There is increasing evidence that what we call civic education embraces only a part of the influences operating on a people, and may well be among the less important. There are a number of practical obstacles to the success of civic education in political socialization. The multifunctionality that allows schools to have so many favorable effects, for example, also assures that many instructional effects will inevitably be seen by some as a drag on progress. The loose and highly complex interconnections among the educational, political, and other components of a developing society suggest that caution must be exercised in proposals for new programs of instruction. One can expect that civics lessons will focus more upon symbols of nationhood than with behavior that would strengthen an individual citizen's responsibility for their share of the tasks of development. There are difficulties in rooting an effective system of political instruction, as well as ambiguities and dilemmas arising in its implementation: the tension between tradition and modernity; multilingualism; gulfs between leaders and masses; pedagogic effects of a one-party government; needs for and effects of practical schooling; lack of well-prepared teachers; and the relationship of education and opportunities for mobility. (JLB)
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR CIVIC EDUCATION

IN DEVELOPING SOCIETIES

by

C. Arnold Anderson

University of Chicago

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In a country the size of Canada, widely diverging regional attitudes are inevitable and, within very broad limits, highly desirable. With the trend toward greater provincial autonomy already well established and likely to continue, these regional differences will intensify in the future. If this inexorable trend is not well balanced by strong, mutually shared, positive feelings about the nation as a whole, it could destroy the basic consensus needed to ensure survival. The school systems of all provinces, working together and not in parochial isolation, must explain to young Canadians the sources of their diversities, encourage greater tolerance and understanding among them, and ensure their emotional and intellectual interest in preserving and enhancing their common heritage.¹

In the 1950’s the African politician was a hero. He was fighting to bring an end to European colonial rule; he was leading his nation to independence; he was the voice and symbol of African aspirations for a glorious future. When independence was achieved, his people hailed him as father of the nation, paramount chief, redeemer, and living god. However, by the mid-1960’s the African politician had fallen from grace and in many parts of the continent had turned into a villain. He was mismanaging the affairs of the nation, robbing the poor to enrich himself and his wealthy colleagues, and ruthlessly suppressing opposition and dissent. His people now often branded him as a criminal, a monster, a dictator, a vain fool.²

In these two quotations are embedded most of the basic issues relating to political socialization and political participation in developing (and other) countries. The quotation referring to Canada seems to apply especially today to Nigeria; the second comment underlines the dilemmas of school desegregation and of poverty programs in the United States today. Word by word scrutiny of the two quotations reveals, at least by implication, innumerable other topics on each of which the scholarly literature is burgeoning. Political socialization (or civic education) involves the whole life of a people. Our task in this paper will be to underline the most basic of those relationships while tracing out a few particular connections sufficiently clearly to facilitate discussion.

In each of the world’s many nation states innumerable influences are generating a sense of common fate and numerous shared aspirations:
varieties of civil understanding if not always consensus. Some of these many influences clearly deserve to be called educational in the broadest sense; but many non-educational processes also serve the same ends. Of the definitely educational activities or influences, a few go on in schools or can indirectly be attributed to formal education. However, what goes on within the "social" part of the curriculum does not exhaust the "political" effects of instruction nor do all of those curricular effects uphold civic unity. Within any polity, innumerable supportive and also many subversive influences are at work; what we call "civic education" embraces only a fraction of those influences and in many circumstances may well be among the less important.

Nation-states, displaying unshakable authority, have arisen within surprisingly short periods from seemingly unpropitious situations -- long before their leaders concluded that the schools might carry out "civic education." Contrariwise, societies that have withstood tremendous rending forces, as the United States in the mid-19th century, with seeming abruptness confront widespread insurrectionary activities or endemic and sullen alienation.

To identify some of the correlates of these opposite patterns of behavior is our task for this paper. To weigh and compare the effects, positive or negative, attributable to schools in contrast to other agencies, is also part of the task. The perhaps "negative" tone of many remarks reflects the massive investigations of schools (as the "Coleman" report) whose outcome has been to raise doubts whether we can rely upon schools to build bridges across the most yawning chasms of our society. Serious experimentation with new curricula in the subtle fields, such as "civic education"...
education," has, to be sure, barely begun in the schools of any nation. At the same time it would be misleading to encourage confidence that programs which work under the most favorable combinations of circumstances can be generalized to typical schools in even the wealthiest or the least heterogeneous of societies. We can only speculate, moreover, what would be the effect of courses in civics if commercial advertising were tightly policed for probity and honesty. We have no notion at all whether civic education is facilitated by national rapture over baseball or soccer. We cannot yet even speculate whether the schools in "new nations" (most of whose parents are illiterate) can continue their seeming success in disseminating national symbols or "the piety of service" after the nation acquires a variety of mass media. Of these many topics, this one paper can touch on only a few. Because of my professional specialty in comparative education, skeptic though I may be most of the time in the eyes of my more optimistic colleagues, inevitably the ensuing discussion is weighted toward examining the effects of conventional, formal systems of schools. But since that is the agency upon which those who would quickly and firmly weld one people out of a congeries of tribes propose to rely, my preoccupation with "schools" is not misplaced.

The Multifunctionality of Schools

Every writer who tries to trace out the elusive connections between schools and society, particularly in a dynamic framework, has his preferred list of the "functions" that schools perform in this or that type of society. My preference is for the following six categories. 3

1. Everywhere schools play some part in preparing individuals to
take a smaller or larger part in the work of society, hopefully also readying them to adjust to the ongoing changes of the occupational structure as "development" takes place.

2. Schools have a particular responsibility to instruct in various "specialties" of the culture, apart from occupations. Skill in voluntary leadership of community activities can prove to be among the more essential supports for a given polity.

