This is an examination of social science literature dealing with contemporary political and social change, and represents the point of departure for the civic education project reported in Volume I, ED 043 554. The chapters discuss: 1) four social types of man -- elite, private, alienated, and civic man; 2) three types of democracy, the history of participation in American political and social life, and the current extent of civic participation; 3) four defenses of low citizen participation levels -- Federalists, democratic elitists, interest group theorists, political systems analysts; 4) political and social crises -- race, technology, generation gap, international -- as the result of historic low levels of participation; 5) challenges of change to public and private institutions, traditional political theory, the social dilemmas facing reform movements, and the conservative, conventional liberal, radical left positions of reform and revolution; (6) the Center's position on civic participation -- democratic society individual and group involvement in decision-making and the rights of dissent, equality, due process, and three models of participation; and, 7) political socialization, group dynamics, interpersonal relations, the role of the schools, and finally the goals for civic education. (SPP)
CIVIC EDUCATION FOR THE SEVENTIES:
AN ALTERNATIVE TO REPRESSION AND REVOLUTION

Volume II

CIVIC PARTICIPATION IN A CRISIS AGE

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PREFACE

This paper represents the substantive document prepared for the project, "The Development of Educational Objectives for Citizenship Education." The document is the product of the social science research staff of the Center for Research and Education in American Liberties at Columbia University and Teachers College. The major project documents and reports are contained in a separate volume.

This document was the basis for research on civic education objectives described in the reports of Dr. Arlene Richards and of the Annual of Objectives and Guidelines for High School Civic Education of Mr. Frank Summers. The collection and analysis of the data and the subsequent preparation of the Annual changed and sharpened our perception of democratic problems and problem solutions. Consequently, this document, Civic Participation in a Crisis Age, represents the initial point of departure, while Civic Education in the Reform Era, our position paper, represents the conclusions of our research and our analysis.

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New York City

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*The position paper is contained in the first volume of this report entitled, Civic Education for the Seventies: An Alternative to Repression and Revolution.*

The papers of Dr. Richards and the Manual of Mr. Summers are also contained in the first volume.
I. CONCEPTIONS OF MAN IN SOCIETY

It takes the clarity and courage of a genuinely creative intellectual act to locate our moment in history during a period of crisis and rapid social change. We need to identify the forces of upheaval and the themes of change and then to sort our concepts of man and society so that we discard those no longer useful and even dangerous to perpetuate and to retain and modify those which give us firm grasp of the realities of our time. There are two changes in society which are producing great tension and escalating conflict throughout the nation and compelling us to make a profoundly realistic analysis of issues and events. First, there is the final phase of the rapid shift from an agrarian to an industrial society which has left in its wake an array of outmoded political and social institutions, an economic ethic of unbridled liberty and laissez faire, and a moral ethic born of a simplified view of what drives and inspires man and how individuals differ. The drift into an industrial society, without any thoughtful consideration of how the new conditions square with religious and democratic values we wish to retain and foster finds us now laboring in and under private and public bureaucracies which have morbid life cycles of their own and which are invincibly resistant to the needs and styles of the individuals who comprise them. Second, there is a burgeoning technology which has vastly increased the amount of information all individuals have about their world and created the insistent demand for participation as a means of exercising newly discovered life options. Counterpoised, therefore, for inevitable confrontation, there is, on the one hand, a political and social system grown topsy turvy out of a basically agrarian ethos and, on the other, an individualism born of a technology which replaces a cloudy mystique of life with the desire for its tangible realization. This welter of events, with the mixture of old and new, provides us a typology of man as we observe him in contemporary society.

A typology of modern man distinguishes four categories or types of political and social life styles. I label these types as (1) the Private Man, (2) the Elite Man, (3) the Alienated Man, and (4) the Civic Man. I assume that these types represent the favorite free or forced choices of Americans today as they select and elaborate their personal life-styles and citizenship-roles. First, I describe each conception by defining the personal need and aspiration and social conditions informing it and the transactional process which establishes some bond between the individual and society. Second, I describe the psychological, political, and social restraints which keep Private Men, Elite Men, and Alienated Men from becoming Civic Men.

The Private Man

The Private Man seeks the fulfillment of need and aspiration in a closed circle of family, friends, and business and professional associates. The outermost periphery of interest is the township, urban, or
suburban boundaries within which he and his family conduct their personal lives. Although career and economic interests may require his daily journey to the foreign territory of city and other communities, he leaves his heart behind in the home and close personal intimacy of the community in which he resides in peace and tranquility. His home is his castle or at least his ranch. The Private Iman wants the "best" for his wife and children. He wants the technological comforts and advantages of the modern home and the status symbols of cars, swimming pools, paintings, and cocktail parties. He wants his children to complete college and post-graduate education and to carve out those careers and marriages which entitle them to an uninterrupted enjoyment of the Private Life. His participation in the political affairs of his community and nation is an occasional foray into the public main necessary to protect the comfort and opportunities of his family and friends. A newly prosperous and comfortable man, he does not want to change the political and social rules which gave him wealth and status. He wistfully believes that the normal political and social processes handle routinely the social problems which arise and rarely require the intervention of the "private" citizen. As the price he pays for the autonomy of private domicile, friends, and career, he abdicates to the "politicians" whatever influence he may have in public affairs. Not all suburban dwellers are Private Iman. Private Iman can erect walls within a city which minimize their participation in society.

The Elite Iman

The Elite Iman seeks the fulfillment of need and aspiration in the power and wealth he enjoys in shaping the political and social history of his time. He believes that he more than the common man has a clear vision of man's personal and social destiny and intelligence and imagination to give to the accomplishment of the mission. Elite Iman attribute their superior missionary vision and zeal to various aristocratic sources, for example, to an aristocracy of blood as in the case of royalty and monarchial inheritance, to an aristocracy of wisdom and thought, as in the case of the Platonic philosopher-king, to an aristocracy of wealth, as in the case of our modern capitalist barons, to an aristocracy of Virtue and Divine Election as in the case of the Calvinists, and to an aristocracy of expertise as in the case of the professional technocrats, and, finally, in the context of our modern world history, the aristocracy of national and ethnic origin, as in the case of the white man, without being asked, to carry the black man's burden. In the visual situation the Elite Iman is more isolated, Nietzschean supersanm. He belongs to and works within institutional and corporate oligarchies in government, labor, business, industry, and the university. The Elite Iman must be both a Private and Civic Iman. As a Private Iman he enjoys the fruits of power and wealth in accordance with his personal appetites and styles. As a Civic Iman he exercises all power and shoulders all responsibility. His power is over the less fortunately endowed, the rest of people who look to Elite Iman for leadership and governance and over the material and human resources of the community and nation. His responsibility is to these same individuals to utilize the resources wisely and ultimately for their welfare and improvement. Then Virtue and Mission are the hallmarks, the Elite Iman is more a Private than a Public Iman. An Elite
Ilan who fails in his mission can retire to the Private life unless his failure disinfects him from the ruling class and forces him to become an Alienated man.

The Alienated Man

The Alienated Man is one who fails to participate in the mainstream of social and political life in any way which has significance for himself or others. His alienation may be self-imposed, as in the case of the hippie, the yippie, the creative writer and artist, and the Trappist, or it may be imposed by society. The feeling that life is almost all necessity and little choice now pervades American society. Individuals find themselves in imposed social positions which keep them from becoming Civic men living in the mainstream of American political and social life. An imposed social position is one which is defined for the individual and over which he has no choice (Levine, 1965). Although some positions may have largely positive value, increasingly large numbers of Americans find themselves in positions having largely negative value and reflecting the arbitrary assignments of a faceless Establishment. The young, the aged, the poor, the unemployed, the black, the immigrants, the small storeowner, and the physically and mentally disabled voice the frustration of those who deeply feel that society has trapped them into social positions, for example, the busy suburban professional and businessman, in fleeting, introspective moments, wonders whether he or the negatively-valued hippie is enjoying more of the fruits of an earthly paradise. In an age where frustration and failure are the shared expectation of American society, all social positions sometimes appear imposed and negative.

The Civic Man

The Civic Man seeks and finds his personal fulfillment in his citizenship-role. The intermeshing of his private and public lives in his open and productive civic participation bridges whatever dichotomy remains the life of the Private Man. He can say, in the manner of the Athenians, that citizenship of the Civic Man attaches to his personality rather than his local or national domicile. In more psychological terms, the fullest expression of the personality of the Civic Man is his citizenship-role. The Civic Man knows that his self-interest is inextricably linked to society's maintenance and extension (Levine, 1965a). His personal feelings and hopes, his social relationships, and his work form a harmonious whole (Levine, 1963). The measure of a society's moral strength is the degree to which personalized expectations become the shared expectations of the community (Levine, 1965b). A central concern of democratic society in the technological era is to reconsolidate the political, social, and psychological aspects of the citizenship-role so that citizenship once again adheres to the personality (Cestin, 1966b).

The Civic Man must be both a Private man and a Public man. In his privacy he develops the individuality so vital to democracy. In Defense of privacy Cestin (1967) writes:
This development of individuality is particularly important in democratic societies, since qualities of independent thought, diversity of views, and non-conformity are considered desirable traits for individuals. Such independence requires time for sheltered experimentation and testing of ideas, for preparation and practice in thought and conduct, without fear of ridicule or penalty, and for the opportunity to alter opinions before making them public. The individual's sense that it is he who decides when to "go public" is a crucial aspect of his feeling of autonomy. Without such time for incubation and growth, through privacy, many ideas and positions would be launched into the world with dangerous prematurity.

Westin observes that either too much or too little privacy creates imbalances which seriously jeopardize the individual's well being. In the Private man, too much privacy jeopardizes and even erases any significant civic role. In the Public man complete disclosure of his private life and total absorption in the public sphere destroy personal integrity and creativity. A completely Public man is really no man at all.

There are several types of restraints which keep the Private man, the Elite man, and the Alienated man from becoming Civic man. First, there are the psychological restraints. For the Private man these stem from a generalized fear of the alien and different, and they confine him to familiar and homogeneous retreats. For the Elite man these restraints stem from his fear of human frailty and irrationality which he believes pervade most of the human race and his exaggerated sense of human dedication and rationality which he believes characterizes the Elite man. Second, there are the political and legal restraints which tie the citizenship of the Private man to the community in which he resides and foster a parochialism of outlook and action. Third, there are the social and institutional restraints which keep the Private man locked into monolithic bureaucracies which provide training for the passive subject role and little experience for the active citizen role. As history so frequently shows, the Elite man, symbolizing the mounting frustration and fear spawned by archaic political and social restraints, tries to initiate dramatic and even popular reforms to "rationalize" the bumbling and creaking system.

There are several variations of these basic types of man which represent largely futile and primitive outcries against imposed social positions. For example, the Hesiodistic man is often an aspect of the Elite man, cast now as a sexual hero or an expert on hallucinatory drugs. He is also an aspect of the Civic man when he invests time and effort into converting "straight" society to his new way of life and when he attracts notoriety and enviable social disapproval. Then private excesses dominate his life, as in the case of hippie drug abuse, the Hedonistic man becomes Alienated man. The Hedonistic man is also the obverse side of the Private man, now entirely enclosed in the family urban or suburban compound, with fewer forays than ever into the hovering confusion of the metropolis. There is also the Ascetic man, who denies himself the material pleasures of the affluent and the carnal pleasures of the Hedonist, hoping to maintain a kind of personal purity amidst widespread social dissolution of manners and
morals. An Alienated Man, he is also the obverse side of the Civic Man who fails to find the moral and political equation for translating his personal ideals and commitments to social action. In our time the contemplative cleric who deserts the parish house or the cloister for the inner cities and neighborhoods "where the action is" dramatically illustrates the conversion of the private Ascetic Man into a Civic Man.

In summary, I have described four social types of man: the Private Man, the Elite Man, the Alienated Man, and the Civic Man. I have depicted the Civic Man as the only man who integrates personal feeling and aspiration with his work and his relationship with society in a way which makes his citizenship the fullest expression of his personality. Finally, I have suggested that the psychological, political, and social restraints which result in imposed social positions prevent Private Men, Elite Men, and Alienated Men from becoming Civic Men. After describing the growth of participation in the following section, I shall explain in Section III how traditional American political theory defines the existence of Private Men, Elite Men, and Alienated Men and ignores the importance of developing more Civic Men.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

This part of the document will (1) identify three types of democracy, (2) briefly sketch the history of increased participation in American political and social life, and (3) briefly describe the current extent of participation.

A Typology of Democracy

Community size and community complexity are the two attributes which distinguish three types of democracies: direct democracy, representative democracy, and participatory democracy (Destin, 1968b). Direct democracy requires a small local community which provides easy face-to-face relations and a sense of internal cohesion among a majority of the citizens. Its formal governmental aspects are the general assembly, rotation in public office, and celebration of civic commitment. Examples of direct democracy are the Greek city-states, the early Roman Republic, the Swiss cantons, and the New England towns.

Representative democracy attempts to preserve participation when community size and complexity increase and when the sense of national community transcends loyalty to local community. Its formal governmental aspects are a constitutional system dividing power and responsibility, popular suffrage as an institutional base, and an orderly process which simultaneously provides for majority rule and the protection of minority rights. Representative democracy organizes the citizenry along socioeconomic interests and frequently by race, religion, tribe, and language.

Participatory democracy attempts to incorporate elements of direct democracy in a national system of representative democracy. It is also a response to burgeoning cities and complexities of civic life introduced by the spectacular developments in technology and communications. It tries to reach a balance between the centralization of decision-making at the national level and the decentralization of decision-making at the local level. It attempts to bring within the orbit of local and national decision-making those groups who are not politically nor informally admitted to participation in direct and representative democracy.

The three types of democracy roughly correspond to our concepts of man. The direct democracies, as in the case of the Greek city-state, were elitist systems which a minority of Elite Men controlled and which excluded vast numbers of Alienated Men from citizenship and participation—foreign residents, women, children, and slaves. The representative democracies, as in the case of American political life, are also systems in which large numbers of citizens are Private Men exercising little, if any, influence on local and national decision-making and limiting their participation to the casting of the ballot. Participa-
tory democracy will require Civic Men who find in civic participation the happy union of personal and political fulfillment.

