v. 8

Weighs the options open to Canada in its relations with the United States, concentrating on Canada's future role in NATO, alternative policies in U.S.-Canadian relations, and the question of independent Canadian foreign policy. Holmes discusses as alternative policies for Canada neutrality, close military cooperation, and differentiated military and diplomatic functions. He concludes that "the option of a reasonable independent foreign policy reasonably pursued, within reason, may retain [the] Canadian identity in international affairs."

62

Houghton, Neal D. A CASE FOR ESSENTIAL ABANDONMENT OF BASIC U.S. COLD WAR OBJECTIVES. Western political quarterly, v. 23, June 1970: 384-411.
JAL.W4, v. 23

Charges that "essentially all of the basic assumptions upon which [U.S.] cold war objectives and policies have rested and developed have been unsound and unwarranted in fact or reality" and that "their operational implications have been outmoded from their basic inception in the very nature of the period of history through which the whole world is now passing." Houghton looks to academics and other intellectuals for the social leadership needed to break out of the cold war impasse and establish an alliance with the social orders that are emerging to meet the real needs of mankind.

63

Hupka, Herbert. ERFURT-KASSEL; FROM MONOLOGUE TO DIALOGUE. Central Europe journal, v. 18, June 1970: 199-202. DB200.7.S74, v. 18

The Erfurt meeting between the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic will be historic as an "all-German experience."

The dialog begun at Erfurt will continue at Kassel, where the East Germans can be expected to press for recognition as a second state in Germany with equal rights under international law. The popular demonstrations at Erfurt for Willy Brandt bear witness that the citizen of the German Democratic Republic has not identified himself with the Communist world view. Brandt marked off unmistakably the position of the Federal Republic by saying "we must not make it impossible . . . for the German people to decide in free self-determination, how it wishes to live together." Yet there can be no reason for optimism, because the Communist all-or-nothing approach continues unchanged and "because no freely elected German government can or will yield the fundamental right of self-determination."

64

Hupka, Herbert. THE PROBLEM OF A NEW GERMAN OSTPOLITIK. Central Europe journal, v. 18, Apr. 1970: 115-119. DB200.7.S74, v. 18

West German policy toward Eastern Europe cannot ignore the hard fact of the division of Germany, and it must take for granted Bonn's own continued integration with the West, specifically, membership in NATO. Policy toward East Germany cannot be considered singly, since that country is itself inextricably connected with East Europe and Moscow. Bonn must also recognize that the Americans have moved from confrontation to negotiation and that the Soviet Union's willingness to talk with the capitalist superpower is shown by the strategic arms limitation talks. The present administration of the Federal Republic has followed the example of its predecessors by offering renunciation-of-force agreements to Moscow, Warsaw, and Pankow. To get a dialog going, Bonn has made some concessions to East Germany in advance. The integrity of the present Polish territories should be recognized in a treaty on the mutual renunciation of force without anticipating a definite peace settlement. The Federal Republic must also recognize the limitations placed on its ability to act in regard to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union by the Paris treaties of 1954.

65

INDONESIA. Asian almanac, v. 8, Oct. 10, 1970: 4207-4209. DS1.A4752, v. 8

Dr. Adam Malik, Indonesia's Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated in July that his Government was not opposed to normalizing relations with Communist China, provided China would agree to cease "hostile acts of subversion" and stop criticizing the Indonesian Government. He believes that the danger of massive military aggression in Asia is low as long as the U.S.-Soviet nuclear balance remains stable. Although China's capacity for large-scale external military operations will be quite limited in the foreseeable future its evolving nuclear capability might induce a radical and dogmatic leadership "to project novel ideas in relation to Asia in general." However, if China achieves a higher level of nuclear development, it will probably adopt a more moderate foreign policy. The most recent manifestation of the ongoing reorganization of the Indonesian Armed Forces is the creation of a Central Civic Mission Board, headed by the Deputy Commander of the Armed Forces

and designed to promote and guide the military in its new sociopolitical roles. President Suharto has said that if the Armed Forces fail to discharge their dual task of national defense and civic action, they would lose their confidence and that of the people, and national development would never be accomplished. Although the military have no intention of monopolizing power, they realized that no other organization was capable of dealing effectively with national problems. The assignment of military personnel to civil-action duties will not necessitate the removal of civil servants from their posts.

66

Jha, D. C. PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY: AN ANALYTICAL STUDY. *Indian journal of political science*, v. 31, Apr./June 1970: 113-137.

JA26.I5, v. 31

Traces the post-1947 evolution of Pakistan's foreign policy. Due to Great Power rivalries in Asia in the 1960's, Pakistan was able to establish "bilateral equations" with Communist China, the Soviet Union, and the United States with the understanding "that the nature and complexion of the equation should be such as to promote our mutual interest without adversely affecting the legitimate interests of third parties." While this policy has enhanced national security considerably, Pakistan might be trapped on a "triangular tight-rope" in the future.

67

Johnson, James A. THE NEW GENERATION OF ISOLATIONISTS. *Foreign affairs*, v. 49, Oct. 1970: 136-146. D410.F6, v. 49

The Vietnam War, domestic problems, and doubts over the Nation's international involvements have produced a new generation of isolationists in the United States. The new isolationism, basically a reaction to military interventionism, is not a rejection of internationalism, as was isolationist sentiment during the interwar period. The sense of world mission characteristic of the 1940's and 1950's is gone, and with it, the simplistic distinction between "good guys" and "bad guys," the "free world" and communism. The idealism of American youth now focuses on new kinds of social and political problems--pollution, racism, urban decay--because the fear of Communist expansionism is no longer real. Changes in the technology of war have shifted attention from fear of foreign conquest to fear of nuclear annihilation. The optimism generated during the Kennedy era has given way to disillusionment. Although the new isolationists have severely criticized many aspects of American society, particularly defense spending and U.S. military involvements, few are pacifists, and most would willingly fight in a conventional war to defend the United States. They share the interventionists' concern for promoting and defending the national interest, but they differ over the components of national interest. Because of their profound distrust of the basic assumptions of the interventionists, "a new internationalism based on a peaceful response to human needs is the only effective response that the new generation of isolationists will heed."

68

Johnson, U. Alexis. THE ROLE OF JAPAN AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH THE FAR EAST. In *American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia*. A new American posture toward Asia. Philadelphia, 1970. (*Its Annals*, v. 390, July 1970) p. 63-72. HL.A4, v. 390

American interest and involvement in Asia is not a recent aberration, but a continuing phenomenon going back to the days of the China Clippers and extending through the period when the United States followed a policy of isolation in other areas. Today Japan is the leading nation in Asia, vastly superior economically and technically to other states in the area. Linked to the United States by a Mutual Defense Treaty, Japan has substantial armed forces capable of assuring the country's immediate conventional defense. In his State of the Union message, President Nixon recognized this primacy, stating "Japanese-American friendship and cooperation are the linchpin for peace in the Pacific." Japan is contributing to the development of the free states of Asia through increasing economic and technical cooperation. We welcome this policy and will not ask Japan to assume security responsibilities inconsistent with the felt concerns of the Japanese people. Looking at the region as a whole, the ultimate ideal is a community of the free states of Asia cooperating for their common interests in the political, economic, and security fields, with which we are associated only to the degree that these states desire our association. Japan must play a major role in any such community. (Abstract supplied)

69

Kapur, Ashok. SOVIET MOVES IN ASIA: TRENDS FOR THE EARLY SEVENTIES. *China report*, v. 6, May/June 1970: 15-27. DS777.55.C4484, v. 6

A detailed conceptual analysis of Soviet policy in Asia that considers the global ramifications of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

70

Karnow, Stanley. LEARNING TO LIVE WITH CHINA. *Far Eastern economic review*, v. 69, July 2, 1970: 27-28, 31-32, 35. HC411.F18, v. 69

Examines traditional and contemporary sources of conflict between the United States and China. Karnow concludes that their relations "have suffered from a good deal of misunderstanding and mistrust built up by both sides largely . . . because of internal pressures on the respective leaderships." Since the United States must live with the Chinese, Washington must recognize the legitimate Chinese interests in Southeast Asia, judge the Chinese by their actions rather than their words, assess Chinese power more realistically, and abandon the missionary attitude that it can change the Chinese.

71

Kennedy, Edward M. BEGINNING ANEW IN LATIN AMERICA. *Saturday review*, v. 53, Oct. 17, 1970: 18-21. Z1219.S25, v. 53

The great hopes aroused by the Alliance for Progress have been dissipated by the continuation

16 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

of an anachronistic foreign policy that prefers the stability of repressive military regimes to the risk of democratic social change. The social and political statistics of Latin America are at least as depressing as they were before the alliance. U.S. military and diplomatic support for oppressive regimes, such as those in Brazil and Argentina, has failed to improve conditions in the countries involved and has contributed to a growing anti-Americanism. Basic social change is inevitable in Latin America; the only question is whether it will come about peacefully or violently. The United States can contribute to peaceful change by reaffirming the democratic goals of the alliance, withdrawing its military missions and curtailing military assistance and arms sales, increasing economic and technical aid and encouraging land reform, assuring a more positive role for American private investments in Latin America, and improving relations with Cuba.

72

Koch, Thilo. [THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC ON THE CHESSBOARD OF THE SOVIET UNION] Auf dem Schachbrett der Sowjetunion, die DDR. [Hamburg] Wegner [1970] 142 p. map.

DD261.4.K56

Includes bibliographical references.

Partial contents.--The German Democratic Republic on the chessboard of the Soviet Union, by Thilo Koch.--Documentation selected by Michael Wolf Thomas.

Sketches the position of the German Democratic Republic within the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) and Warsaw Pact and its general exploitation by the Soviet Union in the world arena. Documentation is chosen to illustrate the thesis that while the relations of East Germany with individual members of the Soviet bloc have varied, Pankow has constantly and directly responded to Moscow's wishes. Koch calls the German Democratic Republic the queen's pawn in the Soviet Union's great power game.

73

Kröger, Herbert. [INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE] Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, v. 15, June 1970: 565-576. D839.B57, v. 15

On the basis of international law, condemns the proposals advanced by the Bonn government for shaping future East German-West German relationships. Kröger thinks the formal recognition of East Germany is more than a "legalistic formality." Peaceful coexistence is not possible in Europe while Bonn refuses to recognize its neighbor as a subject in international law or negotiate in the spirit of the East German memorandum of December 17, 1969.

74

Kuehnelt-Leddihn, Erik von. THE RUSSIANS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. National review, v. 22, August 25, 1970: 891. AP2.N3545, v. 22

The ever-increasing Soviet naval presence is probably not the gravest menace in the Mediterranean.

ean, since in an air age ships are vulnerable. However, the Soviet Union has gained control of strategic Mediterranean airfields through political penetration, making direct control of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles unnecessary. "In order to become a Mediterranean power the Russians no longer need control of the exit through the Hellespont." Decolonization in French North Africa and Libya and the last two Arab defeats by Israel have facilitated the Russian expansion. Moscow has been inspired by the age-old ambition to "liberate" Istanbul as well as by a desire to dominate one of the world's key transportation arteries, control oil resources in the Near East, and secure Arab cooperation in the struggle against the West. The strategy includes acquisition of military bases in North Africa to threaten Southern Europe and separation of Europe from Africa and the Indian Ocean countries. Further, the Soviet Union fears that if it does not fill the Mediterranean vacuum created by the withdrawal of the French, British, and Italians, Communist China will.

75

Negvold, Robert. SOVIET POLICY IN WEST AFRICA. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1970. 372 p. DT476.5.L37 Bibliography: p. 349-357.

Contents.--The Soviet response to colonial Africa.--The first contacts with black Africa.--The era of optimism, 1960.--Africa divided.--Policy in transition, 1962-1963.--Ideological experimentation in Khrushchev's last year.--Policy after Khrushchev: smaller expectations, 1965-1966.--The new realism, 1967-1968.--Conclusion.--Note on methodology.--Index.

A study of Soviet foreign policy in Guinea, Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Mali, Nigeria, and Senegal, states that together illustrate the full spectrum of problems faced by the Soviet Union in its relations with the new states of black Africa. As events in Africa have made it progressively more evident that the continent is not prepared for Socialist revolution, Soviet interest in the area has declined. It now lies on the periphery of Soviet concern, and, unless circumstances change radically, it is likely to remain there.

76

Lewis, Flora. THE NIXON DOCTRINE. Atlantic monthly, v. 226, Nov. 1970: 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16. AP2.A8, v. 226

The Nixon Doctrine is ambiguous even to American officials in Asia responsible for its implementation. The obstacles to stability in non-Communist Asia are enormous and may require longer and more extensive U.S. support than is implied in administration statements emphasizing U.S. withdrawal from Asia. Japan is apparently under pressure from the United States to assume an active military and political role in Asia sooner than Tokyo would like. The attempt to replace U.S. pressure on China with the collective pressure of non-Communist Asia is misconceived and should be abandoned in favor of a policy that encourages each country to seek its own accommodation with China. This can be accomplished only when the United States terminates its involvement in the Indochina War and works for rapprochement with Peking by ar-

ranging for a referendum on Taiwan, which would undoubtedly result in a statement of preference for independence from either Chinese government. The non-Communist countries of Asia "need an American policy which will safeguard their own efforts to develop, rather than a policy of countercoalition designed principally to reduce the cost of conflict for America."

77

Mackintosh, Malcolm [Interview] CLUES TO SOVIET POLICY. U.S. news & world report, v. 69, Nov. 2, 1970: 66-69. JK1.U65, v. 69

Warns that the leadership of the Soviet Union looks upon negotiation not as a means to relieve tensions and promote mutual understanding but as a weapon like any other weapon, to be used to further the growth of Soviet political, economic, and military power. The Soviet Union is in an expansionist mood; it is much more willing to take chances now than in the past, and it is prepared to exploit local opportunities to increase its influence, even at the risk of a confrontation with the United States. In the strategic arms limitation talks, its goals are to stabilize the strategic balance at near parity, prevent another heat in the arms race, which it certainly would lose, and create a "forum for a superpower directorate for running the world."

78

Madhok, Balraj. BALRAJ MADHOK ON INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL AFFAIRS; COLLECTION OF SOME IMPORTANT SPEECHES DELIVERED IN THE LOK SABHA. New Delhi, Bharati Sahitya Sadan [1969] 156 p. DS448.M23

Running title: India's foreign policy and national affairs.

Speeches delivered between June 1968 and January 1969 in the House of Representatives of the Indian Parliament that include a general survey of foreign policy, recommendations for its reorientation, discussions of India's role in the British Commonwealth, its attitude toward West and East Germany, its reaction to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the reorganization of the north-east region, and the Kashmir question.

79

Mahajani, Usha. INDIA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA: SPLENDID ISOLATION, ACTIVE INTERVENTION OR DETACHED INVOLVEMENT? United Asia, v. 22, May/June 1970: 105-124. DS1.U55, v. 22

Advocates "detached involvement" for India in its relations with Southeast Asia, emphasizing that it would inspire India to pursue its legitimate interest in the area, enable it to intervene on its own initiative, and dissuade it from undertaking entangling commitments. Mahajani assesses Indian foreign policy in the context of Communist China's role in South East Asia, the Kashmir dispute, internal revolution, and regional solidarity. He rejects the power-vacuum theory that has been popularized in the wake of Great Britain's withdrawal from East of Suez, noting that there is little to substantiate the assumptions that the Western naval and military presence in Asia and the Indian Ocean are in India's interests or that

the Soviet penetration into the Indian Ocean is a threat to India's security, especially in view of Japanese military activities instigated by the United States.

80

Mansfield, Michael J. PERSPECTIVE ON ASIA: THE NEW U.S. DOCTRINE AND SOUTHEAST ASIA. Report of Senator Mike Mansfield to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1969. 15 p. DS518.8.M24

At head of title: 91st Congress, 1st Session; Committee print.

Contents.--Introduction.--The President's new Asian doctrine.--Reactions to the new Asian doctrine.--The new doctrine and Southeast Asian countries.--Concluding comments.

Evaluates the Nixon doctrine on the basis of conversations with Southeast Asian leaders in August 1969. Mansfield finds that these leaders no longer perceive a significant threat of Communist aggression in the region, that U.S. interests on the Asian mainland are peripheral, and that consequently the United States should alter its role from that of an Asian power to a Pacific power. He reports that U.S. officials in Asia have thus far expended little serious effort to comply with the Nixon doctrine and recommends that Washington issue firm directives to achieve compliance. After reviewing the economic, political, and military situations in the Philippines, Indonesia, Burma, Cambodia, and Laos, he proposes that the United States shift its emphasis from bilateral to multilateral economic aid, impose strict curbs on further military aid, and encourage nonmilitary cooperation among the Asian nations.

81

Meissner, Boris. [THE SOVIET UNION AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY] Sowjetunion und die kollektive Sicherheit. Aussenpolitik, v. 21, July 1970: 393-405. D839.A885, v. 21

Reviews the history of Soviet attitudes toward collective security to establish the difference between the aggressive coexistence strategy being implemented today and the older emphasis on equilibrium. Meissner fears that the proposed European security congress will constitute international recognition of the division of Germany. When its western front is consolidated, the Soviet Union can turn to the integration of Eastern Europe and then expand in the Third World. Meissner proposes a return to the agenda suggested by Molotov for the 1954 security conference.

82

Meyer-Detring, Wilhelm. [DISTURBING REALITIES] Störende Realitäten. Wehrkunde, v. 19, Sept. 1970: 441-443. U3.W396, v. 19

The preoccupation of the German Federal Republic with security obscures its understanding of the realities of military policy. The right of self-determination, the first of the basic realities of military policy, is expressed in the Moscow-Bonn renunciation-of-force treaty. It can become a reality of political policy when the German people,

18 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

not the Government or the Bundeswehr alone, recognize that the right to self-determination merits defense by arms if necessary. An important politico-military reality is that Soviet policy has long since ceased to be motivated by communism or any ideology other than Russian patriotism. Whenever direct confrontation with the Americans must be avoided, it is the Russian tactic to obtain whatever is possible by negotiations and treaties. What else is the meaning of the renunciation-of-force pact? The Russians certainly never thought that West Germany seriously contemplated a military attack. Other realities are Soviet fears of China, of a two-front war, and of the rising costs of armament, which account for Soviet interest in a better economic understanding with Bonn. It is possible that by easing the Soviet economic crisis, the Germans are in effect helping the Soviets to arm. The great reality that the Soviets cannot overlook is the Atlantic alliance. The Soviet call for a European security conference, where security will be considered only from the economic or sociopolitical points of view, is a tactic to outflank that reality. The Soviets seek safety on their western borders, profitable economic relations, and complete military hegemony in Europe with the West's approval, to bring about an era of "pax sovietica."

83

Modelski, George. *THE WORLD'S FOREIGN MINISTERS: A POLITICAL ELITE*. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 14, June 1970: 135-175.

JX1901.J6, v. 14

This is an empirical study of the backgrounds, current experiences, and values of persons holding the role of foreign minister in their respective nations in 1965, with historical comparisons of some aspects. Data are included from a mailed questionnaire with a response of over 15 percent. Findings on educational experience, foreign travel, personal acquaintance with counterparts in other countries, and other attributes are tabulated and discussed. Taking Morgenthau's suggestions about a "world elite" as a point of departure, the study involves implications about the cohesiveness of such an elite and the perceptible changes that have occurred within it since the nineteenth century. The decline of "aristocracy" as a criterion, the participation of new and relatively small powers in world affairs, and the technological facilitation of face-to-face contact among foreign ministers in the twentieth century (especially since World War II) are discussed as factors in present-day international relations. (Abstract supplied)

84

Morgan, Roger. *THE NEW GERMANY: IMPLICATIONS FOR BRITISH POLICY; A CASE OF COVERAGE*. Round table; the Commonwealth quarterly, no. 239, July 1970: 249-255. AP4.R6, 1970

Present Anglo-German relationships are on an extraordinarily friendly level and seem likely to remain so for a fairly long period. The Ostpolitik of the Brandt government will achieve what it can in a very short time. Bonn needs a firm basis in West more than it needs anything it is likely to get in the East. British and German judgements

about the possibility of détente with the Soviet bloc will soon return to a similar focus. The expanding range of common interests in industrial, technological, and economic collaboration and German advocacy of British entry into the Common Market are reasons for anticipating increasing Anglo-German harmony. In the general spectrum of world politics, Britain and Germany see themselves as members of the same category of medium powers, with an increasing area of concern in the organization of Western Europe and in the development of their relations both with the United States and with Eastern Europe. Britain should take care that the four-power negotiations on Berlin make concessions to East Germany only at the proper tempo to help Bonn's effort at East-West stabilization.

85

Mourin, Maxime. [THE SOVIET UNION IN THE FACE OF THE NEW JAPANESE POWER] L'U.R.S.S. devant la nouvelle puissance japonaise. Revue de défense nationale, v. 26, June 1970: 935-948.

D410.R45, v. 26

Focuses on Soviet-Japanese relations during the past 25 years. Mourin contends that the Soviet Union can no longer demand economic collaboration with Tokyo without giving Japan sufficient territorial compensations. Moreover, Moscow is going to find that it will be difficult to consolidate its influence or presence in Asia without improving its political relations with Japan. He concludes that Japan will surpass the Soviet Union in industrial production and that it is beginning to revise its posture in the world, particularly in Asia, and play a greater role in establishing its own security.

86

Muskie, Edmund S. *MUSKIE'S TIMETABLE: OUT OF INDO-CHINA IN 18 MONTHS*. New York times magazine, July 5, 1970: 8-13. AP2.N6575, 1970

President Nixon's policy in Southeast Asia serves only to perpetuate the war in Vietnam and Cambodia and further divide the nation at home. A military victory is out of the question, and the United States should be moving to create conditions conducive to a political settlement. The outlook for such a settlement could be improved materially by adopting a fixed timetable for the withdrawal of all U.S. troops within 18 months. This time frame could be shortened if Hanoi agreed to a ceasefire, and it would not be followed at all unless U.S. prisoners of war were returned and the safety of the withdrawal guaranteed. Arguments against a fixed timetable--in particular, those that raise the specter of a bloodbath in the South--do not stand up to analysis. On the other hand the advantages are very real: a fixed schedule of withdrawal would put control over events back in the hands of the United States, where it belongs; encourage a better climate in which to negotiate for the return of U.S. prisoners of war and the safety of U.S. troops during the withdrawal; and greatly improve prospects for a broad political settlement.

87

Palme, Olof. *SWEDEN: NEUTRALITY, NOT SILENCE*. Vital speeches of the day, v. 36, July 15, 1970: 578-580. PN6121.V52, v. 36

Delivered before the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., June 5, 1970.

Sweden's policy of neutrality is firmly based on its history and its strategic location in Europe between East and West. Neutrality must be credible to be effective, and Sweden's per capita defense expenditures are the world's fourth highest. Neutrality does not mean isolation, nor does it condemn Sweden to remain silent on major international issues. As a small nation, Sweden regards cooperation with the great powers as not only a matter of self-interest but also a means of contributing to world peace. The smaller nations will gradually relinquish more of their sovereignty as states move toward greater interdependence, but this must come about through voluntary agreements, not dictation by the superpowers. Sweden has long played an active role in the United Nations, disarmament negotiations, and aid to developing countries, but it professes no special insight into the world's problems and is acutely aware of its limited ability to influence the course of world events. It may be true that the 1970's portend catastrophe, as some claim, but the decade may also mark the turning point for peaceful and constructive change in the developing countries and a lessening of world tensions. Although Sweden is not without problems, its own progress in social reform is evidence that peaceful social change is possible.

88

Pillai, Kesavakurup R. INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY: BASIC ISSUES AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES. Meerut, Meenakshi Prakashan [c1969] 247 p.
DS445.P5 1969

Contents.--Background.--The cold war.--Relations with Pakistan.--Foreign aid.--Relations with China.--Other major issues.--Conclusion.--Appendices.--Bibliography.--Index.

Examines the attitudes of the major Indian opposition parties and their influence on foreign policy. Pillai selects four parties representing broadly based leftist and rightist points of view--the Communist Party of India, the Praja Socialist Party, the Jana Sangh, and the Swatantra Party--and focuses on events during the period 1947-1963. He concludes that these parties have had a significant and positive influence on Indian foreign policy.

89

Pipes, Richard. RUSSIA'S MISSION, AMERICA'S DESTINY. Encounter, v. 35, Oct. 1970: 3-11.
AP4.E44, v. 35

Compares the historical determinants of Soviet and U.S. foreign policies. Pipes challenges the view that the current détente in Soviet-U.S. relations is the result of the convergence of their social and political institutions. Both the Soviet Union and the United States spring from European civilization, but the differences in what each has borrowed are more significant than the similarities. The isolationism of the Soviet elite derives from a Manichean division of the world into Russians and non-Russians, while American isolationist sentiment reflects an individualistic

bias that places primary value on the ability of a nation to govern itself. The Russian preoccupation with empire manifests itself as a tendency to absorb neighboring peoples, while America's commercial experience predisposes it toward a balance-of-power theory of international relations. Since the Soviet process of industrialization occurred without a corresponding growth of commercial relations, the belief in compromise that is characteristic of American foreign policy is lacking in Soviet policy.

90

Reischauer, Edwin O. TRANSPACIFIC RELATIONS. Tokyo, C. E. Tuttle [1969] 88 p.
DS33.4.U6R4
Originally published as one chapter in Agenda For the Nation: Papers on Domestic and Foreign Policy Issues. HN65.A63

Suggests steps the United States should take to effect a more realistic Asian policy. Reischauer contends that America should terminate the Vietnam War as soon as possible by negotiating a complete American withdrawal, maintain friendly relations with Japan, and seek to relax tensions involving China. The United States must recognize that once the Vietnam War is settled, it has no other vital interests in Asia and must accept that it has less control in Asia than previously. He concludes that the United States should adopt a low profile in Asia while at the same time sustaining a broad concern for the future of Asia and Asians. America "should approach the problems of Asia in Judo style, not trading blow for blow with the forces of Asia, but so adapting [its] stance as to let these forces work for [it]."

91

Riklin, Alois. [MODELS OF SWISS FOREIGN POLICY] Modell einer schweizerischen Aussenpolitik. Österreichische Zeitschrift für Aussenpolitik, v. 10, no. 2, 1970: 67-77.
DB47.043, v. 10

Recognizing that Switzerland can influence world politics only to the extent of its limited means and power is a necessary preliminary to constructing models of Swiss foreign policy. Consequently the most realistic model prescribes the closest possible integration with all efforts toward international cooperation while maintaining Swiss neutrality and refraining from the pursuit of an active neutrality policy. Neutrality implicitly forbids entry into a pact system and requires a readiness to resort to arms for its protection. The areas of action for this model of Swiss foreign policy lie in Europe, the United Nations, international humanitarian efforts, and the policy of coexistence with the Communist states. In implementing its coexistence policy, Switzerland should build up relationships with Eastern Europe and resume diplomatic relations with all states, including the German Democratic Republic.

92

Rostow, Walt W. ASIA: TODAY'S POLICY TOMORROW'S FACT. Vital speeches of the day, v. 36, Sept. 1, 1970: 682-688. PN6121.V52, v. 36
Delivered at the Naval War College, Newport, R.I., June 19, 1970.

20 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

Contents that U.S. withdrawal from Asia would not be in the interests of either the United States or the smaller nations of Asia. Rostow argues that the costs of U.S. commitments to Asia, while substantial, do not significantly affect the ability of the United States to deal with its domestic problems. U.S. withdrawal would encourage Chinese aggressiveness, threaten Southeast Asia with Chinese domination, and increase the probability of a major Asian war.

93

Sapin, Burton M., comp. CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN FOREIGN AND MILITARY POLICY. [Glenview, Ill.] Scott, Foresman [1970] 185 p. (Scott, Foresman's American Government readings series) E840.S24

Includes bibliographical references.

Partial contents.--The United States in world politics.--Military force and foreign policy: The pressures of military necessity, by Gene M. Lyons. New approaches to defense decision-making, by Wesley W. Posvar. Post-Vietnam role of the military in foreign policy, by Maxwell D. Taylor. Politico-military problems and resources, by John C. Ausland.--Politics, publics, the media and the national character.--Formulating and implementing national policy: Planning-Programming-Budgeting, by the Senate Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations. PPBS and foreign affairs, by Thomas C. Schelling.--Major policy problems, foreign policy analysis: The ABM, proliferation and international stability, by Robert L. Rothstein. The Atlantic mirage, by Ronald Steel. Containment in Asia reconsidered, by David P. Mazingo.

Readings in U.S. foreign and military policy. The selections in this volume, intended for use in political science courses at the university level, were made with the aim of throwing light on the decisionmaking process and on the relationship between foreign and military policy. Sapin deplores the dearth of first-rate political analysis in international relations but predicts that trends toward a more self-consciously theoretical orientation, a comparative approach, and a concern with substance as well as structure and process will begin to bear fruit in the very near future.

94

Schmidt, Helmut. GERMANY IN THE ERA OF NEGOTIATIONS. Foreign affairs, v. 49, Oct. 1970: 40-50. D410.F6, v. 49

A new epoch in East-West relations is in the offing. Grandiose dreams of achieving a united Europe in the immediate future will give way to more pragmatic approaches, while a reduction of tensions will enhance the prospects for cooperation on limited measures. NATO will remain the bulwark of Western security, but continued U.S. participation will be essential to make it effective. West Germany is firmly committed to the political unification of Europe, but it recognizes that unification can only come about gradually. Its Ostpolitik is a logical extension of policies enunciated as early as 1966, not a radical break with the past, and supplements East-West negotiations on the general questions, such as the strategic arms limitation talks. West Germany has already

reached tentative agreements with the Soviet Union and Poland, and there is reason to hope for an improvement in relations with East Germany as well. Whatever one may think of the East German regime, it is futile to ignore its existence. Although West Germany will never recognize East Germany as a foreign country, it will agree to East German participation in the international community within the framework of a *modus vivendi* that recognizes the unity of the two German states. A primary means of reducing East-West tensions and thereby improving the prospects for political agreements would be mutual balanced force reductions, which West Germany wholeheartedly supports. On this, as on other questions, West Germany will pursue a flexible policy that combines persistence with realism.

95

Schneider, Fernand-Thiébaud. [WHERE IS MOSCOW GOING?] Où va Moscou? Revue militaire suisse, v. 115, June 1970: 253-261.

U2.R5, v. 115

The Soviet Union's spectacular politico-military advances in the Mediterranean and its potential opportunities in the Far East opened up by America's disengagement must not mask Moscow's internal economic and ideological problems. The Russians have broken out of their continental shell, but only the future can reveal whether they are going to crumble like statues with feet of clay or whether an important part of the world will live under their domination.

96

Singh, Bishwanath. FOREIGN POLICY OF COMMUNIST CHINA. United Asia, v. 22, Jan./Feb. 1970: 16-27. DS1.U55, v. 22

Divides the history of Communist Chinese foreign policy into three periods: ideological militancy, 1949-1953; conciliation and diplomacy, 1954-1959; and extremism and ideological purity, 1960 to the present. Singh contends that the Sentinel ABM system was authorized to defend the United States against China's growing nuclear capability. He concludes that the Soviet-American confrontation will be replaced by an era of bitter Sino-Soviet disputes, "probably culminating in an armed showdown between the two Communist giants, with the USA leaning on the Russian side."

97

Storry, Richard. OPTIONS FOR JAPAN IN THE 1970S. World today, v. 26, Aug. 1970: 325-333. D410.W63, v. 26

Great economic power must eventually lead to the application of power to protect and expand national interests, but if there is to be a new kind of patriotism in Japan it will have to derive its strength from a younger generation of officeholders, who have no direct memory of militarism and war and who regard the Constitution as a fact of life. Modern Japanese history suggests that Japan needs a close relationship with a major world power, so Japan would only opt for neutralism in the 1970's if the United States made it clear that it was unprepared to fulfill its treaty obligations. The mutual security pact will automatically be ex-

tended annually so long as the American nuclear umbrella remains credible. Improved Japanese-Soviet relations may be restricted to commercial ties, although an economic rapprochement could become the basis for a peace treaty if the dispute over the northern islands is resolved. Recovering these islands is a basic, long-term Japanese objective that Tokyo is unlikely to abandon. In the event of a Sino-Soviet War, Japan would remain neutral but would lean toward China. While Japan might conceivably recognize Peking in the 1970's, it has adopted a "wait and see" attitude for the time being. "Japan will become militarily stronger, but it is not easy to see how she could become, or wish to become, a military Power during the next ten years." Resurgent nationalism in a new, nonaggressive form will focus on the Japanese race rather than the imperial house.

98

Symington, William Stuart. CONGRESS'S RIGHT TO KNOW. New York times magazine, Aug. 9, 1970: 7, 62-65. AP2.N6575, 1970

Warns that "executive secrecy surrounding the conduct of [U.S.] foreign policy and its associated military operations is . . . endangering not only the welfare and prosperity of the United States but also, and most significantly, the national security." This policy has all but deprived Congress of its important constitutional prerogatives of independent judgment and control in the areas of foreign and military policy. That body, with public support, must take the initiative and, "using appropriate committees in the foreign and military policy fields, . . . increase overseeing responsibilities with systematic fact-finding inquires, both in this country and abroad." Only in this way can the veil of executive secrecy, which "has been and is being utilized both to defend the past and to limit the future," be torn away.

99

Talbot, Phillips. THE AMERICAN POSTURE TOWARD INDIA AND PAKISTAN. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. A new American posture toward Asia. Philadelphia, 1970. (*Its Annals*, v. 390, July 1970) p. 87-97. H1.A4, v. 390

Difficulties abound in India and Pakistan, but the twenty-year-old American effort to develop a constructive posture toward both of these large South Asian nations remains valid and important for the coming decade. The problem is to find equilibrium in conflicting drives for nationalism, security, and development. Deep-running nationalism in India and in Pakistan hinders psychological self-sufficiency but also fuels the continuing confrontation between the two countries. This confrontation further affects their respective views of security needs. To add to the complexity of the situation, the rivalries between them are components of their relationships with the Soviet Union, with Communist China, and with the United States. The prospective post-Vietnam roles in Asia of China, Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States are of concern in the subcontinent; they could, for example, influence India's nuclear policy. Finally, both India and

Pakistan give very high priorities to economic development, in which outside powers also have a clear stake. Collapse of the development process would have ramifications far beyond the subcontinent. Local efforts are, of course, the key to development but foreign assistance is also essential. Present development assistance levels are virtually the lowest in the world, per capita. If not increased, their inadequacy will have consequences that cannot fail to enmesh more affluent parts of the world. Thus, such questions as development administration, fiscal policies, debt management, trade policies, and aid levels call for high priority attention. Whether there is well-based and continuing progress in the subcontinent through this decade will have much to do with the possibilities of stabilized peace in the rest of Asia. (Abstract supplied)

100

Ulam, Adam B. INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION. COMMUNIST DOCTRINE AND SOVIET DIPLOMACY: SOME OBSERVATIONS. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 13 p. JX1555.Z5 1970

At head of title: 91st Congress, 2d session. Committee print.

"Memorandum prepared at the request of the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations (pursuant to S. Res. 24, 91st Cong.) of the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate."

The Soviet leadership continues to regard conflict between capitalism and socialism as inevitable in the long run, although it has always stressed the possibility of peaceful coexistence in the short run. It persists in viewing the growing conflict with Communist China as a temporary disruption of harmonious relations, since to admit the existence of a basic antagonism between Communist states would undermine an important article of Communist dogma. The belief once prevalent in the West that Communist expansion necessarily benefits the Soviet Union has been called into question during the past decade, when some of the strongest opposition to Soviet policy has come from Communist countries (China, Yugoslavia, Rumania, etc.), while some of its staunchest allies have been non-Communist states, notably the Arab nations. The Soviet Union's position as leader of the Communist bloc now brings with it as many problems as it once brought benefits. Its negotiating advantage as a totalitarian power has frequently been squandered in the oversubtle pursuit of specific goals. What the Soviet Union respects above all in an adversary or ally is industrial and military power and social stability. The current social and political unrest in the West thus tends to reinforce the basic Soviet view that socialism will ultimately triumph in the prolonged struggle with capitalism.

101

U.S. Dept. of State. Office of Media Services. COMMITMENTS OF U.S. POWER ABROAD. [Washington, For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1969] 20 p. illus. (Issues in United States foreign policy, no. 3)

UA23.A4182

Department of State publication 8488. General foreign policy series, 235. Cover title.

22 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

Contents.--Introduction.--What is a commitment?
--Scope of U.S. commitments.--History of U.S. commitments.--Executive and legislative roles.--Prospect for commitments.--Words to know.--Appendix.

A general discussion of the scope and nature of American commitments abroad, including a chronology of U.S. declarations, agreements, and treaties since 1776 and a brief summary of the controversy over executive versus congressional powers in foreign policy formulation. The booklet concludes that "the history of the United States has witnessed an accelerating increase in the exercise of Presidential power in the area of foreign policy."

102

THE UNITED STATES AND HER ALLIES. Round table; the Commonwealth quarterly, no. 239, July 1970: 231-234. AP4.R6, 1970

The American Government has said that it will not renounce the security structure erected in the 25 years since the promulgation of the Truman doctrine and that the structure should now be self-supporting enough to require less effort from a tax-weary American public. The invitation to the West European countries to take the initiative in defense and diplomacy within the framework of the NATO alliance should be accepted. However, the American nuclear presence in Europe continues to be indispensable unless America is prepared to see the nations of Europe build up their own atomic arsenals. The Guam doctrine leaves a gap the Australians should be ready to fill, and the Commonwealth certainly can ease some of the American burden around the world. In the long run the American President must make the choice between withdrawing to concentrate on domestic issues and imperiling world security. "The plaque which Mr. Truman placed on his desk in the White House remains for his successors: the buck stops there."

103

Ushner, Manfred. [AID POLICY, EXPANSION, GLOBAL STRATEGY: LATIN AMERICA AS THE STAGE FOR WEST GERMAN NEO-COLONIALISM] Entwicklungspolitik, Expansion, Globalstrategie. Lateinamerika als Schauplatz d. westl. Neokolonialismus. Berlin, Staatsverlag der DDR, 1969. 204 p.

HC60.U82

Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Introduction.--The overseas underdeveloped countries and the expansionism of the Kiesinger-Strauss government.--The place of Latin America and of the "ABC" Countries in the expansion plans of West German imperialism.--The neocolonial and expansionistic characteristics of West German economic foreign policy in Latin America.--List of most important tables.

Analyzes the 1966-1969 Kiesinger-Strauss economic policy toward South America to establish its role in the global strategy of American imperialism and the expansion of German capitalism. The purpose of West Germany's Latin American policy is to create for the industrial lords of the Rhine and Ruhr an area in which to create and exploit their strategic reserves. At the same time, the Kiesinger-Strauss policy inaugurated a long-range revolutionary threat to the progressive so-

cieties of Latin America, which are not always able to understand the nature of West German imperialism. Ushner presents his study of the goals and functions of West German expansionism as a contribution to the democratic forces who fight for progress and liberty in these underdeveloped countries.

104

Van der Kroef, Justus M. INDONESIA FOREIGN POLICY SINCE SUKARNO. Il Politico, v. 35, no. 2, 1970: 339-353. JAI8.P65, v. 35

Significant changes have taken place in Indonesian foreign policy since the abortive Communist-inspired coup in 1965 and the fall of Sukarno. Once Indonesia's greatest ally, Communist China now sees its relations with Djakarta deteriorated almost to the point of a diplomatic break. Anti-Chinese propaganda was slowed somewhat at the end of 1968 when Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik extended the possibility of diplomatic relations if Peking renounced its subversive activity. Relations with the Soviet Union have been kept on the same formally correct level, possibly because of Indonesia's huge debt to the Soviet Union. Underlying this, however, are grave Indonesian anxieties over the Soviet naval presence in Asian waters. The Indonesians have openly opposed the idea of a Southeast Asian collective security organization in which the Soviet Union would participate, and they have stressed the necessity of improving political and economic conditions to ensure stability. Using the Association of Southeast Asian Nations as a forum, Indonesia has taken positions that show it seeking a Southeast Asia in which the major powers maintain a balance of power but the native states assume a suitable role through regional involvement.

105

Varma, Shanti P., and Kashi P. Misra, eds. FOREIGN POLICIES IN SOUTH ASIA. Bombay, Orient Longmans [for South Asia Studies Centre, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, 1969] 403 p.

JX1569.V36

"The present work is the outcome of a six-day all India Seminar . . . held at Jaipur, under the auspices of the South Asia Studies Centre, University of Rajasthan, from 1-6 February 1968."

Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--pt. 1. Foreign policies and political systems.--pt. 2. Determinants of foreign policies.--pt. 3. Foreign policies in operation.--pt. 4. Role of major powers in South Asia.--pt. 5. South Asia as a region.--Index.--List of contributors.

Analyses of the foreign policies of India, Pakistan, Ceylon, and Nepal. Among other contributors, Wayne Wilcox examines the role of the major world powers in South Asia and N. R. Deshpande focuses on Chinese policies and strategies. V. V. Ramana Murti explores the possibility of establishing a nuclear-free zone in South Asia, which he believes would provide greater security than nuclear armaments or reliance on the nuclear umbrella of a superpower. B. M. Kaushik contends that India should pursue a strategy of nuclear disarmament since it has no reason to fear a Chinese nu-

clear attack and Pakistan is not likely to acquire nuclear weapons.

106

Wagner, Robert Harrison. UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA; A STUDY IN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1970. 246 p.
HF1456.5.L3W34

Examines the relationship between U.S. foreign policy goals in Latin America and the political process in the United States. Wagner argues that the U.S. political system reinforces the tendencies for domestic experience to become the basis for understanding international politics and for domestic groups to become involved in intergovernmental communications. He feels these factors have had an ambiguous effect on the resolution of inter-American conflicts and crises.

107

Wallace, Don. THE PRESIDENT'S EXCLUSIVE FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWERS OVER FOREIGN AID. Duke law journal, v. 1970, Apr.-June 1970: 293-328, 453-494.

LL

Bibliographical footnotes.

Examines the constitutionality of congressional restrictions on presidential discretion in the use of foreign aid appropriations. Wallace distinguishes between a core area of foreign affairs powers exclusively under the control of the executive and other areas in which the President and Congress share certain powers. He reviews the development of the present separation of foreign affairs powers and investigates how these powers have interacted with respect to foreign aid. He concludes that although "congressional self-restraint is the key to the proper accommodation of congressional and executive interests," greater executive self-control will minimize the likelihood of congressional efforts to infringe on executive authority.

108

Wayper, C. L. JAPAN AND THE NEW FAR EASTERN PATTERN OF POWER. Royal Air Forces quarterly, v. 10, summer 1970: 91-95. UG635.G7A1252, v. 10

Although Japan seems destined to play a predominant role in reshaping the Asian power balance, its growing restiveness has been almost overlooked. With its security guaranteed by the alliance with the United States, Japan has been able to maintain a low foreign policy posture and a passive role within the alliance, facilitating minimal defense expenditures and rapid economic growth. The Japanese Government is now confronted with the contraction of U.S. power, increased assertiveness of Soviet power, evolving Chinese nuclear capability, and rising Japanese nationalism, all of which will necessitate greater independence of Tokyo's foreign and national-security policies. Japan will become a great military power. Despite some conflict over Tokyo's relations with China and the U.S.S.R., Japanese and American interests will coincide over the long run. It would therefore be surprising if the Japanese were to conclude that the U.S.-Japan alliance is no longer

fruitful; they will probably find it even more acceptable. As long as the great powers do not threaten Japan's vital interests, Japan will transform the existing pattern of power in Asia into a more stable and enduring balance.

109

Wooters, Garry J. THE APPROPRIATIONS POWER AS A TOOL OF CONGRESSIONAL FOREIGN POLICY MAKING. Boston University law review, v. 50, spring 1970: 34-50. LL

The legalistic approach to the problem of maintaining a healthy balance between the powers of the President and the Congress with respect to foreign policy fails to recognize that a clear legal division in their powers cannot be made and in any event is not self-executing. One major alternative to the purely legalistic approach is the appropriations power of Congress, the legitimacy of which is confirmed by a review of the framers' intentions. This power is not necessarily affected by previous congressional commitments. While there are practical problems regarding the implementation of the appropriations power, the precedents for its use are well established, and it offers a precise and simple means by which Congress can exercise its authority over foreign policy. The major constitutional question raised by this use of the appropriations power is whether in certain instances it may impinge on the President's authority, although in cases of conflict between congressional and presidential powers the constitutional balance appears to favor Congress. The Cooper-Church and Hatfield-McGovern proposals for limiting presidential authority in the conduct of the Indochina War both appear to be a legitimate exercise of the appropriations power. While the need for forceful congressional action is evident, however, it is equally important that Congress exercise its power with discretion so as not to jeopardize confidence in its ability to play a more active role in foreign policy.

TENSION AREAS

110

Balasanov, B. PEACE AND SECURITY IN ASIA: A SOVIET POINT OF VIEW. United Asia, v. 22, Jan./Feb. 1970: 9-10. DS1.U55, v. 22

Asian states must join together to secure their economic and political independence from an imperialism that "seeks to restore its domination through new colonial methods." A Soviet proposal to create a collective security system in Asia was rejected by the West even though Asian leaders stressed the importance and urgency of the proposal, which could frustrate the designs of those who would disrupt Asia's peace. It has been charged that through this proposal the Soviet Union is seeking to fill the vacuum that would result after Great Britain's withdrawal or that it is a means of establishing a new military alliance. These accusations are unfounded. The only alternative to the dangerous course of events in Asia is a collective security system that "would guarantee fruitful cooperation between the Asian countries

24 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

in the interests of strengthening their independence and security, and in the interests of peace in Asia and the whole world."

111

Black, E. P. MEANWHILE, BACK IN PRAGUE. . . . Far Eastern economic review, v. 69, July 2, 1970: 78-80. illus. HC411.F18, v. 69

Over the last 5 years, the Soviet Union has made massive military preparations for war with Communist China. The number of regular Russian divisions deployed along the Sino-Soviet border has nearly tripled since 1965, and East European satellites are reportedly committed to deploying troops in the Far East in the event of war. While large-scale defensive measures are being undertaken in China against the increasing possibility of a Soviet nuclear attack, the full implications of these developments have been deliberately ignored by the United States. The administration seems to be making every effort to prevent this and other crucial issues from disrupting the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT). Although "no one can foretell the fateful repercussions of an Asian continental war," Harrison Salisbury feels that the war will be nuclear, and "even if the US could escape direct involvement it could not escape the resulting nuclear fall-out." President Nixon has said that the United States will maintain a neutral stance in the dispute, but in such a potentially explosive situation "inaction can influence the deadly equation of power as much as action." Dr. Stefan T. Possony, a leading American authority on Sino-Soviet relations, warns that "the Sino-Soviet conflict is becoming increasingly critical" and points out that "the historic and strategic factors which underlie this conflict will outlast local crises and even basic alterations of international power relationships." Possony believes that the Soviets will aim for an agreement at the SALT talks that would guarantee U.S. neutrality in case of Soviet military operations against China. He suggests also that the Soviet Union's military buildup in the Near East is closely related to its preparations for war against China and that the Sino-Soviet dispute dominates both of their policies in Southeast Asia.

112

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. AMERICA AND EUROPE. Foreign affairs, v. 49, Oct. 1970: 11-30. D410.F6, v. 49

The restoration of Europe to its position as a major force in world politics should be a primary goal of U.S. foreign policy. The stability of Europe's post-World War II division into Soviet and American zones is deceptive: it is unpopular among Europeans, it depends on two non-European powers, and it lacks ideological consensus. In contrast to the innovative and revolutionary impact of U.S. relations with Europe, the Soviet impact has been generally conservative, if not reactionary. Despite intensive industrialization and modernization programs, Eastern Europe remains scientifically and technologically inferior to Western Europe, and the gap is widening. Europe can be restored only by the reassociation of its eastern and western halves, which in turn requires united Western Europe. The United States must

support efforts toward greater cooperation and unity among Europeans to counter Soviet efforts to keep Europe divided. For this reason the United States should encourage West European initiatives for negotiation with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe on a broad range of problems; independent initiatives like West Germany's Ostpolitik have little chance of success without united Western support.

113

Buschmann, Martha, and Hans Brender. [QUESTIONS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY AND THE SECURITY CONFERENCE.] Fragen der europäischen Sicherheit und der Sicherheitskonferenz. Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, v. 15, June 1970: 554-557. D839.B57, v. 15

Contents that West Germany should accept the Warsaw Pact countries' call for a European security conference without reservation, in view of the increasing American adventurism shown in the Cambodian attack and in view of the disastrous burdens of the arms race. The proposed conference would inaugurate the social and economic cooperation necessary if the nations of Europe are to overcome American dominance of world markets. To pressure governments into responding to the popular will, a European peoples' conference should be convened representing all forces acting for peace.

114

Campbell, John C. THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: AN AMERICAN POLICY. Foreign affairs, v. 49, Oct. 1970: 51-69. D410.F6, v. 49

Even if Israeli leaders are correct in their belief that Israel can meet any foreseeable Arab threat by maintaining military superiority, they may be faced with increasing domestic and international difficulties that will pose equally serious threats. The Arabs, on the other hand, incited by militant Palestinians, persist in the illusion that they will eventually defeat Israel. The Soviet Union has greatly expanded its influence in the Arab world, but it does not dominate any of the Arab countries nor does it have any reasonable chance of doing so in the future. This does not mean that the United States can afford to be indifferent toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. "By taking the role of advocate of a fair settlement not tied to either side and obviously not based on tactical considerations, the United States would be presenting to Israel, the Arabs and the Soviet Union an alternative to their present policies." Such a settlement might provide for Arab recognition of Israel; Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories; reestablishment of the frontiers that existed on June 4, 1967, with minor adjustments; U.N. administration of special areas, such as the Gaza strip and East Jerusalem, and the stationing of U.N. peacekeeping forces in demilitarized zones on both sides of the frontiers; recognition of Israeli rights to use the Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran; recognition of the Palestinian Arabs' right to nationhood and compensation for the Palestinian refugees; and international guarantees, including a specific guarantee by the United States to Israel.

115

CHINA AND THE USSR--PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND POWER.

China report, v. 6, Mar./Apr. 1970: 1-17.

DS777.55.C4484, v. 6

"The author of this article is a French specialist of Sino-Soviet relations whose high functions oblige him to remain anonymous."

A slightly abridged translation of an article published in Preuves "in its first issue of 1970." AP20.P74

Examines the causes of the Sino-Soviet dispute and discusses some Western experts' doubts about the very existence of the conflict. Geopolitical factors seem to render some form of conflict inevitable, ideology notwithstanding. While the two powers may have been on the brink of war in September 1969, the outbreak of war in the immediate future seems very improbable. However, "their rivalry will persist, alternating between tension and relative détente."

116

Durbrow, Elbridge. LAOS AND VIETNAM--THE SAME WAR.

In American Security Council. Washington report, Apr. 6, 1970: 1-4. Ser

"Hanoi's intensified aggression against South Vietnam started in Laos in 1959." Communist support for the puppet Pathet Lao forces in north-eastern Laos in 1959 served as a convenient diversion for Hanoi's main goal, reactivation of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in eastern and southern Laos, which was essential for the "liberation" of South Vietnam. Massive Soviet aid to the Pathet Lao forces in late 1960 and early 1961 brought strong protests from President Kennedy and led to negotiations that culminated in a shaky compromise in July 1962. In the meantime, Hanoi continued its buildup of forces and supplies in South Vietnam and consolidated its hold over the Ho Chi Minh Trail. "There is, therefore, no question about creating a 'new Vietnam' in Laos: there has always been just one Vietnamese war, which started in, and continues in, Laos and Cambodia as well as South Vietnam."

117

FRANCE WOOS LIBYANS WITH ARMS AND AID, by a special correspondent. Africa report, v. 15, June 1970: 20-21. DTA217, v. 15

The sale to Libya of 100 Mirage jet fighters should be seen in the total context of the French presence there. Fearful of the oppressiveness of Soviet tutelage, the Libyan revolutionaries rejected the United States and Great Britain as too closely tied to the deposed monarchy and already too powerful before turning to France. The French intention was to use military cooperation as a wedge for entering other realms. Paris and Tripoli now are in tacit political agreement to reduce the chance of conflict over the Chad question. However, positive relations remain fragile, and the projected Libyan federation with Egypt and the Sudan will not advance French interests. In any conflict with the Maghreb states, France would side against Libya. It is questionable whether France has the means or the intentions of making major investments in Libya. Without practical economic assistance, Franco-Libyan relations may

have as little future significance as the French gestures to South America or Canada.

118

Germany (Democratic Republic, 1949-) Staatssekretariat für Westdeutsche Fragen. [THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND THE WEST GERMANS: WHAT DOES THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC MEAN FOR THE WEST GERMAN WORKERS? HOW DID THE NEW WAY BEGIN? WHAT IF? WHAT IS IMPORTANT TODAY?] Die DDR und die Westdeutschen. Was bedeutet die DDR für die Westdeutschen Werktätigen? Womit begann der neue Weg? Was wäre wenn? Worauf kommt es heute an? [n.p., 1969?] 30 p. DD261.4.A5485

At head of title: Antwort aus der DDR.

The Socialist development of the German Democratic Republic has meant the erection of norms for progress in all social areas, which exerts an increasingly profound influence on West Germany. After the failure of their efforts through cold war, economic aggression, and political adventurism to abort the successful course of socialism, the West German capitalists and their Bonn political puppets talk meaninglessly of "reform" and the "all-German model." The workers and democrats of West Germany will find strong support in the socialism of the German Democratic Republic. They must first eradicate the poison of anticommunism from their minds and accept their complete responsibility for the actions of the Federal Republic.

119

THE GULF; IMPLICATIONS OF BRITISH WITHDRAWAL. Washington, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1969. 110 p. map. (Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Special report series, no. 8)

DS326.G84

Consists of a background paper and a report of a panel discussion organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University.

"Summary" (7 p.) inserted.

Contents.--Preface.--Members of the panel.--pt. 1. Policy findings and recommendations: Introduction. Panel policy findings and recommendations. Additional comments of individual panelists.--pt. 2. The background paper: Description of the Gulf area. Issues and interests. Interested parties. Present military balance in and around the Gulf. Effects of announcement of British withdrawal. Possible threats to peace and stability in the Gulf.

A panel discussion assessing the strategic significance of the Persian Gulf and the dangers of the British plan to withdraw militarily from the area by late 1971. A majority of the panel believes this timetable should be modified. Maintaining some British military forces in the Gulf somewhat longer would allow additional time for the emergence of local political and military structures and the development of intraregional cooperation, with the aim of excluding Soviet military aid and influence. "The long-term solution to the region's security problem can be based only on indigenous cooperation within an agreed framework." British and U.S. naval visits should be

26 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

continued, and naval visits by other Western powers encouraged. The United States should also study the possibility of creating a large Indian Ocean naval task force to counter the potential Soviet naval threat in the region.

120

Hart, Parker T. AN AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. A new American posture toward Asia. Philadelphia, 1970. (Its Annals, v. 390, July 1970) p. 98-113.

HLA4, v. 390

America is being pressed by two emotionally charged nations to serve their own, not our, national interests, and all our relations with the Middle East are being polarized on the Arab-Israeli issue although that is not the only important issue there. Our internal politics have often made it difficult to pursue either our own national interest or even-handed justice. The history of Palestine is full of missed opportunities for more equitable solutions than are available today. The expatriate Palestinian Arabs make any settlement difficult but no settlement is possible that excludes the Arabs of Palestine. The Big Powers have been too involved and are too suspect; a settlement can come only through the mediation of lesser powers, preferably from the Northern Tier states. A proposed settlement is outlined. (Abstract supplied)

121

Hartmann, Karl. [VATICAN, POLISH BISHOPS, ODER-NEISSE] Vatikan, polnischer Episkopat, Oder-Neisse. Aussenpolitik, v. 21, June 1970: 348-357. D839.A885, v. 21

The West German-Polish talks now underway in Warsaw and the recent appeal of the Polish episcopacy for Vatican recognition accentuate the importance of a solution to the troublesome question of the Oder-Neisse boundary. The Polish Communist regime attempts to use the Vatican's failure to act before international agreement to split the people from the Church and the priests from the bishops. The Polish bishops, who are fully in accord with the government on the legitimacy of the new boundaries, have been reproved as excessively nationalistic by some church authorities. The Vatican refusal to place the lands in question under the administrative jurisdiction of the Polish Church is popularly ascribed to West German influence. The position that West Germany takes at the Vatican on the Oder-Neisse line may determine the future course of Bonn-Warsaw rapprochement.

122

Hauer, Christian E. CRISIS AND CONSCIENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Introd. by Hugh Scott. Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1970. 159 p. illus. DS119.7.H38

Bibliography: p. 154-155.

Asserts that a solution to the Middle East crisis depends on the Arabs' willingness to recognize the existence of Israel and discusses possible solutions and their prospects.

123

Hunter, Robert E. SECURITY IN EUROPE. London, Elek, 1969. 188 p. (International relations series, v. 2) D1058.H85 1969

Sketches the development of the East-West confrontation in Europe and presents strategic factors relevant to European security as they developed over the years. Hunter asserts that the problems of European security were related not to military matters but to those of political organization and stability and economic strength and recovery. After World War II the need for a European security system was evident in light of the conflicting interests of the United States and the Soviet Union, but the forms and methods chosen to resolve these disputes stemmed primarily from misperceptions. Thus the structure of both NATO and the precursors of the Warsaw Treaty Organization were shaped. Paradoxically, the entire fabric of European security, symbolized by the establishment of two opposing blocs, provided both an added impetus to the cold war and the first step toward its end. The creation of a status quo engendered "the basis for ending these mutual hostilities that were founded on a lack of certainty about the manner in which political relations on the Continent were to be ordered."

124

Kilmarx, Robert A., and Alvin J. Cottrel. THE USSR IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Air Force and space digest, v. 53, Aug. 1970: 40-46. illus. UG633.A65, v. 53

Countering the Soviet military buildup in the Near East and the Mediterranean "involves higher risks for the United States than at any time or in any place since World War II." Maj. Gen. E. B. LeBailly, Commander of the 16th Air Force, has said that "land-based airpower is the key to controlling the Mediterranean and other water-adjacent areas." Although the United States may be able to maintain short-term air balance in the Near East by providing aircraft to Israel, the overall air balance has been lost. NATO still enjoys numerical naval superiority in the Mediterranean, but the balance there would be upset by further Soviet naval and air deployment in the area. The 16th Air Force cannot effectively counter the buildup of Soviet airpower in the Arab countries. If the Soviet Union's land-based air capabilities in the Mediterranean area continue to grow, the 6th Fleet will have to divert aircraft from strike commitments to fleet defense, and it may be unable to deter future Soviet incursions. "This limits the muscle the US can bring to bear in pressing for a diplomatic settlement." The United States should develop a more comprehensive Mediterranean strategy, with a clear statement of interests and commitments. Greater emphasis should be placed on new linkages with allies and friendly nations, coordinated military exercises, joint planning, and NATO capabilities in the Mediterranean. Both the 16th Air Force and 6th Fleet should be augmented and modernized. The Government should state in no uncertain terms that it will not "abandon the Mediterranean to the Soviets and their radical, anti-Western proxies."

