ABSTRACT

This is an account of the first three years of the MIDNY Project, a pilot community resource development project in the five-county Central New York Region surrounding the city of Syracuse. The project was set up in 1966 by New York State Cooperative Extension with special funds provided by the Federal Extension Service. It was one of the first Cooperative Extension attempts to apply its community resources development strategies to a complex metropolitan area. The project is still in operation, under a three-year extension of its educational and people-oriented tradition to contribute importantly to the resolution of social problems (urban problems in particular) related to comprehensive planning and decision-making processes. Specific objectives included: development of the sense of a region, initiation of county planning programs; establishment of working relationships with various organizations; training of extension agents in community development; establishing contact among individuals and organizations with common interests; and making research findings available to regional decision makers. (PT)
COMMUNITY RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT
IN A COMPLEX, METROPOLITAN SETTING
MIDNY:
THE FIRST THREE YEARS:
COMMUNITY RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT
IN A COMPLEX, METROPOLITAN SETTING

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AUTHOR'S NOTE

The MIDNY staff was a diverse group, especially for its small size. But, for all our diversity, we got along well and generally saw things eye-to-eye. Consequently, it did not seem too bold to try to express the views of the entire staff in this account, and not just my own. Lyle Raymond and Martin Anderson, who were other staff members, and James C. Preston, project coordinator, all read earlier versions and offered helpful suggestions and corrections.

Nevertheless, it goes without saying that the account is surely peppered with interpretations and opinions that are my own biased views, and not shared by the others. For this reason, no one except myself should be held accountable for what follows.

Finally, thanks in general to Martin, Lyle, and Jim, and to Gordon and Charlie – not only for help with this report, but for being the colleagues they were (and are).

A.J.H.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In the latter 1960's, the task of bringing and holding our society, our communities, our people together assumed critical proportions. The traditional communities where everyone knew everyone else, taught the young, assisted the old, and helped out in emergencies had vanished. In their places were emerging communities—or better, localities—where important decisions were made vertically—in communication with county, state, and federal levels—more often than horizontally—with the participation of nearly all community sectors.

By such trends, we have gained professionalism, skill, and expertise; but we have lost integration, mutual knowledge and understanding of what other groups and organizations are doing, and coordination. There is even evidence that we have become less human. In growing more specialized and exercising our new-found ability to associate only with people of like minds and values, we have become “isolated masses”—self-satisfied, contented, not knowing, sympathizing, or caring about the misfortunes of others.

Many people, fortunately, are seeking solutions to these difficulties. Among them are planners, educators, social workers, and others. They call their efforts community planning, community development, community organization, and other names. The Cooperative Extension Service—of the land-grant colleges and the U.S. Department of Agriculture—is among those making attempts to ease these social problems through its community resource development programs.

This is an account of the first three years of the MIDNY Project, a pilot community resource development project in the five-county Central New York region surrounding the city of Syracuse. The Project was set up in 1966 by New York State Cooperative Extension with special funds provided by the Federal Extension Service. It was one of the first Cooperative Extension attempts to apply its community resource development strategies to a complex metropolitan area. The Project is still in operation, under a three-year extension of its original grant, although this report covers only the first three years, 1966 to 1969.

MIDNY is one among many steps taken by Cooperative Extension in New York and similar organizations in other states to adjust to the changing nature of agriculture. Having existed since the 1910’s primarily as an educational service to farmers and farm families, Extension has been confronted in recent years with rapidly declining numbers of farmers and a resulting erosion of its political base. Among its efforts to broaden this base, the organization has been moving rapidly into the vague area it calls “community resource development.” These attempts to adapt an old organization to new conditions include work with rural onfarm families, suburbanites, and city dwellers. Much of the community resource development work is merely a redeployment of traditional rural and agricultural skills, although some of it represents bolder efforts to confront really serious urban and social problems. Among attempts to work with committees rather than individuals, the most frequently explored have been the transfer of community development concepts and methods from “backward” rural communities to urban areas, and support of city and regional planning programs.
These and other explorations, MIDNY included, are addressed to some critical questions, and the answers to them are by no means obvious. Most of the questions have been raised and repeated by critics of Extension. They include: Are urban areas, and planning and decision-making in them, so much more complex than the classic rural community that an organization lacking technical skills in the urban sciences cannot make a significant contribution? Is Extension's orientation to providing specific technical answers to specific technical problems (of agricultural production, for example) inadequate to the interdependent nature of nearly all urban problems? Is the informal educational approach Extension is most comfortable with unusable in urban situations? Will Extension's contribution be limited to agricultural and natural resource inputs into other, more comprehensive planning and decision-making processes? Will it be merely another special-interest group someone else will include in his coordination efforts, or can Extension successfully play a more comprehensive role itself?

Most importantly, can Extension utilize its educational and people-oriented tradition to contribute importantly to the resolution of increasingly serious social problems, or must it be satisfied with a lesser role?

So far, of course, these questions still have no answers, and MIDNY remains one of the attempts to provide them. Roland Warren has summarized the main adjustments Extension will have to make: (a) the shift to the entire population as the audience, including the urban majority; (b) greater emphasis on community, rather than individual, change; (c) determination of a place for Extension in an already crowded field of agencies, organizations, and decision-makers; and (d) certain organizational changes to reflect changes in functions away from "the conducting of scientific research in problems of agricultural production and its dissemination to individuals as a basis for improved farm and home management." Warren observes the lack of resources suitable to new urban and social roles available to Extension agents from colleges of agriculture, and concludes that either new types of specialists will have to be added to the college staffs, or access to sources of information outside the agriculture colleges will have to be found.

This, then, was one of the demands facing the MIDNY Project at its inception in July 1966: a reorientation of traditional Extension programs in Central New York and the simultaneous development of relevant new programs despite the difficulty of access to appropriate information. There was clearly new ground to be explored and virtually no pre-established guidelines for the staff to follow.

II. THE REGIONAL DECISION-MAKING SYSTEM

Description of the Region

The problems of the Central New York region were not those of areas most familiar to either Cooperative Extension or typical community development programs. They were not the problems of rural, isolated, or depressed areas. With Syracuse at its center and including the counties of Onondaga, Cayuga, Cortland, Madison, and Oswego, Central New York was strategically located at the intersection of major east-west and north-south transportation routes. It had been growing rapidly and was expected to continue to grow. The population of the region was 680,000 in 1960, nearly 740,000 in 1965, and was expected to surpass 1 million by 1990.

The region was highly specialized and differentiated, both physically and socially — its complexity stemming, of course, primarily from the metropolitan nature of the Syracuse area. However, there were other sources of complexity as well, including the several urban sub-centers of Auburn, Oswego, Fulton, Cortland, and Oneida. In addition, the metropolitan nature of the region's center trailed off
dramatically toward the periphery to surroundings that were very non-urban in appearance. Central New York included, then, big cities, middle-sized cities, and small towns; growing places and declining places; ghettos, tract developments, and the exurbs of single-family homes scattered across the countryside; industrial districts, agricultural areas, and areas serving primarily as settings for weekend and seasonal recreation.

**Who Governs?**

The decision-making system in Central New York reflected the region's physical and social heterogeneity, and established, in turn, the context in which the MIDNY Project has been operating.

That the structure of power and decision-making in the Syracuse area was not simple and monolithic was indicated as early as 1961. In *Decisions in Syracuse*, Roscoe Martin, Frank Munger, and their associates concluded:

> In summary, the decisions analyzed in this study afford no basis for easy generalizations about the structure and exercise of power in the Syracuse metropolitan area. Only three overall conclusions seem warranted... First, the myth that significant decisions emanate from one source does not stand up under close scrutiny. Second, there tend to be as many decision centers as there are important decision areas, which means that decision-making power is fragmented among the institutions, agencies, and individuals which cluster about these areas. Third, in reality there appear to be many kinds of community power, with one kind differing from another in so many fundamental ways as to make virtually impossible a meaningful comparison.

The authors of *Decisions in Syracuse* found some evidence that more monolithic patterns of power may have prevailed in the 1930's, but even that may have been more mythical than real. At any rate, one-man rule had clearly broken apart by the time of their study. A related study by Linton C. Freeman reached the same conclusions. Freeman called attention to the crucial question of what efforts were being made toward coordination and integration in the face of continually splintering decision-making structures. Martin and Munger pointed to the Republican Party as an integrative device, Freeman to the Metropolitan Development Association, and coordination and integration were also key objectives of the MIDNY Project.

The challenge was certainly great enough. First of all, there was the typical multiplicity of governmental units. New York, unlike many states farther west, still has a strong system of town government. The five counties of Central New York included six city governments, 47 village governments, 94 towns, 53 school districts, and numerous and varied special districts. While no careful survey was made, it is surely safe to say that cooperation and coordination among these governmental units — while it certainly occurred — was haphazard and incomplete at best.