The Historical Expansion of Political Participation

The history of the extension of suffrage to religious minorities, to small farm owners in the new territories, to the freed slaves, and to women has been marked by many incidents of strong protest and confrontation (Westin, 1968b, pp. 10-12). Increased participation in American political and social life has not been the tranquil, evolutionary process depicted in school textbooks. Street demonstrations, the confrontation of governmental and secular authority, frequent resort to judicial process, and, finally, militant marshalling of support for new legislation and enforcement has accompanied the expansion of political participation.

The first agitation for the rights of minority religious groups began in the eighteenth century with the demand of the small Protestant sects to participate in the established culture. This agitation continued in the nineteenth century when the Jewish, Catholic, Mormon, and other citizenry demanded the right to practice their faiths without the social and political penalties of religious tests for voting and holding office and of restricted participation in community processes.

The Jacksonian Revolution of 1828, which Richard Hofstader depicts as "more an overturn of personnel than of ideas or programs" heralded the entrance of the small farmer and western settler into the mainstream of American political life (Hofstader, 1942, p. 55). The new Democratic Party was a motley array of small western farmers, small southern planters and humble eastern workers (Westin et al., 1965, p. 170). Aside from the noise of the political campaigns and the party presses, this expansion of political participation was considerably less noisy and disruptive than the expansions which followed.

The extension of full participatory citizenship to black people has always escalated the level of political and social tension and conflict to the level of civil war, the civil rights movement, and to the current struggle for Black Power. The freed slaves enjoyed significant voting and citizenship rights for only one decade, from the late 1860's to the late 1870's. The constellation of events which followed quickly reduced black people to a subject in contrast to citizen population: the electoral bargain between the Republicans and Democrats in 1876; the South's return to political power in Washington; the ennui of white northerners with the race question; the rise of the myth of white racial superiority and non-white racial inferiority; and the entrance of the United States into the imperialist ventures of the last decade of the eighteenth century, including the ruling of black and brown peoples as subject populations (Westin, 1968b).

The suffragette movement, which extended the franchise to women, also attained its goals by demonstrations and confrontations often
violent in form. There were the hunger strikes, the urban riots, and
the chaining of militant suffragettes to the doors and desks of legis-
lators.

The difficulties encountered by the white immigrant in winning
full participation in American political and social life present a
stark contrast with the formidable obstacles encountered by black
people as they moved from slave to citizen status and from rural to
urban dweller. In the latter half of the nineteenth and the early
decades of the twentieth centuries, the new immigrant moved from his
ocean docking into American community and political life by capturing
control of a political system which already existed, as in the case
of the Boston Irish, or establishing new spheres of influence in
founding new farm communities and in building political control of
western cities. The existing political parties, for their own
designs, energetically recruited the white immigrants who soon found
political access far easier and hospitable than the black people have
ever found it (Jestin, 1960b). It is the comparative ease with which
the white immigrant has entered the mainstream of American political
and social life that has lent undue support to the thesis that all
major political and social changes have occurred with a minimum of
tension and upheaval.

The Current Extent of American Participation

Voting turnout in presidential elections averages about 60 percent,
and for congressional elections about 40 percent. For local school
boards and referenda, for example, the average turnout is from 20 to 30
percent, rising to 50 percent when there are heated political, racial,
and religious issues generated by the campaigns and candidates. The
generally low voter-turnout (it is lower than most European democracies)
has many explanations, and even defenses, which we consider in this
section of the document. The key finding, however, is that 40 percent
of our eligible voters in presidential elections and 60 percent in

Jestin and his associates (1965, pp. 234-41) list the following
characteristics of American voting behavior: (1) the participation
in voting is relatively low (as noted above); (2) the electorate has
a low emotional involvement in national elections—it does not see
what major difference elections will make in their lives; (3) many
voters are not familiar with leading issues, government policy, and
party positions; (4) ideological positions are weak among voters,
making it difficult to locate them along a liberal-conservative
continuum; (5) party identification is more important than candidates
and issues; (6) voting decisions are not affected by a general
concern and concept of public interest but by the desire to secure
benefits for one’s interest groups and for oneself and one’s family.

We conclude that not only is American voting participation
remarkably low, but also it is influenced more by the perspectives of
the Private than the Civic Man.
In the following section of this document we shall examine several explanations and defenses of the low levels of civic participation among Americans. These explanations embody the conventional wisdom or the traditional theory of American political science (Westin, 1963a). We shall examine traditional theory from four perspectives: (1) the elitist view of Hamilton and Madison, (2) the views of latter-day democratic elitists, (3) the views of the interest-group theory advocates, and (4) the views of the political systems analyst. These political perspectives roughly correspond to the concepts of Private Man and Elite Man, with the exclusionary views consistent with the philosophy and values which inform the Elite Man and with the interest group view consistent with the parochialism of the Private Man. The discrepancies between traditional theory and the social and political realities of our time are considered in Section V of this paper.
III. DEFENSES OF LOW PARTICIPATION LEVELS

Traditional political theory has developed elaborate defenses of low levels of participation. The thread running through these arguments is that high levels of participation result in conflict and instability and that the interest of the masses are best protected by Elite Men organized as ruling minorities or interest groups. We shall examine four defenses, those of (1) the Federalists, (2) the democratic elitists, (3) the interest-group theorists, and (4) the political systems analysts.

The Federalist Defense

Both John Madison and Alexander Hamilton believed that governing elites of those well-endowed by nature with superior reason and judgment and by the world with superior education and material possessions made a populist democracy of the entire citizenry injudicious, unnecessary, and even dangerous. Whereas, in the true spirit of the Enlightenment, Jefferson believed in every man’s inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness and in reason as the core of human nature, neither Madison nor Hamilton shared the generosity of this view. The heirs of the English political system of aristocracy and privilege, these men did not believe that wisdom was equally distributed throughout mankind and that the control of government could be entrusted to all the people. Madison (Federalist Paper 51) wrote:

But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections of human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary.... In framing a government which is administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next phase to oblige it to control itself.

To prevent a "tyranny of the majority" Madison and Hamilton tried to fashion a political system which was more a republic than a democracy, a system which gave preponderant power and participation to the influential, wealthy, and educated.

The government which resulted was not government by popular consent but social control by deference (Hacker, 1957). Also the heirs of the English class system, the underclass of citizenry, the Alienated Men, by tacit consent, more a product of habit than deliberation, deferred to the judgment and governance of the privileged class. School textbooks display little awareness of the political and social realities of the founding of the republic when they fail to describe the elitist basis for an Electoral College largely composed of aristocratic elements to select the President and for a senatorial class and body to counterbalance the influence of a plebian House of Representatives.
Even in the broadest sense of governing class, those citizens who held the right to vote, were distinguished by the stigmata of Divine Election, the ownership of real estate, and the payment of taxes. Robert Lane (1959, p. 11) notes the essentially Puritan, bourgeois ethic of this period:

The fact that many of the early settlements were established by commercial companies, some of whose members were stockholders, made participation in government analogous to participation in the control of a business firm. As a consequence, property requirements seemed a peculiarly appropriate condition for the privilege of voting. In the second place, the Calvinistic ethic of the Puritan culture placed special premiums on economic possessions as the tangible evidence of spiritual worth. Not marked by success in worldly affairs were thought particularly fit to govern.

What Madison and Hamilton sought was minority rule. They looked to the presidential veto and sober deliberations of an aristocratic Senate to check the majority voices which rose cacophonously in the House of Representatives. The Electoral College could scuttle the election of a president whose origin and sympathy lay outside the privileged class, and the process of judicial review was at least a means of undoing legislation which had breached the first line of aristocratic defenses. The party system, which developed outside of the formal governmental structure, Madison saw as factionalism which beclouded political issues and sound judgment and endangered the hierarchical unity of the neonate country. He never foresaw one essential democratizing function of the American party system, the bestowing of political baptism on those groups, particularly the political conversion of the small property owners and the new immigrants, for the first time entering American political and social life.

Robert Dahl (1956, p. 36) has questioned the inclusion of those systems under the rubric of democracy which explicitly seek to avoid majority control. What qualifies the American system for a democratic classification is the growth of two non-constitutional institutions, political parties and interest groups, which formed a pluralistic minorities rule over a monolithic minority rule (Dahl, p. 132).

A complete chronicle of the views of our founding fathers would include the beneficent aspiration of Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson to exclude no man (or almost no man) from the mainstream of politics and society and to develop a genuinely participatory democracy. Jefferson (Padover, ed., 1939, p. 6) wrote to a friend:

We both consider the people as our children.... But you love them as infants whom you are afraid to trust without nurses, and I as adults whom I freely leave to self-government.

Whatever inadequacies Jefferson saw in his children he hoped to remove with popular education. He sounded the note of frustration and disillusionment now heard in the voices of so many young Americans who see the glaring disparities between democratic ideology and American political life when he wrote (Padover, ed., p. 27):
Alienation arises from perception of that contradiction, and from consequent feelings of individual political futility arising when the voter confronts an organization of politics which seems unable to produce minimally gratifying results.

Although the humane zeal of the Enlightenment and the profound faith in man's natural, even inalienable, rights ignited the Revolutionary fires and set a political course independent of the Old World, even today the strains of European elitist philosophies are heard over the democratic melody of American national pledges and anthems. We shall turn now to the consideration of that part of traditional theory we designate as democratic elitism.

Democratic Elitism

The democratic elitists, like Madison and Hamilton, have also faced the problem of justifying limited political participation within the framework of democratic government and society. The problem is not easy to solve--the reconciliation of rational democracy with what they consider most citizens to be, the apathetic, ignorant, ill-mannered, and irrational majority. The father of the modern democratic elitists we describe below was the French aristocrat, Alexis de Tocqueville, who provided the theme others elaborated later. The theme is this: Democratic government attempts to spread political rights to the common man. The common man lacks the capacity for self-government. For an enlightened rule he substitutes a "tyranny of the majority" as his historic and inadequate response to the "tyranny of the minority." The outward manifestations of the majority rule is mediocrity of political style and achievement and conformity of manners and opinion which endanger free expression of opinion and open dissent as much or more than monarchical rule. The typical American robustness of spirit and good humor rather than American governmental structure and practice may counterbalance the excesses of majority rule (de Tocqueville, 1961, ed., vol. 1, pp. 287-340).

The modern theorists of democratic elitism show little Jeffersonian faith in the dignity and reason of the majority of men. Peter Bachrach (1967, p.5) notes that the democratic elitist characterizes the majority as the alienated and apathetic masses of the cities and the rednecks of the farm communities. Ordinarily they are a passive, quiescent group. The trouble for democratic government commences with the political arousal of the ordinary man, who quickly rises to demagoguery and often to successful challenging of the power of the established elites. Gaetano Mosca (1939, p. 53) depicts the political underclass as unorganized individuals who stand alone and without power before the organized ruling elites. Pareto (Borkenau, 1936, p. 114) depicts the majority of men as the social body with political needs and problems they are powerless to solve without the help of the ruling elites. Robert Michels (1915, p. 53) believes that the majority is very content to allow the ruling elite to look after majority affairs. The mass develops enormous needs for direction and guidance.
C. Wright Mills (1956) and John Kenneth Galbraith (1967) are not as much protagonists of democratic elites as they are the sometimes grim social historians of the elitist strains and takers in contemporary American political, economic, and social life. Mills, who argues that the present power elites are the product of the American system of organized irresponsibility, includes in the masses the small property owner in rural and urban areas, the union wage earner, consumers, and all major white-collar groups, all of whom have failed to unite into a significant political force. Even less flattering than the advocates of democratic elites, Mills (pp. 320-1) describes the masses in these words:

Sunk in their routines, they do not transcend, even by discussion, much less by action, their more or less narrow lives. They do not gain a view of the structure of their society and of their role as a public within it. The city is a structure composed of such little environments, and the people tend to be detached from one another. The "stimulating variety" of the city does not stimulate the man and women of the "bedroom belt," the one-class suburbs, who can go on through life knowing only their own kind. Each is trapped by his confining circle; each is cut off from easily identifiable groups.

In our terms, Mills asserts that the price Private Men have paid for their suburban retreats and political abdication is the abdication of power to Elite Men commanding great power and resources and unresponsive to any direction from below.

Galbraith's (1967) portrayal of the majoritarian man lies in the inferences we draw from his description of the educated and scientific elite. Given the spectacular growth of scientific knowledge and technology, this man appears to be untalented, unequipped for self-government in an age requiring long-range planning, and unsophisticated in the technical knowledge required for the solution of our social problems. Edward Shils (1956) is even less flattering of the common man whom he describes as anti-libertarian, hyperpatriotic, xenophobic, isolationist, and generally dangerous. If participatory democracies were possible, they would be anti-intellectual, portraying those who rise above mass culture as highbrows, longhairs, and eggheads. What Tochcheville saw as robustness and autonomy of political spirit, Shils (pp. 161-2) sees as irreverence and disrespect for the law. This antimonianism, he writes, "is widespread, if not often intense, in most sections of the population, and it is perhaps more passive than active." On the other hand, Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee (1954, pp. 314-15) have hailed widespread passivity, indifference, and non-participation as promoting flexibility and stability in the American political system.

With a Manichaean division of man into a Spirit of Evil and a Spirit of Good, the theorists of democratic elitism, with the exception of C. Wright Mills, portray the Elite Man in charismatic terms. Rarely are these Elite Men described as power-seeking, opportunistic Machiavellians. Rather they are seen as men of superior ability and experience upon whom history and mass incom-
petence force the responsibility for controlling political and social life.

Bachrach (1967, p. 8) depicts a system of elite pluralism, which is open to those who organize and voice their grievances and platforms. Political elites preserve the stable, constitutional, and liberal nature of democratic or "polyarchical" theory. Mosca (1939, p. 50) describes an elite which "performs all political functions, monopolizes power, and enjoys the advantages which power brings." It must remain highly organized, and it will remain in power only as long as it solves the important problems. Mosca's elite recruits its members from the middle class. Pareto assumes that there is a biological elite, men born with superior ability and talent. This elite proves its ability to govern by the fact that they do indeed govern. An elite will fall from power when social conditions call for a change it cannot provide. Michels (1915, p. 378) does not believe that social change is simply the result of replacing one group of elites with another, but a "continuous process of intermixture, the oldest elements incessantly attracting, absorbing, and assimilating the new."

