Every art and discipline must accept competition as a natural condition of life growing from the variant interests and aptitudes of different kinds of men. This competition may lead to the identification of "natural enemies" and, for the discipline of rhetoric, some of these are (1) the business man, who debases rhetoric by using fear and false promises to gain success, (2) the historian, who regards speeches as appearances which obscure reality or as storehouses from which information can be drawn, (3) the literarian, who either relegates rhetoric to a second class position, or confuses it with stylistics, (4) the communicologist, who frequently mistakes the part for the whole and attempts to provide statistical formulas for explaining rhetoric, and (5) the rhetorician, who either concerns himself with the "witness" rhetoric of demonstration or dehumanizes the art in his pendantic concern with its elements. Recently, one ancient enemy—philosophy—has been aligned with rhetoric in the publication of a new journal "Philosophy and Rhetoric," devoted to the scholarly trusts held in common by both disciplines. (1N)
Mr. Chairman: Of course I must admit that the flattering words I have just heard fell pleasantly on my ear. I am reminded of the response made by the late James A. Winans, long the Dean of our profession, on a similar occasion: "Disgusting flattery," he said, "Flatter me again."

Let me say to all of you what I have already said to Chairman Martind: The enterprise in which you are engaged is highly intelligent. I applaud your efforts and hope you will maintain them. You must have observed also the excellent management, even to the smallest detail, of the function we have enjoyed here today. Did you note, for example—doubtless thanks to Dr. Barrett—that the "happy hour" was scheduled cleverly to prepare you for the "unhappy hour" now about to begin?

Inasmuch as this occasion calls for what is known in our profession as an after-dinner speech, I shall endeavor not to be profound. I see here some of my former students who can assure you that this effort to avoid profundity will cause me no trouble. In obeisance to our common interest in rhetoric, however, I suppose I should begin with appropriate definitions.

By the term 'rhetoric' I mean, without undue deference or reverence, and with as much understanding as I can bring to bear, what Aristotle meant. In the current literature, as well as in historical perspective, the Aristotelian definition appears to be the most nearly stable. Even Korzybski, in his revolt against rhetoric, avoided his acceptance of the Aristotelian concepts. Only the revisionists, the running dogs of evil rhetoric, received his disapproval. I ought to acknowledge, however, that the Aristotelian definition is one that I employ in my own thought. I am well aware that there are other definitions; and I know that the lady rhetoric is also sometimes referred to as the harlot of the arts. As for the term 'natural enemies' I suggest that every art and discipline has its detractors. This competition among the arts is a condition of life; it is as natural as the arts themselves, and it grows from the variant interests and aptitudes of different kinds of men. In this discourse I hope merely to identify
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some, not necessarily all, of the natural enemies of rhetoric.

THE BUSINESS MAN

It is now nearly thirty years since Joseph Wood Krutch, then Professor of English at Columbia University, where I was a graduate student, told me that in the United States rhetoric is employed chiefly by advertisers. Perhaps he was right; I do not know. But I suggest that if Professor Krutch was right thirty years ago he could hardly be challenged today. The advertiser, agent of the business man, enters our homes regularly through the media of radio and television. What is the rhetoric? Does it not, in large part, exhibit a rather shoddy reliance on the arts once employed by the pitch man, the patent medicine salesman? Apparently, its chief utility, aside from its main business of pushing cigarettes, is to sell drugs, soap, and allied products. The appeals are to fear, immediate or remote: If you don’t use our soap, you won’t smell good. If you don’t smell good, people won’t love you. If people don’t love you, you will dry on the vine. Perhaps there is a sorites here, but if so it is rather too subtle for me and is, I suspect, unplanned. Another bit of the advertiser’s rhetoric that fascinates me is a little gem I heard just the other day: “If he kisses you once, will he kiss you again?” As so often happens in the study of rhetoric, an insight into the art provides a key to the culture. In my day, the rhetorical appeal to fear would have been reversed: If she kisses you once, will she kiss you again. O tempora; o mores!