Furthermore, a simple enumeration of governmental units is no measure of the magnitude of any formal or informal coordination task. Within a single unit of government, the various departments and offices were rarely coordinated and frequently in only imperfect communication with one another.

Agencies of the state and federal governments were also important parts of the regional decision-making structure — and probably increasingly important parts. Some of these agencies, like the State Department of Transportation, were action units. Some, like the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, were funding agencies. Others, like the Soil Conservation Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, were primarily service-oriented. Some operated solely out of Albany or Washington. Others had regional offices in Syracuse, or in the case of some federal agencies, New York City. While cooperation among these agencies was steadily improving, it was still often notoriously weak.
And if the public sector seemed complex, the private sector was even more difficult to coordinate. While there is no ready way of knowing how much impact any given firm had on the region, the fact that there were 61 manufacturing firms in the region employing 200 or more, and 14 employing 1,000 or more, gives some inkling of the size of the private segment of the decision-making system. These figures, counting only industrial firms, say nothing about retail and wholesale firms, or public utilities, nothing about real estate developers or financial institutions, and nothing about the dozen colleges and universities, which were turning more and more toward community involvement. In 1967, the Metropolitan Development Association had some 100 members representing about 80 companies. These figures may come as close as any readily available to an indication of the numbers involved in important regional decision-making. Even MDA, however, was heavily oriented to the Syracuse urbanized area, so its membership list would not include many private sector leaders from outside Onondaga County.

Finally, no study of regional decision-making can ignore the many organizations that might be called quasi-public agencies. Among these were the Community Health Information and Planning Service, the Society for the Advancement of the Visual Environment, the Garden Center Association of Central New York, the Home Builders Association of Central New York, and the Syracuse Area Council of Churches. These are only examples of the range of organizations. In addition, there were nearly countless chambers of commerce; industrial promotion organizations; human rights groups; political clubs; community chests; professional societies for doctors, lawyers, realtors, social workers, etc.; PTAs; political pressure groups concerned with urban renewal, race relations, water supply, schools, hospitals, libraries, parks, and planned parenthood; taxpayers associations; community action programs; leagues of women voters; farmers’ organizations; neighborhood associations; and many more. In 1969, a preliminary inventory counted 1,066 social service organizations in the five counties. In Syracuse, there was even a group called the Organization of Organizations.

Partisan Mutual Adjustment

An accurate map or diagram of these decision-makers would be unbelievably complicated. Nearly all the organizations were special-interest groups of one kind or another. A few – most notably the Regional Planning and Development Board – claimed or attempted comprehensiveness. Many others had as their purpose the coordination of subordinate agencies in particular subject-matter areas, such as social welfare, health, religion, or industrial promotion. The levels of generality at which such coordination was attempted varied considerably, too. So, of course, did the autonomy of the agencies intended to be coordinated.

In addition, the geographical jurisdictions of the agencies varied. Some were nationwide, some statewide, some regional, some county, some town, village, or city. For some – many businesses, for instance – it was meaningless to speak of jurisdictions and boundaries. Others were more concerned with non-formalized jurisdictions, such as trade areas, labor markets, or river basins. School districts had boundaries that perversely followed approximately, but not exactly, town or county boundaries. Finally, there were multi-unit agencies covering areas other than the five counties themselves – areas smaller or larger or about the same size but imperfectly overlapping.

Coordination and even communication among the multitudes of regional decision-makers was, in short, rarely formalized; and even when it was, the extent to which everyone relevant was included varied widely. More often, coordination and communication was informal, sketchy, incomplete, misunderstood, non-existent, or openly resisted.

In summary, the following description of regional decision-making in general describes Central New York well:

It can be hypothesized that the regional decision-making system is highly pluralistic, fragmented, and decentralized. A combination of private market investors, political organi-
organizations, civic leaders and groups, special interests, and semi-independent governmental units operating within limited substantive fields and limited geographical areas make operating and investment decisions which influence the development of the area as a whole. The mixed public-private sector policy-making system is influenced by both market and nonmarket forces. The system is dependent upon informal and formal interpersonal and intergroup connections, flows of information, and varying degrees of awareness of problems and self-interest. Nonmarket (political) decisions are reached through a network of communication, accommodation, and agreement which is always open to change if sufficient influence or political power can be mobilized through the formation of coalitions. The process of mobilizing power and building coalitions takes place through what Charles Lindblom has termed "partisan mutual adjustment." Decisions are made on an incremental, marginal basis involving relatively small changes in a large body of previously settled policy. The lack of regional governmental structure or regional policy constituency makes the decision-making system relatively unstructured, open, and loose, allowing interests to form and re-form in response to specific regional and sub-regional decision issues.\(^{14}\)

### Integrative Forces

Despite this highly unstructured nature of decision-making in the region, Central New York did have a certain amount of built-in solidarity that made improvement in the rationality of decision-making not a hopeless task. A certain amount of solidarity had existed in Syracuse and Onondaga County for some time, as indicated at least partially by the large number of "city-county" and "greater Syracuse" organizations, and also by the many city functions that had been taken over by the county.\(^{15}\) One objective of the MIDNY Project was the expansion of this solidarity to include all five counties; and this was also an objective of the Regional Planning Board (which was established, like MIDNY, in 1966) and a few other organizations.

That there was hope for such objectives was indicated by certain attitudes and behavior on the part of people throughout the five counties — in the varying, but almost ever-present, orientation to Syracuse either for shopping, for employment, or at least for obtaining more specialized goods and services. The use of outlying land for homesites or recreational activities by "Syracuse people" was also at least vaguely evident to growing numbers of citizens. This embryonic "sense of region" was manifested in action by the Boards of Supervisors in all five counties to establish and fund the Regional Planning Board. Continued development of the "sense of region" was among the objectives of MIDNY, the Regional Planning Board, and the Metropolitan Development Association.
III. THE FIRST TWO YEARS: EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT

During the Project's first two years, 1966-67 and 1967-68, the staff's approach was highly exploratory — selecting directions which seemed, on the basis of information at hand, to be the right directions and pursuing them until they seemed in fact to be the wrong directions. By mid-1968, however, a combination of factors (to be discussed later) led to a greater formalization of procedures. Consequently, in the following account, the first two years are treated separately from the third year.

General Organization and Approach

It was apparently intended by the drafters of the original MIDNY proposal that the Project work closely with the Regional Planning Board, which had come on the scene only a few months before MIDNY. Early statements of objectives held that the Project, through its educational activities, was to complement the regional planning program in encouraging "effective comprehensive planning at all appropriate levels." Although close and subtle working relationships were always maintained with the Regional Planning Board and its staff, MIDNY very soon evolved into something quite different from a simple educational arm of the planning program. Its central thrust gradually became one of facilitating communication among planners and various regional interest groups and agencies.

Regional Specialist Martin Anderson summarized four "chasms" the Project sought to bridge:

1. Current organizations tend to be either highly urban-oriented or rural-farm oriented. Few operate effectively in the broad area between that which is truly urban and that which is still recognizable rural. Yet, in this rural-urban interface, we see the greatest conflict and confusion in development.

2. The services of USDA agencies have traditionally been farm oriented. Yet the technical information held by those agencies, based on sound research, is applicable to problems in suburbia and exurbia, with proper interpretation.

3. Communication between organizations which are urban oriented and those which are rural oriented is currently weak.

4. Communication between professionals with a wide variety of agencies and organizations and professional planners is oftentimes lacking. Also communication between the professionals and lay leadership in the region is not strong.

In its attempts to design and carry out educational activities directed at these conditions, MIDNY utilized four techniques: (a) providing a flow of information, new planning concepts and ideas, and timely news to various professionals through a series of memos and other correspondence and, now and then, to a more general public through TV and radio programs; (b) regional meetings and conferences - both small-scale and informal and large-scale and formal; (c) programs carried out in conjunction with the five county Cooperative Extension offices to assist in organizing for planning, developing awareness of major problems, and encouraging involvement in the planning process; and (d) work with other agencies and organizations. About the last technique, the Project's 1968-69 plan of work stated:

Many agencies and organizations are involved in the broad area of community development. None have a coordinating responsibility over others. Development is attained by close coordination and cooperation between groups which have a common concern about specific problems or issues. These cooperative arrangements are frequently on an ad hoc basis, generally dissolving once a problem or issue has been resolved. The MIDNY Project makes a contribution where (it has) expertise or the proper contacts necessary to accomplish an objective. This is viewed as an important part of the overall program...
In all cases, the objectives of the Project were to make planning and development in the region more effective through (a) improvements in the understanding of planning, development, and decision-making processes on the part of all relevant people and (b) increased communication and mutual understanding among those who make important regional decisions.

