The purpose of this paper is to explore possibilities which one social science, cultural anthropology, might offer for enhancing the professional competence of an instructional consultant (IC). The IC is perceived as a facilitator of change in schools for purposes of improved instruction. Application of anthropology to education takes two general forms. The first is the use of anthropological concepts and methods to an analysis of the educative process called the anthropology of education. This paper develops: 1) a brief rationale for relating cultural anthropology to the work of the IC by looking at some of the procedures employed in the anthropology of education; 2) presents some analytical perspectives for examining the role of the IC; and, 3) spells out some of the operational implications for the preparation of IC's. It is noted that the perspectives suggested for analysis and training are not meant to be limited to a supervisory function, they are intended to be tested for their utility in helping educators understand and develop human activities and interaction including relationships among students, students and teachers, teachers, teachers and administrators, and parents. (SHE)
ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES
ON THE ROLE OF
THE INSTRUCTIONAL CONSULTANT
by
Frank Giannotta
NDEA Fellow

INTERNATIONAL AND DEVELOPMENT
EDUCATION PROGRAM

SCHOOL OF EDUCATION
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH
ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE ROLE OF THE INSTRUCTIONAL CONSULTANT

by

Frank Giannotta
NDEA Fellow

Occasional Paper

International and Development Education Program
School of Education
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213

December 1970
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A RATIONALE FOR POSSIBILITIES</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CULTURE AND CHANGE</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDENTITY RELATIONS AND ROLES</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTIVITY SYSTEMS, DECISION MODELS, BEHAVIORAL EXCHANGE</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOME IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture in Interaction</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identities and Roles</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Games and Maximization</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity Systems and Observation</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant Observation</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX I: Features of Activities</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX II: Project Checklist</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PREFACE

The Pitt International and Development Education Program (IDEP) stresses application of the social sciences to the problems of development education. It thus seeks to encourage students to respond to both academic (social science) and professional (education) disciplines in programs of advanced study and research. This paper demonstrates such an integration of anthropology and education. Unlike other recent applications of anthropology in teacher education, school administration, and educational research, it suggests some approaches to the development of a new professional role in American schools, that of the instructional consultant. It involves both a conceptual framework in the anthropology of education and a concern for the teaching of anthropology relevant to specific needs of the educational enterprise.

Mr. Giannotta is an IDEP Ph. D. candidate specializing in educational anthropology. This paper is the result of his observation and participation in a training program for instructional consultants at the University of Pittsburgh and was presented to the IDEP faculty as a professional project for the doctoral comprehensive examinations. Professors Douglas White (Anthropology), David Champagne (Curriculum and Supervision), and Thomas Hart (IDEP) served on the examination committee with me and contributed to the preparation of the paper for publication.

It is especially appropriate that Mr. Giannotta has chosen to focus on a problem of development education in the domestic U. S. context after his cross-cultural experience as a Peace Corps teacher in Turkey. He has now returned to Turkey for research on education there.

John Singleton
Chairman, IDEP
INTRODUCTION

In recent years observers have discussed a variety of considerations in planning and effecting needed changes in education. One of these has been the need for building into educational systems an infrastructure for change. Albers (1967; v. 3; 198) has observed:

Unfortunately, most school systems are not disposed or geared to counteract the various resistances to change. We spend so much time and effort keeping the system operating that we pay too little attention to how to improve it. Ordinarily, no one is assigned or has accepted the responsibility of planning for change, except on an extra-duty basis.

He suggests that school districts of sufficient size establish one or more staff positions to plan, promote, and implement desirable change, particularly on the local level. Such a position would have the task of not only building favorable attitudes toward change but also keeping school personnel informed of potentially useful innovations.

One might argue that this function has long been performed in the area of teacher supervision. However, such has not always been the case. Supervisors have frequently been in short supply, hard pressed to "keep up" themselves, and often perceived (at times justifiably) as little more than administrative raters. In some cases the supervisory function has fallen on the principal, who, by the nature of his position, has simply been unable to provide assistance. Moreover, the supervisory process has often been unidirectional rather than collaborative, with the locus of evaluation stemming from everyone else but the teacher himself.

Increasingly, however, there has been a conscious movement underway with an explicitly stated goal of promoting needed changes through the development of a "helping relationship" between trained change agents and teachers. Rogers (1961: 40) has characterized such a relationship as

...one in which one of the participants intends that there should come about, in one or both parties, more appreciation of, more expression of, more functional use of the latent inner resources of the individual.

Building from such a goal it is perhaps not surprising that the movement has been termed "clinical supervision" (Goldhammer, 1969) and the individual charged with the task of fostering a helping relationship referred to as an "instructional consultant." (Champagne, 1967; Wilson, 1968) Broadly stated, the instructional consultant...
(hereafter designated by I.C.) may be perceived as a facilitator of change in schools for purposes of improved instruction. Specifically, an I.C. is expected to

... support and encourage teachers to improve their classroom performance by identification of personal and professional roles, by trying new curricular patterns with pupils, by making effective use of various means of receiving feedback on their interactions with pupils, and by working with fellow teachers and administrators in an examination of how recent innovation within and outside the district can be transformed into relevant classroom practices for specific pupils. (Champagne, 1967: 34)

To perform such a task it will be necessary for an I.C. to see himself and for others to see him as a facilitator of change with status as such in the power structure of the system within which he works. It will also be necessary for him to integrate a critical examination of his own practices into the performance of his role. One of the competencies he might be expected to develop to help him do this is the ability to draw on theory and practice of the various social sciences to "provide support for his individual practice and rationale for his actions as consultant." (Champagne, 1967: 41)

As the I.C. role has evolved in Pittsburgh, and as it is designed, there is an opportunity to develop such a competency. Here, for example, an I.C. is assigned to a cooperating school in a supervisory capacity with a team of Teacher Corps Interns. At the same time he is working in a university setting which allows him to both analyze and improve upon his professional practice. His commitment to the school is a long-term one and he has an opportunity to develop a helping relationship not only with members of his team but with administrators, parents, students, and other teachers as well.