3. Schools perpetuate many kinds of old and introduce varied kinds of new intellectual systems into a culture. Not least, schools renew and perpetuate the educational system itself; it is neither professional ossification nor popular inertia that keeps schools so stable in form and activity. If they are to continue to have any real utility their main outlines and principal activities must change slowly. Similarly the practices of electoral participation are clusters of sentiment and of civic efficacy with many vestigial elements, yet we strive to maintain their tough mores while we adapt their details to new complexes of public need and to new self-conceptions among leaders in the most diverse of societies.

4. Schools assist children to develop new conceptions of their own identity and to appreciate their untried potentialities, to assimilate new norms for conduct and to learn how to be loyal to new groups and to many groups at the same time.

5. The identification and selection of individuals for membership in one or another elite is always shared in by the schools. The culture creators and rulers of a society seeking to "modernize" rarely can become eminent without using lessons they learn in school. They, along with
humbler pupils, experience the new emotions of success and failure in the seemingly arbitrary tasks a school sets for pupils after literacy is adopted. 4

6. Schools always indoctrinate; the content of those tightly channeled lessons may be mainly political, religious, or scientific. Here is where one places most of what is called "civic education" insofar as it lies within the schools. Schools mold ideologies, perhaps weakly or perhaps strongly, and they help to define varied traditional and novel situations for each new generation, thereby preparing youth to share the "universals" of their culture. When the schools must help pupils distinguish "universals" from "alternatives" among norms, as in the ethnically plural society the United States has become, effective civic education will not be produced by ethnocentric, ignorant, and reluctant teachers; in that kind of a society any tangible effect of civic education must seem to be a miracle.

That schools can enhance the vitality of the intellectual, including political life of a society rests in large part just on the fact that the functions of schools everywhere are plural and nowhere monolithic. It is not chance that the "universal school" of the modern West, now being copied around the world, arose in large measure because ambitious monarchs or thrusting elites wished to extend their charisma or their power over vast areas embracing dozens or hundreds of traditional "peoples."

But the failures of schools, by the same token, stem also from the fact that no educational system can have its activities confined to a narrow sector, especially in the formalized and bureaucratic dynamic societies. And because the school system is so massive (as, for example,
in the proportion of high-level manpower absorbed by it), improvements in
schools are shackled by difficulties in recruiting and retaining the
teachers. What generates a demand for the trained individuals produced
by the schools entices away the teachers who were expected to produce
those trained graduates. It is the expansion of consumers' demands for
all kinds of refined goods and services, reacting backward upon producers' demsands for improved factors of production, that makes it so difficult to
find any effective monetary device for giving the schools more than their
numerical share of the "best qualified" labor force.

Meanwhile, reluctant as educational leaders may be to concede it,
much of the task of creating "national unity" is removed from the schools
by the literacy-induced expansion of mass media, advertising, and many
other society-knitting agencies fostered by growing economic productivity.
To be sure--else this conference would not have occurred--neither rulers
nor teachers rest easy with the drift of "civic education" into seemingly
irresponsible hands outside the cadre of teachers or of party officials.
Moreover, the kind of society that possesses a dynamic consumers' market
and a productive apparatus to serve it is also the society that nourishes
individuation -- making it more difficult to have civic unity. At the
same time we witness multiplication of special-interest groups (each year
more ably served by better-educated hired representatives), and meanwhile
locality differentials in rates of social and economic advance persist or
widen, along with the many varieties of "particularism" that in some
contexts we call "tribalism."

One could trace out the specifically political or civic effects,
positive and negative, of each function of schools. Given the sense of
urgency to eliminate the tawdry and wrenching conflicts among petty groups
and xenophobic leaders, it is no wonder that heads of state find it com-
forting to be told by their educational advisers that the schools can
build national unity and wean youth from unproductive ambition in favor
of public-spirited devotion to the less rewarding but indispensable labor
of peasantry. In the new nations (or in some old ones suddenly aware of
their many factions) it is the day of opportunity for those skilled in
drawing shining blueprints. It is so easy to praise the capabilities of
schools to create a political consensus purified from disillusioning elit-
ism and from the primordial loyalties that block so many of the social
fluidities that are prerequisites for modernization.

Yet at the same time schools are expected to motivate and to qualify
individuals to seek elite positions into which the claims of the masses
seldom can penetrate. Rising productivity makes it easier to attach
loyalties to an advancing society; but a society with growing productivity
is likely also to be one where wide disparities in levels of living per-
sist or grow, exacerbating the traditional regional or tribal tensions of
those now brought into one nation-state. Amidst all these eddying social
currents, no wonder it is so difficult to prescribe a program for civic
education or to demonstrate that a program has any effects whatever, let
alone those aimed at. Yet, it must be emphasized, the multifunctionality
that allows schools to have so many favorable effects (and in such diverse
spheres as political attitudes or sensitivity to the creative effects of
multilingualism) also makes it certain that many of the effects of instruc-
tion that some men see as favorable inevitably will be seen by others as
nil or as a drag upon progress.
The Loosely Connected Matrices of the Factors of Development

For over a decade, aided by the tireless computers, statisticians have been supplying us with increasingly complex and definite pictures of the interconnections among educational, political, and other components of what is variously called "development" or "modernization." Surely one of the most impressive outcomes of this ingenious and untiring work is the looseness of the connections among almost any set of societal features. To be sure, as has correctly been said of many social situations: all positive traits are positively correlated, but not very closely. Today there remain few orthodox believers in yesterday's dogma that every culture or society is an integrated whole; there is not much "wholeness" in a prevalence of correlations running well under .5. Combining this looseness of connection among aspects of complex societies with the multifunctionality of schooling, some writers are so bold as to assert that we never have a school system. Upsetting as that viewpoint might be to a zealous educational planner, its purport is by no means entirely negative for the writer of civics curricula.

