The author takes a look at the free enterprise system as it is practiced in the United States, and concludes that it does not result in equal opportunity for all citizens. Deplorable social and economic inequities are examined. The poor, according to the author are discriminated against in terms of health factors, housing, employment, income and power. Following from this he assumes that the current system is ineffectual and must be modified or completely changed so all people can enjoy it. As a possible means of change, riots and revolution are considered: (1) what are they; (2) what are their goals; and (3) can they work in the United States. The author contends that the America cultural make-up would not, at this time, support total revolution. His answer, and the one for which he builds a case, is a drastic modification of the free-enterprise system, with the government remodifying the system through the legislative process. To those who say that the revolution is here or coming soon, he responds "no," without, however, ruling out that possibility should drastic changes not be forthcoming. (TL)
"In certain circumstances, violence...is the only possible way of setting the scales of justice right again."

-Hannah Arendt

"Reflections on Violence"

By,

Randy Grossman
Recent phenomena of violence and radical tactics around the country and at the University of Michigan have once again implored us to consider these violent means as a valid option of social change. What will the full bring? I personally would say, philosophically speaking, that violence will never lead to a meaningful change. By meaningful, I mean a change which is stable and not conducive to more disruption. Furthermore, a meaningful change would be beneficial to a majority of the people; certainly, it can be argued that revolutionary change can, in effect, change only the people controlling the hierarchies of government and, at least in its initial stages, be as totalitarian as the incumbent government. However, what are people to do when the needs for social change are so great that they cannot be overlooked, and yet their government or institution who controls them refuses to make changes in a rapid effective manner? That is, what recourse is taken when the poor see that "working through the system" does not work? These questions will, in the following paper, be discussed to see if the needs for change are truly poignant, and what the possibilities of change are, for it may be that my hopes are wrong and revolution is a proper mode of change. It is, however, one thing to discuss revolution in a theoretical form of reference, and quite another to say that it is a probable and relevant means of change. In other words, I am questioning as to whether "the revolution is coming."
In order to discuss these questions of need and possibility, the influence of economic and political ideologies on our capitalistic system must be dealt with. This method of approach is used because if we are to put the blame of poverty on our industrial capitalistic system, we must see what the historical influences of this system were. We may see wherein, historically and philosophically, the blame lies. Then the possibilities and needs to modify our thinking may be clearly seen.

Let us first look at some of the basic ideas behind the free enterprise system. We are all socialized into thinking and believing in the American dream: that every person, no matter how poor, can have an equal opportunity to succeed and gain sufficient materials and spiritual growth. Thus everyone competes and profits from the system. In fact, however, this notion is factually incorrect, but, and most important, it is the view that most people in a poverty situation believe in the "American way" and place any blame for failure on themselves. They feel they have not worked hard enough. This idea then of everyone "boosting oneself up by one's bootstraps" is a very ingrained one in American thinking. But how did it get there, and what is wrong with it?

We can look at Darwin and his treatise on the "Origin of the Species" (1859). This biological theory, which emphasizes animals in struggle for survival by what Darwin calls "selective reproduction," really expresses the hypothesis that the strong will
survive and the weak will not. This thinking revived some of the notions that were familiar to the British philosophical tradition and expressed most distinctly the thinking of Hobbs in his analysis of the origin of social organizations. Hobbs argues in his "Elements Philosophicae de Cive" (1642), that "everyone is engaged in fighting everyone else." He further reasons that man is motivated by egotism, and, thus, must realize a social contract if any security for the future is to be guaranteed. Obviously this thinking can be extrapolated to lead to the establishment of social classes and "a justification of aristocratic hierarchies." When Darwin's ideas of the "survival of the fittest" and the "struggle for survival" became perpetrated from their biological origin to be applied to the behavioral and social sciences, the "successful survivor" was bound to become the white, middle-class adult most likely to be engaged in manufacturing or business enterprises. This view then tended to make deviant those persons who were not white and middle class, and they were placed on a rank far below this standard. They became, in Kipling's words, "the white man's burden."