The purpose of this paper is to explore possibilities which one social science, cultural anthropology, might offer for enhancing the professional competence of an I.C. Spindler (1963: 41) has noted that the application of anthropology to education takes two general forms. The first is the use of anthropological concepts and data in courses of study and teacher-training institutions; and the second is the application of anthropological concepts and methods to an analysis of the educative process--an "anthropology of education." Our exploration will (1) develop a "vital rationale for relating cultural anthropology to the work of the I.C." by looking at some of the questions asked and procedures employed in the anthropology of education, (2) present some analytical perspectives, on the basis of direction in which such work has pointed, for examining the role of the I.C., and (3) spell out some of the operational implications these perspectives suggest in terms of ways in which they could be used in the preparation of I.C.'s.
This paper, therefore, asks how various aspects of anthropology as a discipline could profitably relate to the competency development of an I.C. --not how anthropologists might perform such a role or how I.C.s might become anthropologists. Rather, what is maintained is that in providing a "rationale for his actions as consultant," an I.C. is inevitably involved in such activities as problem diagnosis and process analysis. And, as is the case with many other professionals, he will often find himself borrowing methods and analytical frameworks from various social sciences in order to generate and examine data on which to partly base decisions with ramifications in social action.

A RATIONALE FOR POSSIBILITIES

Bearing this distinction in mind, perhaps the most striking parallel between cultural anthropology and clinical supervision may be seen on the procedural level. Goldhammer (1969; 54) has described clinical supervision in an I.C.-teacher relationship as follows:

"By "clinical," I mean to convey an image of face-to-face relationships between supervisors and teachers. . . . "Clinical" supervision is meant to imply supervision up close. . . . The term should also denote supervision of actual professional practice, of actual practical behavior. What the teacher does is central in clinical supervision, of which one hallmark is that the supervisor is an observer in the classroom and that the observational data he collects represent the principal foci for subsequent analysis. A condition of intimacy is implied by this description. . . . An image of idiographic analysis of behavior data and a tendency to develop categories of analysis after teaching has been observed, rather than beforehand, completes the picture.

One sees here the importance attached to observational data. Because of this importance, Goldhammer goes on to mention that, when observing, the I.C. will generally write down what he sees and hears as accurately as possible (preferably verbatim) "everything everybody says, if that's possible, and as objective an account of non-verbal behavior as he can manage." One also notes that "a condition of intimacy" is considered essential. One of the mechanisms used to establish such a condition is the "preobservation conference." Among the purposes which such a conference serves are the (re)establishing of communication, the reduction of anticipatory anxieties, and obtaining as maximum an understanding as possible of the teacher's frame of reference, "his reasons, his premises, his doubts, his explicit professional motives, and the specific payoffs he envisions." Finally, there is the emphasis on post-observation analysis built upon data on the basis of which an interpretation is derived, not imposed. (1969; 59-61)
In terms of certain procedures, then, clinical supervision would seem to parallel a method commonly employed in anthropological field work, namely that of participant observation. The participant observer usually has, for example, as one of his goals, the accurate interpretation of meanings which inhere in the culture and social context of the people he studies. To do this he must not only observe as accurately and as much as he can; he must also be flexible and capable enough to revise his activities and mode of analysis as new insights emerge from the data. Bruyn's recent work on the methodology of participant observation has also touched on some points of similarity (1969: 18-22). He notes, for instance, that the participant observer shares in the life activities and sentiments of the people he studies in face-to-face relationships, trying to view their goals and interests in the same way that they view them. Such a role requires both detachment and personal involvement in that the observer's "scientific role is interdependent with his social role in the culture of the observed." As much as possible, he attempts to become a part of the system of symbols and social interactions operating around him. Bruyn also points out that such an attempt is not unique to the method of participant observation, but in many ways part of human communication itself.

Bruyn also points out that such an attempt is not unique to the method of participant observation, but in many ways part of human communication itself. The participant observer has generally been conceived of as an outsider who seeks to take part in a culture unlike his own. It is now apparent that at another level certain elements that comprise the participant-observer method are fundamental to the social act... and... to some degree part of all research and human activity. (1969: 21-22)

These are some parallels which may be seen on the procedural level. We will return to them later on, particularly in terms of contributions which specific techniques of participant observation and modes of data validation might offer the I.C.

Let us now look at some of the basic interests and work done by anthropologists engaged in research on education. What kinds of problems and questions have they dealt with? What are some of the approaches they have used to study these problems? Are these the kinds of problems that an I.C. might be confronted with?

In some ways the range of concerns exhibited by cultural anthropologists interested in education has been broad and is still growing. It has included, for example, contexts of both formal and non-formal education (often under such headings as "socialization" and "acculturation"); the process of education in cross-cultural settings; cultural influences on roles, and role conflicts of, students, teachers, and administrators; rites and ceremony in school systems; the school as a social system and its relationship to other social systems; anthropology and curriculum development; and more recently language and cognitive style, particularly as they relate to minority-group education. (cf., Spilsbury, 1963; Singleton, 1967; Wax, 1964; Burnett, 1969; Cohen, 1969) The list is far from complete.
Yet in other ways the range has been a narrow one. The process of cultural transmission, particularly values, has received heavy emphasis. The identification of both implicit and explicit value conflicts has also received much attention. Such studies have been important, fruitful, and, without a doubt, do relate to the questions and problems an I.C. must deal with. Let two examples suffice.

One problem Goldhammer makes much of, and justifiably so, is that of students being confronted with teachers who often appear "irrational" to them in terms of cultural values they profess and values they actually transmit. For instance, a teacher's stated goal of effecting maximum pupil participation in the planning of curriculum often will not match his behaviors in attempting to actualize that goal. Conflicts arising from such a situation seem "rational" to neither teacher nor pupil. Spindler (1963: 146) addressed himself to this type of problem by trying to relate conflicts found in an educational system to value differences among teachers, students, parents, and administrators. These differences were, in turn, related to transformations occurring in the larger socio-cultural environment. On the basis of his study, Spindler placed each of the above groups on a "traditional-emergent" value continuum and made certain hypotheses. While not denying the function that each of the value systems serves, he pointed out that both personal and group conflicts can often partly be understood in terms of conflicts of tendency towards either end of the value continuum. Teachers from "traditional" homes, for example, are frequently confronted with "emergent" values in the teacher-training institutions they enter. Spindler further hypothesized certain kinds of adjustments a teacher might make in such a situation. These were (1) ambivalent—"characterized by contradictory and vacillating behavior, particularly with respect to the exercise of discipline and authority," (2) compensatory—characterized by overcompensation consistently in the direction of either emergent or tradition-centered values, and (3) adapted—characterized by a choice to work within the framework of one or the other value set, or a workable synthesis of both. What Spindler basically argues for is an attempt to understand conflicts either between groups or individual educational personnel "in the perspective of the transformation of American culture that proceeds without regard for personal fortune or institutional survival."