As the Project was originally conceived, two Regional Specialists—located in Syracuse—would be responsible for contacts with individuals and groups in the region and for developing and carrying out the Project's educational program. They would be assisted by two Extension Associates, located on the Cornell University campus in Ithaca; these men would be responsible for transmitting research inputs from Cornell and other institutions and for other assistance. In addition, a distinction was made in both pairs between an "urban-oriented" man and a "rural-oriented" man. Project policies were generally set through meetings of the four-man staff and the Project Coordinator. (During the second year, one of the Syracuse-based staff members left the Project and, through the remaining time covered by this account, was not replaced.19)

As the Project proceeded, and the skills and limitations of each staff member were learned, the division of labor became much less formal. The rural-urban distinctions soon proved almost totally irrelevant. The program responsibility-assistance distinction was maintained, but the specific tasks falling to each member were subject to separate decisions as each staff activity was taken up.

MIDNY's educational activities were developed out of the staff's perceptions of audience needs, which were in turn conditioned by (a) the Specialists' contacts with community leaders, decision-makers, and representatives of various agencies and organizations in the region and (b) research findings and theories transmitted through the Extension Associates to the rest of the staff. Actual requests for programs were usually expressed in very general terms; the specific content of the activities was largely a matter of staff decision, though usually in consultation with others who might be involved in the activity.

**Specific Objectives**

Specific objectives pursued during the first two years of the Project included:

1. Development of the "sense of region." While the creation of the Regional Planning Board indicated that the interrelatedness of all five counties was no secret, the spreading and reinforcement of this feeling was deemed important. Responses by the MIDNY Project included a bus tour of newly-urbanizing parts of the region for leaders from throughout the five counties; annual regionwide conferences on land use (1967) and social problems (1968);20 and references in single-county meetings to the entire region and the position in the region of the county in question. A slide series was developed showing the connections between small-community problems and the growth of the Syracuse metropolis.

2. Initiation of county planning programs where none currently existed. With the exception of a series of meetings in Cortland County on the pros and cons of county planning, few formalized efforts were made to meet these needs. In Cortland, Madison, and Oswego Counties—where there were no county planning boards—MIDNY's approach was generally to enter, and possibly guide, coalitions seeking the adoption of county planning. In Oswego County, the coalition included the county economic development association and the State University College at Oswego. In Cortland and Madison Counties, the coalitions tended to be more informal and included Extension agents, Supervisors, college personnel, local planning board members, and other interested citizens. These coalitions attempted to devise and carry out strategies attuned to local political conditions, the positions of the various Supervisors, and their susceptibility to change. All these efforts were ultimately successful; by the end of 1969, all five counties had planning boards, four had professional staffs, and the planning boards of Onondaga County and the city of Syracuse were reorganized into a joint city-county agency.
3. Establishment and clarification of working relationships with various organizations. An immediate need faced by the Project was the easing of potential ruffled feelings on the part of the Regional Planning Board and staff and Syracuse University. Both these organizations tended to see MIDNY as a possible competitor. The specific need was to convey to other organizations the precise role MIDNY would play; unfortunately, this was not quite known by the MIDNY staff itself. Regional Specialist Anderson took every opportunity available to write or speak about MIDNY's objectives. Ultimately, however, the only solution was experience; MIDNY was able to prove it had no ulterior motives and was willing and able to perform a useful service in educating, informally coordinating, and keeping regional leaders posted about important problems, meetings, and opportunities.

Peace with the Regional Planning Board and staff was perhaps always somewhat uneasy. The MIDNY staff tended to feel the planning staff was originally more interested in getting its future plans accepted than in allowing really effective public participation. Many of MIDNY's efforts were directed toward constantly expanding the regional planning program's frame of reference. The planning staff — and also the Metropolitan Development Association seemed to continue to think of MIDNY as primarily a rural- and farm-oriented organization. This was perhaps the price MIDNY had to pay for avoiding conflict.

The greatest success in these respects was achieved with regard to Syracuse University and the region's other institutions of higher education. The Central New York Consortium was formed in 1967 with representatives from Cooperative Extension and the continuing education programs of the region's state and private colleges and universities. In 1968 and again in 1969, the Consortium sponsored a series of public television programs — on regional planning in 1968 and the housing crisis in Central New York in 1969.

The establishment of smooth and effective working relationships with these and other groups consumed a large portion of Anderson's time, but was deemed of critical importance by the staff. Its significance was difficult to convey to critics and superiors, particularly when it resulted in MIDNY joining coalitions instead of "going it alone," letting other organizations take leadership, and quietly and politically giving credit to others. Only in these ways, however, could fears and suspicions be allayed and open resistance to MIDNY's efforts avoided.

4. Training of Extension agents in community resource development. Given the changes called for in Cooperative Extension's traditional work, this need continually underlay most of MIDNY's activities. The joint development of county educational activities by MIDNY and the county agents served, at least as much as formal training programs, to reorient the agents and help them feel comfortable and competent in new subject matter. Each agent had different attitudes and levels of interest in community resource development, and some were judged to have advanced farther than others. Nevertheless, by the start of the third year, the staff felt justified in giving less attention to county programs and devoting a correspondingly greater share of its time to regional activities.

5. Contact among individuals and organizations with potential common interests, but few previous contacts. This was usually accomplished through invitations of diverse representatives to meetings, conferences, bus tours, etc. Meetings of various professionals to hear reports of new research and a series of small-scale conferences on agricultural, recreational, and urban land uses are examples. The conference on recreational land use, to take one specific case, brought together planners, foresters, wildlife biologists, developers of recreational facilities, and others. In Cayuga County, a commercial farm mapping project involved farmers, professional planners, and several USDA agencies. Techniques for bringing together appropriate, diverse discussants were refined considerably in MIDNY's third year.

6. According to original expectations, a sixth objective would have been to make research findings available to appropriate regional decision-makers. This was emphasized at first, but was gradually de-emphasized. In the Project's first few months, the Extension Associates were expected to
play a "linkage" role whereby they would provide a connection between the fieldwork of the Project, on the one hand, and the Cornell faculty and other resource people, on the other. Presumably, the Associates would solicit from the resource people: participation in educational activities; material for use in educational activities; research findings; data; ideas; etc. In turn, the resource people would receive from the Associates: information about MIDNY's specific needs; the nature of the audience; and local data to supplement the resource person's probably more general information. Such exchanges gradually proved more time-consuming than their benefits justified, and the Project soon developed its own approach to the use of research.

Originally, it was intended that the Project would even stimulate new research on regional problems it felt were in need of investigation. This also proved largely unworkable because of (a) the time lapse between the inception of a research project and the availability of its results, (b) the lack of perfect fit between a researcher's personal needs and those perceived by MIDNY, and (c) the substantial gap between research results and information that can be readily applied. In addition, it was found that a considerable amount of research was continually generated within the region, especially as state and regional planning programs got into high gear. The problem was frequently not so much a matter of creating knowledge as one of using the knowledge that was already available.

Instead of many efforts at direct utilization of research, the Project staff soon tended to focus entirely on program needs and to look for research only after the program needs were agreed upon. (There were, however, continued efforts to make appropriate professionals aware of new research reports once they were available, and to facilitate cooperation between researchers and relevant individuals and organizations in the region.) The tendency to employ the Extension Associates directly in educational activities became stronger than it was originally intended; it was found that they were often better able to communicate research to the Project's audiences than the researchers themselves. This stemmed partly from the fact that they had closer contacts with audience needs and levels of understanding, and partly from the fact that they could combine findings from many diverse research efforts in order to meet specific program needs. To meet these demands, the Associates placed considerable emphasis on keeping generally informed of research at Cornell and elsewhere (as reported in journals, at conferences, etc.). The research that they were familiar with was dependent on their own personal interests and their interpretation of the Project's existing and potential program needs.

**Evaluation of "Next Steps"**

A major recurring step in MIDNY's procedures was the evaluation of "next steps." As Marris and Rein indicate in their discussion of community action programs, an appropriate agency response to complexity and difficulty is to take only small steps, so that action, evaluation, and the necessary adjustments in action are not widely separated in time.

MIDNY generally followed this approach, spending considerable time discussing past activities, criticizing them, speculating on how they might be improved, and making modifications in new activities. In spite of the importance of this process of self-evaluation and criticism, it was rarely formalized. It was rarely carried out, that is, in a staff meeting, but most often -- and perhaps most effectively -- in informal conversations (now and then with the entire staff, but frequently with only two or three members). Typical locations were in the car enroute between Syracuse and Ithaca, at lunch, over a cup of coffee, or in a meeting room after the meeting had adjourned.
IV. THE THIRD YEAR

The processes of exploration, evaluation, revision, and new exploration had produced by the beginning of the third year a surprisingly consistent approach in MIDNY's attempts to improve regional decision-making. With the sometimes unintended assistance of several other events, the MIDNY experience jelled noticeably in 1968-69.