There is hardly space here to summarize the salient patterns of relationships among aspects of societies, but a few illustrations may suggest the caution with which proposals for elaborate new programs of instruction must be viewed. One is brought up short, for example, by observing that civil disturbances appear more often to characterize agricultural than urban life. Turning to educational indexes, one notices that over a decade national differences in the waning of illiteracy were unrelated to most variables; one study concludes that it
was not the least literate but the most agrarian societies that made the largest gains of literacy. Primary-secondary enrolments seem to be related more closely to other indexes of "development" than is university attendance. High enrolment in college, moreover, seems to favor neither the spread of literacy nor high levels of voting.

Harbison and Myers found that the proportion of national incomes devoted to education in total was rather closely associated with higher enrolment in universities, unconnected with secondary enrolment, and negatively correlated with primary attendance. Perhaps more striking was their finding that the proportion of students studying science and technology did not relate to average national income, while employment in those categories of occupation did rise with level of national income. Perhaps one should push the political analogy and conclude that the familiar association (among individuals) between level of schooling and intensity of political participation is to be attributed less to instruction in school than to the many and elusive political influences to which sheer persistence in school exposes the better-schooled.

The looseness of the structure of relationships is no less impressive in the matrices for political data specifically. In the context of recent lively discussions of "traditionalism versus modernism" this finding should perhaps not surprise us. Clearly today any "modern" pattern of economic life or of political behavior in the contemporary world is going to be affected by outside and mainly "western" models. It seems irrefutable that a shift to use of modern technology and greater reliance upon market processes will foster convergence among societies; for example, they will have to rely more upon formal schools and specifically upon
instruction in western-type science and technology and upon their under-
lying numeracy and literacy. As countries become more "modern" they will 
become more like western Europe in many respects; Portugal will become 
more like Italy and Peru more like Mexico in something like a "ladder of 
development." But notwithstanding, it would be generations (not just 
decades) before ways of life over the world lose their distinctiveness.
A short but less cogent way of saying those things is that serial corre-
lations are almost always higher than cross-sectional coefficients.

One should not, however, over-stress the absence of tight connections 
in these matrices. On the one side we can put indexes of schooling, use 
of mass media, family history of political activity, family social status, 
and other indices of personal modernity. These are positively correlated 
with indexes relating to political participation or leadership. As Nie 
and his collaborators put it recently,

Economic development alters social structures, particularly the class 
structure and the secondary group structure. Expanding the middle 
class and increasing the organizational complexity of society changes 
political socialization patterns; greater proportions of citizens 
have those politically-relevant life experiences which lead to 
attitudes such as political efficacy, sense of civic duty, etc. These 
attitudes motivate the citizen to participate in politics, sensitize 
him to available opportunities, and provide him with political 
resources. Thus it is that economic development increases the rate 
of mass political participation.

It is difficult to discern any imputation of direct and major effect 
of political instruction within the schools in this complex pattern just 
summarized. To be sure, "information" is related directly to quality of 
school experience, and participation in "secondary group structures" 
surely reflects qualifications to which schools contribute. It is, then, 
not surprising that the recent Easton and Dennis investigation
identified only a trivial proportion of the variance among American school pupils in political sentiments.

I am not the first writer on this broad topic to conclude that the observable variations among individuals or groups in political outlook correspond to no identifiable (or even imaginable) existing pattern of experiences in schools. On the other hand, to reiterate a familiar point, there indisputably is a gross correlation between political (or economic) modernity of outlook and the amount and quality of school experience individuals have received. Whatever factors we identify (on either an individual or group basis) as inducing a specified pattern of behavior or viewpoint, those factors will be correlated both with the general presence of modern education and with the familiar patterns of academic formal schooling. However, these seemingly clean-cut generalizations are not entirely unconfounded.

For example, passing examinations in physics or biology is frequent among members of the ruling elite of most of the "new nations" but at the same time patronage of witch doctors or of astrologers expands in the same nations. High examination scores in even a well-designed course in civics need not then enhance popular appreciation of the tenacious difficulties obstructing attainment of unity among leaders from different provinces or tribes. Certificates in medicine or agriculture can be awarded with greater confidence than for economics or political science—confidence (though far from unqualified) that what had been taught was learned to the point that it would regularly be exemplified in the behavior of former students. Cognitive understanding of how governments work undeniably fosters more active support of a government that is
striving to become organized and to nourish development. But that conclusion does not say that more systematic and sophisticated lessons in civic education for pupils should be the principal instrument for widening or deepening participation in civic life. On the other hand, to anticipate, to require that local districts pay half the cost of their elementary schools (and much of it directly in tuition)--commonly regarded over the world today as a step backward from "equity"--may well produce more active habits of political endeavor for development than highly paid work in designing locally-oriented school lessons on how the new independent government is "striving for national unity and prosperity."

Conflict between Tasks for Leaders and Motivations for Leaders

There is not space, nor need, in this brief paper to summarize the manifold responsibilities expected to be carried out conscientiously by the leadership cadres in developing societies. As all students of development recognize, populations expect efforts for development to pay off handsomely and promptly. This sense of urgency induces the leaders to exalt their own importance and to acquiesce in schemes that leave only token responsibility for decisions about development in the hands of local leadership, least of all in the hands of the ordinary people who presumably are learning to experience the challenges and the successes of modernization. That it is easier to find "a father of his country" than "a servant of the public" among national leaders needs little demonstration. In the variegated circumstances hinted at in the foregoing remarks, schools today commonly are expected to devote time to lessons about government. But in those unleisurably and paternalistic moods of reigning governments, one can anticipate that schools in their
civics lessons will commonly focus more upon expanding acquaintance with the symbols of nationhood than with the behavior that would strengthen the responsibility of individual citizens for carrying forward their share of the onerous tasks of development.