A problem which has also attracted the attention of anthropologists is one similar to the above and which Goldhammer has termed "Incidental learning." By this he refers to a classroom phenomenon in which

In addition to the learning outcomes sought deliberately by the teacher, the pupils, individually and collectively, learn a great spectrum of things that the teacher did not intend them to learn, generally without the teacher's awareness that they have been learned, and as a direct result of the teacher's behavior. (1963: 12)

Some anthropologists have looked at this situation using a framework focusing on unintended consequences of socialization. In research on attitude organization in elementary-school classrooms, Henry (1963) found that "docility" on the part of
students resulted from their "absolute dependence for survival" on a teacher who was trying to foster just the opposite (i.e., more independence). Both Lee and Spindler in their respective studies of vocational-counseling practices and discrepancies in the teaching of American culture (Spindler, 1963) found similar unintended consequences.

Undoubtedly studies such as these have proven highly useful in helping educators increase their awareness of cultural influences on their professional behavior, break down ethnocentrism and better comprehend specific problems they encounter. One might cite the work of Landes (1965) who effectively paired cultural anthropology and education to help teachers deal with difficulties they were encountering with pupils, parents, and communities of heterogeneous social and ethnic backgrounds. Teachers were given training in methods of observation as well as exposure to such topics as "comparative study of the family in different cultures; schooling and health care, and other institutionalized activities in diverse cultural settings; teaching and learning in different cultures; relationships among race, culture, and language." (1965: 287)

However, anthropologists have been quick to note that much remains to be done. For although they agree that anthropology is a discipline uniquely equipped to contribute knowledge about the crucial functions which education performs, unfortunately, as Spindler (1963: 59) has noted, "most often anthropologists will describe the results of education but not the process." He calls for more joining of culture theory and work in areas such as social interaction and organization. Kmeler (1965: 61) makes a similar observation, citing the heavy research emphasis to date on culturally acceptable behavior "as the result of the internalization of cultural norms in childhood and adolescence" as opposed to equally needed work on how individuals interpret the cultural norms they do internalize.

Thus we might ask whether there are some analytical perspectives available in the literature of cultural anthropology which deal with concerns in the direction to which previous work has pointed. And equally important for our purposes, if so, could such perspectives be sufficiently operationalized to apply to the analysis of problems an I.C. might encounter?

Briefly described below are three inter-related perspectives concerned with (1) culture, (2) role relationships, and (3) social interaction and decision-making. The perspectives are drawn mainly from cultural anthropology but also reflect similar work done in other fields. They have been selected to try to generate some tentative modes of answer, the following kinds of questions an I.C. might ask himself. Is there a way of conceptualizing and analyzing "culture" and ways in which it operates which could help me in examining my efforts as a change agent? What are some considerations I might use to help me identify my role and those of others in situations of planned change? Are there ways of looking at my own and others' social interaction that possibly could assist me in formulating strategies of change?
Each of the perspectives will be presented with some general implications they suggest for analyzing the activities of an I.C. The final portion of this paper will attempt to spell those implications out in more detail.

CULTURE AND CHANGE

The perspective on culture and change selected for consideration here is one developed by an anthropologist who spent a good deal of his time involved with change himself, often in the context of cross-cultural technical assistance. Goodenough defines "culture" as the shared products of human learning and conceives of it as follows:

1. The ways in which people have organized their experience of the real world so as to give it structure as a phenomenal world of forms, that is, their percepts and concepts.

2. The ways in which people have organized their experience of their phenomenal world so as to give it structure as a system of cause and effect relationships, that is, the propositions and beliefs by which they explain events and design tactics for accomplishing their purposes.

3. The ways in which people have organized their experience of their phenomenal world so as to structure its various arrangements in hierarchies of preferences; that is, their value and sentiment systems. These provide the principles for selecting and establishing purposes and for keeping oneself positively oriented in a changing phenomenal world.

4. The ways in which people have organized their experience of their past efforts to accomplish recurring purposes in the future.... They included procedures for dealing with people as well as for dealing with material things. (1963:259)

According to such a definition, no two persons will have exactly the same culture, that is, ways of organizing experience and standards for perceiving, predicting, judging, and acting. Goodenough accordingly delineates not one but three kinds of culture. First, a person's private culture would consist of his conception of cultures "which he attributes to others individually or collectively, both within and without his community.....and is likely to include more than one set of beliefs, more than one hierarchy of choices, and more than one set of principles for getting things done." Next, a person's operating culture would be the particular culture he selects as a...
guide for behavior in a specific context (e.g., when with his boss or drinking friends). Finally, a public culture is one that the members of a community share and belongs to all of them as a group. It results from a high degree of consensus regarding the cultures individually attributed to one another and the content of the operating cultures used as guides for mutual interaction. (1963:260-61)

Three factors which Goodenough isolates as affecting which culture among those available to him a person selects as his operating culture are changes in a person's phenomenal world and the contexts in which he finds himself, changes in his purposes, and changes in the identifications he makes. In addition, changes in one's private culture will represent basically an addition or reorganization, not a replacement, which characterizes change in one's operating culture. In looking at change, Goodenough also sees as crucial considerations cultural artifacts (i.e., the things people make, do, and say, or what we see of a culture) and customs (i.e., the pre-fabricated procedural routines by which people deal with recurring situations or problems).

On the basis of these observations, some of the questions a change agent such as an I.C. could ask himself might be: Which kind of culture is the change I am trying to introduce aimed at? If I am trying to bring about change in my client's operating culture and assess whether such a change is occurring, how do I perceive my clients and how do they perceive me?

Insofar as a person tries to conduct himself according to the standards he attributes to others, others are likely to attribute to him a private culture that is in reality a reflection of his generalized culture for them. And it is their generalized cultures for others that people usually use as their operating culture when their behavior is subject to other's scrutiny. (Goodenough, 1963:263)

Under what kinds of conditions would my client perhaps develop a need to expand his private culture? Are changes I have helped foster in material, behavioral, and social artifacts likely to persist when I am gone? If a change is aimed at a custom, would it involve the use of new skills, material, and social organization? Could such a change possibly be accomplished through the use or reorganization of existing customs as levers? Has a custom I would like to see changed become highly sanctified, and if so, how much risk might be perceived by clients in an attempt to alter it? What are strategies I might use to reduce such a risk? What is the nature of my own private, operating, and public culture and what types of subcultures can be discerned in the community in which I work? Such questions are broad yet important. One consideration they lead to is that of the agent's definition of his own identity and role in the target community, to which we now turn.
IDENTITY RELATIONS AND ROLES

The concept of social "role" like "culture" has received extensive attention by social scientists and continues to. Often, however, such a concept has been difficult to clarify when looked at closely. Here we will present the concept in one way it has traditionally been formulated, some of the problems such a formulation has involved, and finally ways in which anthropologists have dealt with these problems when trying to use the concept to study complex social organizations.