125

Kimche, Jon. *THE SECOND ARAB AWAKENING*. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston [1970] 288 p. maps. DS62.8.K54 1970b

Contents.--Introduction.--The Kaiser's initiative.--The Anglo-French settlement.--Egypt at the center.--Iraq and Transjordan.--Israel: state or nation?--Palestine: nation or dispersion?--Chronology.--Notes.--Bibliography.--Index.

The Arab nations' emergence from Great Power tutelage during the half century following the end of Turkish control. Kimche focuses on British diplomacy in the Middle East and on the primary role of Egypt in the rise of Arab nationalism. He concludes that the key to a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the establishment of a state of Palestine on the West Bank.

126

Litvinoff, Boris. *WILL THERE BE A RUSSO-CHINESE WAR?* NATO's fifteen nations, v. 15, June/July 1970: 16-18. UA646.F5, v. 15

Discusses recent speculation by Harrison Salisbury and the two Soviet writers Andrei Amalrik and Serge Tikhvinski over the possibility of war between the Soviet Union and Communist China, and appends the author's own estimate of the situation. For the immediate future, the dispute between the two Communist giants will take the form of a war of attrition, waged largely with political weapons but punctuated from time to time by "hot wars" along the frontier. In 5 or 10 years, when the Chinese have achieved a rough equality in nuclear weaponry, the decisive confrontation could take place. Political changes on one side or the other might head off a military showdown, but this seems unlikely.

127

Maxwell, Neville. *CHINA AND INDIA: THE UN-NEGOTIATED DISPUTE*. China quarterly, no. 43, July/Sept. 1970: 47-80. illus. DS701.C472, 1970

Examines the issues in the Sino-Indian border dispute through a chronological presentation and analysis of diplomatic exchanges and official statements. The author attempts to demonstrate why the dispute remains unnegotiated. He concludes that "the Sino-Indian boundary question was not submitted to negotiation because the Indian Government decided in the early 1950s that to do so would not be in their country's interest; and because it held to that policy in spite of diplomatic deadlock and defeat at arms."

128

Maxwell, Neville. *THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE*. Swiss review of world affairs, v. 20, July 1970: 7-9. D839.S9, v. 20

The Communist Chinese are interested not in restoring China's imperial boundaries but in defining their boundaries on the basis of the status quo. Although many of China's neighbors have negotiated boundary settlements with Peking, India and the Soviet Union have refused, maintaining

that their boundaries with China are settled and that negotiations would be a facade for irredentism. When in 1962 India sought to press an improbable claim to the Aksai Chin territory by force, the Chinese responded by invading several Indian territories. In 1964 Sino-Soviet boundary negotiations broke down because of mutual hostility and distrust and "Moscow's refusal to submit the [boundary] question to comprehensive negotiations." Renewed negotiations have been deadlocked by Moscow's contention that China is seeking irredentist claims. The Kremlin's motive for misrepresenting Peking's policy lies in China's steady growth in power and the Soviet Union's unwillingness to accept a genuine third force in the international community. However, China is becoming just such a force, and "the question is whether the Russians will accept it, or try to break China's power while they still can."

129

Norodom Sihanouk Varman, *King of Cambodia*. *THE FUTURE OF CAMBODIA*. Foreign affairs, v. 49, Oct. 1970: 1-10. D410.F6, v. 49

"Neither Lon Nol nor President Nixon has left Cambodians any alternative to armed struggle and revolution" in their fight to regain their freedom, dignity, and independence. The Lon Nol group seized power by unconstitutional and undemocratic means and ruthlessly suppressed all opposition. The Phnom Penh-Saigon-Bangkok-Vientiane axis cannot win the support of the peoples of Southeast Asia, because it is basically an artificial creation of the United States imposed against their will. Communism may appear terrifying to rich bourgeois and feudalists, but to the masses of Asia it appears as a means of deliverance from social injustice and corruption. The Lon Nol coup d'état has forced Cambodian nationalists to make common cause with Cambodian, Laotian, and Vietnamese Communists, while the feudalists and militarists in Phnom Penh and Saigon have united in a "marriage of convenience." Increased U.S. armed intervention in Indochina will only make more difficult the establishment of genuinely neutralist governments following the war. China has every reason to respect Cambodian and Laotian neutrality, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has already demonstrated its independence of both China and the Soviet Union. Resistance to the Lon Nol regime cannot be crushed. "If they are clearly understood, the long-term interests of the United States ought to impel its government to respect this resistance instead of treating it as hostile."

130

OSTPOLITIK. In *Australia. Department of External Affairs*. Current notes on international affairs, v. 41, June 1970: 317-321. JX1162.A33, v. 41

Examines the events leading up to the Erfurt and Kassel meetings between representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. The policy of the Brandt regime in taking the initiative in establishing a dialog is sketched, and the main points made at Erfurt and Kassel are outlined. These talks are reportedly connected closely with West German talks with

28 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

Poland and the Soviet Union and the discussion in Berlin between the ambassadors of the four powers.

131

THE PALESTINE PROBLEM IN ITS VARIOUS DIMENSIONS.

Middle East forum, v. 46, no. 1, 1970: 27-60.

DS41.M45, v. 46

Addresses delivered at the World Conference of Christians for Palestine in Beirut, May 7-10, 1970.

Contents.--An introductory survey, by Constantine Zurayk.--In historical retrospect, by Bruhan Dajjani.--The humanitarian aspect, by George Dib.--Some social and economic facts, by George Corm.

Reports on the Palestine problem. The implications of the problem are summarized by Zurayk, and the major events and developments are emphasized in Dajjani's address. Dib presents evidence attesting to inhuman treatment and suffering in Palestine, while Corm exposes the social and economic exploitation behind Israel's religious and political idealism.

132

Peace, Power and Politics in Asia Conference Committee. PEACE, POWER, POLITICS IN ASIA; THE BACKGROUND. [Wellington, 1968] 79 p.

DS35.P42

Includes bibliographies.

Papers compiled as background for the Peace, Power and Politics in Asia Conference, Wellington, N.Z., March 30-April 2, 1968.

Contents.--Causes and character of guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare in South-east Asia, by William J. Pomeroy.--The course of the war, by Wilfred Burchett.--Vietnam: a crisis of indecision, by Robert Shaplen.--Waiting for Ho Chi Minh, by Adam Roberts.--The start of SEATO, by James A. Joyce.--United States involvement in Vietnam and the rule of law, by William L. Standard.--New Zealand and the international alliance net, by David McIntyre.--The political and moral isolation of America, by Gunnar Myrdal.--References on Vietnam.--Notes on contributors.

Analyses of the Vietnam War and its implications for Asian politics and world peace. Pomeroy recounts the history of post-World War II guerrilla movements in Indochina, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaya and assesses Western attempts to suppress these movements through military intervention. Burchett contends that the guerrilla strategy of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front has been vindicated by the Tet offensive. Shaplen dismisses the possibility of a military defeat of the Vietnamese Communists and suggests terms for a negotiated peace settlement. Roberts examines diplomatic exchanges between North Vietnam and the United States and finds the latter's proposals preclude the possibility of a negotiated end to the war. Joyce discusses the formation of SEATO in the context of the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina and concludes that SEATO is primarily aimed at the isolation and encirclement of China. Standard charges that U.S. intervention in the Vietnam War is a violation of both the U.S. Constitution and international law. McIntyre questions whether New Zealand's participation in such stern alliances as SEATO and ANZUS is the best

method for safeguarding New Zealand's interests, and Myrdal deplores the U.S. involvement in Vietnam and its tragic consequences for the basic ideals of Western civilization.

133

Peretz, Don. THE PALESTINE ARAB REFUGEE PROBLEM.

[Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp.] 1969. 74 p.

[Rand Corporation. Memorandum] RM-5973-FF)

Q180.A1R36 no. 5973

"Research program on economic and political problems and prospects of the Middle East, the Rand Corporation/Resources for the Future."

Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Introduction.--Origin of the problem.--Nature of the problem.--The changing refugee problem.--The political constant.--Consequences of the Six Day War.--Can the Arab refugee problem be solved.

No discernible progress has been made toward resolving the problem of Palestinian irredentism, probably the most volatile element in the present Near East crisis and almost certain to trigger renewed warfare. "While there is hope of resolving the economic problems of the Arab countries . . . there seems little possibility of resolving the dilemma created by intensification of Palestine Arab consciousness within the framework of existing Middle East relationships." Those peace plans that have attempted to reconcile Palestine Arab irredentism and Israel's existence have not gained the support of any government. U.S. and Soviet policies, however, can strongly influence the degree to which Near Eastern countries continue to oppose alternatives to the status quo. "Although the great powers cannot force the Arabs and the Israelis to make peace, they can do much to create an atmosphere in which the benefits of a peaceful solution to the Palestine and to the refugee problem become the wisest policy for governments in the area to follow."

134

Pledge, Robert. FRANCE AT WAR IN AFRICA. Africa report, v. 15, June 1970: 16-19.

DT1.A217, v. 15

The French forces employed in Chad claim that their technical and logistic superiority has decimated most of the large rebel groups. However, whether French intervention has been successful in the sense of preventing the complete disintegration of President Tombalbaye's army and administration cannot be determined with certainty. Relations between French forces and the Chadians are difficult, since neither side seems to possess the diplomatic skills necessary for an alliance. Because of its geography, Chad is considered strategically important for the maintenance of France's presence in Africa, and Paris thinks President Tombalbaye the best guarantor of this presence. The ultimate survival of the present regime in Chad, however, will depend on a reform of the administrative structure to recognize the rights of the Moslems of the north.

135

Radovanović, Ljubomir. THE BALKANS AND THE MEDITERRANEAN. Review of international affairs, v. 21, June 5, 1970: 18, 23-25.

D839.R4, v. 21

The factors historically dominating the development of the Balkans, such as the pressure of foreign powers or the Macedonian problem, have either disappeared or been greatly altered. However events today show again the inextricable connection of Balkan security with the events in the entire region surrounding the Balkan peninsula. Bloc alignments and the resulting creation of massive military systems have in effect returned the Balkans to their historic position of vulnerability to the exigencies of foreign diplomacy. The Balkan countries must be especially concerned with the issues capable of upsetting the balance in the Mediterranean, the most important of which is the Middle East crisis. The confrontation of the superpower naval forces in the Mediterranean gives justifiable cause for anxiety to all nations in the area. If bloc boundaries in the Balkans cannot be erased, "there is no unbridgeable obstacle to other bridges of understanding and mutual cooperation being built over them."

136

Ramsey, Russell W., comp. SOME KEYS TO THE VIETNAM PUZZLE. Gainesville, 1968. 55 p. (University of Florida Libraries. Dept. of Reference and Bibliography. Bibliographic series, no. 7) 23228.V5R3

An annotated bibliography of 174 books pertaining to Vietnam. Ramsey contends that much of the division within American society over the war lies in the lack of solid knowledge about Southeast Asia.

137

Reinhardt, G. Frederick. THE MIDDLE EAST OF THE 1970'S. Air University review, v. 21, May/June 1970: 41-50. TL501.A5574, v. 21
Adapted from the author's Sept. 30, 1969, speech in the Thomas D. White lecture series at the Air University.

Reviews political, military, and economic developments in the Near East during the last decade. The author concludes that the Soviet Union will continue to exploit opportunities for expanding its influence but will avoid a direct confrontation with the United States. In order to prevent escalation to a "general catastrophe," Moscow will agree to participate in efforts to contain the Arab-Israeli conflict. While the growth of the Soviet fleet has modified the balance of power in the Mediterranean, Soviet maritime force there remains far inferior to the Sixth Fleet in strength and firepower. The United States will continue to work for the settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute, while attempting to cultivate better relations with both conservative and radical Arabs. At the same time Washington should give renewed attention to Turkey and Iran, and consider augmenting its naval capabilities in the Persian Gulf. "Instability and strife and the confrontation of the super powers will continue to prevail in that part of the world for some time to come."

138

Sharabi, Hisham B. PALESTINE AND ISRAEL: THE LETHAL DILEMMA. New York, Pegasus [c1969] 224 p. illus. DS119.7.S458
Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents.--Preface.--America and the Arabs.--The course of U.S. policy.--The pattern of Arab policy.--The Arab-Israeli confrontation, May-June 1967.--Consequences of the 1967 war.--The problems of Jerusalem and the Suez Canal.--The problem of the Palestinian refugees.--Palestinian resistance.--The prospects for peace.--Index.

Treats U.S. policy in the Middle East since World War II, the decisionmaking processes in the Arab countries, and the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and its consequences. Sharabi focuses on four key problems that underlie the Middle East crisis: the status of Jerusalem, the Suez Canal, the Palestinian refugees, and the Palestinian resistance movements. He concludes that the prospects for peace are poor because of the irreconcilable claims of Zionists and Arabs.

139

Siewart, Regina, and Helmut Bildestein. [ALL-GERMAN CONTACTS; EXPERIENCE WITH PARTY AND GOVERNMENT DIALOGS] Gesamtdeutsche Kontakte; Erfahrungen mit Parteien- und Regierungsdialog. Opladen, C. W. Leske, 1969. 162 p. (Analysen, Bd. 1) DD259.4.S52
Veröffentlichung der Akademie für Wirtschaft und Politik, Hamburg.
Bibliography: p. 158-162.

Partial contents.--pt. 1. Analysis. Introduction: all-German contacts--opportunity or danger. Status of the German question, 1965/1966. Alternative conceptions for the intra-German relationship. The decision for the SED-SPD dialog, 1966. Reactions in the Federal Republic: the old road or a reorientation? Reactions in East Germany: new road or immobility? A Great Coalition with a new Ostpolitik?--pt. 2. Supplements and materials. Constitutional provisions and legal regulations. The exchange of correspondence. The German policy of the Great Coalition. International regulations. Basic positions: program points, sketches, and positions taken.--Chronology.

Describes the efforts made by the Socialist Unity Party of East Germany and the Social Democrats of West Germany to undertake a public dialog outside the conventional frame of intergovernmental communication. The exchange of speakers was followed by correspondence between Willi Stoph and Kiesinger and between the economic ministers of the two Germanys after the formation of the West German Great Coalition. The Czech intervention of August 1968 broke off this unofficial effort at reconciliation. The authors conclude that "the problems, conflicts, and necessities of decision, as they were first revealed in the project for the exchange of speakers, remain unaltered even under the changed conditions."

140

SOVIET-GERMAN TREATY--DANGEROUS PLOT AGAINST PEOPLE OF EUROPE AND THE WORLD. Peking review, v. 13, Sept. 18, 1970: 12-16.

DS701.P42, v. 13

August 22, 1970, editorial from the Albanian newspaper *Zeri i Popullit*.
Ser

Charges that Moscow capitulated on the German question at the expense of East Germany. Until

30 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

recently the Soviet Union had insisted on full recognition of the German Democratic Republic as a prerequisite to any agreement with Bonn. However "not a shadow of this promise has remained in the treaty," although the Soviets claim the agreement stipulates that both parties recognize the inviolability of the border between the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic. "All these open and backstage deals between Moscow and Bonn show that the G.D.R. has been thrown on to the market by the Soviet revisionists." Soviet claims that this is an important step toward European security are "sheer bluff and deception. . . . They mean their own security, the security of tranquility and their plans in Europe so as to concentrate their attention in Asia and other sectors to which aggressive plans are extended."

141

Tatu, Michel. EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE: IT MIGHT ACTUALLY TAKE PLACE. Atlantic Community quarterly, v. 8, fall 1970: 309-312.

DD839.A85, v. 8

Reprinted from the weekly English selection of Le Monde. Ser

The memorandum drawn up at the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers conference held in Budapest, June 21-22, 1970, contained three concessions with respect to the proposed European security conference: acceptance of U.S. and Canadian participation; an enlargement of the conference's agenda to include cultural relations as well as human environmental problems; and a proposal that foreign troop reductions be discussed by a special body designated by the conference. Although most European governments prefer a series of meetings to a single conference, such recent developments as the memorandum have restored some substance to the project. "Barring some new crisis, it is not impossible that a European conference will be convened next year."

142

Wilpert, Friedrich von. THE ODER-NEISSE PROBLEM. TOWARDS FAIR PLAY IN CENTRAL EUROPE. 2nd, rev.

ed. [Bonn, New York, Edition Atlantic-Forum, 1969.] 166 p. illus.

DD801.035W47 1969

Translation of Das Oder-Neisse-Problem. Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents.--Foreword.--Introduction.--The problem.--Why there is no "status quo."--Polish-German relations through the centuries.--Poland and Germany in our time.--How the Oder-Neisse line came to be.--The Oder-Neisse problem since 1945.--Polish misgivings.--Why all Germans agree.--Bases for solving the problem.--An issue that concerns the world.--Appendix: "Charter of the German Expellees."

Reviews the problems generated by the establishment of the Oder-Neisse border between Germany and Poland. Wilpert sketches the history of German-Polish relations before and after 1945 and depicts the injustices committed against Germans expelled from territories east of the Oder-Neisse line. He contends that these problems can be settled only on the basis of negotiations between a reunified Germany and an independent Poland.

143

Windsor, Philip. GERMAN REUNIFICATION. London, Elek, 1969. 140 p. (International relations series) DD257.25.W496

Contents.--The nature of the German problem.--The process of division.--The consolidation of the Federal Republic.--Stalinist policy and East Germany.--The dialectics of the German question.--The new meaning of reunification.--The attempt at immobilism.

Gives a history of "the German problem" since World War II. Windsor emphasizes the need for viewing the problems engendered by Germany's division in a historical context that brings to light the interaction of various competing interests, both national and international. He argues that "some form of reunification must be brought about if the inextricable connection between the division of Europe and the division of Germany is to be broken."

II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

MODERN WAR

144

Carroll, Berenice A. HOW WARS END: AN ANALYSIS OF SOME CURRENT HYPOTHESES. *Journal of peace research*, no. 4, 1969: 295-321.

AS9.J6, 1969

"Part of a larger comparative study of wars ending since 1775."

Includes summaries in English and Russian.

An analysis of the problem of war termination is presented in this article. A number of hypotheses put forward to date are examined, including both descriptive and analytical hypotheses, concerning the form of war endings, the duration of warfare, and the processes which play a part in bringing hostilities to an end. Suggestions are offered concerning classification of wars, classification of war endings, and relationships between the two. Among the descriptive hypotheses considered is the widespread notion that "most wars end in peace treaties," which appears to be true of large-scale international wars in the twentieth century, but not true of colonial, civil and revolutionary struggles. A number of hypotheses concerning "termination points" in warfare are examined, including Klingberg's military indices (battle casualties and population losses, size of armies, etc.); Coser's "markers" (capture of a capital city or charismatic leader, reaching of a boundary, etc.); and Galtung's views on termination points. Analytical hypotheses, on how hostilities are brought to an end, are seen to be influenced by at least one of four underlying assumptions: (1) that wars end in "victory" or "defeat"; (2) that war termination is a matter of rational calculation by the adversaries; (3) that war endings are determined by laws of history or of mass behavior, to which both of the preceding are more or less irrelevant; (4) that war endings are determined by past events and present conditions, with little regard for perceptions of the future. In discussing hypotheses influenced by the first assumption, such as Calahan's assertion that "war is pressed by the victor, but peace is made by the vanquished," a classification of conceptions of "victory" and "winning" is offered. Under hypotheses of rational calculation, we examine particularly Porsholt's conflict formula and Wright's escalation formula, and their application and modification in the context of war termination. Deterministic hypotheses and the influence of past-mindedness (vs. perceptions of the future) are touched upon but not examined. In conclusion, an effort is made to construct a war-termination formula for heuristic purposes. A set of nine variables influencing war termination is proposed, and some relationships between the variables, and ways of describing them mathematically, are briefly discussed. The need for further historical research on war endings is emphasized. (Abstract supplied, modified)

145

Dupuy, Richard Ernest, and Trevor N. Dupuy. THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MILITARY HISTORY: FROM 3500 B.C. TO THE PRESENT. New York, Evanston, Harper & Row [1970] 1406 p. D25.A2D8

History of wars and military affairs. Each of the 21 chapters deals with a particular period and includes an essay describing the military trends, leaders, and weapons, with separate sections discussing the military affairs of different countries and regions. There is a general index, an index of wars, and an index of battles and sieges. The authors sketch the first attempts by the Church, during the 10th century, to control war and describe control efforts that took place between the world wars and during the cold war.

146

Falk, Conrad. [GUERRILLA PSYCHOLOGY] Psychologie der Guerillas. *Allgemeine schweizerische militärzeitschrift*, v. 136, July 1970: 506-511.

U3.A43, v. 136

Bibliography: p. 511-512.

Outlines general criteria and characteristics of guerrilla warfare, pointing out the importance of ideology and propaganda as a means of strengthening the morale of the guerrillas. The author touches on terrorism, population, and cities. He describes the development of guerrilla activities and points to the psychopathology resulting from the impermanence of guerrilla movements. He analyzes the dangers resulting from the underestimation of guerrilla units by conventional troops. The guerrilla problem has its own characteristics in every region, and only very basic similarities exist. An understanding of guerrilla warfare is essential to the comprehension of modern war. Even in this time of sophisticated computer-calculated military planning the quotation from Thucydides holds true: "In human relations right will only come into play when the distribution of powers is even; but the stronger party will do everything possible to prevail, and the weaker party will submit."

147

Haas, Michael. THREE APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF WAR. *International journal of comparative sociology*, v. 11, Mar. 1970: 34-47.

HML.I54, v. 11

Three theories of the causes of war have dominated recent empirical research. One focuses on the psychology of decisionmaking elites, attributing international conflict to psychodynamic tensions and motivations. Research into the origins of World War I and the Cuban missile crisis lend support to this theory, but whether these constitute special cases is yet to be determined. A

32 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

second approach, which begins with the Marxist hypothesis that socioeconomic status determines political attitudes, attributes international conflicts to domestic strife. The aggregate statistical data offered as evidence for this view are very impressive, and the theory promises to be a useful one; nevertheless, the data are incomplete, and deviant cases still must be accounted for. A third theory points to structural and aggregate aspects of state systems and subsystems as the major cause of war. This approach shows great promise but must be pushed beyond the present stage of insight to systematic empirical testing. The ultimate challenge, of course, is to expose the dynamic of conflict, whether it be psychological, societal, or systemic, and, having exposed it, control it. Each approach has its own prescriptions, but one may generalize: education promotes rationality and the capacity of individuals to adjust to their environment. One such adjustment could be the avoidance of war. This underlines the need for further research into these complex mechanisms of international violence.

148

Hezlet, Sir Arthur R. AIRCRAFT AND SEA POWER. New York, Stein and Day [1970] 370 p. illus. VC90.H48 1970b

Bibliography: p. [353]-355.

Contents.--Preface.--The birth of naval aviation.--Aircraft at sea in the early part of the Great War, 1914-15.--Aircraft in the North Sea and with the fleets, 1914-18.--Aircraft in the defeat of the U-boats and in the narrow seas, 1914-18.--The period between the wars, 1919-1939.--The Second World War: Norway to Crete, 1939-41.--Aircraft in the attack and defense of trade, 1940-41.--Japanese naval air power in the Pacific, 1941-42.--Air power over the sea in European waters, January-July, 1942.--The great carrier battles of the Pacific in 1942.--Aircraft at sea in European waters, August, 1942-45.--The victory of naval air power in the Pacific, 1944-45.--Air power over the sea since the Second World War, 1945-69.--The future of aircraft at sea.--Notes.--Index.

A history of naval aviation and an evaluation of its role in seapower. Hezlet foresees an important role for aircraft in maintaining control of the seas but believes that land-based aircraft will probably replace carrier-based aircraft as the best means of achieving this goal.

149

Ritter von Schramm, Wilhelm. [STEPS TOWARD PEACE IN VIETNAM; THE CLASSIC PHILOSOPHY OF WAR AS DIRECTIVE FOR THE PRESENT] Friedensschritte für Vietnam; die klassische Kriegsphilosophie als aktuelle Direktive. Wehrkunde, v. 19, May 1970: 225-230. U3.W396, v. 19

Clausewitz, the classic philosopher of war, formulated principles that are applicable to the resolution of the Vietnam problem. He anticipated situations in which considerations of political policy force a "descent" into a state of hostility, characterized by a subsidence of actual contact while the antagonists remain a potential threat to each other. An American strategy in Vietnam derived from Clausewitzian principles

would emphasize concentration in secure bases, economy of forces to secure maximum effect, and pacification of important areas. The "perimeter defense concept" advanced by General Gavin is in complete accord with Clausewitz's precept that once the defensive position is impregnable the battle must be abandoned and the enemy compelled to seek a decision in another way. Clausewitz also foresaw that in situations like that in Vietnam peace comes only when the enemy realizes the improbability or excessive price of success.

150

Sass, Hubertus. [ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF POLITICS AND THE CONDUCT OF WAR--CLAUSEWITZ'S TOTALITY THINKING] Über das Verhältnis von Politik und Kriegführung-ganzheitliches Denken bei Clausewitz. Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, v. 20, June 1970: 309-321. U3.W485, v. 20

Originally presented at the Staff Academy of the Bundeswehr during the military-scientific seminar "Military Leadership Thought in the 19th and Early 20th Centuries--Before, During, and After Clausewitz."

War must be considered not as an isolated phenomenon but as part of a larger political totality. The nature of each war is determined by the ends policymakers pursue and the means necessary to attain them. The politicians must learn the essentials of the conduct of war and the effects of the political goal on it. A war engaged in half-heartedly, in which the enemy turns out to be stronger than expected, is likely to continue indefinitely without achieving its political goal. Changes in military science resulting from changes in politics clearly demonstrate that war is inextricably connected with politics. Clausewitz further pointed out that a war fought on behalf of an ally is rarely more than a business deal unless one's own existence is threatened. The weakness of alliances is that they entail commitments to war and peace when in fact the commitment must be made to peace. Clausewitz offered no panacea for the future.

151

Small, Melvin, and J. David Singer. PATTERNS IN INTERNATIONAL WARFARE, 1816-1965. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. Collective violence. Philadelphia, 1970. (Its Annals, v. 391, Sept. 1970) p. 145-155. H1.A4, v. 391

Patterns in international violence are discovered through the quantitative analysis of international wars which resulted in more than 1,000 battle-connected deaths. Between 1816 and 1965, members of the state system participated in 50 such interstate wars and 43 such colonial and imperial conflicts. Although no secular trends are evident in terms of the frequency, magnitude, severity, and intensity of these wars, the data suggest a twenty-year cycle in the magnitude of systemic war. Over two thirds of all of the wars began in either the spring or the autumn. Major powers have engaged in a disproportionate number of wars and have suffered the most battle-connected deaths. These same powers, however, have won most of their wars. Those on the victorious side have often been the initiators of military hostilities.

Enduring military friendships and enmities have been uncommon over the 150-year period. Further use of these basic war data should be helpful in the assault upon the centuries-old problem of the causes of war. (Abstract supplied)

152

Thompson, Sir Robert G. K. *REVOLUTIONARY WAR IN WORLD STRATEGY 1945-1969*. New York, Taplinger Pub. Co. [1970] 171 p.

HX518.S8t48

Contents.--Author's note.--Foreword.--Revolutionary war.--Russian foreign policy.--The cold war.--China and South East Asia.--From co-existence to the Sino-Soviet dispute.--Africa and Latin America.--Vietnam.--No more Vietnams.--Index.

Contents that the Soviet Union and Communist China have used revolutionary war to reinforce the defense of the Communist bloc and in pursuit of their ultimate goal of world domination. Thompson sees Vietnam as a test case in which the effectiveness of revolutionary war as an instrument of Communist policy will be decided; he urges Western European support for the present long-term, low-cost counterrevolutionary strategy of the United States.

153

Wasserstrom, Richard A., comp. *WAR AND MORALITY*. Belmont, Calif., Wadsworth [1970] 136 p. (Basic problems in philosophy series)
U22.W37

Contents.--Introduction.--The moral equivalent of war, by William James.--The morality of obliteration bombing, by John C. Ford.--War and murder, by Elizabeth Anscombe.--Moral judgment in time of war, by Michael Walzer.--Pacifism: a philosophical analysis, by Jan Narveson.--On the morality of war: a preliminary inquiry, by Richard Wasserstrom.--Judgment and opinion, by the International Tribunal, Nuremberg, Germany.--Superior orders, nuclear warfare, and the dictates of conscience, by Guenter Lewy.--Selected bibliography.

Essays on the morality of war and specific techniques of modern warfare. James, in his famous essay, argues that human nature as currently constituted requires a constructive alternative to war as a means of promoting those virtues now realized primarily through war. Ford contends that the deliberate bombing of civilian population centers is contrary to natural law. Anscombe distinguishes between the moral and immoral uses of violence, Walzer emphasizes the need to recognize different degrees of brutality in a given war, and Narveson finds the basic tenets of pacifism to be contradictory and untenable. Wasserstrom examines some of the criteria by which war is judged to be moral or not, while Lewy questions the morality and legality of the use of nuclear weapons.

154

Yale, Wesley W., Isaac D. White, and Hasso E. von Manteuffel. *ALTERNATIVE TO ARMAGEDDON; THE PEACE POTENTIAL OF LIGHTNING WAR*. New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers University Press [c1970] xvii, 257 p. illus.
U167.5.L5Y34

Contents.--Foreword.--Preface.--A new deterrent.--Characteristics, research objectives.--From antiquity to Napoleon.--Selection of masters: criteria.--The nineteenth century.--The birth of modern blitzkrieg.--World War II: personalities and engagements.--The blitz failure in the Ardennes.--The Sinai campaigns.--Functions of the mobile staff.--The combat environment: fancy and fact.--Automation of the command function via the military-industrial complex.--The air age: the airborne concept.--The air age: the airborne concept.--The confrontation deterrent.--Attainment of the blitz capability.--Index.

Contents that blitzkrieg offers a more effective alternative to nuclear war than does limited war of the type being waged in Vietnam. The authors sketch the history of lightning war, focusing on the leadership abilities essential to its successful implementation.

MODERN WEAPONRY AND RELATED TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS

155

CANTISUBMARINE WARFAREJ. Navy, v. 13, July/Aug. 1970: 16-32. VA49.N28, v. 13

Contents.--ASW cutbacks come at a crucial time, by Larry L. Booda.--Need for air ASW never greater, by John G. Norris.--USS Spruance promises to revitalize destroyer fleet, by W. J. O'Neill.--Soviets put high priority on sub-killer submarines.

Articles on recent developments in the U.S. antisubmarine warfare (ASW) program. The articles decry U.S. neglect of its ASW capability at a time when the Soviet submarine threat is growing by leaps and bounds. Booda compares Soviet and American submarine forces and describes U.S. research and development in sensors and in air and surface craft design and oceanography. Norris discusses the use of airpower in ASW and O'Neill, new developments in destroyer design and construction. The last article compares Soviet and American programs for the production of attack, or killer, submarines, a key element in ASW.

156

Barthel, Friedrich. [WEAPONS SYSTEMS ON SOVIET SURFACE WARSHIPS] *Waffensysteme auf sowjetischen Überwasser-Kriegsschiffen*. Soldat und Technik, v. 13, April 1970: 196-200. illus.
U3.S58, v. 13

Speculates on the electronic systems of Soviet surface warships. Figure 1 models the entire weapon-ship system; its subordinate weapons, weapons control, and weapons guidance systems are modeled in succeeding figures. Similar schematics are constructed for the weapons systems of the Kresta, Kashin, and Krupny guided-missile destroyers, the Miraka frigate, the OSA missile boat, and the helicopter carrier Moskva. Possible fire angles and connections between weapons and weapon-control systems are indicated.

34 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

157

Bex, John E. US DEVELOPMENT OF OPTIMAL DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 50, Aug. 1970: 70-74. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 50

In the Soviet Union one positive factor in the development of science and technology is the respect accorded science as part of culture and ideology. However, Marxist ideology "contains anti-scientific components in the form of doctrinaire beliefs and obligatory tenets." The one-party political system hinders free creative development, and the lower standard of living "produces in intellectuals a psychological reaction to anything which might tend to misidentify them with the manual laborer." Americans, on the other hand, have an abundance of mechanical devices available from childhood on, and they can afford materials and equipment to pursue hobbies or ideas. The greatest potential threat to the development of science and technology in the United States is the existence of anti-intellectual trends in American cultural and political life. The continued exploitation of scientific breakthroughs will eventually increase national security and give America the opportunity to apply scientific techniques to the study and resolution of social and international problems.

158

BOONDOGGLE OR BARGAINING CHIP? by our Washington correspondent. Nature (London) v. 227, Aug. 22, 1970: 770-772. Q1.N2, v. 227

The Senate once again has allowed deployment of the Safeguard system to proceed as planned. The issue this time was not so much whether the system would work as whether it would be needed as a bargaining chip in the strategic arms limitation talks. Defenders of Safeguard point to recent additions to the Soviet strategic arsenal, particularly the SS-9 and multiple warheads, as evidence that the need for the system is greater than ever; its opponents argue that an ABM system cannot possibly be effective against this new technology, that the Soviet Union knows this, and that consequently its value as a bargaining counter is close to zero. Given the complexity of the issues, one might be tempted to go along with the military experts, except that these experts seem unable to make up their own minds on exactly what the system is for and how it is supposed to work. The growing disenchantment in the scientific community is not very encouraging either. Much of this skepticism arises over the disquieting findings of the O'Neill report, which recommended that the Safeguard system be replaced with a cheaper one using smaller radars and requiring less complex data-processing capabilities. Similar thinking within the Pentagon itself is reflected in the Army's Project Hardsite. Will either Safeguard or Hardsite be built? Proponents of the system argue that the Soviet Union will be willing to trade away its SS-9 for the U.S. ABM; this has been proposed by the United States at the strategic arms limitation talks. But whatever happens, the administration stands to gain politically: it can claim credit either for the economies that will ensue if the system is scrapped in a tradeoff or for making an important contribution to the na-

tional defense if no bargain is struck and the system is retained.

159

THE CARRIER CONTROVERSY IN BRITAIN, by our London defense correspondent. International defense review, v. 3, June 1970: 208-210. illus.
Ser

Examines the controversy over the British decision to phase out the Royal Navy's carrier force sometime in 1972. The Labor Party opposes keeping the carriers beyond that date; the Conservatives and the three armed services would like to see a two-carrier force preserved into the 1980's. The major use of the carriers would be to deal with brushfire wars in the Indian Ocean area and Southeast Asia. The Harrier, a vertical or short-take off and landing aircraft, opens some interesting, and still unexplored, possibilities for naval aviation.

160

ENGINEERING WITH NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES. Nuclear engineering, v. 15, Apr. 1970: 353-355. TK9001.N75, v. 15

Reports on the activities of an international symposium on engineering with nuclear explosives that met at Las Vegas, Nev., Jan. 14-16, 1970, under the sponsorship of the American Nuclear Society in cooperation with the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Papers were offered on a wide variety of topics relating to the politics, ecology, economics, and technology of nuclear explosives engineering. It would appear from a general survey of the papers that "it has been adequately demonstrated that nuclear explosives can be used to produce large excavations and substantial underground caverns but more development work is necessary to establish whether the problems of contamination can be overcome and whether the costs can be reduced to levels which make the various applications economic."

161

Foster, John S. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OF THE FUTURE AND THEIR IMPACT ON STRATEGY. Naval War College review, v. 23, Sept. 1970: 17-22.
Ser

"A lecture delivered at the Naval War College."

Discusses the interaction between U.S. defense research and development (R&D) and national strategy; outlines U.S. R&D goals, current programs, and improved program-management policies; and assesses trends and prospects. Foster, U.S. Director of Defense Research and Engineering, asserts that the U.S. R&D base is adequate now, but he expresses alarm about Soviet technological capabilities in 10 or 20 years. If present trends continue, the Soviet Union will soon be spending more on R&D than the United States. Even if the Soviet threat levels off, the United States will have to restructure its strategic forces to ensure their survivability.

162

IDEAS FOR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS IN USSR. In International Atomic Energy Agency. Bulletin, v. 12, no. 2, 1970: 11-21. QC770.I4955, v. 12

Based on a paper submitted by the Soviet Union to the International Atomic Energy Agency for circulation among its members.

A survey of Soviet efforts to develop peaceful applications for nuclear explosives. Soviet research has concentrated on the use of contained explosions rather than excavation blasts "due to the fact that the Soviet Union adheres strictly to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water." Applications discussed include reservoir and canal construction, mining, intensified exploitation of oil and gas deposits, and underground storage-cavity formation. Other applications mentioned are the construction of railway and highway cuts, the control of overburden pressures in oil and gas deposits, and the formation of storage cavities for biologically harmful industrial wastes.

163

Kaye, G. D., and G. R. Lindsey. MIRVS AND THE STRATEGIC BALANCE. *Nature* (London) v. 227, Aug. 15, 1970: 696-697. Q1.N2, v. 227

Criticizes some features of a mathematical model proposed by Ian Bellamy (see item 1833 in v. 6, no. 4, of this bibliography) for analyzing asymmetries introduced into the strategic balance by the deployment of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV). The authors take exception to Bellamy's assumption that *n* MIRVs would be as effective in retaliation against cities as *n* single-warhead missiles. They also question his contention that for practical purposes the parameters characterizing the strategic capabilities of the two superpowers may be treated as identical, offer an alternative model that dispenses with that assumption, and by means of graphic displays generated with the model illustrate the strategic implications of various combinations of MIRV and ABM deployment. The diagrams, besides indicating that MIRV deployment would be destabilizing in most circumstances, suggest some of the difficulties that would be encountered in maintaining strategic stability in the course of an arms-reduction program.

164

Labohm, H. J. [COOPERATION ON ARMAMENTS WITHIN NATO AND THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP] Die Rüstungszusammenarbeit innerhalb der NATO und die technologische Lücke. *Wehrkunde*, v. 19, Aug. 1970: 400-403. U3.W396, v. 19

The disparity between the financial and industrial capabilities of the United States and those of its European partners in NATO explains the contrast in the levels of technological competence. While the requirements of the European nations do differ, these differences are not significant enough to justify the duplications of effort that make European military expenditures relatively less productive than the American. In addition to the technological lag, Europe is handicapped by important managerial inadequacies. The Italian Fanfani plan, originally advanced to bridge these gaps, has become only a way of improving liaison between the military and industry. The proposals for a "Euro" group within the NATO framework, advanced in 1969 by British Defense Minister Healey,

are still waiting for implementation. European nationalism is clearly still too strong for acceptance of the complete integration of defense and armament. In contrast to a NATO-wide arrangement, a solution oriented toward Europe, which would be fitted into the NATO context, is the "least unattractive of all possible solutions."

165

LaFrenz, Robert L. PROJECT PRE-GONDOLA; EXPLOSIVE CRATERING IN CLAY SHALE. Military engineer, v. 62, May/June 1970: 149-153. TAL.P85, v. 62

Reports on the results of a series of chemical-explosive cratering tests conducted between 1966 and 1969 by the Army Engineer Nuclear Cratering Group near Fort Peck, Montana. The aim of the tests, which simulated nuclear cratering, was "to establish the cratering characteristics of weak and saturated shale, to acquire row-charge cratering experience, and to demonstrate the feasibility of connecting a row crater to a body of water."

166

Leary, Frank. ULMS: STRATEGIC EMPHASIS SHIFTS SEAWARD. *Space/aeronautics*, v. 53, June 1970: 24-33. illus. TL501.A8187, v. 53

A detailed description of the capabilities and design of the proposed Undersea Long-Range Missile System (ULMS). The acceptance of the ULMS concept and the elevation of Adm. Thomas H. Moorer to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff could signal the approaching ascendancy of maritime concepts in national strategy. During the past decade, the fleet ballistic missile systems greatly enhanced the credibility and stability of the strategic deterrent; consequently, an increasing number of congressional and Government leaders would like to deploy a greater part of the strategic nuclear force at sea. Although the Polaris/Poseidon fleet could be vulnerable to improved Soviet antisubmarine warfare capabilities in 5 to 7 years, the Navy predicts that ULMS, which could be operational by the late 1970's, would withstand a counterforce attack. At the White House and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, ULMS is deemed vital. If the strategic arms limitation talks fail, ULMS will provide "a credible deterrent for the late 1970's and beyond." Even in "a strategic environment constrained by arms limitations, it may carry the major burden of deterrence."

167

Maeder, H. AIRMOBILE FORCES IN EUROPE. *International defense review*, v. 3, June 1970: 160-161. Ser

Argues that given adequate air support and appropriate tactics, air-mobile forces of the type perfected by the United States in Vietnam can be employed effectively in Central Europe. Air-mobile forces would reduce the reaction time of the defense, increase its mobility and dispersal capability, and enhance its general effectiveness in all types of combat except local defense.

36 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

168

Marey, Georges. [ROYAL NAVY AND ROYAL AIR FORCE] Royal Navy-Royal Air Force. Revue militaire générale; general military review, no. 5, May 1970: 705-718. U2.R48, 1970
Includes summaries in English and German.

Outlines the strength of Great Britain's naval and air forces in terms of weaponry. Several types of vessels and aircraft are listed, and their organization and disposition given. Marey concludes that austere financial measures have repeatedly kept the Air Force from buying excellent modern aircraft.

169

MIRV'S AND THE STRATEGIC BALANCE. Nature (London) v. 228, Oct. 3, 1970: 53-54.
Q1.N2, v. 228

Contents.--A letter, by L. Sartori.--A reply, by Ian Bellamy.

A letter disputing Ian Bellamy's claim [see item 1566, v. 6, no. 4, of this bibliography] that the deployment of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV'S) could increase the stability of the strategic nuclear balance, together with a reply from Bellamy. Sartori challenges Bellamy's assumption that the number of warheads expected to survive a first strike is a good measure of stability. He also criticizes Bellamy for not maximizing this value with respect to the total number of launchers, as he does with respect to the number of warheads per missile, and for failing to anticipate recent improvements in warhead accuracy, which could enable both sides to achieve first-strike capabilities with MIRV.

170

Oldfield, Barney. EARTH ORBIT: PEACEFUL OR LETHAL? NATO's fifteen nations, v. 15, June/July 1970: 24-29. UA646.D5, v. 15

Discusses the military implications of U.S. and Soviet satellite technology. Oldfield speculates that the Soviet Cosmos series of earth satellites has included tests of an "interceptor-inspector-destroyer" satellite for use against other spacecraft. The United States, by contrast, has cancelled its Manned Orbiting Laboratory, the purpose of which was to test military space applications.

171

Raven, Wolfram von. [THE TWO FACES OF THE MOON: STRATEGY IN SPACE] Die zwei Gesichter des Mondes. Strategie im Weltraum. [Salzburg, SN-Verlag, Salzburger Nachrichten, 1969] 156 p. illus. (Politik konkret) UG630.R37
"Quellenhinweise und Bemerkungen": p. 141-150.

Contents.--Preliminary notice.--The vision of Archimedes.--The great horror.--Applied anxiety.--Deterrence without terror.--Peace through reason? --The road to confrontation.--The disturbed equilibrium.--Is the count correct?--The Soviet sword of Damocles.--Rockets from the moon?--Sources and notes.--List of persons.--Index.

Sketches the reciprocal influences of national policy and space technology, emphasizing the mili-

tary implications of rocket and missile flight. While political goals and doctrines are tied in with military possibilities and potentialities, emphasis is placed on the evolution of the nuclear missile and the concomitant politico-military environment. Von Raven asserts that today national policy depends on technology, which almost always decides the course of action. Modern history is being made not by men but by machines which men have made and which dominate the relations between nations.

172

Seaborg, Glenn T., and Justin L. Bloom. FAST BREEDER REACTORS. Scientific American, v. 223, Nov. 1970: 13-21. illus.

TL.S5, v. 223

Describes the breeder-reactor concept as well as the design and major characteristics of various types of fast-breeder systems, and briefly summarizes the status of operational or planned fast-breeder reactors in the United States, the Soviet Union, Western Europe, and Japan. Since fast-breeder reactors produce more nuclear fuel than they consume, their ability to use large quantities of low-grade uranium and thorium ores as a source of low-cost electrical energy possesses vast economic potential. Thus the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, the nuclear industry, and public utilities are engaging in a vigorous development program in order to have a breeder-reactor generating commercial electric power by 1984. The authors conclude that "breeders will result in a transition to the massive use of nuclear energy in a new economic and technological framework."

173

[SOVIET GUNBOATS IN VIENNA] Sowjetkanonenboote in Wien. Soldat und Technik, v. 13, Sept. 1970: 508-509. illus. U3.S58, v. 13

Relates the recent visit to Vienna of four units of the Soviet Danube flotilla, the strongest of all Warsaw Pact river forces on the Danube, during which a river gunboat was revealed. Photographs and a graph illustrate the characteristics and capabilities of this armored cutter.

174

Swanborough, Gordon. ANGLO-GERMAN COLLABORATION IN AEROSPACE. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 15, Aug./Sept. 1970: 54-60. illus.

UA646.F5, v. 15

Discusses recent examples of cooperation between Great Britain and West Germany in the design and production of military and civilian aircraft and aircraft engines. The most important to date are those involving engines for vertical takeoff and landing aircraft, the MRCA-75 or Panavia 200 project, and the A-300B airbus. The ability of the two countries to cooperate at both private commercial and government levels has now been proven, and fruitful collaboration can be expected to continue.

175

TACTICAL WARFARE. Space/aeronautics, v. 53, Jan. 1970: 71-79. illus.

TL501.A8187, v. 53

A detailed examination of U.S. tactical weapons projects. Current trends in military procurement suggest that the United States will deemphasize close air support and tactical bombing in the 1970's and will instead concentrate on air superiority, antisubmarine warfare, and fleet air defense. "The U.S. is washing its hands of wars of liberation and instead preparing for cat-and-mouse confrontations with the Soviets on the periphery of strategic conflict."

176

Taubinger, L. M. von. [CHINA'S NUCLEAR ARMS.] Die nukleare Rüstung Chinas. Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift, v. 136, Sept. 1970: 630, 633-634. U3.A43, v. 136

Reviews the historical development of China's nuclear weapons program. During the first phase, 1949-1959, China cooperated closely with the Soviet Union, acquiring vast knowledge from the Russians. The break with the Soviet Union occurred in 1960; since then, the Chinese have been working independently and successfully. (The cultural revolution had little effect on nuclear research.) The Army has complete control over nuclear and missile research, and recent emphasis on the latter indicates that Peking wants not bombs but guided missiles. The author analyzes China's present and future nuclear capabilities and concludes that after the launching of its first satellite China might shift emphasis from ICBM's to space and undertake nuclear-warhead tests there. Such a step would alter the world military situation.

177

Terzibaschitsch, Stefan. [SABMIS--A NEW WEAPONS SYSTEM] SABMIS--ein neues Waffensystem. Atlantische Welt, v. 10, June 1970: 4-5. U3.A8, v. 10

Takes a look at the U.S. Navy sea-based antiballistic missile intercept system (SABMIS) now under study and suggests the possible dimensions, speeds, protective armament, electric equipment, and organization of SABMIS and its potential advantages over Safeguard.

178

TUNE WITHOUT A PIPER, by our Washington correspondent. Nature (London) v. 227, July 11, 1970: 113-116. Q1.N2, v. 227

It has become quite clear that the United States has no policy governing science and technology. Decisions are reached in a tug-of-war between competing Federal agencies or "by the necessarily wayward arguments of Congress." The administration's current confusion is manifest in its foolish attempt to abolish graduate traineeships and its bungled effort to mitigate the impact of the Mansfield Amendment. Although the latter legislation did not express hostility to basic research as such, it did indicate Congressional impatience with the notion that "pure research should be a kind of by-product of military defense." Where is the much-needed leadership in science to be found? Past failures have undermined the reputation of the Office of Science and Technology; and neither

the National Academy of Sciences nor the Congress is equipped to provide the needed guidance. The National Science Foundation (NSF) shows some promise but lacks the organizational strength and self-confidence essential to strong leadership. The problem is that "the bureaucracy is not so much malevolent as weak and even dull." Responsibility for basic research ought to be vested in an organization like the NSF, but one managed "with the skill and flair of an agency which knows where it is going."

179

Vendryes, Georges A. SURVEY OF FRENCH FAST REACTOR PROGRAM. Nuclear news, v. 13, Aug. 1970: 51-55. illus. QC770.N75, v. 13

Substance of remarks made at a session of the 16th Annual Meeting of the American Nuclear Society.

Surveys results of French work on the design, construction, and operation of fast-breeder reactors. Since natural uranium reserves are sufficient to meet requirements of the power industry for some years to come, there is no urgent need for these reactors. Nevertheless, French experience indicates that the fast breeder can be made economically competitive in the near future, and they will probably be operating on a large scale by the early 1980's.

180

Williams, Ralph E. AFTER VIETNAM. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 96, Apr. 1970: 19-25. V1.U8, v. 96

The proposal for the Safeguard ABM system bears ominous similarities to the disastrous policies pursued by the United States in the Vietnam War. Just as the doctrine of gradualism prevented any decisive action in the Vietnam War despite a massive commitment of men and materiel, the thin Safeguard system may gradually expand in the face of growing Soviet and Chinese threats without increasing U.S. security. The decision to halt the bombing of North Vietnam and fight the war solely on the territory of an ally is similar to the decision to build an ABM system on the territory of the United States and thus invite widespread destruction even if the system works. U.S. land-based missile systems are superfluous for an assured second-strike capability and may have been the impetus for the rapid increase in Soviet missile strength. A thin ABM system is inadequate to deter a Soviet attack and probably unnecessary to deter the Chinese, and the added protection of an expanded ABM system can always be offset by an increase in enemy offensive forces. "The valid criticism of such attempts to defend our population and our land-based missile systems is therefore not that they are provocative and dangerous, as some maintain, but simply that they are costly and fruitless, and in the end, self defeating." The logical alternative to this futile race between offensive and defensive missile systems is to rely entirely on a sea-based strategic striking force and to construct a seaborne ABM system (SABMIS), both of which would be more reliable than land-based systems and would remove the potential conflict from U.S. territory. A thin

Safeguard system might then be justified to compensate for the relatively insignificant limitations of SABMIS.

DEFENSE POLICIES AND MILITARY STRATEGIES OF NATIONS AND ALLIANCES

181

Alsop, Joseph. *READING SOVIET INTENTIONS*. New republic, v. 163, Oct. 3, 1970: 17-19.

AP2.N624, v. 163

Assesses the Soviet military buildup on the Sino-Soviet frontier and in the Near East and concludes that the Soviet Union is preparing for nuclear war in both situations. If the Soviet Union attacks China, a surgical nuclear strike would be launched to destroy the Chinese nuclear capability. Soviet nuclear-ballistic missile units recently have been deployed along the border in the exact positions required for such a strike. Since the Soviet Union is also planning a serious attack on Israel, it can be assumed they are preparing for a nuclear war in that theater as well, for they must certainly realize that there is a very high probability that Israel possesses nuclear weapons. Alsop's view, "especially since Czechoslovakia's invasion, is to assume that preparations reveal intentions. . . . May not the mere preparations I have described imply a drastic mutation in Soviet policy? . . . In the facts I have set forth, there is certainly a strong smell of long-range military planning, rather than normal civilian policy-making."

182

American Surveys (Firm). *U.S. SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA; REPORT FOR THE "AMERICANS FOR PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH" GROUP*. Washington, 1970. 30 p.

UA23.A663

Cover title.

Contents.--The project team.--Introduction.--Threat and response: Summary. The importance of the Mediterranean area. Analyses of threats to U.S. interests in the Mediterranean. Statements of concern by key officials and journalists. Summary and evaluation of findings of recent research. The state of research and public information. U.S. governmental policies in the Mediterranean.--Project conclusions.

Analyzes U.S. interests and policy in the Mediterranean area in light of the buildup of Soviet power and influence there. The report includes an evaluation of pro- and anti-U.S. sentiment in the Mediterranean nations and recommends positive action to improve America's image and strategic position in the area.

183

Andreev, IU. *THE ARMY IN MAOIST HANDS*. Daily review; translations from the Soviet press, v. 16, June 30, 1970: pt. 1, [item] 6, 1-5.

Slav Rm

Translated from *Krasnaya zvezda*, June 3, 1970.

Slav Rm

The role of the leaders of the Chinese Army has been enhanced by the campaign to whip up an anti-Soviet military psychosis. The military-bureaucratic dictatorship intends to propagandize Mao's "ultra-revolutionary ideas," the essence of which is hatred for the world's Communist and Socialist Parties. At the same time Mao's group is switching the entire national economy to a wartime footing while relegating consumer-oriented production to the background. However, recent events indicate that an ever-growing number of military leaders find unacceptable the antipopular, anti-Socialist policy being imposed.

184

Arneson, Ruthann, and Don Fowler. *STRATEGY: MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES*. Chicago, National Research Analysts [1969] 224 p.

UA23.A72

Contents.--Introduction.--Strategy: an overview.--Unilateral military intervention.--Multilateral alliances.--Qualifications of sources.--Bibliography.

A bibliography and selection of quotations for use by high school students debating the topic "What should be the United States military commitment to foreign countries?" The three resolutions that form the year's debate topic urge Congress to prohibit unilateral U.S. intervention in foreign countries and call for the withdrawal of the United States either from NATO alone or all multilateral defense organizations.

185

THE ATLANTIC DILEMMA: AGGRESSION AND THE CRISIS OF NATO, 1949-1969] Das Atlantische Dilemma; Aggressivität und Krise der NATO, 1949-1969. [Hrsg. vom Deutschen Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Berlin. Autorenkollektiv: Hans Walter Callenius, et al.] Berlin, Staatsverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1969. 469 p.

JX1393.N67A78

Bibliography: p. 411-459.

Contents.--The construction of NATO as the most important politico-military instrument of aggression and intervention of American imperialism against the Socialist states of Europe.--The incorporation of West Germany into NATO (1949-1954).--Attempts at consolidation of NATO and attainment of its counterrevolutionary goals (1955-1957).--The failure of the position-of-strength policy (1958-1960/1961).--The overt outbreak of imperialistic contradictions between the NATO powers (1960/1961-1963).--Accentuation of the NATO crisis (1964-1966).--Character and goals of NATO in conflict with the peace and security of Europe (1966-1968).--Judgment and future projection.--Summary.--Resumé.--Tables and graphics.--Appendixes.

A "Marxist-Leninist analysis" of the history of NATO from its origins to the present, emphasizing two themes: the danger to European peace represented by this imperialist pact system, and its continued loss of efficacy in view of the change in the balance of power in favor of the Communist states and the intensifying internal and external contradictions of imperialism in its present stage of development. The aggressive, counterrevolutionary concepts and practices of the United

States, West Germany, and the other imperialist powers in NATO are contrasted with the efforts of the Soviet Union and the Communist world to bring peace to Europe.

186

Baldwin, Hanson W. STRATEGY FOR TOMORROW. New York, Harper & Row [1970] 377 p. maps. UA23.B265 1970

"Written under the auspices of The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C."

Bibliographical references included in "Notes": p. 347-365.

Examines U.S. security problems in the coming decades and outlines U.S. strategic options. "It should be obvious, without argument, that the demands on the U.S. economy, the U.S. taxpayer and the U.S. patience in the decades ahead are too great to support a global policy of intervention." Baldwin concludes that active political, economic, and military participation in the international community and regional alliances and groupings in defense of vital interests will present America's only reasonable policy alternative in the latter half of the 20th century. A "reasonable internationalism" or balance-of-power policy necessitates a flexible political and diplomatic posture, since regional alliances and groupings change constantly, as do threats. Such a policy need not exclude the United Nations, but it cannot rely on it for security and stability. To implement this new world role, the United States must have the capacity to achieve oceanic control. "There is no doubt that an oceanic or maritime strategy, modernized technologically and modified regionally to meet special needs, is best suited to U.S. capabilities, exploits our strengths rather than our weaknesses, is more likely to secure the American future and preserve the American dream, is achievable at less cost, reduces political and psychological frictions, and is far more flexible politically and militarily and psychologically than is a continental strategy."

187

Barclay, C. N. [THE DEFENSE POLICY OF GREAT BRITAIN--TODAY, YESTERDAY, AND IN THE FUTURE] Die Verteidigungspolitik Grossbritanniens--heute, früher und in Zukunft. Wehrkunde, v. 19, May 1970: 238-243. U3.W396, v. 19

Characterizes the 1970 White Book of the British Defense Ministry as displaying pride in the training and armament of troops it believes are unexcelled in Western Europe. Budget expenditures, the experience in North Ireland, and the order of battle are briefly summarized, and the failure to recruit a volunteer army is analyzed. Barclay rejects most criticism of Denis Healey's conduct of the Defense Ministry as unrealistic in view of Great Britain's limited finances and its inability to dictate NATO planning. He thinks that a Conservative Party electoral victory, "thought possible by many," will mean some kind of English presence East of Suez.

188

Beecher, William. U.S. MOVES TOWARD NEW STRATEGY AS ADMIRAL MOORER BECOMES JCS CHAIRMAN. Navy, v. 13, June 1970: 13-16. VA49.N28, v. 13

Budgetary restrictions may force the United States to abandon at least one of the three separate deterrents it now maintains as a hedge against technological breakthroughs. If so, the bomber and sea-based systems will be retained and the land-based Minuteman sacrificed. Should it come to a choice, the Air Force would favor its new B-1 bomber program over retention of the Minuteman. The Navy, of course, has long championed the advantages of a sea-based over a land-based deterrent and is now pressing for the adoption of its Underwater Long-Range Missile System (ULMS). ULMS might cost as much as \$20 billion, however, and expansion of the present Polaris-Poseidon fleet by 10 boats has been proposed as a less expensive, but also somewhat less effective, alternative. Appointment of an admiral as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is one herald of change, but this need not mean that a new policy will be of particular benefit to the Navy. Decisions will be strongly influenced by the outcome of the strategic arms limitation talks, where consideration is certain to be given to proposals to shift the strategic deterrent of both sides to sea-based systems in order to minimize fears of a first strike.