Mills (1956) portrays a power elite without ethics and responsibility to those they rule. He writes:

The men of the higher circle are not representative men; their high position is not the result of moral virtue; their fabulous success is not firmly connected with meritorious ability. Those who sit in the seats of the high and the mighty are selected and formed by means of power, the sources of wealth, the mechanics of celebrity, which prevail in their society. They are not men selected and formed by a civil service that is linked with the world of knowledge and sensibility. They are not men shaped by nationally responsible parties that debate openly and clearly the issues this nation now so unintelligently confronts. They are not men held in responsible check by a plurality of voluntary associations which connect debating publics with the pinnacles of decision. Commanders of power unequalled in history, they have succeeded within the American system of organized irresponsibility.

To check the monopolization of power by the present elitist power structure and to influence high-level decision-making, Mills looks to the intellectual community to organize in the interest of free intellects and to bring public pressure to bear on the decision-makers.

Galbraith (1967) also looks to the university to supply the elite he portrays as an educational and scientific estate growing in size and increasingly crucial to the political and industrial systems. Galbraith (p. 71) describes the modern corporation as a "techno-structure" in which the specialized skills, knowledge, and experience of men at all hierarchical levels of the organization have replaced the individual decision-making of the lonely entrepreneur, with great independence and wise judgment, ruling his far-flung enterprises. Galbraith believes that the men who occupy important positions
in the modern corporation rather than the capitalist barons or the ordinary man will bring about the significant changes of our time.

All of the propagators of democratic elitism, with the possible exception of Galbraith, subscribe to a tragic view of history, alternating between periods of democratic insurgency and success and periods of aristocratic domination, all periods culminating in the destruction of the governing forces by the antithetical forces they have unwittingly bred. Michels (1915, p. 403) writes:

When democracies have gained a certain stage of development, they undergo a gradual transformation, adopting the aristocratic spirit...against which they struggled so fiercely. Now new accusers arise to denounce the traitors; after an era of glorious combats and of inglorious power, they end by fusing with the old dominant class; whereas once more they are in their turn attacked by fresh opponents who appeal to the name of democracy. It is probable that this cruel game will continue without end.

The distinguishing characteristics of democratic elites appear to be their occasional recruitment from the underclass and their embroidered but brief episodes of glory. Democratic elitism embraces that part of traditional theory which endorses minority rule of Elite Men equal to the historical moment and the problems and downgrades the Private Men, who properly domiciled, fed, and amused, have neither the instinct nor desire to lead. Democratic elitism has little to say about Civic Men, who by integrating their public and private lives, become more than either the Spirit of Evil and the Spirit of Good. We may express the dilemma now besetting American society as one in which there are elaborate traditional, humane, and literary apologies for and celebration of the Private Man and the Elite Man and little in the way of even prototheory and intuitive poetic advocacy of the role of the Civic Man in a participatory democracy. At the present historical moment, when the nation is torn by monumental crises feeding on each other, it is not surprising to see Private Men turn to Elite Men for their deliverance and salvation.

Interest-Group Theory

The favored explanation for and the defense of low levels of participation in the last twenty-five years of political science thought is based on the system of interest groups (Westin, 1968a). Westin (1965) defines an interest group as a "collection of individuals who share some common attitude, seek recognition or advancement of their position in society, and engage in repeated and patterned activity to advance the group's claims on others in society." When the group seeks to advance its concerns through governmental agencies, it is a political interest group.

In dealing with interest groups as the pivotal point of democratic society, political scientists mix description, explanation, and defense, Westin (1968a, pp. 7-16) has identified five explanation-defenses of the system of interest groups. First, it is argued that the system
of interest groups and the franchise is legally open. The system is not closed by laws which block the likely points of access. There are several points of access: (1) At the national level a group may press its claims through the Presidency as well as through Senators and Congressmen. There are also the regulatory and administrative agencies which sometimes function almost independently of executive policy. Finally, at the national level, groups have recourse to the courts where they seek and obtain favorable adjudication. (2) At the state and local levels the group may press its claim through a parallel system of executive, legislative, and judicial branches, often employing its influence in state and local politics to obtain the most favorable reception of petitions. (3) The group may also employ the increasing power of the mass media, hoping to influence governmental branches and functionaries by molding public opinion. Because of these several access points, it is argued, governmental policy is the totality of interactions of political interest groups. David Truman (1962, pp. 153-4) describes the functional access of groups as follows:

Within limits...organized interest groups, gravitating toward points or responsive decision, may play one segment of the structure against another as circumstances and strategic considerations permit. The total pattern of government over a period of time thus presents a protean complex of crisscrossing relationships that change in strength and direction with alterations in the power and standing of interests, organized and unorganized.

A second explanation and defense of the system of interest groups rests on the assertion that those citizens who do not vote and join interest groups willingly eschew active political life because they believe that those citizens who do vote and join groups will safeguard their interests. This argument rests on the assumption, which we shall seriously question later in this document, that the non-participants in American political life are always those who feel that the system works well enough and does not jeopardize their interests.

A third explanation, Westin (1960a, p. 3) calls it a "calming" explanation, is that the group system remains responsive to the unorganized citizens because these citizens are a source of membership in "potential groups." Any group of unorganized citizens who share a common interest which other groups or governmental agencies, if either ignored or outraged, may potentially organize to protect and promote its interests. Potential groups can turn to system-shaking and system-breaking activities, as city riots and demonstrations in the inner city graphically illustrate. The principal finding of the Koerner Commission on the summer riots of 1967 was that there was no patterned, organized group instigation or participation. The black peoples remain a source of membership in potential groups. The hasty and even precipitous efforts of many urban, state, and federal officials to make economic concessions to the black inhabitants of urban ghettos illustrates how the interest groups in power try to avoid the formation of new system-breaking groups. The fact that the system can be responsive enough to account for unorganized interests, according to its apologists, warrants less criticism for the system than one
designed to respond only to the organized and politically active citizenry.

The fourth explanation and defense of the existing system asserts that the history of American political activity shows steady gains in numbers of citizens who have won voting privileges. The process of extending these privileges, described as peaceful and gradual, has succeeded in adding more and more groups to the political mainstream. The hallmark of the process is its evolutionary gradualism which holds check on those American populist strains often displaying impatience with law and constitutionalism and clamoring for nativistic, direct democracy (Clemin, 1960a, pp. 11-12). Group theorists see the slow rate of socialization and politicization of the disenfranchised and underrepresented as a vital necessity for a representative democracy. This claim for the advantages of political gradualism, as we have noted in the history of expanded suffrage, does not square with the agitation and upheaval that has often been necessary before political outcasts could enter the system.

The fifth explanation and defense of the system celebrates the life-style, moral values, and political acumen of the middle class. Those who take this position argue that the middle class governments, from the Greek and Roman city-states down to the modern governments of Switzerland, Great Britain, and the United States, have provided more stability than governments of either aristocratic or popular extremes. In terms of contemporary American social and political issues this argument asserts, to the degree that social, cultural, and informal factors over-accentuate the middle-class role in American politics through the interest group and party system and deaccentuate the role of the poor, the black, and uneducated, that the middle class is a stability and progress-producing factor (Clemin, 1960a, p. 14). The American political system requires this stability and predictability because a heavy degree of decision-making rests on private enterprise and private groups.

The interest-group theorists are the contemporary heirs of laissez-faire economic philosophies and American individualism which cherishes faith in a system that derives its chief energy and growth from the competition and pragmatic tests of life in the private sectors of interest and attainment. These theorists are the political apologists for the Private Man, as theorists of democratic elitism are the apologists for the Elite Man. Section V of this document will explore how well interest-group perspectives square with contemporary political and social reality.

**Political Systems**

Following the use of models and systems as a means of depicting multi-variate phenomena in the physical and life sciences and as a means of increasing the accuracy of prediction of future political events, many political scientists have developed similar models to analyze and relate the many facets of contemporary political life.

A political systems approach tries to identify groups of variables, called inputs, and to correlate these inputs with groups
of political events, called outputs. The system boundaries, therefor,e, are input and output variables and the system process is the empirical way in which the variables interrelate. Westin (1965, p. 242-254) provides an illustration of a political subsystem or microsystem which depicts the basic factors which shape individual voting decision.

He identifies four groups of voter variables: (1) the demographic characteristics of the voter, including class, sectional allegiance, sex, and age; (2) the psychological factors, such as the sense of civic duty and political efficiency and political efficacy and intensity of partisan identification; (3) sociological factors, such as election laws and extralegal coercion. These four groups bear particular relationship to issues and candidates and, in turn, to voter decision. Westin's system is designed to forecast two classes of outputs, whether an individual will vote and which issues and candidates he will support.

There are additional attributes of political systems analysis which distinguish it from the political sciences approaches we described earlier. First, the systems approach concerns itself almost solely with system input and output. It does not ask, in the McLuhan mode, what the system or political mechanism itself adds to or subtracts from the original inputs. Alternative models of internal systems operations or processes has not been a part of systems analysis in political science. The systems approach describes the conversion of input to output components without considering the influence of the converter (Westin, 1966a, p. 20). Second, the approach often fails to consider the effects of withholding certain input variables. Almond and Powell (1966), aware of this problem, have tried to distinguish the effects of participants and non-participants on the system. Third, the approach tries to maintain scientific neutrality by avoiding questions about the requisites of democratic systems and the changes it should provide and the directions it should take. The projected models try to explain how the system maintains itself, and the system is the political and social realities which comprise it. Systems analysis avoids any idealized version of the system and therefore limits its usefulness in discussing future states and trends of political and social events. Fourth, on a liberal-conservative continuum, political systems analysis leans toward the conservative side, presuming the kind of harmony and stability in political events one frequently finds in the biological world but which it is increasingly difficult to find in a nation racked by internal and external strife. This analytical mode deals awkwardly with rapid change and political upheaval. Fifth, the mode of analysis itself may be somewhat pretentious in that it pretends more complete knowledge of the input variables than we actually have. The tendency is to lean heavily on conveniently obtained demographic data which can only suggest the outer parameters of the system without necessarily identifying the crucial input variables, such as the "revolution of rising expectation" of minority groups enjoying for the first time significant economic and social progress.

The systems approach to political analysis and theory, to the degree that it attaches to the political status que, leans heavily on the concept of the "Private Iem. The system seems to lie outside the significant life of its citizens and defines a relatively
limited sphere of public activity and involvement. There is no
assumption of a satisfying transactional relationship between personal
need and expectation and civic competence and participation, as we
find in the Civic Man. Where the analyst, with cool scientific
demeanor and superior knowledge, rises above the system to comprehend
it from Olympian heights, he becomes a non-manipulative Elite Man,
not yet a man of politics but somehow more than a Private Man, who
combines non-participation with little political sophistication.

In Section III we have explored how traditional political
science theory explains and often defends low levels of civic partici-
pation. To introduce this question in the previous section, we dis-
tinguished three types of democracy to show that only a genuinely
participatory democracy, as distinct from classical direct democracy or
representative democracy, envisions a high level of civic participation
on the part of all social and ethnic groups comprising the electorate.
We also noted that the expansion of political suffrage in this country
to the disenfranchised has not always been a chronicle of peaceful
gradualism and majoritarian benevolence and there have been intense
struggles. As for the political theorists, the Federalists and the
democratic elitists neither foresee nor endorse broad civic partici-
pation. They do not find ample enough amounts of political visions
in the common man to warrant dedication of power by those whose
biological and social credentials appear to be inherently meretricious.
After all, they argue, a governing elite pays the ultimate price for
its mistakes—it is shorn of power and replaced by a more able elite.
The tyranny of an aroused majority is perhaps even less merciful than
the tyranny of the elite.

In his *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding* Daniel Moyihan (1969)
provides the latest defense of gradualist reform under the auspices
of the interest groups and the middle-class liberal consensus.
Moyihan (p. 193) argues that there is today a scarcity of social
opportunity which is analogous to the scarcity of economic resources.
Reformers from the upper middle-class and the social sciences who have
argued for full participation of the black and the poor in community
action programs which led the war on poverty have overlooked this
scarcity of social opportunity. Moyihan (p. 161) writes that "the
community action programs of the war on poverty with their singular
emphasis on 'maximal feasible participation' of the poor themselves...
 ليس/ the work of social scientists and professional reformers." When
these programs became disruptive the non-poor elements "i.e., the
majority" of the urban population saw signs of the further deterio-
ration of the whole community.

The import of Moyihan's argument is that the poor are not ready
for participation. Until there are basic economic changes in their
lives, participation will be achieved at the great cost of civility.
He claims (p. 164) that telescopic sights and mimeograph machines of
the community action program were not very different than the attempts
of Castro's Cuba to solve the problems of juvenile delinquents by
giving machine guns to its delinquents. Moyihan (p. 172) even sug-
gests that lower-class culture has a validity and integrity of its
own which middle-class reformers, particularly of the intellectual-
social science elite, have destroyed by their insistence on full
participation. "We may discover to our sorrow," he (p. 164) states, "that 'participatory democracy' can mean the end of both participation and democracy."

The activist social scientists also do not share the desire for order and anxiety about change encountered in working class and lower middle-class persons. These persons fear disorder. They fear crime. The social scientists, on the other hand, not to be appalled by disorder, almost welcome it. What has happened in the 1960's is that there have been "various forms of public disorder either sanctioned, induced, or led by middle-class literal-radicals" allied with the proletariat playing a relatively passive role. In the meantime there has been a backlash of the "mass of fundamentalist citizens" in the grip of anxiety, puzzlement and alarm. Moynihan (p. 181) argues that "intellectual groups had acquired an interest in political turmoil of the moment and came very near in misusing its position in government to advance that interest." In effect, Moynihan (pp. 187-188) is arguing for the slow access of the poor to power and participation through conventional interest group routes, the trade union organizations, the small fundamentalist churches of the black community, and Pentecostal sects of the Puerto Ricans—which he (p. 168) calls the "single incontrovertibly indigenous and independent institutions created by the minority slum dwellers in the present age."

In a later section of this report we shall grant Moynihan the validity of his gradualist thesis and ask, in the strictly evaluative sense he advocates for social scientists, why it has not answered the crisis of poverty and race.