**Turbulent Beginnings**

The year began ominously with an unfavorable audit by the U.S. Inspector General's office. The auditors charged that the Project suffered from (a) lack of a comprehensive plan of operations, (b) absence of delineated duties and responsibilities for the staff members, and (c) failure to involve other USDA, federal, and state agencies. It was implied that the Project had strayed too far from its rural and natural resources origins in the Department of Agriculture and that it should have taken a firmer approach toward coordinating the activities of other agencies in the region.22

It was strongly felt by the staff that the audit was very unfair and betrayed a total misunderstanding of the situation in which the Project was working. Regardless of the audit's fairness or unfairness, Cooperative Extension administration at Cornell quickly undertook its own re-evaluation of the MIDNY Project. Three changes resulted:

1. Attempts were made to restructure the staff positions. The major change was the removal of the Extension Associates from program development, which was left completely in the hands of Anderson and the still unfilled second position in Syracuse. Immediate impacts of this change were negligible, however; since disagreements among the staff members were minimal anyway, who was formally in charge didn't matter very much.

2. Demands were placed on Anderson and the Project for a heavier natural resources orientation, focusing on "land and water resources as influenced by the process of urbanization."23 The Project was encouraged to devote special attention to strengthening and clarifying its ties with other USDA agencies, such as the Soil Conservation Service, and with other state and local natural resource agencies. Programs relating to the "ongoing comprehensive planning process" and to assisting "in bringing other agencies together in the process" were to be the responsibility of the second Syracuse position.24 Until this position was filled, Anderson was to devote what attention he could to these programs.

3. Extension administration called for more rigorous work-planning and program evaluation. In the early part of the third year, considerable time and energy was devoted to writing and rewriting plans of work. The adoption by New York State Cooperative Extension of a computerized work-planning and activity reporting system strengthened these emphases. Certain stress was placed on establishing a clear identity for Cooperative Extension, as opposed to letting MIDNY disappear in the maze of organizations with which it worked, and on devising objectives and programs of the Project's own, rather than merely reacting to the needs and concerns of others in the region.

The MIDNY staff tended to feel that some of the emphasis on work-planning and the setting of objectives was misplaced. While the Project never worked without at least general goals in mind, the staff was reluctant to admit the value of specific objectives. They feared that getting too concrete and precise about work-planning could result in overcommitment to the plans and a seriously reduced ability to maintain relevant programs by changing as regional problems, needs, and opportunities changed. Nevertheless, there was clearly a good deal of confusion — both in Central New York and within the overall Extension organization itself — about the nature, purposes, and activities of the MIDNY Project. Recognizing this, the staff, and particularly Anderson, undertook concentrated efforts to develop a coherent plan for the Project's future. At the same time, Extension administration reiterated its understanding that work-planning and program-evaluation for a project like MIDNY is difficult, and that sufficient allowance for flexibility and revision was necessary.

10
The Task Force Concept

At any rate, in MIDNY's third year, a fairly definite "MIDNY approach" to community resource development in Central New York had emerged. In part, it certainly developed as the Project's ad hoc, trial-and-error approach of the first two years gradually hit upon successful formulas, and these formulas were repeated and improved upon. It is also probable that the approach came to be recognized by Anderson and the rest of the staff only because serious efforts finally took place at setting it down in written plans of work. In November, Anderson wrote:

On regional-wide activities we are becoming more specific on subject matter. We intend to focus on current critical issues which result from complex unresolved problems. We will pick those problems in which solutions may be found by upgrading public decisions. Our procedures will be to improve the public decisions by information input, interaction among decision-makers, and integration of major problems into the planning process.25

What emerged was an approach relying heavily on the formation of "task forces" (for want of a better term) to deal with different regional problems. Anderson summarized the process as follows:

1. Small task force committees on a regional level to analyze situation, determine approaches to take, establish guidelines and timing considerations.
2. Regional-wide educational activities from the MIDNY office.
3. Activities by other agencies and organizations at the regional level, resulting from interaction with the task force committee and Extension's regional educational efforts.
4. Educational activities by Extension at county level if appropriate and feasible.
5. Follow-up personal contact with key leaders over a period of time to help guide action.
6. Action by communities as needed, utilizing service and assistance from relevant agencies and organizations.26

Through this approach, MIDNY attempted to relate its community resource development efforts directly to important decision-making in the region. As Anderson noted in a draft of the 1969-70 work plan, "Timing is critical." To talk, as many community development efforts do, of "community problems" in the abstract strikes at issues too early for there to be sufficient interest in them for any action to result. Similarly, delaying educational inputs too long is likely to meet controversy, positions that are too firmly set to change, and failure.

The task-force concept also recognized the complexity of regional problems and the lack of solutions in the hands of any one organization. According to Anderson, the approach often involves a number of disciplines just to get a clear definition of the problem and some guidelines on how to approach it. Complex issues have developed because of a number of interrelated problems brought on by urbanization. No single organization has the resources or background to work independently on these complex problems. Success will be attained (only) by many agencies and organizations in a coordinated total effort.27

Related to this was the recognition that what was needed was often not an organization with technical solutions to problems, but simply a "catalyst" to bring a variety of people together and initiate a coordinated process of discussion, information gathering, strategy planning, and eventually action.

15
Finally, MIDNY's task-force approach was by no means short on courage and was not interested in tackling small, easy problems in order to insure measurable success. Noting the complexity and difficulty of major regional problems, Anderson stated, "Concentrating on less complicated problems, however, does not seem warranted." Regardless of the pressures of serious evaluation, which was intended, the Project staff persisted in its belief that it could ultimately justify itself only if it tackled the hard problems. The various task forces were all aimed at truly significant issues, and they all anticipated some form of concrete action.

Task forces operating during the third year included the following:

1. The Central New York Consortium, which continued to explore areas of cooperation among the region's continuing education programs. In 1969, it sponsored, with the local public television station, a series of programs on the housing crisis in Central New York.

2. Commercial farm mapping projects. Begun earlier in Cayuga County, these joint planner-farmer USDA agencies efforts were expanded to three more of the five counties during the third year. Relying heavily on the knowledge of local farmers, maps were prepared showing land in production and headquarters for each commercial farm in the county. The projects had two purposes: one, to provide planners with more information and understanding about agriculture, and the other, to increase the participation of farmers in the planning process. Perhaps more than any of the other task forces, the purpose here was the creation, and not just the use, of interest in a certain issue-area. Farmers, who normally evidenced little interest in planning (or even antagonism toward it) were given opportunities to contribute their own personal knowledge to the technical work of planners; interest was maintained because local people had opportunities to interact as equals with the "experts" and could see tangible results from their efforts (in the form of completed maps). Following the success of these projects, consideration was given to adapting the mapping procedures to forest and fish and wildlife resources as well as agriculture.

3. A task force on planning the rural community, which began in a series of informal discussions at Cornell University, involving several faculty members, Extension personnel, and professional planners, mostly from Central New York. With MIDNY's help, additional meetings were held in Syracuse, and there eventually emerged a coordinated program of education in planning for the newly-created Madison County Planning Board. Under the specific leadership of the Syracuse district office of the State Office of Planning Coordination, this was seen as a pilot project in adapting many urban planning tools to a more rural situation. The educational programs were conducted by OPC, the staff of the Regional Planning Board, and Extension personnel from Cornell.

4. A task force on housing. The continued concern with housing in Syracuse and Central New York — reflected earlier in unfilled plans for a MIDNY regional housing conference in 1968 — eventually led to the planning of an "issue analysis session" by MIDNY and the OPC district office. The specific impetus was a new requirement from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development that all subsequent "701" plans include a section on housing. Advice was sought from representatives of the Home Builders Association, several groups concerned with housing for low-income people, the Farmers Home Administration, and professors of housing and real estate. The chief topic of discussion was the needs that the various agencies have for information that professional planning programs could provide. While no specific action resulted, the mix of participants in the discussion provided an exchange of ideas and opinions that was normally prevented by the fragmented nature of regional decision-making. "More practical planning programs may result from just this one meeting," the OPC director concluded. Additional meetings to allow for continuous communication were called for by several participants.

The group was reconvened later to discuss the proposed television series on the housing crisis with members of the Central New York Consortium and representatives from the TV station. Advice, suggestions, and criticism were offered, and plans for the series were modified in light of this assistance.
5. A task force on natural resource utilization, which consisted of professional planners from throughout the region and representatives of such natural resource agencies as the Soil Conservation Service, the State Conservation Department, Division of Fish and Wildlife, State College of Forestry, etc. This task force grew out of objections by various natural resource specialists, including some faculty members at Cornell, to the Regional Planning Board's land-use classification scheme for rural areas. An initial meeting, co-sponsored by MIDNY and the College of Forestry, served to open a dialogue between the natural resource specialists and the planners. It was apparent at this meeting that little communication had taken place previously between these two groups. The next step was a bus tour focusing on the impacts of urbanization on natural resources and rural land use, allowing further dialogue between the two groups. Discussion followed, and some modification of the planners' treatment of rural land use resulted. These meetings were also expected to continue.