189

Beste, Hans D. [SECURITY POLICY--MILITARY POLICY--DEFENSE POLICY: CONCEPT AND CONTENT IN THE 70'S] Sicherheitspolitik--Militärpolitik--Verteidigungspolitik: Begriff und Inhalt in den 70er Jahren. Wehrkunde, v. 19, July 1970: 349-354. U3.W396, v. 19

The concepts of security policy, military policy, and defense policy have meaning only when they are related to German national interests. While the situation in Europe seems satisfactory from Bonn's viewpoint at the moment, the long-term global threat continues. American optimism about the outcome of the strategic arms limitation talks is contradicted by the facts of Soviet advances in sea-based missiles and Soviet penetration in the Mediterranean and the Third World. The slogan "The Russians are not coming: if they were they would have come a long time ago" is fallacious. The Soviets have successfully narrowed the room for maneuver left to the West without their risking war. American discussions with the Soviets have usually worked out to the disadvantage of the United States. The exact nature of NATO's nuclear threshold should be made clear. The damage caused by a nuclear attack on Russia would be no worse than that created by a conventional war in thickly settled Germany. Deterrence as a strategy can be replaced by a balance of interests only when there is confidence in both parties. The goodwill of one of the parties should not be exploited as weakness by the other. Peace research may be useful, if it is conducted with trust in, and participation by, the military.

190

Brown, Neville. BRITISH ARMS AND STRATEGY 1970-80. London, Royal United Service Institution, 1969. 73 p. UA647.B87

Contents.--The new context for policy.--Obligations outside Europe.--Britain in Europe.--Instruments of strategic deterrence.--Local war forces.--The economic outlays.--Britain's European future.

Surveys British defense policies and programs within the framework of Britain's role in Europe and special relationship with the United States, local war forces, and the superpower arms race. Brown is not optimistic about the world of 1980 in view of the turmoil and crises of the present international situation. He advocates a strategically independent and economically competitive Western Europe in which Great Britain is a full member.

191

Byrd, Harry F. THE OUTLOOK IN THE SENATE FOR ADVICE AND CONSENT. Naval War College review, v. 23, Oct. 1970: 4-10. Ser

"An address delivered at the Naval War College."

Summarizes the pros and cons of increasing the number of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and discusses the Okinawa question from a purely military point of view. Many Senators believe that the United States is overcommitted globally, and while the author does not favor an American policy of intervention--particularly unilateral intervention--or a "world policeman" role, he maintains that the United States has serious international responsibilities. "In this imperfect world of violence," the United States needs strong defenses, and no part of those defenses is more important than naval power. Keeping the sea lanes of the world open "is vital to our very survival," and a modern carrier force is essential if the United States is to hold the balance of power at sea. Furthermore, as long as the United States maintains its military commitments in Asia, it must continue to have unrestricted use of its Okinawa bases. An amendment recently adopted by the Senate by a vote of 63 to 14 declared that the President should seek the advice and consent of the Senate before entering an agreement changing the status of Okinawa. Since the Senate-ratified Treaty of Peace with Japan determined the present status of Okinawa, the Senate should be consulted on any changes in that treaty. During the past 25 years the Senate has too often relinquished its responsibilities in foreign affairs. Congress must assert itself in the field of foreign policy, though it should not interfere in military tactics.

192

Cameron, Robert. OPTIONS MAKE GOOD PROPOGANDA BUT POOR DEFENSE FOR NATO. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 15, June/July 1970: 20-23. UA646.F5, v. 15

Indicts the doctrine of flexible response and NATO strategy and defense policy in general for failing to provide the West with a credible deterrent in Europe. The Western allies simply will not furnish the conventional forces required for a flexible response strategy. Consequently there is no realistic alternative to greater reliance on a credible nuclear posture. Promotion of more Europeans to top military commands, reorganization of the military command structure, and adoption of strategy that relies explicitly on the use of nuclear weapons to control the battlefield would do much to improve NATO's deterrent capability.

193

Clark, Gregory. AT THE WHIM OF THE SHISEI. Far Eastern economic review, v. 69, July 23, 1970: 23-26. HC411.F18, v. 69

Critics who warn of resurgent Japanese militarism claim it is the direction, not the substance, of Japan's policies that causes apprehension. Although Japan has repeatedly renounced nuclear weapons and war and has a relatively small number of men under arms, the very existence of the self-defense force is inconsistent with the Japanese Constitution, and Government statements concerning the renunciation of nuclear weapons have highly ambiguous overtones. Many members of the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP), including the defense chief, Yasuhiro Nakasone, would like to revise the Constitution; they opposed the signing of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. For some critical observers this ambiguity is not as alarming as the open totalitarianism and militarism of Japan's extreme right-wing organizations. While numerically inferior to the left, the extreme right possibly has more influential personal links with the LDP. However, it may not be appropriate to judge Japanese behavior by Western standards. Only through the framework of Japanese thought can the chances of military resurgence be assessed. In actual fact, there is overwhelming evidence against the argument that militarism is reviving in Japan.

194

Clarkson, Albert G. UNITED STATES NATO FORCE LEVELS. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 50, Aug. 1970: 38-44. illus. 26723.U35, v. 50

The French withdrawal, reduced U.S. force levels in Vietnam, and the buildup of Soviet strategic power could influence the Nixon administration to maintain or increase U.S. conventional NATO forces. The extent of Soviet troop deployment into Eastern Europe and West Germany's role in Europe vis-a-vis Soviet-American relations will also influence any decision regarding U.S. troops in Europe. Militating against troop increases are the encouraging facts that the Soviet Union would have to enjoy a three-to-one conventional superiority in Europe to achieve a conventional military victory; that it is improbable that NATO could be defeated by a surprise attack; and that the Russians "could place little confidence in the loyalty and cohesiveness of other Warsaw Pact forces in a war against the West." The question of appropriate U.S. force levels in NATO revolves around changing strategic and tactical concepts and economic problems. Whatever the final outcome, more attention should be paid to training and preparing NATO forces.

195

Coye, Beth F., and others. AN EVALUATION OF U.S. NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. Naval War College review, v. 23, Oct. 1970: 34-52. map. Ser

A "group research project completed in the School of Naval Warfare."

Examines U.S. policy and strategic options in the Indian Ocean area in light of the Soviet naval

presence there and the British withdrawal from East of Suez. The study concludes that "a low profile course of action comes closest to meeting U.S. objectives in the Indian Ocean area." The United States should continue its economic and military assistance programs, encourage a continuation of bilateral and multilateral allied naval training exercises, establish air, communications, and satellite-tracking facilities in the British Indian Ocean Territory to fulfill support and intelligence requirements and to establish an alternate base for the U.S. Navy's Middle East Force now based at Bahrain in the Persian Gulf, modernize the Force at its present strength, and conduct naval show-of-force operations as required. "If the Soviet presence or threat increases, additional elements could be employed to counter this."

196

Davis, Vincent. UNIVERSAL SERVICE: AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMED SERVICES. Naval War College review, v. 23, Oct. 1970: 19-33.

Ser

In view of general dissatisfaction with conscription and congressional and military opposition to the all-volunteer concept, proposes the implementation of a universal service system (USS) as an alternative method of fulfilling U.S. manpower requirements and outlines possible objections and obstacles to the idea. Under this system all citizens between the ages of 18 and 20 would have to serve the Government in either a military or nonmilitary domestic or international capacity. The author emphasizes the need for a periodic and comprehensive national manpower-needs survey as the basis for a comprehensive national manpower policy and the need for a viable national youth policy. Since an overwhelming majority would prefer nonmilitary to military programs, differential incentives and inducements would be devised to make the "military corps" more attractive. The universal service systems seems to be one of the most effective ways to satisfy massive and urgent U.S. manpower needs and "to help once again to instill the idea of service to the American society within the broader context of service to humanity."

197

Debré, Michel. [THE PRINCIPLES OF OUR DEFENSE POLICY] Les principes de notre politique de défense. Revue de défense nationale, v. 26, Aug./Sept. 1970: 1245-1258. D410.R45, v. 26

Statement made before the Institute des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale on June 25, 1970, that outlines the future requirements and priorities of French foreign and defense policies. Debré emphasizes decisionmaking freedom, establishing friendly relations with the superpowers, working toward managing tension in areas in which France is directly involved, and preserving peace and defending liberty. He concludes that defense policy should be formulated to enable France to safeguard its nuclear retaliatory power, intervene outside Europe, and strengthen defense-related scientific and industrial capabilities.

198

Delden, Rembert van. [A CONCEPT OF THE ARMED FORCES TO COMBAT RISING COSTS: THOUGHTS ON ELIMINATING THIS DILEMMA OF THE BUNDESWEHR] Wehrkonzeption im Widerstreit zur Kostensteigerung; Gedanken zur Behebung dieses Dilemmas bei der Bundeswehr. Wehrkunde, v. 19, July 1970: 340-342.

U3.W396, v. 19

In view of the current inflation of costs, changes in the operational structure of the German Navy should be considered. The cruisers now in service are still the backbone of the fleet, but they are badly located for tactical purposes. While England's reluctance to see a German Navy in its waters is understandable, the NATO command must deploy it there. The Soviets will not attempt to break out of the Baltic Sea without first occupying the Danish islands. To maintain lines of communication with Great Britain in the face of any Soviet action, vessels larger and faster than mine sweepers or missile boats are necessary. The multipurpose Fregatte-70 type will probably cost almost as much on completion as a cruiser, but now seems the better answer. The submarine and anti-submarine programs must be continued at any cost. If the Fregatte-70 program proves too expensive, the alternative of fixed missile sites along coastal areas should be examined. The "Monitore," slow rocket ships armed only with antiaircraft artillery that are used by the Russians, should perhaps be imitated. Helicopter carriers of the type used by the U.S. Coast Guard could reinforce the naval air arm. The unification of the branches and services should be implemented.

199

den Toom, W. CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. NATO letter, v. 18, Mar. 1970: 4-11. D845.2.A44, v. 18

The relationship between deterrence and crisis management, on the one hand, and flexible response, on the other, is a close one. Crisis management is the use of political, military, and other means to prevent the escalation of crisis into armed conflict or to prevent armed conflict from escalating to higher levels of violence. The role of military force in this process is to impose risks in such a way as to encourage restraint and the choice of political alternatives to further violence. Flexible response is the military dimension of crisis management, and its purpose is to give policymakers a maximum range of choice among military methods and means. The key word is flexibility, and this strategy should not be mistaken for a doctrine of defense in depth, for a renunciation of the early use of nuclear weapons, or for any other fixed plan. Four conditions must be satisfied if the strategy is to succeed: the armed forces must be of great diversity and in a high state of combat readiness; means must exist for the rapid implementation of political and military decisions; adequate reserves and a system of mobilization must be available; and forces in being must possess good tactical and strategic mobility and be ready for immediate commitment to battle. Forces available to NATO must visibly satisfy these conditions. Deterrent effect is seldom enhanced by secrecy or concealment; success of the strategy may well depend on the demonstration of military preparedness and determination.

42 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

200

Elser, Gerhard. UNITED STATES ARMY 1969. Wehrkunde, v. 19, June 1970: 305-311.

U3.W396, v. 19

In German.

A tripartite discussion of U.S. military problems: a situation report on the American forces in Vietnam, the American experience in limited warfare, and the tasks of the next ten years. Part 1 comments on the rate of American withdrawals from Vietnam, the defense implications of the Nixon Doctrine, Safeguard versus the SS-9, the American order of battle, and the massacre of the civilian population at My Lai. The principles and concepts of limited war, supply and provision, mobile infantry and armor, and air cavalry and air assault forces are then described. The tasks of the future are Vietnamization (defined as helping those who help themselves), reduction in expenditures, and restoration of the American image.

201

EXTENSION OF JAPAN-US SECURITY TREATY. Asian almanac, v. 8, July 25, 1970: 4073-4079.

DS1.A4752, v. 8

Contents.--Text of government statement.--LDP statement.--Views of opposition political parties.--Protest by Okinawans.--Comments and reactions.--Press comment.--Defense programme.--Japan-US talks on future of Okinawa.

Prime Minister Sato recently stated that Japan would adhere to a nonnuclear policy, retain the present Constitution, and maintain the security treaty for at least 2 or 3 more years (though not indefinitely). He emphasized that Japan would not repeat history and become an economic-military power. Yasuhiro Nakasone, director general of the defense agency, announced that future defense plans would bolster air and maritime defense capabilities and streamline the defense organization. Research should be conducted to attain self-sufficiency in the production of military equipment; however, it will take 10-15 years to achieve this goal. Nakasone suggested that a gradual increase in military spending over the next 5 years would be necessary to develop such a capability and reportedly favors extending the period of the defense buildup, largely because of immense funding requirements. The Liberal-Democratic Party's security research council has recommended that national security policies be revised, giving priority to self-defense rather than the security treaty, which will be supplementary, and reducing Japan's dependence on U.S. forces. They feel that military expansion must not take place at the expense of the economy. The council opposes the defense agency's fourth defense program (1972-76), which sets annual defense expenditures at 1 percent of GNP and advocates reorganizing the National Defense Council along the lines of the U.S. National Security Council.

202

Foster, John S. OPTIONS FOR STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. Astronautics & aeronautics, v. 8, Aug. 1970: 27, 29, 31, 33.

TL501.A688A25, v. 8

Discusses some of the basic problems and considerations in deterrent postures and relationships,

assesses the U.S.-Soviet nuclear balance, and outlines specific options to preserve the survivability of existing deterrent systems, particularly ICBM's. While Foster points out that the present basing of the Minuteman force "may have a relatively short life," he concludes "that, in the immediate future, the deterrence capabilities of our present systems will not be significantly impaired, but that sometime in the 1970s the risk will begin to rise--unless there are some changes," and these will occur when needed.

203

Foster, John S. THE GROWING SOVIET THREAT: A SOBERING PICTURE. Air Force and space digest, v. 53, Nov. 1970: 77-81. illus.

UG633.A65, v. 53

Assesses the Soviet Union's current strategic nuclear and conventional capabilities and projects the Soviet military threat to 1975. Although there is still approximate strategic parity between the United States and the Soviet Union in numbers of offensive weapons, no parity exists in strategic defensive systems. The Russians have an operational ABM system, while the United States does not. Foster, U.S. Director of Defense Research and Engineering, summarizes: "In the strategic area, we will face a greater threat in numbers of improved strategic offensive missiles--including missile submarines operating off our shores--and also an improved Soviet defensive network, intended to intercept our retaliating missiles and bombers." He points out that the Soviet Union has been improving its antisubmarine warfare techniques and technology, but he does not foresee any specific breakthroughs that might pose a serious threat to the American submarine missile force. He concludes that "the greater the disparity in quality and quantity of arms between the United States and the Soviet Union, the greater that risk [of war] will be--since all the foreseeable disparities will not be in our favor."

204

Frye, Alton. DEFENSE POLICY AND THE NEW AMERICAN POLITICS. Astronautics & aeronautics, v. 8, Aug. 1970: 26, 28, 30, 32, 34-35, 82.

TL501.A688A25, v. 8

Mounting domestic disapproval of the military establishment in general, and defense spending in particular, will eventually bring about drastic changes in U.S. national security policies. This criticism will continue, since congressmen now find that it "strikes a very responsive chord in their constituencies." However, without responsible leadership for wide public discussion of these issues, such tendencies could degenerate into ill-considered reprisals against the military establishment, endangering U.S. national security over the long run. Congressmen "need to be disabused of the myth that the defense budget has grown wildly in recent years." In fact, the percentage of gross national product going to the defense sector has remained fairly constant at about 9 percent over the last 15 years, and the Council of Economic Advisers estimates that defense spending will decline to about 6.3 percent of GNP by 1972. Although this does not imply that efforts to trim the military budget should be abandoned, critics who hope to find easy targets for reductions will

be disappointed. There are no simple, standing rules for evaluating defense budgeting or determining how much the United States should allocate to national security, but the responsibility to examine the budget continuously and in detail cannot be avoided. While U.S. overseas defense commitments must be reduced further, an extensive American withdrawal from Europe, for instance, would not necessarily induce the allies there to assume a more equitable share of the costs of common defense. Instead, some countries might opt for nuclear deterrents--a development that would certainly undermine American efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The most crucial factor affecting U.S. national security policies is the state of Soviet-American strategic relations. If the superpowers can agree to base the strategic balance on the concept of mutual deterrence, then a number of substantial strategic arms agreements may be possible, but without a mutual acceptance of that doctrine the strategic arms limitation talks will fail. It would be a mistake to concentrate on the risks of verification and implementation of arms control, for the risks of the present situation may be even greater.

205

Giese, Fritz E. [THE INTERNATIONAL NAVAL SITUATION IN THE 1970'S] Die internationale Flottenlage in den siebziger Jahren. Wehrkunde, v. 19, Aug. 1970: 404-409. U3.W396, v. 19

The international balance of naval strength has altered fundamentally in the past decade. Although the number of nations maintaining naval forces has almost doubled, there are two acknowledged superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. While the United States remains the greater sea power, the Soviets have created a naval instrument whose capabilities are very impressive, even if exaggerated by the popular press. The presence of the six-warship ESKADRA in the Mediterranean and the imminent acquisition of bases in Egypt, Libya, Algeria, and the Sudan demonstrate that the Soviet Union has broken out of the confines imposed by geography on Tsarist Russia. A country-by-country count indicates that the sea-power of the Western nations in the NATO alliance is superior to that of the Warsaw Pact countries and that the rest of the world lags far behind both. While the West remains superior to the East on the seas, its commitments are so much more widespread that its present superiority must be maintained at all costs if the security of the free world is not to be threatened.

206

Goodpaster, Andrew J. STRATEGY AND CAPABILITIES OF ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE. Naval War College review, v. 23, Oct. 1970: 11-18.

Ser

"An address presented at the Naval War College."

Traces the evolution of the Soviet military threat, assesses Soviet and NATO capabilities, and outlines NATO strategy. Goodpaster asserts that NATO is vital to the security of the United States as well as to other member nations, that a large collective force is essential to NATO's viability, and that a sizeable American deployment in Europe

is required for the continued existence of a powerful collective force. One hazard of U.S. military cutbacks could be an erosion of West European confidence in NATO's defense potential that would eventually result in a deterioration of NATO's military strength and "solidarity." Reductions could also "encourage a potential aggressor to adopt a more adventuresome policy and posture which, for the moment, is not attractive to him--faced with what NATO puts before him."

207

Griffiths, Eldon, and Michael Niblock. TOWARDS NUCLEAR ENTENTE: THE CASE FOR ANGLO-FRENCH NUCLEAR CO-OPERATION. [London] Conservative Political Center [1970] 19 p.

UA646.G74

Presents the case for an Anglo-French nuclear deterrent force. The authors assert that a nuclear alliance with France would be more economical for British nuclear industries, serve the French as a ticket of readmission to NATO, and widen the Anglo-American agreement on nuclear weapons technology to include France. They conclude that the best way of establishing a strong European pillar in the alliance is through Anglo-French collaboration within the context of a reformed NATO structure.

208

Hirschfeld, Oswald. [GERMAN SECURITY AND THE EAST-ERN POLICY] Die Sicherheitsfrage der BRD und die Ostpolitik. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 6, June 1970: 322-324. U3.W38, v. 6

Deals with the situation which emerges from the resolutions passed by NATO in Reykjavik and Rome and from their consequences insofar as these are reflected in the German White Paper on Defence. Though the Federal Government's policies towards Eastern Europe coincide with international efforts to strengthen the peace, they threaten to become the subject of bitter controversies on the home front. The overall defence budget, which calls for certain shifts in emphasis, will undoubtedly create some difficulty in reorganizing and equipping the Bundeswehr. The projected increase in expenditure on the personnel side of the Bundeswehr must obviously have its repercussions on the equipment side, in a stretching or redistribution of the funds earmarked for research, development and procurement. Defence Ministry sources report that the decisions which will be required are to be prepared during the parliamentary recess and will then be discussed by the Bundestag immediately after it reconvenes in the autumn. (Abstract supplied, modified)

209

IS U.S. FORFEITING THE ARMS RACE TO RUSSIA? U.S. news & world report, v. 69, Oct. 19, 1970: 21-24. JK1.U65, v. 69

Top strategists in the U.S. Department of Defense view current U.S. defense policy as conceding strategic superiority to the Soviet Union; if present policy trends continue, "there will be

only one superpower left in the world five years from now--Russia." By 1975 the Soviet Union will have matched or exceeded the United States in most categories of modern armaments--strategic missiles, aircraft, surface ships and submarines, troops under arms, and tanks--and will also be spending more on military research. The United States will see its allies turning toward accommodation with the Soviet Union and find itself faced with the necessity of keeping its threatened nuclear deterrent on a hair-trigger alert. Vitiating of the national will in the controversy over Vietnam is the major cause of this incipient demise of national power.

210

Ishibashi, Masatsugu. JAPAN'S DECISION IN 1970 AND UNARMED NEUTRALITY. *Contemporary Japan*, v. 29, Mar. 1970: 217-227.

DS801.J6, v. 29

Japan must choose between two diametrically opposed national security policies: military alliance with the United States, which would mean subordination of Japanese to U.S. interests and revival of imperialist tendencies; and unarmed neutrality, which would contribute to world peace as well as Japanese security. The decision hinges on whether Japan agrees to extend the U.S.-Japan security treaty, with or without revision, and on the conditions attached to Okinawa's reversion to Japanese sovereignty. The results of preliminary negotiations on these questions indicate that the Japanese Government contemplates a military alliance with the United States that provides for a more active Japanese military and political role in the Far East. The Socialist Party of Japan unequivocally supports a policy of unarmed neutrality, the only means of realizing the ideals of democracy and pacifism embodied in Japan's constitution and of insuring genuine and lasting security.

211

Kapur, Ashok. PEACE AND POWER IN INDIA'S NUCLEAR POLICY. *Asian survey*, v. 10, Sept. 1970: 779-788. DSI.A492, v. 10

Analyzes the growth of strategic thought in India, emphasizing the post-1962 conceptual changes in Indian defense policy, their relationship to shifts in the international system, and their implications for Indian strategy. Kapur notes that the improvement of Soviet-American relations during the late 1950's and the early 1960's was less the result of Nehru's diplomacy than the rise of Communist China to nuclear-power status. Today, however, India can play a prominent power role in Asian affairs so long as it maintains a nuclear option.

212

Kim, Samuel S. COMMUNIST CHINA'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. In *U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth*. Military review, v. 50, Oct. 1970: 35-46. illus.

Z6723.U35, v. 50

Reassesses China's progress toward a nuclear-weapons capability in light of past predictions and the disruptive impact of the cultural revolution, lists potential Chinese strategic delivery

systems, and concludes that Peking will probably develop a small number of ICBM's supplemented by tactical nuclear weapons or IREM's. "Given the fiscal, technical, political, moral, and succession problems, plus the volatility of Chinese politics, we are more likely to witness a slow and somewhat haphazard progress rather than a 'Great Leap Forward' in China's impressive, but uneven, military growth."

213

Kim, Yong-jun. NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE 1970'S. *Korea journal*, v. 105, May 1970: 8-10. DS901.K7, v. 105

A translation of a paper presented to a seminar held on March 28, 1970, by the Korean Association of International Relations under the sponsorship of the *Hankook Ilbo*.

The continuing Sino-Soviet dispute and the possibility of improved U.S.-China relations may render increasingly unlikely a successful North Korean large-scale invasion of South Korea. Instead, Pyongyang would conduct a guerrilla war in the south. South Korea's dependence on American military and economic assistance will decline as the United States gradually withdraws in accordance with Washington's new policy of noninvolvement in regional conflicts. The new American policy, motivated in part by a desire for improved relations with Peking, will eventually lead to an independent South Korean military posture. The United States is prepared to extend its nuclear shield to nations engaged in a total war in which either China or the Soviet Union intervenes, but any war short of that will be considered the concern of those involved, to be settled collectively. While Japan's military strength may affect the balance of power in Northeast Asia, that nation is not expected to make positive contributions to an Asian anti-Communist defense system or assume U.S. military commitments. Since the basic goal of Japan's military buildup is to protect its economic interests, Japan is not likely to jeopardize its access to Chinese and North Korean markets by establishing a military alliance with the Republic of Korea. Japan will promote South Korean security both through increased economic cooperation with Seoul and through political and economic relations with the Communist countries, which could restrain their adventurism. Given the de-Americanization program in South Korea and the uncertainty of collective security arrangements, South Korea "should not hasten to seek military cooperation with Japan for mutual security. Rather, the fundamental approach is to strengthen basic ties which bind the United States and the Republic of Korea together in the joint security treaty."

214

Knorr, Klaus E. MILITARY POWER AND POTENTIAL. Lexington, Mass., Heath Lexington Books [1970] 150 p. (Studies in international development and economics) UA10.K52

Includes bibliographical references.

Delineates the concept of national military potential, focusing on economic and technological capacity, administrative capabilities, and political foundations of military power, and including a brief introductory discussion on the nature, components, and functions of military power.

THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 4

215

Kreker, Hans-Justus. THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MEDITERRANEAN. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 50, Aug. 1970: 21-26. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 50

Sketches the development and growth of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet. Since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War the Soviet fleet has grown at an alarming rate: at the beginning of 1968 the fleet consisted of 40 vessels; by October it had increased to 100 ships, including 25 helicopters, 4 cruisers, 8 guided-missile destroyers, and 10 submarines. Kreker maintains that the Soviet fleet in this area "is not only a military threat, but it also can be used as a political weapon which might cause NATO considerable embarrassment if employed at the right time at the right point."

216

Kürsener, J. [THE AMERICAN ARMY IN EUROPE] Die US Army in Europa. Schweizer Soldat, v. 45, May 1970: 13-16. illus.
U3.S23, v. 45

Describes the mission, opposing forces, administrative subordination, composition, zone of communications, combat readiness, reinforcements, and supply of the United States Army Europe. Kürsener points out that the costs of an equivalent of the American Army in Europe stationed in the United States itself would be very much higher.

217

Lehners, Richard. [THE ROLE OF CIVIL DEFENSE IN ENSURING PEACE] Zivile Verteidigung als Funktion der Friedenssicherung. Wehrkunde, v. 19, Apr. 1970: 169-171. U3.W396, v. 19

Condemns the present West German imbalance between expenditures on civil defense and on the armed forces. A civil defense system on a scale comparable to that of Sweden or Switzerland would allay the fears created by West Germany's "forward position" in NATO strategy. Lehners suggests a 20 to 1 ratio of military to civil defense expenditures instead of the present 50 to 1 to make clear the defensive nature of West German armament.

218

LETTER FROM LONDON, by our correspondent. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 15, Aug./Sept. 1970: 12-16. illus. UA646.F5, v. 15

Speculates on the shape of British defense policy under the new Conservative Party administration. The most interesting question at the moment is how Prime Minister Heath, whose chief preoccupation is with British solvency, intends to finance a defense program that is expected to include maintenance of a presence East of Suez, retention of a carrier force, revitalization and extension of the Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve, and a general strengthening of all the services.

219

LIN PIAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, by the editor. Current scene, v. 8, Aug. 1, 1970: 1-14. DS701.C9, v. 8

Traces the ascendancy of Lin Piao and the triumph of politics over weaponry in the People's Liberation Army (PLA), focusing on Lin's role in the cultural revolution. While the involvement in the cultural revolution may constitute the most significant recent modification of military policy and strategy, Lin Piao has been able to maintain basic continuity in military policy. "Now that Lin has weathered the Cultural Revolution upheavals within the PLA leadership, . . . and has placed close associates in key military positions, he is probably in a stronger position than ever before to ensure that future military policy is guided by his version of the proper mix of political and military considerations."

220

London. Institute for Strategic Studies. THE MILITARY BALANCE, 1970-1971. London [1970] 126 p. UA15.L65, 1970-71.

Contents.--Countries and principal pacts: The United States and the Soviet Union. The European balance. The Middle East and the Mediterranean. Sub-Saharan Africa. Asia and Australasia. Latin America.--Regional balances: The military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The military balance between the Soviet Union and China.--Tables: Estimates of comparative strategic strengths. Major nuclear delivery vehicles. Defense expenditures and national economies. Comparisons of military manpower. Current international defense production projects. Major identified arms agreements, July 1969-June 1971.--Appendix: Fissile material.

Annual review of the world's major military forces. New features of this year's review are wider coverage of African countries and new sections on Latin America, regional military balances, international defense production projects, and fissile material.

221

Mackintosh, Malcolm. SOVIET STRATEGIC POLICY. World today, v. 26, July 1970: 269-276. D410.W63, v. 26

To deter war, to win those wars that are not deterred, and to conduct political relations from a position of strength are the major aims of Soviet strategic policy. The specific form this policy takes is powerfully shaped by Russian national traditions, Soviet geography, the dual capacity of the Soviet political system, and modern strategic-weapons technology. First place in Soviet planning is given to the strategic confrontation with the United States. Strategic defense is the area of greatest concern, but offensive forces are not therefore neglected. The Soviet Union does not consider a first-strike capability a practical goal, but it would like to attain superiority in missile forces over the United States if it can do so without provoking a new arms race. Second priority goes to the confrontation in Europe. Soviet

probing operations in peacetime are highly unlikely. The aim is rather to maintain a force capable of waging and winning a general war at any level of weapons employment, nuclear or conventional. Third in the scale of priorities is the confrontation with China. The Soviet Union is unlikely to resort to large-scale military operations to resolve its dispute with China, but threats of force will continue to be used politically. Last priority goes to the use of military forces to support Soviet diplomacy in peacetime. Maritime forces are expected to play a major role in this respect. These peacetime political activities are a "bonus," however. The chief concerns are the substantial challenges to the security of the Soviet homeland that originate in the United States, Western Europe, and China.

222

McNulty, James F. SOVIET SEAPOWERS: RIPPLE OR TIDAL WAVE. In United States Naval Institute, *Annapolis*. Proceedings, v. 96, July 1970: 18-25. illus. V1.U8, v. 96

The Soviet Navy is challenging Western maritime supremacy. A permanent Russian presence in the Eastern Mediterranean is taken for granted, while the Baltic Sea has become the almost private domain of Communist naval forces, and the growing frequency of Soviet naval visits in the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf indicate that this pattern will continue. The Soviet maritime thrust has its roots in the frustration experienced by Russian leaders when Western naval power was employed to counter Soviet moves in Greece, Lebanon, and Cuba. Moscow realized that "if the doctrine of 'peaceful coexistence' were to function as the keystone of Russian Communist policy, then the supporting arches of that policy would have to be restructured to include all facets of Russian national power." The Soviet naval challenge is aimed at weakening the political, psychological, and economic force of the free world. Challenging the Soviets in turn would take the shape of a multinational effort based upon the existing regional alliance systems among the maritime nations of the Western world. Some of the alliances would establish information centers to collect data on Soviet political, military, and commercial ventures; diplomatic initiatives might provide a direct liaison among these alliances with the objective of creating multinational cruising squadrons. Long-range plans to counter the Soviet naval threat should include the modernization of Western navies as well as steps to increase the efficiency of commercial operations. The Soviet maritime challenge may be of little consequence, but "if the early 'sea ripple' grows, unchecked, to a wave of tidal proportions, even the firmest shore-rooted structure cannot long stand against it."

223

Mahncke, Dieter. [THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND EUROPEAN SECURITY] Atlantische Allianz und europäische Sicherheit. Schweizer Monatshefte, v. 50, Apr. 1970: 29-35. AP32.S47, v. 50

The configuration of the Atlantic alliance will remain unaltered in the next decade, but efforts

will be made to place East-West relationships on a basis of mutual acceptance by softening the rigidity of the military balance of power. However, Western Europe must cling to its American ally and continue to reinforce its own conventional forces. American abandonment of Europe is unthinkable, since it would be tantamount to abdication as a world power, but the nature and dimensions of the future American presence in Europe are uncertain. West Germany is doing its share already, and increased German representation in NATO would mean a lasting Soviet propaganda victory. The nations not directly threatened by the Warsaw Pact seem reluctant to arm against a threat that may not be directly imminent. Perhaps the answer is to subsidize American troops while qualitatively strengthening the European contribution to NATO. Simultaneous reduction of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces would ease the American situation but might not be acceptable to the Soviet Union because of the threat to its troops in the satellite countries. Reduction must not affect the overall symmetry of the present military equilibrium. As many NATO countries as possible should physically take up a front-line position. Soviet calls for a general security conference conceal pressure to abandon East Germany and accept the Brezhnev doctrine. The strategic arms limitation talks and the Moscow-Bonn renunciation-of-force agreement show the efficacy of approaching European security by small steps.

224

Mendl, Wolf. DETERRENCE AND PERSUASION; FRENCH NUCLEAR ARMAMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1945-1969. New York, Praeger [1970] 256 p. UA700.M45 1970

Contents.--Preface.--Introduction.--French nuclear policy in the context of French foreign policy.--French nuclear policy as a function of defence policy.--The civil and military development of the French atomic energy programme.--The domestic political environment.--Conclusion.--Appendix.--Bibliographical note.--Index.

Examines the role of nuclear armament in French foreign and domestic policy since 1945. Mendl argues that while the development of an independent nuclear force may partly reflect De Gaulle's idiosyncracies, it also reflects basic French objectives that will outlast De Gaulle. The book was completed just prior to De Gaulle's resignation.

225

Mettler, Eric. THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN ALLIANCE. Swiss review of world affairs, v. 20, Aug. 1970: 10-11. D839.S9, v. 20

Some U.S. senators and generals want Tokyo to share the defense burden in the Far East, and interest groups inside Japan are demanding a larger navy to protect the commercial seaways. Japanese industry would like to increase arms production for profits as well as its technological spin-off. The business sector also strongly resisted Japan's signing the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, because of its fear that Japan might be driven out of industrial leadership. In addition, some important Japanese are saying that a world power can

be independent only if it possesses a nuclear deterrent. Japan's absorption of Western technology and political forms and the renewal of the U.S.-Japanese security treaty will not prevent Japan "from trying to regain independence in every respect and to go its own way in the foreseeable future." Whether Tokyo can replace the aversion to everything military with a more tempered understanding for Japan's legitimate defense requirements, or whether chauvinism will displace the current fanatic pacifism "remains hidden in the mysterious depths of the Japanese soul."

226

MILITARY SPENDING REPORT. Congressional record [daily ed.] 91st Congress, 2d session, v. 116, July 31, 1970: S12559-S12566.

J11.R52, v. 116

A summary of the 1970 Military Spending Report submitted by the Military Spending Committee of Members of Congress for Peace Through Law (MCPL); inserted into the *Record* by Senator Mark O. Hatfield, Chairman, MCPL Military Spending Committee.

Examines the utility and necessity of new strategic and tactical weapons systems requested in the Defense Department's proposed Fiscal Year 1971 budget. The report also pinpoints problems regarding overseas troop deployments and the impact of defense spending on the economy. While the report recommends substantial reductions in spending for land-based strategic systems, including a cancellation of the Minuteman III program, it makes a strong case for the Underwater Long-Range Missile System (ULMS). "We should proceed with ULMS as part of a decision to make a sea-based nuclear missile system the first line of deterrence." In order to accomplish this shift in emphasis, the concept of "strategic mix," which has created excessive redundancy of strategic systems, may have to be redefined. "When viewed as a successor to land-based missiles and their requisite defense systems the ULMS seems cost-effective." The Committee concludes that "significant reductions can be made without in any way weakening our national security."

227

Millar, Thomas B. AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE. [2d ed. Melbourne] Melbourne University Press [1969] 229 p. illus. UA870.M5 Bibliography: p. 215-217.

Contents.--Preface to the second edition.--Acknowledgments.--Introduction.--The defence heritage.--Strategic considerations and national interests.--Forward defence and regional commitments.--Threats and sensitivities.--Australia and the war in Viet Nam.--Australia's defence organization and capacity.--Australia and nuclear weapons.--Defence of the Australian environment.--Some conclusions and proposals.--Appendices.--Index.

Traces the historical background of Australia's defense policy and examines specific current facets: the size and disposition of defenses, administrative departments, and nuclear weapons policy. Australia has not signed the nonproliferation treaty (NPT) because of its involvement in industrial nuclear activities and because the way Pres-

ident Nixon will interpret the security treaty between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand in regard to nuclear threats is not settled. Millar contends that as long as the NPT perpetuates the present nuclear oligopoly and reduces the foreign policy options of most governments, Australia should not completely forfeit its nuclear-weapon option. He concludes that Great Britain's withdrawal from the area East of Suez will foster a closer relationship between Australia and the United States, which, together with Australia's growing economic strength, will become the cornerstone of Australian security.

228

Millar, Thomas B. SOVIET POLICIES SOUTH AND EAST OF SUEZ. Foreign affairs, v. 49, Oct. 1970: 70-80. D410.F6, v. 49

Whatever Soviet intentions in the Indian Ocean may be, the modest but growing Soviet naval presence there represents a shift in policy. Through the judicious use of these forces, Moscow could exert significant political influence, particularly since competition from Western navies appears to be decreasing. The Soviet Union has become a major supplier of India's Navy and Air Force and has provided sufficient military aid to Pakistan to retain some diplomatic leverage there. Its influence in Indonesia has declined sharply since Sukarno's overthrow, but it has negotiated favorable trade and other agreements with Malaysia and Singapore, at the eastern end of the Indian Ocean, and with Mauritius and Mozambique, at the western end. It has not yet sought to replace British with Soviet naval power in the Persian Gulf, but it has clearly sought to bolster its position in the Arab countries. In sum, "the Soviet Union has built itself a modest capacity for long-range intervention, but would be quite incapable for many years of major operations far from home. . . . South and East of Suez, the strengthening Soviet influence is more shadow than substance, but the shadows give warning of more substance to come."

229

Miller, J. D. B. AUSTRALIA IN VIETNAM: NECESSARY INSURANCE OR BURNT FINGERS? Round table; the Commonwealth quarterly, no. 239, July 1970: 295-302. AP4.R6, 1970

In military terms the Australian intervention in Vietnam is probably to be accounted a success. Its justification lay in Australia's doctrine of forward defense, which assumes that Australia's wars will and must be fought elsewhere, but with the aid of a senior partner, Britain or the United States. The Americans have accepted Australian aid as proof of friendship, and the Asian governments have either approved or failed to voice disapproval. The catastrophe of the Vietnam war, from the Australian point of view, is that American public opinion may prevent the United States from playing the senior partner role in Asia in the future. The great problem now is bringing the doctrine of forward defense up to date. The projected British withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore means that there will be no senior partner there; the Guam doctrine leaves uncertain how future insurgency in Laos or Thailand will be met.

48 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

230

Mitchell, Donald W. THE SOVIET NAVAL CHALLENGE. Orbis, v. 14, spring 1970: 129-153.
D839.068, v. 14

Asserts that the Russians are developing an offensive maritime strategy and attempting to challenge U.S. naval supremacy in response to U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War and cutbacks in U.S. military research and development. Mitchell describes the growth of the Soviet submarine fleet, progress in the three related fields of oceanography, fishing, and commerce, and the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and the Far East. He concludes that "the acquisition of the present level of naval strength has been one of the greatest achievements of the twentieth century."

231

Monaghan, Henry P. PRESIDENTIAL WAR-MAKING. Boston University law review, v. 50, spring 1970: 19-33.
LL

Many critics of the Vietnam War have unjustly challenged not only the wisdom of U.S. policy but also the constitutional power of the President to conduct such a war. The words of the Constitution alone are not sufficient to determine the limits of the President's powers in the area of foreign policy. Presidential power has grown enormously, especially during this century, while congressional power has steadily declined. The so-called separation of powers is in fact a sharing of powers by separate institutions whose relative power is determined by the capacity of each to act effectively in foreign affairs. U.S. presidents have frequently committed military forces without congressional authorization; limitations on this practice have almost always been political rather than legal. While no one questions the President's power to act in an emergency without prior congressional approval, various legal theorists have proposed specific conditions under which such approval would be constitutionally required. These proposals are ambiguous in what they demand. They fail to reckon with the firmly established practice of presidential war-making and lack a realistic model of the separation of powers. However unwise it may be, the Vietnam War is not an unconstitutional use of presidential power. Congress has the power to repudiate the war if it so decides.

232

Montfort, Colonel-divisionnaire. [WHAT'S NEW AT NATO?] À l'OTAN, quoi de nouveau? Revue militaire suisse, v. 115, June 1970: 249-252.
U2.R5, v. 115

Reports on NATO's current activities and problems. Montfort discusses Joseph Coffey's article "The United States and the Defense of Western Europe" (cited as item 1101 in v. 6, no. 3, of this bibliography), which advocates the use of nuclear weapons to counter the Soviet threat to Western Europe. Other topics are the NATO exercise "Arctic Express;" a "white paper" published last February contending that Great Britain is the greatest military power in Western Europe; and the need for U.S. bases to remain in Spain in light of the

Soviet buildup in the Mediterranean and the loss of American bases in Libya.

233

Montfort, Colonel-divisionnaire. [WHAT'S NEW AT NATO?] À l'OTAN, quoi de nouveau? Revue militaire suisse, v. 115, Aug. 1970: 345-351.
U2.R5, v. 115

Describes NATO's structure through an organization chart. Montfort is primarily concerned about France's attitude toward the alliance in the event of a military operation. He concludes that despite NATO's impeccable organization, the lack of conventional arms and troops will lead to a nuclear war in Europe and will result in Western "capitulation without war."

234

Müller, Johannes. [A QUARTER CENTURY OF THE AMERICAN AIR FORCES IN EUROPE] 25 Jahre amerikanische Luftstreikräfte in Europa. Wehrkunde, v. 19, Aug. 1970: 421-424. illus.
U3.W396, v. 19

A history of the American Air Force in Europe (USAFE), stressing the transition in doctrine from massive retaliation to flexible response, as well as the changes in technology. In addition to executing the military will of the United States, USAFE is charged with contributing to the NATO deterrent, and, in the event deterrence fails, will fight side-by-side with the NATO allies. The structure, organization, weapons systems, and infrastructure of the USAFE are outlined. Müller concludes that USAFE has successfully fulfilled its mission, and he expresses the hope for its continued presence in Europe "as long as our security requires."

235

Nau, Ludwig. [CHANGES IN MISSION AND STRUCTURE OF THE BUNDESWEHR: THE REVISION OF STRATEGIC CONCEPTS.] Auftrags- und Strukturwandel der Bundeswehr/Die Aenderung des strategischen Konzepts. Frankfurter Hefte, v. 25, May 1970: 326-332.
AP30.F555, v. 25

Traces the parallel relationship between the development of NATO military doctrine from massive retaliation to flexible response and the changes in the structure of the West German Armed Forces. The ratio of NATO to Warsaw Pact divisions indicates the dangers inherent in the German mission today. Nau suggests that the West German forces are limited by geography and armament to defensive action while reserves are brought up. He concludes that the May 1970 White Book will effect no essential changes in the organization of the German Air Force and Navy.

236

NAVAL REVIEW 1970. Edited by Frank Uhlig and Jan Snouck-Hurgronje. Annapolis, United States Naval Institute [1970] (Its Proceedings, v. 96, May 1970) 568 p. illus.
VL.U8, v. 96

THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 49

Partial contents.--Naval and maritime events, 1 July 1968-31 December 1969, by D. L. Strole and W. E. Dutcher.--Essays: The Indian Ocean as seen by an Indian, by A. P. S. Bindra. The development of Navy strategic offensive and defensive systems, by Dominic A. Paolucci. Developments and problems in carrier-based fighter aircraft, by C. O. Holmquist.--Sea power; a commentary: Patterns of American sea power, 1945-1956; their portents for the seventies, by John D. Hayes.--Maritime information: The 1970 defense budget and defense program for fiscal years 1970-1971; a statement by Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford. Supplemental statements before Congress by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird. Summary of major naval, maritime, and military forces.

Essays on current naval and maritime history, naval research and development, Marine Corps and Navy combat operations in Vietnam, carrier operations, geopolitical aspects of maritime transportation, and the future of American sea power, together with a selection of official statements and other information pertinent to this general survey of the naval and maritime posture of the United States in 1970.

237

Norman, Lloyd. THE CHIEFS: PARTNERSHIP GOES OUT WHEN 'PURPLE SUITS' GO ON. Army, v. 20, May 1970: 36-43. UL.A893, v. 20

The once fractious Joint Chiefs of Staff seem to have achieved a harmonization of views. Whether this reflects greater maturity or a deliberate closing of ranks to meet the challenge from civilian strategists, it is a fact of primary significance, because this body of men exercises enormous influence over U.S. foreign and military policy. Surprisingly, over the years the quality of this influence has been anything but hawkish. It is true that the Chiefs were perhaps the most influential advocates of the policy of containing Communist aggression, but their councils have always been marked by moderation and restraint. The influence of the Chiefs seems to have reached its peak under President Johnson. The present administration is moving faster on troop withdrawals from Vietnam and slower in the development of strategic missiles and aircraft than the Chiefs would like. It also overlooked their views in not retaining a stockpile of biological weapons for its deterrent effect. The Chiefs now advise extreme caution in the strategic arms limitation talks. They are likely to get their way on the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle, ABM, and the underwater long-range missile system, but only by the sacrifice of troops, aircraft, and ships. How effective are the Chiefs? The secrecy surrounding their activity makes it very difficult to judge. One thing is certain, however: there is nothing sinister about their influence.

238

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Information Service. NATO FACTS AND FIGURES. Brussels, NATO Information Service [1969] 354 p. illus. UA646.3.A559

A factbook describing the origins and subsequent evolution of the alliance, the activities of the

North Atlantic Council, and the structure of NATO. Statistics, appendices, a chronology, and an alphabetical index are included.

239

Paice, Anthony. A DEFENSE FOR BRITAIN. London, Published by the Liberal Publication Department for the Unservile State Group [1969] 24 p. (Unservile state papers, no. 15) UA647.P25

Proposes a new foreign and defense policy for Great Britain. The country can no longer afford to ignore the economic and political realities that sharply limit its options in foreign affairs. Decisionmakers need to recognize that Britain is unable to stand alone and that no defense policy is good if it undermines economic strength at home or abroad. British policy ought to be directed toward the maintenance of peace in Europe and "the creation of integrated European forces controlled by a supranational Political Community which may include East European states." Paice offers specific recommendations on nuclear and conventional force levels and on steps that might be taken to promote the ultimate goal of an integrated European political community.

240

POSSIBILITY OF STRENGTHENING CIVIL DEFENCE IN WESTERN GERMANY. International civil defence, v. 17, May 1970: 1-4. UA926.I488, v. 17
Translated from Ziviler Bevölkerungsschutz, no. 4, 1970. UA929.G325

Outlines West Germany's official position on civil defense. The government recognizes civil defense as an essential part of the total defense picture but regrets that it will be unable to increase civil defense funds at least until 1972. Nevertheless Bonn intends to maximize the effectiveness of civil defense through available resources and presents a list of proposals to this end.

241

Possony, Stefan T. WAR HATES THOSE WHO HESITATE. In American Security Council. Washington report, May 18, 1970: 1-4. Ser

The U.S. intervention in Cambodia was overdue. Laos and Cambodia have long been the main supply routes and staging areas for Hanoi's forces and are essential to their efforts to overthrow the government of South Vietnam. Destruction of the North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia has severely hurt the enemy, but additional measures are necessary if the United States is to deal a decisive blow. The port of Sihanoukville must be closed to the enemy, guerrilla operations must be mounted to follow up the present offensive, U.S. air supremacy must be maintained over Laos and re-established over North Vietnam, the flow of supplies through Laos must be halted and an oil embargo imposed on North Vietnam, and Vietnamization must be supplemented by Asianization of the war. The main struggles of the Vietnam War continue to be fought in the United States, where the Nixon

50 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

administration must make a greater effort to inform the U.S. public of the necessity for strong measures to win.

242

Rau, Erwin M. RUSSIA AND THE BALTIC SEA: 1920-1970. Naval War College review, v. 23, Sept. 1970: 23-30. Ser

Historical survey of Soviet policy in the Baltic Sea area, including a brief summary of current military capabilities and strategy. "Throughout its history the Soviet Government has consistently attempted to increase its influence and control in the Baltic. In recent years these efforts have been paralleled by the growth of the Soviet maritime establishment, a large part of which must utilize the Baltic for overhaul and logistical support." Rau concludes that the Soviet Union has the capability to seize and hold the exits of the Baltic, making it feasible to exclude enemy warships entirely. In the event of a general war Warsaw Pact naval forces could move between the Great Baltic shipyards and the North Sea and the Atlantic, where they would intercept Western maritime traffic and U.S. aircraft carriers and submarines far from the Soviet Union's vulnerable flank on the Baltic. The West must be alert to the possibility of a limited Soviet amphibious assault in the Baltic.

243

Ray, Dennis M. PLA IN THE SADDLE. India quarterly, v. 26, Jan./Mar. 1970: 20-29. D410.I44, v. 26

Concludes that the military is reemerging as a dominant political force in China. Although the rise of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) began early, its political power and nonmilitary roles were greatly enhanced by the cultural revolution. Further involvement in political activities will, however, adversely affect the PLA's military capabilities. The PLA must either relinquish some of its nonmilitary functions or gradually be civilianized, as it was following the civil war. While there exists no viable political counterweight to the PLA, this does not necessarily augur a return to "warlordism" or monolithic military dictatorship, although either could emerge. "Whether succession to Mao Tse-tung will lead to stability would depend on the ability of PLA to accommodate the various units of its own and the many segments of China's mammoth and complex society."

244

Rehm, Walter. [THE SOLDIER OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLES ARMY AND HIS FATHERLAND] Der NVA-Soldat und sein Vaterland. Wehrkunde, v. 19, Sept. 1970: 444-449. U3.W396, v. 19

In the training given the East German soldier the fatherland is defined as not only the land of his birth but also the social relationships under which he lives. From the Marxist point of view, "only where the working class rules does the true fatherland exist." The training designed to instill an emotional attachment to the fatherland

thus defined also attempts to exploit the sentiment of love for the soil. Love of the fatherland and the feeling of unity with its soil are merged into fear and hate of its putative enemies. In theory the contradiction between nationalism and internationalism is resolved by the concept of "patriotic internationalism," although it is significant that the East German Army still styles itself a national rather than a Communist army. The number of deserters and the findings of sociological investigations show that it is questionable that the authorities have succeeded in inculcating a deep and convinced patriotism into the National Peoples Army of East Germany.

245

Rhee, T. C. JAPAN: "SAME BED, DIFFERENT DREAMS." Interplay, v. 3, Aug. 1970: 4-10. Ser

Although Japan is currently peace-minded, its economic power and renaissance nationalism may eventually be harnessed to underpin a powerful diplomatic and military role in Asia and the world. A firm foundation for an expanded military effort already exists. Although Japan allocates only 1 percent of its GNP to the defense sector, military expenditures have been quite substantial in real terms and could exceed those of Communist China by 1975. The proposed national budget for fiscal year 1970 contains a request for a 17.7 percent increase in military spending, the sharpest rise since 1945. Japan is also investing heavily in long-range research and development projects undertaken by major Zaibatsu combines. "One could well wonder why the pragmatic Japanese business circles would commit so much of their efforts to weapon systems development and research if there is no agreement on the future trend of Japan's military policy." A rapid transformation of Japanese attitudes is generating support for rearmament, and an alarming number of Japanese now favor massive rearmament. A recent poll of Japanese public opinion showed that 81 percent of the population favor an independent national defense posture while 45 percent would approve nuclear weapons acquisition. Japan has signed the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, but in view of its numerous objections, ratification seems highly uncertain. The United States hopes Japan will play a complementary role in maintaining the balance of power in Asia, but "even supposing Japan's nominal cooperation, Tokyo's aims would not be to foster an Asian political climate likely to lead to harmony with American goals." A number of serious Japanese-American commercial disagreements already exist, and there are widespread signs of anti-Americanism in Japan.

246

Rippon, Geoffrey. SOUTH AFRICA AND NAVAL STRATEGY: THE IMPORTANCE OF SOUTH AFRICA. Round table; the Commonwealth quarterly, no. 239, July 1970: 303-309. AP4.R6, 1970

Argues that in the event of another major conventional war the sea route around South Africa will be of vital importance. The route is understood to include also the Portuguese territories

of Mozambique and Angola, lying along the coast to the immediate north of South Africa on the east coast, and South West Africa, on the west coast. Rippon urges that NATO include the South Atlantic in its area of responsibility to support South Africa "in her action as a bastion against the spread of Communism in Africa and her commanding geographical position on two Oceans." For this purpose the Conservative Party must ensure that Great Britain provide South Africa the arms necessary to defend the Cape route.

247

Roherty, James M. DECISIONS OF ROBERT S. McNAMARA; A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE. Coral Gables, Fla., University of Miami Press [1970] 223 p. UA23.R64
"Notes": p. 183-211.

Contents.--Generalists and functionalists:

James V. Forrestal. Robert A. Lovett. Thomas S. Gates. The Eisenhower-Rockefeller schema: Charles E. Wilson. Neil H. McElroy. Two role concepts.--The new management: Active management. The economic criterion. The programming function. Cost-effectiveness analyses. Civilians and military.--A manned bomber: A technological plateau. Assured destruction and damage limitation. The systems inventory. Dialogue on AMSA.--A nuclear carrier: Tactical doctrine. Strategic doctrine. The case of CVA-57.--Epilogue.--Appendix.

Describes Secretary McNamara's role in the formulation of tactical and strategic doctrines during the 1960's. Roherty analyzes the problems of the manned bomber and the nuclear carrier to clarify the connections between McNamara's decisions and the conceptual scheme that produced them. He argues that "the ascendancy of management and the decline of policy, the elaboration of structure and technique, and the faltering of innovation and bargaining mark the McNamara years."

248

Ryan, John D. THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE--PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE 1970'S. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 15, Aug./Sept. 1970: 18-26. illus. UA646.F5, v. 15

Discusses the impact of recent U.S. cutbacks in defense spending. Ryan, who is Air Force Chief of Staff, claims that "the degree of retrenchment already has been substantial, and [Air Force] combat capability has been reduced." The cutbacks have forced the Air Force to reduce military and civilian personnel levels, aircraft inventories, and aircraft procurement rates, and have brought about a slowdown in the replacement of Minuteman II with Minuteman III, a decline in manned bomber and air defense capabilities, and difficulties with the tactical airlift force. Despite budget reductions, the Air Force has succeeded to some extent in modernizing its aging air fleet, but further cutbacks, particularly in research and development, could have a serious impact on U.S. security in the 1970's.

249

Magatelian, M. OUR COMMENTARY: FAULTY CONCEPT. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 22,

Sept. 29, 1970: 19.

D839.C87, v. 22

Translated from *Izvestia*, Aug. 29, 1970.
Slav Rm

Many reputable American newspapers report that Washington is operating on the concept that "only the acceleration of the arms race by the United States can ensure the limitation of the arms race." This concept is a reversion to the familiar "position of strength" fallacy and is based on the assumption that only the United States can support a costly arms race. However, soberminded U.S. political circles realize that the arms race has damaged not only the American foreign policy position but its domestic economy as well. In implementing this faulty concept, the United States will succeed only in hurting itself.

250

Salitter, Michael. [THE SOVIET MARITIME FLEET AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY] Die sowjetische Marine als politisches Instrument. Wehrkunde, v. 19, May 1970: 243-247. U3.W396, v. 19

The role in Soviet international policy assigned to the maritime fleet can be defined in terms of three areas: oceanography, maritime commerce, and bases. Soviet oceanographic contributions to the International Geophysical Year were impressive both qualitatively and quantitatively. Ostensibly scientific in design, these studies actually deal with problems that may be decisive in the conduct of sea-based missile warfare. Soviet expenditures on research and education in oceanography far exceed those of the United States. Although the expansion of the Soviet merchant fleet leaves it in sixth place in tonnage terms, the ships are new and well equipped. Future expansion will free the Soviet Union from dependence on foreign carriers, give it entrance into the shipping cartels, and advertise its presence in the Third World. Of course, many Soviet ships will then be transporting military supplies for subversion movements. The Israeli-Arab conflict has given the Soviet Union ad hoc bases throughout the Mediterranean. Russia now has set the stage to show how well it has learned to use naval power to influence political events.

251

Schmidt, Helmut. [FOR AN ARMY OF PEACE] Für eine Armee des Friedens. Monat, v. 260, May 1970: 16-19. AP30.M56, v. 260

German youth realizes that military service means service for peace. The confidence and naturalness with which the German military serves the Western alliance guarantees its peaceful intentions. Weakening NATO would defeat the purpose of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and the strategic arms limitation talks. The military also wishes to protect the great social progress achieved by the liberal regime. The soldiers have to understand that their task is not aggression and destruction but protection. Germany and its allies must create a military balance that in turn will guarantee a political balance, so that "no foreign will can be imposed on Germany." Public

52 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

discussion is welcomed; for it provides an incentive for soldiers to think. Mutual confidence among the German citizens in uniform and in civilian clothes can be established only if biased party polemics are avoided.

252

Schneider, Fernand-Thiébaud. [RUSSIA'S MOVE TOWARD SEA AND WORLD POWER] Russlands Griff zur See- und Weltmacht. Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, v. 20, June 1970: 301-308.

UB485, v. 20

A continuous drive toward sea and world power has characterized Russia's military and foreign policy since 1945. The Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance strengthen Soviet power in Middle Europe, but not to the extent of making it a world power. In Africa and Latin America Russia has not been able to gain a firm footing. The nuclear potential of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries outweighs that of the United States and NATO. The Soviet Navy is second in size, but first from the point of view of recency of construction. Access to the warm seas is essential, since superiority in land and nuclear weapons may be misleading, especially in light of the recently achieved success of the Americans with lasers, which in the future will be able to destroy not only aircraft but also tanks and missiles. To assure access, the Soviets have been building up their Navy. The Russian fleet sails on all oceans, and the Mediterranean is coming more and more under the supervision of the Soviets. In 1968 Admiral Gorshkov stated that "sooner or later the United States must understand that they no longer rule the waves." In America, Admiral Moorer admitted that "America was losing its maritime supremacy to the Soviet Union." This supremacy is Moscow's only means to world power. At present, Soviet policies seem to focus on Asia and Latin America. America has to be outweighed, China contained, and a beginning made in influencing the developing countries. Russia rules the old "World Island" and apparently is in the process of becoming stronger than the United States. Still there is some uncertainty regarding the most recent technological innovations, which call into question the supremacy of the Soviet Union and therefore limit strategic possibilities. "In the ashes of the Czech spring of freedom the light of liberalism might still glow," while even in the Soviet Union the elite contest the regime. The Soviet economy is not up to the requirements of world politics. Only the future can show whether the Soviet Union will be the first world power or even America's equal.

five communities and a questionnaire survey on the work of local civil defense directors in three states in the Middle West and concluded that optimum participation cannot be achieved using volunteers, because civil defense has lost its prestige and credibility among the middle class. The study showed that community leaders were more inclined to support a local civil defense program than a federal one; that apathy prevails toward a shelter program; and that when nonspecialists had the responsibility for planning civil defense programs, difficulties arose in their collaboration with the established town authorities. The group recommended the appointment of full-time civil defense directors and the establishment of full-time coordinators in areas that could not afford civil defense directors.