Thus this view which was popular all over Europe, but for the most part in England, was actually refining a system of free competitive enterprise in which the middle and upper classes would benefit and the lower class would not, and this may be the key point. It may be that this view of man as a competitive,
striving, egocentric individual is one of utter truth; however, in terms of an effective prototype for politico-economic systems, it may be very lacking because of its gross inequities toward the poor. In terms of Bentham's utilitarian idea that a system should, above all, do the greatest good for the greatest numbers, a free enterprise system is successful. However, to what degree is this so? Could not, with all the resources that are accrued in such a system, more be done for the poor? This is a key question for our capitalistic system and perhaps one that must soon be dealt with in the future. This warning will become more apparent as this paper progresses, because it seems to be increasingly obvious that the goals of such a system, echoed by the philosophy behind them, are ones that do not serve in a truly pragmatic manner. It is expected in such a system as ours that every member of our society will work vigorously toward these abstract goals of material success, but if he is unsuccessful, as some will be, then the fallacy is seen. To this "failure" is awarded the respect of abject disdain. Thus the system is unpragmatic in the sense that there is too little done for those people who are not competitive enough. They are never really given a chance to "get their piece of capitalism," and upper classes are always keeping them in their impoverished state. In effect the ills of this uncompromising philosophy, which underlies our politico-economic system, are shown very clearly by Francis Galton, Darwin's cousin, in his book *Hereditary Genius* (1869), when he says:
It may seem monstrous that the weak should be crowded out by the strong, but it is still more monstrous that the races best fitted to play their part on the stage of life should be crowded out by the incompetent, the ailing, and the desponding (p. 343).

We may see then that this thinking that has influenced our western competitive life styles is truly not only barbarous, but syllogistic. It is absurd to think that a government, which in less than two hundred years has become the strongest economic and political force in the world, cannot compromise on its rigid, aggressive, success-oriented philosophy and make the system more relevant to everyone. It is a great tribute to capitalism that such a high degree of success has been attained; however, more can be done and more must be done to insure that more opportunities for material gain will be provided for those in need of it. In other words, it is my contention that the system must be modified so that the poor may be helped by the more successful so that the gap in the wealth may be narrowed. In short, the American dream is a dream, but it does not have to be that way. This whole realm of thought may seem a bit idealistic and naive, but there is a dire need for such modification.

If the American dream is to make any intrinsic sense whatever, these needs must be met in such areas as the trades, business, and education. It has long been known that in the trades and business there has been subtle, but ample discrimination. It is in this latter field, which has traditionally been regarded as one of equal
opportunities, that we now see a question being raised at this university as to whether there are such opportunities. Even in education we are seeing that some priorities must be altered. If these "sacrifices" are not made, our system will become even more irrelevant to those suffering from it now, and they may then realize that the American dream is truly just a vision. At that point it is then feasible to consider revolution as a means of change, assuming of course there is support by the middle class.

However, before discussing the possibilities of revolution as a means of change, it is best to paint, much more vividly, the picture of the deplorable conditions that contribute to the urban crisis. There are a number of ways in which this substantiation could be initiated. We will first consider some salient social and economic goals which are deeply embedded in American ideals: educational attainment, income, and employment. All these goals present us with objective measures from which we can plainly see that certain Americans are not enjoying them on an equally relative basis.

Let us examine that all-important American ideal of education for all. Historically speaking, Killingsworth reports that school attendance rates and the years of completed education by adults have been higher in urban than in rural areas. Thus they have been higher in the North and West than in the South. "Hence, Negro migration patterns have strongly favored improvement in educational attainment. And there has been improvement." However, the chief
question we should ask is how much relative improvement has taken place. We will then be able to see if the great emphasis on educational improvement as a long range means of ameliorating the social status of nonwhites is occurring. On close examination of the facts we see little optimism for the justification of this American maxim.

It is true that between 1940 and 1960 the median years of education completed by the adult nonwhite population rose by nearly one-half (from 5.8 to 8.2 years). But the white majority was also improving its educational attainment during those years; the white median rose from 8.7 to 10.9 years. Thus, after two decades of heavy migration, the white-nonwhite differential had been reduced only from 2.9 to 2.7 years, and the nonwhite of 1960 was still substantially below the white median of twenty years before.

It is certain that these facts point to a rather discouraging situation, one that may be thought of as quite substantiating my hypothesis. Here are the poor of our country who are supposed to be getting an equal chance; and yet in such a highly held American value as a good education, they are far below the rest of our society, i.e. the white middle class, as Riegel would have it (see earlier section of paper).