To illustrate these activities more thoroughly, detailed case studies of two other task forces follow. They are:

6. A task force on solid waste disposal, and

7. A task force on poverty.

Task Force on Solid Waste Disposal

These particular task forces have been selected for detailed treatment because they tend to represent two ends of a continuum from specific to general issues. The solid waste disposal issue was quite specific. Legislation had been passed which placed restrictions on the disposal of solid waste and gave the State Health Department responsibility and expanded authority to force the closing of "open dumps." Open dumps, despite their contributions to health problems and environmental pollution, had been the rule for many years in most smaller towns in the state. Enforcement of the new legislation would force many of these towns to respond without any clear understanding of how most effectively to comply and where to obtain assistance in analyzing alternatives. Antagonism toward the Health Department was building rapidly in Central New York and nearby areas.

Interest in a task force was stimulated originally by the South Central New York Resource Conservation and Development Project in an adjacent region. Assistance was sought from other sources, including MIDNY. Several early small-group meetings with agency administrators and key local government officials were held to explore the situation. As Martin Anderson put it, "These meetings resulted in a recognition that the problem was considerably more complex than had been expected." Growing "polarization" between local governments and the Health Department was indicated in Extension Associate Lyle Raymond's report on one of these meetings:

Perhaps the most significant development was the complete absence of the representatives of the State Health Department (including local and district officials). . . . Alienation was freely expressed by those in attendance; opinions were given that this was symptomatic of the inconsistency of the policies of the State Health Department; that the State was not interested in local solutions to waste disposal problems. . . ; and that the State officials did not know what their policy was either and chose to absent themselves rather than be put on the hot seat.31

At the conclusion of several of these small-group meetings, a suggestion was made that Anderson organize a 15-county task force to delve into the problem and come forth with recommendations. Raymond was called upon to analyze the early meetings and review reports of studies made elsewhere. He concluded that, of the various types of problems — economic, technical, legal, social, and political — the biggest obstacles were the socio-political ones. He discovered that no single agency or organization had the resources or program scope to encompass the entire problem. At the same time, a number of local, state, and federal agencies were all identified as having responsibilities concerning one or more key factors. Hence, it was apparent that a cooperative effort would be needed.
Anderson enlisted the assistance of the OPC district office to organize the regional task force. An organizational meeting included representatives from OPC; the State Office for Local Government; the Health Department; an Onondaga County consultant on solid waste disposal; the Regional Planning Board; MIDNY; another Extension community resource development project in Chenango, Delaware, Otsego, and Schoharie Counties; the RC&D project; the district Technical Action Panel; and the Soil Conservation Service. Phil Peters of OPC summarized the meeting’s conclusions regarding the nature of the problem:

1. Cooperation. The burden of finding new means of refuse disposal falls upon the towns, but they are frequently incapable of solving the problems by themselves. Towns have been reluctant to work together, counties have not assumed responsibility, and citizens have been opposed to landfill sites near their personal property.

2. Money. For most towns refuse disposal by means other than open dumps will mean a considerable increase in cost.

3. Planning. In addition to technological research in disposal methods, planning is needed to determine landfill site locations, service areas, organizational arrangements, and transportation systems to minimize costs.

In contrast to the earlier aloofness of Health Department officials at higher levels, David Prosser of the department's Syracuse office said he would appreciate help from others present to carry out education, public relations, and planning roles. Peters and Prosser agreed to look further into planning and financing prospects from the Health Department and also from the State Pure Waters Authority (which was subsequently brought into the task force). Gregory Merriam of the Office for Local Government agreed to make presentations to county boards of supervisors on the subject of solid waste disposal and to provide continuing assistance to the boards; his office would be assisted by the Health Department and Cooperative Extension.

The first of these presentations was made in Oswego County in early February; program participants included the Health Department, OLG, the Pure Waters Authority, and the Technical Action Panel. Among the results was the formation of a Board of Supervisors environmental committee to work with OLG and other agencies. In the meantime, the Technical Action Panels in each county and at the district level began to play an active role in coordinating the activities of the various service agencies involved with certain aspects of the solid waste disposal problem. Cooperative Extension, including MIDNY, continued to play an active role in alerting others to the problem, the need for change, progress being made, and opportunities for taking advantage of programs.

The problem, of course, was by no means solved. Nevertheless, as Anderson noted, “a major effort is underway, coordinated by a task force at the district level.” The inter-agency cooperation in carrying out various tasks agreed upon by the task force, and the coordination and communication that had resulted, was clearly a vast improvement over the situation a half-year before, when the State Health Department was accused of deliberately staying away from a meeting “rather than be put on the hot seat.”

Task Force on Poverty

Unlike the solid waste disposal case, which took place in a situation where the issues were quite immediate and clear-cut, the task force on poverty worked in a very different environment. While there were certainly potentially explosive characteristics of the poverty issue, it had not created the heated interest that solid waste disposal had. While poverty might be a much more critical issue ultimately (the fact that it probably will was what stimulated MIDNY's interest in it), it had not emerged in any form specific enough for the poverty task force to move ahead as deliberately as the solid waste disposal group did.
MIDNY's recognition that poverty and related problems needed to be addressed by its community resource development program was first expressed in the 1968 regional conference. These annual conferences were seen by the staff as a means for orienting the following year's activities and alerting other groups in the region to the concerns MIDNY hoped to deal with. The first opportunity to take action on the poverty issue came following the appointment by the State University Chancellor of a Committee on the Rural Disadvantaged at the State College of Forestry. Anderson was in contact with the committee's chairman, Prof. Russell Getty, and a small conference on rural poverty in Central New York was proposed. Anderson, largely because of his extensive contacts in the region, was able to suggest an appropriate audience for the activity, an agenda, a list of speakers, and a recommended procedure.

Speakers at the conference included Extension Associate Alan J. Hahn, who attempted to summarize the information available on rural poverty in the region; a Supervisor from Cortland County, who cited citizen concerns over rising welfare costs and expressed a need for greater support for social casework; and the director of planning for the United Community Chest and Council of Syracuse and Onondaga County, who discussed the need for sweeping reform of the entire social welfare system. There was considerable discussion following the formal presentations. Hahn summarized the conference:

In conclusion, the discussion tended to revolve around social welfare programs, their faults and weaknesses, and possibilities for improvement. There was little attention to rural economic development and other possible solutions, although some of the participants pointed out that some profound changes in our approach to anti-poverty efforts are in order.

It appeared also that the problem of rural poverty, as opposed to urban poverty or poverty in general, was not well understood. Most of the participants tended to have urban orientations. Questions about the exact nature of rural poverty... could not be answered with confidence.

There were also questions about whether or not the rural poor really wanted help, or whether they were "poor" only by other people's standards. This question, like many others raised at the meeting, emphasized the need for anti-poverty efforts that are not just attempts by "us" to do favors for "them." 36

In the end, the group was left with little indication of what to do next. The proceedings of the conference were published by MIDNY and distributed to numerous agencies and regional leaders, and other materials on rural poverty — including both Hahn's and Raymond's reactions to the conference — were mailed to the "MIDNY Memo" mailing list of over 200 regional leaders. Anderson attempted to generate interest in a second task force — one on social services — which would initially study a recent report on social services in Onondaga County with the intention of encouraging action on its recommendations. 37 These attempts failed to bear fruit, however.

Eventually, Anderson took advantage of expressions of interest by the New York State Council of Churches, whose offices are in Syracuse. A small, informal meeting was held at the Church Center in April, co-sponsored by MIDNY and the Council of Churches, and attended by representatives of MIDNY, the Council, the regional branch of the New York State Office of Economic Opportunity, and the College of Forestry's Committee on the Rural Disadvantaged. Several others expressed interest, but did not attend. Jack Smith of OEO expressed frustration at yet another meeting while there continued to be no concrete programs. The meeting did serve to clarify the situations, difficulties, and limitations of the organizations represented and identified several fundamental problems in attacking
rural poverty — but still produced few definite ideas for future action. Anderson made several suggestions, however, as possible objectives for the task force:

1. providing ideas and information for the Council of Churches;
2. strengthening communication on the regional level (among the churches, OEO agencies, and Extension and other rural agencies);
3. identifying the roles of each agency or group in a unified effort;
4. exploring the possibilities of organization among the rural poor (cooperatives etc.);
5. identifying target audiences (these may be the poor themselves, or they may be professionals or the general public).38

Some of the difficulty in getting started seemed to arise from the obvious lack of knowledge and serious concern about the specifically rural aspects of poverty. Rev. Arthur Tennies of the Council of Churches agreed to assume primary leadership for further work by the task force, but redefined its subject matter from “rural poverty” to “poverty as a regional problem.”