The conceptual framework sometimes called "role theory" has involved a number of concepts. Important for our purposes are some which Goffman (1961; 35) has summarized as follows. First, status or a position in some system or pattern of positions and related to other positions through reciprocal ties of rights and duties binding on the incumbents. Second, role or the activity the incumbent would engage in if he were to act solely in terms of the normative demands of someone in his position. Third, role performance (or enactment) or the actual conduct of a particular individual while on duty in his position. Fourth, role-others or those role audiences with which an incumbent interacts through a cycle of face-to-face social interactions. Fifth, these various kinds of roles for an individual in role, when taken together, may be termed a role-set (e.g., an I.C.'s role-set might consist of I.C.-students-teachers-administrators-parents-colleagues). Sixth, role-sectors (or subroles), each having to do with a particular kind of role-other, and forming part of the overall role associated with a position (e.g., I.C.-teacher). Seventh, self-image or a combination of the impressions of an incumbent conveyed in a performance situation and the role-appropriate personal qualities imputed to him by his role-others. Eighth, commitment, whereby because of the fixed and interdependent character of many institutional arrangements, an individual's performance of his role irrevocably conditions other important possibilities in his life, forcing him to take courses of action, causing other persons to build upon their activity on the basis of his continuing in his current undertakings, and rendering him vulnerable to unanticipated consequences of these undertakings. Finally, role-conflict which occurs when normally segregated-roles and role-sets overlap in a situation causing embarrassment or vacillation in performance.

Goffman observes that while such concepts as those sampled here have usually been useful in analyzing some category of person and the differentiation and integration of roles, they are often found to need broadening, particularly when the individual is taken as the central unit of analysis, but at the same time, placed in contexts wider than those of highly bounded formal organizations. Thus he suggests that a more atomistic frame of reference be used—a fact often used in actual studies. When we study role, we study the situation of someone of a particular analytical category, and we usually limit our
Interest to the situation of this kind of person in a place and time...

But any identification of these contexts as social systems is surely hazardous, requiring for justification an extensive preliminary study seldom undertaken. (Goffman, 1951: 95)

Again, Goodenough (1965) has offered some interesting suggestions here. He notes, for instance, that very often units of analysis such as "status" or "position" have lumped together such independent concepts as "rights and duties" and what he would call "social identity." Thus he distinguishes status (a combination of rights and duties) from position by defining the latter in terms of social identity, i.e., "an aspect of self that makes a difference in how one's rights and duties distribute to specific others." Status would involve then (1) such concepts as rights, duties, privileges, powers, liabilities, and immunities and (2) the ordered ways in which these are distributed in identity relationships. Hence every individual will have a number of different social identities and his rights and duties will vary according to the identity he may appropriately assume in a given interaction. However, equally central is the fact that one's duties owed and rights due will depend on both one's own and another's identity taken together.

Failure to take account of the identity of alters and to speak in general terms of the status of a chief or employer has been responsible for much of the apparent lack of utility of status-role concepts. (Goodenough, 1965: 4)

What are some of the factors that come into play in identity selection in a given interaction? Excepting the fact that some identities are ascribed (e.g., brother-sister), of importance are (1) an individual's or group's qualifications for selecting an identity, (2) the occasion for and culturally recognized types of an activity, (3) the setting of an activity, and (4) one's identity-relationship, i.e., that identity, chosen from a limited number of "matching" identities, with which we respond to the identity communicated and assumed by another party. Since parties do not ordinarily deal with one another in terms of only one identity-relationship at a time, Goodenough calls the composite of identities selected as appropriate for a given interaction the selector's social persona in the interaction.

For each culturally possible identity-relationship, then, there is a specific and mutually defining allocation of rights and duties. Also, when observing the distribution of rights and duties in a society, one must observe every relationship twice, that is how rights and duties are distributed from the point of view of each participating identity independently. Since the number of rights and duties in any interaction will be a composite of several status dimensions at once (e.g., deference, sex), one may be described as having a composite status. It is the aggregate of a given identity's composite statuses that constitutes his role.
Looking at roles in this manner it will be seen that some identities will net more privileges (i.e., fewer duties) and/or more rights in all their identity relationships taken together than others.

That is, the roles of some identities will have greater possibilities for gratification than the roles of others; some roles will allow more freedom of choice in action generally than others; and some will be more and some less cramping to particular personal styles of operation. (Goodenough, 1965: 16)

How is such a framework, presented here in skeletal form, relevant to ways an I.C. might want to examine his own role? One thing he might want to look at is the kind of social identity he would like to establish, the specific individual or group with whom he will be (or has been) interacting, and the type of identity-relationship that could be envisaged. Next, relative to what he hopes to accomplish through the interaction, he might look at not only the qualifications he will need to establish such an identity but also those his client perceives as needed. He might also ask himself the kinds of settings, occasions, and cases that would be most effective and mutually gratifying relative to the role he will have to both communicate and perform. He might, in addition, want to try to assess the possibilities and (in some cases) danger of over-commitment to such a role, becoming “locked in” particularly when perceptions of needs will change as the relationship develops. He might, for example, have to change his personal style of operation as his social identity changes. Does he have the resources to do this? Does his client? Finally, will a change from old to new identity relationship be recognized and accepted as such by both incumbents and “relevant others?”

It is clear that all of these questions revolve around the I.C. and the particular situation in which he finds himself. Recognizing the importance of the specific context, Goffman (1961) has voiced a need for looking at roles in what he calls a “situated activity system” to which we may now turn our attention.

ACTIVITY SYSTEMS, DECISION MODELS, AND BEHAVIORAL EXCHANGE

Below we will briefly describe what is meant by an “activity system,” look at one of the ways used to examine such a system, and summarize the relationship of what we describe to the perspectives we have just presented, namely culture and role. We will then pass on to some of the specific implications all these perspectives suggest for the competency development of an I.C.