Let us look next at the income of our nonwhite poor as compared with the white element of our society. Here again, there have been what appears to be tremendous improvements both in absolute and relative terms to the white majority. In 1939, Negro families
and, individual had a median annual income from wages and salaries of \$489. This figure was 37\% of the white median. Improvements ensued, and by 1963 the median income for Negroes was increased to \$3,328, a figure that was 53\% of the white median. In closer examination of the figures we see that these ostensible improvements were very misleading.

...The period of most rapid progress in closing the relative income gap was between 1939 and 1954. By the later year, the Negroes had achieved a ratio of 56\%. Over the next dozen years, that ratio was not exceeded; in fact, in most years the ratio was slightly lower, as in 1963. Improvements have actually been very stagnant, strikingly so in recent years.

Another way to examine the problems of relative differences is to examine income by region. One investigator, Alan Sachelder, has studied the changes in income from all sources on a regional basis between 1949 and 1959. His data showed that during that ten year period, the white-Negro income ratio for the country's different regions did not change, but within each of the major regions the income of Negro men, relative to that of their white counterparts, was significantly less.

Poverty itself is a relative concept, and income ratios may be looked at as a measure of relative deprivation. We can objectively look at poverty by taking into consideration the poverty line. This is a measure "which most Americans accept as the minimum necessary to meet basic needs in a contemporary society."
The Council of Economic Advisers has, based on 1962 prices, set this figure at $3,000.\textsuperscript{15} This figure shows that poverty among nonwhite families has decreased in postwar years. "In 1947, two-thirds of all nonwhite families lived in poverty; by 1962, less than half (44\%) fell below the poverty line."\textsuperscript{16} Demography was also a variable during this time span. Nonwhite families were increasing at about twice the rate of white families; moreover, white families were moving out of poverty at a faster rate. Thus by 1962 nonwhite families were a larger proportion (22\%) of all poor families than they were in 1947.\textsuperscript{17} We can see that while it appears that nonwhites have significantly freed themselves from poverty incomes, the opposite is the case when we compare them proportionally to the whites suffering from poverty. The relative figure again tells the true story.

Employment, our third area of consideration, is very revealing too. Under our system, every American should have an equal chance for employment. However, nonwhites unquestionably suffer from unemployment at greater rates than whites. "In the view of a great many people, specialists as well as laymen, racial discrimination is the principal source of economic disadvantage for Negroes."\textsuperscript{18} Historically we can easily view this fact by realizing that for two and one half centuries the entire Negro population was held in slavery. When they were finally "freed," they were obviously at a great disadvantage. One must realize that American slaves, unlike slaves in other parts of the world, were also socially very
limited, they were mechanically denied such human rights as education, marriage, family life, and property rights. In essence, they were institutionalized into subhuman status. Therefore, Negroes are substantially behind whites in most economic measures because they were behind when they were emancipated. It is true that they have made enormous progress toward true freedom, but whites have improved their own status as well.

We can now clearly see that racial discrimination has played an active part in depriving Negroes of their economic dues, including employment. Economic progress for Negroes was greatest from 1940 to 1953. Since then relative unemployment for Negroes has risen, ... and the narrowing of the relative Negro-white income gap has slowed or stopped. As before, we can see that we are in a dangerous stagnant situation, and we have not heeded history's warning. Even in our present situation some industries and firms employ fewer Negroes than other industries and firms with comparable needs.

Probably the best explanation of the adverse situation of unemployment is presented in Table 1. (see next page) It should be noted that these figures relate to men and women of working age. They definitely show that since the late 1940's there has been a significant increase in the relative unemployment rates of nonwhites as compared to whites, and there has been little apparent change since 1955. These figures also conceal the different employment experiences of teenagers. The unemployment rate for non-
## Table 1

White and Nonwhite Unemployment Rates, 1948-66

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Nonwhite</th>
<th>Ratio Nonwhite/White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>223</td>
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<tr>
<td>1956</td>
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<td>8.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>214</td>
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<td>1964</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>9.8</td>
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<td>1965</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
white teenagers in 1948 was only slightly higher than that of the white teenage rate. However, consider that in 1954 the nonwhite rate had changed to about one third higher than the white rate; and, furthermore, after 1958, the nonwhite rate has increased to twice the white teenage rate. Moreover, both of these rates were markedly higher in the 1960's than in the previous decade. Again, we have another deplorable situation.