254

Schütze, Walter. [FRANCE AND THE PROBLEM OF A BALANCED FORCE REDUCTION IN EAST AND WEST] Frankreich und das Problem einer ausgewogenen Truppenverminderung in Ost und West. Europa-Archiv, v. 25, July 10, 1970: 469-478.

UB39.A66, v. 25

Describes the development of post-1967 French military policy, focusing on Pompidou's attempts to ensure France's diplomatic independence within the framework of superpower rivalry. The author evaluates the French military situation from a military-technical point of view, noting the special attention given to mutual balanced force reductions since 1969, outlining the prospects for a unilateral American troop reduction in western Europe or simultaneous and balanced force reductions of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) are seen as an attempt to take Europe out of a military confrontation and to balance terror. The technical-financial situation seems to demand a force reduction. From a political standpoint, mutual balanced force reductions would play an important role in the East-West relationship. Yet France opposes reductions.

Schütze concludes that the new policies in Europe are carried out without the constructive cooperation of France. In the absence of a long-term concept, France maintains its status quo. Its defensive attitude seems a paradox, since the allies are interested in a settlement with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries. Mutual balanced force reductions cannot be isolated from these efforts. Paris will have to consider its chances of blocking European trends in view of Soviet calls for a security conference and a German settlement and the Soviet desire for arms control in Europe. Moreover, France's isolation within the West will present obstacles to its influencing trends.

253

Schützack, Udo. INQUIRIES REGARDING THE ROLE OF VOLUNTEERS IN THE CIVIL DEFENCE SERVICES OF THE U.S.A. International civil defence, v. 17, Apr. 1970: 1-6. UA926.1438, v. 17

Translated from *Zivilschutz*, v. 12, Dec. 1969.
Ser

Reviews a study of the role of civil defense centers and voluntary organizations. A group of sociologists at Cornell University conducted a qualitative field study at the municipal level in

255

Seamans, Robert C. PLANNING THE TOTAL-FORCE CONCEPT FOR THE 1970'S. Air Force and Space Digest, v. 53, Nov. 1970: 68-71. Illus.

UD633.A65, v. 53

Outlines the tactical and strategic weapons requirements of the U.S. Air Force in light of budgetary constraints and the growing Soviet threat. While planned reductions in certain defense outlays are dependent to a considerable degree on a

"firm" understanding with the Soviet Union, the United States has no intention of implementing a premature or exaggerated reduction in military strength. In order to maintain a credible deterrent in the absence of an arms control agreement, the United States must modernize its strategic forces, because quantitative and qualitative improvements in Soviet strategic capabilities could significantly reduce the effectiveness of U.S. land and sea based missiles. Although the United States is upgrading its strategic capabilities, their effectiveness will vary with the length of time it takes to counter new Soviet capabilities, and it is therefore unwise to base the deterrent on missiles alone. A dispersed manned bomber force is also essential.

256

Sights, A. P. GRADUATED PRESSURE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 96, July 1970: 40-45. illus. VI.08, v. 96

Whether the military escalation strategy employed in Vietnam was a success or failure is uncertain. It did not lead to world war III, but neither did it force a settlement of the war. It appears that the United States "expected a big return from a small investment and got instead a small return from a big investment." Policymakers incorrectly assumed that graduated military pressure would produce a corresponding increase in pressure on the enemy to surrender or negotiate and that the United States would continue increasing its bombing until it achieved its objective. Military escalation failed to end the war at a low level of violence because the North Vietnamese learned new ways to limit the effects of bombing, faced neither a land invasion nor a naval blockade, and knew it was highly unlikely that the United States would use nuclear weapons against a nonnuclear country in a limited war. Although a bold and massive strike against North Vietnam would have held more promise of military success, it probably is an unacceptable alternative now. The civilian leaders who formulate military policy will likely choose a middle course between the extremes of nuclear holocaust and preemptive surrender. Military and naval strategists must devise a workable compromise between the political preference for caution and the military need for boldness and shock, but "the task will be challenging to say the least."

257

Schik, Erich. (THE COMMUNIST CHINESE PEOPLES LIBERATION ARMY) Die chinesische Volksbefreiungsarmee. Wenkünde, v. 19, Sept. 1970: 451-456. U3.W396, v. 19

The question as to which of the encircling powers China will attack--the United States in Southeast Asia or the Soviet Union in the north--cannot be answered with complete certainty. However it can be assumed that Chinese military doctrine echoes Chinese political doctrine and that both remain as they were formulated by Mao in the 1930's. In Mao's view, war is not the continuation of politics by other means, but another form of politics, and so must be conducted only by

chiefs of state. Mao consistently has maintained that China would fight a defensive war against U.S. imperialism on Chinese soil. Mao's political and ideological doctrine is aggressive and revolutionary, but his military doctrine is defensive and pragmatic. The Chinese Armed Forces are structured, armed, and trained in accordance with this doctrine, which recognizes the tremendous defensive advantage inherent in China's open spaces and enormous population. On the other hand, the offensive capabilities of the Chinese Army have always been neglected, and its atomic armament cannot approach the American or Soviet level at any time in the near future. A Soviet surprise attack on the Chinese atomic installations will not in itself win a war, and it might lead to endless guerrilla warfare. If the Soviets do not reinforce the troops stationed at the Ussuri with atomic weapons, it will seem most probable that Moscow does not contemplate large-scale hostilities.

258

Schik, Erich. (POWER DEMONSTRATIONS OF THE SOVIET NAVY ON ALL WORLD SEAS) Machtdemonstration der sowjetischen Seestreitkräfte auf allen Weltmeeren. Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift, v. 136, Sept. 1970: 634-637. U3.A43, v. 136

Evaluates the characteristics and goals of the Soviet Navy's extensive exercise "Ocean." Just as at the Army's "Dane" maneuver, the parties were divided into "north," consisting of the North Sea and Baltic fleet, and "south," consisting of the Black Sea and Pacific fleet. These exercises, the continuing growth of the Soviet merchant fleet, the Soviets' enormous fishing fleet and extensive oceanographic research program, and the constant strengthening of the four Soviet naval fleets inescapably prove that the Soviet Union has ceased to be a land power only and that Soviet maritime expansion throughout the world has as its aim the achievement of military superiority over the West.

259

Seon, Chae-sok. DIPLOMACY IN THE 1970'S: CHALLENGE OF DE-AMERICANIZATION POLICY. Korea Journal, v. 105, May 1970: 4-7.

DS901.K7, v. 105

A translation of a paper presented to a seminar held on March 28, 1970, by the Korean Association of International Relations under the sponsorship of the Hankook Ilbo.

South Korea still depends on U.S. military assistance, but President Nixon's foreign policy will reduce U.S. treaty commitments and troop deployments in Korea. "Though the United States professes to keep all its treaty commitments, U.S. military intervention is excluded in principle in a conventional war or guerrilla warfare, except for an incident where a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation." Instead of seeking new guarantees through revision of the South Korean-U.S. defense treaty, it would be more advantageous to negotiate a military assistance agreement to strengthen the South Korean Armed Forces and to secure the continued presence of American troops.

54 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

Although the U.S.-Japanese understanding regarding Japan's role in Asia may contribute to regional economic cooperation, direct military intervention or indirect military assistance by Japan are out of the question. A collective security system will not function without Japanese participation, but because of domestic political pressures, widespread anti-Japanese sentiment in Asia, and a desire for improved relations with China, Japan is unlikely to enter into such an arrangement. The Republic of Korea will confront serious diplomatic and military problems in the 1970's; solving them successfully may afford new opportunities for South Korea.

260

Speidel, Hans. [THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE] La défense de l'Europe. *Revue militaire générale*; general military review, no. 7, July 1970: 159-186.
U2.R48, 1970

Includes summaries in English and German.

Reviews NATO's military strategy in light of the Soviet threat. Speidel contends that while the Russians have become militarily stronger and are projecting their power on a global scale, strained relationships between the United States and Europe have diluted the alliance's cohesion. He considers loyalty to the alliance, avoidance of unilateral troop reductions, protection of the southern and northern flanks, and a U.S. nuclear guarantee toward NATO territory essential requirements of European security.

261

Stone, Isidor F. MEMO TO THE AP EDITORS: HOW LAIRD LIED. *New York review of books*, v. 114, June 4, 1970: 14-20. AP2.N655, v. 14

Contents that Secretary of Defense Laird and other Pentagon officials deliberately misrepresented and exaggerated Soviet missile strength in an April 20, 1970, speech to the editors of the Associated Press and in subsequent statements. Stone challenges Laird's assertion that during the past 5 years the United States has been in neutral gear and the Soviet Union in high gear in the deployment of strategic offensive missiles, and he concludes, through an analysis of Laird's figures, that the United States continues to maintain a clear superiority both in types of missiles deployed and in research and development of new missiles.

262

STRATEGIC WARFARE. *Space/aeronautics*, v. 53, Jan. 1970: 59-69. illus.

TL591.A8187, v. 53

Assesses U.S. strategic weapons projects in light of the mounting Soviet threat. Impending parity between the United States and Soviet Union has had a destabilizing effect on the arms race and produced strong incentives for success at the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT). "Both American and Russian arms experts are growing convinced of the sufficiency of weapons at present levels and apparently are searching for negotiat-

ing edges, but not a way out." However, the possibility of procrastination and failure at the SALT talks exists, so while President Nixon believes that decisions on advanced strategic weaponry can be postponed for 1 year without adversely affecting the U.S. deterrent in the late 1970's, he is prepared to deploy new strategic weapons systems if mutual arms limitations prove elusive.

263

Subrahmanyam, K. INDIA'S PROBLEMS OF SECURITY. Jaipur, Dept. of Political Science, University of Rajasthan [1969] 3. 33, 2 p.
DS480.84.S835

Discusses issues directly related to India's security and analyzes potential conventional, guerrilla, and nuclear warfare threats from China and Pakistan. Subrahmanyam asserts that India's defeat by China in 1962 was caused by a lack of psychological preparation for war. He notes that had there been "vigorous professional debates and had there been adequate feed-back from the defence decision-making structure to other opinion-forming institutions of the country," India could have realized that China's capacity to strike was limited and reacted with greater calm and courage. The author rules out another Chinese or Pakistani invasion, as well as guerrilla warfare in India in the next decade, and contends that an alliance between India and Japan or Australia is neither necessary nor feasible.

264

Sullivan, Robert R. THE ARCHITECTURE OF WESTERN SECURITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF. *Orbis*, v. 14, spring 1970: 71-91. D839.C68, v. 14

Great Britain's withdrawal from the Persian Gulf can have three possible consequences: The Soviet Union may replace the British as the imperial arbiter of the area; the regional power balance may break down into a war between Iran and Saudi Arabia involving the superpowers; or "the British presence [may] be continued or replaced by a Western imperial presence." If the British withdraw, the United States should restrict itself to maintaining a regional diplomatic presence backed up by an extraregional military posture. In this way it will be able to mediate the balance of power between Iran and Saudi Arabi and ensure the steady supply of oil by keeping the peace. The military will keep the area open "in case force is needed to uphold what diplomacy has wrought." The United States must be willing to intervene in "unfolding power vacuums" early, quickly, and diplomatically and "accept the imperial mantle being thrust upon [it]." Isolationism may engender later reinvolvement at a much higher cost and a breakdown of the domestic social order.

265

Terzitaschitsch, Stefan. [SARMIS--A NEW STRATEGIC COMPONENT OF THE UNITED STATES?] SARMIS--eine neue strategische Komponente der Vereinigten Staaten? *Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau*, v. 20, June 1970: 322-324. U3.W485, v. 20

The purpose of the sea-based antiballistic missile system (SABMIS) study is to determine how far the United States Navy can defend against Chinese and Russian missiles with a still-to-be-determined number of missile units and to prove that SABMIS could efficiently complement the land-based Safeguard system, if not replace it. Since SABMIS units will transport 40 to 60 antiballistic missiles, some of their characteristics can be deduced. Their weight is expected to be between 20,000 and 30,000 tons, and their length approximately 220 m. (660 ft.). They will be fast and maneuverable. One of many advantages SABMIS has over Safeguard is that the former provides protection "at the garden door" and not "at the front door," giving the administration more decision time. Sea-based missile systems are also cheaper and more durable. Despite these and other advantages, the Navy has declared that it offers SABMIS not to replace but to complement Safeguard, perhaps in deference to the other services. Decisionmakers in the United States often do not think in maritime terms and the last word on this strategic component has not been spoken yet, but the possibilities for its realization still exist.

266

Ulsamer, Edgar E. THE ICBM'S REMAIN THE BULWARK OF OUR DETERRENCE. Air Force and space digest, v. 53, Nov. 1970: 38-42. illus.
UC633.A65, v. 53

Focuses on the U.S. Air Force's proposed "hardpoint" ABM program and briefly reviews several other programs currently under consideration by the Defense Department for ensuring the prelaunch survival of U.S. land-based ICBM's. The "hardpoint" defense system, as envisioned by military planners, would back up the Safeguard ABM system and would incorporate available off-the-shelf hardware. While the Soviet Union's existing SS-9 force could destroy approximately 450 U.S. Minuteman missiles, this would not impair the U.S. capacity to inflict unacceptable damage in a retaliatory strike. If the present rate of SS-9 deployments continues, however, the Soviet Union could achieve a first-strike capability vis-a-vis the United States in a relatively short time. A combined Hardpoint-Safeguard defense system, which would be comparable to a conventional area and point air defense system, could effectively defend against a massive attack on U.S. ICBM's.

267

U.S. Blue Ribbon Defense Panel. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ON THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. [Washington:] Dept. of Defense [for sale by the Gtpt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1970. 237 p. illus.
UA23.3.A419

Contents.--Letter to the President.--Preface.--Executive summary.--Background and introduction.--Organization.--Management of material resources.--Management and procedures.--Management of personnel resources.--Other management considerations. Conflicts of interest.--Individual statements of panel members.--Consolidated lists of recommendations.--Appendices (to be published separately).

Concentrates on problem areas in the organization and management of the Defense Department and offers specific recommendations to effect substantial improvements. The panel felt the updated 1947 National Security Act was still basically sound. Some substantive change is needed, but "many of the deficiencies evident in the operation of the Department could be remedied by more faithful application of the concepts on which the Act is premised."

268

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe. UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH EUROPE IN THE DECADE OF THE 1970'S. Hearings, 91st Congress, second session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 468 p.
KF27.F642 1970

Testimony from officials and scholars on the U.S. contribution to European security in the 1970's. The effects of a proposed reduction in U.S. troop strength in Europe, progress in East-West détente, and Soviet proposals for an all-European security conference are the primary concerns of the subcommittee. Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Prof. Marshall D. Shulman, Prof. George F. Kennan, and Prof. Zbigniew Brzezinski were among those who testified.

269

U.S. Dept. of the Army. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NATO: ANALYTICAL SURVEY OF LITERATURE. Washington, 1970. 450 p. illus.

26724.A9U475

Cover title.
"DA Pam 50-1."

Contents.--NATO at the twenty-year mark.--The Atlantic alliance: an overview. West European security and national aspirations.--East-West strategic balance: influencing factors.--Arms control, disarmament, and nuclear proliferation (some selected and pertinent documents).--Source materials for further research and reference.--Map index.

A bibliographic survey containing 900 entries selected from periodicals, books, studies, and documents published between 1965 and October 1969. The materials cited explore many of the problems confronting NATO as well as the broader aspects of Western European security, arms control, the NATO-Warsaw Treaty Organization strategic balance, and the Communist Chinese nuclear threat. Appendixes contain background notes and maps on NATO member countries, organization charts, texts of treaties and relevant statistical data.

270

U.S. President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force. THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON AN ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMED FORCE. [New York:] Collier Books [c1970] 218 p.

UB323.A5 1970

Commonly known as the Gates report.

Contents.--Introduction.--Protecting the free society.--The debate.--Conscription is a tax.--

56 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

Military personnel requirements.--Compensation and management of military personnel.--Officer procurement and retention.--Recruitment.--Conscription of physicians.--Reserves.--The standby draft.--Budgetary implications.--Objections to an all-volunteer force.--Conscription in America.--Recent foreign experience with voluntarism.--Alternatives to an all-volunteer force.--Appendix A: Budget expenditures for all-volunteer forces.--Appendix B: Military and civilian compensation.--Appendix C: Review of the 1966 Dept. of Defense draft study.--Index.

Examines the feasibility and desirability of an all-volunteer armed force. The commission unanimously recommends that steps be taken promptly to establish an all-volunteer force, the first and indispensable step being the institution of equitable pay for men serving their first term in the Armed Forces. It argues that although an all-volunteer force will require a net budgetary increase of from \$1.5 billion to \$4.6 billion annually, depending on the size of the force, the actual cost will be lower than for the present mixed force because of hidden costs not reflected in the budget. The commission foresees no significant undesirable social effects or impairment of military effectiveness as a consequence of establishing an all-volunteer force.

271

UNITED STATES INTERVENTION IN CAMBODIA: LEGAL ANALYSES OF THE EVENT AND ITS DOMESTIC REPERCUSSIONS. Boston University law review, v. 50, spring 1970: 1-168. LL

Bibliographical footnotes.
Special issue.

Partial contents.--Introduction: Toward a jurisprudence of peace? by Fred P. Graham.--Presidential vs. congressional war making powers: The war-making powers: the intentions of the framers in the light of parliamentary history, by Francis L. Coolidge, Jr., and Joel David Sharrow. Presidential war-making, by Henry P. Monaghan. The appropriations power as a tool of congressional foreign policy making, by Garry J. Wooters. Historical and structural limitations on congressional abilities to make foreign policy, by Jason A. Rosenberg, Philip Weinberg, and William M. Finzler. The Supreme Court as arbitrator in the conflict between presidential and congressional war-making powers, by Kenneth F. MacIver, Jr., Beverly M. Wolff, and Leonard Bruce Locke.--International law and U.S. intervention in Cambodia: United States recognition policy and Cambodia, by William Sprague Barnes. Self-defense and Cambodia: a critical appraisal, by John C. Bender. A wider meaning of "illegality," by Banks McDowell, Pamela Taylor, and Elizabeth Gemmill.

Reviews the history and current status of presidential and congressional war powers, particularly as they relate to the Indochina War. The authors consider the legal and political implications of the growth of presidential power in the field of foreign policy and propose various methods of reasserting congressional authority in this area.

272

May. RUSSIA LOOKS BEYOND THE MIDDLE EAST. Force and space digest, v. 53, Oct. 1970: 58-

59.

JC633.A65, v. 53

"Reprinted . . . from The Wall Street Journal."

Reviews recent Soviet military activities in the Indian Ocean, Southern Asia, and East Africa and concludes that this southward thrust is part of a global plan to counteract Communist Chinese and American influence. Although the Soviet Union is building up its maritime capability and has the nucleus of an Indian Ocean fleet, it will have to become a first-rate naval power before it can achieve its global goals.

273

Wallace, J. F. NATIONAL CIVIL EMERGENCY MEASURES PROGRAM. In Canada. Emergency Measures Organization. EMO national digest, v. 10, Apr./May 1970: 1-4, 8. UA926.C295, v. 10

"Address delivered to the Mayors-Elected Officials Conference (French) in February 1970 at the Canadian Emergency Measures College, Arrnprior, Ontario."

Outlines the key elements of a civil defense program designed to enable Canadians to survive and recover from any war emergency. Wallace stresses public protection and the maintenance of news, public utility, and societal services and concludes that despite the East-West détente the nuclear threat is real, necessitating civil organizations that can reduce the consequences of an attack.

274

Walton, Richard J. BEYOND DIPLOMACY; A BACKGROUND BOOK ON AMERICAN MILITARY INTERVENTION. Introd. by James J. Storrow, Jr. New York, Parents' Magazine Press [1970] xviii, 270 p. neps. (Background series) E183.7.W34

Contents.--Introduction.--Author's preface.--Author's note.--The Mexican War.--That "splendid little war"--Dollar diplomacy.--Intervention in Lebanon.--Again the Dominican Republic.--Epilogue.--Documents.--Bibliographic and reference notes.--Index.

History of U.S. military interventions in Mexico, Central America, Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, the Philippines, and Lebanon. Walton challenges the conventional view that the United States was basically an isolationist country prior to World War II and questions the necessity and wisdom of these interventions, which he attributes primarily to a pervasive belief in Manifest Destiny.

275

Whetten, Lawrence L. STRATEGIC PARITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 50, Sept. 1970: 24-31. Z6723.U35, v. 50

The history of Soviet policy in the Near East shows that "one of the chief reasons for Soviet diplomatic failures from 1955 to 1965 in the Middle East was the lack of sufficient military power to reinforce its political influence." However, the Soviet Union now has an embryonic overseas strategy, based on floating naval bases and land-based airpower, that has fundamentally changed the

balance of power and potential political alignments in the region. "It must be credited with sufficient forces permanently in the theater to neutralize key Western capital ships and airbases through massive preemptive nuclear strikes by ship and air-launched, medium-range missiles." Although the West can no longer act with impunity, it still has overwhelming conventional military superiority. The Soviet military buildup in the Near East, though, when coupled with strategic nuclear parity, produces "the highest level of symmetrical East-West deterrence since the advent of the nuclear era." While the Soviets may have succeeded in reducing Western options in the area, they have not been able to convert their advantage into positive political influence. Persistent Great Power rivalries and continuing political instability require that long-term measures be considered to ensure Great Power interests and fulfill regional security requirements. New defense arrangements should be established in the area. "Ad hoc political coalitions . . . appear from the Western side the most feasible solution."

276

WHITE BOOK 1970: ON THE SECURITY OF THE GERMAN REPUBLIC AND THE STATUS OF THE BUNDESWEHR. Weisbuch 1970. Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage der Bundeswehr. Wehrkunde, v. 19, June 1970: 285-290.
U3.W396, v. 19

Extracts from the first chapter of the 1970 White Book of the German Federal Republic on peace in freedom, the international political landscape, balanced reduction of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, Ostpolitik and détente, the criteria of a security policy, and the North Atlantic alliance as the base of West German defense policy. The strategic arms limitation talks are described as posing no danger to the interests of Western Europe. Their success will have important consequences for other arms control and disarmament measures with which West Germany is specifically concerned. The security criteria include maintenance of the partnership with America, effective military defense with less actual armament, and readiness to negotiate with the Soviet Union and East Europe.

277

Wienhöfer, Elmar. [THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICS AND THE MILITARY IN GERMANY] Das Verhältnis von Politik und Militärwesen in Deutschland. Wehrkunde, v. 19, Aug. 1970: 393-399.
U3.W396, v. 19

Bibliographical footnotes.

The distrust of the military engendered by the recent events of German history is understandable. Unfortunately it is expressed by allocating to the military a sociopolitical position like that of the postal and railroad services. The Germans must recognize that the military factor in society has its own needs and dynamics, if it is to work in fruitful reciprocal action with politics, which of course always has the decisionmaking responsibility. The civilian authorities responsible for setting the role of the military in future overstate policy must understand the dialectic of

action and reaction of the military and politics. The Bundeswehr is an instrument of political power whose skillful use requires understanding of its specific modes of employment.

278

WILD AMBITION COMPLETELY EXPOSED. By "Renmin Ribao" commentator. Peking review, v. 13, Oct. 30, 1970: 29-30.
DS701.F42, v. 13

Charges that policies outlined in a recent speech by Yasuhiro Nakasone, Director General of the Japanese Defense Agency, on the "future course" of Japan have revealed "Japanese militarism's rabid designs." To the commentator, Nakasone's speech indicates that Japan will carry out "arms expansion and war preparations on a larger scale to meet the demand of Japan's monopoly capital for expansion abroad"; it also "gave away the ambitious attempt of the Japanese reactionaries to carry out nuclear armament." The author suggests that Japan will use enriched uranium produced under the guise of peaceful purposes to manufacture nuclear weapons. In fact, while reiterating its policy of nonnuclear armament in its recently published white paper on national defense, the Japanese Government asserted that it would not be unconstitutional for Japan to possess small defensive nuclear weapons. "What Nakasone called Japan's 'future course' is the embarkation once again on the Japanese militarist road of aggression and expansion by relying on U.S. imperialism, the road of serving as U.S. imperialism's gendarme in Asia in an attempt to dominate Asia through military adventure, the dangerous road of plunging the Japanese nation once again into an abyss of misery."

279

Zaïor, Heinrich. [MILITARY EDUCATION IN ISRAEL] Wehrerziehung in Israel. Wehrkunde, v. 19, Apr. 1970: 191-192.
U3.W396, v. 19

In Israel no social distinction is made between the civilian and the soldier, and no one refuses to enter military service. Military education begins with the child's forced recognition of the necessity of national defense. Examinations given the recruit are designed to seek out his potential; the armed forces reinforce this potential by educating him to their needs. Because the recruit is frequently an immigrant, the armed forces instill knowledge of Hebrew and in other ways act as a national school. Officers are selected for leadership, personal authority, initiative, and decisionmaking ability.

280

Zoppo, Carlo E. SOVIET SHIPS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE U.S.-SOVIET CONFRONTATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Orbis, v. 14, spring 1970: 109-128.
D339.C68, v. 14

Soviet interest in the Mediterranean dates back to the 18th century. Then, as now, the Soviet Union sought to control the straits and increase its political influence in the Arab world. Today, in addition to these objectives, Russia is concerned

with gaining strategic naval mobility in the area, and the immediate consequence is a challenge to U.S. naval supremacy. For the last 10 years Moscow has been developing ships and techniques that would allow it to project its power on a global scale. "The theme that Soviet seapower has extended its reach to remote areas of the world's oceans, to cruise and patrol whenever the defense of the national interest requires it, reflects a role for the Soviet navy without precedent." The Soviet Mediterranean presence complicates the defense of NATO's southern flank, inhibits U.S. military initiative in the area, and increases the chances of a local conflict's escalating. It extends Moscow's political influence among the Arab States, and is allowing the Soviet Union to become the leading external power in the Near East. Whether a naval balance of power leading to mutual deterrence can be achieved before another Middle East war or Cyprus crisis breaks out remains to be seen.

CONSEQUENCES OF DEFENSE POLICIES AND WAR

261

Atkinson, James D. THE URGENCY OF ABM. In American Security Council. Washington report, June 1, 1970: 1-4. Ser

The time for complacency over constructing an ABM system is past. From November 1969 to April 1970 the Soviet Union test-fired twice as many strategic missiles as the United States, and during the past 5 years it radically increased its missile strength. During the same period, the United States made no basic changes in its strategic missile forces and actually reduced its megatonnage by 40 percent. The Soviet Union has tested a depressed-trajectory ICBM and a fractional orbital bombardment system, increased the number of submarine-launched ballistic missiles from 25 to over 200, and deployed an ABM system around Moscow, while the U.S. Safeguard system will not be operational before 1974. The growing Chinese threat can no longer be taken lightly in view of the recent launching of China's first satellite. To counter the Soviet and Chinese threats, the United States should move forward vigorously with both land-based and sea-based ABM systems, of which the latter would constitute a valuable supplement to the proposed Safeguard system. The cost undoubtedly will be high, but no price is too great when the lives of Americans are at stake.

282

Beurgartner, John S. THE LONELY WARRIORS; CASE FOR THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX. Los Angeles, Nash Pub. [1970] 237 p. illus. NC110.D4B38 Bibliography: p. 231-232.

Defends the record of America's integrated structure of Government agencies, private corporations, and universities--its military-industrial complex (MIC)--in providing security for the United States and the rest of the free world. But focuses on the mechanics of defense pro-

curement--"who makes the decisions and how, where the money goes and who tries to control it, and how companies get those Fat Government Contracts." He argues that the MIC, in besting the Soviet Union in the competitions to deploy long-range strategic weapons systems in the 1950's and early 1960's and advanced electronic and space systems in the later half of the 1960's, was winning world wars III and IV, and he suggests that all Americans should be thankful for "the integrity, devotion, selflessness, and tremendous collective abilities of people in MIC--the Lonely Warriors who provide the protective cover for [the United States] and for much of the free world."

263

Berkower, Larry P. THE MILITARY INFLUENCE UPON FREUD'S DYNAMIC PSYCHIATRY. American Journal of psychiatry, v. 127, Aug. 1970: 167-174. RC321.A52, v. 127

A previously disregarded but consequential influence upon the conceptual model of dynamic psychiatry as evolved by Freud is that of military science. Thus many fundamental terms bear obvious military connotations, including conflict, defense, repression, alliances, and resistance. Freud repeatedly exploited the rich metaphorical possibilities of the military analogy as he depicted psychology in terms of conflicts of forces, emphasizing the onslaught of instinctual impulses and the defensive operations of the ego to ward them off. (Abstract supplied)

284

Blake, Joseph A. THE ORGANIZATION AS INSTRUMENT OF VIOLENCE: THE MILITARY CASE. Sociological quarterly, v. 11, summer 1970: 331-350. HM1.S69, v. 11

"References": p. 348-350.

Proprietors of a society, in order to gain their ends, frequently resort to the use of force and violence. An important tool is the organization of violence. Massive violence is instituted by these organizations and at the behest of the societal proprietors as a means of social attainment. One of the consequences of this massive violence is the disruption of the experience of everyday life and the imposition of another experience upon the actor. The organization, as a result of its own action, creates problems which must be solved in order that action may be continued. The organization must make combat action meaningful by making it relevant; it must devise strategies for successfully moving individuals from one reality to the other; it must define the parameters of the most relevant action, i.e., violence; it must socialize men into violence; it must devise strategies to constrain, channel, and direct the actions of men socialized into violence; it must, in short, construct a social reality designed to cope with the exigencies of the battle-moment. A discussion of some of the factors relevant to the success or failure of this project has been the subject of this paper. (Abstract supplied)

285

Boffey, Philip M. HERBICIDES IN VIETNAM: AAS STUDY RUNS INTO A MILITARY ROADBLOCK. Science,

v. 170, Oct. 2, 1970: 42-45.

Q1.835, v. 170

Reports the problems faced by the American Association for the Advancement of Science team sent to Vietnam this past summer to conduct a preliminary survey of the impact of defoliation there. The team, headed by Harvard biologist Matthew S. Meselson, was unable to gain access to classified military records on U.S. spray missions, and was at a considerable disadvantage. A recent congressional decision suggests that Meselson's pilot study may be followed by a more comprehensive Defense Department-funded National Academy of Sciences investigation into the short- and long-term ecological and physiological effects of military use of herbicides in South Vietnam. Meselson states that "the Vietnamese scientific community has become 'deeply concerned' over the impact herbicides will have on future economic development and on health levels in their country" and, on the basis of visual observations, that "there has been a severe bamboo invasion of some defoliated hardwood forests and [that] his ground explorations in the denuded mangrove swamps have confirmed previous aerial observations that there has been little or no regeneration." Meselson's report, due late this year, "will probably not come to firm conclusions as to the impact of the herbicides but will 'state the limits of likely effects and say that such-and-such an effort is required to find out what the actual magnitude of the effect is.'"

286

Brownfeld, Allan C. SCAPEGOAT FOR A NEW ISOLATIONISM. In American Security Council. Washington report, Aug. 10, 1970: 1-4.
Ser

"The recent assault upon the role of the military in American life together with the mounting opposition to President Nixon's proposed ARM system, may be only the early warning signals of a new isolationism in America." While no one claims that the military is beyond reproach, its critics have invoked a new devil theory of history in which the military is the scapegoat. America's European allies are increasingly concerned that the United States will overreact to the unpopular war in Vietnam by sharply reducing its forces in Europe. Those who recognize that a new period of isolationism would increase rather than lessen world tensions must act now to prevent a rapid expansion of Communist power and influence.

287

Carr, C. Jellef, and others. PROTECTIVE AGENTS MODIFYING BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF RADIATION. Environmental health, v. 21, July 1970: 88-98.
RC963.A22, v. 21

A survey of radioprotective agents that might prove useful "in protecting man against single or short-term, low-level sublethal radiation doses." The research focus to date has been on the development of compounds to protect against single or short-term, whole-body, lethal irradiation, and little has been done to test the efficacy of these compounds in protecting against low-level exposures.

288

Carter, Luther J. ABM: SENATE APPROVES EXPANSION, BUT HOPE SEEN FOR ARMS CURB. Science, v. 169, Aug. 28, 1970: 844-845.
Q1.835, v. 169

The Senate's vote on the ABM last year suggested that it was adopting a tougher and more skeptical attitude toward military requests for new weapons; this year's decision could indicate that the Senate "has gone back to assuming that the Joint Chiefs of Staff always knows best." During the 1970 ABM debate, the administration contended that an expanded system would give U.S. negotiators a vital bargaining chip in the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT), and although historical evidence does not clearly support this kind of argument, it may have been decisive. Few senators challenged the President's judgment. However, the Senate restricted ABM's to defending U.S. offensive-missile sites, and some observers have concluded that the Senate does restrain American weapons policy to some extent. The Armed Services Committee struck from the House-approved administration proposal a \$10 million authorization for advanced preparation at four "area defense" sites, asserting that the existing situation did not justify preparations for a costly area-defense system against a potential Chinese nuclear capability. Jeremy J. Stone, executive director of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) and an anti-ABM lobbyist, believes that strong senatorial opposition to the ABM over the past year and a half has influenced the SALT talks. This year's debate suggests that the Senate will not go back to rubber stamping Defense Department requests for new strategic weapons. Stone has said that "people are getting angry about losing (on arms control issues)," and FAS feels "the climate is favorable to an expanded lobbying effort." The group is establishing committees to study a wide range of arms control issues. While Stone may be more optimistic than is justified, "nevertheless, when the Senate emerged last year from the ABM struggle, it appears to have crossed some kind of threshold and to have adopted a more independent view of arms-procurement questions."

289

Clark, Ramsey. ON VIOLENCE, PEACE AND THE RULE OF LAW. Foreign affairs, v. 49, Oct. 1970: 31-39.
D410.F6, v. 49

The rapid change in modern society has rendered traditional approaches to international relations misleading, if not irrelevant. "Violence as a way of solving problems must be relegated to the past. It is no longer tolerable. It can no longer succeed. The once romantic ideal of peace has become essential realism." If the nuclear powers cannot agree to effectively limit weapons of mass destruction, unilateral deescalation of the arms race may provide the impetus for peace. But the United States cannot expect the rule of law to prevail in international relations until it is prepared to adhere strictly to its own constitutional processes regarding force and to recognize when its use of force violates basic humanitarian principles. Vietnam is only the most glaring example of the inadequacy of violence as a means of furthering American ideals. Violence in Vietnam

must be ended, not perpetuated by Vietnamization, an ignoble end in itself. Fears of a bloodbath or a U.S. loss of face must not deter prompt and positive action to replace military aid with massive civil aid to rehabilitate and develop Vietnam.

290

Ezemenari, F. R. C., and J. R. Prescott. AUTUMNAL PEAK IN ^{109}Cd FALLOUT IN PRECIPITATION AT CALGARY, CANADA. *Journal of geophysical research*, v. 75, Sept. 20, 1970: 5271-5275.

QC811.J6, v. 75

After the the mononuclear explosion of July 9, 1962, at 400 km over Johnston Island (17°N, 169°W) in which some ^{109}Cd was specially produced, measurements were made at the University of Calgary to determine the concentration of ^{109}Cd in precipitation since early 1964. The results showed a late summer to fall peak as well as the well-known spring maximum in radioactive fallout. Profiles of total β activity in Calgary precipitation also indicated late summer to fall increases during cessation of nuclear testing in 1963 and 1964. (Abstract supplied)

291

Fleckenstein, Bernard. [THE 1969 YEARLY REPORT OF THE DEPUTY FOR DEFENSE] Der Jahresbericht 1969 des Wehrbeauftragten. *Wehrkunde*, v. 19, June 1970: 290-293. U3.W396, v. 19

Describes the 1969 report of the Bundestag deputy charged with representing the parliamentary interest in the supervision of the German Armed Forces, a functionary described as "the social and societal conscience of the Bundeswehr." This report goes beyond the specifics of an annual report to consideration of possible future developments of the Bundeswehr in a highly developed industrial country with a dynamic social structure. Particular attention is given to seeking out effective methods of controlling the conflicts inherent in the unique social situation represented by the armed forces.

292

Freudenthal, Peter C. STRONTIUM 90 CONCENTRATIONS IN SURFACE AIR: NORTH AMERICA VERSUS ATLANTIC OCEAN FROM 1966 TO 1969. *Journal of geophysical research*, v. 75, July 20, 1970: 4089-4096.

QC811.J6, v. 75

Strontium 90 in surface air has been measured continually for three years, February 1966 to January 1969, at four North Atlantic Ocean weather stations to compare fallout processes over the ocean with those over land. Between 35°N and 55°N, concentrations over land were an average 1.1 times greater than those over the ocean. The relative concentration varied with both season and latitude, being greater in the north and during the summer. This variation seems to correlate better with monsoonal meteorological processes with the suggested process of aerosol scavenging by ocean spray. (Abstract supplied)

293

Gilbert, Charles. AMERICAN FINANCING OF WORLD WAR I. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Pub. Corp. [c1970] xix, 259 p. (Contributions in economics and economic history, no. 1)

EJ257.G54

Contents.--Preface.--Basic problems in war finance.--The effect of the outbreak of the war on the American economy.--Prosperous neutrality.--The eve of war finance.--Taxation and war finance.--War expenditures and revenues.--Defense revenue and the war revenue act of 1917.--The war revenue act of 1918.--The Liberty and Victory Loans.--Treasury certificates of indebtedness.--War savings certificates.--Conversions, redemptions, and retirements of the Liberty and Victory Loans.--The effects of the war loan program on the banking system.--Economic effects of war finance.--Evaluation of World War I finance.--Bibliography.--Index.

Analyses the problems involved in financing a major war in a democratic, capitalist country and presents a history of the specific methods employed by the U.S. Government to finance World War I. Gilbert concludes by comparing America's financing of the war with that of other belligerents, with the financing of other major U.S. wars, and with the theoretical standards of war-financing procedures.

294

Gutteridge, William. A COMMONWEALTH MILITARY CULTURE? SOLDIERS IN THE BRITISH MOULD. Round table; the Commonwealth quarterly, no. 239, July 1970: 327-327. AP4.R6, 1970

The assumption of political power by African officers has focused attention on the European military traditions to which these officers have been exposed. However, generalizations must be made with caution, since training and the professional ethos interact with local social and political conditions. While military training in a foreign country profoundly affects those undergoing it, the question is how they interpret the manifestations of the teaching culture. Variations in political behavior of African military forces are sufficient to place in question the attribution of all military behavior to the preconditioning of army education. The influence of what may be termed a "Commonwealth military culture" stemming from Britain shows itself in the relative ease of communication and understanding in situations involving international cooperation and the abstention from guerrilla activities or subversion of other states by soldiers trained in the British tradition.

295

Kass, Gerhard. [ON SOME ERRORS IN THE INTEGRATION OF THE SOLDIER INTO SOCIETY] Zu einigen Irrtümern über die Integration des Soldaten in der Gesellschaft. *Wehrkunde*, v. 19, May 1970: 261-262. U3.W396, v. 19

The concept that the soldier ought to be indistinguishable from the society he protects should

not be termed "integration." To place the soldier in the statistical middle of a pluralistic society is to demilitarize him. True integration is achieved when the soldier feels he belongs fully to the society he protects. The military man is integrated also in the sense that he has the right to have his professional interests represented to the makers of state policy. The effort for integration must seek the optimum of societal identification and combat efficiency.

296

Haji, William C., and Carsten M. Naaland. IN THE SHADOW OF GROUND ZERO. In Canada. Emergency Measures Organization. EMO national digest, v. 10, Apr./May 1970: 16-18.

UA926.C295, v. 10

By implementing basic civil defense measures the fatalities and injuries from a nuclear blast can be reduced, and the postattack recovery of a nation can be ensured. Hardened shelters can provide protection for people located 1,500 feet from the origin of a 1-megaton detonation, while at a distance of 2 miles a person can survive without the benefit of a special structure providing he ducks "immediately into the shadow of something, anything—a car, a building, or even a utility pole." The most uncertain hazard of the blast is radioactive fallout; a city shelter or even an improvised lean-to can offer protection.

297

Holmes, R. RADIATION PROTECTION CONGRESS. Nuclear engineering, v. 15, July/Aug. 1970: 620-622.
TK9001.N75, v. 15

Reports on activities of the Second International Radiation Protection Association Congress, which met at Brighton, England, May 3-8, 1970. Its principal business was the presentation of more than 300 scientific papers relating to the protection of man and his environment from the potential hazards of ionizing radiation. These papers will be published at a later date. The Congress gave "the satisfactory impression that a conscientious and non-complacent profession was not likely to omit by default or negligence any factors likely to hazard the public" and ought to have convinced "critics (particularly, those in the United States) that the potential hazards of radiation are under constant and professional surveillance and that little benefit will be gained by recourse to the distorting influences of politics and law."

298

Karter, Phillip. DEFERENCE, THE ARM, AND STABILITY IN ASIA. Air Force and space digest, v. 53, Oct. 1970: 60-61.
UG633.A65, v. 53

The deployment of new Soviet offensive and defensive missile systems erodes America's capacity to inflict unacceptable damage in a retaliatory attack and heightens the necessity for precautionary U.S. antiballistic missile (ABM) deployment to deter the American deterrent. Yet the administration's argument in favor of Safeguard stressed

protection against Chinese, not Soviet, attacks. If the Government can rely on a second-strike capability to deter the Soviets, why not assume that China, too, can be deterred from a first strike? The American nuclear umbrella over Japan and India is necessary not because of an altruistic desire to protect them or because of responsibilities assumed under the nuclear nonproliferation treaty but because these guarantees could avert the nuclearization of India and Japan. However, as American cities become vulnerable to Chinese ICBM's, the credibility of America's nuclear guarantee will diminish. Japan and India would find "the temptation to provide for their own nuclear security will undoubtedly grow in direct proportion to the retraction of our deterrent." If the United States fails to deploy a limited area ABM system, its cities will eventually be vulnerable to Chinese missiles, unleashing "a nuclear anarchy that will inevitably engulf us in catastrophe."

299

Kennedy, Edward M. SENATOR KENNEDY URGES HALT TO ARMS RACE. Congressional record (daily ed.) 91st Congress, 2d session, v. 116, May 28, 1970: S7997-S7999.
J11.R52, v. 116

Text of a speech delivered at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, May 1970.

The Nixon administration is undermining the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) by insisting on immediate deployment of the ABM and MIRV. Secretary of Defense Laird's contention that failure to deploy these weapons would jeopardize U.S. security is simply untrue--Polaris submarines alone, which the Secretary himself proclaims to be invulnerable, provide a more than adequate second-strike capability. The vulnerability of missile-site radars makes questionable whether Safeguard could protect Minuteman missiles. Even assuming it would work, Safeguard is an unnecessarily expensive method for assuring a second-strike capability. In any event, the radioactive fallout from a successful ABM defense would kill a large portion of America's population within a generation. An anti-Chinese ABM system is not necessary to make U.S. Asian commitments credible, as Secretary Laird contends, and it is sheer parochialism to pretend that the Chinese are so irrational that they would risk the total destruction of China by attacking the United States. President Nixon's prediction that Safeguard would be "virtually infallible" against a Chinese attack is wholly unrealistic. Moreover the deployment of the thousands of ABM interceptors necessary for a credible anti-Chinese system would surely compel the Russians to increase their strategic forces. Deployment of MIRV in the middle of the SALT talks is provocative and unnecessary for the Nation's security. If no agreement is reached with the Soviet Union and it becomes necessary to deploy MIRV's at a later date, this can be done on short notice. Whatever the outcome of the SALT talks, the Nixon administration is pursuing an unwise strategic-arms policy by prematurely escalating the arms race and increasing tensions with the Soviet Union. Deployment of MIRV's by the United States will seriously upset the strategic balance and probably lead the Soviet Union to resort to a launch-on-warning system, thus increasing the possibility of accidental nuclear war. Congress must enforce a

62 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

freeze on deployment of the ABM and MIRV by cutting off funds for these weapons.

300

Kilmarx, Robert A. ABM & MIRV IN THE CONTEXT OF SALT. Vital speeches of the day, v. 36, July 15, 1970: 602-604. PN6121.V53, v. 36
Delivered at the Georgetown University Annual Alumni Seminar, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., June 12, 1970.

If opponents of further advances in military technology have their way, the United States may soon find itself in a precarious strategic position. Imagine the following scenario in 1978: The Soviet Union has greatly expanded its submarine fleet and equipped it with long-range missiles, while the United States retains only 41 aging submarines. Soviet progress on MIRV and ABM has been substantial, while the United States long ago halted MIRV deployment, and Congress cancelled further development of the ABM system. Agreements on strategic arms limitation were indeed negotiated, but blind faith on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union's closed society enabled the latter to improve its strategic position despite these agreements. U.S. expenditures on military research and development, which began to decline even before the strategic arms limitation talks, at the very time that Soviet expenditures were increasing, have resulted in Soviet superiority in military technology. That such a scenario is not unrealistic is evidenced by the current impact of defense budget cuts and of university turmoil on basic research and development. If this trend continues, the United States may soon lack the scientific-technological base to compete effectively with the Soviet Union in strategic armaments.

301

Kreus, Melvin. (SOVIET PATRIOTISM AS A MILITARY FACTOR) Der sowjetische Patriotismus als militärischer Faktor. Wehrkunde, v. 19, Sept. 1970: 449-450. US.W396, v. 19

The training given in the Soviet paramilitary youth groups and in the organizations preparing reserve officers emphasizes political indoctrination. In addition to its exploitation of the most modern and complex military technology, this training is also characterized by its increasing concern with the use of military symbols. Military traditions like martial music, honor guards, and elaborate uniforms, once rejected as remnants of the old regime, are now aggressively promoted. The Soviet military press preaches internationalism abroad and nationalism within its frontiers. The potential conflict between these two concepts in a Sino-Soviet dispute, for example, will quickly be resolved in favor of nationalism.

302

Lapp, Ralph E. CUTTING THE PENTAGON DOWN TO SIZE. New republic, v. 163, Aug. 22/29, 1970: 16-20. AP2.N624, v. 163

critique of this year's Report on Military Spending (summarized in the July 31, 1970 issue

of the Congressional Record and cited elsewhere in this issue). by the organization Members of Congress for Peace Through Law. Lapp concludes that by zeroing in on Defense Department program-cost estimates, the study "performs a most valuable service for the Congress as it attempts to draw together the pursestrings on the defense budget." An offshoot of this bipartisan congressional study has been the creation of an "invisible college of defense knowledge" on Capitol Hill that will provide uninformed congressmen with reliable information on new weapons projects requested by the Pentagon.

303

Lifton, Robert Jay. FALSE GOD. Atlantic Monthly, v. 226, Oct. 1970: 104-106, 109-110. AP2.A8, v. 226

Man's experience of symbolic immortality in the face of inevitable biological death is expressed through identification with one's children or group or belief in an afterlife, through human inventions and creations, through immersion in nature, and through psychic transcendence, all of which affect man's everyday life, consciously or not. The possibility of nuclear war raises the prospect of severing all forms of symbolic immortality. "Nuclearism"--"the passionate embrace of nuclear weapons as a solution to our anxieties"--offers an apparent means of restoring this lost sense of immortality. It is a secular, apocalyptic religion that has won many converts since the first atomic bomb was exploded at Nagasaki in July 1945. One particularly baneful consequence of nuclearism has been the phenomenon of psychic numbing, a defense mechanism by which one becomes psychologically desensitized to human suffering and even to the death of the species. Nuclearism thus leads to a peculiarly acute gap between the capacity for technological violence and moral indignation. The nuclear deity must be desacralized and the necessary psychological boundaries between man and his destructive tools reestablished.

304

LIMBERING UP FOR AN OLYMPIAN DEFEAT, by our Washington correspondent. Nature (London) v. 227, Aug. 1, 1970: 433-434. Q1...2, v. 227

Reports on testimony taken by the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Science, Research and Development in its investigation of U.S. science policy. The Mansfield Amendment, which has restricted mission-oriented agency support for research to matters directly relevant to agency needs, has had a shattering impact upon American science. There was general agreement among those testifying that the U.S. scientific edifice, "though proud and massive, is not built according to coherent principle." Dismay at the cancellation of important research projects by the U.S. Air Force, at the present state of irrational attacks on science and technology, and at the prospect of a too-rigid separation of the mission-oriented agencies, particularly the Department of Defense, from basic research programs was also voiced.

305

Mikschke, Ferdinand O. (THE NEED FOR SIMPLIFICATION) Vereinfachung tut rot. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 6, June 1970: 335-336.

U3.W38, v. 6

Tackles the vicious circle presented by the growing cost of weapon systems, their high susceptibility to failure due to their extreme sensitivity, rising upkeep and operating costs and the resulting inability to equip either the regular or the reserve units adequately. Although this analysis of the situation is entirely realistic, it leads to some curious conclusions. The solution lies in simplifying not only the actual systems, but also the present forms of organization, command structures and equipment (and tailoring the latter to fit the mission). (Abst. act supplied, modified)

306

THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY. Edited by Omer L. Carey. (Pullman) Washington State University Press (c1969) 66 p. HC110.D4M5

Earlier versions of four of the five papers were presented at the 14th Annual Institute of World Affairs, Washington State University, Pullman, Wash., March 20-21, 1969.

Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents.--The defense establishment: vested interests and the public interest, by Samuel P. Huntington.--The military-industrial complex and the industrial state, by Walter Adams.--The military-industrial complex: an economic analysis, by Murray L. Weidenbaum.--The military-industrial complex: 1969, by Ralph E. Lapp.--Politics, policy and the military-industrial complex, by Patrick M. Morgan.

Analyses of the role of the military-industrial complex in U.S. domestic and foreign policy. Huntington reviews the emergence of the military-industrial complex as a vested interest in U.S. society and expresses concern that antimilitarism may encourage the trend toward greater internal cohesiveness and concentration of power, thereby adversely affecting the quality of the defense sector. Adams argues "that industrial concentration is not the inevitable outgrowth of economic and technical forces" but rather "is often the result of unwise, man-made, discriminatory, privilege-creating governmental action." Weidenbaum examines the relationship between the military and private sectors of the economy and proposes measures to reduce the possible harmful effects of this relationship. Lapp emphasizes the importance of the military-industrial complex in U.S. politics and concludes that reform of the military must originate with Congress, not the President. Morgan finds that the military-industrial complex is not unique to the United States and seeks to place its long-term effects in historical perspective.

maps.

JAB57.S1M5

Cover title.

Includes bibliographical references.

Partial contents.--Introduction.--The arms build-up.--The international arms embargo.--South Africa's armed power.--Western help for South Africa's militarisation.--Internal arms production.--South Africa's nuclear potential.--South Africa's role in Africa.--The white alliance.--Portugal's African war.--NATO weapons.--Neighboring African states.--Evolving entente relationships.--The British stake in South Africa.--South Africa's military calculations.--Hemispheric power.--SATO. South Africa's military posture.--South Africa's Monroe doctrine.--Western recognition for regional power?--Regional intervention in African states?--Conclusion.--Appendix.

Even in the absence of a formal military agreement, the major Western powers could be easily drawn into the South African conflict. As their ties with South Africa grow, Western governments will become increasingly reluctant to back international sanctions against South Africa and might eventually intervene directly to preserve the status quo there. "The outbreak of widespread violence inside South Africa will further unite the coloured world against South Africa and these Governments which render it aid and comfort--with all the grave implications of a global racial confrontation which can only spell disaster for humanity as a whole."

308

Moot, Robert C. SECURITY ON A BUDGET. O'finance, v. 55, July/Aug. 1970: 48-51.

UPL067, v. 55

Outlines Department of Defense (DOD) planning and budgetary procedures, including the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System and the Five-Year Defense Program. Moot sees five major changes in these procedures since Secretary Laird assumed office: the introduction of National Security Council advice at key points, an emphasis on economic realism at an earlier stage of the planning process, greater involvement by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, more responsibility for analytical input by the services, and lengthening of the planning cycle by about four months. He notes that Federal spending for domestic programs has risen faster than defense spending during the past decade, but since defense spending accounts for two-thirds of the controllable portion of the budget it has necessarily borne the brunt of anti-inflationary budget cuts. Present DOD estimates call for reductions of \$6.9 billion and 1.3 million military and civilian personnel by June 1971, and more emphasis is being placed on fiscal efficiency than in the past.

309

KRO, AAAS TO REPORT ON VIETNAM DEFOLIATION, by our Washington correspondent. Nature (London) v. 228, Oct. 10, 1970: 108-109.

Q1.N2, v. 228

Reports on a proposed study by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) of the "danger inherent in the use of herbicides" and on the preliminary

results of a similar study undertaken by the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). Both groups have attempted to measure the effects of U.S. defoliation and crop-destruction programs in Vietnam, where the powerful herbicides, picloram, cacodylic acid, 2,4-D, and 2,4,5-T have been in use on an unprecedented scale for several years. The AAAS study, the results of which are to be made public at the Association's annual meeting in December, has been hampered by the refusal of Defense Department officials to release key information relating to the Vietnam program. Should IAC be confronted with similar restrictions, it too may have difficulty in producing a meaningful study.

310

Nathusius, Klaus. (DEFENSE AND THE ECONOMY; SOME INFLUENCES OF THE MAINTENANCE OF COMBAT FORCES ON THE NATIONAL ECONOMY) Militär und Wirtschaft; Einige Einflüsse der Unterhaltung von Streitkräften auf die Volkswirtschaft eines Landes. Wehrkunde, v. 19, Sept. 1970: 476-480.

U3.W395, v. 19

Expenditures on armaments make up a very significant part of the national income of most countries and so can be used to curb inflation, prime the pump during depression, determine the rate of growth of the gross national product, and even influence foreign relations. In addition, arms expenditures can influence the national economy in indirect ways. For example, installations like airports or harbors originally designed for military use may have value for the civilian economy. The scale of military purchasing is so large that private industry often benefits from prior military purchases in "decreasing cost industries." Industry also benefits from the technical training given the conscript during his service. On the other hand, conscription takes a large body of potentially highly productive workers out of the labor market. The NATO countries coordinate armament research and development so that an exchange of international "know-how" takes place. Military expenditures in research and development, even though they make up a very small part of the military budget, have a very special influence on the national economy in revealing new materials and new management techniques. This spinoff is an important factor in determining the increase of the technological component of the national product. Conversion of research and development to a peacetime basis will not necessarily destroy it, but the appropriate manner of this conversion remains to be demonstrated.

311

Orians, Gordon H., and Eibert W. Pfeiffer. ECOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM. Science, v. 168, May 1, 1970: 544-554. illus.

Q1.S35, v. 168

Bibliographical footnotes.

Assesses the effects of defoliation, crop destruction, B-52 bombing, and other military activities on the ecology of Vietnam. The authors describe various types of defoliants, their methods of application, and their effects on target areas ranging from mangrove and rubber trees to upland

forests. They conclude that the massive use of chemical weapons in Vietnam has had severe ecological consequences destructive to both human life and the environment. The U.S. military, which is convinced that defoliation is an effective counter-guerrilla weapon and which has restricted its use only through lack of personnel and equipment, may very well expand its use in future wars. This focus on military effectiveness ignores the enormous social and ecological consequences of chemical warfare, which have intensified Vietnamese antipathy toward the United States. American scientists have an obligation to Vietnamese scientists to investigate and publicize thoroughly the long-term effects of the military uses of herbicides.

312

Packard, David [Interview]. MILITARY SPENDING: IMPACT ON BUSINESS. U.S. news & world report, v. 19, Aug. 3, 1970: 44-48.

JRI.069, v. 69

Touches upon various aspects of defense spending in the United States. The probable effects of a termination of the Vietnam War, the draft and creation of an all-volunteer Army, conversion of defense industries to peaceful uses, the place of defense contracts in the civilian economy, the control of waste and inefficiency, and the role of the Defense Department in civilian education and research and development are some of the topics discussed. Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard sees little probability of a cutback in U.S. defense spending over the next few years unless the Nation is willing to adopt a "Fortress America" strategy, which would permit substantial savings from the reduction of conventional forces.

313

Parenti, Michael. THE ANTI-COMMUNIST IMPULSE. New York, Random House [1969]. 333 p.

E183.7.F2 1970

Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Introduction.--The conflicting communisms.--The demon Communist.--America the virtuous.--Anti-communism as an American way of life.--The liberal and conservative orthodoxies.--Virtue faces the world.--The holy crusade: some myths of origin.--Sacred doctrine and self-fulfilling prophecy.--The yellow demon I.--The yellow demon II.--Vietnam: who? why?--Revolution and counter-revolution.--Profit, prestige, and self-preservation.--Moral imperialism.--The tragic success.--The martial state.--Civil defense: kill a neighbor.--The devil moves east.

A critique of the effects of anticommunism on American domestic and foreign policies. Parenti examines the origins and development of U.S. anti-communism, which has become the orthodox political outlook of liberals and conservatives alike. He contends that Americans have grossly exaggerated and misunderstood the alleged Communist threat and rationalized "any number of heinous actions in order to counter the 'menace'; thereby they perpetrating greater human miseries and dangers than the one they allegedly seek to eradicate and they become the very evil they profess to combat."

314

Proxmire, William. *REPORT FROM WASTELAND; AMERICA'S MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX*. Foreword by Paul H. Douglas. New York, Praeger (1970) xv, 245 p. illus. H0110.D4P76

Contents.--Preface.--The power of the Pentagon.--Patriots in trouble.--Blank check for the military.--Budget review: ask not the reason why.--Congress: pushover for the Pentagon.--Men in the military-industrial complex; part one: civilians in the Pentagon.--Men in the military-industrial complex; part two: officers in industry.--How tall is the adversary?--Future megatonnage: action and reaction.--Bringing the military budget under control.--Appendix.--Index.

Criticizes wasteful and excessive defense spending in the United States. Proxmire contends that effective controls over defense spending, which neither the Bureau of the Budget nor Congress has thus far exercised, would increase rather than decrease the Nation's security. He recommends various procedural, institutional, and substantive changes to improve the efficiency of defense spending and insure civilian control of the military.