The need for a more situational orientation has not been seen as restricted to role theory alone. Howard (1963: 401), for one, has observed implications for ethnographers as well.
Ethnoeraphic description should provide sufficient data to permit
the combination of decision-making models in which culturally
perceived alternatives are designated, the principles (or factors)
which are determinate for choosing between alternatives
described, and the relationship between the factors specified...
a model based on individual choice.

He remarks that in using such an approach, one would ask not "What are the
principles of social structure?" but rather "What are the principles that structure
behavior under given circumstances?" What the answers to the latter question
would describe is basically an activity system, "the relevant units being the
principles... that are predictive of choice." One notices here that the concern is
not necessarily with the structure of a social system, but rather with social
behavior. And since such an approach is dealing with social behavior, i.e.,
behavior that has significance for others, we might ask how one is to decide what
is significant behavior for a specific group. Howard sees

... simply no alternative to intensive analysis of the cognitive world
of our subjects. We must learn how they categorize behavior, how they
distinguish one type of behavior from another. It may be that a whole
range of behavioral acts which to the observer appear quite distinct, are
to our subjects only insignificant variations within a distinct category.
(1963; 433-34)

Again, using such an approach, one would explore behavior in a variety of
activity systems in order to understand behavior in any one such system. An
exploration of behavior within an activity would also include such factors as some
account of the origins of the stimuli to the activity, the cognitive distinctions
employed, and why certain decision-making principles are favored over alternatives.

Along similar lines Keesing (1967; 2) has also urged the use of a "decision-
model" in ethnographic description, that is, "an ethnographic description that is
actor-oriented and based on categories of the culture under study" with the advantage
that each new observation could constitute "a test, not merely a statistic." In this
sense, the model would basically constitute an attempt
to achieve a description that allows us to replicate, as much as
possible, the expectations of our subjects.... Let's minimal properties
are that it (1) defines the situation or context in a culturally meaningful
way, (2) defines the range of culturally acceptable alternative courses
of action in that situation and provides either (3) a set of rules for
making appropriate decisions under culturally possible combinations
of circumstances...or (4) a set of strategies for deciding among
alternatives, i.e., a value maximization model.
In terms of this model, Burling, following Robbin's earlier work, has defined economic anthropology as

the science which studies human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses. When time and the means for achieving ends are limited, and capable of alternative application, and the ends are capable of being distinguished in order of importance, then behavior necessarily assumes the form of choice.

... If we focus on the individual who is caught in the web of his society, and who is trying to maximize his satisfactions, we are led to an investigation of his actual behavior in situations of choice. (1962; 818)

Such situations need not deal with material objects. "Satisfactions" might include non-materials as power, prestige, independence, etc., viewed in the context of culturally available opportunities for maximization. Burling points out too that "since one makes choices partly with an eye to the expected choices of others, it is not unreasonable to view this pursuit of satisfaction as a... continuing game of strategy." (1962; 818)

One area which has tried to look a bit closer at what is involved in decision-models is game theory. Richard Brody has defined game theory (contrasting it with games) as follows:

The Theory of Games ("Game Theory") provides a means of describing the strategic behavior of one or more actors who have to make choices in conflict situations (games) in which payoffs (potential outcomes) are a function of the choices made by all parties to the conflict. The Game Theory Model is normative, in that it prescribes the choice or combination of choices which lead to the best payoff under the circumstances of a given conflict situation. The theory, moreover, postulates a "rational" actor who will always follow this best strategy. (as quoted in Reser, 1969, ix)

Some notions of game theory as it relates to the behavioral sciences and which might be helpful to us have been summarized by Buchler and Nutini (1959). They note that game theory makes a distinction between ground rules (rules that structure the game) and strategy rules (individual options of the actor playing the game). In the social sciences ground rules have been concerned with mechanical (deterministic models) or ideal norms of what people should do, while strategy rules have been concerned with statistical models of what people actually do. The theory of games is concerned basically with games of strategy "in which the outcome depends on the interlinked decision processes of players, and, in this sense, may be usefully contrasted with games of chance, in which the outcome is determined solely by random events." (1959; 7) In addition, Buchler and Nutini see the relationship of decision theory to anthropology as a complementary one:
Decision theory is not concerned with the factual (cultural) knowledge that a player has about a given situation, or with formulating a theory to explain how such knowledge is obtained. It is here that the theory of statistical decisions, game theory, and related approaches on the one hand, and cultural anthropology on the other, which seem in certain respects to be so far apart, complement one another. In the distinction between the anthropologist's interest in ground rules, which structure the cultural framework within which decision making occurs, and the game theorist's interest in strategy rules, or rules for playing games intelligently, which guide choices among options which the cultural framework allows. (1969:8)

Finally, there also is the distinction made between zero-sum games (in which either player's gain must entail an equal amount of loss for the "opponent") and non-zero games. In the case of the zero-sum games, in which only one optimum strategy is possible, strategic choices may be unambiguously "rational." On the other hand, in the case of non-zero sum games which sometimes present a hierarchy of decision problems or the possibility of bargaining and coalitions, the concept of a single rationality is questionable, as optima resolve into different "levels" of rational strategy, or into unresolvable paradox (e.g., Arrow's Theorem).

In terms of our interest in social interactions in which a change agent is involved, it might be interesting to ask how preferences of different individuals or groups are amalgamated into a social or group choice, particularly when preference patterns are contradictory. Lieberman (1959) has pointed out that in such situations people resolve their problems by solutions which often may or may not maximize some "rational" optimum; yet Lieberman also insists that while the notion of maximization may not be wholly realistic or descriptive of all behavior, it is certainly characteristic of much human behavior, and worth taking into account.

In examining group decision making in a non-zero-sum game context, he isolates six factors influencing outcomes (as distinguished from various techniques arriving at decisions such as majority vote, veto power, etc.). These are:

1. **The distribution of power.** Here one would look at not only power as it is formally distributed but, equally crucial, participants' own beliefs about and own perceptions of their own power to influence a decision in a particular situation.

2. **The joint-welfare function.** Here a group would communicate the utilities of various alternatives to each other either intuitively or explicitly, and eventually arrive at a decision whereby some joint-welfare total is maximized.
3. **Bargaining and coalition formation.** In a situation where the power distribution does not permit a single individual to determine the outcome, social choices can be effected only if coalitions are formed.

4. **Individual differences and characteristics of the participants.** Here Lieberman points out that, though individual characteristics (e.g., personality, aggressiveness) do affect outcomes, it is difficult to specify exactly what factors or characteristics are involved in bargaining behavior.