This picture is cursory, but it does show that the poor are not receiving equal opportunities in terms of health factors, housing, employment, income, and, most important, power. In view of this truly bleak situation, we must assume that the system is truly un efficacious and must be modified or completely changed so that all the people can enjoy it. For the sake of theory, let us speculate on such violence as riots and revolution, as a means of change.

Foremost, let us become familiar with nomenclature. Riots will be defined as extreme uncoordinated acts of group violence resulting from repeated failure of civil rights and civil disobedience goals. Thus, riots stem from intense conflicts within the social and political value systems that exist. If we consider further the breakdown in urban systems and the great disparities of the poor, the need for violent action becomes apparent. What else is left if change does not come through the system? Thus it may be that violence may have some form of justification, as Hannah Ardent points out, "under certain circumstances violence... is the only possible way of setting the scales of justice right.
again."

The needs are very apparent for violent action in America, but what about the possibilities and probabilities of such action? To discover these, we must look deeper into the situation. According to Conant, the possibilities for a riot are quite high when a community is aggravated to a threshold point. He points out that in the first phase of a riot the "precipitating incident", a relatively insignificant event can touch off the violent action. Such an event could be a white policeman arresting a black youth. This action can then work itself up to the "Roman Holiday" stage, as Conant calls it, in which rocks and bottles are thrown by people and cheers arise as "hits" are scored on white stores and police cars. Finally, in the fourth or "siege" phase, there is simply no communication between the rioters and police. The degree of polarization is too high. At this stage State and Federal troops are called in while snipers attack and fire bombs are being exploded.

As more communities become incensed, this form of violent action becomes increasingly probable. But is this action really effective? I think in terms of long-range change, the answer is no. What a riot does accomplish seems to be the initiation of some very temporal and petty demands to, in the end, appease the poor. More important, riots seem to cause the middle class to grow increasingly reactionary and more fervent in their decadent middle class values, which in essence is the whole problem. My
argument is actually that riots do not create meaningful changes. However, unless these kinds of changes are brought about, the probabilities for riots will increase.

Our next question is that of revolution -- what are its needs, possibilities, and probable means for concrete change now? To answer this question, it is necessary to first discuss what revolution is and how it comes about. Revolution may be seen as a complete overthrow of a system of government by very violent means. Revolution of this kind occurs, as in riots, as a result of dissatisfaction on the part of the governed with the realization of their social needs. The difference here is that the frustrations are so great, people are willing to risk their lives for this total change. In a riot, usually, this is not the case.

As for the need for a revolution, I can only highly speculate. This question again depends on finer definition of revolution. As it stands now, revolution is a very hypothetical concept. It can exist in a violent form and get to be very ubiquitous in intent. It is very possible to imagine a violent revolution that seeks a strict scientific social end in the way Marx theorizes socialism. It is less possible to picture a violent revolution with the intent of a "benevolent" form of modified capitalism (such as I have earlier suggested), in which the poor are given greater opportunity to enter the system. I see the nature of revolution as being one of such intense hatred for the present system that it simply seeks to completely destroy the system it
is rebelling against. In other words, I see this latter possibility of a revolution as contradictory to the definition of revolution.

Let us try to put these two different forms of revolution into the context of our society to answer this question of need. First, because we have a highly industrialized culture, there is an extreme amount of conditioning for the "achievement motive" in our society.* Thus, I do not feel that a revolution leading to a socialistic form of government that itself may lead into a communist orientation would fit well in our society. Our society, as it is, is diametrically opposed to this intention. Furthermore, I cannot visualize a "benevolent" revolution in this country, because I feel that if there were a revolution, its intent would be a total change.

Still the need for change exists, and some radical thinkers feel that this need is so great that total revolution is the one and only answer. They see no help for the poor by working through the system, because that method has failed repeatedly. They see better treatment for the poor by some socialistic system. Once more, I question the practicality of such a system in the United States. I still see the answer in terms of drastically modifying our present free-enterprise system. This type of change would

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* Roger Brown discusses this idea thoroughly in Social Psychology, Chapter 9.
differ from revolution in that no violent overthrow of the government would be necessary. The government would remoldify the system through the legislative process. Finally, I see a need for revolution only if matters continue to increase the appalling situation of the poor and only if this revolution reorients the priorities of capitalism, a situation that I feel is highly unlikely.