315

Rehm, Walter. [KARL JASPERS AND THE MILITARY] Karl Jaspers und das Militär. *Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau*, v. 20, June 1970: 347-356. U3.W485, v. 20

Considers Jaspers' ideas on "soldierhood." Jaspers recognized the reality of violence, asserting that believers in absolute non-violence are bound to fall into violent hands. Although the soldier increasingly becomes a technician and fights not for his country but for humanity, the old characteristics, such as loyalty and self-sacrifice, remain important. Currently, soldiers tend to form their own political opinions, and some think that since they hold the means of destruction, they might very well disobey the politician's orders to destroy. Jaspers himself cautioned that we may not rely on this "fantastic idea." Negative aspects notwithstanding, Jaspers believed in the necessity for a German army. He was very much concerned with the soldier as a "moral human being" and his difficulty in accepting "the absurdity" that he must prepare for war in order to prevent it. This has been spoken of as an almost passive interpretation of the soldier's life work, but as a view that truly make his efforts worthwhile and moral.

316

Schilling, Jürgen. [THE POLITICAL MISSION OF THE BUNDESWEHR] Der politische Auftrag der Bundeswehr. *Wehrkund.*, v. 19, Apr. 1970: 179-184. U3.W396, v. 19

Justifies recent complaints by military spokesmen that Germany has imposed a mission upon the Bundeswehr without recognizing all the consequences of that mission or providing the means for carrying it out. Schilling criticizes the present ambiguity of the military mission and public failure to accept its consequences, the scanty provi-

sion of men and money, and the internal organization of the armed forces in relation to their mission. Because public opinion is the ultimate determinant of military morale and the will to national self-defense, society must reconcile its love of individual liberty with the imperative requirements of management and administration. The viability of the pluralistic society will be determined by whether or not it places the common interest first and establishes the order of priority of its goals.

317

Smith, Robert B. *REBELLION AND REPRESSION AND THE VIETNAM WAR*. In *American Academy of Political and Social Science. Philadelphia. Collective violence. Philadelphia, 1970. (Its Annals, v. 391, Sept. 1970) p. 156-167.*

H1.A4, v. 391

Aspects of the domestic social costs of the Vietnam war are studied by relating differences in attitude about the war to tolerance for rebellion and support for repressions. Attitudes about the war define three social types: the disaffected doves strongly oppose the war; the harassed hawks are strongly committed to it; and the silent majority is in the middle. The doves are more concerned about domestic problems, take a more liberal position on civil rights and social welfare, and have greater tolerance for rebellion. Surprisingly, the silent majority is almost as tolerant as the doves. Both are considerably more tolerant than the hawks. Four test factors also affect tolerance for rebellion. These are: attitudes favorable to civil rights, membership in an ethnic minority, high socio-economic status, and being less than forty years of age. These test factors also specify the original relationship between attitude about the war and tolerance. The overall effects on tolerance of being a dove is increased whenever a category of a test factor predisposes toward tolerance. Whenever a category predisposes toward repression, the doves are less tolerant and are similar to the silent majority. (Abstract supplied)

318

Welch, Claude E., comp. *SOLDIER AND STATE IN AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MILITARY INTERVENTION AND POLITICAL CHANGE*. Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1970. 320 p.

U4855.W45 1970

Bibliography: p. 302-309.

Contents.--Introduction.--The roots and implications of military intervention, by Claude E. Welch.--The military and politics: Dahomey and Upper Volta, by W. A. E. Skarrik.--Congo-Kinshasa: General Mobutu and two political generations, by Jean-Claude Williams.--Aims and politics in Ghana, by Jon Kraus.--The Algerian Army in politics, by I. William Zartman.--The military and political change in Africa, by Pierre L. Van Den Berghe.--Appendixes: Armed strength and defense expenditures of African states in 1966. Violence and military involvement in African politics from independence through 1968.--Glossary of acronyms.

Articles on the causes of military involvement in African politics and on the impact of military

rule in particular African states. Attempts by the civilian leadership to intervene in the internal affairs of the military, together with the general weakness of the civilian regimes themselves, are the major causes of intervention. The military becomes "imbued with the sense of an identity separate from that of the civilian government" and feels it has "a unique duty to safeguard the national interest undermined by the politicians in control." The new military regimes are still too untried and the state of political analysis too primitive to predict the future course of African politics.

319

Williams, P. M., J. A. McGowan, and M. Stuiver.
BOMB CARBON-14 IN DEEP SEA ORGANISMS. *Nature*
(London) v. 227, July 25, 1970: 375-376.
Q1.N2, v. 227

Results of a study in which "incorporation of . . . carbon-14 into marine phytoplankton through photosynthesis, and so into zooplankton and higher trophic levels in the food chain, [was] used to determine the flux of organic carbon from the euphotic zone (0-100 m) into the deep sea and into the bottom sediments." The carbon-14 found in surface seawater is a product of the extensive nuclear weapons tests conducted in 1961 and 1962.

320

York, Herbert F. *RACE TO OBLIVION; A PARTICIPANT'S VIEW OF THE ARMS RACE*. New York, Simon and Schuster [1970] 256 p. UA23.Y67 1970

Contents.--Introduction. Prologue: Eisenhower's other warning. The arms race and I.--pt. 1. Toward a balance of terror: The race begins: nuclear weapons and overkill. The bomber bonanza. The elusive nuclear airplane. Rockets and missiles. Sputnik. Missile-gap mania. The McNamara era.--pt. 2. Unbalancing the balance of terror: MIRV: the multiple menace. The defense delusion. Other lessons from the ABM debate. The ultimate absurdity.--A glossary of acronyms.--Index.

An account of the strategic arms race since World War II, focusing on the major events in the development of U.S. strategic weapons and the author's role in these events. York maintains "that excessive prudence and technological hard-sell have led to unnecessary overreaction in case after case." In part 2 he discusses four technological innovations of the 1960's (improvement in the reliability and accuracy of strategic missiles and the development of MIRV's and ABM's) that have produced "a situation which is at once wondrously absurd and exceedingly dangerous, and which no one, neither the most sanguine weapons fancier nor the most cerebral strategic analyst, ever intended." The ultimate absurdity of this is twofold: the security of both superpowers has decreased despite massive increases in defense expenditures, and the power of decision for the use of these weapons "is in the process of passing from statesmen and politicians to lower-level officials and technicians and, eventually, to machines." Primary responsibility for the rate and scale of the arms race lies with the United States, not because it is less sensitive to the dangers, but because it is wealthier and more powerful and possesses a more dynamic scientific and technological capacity.

III. INSTITUTIONS AND MEANS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

INTERNATIONAL LAW

321

Anand, Ram P. STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION. (Delhi) Vikas Publications (1969) 298 p.
JX1952.A69

Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--The United States and the World Court.--India and the World Court. Attitude of the 'new' Asian-African countries towards the International Court of Justice.--The International Court of Justice and impartiality between nations.--International status of South-West Africa.--The International Court of Justice and the development of international law.--The role of individual and dissenting opinion in international adjudication.--The Kutch award.--Execution of international judicial awards: experience since 1915.--Index.

A collection of the author's articles on the role of international adjudication in the settlement of disputes. International law has vast, unexploited potentialities and is "definitely one of the promising approaches to peace."

322

Baroch, Charles T. THE SOVIET DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGNTY. (THE SO-CALLED BREZHNEV DOCTRINE). (Chicago) American Bar Association, Standing Committee on Education about Communism and its Contrast with Liberty under Law (c1970) 25 p.
JX4041.B365

Contents.--Introduction.--The Czechoslovak test case.--Marxist-Leninist concept of state, law and sovereignty.--Marxist-Leninist concept of sovereignty and its impact on international law.--Conclusion.--Notes.

Argues that the Soviet doctrine of limited sovereignty has long been an integral concept of Soviet international legal theory. The so-called Brezhnev doctrine is thus only its most recent application. Baroch reviews the origins of the concept and its function in the Marxist-Leninist view of society.

323

Bender, John C. SELF-DEFENSE AND CAMBODIA: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL. Boston University law review, v. 50, spring 1970: 130-139.
LL

Not all the reasons given by the Nixon administration for U.S. intervention in Cambodia are consistent with the international legal concept

of self-defense. Whereas the concept of self-defense requires that the threat of an attack be imminent, particularly in the case of preemptive action on the territory of a neutral state, President Nixon indicated that the purpose of intervention was to forestall possible future attacks after U.S. combat troops are withdrawn from Vietnam. The United States did not exhaust alternative measures of dealing with the threat even though such alternatives appear to have been available. The stated limitations on the Cambodian operations were in accord with the principle of proportionality as required by the concept of self-defense, but the actual scope of these operations has exceeded what can reasonably be justified in the name of this concept. Having previously invoked the right of collective self-defense as the basis of the Cambodian operations, it would at best be inconsistent to now claim other grounds, while "to assert that self-defense need not be based on the requirements of necessity and proportionality would be to establish a precedent destructive of requirements that have only too recently evolved to control the discretionary use of force by states."

324

Berman, Harold J. LAW AS AN INSTRUMENT OF PEACE IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. Stanford law review, v. 22, May 1970: 943-962.
LL

Traditional perspectives on international relations need to be supplemented by a more dynamic perspective of a developing world order, of challenge and response. Such a perspective would emphasize the common destiny of mankind and the need for common standards of conflict resolution. A comparison of Soviet and American approaches to international law elucidates the problems involved in creating internationally binding legal institutions. Soviet international legal theory differs from American in six basic respects: its emphasis on the right of each nation to decide which principles it will accept and its regard for treaties as virtually the exclusive source of international law, its straightforward equation of international legal principles with Soviet foreign policy interests, its treatment of economic issues as state concerns, its preference for principles that conform to Marxist social philosophy, its distinction between the nature of law in capitalist and Socialist society, and its view of law as an educational tool. The two countries are parties to various bilateral and multilateral treaties and participate together in international organizations and conventions, but the number of such contacts could and should be much greater in view of their status as world powers. Both would benefit by expanded cultural and trade relations. The

68 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

differences in Soviet and American concepts of law preclude the immediate establishment of universal legal standards, but an important step toward this end can be taken by promoting cooperation on all levels, including various forms of legal cooperation.

325

Falk, Richard A. *THE STATUS OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY*. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1970. xvi, 676 p.

JX3:10.F387

Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Introduction.--Acknowledgments.--pt. 1. An orientation toward the political setting of the international legal order: Opps and biases in contemporary theories of international law. The relevance of political context to the nature and functioning of international law: an intermediate view. Some notes on the consequences of revolutionary activity for the quality of international order.--pt. 2. Expanding horizons of authority in the international legal order: Confrontation diplomacy: Indonesia's campaign to crush Malaysia. An argument to expand the traditional sources of international law--with special reference to the facts of the South West Africa cases. On the quasi-legislative competence of the General Assembly. The authority of the United Nations to control nonmembers. Unilateral claims to use outer space and the development of world legal order. An explanation of the extraterritorial extension of American antitrust regulation.--pt. 3. Making international law effective in national and international arenas: Some thoughts on identifying and solving the problem of compliance with international law. On treaty interpretation and the New Haven approach: achievements and prospects. The South West Africa cases: an appraisal. The Sabbatino litigation and after: the complexity of the Supreme Court decision and the simplicity of the legislative epilogue. Domestic courts, international law, and foreign acts of states: executive prerogatives and judicial imperatives.--pt. 4. A plea for systematic procedures of inquiry: Some new approaches to the study of international law. Wolfgang Friedmann. Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas deP. Katzenbach. Kenneth S. Carlston. The recently independent states: a framework for systematic inquiry.--pt. 5. Strengthening the international legal order: Settling ocean fishing conflicts: the limits of "law reform" in a horizontal legal order. The prospects for world order: models of the future. The quest for world order and the Vietnam War: a second American dilemma. Observations on political loyalty at a time of world crisis.--Appendices.--Index.

Analyzes "the jurisprudential and sociopolitical foundations of modern international law," focusing on the distinctive features of the international legal order that has evolved since World War I. Falk emphasizes the need for a dynamic theory of international law that retains some degree of autonomy without losing its relevance to the conduct of international relations.

A. W. Sijthoff; Durham, N.C., Rule of Law Press, 1970. xx, 544 p. JX1555.Z5 1970c
Bibliography: p. 523-533.

Contents.--Soviet science of international law: its history and basic doctrines.--The state and the modern community of nations.--Jurisdiction.--Population.--Organs of international relations.--International organizations and the Soviet Union.--Soviet law of treaties.--Disputes.--Propaganda.--the permissible means of struggle.--International law and the Soviet Union.--List of selected treaties.--Index.

A study of the Soviet theory and practice of international law. Grzybowski stresses the role of Soviet diplomacy in shaping the Soviet doctrine of international law.

327

Jenks, Clarence W. *A NEW WORLD OF LAW? A STUDY OF THE CREATIVE IMAGINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW*. Harlow, Longmans, 1969. 341 p.

CX3225.J45

Bibliography: p. [301]-326.

Argues for a fresh approach to the study and practice of international law that will increase its effectiveness in a world undergoing rapid social and technological change. The tasks of the creative imagination are to restate the basic goals of international law in terms relevant to contemporary problems, to insure the continued growth of international law and institutions, and to suggest the best means of achieving a lawful and peaceful world order.

328

Kearney, Richard D., and Robert Dalton. *THE TREATY ON TREATIES*. American Journal of International Law, v. 64, July 1970: 495-561.

JX1.A6, v. 64

Describes the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as the "first essential element of infrastructure that has been worked out in the enormous task of codifying international law pursuant to Article 13 of the United Nations Charter." The order of discussion is conclusion and entry into force of treaties; observance, application, and interpretation of treaties; amendment and modification of treaties; invalidity, termination, and suspension of the operation of treaties; settlement of disputes; miscellaneous provisions; and depositaries, notifications, corrections, and registration. Kearney and Dalton conclude that the treaty has provided the mechanism to adjust the conflicting demands between the forces of stability and change "by codifying the doctrines of *jus cogens* and *rebus sic stantibus*" and strengthened the customary law rule by reasserting the principle of *pacta sunt servanda*.

329

Khlestov, O. N. *NEW FEATURES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF TREATIES*. Daily review; translations from the Soviet press, v. 16, July 3, 1970: supplement, [item] 1, 1-12.

Slav Rm

Translation from *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, no. 5, 1970.

Slav Rm

Aspects of international law specifically examined at the diplomatic conferences on the law of treaties held in Vienna in 1968 and 1969 included treaties and third parties, the invalidity of a treaty conflicting with a peremptory norm of international law (*jus cogens*), the doctrine of the fundamental change in circumstances (*rebus sic stantibus*), and the procedures for terminating treaties. In elaborating the first problem the delegations agreed that the freedom of action of nonsignatory third parties did not exclude the observance of a treaty forced upon a state committing an act of aggression and did not affect the most-favored-nation device. The listing of specific instances in which treaties might legally be terminated excludes boundary disputes. The Socialist countries and the Third World split on the attempt to require obligatory jurisdiction by the International Court of Justice and other supranational agencies on the termination of a treaty. The compromise propositions worked out by Nigeria and Ghana in the Convention on the Law of Treaties "can in no way enhance its authority and the stability of international treaties, although representatives of the Western countries . . . sedulously tried to prove the opposite."

330

Krüger-Sprengel, Friedhelm. (LIMITATIONS ON SOVEREIGNTY IN THE FRIENDSHIP TREATIES OF THE SOVIET UNION WITH THE SOCIALIST STATES: Souveränitätsbeschränkungen in Freundschaftsverträgen der Sowjetunion mit dem sozialistischen Staaten. Wehrkunde, v. 19, July 1970: 343-349.

U3.W396, v. 19

The recognition of West Germany's complete sovereignty (including the abrogation of the enemy-state clauses of the United Nations Charter) that is implied by the renunciation-of-force treaty would not be transferable to East Germany in the Soviet practice of international law. As a constituent member of the Socialist camp, the Pankow regime is subject to certain limitations that are exceptions to customary international relations but that the United Nations has recognized in practice. The May 6, 1970, Czech-Soviet treaty, with its broadly expanded definition of mutual assistance and acknowledgment of the Brezhnev doctrine, illustrates these deviations. Examination of Soviet treaties with Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Finland, China, Mongolia, Persia, and Afghanistan confirms the existence of a trend toward development of a specifically Socialist international law. Rumania will probably be the next country pressured to sign a treaty of "friendship, cooperation, and assistance," expressing the Soviet Union's understanding of these terms in the relationships of members of the Socialist bloc.

331

Mallison, William T. CLAIMS CONCERNING LAWFUL WEAPONS OF BELLIGERENT ATTACK. In *his* Studies in the law of naval warfare: submarines in general and limited wars. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. (U.S. Naval War College. International law series, v. 58) p. 151-159.

JX1295.U4, v. 58

An examination, undertaken as one phase of a study of the legal restraints on submarine and na-

val warfare, of restraints on the possession or use, in various contexts, of particular weapons systems. From a survey of the historical experience with efforts to abolish or limit armaments and an examination of particular issues relating to naval weapons systems and the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons in general and limited war contexts, Mallison concludes that such restraints as have existed have resulted from a weighing of considerations of humanity against military necessity, with the latter given preponderant consideration, the general criterion being that a weapon "must not cause a destruction of values which is disproportionate to the military advantage gained through its use." The record so far is not very encouraging, but it may not be relevant to an age of mass-destruction weapons when the impetus for arms control is so much greater.

332

Mallison, William T. STUDIES IN THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE: SUBMARINES IN GENERAL AND LIMITED WARS. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. 230 p. (U.S. Naval War College. International law studies, v. 58) JX1295.U4, v. 58
"NAVPERS 15031."
Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents.--Foreword.--Preface.--Short forms of references cited.--Submarine warfare and international law.--Claims concerning lawful combatants.--Claims concerning lawful areas of operation: submarine operational areas.--Claims concerning lawful objects and methods of belligerent attack.--Claims concerning lawful weapons of belligerent attack.--Appendix A. The London Naval treaty of 1930.--Appendix B. Document D8nitz-100.--Appendix C. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Ship-Wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949.--Index.--Table of cases.

A study of the legal restraints on submarine warfare as well as related issues raised by other types of naval warfare, arms control and disarmament efforts, chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons technology, and general and limited war. A major aim of the study is to convince naval officers and international lawyers of the effectiveness of law in minimizing the impact of international violence and of the compatibility of legal restraints with military efficiency. The need for more comprehensive measures including, ultimately, effectively sanctioned disarmament is also recognized.

333

Phillips, Orie L., and Eberhard P. Deutsch. PITFALLS OF THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION. American Bar Association Journal, v. 56, July 1970: 641-646.
LL

"Wholehearted concurrence in the lofty ideals that engender promotion of moral issues should not be permitted to substitute the ephemeral tissue of those ideals for the enduring fiber of constitutional limitations." The United States has joined in denouncing genocide but has so far wisely refrained from becoming party to a convention that would transfer jurisdiction in genocide cases to the United Nations or some other international

body. The Genocide Convention permits trial even when there is no allegation of government complicity. Its language is exceedingly vague, and political genocide was excluded as the result of a one-sided compromise between Communist and Western countries. Some supporters of the convention argue that a genocide case involving a U.S. citizen could only be tried in a U.S. court and that in any event there is little likelihood that an international tribunal for genocide cases will be established. The convention explicitly calls for mandatory extradition, however, and some U.S. officials have themselves recommended that an international penal tribunal be created. The trial of a U.S. citizen by an international court would deprive him of several constitutionally guaranteed rights. Attaching specific reservations to ratification of the convention would be futile, since the convention itself overrides the effect of such reservations. The Genocide Convention cannot deter genocide where it is most likely to occur, and it would jeopardize basic freedoms of Americans if the United States were to ratify it.

334

Ramundo, Bernard A. CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE LAW OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE: LEGAL CHARACTERIZATION IN THE SOVIET NATIONAL INTEREST. *Stanford law review*, v. 22, May 1970: 963-976.

JL

The contradictory nature of the Soviet law of peaceful coexistence was clearly revealed by the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and subsequent legal rationalizations of that act. The law of peaceful coexistence rests on two fundamental principles: peaceful coexistence, which applies to relations between socialist and capitalist states, and Socialist internationalism, which ostensibly governs relations between Socialist states. In sharp contrast to the Soviet emphasis since 1956 on the objectivity of law, the intervention in Czechoslovakia, which was justified as an act of "fraternal assistance," demonstrated the subordination of Soviet law to Soviet national interest. The Brezhnev doctrine seriously compromised such basic international legal principles as national sovereignty, nonintervention, and self-determination, and thereby dimmed the prospects for international law and order.

335

Rhynes, Charles S. THE GROWING "LAW FULLNESS" OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY: INTERNATIONAL LAW. Vital speeches of the day, v. 36, Oct. 1, 1970: 761-764. FN6121.V52, v. 36

Delivered before the 2d World Meeting on Medical Law, Washington, D.C., Aug. 18, 1970.

The most important indications that a peaceful world order may someday become a reality are the ever-growing number of international legal institutions and the tremendous growth in the body of international law. The trend is evident in such fields as international communications and trade and in the expanded role of international agencies and courts. A primary means of encouraging this trend would be to strengthen the International Court of Justice, which, for want of cases, lies dormant. This could be achieved by making the court more accessible, reducing the cost of using it, and increasing the scope of its jurisdiction

and activities. The World Peace Through Law Center stands in the forefront of those actively seeking a more lawful world.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

336

AUSTRALIA AND THE IAEA. In *Australia. Dept. of External Affairs*. Current notes on international affairs, v. 41, Mar. 1970: 104-111.

JX1162.A33, v. 41

Discusses current issues confronting the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as they affect Australian interests. These issues include the governing machinery of the Agency and moves for its revision; the expansion of nuclear power resources; the wider dissemination of nuclear technology; the proposed international service to provide nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes; and the IAEA's safeguards system and its responsibilities under Article III of the nonproliferation treaty. The Australian Government's view is that the IAEA should not become the central authority in the provision of peaceful nuclear explosions, though it might legitimately consult on procedures.

337

Borgese, Elizabeth M. LAST DAYS OF THE SUPERPOWERS. *Center Magazine*, v. 3, July 1970: 2-7.

Ber

Examines the question of United Nations reform and Charter revision. Borgese points out that the United Nations already has been changed in several fundamental ways since its founding in 1945, and she finds in one of these changes, the new voting power of the Third World in the General Assembly, reason to believe that "the widespread skepticism about the U.N. . . . may not be really justified." She suggests, nevertheless, that the aims for which the organization was founded--peace, development, sovereignty, property, and human rights--need to be reappraised, and she makes her own contribution thereto. She concludes by pointing out that the seabed and high seas raise the whole gamut of problems faced by the international community, and thus constitute a field in which to develop a new, future-oriented organization.

338

Cobb, Roger W., and Charles Elder. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: A REGIONAL AND GLOBAL STUDY. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston [1970] 160 p. (Cases in international politics)

JX1950.C62

Bibliography: p. 143-152.

Contents.--pt. 1. Integration theory and community development: Community formation in the international system. Approaches to the study of community integration. The components of integration theory.--pt. 2. The nature of the empirical studies: Research design and data acquisition.--pt. 3. Empirical findings: Mutual relevance and the impact of geophysical properties. Unit properties and mutual relevance. Systems properties and mutual relevance.--pt. 4. Review and conclusions: Two levels of community; a reappraisal.--Author index.--Subject index.

Considers the sources of integration theory at the nation-state level, provides a model for interrelating existing studies on community development, focuses on several levels of nation-state alignments, and develops a set of propositions that can be subjected to empirical verification. The authors hope that "more precise research designs will become prevalent in the future, so that speculations about trends in regional or world communities can be scrutinized in the light of empirical inquiry."

339

Giovannetti, Alberto. THE UNITED NATIONS' SILVER ANNIVERSARY. *Thought*, v. 45, summer 1970: 165-195.
AP2.F333, v. 45

Reviews the achievements and failures of the United Nations and assesses its future prospects. Giovannetti finds that the system of collective security on which the United Nations is based has been ineffective because of the conflict between national sovereignty and communal diplomacy. U.N. efforts at peacekeeping have foundered, largely as the result of inadequately defined peacekeeping rules, while its role in disarmament has been limited primarily to that of a public forum. The United Nations can become more effective only if the present balance of terror gives way to a strengthening of international authority.

340

Kewenig, Wilhelm. (GERMANY AND THE UNITED NATIONS) Deutschland und die Vereinten Nationen. *Europa Archiv*, v. 25, May 25, 1970: 339-346.
H639.L86, v. 25

The admission of both the Federal German Republic and the German Democratic Republic to the United Nations is inextricably connected with the problem of the international status of East Germany. Pankow's admission would in effect force Bonn to recognize that East Germany has all the attributes of a sovereign state. In the same way, the enemy-state clauses of the United Nations Charter would disappear when the Soviet Union accepted the admission of West Germany to the world organization. The admission of both Germanys to the United Nations would not end the authority of the victorious four powers, however. The Western powers can recognize East Germany only after carefully providing for the security of Berlin. Certainly the appearance on the world stage of two Germanys will complicate Bonn's foreign policy, but nullification of the Hallstein doctrine is necessary. In the long run, this realistic recognition of the existence of two Germanys may aid their reunification.

341

Mirimanoff, Jean. THE RED CROSS AND BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS. *International review of the Red Cross*, no. 111, June 1970: 321-315.
HW560.156, 1970

Reviews the role of the Red Cross and other international organizations in the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons. Mirimanoff notes the controversies over the types of chemical agents excluded by the 1925 Geneva Protocol and discusses some of the protocol's limitations. The Red Cross supports a broad interpretation of the Protocol and urges the adoption of new agreements

that would protect civilians from indiscriminate warfare and prohibit the use of weapons of mass destruction.

342

Sharma, G. N. AFRO-ASIAN GROUP IN THE U.N. Allahabad, Chaitanya Pub. House [1969] 411 p.
JX1977.2.A185

Contents.--Introduction.--Evolution of the Afro-Asian group in the UN.--The Suez question.--The Hungarian question.--The Lebanese question.--The Congo question.--Decolonization.--Racial discrimination in South Africa.--Reorganization of the principal UN organs.--Concluding observations.--Appendices.--Bibliography.--Index.

Reviews the formation of the Afro-Asian group in the United Nations and its role in problems of war and peace, colonialism, and racism during the period 1955-1963. Sharma notes the diversity of attitudes among Afro-Asians but stresses their common interest in achieving national autonomy vis-à-vis the major powers and in maintaining impartiality in the East-West ideological conflict.

343

Thant, U. THE UNIVERSALITY OF THE U.N.: GIVING THE CHARTER A CHANCE. *Vital speeches of the day*, v. 36, Aug. 15, 1970: 652-655.

FN6121.V52, v. 36
Delivered in San Francisco, June 26, 1970.

The mood of uncertainty and anxiety that characterizes the 25th anniversary of the United Nations' founding contrasts with the cautious optimism of only 15 years ago. Like many other institutions, the United Nations faces a crisis of confidence. New approaches and priorities are essential if it is to regain the confidence of the world and realize the ideals embodied in its charter. Collective responsibility must replace power politics as the basis of world order, for no nation has the power to rule the world or solve its problems alone. Membership in the United Nations must be made universal by bringing in the People's Republic of China and the divided nations. The major powers must resolve the Middle East conflict within the context of the U.N. Charter. Ideological exclusivism must be abandoned in favor of more tolerant approaches to social change. Economic aid must be internationalized and thus removed from the realm of power politics. Finally, the problems generated by a mushrooming technology must be diagnosed and dealt with collectively.

344

Toulemonde, Bernard. (COMMUNIST CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE UNITED NATIONS) L'attitude de la République populaire de Chine à l'égard de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Paris, Documentation française, 1968. 54 p. (Notes et études documentaires, no. 3497)
D411.F67 no. 3497
Bibliography: p. 50.

Divides the history of Communist China's relations with the United Nations into four stages: the arms offensive, 1949-1953; the offensive of charm, 1954-1957; retreatment, 1957-1963; and general attack, 1963 to the present. Toulemonde concludes that China has avoided completely severing contacts with the United Nations despite Peking's

verbal condemnations of the organization in recent years. The appendix lists documents exchanged between China and the United Nations.

INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY FORCES

345

Groom, John. [THE PEACEKEEPING ACTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS] Die friedenserhaltenden Aktionen der Vereinten Nationen. Schweizer Monatshefte, v. 5, Aug. 1970: 403-413.

AP32.S47, v. 5

Although other international or regional organizations concern themselves with peacekeeping, it is a task mainly for the United Nations, which can fulfill it successfully only if the countries in conflict agree to accept the U.N. solution and if the world body takes into account the desires for social change that caused the conflict. Can the United Nations maintain an existing government? Peacekeeping actions represent intervention, and cause many problems thereby. Therefore better peacekeeping procedures must be found for the four cases in which it is most relevant: conventional wars between states; armed disputes between the Great Powers; decolonization conflicts; and post-colonial crises within a state. A peacekeeping force could play a significant role when détente is reached in the East-West conflict, for example, in overseeing agreements on arms limitations. All too often only a peacekeeping force is organized when a crisis occurs. Its task is limited to avoiding escalation, in hopes of "freezing" the conflict. A U.N. mediator is needed as well. The task of the peacekeeping force must be clearly delineated: smother the conflict, play the role of a jury, freeze the conflict, legalize it, help one of the litigating parties (usually the status-quo party), fulfill the duties of a counsel-government, keep third parties out of the conflict, or internationalize the conflict. The impression that the United Nations is a party to the conflict, among other political and financial problems, encumbers its peacekeeping activities. What is needed is a standing peace-army, able to solve conflicts as soon as they arise.

346

Hill, R. J. COMMAND AND CONTROL PROBLEMS OF UN AND SIMILAR PEACEKEEPING FORCES. Ottawa, Dept. of National Defence, Directorate of Strategic Operational Research, Operational Research Division, 1968. 39, [12] i. illus. (ORD report, no. 68/R5) UA600.C28 no. 68/R5

Includes bibliographical references.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the command and control problems experienced by Peacekeeping Forces, in the hope that investigation may lead to eventual improvements in performance. There are several different kinds of Peacekeeping Force: some provide useful machinery for the control of international disputes; but several have suffered from serious command and control problems. The histories of the Forces are considered in some detail, to help delineate a number of problem areas and so provide guidance on the various improvements which are necessary. The discus-

sions turn around the Terms of Reference, organizational structures, equipment, and so on, required by Peacekeeping Forces if they are to fulfill the missions assigned to them. (Abstract supplied)

247

THE ROLE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING: REPORT OF A CONFERENCE AT DITCHLEY PARK, 16-19 MAY 1969, by Alan James, conference rapporteur. Enstone (Ox) J, Ditchley Foundation, 1969. 31 p. (Ditchley paper no. 20) JX1961.M7R57

Considers the role of force in maintaining international order and the significant changes that have taken place in recent decades concerning the place of force as an instrument of national policy. James reviews the part the superpowers and regional organizations play in stabilizing the world order and the proposals that could allow the United Nations to contribute to this objective. Some conference members conclude the United Nations presents an obstacle to the attainment of a safer international order, one in which states will be denied the right to use force. They advocate the establishment of a superior arrangement.

OTHER PROCESSES, PLANS, AND PROPOSALS

348

Burton, John. MEDIATION RECONSIDERED. In Macdonald, Norman, and others. Disarmament now. Three lectures given at a one-day Conference on Disarmament held jointly by the U.U. Association and the Friends Peace and International Relations Committee at Friends House N.W. 1 in November 1968. London, Friends Peace & International Relations Committee [1969] p. 6-10.

JX1974.M324

Discusses the inadequacies in traditional methods of resolving conflicts and calls for a greater allocation of resources for researching social and political problems. Burton deprecates third-party intervention, arbitration, conciliation, mediation, and good offices as methods of solving international disputes. He maintains that disputes can no longer be referred to courts for a judicial settlement, because they result from perceived relationships. An approach resembling that used in family or industrial counselling could prove effective in the resolution of these disputes.

349

Carroll, Berenice A., ed. PEACE RESEARCH IN HISTORY. Journal of peace research, no. 4, 1969. p. 288-400. A59.J6, 1969

A special issue.

Includes summaries in English and Russian.

Contents.--Introduction: history and peace research, by Ebernick A. Carroll.--How wars end: an analysis of some current hypotheses, by Berenice A. Carroll.--The Peace of Nicias, by Ronald P. Legon.--Ending the war of the Sicilian Vespers, by J. Lee Schneidman.--Ending the American Revolution: lessons for our time, by Richard B. Morris.--Portsmouth 1905: peace or truce? by J. A.

White.--Victory in modern war. by Raymond O'Connor.--The conference on peace research in history: a memoir, by F. Hilary Conroy.--Recent developments in the teaching of peace research and related areas in North America, by Sandi E. Cooper.--Book notes.

Draws historical analogies to examine the problem of war termination. Carroll's introduction describes the value of historical study in the achievement and maintenance of peace and outlines methods of inquiry into the relationship between historical study and social policy formulation.

350

Corbett, Percy E. FROM INTERNATIONAL TO WORLD LAW. Bethlehem, Pa., Dept. of International Relations, Lehigh University, 1969. 40 p. (Lehigh University. Dept. of International Relations. Research monograph no. 1.) JK31.O.C6F73

Surveys the roles of international business and the governmental and intergovernmental agencies of foreign aid, technical assistance, and economic development in an integration process that might one day culminate in effective world community under a common law. Corbett warns that the achievement of a world order will require difficult political decisions. He advocates a worldwide educational campaign to convince the peoples of the international community that effective centralization is indispensable to maintaining peace and security.

351

Czaja, Herbert. [SETTLEMENT WITH EASTERN EUROPE; APPROACH TO ACHIEVING EUROPEAN PEACE] Ausgleich mit Osteuropa; Versuch einer europäischen Friedensordnung. Stuttgart, Cservald [1969] 64 p. LD259.2.C9

Contents.--Introduction.--Present Christian duty toward peace.--The bases for achieving peace with our direct eastern neighbors.--The road toward a viable settlement.--Prerequisites for a settlement.--Tasks of the present.--Christian hope in a difficult situation.

Argues that if freedom is to survive, Germany will have to cooperate with its neighbors economically, scientifically, and culturally. Pope Pius XII and Pope John XXIII stressed the importance of human rights and the commonweal as means to overcome the differences between nations. Now, when cultural achievements and technological innovations are juxtaposed with power struggles, dehumanization, and horrible wars, it is more important than ever that all people, especially Christians, work toward a practical and lasting peace.

352

Czempiel, Ernst O. [PEACE AND PEACE RESEARCH] Friede und Friedensforschung. Vorgänge, v. 9, Mar. 1970: 109-110. AP30.V82, v. 9

With the help of Gustav Heinemann the Federal Republic of Germany has finally discovered peace research, although for years it has been widespread in other countries, and the International Society for Peace Research is a respected organization. Peace research encompasses the entire

discipline of international relations, for no subject is as crucial. Scientists speak of "negative peace," wherein war does not occur but other forms of economic and political violence continue to be used, and "positive peace," where justice is applied without violence and conflicts can be solved by compromises. Paradoxically, it is easier to determine and work toward the prerequisites of positive peace, especially on the social-political level. Although the "militants" are wrong in demanding social justice at the expense of peace, they correctly point out that lasting peace cannot be achieved without it. Social justice can be approached through increasing economic aid to developing countries, solving racial problems, and distributing income more justly.

353

Drinan, Robert A. VIETNAM AND ARMAGEDDON; PEACE, WAR AND THE CHRISTIAN CONSCIENCE. New York, Sheed and Ward [1970] 210 p.

WT736.2.D7
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Foreword.--Vatican II and war.--The American hierarchy and Vietnam: 1961.--The American hierarchy on war and peace: 1960.--Peace in Terra: the morality of war.--Did the just war theory die at the birth of the atomic age?--Unsolved problems: tyrannicide and revolution.--American Protestants and the morality of war -- Vatican III and war.--Judaism and the morality of war.--Hunger, poverty, and war.--Does America make war against communism or on behalf of capitalism? --American unilateralism, the United Nations, and world federalism.--America's lawlessness in the conduct of the Vietnam War.--Is pacifism the only option left for Christians?--Appendices.

Contents that "the existence of nuclear arms and the possession by the United States and by Russia of fantastically destructive biological and chemical weapons make the possibility of a 'just' war so remote that the Church could and should condemn war as morally objectionable." Drinan finds the statements of Catholic theologians on the morality of war, particularly the Vietnam War, unsatisfactory and evasive, and urges that a new ecumenical council of bishops and lay leaders be convened to clarify this problem. Recognizing the improbability of a bilateral disarmament agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, he advocates unilateral disarmament by the United States and reliance on passive resistance and militant nonviolence as alternative methods of defense.

354

Hanning, Hugh. DEFENCE AND DEVELOPMENT. London, Royal United Service Institution, 1970. 34 p. UN725.G7H3

Discusses various civic-action programs through which the military can contribute to promoting peace in developing countries. Hanning argues that both civilians and the military benefit from civic-action projects, not only through improved military-civilian relations but also by preventing the discontent that breeds violence. He concludes that Britain's Armed Forces should acquire a greater capacity for civic action because it would upgrade the forces' morale and add to the nation's stock of skilled manpower.

355

Hulton, Sir Edward. EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST. European Review, v. 20, summer 1970: 10-11. AP4.E78, v. 20

The proposal of Moroccan Foreign Minister Abdel-hadi Boutaleb "for the creation of a multi-confessional state in Palestine, comprising Jews, Arab Muslims and Arab Christians," may provide an opportunity for Europe to play an active role in a Middle East peace settlement. Europe's experience in creating an economic community out of recently warring states is obviously relevant to the needs of the Middle East states, and Europe possesses the requisite financial and technical resources to assist development in the region. Israelis and Arabs alike increasingly recognize the futility of their present policies. "What is needed is a European initiative to convene a conference to discuss the formation of a Middle East Community." The conference would draft a constitution for the new Palestinian state and devise a plan for the new community. Whatever the outcome of such a conference, Europe would gain in self-confidence by acting as a political entity in the Middle East.

356

Macdonald, Norman. WHY MAN IS A KILLER. In Macdonald, Norman, and others. Disarmament now. Three lectures given at a one-day Conference on Disarmament held jointly by the U.N. Association and the Friends Peace and International Relations Committee at Friends House N.W. 1 in November 1968. London, Friends Peace & International Relations Committee [1969] p. 1-5. JX1974.M324

Man is the only mammal who kills vast numbers of his own kind, and "most of the killing is done by men in full possession of their normal faculties." Today man has the capability to destroy civilization with weapons of mass destruction. However there are reassuring indications that the role of weapons in settling international disputes is declining: international arbitration machinery has been established in the last half century, and, since the Cuban missile crisis, the superpowers are beginning to recognize the futility of nuclear war. But the danger remains. Human behavior must be influenced positively, and man must free himself from his bonds with weapons. To achieve this goal, an elected ethical council or forum in every university and medical school to consider relevant ethical problems and a U.N. committee to investigate the causes of war should be created. The time has come to control weapons. The fate of future generations "rests crucially on the decisions we now make or fail to make."

357

Metzsch, Joachim von. (THE SOLDIER AND PEACE RE-SEARCH) Soldat und Friedensforschung. Wehrkunde, v. 19, June 1970: 293-296. U3.W396, v. 19

The German soldier, who is charged by his constitution with maintaining and preserving peace, must be vitally interested in peace research. Taken literally, the words "peace re-

search" should mean research on peace, but usually mean the study of the factors threatening peace. Psychologists say that aggression, like the drive for power, is innate in man and in groupings of men, and that tensions must be endured and overcome. A peace achieved through fear of nuclear weapons is no more unworthy of man than his abdication, in the delusion of utopian pacifism, of the right of self-realization or his refusal to pledge himself to fulfilling his obligations. When the soldier learns to accept that the only peace possible in this world is to be won on a field of tensions, he has taken the first step toward peace. "In peace here and today the spiritual and social battles are fought that will decide . . . if peace is won or lost and war is to break out."

358

O'Connor, Raymond G. VICTORY IN MODERN WAR. Journal of peace research, no. 4, 1969: 367-384. AS9.J6, 1969
Includes summaries in English and Russian.

In this article "victory" is defined as the cessation of armed conflict under conditions satisfactory to at least one of the combatants in terms of stated objectives. Drawing on examples of wars from the American Revolution to the present day, the author demonstrates how the nature and conduct of the war can modify the original objectives, and provides examples where military victory insofar as the surrender or annihilation of the enemy forces was not achieved but the political aims were realized. Coalition warfare and diplomacy can be affected by the diverse goals of allies, which may lead to harsh or mild treatment of the defeated. Wars have been concluded in a number of different ways, and victory has taken many forms. While armed force usually determines the outcome, other factors often influence the decision to end hostilities and alter the terms of settlement. Among these factors are a change in the government of one of the belligerents, negotiations during the course of hostilities, domestic considerations, coalition or "proxy" ally developments, and the role of outside agencies. The stakes involved may transcend local issues, and a multilateral approach may induce the antagonists to accept a solution that would be impossible in the context of bilateral negotiations. The Geneva Conference of 1954 and the United Nations interventions in the Arab-Israeli wars are examples of the way in which outside agencies can make compromise or renunciation of an initiator's intentions more palatable. Major powers have accepted "proxy defeats" under these circumstances. The prevalence of "limited wars" in recent times--wars which are restricted in aims, hostilities, and the commitment of resources by at least one side--places a premium on the exercise of total control over all the elements leading to victory. But while the means must be correlated with the end, there is no way of ensuring that the cost will be commensurate with the gain, for the opponent may place a higher value on the issue. Victory in modern war has seldom been viewed in exclusively military terms, nor has it always consisted of an alteration in the status quo ante. The term should be understood in its historical setting and deprived of its absolute, restrictive connotations. (Abstract supplied)

359

Pauli, Fritz. [A WORLD FREE FROM HUNGER--A PREREQUISITE FOR PEACE] Eine Welt frei von Hunger--Voraussetzung für den Frieden. Neue Politik, v. 15, June 20, 1970: 12-15.
H5.N337, v. 15

Food production increases by 1 or 2 percent per year, whereas population increases by at least 2 percent annually. The great population growth takes place in those countries least able to feed their people. Narrow-mindedness and apathy also contribute to the food shortage. Even countries like Japan, where a yield takeoff has occurred, give no grounds for optimism, because possible improvements in soil condition and fertility are limited. Nature cannot be forced without disturbing the biological balance in the long run. Currently, 10 percent of the total terrestrial surface is being used intensively for agriculture, and more than 35 percent is potentially usable. Intensive work on soil biodynamics will help make more agricultural land available even in zones of climatic extremes. Hunger can be banished or alleviated only if policymakers commit themselves and their governments to fighting hunger instead of planning for war and destruction.

360

Pickus, Robert, and Robert Woiwo. TO END WAR: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE IDEAS, BOOKS, ORGANIZATIONS, WORK, THAT CAN HELP. [Berkeley, Calif., World Without War Council, 1970] 261 p.

Z6464.Z9P5 1970

Includes bibliographies.

Contents.--Our intention: a note to the reader --pt. 1. The ideas: War: strategies and causes. Disarmament: problems and approaches. World development and world community. International organization and world law. The United States and international relations. The Communist nations and international relations. Area studies, crisis problems and issues. Moral, religious, philosophical and ethical thought on war. Conscientious objection and the draft. Social change: the nonviolent approach. Political processes and the peace effort. Peace research.--pt. 2. A context for action: Contexts for considering war/peace problems. A context for work to end war.--pt. 3. Resources for action.--Index.

Annotated bibliography on the problems of war and peace, with introductory essays to each chapter that consider the courses of action most likely to end war. A list of organizations working to end war is included. The authors offer a political and moral framework for evaluating various approaches to peace and conclude with a series of recommendations for those actively seeking an end to war.

361

Pisar, Samuel. COEXISTENCE AND COMMERCE; GUIDELINES FOR TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co. (1970) xv, 553 p.
DLC

Contents.--Introduction.--Book 1. pt. 1. The economic and political context. pt. 2. The commercial setting.--Book 2. pt. 1. The legal

framework. pt. 2. The settlement of disputes.--Abbreviations.--Notes.--Index.

Describes and analyzes the commercial relations between East and West and their impact on East-West relations in general. Pisar assumes that separate capitalist and Communist economic systems will continue to exist, but with any luck they will tend to move toward constructive cooperation and competition. He proposes "an internationally sponsored but independent system of regulation: a code of fair practices mitigating the disabilities of Western and Eastern enterprises alike and operating to safeguard the general structure of world trade as it strains to accommodate the growing phenomenon of total state commerce." Such a code would provide for the normalization of Western policy and the adaptation of Eastern practices; facilitate Western access to Eastern markets and market data; protect legal rights, including patents and copyrights; establish simplified and binding contractual procedures and means of settling disputes through litigation and arbitration; and encourage intergovernmental cooperation.

362

Radovanović, Ljubomir. BLOCS AND EUROPEAN SECURITY. Review of international affairs, v. 21, June 20, 1970: 22-25.
D839.R4, v. 21

Describes the origin and early history of the proposed European Security Conference up to the May 1970 meeting of the NATO Council in Rome. Radovanović considers the final communiqué of the Rome meeting unique in its direct approach to the neutral and nonaligned countries and in its rejection of the concept of the conference as merely an interbloc meeting.

363

Rumpf, Helmut. [PEACE RESEARCH AND THE CONCEPT OF PEACE] Friedensforschung und Friedensbegriff. Außenpolitik, v. 21, June 1970: 329-337.
D839.A885, v. 21

The subject components of the new study called peace research, conflict theory, decisionmaking, arms control and disarmament, foreign affairs, nationalism, and negotiation technique among others, manifest that its purpose is the broad-based investigation of international behavior. While it carries on the tradition of the Utopian dreamers of eternal peace, peace research also attempts to meet today's heightened dangers by applying all the methods of modern science. In that study, the word peace means order as well as quiet, and accord as well as justice; consequently it implies a contractually regulated relationship as much as harmony or nonviolence. The ever-present contradiction between justice and order has forced the recognition of the possibility of a just war, difficult as that concept is to define. Peace research assumes that the just distribution of property or raw materials is not possible and gives most priority to expelling the use of force from the international system. The peace concept central to the United Nations Charter does not call for universal harmony but for the readiness to seek peace through prescribed juridical procedures. History refutes those who think to find peace in the institution of a world state. The Pax Romana and Pax Britannica as well as today's

76 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

Pax Sovietica are more accurately described as pacification than peace. The political concept that is the goal of peace research should not be a material ordering of society, with its inevitable tendency to become frozen, but the establishment of accepted procedures to resolve international and domestic problems.

364

Schneidman, J. Lee. ENDING THE WAR OF THE SICILIAN VESPERS. *Journal of peace research*, no. 4, 1969: 335-348. AS9.J6, 1969

"An earlier version of this paper was read at a meeting of the Metropolitan Conference on History and Political Science and the Conference on Peace Research on 4 May 1968 at Marymount Manhattan College."

Includes summaries in English and Russian.

Schneidman's paper treats the case of a war in which major hostilities ended within two years, and the final settlement approximated conditions established within the first year, but where hostilities were nevertheless prolonged or resumed in desultory fashion for two decades. Schneidman provides much useful information on the role of military developments, domestic and external pressures on the various parties, their conflicting objectives, face-saving, etc. He discusses explicitly various peace proposals, an abortive peace treaty in the course of the war, and the conditions under which the war finally did end. (Abstract supplied)

365

Singh, Nagendra. RECENT TRENDS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANISATION PROMOTING INTER-STATE CO-OPERATION AND WORLD PEACE. Delhi, S. Chand, 1969. xvi, 244 p. (University of Geneva inaugural Nehru lecture, 1)

JX1950.S55

Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--The Nehru approach.--The first welcome trend: end of colonialism and the expansion of the world family of nations.--Full faith in international organisations as the ultimate solution of all ills and consequent multiplication of inter-governmental organs in the international system of today.--The welcome urge for formulation of new laws and revision of old ones.--The great urge to regulate new fields of inter-state activity.--'Humanitarianism' predominates.--The awakening of the masses and the sanction of world public opinion.--Conclusion.--Appendices.

Maintains that a strong tide in international affairs flows toward the development of more effective international law and world order. Singh links this trend to the postwar 'liberation of humanity and the grant of freedom and independence to states yoked to colonialism.' He claims it will benefit developed and developing states alike and is supported with 'great zeal and earnestness' by the majority of the members of the international community.

The concept of the army as a means of heroic conquest has evolved into attributing to it the role of preventing or limiting wars. Its next transformation must be as an instrument of peace. Not only has war become too great a threat, but also the changing societal attitudes demonstrate that the time is ripe for a change of personality. Peace research should be undertaken by social scientists, and politicians and military leaders must heed them. Change the Department of the Army into a Department of Peace and charge it with active peace research, and its aggressive image would be changed, and it could command the respect of all the Swiss people. Since the Red Cross was born in Switzerland, this nation would be an appropriate cradle for a peace research institute that could span the world.

367

Unnithan, Thottamon K. K. N., and Yogendra Singh. SOCIOLOGY OF NON-VIOLENCE AND PEACE: SOME BEHAVIOURAL AND ATTITUDINAL DIMENSIONS; A STUDY OF ELITES, NON-ELITES, AND STUDENTS, AND INSTITUTIONAL SITUATIONS IN INDIA, AND OF ELITES IN NEPAL AND CEYLON. New Delhi, Research Council for Cultural Studies, India International Centre; [exclusively distributed by Munshiram Manoharlal] 1969. x, 188, xiv p. RM278.U65

"The study was sponsored by the Unesco under its Major Project IV for the Mutual Appreciation of Eastern and Western Cultural Values."

Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Preface.--The approach.--Meaning and perception of non-violence.--The value system of non-violence and peace.--Social structure of a non-violent society.--Behavioral dimensions of non-violence and peace.--Social policy and non-violence.--Images about non-violent nations and non-violence in international relationships.--Attitudinal and behavioral dimensions of the sociology of non-violence and peace.--Appendix: questionnaires.

An empirical cross-cultural investigation of the social foundations of nonviolence, defined as "a normative system governing the total gamut of social relationships of man wherein progressively the role of coercive power is replaced by relative compatibility of volitions, motives, and forms and systems of actions in the life conditions of individuals, groups and societies; native, normative, structural-behavioral, and the findings are applied to determining whether a nonviolent social order, at national or international levels, is feasible. The authors are optimistic about the emergence of the required value-consensus, but they stress that this and other of their conclusions are tentative and call for further research.

368

Wienand, Karl. (PEACE RESEARCH AND PEACE POLITICS) Zur Friedensforschung und Friedenpolitik. Neuwied, Gesellschaft, v. 17, July/Aug. 1970: 463-465. H5.N36, v. 17

Peace researchers and politicians agree that peace research should be conducted on an interdisciplinary and international level. Since German

366

Alfred. (AN ARMY FOR PEACE) Armee für den Frieden. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitung, v. 136, Aug. 1970: 563-564. U3.A43, v. 136

peace research is still in the beginning stage, available data from abroad should be used. No definition of peace has been universally adopted, thus allowing peace researchers to work objectively. The causes for domestic political conflicts must be found to give policymakers insight into social and political change and the tools to overcome and prevent international crises. Peace research must not be limited to one institute or university, even though differences among them have so far prevented establishing an organization to promote peace research. The German public must be made aware of the importance of such research, and social scientists must coordinate the relevant elements in their individual fields. However, care must be taken that peace research does not become a fad. Politicians can contribute by campaigning on peace platforms. Their experience will enable them to reconcile different views and prevent peace research from degenerating into

methodological conflict. Moreover, politicians can help make funds available.

369

Wolfe, Bertram D. RUSSIA AND THE U.S.A.: A CHALLENGE TO THE CONVERGENCE THEORY. *Quest*, no. 66, July/Sept. 1970: 54-62.

AP8.Q4, 1970

Criticizes the convergence theory and its most recent exponent, John Kenneth Galbraith. Wolfe asserts that the theory does not stand up to historical scrutiny or an analysis of American and Russian social and political systems. He concludes that each country "will continue to move towards its own future under the influence of its own heritage, its traditions, and its institutions, which will be both conserved and altered more by the actions of men than by the weight of things."

IV. GENERAL ANALYSES OF, AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES TO, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

370

Ansberry, William F. *ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT: SUCCESS OR FAILURE?* Berkeley, McCutchan Pub. Corp. [1969] 110 p.

JX1974.A74

Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Preface.--Introduction and background.--The post-World War I period: the League of Nations.--The post-World War II period: the United Nations.--The partial nuclear test ban treaty: an example of limited success.--Non-proliferation: a second example of the partial approach to arms control.--The arms control and disarmament picture today.

Analyzes past arms control efforts and problems, proposed solutions to these problems, the reasons for the failure to reach a comprehensive agreement, and successful methods, past or future. Historically, arms control negotiations have failed to produce a comprehensive agreement because of the failure to understand "that the long range national security goals of the world states will, to different degrees, be in conflict." Ansberry decries general and complete disarmament efforts and contends that the only way to reach an agreement lies in promoting limited arms control measures.

371

Benesch, Gustav. [THE STATUS OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENT AFTER 25 YEARS] Der Stand der Nuklearrüstung nach 25 Jahren. *Aussenpolitik*, v. 21, July 1970: 416-430. DB39.A855, v. 21

Historical review of efforts toward disarmament. Tables show the technical development of nuclear weapons and contrast the destruction capabilities of the strategic weapons of 1945 and 1970. The rocket vehicle is discussed apart from nuclear warheads. Benesch thinks the strategic arms limitation talks will have positive results in slowing the arms race between the superpowers.

372

Buckley, Thomas H. *THE UNITED STATES AND THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE, 1921-1922*. Knoxville, University of Tennessee [c1970] 220 p. E785.B8

Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents.--The politics of the limitation of arms.--The Atlantic contest.--Making straight the way.--The American plan.--The speech.--The Pacific contest.--Pacific fortifications.--Arms limita-

tion.--The four-power treaty.--China: nine-power treaty.--China: Shantung and sovereignty.--The Senate and the treaties.--In conclusion.--Bibliographical essay.--Index.

A history of the U.S. role in the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments, "the only successful arms limitation conference in modern history." On the basis of his examination, Buckley concludes that disarmament and politics are inextricably linked, "that those who believe that world peace can be secured through disarmament alone, without making political arrangements concurrently, are ignoring reality." The alleged failure of this conference was in fact a failure to supplement and reinforce agreements intended to be only temporary.

373

Burns, Richard Dean, and Seymour L. Chapin. *NEAR EASTERN NAVAL LIMITATION FACTS, 1930-1931*. East European quarterly, Mar. 1970: 72-87. DB1.E33, 1970

Part of a broader study entitled "Disarmament in Perspective: An Analysis of Selected Disarmament and Arms Control Agreements Between World Wars, 1919-1939" for the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

JX1974.B78

Describes the conditions leading to the naval limitation pacts between Turkey and Greece in 1930 and between Turkey and the Soviet Union in 1931. The significance of these accords lies in their limiting armaments instead of reducing or scrapping them and in their producing stability, not parity. The parties' sincere desire for peace, along with domestic economic pressures, the recognition of changing concepts of warfare, and the relative simplicity of these agreements facilitated their formulation.

374

Cook, Blanche W. *BIBLIOGRAPHY ON PEACE RESEARCH IN HISTORY*. Santa Barbara, Calif., ABC-CLIO [c1969] 72 p. (Bibliography and reference series, no. 11) DB464.Z9C7

Contents.--Preface, by Charles A. Parker.--Introduction, by Blanche Wieren Cook.--Manuscript sources.--Bibliographical aids and organizations providing material for the peace researcher.--Journals of peace research and related subjects.--Church history and religious pacifism.--Works on pacifism, anti-militarism and non-violence.--Works on arbitration, internationalism and world law.--Histories of peace organizations.--Autobiographies, memoirs and biographical studies of leaders

in the movements for peace.--The politics and propaganda of peace and war.--Contemporary peace-keeping operations and studies in disarmament.--Works on Vietnam: a selected list.

A bibliography for "students in all areas of the social sciences and humanities interested in anti-militarism, non-violence, and the politics and dynamics of war and peace." The citations are largely American, but a limited number of other works in English and in several foreign languages are included. The bibliography focuses on materials written from a historical perspective; sociological and psychological literature on conflict management and human aggression has, with some exceptions, been omitted.

375

ON THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY; SPEECHES AND DECLARATIONS, INCLUDING DOCUMENTS ON THE GENEVA CONFERENCE, ON THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY, AND ON THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM. Zum Atomsperrvertrag; Reden und Erklärungen sowie Dokumente zur Genfer Konferenz, zum NV-Vertrag und zum europäischen Sicherungssystem. (Verantwortlich für Auswahl und Übersetzungen der Texte: Arnold Hartung. Berlin) Berlin Verlag [1969] 128 p.

JX1974.729

Includes the text of the nonproliferation treaty in German and English.

Bibliographical footnotes.

Statements by Willy Brandt and Swidbert Schnippenkoetter and documents on the Geneva conference of non-nuclear-weapon states, the nonproliferation treaty, the U.N. security system, and the European security system. In his introduction, Arnold Hartung points out the world political importance of arms control. An appendix contains Protocol 3 to the Brussels Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty, dated October 23, 1954, which deals with arms control and defines nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.

376

Stone, Isidor F. A CENTURY OF FUTILITY. New York review of books, v. 14, Apr. 9, 1970: 30-33. AP2.N655, v. 14

Despite a century and a half of agitation for disarmament, the issues remain the same; the only changes have been in the danger and cost of the arms race and the replacement of Great Britain by the United States as the leading world power and arms producer. Armament politics in 19th-century Britain employed the same scare tactics that the Pentagon and arms producers use today to justify massive defense budgets. The series of pre-World War I disarmament conferences that began at the Hague in 1864 failed to significantly limit or reduce arms, and postwar efforts were still more futile. Disarmament negotiations dragged on interminably, adding to German cynicism over the failure of the other Great Powers to fulfill solemn promises to disarm, and thereby contributing to the rise of Hitler and the Nazis. A similar failure by the United States and the Soviet Union to take seriously their pledge to pursue disarmament negotiations in good faith, which was included as Article VI of the nonproliferation treaty against its will, might well lead to a third world war.

377

Stone, Isidor F. THEATRE OF DELUSION. New York review of books, v. 14, Apr. 23, 1970: 15-16, 18-24. AP2.N655, v. 14

The Baruch plan for the international control of atomic energy was the first of several missed opportunities to control nuclear arms in the postwar period. What was originally an idealistic proposal for a world superstate was revised until it appeared to Soviet leaders as a plan for American domination of the Soviet economy and the world. A second opportunity occurred on May 10, 1955, when the Soviet Union, in a dramatic reversal of previous policy, agreed to permit extensive international inspection of its military facilities. The United States, which had long insisted on on-site inspection as a precondition for nuclear disarmament, reacted coolly to this proposal, and President Eisenhower even suggested that inspection might be inimical to national security. A third opportunity came with President Kennedy's inauguration, but unfortunately he "tried to ride two horses at once in two opposite directions, rearmament and disarmament." Sympathetic historians, such as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., have attempted to exonerate Kennedy of responsibility for stepping up the arms race, but the record clearly shows that Kennedy not only failed to heed Eisenhower's farewell warning regarding the military-industrial complex but greatly expanded a number of strategic weapons programs as well.