These political scientists and sociologist system from the perspectives of the interest groups and political systems analysis probably have less difficulty accommodating the political and social realities of our time. Their position avoids the rigid class dichotomies of elitist positions and allows for the pluralism so real and essential in American politics and society. More unwittingly than consciously, these latter theorists have become apologists for low levels of civic participation. The defenders of the interest groups have failed to see that interest groups have not granted the same ease of access to all minority groups and that access has often been defined along ethnic lines so that the white person finds access more quickly than those people who are black, brown, and yellow. The systems analysts fail to see that identifying and correlating an array of input and output components does not answer questions about what is missing in the system, what the system is all about, and what it should be providing. In a following section of this document, we shall see how conceptions of democratic systems which accept low levels of civic participation fail to deal with the great crises of American society.
IV. POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CRISSES IN PARTICIPATION

Before we fully demonstrate the degree of disparity between traditional political science theory and the political and social realities of our time, we must try to trace the contours of the problems which confront us. This section of the document provides two functions: (1) it formulates the general contemporary political and social problem, the crises of our time, and (2) it deals with the four major crises, (a) race, (b) technology, (c) the generation gap, and (d) the international crises. I shall treat these problems as crises in participation. My thesis for this section is the following: The political and social crises now confronting the American democratic system are largely the result of historic low levels of civic participation and of the growing expectation and insistence of underrepresented groups to exercise more control in the plans and policies of all institutions to which they belong, including governmental institutions.

The General Problem

In broadest brush stroke we may trace this crisis moment in American history to the failure of the system's balancing mechanism to perform its usual function. Generally this mechanism absorbs the shock of new problems and demands by correcting a drift of events which has gone too far to the left or right. The function of the balancing mechanism is to articulate the competing theories, concepts, expectations, interests, and demands, with which it must cope and provide some general direction and progress for the whole system. The American political system is a gyroscope which moves along some general path leading to shared goals and values and controlled by a sensitive balancing mechanism which compensates for deviations from the true hypothetical linear path by providing the degree of correction proportionate to the degree of deviation. Deviation here is a mathematical concept, in the sense that we speak of deviations from the mean, and is used without pejorative value. Clearly the political and social crises of any historical period are more than deviate threats and nuisances to a system in perfect balance. These "threats and nuisances" are indeed the extraneous events and demands which the system largely ignores to maintain a simplified balance. The more factors the system must balance, the harder it is to achieve balance. Yet romantic or conservative arguments to preserve the simplified system-balance of the past never have widespread appeal, especially for those Alienated Men who never felt part of the system and also for those Civic Men within the system who find its parameters confining and even threatening to human values.

In the American democratic system political balance is a product of the spirit and practice of compromise. The spirit of compromise controls the level of expectation of the citizenry in its public encounters so that citizens ordinarily expect nothing better than...
modest success or nothing worse than modest failure in achieving their public goals. This controlled level of expectation, a unique American blend of idealism and pragmatism, avoids the pitfalls of extravagant despair and aspiration typical of nations which alternate between revolution and dictatorship to achieve at least temporary political and social balance. Americans, like President Nixon, never expect to win every political encounter and this makes them better winners and losers.

The practice of compromise has enabled the system to embrace a diversity of individual and group styles, beliefs, theories, interests, pressures, and directions. The practice has developed rituals of fair play, allowing disputants to state clearly their position and demands and to conduct the negotiations in a manner consistent with their basic beliefs and styles so that the compromise reached pertains only to the degree of success won or failure suffered in a limited encounter and not to the abandonment of basic individual and group integrity and freedom to continue to strive for a better future settlement. The American practice of compromise closely relates to the fundamental aspect of a democratic system we call due process, often the formal legal aspect of the informal behaviors enacted in reaching compromises. Due process protects the rights of the temporarily vanquished and enables him to re-enter the public forum for future rounds of compromise.

Why does it appear that the American democratic system, with the balancing-compromise mechanism having achieved notable success in the past, is unable presently to allow the compensations and corrections which provide a basic unity and direction? For a detailed answer to this question, we consider later in this section the racial, technological, and generational crises. Here I note some general trends which we observe in the three crises. First, we have developed more heterogeneity of life-styles than ever before. There are, for example, a variety of styles of attire, so that even men can express inner psychological states and choices of interpersonal relationships by selecting from a rich array of Brooks Brothers' suits, bell-bottom trousers, Edwardian-tailored coats, and beads as well as ties or by deciding to wear very little or no clothing. There is the variety of manners, so that one can adopt the frank casualness and openness of the hippies and the love children, the stolid demeanor or "uptightness" of the bank executive, or a California informality which combines luxurious living with ample hospitality. There are a variety of sexual styles so that one can decide on marital or single states, or some fairly rapid alternation between the two states, with one or several partners of the same sex or different or both sexes. There are a variety of domestic living styles so that one can select furnishings with Hellenic and Roman styling to the latest psychedelic, chrome, and plastic motifs. One can live in an apartment, a house, a cottage, a Greenwich Village basement, a trailer, a tent, or a sleeping bag, all expressing styles as diverse as brownstones, apartment towers with glass walls, and suburban ranch-type homes. All variations in life-styles and many more make compromise difficult and balance harder to restore. The cultural richness and esteem of present-day American pluralism contributes largely to political flux and imbalance.
Second, there is the conviction of increasing numbers of citizens that the political balance of the past was maintained largely within the narrow context of middle-class values, life-styles, and high economic priorities. The citizens who share this belief are often those occupying negatively imposed social positions within an Establishmentarian society with which they experience little essential identification and over which they exercise no control. This belief is especially undermining of present efforts to re-establish a political balance especially when that balance is narrowly conceived. The belief gives rise to activities originated outside and directed against the system, as in the case of demonstrations, confrontations, and riots of students and black people. The challenge is basic, directed against the system itself in the belief that only its replacement can result in political and social justice.

Third, larger numbers of citizens than ever before are questioning the assumption that political and social progress require certain continuing streams of social stability (Westin, 1963b, p. 6). Traditional theory asserts that those regimes having the highest levels of stability in Europe and America have generally achieved the greatest degrees of material rewards for their citizenry within the context of available resources and international position. Indeed, historical and political studies document the fact that high levels of cleavage and conflict, disruption, and revolution impede and even destroy progress toward values and goals widely shared by mankind. The maintenance of political stability, however, does not require the absence of turmoil and dissensus and recognizes the need for change in the power balances of community and nation over time to build a larger consensus incorporating new elements with the older citizenry (Westin, 1968b, p. 7). Democratic elitist theory, however, has often assumed that the entrance of disestablished popular elements into the system creates political and social havoc, with anti-intellectual and xenophobic overtones (see Section two above). Westin (1968b, p. 7) asserts that a large school of liberal democratic theory fears activation of the masses because it sees the masses as less committed to basic democratic values—civil liberty, racial equality, cultural pluralism, and so on. Such theorists provide elaborate discussions making a virtue of indifference, non-participation, and popular apathy. The radical left, and perhaps the radical right of the future, does not distinguish between one kind of basic stability which history shows as facilitating economic, political, social, and moral progress and another kind which perceives all manner and degrees of dissent and disruption as basic threats to the system. In the present situation, paradoxically enough, even the defenders of the system are moving to extra-system activities, as illustrated in the strikes of teachers, policemen, firemen, sanitation workers, and utility workers and in the establishment of two new political parties in the presidential election of 1960. The resort to extra-system techniques to gain one's ends makes the restoration of balance incredibly difficult.

Fourth, in the catalog of trends which our major social crises share is the existence of widespread role ambiguity (Levine, 1968). The flood of technological change inundating society shows every indication of reaching new levels in the regions it now occupies and
of spreading to all sectors of American life. Our conceptions of male-female roles, of family roles, of worker roles, of leisure-time roles, and so on, largely stem from a rural community society which clearly defined, not always suitably, the appropriate face-to-face relationship of its lineal inhabitants. The technology and the environment not only provide a greater diversification of roles but also any single role can be enacted in a number of ways. With such cultural diversity it becomes more and more difficult to abstract role norms which are essential role attributes and to distinguish these from idiosyncratic role enactments. A political and social system which does not provide a basic residue of role definition is frequently seen, especially by the young, as a system in considerable disarray or as generally disfunctional. When one combines the anxiety growing out of role ambiguity with that frustration growing out of occupying negatively imposed social positions, one has the ingredients for considerable political and social upheaval and a gloomy forecast for the restoration of political balance. Levine (1960 cited) describes the extraordinary confusion of the individual in times of crisis and his ominous tendency to retreat to primitive behavior levels:

In times of crisis, more than ever, it is necessary that the bewildering array of events, information, impressions, and experiences with which the individual is confronted be ordered and simplified. In complex situations, when the personal modes of perceiving are projected to the social screen, tendencies to distort, to detect differences, and to experience danger become magnified. And in this process the special ordering of ideas and information, co-mingled with misinformation and fallacious belief, are directed toward achieving a comfortable state of seductive simplicity, in which definition takes the place of doubt, order takes the place of chaos, and the anxieties associated with ambiguity are held in check.

Thus far in this section we have described a system of political balance that corrects for sharp deviations from some central consensus which provides cohesion and progress for American society even in times of rapid change. Both the spirit and practice of compromise maintain and promote this balance. We then discussed four trends which are making the balanced consensus and compromise ever more difficult: (1) the increasing heterogeneity and pluralism of American life-styles; (2) the suspicion of many that past balance was achieved and maintained within the narrow context of middle-class values; (3) the frequent resort to extra-system activities; and (4) widespread role ambiguity. In the section which follows I discuss the major problems confronting American politics and society, the problems of race, technology, the generation gap, and international relations, relating each problem to the general problem and trends discussed above and showing how each represents a crisis in participation.

The Racial Crisis in Participation

The racial crisis is perhaps the most dramatic illustration of the current trends and deep forces and convictions now dividing American society and producing serious political imbalance. First, the trend
toward greater heterogeneity of life-styles has been enhanced greatly by the increased visibility of black people in the mass media, the schools and colleges, and places of work and residence. Second, there is the growing black awareness that American society has achieved a superficial political harmony and social stability largely within the framework of white middle-class priorities and values. Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton (1967, p. 25) express this dissatisfaction when they reject "the goal of assimilation into middle-class America because the values of that class are in themselves anti-humanist and because that class as a social force perpetuates racism."

Third, the racial crisis also illustrates the trend for large numbers of individuals, in this case black people, including their youthful college and high school cohorts, to turn to extra-system and anti-system activities, as riots and fires in our city streets and violence on college and university campuses, to threaten severely and perhaps to topple systems which they believe ultimately will fail to provide solutions for black problems. Fourth, the racial crisis demonstrates role ambiguity, not only for the black person assuming new roles and redefining old roles in ways allowing more self-acceptance and individuality, but also for the white person who tries to develop more democratic black-white interpersonal transactions. Levine (1966, pp. 246-7) describes the fear and mistrust which often surrounds these transactions:

One of the most difficult elements in the racial crisis to confront is the intensity of mutual distrust which Caucassians and Negroes have of one another. In a recent newspaper article, a militant Negro leader was quoted as saying that he had never known a white man he could trust. Even if the quote is only apocryphal, it might serve as an example of the complexities of the phenomena of distrust. Countless indignities which Negroes experience irrespective of their status, positions, attainment, competence, moral character, or other virtues, are often subtle and out of the range of awareness of most whites. These experiences continually serve as reminders that one is perceived in a subordinate and inferior status and such experiences reinforce perceptions that whites are the enemy and cannot be trusted. The hated category "white" can be maintained while at the same time some whites can be respected, trusted or loved through a psychological process which permits the creation of a category of "exception."

As Levine suggests, there is considerable role ambiguity for both the white and the black person until master-slave (either white or black masters or slaves) become person-person relationships.

There are several disputes about the political and social progress of black people which sharply divide social scientists and which relate directly to participation. The first dispute concerns the claim that white immigrants have moved quickly into the mainstream of American society while black people have uniquely encountered heavy obstacles. The second dispute is whether the present economic and social position of the black person is growing relatively better or worse. In weighing the merits of each side in these disputes and their supporting data, it is important to note that it is the subjective perception of the black people of their political, economic, and social conditions which is
important—perhaps more important than the objective data which we summarize here.

Social scientists are divided in their interpretation of the racial history of black people in America. One group emphasizes the uniqueness of black history while the other group emphasizes the similarities between black history and the history of the assimilation of the white immigrant in American culture and politics. Both interpretations have implications for the racial crisis in political and social participation.

What makes the black history unique or at least distinct from white immigrant history in America? First, the black people exercised no choice in the decision to leave or the manner in which they left Africa. They were taken by force, chained during their ocean passage, and sold as commodities for plantation labor. Second, black people have been forced to live in slavery for two hundred years, a situation no white immigrant endured. These tragic episodes of forced removal from native lands and their inhuman subjugation in the new land gives credence to the now popular assertion that black people are really colonials, made to feel inferior to their American settlers in all aspects of life, and who must overthrow their colonial masters if ever they are to be free, and who must establish a separatist black nation. Third, black people have lived in political inferiority for the last one hundred years. Indeed, we have noted that the extension of the franchise to the black man has enormously raised the level of tension and conflict and that the legal gains made, for example, in the Reconstruction period, were often only temporary advances. Fourth, there has always been the unique role of black culture in American art, life, and manners, often reaching high levels of literary, musical, and graphic expression, exercising major influences on American imagination, and providing the chief avenue of black participation in American society during the period of black exclusion.

Most social scientists would agree that these four aspects of black history entitle the black man to a unique role in American history, distinct from the history of the white immigrant. The disagreement occurs over the fifth point, whether or not black people have suffered more economic deprivation and denial of opportunity than other ethnic and minority groups. This debate involves comparison not only with white European immigrants but also with racial minorities, the Chinese, Japanese, American Indians, Puerto Ricans, and Mexican-Americans.

The Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968), popularly known as the Kerner Commission Report, reviews evidence which shows the black experience is sharply distinct from the white immigrant experience. To support the assertion that patterns of black assimilation have been unique, the Kerner Commission Report points to the following evidence (pp. 276-281): (a) white immigrants were able to fill unskilled jobs and thereby secure an economic foothold denied today to the black man because of the greatly reduced number of unskilled jobs in the technological era; (b) white immigrants were able to move rapidly into big city politics
and thus deny access to the black men who arrived in the cities later; (c) the close family structure of the white immigrant provided incentives and the willingness to sacrifice, whereas the loose black family structure provided few incentives; and (d) the segregation of black people denied them access to good jobs and to good neighborhoods in which they could rear their children.