The foregoing comments clearly rely upon Myint's discussion of the tension between the creation of organizational patterns embodying flexibility and the imposition of necessary (hopefully, not excessive) discipline upon a people whose leaders have committed them to pursuit of a virtually mythical goal called "development." Because of the contemporary emphasis throughout most of the third world upon "leaders", there is a virtually built-in compulsion to seek ways to "discipline" a people rather than ways of flexible utilization of available resources and motives. Whether one chooses Myint's formulation or the one I had sketched in the preceding paragraph, there are interlocked tendencies toward rigidity, strongly encouraged also by the vogue for the language and ideologies of "socialism." Here one must think not only of long drill in awaiting instructions from the capital (as may have been encouraged by colonial rulers for generations) but also of the ideological emphasis upon "democratic centralism." Whatever one might have written confidently a couple of decades ago, today we are becoming impressed also by the retarding effects of centralized direction of national life. From the flood of recent analyses of agricultural development comes strong evidence for the readiness of ignorant peasants to respond vigorously to market incentives. Relentlessly, however, central authorities are taking over the implanting and the operation of schools (not to mention other agencies with which the public has direct contact).
Accordingly, I see no escape from emphasizing that study units designed to foster civic education almost tropistically turn to verbal exhortation for citizenship and demands for unity while the civil service continues to display its disdain for citizens' self-directed pathways toward higher production and local responsibility for local programs, be they schools or a preference to produce one crop rather than another.

This mandarin outlook by civil servants, whether they can correctly quote the dogmas of democratic centralism or not, has in my opinion been encouraged by establishment of institutes for training in public administration. Those programs contain more instructions about efficient "administration" than about how to draw out active and flexible local and self-oriented behavior that could add to the GNP. A large part of such training for officials, regardless of the sponsoring nation, tacitly or directly sets forth the view that decisions for a whole society ideally are made by a "central plan." These many clusters of situations alluded to in this section combine to discourage any kind of civic education in the schools that would emphasize active initiative and responsible decision-making by ordinary citizens. Instead the populace is deluged with explanations of "the national plan," hear endless variations of the claims for "the benefits of freedom from colonialism," and are warned of the dangers of neo-colonialism. They are scolded into ritualistic electoral support in the manner of a 19th century Gaspé priest exhorting his flock to attend mass. The national leaders today, then, are expected to hasten development while removing all tokens of subservience to a former ruler and avoiding any signs of tutelage from more prosperous nations.

These clusters of attitudes encourage adoption of a ritualistic approach...
to design of lessons about political life for the nation's pupils. Even under conditions most favoring the efficacy of school lessons about politics, a frequent outcome in these kinds of circumstances is discouragement for institutions that could embody local and citizen-run activities that are the very texture of the development so eagerly hoped for.

Not surprisingly, much of the politics in developing nations has not only a ritualistic flavor but goes on in a behavioral vacuum. There is widespread discussion about the means for achieving "national unity" and about the urgency to turn out high-level manpower with which to staff the always-expanding governmental establishments. But this preoccupation often leads to an overlooking of the fact that the main function of governmental agencies is to adjudicate and compromise the "real interests" that arise out of day-to-day (mainly economic) processes of development. Apart from a few agencies like the post office and often even the schools, the main content of political operations is the balancing or compromising of competing claims arising from different regions, different sets of consumers, or from industrial workers with organizational impact as against largely unorganized peasants--in short between the interests of the haves and the have-nots. It is hard clashes of objective interests that constitute most of the stuff of politics. There are boring but crucial maneuverings within a legislative appropriations committee. There is the problem of how to bring down the $1,000 annual cost for a university student and of how to raise the $10 cost per village child by challenging the unrealistic dogmas of international experts on what a university "is."

Nearly everywhere there is a problem of safeguarding marketing-board funds
so that peasants will have inducements to produce food for townsmen and save precious foreign exchange. But so long as national leaders encourage dreaming about the home-grown variant of "socialism" and dragoon teachers into sermonizing about these dreams rather than teaching how to achieve the productivity that ends hunger among children, no courses in civic education can tangibly foster modernization nor discourage the futile parroting of synthetic so-called national traditions.15

Some Dilemmas in the Institutionalizing of Effective Political Socialization

If the just preceding section perhaps overemphasized the difficulties in rooting an effective system of political instruction, this section will produce some balance in the discussion by focusing on ambiguities or dilemmas, rather than on simple obstacles, that arise as well-conceived schemes for orienting pupils toward political events are tried out in schoolrooms of a developing society. Always, each developing country has its individuality; seen as models for further experiments in civic education, their diverse adventures sometimes point in opposite directions.

There may be some utility in returning to a theme that has received increasing attention among writers about development: equivocation in the meaning of both "traditional" and "modern."16 Whether modernization must entail westernization has been the focus of much controversy; with salient exceptions, I can see no escaping a broadly affirmative response. But as I remarked, each country's traditional way of life is a distinctive starting point on what may become a common journey toward modernity, though that goal is often phrased in illusorily simple terms. Models for some or all of the new nation's aims and means in a search for modernity may be found in West or East, in the life of the recently ruling metro-
politically power, in the economy of the world's most technological society, or in the experiences of a neighboring country that started this journey only a decade or a generation earlier. Yet how those components are fitted together inevitably reflects the particular traditional way of life from which this nation's citizens begin their journey to modernity as they are able to visualize it. It is needless to fear that successful development necessitates sacrifice of all the familiar and distinctive customs and beliefs that have given a people an orderly way of looking at life. For example, there is more than an exotic parallelism between the vicissitudes of Japanese universities today and how the Tokugawa government treated the Dutch hostages at Nagasaki two centuries ago as there also is with the tactics by which the Meiji "restoration" itself was carried through.

These generalities about the counterpoint of tradition and modernity are not irrelevant to the down-to-earth task of designing a new curriculum for the schools. The more revolutionary their aims, the more consciously they must try to meld the old and the new—and unfortunately there are several kinds of new to be taken into account. The economic or political features of "modernity" that are to be encouraged by the new lessons in school will be few in due course, but those few must be selected from many disparate and conflicting models. Each aim is difficult to state in concrete terms that pupils can use as cues in achieving "success."