5. **Group processes.** Here again, he notes that the literature in the field of small groups has been inconclusive except for the fact that weaker parties may tend to unite against those perceived as stronger.

6. **Past and future commitments.** This area he terms "virtually unstudied," and would consist of processes involving the effect of past commitments and decisions, and anticipations of the effect of future social-choice situations and commitments on a present problem.

In reviewing work done by social psychologists in the area of behavioral change, Gergen (1969) makes some observations of interest here. He notes, for instance, that the value of a given payoff will often vary within a situation and may be partly dependent on both cultural and subcultural norms which one has learned. In interpersonal bargaining one's perception of the characteristics of alter, and the situation in which one finds himself will have implications for bargaining behavior. On the other hand, some social norms may tend to become sanctified and ritualized and as they do, inequity as an "objective" level can come to be viewed as equitable. Also, there is not necessarily a one-to-one relationship between satisfaction and dissatisfaction at the social and psychological levels. Thus behavior that may appear quite irrational on one level may be quite satisfying on another.

Social scientists who have worked with game theory note, however, some weaknesses it has presented as a methodology. Among these is the fact that many of the designs have been laboratory ones, taking very narrow slices of time, with very specific stimuli, and permitting subjects only limited awareness of each other. Pruitt (1969:126-127) has observed:

For generating new insights, informal interviewing and participant observation have great merit. Unfortunately, our discipline (social psychology) has largely lost sight of these methods. . . . Observation of one's surroundings (e.g., bargaining within one's own family) should be cultivated. . . . Practical problem-solving in the role of a consultant can provide a setting for informal observation of inter-personal relations.
And while Pruitt would not designate the laboratory devoid of potential for deriving new insights, he does say that "certain kinds of phenomena, e.g., those involving larger time slices and complex mental sets, are almost necessarily excluded from most laboratory research and may have to be studied outside the laboratory."

In summary, we have looked at culture from an essentially cognitive perspective and roles in terms of identity selection and relationships. We have tried to specify how behavioral interaction may be viewed in the context of activity systems and decision-making models and briefly presented some features of one approach that has been used to do this, namely that of game theory and maximization.

**Some Implications and Suggestions**

In trying to translate the above perspectives into operational terms, for the competency development of an I.C., we will be looking at three areas: (1) possible learning experiences using these perspectives in behavioral interaction, (2) ways in which an I.C. might want to structure observations he makes on his job, and (3) some techniques of validating those observations. As the I.C. role has developed in Pittsburgh, all of these areas overlap, since both one's professional practice and reflection upon that practice are integrated into the design of the consultancy. This is an advantage that I hope would be provided for in the development of similar roles in the future. The suggestions below are focused on the I.C. and improving his ability to analyze social interaction in which he engages. They are neither definitive nor complete. They are essentially intended to be tested for their practical applicability as a means of generating relevant data. Where possible, I have tried to cite examples where their use has seemed promising.

**Culture in Interaction**

One of the problems in trying to use the notion of culture in training sequences is that of translating an abstract concept into concrete illustrative experiences. Lectures often prove ineffective. One way of solving such a dilemma has been provided through such techniques as simulation, role-playing, T groups, audio-visual media, and discussions, which have the advantage of often increasing student interest, participation, and the "reality" of a training curriculum.

In a training program which attempted to illustrate aspects of culture implying on interpersonal communication, interesting work was done by Stewart (n.d.) using techniques of simulation and role-playing. Basically, what he started with was a definition of culture as cognition, similar to the one described above, and then broke the notion down into various components consisting of (1) form cognitions, (2) assumptions, and (3) values. The first consisted of such basic aspects of cognitive processes as temporal orientation, relational concepts and the like. The second and third areas included such notions as self-perceptions, perceptions of the world, how
one relates to others, and modality of activity (e.g., Americans' emphasis on doing). Since his intention was to increase an individual's awareness of these components, he constructed what he called contrast cultures to each of the above. An actor then assumed such contrast cultures in a behavioral encounter with an American who was trying to assist him with some problem. For instance, the actor was trained to react to such American values as the "need for immediate action" with just the opposite orientation.

Bennett and McKnight (1966: 604) have described what might happen in a similar situation between an American and a Japanese individual. Using information on contrasting cultural norms and cue systems, they observe "it is possible to predict in a general way that when a Japanese interacts with an American, certain blockages to communication and to the correct assessment of status behavior may occur."

However, Stewart notes that in attempting to apply such analyses in simulations, a better knowledge of particular situations and individuals involved will make a good deal of difference in how one could specify what might tend to occur, as well as in enhancing the "realism" and transfer value of the experience. It would seem that an I.C.'s position in terms of field experiences as well as an opportunity for university-based analysis might be of help here. Simulations could be brought to a level of situational specificity unable to be achieved in programs without such an explicit link-up to daily professional activities and people.

One exercise that might be tried using Stewart's approach would be to specify public and operating subcultures within a school (e.g., among groups of teachers, students, etc.) and construct contrast public and operating cultures. Working from these in a simulation, some of the blockages that might emerge in solving a particular kind of problem could be explored as well as underlying orientations in an I.C.'s own cultures.

Identities and Roles

Relative to an I.C.'s task as a change agent, some of the literature on cross-cultural technical assistance is again suggestive. Juarez, (n.d.) for example, has conceptualized the technical advisor in Rogerian terms as a change-therapist. He sees assistance as a process of developing helping relationships with three phases: (1) the model phase--where the change therapist mainly demonstrates or introduces new ideas and practices, (2) the peer phase--in which his clients have reached a stage of competence almost or roughly equal to his own, and (3) a consultant stage--in which his clients have reached a degree of autonomy where they will need his services only on very specific occasions.

Juarez sees the change-therapist as being in the center of a circle surrounded by a network of inter-connected options. These include the "roles" of (1) analyst--who
must interpret a situation in the context of the community environment to arrive at an understanding of needs, judge priorities among them, and assess the availability of mutual resources for satisfying them. (2) Advisor--advising the community regarding alternatives potentially applicable to a given situation. (3) Advocate--recommending one or several alternatives to the community. (4) Systems linker. (5) Organizational innovator. (6) Technical innovator. (7) Educator, and (8) Leadership trainer. The options are not mutually exclusive, although Juarez suggests that taking the analyst role first will often enable the change agent to determine a sequence he might want to use in assuming the others.