Nathan Glazer (1963a, 1963b), however, disputes the claim that white immigrants have rapidly moved into American society, quickly achieving very favorable levels of income, living, and political power while racially distinct groups have been held back in severe social, economic, and political subjugation, particularly the black person, who has been most severely impeded. He writes (1963a):

The truth is nothing like this. Some white ethnic groups—such as the Jews—have shown a rapid economic mobility. Others have been much slower to achieve economically. One of the economically backward white ethnic groups, the Irish, has been politically gifted, and members of the group are to be found disproportionately among elected officials of every level and in almost every part of the country. Others, such as Italians and Poles have done poorly both economically and politically. Some socially distinct groups—such as Japanese—have done remarkably well in education and occupation. Most others have done badly.

The second area of considerable disagreement among social scientists concerns the present position of the black people and whether it is growing better or worse. Levine (1967, pp. 233-240) argues that the relative (to the white man) conditions of the black man are inferior and that they grew relatively more inferior. Levine uses the measure of "time lag" to show how the black condition has improved over time yet remains further behind the white position today than previously. He presents the following "time lag" data of Rashi Fein (1965):

1. In comparing the actual infant deaths relative to live births in 1960, the Negro infant mortality rate was 43/1000 live births, a figure attained by whites twenty years earlier in 1940.

2. "The gap for neonatal mortality rates—deaths of infants under 28 days—is about twenty years and also has widened slightly."

3. "The Negro male child is born into a world in which in 1962, his chances of reaching age 20 are about the same as that of a white's reaching 37. A Negro girl at birth has the same chances of attaining age 20 as the white girl has of reaching 42. The lags are almost two decades."

4. In 1964, 10% of Negro males age 20 to 24 had one or more years of college—the same percentage as among white males age 55-64, years old attained when they were young. This represents a gap of over 35 years. The gap though still
considerable is much shorter at lower levels of educational attainment."

5. "In 1963, about 13% of employed Negroes were laborers (except farm and mine)—the same percentage in the white population of 1900 (a percentage which for whites had gradually declined to 4% by 1963)."

6. The considerable emphasis that is being placed presently upon improving the educational attainment of Negroes frequently gives the impression that this constitutes the solution to income and employment problems for Negroes. "The Negro family whose head had some high school earned less than the white with fewer years of schooling; the Negro who has attended (but not completed) college earns less than the white with only 8 years of elementary school. The Negro college graduate earns slightly more than does the white high school graduate.... The value of an education is less clear when, for those who attend college, Negro male income is only 60% of white male income but is 60% for those who only completed high school and 73% for those who only attended elementary school... It is a simple fact that the Negro is qualified for higher educational levels and for higher incomes than he attains."

The Kerner Commission Report also provides data to show that there is a growing disparity between white and black conditions: (1) While the incomes of whites and blacks have been rising, in 1966 the median black income was only 59 percent of the white median (p. 251). In 1966, 26 percent of black families earned $7,000 and over as compared to 55 percent of white families (p. 252). (2) In 1967, 21 percent of the unemployed were non-whites. Even the employed blacks occupy the lower-paying and unskilled position, such as service workers and city and farm laborers, while whites hold most of the professional, sales, and supervisory positions (p. 253). (3) With the level of poverty fixed at an annual income of about $3,000 in 1966, 11.9 percent of the whites and 40.5 percent of the non-whites fell below the poverty line.

Glaser (1960b, pp. 10-12) disputes the use of what he calls the "absolute gap" between black and white levels of income, occupation, education, housing and political participation to show that the situation of the black man is getting worse. Using 1967 data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Bureau of Census, Glaser reports these improvements in the black conditions:

Income: In 1966, 23% of non-white families had incomes of more than $7,000 against 53% of white families. Ten years before, using dollars of the same value, only 9% of the non-white families had incomes at this level, against 31% of white families.

If we look at the United States, outside of the South where the Negro situation on all measures is worst, we find in 1966
33% of non-white families with income above $7,000 against 59% of white families at that level.

**Occupation:** Between 1960 and 1966, the number of non-whites in the better-paying and more secure occupational categories increased faster than whites: a 50% increase for non-whites in professional, technical, and managerial work, against a 13% increase for whites; a 48% increase in clerical occupations, against a 19% increase for whites; a 32% increase in sales workers, against a 7% increase for whites; a 45% increase in craftsmen and foremen, against a 10% increase for whites. And during the same time, the proportions of non-whites working as private household workers and laborers dropped.

**Education:** In 1960, there was a 1.9 years gap in median years of school completed between non-white and white males over 25; by 1966, there was only a .5 years gap.

In 1960, 36% of non-white males over 25 had completed high school, against 63% of white males; by 1966, 53% of non-white males had completed high school, against 73% of white males.

In 1960, 3.9% of Negro males had completed college, against 15.7% of white males; in 1966, 7.4% of Negro males had completed college, against 17.5% of white males—a 90% increase among non-white college graduates, against a 14% increase in white college graduates.

**Housing:** Between 1960 and 1966, there was a 25% drop in the number of substandard housing units occupied by non-whites (from 2,263,000 to 1,600,000 units), and a 44% increase in the number of standard units occupied by non-whites—from 2,831,000 to 4,135,000 units.

If we look at political participation—voting, offices held, in effect, political power—we find an equally striking increase. Thus, Negro voter registration in the South increased from 7,164,000 in March 1964 to 3,072,000 in May 1966, while Negro population remained stable. The National Commission on Civil Disorders surveyed twenty cities to find out the extent of Negro political representation. The cities averaged 16% in Negro population; 10% in proportion of elected Negro political representatives. We have to interpret such a figure in the light of the fact that Negroes of voting age are generally a smaller proportion of the total Negro population in most cities than whites of voting age of the white population, since Negroes in cities have a higher proportion of young families and children, whites a higher proportion of the aged.

Even on that sorest point of black-white relations, the police, the Kerner Commission reports progress in one significant respect: there are now substantial numbers of Negroes on many city police forces—Washington 21%, Philadelphia 20, Chicago 17, St. Louis 11, Hartford 11, Newark 10, Atlanta 10, Cleveland 7, New York 5, Detroit 3.
The Bureau of Census (1963, pp. v-vii) has reported data which support Glazer’s thesis. For the first time, in 1967, more than fifty percent of all non-white persons had white-collar, craftsman, and semi-skilled jobs. Last year there was a net gain of about one-quarter million non-white workers of considerable status and pay. Fifty-eight percent of young white adults were high school graduates, as compared with 55 percent in 1965 and 39 percent in 1960. Glazer (1963b, p. 9) finds the present situation paradoxical because improvement on the economic lot of black people has accompanied increasing black militancy. He writes:

Something very strange is happening in the racial crisis in the United States. On the one hand, the concrete situation of Negro Americans is changing rapidly for the better. This is not only true when we look at economic measures of all kinds (although we all know these are an inadequate measure of group progress, and that a people that feels oppressed will never be satisfied by the argument "you never had it so good"); but it is also true that things are better when we look at measures of political participation and power. It is even true when we look at the critical area of police behavior and police attitudes. There is no question that police in city after city are becoming more careful in how they address Negro Americans, more restrained in the use of force, of firearms. The history of the riots alone, from 1964, demonstrates that. But on the other hand, the political attitudes of Negroes have become more extreme and more desperate.

In this section of the document we have seen how the racial crisis dramatically illustrates political and social trends threatening the balance of the democratic system. The racial crisis has made its profound contribution to the increased heterogeneity of lifestyles, the distrust and criticism of middle-class political priorities and values, increased extra-system and anti-system activities as a way to redress grievances and win more favored positions, and increased role ambiguity for blacks and whites as they attempt to achieve more democratic interpersonal transactions. We have also considered the division of opinion among social scientists on the degree of uniqueness of history of black Americans, especially as they are compared with white immigrants and other racial groups on the rapidity with which they have achieved political and economic power. There is also disagreement over the degree of improvement there has been in black conditions, with one group arguing that a time lag has actually increased the disparity between conditions of white and black men, and the other group insisting that improvement is improvement even though the black people have not attained economic equality. The objective description of the improvement of black conditions clearly cannot fully explain the continued unrest and upheaval in the black communities. More important, perhaps, is the subjective reactions both whites and blacks have to each other—the political, social, and economic conditions in which they find themselves. The following section of this document is a consideration of these various reactions.
What makes the racial crisis a crisis in participation is the intensity of action and reaction we observe in black and white relations as each group attempts to wrestle with social and economic problems which beset it. The determined fury with which the teachers' union in New York City fought the attempt of the non-white communities to gain local control over their schools was matched only by the stout opposition of the non-white communities to face whatever consequences their action brought. It is indeed a crisis in participation when increased participation by the former political outcasts results in system-shaking and system-breaking activities, an uncontrolled participation, on the part of both whites and blacks. In the early history of the civil rights movement, many liberal white men believed that at last the black man would make his full entrance into American society. What liberal whites and blacks did not fully foresee was, to the extent that American society was white society, that black men would find themselves demanding not only full membership but also a change in the purposes and function of the club. In assuming control of their destiny, the black man wanted a black not a white destiny. The white man, even the traditional liberal, suddenly realized that he had not only to share but also to change the political and social system. The civil rights movement became the racial crisis when both blacks and whites fully realized the basic nature of the struggle. In the following section we shall look at the various responses blacks and whites have made to the struggle in which they now find themselves and how each type of response has raised the level of tension and made conflict resolution more difficult.

The black response which is most telling and determined has been the movement toward black separatism. We can delineate this movement in two ways. First, we can see black separatism as the latest illustration of the typical mode of assimilation of outcasts in American society, with the establishment of semi-autonomous enclaves within the larger society which preserve the valued links to tradition and familiar life-styles while also providing staging areas for entrance into the larger social collectivity (Glazer, 1968a). Until the present decade, black communities in both the north and south protested the lack of local and ethnic autonomy and have not experienced the political independence of the Irish in Boston or the Jews in New York City. This view of current black separatism as the latest achievement of the process of immigrant assimilation, neatly fits current black protest and reform into the main current of American history. Second, we can see black separatism, especially Black Power, as the movement toward colonial revolution in which black people will overthrow a sick American regime as the only way to right historic injustice and inequality and to establish territorial and political independence—a black nation under black control. The two views of black separation sharply divide black leadership, with Martin Luther King typifying the former or enclave view and the militant leadership of the Black Panthers typifying the latter or colonial view. Both views, and the political activity which spring from them, constitute crises in participation. Both modes of black separation challenge the extraterritoriality of current decision-making at both local and national levels and demand that the central focus of decision-making
affecting black aspirations and priorities fall within the black community. This demand often appears to the white political establishment, with its deep involvement in governmental, business, and labor bureaucracies, as an attack on the core of the democratic system even though the blacks are careful to phrase their demands in the language of local participatory democracy.

There is, therefore, the white response to the black demands and to the diffuse uneasiness and heightened tension they arouse. One response, often more a possibility than a probability or actuality, is a white backlash which meets black demand with white repression. This response, when it occurs, stems largely from two sources. First, those ethnic groups, as in the case of the Italians and Polish, who are only now achieving levels of political and economic power which the Irish, Jews, and Germans have long exercised, see the black people as most untimely interlopers about to deny them their moment of imminent triumph. These are the groups, including the recently somewhat affluent residents of Los Angeles, Orange, and San Bernardino counties in California, and of Cook county in Illinois, who find it terribly hard to accept the compensatory character of the racial crisis—the black demands for reparations as well as mere social equality in correcting historically-based inequities (Justin, 1968b, p. 15). Herbert Gans (1968) writes:

Perhaps the most frequently heard argument is that the unequal must do something to earn greater equality. This line of reasoning is taken by those who have had the liberty to achieve their demands and assumes that the same liberty is available to everyone else. This assumption does not hold up, however, for the major problem of the unequal is precisely that they are not allowed to earn equality—that barriers of racial discrimination, the inability to obtain a good education, the unavailability of good jobs or the power of college presidents and faculties make it impossible for them to be equal. Those who argue for earning equality are really saying that they want to award it to the deserving, like charity. But recent events in the ghettos and on the campuses have shown convincingly that no one awards equality voluntarily; it has to be wrested from the 'more equal' by political pressure and even by force.

Second, white backlash is often the result of white failure to distinguish between those basic aspects of the American democratic system which are independent of class and ethnic biases, values, and priorities. The distinction here is between, on one hand, what is white or black, and on the other, what is middle class or democratic. Black demands for control of their schools, for example, are seen by many whites and blacks as an attempt to divide and ultimately to take over urban education. At least thus far in the racial crisis it has been difficult for large numbers of whites to sustain an intense enough paranoia to convert such suspicions into cruelly repressive action against the black community.

The favored and most energetic response to the racial crisis thus far on the part of both white and black people has been to increase the rate at which human and material resources are poured
into black ghettos in an effort to ameliorate conditions as quickly as possible. The purposes lying behind this response are not singular or clear but they include the hope that black people can experience enough of the affluence and comfort of American society not to want to overthrow it, the strong intention to right the social, political, and legal injustices of the past, and the desire to school black leadership quickly in self-government within the system so that the militant leadership operating outside of and against the system attracts as small a following as possible. Black people, in the language of interest groups, are a "potential" group of such greatly widespread influence and power, that one can understand the bitter struggle waged within and outside the system for their support. The white protest groups have tried to enlist black radicals in their struggle either (1) to build a strong alliance or (2) to obtain their temporary support in particular confrontations. The whites hope that the black militant leaders can deliver the black people for their struggle. The attempts at black-white militant alliance occurs at a time of growing discontent in the black community fed by the black Vietnam War veterans who are unwilling to accept old social slots and often unite with the Peace and Freedom movement. The Peace and Freedom Party succeeds where the Communist Party fails because now blacks have become militant.

Each of these responses, or subordinate parts of them reflect current conceptions of man and of traditional political theory. The militant leadership of the movement for colonial black separatism, condemning both the ameliorative efforts of white society to right the radical imbalance and the cooperation of black society in encouraging and directing these efforts, often fashions itself as a ruling elite who has a clearer vision of black need and destiny than the majority of white and black people. Where there has been black acquiescence in accepting black elitist leadership, particularly on the part of black high school and college students, there is evidence suggesting the adoption of that concept of man I have dubbed Elite Man and of that part of traditional theory I have called democratic elitism. In fighting white elitism, imagined and real, black militants have often spawned a revolutionary elitism of their own.