My concern with the advertiser, the business man’s rhetorician, is not the common plaint that he is vulgar, although vulgar and sometimes disgusting he often is. Surely there is a better way to sell drugs than to picture their course through the abdominal tract! My concern is that the rhetoric employed by the soap and drug peddlers debases the art and makes those who consume it a more ready prey to more of the same in every issue in which rhetoric can be engaged. We hear much nowadays about the pollution of our rivers, but I fear too little about the dirtying of our streams of discourse. Whoever debases rhetoric is an enemy of rhetoric and therefore an enemy of the human race. Yet it is among men of business and public affairs that rhetoric, as these men conceive it, gains its widest support as a help to getting along in the world, as a means to success. Public speaking is highly regarded as a way to personal power and prestige. Is it possible that the leaders in our worlds of business and public affairs identify the arts of rhetoric to which they confess allegiance with the practice of rhetoric seen in their advertisements? I suggest that if so, we are justified in apprehensions for the future of the republic. For the quality of the public discourse, and the way in which it is regarded, is surely one of the indicators—and not the poorest one—of the viability of a civilization. It is said that Nathan Bedford Forrest once answered a young lieutenant’s plea for a leave of absence with the terse statement, “I told you once, I told you twice, God damn it, NO.” His grammatical usage may have been open to question, his profanity may have been objectionable, but he employed the choicest rhetoric. His meaning could not be mistaken.

Is it futile to hope that men of business and public affairs will cease to be the enemies of rhetoric?

THE HISTORIAN

Once upon a time I put to Sir Maurice Powicke, the distinguished British medievalist, the question, “What relation should rhetoric bear to history?” After
a moment's reflection, Sir Maurice replied unequivocally, "I should hope, sir, none at all." I did not pursue the matter with Sir Maurice, but I must surmise that he had in mind only that misshapen form of the art of rhetoric known as sophistry. For if rhetoric has no concern with history, how is one to account for Thucydides, still one of the greatest of historians, to whom Cicero paid the highest compliment, as he wrote, "The number of his thoughts almost equals the number of his words." And even if one's view of historiography is less rhetorical than that of Thucydides, one must observe that as soon as the historian begins to write a narrative, he is rhetorician as well as historian. To tell the truth, as well as to tell lies, requires the aid of rhetoric. Indeed, even before the historian begins to write, he will presumably employ the rhetorical art of *inventio* to discover the policy, the lines of his discourse. I must thus beg leave to doubt that Sir Maurice must be listed among the enemies of rhetoric. His own distinguished discourse serves as an adverse witness to that indictment.

That enemies of rhetoric can be found among historians, however, I have no doubt. Among them are the historians who do not regard speeches (as did Hegel) as "veritable transactions in the human commonwealth; in fact, very gravely influential transactions," but simply as a mine or storehouse of data from which an account can be drawn; or as a compendium of cynical protestations to be explained only by the true history that regards speeches as appearances only, whereas realities are economic. Perhaps a useful judgment concerning any given historian may be gained by the test question, "What does he think of speeches?" If speeches represent to a historian one form of human experiences worthy in their own right of investigation and report, then he is certainly not a member of the same guild as his brother who sees in speechmaking only an attempt, deserving either pity or scorn, to obfuscate the truth that the historian must somehow disclose. In my own endeavor to understand the history of speechmaking, and even now and then to teach and write a bit about it, I have taken comfort in the words of a friend of mine, a great historian and a great gentleman, whose name I shall not pronounce here lest my doing so should embarrass him with his colleagues. I once heard him remark: "It is better for the speech people than for historians to write the history of public speaking, because it is easier for them to learn history than it is for historians to learn rhetoric." Perhaps the right conclusion is that some historians are the enemies, and some are the friends, of rhetoric.