The next meeting, with invitations sent to those who attended and those who expressed interest in the previous meeting, was attended by representatives of only the Council of Churches and the MIDNY Project! Nevertheless, positive steps were taken, for opportunities had been opened for the task force by other recent developments. The Regional Planning Board had recently contracted the United Community Chest and Council to conduct a social services inventory of the region. This group had then sought the assistance of many other groups, including MIDNY and Cooperative Extension, in identifying the social services provided by various agencies and organizations throughout the region.

Plans were made by MIDNY and the Council of Churches to sponsor another meeting of the poverty task force in the fall, at which time preliminary results from the social services inventory would be available. At the fall meeting, the task force would hear a report from the inventory staff, have an opportunity to react and criticize, and would also explore means of interacting with the regional planning effort in social services, which was intended to be a continuing operation.

At the end of MIDNY’s third year, this was the status of the task force on poverty. Unable to concentrate on a specific, concrete issue like that available to the solid waste disposal group, there was considerable fumbling. A beginning had been made, however, and the group was in a position to capitalize on opportunities, like that presented by the social services planning effort, as soon as they arose.

Analysis

It bears repeating that MIDNY’s task-force approach represented no new departure, but only a culmination of the Project’s trials-and-errors of the first two years. The approach reflects the belief the MIDNY staff shared with many others that rational, formalized, pre-planned, comprehensive approaches to coordinating the activities of other agencies are impossible — especially in complex, metropolitan areas like Central New York. The need for the coordination at which such attempts aim is unquestioned, and many efforts have been made. Unfortunately, most have failed.

Among the most widely publicized of these efforts have been the anti-poverty community action programs. In a review of programs of this type, Marris and Rein observed the failure of most of the more formal, more highly organized programs, and concluded that

... the aims of the ... projects may be better realized by discrete political opportunism than by attempting to induce a coalescence of power. Such a strategy does not create leadership, but unobtrusively supplies it, manipulating the existing structure. It demands no
prior commitment, and threatens no jurisdiction. It does not predetermine the targets of
reform, or theorize its plans, but exploits its chances.9

This was essentially the rationale for MIDNY's task forces.

The task forces generally began as small groups brought together to generate ideas about how to
tackle a problem of mutual concern. Efforts were made from the start to bring in the entire range of
individuals and groups with a stake in the issue; this not only expanded the range of ideas that could
be generated and possible counter-arguments that could be dealt with, but also reduced the potential
for future opposition from someone who was left out.

In cases like that of solid waste disposal, where the issues were fairly immediate and clear-cut,
ideas on how to proceed were easily produced once the appropriate parties were brought together. In
cases like that of the poverty task force, on the other hand, "next steps" might not have been so
obvious. At any rate, at each step, great stress was placed on allowing ample time for discussion and
questions. It was always part of MIDNY's unwritten philosophy that the primary source of education
is not lectures by "experts," but the exchange of information among diverse individuals discussing
common concerns. Furthermore, as Anderson has written:

"The discussion session is often a tip-off as to what the next move should be. If there is
reasonable agreement on certain points, the meeting should be summarized emphasizing
these points as feedback to those who attend, and perhaps others in the community."4U

Each succeeding step was built on previous ones, advancing or retreating or consolidating forces,
depending upon signs of success or failure. "From that point on," Anderson wrote, "a person may
need to 'play it by ear.'"41 The care given to "playing it by ear" was especially important in cases like
the poverty one, where opportunities to advance were relatively scarce. When chances, like the one
presented by the social service inventory group's request for assistance, come along, the task force had
to be ready and able to act.

The implication here that timing was important should not be missed. Anderson has been very
specific about it: "Timing of educational activities is highly critical - both to head off damaging
controversy and to gain greatest impact from activities undertaken."42 It is as if there was a precise
point in the development of an issue where an educational input could be effective. Issues probably
begin as needs felt by a single small group. Gradually, as this group agitates for support from other
groups, and as conditions giving rise to the issue grow more serious, interest and concern spread and
increase in intensity. Action taken too early by a project like MIDNY would fail by not attracting
sufficient interest. As interest in the issue grows, the right time arrives. It is important to strike at this
moment, for soon the issue becomes "public," sides are taken, and the matter quickly grows too
controversial for rational, impartial discussion. It has become a political issue, not an educational one.

Additional "principles" guiding MIDNY's use of task forces included careful attention to spon-
sorship and to communication. The question of sponsorship was considered especially important
where the risk of controversy was high. Multiple sponsorship by neutral and/or respected agencies
could help reduce suspicion and mistrust. "The more a person can involve others in co-sponsorship and
participation," Anderson has written, "the better are prospects for eliminating a stigma of trying to
sell a specific point of view."43

For related reasons, communication of task-force deliberations, conclusions, activities, and ac-
complishments was considered important. In Anderson's words again: "an effective way to build up
resistance to a new idea or effort is to fail to communicate the idea to local leaders."44 He admitted
that this approach runs the risk of community rejection of certain proposals, but at the same time it
generally enhances the likelihood of even better proposals, and widespread support and lasting success
when success is achieved. Therefore, continual efforts were made to keep task-force discussions open;
there were no attempts at secrecy or manipulations, and emphasis was on expanding rather than
contracting the scope of participation. A major role of MIDNY was to keep informed everyone the task-force members could identify as having a stake in the issue at hand. Its regular series of “MIDNY Memos,” mailed to a list of 200 regional leaders, was often used for these purposes.

“Organization and Communication” and Other Activities

In addition to task-force activities, three other functions absorbed much of MIDNY’s energies during its third year. One was the provision of a continual flow of information through the “MIDNY Memos” and through specific correspondence with planners, county agents, and other groups whenever there was information judged to be of interest or importance to them. Some of this was research findings and other information gleaned by the Extension Associates. Much of it was summaries of meetings, progress on certain activities, etc. Anderson was a master at summarizing. Not only was it a useful communication device, but it could also serve to redirect other people’s thinking, call attention to points or issues the staff felt should be emphasized, or guide the groups past obstacles that might hinder cooperation or resolution of a problem.

Another activity was the sponsorship of the Project’s third annual regional conference, “Regional Solutions for Community Problems,” emphasizing the processes of communication, coordination, and cooperation.

The final major activity included what Anderson eventually came to call “organization and communication.” Involved were continuing contacts with a very large and always growing number of agencies, organizations, and individuals in the region. The contacts ranged from the Metropolitan Development Association and the Educational and Cultural Center of Onondaga and Oswego Counties to the Soil Conservation Service and the Society of American Foresters. Through these contacts, Anderson managed to keep abreast of nearly all critical problems and concerns in the region—an important step in keeping MIDNY’s activities immediately relevant to important regional issues. It also allowed him to perform valuable services to the groups with which he maintained contacts: informing them of needs, problems, and opportunities of interest to them; offering assistance whenever possible; helping them establish liaisons with other groups with mutual concerns; etc.

Occasionally, these contacts of Anderson’s would result in small group meetings to deal with specific problems. Examples from the Project’s 1968-69 quarterly reports include:

... small-group discussion to plan a comprehensive long-range educational program in soils interpretation.

... a meeting for key persons in the region to hear a progress report on commercial farmland mapping in Cayuga County and discuss plans for expansion of this activity.

... personal contact with administration of five programs to plan for a small-group session looking into the problems of increasing welfare needs and rising costs to local government.

... consulted with the community relations director for (a) proposed new town development by (the State Urban Development Corporation) in Onondaga County (—a potentially controversial project).

Most of these meetings were ad hoc, and the groups usually disbanded as soon as the specific, immediate problem was solved. Sometimes, however, they would grow into new task forces.

Still other “organization and communication” activities included:

... attendance of the spring and fall ... Syracuse Metropolitan Leadership Conferences; participation in Syracuse University Thursday Morning Roundtables; appearances
from time to time at the Cortland Community Roundtable; attendance at Regional Planning Board annual and quarterly meetings; occasional attendance at the ... RC&D steering committee meetings; participation in the district TAP; attendance at the MDA annual meetings; frequent attendance at the Water Resource Commission board meetings; and annual meetings of county Extension Associations as feasible.87

As Anderson has noted, "Impacts from these types of activities are difficult to evaluate, but seem to be important in order to maintain productive working relationships with many other agencies and organizations. ..."48 That the efforts were often successful was indicated by the growing tendency for agencies in the region to look specifically to MIDNY for information, advice, and assistance. The Project office appeared to be emerging as something of a "communications center" for much of the regional decision-making system.