Where the response to the racial crisis has been tendencies in thought and action toward backlash and repression on the part of the whites, we often get the vague impression of an embattled privileged group, like the pre-revolutionary French nobility, whose petulant outrage was as inordinate as their understanding of contemporary political and social problems. These are indeed the Private Men, forced to emerge from their suburban compounds, inexperienced and unskilled in the public forum, and eager to adopt any measures which will allow them a hasty retreat to sheltered peace and tranquility. Whether fear and insecurity and increased crisis levels will move them from privacy to leadership of Elite Men is not yet evident in any organized activity of the reactionary right.

There are two modes of response to the racial problem which presage great hope for making more Civic Men out of Private Men. One mode is that part of black separatism adopting the enclave view
which sees in increased black political and economic autonomy the necessary next step in the assimilation of black people in the democratic system. The black adherents of this view show in both word and deed that racial crises in participation can be solved when black people find in their public participation the freedom and dignity they seek in their private lives. The black man, who is an Alienated Man, clearly has stronger reasons for escaping the "privacy" of his ghetto compound, more a prison than a retreat, than the Private Man for escaping his suburban compound. And the remarkable development in our era may be the discovery of the black man that he need not become a Private Man to achieve the social justice and happiness he seeks. The other response mode which is making more Civic Men out of both whites and blacks are the meliorative efforts to improve as rapidly as possible the economic and social conditions under which black people live. The human and material resources required for the solution of the racial problem are of such enormous proportions that employment for the next decade can be guaranteed to all white and black Private Men and Alienated Men seeking public careers.

The Technological Crisis in Participation

I am using the term "technology" in two senses: (1) it describes the electromechanical equipment, the hardware of electronic and space age, and (2) it describes the knowledge in the natural life, and behavioral sciences applied in the solution of practical problems. Donald Michael (1963, chapt. 2) describes the likely scope of technological developments in the decades ahead. The application of automation and computers to an ever greater variety of tasks is expected to increase rapidly. A major tool in the advancement of this knowledge will be the computer program to simulate individual and institutional behavior. Experiments in application of technology that supplements or replaces the human teacher will increase. Biology is likely to provide the most exciting and dramatic break-throughs in science in the next decades. There will be more telephone lines, television and radio channels, and facsimile circuitry. Missiles and other strategic vehicles for delivery will become ever more sophisticated. There will be more cars. More mass transportation will be used, but only gradually. A vast variety of radical construction methods and fabrication materials will revolutionize the building industry, especially the construction of private dwellings. There will be short range weather forecasts in many parts of the world, but it is unlikely that weather control will expand greatly. Recreational technology will offer enormous opportunities for engineering imagination and entrepreneurship.

Although the technological crisis may not supply all the drama and violence of the racial crisis on the contemporary American stage, it has profound effects on American society and politics, with its silent and disquieting undercurrents of pathos and confusion. Like the racial crisis, it embodies and illustrates current trends which threaten political and social balance and compromise. First, although literature and art traditionally attribute color and variety of life styles to bucolic, pre-technological romanticism, there is much evidence that modern technology for large numbers of individuals furnishes the occasion and materials for heterogeneity and idiosyncrasy, even when this technological sophisti-
cation is used only to manufacture stronger hallucinogens, psychedelic beads and paintings, and electronic music with anti-system lyrics. By increasing social complexity, technology provides the occasions for groups living at different styles and paces in enclaves providing opportunity for more whimsical, personally-paced styles of life (Michael, 1963, chapt. 3). With entrepreneurial ingenuity, technology in the service of business provides novelty and sensation in gadgetry equal to, if not surpassing, in scope the variety found in Wordsworthian Nature. The Harvard group on technology and society holds that "technology has created a society of such complex diversity and richness that most Americans have a greater range of personal choice, wider experience and a more highly developed sense of self-worth than ever before" (New York Times, January 19, 1969). Emmanuel Kenione (1969) believes that "this is probably the first age in history in which such high proportion of people have felt like individuals. No eighteenth century factory...had the sense of individual worth that underlies the demands on society of the average resident of the black urban ghetto today."

Second, the gargantuan development of modern technology poses a grim challenge to the middle-class ethic of rewards for hard work, conservation of resources for our less fortunate older years, and studious avoidance of worldly indulgence which weakens character and morals. To replace the interest groups which actively shouldered political and social responsibility, technology, for better or for worse, pushes us toward new forms of organization and control under the aegis of managers, engineers, and other professionals whose hierarchical positions are more a product of knowledge and experience than social class and traditional interest groups. The family and hearth, the core of middle-class domestic life, exercise less influence over what children believe and do as the ubiquitous mass media relentlessly shape manners and morals.

Third, technological development, or the response to it, results in extra-system activities when present political and industrial organization seems too cumbersome to cope with the problems it poses and when innovative managers unschooled in the veneration of the past devise new organizational models and systems which circumvent the costly pitfalls and delays of old routines. Keniston (1967, p. 159) believes that one victim of the new technological age will be the sense of history. For today's youth, he writes, "the past grows more remote and irrelevant psychologically, the future grows more remote and unpredictable, the present assumes a new significance, one in which the environment is relevant, immediate, and knowable." The apotheosis of the present will fortuitously result in extra-system activities.

Fourth, the technological age results in widespread role ambiguity largely because it disrupts and confuses traditional roles of man, woman, child, mother, father, citizen, friend, worker, and so on, without rapidly enough crystalizing new and appropriate roles or redefining old ones. The worker who finds himself technologically unemployed, the job which either male or female can perform with equal adroitness, the suburban mother attempting to inculcate a lifestyle which is lackluster in comparison with zing and zest of the latest television teenage idol, all produce massive confusion over
social roles and transcendental self-identity. The-om-I becomes a shapeless amalgam of half-hearted experimentation with new roles, a blend which leaves many individuals with a pervasive sense of hypocrisy and self-deception. As individuals forecast the future likelihood of role modification, commitment to any role appears unsafe and becomes more difficult.

Our central question concerns the political response to this burgeoning technology, that is, the threat posed by modern technology to the democratic tradition of balance and compromise and the way in which it contributes to a crisis in participation. Before dealing directly with this question, I shall describe briefly some of the major effects of technology on contemporary society and on decision-making in private and public institutions.

There are three sectors of experience which vividly show the effects of technology on contemporary society: (a) knowledge and careers, (b) privacy, and (c) leisure-time activities. Regarding knowledge and careers, Michael Harrington (1967, p. 241) has noted that automation and cybernation will make "machines capable of responding to a near infinity of contingencies by hooking them up to computers." Automation will result in the elimination of millions of jobs tied to routine production and clerical functions. New jobs will require higher knowledge and skill levels especially in the physical and biological sciences. The new technology and economy, with its seemingly insatiable need for highly trained specialists, will seriously challenge traditional purposes of American education, the training of the democratic and liberal generalists who can assume a broad range of citizenship responsibility and who appreciate the literary and aesthetic dimensions of human experience. Harrington (1967, p. 285) notes how unresponsive American education has been to the demands of the technological era:

It is impossible to structure our educational system without knowing what kind of world the young who are being trained will live in. The absence of such knowledge is unquestionably one of the elements that has made so much of the American vocational educational system a waste of time and resources. The intelligent anticipation of occupational needs in the future—and of its leisure possibilities—is a necessity in modern society.

Westin (1967) has provided excellent documentation of the threat of modern technology to individual privacy. Electronic eavesdropping and "lie-detecting" devices used by private and public agencies and investigators and the accumulation of gigantic data banks with detailed information on all aspects of the individual's personal and public life will require careful redefinition of the boundaries between public interest and individual civil liberties. Finally, the technological era has sharply altered the traditional relationship of work and play. If work no longer remains the fundamental link of the individual to reality and the major source of personal fulfillment, people will increasingly turn to leisure pursuits, to the degree that time and money permit, for the sense of reality and identity they cannot find in vocation and career. It is possible that the Puritan ethic which assigns high moral priority to work will be carried by many individuals into leisure-time pursuits. They will display selfless
devotion to hobbies and the development of motor skills, always keeping busy enough to avoid the temptations of Satan and the psychosomatic ministrations of their physicians.

The effects of the technological era on decision-making in all sectors of contemporary life have been and will continue to be profound. Westin (1960b, pp. 15-16) describes the impact of the shift to a technological electronic system on decision-making in a democratic society. He observes that decision-making on matters that affect the largest social issues is gravitating steadily into the hands of technically trained experts as the modes of production and distribution become increasingly complex and the computer profoundly affects the economy. In the hands of experts, the language of analysis becomes specialized and esoteric rather than generalized and political and, consequently, the classic balances in decision-making in a democratic society are subjected to special stress. Westin predicts that there will be a whole new literature of the 1970's dealing with the question of technological versus participative decision-making in the areas of urban planning, community development, welfare, education, and so on. As industrial and business automation absorbs more jobs, the displaced workers, especially when they are members of ethnic minorities, will feel politically and socially dispossessed, victims of decisions and plans in which they have no voice. The decision-makers will be the technocrats with specialized knowledge of production and marketing. Systems analysts, working with computerized information storage and retrieval systems, will make decisions which interrelate multifarious factors and which broadly affect the deployment of resources and personnel. Technology, therefore, thrusts decision-making more and more into the hands of the knowledge and technical elites who alone have the sophistication and skill to analyze multi-dimensional problems and to explore the probable consequences of following one of an array of alternatives. In this contingent, probabilistic, and statistical world of computer-based decision-making, the non-technician, which includes not only the man of little education but also the man of much education in the areas of the humanities and art, easily develops a sense of personal impotence and rage. Although he does not see it this way, the response of the non-technical man to the technological era is not so much to the technology itself, which, after all, along with his political heritage, has been his rich legacy, but to the organizational adjustments which the technological era require in almost all political and social spheres of life. In the following paragraphs we shall consider the various political responses to the organizational dilemmas posed by a burgeoning technology and how these responses constitute threats to the democratic tradition of balance and compromise and how collectively they result in a crisis in participation.

One response to the technological era is the widespread fear of productive workers of both the blue and white collar classes of being replaced by a machine (Westin, 1963a, p. 16). The resistance which has met the introduction of automation in the railroad and shipping industries and in the offices and schools is as much a product of psychological fear as the Luddite riots of the early Industrial Revolution which resulted in the smashing of machines. This fear of a technological take-over is shared by those interest groups which have controlled American politics. A White House overrun with university
and industrial experts untutored in and not screened by customary political processes is a disturbing specter for the hoary precinct politicos who soon discover that knowledge from above bears more weight than political pressure from below. This fear often takes the form of opinions expressing serious distrust of "experts" and asserting that man is infinitely more than a manipulatable being. It will be interesting to discover in the decade ahead whether the traditional American respect for the "facts" will remain strong and incorruptible in the face of the hostility toward the expert who both generates and utilizes these data. This response of fear and mistrust is a crisis in participation when the blue and white collar workers align themselves against the system and resort to extra-system measures as we have witnessed in recent union strikes threatening vital metropolitan services. Extra-system activities, as we noted above, threaten the democratic tradition of balance and compromise. Disputes which join governmental and industrial experts and productive and service workers in an atmosphere of fear of the loss of job and career make compromise awkward and difficult. This fear will dissipate only when we have developed decision-making structures which include both the technocrats and those affected by their decisions.

Another response to the technological era is its widespread acceptance by the scientific and engineering community who sometimes claim a proud sponsorship of the era. We are learning more about this community and we are discovering that it is not as homogeneous in opinion, values, and styles as popular stereotypes would have us believe. At the highest community level, there are those governing scientific elites who largely determine the areas of research and development most vigorously explored and the leadership and policies of the professional associations. At the next level there are those professional careerists, the first-rate professionals, who have superior training in the fundamentals of their fields, aspire to high work standards, make enormous time and energy commitments to their work, and among whom the members of the governing recruit new leaders. At the lowest level are the "gentleman scientists" who are well-paid, work a modest number of hours each week in pleasant surroundings, and undertake tasks far less consuming than those engaged in by their superiors. A crisis in participation arises when citizens are increasingly aware that only the members of the scientific and engineering community have the intellectual requirements of dealing with complex social, scientific, and production problems. When the scientific and professional communities vigorously claim and try to assert their "knowledge prerogatives," balance and compromise become difficult. The scientific and professional insistence that only alternatives they endorse meet the "rational" requirements of problem and solution makes compromise appear inappropriate because one is now bargaining over the Truth. We indeed have a technological crisis in participation when the fear of the underclass clashes with the self-righteous Truth of the governing elites. Until we can develop means for distinguishing between and relate matters of public policy and matters of future technological development, questions of values and questions of fact, and what we want and how we get it, this crisis in participation will continue to threaten our system of political balance and compromise.
There is a third "response" to the technological era, a growing passivity or non-participation in civic affairs of that part of the citizenry which feels increasingly separated from the complexities of national and local policies and programs. Content to enjoy the products and leisure of the new era, and unable by education and career to contribute any specialized knowledge or skill, these citizens cease to believe that there remains for them a meaningful political role of any practical value. Passivity during stable periods of relatively slow change does not constitute a crisis in participation. At this critical moment of change in American history, such passivity constitutes a serious crisis. Since all men are deeply affected by the new policies and programs of the decision-makers, we must find ways to engage the participation of more and more citizens at the various governmental and institutional levels of decision-making, if the changes instituted are to result in general consensus and in balance and compromise essential to the democratic system.

We can easily compare these three responses to the technological era with our four conceptions of man. In the fear of the blue and white collar workers and in the passive citizenry abdicating decision-making responsibilities, we can see the Private Man who views all political and social change in terms of their unsettling effects on his private sphere of living, enjoyment, and responsibility and in terms of his need to protect his domicile from the foreign society which surrounds it. In the aspirations and behavior of the scientific and engineering community we see the Elite Man at work, exercising great responsibility apparently with resignation to their fate. In the professional careerist we see both the elitism of the Elite Man when he moves to high levels of decision-making and the exclusivism of the Private Man when the motivation for his prodigious efforts and discipline somehow lie in the private fortune he builds for himself and his family.