**The Literarian**

I ask you to believe that I have rescued the term "literarian" from the depths of my dictionary not from a preference for ink horn terms but rather from a genuine dissatisfaction with any other term—e.g., littérateur, literato, literator, belles-lettres—to designate those who regard poetry and prose, for that matter—as a mystery to be exegeted only to the faithful, and only by those high priests known as critics. In our day, in contrast with former times, literature tends to become an esoteric rather than a communicative art. To the degree that a poet is obscure, he appears to satisfy his own needs and to achieve acclaim among the literarians. If one accepts the dictum that the artist father wrote to his poet son (That which can be understood is not poetry) and contrasts that dictum with the lesson that may be drawn from the Bryn Mawr lectures of I. A. Richards (That which can be misunderstood is not rhetoric) then one may view the chasm between the
literarian and the rhetorician. That the narrative poet, the epic poet, if you like the "rhetorical" poet enjoys no vogue in our day is as much a commentary on the times as on the poets and poetry. Human beings, not excluding Americans, are in desperate need of declarations of courage that will enable them to confront a future filled with nameless terrors. That they do not often find these declarations coming from the poets may be owing in part to the poet's own fears but also, I suggest, to the premium placed nowadays on non-communication in poetry, as in the arts generally. I reflect sometimes on the rhetorical criticism of the lady who, on being asked what she thought of the new preacher, replied, "He can't be much of a preacher: I could understand everything he said."

If the rhetorician finds an enemy, or at the least a stranger, in the modern literarian he may console himself by calling the roll of the friends of rhetoric among the poets of former times. In the English language he may begin with Chaucer, Milton, and Shakespeare—who understood rhetoric as well as poetry.

The enmity of the literarian toward rhetoric is doubtless unwitting. Indeed, residing as he often does in a Department of English, the literarian may honestly consider himself to be a friend to rhetoric. "Rhetoric," he may have been told by the bookman overheard by one of my colleagues at a convention of the National Council of Teachers of English, "is the hottest thing on the market." Only the blind could overlook the spate of articles and textbooks coming from Departments of English under the rubric "rhetoric" or "the new rhetoric." The so-called "new rhetoricians" have doubtless done some service in rescuing the term "rhetoric" from oblivion or obloquy in Departments of English.

Can you not remember when a good many Departments of English banished the term "rhetoric"—as the substance had been banished long before—even from the lowly freshman course? Now they strive to be foremost not only in restoring the term to the freshmen but even in admitting it to respectability in upper-class courses. To be sure, even in such Departments of English, rhetoric does not enjoy the status of literature or even of linguistics. Shall we observe that in Departments of English rhetoric is no longer a third-class citizen but is now almost a first-class citizen—of the second-class?

The current prosperity of rhetoric in Departments of English would delight me if I could be convinced that our colleagues are secure in the faith. Believing, as I do, that no generation of men has ever had greater need than ours for the wisdom and utility to be found in a complete and honest rhetoric, I would wish to see studies in rhetoric prosper everywhere. But alas, I see little pieces called "the rhetoric of the paragraph," and "the rhetoric of the sentence"; and I see textbooks refurbished with the major change to be found in the title page with the addition of the word "rhetoric"—doubtless a concession to "the hottest thing on the market"; and I see the full-bodied rhetoric confused incessantly with stylistics—much as rhetoric was once confused with elocution. I despair. I judge him to be a wise politician who observed, "I will defend myself against my enemies if only Heaven will protect me from my friends."

Is it not likely that in Departments of English, where rhetoric has for years been regarded as beneath the notice of scholars, the current interest will soon pass? Is it not probable that the ardor for the lady rhetoric, like that expressed not long since for general semantics and more recently for structural linguistics,
will yield to still another passion? Can you not hear the refrain: "I could not love thee dear so much loved I not English more"?

I despair, and I recall the innocence of the young instructor in English to whom I was introduced not long ago. On being told that I admit an allegiance to the art of rhetoric, the young lady remarked sweetly, "Isn't that nice. You know, I had a professor at Yale who was interested in figures of speech."

Very well. The lady rhetoric will always find refuge in the House of Speech, where she sits at or near the head of the table rather than far below the salt or out in the kitchen. As Schwartz and Rycenga observed in their introduction to *The Province of Rhetoric*, one of the few praiseworthy books in rhetoric to come recently from Departments of English: "Scholars in speech have, of course, always been aware of the importance of rhetoric, and they continue to urge that its systematic and thorough study now be wilted with an awareness of new developments in the field. . . ."