Let us now examine the possibilities and probabilities of revolution at the present time in our country. In order to do this, we must answer the question of why a revolution occurs. As Davies says in his research, "revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a sharp period of reversal." What happens is manifested reality breaks away from anticipated reality.

To see this theory more clearly, let us view the Russian Revolution as an example. During a period from 1861 - 1905 Russia experienced great economic advances. People moved to the cities, and industry grew. There were also social reforms evidenced by justice being administered not by the nobles, but by municipalities. Furthermore, in 1864 trials became public and beatings were stopped. The absolutism of Alexander III remained, but the intelligentsia was permitted to make criticisms. Alexander's successor Nicholas II was less forceful than his father, but still absolute. The intelligentsia then aligned with the proletariat.
but demanded economic reforms.

The events from 1904 - 1905 marks a downward turning point in this progress. The expectations of the people became frustrated by the continuance of the czardom. Finally on January 22, 1905 there occurred "Bloody Sunday." In this action, proletarians were killed as they marched on St. Petersburg palace. People then realized that the Tsar was not the great protector. Moreover, at this time Russia's army and navy were defeated by Japan, and the war victims were returning home and reminding the people of the weakness of Czarist absolutism. Then from 1905-1917 there was continuous despair, as manifested by 4,449 executions, bad crops, etc. Finally, in 1917 the revolution occurred. Therefore, we have progress which started in 1861, with the freeing of serfs, and then a relatively short repression followed by revolution. The frightening prospectus here is, as Davies put it, "there appears to be no sure way to avoid revolution, short of effective, affirmative and continuous response on the part of the government to the continuously emerging needs of the people."

This statement only seems to solidify my basic premise of needed change. If change does not come about and there is a sharp recession in this country, it is, at least, in a theoretical sense possible, to see a violent, all-encompassing revolution occur, one which I fear would alter the structure of the country in an un-pragmatic way. That is to say, I feel this type of revolution would not bring about a compromise in the system, but would force
the system to the opposite end of the political spectrum. As mentioned before, I do not see this as a meaningful solution, for whereas the poor would be relieved to a degree from their plight, they would not be given the chance to fully succeed. Similarly, the rich would be penalized for their material success and, in short, such a socialistic system seems at best utopian within the context of our society. We are simply at this point too technologically advanced, and achievement is very much part of our nature.

This latter point can best be seen when we consider the possibilities and probabilities for revolution in this country. In other words, we will now attempt to answer the question of whether truly "the revolution is here" or soon coming. My answer would be no. At the present time the machinery for such vast action does not exist. First of all, as has been shown in much of the literature, a revolution does not require an overwhelming number of true revolutionary leaders. As Crane Brinton states, extremists can, in the words of Trotsky, force the masses into a state of "political non-existence," by terrorism at the polls. The little man quits through either these frightening tactics or laziness, and "the extremists have the field to themselves." Brinton substantiates this idea in the following example: in September of 1917 elections for the Moscow District Dumas were held. The Bolsheviks received 52% of the vote. Before in June the Socialists-Revolutionaries got 375,000 votes out of 647,000
cast. In September the Bolsheviks received 198,000 out of 381,000 cast. In three months half the electorate had dropped out. The imminent factor of the extremists then is not their size but the fervor with which they hold their cause. Here, though, is a key point. If a revolution is to be within reason, there must be at least a minimally sized revolutionary group. Revolutionary groups of this violent nature are simply not yet strong enough or great enough in numbers. This is not to say that they could not be. At present the threats of the SDS Weathermen and the Black Panthers are just words, but in light of the recent bombings throughout the country, I would admit that certainly revolutionary fervor is increasing.

Another argument against revolution is that of middle-class values. They are simply too strong in this country. Caplan (see earlier section of this paper) reports in his research that all the non-rioters in Newark still preferred self-blame to blaming the system for their problems. This was not true of the better educated, prouder militants.

Nevertheless, the chief problem in changing poverty by radical means is, as Davies mentions (and I have previously mentioned) that people are not willing to give up their chains when the cost will be their lives. If we join this notion to that of high middle-class values that ghetto dwellers seem to possess, then we can see that revolutionaries will be slow in gaining converts. It certainly can be argued that they need some support to carry

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a revolution through. It does not appear that at present they have this support.