Further Analysis

MIDNY's approach — the task forces, the flow of information, the annual regional conferences, and Anderson's "organization and communication" work — was clearly a response to the nature of regional decision-making, as described in Part II of this account.

The approach employed little of the social psychological methods of "leadership development" and other tools familiar in community development programs in underdeveloped countries abroad or underdeveloped areas at home. As noted in Part II, there was no shortage of leaders in Central New York. Although the problem might not have been a surfeit of leaders, it could at least be said that there were too many leaders in proportion to the amount of effective communication and coordination binding them together. There might have been problems of apathy, powerlessness, and frustration among the region's poor, and I will return to this point in Part V. However, even that is a little doubtful, for the Syracuse ghettos certainly had their articulate spokesmen, too. The ghettos' problem was more likely the lack of anyone listening. At any rate, the problem MIDNY saw the opportunity to tackle was one of bringing existing leaders together, and not one of creating leaders that did not already exist.

Secondly, MIDNY found relatively little need to bring in "experts" to inform and educate local and regional leaders. This does not mean that MIDNY's meetings were only a "pooling of ignorance," for knowledge, like leadership, was also abundant within the region. And as in the case of leadership, the need in the case of knowledge was to bring together the people with the knowledge and the people with the problems. Occasionally, there were needs for experts, and sometimes MIDNY could provide them easily through its ties with Cornell. This was especially true in matters of agriculture, natural resources, and rural phenomena in general. (Often, too, this and other expert assistance had to be interpreted for local consumption, and MIDNY's Extension Associates were often able to help.) Most often, though, the need was simply to re-establish the horizontal linkages among leaders and between leaders and experts that specialization and fragmentation had destroyed.

Lastly, this bringing-together, this coordination could not be brought about by making MIDNY or any other agency into an umbrella organization that would specify the precise parts of the total job every other agency in the region would play. This fact is so often misunderstood by those who propose, those who establish, and those who criticize projects with objectives like MIDNY's. The evaluation of the MIDNY Project itself by the Inspector General's office was a case in point. The auditors consistently leveled criticism at the Project's failure to assume a more positive role in coordinating and leading the region:

... It was intended (but not realized) that all available agencies and groups be pooled to insure a more comprehensive understanding of the area's problems and needs. This enables the development of a comprehensive plan of operations which outlines the actions and resources needed to insure total resource development.
In our opinion, the orderly accomplishments of an endeavor with the magnitude of MIDNY requires the mind and labor of all groups. Comprehensive planning should be undertaken to determine each agency's role for total involvement and accomplishment.49

Unfortunately for the auditors' position, however, such advice was impossible to follow. As Anderson wrote in rebuttal:

The auditors' references to the need for MIDNY to get all of the agencies and organizations in the region together to bring about coordination and determine areas of responsibility indicate a total lack of understanding of the region. Some executive secretaries of organizations with which we work ... draw salaries several times that of our Extension agents and specialists. I doubt whether they would be terribly impressed by such a blunt approach. Organizations respond favorably to working with us, particularly on an ad hoc basis. ... We can only function effectively by finding our niche in the complicated maze of organizations and operating from that position.50

Finding that niche was exactly what MIDNY had begun to do during its third year.

Decision-making in Central New York was an on-going system of demands and responses, counter-demands and accommodations, pressures and opposing pressures, decisions and protests and new decisions. There was no clear-cut power structure — no sharp distinction between ruler and ruled. Like everywhere else, some got more and some got less (and some, unfortunately, got much less). But power and decision-making were vastly complicated; they took place at a great number of decision centers; and the participants were different in each issue. No one knew what the next critical issue would be, where it would arise, what course it would take, or who would resolve it, or how.

An organization like MIDNY could not possibly get on top of a system like that and lead it. So it attempted to get inside instead — and push where it could.

V. CONCLUSIONS

This account began with references to the stresses and strains tearing at our society in the latter 1960's. Three years' experience by a pilot community resource development project in Central New York was then described. What remains is to face up to some questions about how the MIDNY experience stacks up against the problems the Central New York region has been facing. More broadly, what hope does this analysis suggest for community resource development in general as a cure for social ills?

It would be naive, of course, to suggest that MIDNY's progress in the face of staggering social problems has been significant. Nevertheless, when compared with doing nothing, the experience seems more encouraging.51 At least, it suggests some hope... and it suggests that if every community could have someone playing the same roles, one might eventually be able to look upon the state of the union with more confidence. These roles — all revolving around a broadly-defined concept of community education — include informal coordination, gentle pushing and prodding, creating forums for exchange of information and ideas, and doing all this with careful attention to timing and the importance of the issues.

This conclusion, it should be noted, is not that the MIDNY staff has found the answer; but only that three years of careful looking did not prove that there is no answer. More looking is in order. Conclusions to an earlier report on the MIDNY experience still hold: "... the staff would ... be the first to admit that they know much more about what not to do than what to do instead."52 Progress is indicated by the fact that they would admit it a little less readily now than then.
Two dangers, however, seem to stand in the way of optimal continued looking. One is what Marris and Rein call "bureaucratic introversion"; the second is one of concentrating so heavily on coordination of groups within the decision-making system that one forgets about those who are still outside.

"Bureaucratic Introversion." It is said that the fundamental objective of nearly every organization is survival; and the most obvious way to insure survival is apparently to gain control over all relevant aspects of the organizational environment. This is done in two ways: (a) an organization (like individuals) specializes and narrows the range of its relevant environment, and (b) it seeks to enclose the relevant environment within its organizational domain. The result is that the decision-making system of a region like Central New York gets divided up among its many agencies and organizations. Each organization takes its own specialized portion, which becomes its domain, and other organizations are generally excluded from involvement in those concerns. Boundary disputes occur, of course, but over time bargains, compromises, and agreements are worked out, and there is little overlap. Each organization has its own specialized concerns, nearly complete control over those aspects of regional decision making assigned to it, a guarantee that other organizations will not interfere, and at least implicit agreements that it will not interfere in the domains of others. One has control over one's survival because one has internalized the factors impinging on survival and excluded others from interfering.

Once this is understood, it is easy to see why there is such resistance to formal attempts to coordinate by the imposition of a separate umbrella agency. This would require that the various organizations yield part of their control over their own destinies to the new organization, and few organizational leaders are willing to accept this kind of insecurity and instability. What Marris and Rein call "bureaucratic introversion" is among the negative consequences. It refers to the tendency for agencies to develop their own specific programs, settle into routines, and subsequently resist any efforts to alter, broaden, or coordinate their activities. These are the kinds of pathologies in organizations that projects like MIDNY (and also the community action programs Marris and Rein studied) were presumably designed to fight.

There are two implications for operations like MIDNY. First, if they are to play any kind of coordinating role, they will have to take this defensiveness — this "bureaucratic introversion" — into account. This demands subtlety, tact, flexibility, and a readiness to adjust one's own goals to those of other organizations. Improvement in regional decision-making — coordination — is not brought about by forthrightly leading, but through a process of give-and-take guided by a judicious amount of conscious direction.

Second, the gains that can be made in this way will be sacrificed as soon as a project like MIDNY itself becomes defensive and introverted — falling into the same inflexible, unimaginative, tightly organized routines as the agencies it is trying to help. Marris and Rein suggest the type of organization needed:

Since we are often very uncertain of the consequences of social action, we need to reduce as far as we can the unknown factors relevant to a decision. The shorter the span of action under review, the less we do not know, and the quicker we shall discover the wisdom of our decisions. Hence, it is easier to make rational choices if a plan of action is broken down into a series of proximate steps, and the plan is open to revision as each step is completed. As it will be continually reinterpreted in the light of experience, a precise and inflexible definition of the ultimate goal would only be an encumbrance.

Of course, MIDNY's administrators, at Cornell and in Washington have their own commitments to survival, and their projects must meet certain standards for congressional approval and the like. Among the results can be the encouragement, or permission at least, of "bureaucratic introversion" on MIDNY's own part. While overall goals and objectives can be expressed in general terms (as they have
been earlier in this paper), statements of goals and objectives specific enough to actually guide a project like MIDNY are, as Marris and Rein indicate, impossible to state in advance. Nevertheless, MIDNY, like the rest of Extension, is asked to prepare and publish plans of work for a minimum of a year in advance. It is expected to set fairly precise objectives, work toward them, and preferably carry the rest of the region along with it. It is hoped that its objectives and activities will be clear enough and definite enough that they can be rationally — and, if possible, even quantitatively — evaluated. The project should have “identity,” control over its own destiny, and it probably should be careful of overstepping into other organization’s domains.