THE COMMUNICOLIGIST

The latest enemy of the art of rhetoric is the communicologist, who, bringing with him the heavy artillery of statistics and computers, is preparing to provide formulas and equations that will explain what have hertofore been the mysteries. I would not have you think that I am an enemy of the communicologist, even though I believe him to be quite probably an enemy to the art of rhetoric. For he means well, and well-meaning people should always be encouraged. There are so few of them.

I do deplore the term communicologist—it is not of my coinage—as I deplore equally the term communication employed as synonymous with *speech* or *rhetoric*. Once I told my friend Elwood Murray, who was at the time engaged in establishing the National Society for the Study of Communication, that I could not join his Society, because I was waiting for him to start the National Society for the Study of Conception, of which I would gladly be a charter member. I believe Professor Murray thought me frivolous, as perhaps I was; yet I suggest there was sense in my frivolity. An organization entitled the National Society for the Study of Conception would doubtless be open to misunderstanding; but so also, I suggest, is an organization entitled *The National Society for the Study of Communication*. Both words—conception and communication—suggest too much or too little. Not to bother with the term conception—since I was never offered the charter membership—I will observe that the term communication suggests to many people telephones, telegraphs, satellites, and Alexander Graham Bell. To many people the term does not at once, and to some I daresay it never does, convey the idea of a whole discourse, including what you and I are wont to call inventio and dispositio. Here is no mere semantic difficulty. I tend to believe that the communicologists are in grave danger of repeating in the twentieth century—with computers—the sixteenth-century errors perpetrated by Petrus Ramus. A dwarfed and crippled rhetoric can be dangerous, particularly if its practitioners further the illusion that their art encompasses the whole of discourse; and what rhetoric requires today is not only a concern for communicatio but especially a searching, a scholarly, and in so far as possible a scientific investigation into the ways in which the conception of ideas, arguments, and lines of policy actually occurs—and should occur—with attendant investiga-
tion of dispositio. I here refer not to the enthymeme but to what precedes it. I refer not to the metaphor but to what "causes" it. Perhaps the communicologists believe themselves to be engaged in this delicate enterprise. I beg leave to doubt that they are. In so far as I am competent to understand them, I believe that they—like the literarians—characteristically take inventio for granted. I fear that in taking the part for the whole they may be enemies to rhetoric and hence to men whom they lead astray.

But I daresay I should not grieve for the lady rhetoric. Having survived Petrus Ramus, she is proof against misfortunes and will doubtless outlive the communicologists, even with computers. For the lady rhetoric has in her keeping the two great imponderables of this planet: humanity and futurity. And in every one of her suitors, in every rhetorician, there is a bit of the poet; for like the poet the rhetorician must wonder and he must ponder. And like the poet he deals in language applied to those ineluctable verities that make life itself uncertain.

**The Rhetorician**

*The Witnesser.* You may be shocked to find the rhetorician named as an enemy of rhetoric. Yet if you will bear with me I will endeavor to demonstrate that two kinds of rhetoricians today are truly enemies of rhetoric.

As we have seen, what the literarians call the "new" rhetoric is not new at all: it is simply a branch, an adaptation, of elocutio. If there is a new rhetoric, it is not found in elocutio but in the current practices observed in the streets, on the highways—from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama, for example—and, alas, on television. The witness rhetoric has as its first law the adage taught to children: "Actions speak louder than words."