One exercise which might offer a variety of possibilities for developing these roles is the following. First a situation could be given some specific parameters. One way of doing this might be to use the framework developed by Goodenough (See Appendix I) for looking at the overlapping structures of an activity, any part of which may be affected by a change introduced into some other part. Some specific activity might be selected for consideration (e.g., introducing a new program of studies or instructional technique). Next, in terms of the phases and roles described above, an I.C. might go about trying to plan a project or strategy. (See Appendix II for a project checklist suggested by Harrison.) After the preparation of such a strategy, the personnel involved in the activity would be role-played with new problems being introduced, but based on the parameters which were set.

In such an exercise, one could look at the kinds of identity relationships an I.C. would cultivate in a specific phase and with whom. What kinds of questions would he ask? What kinds of commitments would he try to establish? In what kinds of contexts would he try to establish them? What relationships would he envisage as being altered through the introduction of the proposed change?

One might also want to see how useful the above framework is in looking at specific roles that have been cultivated over an extended period of time in an I.C.'s "real" school. With whom has there been extensive interaction and what kinds of relationships have been defined? Looking at specific individuals, has the I.C. tended to become "frozen" or "locked into" a role? How aware is he of the perceptions others have of his role and how these might have been formed? How many options can he envisage in terms of developing new roles?

Games and Maximization

In terms of looking at protracted interpersonal interaction and particularly conflict-resolution in education, new might the game perspective we described above be used? Here we might mention two examples, which seem promising.
Ross (1968) found that game theory could be successfully applied to "real-life" conflict situations in collective negotiations between teachers and school-board members. In simulated collective negotiations involving teachers, administrators, and board members, results showed that actual board members and teachers playing their respective negotiator roles... arrived at solutions that did not differ significantly from the optimum solutions determined by... two-person cooperative games." Basically, Ross found game theory an effective tool in analyzing such collective-bargaining situations and argues that it may prove of great value when applied to similar bargaining situations in "real-world" negotiations.

Roccio (1969) has presented a very stimulating application of game theory to protracted intra-familial interactions, one of which involved the relationship between a student and a teacher. Basically, using participant observation, she analyzed a situation where, over time, strategies for maximizing satisfactions had become "locked in." In addition, when viewed on both the level of social and individual norms, one can have a situation where both players maximize joint payoffs by altering their perceptions of their own payoffs, "or, in my terms, that the sum of the perceived payoffs of the games played at all levels of consciousness in any protracted interaction situation will be positive for all the players involved." (1969; 13-14)

Thus one could have a situation where an activity introduced to supposedly maximize a client's payoffs on a "rational" level (e.g., new instructional procedures for teachers) is, because of his current strategy's efficiency in emotional and psychological terms, actually perceived by its clients as a negative payoff. Roccio sees an entrepreneur as one who is willing to risk (perhaps because of "sufficient ego-strength") using a possible non-dominant strategy (e.g., an innovation). She makes the interesting observation, however, that

Once a role labelled "entrepreneur" has been established within a society, and the strategies associated with the social norm for this role have become dominant strategies, then persons who adopt this role are not entrepreneurs in the sense given above. (1969; 22)

Roccio's work is interesting for several reasons. First, as she points out, the intent in using game theory to look at interaction was not to be able to say "in situation C, given A, B follows." Rather it was to state the relationship between A and B in terms of a theoretical construct, which, if it accounted for an observational configuration of facts, may enable us to see facets of the relationship that we did not see before, and see similar relationships in a new light. Secondly, in view of some of the problems involved in using game theory to look at protracted "real-life" interactions, as were mentioned above by Lieberman and Pruitt, it has shown they are not insurmountable if both normative social and psychological levels are considered. Further, it has underscored the necessity and utility of using participant observation to do this. Finally, it raises several questions concerning the introduction of and resistances to change.
An I.C. might ask himself, for example, whether formalizing an explicit role in trying to facilitate change will ultimately provide maximum payoffs in the long run. It may be that some changes would better be introduced through a variety of non-explicit mechanisms. Might some strategies better be left unformalized? What is his knowledge of both his own and his clients' perceptions of payoff in terms of both individual and social norms?

It should be stressed here that our two examples of game theory as used in analyzing educational-conflict situations represent but a fraction of the kinds of work done in the area of using games as teaching devices. For a fuller look and critical analysis of the kinds of games available to teachers and trainers, the reader is referred to Rase's (1969) Simulation and Society, particularly his section on "Games for Teaching." Interestingly enough, Raser urges that, when using games, students be encouraged not only to play pre-fabricated or completed ones, but also to build and rebuild their own games and then play them, in much the same fashion as suggested above for role-playing in a situation provided with a number of change permutations through the introduction of new problems.

Activity Systems and Observation

In terms of obvious importance attached to looking at behavior as a function of both norms of conduct and actual behavior, vis-a-vis the perspectives and suggestions we have been discussing, how might an I.C. try to structure observations he does make? One approach that has been suggested for studying activity systems is that of situational analysis. Such an account basically calls for examining the actions of a specified individual or group of individuals in a wide variety of contexts. Such an approach would also regard observed discrepancies between professed norms and actual behavior as capable of disclosing their own regularities. Van Velsen (1967: 142-143) states:

"Situational analysis may prove very useful in dealing with the process of option, that is, selection by the individual in any one situation from a variety of possible relationships--which may themselves be governed by different norms--those relationships which they consider will serve their aims better. The particular relationships and norms selected are likely to vary in regard to the same individuals from one situation to another and in regard to similar situations from one individual to another."

Such observation would entail, then, an examination of the actions of individuals over some length of time as well. Also, in trying to observe the decisions of a specific individual in a specific context, some attempt would also be made to take into account as much as possible of the total situational context and norms that appear at work on it."

We might also mention here the importance of two other factors in observing behavioral interaction. The first is the range and significance of cues employed, which Goldhammer mentioned as being so crucial. There has been increasing attention paid to these in recent years by both sociologists (e.g., Goffman, 1961; 1967) and anthropologists (e.g., Hymes, 1964). An accurate interpretation of these is vital. An examination of cues in interaction is beyond the scope of this paper, but we might mention here a second factor related to them, namely awareness context.