There is always the dilemma of asking teachers to encourage ways of acting that are "modern," for it is difficult to breathe life into aspirations for a modernity whose very nature has never been exemplified to pupil or student by life roles of parents or neighbors. It seldom helps
the builder of curricula—however conveniently it allows the national leader to fob off the problem onto his minions—to search for lessons to uphold and foster a new kind of socialism that is supposed to embody immemorial practices of consensus decisions or of large-family cooperation. Almost never can the educational specialists be so fortunate as to find definite social patterns in traditional life that can be transferred bodily into actions that increase the production of maize or guide officials to an effective way of collecting income taxes. Traditional consensus in the village (seldom in a whole tribe) provides few clues for appropriate political behavior in the new situations. What is needed now is a clear way of using the ballot to choose one among several barely-known candidates for the legislature who will most effectively guard the peasants' hard-won marketing funds against being raided to buy off aggressive leaders of urban trade unions asking for higher wages or provide larger salaries to console older and obsolescent officials who fear the oncoming cohort of younger and better trained candidates pouring out of the new university.

The most excruciating difficulty for the builder of new political syllabi for the schools is to discover that there is no dominant tradition among the peoples of his nation—or that political peace can be ensured only if the conflicting traditions are allowed quietly to die out. "Build the curriculum on the local culture" is hurled at ministries of education all over the third world—as it is at those who are trying to redesign our schools to make them more useful to the black children of urban slums. Few nations have shared traditions and almost none can claim to possess a comprehensive "local" culture embracing even the most populous of their subpopulations. Whether that deficiency prevails or not, seldom will
traditions meld smoothly with prescriptions for an unrealized but hoped-for new kind of future. Blithe speeches at international meetings exhorting schools to protect local ways of life against materialistic neocolonialism commonly are made in ignorance of the necessity to transcend traditions if the aims of the conference--more pupils, better teachers, higher productivity on farms, better health--are to be turned into reality.

Thus, to choose a particularly dramatic and poignant example, the anti-capitalistic and anti-individualist appeals by Nyerere to alleged traditions of equality block off the emergence of the laborers' jobs on farms that would reduce the problem of unemployed school leavers.18

Whether one pursues the ramifications of this Tanzanian example or explores other situations, a single-party state (even with vigorous competition inside that party) cannot encourage the preparation and use of textbooks to teach children that a key role for political leaders is the articulating and compromising of divergent interests, not hopes. Implementation of beliefs that each region of Nigeria should have its own university surely reflected respect for divisive local traditions more than it exalted "national" unity. The plurality of universities--paradoxically in contrast to the earlier unifying experience of attending Oxford or another university in Britain--seems to have undercut national unification more rapidly than it trained a civil service devoted to national modernization through the sacrifice of tradition. What conceivable instruction about civic behavior could have been instituted in the pluralistic Nigeria of 1960 or earlier that would have retarded the slide into political chaos?

In many countries around the world the problems to which I am
alluding have come to focus in some variety of "the language issue." Here if ever, tradition and modernity clash and merge in swirling patterns. Men of good will sharply disagree on what is feasible and on what would be pedagogically most constructive for the nation's children. Surely pupils learn more happily if they begin their school career by using their mother tongue. (In actuality, we may exaggerate the suffering of learning first in a foreign tongue; the contrasts between French and British policy on this issue within Africa have not yet been explored.) But there often are pragmatic obstacles to reliance upon vernaculars in classrooms.

There is first the question of whether the government can produce or purchase the inevitably more costly stock of school books in several tongues. A decision must be made (however candidly or evasively it is linked to questions about "national culture") on how far to go in substituting existing, revived, or even invented fragmentary cultures that can contribute little to "modernization" for a language-culture policy that is more forthright on the issues of hegemony. We can cite examples of how use of vernacular cultures will arouse so many rivalries for prestige that agreement about syllabi and textbooks will be postponed for decades. Since "development" is accompanied by large-scale migrations, more and more classrooms will contain pupils speaking diverse vernaculars, and the teacher seldom will know more than one of them. One or a few languages of instruction can be imposed, but at the same time it will be frivolous to speak about linking schools into the local culture so subtly as to persuade pupils that their local culture should be surrendered willingly
in order to spread a "national" culture—the elements of which must always initially be incomprehensible to pupils.

Alternatively, "civic" lessons could focus only upon symbols in order to foster national unity: the flag, the ruler's picture, the visible displacement of expatriate officials by local men. But those lessons will contribute little to instilling the attitudes that link individual's political acts to advance in national productivity.

But at this point caution or skepticism must be brought forward in order to emphasize one of the main puzzles of political-economic development. To some degree in all societies and to a large extent in societies possessing traditional "high cultures" the road to modernity includes a revival of allegiance to the high culture and to regional variants of it. Yet the capability of sharing in the high culture is at the same time a means of entry into the world of ideas that subvert that traditional culture when it blocks acceptance of the instrumentalities of "western science" or industrial technology. Slumps and spurts in the economic trend lines of many nations over the coming decades will eventually be explained in terms of how skillfully leaders achieved syncretisms of the cultural elements that supplied national pride and distinctiveness with the borrowed and foreign elements that subordinated the nation intellectually to the earlier embodiments of modernity.22

I have several times alluded to ways of using schools to deal with the irritants of "tribalism." For reasons that need not be boringly summarized, that problem is more manageable within a university than in the elementary schools. One can usually limit fissiparous tendencies within the civil service to modest levels, but at the cost of sterilizing
most of their technical capability for making decisions by the principle of political neutrality. Usually one can expect ambitious politicians to seek private political advancement by reviving local and particularist rivalries. How a ministry of education can introduce textbooks that explicitly discuss the drawbacks of such demagogic political action while politicians openly place fellow tribesmen in good civil service jobs I leave to be solved by those who are more confident about the potentials of civic education than I am.