378

STRATEGIC SURVEY, 1969. London, Institute for Strategic Studies [1970] 114 p. illus. U162.S77, 1969

Contents.--Perspective.--Notes: Arms and arms control. War and conflict. International security arrangements. Low level violence.--Chronologies.

Chronological summary and general review of the principal events and trends of strategic importance during 1969. A new section on selected issues of special significance, namely, the strategic arms limitation talks, chemical and biological weapons, control of arms on the seabed, the nonproliferation treaty, the Vietnam, Arab-Israeli, and El Salvador-Honduras wars, the Nigerian civil war, the Sino-Soviet dispute, the U.S.-Japanese security treaty, aerial piracy, and student violence, has been added. More attention is paid to sub- and supra-national social and economic developments on the assumption that "the inadequacies of the international economic system, the aspirations of the young or the frustrations of the poor" are important determinants of the strategic situation.

GENERAL ANALYSES

379

Allen, Gary. DISARMAMENT: THEY'RE PROMOTING THE FACE OF THE GRAVE. American opinion, v. 13, June 1970: 1-15. AP2.O4732, v. 13

Despite the facts that treaty breaking is standard Soviet policy and disarmament is a proclaimed

80 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

instrument of Communist conquest, President Nixon has given top priority to the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT). According to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, "acceptance of any precipitate program of disarmament . . . would constitute for the West a strategic defeat of enormous magnitude." "Liberals" claim the Communists will not use disarmament treaties to achieve world conquest; Walt Rostow and the Disarmament Lobby contend that if the United States were to cut down on arms, the Communists would do likewise. However, while the United States has disarmed unilaterally and announced that all strategic systems are negotiable at the SALT talks, the Soviets have implemented an all-out military buildup. The Disarmament Lobby and the Left squeal about the prodigious cost of the "arms race" and "misguided priorities," but only 7 percent of the 1970 U.S. military budget was allocated to strategic weapons, while the Soviets have increased military expenditures by 15 percent annually. "We must have a nuclear capacity to defend America that is superior beyond question" keeping sight of the fact that America's "chief danger comes from the policies of disarmament and surrender being hatched in New York and Washington."

350

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT. In Australia. Dept. of External Affairs. Current notes on international affairs, v. 41, May 1970: 253-266. JX1162.A33, v. 41

Reviews developments in arms control and disarmament in the 1960's and examines the prospects for the 1970's. International instruments discussed include the Antarctic Treaty, the partial test ban treaty, the outer space treaty, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the nonproliferation treaty, and the draft treaty for arms control on the seabed. The Australian point of view on the strategic arms limitation talks, chemical and biological warfare, and conventional armaments is indicated. The article concludes that "there may now be forces at work that offer some prospect of positive developments in the field of arms control in the years ahead."

381

Barnaby, Frank. DISARMAMENT PROSPECTS IN THE 70'S. Humanist, v. 85, Sept. 1970: 262-264. BL2700.M7B, v. 85

The need for disarmament is greater than ever, but the prospects for concrete progress during the coming decade are poor. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has achieved only limited success and has totally failed to achieve its main goal of nuclear disarmament. The nonproliferation treaty is a more ambitious and important attempt at arms control, but its chances for long-term success depend on the unlikely prospect of agreement by the superpowers to limit and significantly reduce the number of strategic weapons. There has been renewed interest in banning chemical and biological weapons, but the British-proposed ban unfortunately excludes nonlethal chemical agents. The focus on arms control rather than disarmament in recent years has resulted in "a number of rela-

tively insignificant arms control agreements and no disarmament. . . . Is it not time that efforts to achieve really significant nuclear disarmament are revived?"

382

Calder, Nigel. THE FUTURE OF MANKIND. In MacDonald, Norman, and others. Disarmament now! Three lectures given at a one-day Conference on Disarmament held jointly by the U.N. Association and the Friends Peace and International Relations Committee at Friends House N.W. 1 in November 1968. London, Friends Peace & International Relations Committee [1969] p. 11-15. JX1974.M324

Previously, man was able to spend several generations adapting to new technologies. Today, however, new technologies are proliferating beyond man's ability to adjust to them. Scientists are not to blame. In the innocence of the built-in ethical system of science, "what matters is not the utility of the knowledge but whether the knowledge is sound and interesting, and sheds new light on nature in the widest sense, including man." Scientists have, in fact, played a major role in popularizing the problems involved in population growth, conservation, and world poverty. The basic problem with respect to the growth of science and knowledge lies in harnessing science to rationalistic purposes. The assumption of scientific responsibility by society would alleviate the problem of properly applying scientific knowledge. In addition, a "Futures Research" program, in which everyone would participate, should be established to provide "a means of bringing into public discussion the issues that arise from the uses to be made of science." Despite the adverse implications of the new technologies there is a growing realization that old political modes are outdated, and "a lot of this is going to spill over into the military and disarmament field."

383

California. University. University at Los Angeles. Security Studies Project. ARMS CONTROL SPECIAL STUDIES PROGRAM. Prepared for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Los Angeles, 1968. 10 v. DLC

"ACDA/WEC-126."

Contents.--v. 1. Summary report.--v. 2. The argument against proceeding with the BMD. in: aspect of strategy, politics and arms control, by Bernard Brodie.--v. 3. The IAEA as a political system: implications for arms control, by Lawrence Scheinman.--v. 4. The denuclearization of Latin America: implications for arms control, by Lynn H. Miller.--v. 5. The reporting of international arms transfers, by Lynn H. Miller.--v. 6. Arms races and war initiation: the effect of strategic choices, by Michael D. Intriligator.--v. 7. Trends in international polarity: implications for arms control, by Jerome Garri--v. 8. Laurie Wiseberg.--v. 8. A statistical analysis of some international confrontations: implications for arms control, by James B. MacQueen.--v. 9. Peacekeeping and peace observation: the Canadian case, by John C. Rise.--v. 10. Technology, politics, and proliferation, by Ciro E. Zoppo.

Studies on arms control and disarmament issues of both specific and general natures, prepared by faculty and students from a variety of disciplines.

384

Clark, Joseph S. *ASIA AND THE PROSPECTS FOR WORLD ORDER*. In *American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia*. A new American posture toward Asia. Philadelphia, 1970. (*Its Annals*, v. 390, July 1970) p. 27-37.
HLA4, v. 390

Three critical unsolved problems, Asian as well as global, confront the world: peace, population, and pollution. Non-violence, economic development, and social justice are needed to solve these problems, which are global in their scope. World order is a workable system of war prevention conceived on a global basis. International institutions capable of keeping the peace are required to achieve it. There are six major Asian countries or areas capable of affecting developments in Asia: Japan, mainland China, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, and the Middle East complex. Of these, only Japan, Israel, and possibly Indonesia are capable of creative action in the sense used by Arnold J. Toynbee. In many Asian areas, hate between adjacent countries is so great that constructive moves for peace are unlikely. Thus, Asia desperately needs world order but is not likely to contribute much toward its achievement. World order, if it comes, will result from widespread disarmament of the super- and middle-sized powers, the growth concurrently of an international peace force, and the creation of international institutions with power to prevent violence and administer justice. Leadership must come from the Soviet Union and the United States, hopefully through the United Nations, or from amplification of the treaties of General and Complete Disarmament filed by the United States and the Soviet Union at Geneva in 1962. China can be disregarded for the time being as a paper tiger. The Soviet Union is more likely to contribute to world order than the United States, which has become a militaristic nation since the end of World War II. The Germanization of the United States springs from a powerful and highly respected elite corps of military officers who manipulate the youth of the nation through conscription. Much of this is due to the unnecessary involvement of the United States on the land mass of Asia. Withdrawal of American forces from Asia is the place to start in the search for world order. (Abstract supplied)

385

DISARMAMENT. *Pax et libertas*, v. 35, Apr./June 1970: 13-14. Ser

Two sections discussing the Latin American nuclear-free zone and the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT). Gertrude Beer praises the Treaty of Tlatelolco, noting that "it should become an example to all regions which are equally, or even more, endangered by war." Phoebe Cusden stresses SALT's importance while expressing pessimism about curbing the arms race.

386

Kissinger, Henry A., and Bernard Brodie. *BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND STRATEGY*. Los Angeles, University of California, 1968. 60 p. (Security studies paper no. 17) UA23.K487

Contents.--Foreword.--Bureaucracy and policy making: the effect of insiders and outsiders on the policy process, by Henry A. Kissinger.--Changing attitudes towards war, by Bernard Brodie.--Technology, politics, and strategy, by Bernard Brodie.--Ending a war: is the Korean lesson valid for Vietnam? by Bernard Brodie.--Theories on the causes of war, by Bernard Brodie.

Seminars, lectures, conference papers, and newspaper articles dealing with strategy, politics, and the study of war. Kissinger contends that a large and complex bureaucracy, in which "more time is devoted to running its internal management than in fulfilling the purpose which it is supposed to serve," is the major obstacle to changing foreign policy. He argues that decisions are not made until they appear as administrative issues, that congenital insecurity is created when executives "have to make decisions on a range of issues in which they may not give many hours to the same problems that their experts have spent years studying" and that, as policymakers, business executives often become prisoners of the bureaucracy because of their inexperience within the Government. In his first essay, Brodie maintains that certain attitudes toward war have gone out of style, noting that neither national glory nor the conquest of foreign territories is important for statesmen trying to decide for or against war. In "Technology, Politics, and Strategy" (previously cited as item 152 in v. 6, no. 1, of this bibliography) he argues that systems analysis has failed to clarify the strategic and political implications of technological advancement in weapons design since World War II and that the strategic questions solvable quantitatively are less important than the questions that can be answered by intuition and bias. In his last two essays, Brodie compares the Korean and Vietnam Wars and considers the causal theories of war.

387

Kolkowicz, Roman, and others. *THE SOVIET UNION AND ARMS CONTROL: A SUPERPOWER DILEMMA*. Baltimore, London, Johns Hopkins Press [c1970] 212 p.
DLC

Examines the domestic and external factors that shape Moscow's arms control policy: political, economic, and military stresses inside Russia as well as the pressures imposed on it by Communist China and by the United States and Europe. The authors analyze the hawk-dove debate within the Soviet Union and forecast the realities on which Soviet-American negotiations must be based if an arms control agreement is to be achieved and deterrence brought into equilibrium.

388

Kohn, A. G. *ACTIVE DISARMAMENT CONSULTATIONS IN NATO*. NATO letter, v. 18, Mar. 1970: 20-23.
D845.2.A44, v. 18

NATO has moved closer to the possibility of some major arms control or disarmament agreements in

82 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

the 1970's. Valuable discussions within the alliance took place during 1969 on balanced force reductions, the seabed and ocean floor, and chemical and biological weapons. Seabed issues emerged as a matter of immediate concern. In conjunction with an April 1969 pledge to "pursue . . . efforts and studies in the field of disarmament and practical arms control, including balanced force reductions and the initiatives already undertaken for the renunciation of the use of force," the alliance is now keeping a watchful eye on disarmament discussions already underway in other international forums, such as the Committee on Disarmament and the strategic arms limitation talks, on consideration by the United Nations of related matters, and on the disarmament studies undertaken by the alliance itself. So far the response from the other side has not been encouraging, and progress is bound to be slow. The alliance is not discouraged, however, and will continue to lay the groundwork for future agreements. Arms control, and, eventually, disarmament are certain to play a significant part in the future of mankind.

389

M MacDonald, Norman, John Burton, and Nigel Calder. DISARMAMENT NOW. THREE LECTURES GIVEN AT A ONE-DAY CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT HELD JOINTLY BY THE U.N. ASSOCIATION AND THE FRIENDS PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE AT FRIENDS HOUSE N.W. 1 IN NOVEMBER 1968. London, Friends Peace & International Relations Committee [1969] 15 p. JX1974.M324

Three essays on maintaining peace. Norman MacDonald discusses war causation and proposes two methods of helping man understand the reasons for his aggression, while John Burton describes the inadequacies of traditional methods of resolving conflicts. The future of mankind in relation to its weapons-producing environment is considered by Nigel Calder.

390

Midgaard, Knut. ARMS RACES, ARMS CONTROL, AND DISARMAMENT. Cooperation and conflict, no. 1, 1970: 20-51. Ser

"First published in Norwegian, in the Journal Internasjonal Politikk, No. 4-5, 1969." D839.L46, 1969

Proposes the use of mathematical models for analyzing the interaction of the strategic armaments policies of two nuclear powers. Midgaard bases his preliminary inquiry on the simplifying assumption "that the states are known to be aware of each other's armaments and armament requirements as well as other cultural variables" and then brings the model into closer approximation with reality by introducing additional complications. The model is applied to the analysis of policy statements by the Johnson and Nixon administrations and independent analysts concerning the deployment of a U.S. ARM system and its effect on the arms race and disarmament negotiations. Midgaard concludes by defending strategic models against their detractors, who, arguing from the standpoint of organization theory and social psychology, claim these models are too simple to represent complex political realities.

391

Mordic Conference on Peace Research, 3d, Lund, 1968. REPORT. [Edited by Håkan Wiberg. Lund 1968. 76 p. JX1930.N65 1968c
At head of title: Seminar for Peace and Conflict Research.

Contents.--Program. Participants.--Opening speech by the director of SIPRI, Robert Neild, abstract.--Plenary lecture by the director of IFRI, Johan Galtung, abstract.--Abstracts of papers presented.--Plenary debate on goals and means of peace research.--Debate on future activities.--Messages from the conference.

Summarizes the major speeches, debates, and papers presented at the conference, which focused on the methodology of peace research and the analysis of interstate relations.

392

Rapoport, Anatol. CAN PEACE RESEARCH BE APPLIED? Journal of conflict resolution, v. 14, June 1970: 277-286. JX1901.J6, v. 14

Institutionalized science has come into being in industrial societies where "progress" is identified with increasing manipulative control over the environment. Traditionally the applied science involved in this institutionalization has included industrial, military, and medical technology. The success of these technologies seems to have encouraged the addition of a fourth area: the "behavioral sciences." However, for applied science, the distinction between understanding and control is crucial; and even if "the answer" to a human problem is known, the problem will remain unsolved unless institutions are created through which the solution can be implemented. The author argues that all applied science implies an institutional structure; therefore, in hopes for the application of peace research, the first question is what institutions are available for it or can reasonably be expected to be created. Only a very limited technology of "arms control" can be implemented at present. Other aspects of peace research can only--at best--be fed into public information. An extended analogy between peace research and criminology is used to urge a fusion of knowledge-seeking and social action at the present juncture. (Abstract supplied)

COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES

393

Leonard, James F. U.S. REVIEWS POSITION ON GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 63, Aug. 17, 1970: 195-203. JX232.A33, v. 63

Statement "made before the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva on June 23," 1970.

Outlines the U.S. position on efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament (GCD) and on arms control and disarmament issues generally. It is the view of the United States that arms control

and disarmament is "a complex of efforts at many levels, of efforts that attempt to deal, at times simultaneously, with the many individual but interrelated aspects of the whole range of arms and security issues," and, consequently, that "progress toward GCD cannot be made in a vacuum but will have to be accompanied by concrete progress toward a peaceful world." Leonard notes the conditions that must be satisfied if world peace is

to be achieved, outlines the role that arms control must play in the attainment of those conditions, and calls attention to some of the specific armaments problems to which disarmament negotiators ought to address themselves--chemical and biological weapons, the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the seabed, underground nuclear weapons testing, and the production of fissionable materials for weapons use.

V. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND LIMITED MEASURES

REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR (COMMAND AND CONTROL OF WEAPONS, ESCALATION, ACCIDENTAL WAR, NEGOTIATION, DISENGAGEMENT, NEUTRALIZATION)

394

Baldwin, Frank. A "KOREAN SOLUTION" FOR VIETNAM?
New republic, v. 163, July 18, 1970: 19-21.
AP2.16624, v. 163

The Nixon administration is pursuing a "Korean solution" to the Vietnam War, based on a reduced residual force of U.S. troops that will enable South Vietnam to develop a stable government capable of defending itself against North Vietnam. This analogy with South Korea's experience, however, fails on several counts. South Korea, whose only common border is with North Korea, has benefited from its relative isolation and the stability of northeast Asia. South Vietnam has a long common border with Laos and Cambodia, both of which are embroiled in what will probably be long and bitter civil wars. South Korea's sparse terrain and severe winters make infiltration and guerrilla warfare extremely difficult, while South Vietnam's dense jungles and tropical or moderate climate favor both operations in all seasons. South Korea has successfully limited infiltration by a heavily fortified demilitarized zone and well patrolled coastline, while South Vietnam would be hard pressed to restrict North Vietnamese infiltration even to present levels, which are far higher than North Korean infiltration has ever been. There is no significant indigenous support in South Korea for a North Korean invasion or guerrilla effort, whereas in South Vietnam the peasantry has given widespread support to both the Vietcong, which was able to stand on its own prior to massive U.S. intervention, and to the North Vietnamese. Despite South Korea's impressive progress since 1953, it still regards the presence of U.S. troops essential to its defense, and the stationing of these troops alone has cost the United States around \$1 billion a year. The costs for South Vietnam would be incomparably higher with less chance of success. "The Korean experience indicates that there is no 'Korea Solution' for Indochina, only an American solution: swift and irrevocable curtailment of American involvement."

395

Burnham, James. FAX ATOMICA. National review,
v. 22, July 14, 1970: 729.

AP2.N3545, v. 22

Scientists, whiz kids, statesmen, and poets have warned that unless nuclear weapons are shared or eliminated the world will end, yet this has not

happened. Though mankind has been in constant battle, the nuclear powers have deliberately prevented the day-by-day fighting from escalating into general nuclear war. The existence of nuclear weapons has, in fact, precluded large-scale wars. "These supposed scions of hell . . . have turned out to be the guardian angels of peace." A small nation is more likely to employ nuclear weapons than a large one, but small-nation use probably would not trigger a big war. War would be closer if one of the largest nations achieved near-absolute superiority, but this is unlikely, and relative superiority is insufficient. "For the great nations, nuclear armament is a 'necessary condition' of survival, but the 'sufficient conditions' include effective use of the old-fashioned methods." Pax Atomica could last several more decades.

396

Cadoux, J. E. [THE DILEMMA OF EUROPEAN NUCLEAR STRATEGY] L'impasse des stratégies nucléaires européennes. Revue militaire générale, general military review, no. 5, May 1970: 630-654.
UP.546, 1970

Includes a German translation and a summary in English.

West European unification lies beyond the political horizon, but it could comprehend a West European deterrence system incorporating British and French nuclear capabilities without violating the principle of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. Under such a system a threatened West European country would acquire the right to use nuclear weapons through a "permissive link" mechanism controlled by a central European authority. Determining the release threshold of the reply would be divided into two phases: access to nuclear weapons and the decision to use them. The machinery of deterrence must avoid any uncertainty about the conditions under which reprisals will take place, and the potential aggressor should be fully aware of those conditions. Because deterrence strategies engender ever more destructive plans and capabilities, conventional strategies, based on capabilities that would be genuinely useable in the field, must be employed as a safety valve.

397

(COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE 1970S) Armed Forces management, v. 16, July 1970: 18-47. illus.
UB153.A65, v. 16

Entire issue devoted to command and control.

Contents.--White House: presidential interest is the key.--Industry viewpoint: a crisis at hand.--DOD: a communications overhaul is overdue.--Air Force: coping with a new dimension in ignorance.--Army: on to the automated battlefield.--

Navy: modernization will be evolutionary.--Wharves: improved data systems have been enlisted.--NATO: can satellites meld patchwork communications?

Focuses on the President's role in command and control, the budgetary problems affecting the modernization of communications, and reorganization in the management of U.S. telecommunications systems.

398

Greene, Fred. THE CASE FOR AND AGAINST MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM AND KOREA. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. A new American posture toward Asia. Philadelphia, 1970. (*Its Annals*, v. 390, July 1970) p. 1-17. H1.A4, v. 390

The pros and cons of rapid military withdrawal from Vietnam are both strong, but in public debate are not mutually responsive. The case against rapid withdrawal from Vietnam rests on the presumed danger of the precedent of broken United States commitments, the blow to the viability of divided states elsewhere, the increase in the prestige of China, the domino theory, the encouragement of other wars of liberation. The case for withdrawal, based on a notion of the demise of the monolithic, unalterably aggressive nature of world communism, argues that Southeast Asia is not of vital interest to us, that Hanoi's actions are, if not justified, understandable, and that Communist governments in Southeast Asia are neither particularly dangerous to us nor anathema to their populations. Vietnamization has many advantages for us, but, given a weak government, runs the risk of a failure, endangering American troops. Troops should be withdrawn from South Korea, both for its good and our own. (Abstract supplied)

399

Heitger, Marian, Georg Prader, and Manfred Scheich. (AUSTRIA--ITS NEUTRALITY AND ITS DEFENSE) Österreich--Seine Neutralität und ihre Schutz. Hrsg. von Georg Prader. (Melke, Wien) Wedl (1969), 95 p. DB99.2.H4

Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents.--The citizen in the republic, by Marian Heitger.--The neutrality of Austria--mission and obligation, by Manfred Scheich.--Foundations and aspects of Austrian defense, by Georg Prader.

Offered as a contribution to intensifying the Austrian citizen's consciousness of his civic responsibilities. Heitger expounds the moral obligations of the citizens of a democratic republic, emphasizing the necessity for increased effort in civic education. Scheich examines the effects of Austrian neutrality on the goals and operation of its foreign policy. Since "the readiness of the neutral state to defend itself is the greatest of its obligations toward neutrality," Prader outlines the fundamentals of Austrian military policy.

LATION IN VIETNAM WAS REVERSED. New York, D. McKay Co. [1969] 245 p.

DB557.A63H6

Bibliographical references included in "Notes" (p. 241-242).

Contents.--Roots of intervention.--Concurrent events.--Full-throated war.--Bombing North Vietnam.--Official optimism--public doubt.--The strains of January.--The Tet offensive.--The beginnings of reappraisal.--Clifford resolves his doubts.--The President at bay.--Epilogue.

Chronicles the events leading up to President Johnson's March 31, 1968, decision to deescalate U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. Hoopes, the former Under Secretary of the Air Force, reviews the increasing doubts that he and other military and civilian officials had regarding U.S. policy in Vietnam and describes in detail the high-level decisionmaking process during the weeks immediately preceding the decision to deescalate. He addresses himself to three basic questions: "How Vietnam came to represent the outer limits of feasible American intervention, how the working of the democratic process finally forced the President to abandon a policy of escalation, and why the particular events of March 1968 signaled the end of an era." In the epilogue he criticizes President Nixon's policy of Vietnamization, which he regards as inherently contradictory, and urges complete U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam by a fixed date as the only acceptable alternative available to the United States.

401

IK16, Fred C. INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION; AMERICAN SHORTCOMINGS IN NEGOTIATING WITH COMMUNIST POWERS. Memorandum prepared at the request of the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations (pursuant to S. Res. 311, 91st Cong.) of the Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 17 p. JX1428.C73135

Cover title.

At head of title: 91st Congress, 2d session.

Committee print.

"Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations."

Describes American shortcomings in negotiating with Communist powers. IK16 cautions against paying excessive attention to ephemeral Communist rhetoric, getting lost in tactical detail, giving in to semantic infiltration, and treating Soviet evaluations as unchangeable. He suggests that improvement in the management of negotiations can be achieved by raising the level of discourse about interagency coordination. He further suggests that the State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency should not avoid discussing the limitation or discontinuance of a military activity simply because it is termed "vital."

402

Joy, Charles Turner. HOW COMMUNISTS NEGOTIATE. Santa Monica, Calif., Fidelis Publishers (c1970) 178 p. DB921.7.C6 1970

Describes Communist Chinese and North Korean negotiating techniques at the Korean Armistice Conference (1951-1953) and summarizes lessons learned.

80 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

"It is only through the imminent threat of application of our military power that the Communists can be compelled to negotiate seriously for the alleviation of the basic issues between their world and ours. We must be prepared to accept the risk of war if we hope to avoid war."

403

Leitenberg, Milton. SO FAR, SO GOOD. Environment, v. 12, July/Aug. 1970: 26-35. illus.
UF767.S33, v. 12

With increases in the number of deployed nuclear weapons and their vulnerability to surprise attack (and consequent need for fast response), serious danger of accidents involving nuclear weapons exists. Nuclear weapons "might be detonated in the aftermath of accidents which produce unusual physical stress or energy inputs to the weapon." There were 33 major accidents prior to March 1966, and 50 lesser incidents involved in maintenance, transportation, or modernization of nuclear weapons. There is reason to believe that the total number is even higher: some accidents have not been officially recorded, and it is unlikely that there have been no accidents involved in carrier or land based fighter aircraft, antisubmarine warfare aircraft, or other tactical naval and land weapons.

404

Roberts, Adam. THE FOG OF CRISIS: THE 1964 TONKIN GULF INCIDENTS. World today, v. 26, May 1970: 209-217.
D410.K63, v. 26

Events surrounding the August 1964 naval incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin deserve careful attention from students of crisis management. Serious questions have been raised about the veracity of the information made available by the U.S. Government during the crisis and about the appropriateness of U.S. responses. The nature of the mission being pursued by the destroyer Maddox and the truth about the incidents that occurred at sea, especially during the second encounter, have become matters of controversy. Official characterization of the Maddox mission as a "routine" patrol was certainly disingenuous; the circumstances in which the patrol took place made it anything but routine. Washington was also at fault in exaggerating the clashes themselves, and in the quickness of its response. The crisis should serve as a reminder that the technology of detection and communications is subject to error, that intergovernmental differences in political judgment and interest can disrupt crisis coordination and control, that third parties (in this case, South Vietnam) can have a catalytic effect on the course of a crisis, and that contingency planning often functions as self-fulfilling prophecy. "The precise role of these factors in the Tonkin crisis is debatable, but the potential of each of them for mischief is not."

1969. 107 p. (System Development Corporation. Technical memorandum. TM series. TM-2304/106, ...) BF637.N485

This is the eighth and final Report for the On-Line Computer Studies of Bargaining and Negotiation Behavior Project. This report describes the progress on SDC's contract DAKC15-67-C-0277 with the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense, which has been under way since July 1, 1957. This research program was designed to lead to a set of empirically derived propositions on bargaining and conflict resolution behavior, and on processes that occur in situations where the parties involved have both common and conflicting interests--that is, where they are mutually dependent in the pursuit of otherwise antagonistic goals. Of particular concern were those issues and strategies in bargaining that appear to be relevant, actually or potentially, in political-military confrontations, particularly limited conflicts. This program involved five routes of development, and particularly the interaction and mutual support among them: (1) The design and use of interaction simulation methodology--both manual and computer-based--for studies of IR theory and policy issues. The effort in this area was a distinct departure from our previous work but a logical extension of it--of computer and research methodologies to complex, multi-person, international relations games. We attempted to break through some of the methodological limitations that currently threaten the viability of such games for use as tools in both theory-building and policy study; (2) The development of software support for the computer-based laboratory; (3) The development of computer systems for data management and analysis; (4) On-line computer experiments in bargaining and negotiation; (5) Design and plans for a new ARPA supported Center for Computer-based Behavioral Studies. This final report, covering a period of two years, reviews the progress of this work. (Abstract supplied, modified)

406

Walton, Richard E. INTERPERSONAL PEACEMAKING; CONFRONTATIONS AND THIRD-PARTY CONSULTATION. Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley (1969) 151 p. (Organization development)

HF5548.B.W26

Bibliographical footnotes.

Offers three case studies that supply "some of the empirical basis for constructing a middle-range theory of a form of sociotherapeutic." Walton proposes a diagnostic model that identifies some features of a conflict cycle and postulates the advantages and the risks of direct confrontations, noting that well-managed ones could "allow for the exchange of essential information (and) increase the authenticity of the relationship." He describes the strategic functions, tactical choices, and optimum positional attributes of a third party to a dispute.

405

Geroch H., and R. J. Meeker. ON-LINE COMPUTER STUDIES OF BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR. San Monica, Calif., System Development Corp.,

407

Wilke, Dieter G. [CONTAINMENT AND NEUTRALIZATION; THOUGHTS ON THE WEST'S ASIA POLICY, ESPECIALLY REGARDING INDOCHINA, 1954-1964] Einsamung und

Neutralisierung. Zur westlichen Asienpolitik unter besonderer Berücksichtigung Indochinas, 1954-1964. (Friburg in Br.) Bertelsmann-Universitätsverlag [1969] 109 p. (Materialien des Arnold-Bergsträsser-Instituts für Kulturwissenschaftliche Forschung, Bd. 22)

DS518.8.W55

Bibliography: p. 105-109.

Contents.--Introduction.--pt. 1. Historical background: Southeast Asia and the Great Powers during the Pacific war. The way to the first Indochina war.--pt. 2. The policy of containment: Value and historical standpoint of the policy of containment. The application of the policy of containment in Asia.--pt. 3. The policy of neutralization: The concept of neutralization. Prerequisites for a neutralization policy now. Aspects of the Leotian neutralization.

Comprehensive and systematic analysis of the history of and Western policy toward the second Indochina war, using as a framework the concepts "containment" and "neutralization." Neutralization is defined as an active policy on the part of the Great Powers designed to impose neutrality where it does not actually exist, with rules binding even during peacetime, in order to create a buffer zone. The West's Southeast Asia policy tends toward guaranteeing neutrality there, resulting in a modified form of the classic multipolar balance. Part one analyzes the interests of the Great Powers in Asia during World War II and surveys the origins of the first Indochina war. Part two deals with containment policy as manifested in Asia. The differing expectations of the parties to the Southeast Asia treaty are discussed; whether such alliances, threatened with being overtaken by dynamic political development, can survive is questionable. Part three describes the policy of neutralization as applied in Southeast Asia.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS

413
THE BOOMING WORLD TRADE IN ARMS. *Business week*, no. 2125, May 23, 1970: 114-116, 118. illus.
HF5001.F59, 1970

Analyzes current trends in the international arms business, focusing on recent American, Soviet, French, and British transactions. Although no nation will overtake the United States as the world's largest arms supplier in the immediate future, new arms deals reflect increasing competition from Russia, France, and Britain. Existing relationships in the international arms business are expected to change in the 1970's. Numerous Western European cooperative armament projects and a rising demand for more licensing agreements will reduce sales to the industrialized nations, and military aid programs will level off. Increased advanced-weapons sales to the underdeveloped countries and higher Third World defense expenditures will offset this trend. A buyer's market could evolve over the next decade, with the emergence of more supplier nations like Japan.

409

Gallois, Pierre M. FRENCH MILITARY AERONAUTICS MAKE BID FOR WORLD MARKETS. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 15, Aug./Sept. 1970: 28-34, 36. illus.
UA646.F5, v. 15

Inquires into the reasons for French commercial success in the export of military aircraft, missiles, and supporting equipment. French export sales in military aviation more than doubled in cash value between 1960 and 1970. This remarkable record is the culmination of a number of commercial, technological, and politico-military factors, of which the French aviation industry has taken particularly astute advantage. Whether in the coming decade France will be able to defend the enviable export position it has won cannot be determined; the French Government recently has made several important technical and industrial decisions that could seriously hamper French aviation in the years ahead.

410

Minter, William. ALLIES IN EXPIRE: PART II -- U.S. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT. *Africa today*, v. 17, July/Aug. 1970: 28-32. DT1.A22, v. 17

A brief and critical summary of U.S.-Portuguese military relations, with particular reference to the nature and scope of military assistance programs since 1949 and Portugal's use of American and NATO military weapons and equipment in counterinsurgency operations in Africa. U.S. military aid to Portugal has been quite limited compared with the massive quantities given to such countries as Taiwan and Vietnam. During the 1950's, the amount given Portugal was less than that given to other Western European countries, but while such programs are being phased out elsewhere in Western Europe, military assistance to Portugal has continued despite its growing involvement in three colonial wars. "American identification with Portugal is solidified by 'business as usual' contacts, and the close working relationships fostered by American aid."

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

411

Brunner, Dominique. [THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY AND SWITZERLAND'S SECURITY] Le traité de non-prolifération nucléaire et la sécurité de la Suisse. *Revue militaire suisse*, v. 115, June 1970: 275-260. U2.R5, v. 115

The nonproliferation treaty has not halted the arms race nor diminished the probability that nuclear weapons would be used in a European conflict. Although Switzerland has no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons, the treaty will be valid for 25 years, and it is impossible to foresee the needs of Switzerland's security after 15 or 20 years. Ratification should be considered only after the superpowers have agreed to stop the arms race. No one could believe that its refusal to ratify menaces world peace, and Switzerland risks nothing by waiting.

412

Cassuto, Aldo. HIROSHIMA'S JAPAN GOES NUCLEAR. *World today*, v. 26, Aug. 1970: 313-316.
D410.W63, v. 26

Outlines Japan's burgeoning nuclear-energy program against a background of rapidly rising demand for electricity. Despite strong anti-nuclear-weapon attitudes and policies in Japan, "some doubts may linger, both at home and abroad, as to whether the plutonium automatically produced by the growing national capacity of the nuclear power station network might not be diverted from the intended channel of economic development and expansion to military uses."

413

Deshingkar, G. D. CHINA'S EARTH SATELLITE: THE CASE FOR INDIAN BOMB. *China report*, v. 6, May/June 1970: 28-33. DS777.55.C4484, v. 6

The military implications of China's space show alarmed some Indian political leaders, who now argue for an accelerated nuclear weapons program to counter the "Chinese threat." For 2 or 3 years China has had ICBM's capable of reaching almost all of India's strategic targets, but Peking has not threatened India or any other nation. If China's nuclear weapons were intended to support a policy of territorial aggrandizement, it would have actively pursued its territorial claims. However, China "has not taken any step which can be construed as territorial expansion." Although its burgeoning nuclear weapons capability will deter a Soviet or U.S. preemptive strike, this does not mean that China would launch a nuclear attack against India. China has pledged to first use of nuclear weapons, and the possibility of joint retaliatory action by the superpowers will continue to deter a Chinese attack on such nonnuclear nations as India. "If the Chinese are 'irrational' enough to attack India at the risk of total self-destruction, no amount of Indian retaliatory capacity will ever deter them." In developing a defensive nuclear arsenal, the Chinese are motivated primarily by a desire for increased political leverage and prestige. The Indian Ministry of Defense has recognized the validity of these arguments and has recently questioned the credibility of the Chinese nuclear threat. Yet other reasons exist for a nation to want nuclear weapons. India will never be accepted as a great power until it acquires them. Their domestic and international costs are high, but their intangible advantages weigh heavy.

414

DISARMAMENT IN THE WESTERN WORLD: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS IN CELEBRATION OF THE 23RD ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS, OCTOBER 24, 1968. Edited by Henry C. Kerge. New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers University [1969] 37 p. (Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J. Latin American Institute. Occasional publications, no. 1)

JX1974.D53

Conference sponsored by the Latin American Institute, Rutgers University.

Includes bibliographical references.

Focuses on nuclear nonproliferation in Latin America. In the first part, William Foster re-

views the achievements of the past decade in arms control and disarmament, noting that where the latter relates to peace and security "the edifice of the United Nations always remains at least in the background of all our endeavors in this field"; Alfonso Garcia Robles surveys Latin American disarmament efforts, emphasizing the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and its immediate antecedents; and E. L. M. Burns sketches the disposition of Canada's Armed Forces as well as its role in disarmament. The feasibility of disarmament in Latin America and the economics of arms control and military expenditures both worldwide and with respect to Latin America are discussed by Robert Alexander and Archibald Alexander. In part two, Garcia Robles considers the origin, purposes, and scope of the Latin American nonproliferation treaty and concludes by quoting a statement of U Thant praising the treaty as "an important milestone in the long and difficult search for disarmament."

415

Ehrlich, Thomas. THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY AND PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES. *Virginia law review*, v. 56, May 1970: 587-601.

LL

Bibliographical footnotes.

Contends that "the future use of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes will depend in large measure upon the international arrangements for arms control that are developed under [the nonproliferation] treaty" (NPT) and that "the success of the treaty in checking the proliferation of nuclear weapons is contingent, in substantial part, on those peaceful-uses arrangements." Ehrlich notes the importance, in some cases exaggerated, that many non-nuclear-weapon states attach to NPT provisions regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and he examines some of the problems involved in the transfer of nuclear information and explosives. The non-nuclear-weapon states, including the crucial threshold states, will ratify the NPT only if they are assured of reaping the benefits of peaceful nuclear explosives. Since it is in the interests of the nuclear powers that the non-nuclear-weapon states ratify the treaty, and since the non-nuclear-weapon states insist on substantive arms control agreements by the superpowers as a precondition for ratification, arms control and peaceful uses of nuclear explosives reinforce rather than exclude each other.

416

Endel, S., and Allan McNight. BOMBS, POWER STATIONS, AND PROLIFERATION. *Australian quarterly*, v. 43, Mar. 1970: 45-66.

D689.A95, v. 43

Although Australia's announcement that it would sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty represented a victory over the "bomb lobby," it was hedged with qualifications concerning ratification that were influenced in part by Australia's "special" nuclear relationship with France. The government's reservations imply that Australia intends to retain the option of developing nuclear weapons because it believes that the alliance with the United States is unreliable. Such a policy, however, would upset U.S.-Australian relations and

weaken the alliance that is the foundation of Australian foreign policy. The construction of a nuclear reactor for potential military use would be difficult, since Australia is already subjected to an international inspection system and other obligations embodied in the nonproliferation treaty under preexisting agreements. Although the development of a limited nuclear-weapons capability is economically feasible, it would be of questionable strategic value. "A case made on military grounds for Australian possession of nuclear weapons [is] implausible." Australia should ratify the treaty, because further proliferation of nuclear weapons will heighten international instability. The prospect of a nuclear force would have an unfavorable effect on Australia's relations with Indonesia, China, and the Soviet Union, and Australian ratification might significantly influence "the continuation of Japan's peaceful posture."

417

Ericsson, Ulf. THE NON-CONTROVERSIAL USE OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. Cooperation and conflict, no. 1, 1970: 1-19.

Ser

Adapted from "a paper written at the request of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to serve as a background paper for the 1968 Geneva Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States, as document A/Conf 35/Doc 3 of July, 1968 and document A/Conf 35/Doc 3 Cca 1 of 27 August, 1968."

Speculates on problems likely to arise in attempts to develop and use nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes. Ericsson examines the most important limitations on the use of nuclear explosives; international arrangements for the provision of nuclear explosives and related services; the conduct of nuclear explosives operations, problems peculiar to development and production, nuclear-weapons testing, and the study of nuclear-explosive effects; the problem of accommodating the development and application of nuclear explosives with the test ban and nonproliferation treaties; and the dangers of misuse. Peaceful nuclear explosive programs are unlikely to be used to circumvent the partial test ban treaty. The treaty imposes needless and potentially harmful restrictions on the development of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes and should be amended. An unlimited test ban treaty would make it difficult to reconcile the desire for a foolproof safeguards system with the requirements of a vigorous development program. The benefits of peaceful nuclear explosive applications will have to be weighed against the danger of limited improvements in weapons technology.

418

Kaul, Pavi. INDIA'S STRATEGIC SPECTRUM. Allahabad, Chansky Pub. House (1969) 223 p.
UAB40.K28

Bibliography: p. 223.

Contents.--Psychological barriers.--The global balance of power.--The vacuum of power in the Indian Ocean.--Vigil in the north.--The spectrum of conflict.--The organization for defense.--Strategic planning.--The nuclear dilemma.--Strategic doctrine.

Surveys India's military capabilities and strategy and considers arguments for and against acquiring nuclear weapons. Although a crash program to achieve nuclear parity with Communist China would be an economic disaster for India, a small nuclear force, based on the burgeoning nuclear power program, would provide a minimal, credible deterrent in the 1970's. "By subordinating an inescapable military requirement to economic development [India] shall be broadening her industrial and technological capacities which will allow her greater freedom to enter the more costly sophisticated fields of the nuclear spectrum if found necessary in the latter seventies."

419

Mukerjee, Dilip. ITCHING FOR THE BOMB. Far Eastern economic review, v. 69, July 9, 1970: 83-85.
HC411.P18, v. 69

Briefly outlines the Indian Atomic Energy Commission's (AEC) 10-year plan, which calls for a substantial acceleration of nuclear and space programs. The new program requests funds for the development of an experimental fast-breeder reactor with French and, possibly, Soviet assistance, uranium-enrichment technology, and a delivery system capable of orbiting 1,200-kg. payloads. The AEC would draw on its experience in foreign-supplied experimental reactors, which are presumably covered by safeguards, to build its own reactors for military purposes.

420

NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT. Asian almanac, v. 9, Sept. 26, 1970: 4182-4184. DSI.A4752 v. 8

During a panel debate held this spring by the nongovernmental Indian Parliamentary and Scientific Committee, India's top scientists, economists, and defense specialists concluded that a nuclear-weapons program was "technically feasible, politically desirable and strategically inescapable" and urged the government to abandon its policy of developing nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes. In Parliament on May 20, 1970, a Congress Party member advised the government to publish a white paper to clarify its ambiguous nuclear policy, accusing it of failing miserably to make the nation defense conscious. The Indian Government has stated repeatedly that it has no intention of changing its peaceful nuclear policy. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi asserted that "strengthening our industrial and economic base" was more important than developing nuclear weapons and emphasized that such weapons were strategically unnecessary. In March, however, when asked if India's nuclear policy might change in the future, the Minister for Defense replied that "if the situation changes, we can decide what other action we should take." In late May India's Atomic Energy Commission presented an accelerated 10-year nuclear-energy and space plan, which included a proposal to design and construct a large prototype fast-breeder reactor, develop gas-centrifuge technology, and build multistage solid-fuel delivery systems capable of orbiting 1,200-kg. payloads. In response to mounting domestic pressure for a nuclear-arms program following China's space shot,

the government established a study group under the Cabinet's committee on science and technology to examine the technical and economic feasibility of India's producing nuclear weapons.

431

Quester, George J. JAPAN AND THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. Asian survey, v. 10, Sept. 1970: 765-779. D61.A492, v. 10

Among the Japanese objections to ratifying the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) are that the international safeguards system will be prohibitively expensive, may disrupt those industries to which it is applied, and will offer opportunities for industrial espionage. They object to treaty provisions that seek to impose international inspection on what a nation has produced or will produce for itself. Further, the Japanese see the NPT as manifesting the world community's view of Japan as a "permanently second-class loser of World War II." Even if Japan rejects the NPT, Tokyo may not opt for nuclear weapons production, but imaginative Japanese strategists may devise scenarios for their use and, more importantly, "the sheer glamour of handling such weapons will have an appeal of its own for many military professionals." Any real desire for nuclear weapons will be contingent on America's Southeast Asian policy. "If the United States withdraws from all of Southeast Asia, 'it will be difficult for Japanese (or Australians) to accept assurances that America is committed to their defence as ever,' making nuclear weapons more acceptable in Japan. The NPT, if ratified, would prevent this."

432

Quester, George H. PARIS, PRETORIA, Peking . . . PROLIFERATION? Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 26, Oct. 1970: 12-16.

TK9145.A54, v. 26

The refusal by France and Communist China, both nuclear powers, and the Union of South Africa, a major supplier of uranium, to sign the nonproliferation treaty could have unfortunate consequences. France has promised to abide by the terms of the treaty, but there is no certainty that it will interpret those terms as restrictively as the signatory states. South Africa, which is able to assist other states attain nuclear status or to achieve it itself, has made no such promise. It is not likely to exercise either of its options, however, except in very specific circumstances, because there are too many advantages to postponing a decision. The Communist Chinese have indicated on occasion that they would not be averse to giving nuclear weapons to Pakistan, the United Arab Republic, or other countries, should they request them. However it is not clear that these countries want nuclear weapons, and there are good reasons for believing that the Chinese themselves are less willing than indicated by their public statements to contribute to the spread of nuclear weapons. It must be remembered that the Chinese still attach primary importance to guerrilla movements and that in foreign policy they are anything but adventurist. Nevertheless the possibility of Chinese aid cannot be discounted altogether, and much depends on the behavior of Israel and India. Moreover, China, by the very fact of its refusing to commit itself openly to nonproliferation, in-

creases the danger that nuclear weapons will be introduced into the Middle East. Chinese, French, and South African intransigence contribute materially to the difficulty of controlling nuclear proliferation.

433

Quester, George H. SWEDEN AND THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. Cooperation and conflict, no. 1, 1970: 52-64.

Ser

Sweden, which a short 12 years ago was seriously debating whether to acquire nuclear weapons, today considers itself a staunch champion of nonproliferation. The changeover was due in part to developments in the military field that cast doubts on the military value of any Swedish nuclear weapons program, and in part to the impact on Swedish public opinion of Sweden's admission to membership in the disarmament committee at Geneva. A firm national commitment to nonproliferation did not prevent Sweden from playing a leading role in the fight to amend the superpower draft of the nonproliferation treaty and acquiring thereby a reputation as an "NPT-recalcitrant," but in the end superpower inflexibility left the Swedes with little choice but to ratify the document as it stood. Today there is little domestic opposition to the treaty. However, disputes may arise out of Swedish research on protection from nuclear weapons effects, which to some degree overlaps research on nuclear weapons themselves, or over interpretations of treaty restrictions on the sale of nuclear equipment to nonsignatories such as India. Meanwhile the Swedish nuclear option has certainly not atrophied, nor will it do so under the treaty; the most damage the treaty can do is add three months to the time it would take for Sweden to manufacture its first nuclear weapon. In certain circumstances--a Soviet invasion of Finland, the disintegration of NATO and its replacement with a Nordic security structure, West German abstention from the treaty with indications that it intends to acquire nuclear weapons--Sweden might be forced to withdraw from the treaty. Fearing these contingencies, Sweden is not likely to forsake the treaty, even if the great powers fail to move toward their own nuclear disarmament.

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Fynn, William L., and Sam Sinnerlin. THE CHINA CHUIN: AMERICA'S TRAGIC HUNGER AND CHINA'S RISE TO NUCLEAR POWER. London, Hutchinson, 1970. 319 p. 1743.1.189 1969 Bibliography: p. 257-295.

Considers U.S. and Soviet contributions to China's nuclear-weapon program, focusing on Tsien Hsue-shen's career at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and California Institute of Technology. The authors explain that he and other Chinese scientists became discouraged and even frustrated by the intensive anti-Communist atmosphere in the United States in the early 1950's and returned to China, where they rose rapidly to key positions in China's burgeoning nuclear-weapon program. China most likely would eventually have developed nuclear weapons alone. The "astonishing speed" of Peking's entry into the nuclear club, however, was the result of aid from the

United States and the Soviet Union. "In the case of the Americans, the help was unintentional. . . . In the case of the Russians, the help was political expediency. . . . Both the Russians and the Americans would have reason to regret deeply having extended such help."

425

Stone, Isidor F. THE TEST BAN COMEDY. New York review of books, v. 14, May 7, 1970: 14-22. AP2.N655, v. 14

A critique of the Kennedy administration's negotiation of the limited nuclear test ban treaty of 1963. Stone contends that the Kennedy administration assured the continuation of U.S. military superiority by driving a hard bargain with the Soviet Union but wasted an opportunity to achieve significant progress toward arms control and disarmament. The administration won the support of the U.S. military by persuading them that the treaty would strengthen rather than weaken the Nation's strategic position and by assuring a continuation of the arms race and an increase in defense spending.

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

426

Bogdanov, Oleg V. FOR AN EFFECTIVE BAN ON CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. Daily review; translations from the Soviet press, v. 16, July 16, 1970: supplement, [item] 1, 1-10.

Slav Rm

Translation from Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i prav, no. 6, 1970. Slav Rm

Reviews the history of efforts to ban the use of biological and chemical weapons (CBW), treating U.S. use of chemicals in Vietnam, pre-1929 prohibitions on chemical and biological weapons, and the making of the Geneva Protocol, the U.S. position on it, and the development of the Nixon administration's reservation of the use of tear gas, antiriot gases, and herbicides from its application. Bogdanov believes that recognizing any exception to the Geneva Protocol opens the gate to the application of the entire CBW arsenal, since in the heat of conflict there is no possibility of ascertaining the due proportionality of retaliation. The British proposal for separating chemical and biological weapons is held ambiguous and dangerous. The final section discusses the Soviet proposal calling for the destruction of present stocks and an end to their manufacture.

427

Carter, Luther J. NERVE GAS DISPOSAL: HOW THE AEC REFUSED TO TAKE ARMY OFF THE HOOK. Science, v. 169, Sept. 25, 1970: 1296-1298.

Q1.S35, v. 169

Describes the controversy over the U.S. Army's request that the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) destroy dangerous stocks of Army gas in underground and nuclear explosions. Although this method may have been safer and more predictable than sea disposal or some other methods that were

briefly considered, the AEC concluded that the project would cause unacceptable interference with scheduled nuclear tests and might fuel public criticism of the Commission's ongoing underground nuclear test programs. While the Army's statement on environmental impact minimized the hazards of dumping at sea, the Council on Environmental Quality, in criticizing the Army's statement, contends that it "left a number of questions unanswered and that no firm prediction about the effects of the dumping were in order."

428

GENEVA PROTOCOL ON GASES AND BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE RESUBMITTED TO THE SENATE. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 63, Sept. 7, 1970: 273-275.

CX232.A33, v. 63

A message from the President to the Senate of the United States requesting advice and consent to ratification of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva in 1925, together with a report from the Secretary of State that "sets forth the understandings and the proposed reservation of the United States with respect to the Protocol." The President notes that "the United States has renounced the first-use of lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons" and "any use of biological and toxin weapons," that its "biological and toxin programs will be confined to research for defensive purposes, strictly defined," and that it "will seek further agreement on effective arms-control measures in the field of biological and chemical warfare." The Secretary's report recommends adoption of a reservation that states that the "Protocol shall cease to be binding . . . with respect to the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, in regard to an enemy State if such State or any of its allies fails to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol." The report also notes that "the U.S. view, the Protocol does not prohibit the use of riot-control agents, chemical herbicides, smoke, flame, and napalm."

429

Goldhaber, Samuel Z. CBW: INTERAGENCY CONFLICTS STALL ADMINISTRATION ACTION. Science, v. 169, July 31, 1970: 454-456.

Q1.S35, v. 169

President Nixon's November 1969 announcement on chemical and biological weapons (CBW) "was hailed as a major policy decision that would generate positive initiatives toward world peace," but it now seems that his action may not have been as far-reaching as it first appeared. Although the White House has stated unequivocally that all future biological warfare research would be defensive in nature and completely unclassified, the Pentagon maintains that research on U.S. vulnerability to specific germs will remain secret. Matthew S. Meselson, a Harvard biology professor, has said that "secret research might permit the biological warfare establishment to linger quietly until public opinion lets it flourish once again." Nixon pledged to submit the Geneva Protocol to the Senate for ratification, but it remains stalled in

92 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

the Executive Branch due, in part, to sharp inter-agency conflict over tear gas and defoliants. The White House contends that these agents are not covered by the protocol. In its recent report on CBW, the House Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments recommended that the question of tear gas and defoliants be left open and suggested that after ratification the United States "should seek agreement with the other parties on a uniform interpretation of the scope of the protocol." Significant non-Government groups believe the United States should interpret the protocol as encompassing tear gas and herbicides. "If Nixon does not declassify defensive biological warfare research, and if he insists on a reservation to the protocol instead of leaving the tear gas issue open, he may lose much of the positive response that he received from his original CBW announcement."

430

Lederberg, Joshua. A BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS RACE: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. Vital speeches of the day, v. 36, Oct. 1, 1970: 740-743.

FN6121.V52, v. 36

Delivered at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, Geneva, Aug. 5, 1970.

Biological warfare poses a threat to men of all nationalities and political persuasions. The history of the spread of bubonic plague in Europe illustrates the difficulty of confining an epidemic to a specific locality. Viruses undergo a constant evolution, giving rise to new and possibly more resistant diseases. The present moment is favorable for an international agreement banning all biological weapons since no nation has yet staked its security on their use. It is important to move toward this goal at once, however, for a scientific breakthrough in biological warfare may sharply escalate this deadly race at any time. Increased international cooperation in health programs would improve the chances for an effective ban on biological weapons and render clandestine research more difficult.

431

Leonard, James F. CONTROL OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 63, Sept. 21, 1970: 330-331. JX232.A33, v. 63

Statement "made before the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva on Aug. 27," 1970.

Outlines U.S. views on several aspects of the problem of controlling chemical and biological weapons. Leonard states the U.S. view "that there are intrinsic differences between biological and chemical weapons which justify their separate treatment," and rebuts Soviet objections to this thesis. He expresses U.S. support for the United Kingdom draft convention to prohibit the development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons, and U.S. opposition to a Socialist draft convention to control both types of weapons. The control of chemical weapons can be accomplished only on the basis of wide-ranging and intensive studies of all aspects of the problem; meanwhile, there is no reason to delay adoption of a convention to prohibit biological agents.

432

ON THE QUESTION OF SUPERVISING A PROHIBITION OF BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS. Zur Frage der Überwachung eines Verbots der B- und C-Waffen. Katastrophenmedizin, no. 2, Apr./June 1970: 26-30. In Wehrmedizin und Wehrpharmazie, v. 6, no. 5/6, 1970. Ser

Statement of the German Federal Republic to the Geneva disarmament conference, Feb. 17, 1970.

Describes West Germany's control over the production of bacteriological and chemical weapons in connection with their prohibition, Germany's experience since the 1954 renunciation of these weapons, and the submission to West European Union supervision. This contribution of the German Government can possibly be related with East Germany's allegations that the Federal Republic is producing such weapons.

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION

433

Benckiser, Nikolas. WHAT ARE THE CHANCES FOR SALT? Welche Chance für SALT? Die Zukunft no. 9/10. H5.265, 1970

The chances are slim that the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) will open a new era ending the absurdity of the arms race. The problems to be solved are not only technical but political as well. The world political equilibrium is one of balance of terror and overkill, which can only be alleviated. Yet it is more desirable than ever to cut the financial costs of the arms race. Periodic contact between those who control nuclear weapons is heartening, as is the attempt to calculate and freeze the arms race, but ultimately China must contribute.

434

Brown, Neville. THE ADVERSE PARTNERSHIP--THE US AND RUSSIA LEARN TO TALK. New Middle East, no. 23, Aug. 1970: 17-21. DS63.1.N48, 1970

Reviews the emergence of strategic balance and political détente between the United States and the Soviet Union and assesses the effects of these developments on local and regional disputes, particularly the Arab-Israeli conflict. Brown notes the threat posed by MIRV's and ABM's to the present stability in the strategic arms race and discusses the attempt to deal with this threat at the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT). He warns that the initial optimism over SALT may give way to cynicism or despair if, as is likely, the talks do not lead to any fundamental change in the strategic arms race.

435

Centrell, Burton W. MISCONCEPTIONS CONCERNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. Christian century, v. 37, Oct. 14, 1970: 1219-1220. ER1.C45, v. 37

American misconceptions about nuclear weapons might hinder public support for a strategic arms limitation agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. At least three technical misconceptions are commonly held: that the size of a weapon's warhead is the crucial factor in judging

its value, when in fact the accuracy of the delivery system is much more important; that the number rather than the quality of missiles is decisive; and that land-based missiles are more important than sea-based missiles. An even more basic misconception is the generalized belief in the possibility of "winning" a nuclear exchange. "Any use of nuclear weapons would be self-defeating and futile." Finally, acceptance of the legitimacy of nuclear weapons erodes man's spirit. "Any scheme for limiting nuclear weapons which does not work for their eventual elimination is misconceived."

436

Chalfont, Alun. SLOWING DOWN THE MISSILE RACE. *New statesman*, v. 80, Aug. 28, 1970: 231-232.
APL.664, v. 80

The ABM and the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) are the primary causes of "a crazy, ruinously expensive and self-perpetuating (nuclear arms) spiral." The significance of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) lies in the superpowers' recognition of the appalling implications of an accelerating spiral. The most likely outcome of SALT will be an accord to halt the deployment of ABM's. No chance exists for an agreement on MIRV's, since it would require unacceptably intrusive inspection. Moreover, MIRV testing is so far advanced that it is hardly worth stopping. An agreement to limit the numbers of delivery systems--a move that would alleviate American fears of the Russian SS-9--is most likely. "It should be possible for the super-powers to reach agreement by the spring" of 1971.

437

Clemens, Walter C. THE ECOLOGY OF WEAPONRY. *Bulletin of the atomic scientists*, v. 26, Sept. 1970: 27-31.
TK9145.A64, v. 26

Changes military technology, the interaction between and among nation-states, and the "warrior class" with being the major factors contributing to the arms race. Clemens outlines the current international situation and arms control efforts in terms of these factors. He concludes that aside from technical solutions that stress research and development instead of actual weapons deployment and the submission of every weapons system decision to careful analysis, the essential factor in controlling military technology "is the emergence of an informed, alert and concerned citizenry, willing and able to organize and work for its beliefs."

438

Feld, Bernard T. THE SWARM HISTORY OF ARMS CONTROL. *Bulletin of the atomic scientists*, v. 26, Sept. 1970: 22-26.
TK9145.A64, v. 26

Traces postwar arms control and disarmament efforts and contends that the nonproliferation treaty, the partial nuclear test ban treaty, and the strategic arms limitation talks have been little more than stopgaps that will be outlasted by new technological advances as in the 1970's. Feld warns that neither superpower will divest itself of its obsolete weapons systems "but rather will continue to employ them as insurance against failure of the Polaris and Poseidon submarine systems, researching furiously all the while on means of

nullifying these." He advocates a unilateral U.S. moratorium against deployment of the ABM, the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle, the fractional orbital bombardment system, or any other new missile system. To meet the challenge of the next decade, the control of an increasing number of independent nuclear systems, current strategic concepts will have to be rethought.

439

Geneste, Marc. [THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS (SALT)] Les conversations sur la limitation des armes stratégiques (SALT). *Revue militaire générale*; general military review, no. 6, June 1970: 3-25.
J2.R48, 1970

Includes summaries in English and German.

Report from the Fourth International Symposium on Arms Control organized by the Foreign Policy Institute of the University of Pennsylvania and held in Philadelphia, Oct. 17-19, 1969.

Discusses, among other things, nuclear bombs, satellite reconnaissance and surveillance, the ABM, multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, manned aircraft, the partial nuclear test ban treaty, and the arms race. Geneste notes that the United States has had to reinforce the electronic equipment of its new missiles because it signed the test ban treaty before testing high-megaton superbombs, which "neutralize the ordinary electronic equipment . . . of current missiles and warheads by ionization." He concludes that ABM deployment would facilitate disarmament and that relief of the arms race is tied to an efficient European defense system.