The technique of the witness rhetoric appears to be simple and, so far as one can tell, highly effective, up to a point: Go out into the streets, the highways, or the public buildings. Chant a message: "We won't go. We won't go. We won't go." Or coin a slogan—the more outrageous the better: "L.B.J., L.B.J., How many babies have you killed today?" Stage a demonstration. The demonstration is itself a valuable instrument: it testifies to all the world of the ardor and the will of the persuaders. If some demonstrator is attacked, perhaps injured, or even killed, by an anti-demonstrator, so much the better for the persuasion. It is noteworthy that—so far I have observed—the violence attendant on the witness rhetoric has been instigated, or appears to have been instigated, by the anti-witness. Yet the instrument is not passive resistance. It might be described as non-violent action, as near to violence as possible. In the street demonstrations, for example, the witnesser, either consciously or unconsciously, may employ forces deep in the psyche of the presumed antagonist. Even though the street on which the witness demonstrates belongs technically to the city, the dweller in the block responds to the primordial impulse: *They are on my street.* You must have seen, as I have, a puppy flee from the threats of a larger dog until he reaches his own back yard, whereupon he turns and barks furiously, secure in the knowledge that he is on his own territory. My cave, my tree, my wigwam, my Lome have developed creature sanctions. To seem to imperil them is an incitement, whether the incitement be legal or extra-legal. What weight should be given to provocation, to the goading of the anti-witness, even to the martyr-witness's wish that he will be
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violated—I am not prepared to say, even though I am constrained to suggest that this element exists in the witness rhetoric. The witness rhetorician counts on gaining the sympathy, the allegiance, and eventually the votes, of those who read about and perhaps even more of those who see, the action that speaks louder than words. In a kind, timid, and permissive society the spectacle of police dogs confronting people in the streets, of policemen pulling young women humpety-bump down stairways of a great university, of children with burned and misshapen faces—whether from phosphorous or from the explosion of a kerosene stove in which stolen gasoline has been poured—is manifestly rhetorical under Arktoile's definition of rhetoric as the discovery of all the means available in a given problem of persuasion. Those of us who have a preference, as did Aristotle, for the persuasion of the enthymeme, may regret that the modern witness rhetoric appears, so far as one can tell, to circumvent the enthymeme in favor of "the arousing of prejudice, of pity, of anger, and the like feelings of the soul." The witness rhetoric thus appears to return to the rhetoric of Syracuse, so reasonably and eloquently deplored by Aristotle in Ars Rhetorica. Yet if those who prefer an enthymematic rhetoric are as reasonable as their master Aristotle they must cope with conditions, as he did. Is there a counter to the witness rhetoric? I do not know. Concerning television, I must admit that my attitude is to a degree somewhat like that of Lord Grey of Fallovid toward the airplane: it is too bad it was ever invented; or perhaps I should say, that it was invented so early in the history of the human race. Or is it early? It may be later than we think. I am reminded ominously of Einstein's judgment that his great discoveries had come too soon: that the human race is not prepared at this stage to deal with nuclear fission. Is the human race prepared at this stage to deal with television? Yet is there to be another stage?

Is the witness rhetoric really new? I doubt it. I believe it to be new only in its manifestations and in its current adaptation. The newness is not in the witness but in the television set that makes millions of persons immediate spectators, if not participants, in persuasive actions. A current popular manifestation of the witness-rhetoric is the in. I refer not to a hostelry but to the in now so frequently found in compounds, such as teach-in, lie-in, sleep-in, and, so I have been recently informed, love-in. The latest in to come to my attention, however, I believe to have been invented at the University of Oregon, where a group of student doves are now staging a fast-in. They are fasting as a protest against American involvement in Vietnam; but the force of their witness-rhetoric is somewhat impaired by a group of student hawks, who, employing a counter witness-rhetoric, are staging a competitive in, a feast-in—much more popular with undergraduates than a fast-in—with proceeds from sales of hamburgers and coca-cola to go to needy children in Vietnam. In my professional capacity as rhetorician, I can hardly wait to get back to Eugene to see which in is in.

The orator has always been a witness, his own best or worst, to his own commitment. From this observation flow the doctrines of ethical proof. But not only the formal orator has served as witness rhetorician. Archibishop Cranmer's body burning at the stake, Sir Thomas More's noble head raised high on London Bridge, Crispus Attucks shot down on a Boston street: all were witnesses. Not many years ago the Nazis massed their legions at Nuremberg and
throughout the Reich to bear witness to the Führer. In our day we observe the lesser politician rushing to have his picture taken with a Kennedy—any Kennedy; we observe the relevance of Lyndon Johnson’s phrase, “press the flesh.” We recall the wonderful folksy progress Harry Truman made across the country in 1948.