In summary, we have now viewed both the racial and technological crises as crises in democratic participation. Both crises embody the social and political trends sweeping American society by adding to heterogeneity of life-style, by challenging the legitimacy of middle-class priorities, by feeding anti-system and extra-system activity, and by increasing role ambiguity. Although less dramatic in a journalistic sense than the racial crisis, the technological era is profoundly affecting career aspirations, privacy, and the use of leisure time. It is no less profoundly affecting decision-making by removing it more and more from the hands of productive workers and from traditional interest groups. The technological era becomes the technological crisis when the responses of the citizenry fail to promise a restoration of political balance and compromise. The abject fear of the worker of being replaced and dominated by a machine, the disdain and repugnance with which the scientific and engineering community meets efforts to compromise what they believe are basically rational decisions, and the passive withdrawal from civic participation of many individuals who feel that the complexity of decision-making leaves them more and more behind, constitute political responses woefully inadequate to meet the problems of the technological era.
The Generational Crisis in Participativation

The protests of the younger against the established ways and values of the older generation and the acute dissatisfaction of the older with the apparent iconoclasm and high-handed disregard of the responsibilities of traditional and legal authority of the younger generation has produced a wide generation gap. Generational misunderstandings are hardly new in the history of civilization. In periods of rapid change, with high conflict levels, a generation gap has serious consequences. As the instinct for preservation and stability of the older generation clashes with the instinct for rebellion and change of the younger generation communication between old and young is difficult and ominous. Without constructive communication and action on both sides, patterns of youthful protest and adult reprisals emerge and escalate the generational tension and reduce the probability of communication and compromise to near zero. As defiance and punishment become the favorite ways of influencing behavior across generations, polarization of old versus young occurs, with the widespread belief that communication is hardly possible at some hypothetical age-point, popularly believed to be thirty. At the moment that society needs cohesiveness to struggle with mounting social problems and expectations, the generational gap makes conflict resolution and political balance virtually impossible.

As in the case of the racial and technological crises, the generational crisis is fed by and feeds other contemporary crises. The young, therefore, quickly identify the corresponding problems and injustices they see in the treatment of black people--political inequality, economic servitude, the imposition of middle-class white morality, and so on. For the youthful protester, to challenge the archaic ways of the older generation is more than a defense of self-interest. His challenge is a blow for freedom for all humanity, black, brown, yellow, and young-white. The young also quickly sense the awkwardness and fear of the older generation in dealing with a technological era which rapidly outdates political and social institutions and traditional codes of ethics. For them, to challenge the pretechnological ethic of the old is to usher in the new era of the young.

Along with the racial and technological crises, the generational crisis embodies the trends in contemporary political and social life which threaten traditional modes of balance and compromise. First, the protest of the young is a protest of personal life-style, as the hippie so well illustrates (Lestin, 1963b, p. 16). Although the hippie's particular contributions to language, dress, art, manners, drug usage, and sexual mores may fall short of real historical significance, their overall support and encouragement of pluralism in life-styles will expand significantly the heterogeneity so long absent in American society. The fact that the individual today has a wide array of stylistic inventions out of which he fashions his own life, provides him with the materials to conduct the personal experimentation necessary to develop high levels of individuality. Everyone "doing his own thing," however, does not in itself develop political balance. Whether the young protesters can see the need for political
and social cohesion beyond legitimate personal idiosyncrasy poses a difficult question for the future.

Second, the protest of the young, especially the articulate young of the suburbs and the university campus, is directed against a political and social system heavily laden with middle-class priorities. This attack on middle-class aspirations and political and social priorities takes many forms. There is criticism of middle-class hypocrisy whenever the young detect the operation of an adult business and sexual ethic which departs from Judeo-Christian norms, although the young have little religious attachment, unless it is the religion of personal ecstasy that we find in the drug cults. There is criticism of middle-class materialism whenever they observe economic self-interest taking precedence over humanitarian goals. There is criticism of middle-class self-consciousness whenever they observe preoccupation with status taking precedence over a concern for political and social equality and justice. There is criticism of the traditional middle-class political leadership which they see as thinly disguised tyranny of the majority parading as the guardian of illusion... with the major political parties and interest groups and growing interest in working outside these self-seeking and antiquated structures for more rapid reform. The youthful following attracted by Eugene McCarthy in the election of 1968 consisted largely of young people who had little appetite for the conventional parties and politics and yet were unwilling to forfeit the election.

Third, the protest of the young, especially as we observe it in the black ghetto and on the university campus, increasingly resorts to anti-system activities as a way of escalating the level of conflict and creating the political and social fluidity necessary for moderate or drastic institutional change. The young who adopt the social protest model to bring about institutional change no longer accept the common view that only changes in attitude can bring about social change (Mathews, 1968, p. 27). They believe, as Mathews states, that the attitude theory of social change "would have us all lie down for an aeon or two and await the regeneration of mankind.... A man's rights should not depend upon another man's virtue or attitude." The successful young protestor has unimpeachable evidence that conflict or the threat of conflict can quickly change institutionalized forms of behavior.

Finally, the protest of the young widens the generational gap when it attempts to relieve role ambiguity by redefining roles in ways at odds with tradition. The student role, for example, is no longer seen as one of passive acculturation, with the school and university acting as both master pedagogue and moral guardian. Students increasingly see their role as partners in a vast educational enterprise which produces active inquirers rather than inert knowledge storehouses and which prepares them for the careers of tomorrow rather than yesterday. Redefinition of sex roles increasingly challenges the use of sex-linked political and social roles which keep women "second-class" citizens and assigns them activities largely outside the arena of political and social participation and conflict. Members of the older generation, although genuinely
confused about the proper enactment of the many roles they occupy, see ... the role definitions of the young as easy avoidance of weighty responsibilities and the certain prospect for widespread social confusion and personal unhappiness.

I have shown how the protest of the young has produced a wide generational gap and how this protest embodies the same trends toward political imbalance and polarization we found in the racial and technological crises. We can also view the generational gap as a series of political and social issues which separate the young and old generations. The major issues center about the Vietnam War, the new sex and drug ethic, questions of poverty and race, and questions of education and careers.

The Vietnam War both dramatizes the generation gap and contributes to its widening. It easily becomes the focal point of youthful alienation from the American mainstream and for the growing feelings of powerlessness of the young. For the male student who fails to win draft deferment, service in the Armed Forces is added to the educational obstacles which block his emergence from a lengthy apprenticeship into full citizenship. For the girl who must wait for her man to come home, service in the war defers the marriage and the family which mark her entry into adulthood. For the dissenter urging services forms of resistance to the war effort—draft card burning, inescapable treatment of visiting recruiters from the Armed Forces and the Chemical Company, anti-IOEC activities, and so on—efforts to deny him access to the public forum for recruitment to his own cause and demonstration of his war opposition are serious denial of his democratic rights. For the non-voting student who feels that his life is shaped by a war produced by adult mismanagement, there is often acute resentment of his subject status in the authoritarian Establishment. For the ideologist, the war is a product of the same economy which gives priority to material over human and welfare goals and keeps yellow people, black people and young people in prolonged colonial servitude. The older generation, shocked by the resistance to the war as another example of the irresponsibility, ingratitude, and anti-authority attitudes of a permissively-reared younger generation, often finds impossible even superficial discussion and reflection of this issue.

The issues of race and poverty and drug usage and sexual freedom also widen the generation gap. A politically disenfranchised youth, unable to influence in peaceful ways the institutional conditions under which they must spend the first three decades of their lives, easily identifies with the poor and the black people who must rely on sporadic beneficence of whiteness to relieve their misery and to allow them a share in shaping their own economic and social destiny. The widespread use of and experimentation with drugs and the open preaching, if not practice, of sexual freedom are ways the young caricature the moral practices of an older generation. A socially committed to a Puritan ethic from which there are frequent lapses. Drugs and sex are also ways to occupy a prolonged adolescence and to claim adult prerogatives before they are formally given by adult society. The fact that drug usage and the sex social entanglements and considerable parental embarrassment . . . visits a youthful
political strategy which gives the young access to the community at least through the rear door.

Regarding the question of education and careers, Jastin (1968, p. 16) identifies an important issue in the protest of the young. He notes, among other things, that the young are being deferred from their goals of education and careers and are being set into the context of youthful institutions which are non-participative and subject-oriented. Part of the protest of the young is that a decade or more of their lives will not be spent in such authoritarian and manipulative settings as the classic American high school, university, and graduate school.

We can easily depict the political import of issues separating the younger and older generations. But we have yet to answer the question as to why the generational crisis is a crisis in participation. First, it is a crisis in participation because the activists in the younger generation have chosen the social protest model to redress grievances, win reform, and sometimes to mount revolution. Raising the level of social and political conflict, as American history well documents, is a traditional way of raising the majority out of its political complacency and of winning social equality and justice. Social protest assumes the dimensions of a crisis in participation when it is not employed to redress specific grievances and when it is organized to topple rather than reform the system. Both black and young revolutionists have also discovered that the level of protest and conflict must be continually escalated in order to preserve cohesion in their own ranks. Confrontation by the Establishment often results in serious factionalism among the protesters, especially between those groups with a fairly specific reform program and those groups with broad revolutionary goals. A program of revolution rules out both the traditional spirit and practice of compromise and seriously threatens the political and social balance. Second, the generational crisis remains a crisis in participation because of the incredible difficulty and delay we have in making those reforms which allow fuller and earlier access of the young into the governance of institutions so vital to their lives and careers. For example, we are witnessing now the painful struggle of university boards, administrations, and faculties to define areas of decision-making involving the young which do not compromise and even enhance the accomplishment of essential university missions. But the American university, like the National Government, does not easily reform. Describing this Government, Peter Drucker and Martin Rein (1969) write:

The policies are set to run a legislative obstacle race that leaves most reforms stranded helplessly in a scrum of competing interests. Those which slip into law may then collapse structure, too enmeshed to struggle through the administrative tangle which not only defeats them, but too damaged to attack the problems for which they were designed.
So is the history of university reform. Almost all major American institutions, the family, the school, the church, the unions, the businesses, and industrial institutions are showing considerable immobility and resistance to the demands of the young for earlier and fuller institutional participation.

**War, Peace, and the International Order**

I have described the racial, technological, and generational crises as the result of rising demands for participation in the internal political and social order of the nation. The spread of participation on the domestic scene, however, raises a most challenging question on the international scene: Can we develop at home a participatory society in a largely non-democratic world torn by widespread international conflict?

The heterogeneity of lifestyle sweeping American society has its counterpart in the international order with the growth of nationalism which divides the world into an ever-expanding number of autonomous national units with independent diplomatic destinies. This spreading nationalism occurs at the very moment that older national units are forming new economic and quasi-political collectivities, as in the case of the European Common Market, and in a technological age of international communication, which presumably should bring us closer to a single world state.

The specter of nuclear and biological warfare increases the tensions produced by these cross-currents. Few of us enjoy a sense of security with the fail-safe automatic missile systems which can trigger a nuclear holocaust with a higher probability than they can avoid or protect us against one. There is the equally disquieting vision of irreversible and biological experiments which once launched, rapidly move beyond the control of the experimenters, producing genetic mutations and disease which alter the course of natural evolution and eventually produce death.

When the consequences of unwise decisions are so powerful and potentially destructive for every citizen in the nation, it is not surprising that there is increased demand for information about what is happening on the international front and for participation in the decision-making. The Government, however, faces the dilemma of surrendering secrecy and divulging information at the very moment that its decisions are most critical.

The issues of war, peace, and the international order, therefore, clearly add to the domestic crisis in participation. The frequent demonstrations in the streets of the "credibility gap," the angry anti-Vietnam War demonstrations, the public burning of draft cards, the teaching, and the sit-ins, describe typical responses of a citizenry demanding greater voice in foreign policies which deeply affect their personal lives. The international crisis feeds and is fed by the domestic crisis. The money spent on war and missile defense...
systems is money denied poverty programs for the black people. Black veterans from the Vietnam War refuse to return to pre-war economic and racial niches. Dissident students, already estranged from the domestic Establishment, find new revolutionary fuel in wars which destroy lives of the young and poor and ignore basic human and democratic values. The technology of communication makes possible the daily production of the crisis on our television screens so that none of us can long forget the misery which surrounds us.

In summary, we have reviewed four major crises in participation—the racial crisis, the technological crisis, the generational crisis, and the international crisis. We have seen how each crisis embodies contemporary historical trends presently threatening political balance and social cohesion. These trends are the increasing pluralism of lifestyle, disillusionment with solutions within the framework of middle-class priorities, the increasing resort to extra-system and anti-system activities to accomplish organizational and revolutionary goals, and the widespread role ambiguity which renders all our accustomed niches precarious bases for contemplation and action. We have seen how the reactions to the problems of race, technology, and generational differences constitute crises in participation. The resistance of the white establishment to black people’s fuller enjoyment of our national resources, the black militancy which has mounted a movement to establish an autonomous black nation, the uncritical and irrational fear of a machine takeover on the part of many productive workers, a rather pretentious pose of the technocrats that only their “rational” solutions will lift us out of this critical era, the social protest of the young with its increasingly student and uncompromising demands, and the widespread institutional resistance to fuller access of the young to institutional self-government are all reactions which do not bode well for our democratic system.

Fortunately, there are responses to these problems which are major sources of hope for some future balance and consensus. These latter reactions indicate the need for new priorities. In the following section of the paper we shall consider the need for new balance and cohesion in meeting contemporary challenges to the American political and social system.
The political and institutional crises confronting American society are grave challenges to achieving political and social balance and sufficient cohesiveness to give our reform efforts general direction. This section of the document will (1) review the challenges to public and private institutions and to the conventional wisdom of traditional political theory supporting these institutions, (2) consider the social dilemmas facing reform movements as they try to struggle on one hand, to keep alive the spirit of tolerance and innovation and, on the other hand, to achieve new political and social equilibrium, and (3) describe the conservative, conventional liberal, and radical left positions on reform and revolution as a way of introducing a statement in the following section on the Center’s positions.

**Challenges to Institutions and Traditional Theory**

The crises described in the preceding section of this paper are serious challenges to all political and social institutions and reveal glaring disparities between traditional political theory, as reviewed in section II, and the realities of the contemporary political and social scene. In this section I shall summarize these institutional challenges and theoretical disparities.

Kostin (1968b, pp. 14-15) distinguishes two levels of challenges and the American political system. The first level consists of governmental institutions and political parties. The second level consists of institutions such as business and industry, labor unions, churches, and the universities.