But other tensions lie along the vertical rather than the horizontal dimension: gulfs between leaders and masses. With widening concern about a supply of adequate officials, we have seen the rise of a whole school of specialists on "high-level manpower requirements," the merits of whose views need not be debated in the present paper. While "everyone agrees" that widespread literacy and elementary schooling are seen as vital for development, stress has fallen understandably upon the more advanced form of training, encouraged also by the fact that the analyses and the decisions are made by university graduates and professors, not by parents of village children. The same focus is nourished by the already-mentioned vogue for "socialism" and its supposed twin, "planning" among technicians in international agencies and among their clients in the ruling cadres of the aspiring new nations.

Up to now, however, we have had only a handful of comparisons of the contributions made by different levels of education to economic or any other sort of development, for the difficulties of carrying out such investigations are formidable. It nevertheless remains tragic that the well-placed and extraordinarily well-paid university graduates in the new
governments rarely can be induced to face the fact that their preoccupa-
tion with "high level" training (and in turn the upgrading of those so
unfortunate as to be among the earlier and less rich vintages of graduates)
fails to consider the educational needs or desires of the masses of rural
people in whose names development is being sought. Why should one expect
officials with such privileges and biases to favor school syllabi that
encourage pupils to understand either the basic processes of development
or how basic questions about distribution of educational resources might
be worked out? I am not just echoing populist preferences. In nearly
every non-advanced country expenditures annually per university student
are many times--often over 100:1--those of a village youth. A second,
"populist" query would ask why the fallacy that free university education
is democratic cannot elicit even serious discussion from officials or
university students in most countries of the "third world." If civic
education is envisaged as including some of these sorts of questions about
equity, then the builder of political curricula has to construct teaching
units about concrete decision processes while avoiding the maudlin
generalities about "African" or some other imaginary socialism.

We have now returned to a new implication of the observed frustrations
involved in conducting civic education in a society devoted to one-party
government. This arrangement--seldom more than an annoying nuisance if
countries do not have the enormous human resources of secret police like
those inherited by the Bolsheviks--arouses chronic uneasiness among
teachers. All officials, and particularly those concerned with schools,
become chronically uneasy and anxious about their orthodoxy. Not
infrequently local party bosses stroll into classrooms in order to check
on the political reliability of teachers. To emphasize first that teachers must be loyal (to party edicts or to the official syllabus in civics) is virtually to guarantee that teachers will be cautious also about how they teach other subjects, for no teacher's style is made up of bits and pieces. Habits of caution in teaching civics will tend to spread into the teaching of science or of English. Enthusiasm for "problem solving" and venturesomeness in learning generally seldom will emerge among pupils whose teacher never knows at what moment his or her work will be reported upon by some political hack.

Without further belaboring the difficulties inherent in the circumstances normally surrounding the teaching of civic education, and granting that under favorable conditions those lessons like others can arouse magical responsiveness by pupils, we turn now to exploring some of the same questions in the context of the long-running debate about "practical" education. It is a basic article of faith within international agencies and among many specialists on "developmental education" that the schools of today's new nations can succeed in a task at which our schools failed. That different outcome, it is contended, will emerge by developing patterns of instruction and of learning that are "practical" rather than "academic" (in the invidious sense). We turn, then, to examining some implications for civic education of that newly popular creed.

The Search for a More Practical Developmental Education

The literature relating to the effects of education upon development is filled with assertions that a particular kind of school system contributes to, or contrariwise, retards development. It is not illuminating
just to enumerate the shortcomings of a school system, for one can lengthily indict schools even in the most advanced countries by whatever set of criteria you prefer. In the advanced countries the schools we now so severely criticize produced the present degree of advancement that enables us to see how much more advanced we might be. Schools can indeed cease being unadapted to the putative needs of a society as markets or political contexts change, without any modifications in the schools themselves—though that situation will not be typical. If residents acquire a new perception of opportunities open to them, their schools can become more relevant (either politically or economically) with minimal change in how those schools are run and without recruiting a new set of teachers.\textsuperscript{24} Moreover, as many well-documented cases demonstrate, "western" schools can be implanted in new situations with surprising speed and rapidly become patronized by rising proportions of local families. This often-repeated experience casts doubt upon older dogmas that "foreign" practices normally are rejected by new societies. But having dealt sufficiently in earlier pages with the issues surrounding "localization" of schools, here we can speak more particularly about practicality rather than about congruence with local customs.

An educational system may serve some goals of a society comparatively well but others poorly or not at all; e.g., investment of black American youth's time in schooling is not markedly below that by white youth but informal association by the two groups during their learning meets with strong public resistance. Both situations reflect and in turn alter America's political reactions about policies on education.
But how judge whether schools are adjusted to the character (or the needs) of a society? Studies of political socialization made in the United States emphasize the potency among small children of the image of the president whereas local and state officials are unheard of—as they normally continue to be among adults. Nevertheless, civic education hardly is to be conceived mainly as exhorting pupils to hand over societal activities to the distant and often clumsy federal government. Yet how shall we make both the local government and the local problems (say, of pollution) vivid for an oncoming generation of voters?

Other writers prefer to focus upon what they see as the pedantry or the bookishness of schools. To be sure, memorization of facts about the political structure impresses one as being less relevant to life than memorizing the multiplication table. But preparation of pupils to become active citizens—apart from the stimulating experiences of extracurricular activity—entails more than evangelistic pleas for "participation." There is also the drudgery of digging in libraries, municipal records, or legislative minutes. But such burrowing into the "sordid" aspects of political affairs will be essentially mindless unless accompanied by a bookish analysis of the political economy of tax systems or of how to use market incentives to persuade peasants to produce the mountains of food needed to undergird industrial development. Unfortunately there are few outside the ranks of expatriate teachers with either the self-confidence or the knowledge to enable them to lead pupils or students into such activist forms of political learning. (Meanwhile, expatriate teachers are typically or often excluded from teaching such "sensitive" subjects.) Moreover, such
undeniably superior ways of training pupils to be sensitive to their own political problems require resources that many educators would think better invested in other subjects, such as science. Similarly, preoccupation with choice of a language of instruction can easily consume classroom time better spent upon civics or science.