Closely related to this question of support, but more important, is the question of power. Revolution of a powerless group against a wealthy and powerful group will be smashed. This can be easily seen when we reminisce to the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. It was crushed. On the other hand however, if the rich rebel in the face of apathy, the best they can expect is a coup d'etat. Therefore, although they have power, they still need support from the poor if revolutionary changes are to be established.

Perhaps then the principal factor in the question of a probable revolution in this country is still whether a recession will occur, and whether the middle class with its power will be affected enough to join the poor in rebellious action. If we do experience a serious recession over an adequate period of time, it is quite likely that the middle class will be affected; and if their needs are not met, revolution is quite feasible, for they will have power and the probable alliance of the poor. Again I see the intent of such action as socialistic, and I do not feel this to be the solution. however, depending on the leaders of a revolution in this country, it is possible to see a modified socialism which would be almost suggestive of some of the changes I suggest. This is possible to see, because I find it hard to imagine a great many wealthy capitalistically minded people giving up their "earned" possessions for the good of a state of mind.

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which ultimately political stability or instability becomes. On the other hand, the dissatisfaction could be so great that the leaders of such action could call for a total overthrow of the system. Here, then, we also see an important question of who the leaders of a possible revolution would be.

Throughout this paper I have stressed continually a solution to the problems of the poor which is a system compromising in nature. If this means limiting the rich more, then we must do it in order to save any hopes of an equal opportunity system. It is not within the scope of this paper to suggest specific answers to the problems of poverty; however I can make some rather broad suggestions that may help to bring the poor into the system.

In private correspondence with Senator Philip Hart (D-Mich.) I have received the following information:

The National Committee on the causes and prevention of violence, of which I am a member, has just issued its final report, which includes the recommendation that the estimated $20 billion dollars that can be saved by the termination of Vietnam hostilities be used in our cities and for much-needed programs for pollution control, health, housing, education and the like....

We must then have a reorienting of priorities, and when after that insidious war in Vietnam is ended, that $20 billion must go into our sad domestic scene.

Another suggestion might be to really aid "black capitalism" by making SBA an effective organization, and thus we could see

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some black entrepreneurs. As to how this goal would be accomplished, I am not qualified to say.

Finally I might suggest, as many have before us, a tremendous boost in federal aid to education. This must be done so more of the disadvantaged may have a chance at education. Yet, as Richard Austin, mayoral candidate for the city of Detroit said, "a billion and a half dollars was considered necessary for construction at the undergraduate level, but the authorized figure was pulled down to $950 million, because of the press of the war. The Nixon budget says $43 million is enough - one dollar out of 20." This is only one example which again shows that more money must be put into education.

I feel it only fitting to close by sighting our recent strike for minority admissions at the University of Michigan. There was a need that was so apparent and yet again the administration did not move to "put more people in the system." It took a strike to do this. What would have happened if Robben Fleming's brilliant negotiating finesse had not convinced the regents of the validity of the demands? I overheard one frustrated striker say, "if we don't get these demands, then we're going to polarize this whole goddamn campus," and he meant it.

So I ask again, America, where are you now. Are the social needs of the poor of this country going to be given just consideration, or are Americans going to have to echo Hannah Arendt's words and resort to violent revolution in order to satiate their needs? Will they be pushed that far?


4. Ibid. p. 2.

5. Ibid. p. 2.

6. Ibid. p. 5.


10. Ibid. p. 15.


14. Killingsworth, p. 14

15. Economic Report of the President, 1964, pp. 57-58 This is a figure for a four person family.

17. Ibid. Table 8, p. 17.


19. Ibid.

20. Ibid. p. 32.


22. Figures for 1948-1965 from *Manpower Report, 1966, Table A-11* p. 166; figures for 1966 from *Manpower Report, 1967, Table A-11*, p. 214. The 1966 figures are not completely comparable to those of earlier years, because they exclude the unemployed who are 14 and 15 years old, and the figures for earlier years include this age group.

23. Killingsworth.


28. Ibid.

29. Ibid. p. 18.


31. Ibid.

32. Davies.

33. Ibid.

34. Austin, Richard, Remarks from a speech given at the University of Michigan, December 10, 1969, p. 4.
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