440

Hermes, David. [SALT--A GREAT HOPE] SALT--Eine grosse Hoffnung. *Die Zukunft*, no. 9/10, 1970: 11-12.
H5.285, 1970

At the opening of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) both powers expressed favorable attitudes. Although the problems are extremely complicated, no time should be lost, because the expenditures of the arms race are gigantic and, more importantly, because China has become a serious competitor. Within 3 years Peking may be able to strike American and Russian targets. Once the two superpowers have reached agreement, they must persuade China to join them. As a first step, China should be invited into the United Nations under the condition that it sign the nonproliferation treaty. European integration must strive toward economic, scientific, technological, and cultural cooperation. A united Europe could show the world the way to a better future. Austria, the site of the SALT talks, urges that the International Atomic Energy Agency, also based in Vienna, be charged with coordinating verification procedures reached by the talks.

441

Lepp, Ralph E. SALT CHIPS AND SAFEGUARD. *New republic*, v. 163, Aug. 15, 1970: 14-17.
AP2.R624, v. 163

The Senate Armed Services Committee has pared back the Safeguard antiballistic missile (ABM) program, abandoning the 12-site area-defense system in favor of a 4-site deployment protecting a

portion of the Minuteman force against the potential first-strike capability of the Soviet Union's SS-9 missiles. Although Senator Stennis, chairman of the Committee, and Defense Secretary Laird maintain that terminal defense is essential for national survival, Stennis and other proponents of the ABM admit they are justifying it primarily as a bargaining chip in the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT). Stennis emphasized this point by warning that "a vote in the Senate against the ABM means sudden death at this sitting, at least, of the SALT talks in Vienna." However, in view of the Committee's decision, it is difficult to understand how Safeguard has any chip value at all. The bargaining power of Phase II has to be related to further deployments of the SS-9, but reports on the SALT talks do not suggest that this type of deal is in the offing. If a strategic arms limitation agreement restricted ABM's to rival national command centers, a possibility discussed by Henry Kissinger, the United States would have to dismantle ABM sites protecting Minuteman missiles, but "that's hardly a bargain that President Nixon could go for." Dr. John Foster, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, has estimated a two- or three-to-one cost advantage for the U.S. defense over the Soviet offense, but he miscalculated unit costs on both sides. Even assuming a one-for-one kill ratio, the Soviets would have an eleven-to-one cost advantage. In its recent authorization report, the Senate Armed Services Committee backs Foster's argument without, however, providing cost figures to back its position. If the bargaining-chip argument is genuine, then one must ask: "How many bargaining chips do we need?" The chip value of new U.S. strategic weapons systems must impress the Soviet negotiators. "The Soviets may be pardoned if they view Minuteman III and Poseidon as prime pieces on the strategic chess board and ABM as simply pawns."

442

Lendvai, Paul. [SMALL HOPES--GREAT DANGERS] Kleine Hoffnungen--grosse Gefahren. Die Zukunft, no. 9/10, May 1970: 10-11.

H5.285, 1970

The current strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) might be the most difficult and potentially most dangerous negotiations between the two superpowers. Conflicts arise from technical, political, and economic factors. Nuclear-strategic parity must be maintained without one of the two acquiring a first-strike capability. The dynamics of technical development, however, seem to escape rational control. A comprehensive agreement to freeze the balance is hardly possible. The best that can be expected is a quantitative limitation on offensive and defensive weapons if effective control procedures can be agreed upon. Western Europe could still be threatened by the 700 Soviet medium-range missiles. A disproportionate ABM system directed against third-country attacks could also endanger the Soviet-American relationship. Even though the Soviets feel the financial burden of the arms race, suspicion of their peace-loving nature is not out of line, considering their tremendous military buildup. In the United States, at least criticism may be voiced, and politicians can be influenced by public opinion. Accidental or irrational war cannot be ruled out, and even a moderate limitation of missiles would be a step in the right direction.

443

Lewis, Richard S. SALT IN VIENNA: THE WALTZ OF THE POWERS. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 26, Sept. 1970: 19-21. illus.

TK9145.A84, v. 26

The strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) will culminate in a limitation agreement despite ABM deployment, the testing of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV), the Soviet refusal to accept on-site inspection, and the threat posed by Communist China's growing nuclear capability. U.S. officials regard MIRV and ABM deployment as bargaining chips at the table despite the contention that they make limitation less amenable to negotiations. In the U.S. view, it was understood by both sides that because of the long lead-time required for missile system development they would continue programs until an agreement was reached. Verification of a limitation agreement is no longer an obstacle, for it can be carried out by satellites, radar, and field intelligence, thus eliminating the need for on-site inspection. The superpowers have agreed that the time has come for an arms control agreement. SALT can be the instrument to dispel the mutual fears and suspicions that have up to now prevented an accord.

444

Perle, Richard. ARMS CONTROL CRITERIA. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 50, Oct. 1970: 82-93. illus.

26123.U35, v. 50

"Condensed from the original, published in the Westinghouse Advanced Studies Group Monograph Series, Waltham, Massachusetts, April 1970, under the title 'Criteria for the Evaluation of Arms Control Options.'"

An arms limitation agreement that seeks to maintain the strategic balance should aim at controlling potentially destabilizing technologies and at promoting technologies that contribute to stability. Technologies in the first category include improvements in missile accuracy and the perfection of phased-array radars and, in the second, nuclear submarines, early warning systems, and hardened missile silos. The degree to which advanced technologies are destabilizing can be tied to the requirements for dynamic stability, which is "a function of the rate at which the conditions leading to static stability can be changed." Because technological innovations are always taking place, there is the danger that an agreement that freezes the strategic balance and prohibits the introduction of new weapons systems will contribute to dynamic instability. In view of this problem, an accord will have to include an option to negotiate, consisting of provisions that will either confer advantages on neither party or distribute potential advantages to both; it will exclude those technologies that are critical elements in the strategic balance. Further, technologies and systems that are constrained under an agreement will have to be highly visible and subject to national inspection and verification. High visibility systems, however, are becoming increasingly vulnerable and may be less stabilizing than low visibility systems, such as mobile missiles, which should be "usefully constrained only if their potential impact on the strategic balance

is slight." An arms control agreement that provides for advancements in technology has less chance of being violated or abrogated, and it will contribute to dynamic stability despite continuing defense-related technological improvements.

445

Fitman, George R. ARMS RACES AND STABLE DETERRENCE. Los Angeles, University of California, 1969. 66 p. (University of California. Security studies paper no. 18) UALL.P5

Contents.--Introduction.--Strategic objectives and deterrence.--Dynamics of a nuclear exchange.--An example of strategic response in a technological arms race.--Stability and instability in strategic arms races.--Destabilizing factors in the balance of strategic armaments.--Ballistic missile defense and strategic stability.--Conclusions and some policy implications.--Appendices: Strategic force requirements. The selection of weapons for a deterrent force.

Develops an analytical model of the arms race and applies it to a determination of the conditions most likely to promote a stable balance in strategic armaments. It is essential to stability that both adversaries adopt assured destruction rather than first-strike, damage-limiting strategic postures. Even if this condition is met, however, fears arising out of the uncertainties of technological innovation and enemy intentions may be too great to cope with unless steps are taken to establish better communications between the adversaries on matters relating to strategic objectives, weapons capabilities, and deployment plans.

446

PUGWASH WORTH ITS WEIGHT IN SALT, by our special correspondent. Nature (London) v. 227 Sept. 19, 1970: 1185-1186. QL.N2, v. 227

The chief value of the most recent conference of the Pugwash movement may be the opportunity it afforded for conversations between the U.S. and Soviet representatives. The Soviet participants quite obviously were poorly informed on strategic matters; the discussions may have enhanced the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) by making clear to the Russian conferees the full implications of the nuclear arms race. It is evident, in any case, that with the U.S.-Soviet arms talks underway, the Pugwash get-togethers have more to contribute to disarmament than ever, and attempts by some to divert the energies of the movement in the direction of other issues, such as environmental pollution, should not be encouraged. The discussion of disarmament questions was greatly influenced by the realization that upcoming improvements in missile accuracy doom land-based missiles to rapid obsolescence and throw the responsibility for maintaining the strategic balance almost entirely on sea-based weapons systems. It follows that one goal of the U.S.-Soviet talks must be to head off technological threats to the invulnerability of the submarine. The conferees had little to offer in the way of suggestions as to how to halt the deployment of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV), a much more serious escalation than ABM deployment. The U.S. decision to accelerate MIRV deployment, closely followed by the Soviet Union's resumption of SS-9

production, would almost confirm the view that neither party is anxious to make anything of the SALT talks. It may have been the achievement of Pugwash to have convinced them that the situation is not nearly as bad as they think.

447

Ruehl, Lothar. [TERROR AND DISARMAMENT. SALT AND EUROPE] Abschreckung und Abrüstung. SALT und Europa. Monat, v. 22, July 1970: 19-26. AP30.M56, v. 22

In Europe the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) are seen mainly as a means of perfecting and justifying the hierarchy of the two alliances and the nuclear protectorates of both powers, and their establishment in an arms control agreement. The bilateral nature of the talks reinforces the status of the two countries as the only important nuclear power until China joins them, and, therefore, their primacy in security politics. Nevertheless SALT is viewed positively by most European countries, because it stabilizes the strategic equilibrium and reduces the risks of nuclear war. They hope the talks eventually will lead to a successful mutual balanced force reduction, which is of particular interest to the Federal Republic of Germany. Still, the West German Government has some reservations regarding Europe's security. Since nuclear weapons most likely will not be used, the stabilization of the conventional balance of power is desirable. The German NATO ambassador, Wilhelm Greve, has made several suggestions as to how negative results from SALT can be avoided. In light of the absurd technical demands the Soviet Union allegedly made in Helsinki, the question arises whether the Soviets are using SALT to weaken NATO. Europeans have no influence on the relationship between the two superpowers, which are at the same time partners in the prevention of war and rivals for power in the area of sophisticated weaponry. If the talks do lead to cooperative arms control, Europe will enjoy security in which it has no direct say, but for which it has constantly sacrificed its practical sovereignty and independence.

448

Schwartz, Urs. [BEFORE THE NEW NEGOTIATIONS ON ABM LIMITATIONS] Vor neuen Verhandlungen über Rüstungseinschränkungen. Schweizer Monatshefte, v. 50, Apr. 1970: 22-28. AP32.S47, v. 50

Technical developments have weakened the assured-destruction or second-strike concept that formerly forced the superpowers to keep the peace. The changes are qualitative: in the act of deployment, defensive systems like Safeguard take on offensive character, and the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) can hardly be equated with a simple numerical increase in the number of SS-9 or Minuteman missiles. MIRV, the reconnaissance-proof vehicle, is the technical breakthrough so long feared. The increase in offensive capability it represents nullifies the ABM's hardened silos. The world lives in fear of a superpower yielding to the folly of a surprise attack, to which its adversary can reply only by releasing all its missiles in total nuclear war. Since mutual disarmament is impossible, the two superpowers must agree to curtail missile technology, despite the danger represented by China.

449

Smart, Ian. THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS.
World today, v. 26, July 1970: 296-305.
D410.W63, v. 26

It is clear that "the process by which nuclear weapons are acquired has escaped from the restraints of objective rationality and has taken on a momentum of its own." The sheer size of the opposing forces has created a situation that is dangerous enough, but recent technological innovations--multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, ABM, increases in missile accuracy--threaten to overturn the strategic balance altogether, and deterrence along with it. Hence the impetus to begin the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) comes less from financial or political concerns than from a simple fear of the unpredictable. Hence also, it is not arms limitations as such, but rather "the maintenance, the consolidation, and, if necessary, the reconstruction of deterrence" that will be the primary object of these negotiations. Agreement on "probably will take a concrete form, and this means limitations on specific weapons systems; the difficulty is to work out a plan that will encompass both offensive and defensive systems and be equally attractive to both superpowers, whose security needs are by no means identical. Actually the talks may have a largely educational value, in which case a formal agreement would not be essential. If, through an exchange of information about intentions, the talks succeed in reducing by even 20 percent the need statesmen feel to resort to "worst-case calculation," surely one of the most malevolent influences on armaments decisions, then a major breakthrough will have been achieved. It is well to keep in mind that deterrence "is a delicate psychological plant" and can survive only with informed and intelligent cultivation.

450

UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION CONCLUDE PHASE OF STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State Bulletin, v. 63, Aug. 31, 1970: 245-246.
JX232.A33, v. 63

Statements made by U.S. Ambassador Gerard C. Smith and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister V. S. Semenov on August 14, 1970, at the ceremonial closing of the second phase of the U.S.-Soviet strategic arms limitation talks, together with the text of the communique released at the close of the talks. The communique reports that in the discussions "a wide range of questions dealing with the problem of limiting strategic offensive and defensive armaments was thoroughly considered," that "the exchange was useful for both sides and made it possible to increase the degree of mutual understanding on a number of aspects of the matters discussed," and that both delegations are determined "to pursue the negotiations with the aim of limiting strategic armaments." Ambassador Smith affirms that "important progress has been made" in the talks, Ambassador Semenov, that "substantial and useful work was accomplished" in an atmosphere that was "businesslike, calm, and frank."

REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

451

Barclay, G. St.J. COMMONWEALTH OR EUROPE. 1st. Lucia, Australia: University of Queensland Press [1970] 210 p. (The Commonwealth: problems and perspectives) HC241.25.G7B35
"Distributed by International Scholarly Book Services, Inc., Great Britain, Europe, North America."
Bibliography: p. 203-206.

"Describe[s] and interpret[s] the changing attitudes adopted by the British governments since the second world war to the phenomenon of Western European integration, and the reactions to these changes by the governments of other nations of the British Commonwealth." Barclay concludes that Great Britain is unlikely to be admitted to Europe so long as it continues to challenge French or German predominance there.

452

Bender, Peter. 16 * SECURITY. CONCERN AND HOPE IN EASTERN EUROPE 6 * Sicherheit. Sorgen und Hoffnungen in Osteuropa. Merkur, v. 24, Sept. 1970: 797-806. AP30.M43, v. 24
Last chapter of 6 * Sicherheit. Befürchtungen in Osteuropa, to be published by Kiepenhauer & Witsch.

Each of the six Warsaw pact states has its own security problem and its own way of solving it. Their common fears are based on the acknowledgment that the struggle for power between the two blocs represents a danger, that local wars might lead to an escalated military conflict, that changes such as those in Czechoslovakia in 1968 might lead to an East-West confrontation, and that a similar development in East Germany, combined with nationalist trends in West Germany, harbors an explosive threat. All six countries have found a more or less satisfactory compromise between internationalistic duty and national trends, demonstrating that the main threat to security is not an East-West war but the danger of an ideological "softening up" in the East, entailing Soviet intervention. Today security in Europe is much more a political than a military question. Arms control and disarmament plans do not thereby become superfluous, but they can only be realized and useful if they are part of a policy that is aware of the true security problems. For East Germany, security in Europe virtually means recognition as a state; for Poland, recognition of the Oder-Neisse border; for Czechoslovakia and Hungary, more internal freedom of movement; for Rumania, more independence from Moscow; and for Bulgaria, the neutralization of the Balkan and Mediterranean. To find a suitable solution to the international class struggle Moscow operates on the principle of as much unity as possible in the East and as much cooperation as necessary with the West. Its allies, other than East Germany, would rather have the priorities the other way around, but they are not strong enough politically or economically to do away with Moscow's protection without coming under Western influence. Ideological differences between them and the Soviet Union stem to a large

extent from economic differences. If the latter fade, the former will diminish, and the Soviet's fear of losing its allies would thereby be reduced. More security must be created by cooperation, and more cooperation must be made possible by more security. Arms control and disarmament present the stepping stones for cooperation, but the problems of European security cannot be solved, only gradually rendered meaningless.

455

Blomberg, Jaakko. (FINLAND AND THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE) Finland und die europäische Sicherheitskonferenz. *Moderne Welt*, v. 11, no. 2, 1970: 199-202. D639.M58, v. 11

Finland's increased foreign policy activity is highlighted by its proposal for a European security conference. Finland stresses its neutrality and its good relations with all participants, including the two Germanys. The proposal allows neutrality for both Germanys and calls for the exclusion of such Eastern or Western preliminary conditions as formal recognition of East Germany. The proposal is very flexible in foreseeing consultation among governments and preparatory meetings as forerunners of the real security conference. This leaves the field wide open for either a total solution to the tensions between East and West and a final World War II peace treaty guaranteeing the security of Europe, or for partial solutions, for example, a renunciation of force and increased economic, technical, and scientific cooperation. A permanent regional peace order in accordance with Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter is also envisioned. Since the initiation of West German bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union, Poland, and East Germany, the Federal Republic and the Warsaw Pact countries have scaled down their pressure for a conference, because the negotiations already signal a détente in the heart of Europe. Nevertheless the Finnish initiative remains important for the development of European cooperation and a permanent institutional organization to resort to, should international development run into a dead-end street.

454

De La Motte, Stuart R. TOWARDS ONE EUROPE. Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1970. 332 p. HC241.D38

Contents.--Economic revival in Europe.--Economic and monetary co-operation in Europe.--Structure of industry.--The technological gap.--The common agricultural policy.--Main industries (steel, chemicals, motor).--The common transport policy.--EEC trading relations with non-member countries.--Defense of the West.--The future of NATO.--The political organization of Europe.--The EEC: how it works.--List of abbreviations.--Index.

Discusses the prospects for economic and political unity in Europe and describes the institutions best suited to achieving unification. De La Motte contends that a European defense organization can exist only within the framework of a politically united Europe endowed with a supranational government. He concludes that the worst solution to unification would be for the European Economic Community to assume the role of a European government under the EEC's present rules.

455

Grass, Günter. (GERMANY--TWO STATES--ONE NATION?) Deutschland--zwei Staaten--eine Nation? *Neue Gesellschaft*, v. 17, July/Aug. 1970: 494-500. E5.H36, v. 17

All through German history the concepts "mother country" and "nation" have been difficult to define. This was one reason the masses were so willing to accept Hitler's mystifying definitions. The current concept of two German states within the German nation must take into account not only the territorial and political differences, but also the incompatibility of the two social realities. Yet to regard East and West Germany as two separate countries doubles the dangers of Vietnamizing Germany. A more promising solution would be for the two German states to give the idea "nation" a new content. The two states must accept the consequences of recent history, cooperate in bringing about a *l'écarter* in Europe, give concrete meaning to the concept of peaceful coexistence, and work gradually toward disarming both blocs; they must develop the new science of peace research, possibly with Berlin as the center; and they should mutually undertake aid to developing countries, setting an example for other divided nations. Willy Brandt's "concrete utopia" must be taken seriously. Realpolitik, often a synonym for shortsightedness, should offer room for utopian perspectives and allow for the resolution of conflicts and irrationalities. The United States and the Soviet Union are no longer politically, ideologically, or morally able to police the world. If they could not deal with the problem of China, there is no reason to expect them to handle Germany any better; and Germany has often enough been the bone of their irrational contention.

456

Hacker, Jens. PROSPECTS FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY. *Central Europe Journal*, v. 18, Sept. 1970: 310-315. DB200.T.874, v. 18

The unexpressed purpose of Soviet security proposals during the past decade has been the consolidation and legitimization of the status quo. NATO efforts in the same period have been directed to the removal of the causes of tension. Since security is always relative, any new European security system proposed by the Soviets should not pull West Germany into unrealistic confidence. The Brezhnev doctrine, the Soviet failure to respond to the proposal for a mutual balanced reduction of forces, and, next of all, Soviet insistence on the enemy-state clauses of the United Nations Charter conclusively prove that the Russian purpose remains the reinforcement of the status quo without the lessening of tensions.

457

Hakovirta, Eero. WESTERN INTEGRATION AND FINNISH NEUTRALITY. Cooperation and conflict, no. 2, 1970: 129-136. Ser

Examines some conceptual and methodological difficulties encountered in investigating the impact of Western European integration on Finnish neutrality. These remarks, a continuation of an earlier study of Finnish security matters (see item 1112, v. 6, no. 3, of this bibliography), are

largely concerned with the problems of operationalizing the concept "neutrality" and devising a theoretical model and empirical tests of the linkage between Europe's burgeoning integration and Finland's standing as an East-West neutral.

458

Koh, T. T. B. INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION CONCERNING SOUTHEAST ASIA. In *American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. A new American posture toward Asia. Philadelphia, 1970. (Its Annals, v. 390, July 1970) p. 18-26.*
H1.A4, v. 390

Following conventional usage, Southeast Asia is defined as the region consisting of Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, North and South Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. At present there is no organization to which all Southeast Asian nations belong. Regional economic collaboration is being obstructed or impeded by nationalism, national economic policies of autarchy, industrialization based on import substitution, and an unripened sense of regional identity. In view of the seriousness of the obstacles, regional bodies such as ASEAN should devote themselves to the promotion of practical projects and not aim for grandiose schemes which are beyond their present capacities to realize. Collaboration between two or three countries in the region should be encouraged. Encouraging progress is being made in the fields of education and training, which is not only important in itself but also builds confidence for other forms of regional collaboration. A plea is made for greater support from the developed countries, particularly from the major powers, for regional projects. Such support should, ideally, be accorded high priority in the aid policies of the developed countries. The collaboration between ASEAN and ECAFE (Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East) is also seen as important, and could provide a valuable impetus to the growth of regionalism in Southeast Asia. (Abstract supplied)

459

Lucht, Herbert. [ALBANIA: FIRST STEPS TOWARD EUROPE. RECONCILIATION BETWEEN BELGRADE AND TIRANA.] Albanien: Erste Schritte nach Europa. Aussöhnung zwischen Belgrad und Tirana. Europäische Begegnung, v. 10, Sept. 1970: 22-23.
AP30.E78, v. 10

For the first time Albania, in its efforts to find a better relationship with its neighbors, is coming out of its self-imposed isolation from both East and West. Its desire for security, stability, national identity, territorial integrity, and political self-assertion have accelerated its tendency to think and act realistically. Yugoslavia's interest in improved relations with Albania seems based on economic considerations, as evidenced by its work toward trade cooperation with Albania. These tendencies are important not only for both countries but also for the consolidation of the Balkans. Albania may gradually be finding its way to Europe, and a small but important political and strategic unit may be beginning to grow. These important changes must be weighed by Moscow.

460

NEW STAGE IN PREPARATION FOR ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE. *International affairs (Moscow)* no. 9, Sept. 1970: 3-6.
D839.I465, 1970

The constructive proposals advanced at Budapest by the Socialist countries to facilitate the convocation of an all-European security conference call for the establishment of a permanent diplomatic mechanism for questions of security and cooperation in Europe, the reduction of foreign armed forces on the territory of European states, and the development of cultural matters, including problems of man's environment. The realism of the Budapest proposals has been praised by government circles in many western states. Naturally, the opponents of détente and European cooperation seek to delay the convocation of the conference by linking it, without justification, to the Middle East crisis and the so-called German question. Their purpose in raising these questions is to bring about a deadlock in the preparation of the conference or, ultimately, to discredit it.

461

Feitzner, Almar. [EASTERN EUROPE AND THE WEST: POLICY FOLLOWING THE EVENTS IN PRAGUE.] Die deutsche Friedenspolitik, nach den Ergebnissen in Prag. [Munich, Verlag Die Welt, 1970] 31 p. (Schriftenreihe der Seliger-Gesellschaft)
DD299.4.R4

Bibliography: p. 29.

Contents.--Military balance.--Stalled development stage.--The role of the Soviet Union.--The dangerous bacillus.--The Bohemian trap.--Decisiveness or opportunism.--The German line.--Self-determination and self-reliance.--Ostpolitik possibilities.

The Soviet invasion in Czechoslovakia has shown that communism faces many problems, and has raised the question of the effects of an active German Ostpolitik and of events in Eastern and Western Europe. Yesterday's political ideas and norms can no longer fulfill current and future needs. West Germany's Ostpolitik should undergo essential changes; the politics of peace must be based not on international agreement but on present political possibilities, allowing for the possibility without sacrificing the goal. Europe must become a meeting place for people in which peace, social justice, freedom, and liberty have the place, and national borders will lose their importance.

462

Vernant, Jacques. [THE NEW TREATY OF MOSCOW.] Le nouveau traité de Moscou. *Revue de politique internationale*, v. 16, Oct. 1970: 1501-1504.
J412.P47, v. 16

The West German-Soviet renunciation of force agreement marks the beginning of a new situation of relations between West and East Germany that could bring about a new situation in Europe relative to the development of interblock relations and the subsequent mutual balanced relations of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. The spectacular evolution of Soviet-German relations, together with the progress of the strategic arms limitation talks

and the relative convergence of Soviet and American efforts in the Middle East, are creating an atmosphere in Europe that might contribute to the realization of a European cooperation system. Such a system, in and by itself, would not harm NATO solidarity. Europe's future lies in cooperation between not only the Western states but all Europeans, West and East alike.

463

Wintelien, Heinrich. REUNIFICATION OR RECOGNITION. *Central Europe Journal*, v. 18, Apr. 1970: 120-123. DE2C0.7.S74, v. 18

The Brandt regime is exploring the possibilities of a European supranational system to include the East European states through exchanges of declarations renouncing the use of force. However West Germans should be reminded that accepting the status quo does not overcome existing tensions, but merely leaves them for the next generation. The answer to the challenge from the East is the close cooperation of the European nations in partnership with America. While the Federal Republic has shown its willingness to negotiate without prior conditions, there are good reasons to doubt that Ulbricht wants recognition at the cost of losing East Germany's special relationship with the European Economic Community. Negotiations in a new Ostpolitik will be frustrating and probably fruitless; Ulbricht is not prepared to make any serious concessions, and he is certain to find an excuse to justify the retraction of the few concessions he does make.

SPECIAL ENVIRONMENTS (OCEAN, SEABED, SPACE, ETC.)

464

DRAFT U. N. CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SEABED AREA: U.S. WORKING PAPER SUBMITTED TO U.N. SEABEDS COMMITTEE. In *U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin*, v. 63, Aug. 24, 1970: 209-218. JX232.A33, v. 63

Statements of August 3, 1970, by Dept. of State Legal Adviser John R. Stevenson and Christopher H. Phillips, U.S. representative to the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, together with a summary of the U.S. draft convention on the international seabed area prepared by Mr. Stevenson.

Outlines the objectives and chief provisions of the U.S. draft convention on the seabed. The U.S. proposal, which is designed to "save over two-thirds of the earth's surface from national conflict and rivalry, protect it from pollution, and put it to use for the benefit of all," would put "narrow limits on national sovereign rights with respect to the seabed" and establish "a pragmatic division of revenues and administration in the area beyond national jurisdiction." Among other things, it reserves the seabed beyond the 200-meter isobath exclusively to peaceful purposes, ensures that revenues from seabed resources will be applied to the needs of developing countries, provides for safeguards to human life and the marine environment, regulates the exploitation of seabed resources, establishes trusteeships among

coastal states for continental margins beyond the 200-meter isobath, and creates and outlines the powers and duties of an international seabed resource authority.

465

Fells, Richard. THE EMERGENCE OF A CORPORATE SOVEREIGNTY FOR THE OCEAN SEAS. In *Pacem in maribus: ocean enterprises; a summary of the prospects, and hazards, of man's impending commercial exploitation of the underseas. A special report on the preliminary conference held in preparation for the Pacem in maribus convocation at Valletta, Malta, June 26-July 3, 1970. Edited by Elaine H. Burnell and Piers von Simson. Santa Barbara, Calif., Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1970. (A Center occasional paper.)* p. 64-74. G02.P33

Corporate sovereignty for the ocean seas offers a more practicable means of regularizing the exploration and development of ocean resources than either the extension of national sovereignty or the establishment of an international political regime. The modern corporation is a dynamic and adaptable institution that has proven itself peculiarly suitable for economic development. The corporation envisioned would be mixed, with both government and private participation. Its main purposes would be to promote the systematic exploration of the ocean and ocean floor for peaceful purposes, to ensure the rational and nondestructive use of ocean resources, and to conserve the ecological balance between man and nature. If these goals could be achieved by a regime responsive to international political bodies—for example, the United Nations—well and good, but given the present system of nation-states, each with its own special interests, this appears unlikely. A regime responsive to transnational economic bodies might overcome many of the obstacles that stand in the way of alternative solutions, although even this possibility is by no means assured.

466

Friedheim, Robert L. UNDERSTANDING THE DEBATE ON OCEAN RESOURCES. Denver, University of Denver (1969) 38 p. (Social Science Foundation and Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver. Monograph series in world affairs, v. 6., monograph no. 3) JX4419.F75

Bibliographical footnotes.

Focuses on four models that "provide the intellectual substructure for more specific schemes for dealing with allocation of the oceans": normative nationalism, functional nationalism, functional internationalism, and normative internationalism. He concludes that the actual management of ocean resources will fall to the national and international functionalists, particularly with respect to the problems of the seabed and fisheries control.

467

Grisel, Etienne. THE LATERAL BOUNDARIES OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF AND THE JUDGEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE IN THE NORTH SEA CONTINER-

TAL SHELF CASES. American Journal of international law, v. 64, July 1970: 562-593.

JX1.A6, v. 64

Examines paragraph 2, Article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, focusing on three issues: the role attributed to agreement, the application in concrete cases of the "principle of equidistance" and the flexibility of this rule and the meaning of the words "special circumstances." The methods of determining lateral shelf boundaries for states that are not parties to the Convention on the Continental Shelf are generalized as taking either the division of the shelf or the drawing of the boundary lines as the starting point. The rules laid down by the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases are "firmly approved."

463

Gupta, V. P. THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE GULF OF AQABA. Indian Journal of political science, v. 51, Jan./Mar. 1970: 82-88.

JA26.15, v. 31

The Arab argument for declaring the Gulf of Aqaba strictly Arab is based on the narrowness of the gulf and its alleged historic status as a mare clausum. The territorial status of rivers, bays, lakes, canals, gulfs, and straits surrounded by several states is unclear. Such enclosed waters may belong to the riparian states, although other writers have suggested that they should be considered international waters. As a rule, all gulfs and bays enclosed by more than one littoral state are nonterritorial, regardless of how narrow their entrances may be. They are considered parts of the open sea except for internal marginal belts and can never be appropriated. The extent of the territorial sea and the international status of bays and straits should be determined by the coastal states concerned, with the general interest prevailing over that of individual states. No accord exists between the Arab littoral states providing for either joint control of the Gulf of Aqaba or its apportionment, which leaves the gulf open to the shipping of all littoral states and the question of jurisdiction unsettled. The 1958 Geneva convention on territorial seas established Israel's right of innocent passage through the Strait of Tiran to its port of Eilat. Although Egypt claims the strait, it has not asserted its claim over the gulf, thereby recognizing the respective rights of the other three riparian states and, in turn, acknowledging Israel's right of navigation. Hence, political considerations govern the Arab interpretation of Israel's maritime rights in the Gulf. In keeping with practice and the law of nations, the United Nations or the four littoral states should internationalize the Gulf of Aqaba.

469

Klein, Jane. [THE MILITARY USE OF THE SEABED AND DISARMAMENT] L'utilisation militaire des fonds marins et le désarmement. Politique étrangère, v. 35, no. 2, 1970: 405-435.

JX3.16, v. 35

Since Malta raised the question in the United Nations of the peaceful uses of the seabed, the regulation of armaments in this area has been the

object of many debates. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament tackled this question shortly after the signing of the nonproliferation treaty, and in October 1969 the superpowers agreed to prohibit nuclear arms beyond the 12-mile limit. However the ambiguities and gaps of the draft treaty created some reservations among the principal maritime states, and the amendments accepted by the United States and the Soviet Union in April 1970 have not dissipated all the prejudices. The scope of this treaty will depend in large measure on the concessions that will be made during the ultimate phase of the negotiations, but it will be for all practical purposes a treaty comparable to the outer space and nonproliferation treaties and in no way an effective contribution to the disarmament process. (Translation of supplied abstract)

470

Koers, Albert. THE DEBATE ON THE LEGAL REGIME FOR THE EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION OF OCEAN RESOURCES: A BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR THE FIRST DECADE, 1960-1970. n.p., Law of the Sea Institute, University of Rhode Island, 1970. 43 p. (University of Rhode Island. Law of the Sea Institute. Special publication no. 1)

LL
Cover title.

Bibliography of articles, books, reports, papers, and conference proceedings on the legal problems of exploring and exploiting the ocean and seabed, arranged chronologically by year and alphabetically within each year.

471

Kolodkin, A. L. PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES ON THE USE OF THE SEA-BED. Daily review; translations from the Soviet press, v. 16, July 16, 1970: supplement, item 2, 1-9.

Slav Rm
Translated from *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, no. 6, 1970.
Slav Rm

Describes the various schools of thought on the status in international law of the seabed: the opposed positions on whether the seabed is subject to the same legal regime as the high sea, the "national lake" theory, and the recently advanced concept that the seabed is the "common heritage of the human race." Kolodkin rejects the common-heritage concept as stemming from the common-property concept of civil law and hence inapplicable in international public law. Consequently the proposals of the American Organization to Study the Organization of Peace, of the Brazilian delegation to the United Nations Seabed Committee, and of those individuals who wish to establish a supranational apparatus as trustee for the seabed are dismissed as untenable and unrealistic. The Soviet delegation to the Seabed Committee has already expressed the need for more exact definition of the beds of seas and oceans lying beyond the limits of the national jurisdiction of coastal states and has formally denounced the acquisition of property rights in any part of the seabed. Kolodkin rejects the argument of the existence of a legal vacuum, which was advanced by adherents of the common-heritage cause. He suggests that a seabed legal regime be drawn on the basis of the recognized principles of the freedom of the seas for all, without discrimination, under the provisions of the U.N. Charter.

472

Kolosov, Y. SOME URGENT PROBLEMS OF SPACE LAW. *International affairs* (Moscow) no. 9, Sept. 1970: 24-26. D839.1465, 1970

Comments on the "truly important" problems occurring in the actual practice of space exploration, which require solution on the basis of international law: the responsibility of states for possible damages caused by space objects; the development of space communications and television; prospecting for natural resources via satellite; the registration of space objects; and the distinction between airspace and outer space. Participants at the eighth session of the Legal Subcommittee of the Outer Space Committee of the United Nations agreed that the questions raised by the Polish and Argentinian proposals should be placed on the agenda as "the utilisation of outer space and celestial bodies, including the various implications of space communications." Kolosov concludes that cooperation between states in this field can develop only on the basis of "the existing universally recognised principles and standards of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations."

473

Niu, Sien-chong. DON'T FORGET THE INNER SPACE. *NATO's fifteen nations*, v. 15, June/July 1970: 30-36. UA646.F5, v. 15

Argues for a more vigorous U.S. effort to exploit the vast potentialities of the oceans and seabed. Niu explores the military, economic, political, and scientific promise of this "inner space" and concludes that the race to possess it may be decisive for the future of the world, determining "which nations or group of nations will rise and which will decline." He recommends that the United States support an international approach to the exploitation of these resources. As a first step it might join with other nations in an international or regional program of oceanic survey and research.

474

Polantzias, Nicholas M. THE PROBLEM OF "PEACEFUL PURPOSES" REVISITED. *Nederlands Juristenblad*, no. 10, 1970: 265-269. LL

As it pertains to outer space and the seabed, the term "peaceful purposes" is ambiguous. A realistic solution is to substitute the "non-armed" interpretation for the "nonmilitary" one. Distinguishing between offensive and defensive weapons or identifying all the prohibited activities and installations only complicates the question. Unarmed military personnel and equipment are already involved in space vehicles, and the non-arm interpretation was adopted in Article 4, paragraph 2 of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. The problem of interpreting peaceful purposes takes on added importance in light of the proposed seabed treaty. The Russians have called for a complete demilitarization of the seabed that would include all the undersea devices the United States uses to track foreign submarines, while the Americans have argued that "peaceful" includes military non-weapon devices and equipment" and favor only the de-

nuclearization of the seabed. "What is now to be expected is a 'rapprochement' between the USSR and the US Draft Treaties following mutual concessions, the drafting of a Joint Draft Treaty, and an appeal to all world States to sign and ratify this Treaty."

VIOLATION, INSPECTION, VERIFICATION, AND ENFORCEMENT OF AGREEMENTS

475

Gupta, Bijak, and Jürgen Seetzen. [CONTROL MEASURES IN NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY] Kontrollmassnahmen in der Kerntechnik. *Aussenpolitik*, v. 21, June 1970: 338-347. D839.A885, v. 21

The entry into force of the nonproliferation treaty confronts the non-nuclear-weapon states interested in peaceful development and exploitation of atomic energy with the problem of setting up international inspection and control mechanisms. The magnitude of the problem is indicated by the prediction that by the end of the century 70 to 80 percent of the electrical power of the highly industrialized states will be provided by nuclear power plants. The essential task is to safeguard the legitimate economic interests of national industries by formulating inspection and verification methods that do not go beyond assuring nondiversion of fissionable material and respect proprietary and commercial rights. The three approaches to inspection and control sketched here are believed to be no more expensive or cumbersome than internal security methods now in use.

476

PREPARING FOR THE DELUGE. *Nature* (London) v. 227, Aug. 22, 1970: 761-762. Q1.N2, v. 227

There is little indication in the annual report or 1971 budget and program of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that it is aware of how great its responsibilities are going to be under the nonproliferation treaty. It should be clear to all concerned that "anything like a full blown inspection of the [treaty] would require the mobilization of a small army of inspectors." Apparently the agency is depending on the Committee on Safeguards to come up with a workable arrangement, but, given the political and financial difficulties involved, there is no ground for optimism. Hence it is worth recalling that the treaty is more a statement of good intentions than a guarantee of nonproliferation. A too-literal interpretation of what the treaty requires in the way of inspections may force the IAEA to attempt more than it can possibly accomplish. That would be bad for the treaty, disastrous for IAEA.

477

PROGRESS IN SAFEGUARD TECHNIQUES. *Nuclear engineering*, v. 15, Sept. 1970: 720-722. T89001.N75, v. 15

Reports on matters discussed at the nuclear safeguards symposium held in Karlsruhe, Germany,

July 6-10, 1970, under the sponsorship of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Accountability, containment, and inspection measures, the legal structure of the IAEA safeguards system, the results of IAEA experiments in which safeguards were applied to actual nuclear facilities in several countries, criteria for the design of nuclear installations to facilitate the application of safeguards, the results of U.S. tests of these criteria, and new surveillance and assay instrumentation were the major items discussed. The length and complexity of the fuel cycle, together with the inevitable political complications, make the whole business of applying nuclear safeguards a matter of extraordinary difficulty. Devising a system that will detect violations and yet not intrude upon normal plant operations is the major challenge.

476

Scoville, Herbert. VERIFICATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS LIMITATIONS: AN ANALYSIS. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 26, Oct. 1970: 6-11.
TK9145.A84, v. 26

Verification procedures for arms control agreements fall into two categories: "national" procedures, which do not require activity within the boundaries of other states, and on-site inspections, which do. In judging the efficacy of the former, it must be remembered that these same procedures are relied upon for strategic planning, where the intelligence requirements are often more stringent than would be necessary to verify an arms control agreement; that the risks inherent in a given verification system must be weighed against the risk of having no arms control agreement at all; that given the large size of the opposing forces, a violation would have to be very great to be significant; and that surveillance technology has improved vastly in recent years. Verification capabilities vary with the stage in the development cycle of the weapon system under scrutiny: research and development and production would be difficult to monitor, testing and deployment, relatively easy. Verification capabilities also vary with the particular weapons system: an agreement restricting deployment of fixed-site, land-based ballistic missiles, ballistic-missile submarines, or ABM's would be relatively easy to verify, while an agreement restricting multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV) would be almost impossible to monitor in any but the testing stage. A total ban on mobile land-based missiles could be verified with comparative ease, but a partial ban would cause problems. Finally, it would be easier to verify a broad freeze on both offensive and defensive strategic systems than one on a single weapon. If missile launchers, MIRV's, and ABM's were all frozen at current levels, a nation would have to commit violations in two of the three prohibited areas before security was jeopardized.

479

THE SPY RACE IN THE SKY. U.S. news & world report, v. 69, Oct. 12, 1970: 24-26.
JN1-U65, v. 69

Discusses the technical capabilities and strategic implications of the new intelligence-gathering techniques being used by the United States and the

Soviet Union. As a consequence of these vastly increased capabilities, each of the two superpowers enters the strategic arms limitation talks fully informed of the composition of the other side's strategic arsenal. These capabilities should make it possible "to limit armament costs--and thereby reduce arms budgets--without fear that a 'cheater' will develop a massive superiority and subject the other to nuclear 'blackmail.'"

480

Szarvas, Robert F. NO PLACE TO HIDE. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 15, Aug./Sept. 1970: 76-80
illus. UA646.F5, v. 15

Surveys current U.S. capabilities in the field of aerial reconnaissance and looks at future developments. Although surveillance technology has made great strides in recent years, "the best news in the reconnaissance business is that none of the experts see an end to further sophistication." Major breakthroughs can be expected in the detection of submerged objects in the oceans and the transmission of massive quantities of data from air to ground by rapid electronic means.

CONSEQUENCES OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT MEASURES

481

Berkowitz, Marvin. THE CONVERSION OF MILITARY-ORIENTED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TO CIVILIAN USES. New York, Praeger (1970) xxix, 649 p. illus.
(Conversion of industry from a military to civilian economy) HC117.D4B46

Praeger special studies in U.S. economic and social development.

Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Framework for the conversion of military research.--Resources committed to the research and development industry.--The impact of research and development.--Economic impact of a cut in military expenditures on research and development.--Technology transfer process--implications for conversion.--Steps toward conversion--from inside and outside the defense system.--The conversion of military R&D to civilian needs.--Conclusions.--Appendixes.

Problems in the conversion of military research and development to socially more desirable civilian uses. The study concludes that the conversion of military research and development programs cannot be achieved on any considerable scale independent of a general conversion of the military establishment. Systems analysis, planning, programming, budgeting, and preplanning techniques are available now for applications in the civil sector, but any large changes or innovations wait upon the generation of a greater sense of political urgency. Research and development must be subordinated to social goals and to formal mechanisms for translating intentions into action. A strong federal commitment to support research into the unmet needs of society "will be necessary before private firms, labor unions, and academic institutions will commit their own resources to these tasks."

462

Mack-Forlist, Daniel M., and Arthur Newman. THE CONVERSION OF SHIPBUILDING FROM MILITARY TO CIVILIAN MARKETS. New York, Praeger (1970) 211 p. illus. (Praeger Special Studies in U.S. Economic and Social Development)

VM23.M23 1970

Partial contents.--pt. 1. The shipbuilding industry, by Daniel Mack-Forlist: Introduction. The state of the shipbuilding industry. Historical background. Technology in U.S. shipbuilding. Structure of the industry. Earnings, costs, and productivity. Shipyards in the national economy. Competitive potential. Diversification potential. Time factors and some general considerations. Conclusions and recommendations.

Recommends steps to protect the shipbuilding industry from the effects of drastic cuts in defense spending and to establish it as a viable civilian industry capable of competing in domestic and foreign markets. Mack-Forlist recommends the appointment of a board to investigate thoroughly the problems of the industry, a limitation on subsidized designs, the creation of an operations-analysis committee, and the initiation of standardization studies. He also proposes "an industry-labor-government study of the labor-displacement problems arising from reduction in defense spending, ship automation, and shipyard cost reduction."

463

Melman, Seymour, ed. THE DEFENSE ECONOMY; CONVERSION OF INDUSTRIES AND OCCUPATIONS TO CIVILIAN NEEDS. New York, Praeger (1970) xxix, 528 p. (Conversion of industry from a military to civilian economy) HC110.D4M39

Praeger special studies in U.S. economic and social development.

Bibliography: p. 469-518.

Contents.--Preface.--pt. 1. The conversion of industries: Characteristics of the industrial conversion problem, by Seymour Melman. Economic effects of military activity on states and counties, 1950-60, by Demosthenes Menegakis. Economic effects of military procurement in New Jersey, by John F. Gorgol. The impact of military spending on manufacturing in the New York area, by Alfred J. Wood. A network model of the conversion process, by James E. Baird. A case study of an organization's conversion from defense to civilian industry, by Moses H. Harary. Conversion options of the airframe industry, by Marvin Fernowitz and Seymour Melman. Conversion of the marketing function, by C. R. Nydberg. Lead time in hospital construction, by Sidney Elkind.--pt. 2. Conversion of occupations: Re-education and re-employment of engineering and scientific personnel, by Lloyd J. Dumas. Civilian professional training options for defense industry engineers, by Maurice J. Ward. Financial support for displaced defense workers, by John J. Walsh.--Appendixes.

Investigates the problems involved in converting from a defense-oriented economy to a civilian economy. The effects of defense spending on particular segments of the economy and on regions of the country are examined, and various proposals intended to facilitate the conversion from defense to civilian employment are considered.

OTHER PROBLEMS AND MEASURES

464

Larock, Victor. THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ARMS-RACE. Review of international affairs, v. 21, June 5, 1970: 16-18.

D839.R4, v. 21

Repeats the proposal made in 1957 by the author, then Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, that the United Nations General Assembly prepare an information campaign on the meaning for mankind of the arms race. The Secretary General of the United Nations would be responsible for disseminating this information to the populations of the U.N. member states. Execution of the information campaign would be entrusted to the local political authorities under constant supervision of U.N. representatives.

465

Michener, James A. 'WHAT TO DO ABOUT THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES?' New York times magazine, Sept. 27, 1970: 22-25, 114, 116-121, 123, 126, 130.

AP2.R6575, 1970

Surveys the situation of the Palestinian refugees--their origins, numbers, living conditions, wants, expectations, prospects--and suggests a solution to their dispute with Israel. Michener argues that disputes over historical responsibility for the present situation or the legal rights of the parties involved are irrelevant: the present condition of the refugees is an affront to humanity and must be rectified. He proposes that Israel, in exchange for an Arab guarantee of its peace and security and a cessation of Palestinian terrorism, accept repatriation of those refugees who wish to return and grant financial compensation to those dispossessed. The oil-rich Arab states and the other countries of the world would have an obligation to make a financial contribution to this settlement.

AUTHOR INDEX

[Numbers refer to entries.]

A

Adams, Walter, 306
Alexander, Archibald, 414
Alexander, Robert J., 414
Allen, Gary, 379
Alsop, Joseph, 181
American Surveys (Firm), 182
Anand, Ram P., 321
Andreev, IU., 183
Ansberry, William F., 370
Anscombe, Elizabeth, 153
Appadorai, A., 105
Arneson, Ruthann, 184
Atal, Yogesh, 105
Atkinson, James D., 281
Ausland, John C., 93
Ayooob, Mohammed, 109

B

Badgley, John H., 40
Baer, Gertrude, 385
Bahr, Hans-Eckehard, 23
Baird, James E., 483
Baklanov, B., 110
Baldwin, Frank, 394
Baldwin, Hanson W., 186
Bandura, Albert, 17
Bardypadhyaya, J., 105
Barclay, C. N., 187
Barclay, G. St. J., 451
Barnaby, Frank, 351
Barnes, William S., 271
Barnett, A. Doak, 1
Baroch, Charles T., 322
Barthel, Friedrich, 156
Bartos, Ottomar J., 31
Basiuk, Victor, 2
Baumgartner, John S., 282
Bechtoldt, Heinrich, 41
Becker, William, 188
Bellamy, Ian, 169
Benckiser, Nikolas, 433
Bender, John C., 271, 323
Bender, Peter, 452
Benedict, Ruth, 32
Benesch, Gustav, 371
Berghes, Ingeborg von, 42
Berkower, Larry R., 283
Berkowitz, Marvin, 481, 483
Berman, Harold J., 324
Peste, Hans D., 189
Pex, John E., 197
Rilstein, Helmut, 139
Bindra, A. P. S., 236
Black, E. F., 111
Blake, Joseph A., 284
Blomberg, Jaakko, 453
Bloom, Justin L., 172

Boffey, Philip M., 285
Bogdanov, Oleg V., 426
Booda, Larry L., 155
Borgese, Elizabeth M., 337
Boulding, Kenneth E., 6
Bouthoul, Gaston, 23
Branitt, Willy, 375
Brander, Hans, 113
Bresler, Robert J., 43
Brodie, Bernard, 333, 386
Brown, Neville, 190, 434
Brownfield, Allan C., 286
Brunner, Dominique, 411
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 112
Buchholz, Arnold, 23
Buckley, Thomas H., 372
Burchett, Wilfred, 132
Burnell, Elaine M., 465
Burnham, James, 395
Burns, Arthur L., 6
Burns, E. L. M., 414
Burns, Richard Dean, 373
Burton, John, 348, 389
Buschmann, Marthe, 113
Byrd, Harry F., 171

C

Cadoux, J. E., 396
Calder, Nigel, 382, 389
California. University. University at Los Angeles. Security Studies Project, 383
Callenius, Hans Walter, 185
Cameron, Robert, 192
Campbell, Alexander, 44
Campbell, John C., 114
Cantrell, Burton N., 435
Carey, Omer L., 306
Carr, C. Jellef, 287
Carter, Luther J., 288, 427
Cassuto, Aldo, 412
Chalfont, Alan, 436
Chapin, Seymour L., 373
Chauhan, R. S., 105
Clark, Gregory, 193
Clark, Joseph S., 384
Clark, Ramsey, 289
Clarkson, Albert G., 194
Clemens, Walter C., 3, 46, 387, 437
Clifford, Clark M., 236
Clissold, Stephen, 47
Cobb, Roger W., 338
Cockran, Gail-Maryse, 49
Collier, David S., 4
Colm, Peter W., 357
Congressional Quarterly Service, Washington, D.C., 49
Cock, Blanche W., 374

Coolidge, Francis L., 271
Cooper, John M., 50
Corbett, Percy E., 350
Corm, George, 131
Cottrell, Alvin J., 124
Coye, Beth F., 195
Cusden, Phoebe E., 385
Czaja, Herbert, 351
Czempiel, Ernst O., 352

D

Dajjani, Burhan, 131
Dalton, Robert E., 328
Davis, Vincent, 196
Debré, Michel, 197
Decornoy, Jacques, 22
De La Mahotière, Stuart R., 154
Delden, Rembert van, 198
Dellinger, Dave, 51
den Toom, W., 199
Deshingkar, G. D., 413
Deshpande, N. R., 105
Deutsch, Eberhard P., 353
Dib, George, 131
Dollard, John, 17
Domes, Jürgen, 52
Doob, Leonard W., 17
Drinan, Robert F., 353
Dumas, Lloyd J., 483
Dupuy, Richard Ernest, 145
Dupuy, Trevor N., 145
Durbrow, Elbridge, 116
Dutt, V. P., 105

E

Eckhardt, William, 5
Edwards, David V., 6
Eells, Richard, 465
Ehrlich, Thomas, 415
Elder, Charles, 338
Elkind, Sidney, 463
Elser, Gerhard, 200
Enzel, S., 156
End, Heinrich, 53
Einstein, Seymour, 27
Ericsson, Ulf, 417
Etzioni, Amitai, 17
Ezemenari, F. R. C., 290

F

Falk, Conrad, 1-6
Falk, Richard A., 325
Feld, Bernard T., 438
Firestone, Joseph M., 34
Fischer, Ernst, 23
Fleckenstein, Bernard, 201

Ford, John C., 153
 Foreign Policy Association, 54
 Foster, John S., 161, 202-203
 Foster, William C., 414
 Fowler Don, 184
 Franco, Ambassade, U.S. Service de Presse et d'Information, 56
 Frankel, Joseph, 7-8
 Freud, Sigmund, 17
 Freudenthal, Peter C., 292
 Friedheim, Robert L., 466
 Fromm, Erich, 23
 Frye, Alton, 204

G

Gallagher, Matthew P., 301
 Gallois, Pierre M., 409
 Galtung, Johan, 391
 Garcia Robles, Alfonso, 414
 Gardner, Lloyd C., 57
 Garris, Jerome, 383
 Gemmill, Elizabeth, 271
 Geneste, Marc, 439
 Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 58
 Germany (Democratic Republic, 1949-) Staatssekretariat für Westdeutsche Fragen, 118
 Giese, Fritz E., 205
 Gilbert, Charles, 293
 Giovannetti, Alberto, 339
 Glaser, Kurt, 4
 Goldhaber, Samuel Z., 429
 Goodpaster, Andrew J., 206
 Gorgol, John F., 483
 Graham, Fred P., 271
 Grass, Günter, 455
 Greene, Fred, 398
 Griffiths, Eldon, 207
 Grisel, Etienne, 467
 Groom, John, 345
 Gross, Herman, 4
 Gruder, Charles D., 31
 Grzykowski, Kazimierz, 326
 Gupta, Dipak, 475
 Gupta, Sisir, 105
 Gupta, V. P., 468
 Gurtov, Melvin, 59
 Guttenburg, Theodor Freiherr von und zu, 4
 Gutteridge, William, 294

H

Haland, Carsten M., 296
 Haas, Gerhard, 295
 Haas, Michael, 147
 Hacker, Friedrich J., 23
 Hacker, Jens, 456
 Hakkio, Harjo, 457
 Hall, William C., 296
 Hallett, Edward R., 195
 Hammond, Paul Y., 6
 Hanning, Hugh, 354
 Harary, Moses H., 483
 Hart, Parker T., 120
 Hartmann, Frederick H., 60
 Hartmann, Karl, 121
 Hartung, Arnold, 375

Haur, Christian E., 122
 Hauptmann, Jerzy, 4
 Hayes, John D., 236
 Hayes, Samuel P., 54
 Heidmann, Eberhard, 185
 Heitger, Marian, 399
 Herge, Henry C., 414
 Heruges, David, 440
 Hess, Frederick W., 4
 Hewavitharana, B., 105
 Hezlet, Sir Arthur R., 148
 Hill, R. J., 346
 Hirschfeld, Oswald, 208
 Hokanson, Jack E., 17
 Holmes, John W., 61
 Holmes, R., 297
 Holmquist, C. O., 236
 Honeywell, J. A., 9
 Honnigmann, John J., 32
 Hoopes, Townsend, 400
 Horn, Ruppert, 10
 Horowitz, Irving L., 31
 Houghton, Neal D., 62
 Hulton, Sir Edward, 355
 Hunter, Robert E., 123
 Huntington, Samuel P., 306
 Hupka, Herbert, 63-64

I

Iklé, Fred C., 401
 Ingram, Derek, 11
 Intriligator, Michael D., 383
 Ishibashi, Masatsugu, 216

J

Jackson, Henry M., 4
 James, Alan, 347
 James, William, 153
 Jenks, Clarence W., 327
 Jha, D. C., 66
 Johnson, Frank J., 12
 Johnson, James A., 67
 Johnson, U. Alexis, 68
 Joy, Charles Turner, 402
 Joyce, James A., 132
 Jungk, Robert, 23

K

Kaplan, Morton A., 6
 Kapur, Ashok, 69, 211
 Karber, Phillip, 298
 Karnov, Stanley, 70
 Kaul, Ravi, 418
 Kaushi, B. M., 105
 Kaye, G. D., 163
 Kearney, Richard D., 328
 Kennedy, Edward M., 71, 299
 Kewonig, Wilhelm, 340
 Khlostov, O. N., 329
 Kilmarx, Robert A., 124, 390
 Kim, Daniel S., 212
 Kim, Yong-jun, 213
 Kinche, Jon, 125
 Kindermann, Gottfried-Karl, 23
 Kirtner, William R., 4
 Kissinger, Henry A., 6, 366
 Klein, Jean, 469
 Knorr, Klaus F., 214
 Koch, Thilo, 72
 Kodikara, S. L., 105

Keers, Albert W., 470
 Kch, T. T. B., 458
 Kolkowicz, Foman, 387
 Kolodkin, A. L., 471
 Kolosov, Y., 472
 Kraus, Jon, 318
 Kraus, Melvin, 391
 Kreker, Hans-Justus, 215
 Krockow, Christian Graf von, 23
 Kröger, Herbert, 73
 Krüger-Sprengel, Friedhelm, 330
 Kruglanski, Arie W., 31
 Kühn, A. G., 388
 Kuehnelt-Leddihn, Erik von, 74
 Kürsener, J., 215

L

Labohm, H. J., 164
 LaFrenz, Robert L., 165
 Laird, Melvin R., 336
 Lakhi, M. V., 105
 Lambeth, Benjamin S., 387
 Lapp, Ralph E., 302, 306, 441
 Larock, Victor, 484
 Leary, Frank, 166
 Lederberg, Joshua, 430
 Legvold, Robert, 75
 Lehnars, Richard, 217
 Leitenberg, Milton, 403
 Lendvai, Paul, 442
 Leonard, James F., 393, 431
 Levine, Robert A., 6
 Lewis, Flora, 76
 Lewis, Richard S., 443
 Lewy, Genter, 153
 Lieberman, Stanley, 17
 Lifton, Robert Jay, 303
 Lindsey, G. R., 163
 Litvinoff, Boris, 126
 Locke, Leonard B., 271
 London, Kurt L., 4
 London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 220
 Lorenz, Konrad, 13, 17
 Lovell, John P., 14
 Lucht, Herbert, 459
 Lyon, Peter, 22, 105
 Lyons, Gene M., 93

M

M., J., 105
 McClelland, Charles A., 6
 MacDonald, Norman, 356, 389
 McDowell, Banks, 271
 McGowan, J. A., 219
 McIntyre, David, 132
 Maciver, Kenneth F., 271
 Mack-Ferlist, Daniel M., 482
 Mackintosh, Malcolm, 77, 221
 MacIntosh, Allan, 416
 McNulty, James F., 212
 MacQueen, James E., 335
 Madhok, Balraj, 78
 Maeder, H., 167
 Mackherup, Fer, 4
 Mahajani, Usha, 79
 Maheshwari, B. L., 105
 Mahneke, Dieter, 223
 Mallison, William T., 331-332