What are the prospects for the witness rhetoric? It is not yet clear whether the witness-rhetoric or the word-rhetoric will prevail. Yet we can hardly avoid the judgment that they are in conflict, for at the heart of the word-rhetoric for a hundred generations has been the enthymeme. Can an enthymeme be presented effectively on the television screen in close competition with a spectacle? I doubt it. To one educated in the word-rhetoric the witness-rhetoric must obviously seem inferior; yet the witnesses are within their legal if not their moral rights to practice their art to achieve purposes they believe to be worthy. Whether the exercise of these rights will serve them well in the long run remains to be seen. If the witness-rhetoric should bring our so-called civilization more and more to resemble life in Nature, as envisioned by Thomas Hobbes—nasty, brutish, and short—then the witnesses, along with the rest of us—will suffer. If the affluent barbarian, the vertical invader of Ortega, intends to employ the witness-rhetoric to the detriment of the enthymematic rhetoric, he may lose more than he gains.

Yet it is possible to discover a wry hope for the future in the limitations of the past. If one were able truly to get behind the enthymeme, one might discover that its source—particularly in popular oratory—is not in rationality but in rationalization. Perhaps only the intellectual (perforce a literate person), whose self-portrait is normally that of the man of reason, has been deluded into believing that his enthymemes are indubitably reasonable. Doubtless counterfeit enthymemes have always been coined, and passed, and accepted as pure gold by those whose conclusions have been predetermined by their prejudices. Perhaps the great mythologists—Frazer, Freud, and Sapir—have been riding the wave of the future rhetoric. Perhaps the accessories of proof will tend more and more to become the presumptive, if not the substantive, proof and will thus relegate the enthymeme and the syllogism to that museum called the classroom.

I would not have you utterly despise rationalization. It may possibly be, for example, a better vehicle for governing the turbulence of the human race than forthright and designing prejudice. Is not rationalization the obeisance that passion pays to reason?

Please understand that I do not argue that the development of the witness-rhetoric is a triumph to be celebrated. I want merely to suggest that the transition, if it comes, may not be catastrophic, even to the true believers in the word-rhetoric. Perhaps the new rhetoric will not be easily distinguishable from the old. Perhaps it will be a new instrument fashioned from the old materials: Hall weapon and half word. Moreover, my favorite rhetorician and devotee of the enthymeme—Mrs. Bower My—offers us some hope for the survival of the enthymematic rhetoric, even in competition with the witness. She opines that people become inured to spectacle, that they more and more respond to a battle in Viet Nam or a race riot in Tennessee as though it were a fight in Gunsmoke or an episode in Bonanza: the unreality, rather than the reality, supervenes; or the two unrealities so infuse each other that the testimony of the witness is lost in Never-Never Television Land. Thus television develops its own peculiar cred-
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...ility gap, and leaves more of the field than might have been thought possible to its competitor, the enthymeme.

The Scholiast. The other enemy of rhetoric among the rhetoricians I shall call “the scholiast,” meaning you and me. The scholiast, as you know, is the perennial annotator, the writer of marginalia. I suggest that as enemies without enmity, we professors of rhetoric are oftentimes guilty of the crime described by Oscar Wilde: “Each man kills the thing he loves.” With our sometimes pedantic concern for ethos, pathos, and logos, for proofs artificial and inartificial, for eloquence forensic, deliberative, and epideictic do we not kill the lady rhetoric with smother love? We rhetoricians need now and again to remind ourselves that we have in our keeping the most human of the arts; we need to remember that rhetoric is not a dead issue but a thing art and craft, to be found wherever our fellow-humans foregather. Just as in Aristotle’s day, and Cicero’s, and Quintilian’s the living rhetoric is to be found in reasons and appeals that men in the strength of life give to each other.

As in the nays of Alexander Hamilton, Abraham Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt rhetoric exists in the life about us. To find enthymemes and metaphors one has only to observe men making and listening to speeches. To be sure, the close observer may hear wickedness that will make him shudder or follies that will make him smile; but he may also see men who, as in the Phaedrus, endeavor to bring their fellows to truth or to wise policy. In any event, he will not have a dull moment.