Advantages and disadvantages tend to go together. Thus a shortfall in the number of teachers tends to go along with difficulty in finding sufficient numbers of perceptive officials for the party. Wishes expressed by party officials will tend to be expressed clumsily if it tries to affect the content of civic education. In such circumstances also there are likely to be more dishonest officials, whether of civil service or of party, who will not welcome a realistic exploration by pupils of how that new road from the village to the main highway was financed--or of any other concrete governmental activity zealous teachers might choose to illustrate how public affairs are run.

There has developed over the years a vast literature relating to the development of practical vocational education. In this paper the aim is not to retell that controversy but to emphasize one aspect of it that bears upon the aim of insuring national unity. Over the many decades of colonial history, efforts to establish practical schools proved disappointing. Local people saw vocational training as "inferior" because it had not been received by the officials reigning over them, or they saw that the colonial service and other sets of expatriates residing in their country paid much better salaries to men with bookish training. The how-to-do-it sort of training (after procuring the initial supply of
carpenters and masons to erect mission and government structures) was little esteemed by employers and quickly became obsolete. Many of these old disputes have been reenacted recently as the number of youth with a few years of schooling but no jobs has multiplied. The trite proposal is being heard again that village youth be taught only how to farm so that they will be maladapted for the sorts of jobs to be found in towns. Apart from innumerable objections to such proposals, such blatant inequity would be political dynamite in nearly every country. Peasants quickly learn that while they pay the bulk of the costs for development, their children are to be deliberately taught so that they will have poorer chances to reach secondary school or university than will the offspring of townspeople. Such a duality of schools might ease the problem of "surplus migrants to towns," but it would quickly make the citizens of any country aware that leaders' ringing declarations about equal opportunities for all were demagogic and hypocritical.

In the whole history of this debate over "practical" schooling there has been almost no attention given to specifying who were the most suitable recipients of one or another sort of useful training. I would contend that instruction about the life of the farmer seems to me most suitably given to university students about the place of agriculture in the whole economy--apart from active farmers and youth who choose to be farmers and are certain to be able to command the resources with which to turn their dreams into reality. It is mainly the graduates of higher secondary schools and of university who will become legislators and civil servants and thus the decision makers about agricultural or tax policy, about import and export tariffs, and so on. Such practical instruction
about farming would be rather more complex than digging in a garden, to be sure. Along with the lessons learned from taking care of one's own room at college, the instruction just sketched is designed to enlighten the people who will make the decisions. Such lessons, even where called lectures on local socialism, could be sophisticated discussions of political economy.

In more general terms, whether any curriculum about civic affairs effectively changes the attitudes of pupils has proved hard to demonstrate. Those pupils who are comparatively disadvantaged in their rearing and who have fewer non-school sources of information, do seem to be more affected by what is in civics courses. But we have to be careful in inferring from Spanish-Americans in the schools of El Paso, Texas or black pupils in Boston to a cross-section of pupils in Peru or Kenya. Undeniably, wonders are accomplished by superior teachers supplied with good materials and good supervision, but few sets of pupils or schools in developing countries can be so characterized. Moreover, under the usual sorts of handicaps, teachers are likely also to have to worry about opposition from rulers or party when they begin to introduce "relevance" or practical examples into their lessons. Official suspicion or recalcitrance will unquestionably be more frequent and more galling to teachers of civics than in lessons dealing with mathematics or science. This differential risk occurs not only because the "interests" of the power elite are aroused. In countries striving to modernize, many facets of "nation building" have to be dealt with by a well crafted set of lessons about political or civic affairs.
Education and Mobility Opportunities

When one proposes to reorient the ways schools try to enlist pupils' loyalties for "development" aims or programs, many effects of schooling that can be grouped under the broad rubric of "career payoff" become involved. The mobility effects of schools, in particular, are closely linked to deep issues of equity in every society that self-consciously tries to use its schools to accomplish the "social" aims of development.28

The many tensions between ideals or criteria of equity and efficiency have been discussed by me in other places.29 Enshrined in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, education itself has become a political aim, apart from whatever ways it is expected to serve as an instrumentality for diverse political or economic aims. Many of the dualities and the dilemmas pointed out in the foregoing pages draw upon deep wells of animus and contention just because they do reflect widespread intentions to use educational opportunity as a prime exemplification of the goals of equity and/or efficiency. How excruciating the choices of policy in this area can be for national leaders may be illustrated fairly typically with data from Tanzania.30 Half of an age cohort born in the middle 1950s would never enter any school; a third would achieve bare literacy (4 grades); one in five could complete elementary school; and three percent would enter secondary school (of whom not all would finish it, let alone have a chance to try university).

In many parts of the third world the educational history of the now-advanced countries is being telescoped. Employers demands for schooling rise faster than some parents feel they can extend their children's stay in school, yet a given amount of schooling does not produce as much income...
or as good a job as it did in the last generation. Schooling is less an assurance of mobility than a few years ago in many parts of the third world; relatively advanced schooling is necessary but not sufficient to assure upward mobility. After the initial spurt of economic advance, especially where formerly colonial officials can be exiled in large numbers, opportunities in the upper occupations expand relatively slowly. In these new nations particularly, the incomes among secondary or university graduates is an unusually large ratio to the incomes of the ordinary worker.

Since various aspects of opportunity, and in the distribution of schooling specifically, are likely to be vigorously discussed if raised in civics courses, exploring the connections between education and status can be a very upsetting topic. And as governments find it more desirable (for wise or foolish reasons) to slow down the flow of youth through schools, governments are going to be tempted to rewrite large parts of their syllabi that deal with nation building and the life of the citizen. Yet the mechanisms by which citizens affect legislators' or officials' actions will retain only a modest place in civics courses, for the idea that political activity functions to achieve interests (as much or more than it serves to affirm national unity) has not become firmly rooted in very many of the new nations.