There are clearly inconsistencies here, although in all fairness it must be admitted that Extension administration at Cornell is not unaware of the realities and difficulties. MIDNY’s exploratory, experimental nature has been fully recognized. For MIDNY and all other Extension programs, the more rigid planning, programming, and reporting procedures have been avoided or relaxed. My purpose, in fact, is not to condemn the efforts that have been made, or to close my eyes to certain undeniable needs for information and evidence of results. My only question is: Do we further the cause of community resource development most by modifying old methods and procedures, or by inventing new ones?

Bureaucratic neatness is useful when the work is routine. When even the specific goals and objectives are known and agreed upon, a hierarchical organization is a fine invention for achieving them. But in truly relevant community resource development work, only general goals and objectives — and not the all-important specific ones — can be known in advance.56 “Social action,” according to Marris and Rein, “is . . . more an endless exploration than the search for solutions to specific problems. We know where we start from, and in which direction we are heading, but we cannot know where we will end up.” 57 As stated in a MIDNY memorandum on objectives:

... Objectives can not be stated clearly and precisely. This is true for a number of reasons, among them:

a. The Project is expected to be relevant to felt needs in the . . . region, and these felt needs are frequently changing; thus, the Project’s objectives must likewise change.

b. Because of the degree of organizational development in Central New York, the Project, to be effective, must mesh its activities with those of many other organizations; consequently, the Project’s objectives must shift from time to time to correspond with the objectives of other organizations with which it works.

c. As new needs arise, work with new agencies must be undertaken, and objectives must again be reconsidered.

d. The complexity of the region makes it impractical to study it and understand it in sufficient detail to foresee every possible worthwhile objective; objectives must be based on partial knowledge and partial understanding, and revised as knowledge and understanding increases or changes.

e. The range of possible objectives is so great that priorities must be set; these priorities will shift as conditions and felt needs in the region shift; those objectives of sufficiently high priority to be pursued will, therefore, change frequently and unpredictably.

f. Finally, it is simply impolitic to express some objectives.58

In short, what is needed is an extremely flexible form of organization — one that can set directions and follow them without getting committed to them. It must not have too many goals of its own because it must constantly adjust its activities to the diverse goals of other agencies and organizations.
Above all, it needs tremendous freedom of operation. (Community resource development cannot, for example, be restricted to agriculture or natural resources.)

In many ways, Extension has definite advantages — advantages deriving from the complexity, looseness, and flexibility of its own organization. Most of these advantages come by accident, however, and not by design. If community resource development is to be a positive, serious attempt to help solve major urban and social problems — and not just a stopgap device to save Extension's neck in the face of a dwindling farm population — then the encouragement of new, flexible forms of organization and methods of evaluation should be a chief object of Extension administration's attention. This could literally make the difference between community resource development being part of the solution or part of the problem.

"Stable Unrepresentation." The second danger facing community resource development programs like MIDNY is that of failing to recognize the phenomenon sociologist William Gamson calls "stable unrepresentation." In decision-making systems characterized by Lindblom's "partisan mutual adjustment," no group can expect to be satisfied all the time. Some attempts to influence decisions are successful, and some are not; but to the extent that the system works properly, every group should expect to do tolerably well, over the long run at least. In other words, if a group's interests are not represented in some decisions, they should be in others.

However, some people are "stably unrepresented" in that their interests, needs, and wants are practically never taken into account. People can be represented in two ways: (a) through membership in an interest group that participates in the decision-making system and has a measure of influence, or (b) through the attention paid by elected officials to the voters, of which they are a part. Gamson says that the American political system functions to discourage political solidarity and organization among unrepresented groups and to beat back their attempts to move into the system of effective decision-makers and interest groups. At the present time, the most obvious of these unrepresented groups are the poor, the blacks, and other minorities. In Gamson's words:

Examples of forces which discourage solidarity and initial political organization include: (1) lack of access to information about the effects of political decisions; (2) lack of politically experienced and skilled leadership; (3) the "culture of subordination" . . . , including self-blame ideologies which locate sources of dissatisfaction in the individual's own shortcomings or in irremediable states of nature and society rather than in politically remediable features of the social system; (4) low rates of interaction and organizational participation which might encourage the development of solidarity; (5) lack of financial resources; (6) pursuit of personal rather than group interest . . . ; (7) lack of personal trust toward each other among members of the (unrepresented) group; . . . (8) "opiates" which divert energies from political paths (and (9) the weakness of these groups as potential coalition partners for already represented groups).

A great deal of the current agitation in community politics is a product of efforts by unrepresented groups to gain representation. Groups that did not participate in the past — for want of education, information, awareness, self-confidence, or whatever disadvantage — are now demanding a place in the bargaining. These trends reached a fever pitch in the community action programs and have persisted and spread in Model Cities, local education issues, housing, and many others. The question is no longer whether or not these groups eventually will become part of the decision-making system, but whether they will do it quietly or noisily.

It is as if decisions we have always thought were democratic have proven to have been democratic only for the relatively better-off segments of the population who have been concerned with "public affairs." In a sense, the radicals are right when they say democracy has been a sham. The turmoil in our cities makes plain the magnitude and variety of interests that have been left out until recently.
The problem for community resource development programs is that it is still so easy to think one is including a "broad cross-section of the community" and yet be leaving out those still poorly organized, rather inarticulate, and perhaps uncouth groups that have for so long been "decided for" rather than "with." No community resource development project can really call itself successful without constantly asking itself if there are not still other groups, interests, and points of view that need to be allowed into the deliberations of its educational activities — or perhaps even helped in. As the 1969 MIDNY regional conference was cautioned:

Let's not be too hasty about congratulating ourselves. We will have to be certain that when decision-making, coordination, cooperation, communication, and so on gets easier and smoother — it is not easier and smoother because we are talking to ourselves and shutting out of our conversations a major part of the population.64

If these two dangers — of "bureaucratic introversion" and "stable unrepresentation" — can be avoided, then Extension's community resource development programs MIDNY included, just may make a contribution toward bringing and holding the American society of the 1970's together. It has the advantages of at least a half-hearted willingness to undertake the job, a tradition of bringing together diverse groups (if only professors and farmers), and an organization with a representative — the county agent — in almost every county in the nation. This last advantage, a man constantly on the scene, where the action is, may well prove to be Extension's greatest advantage.

If Extension fails, the job is likely to prove important enough that somebody else will have to do it.
FOOTNOTES


8. Martin, Munger, and others, pp. 334-341; Freeman, p. 62. MDA is an organization of key business and industrial leaders oriented toward industrial and other physical development of the Syracuse area.


11. A Profile of Central New York, pp. 35-38.


15. Some of this shift of functions from city to county is described in: Martin, Munger, and others, op. cit.

16. For the original Project proposal, see: Five-County Community and Resource Development Proposal (Ithaca: N.Y.S. Cooperative Extension, 1966). Much of the early goal-setting was done, however, in meetings between the Project staff and Extension administration after the staff itself had been hired.


19. There were personnel difficulties involved here which I will not discuss. The central thrust of the Project and the validity of this account are not seriously affected.


24. Ibid., p. 6.

25. Memorandum in the author’s files.

26. Ibid.


28. Ibid.

29. Memorandum in the author’s files.


31. Memorandum in the author’s files.

32. Memorandum in the author’s files.

34. Communities of Tomorrow, cited in footnote 2.


36. Memorandum in the author's files.


38. Memorandum in the author's files.


40. Memorandum in the author's files.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.


47. Memorandum in the author's files.

48. Ibid.

49. Rosen, Audit of the MIDNY Project, pp. 8-10.

50. Letter in the author's files.

51. There are, of course, serious evaluation problems in community resource development projects. I am afraid that many of the cases described in this report sound like a lot of meetings and a lot of hot air, with maybe not much action. The MIDNY staff sensed that much was being accomplished, but the progress — if any — was mostly in people's attitudes and the potential for future change. And these things, as any program evaluator knows, are hard to measure. Most measurable results, unfortunately, take more than three years to happen.


53. Marris and Rein, op. cit.

55. Marris and Rein, p. 204.

56. Discussion of these issues is always muddied by confusion over definitions of “goals” and “objectives.” General goals such as “increasing the effectiveness of comprehensive planning” or “bringing appropriate groups together to discuss issues and problems of mutual concern” can be stated, of course. But I question whether they are concrete and specific enough to be of value in project evaluation. And I am sure they are of little value in actually guiding staff members of projects like MIDNY; what these latter individuals need are clear and precise ideas about what specific issues to tackle, what specifically to do about them, and whom specifically to work with. These kinds of objectives, I am convinced, cannot be known in advance.

57. Marris and Rein, p. 204.

58. Memorandum, by the author, in the author's files.


61. See the section, “Partisan Mutual Adjustment,” in Part II, above.