As an honest rhetorician, however, I should note that there are here this evening some young people whom I have heard read some excellent papers. Lest they be led astray by my advice, I think I should tell them the other side of the story. Hence I shall endeavor to explain to them how to succeed in rhetoric without really trying. Perhaps I can do so by reference to my paper called “Enthy- memes: The Story of a Light-Hearted Search” to which Dr. Barrett has already referred. After reading this paper in Ithaca, Pittsburgh, and Honolulu, with (I trust) suitable disposi- tio, I was indis- creet enough to let it go into print. Ever since, I have suffered the worst fate that can come to a scholar or a politician: I am controversial. My older friends among the scholars—e.g., James McBurney, Kenneth Burke, Harry Caplan—profess to think the little piece wonderful. But the solemn younger scholars—whom I shall not name—were shocked that a professor should read—let alone permit to be published—an article so light-hearted, so irreverent, so—shall we say—sacrilegious concerning the enthymeme. Hence to do right by my new-found friends here this evening I give you Aly’s four rules on how to succeed in rhetoric without really trying:

First, always be dull, especially about rhetoric. The old scholars won’t notice you, and the young ones will think you profound.

Second, bite your tongue rather than put it in your cheek.

Third, run, don’t walk, to the nearest undertaker and learn how he conducts a funeral. Apply his attitudes toward all your professional appearances.

Fourth, never crack a smile—until you have tenure.

As for myself, I think this occasion appropriate to announce that, as penance for my light-hearted sins against the enthymeme, I promise hereafter—beginning with my next incarnation—to conduct a serious, heavy-handed, scholarly, scientific search for metaphors. I shall let none escape me.

Mr. Chairman: After naming so many enemies of rhetoric, I am happy at last to be able to tell you that rhetoric has
a friend. As you know, ever since Plato's indictment of the sophists, and since the almost open warfare between the philosophers and rhetoricians in ancient Rome, the philosophers—doubtless not without reason—have characteristically been suspicious of rhetoric and of those of us who profess the art. Their suspicions have not normally engendered in the rhetoricians a spirit of great good will toward those who follow philosophy as a profession. I am very far from being able to say that all philosophic suspicions have been allayed or that all rhetorical distrusts have been abandoned. But I can tell you that some philosophers and some rhetoricians now seem to understand each other, or to be willing to try to understand each other, some of the time. Perhaps the rapprochement is owing in some degree to the current preoccupations of the philosophers with problems of language. This preoccupation is noteworthy especially among those who follow Wittgenstein, who went so far as to remark that "Most questions and propositions of the philosophers result from the fact that we do not understand the logic of our language." It is noteworthy also that this preoccupation of the philosophers with language is coincident with the rise of the rhetoricians' interest in persuasion by act, and by visual symbols, as in the witness-rhetoric. In any event, we find Gilbert Ryle, one of the most distinguished of modern philosophers, writing very much like I. A. Richards, who (although he may also qualify as a philosopher) is indubitably a rhetorician. Gilbert Ryle declares:

I conclude, then, that there is, after all, a sense in which we can properly inquire and even say 'what it really means to say so and so.' For we can ask what is the real form of the fact recorded when this is concealed or disguised and not duly exhibited by the expression in question. And we can often succeed in stating this fact in a new form of words which does exhibit what the other failed to exhibit. And I am for the present inclined to believe that this is what philosophical analysis is, and that this is the sole and whole function of philosophy. But I do not want to argue this point now.

I find another evidence of the friendship of philosophers for rhetoric, if not for rhetoricians, in an event now transpiring at the Pennsylvania State University, where philosophers and rhetoricians have joined forces to found a new learned journal devoted to the scholarly trusts they hold in common. The new journal, to be published by the Pennsylvania State University Press, is entitled *Philosophy and Rhetoric.* To all of you rhetoricians here I bespeak for the new venture your generous consideration. Surely you will agree that with all the enemies it has made, rhetoric deserves a friend; and there is no better friend than philosophy! Indeed, if I were to offer a toast, as is sometimes permitted on after-dinner occasions, I would suggest that we drink, in water or in wine, to rhetoric and to rhetoric's ancient enemy and new friend!

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