If or when politics does come to be viewed as a mechanism for balancing conflicting interests, on the other hand, examination of the distribution of educational opportunities can become a salient political issue in several forms. For example, there are disputes about the most
suitable distribution of elementary schools over the surface of the country. Here a policy of laying most of the costs upon local people (with subsidy to hardship areas), can become an effective demonstration of how development depends upon local and individual activity. In a similar manner a policy that forces pupils or their families to explicitly choose whether it is worthwhile to them individually to remain in school or to take a job can become a basic unit in any relevant course dealing with political economy.

Conclusion

To have cited more than a smattering of the materials looked over before writing this paper would have produced a 200 page precis of recent literature on political socialization. The way I have chosen to cut through the materials may seem unorthodox to some readers. An adequate summary of the correlates of education within the political sphere for a half dozen countries can be found in the justly famous Almond and Verba report. A microscopic parallel inquiry within a set of neighboring Tanzanian villages can be found in Hydén's book. The Dawson-Prewitt textbook gives an overview of the topic in systematic fashion. What can be said about the direct effect of schooling upon political attitudes and behavior is represented in those sources, as in others familiar to the specialists on this topic.

A specific embedding of the problem within the context of "modernization" is represented by the worldwide survey of Inkeles and his associates. But even in the latter comprehensive inquiry, less than full attention is given to the indirect effects of education upon political action, with
allowance for the augmenting or offsetting effects of other factors such as family or social status. Greenstein, for example, suggests that improved registration procedures probably would induce more increment to Americans' participation in political life than would any practicable increase in instruction or exhortation, of adults now or of children for the future.35

As conceded in the opening section, I have underlined practical obstacles to civic education, thinking of the typical school in developing societies rather than of the experimental or pilot project under more favorable circumstances. We do know that it is exceedingly difficult to change attitudes that people hold on any topic through deliberate instruction—though those attitudes may become changed rapidly and seemingly with little resistance in favorable conjunctures of events. But those two sets of conditions are quite unlike and the two forms of the verb used clarify thinking about the problem.

It is now well recognized that governments disinclined to find out just how firm their support may be usually are reluctant to allow schools to "improve" the political "competence" of school pupils. The favorable circumstances for the spread of political enlightenment, within or outside the schools, is most likely to be found just in those societies where schools need carry only a small part of the total task of political socialization.

One should not overlook the fact that (at least in the short run) there is a conflict between economic and political means of developing economic viability in a society. Rulers speak often of the priority of
political unity, but they want to turn that consensus (so often focused on dislike of the distant enemy) into submission to economic coordination when the quite real competitor is sitting in the next seat at school or living on the next farm so strongly wanted in order to have a prosperous farm of one's own.

Finally there are all the difficulties surrounding the cadre of teachers. They are too few, and rarely are they prepared for their tasks. The canny ones have more chance to exchange the disutilities of managing a battalion of squirming children for a more lucrative employment. But teachers are expected also to insure that their pupils become self-directing and loyal citizens without using their newly-acquired intellectual leadership for political subversion.

That societies do become politically unified is known to each of us. That deliberate instruction in political or economic morality will be as often unsuccessful as instruction in religious morality, however, is one of the chilling lessons of the last generation. Slowly we come to realize that most of the task of political socialization must be borne by non-school agencies, among which advertising may be as important as electoral speeches. It is the indirect effect of many kinds of social change mainly that produces citizens; any addition to that learning by schools is a boon, to be appreciated but seldom to be counted on in advance. Development, struggling against the handicaps of social anomie, is the best teacher of how to develop--lessons so much more effectively learned in the workshop, weekly market, or local court than in conning stilted and censored phrases of a textbook.
Footnotes


4 Dreeben, R., On What is Learned in Schools (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1968).

5 The concepts of "universals" and so on are taken from R. Linton, The Study of Society, (New York: Appleton-Century, 1936).


9 Of the citations in f.n. 6, for example, the items by Cutright and Olsen.

10 See the just-cited Adelman-Morris book and citations to Inkeles and associates.


13 For example, A. Inkeles, "Participant Citizenship in Six Develop-
Footnotes (con't)


15 See the many discussions of the cruel dilemmas faced by leaders of half-formed nations seeking both to complete the task of nation building while also eliciting rising levels of productivity from apathetic citizens.


20 I propose that the most useful test of whether a government is ready to do something seriously designed to improve its schools is the reply to this question: "What percentage of your school pupils have no textbooks?"

21 Moreover, since teachers can emerge only some years after schools have taken root in a new area, teachers who come in from educationally more advanced areas will seldom know the local tongue or sympathize with the local culture.

22 This paradoxical relationship between tradition and modernity is beautifully analyzed in Lloyd I. and Susanne H. Rudolph, The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India (University of Chicago Press, 1967), Part I.


24 A useful summary of the distribution of political and related attitudes among pupils in one developing country can be found in the unpublished paper by David R. and Judith L. Evans, "Citizenship Concepts of Uganda Secondary School Pupils."
Footnotes (con't)

25 Discussed briefly in the references cited in footnotes 3 and 17.

26 It is a chastening experience to read through the many studies of how well or poorly new curricula work as reported in the J. of Rec. in Science Teaching.

27 Though of marginal relevance to this discussion, it is chastening to read the comments of the not inconsiderable proportion of residents of the United States who resolutely disbelieve that men actually reached the moon.

28 In Smelser, N. J. and Lipset, S. M. (eds.), Social Structure and Mobility in Economic Development (Chicago: Aldine, 1966) see various chapters relating to mobility in pre-industrial societies.

29 Again, for convenience, see the citation of footnote 3.


33 Dawson, R. E. and Prewitt, K., Political Socialization (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969).