106 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

Mansfield, Michael J., 80
Manteuffel, Hasso E. von, 154
Marcic, René, 23
Marcuse, Herbert, 23
Marey, Georges, 168
Martin, Donald V., 195
Maryanov, Gerald S., 15
Maslow, Abraham H., 32
Mathur, P. C., 195
Matthews, Robert O., 268
Maxwell, Neville, 127-128
Mead, Margaret, 32
Mecker, R. J., 405
Megargee, Edwin I., 17
Meissner, Boris, 4, 61
Melman, Seymour, 483
Members of Congress for Peace Through Law, 226
Mendl, Wolf, 224
Menegakis, Demosthenes, 483
Mettler, Eric, 225
Metsch, Joachim von, 357
Meyer-Detring, Wilhelm, 82
Michener, James A., 485
Midgaard, Knut, 417
Miksch, Ferdinand O., 305
Miller, Thomas B., 227-228
Miller, J. D. B., 229
Miller, Lynn H., 383
Miller, Neal E., 17
Minter, William, 410
Minty, Abdul S., 307
Mirimanoff, Jean, 341
Misra, Kashi P., 105
Mitchell, C. R., 16
Mitchell, Donald W., 230
Mitscherlich, Alexander, 19
Modelska, George, 63
Monaghan, Henry P., 231, 271
Montfort, Colonel-divisionnaire, 232-233
Moot, Robert C., 308
Morgan, Patrick M., 306
Morgan, Roger, 84
Morgenthau, Hans J., 20, 23
Mourin, Maxime, 85
Mowrer, O. H., 17
Mozingo, David P., 93
Müller, Johannes, 234
Mukerjee, Philip, 419
Muri, S. P., 105
Murti, V. V. Ramana, 105
Muskie, Edmund S., 86
Myrdal, Gunnar, 132

N

Narain, Iqbal, 105
Narain, Vivendra, 105
Narveson, Jan, 153
Nathusius, Klaus, 310
Nau, Ludwig, 235
Neill, Robert, 321
Neumann, Erich Peter, 21
Newman, Arthur, 482
Niblock, Michael, 207
Niu, Sien-chong, 473
Nixon, Richard M., Pres. U.S., 428
Nordic Conference on Peace Research, 31, Lund (1968), 331
Norran, Lloyd, 237

Norodom, Sihanouk Varman, King of Cambodia, 129
Norris, John C., 155
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Information Service, 238

O

Oldfield, Barney, 170
O'Neill, W. J., 155
Orians, Gordon H., 311

P

Packard, David, 312
Paice, Anthony, 239
Palme, Olaf, 87
Paolucci, Dominic A., 236
Parenti, Michael, 313
Pauli, Fritz, 359
Peace, Power and Politics in Asia Conference Committee, 132
Penrose, Edith, 22
Penrose, Ernest F., 22
Peretz, Don, 170
Perle, Richard, 444
Pfeiffer, Egbert W., 311
Pfeiffer, Leon K., 195
Phillips, Christopher H., 464
Phillips, Orie L., 333
Pickus, Robert, 360
Pillai, Kesavakurup R., 88
Pirzler, William M., 271
Pipes, Richard, 89
Pisar, Samuel, 361
Pitman, George R., 445
Pledge, Robert, 134
Pomeroy, William J., 132
Possony, Stefan T., 241
Posvar, Wesley W., 93
Poulantzas, Nicholas M., 474
Prader, Georg, 9
Prescott, J. R., 290
Proxmire, William, 314

Q

Quester, George H., 421-423

R

Radovanović, Ljubomir, 135, 362
Ramsey, Russell W., 136
Ramundo, Bernard A., 334
Ransford, H. Edward, 17
Rapoport, Anatol, 31, 392
Rau, Erwin M., 242
Raven, Bertram H., 126
Reven, Wolfram von, 171
Ray, Dennis H., 243
Reid, D. R., 105
Rehm, Walter, 315, 244
Reinhardt, G. Frederick, 137
Reischauer, Edwin O., 90
Reitzner, Almar, 461
Ree, T. C., 245
Reide, Gutthold, 4
Rhyne, Charles S., 335
Richter, Hans, 165
Ries, John C., 383

Riklin, Alois, 91
Rippon, Geoffrey, 246
Ritter von Schramm, Wilhelm, 149
Roberts, Adam, 132, 404
Röling, Bert, 23
Rogers, William P., 428
Roherty, James M., 247
Rose, Leo E., 105
Rosecrance, Richard N., 6
Rosenberg, Jason A., 271
Rostow, Walt W., 92
Rothstein, Robert L., 93
Ruehl, Lothar, 447
Rumpf, Helmut, 363
Ruppel, Edith, 185
Ryan, John D., 248
Ryan, William L., 424
Rydberg, C. R., 483

S

Sagatelyan, M., 249
Salitter, Michael, 250
Salzburger Humanismusgespräch, 4th (1968), 22
Sapin, Burton M., 93
Sartori, L., 169
Sass, Hubertus, 150
Saxena, Adarsh K., 105
Sayeed, Khalid P., 105
Schatz, Oskar, 23
Scheich, Manfred, 9
Scheinman, Lawrence, 383
Schelling, Thomas C., 93
Schieder, Theodore, 4
Schilling, Jürgen, 316
Schmidt, Helmut, 94, 251
Schmitt, Hans A., 24
Schneider, Fernand-Thiébaud, 95, 252
Schnippenkoetter, Swidbert, 375
Schütze, Walter, 254
Schützack, Udo, 253
Schwan, Alexander, 23
Schwarz, Siegfried, 185
Schwarz, Urs, 448
Scott, Hugh, 122
Scott, J. P., 25
Seaville, Herbert, 478
Seaborg, Glenn T., 172
Seamans, Robert C., 25
Sears, Robert R., 117
Seetzen, Jürgen, 475
Semenov, V. S., 450
Sen, Chanakya, 26
Shaplen, Robert, 132
Sharabi, Hisham B., 138
Sharma, D. N., 342
Sharrow, Joel D., 271
Sherif, Carolyn, 17
Sherif, Muzaffer, 17
Shorola, James, 27
Shure, Gerold H., 409
Siewert, Regina, 139
Sigal, Leon V., 28
Sights, A. P., 256
Sihanouk, Norodom. See Norodom Sihanouk Varman, King of Cambodia
Silverman, Arnold W., 17
Singer, J. David, 151

Singh, Bishwanath, 96
 Singh, Nagenbra, 365
 Singh, S. Nihal, 244
 Singh, Yogendra, 367
 Siverson, Randolph M., 29
 Skurnik, W. A. E., 318
 Small, Melvin, 151
 Smart, Ian, 449
 Smith, Gerard C., 450
 Smith, Robert B., 317
 Snouck-Hurgronje, Jan, 236
 Sobik, Erich, 257-258
 Solomon, Robert L., 30
 Sombart, Nicolaus, 23
 Son, Chae-sok, 256
 Spartz, John N., 15
 Speidel, Hans, 260
 Speier, Hans, 23
 Standard, William L., 132
 Steel, Ronald, 93
 Stevenson, John R., 464
 Stone, Isidor F., 261, 276-
 377, 425
 Storrow, James J., 274
 Storry, Richard, 97
 Strole, D. L., 236
 Stuci, Alfred, 366
 Stuiver, M., 319
 Subrahmanyam, K., 263
 Suh, Dae-Sook, 4
 Sullivan, Robert R., 264
 Summerlin, Sam, 424
 Swanborough, Gordon, 174
 Swingle, Paul G., 31
 Symington, William Stuart, 98
 Szarvas, Robert F., 480

T

Talbot, Phillips, 99
 Tatu, Michel, 141
 Taubinger, L. M. von, 176
 Taylor, Maxwell D., 93
 Taylor, Pamela, 271
 Taylor, Stuart P., 27
 Tedeschi, James T., 31
 Terhune, Kenneth W., 31, 33-34
 Terzibaschitsch, Stefan, 177,
 265

Thant, U., 343
 Thiess, Frank, 35
 Thomas, Michael W., 72
 Thompson, Sir Robert G. K.,
 152
 Timasheff, Nicholas S., 6
 Toch, Hans, 17
 Toulemonde, Bernard, 344

U

Uhlig, Frank, 236
 Ulam, Adam B., 160
 Ulsamer, Edgar E., 266
 U.S. Blue Ribbon Defense
 Panel, 267
 U.S. Congress. House. Commit-
 tee on Foreign Affairs. Sub-
 committee on Europe, 268
 U.S. Congress. Senate. Commit-
 tee on Government Opera-
 tions. Subcommittee on Na-
 tional Security and Interna-
 tional Operations, 93
 U.S. Dept. of State. Office of
 Media Services, 101
 U.S. Dept. of Army, 269
 U.S. President's Commission on
 an All-Volunteer Armed
 Force, 270
 Unnithan, Thottaron K. K. N.,
 367
 Uschner, Manfred, 103

V

Van Den Berghe, Pierre L., 318
 Van der Kroef, Justus M., 104
 Varma, Shanti P., 105
 Vendryes, Georges A., 179
 Vernant, Jacques, 462
 Vicker, Ray, 272
 Von Simson, Piers, 465

W

Wagner, Robert H., 106
 Walker, Richard L., 4
 Wallace, Don, 107

Wallace, J. F., 273
 Walsh, John L., 483
 Walters, Richard H., 17
 Walton, Richard E., 406
 Walton, Richard J., 274
 Walzer, Michael, 153
 Ward, Maurice J., 483
 Wasserstrom, Richard A., 153
 Wayper, C. L., 108
 Weidenbaum, Murray L., 306
 Weinberg, Philip, 271
 Welch, Claude E., 318
 Whetten, Lawrence L., 37, 274
 White, Isaac D., 154
 Wiberg, Niskan, 391
 Wienand, Karl, 368
 Wienhöfer, Elmar, 277
 Wilcox, Wayne, 105
 Wilke, Dieter G., 407
 Willame, Jean-Claude, 318
 Williams, P. M., 319
 Williams, Ralph E., 180
 Wilpert, Friedrich von, 142
 Windelen, Heinrich, 463
 Windsor, Philip, 143
 Wiseberg, Laurie, 383
 Woito, Robert, 360
 Wolfe, Bertram D., 369
 Wolff, Beverly M., 271
 Wood, Alfred J., 483
 Wooters, Garry J., 109, 271
 Wriggins, W. Howard, 35

Y

Yule, Wesley W., 154
 York, Herbert F., 320

Z

Zador, Heinrich, 279
 Zartman, I. Wil 'am, 318
 Zbinden, Hans, 39
 Zoppo, Ciro E., 280, 383
 Zurayk, Constantine, 131

SUBJECT INDEX

(Numbers refer to entries.)

A

- ARM. *See* Antimissile defense systems
- ANZUS TREATY. *See* Pacific Security Treaty under Treaties, agreements, etc.
- ACCIDENTAL WAR, 403
- AEROSPACE INDUSTRY
 - France, 409
 - Great Britain, 168
- AFRICA
 - conflict, 16
 - role of the military, 318
 - Sino-Soviet competition, 272
- AFRICA, NORTH, 74
- AFRO-ASIAN NATIONS, role in the United Nations, 342
- AGREEMENTS. *See* Treaties, agreements, etc.
- AGGRESSION
 - anthropological analysis, 32
 - behavioral analysis, 17
 - biological aspects, 25
 - Communist view, 5
 - See also* Conflict; Violence
- AIRCRAFT
 - Anglo-German collaboration, 174
 - France, 409
 - Great Britain, 168
 - naval, 148
- AIRPOWER
 - Mediterranean area, 74
 - U.S. doctrine, 256
- ALBANIA, role in Europe, 459
- ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS, 71
- ALLIANCES
 - Anglo-French nuclear deterrent force, 207
 - role in Soviet-U.S. maritime competition, 222
 - United States, 101, 184
 - See also* Treaties, agreements, etc.; Non-alignment
- AMALRIK, ANDREI, 126
- ANTARCTIC TREATY, 380
- ANTICOMMUNISM, United States, 313
- ANTIMILITARISM, United States, 306
- ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS
 - deployment
 - effects, 436, 439, 441, 443, 445
 - U.S. controversy, 158, 298-299, 383
 - limitation. *See* Negotiations--strategic arms limitation talks
 - sea-based antitallistic missile intercept system (SASMIC), 177, 180, 205
 - United States
 - criticism, 180
 - policy, 231, 390
 - programs, 206
 - Senate debates, 288
- ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE, United States, 155
- APAB COUNTRIES
 - relations with the Great Powers, 125
- APAB COUNTRIES--Continued
 - relations with the United States, 138
 - Soviet policy, 74
- APAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE, 131
 - Arab view, 138
 - international law, 468
 - Palestinian refugees, 133
 - settlement, 122, 125
 - creation of a Near East Community, 355
 - Palestinian refugees, 46,
 - role of small countries, 120
 - U.S. policy, 114
- APAB-ISRAELI WAR (1956-1957), 29
- APAB-ISRAELI WAR (1967), 138
- ARMAMENTS INDUSTRY. *See* Defense industry
- ARMED FORCES, 305
 - air-mobile forces, 167
 - Communist China, 243, 257
 - comparative statistics, 220
 - East Germany, 244
 - Europe, 239
 - Great Britain, 167, 354
 - Israel, 279
 - U.S.S.R.
 - patriotism, 301
 - See also* specific branches under U.S.S.R.
 - West Germany, 208, 251, 277
 - See also* Peacekeeping and security forces
- ARMES AND ARMAMENTS
 - national expenditures, 220
 - North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 164
 - reduction or elimination, 370, 375, 378, 383, 437
 - Australian view, 360
 - bibliography, 209
 - effect on Asia, 384
 - effect of ARM deployment, 390
 - history, 376
 - Latin America, 414
 - mutual balanced force reduction, 254, 388
 - naval limitation, 373
 - nuclear weapons, 371
 - post-World War II period, 377
 - prospects, 381
 - Pugwash movement, 446
 - strategic arms limitation talks. *See* under Negotiations
 - U.N. role, 339
 - U.S. policies and proposals, 379, 394
 - U.S.-Soviet draft treaty on the seabed, 469
 - verification, 478
 - Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments (1921-1922), 372
 - West German view, 360
 - See also* Strategic arms limitation talks under Negotiations
- research and development. *See* Defense research and development
- trade and dissemination, 333, 448

ARMS AND ARMAMENTS--Continued
 trace and dissemination--Continued
 France, 409
 Libya, 117
 South Africa, 246, 397
 United States, 49, 175, 410
 United States, undersea long-range missile system, 166
See also Chemical and biological weapons;
 Conventional weapons; Military balance;
 Missiles; Nuclear weapons
 ARMS RACE
 effect of strategy, 383
 history, 376
 mathematical analysis, 390, 445
 role of technology, 437
 Soviet-U.S. competition, 281, 320, 436, 448
 Soviet view, 249
 United Nations role, 484
 ARMS TRADE. See Arms and armaments--trade
 and dissemination
 ARMS TRAFFIC. See Arms and armaments--trade
 and dissemination
 ASIA
 balance of power, 1
 effect of major war, 111
 Japanese role, 68, 245
 role of outside powers, 36
 security in, 110, 259, 384
 Australian nuclear policies, 416
 role of Japan, 108
 U.S. policy, 421
 U.S. role, 60
 Soviet policy, 69
 U.S. policy, 44, 76, 92, 132
 U.S. presence, 40
 See also Near East; Southeast Asia; specific countries
 ASSOCIATIONS
 American Association for the Advancement of Science, 309
 National Academy of Sciences, 309
 ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization
 ATOMIC. See entries beginning with nuclear
 ATOMIC FOR PEACE PROGRAM. See Nuclear energy--peaceful uses
 AUSTRALIA
 and the International Atomic Energy Agency, 336
 defense policies and programs, 227, 229
 disarmament policies and proposals, 360
 nuclear policies and programs, nonproliferation treaty, 416
 AUSTRIA, 399

B

BALANCE OF POWER
 Far East, 1
 Near East, 137
 U.S.-U.S.S.R., 438
 Near East, 274
 See also Military balance
 BALKAN COUNTRIES, 459
 BALTIc SEA AREA, 242
 BARGAINING THEORY, 31
 BARUCH PLAN, 377
 BELMONT, J. EDGAR, 163
 BIBLIOGRAPHIES
 international relations, 20
 NATO and nuclear weapons, 269
 ocean, legal aspects, 470

BIBLIOGRAPHIES--Continued
 peace research, 374
 Vietnam, 136
 war and peace, 360
 BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. See Chemical and biological weapons
 BOUNDARIES, INTERNATIONAL
 concepts of, 30
 Sino-Indian dispute, 127
 BREZHNEV DOCTRINE, 323, 334
 BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS, 11
 military culture, 294
 role in international security, 102

C

COMECON. See Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
 CAMBODIA
 insurgency, 129
 U.S. policy, 49
 U.S.-South Vietnamese intervention, 241
 international law, 323
 CANADA
 defense policies and programs, civil defense, 273, 296
 foreign policy, 55, 61
 foreign relations, United States, 61
 radioactive fallout, 290
 CAYMAN, foreign policy, 105
 CHAD, foreign relations, France, 134
 CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, 375
 Australian view, 380
 ban, 426
 British proposal, 381
 on biological weapons (proposed), 430
 role of the International Red Cross, 341
 disposal, 427
 defoliants. See under Herbicides; United States--defense policies and programs; Defoliant program under Vietnam
 international law, 331
 NATO view, 386
 U.S. policy, 428-429, 431
 West Germany, 432
 CHINA, COMMUNIST
 approach to negotiations, 402
 Armed Forces, 183
 civil-military relations, 219, 243
 defense policies and programs
 strategic weapons systems, 212
 strategy, 257
 effect on strategic arms limitation talks, 443
 foreign policy, 105, 152
 Africa, 212
 Asia, 38
 history, 96
 Indonesia, 65
 proliferation of nuclear weapons, 422
 South Asia, 26
 Southeast Asia, 45, 59, 79
 United States, 70
 foreign relations
 India, 126, 211, 263
 Indonesia, 104
 U.S.S.R., 126, 128
 nuclear war potential, Indian view, 413
 nuclear weapons, bibliography, 269
 nuclear weapons development, 176
 role of U.S.- and Soviet-trained scientists, 424
 threat to Republic of Korea, 213

CHINA, COMMUNIST--Continued

- threat to United States, 281, 298
- U.N. membership, 440
- U.N. policy, 344
- view of Japan's defense policies and programs, 276
- view of Nationalist China, 28
- See also Sino-American relations; Sino-Soviet dispute

CHRISTIANITY

- role in East-West relations, 35
- view of Europe, 351
- view of war, 353

CIVIL DEFENSE, 296

- Canada, 275
- role of volunteers, 253
- West Germany, 217, 240

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS, 295

- Africa, 318
- civic-action programs, 354
- Communist China, 219, 243
- Indonesia, 69
- Third World, 294
- United States, 296, 286
- West Germany, 291, 277, 291, 316
- See also Antimilitarism; Militarism; Military-industrial complex; Scientific-military relations

CLAUSEWITZ, KARL VON, 149-150

COFFEY, JOSEPH I., 232

COLL WAR, 62

- history, 57, 123

COLLECTIVE DEFENSE. See Security, internationalCOLLECTIVE SECURITY. See Security, international

COMMAND AND CONTROL

- communications systems, 397
- nuclear weapons, Europe, 396
- Tenkin Gulf Crisis (1964), 404

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT, 388

COMMON MARKET. See European Economic Community

COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, MILITARY, United States, 397

COMMUNISM

- and Soviet foreign policy, 100
- ideology, 5
- U.S. view, 313

COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

- guerrilla warfare strategy, 152
- international law, 330
- Soviet relations with, 334
- views on European security, 37
- See also Eastern Europe; Sino-Soviet dispute; Warsaw Treaty Organization; specific countries

COMPUTERS, international relations analysis, 405

CONFERENCE OF ALL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (PROPOSED). See European security conference (proposed) under Conferences; also under Europe--security in

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT, U.S.-Soviet draft treaty on the seabed, 469

CONFERENCES

- conference of non-nuclear-weapon countries, 375
- European security conference (proposed), 56, 62, 141
- ish view, 453
- et view, 460
- slav view, 362

CONFERENCES--Continued

- International Atomic Energy Agency symposium on safeguards, 477
- International Radiation Protection Association Congress, 24 (1970), 297
- Nordic Conference on Peace Research, 34, Lund (1968), 391
- Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, 446
- symposium on engineering with nuclear explosives, 160
- Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments (1921-1922), 372
- See also Negotiations

CONFLICT

- causes, 15
- international, perception of injury, 29
- resolution, 389, 406
- computer analysis, 405
- counselling, 431
- role of international law, 321
- structural aspects, 31
- See also Aggression; Violence; War

CONTAINMENT, Southeast Asia, 407

CONTROL. See Inspection and verification

CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, ecological effects, 311

CONVERGENCE THEORY, 89, 369

CONVERSION. See economic conversion under Defense industry; Defense research and development--United States

COOPERATION, INTERNATIONAL

- Asia, 68
- Southeast Asia, 456

COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS, U.S. ARM deployment, 441

COUNCIL FOR MUTUAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, role of East Germany, 72

COUNTERINSURGENCY

- U.S. policy, 175
- See also Guerrilla warfare; Insurgency

CRISIS MANAGEMENT, 404

- flexible response, 199
- Formosa Straits crises, 28
- perception of injury, 29

CZECHOSLOVAKIA, Soviet invasion, effect on European integration, 461

D

DECISIONMAKING

- and perception of injury, 29
- behavioral analysis, 6
- bureaucracy, 386
- United States, 93, 237
- criticism, 267, 320
- executive vs. legislative, 43, 98
- Vietnam War, 400

DEFENSE BUDGETS AND EXPENDITURES, 293

- comparative statistics, 220
- economic effects, 305
- Great Britain, 68
- Japan, 201
- reductions. See Defense cutbacks
- United States, 204, 236
- criticism, 314
- economic effects, 463
- West Germany, civil defense, 217

DEFENSE CUTBACKS

- Great Britain, 159
- United States, 245, 308, 312
- economic effects, 482

DEFENSE INDUSTRY

- economic conversion, 312

DEFENSE INDUSTRY--Continued
 economic conversion--Continued
 shipbuilding, 482
 United States, 481, 483
 United States, 282
See also Aerospace industry; Military-industrial complex; Nuclear energy industry
 DEFENSE PROCUREMENT, United States, 282
 DEFENSE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
 Japan, 245
 oceanography, 473
 strategic weapons systems, 448
 United States, 304
 economic conversion, 481
 naval, 236
 U.S.-Soviet competition, 161
 DEFOLIANTS. See under Herbicides
 DETENTE
 East-West, 440
 proposal for a European security conference, 453
 Europe, 123
 West German policy, 94
 Soviet-U.S., 434
 DETTERENCE, 395
 and flexible response, 199
 and strategic arms limitation talks, 449
 Anglo-French nuclear force, 282
 assured destruction, 448
 effect of ABM deployment, 298
 India, 418
 of Communist China, 413
 role of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, 169
 sea-based vs. land-based, 226
 stable deterrence, 445
 theory, 31
 Western Europe, 396
See also Strategy
 DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
 relations with the West, 15
 South Asia, 26
 DIPLOMACY, military attachés, 10
 DISENGAGEMENT, U.S. policy in Vietnam, 86
 DRAFT. See Military service, compulsory

E

ENDC. See Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
 EURATOM. See European Atomic Energy Community
 EAST-WEST RELATIONS
 moral and ethical aspects, 35
 the German problem, 455
 trade, 361
 West German policy, 94
See also Soviet-U.S. relations; specific countries
 EASTERN EUROPE
 and European integration, 461
 Soviet policy, 3, 58
 view on European security, 37
See also East-West relations; specific countries
 ECOLOGY
 disposal of chemical and biological weapons, 427
 effects of war, 311
 ECONOMIC CONVERSION. See under Defense industry; Defense research and development--United States

ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, 305, 310
 shipbuilding, 482
 United States, 293, 306, 312, 483
 ECONOMIC POLICIES AND PROGRAMS, international firms, 22
 EIGHTEEN NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT. See Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
 EISENHOWER, DWIGHT D., and disarmament, 377
 ENGLAND. See Great Britain
 ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION. See Ecology
 ESCALATION, 256
 ETHIOLOGY, 25
See also Violence--causes; War--causes;
also under Peace--approaches
 EUROPE
 German problem, 455
 integration, 351, 451, 457
 British policy, 239
 nuclear deterrent force, 207
 role in Near East peace settlement, 355
 role of Great Britain, 190
 science and technology, weapons development, 164
 security in, 4, 123, 194, 452, 456
 air-mobile forces, 167
 Anglo-German relations, 84
 Communist view, 37
 deterrence, 396
 European security conference (proposed), 46, 81-82, 113, 223, 362
 Finnish proposal, 453
 prospects, 141
 Soviet view, 460
 French view, 254
 role of:
 Balkan countries, 459
 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 192, 233, 260
 United States, 102, 204, 268, 286
 West German Navy, 198
 strategic arms limitation talks, 447
 U.S. Air Force, 234
 West German view, 276, 457
 unification, 39, 112, 454, 462
 German reunification, 143
 history, 24
 West German policy, 94
See also East-West relations; Central Europe; Eastern Europe; European-U.S. relations; Western Europe; specific countries
 EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE (PROPOSED). See under Conferences; also under Europe--security in
 EUROPEAN-U.S. RELATIONS
 problems and prospects, 268
See also North Atlantic Treaty Organization

F

FALLOUT. See Radioactive fallout
 FAR EAST. See Asia; South Asia; Southeast Asia; specific countries
 FINLAND
 neutrality, 457
 proposal for a European security conference, 453
 FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, 192, 199
 FOOD SUPPLIES, WORLD, 359
 FORCE, USE OF, United Nations, 347
 FOREIGN POLICY, 14
 decision-making process, 8
 foreign ministers, 83

112 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

FOREIGN POLICY--Continued

- role of military-industrial complex, 306
- See also under specific countries
- FRANCE
 - arms trade and dissemination, aircraft, 409
 - defense policies and programs, 197
 - foreign policy, 56
 - mutual balanced force reductions, 254
 - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 422
 - foreign relations
 - Australia, 416
 - Chad, 134
 - Libya, 117
 - NATO policy, 194
 - nuclear policies and programs, 179, 224
 - role in Europe, 3
 - role in NATO, 233
- FRUSTRATION-AGGRESSION HYPOTHESIS, 27

G

- GGD. See General and complete disarmament
- GALBRAITH, JOHN KENNETH, 369
- GAME THEORY, 31
 - negotiation, 405
 - peace research, 34
- GAVIN, JAMES M., 149
- GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT, 332, 370, 381
 - and Asia, 384
 - moral and ethical aspects, 353
 - Soviet policy, 379
 - U.S. policies and proposals, 393
 - See also Arms and armaments--reduction or elimination; Negotiations--strategic arms limitation talks
- GENEVA DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE. See Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
- GENEVA PROTOCOL (1925). See Protocol Prohibiting the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare under Treaties, agreements, etc.
- GENOCIDE CONVENTION, U.S. ratification, 333
- GERMANY
 - foreign relations, Poland, 142
 - renunciation, 46, 139, 143, 340, 462
 - two-state concept, 455
- GERMANY, EAST
 - admission to the United Nations, 340
 - Armed Forces, 244
 - relations with the U.S.S.R., 72
 - relations with West Germany, 46, 63-64, 71, 118, 139, 139, 143, 463
- GERMANY (FEDERAL REPUBLIC)
 - admission to the United Nations, 240
 - aircraft, Anglo-German collaboration, 174
 - Armed Forces, 235, 277, 291, 316
 - chemical and biological weapons, 432
 - defense policies and programs, 189, 217, 245, 251, 276
 - European security conference (proposed), 11
 - foreign policy, 94
 - Eastern Europe, 46, 64, 139, 298, 461, 463
 - Latin America, 193
 - U.S.S.R., 456
 - foreign relations
 - Great Britain, 84
 - Ireland, 121
 - U.S.S.R., 41, 82, 140, 462
 - foreign service, 10, 53
 - cy, 21, 194

GERMANY (FEDERAL REPUBLIC)--Continued

- peace research, 369
- relations with East Germany, 63, 73, 118, 139, 143
- GHANA, relations with the U.S.S.R., 75
- GREAT BRITAIN
 - aircraft, 174
 - and Third World military traditions, 294
 - defense policies and programs, 168, 187, 190, 218
 - civic-action programs, 354
 - East of Suez, 79, 110, 264
 - naval, 159
 - Persian Gulf, 119
 - disarmament policies and proposals, chemical and biological weapons, 431
 - foreign policy, 22
 - foreign relations
 - South Africa, 45, 246
 - West Germany, 84
 - NATO policy, 207
 - national security policies, 239
 - Navy, 168
 - role in Europe, 451
- GREAT POWERS
 - policy toward Southeast Asia, 407
 - role in South Asia, 105
- GUERRILLA WARFARE
 - Asia, 132
 - Communist strategy, 152
 - psychological aspects, 146
 - See also Counterinsurgency; Incubency
- GUINEA, relations with the U.S.S.R., 75
- GULF OF AQABA, right of innocent passage, 408

H

- HERRICIDES
 - defoliants, 285, 309
 - ecological effects, Vietnam, 311
 - Soviet view, 420
 - U.S. policy and Geneva Protocol, 409

I

- IAEA. See International Atomic Energy Agency
- INDIA
 - disarmament policies and proposals, 105
 - foreign policy, 92, 105
 - opposition parties, 88
 - South Asia, 26
 - Southeast Asia, 45, 79
 - national security policies, 78, 211, 263
 - nuclear policies and programs, 413, 413-420
 - relations with Communist China, 127
- INDIAN OCEAN
 - Sino-Soviet competition, 272
 - Soviet policies, 228
 - strategic situation, 119, 195
- INDOCHINA WAR. See Vietnam War
- INDONESIA, 65, 134
- INSPECTION AND VERIFICATION
 - aerial reconnaissance, 450
 - arms control agreements, 345, 475
 - ban on chemical and biological weapons, 432
 - IAEA safeguards, 477
 - nonproliferation treaty, 475-476
 - strategic arms limitation agreements, 443
 - U.S. view, 377
- INSURGENCY
 - Chad, 134
 - See also Counterinsurgency; Guerrilla warfare

SUBJECT INDEX 113

INTELLIGENCE, 479
 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, 383, 440
 Australian view, 336
 nonproliferation treaty, 476
 safeguards system, 477
 INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, 329
 INTERNATIONAL LAW
 and Soviet-U.S. relations, 324
 concept of self-defense, 323
 Convention on the Continental Shelf, 467
 Genocide Convention, 333
 Germany, status of, 73
 Gulf of Aqaba, 468
 international adjudication, 321
 international legal order, 350
 intervention. *See* Intervention
 laws of war, 331-332
 outer space, 472
 reevaluation, 327
 role in maintaining peace, 335, 365
 seated, 471
 Soviet doctrine, 322, 326, 330, 334
 theoretical analysis, 325
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 328-329
 See also War--moral and ethical aspects
 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 339, 343
 and the maintenance of peace, 365
 behavioral analysis, 338
 control over ocean and seabed, 465
 problems and prospects, 337
 role in the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons, 341
 Soviet view, 326
 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. *See* Organizations
 INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY FORCES (PROPOSED), 384
 INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS, 341
 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 7, 383
 behavioral analysis, 6, 8
 bibliographies, 20
 mathematical analysis, 320
 need for reorientation, 22
 peace research movement, 391
 role of national character, 33
 study and teaching, 93
 world order, 350
 See also Alliances; World order
 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. *See* Security, international
 INTERVENTION
 civil wars, 18
 Czechoslovakia. *See* Czechoslovakia--Soviet invasion
 U.S. policy, 67, 184, 274
 ISOLATIONISM, United States, 59, 67, 286
 ISRAEL
 Armed Forces, 279
 Gulf of Aqaba, right of innocent passage, 468
 relations with Arab countries, 122
 See also Arab-Israeli dispute; Arab-Israeli War (1956-1957); Arab-Israeli War (1967)
 IV. PY COAST, 75

JAPAN--Continued
 foreign relations
 Asia, 68
 United States, 201
 national security policies, 201, 210, 225
 nuclear policies and programs, 412, 421
 rearmament, 493
 role in Asia, 1, 76, 108, 213, 259
 world role, 85
 JASPERS, KARL, 315

K

KENNEDY, JOHN F.
 and disarmament, 377
 and the nuclear test ban treaty, 425
 KOREA, risk of war, 213
 KOREA, NORTH
 approach to negotiations, 402
 defense policies and programs, 213
 KOREA, REPUBLIC OF
 comparison with South Vietnam, 394
 national security policies, 213
 U.S.-Korea mutual defense treaty, 259
 U.S. troop withdrawal, 398
 KOREAN ARMISTICE CONFERENCE, 38
 KOREAN WAR, settlement, 394

L

LAIRD, MELVIN R., 261
 LAOS
 role in origins of Vietnam War, 116
 U.S. policy, 49
 LATIN AMERICA
 nuclear-free zone, 333, 385, 414
 relations with the U.S.S.R., 47
 U.S. policy, 71, 106
 West German role, 193
 LIBYA, 117
 LIMITED MEASURES
 criticism, 381
 See also specific measures, e.g., Negotiations--strategic arms limitation talks; Nuclear test ban treaty; etc.
 LIMITED WAR, 154, 358
 LIN, HAO, 219

M

MIPV. *See* Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles
 MINAMURA, ROBERT S., 247
 MADHREB. *See* Africa, North
 MALI, 75
 MARITIME STRATEGY, 222, 230
 MASSIVE RETALIATION, 27
 MATHEMATICAL MODELS, 399
 MEDITERRANEAN AREA
 and the Balkan countries, 33
 Soviet Navy, 215
 Soviet policy, 74, 289
 strategic situation, 124
 U.S. policy, 182
 MEMBERS OF CONGRESS FOR PEACE THROUGH LAW, 392
 MERCHANT MARINE, 250
 MESSIAH, MATTHEW S., 429
 MIDDLE EAST. *See* Near East
 MILITARISM, 315
 Africa, 318
 Communist view, 5
 in Freudian psychology, 263
 Japan, 97, 173, 245, 278

J

114 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

MILITARISM--Continued

- role in arms race, 437
- sociological aspects, 284
- See also Antimilitarism; Civil-military relations; Military-industrial complex
- MILITARY AID, U. S. to Portugal, 410
- MILITARY BALANCE, 220
 - East-West, navies, 205
 - U.S.-U.S.S.R., 203, 209, 252, 261
 - Mediterranean area, 124
 - Soviet maritime expansion, 258
 - strategic arms limitation talks, 300
- See also Balance of power
- MILITARY BUDGETS AND EXPENDITURES. See Defense budgets and expenditures
- MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, U.S., 306
 - and Congress, 314
 - and disarmament, 377
- See also Civil-military relations; Militarism
- MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS, 284
- MILITARY POWER, 214
- MILITARY PROCUREMENT. See Defense procurement
- MILITARY PROFESSION, 294-295
- MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. See Defense research and development
- MILITARY SERVICE, COMPULSORY
 - alternatives, 196, 312
 - United States, 270
- MILITARY STRATEGY. See Strategy
- MISSILES, 171
 - development, 371
 - Soviet Navy, 156
 - Soviet-U.S. competition, 261
 - Undersea Long-Range Missile System, 166, 188, 226
- See also Antimissile defense systems; specific types, e.g. Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles; also under specific countries
- MORALITY OF WAR. See War--moral and ethical aspects
- MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES
 - deployment, 163, 169, 299, 436, 443
 - limitation. See Negotiations--strategic arms limitation talks
- MUTUAL BALANCED FORCE REDUCTION. See under Arms and armaments--reduction or elimination

N

- NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- NATIONAL CHARACTER, 33
- NATIONAL INTEREST, 8
- NAVAL WARFARE, 236
 - antisubmarine warfare, 155
 - international law, 331-332
 - role of aircraft, 148
- NAVIES
 - world comparison, 205
- See also Navy under specific countries
- NEAR EAST
 - Arab-Israeli dispute. See Arab-Israeli dispute
 - balance of power, 274
 - political settlement, 122
 - proposal for a Near East Community, 355
 - role of Great Powers, 137
 - U.S. policy, 181, 280
 - Tension. See Tension--Near East
 - U.S. policy, 49, 120, 124

- NEGOTIATION, ART OF, 406
 - computer analysis, 405
 - Soviet policy, 77
 - U.S., with Communist powers, 401
- NEGOTIATIONS
 - Communist approach, 402
 - naval limitation, 373
 - Soviet policy, 100, 387
 - strategic arms limitation talks, 158, 189, 204, 299, 300, 371, 381, 385, 434, 436, 438-442, 447, 450
 - Australian view, 380
 - effect of Pugwash conferences, 446
 - NATO view, 388
 - prognosis, 433, 443
 - role of military intelligence, 479
 - Sino-Soviet dispute, 111
 - Soviet policy, 46, 77
 - technological aspects, 444
 - U.S. policy, 262, 379
 - U.S. public opinion, 435
 - U.S. Senate debates, 288
 - West German view, 94, 276
- See also Conferences

NEPAL, 105

NEUTRALITY

- Austria, 399
- Finland, 457
- Japanese Socialist Party view, 210
- Swedish policy, 57
- Switzerland, 91

See also Nonalignment

NEUTRALIZATION, Southeast Asia, 437

NIGERIA, 75

NIXON DOCTRINE, 76, 80

NONALIGNMENT

- Balkan countries, 135
- See also Alliances; Neutrality

NONLETHAL WEAPONS. See Chemical and biological weapons

NONPROLIFERATION TREATY. See under Proliferation of nuclear weapons

NONVIOLENCE, 51

- sociological analysis, 367

See also Violence

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, 232

- and European security, 223
- British policies and programs, 237
- communications systems, 397
- Communist view, 185
- Council view of proposed European security conference, 362
- defense policies and programs, 206
- disarmament policies and proposals, 368
- history, 123
- nuclear weapons bibliography, 269
- problems and prospects, 233, 260
- public opinion, West Germany, 21
- role in European unification, 454
- role of U.S. Air Force, 234
- Spanish view, 42
- statistics, 238
- strategy, 169, 192, 199, 235
- U.S. policy, 184, 194
- weapons technology, 164
- West German role, 251
- See also Europe--security in; European-U.S. relations; also NATO policy under specific countries
- NUCLEAR ENERGY
 - military potential, 418
 - peaceful uses
 - India, 420

NUCLEAR ENERGY--Continued
 peaceful uses--Continued
 inspection and verification, 475
 Japan, 412
 NUCLEAR ENERGY INDUSTRY, U.S., 172
 NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS
 effects, 296
 peaceful uses, 160, 165, 417
 International Atomic Energy Agency, 336
 nonproliferation treaty, 415
 U.S.S.R., 162
 See also Nuclear energy--peaceful uses
 See also Nuclear weapons tests; Radiation;
 Radioactive fallout
 NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, UNDERGROUND, 427
 NUCLEAR FORCES, 224
 NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES
 Latin America, 265
 South Asia, 105
 NUCLEAR RADIATION. See Radiation
 NUCLEAR REACTORS
 fast-breeder, 172, 179, 420
 India, 419
 Japan, 412
 NUCLEAR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
 France, 179
 gas-centrifuge technology, 420
 India, 418
 NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS SYSTEMS
 Japanese view, 421
 nonproliferation treaty, 336, 476
 NUCLEAR STRATEGY
 India, 105, 416
 United States, 188
 NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY, 370, 435
 and peaceful uses of nuclear explosions,
 162, 417
 effect on weapons development, 439
 U.S.-Soviet negotiations, 425
 NUCLEAR WAR
 prevention. See Deterrence
 psychological aspects, 303
 See also Civil defense; War
 NUCLEAR WEAPONS, 171
 accidents, 403
 acquisition, 413
 deterrence, 395
 development, 371
 Australia, 416
 Communist China, 212, 424
 France, 224
 India, 418-419
 Japan, 421
 dissemination. See Proliferation of nuclear
 weapons
 effects. See Nuclear explosions--effects;
 Nuclear war--probable effects; Nuclear
 weapons tests; Radiation; Radioactive
 fallout
 Indian view, 211
 laws of war, 331
 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, bibliog-
 raphy, 269
 proliferation. See Proliferation of nuclear
 weapons
 public opinion, United States, 435
 reduction or elimination. See Negotia-
 tions--strategic arms limitation talks
 space, 176
 tactical uses, 192
 See also Missiles

OCEAN
 carbon-14, 319
 continental shelf, 467
 corporate sovereignty, 465
 international law, 466
 peaceful uses, bibliography, 470
 pollution, draft convention on the seabed,
 464
 research, 250
 strategic importance, 473
 See also Seabed
 ODER-NEISSE LINE, 142
 OKINAWA, reversion to Japanese control, 191,
 210
 ORGANIZATIONS
 American Association for the Advancement of
 Science, 265
 Federation of American Scientists, 288
 International Atomic Energy Agency, 336
 International Red Cross, 341
 Members of Congress for Peace Through Law,
 302
 See also specific organizations, e.g., In-
 ternational Red Cross
 OSTPOLITIK. See Germany (Federal Republic)--
 foreign policy--Eastern Europe

P

PACEM IN TERRIS (JOANNES XXIII, POPE), 353
 PACIFIC OCEAN, 50
 PACIFISM, 315, 353
 PAKISTAN
 foreign policy, 26, 66, 99, 105
 relations with India, 263
 PAX AMERICANA, 12
 PEACE
 achievement and maintenance, 365, 389
 Europe, 4, 461
 sociological analysis, 367
 violence, 289
 world order, 384
 approaches, 87, 349, 357, 363, 382
 art of negotiation, 406
 bibliography, 360
 Clausewitzian theory, 149
 counselling, 348
 education, 147
 ethology, 13
 international adjudication, 321
 international law, 327, 335
 international trade, 361
 moral and religious, 351, 356
 psychology, 19
 sociology, 23
 sociopolitical, 352
 Swiss Department of Peace (proposal), 366
 world food supplies, 359
 bibliography, 374
 role of intellectuals, 62
 See also War
 PEACE MOVEMENTS, United States, 51
 PEACE RESEARCH, 23, 363, 366
 and the soldier, 357
 applications, 392
 criticism, 189
 game theory, 34
 history, 144, 349, 358, 364, 374
 methodology, 191
 West Germany, 352, 368, 461

116 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE, 5, 334
 PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES, 348, 389
 PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY. See Nuclear energy--peaceful uses
 PEACEKEEPING, 383
 PEACEKEEPING AND SECURITY FORCES
 command and control, 346
 United Nations, 339, 345, 347
 PERSIAN GULF, 119, 264
 FLOWSHARE, PROJECT, 160
 See also Nuclear explosions--peaceful uses
 POLAND, relations with Germany, 121, 142
 POLLUTION. See Ecology
 POPULATION EXPLOSION, 359
 PORTUGAL, U.S. military aid, 410
 POWER (CONCEPT), 214
 PRE-GONDOLA, PROJECT, 165
 PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, 363
 effect of ABM deployment, 298
 effect of nonsignatories of nonproliferation treaty, 422
 Europe, 204
 European deterrence system, 396
 nonproliferation treaty, 370, 375, 381, 436
 and peaceful uses of nuclear explosions, 417
 Australian view, 426
 International Atomic Energy Agency, 336
 safeguards system, 476-477
 Japan, 225, 421
 peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 475
 peaceful uses of nuclear explosions, 415
 Swedish view, 423
 Swiss view, 411
 PROTOCOL PROHIBITING THE USE IN WAR OF ASPHYXIATING, POISONOUS OR OTHER GASES, AND OF BACTERIOLOGICAL METHODS OF WARFARE, 426
 PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF WAR, 303
 PUBLIC OPINION
 United States, 93, 435
 West Germany, 21
 RUGWASH CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE AND WORLD AFFAIRS, 446

R

RADIATION, protection, 287, 297
 RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT
 atmosphere, 292
 detection and measurement, 290
 ocean, 319
 REARMAMENT, Japan, 245
 REGIONALISM, Southeast Asia, 458
 REMOTE SENSING, 480
 REPORT ON MILITARY SPENDING (1970) (MEMBERS OF CONGRESS FOR PEACE THROUGH LAW), 302
 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT See Defense research and development; Nuclear research and development
 REVOLUTIONS, 9
 ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH
 effect on Polish-West German relations, 121
 view of war, 353
 RUSSIA. See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

S

SALT. See Strategic arms limitation talks
 under Negotiations
 SAFEGUARDS SYSTEMS. See Nuclear safeguards
 as
 SBY, HARRISON, 126

SATELLITES, 170
 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 383
 effects on civilization, 382
 effects on strategic arms limitation talks, 444
 United States, 178, 304
 U.S.-Soviet competition, 157
 SCIENTISTS, 382
 SEABED, 388
 corporate sovereignty, 445
 demilitarization vs. denuclearization, 474
 international control, 337, 471
 peaceful uses, 469
 bibliography, 470
 U.S. policy, 464
 strategic importance, 473
 treaties, agreements, etc. (proposed), 360
 See also Ocean
 SEAPOWER, 205
 antimissile defense systems, 180
 Baltic Sea area, 242
 Cape of Good Hope route, 48, 246
 role of naval aircraft, 148
 Soviet-U.S. competition, 137, 222, 230, 280
 U.S.S.R., 215, 250, 258, 270
 United States, 166, 186, 188, 236
 SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL, 378
 and national sovereignty, 339
 nuclear weapons, 375
 Soviet policy, 81
 U.S. role, 102
 See also North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Security, regional
 SECURITY, REGIONAL
 Asia, 110, 213, 263
 Balkan countries, 135
 Eastern Europe, 452
 Southeast Asia, 59
 SELF-DEFENSE, 323
 SENEGAL, 75
 SHIPS
 Great Britain, 159
 U.S.S.R., 156, 173
 United States, 462
 SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1
 accommodation, 40
 history, 70
 prognosis, 58, 96
 Taiwan issue, 76
 U.S. policy, 49
 SINO-INDIAN DISPUTE, 127
 SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE, 69, 115
 Communist Chinese policy, 183
 Communist Chinese territorial claims, 128
 effect on Korea, 213
 effect on Soviet disarmament policies and proposals, 387
 Indian Ocean area, 272
 possibility of war, 96, 111, 126, 181
 prognosis, 18
 South Asia, 26
 West German view, 52
 SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS, 1
 SOUTH AFRICA, REPUBLIC OF
 defense policies and programs, 307
 foreign policy, 48
 proliferation of nuclear weapons, 422
 relations with Great Britain, 210
 SOUTH ASIA
 international relations, 26
 security in, 135

SOUTH ASIA--Continued

See also Far East; Southeast Asia; specific countries

SOUTHEAST ASIA

concept of boundaries, 30
international cooperation, 458
security in

Indian role, 45, 79

Indonesian policy, 104

U.S. role, 59

U.S. policy, 80

Western policy, 407

See also Asia; South Asia; Vietnam War; specific countries

SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION, 130

SOVEREIGNTY, 322, 339

SOVIET UNION. See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

SOVIET-U.S. RELATIONS, 189, 204

and international law, 324

and the German question, 194

convergence theory, 69, 369

détente, 434

effect on Soviet disarmament policies and programs, 387

history, 123

military balance. See Military balance

Near East, 274

nuclear test ban treaty negotiations, 425

possibility of war, 376

prognosis, 58

See also Negotiations--strategic arms limitation talks

SPACE

Indian programs, 419

military uses, 171, 176

peaceful uses, 474

U.S. programs, 170

SPACE LAW, 472

SPAIN, 42

STONE, JEREMY J., 288

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS. See under Negotiations

STRATEGIC BOMBING

ecological effects, 311

Vietnam, 256

STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS, limitation. See Negotiations--strategic arms limitation talks

STRATEGY

air-mobile forces, 167

bibliography, 269

Communist China, 219

effect of technology, 386

India, 211, 413, 418

Mao Tse-tung's doctrines, 257

mathematical analysis, 163

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 199, 206, 235

flexible response, 192

naval, 146

survey, 378

U.S.S.R., 221

United States, 69, 184, 186, 202, 203

area-based deterrent, 166, 205

tactical, 175

West Germany, 235

See also Deterrence

SUBMARINE WARFARE, 331-332

SUBMARINES, U.S.S.R., 230.

SWITZERLAND

foreign policy, 87

nonproliferation treaty, 423

SWITZERLAND

foreign policy, 91

nuclear policies and programs, 411

peace research, 366

T

TECHNOLOGY, 2, 437

TENSION

Cambodia, 129

Iran-Saudi Arabia, 264

Near East, 122, 131, 137-138, 181

Sino-Indian border, 127

South Africa, 307

TERRITORIAL DISPUTES

Communist China-India, 128

Gulf of Aqaba, 466

Oder-Neisse line, 121

See also Sino-Soviet dispute

TERRORISM. See under Violence

THIRD WORLD. See Developing countries

TINKOVSKI, SERGE, 126

TOKIN GULF CRISIS (1964), 404

TRADE, INTERNATIONAL, 361

TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, ETC., 364

arms control and disarmament, 336

nonproliferation treaty. See under Pro-liferation of nuclear weapons

Pacific Security Treaty (1951), 227

Protocol Prohibiting the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, 426

U.S. ratification, 428-429

Soviet doctrine, 326

Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (Japan-United States), 108, 201, 210, 225

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, 385, 414

Turko-Greek Naval Protocol (1930), 373

Turko-Soviet Naval Protocol (1931), 373

United States, 111

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 328-329

West German-Soviet renunciation-of-force agreement, 41, 82, 140, 330, 462

See also North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Warsaw Treaty Organization; specific treaties

TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, ETC. (PROPOSED)

United Kingdom draft convention for the prohibition of biological methods of warfare, 351, 431

U.S. draft convention on the international seabed area, 464

U.S.-Republic of Korea joint security treaty, 213, 259

U.S.-Soviet draft treaty prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof, 380, 469, 474

TREATY OF TATELOCCO. See Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America under Treaties, agreements, etc.

TREATY ON PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES IN THE EXPLORATION AND USE OF OUTER SPACE, INCLUDING THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES, 350

TSIEN, NGUE-CHEN, 114

U

ULM. See Ulmarea Long-Range Missile System under Missiles

118 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE. See Guerrilla warfare; Insurgency

UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT, 353

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
and European security, 37
Armed Forces, 301
Baltic Sea area, 242
defense policies and programs, 181, 209, 260
antimissile defense systems, 258
Europe, 194, 206
future, 300
Indian Ocean area, 272
maritime supremacy, 259
Mediterranean area, 124, 182, 215, 280
Navy, 156
strategic weapons systems, 261
defense research and development, 161
disarmament policies and proposals, 377, 379, 387
chemical and biological weapons, 426, 431
foreign policy, 58, 77, 81, 95, 152
Africa, 75
Arab-Israeli dispute, 133
Asia, 38, 69, 110
comparison with U.S. foreign policy, 89
Eastern Europe, 3
Europe, 46, 112, 456
ideological factors, 100
Indian Ocean area, 228
Mediterranean area, 74
Near East, 137, 274
Southeast Asia, 59
foreign relations
Communist China, 126, 128
East Germany, 72
Indonesia, 104
Japan, 85
Latin America, 47
Spain, 42
West Germany, 41, 52, 140, 462
international law, 324, 326, 330
invasion of Czechoslovakia. See Czechoslovakia--Soviet invasion
maritime policy, 222, 250
military intelligence, 479
national security policies, 221
Navy, 173, 205, 215, 222, 228, 230, 258
nuclear explosions, 162
nuclear policies and programs, 424
peaceful coexistence, 334
possibility of war with Communist China, 111
role in world peace, 384
satellites, 170
science and technology, 157
strategic arms limitation talks. See under Negotiations
strategic weapons systems, 203
strategy. See Strategy--U.S.S.R.
submarines, 155
See also East-West relations; Sino-Soviet dispute; Soviet-U.S. relations

UNITED KINGDOM. See Great Britain

UNITED NATIONS, 375
and space law, 472
Charter, enemy-state clauses, 340
committee on the causes of war (proposed), 356
disarmament policies and proposals, 388
information dissemination, 454
peacekeeping and security forces, 345-347
problems and prospects, 337, 339, 343
relations with Communist China, 344
role of Afro-Asian nations, 342

THE UNITED STATES AND THE DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE (JOSEPH I. COFFEY), 232

UNITED STATES
aerial reconnaissance capabilities, 430
and Communist Chinese nuclear-weapons program, 424
antimissile defense systems. See Antimissile defense systems
Armed Forces
in Europe, 216
proposal for an all-volunteer Armed Force, 270
See also specific branches under United States (Government)
arms and armaments, 249
arms trade and dissemination, 410
constitutionality of Vietnam War policy, 231, 271
defense budget and expenditures, 282, 312
criticism, 226, 302, 314
economic effects, 306
planning procedures, 308
defense cutbacks, 248, 397
defense industry
economic conversion, 483
shipbuilding, 482
defense policies and programs, 93, 200, 204, 265, 267
and South Africa, 45
antisubmarine warfare, 155
chemical and biological weapons, 427
criticism, 429
Soviet view, 426
civil defense, 253
criticism, 209
decisionmaking, 98
defoliation, 309
deployment of strategic weapons systems, 262, 299, 441
Europe, 268
formulation, 237
future, 300
graduated military pressure, 256
herbicides, 255
Korea, 213, 259
Mediterranean area, 124, 182, 280
Persian Gulf, 264
role of Robert McNamara, 247
seapower, 191
South Korea, 358
strategic weapons systems, 177, 188, 202, 255, 261, 266, 281, 300, 320
strategy. See Strategy--United States
tactical weapons systems, 175
Vietnam. See Vietnam War--U.S. policy
strategic arms limitation talks. See under Negotiations
defense research and development, 161, 451
disarmament policies and proposals, 393
chemical and biological weapons, 428, 431
criticism, 377, 379
scaled, 464
Senate debates, 288
financing of participation in World War I, 293
foreign aid policies, 107
foreign policy, 49, 54, 93
alliances, 107
Arab-Israeli dispute, 133
Asia, 38, 40, 44, 76, 80, 90, 92, 132
British view, 102
cold war, 57
Communist China, 70

UNITED STATES--Continued

foreign policy--Continued

- comparison with Soviet foreign policy, 89
- criticism, 51, 60, 62
- Europe, 112
- Far East, 1
- India, 99
- Indian Ocean area, 195, 272
- Indochina, 129
- isolationism, 50, 67, 286
- Latin America, 71, 106
- Near East, 120, 137-138, 274
- Pakistan, 99
- role of Congress, 43
- role of technology, 2
- Sino-Soviet dispute, 111
- Southeast Asia, 59, 79
- use of force, 289
- Vietnam. *See* Vietnam War--U.S. policy
- foreign relations
 - Asian countries, 90
 - Australia, 227
 - Communist China. *See* Sino-American relations
 - Japan, 108, 201, 210
- intelligence methodology, 479
- internal security, 313
- intervention, 274
- national security policies, 180, 184, 186, 386
- nuclear guarantees, 298
- oceanographic research, 473
- ratification of the Genocide Convention, 333
- role in:
 - Arab-Israeli dispute, 114
 - Asia, 68
 - NATO, 194, 206, 260
 - Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments (1921-1922), 272
 - world peace, 384
- science and technology, 157, 304
- space policies and programs, 170
- Vietnam War. *See* Vietnam War--U.S. policy
- view of Soviet strategic threat, 293
- world role, 12

See also East-West relations; Sino-American relations; United States (Government)

UNITED STATES (GOVERNMENT)

- Air Force, 234
 - communications systems, 397
 - hardpoint defense system, 266
 - impact of defense cutbacks, 248
- Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 401
- Army, 397, 427
- Atomic Energy Commission, 172, 427
- Congress
 - appropriations power, 109
 - defense spending, 314
 - foreign aid powers, 107
- House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on Science, Research and Development, 304
 - role in foreign policy, 43, 98, 101, 191
 - role in national security policy, 204
- Senate, 288
 - war powers, 231, 271
- Dept. of Defense
 - Congressional criticism, 226
 - defense budget and expenditures, 308
 - organization and management, 267
 - research and development, 161
 - role in civilian research and development, 312

UNITED STATES (GOVERNMENT)--Continued

Dept. of Defense--Continued

- Secretary, 247
- Dept. of State, 401
- Joint Chiefs of Staff, 237
- National Science Foundation, 178
- Navy, 236, 383
 - antisubmarine warfare, 155
 - communications systems, 397
 - comparison with Soviet Navy, 222
 - Indian Ocean area, 195
 - strategic role, 180
 - submarine program, 168
 - undersea long-range missile system, 166
- President
 - foreign aid powers, 107
 - role in foreign policy, 101, 109
 - war powers, 143, 231, 271

V

VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, 328-329

VIETNAM, SOUTH, U.S. troop withdrawal, 398

VIETNAM WAR

- air-mobile forces, 167
- Australian role, 229
- bibliography, 136
- chemical and biological weapons, 426, 429
- Communist strategy, 152
- defoliation program, 309
- effects
 - ecological, 311
 - on U.S. defense policy, 209
 - on U.S. maritime strategy, 230
 - on U.S. society, 317
 - on world peace, 132
- legal aspects, 323
- moral and ethical aspects, 353
- origins, 116
- settlement
 - aftermath, 90
 - application of Clausewitzian theory, 149
 - comparison with Korean settlement, 334
 - economic effects, 312
 - U.S. policy, 49, 241, 398
 - constitutionality, 231, 271
 - criticism, 22, 51, 129, 132, 256, 400
 - Torbin Gulf crisis, 404
 - U.S. troop withdrawal, 86

VIOLENCE

- causes, 13, 27, 119, 147
- low-level, 378
- organizational aspects, 284
- role in achieving peace, 289
- terrorism, 36

W

WAR

- blitzkrieg, 151
- causes, 13, 17, 19, 25, 147, 356, 353, 359
- changing nature of, 356
- history, 145
- just war, 353
- legal aspects, 331-332
- moral and ethical aspects, 153, 303, 315, 353
- quantitative analysis, 151
- strategy. *See* Strategy
- study of, 150, 360
- survey, 378
- termination, 144, 249, 364

120 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

WAR--Continued

victory, 356
 Vietnam. See Vietnam War
 WAR CRIMES. See International law--war
 crimes; War--moral and ethical aspects
 WARSAW PACT. See Warsaw Treaty Organization
 WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION
 and European security, 223
 and NATO, 194
 European security conference (proposed), 141
 history, 123
 problems and prospects, 452
 role of East Germany, 72
 WASHINGTON CONFERENCE ON THE LIMITATION OF
 ARMAMENTS (1921-1922), 372
 WEAPONS. See Arms and armaments; also spec-
 ific types of weapons; e.g., Missiles; Nu-
 clear weapons
 WEAPONS COUNTRIES
 maritime policy, 222
 relations with South Africa, 307
 WESTERN EUROPE
 unification, 396

WESTERN EUROPE--Continued

See also specific countries
 WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
 supervision of West German CEW ban, 432
 WORLD GOVERNMENT, 7
 WORLD LAW. See International law
 WORLD ORDER
 approaches, 350
 Asia, 384
 changing nature of, 365
 role of international law, 325, 335
 U.N. contribution, 347
 U.S. role, 12
 WORLD PEACE THROUGH LAW CENTER, 335
 WORLD POLITICS. See International relations
 WORLD WAR I, 50, 293
 WORLD WAR II, 76

Y

YUGOSLAVIA, 459