Hodgkinson (1967) has observed that in evaluating role performance, one of the major decisions we must make concerns the amount of awareness a person with whom we are interacting possesses of himself and us, and vice versa. Interaction, thus, exists in a context of awareness or the lack of it. An awareness context would consist of the total combination of what each participant knows about the identity of the other and his own in the eyes of the other. There are several possible kinds of awareness context that can exist: (1) open—where both are totally aware of the context, (2) closed—where one person does not know his true condition or identity, or the other person's view of him (e.g., hospitals), (3) suspicious—a variation on closed, where one person suspects his true context, and (4) pretense—a variation on open where both persons are fully aware but pretend not to be.

Such a range of possibilities would seem also crucial in attempting to use situational analysis. Let us now turn to some techniques of participant observation which might be helpful in dealing with such a problem.

Participant Observation

We have already mentioned the unique opportunity provided to the I.C. for reflection on observations he makes on his job. We also stated earlier that we do not envisage the I.C. becoming an anthropologist but rather being able to make use of some of the perspectives and techniques available in the field. Here we will stress two techniques that seem relevant, not excluding the possibility that there are others he may want to explore. There have been selected because they do not appear particularly unfeasible or difficult to employ.

We might stress first that one of the I.C.'s goals both as participant and observer will be to try to experience events from the perspective of those he is trying to help and to understand the meanings his clients attach to those events, i.e., how they see them.

The first point we may note is the very basic one of the importance of recording his experiences, both in terms of what happens and what such happenings seem to mean to those he observes. Some of the mechanisms he could use here are the use of a diary, kept on a daily basis, and, when he has the opportunity, the tape or video.
recording of staff conferences in which he participates. Some of the kinds of things that might go into a diary are not only events but the contexts in which such events occurred. Who was present? Where? When? What conflicts or difficulties arose? What were the participants' reactions to them? What was his reaction to them?

Relative to our discussion of situational analysis, he has observed a specific individual or group in a wide variety of contexts? How have they reacted to different alternatives presented to them? One technique which might be of some help in dealing with awareness contexts is that suggested by Becker and Geer (1960). They suggest that one way of recording statements or activities is classifying them according to whether they were volunteered or directed by the observer, whether the statements were to him alone or to others in everyday conversations, whether the activities were of an individual or a group nature, and again, like statements, either volunteered or initiated by the observer.

A somewhat more comprehensive treatment of participant observation is that of Bruyn (1966). Among the suggestions he makes with reference to data is dividing them into certain dimensions, which can also be used as criteria for verifying one's personal observations. Such dimensions additionally serve as guidelines to our second point and that is what considerations an I.C. might want to take into account when participating in an activity. They are classed under six headings:

1. **Time**--How long has an observer participated in a setting? Has he recorded different temporal phases of data-gathering?
2. **Place**--Where has he participated in the physical setting? Has he recorded experiences of how those around him relate to their environment?
3. **Social Circumstance**--Has he recorded experiences of those he observes under contrasting social circumstances?
4. **Language**--How well does he know the language (e.g., conceptual styles, cue systems, etc.) of those he observes? Has he recorded his experiences in learning it?
5. **Intimacy**--In what private social arrangements does he participate? Has he recorded how he has encountered social opportunities for participation and barriers experienced in interpreting social meanings in such contexts?
6. **Meaning**--How has he gone about confirming what meanings he finds existing in the culture in which he operates? Where has he observed meanings being expressed and shared? In terms of categorizing the data further, has he tried to sort out and late meanings or understandings, emotions, and behaviors connected with an activity?
One other technique might be mentioned here, and that is whether or not he has tried to take the role of those with whom he is interacting. This will perhaps ultimately determine whether a helping relationship is being created or not, in the sense that if his observations are totally incapable of enabling him to do this to some extent, they may be of dubious value to both himself and his clients.

CONCLUSION

If we recall Spindler's distinction (1967: 41), in the application of anthropology to education, between (1) the use of anthropological data and concepts in courses of study and teacher-training institutions and (2) the application of anthropological concepts and methods to an analysis of the educative process, it will be seen that this paper has of necessity had to deal with both areas. Of necessity, because the I.C. is constantly being "trained" through the on-going analysis of his work. Both his preparation for and tools used to examine his work are not only interrelated, but interdependent.

Also, while we were firm in stressing the fact that we did not expect I.C.s to become anthropologists, and vice versa, this would certainly not preclude the option of having a professional anthropologist work with I.C.s in either a training or research capacity or on a consultant basis.

Finally, while our discussion has centered around the I.C.-teacher relationship, we might note that the perspectives suggested for analysis and training are not meant to be only limited to a newly emerging role that can perform a "supervisory" function. Rather, they are intended to be tested for their utility in helping educators understand and develop human activities and interaction on a variety of levels. These levels would include relationships among students, students and teachers, teachers, teachers and administrators, parents, and so on. As such, teaching or supervision would be just some of the activities that go on in the educational process. Much work remains to be done using foci other than those derived from and based on the formal properties of educational structures. The discipline of cultural anthropology should continue to play a significant part in that work, since it is equipped to look at precisely the kinds of activities and processes so often overlooked in purely structurally based analyses.
APPENDIX I

Features of Activities

1. Purpose
   a. Stated goals and their justifications
   b. Other gratifications accruing to participants

2. Procedures
   a. Operations performed
   b. Media used, including raw materials
   c. Instruments employed
   d. Skills

3. Time and Space Requirements
   a. Time required for each operation
   b. Time as affected by numbers of participants and their skills
   c. Minimum and maximum time requirements
   d. Space requirements such as work areas and storage facilities

4. Personnel Requirements
   a. Minimal and optimal division of tasks
   b. Minimal and optimal number of persons for each
   c. Specialists, if any

5. Social Organization
   a. Categories of personnel
   b. Rights, duties, privileges, and powers and their allocation
   c. Management and direction
   d. Sanctions
   e. Permanence of organization (ad hoc vs. standing groups)

6. Occasions for Performance
   a. Occasions when mandatory, permitted, and prohibited
   b. Processes by which activity initiated
   c. Locus of privilege, power, or duty to initiate
   d. Relation of initiation to direction
   e. Availability of media, instruments, personnel

APPENDIX II

Project Checklist

1. Obtain information from the social environment (communication).
2. Formulate and test hypotheses about forces and processes existing in the environment (diagnosis).
3. Select and describe some part of the situation which is to be altered or changed (problem definition).
4. Plan action to solve the problem (commitment, risk-taking).
5. Carry out the action, enlisting the help and cooperation of others (influencing and organizing).
6. Verbalize attitudes, perceptions, and tentative learnings from the experience (cognition and generalization).

BIBLIOGRAPHY