At the first level Kostin believes the central question of our time is "whether the representative democracy of the American middle-class system will be able to incorporate the new demands of the poor, the black, and the dissident youth within the elastic boundaries of the system or whether there will have to be drastic revision of the political system and the fundamental political process in order to cope with these new demands." Kostin identifies several challenges and issues: (1) the demand of formerly excluded groups to achieve the full rewards of citizenship, (2) the challenge to achieve significant political participation in the technological era, (3) the demands of the young for earlier and fuller participation in governmental and institutional decision-making, (4) the challenge of our youth to the existing and resources needed for the economic crisis, and (5) the challenge to American communities to reorganize right away and self-reconstruct fire faculties to meet the unemployment, housing, educational, and welfare problems of the city.
At the second, or institutional, level Westin (1968b, pp. 18-19) identifies a number of institutional challenges which result from the "rising demand for meaningful participation within the significant institutions of American society that shape and control the daily lives of the citizens. As these institutions increasingly deal with matters affecting personal life-style, needs, and satisfactions, their members demand more voice in the decisions. Westin identifies challenges in four institutions: (1) In business and industry, there are growing demands for industrial democracy, not only in matters of wages and working conditions but also in matters of the process, egalitarian personnel policies, and the freedom "to live independent life-styled rather than conform to gray-flannel suit patterns." (2) In unions, there is growing demand by members for protection of their right to dissent, to participate meaningfully in the union electoral processes, to establish bases on racial and other forms of discrimination, and to establish legal guarantees that unions represent even those workers within a bargaining unit who do not choose to belong to the union. (3) In the churches, there is growing demand for participation, especially in the non-authority oriented of the American religions, American Catholicism, in matters involving decision-making powers of laymen and priests in areas reserved for the hierarchy and in personal matters of clerical celibacy and lay birth control. (4) In the university, there are rather vivid and forceful demands by the students for participation in the making of decisions which govern internal and external relations of the academic community.

The need for modified or new conceptions of the democratic system is indicated by the growing disparity between conventional political visions and the harsh realities of contemporary politics and society. Nathan (1968, p. 13) argues that "The characteristics of the community and political system are more determining of the extent and effectiveness of political participation by the poor than are the characteristics of the poor themselves." In the paragraphs which follow we shall consider the inadequacies of the four aspects of traditional political theory to deal with the crises of our time: the social, technological, and generational crises.

First, there is the federalist doctrine which formed the basis for the constitutional system of checks and balances, a system described by Hofstadter (1948) as a "flawed system of mutual frustration." Designed to curb popular majorities or citizen participation, the system shifted power to the federal level to thwart the desires of state majorities, and to federal separation of power through majorities on the federal level. James McGregor Burns (1968) described a host of extra-constitutional checks on the "tyranny of the majority": a seniority committee system, filibuster, presidential vetoes, registration procedures, and so on. The two-party system translates to middle-of-the-road positions and courts minority views only when necessary to win crucial elections. Schattschneider (1960) means that party unity involves the suppression of conflicts
and the selection of relatively safe issues to win elections. The political system, therefore, is preoccupied with the issues close to the hearts of the 60 percent of the electorate which votes and insensitive to the issues close to hearts of 40 percent of the electorate which does not vote. The decidedly middle-class character of our political system makes difficult any response to the problems of black and poor people and to youth. We can finally note Federalist doctrine that we born of preferences for an aristocratic society in which the upper classes assumed patrician responsibility for the lower classes. It is also born of rural society, a system of plantations, farms, and markets totally unlike the urban centers of today. The rural bias, especially with our present geographical divisions of power, is unresponsive to the problems of urban minorities, to metropolitan youth, and to an era of technology which erases the rural pattern of life even while a farm-based political system lingers on.

Second, there are the doctrines of the democratic elitists, who see in mass apathy and non-participation the freedom of governing elites to make the wise decisions and take the most efficient and timely action. For the elitist, the elimination of the social minorities and the poor in our cities and the protecting and demonstating of the young on our campuses breed political chaos born of inexperience and hysteria. The elitist must believe that when the present noisy inceptions of the masses for privilege and power finally abate, then he will assume his political mission and provide the direction the masses are unable to provide for themselves. Doctrines of democratic elitism have a new lease on life in a technological era when decision-making involves increased consideration of multiple factors and higher levels of knowledge and skill. The doctrine of ruling technocratic oligarchies appears to be especially attractive when there is widespread disagreement over preferences for means and preferences for ends (Mishan, 1962, p.53) the doctrine holds that only the strong man and his knights of honor and loyalty can cut the political and social Gordian knot and move the nation toward progress. The inappropriateness of elitist doctrine is seen in the growing demands of the subject populations in our cities, industries, businesses, unions, universities, and churches to exercise more control over the conditions under which they must work and live and the singular ineffectiveness of elitist solutions imposed from the top. In the case of universities undertaking extensive administrative centralization while ignoring student opinion and expression, a colossal growth of pluralism in life-styles and the intense conflict among interest groups and the general spirit of compromise and conflict which sacrifices the advantages of one encounter only for the transfer advantage of another encounter dooms the prospects of a monopolistic political and social system held in the control of ruling elites and their computers. In fact, the advocates of participatory democracy often produce convincing evidence that the scales of today are the handiwork of the ruling elites not in power, allocating resources on the basis of middle-class priorities and insensitive to minority demands. Clearly democratic reform which
results in a broader base of popular democracy will have to define the limits of decision-making of all old and new power blocs—the minorities newly entering the system, the old middle-class majority and interest groups, representatives at the national level, and the technocrats in both public and private institutions.

It is perhaps the sacrosanct theory of interest groups that gives the middle class today its hope for longevity and tranquility within an altered but familiar political framework. It is, perhaps, our last hope to keep the system working without drastic alterations. But in the "ecology of games" (Porten, 1961) which makes up the American community, including the banking game, the welfare game, the business game, the education game, and so on, minorities have been left out of the action. Mathews (1966, p. 16) notes that players in each game or subsystem make use of the players in other games, for each game possesses power that other games must use. But you have power only if you are needed. Mathews states that "generally speaking, Negroes stand outside these systems and are not needed. They lack status, decision-making posts, money, and large numbers, their major and often only resource, leads to greater white insensitivity."

The theory of interest groups, we have seen, assumes ease of access into the system, the rather automatic conversion of potential into actual interest groups, and the advantages of overlapping membership. Although the situation for the urban blacks and poor has notably improved, it is increasingly clear that the groups they form have allowed only limited political access and may in some ways have increased their dependence on the sporadic generosity of the white interest groups. There is convincing evidence, especially in studies of responsiveness in the South to black demands, that the characteristics of the white community such as degree of urbanization, level of education, action on the political spectrum (moderate liberal to conservative) are highly determinant of the degree and quality of black political participation (Mathews and Prothro, 1966). Not only has there been limited access and limited effectiveness of black groups but also there has been lacking the overlapping group membership which is necessary for the successful operation of interest groups. To almost all social and economic questions there seems to be a black and a white side—so the races find themselves pitted against each other on a broad spectrum of important issues—housing, education, employment, welfare, and so on.

But the old-time interest groups, the precinct workers, the middle-class businessmen, and the influential local elites find themselves threatened from another side, the technical—scientists and engineers whose knowledge and talents qualify them for positions of decision-making outside the system of interest groups. Established interest groups, therefore, find themselves facing competing decisions incompatible with the self-interests they were organized to protect. As they are threatened from below by these groups demanding entry to the system from above by these groups usurping their powers of
decision-making and all this while they meet the traditional demands of vigorous competition within the system of interest groups in which they occupy full membership. It seems clear that certain changes in community organization and government will be necessary to provide for the effective access and functioning of groups of black and poor people to the ecology of community gave.

Lastly, there is the disparity between what a systems theory describes and predicts for our political system and the critical realities of our time. We noted earlier that one telling inadequacy of systems theory is that it relates inputs to outputs without considering the effect of the system on medium itself on the outputs. The approach is also concerned primarily with maintenance and often avoids questions about ultimate goals and values and alternative political and social directions. This approach suffers considerable embarrassment when the black, poor, and young decide that the system itself is woefully inadequate and refuse to play tidy input roles for the system to grind into informational outputs and predictions. A system which continues to operate on a diet of limited inputs, so that the validity of its findings applies to increasingly smaller political and social sectors, is a system in need of repair and treatment, surely not one able to provide the balance and cohesion we need in this crisis age. As a technical approach to the choice of the best means to accomplish desired ends, systems analysis has obvious merits, especially where problems are limited in scope. This does not mean that we should place the future of America in the hands of the systems analysts. There must be a sensitive interaction of decisions on preferences for ends and decisions on preferences for means. For proper political balance we cannot allow technique or the convenience of means entirely to dictate the direction of our efforts and we should not try to pursue programs and plans in ignorance of the available and to-be-available technology. The systems approach, unfortunately, fails to tell us how to achieve the proper balance between citizen participation and technological decision-making. There must be some middle ground where the technocrat turns politician and the citizen briefly joins the scientific and engineering community to make decisions which properly balance ends and means and enhance and protect legitimate self-interests.

This catalog of challenges to American government, politics, and institutions and of the disparities between traditional theory and contemporary realities should be enough to convince us of the need for new formulations which provide the balance and cohesion now lacking in American society. But the story becomes even more relevant when we review the dilemmas which social reform faces in our heretofore society of competing interests, enemies, and counterefforts. It is to these dilemmas of reform that I shall now turn.
The Dilemma of Social Reform

In discussing the origins of community action, Harris and Rein (1967, pp. 7-32) discuss the political obstacles in the path of social reform. The reformer, they point out, faces three crucial tasks: (1) He must manipulate into coalition of power sufficient for his objectives entrenched interest groups of great diversity of doctrine, ideology, and constituencies. (2) He must heed the democratic tradition which expects every citizen to participate in decisions affecting his own affairs. (3) His policies must be demonstrably rational. The political and administrative structure of the American government make the achievement of these missions incredibly difficult. They first describe the political structure (pp. 7-9):

Presidential power confronts independent centers of congressional power, based on the safe seats of one party districts, whose venerable intracollege frustration social legislation not only by its voters, but by control of the machinery—"the committees, the caucuses and conference, the promotion system, the movement of legislation, procedure on the floor (Burns, 1963 p. 186)."

Leadership is therefore at the mercy of a coalition of congressional support which can be rarely contrived except in an overriding national emergency. The faith in divided powers inhibits government at every level, setting executive against legislature, state against nation, city against country—elaborating overlapping, partial jurisdictions in an almost obsessive distaste for effective government.

The administrative structure shows the same confused pattern. Andrew Shonfeld (1965, p. 311) describes this pattern:

There are altogether over eighty different government departments and agencies which report directly to the President of the United States. They are not grouped in any hierarchy which would permit the President to restrict his dealing to a smaller number of intermediaries who would make reports and carry back the government's decisions to the agency chiefs. Each of them has the right of access to the man at the top and is determined to use it.

It is almost inconceivable that a coherent policy could emerge out of an administrative web of this kind. Its effect under any but the strongest President is to turn the offices of the government into a loose confederation of more or less hostile bodies competing with one another for more money and more power.

Harris and Rein (p. 7) marvel over the fact that so had a governmental structure has produced so prosperous a nation and proffers only the liberties of the winter part of the itinerary.

Referring once more to the three crucial missions of the social reformer, they describe the dilemma he faces: "The impulse to reform is nurtured between the frustrations of impotence, and fear of upsetting
a delicate balance which has already achieved so much." In addition to the social problems the reform must ultimately solve, the reformer must maintain a healthy "respect for governmental anarchy while manipulating governmental levels and administrative agencies into coherent action. He must also avoid (p. 9) "any conception of social welfare which appears to patronize its clients... Nothing should be done for people, that is not also done with them." Finally, he must find the argument for his reform in the technical and scientific worlds of empiricism and dispassionate intellectual analysis.

For their analysis of American social reform strategies, Morris and Rein studied the projects promoted and financed during the years 1950 to 1964 by the Ford Foundation and the Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offences Control Act of 1961. These projects included six "grey area" metropolitan projects in Oakland, Boston, Philadelphia, Washington, D. C., New Haven and the State of North Carolina. The Juvenile Delinquency Act also sponsored projects in the cities of Syracuse, Houston, St. Louis, Minneapolis, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, Charleston, Cleveland, Providence, and Eugene. Mobilization for Youth in New York City was jointly sponsored by funds from the Ford Foundation and the Federal Government.

Morris and Rein believe that the reform strategies were based on particular conceptions of economic and bureaucratic dysfunction. First, the theory of the poverty cycle held that it was impossible for the disadvantaged child, adult, and family to "break out" of the poverty cycle. They state (pp. 38-39):

Poverty, then, is seen as self-perpetuating. The children of the poor and ill-educated start school at a disadvantage, and soon fall behind. Their parents can give them little help or encouragement; school becomes a humiliating experience, where they cannot meet the teacher's demands, and finally lose her interest. They take the first opportunity to drop out. Without skills or confidence in themselves, they remain marginally employable. Some work off their frustration in crime and violence, most will always be poor. Robed of self-respect that comes from earning a decent livelihood, the young men cannot sustain the responsibilities of marriage, and so they bequeath to their children the same burden of ignorance, broken homes and apathy by which they themselves were crippled.

There was also a "morbid life-cycle of bureaucracy" which paralleled the cycle of poverty (p. 42). Morris and Rein describe this bureaucratic life-cycle as follows (p. 42):

When an organization fails to adapt, and loses its sense of direction, a new one is created to fulfill the neglected functions. Since the newcomer threatens the jurisdiction of the established authority, it has to struggle to survive. Survival becomes the most urgent purpose, to which ultimate ends are subordinated, and the new organization too begins to
lose its sense of direction. By the time it is confidently established, pressures from within have imposed inflexible loyalty to principles and routines already doubtfully relevant. A stir of frustration begins to concoct its successor...

A theory of political balance, as outlined in an earlier section of this document, requires that imbalances in bureaucratic self-centeredness be corrected but that the correction avoid so drastic an aspect as to topple the bureaucracy.

Combining both the theory of poverty cycles and bureaucratic life-cycles, Harris and Rein (p. 53) describe how the assumptions of the community reforms of the period 1961-1964 were embedded in the political and social realities of the period:

Poverty and delinquency were perpetuated by an inherited failure to respond, through ignorance, apathy, and discouragement to the demands of urban civilization. The institutions of education and welfare had grown too insensitive and rigid to retrieve these failures, from a characteristic, morbid preoccupation with the maintenance of their organizational structure. The processes of assimilation were breaking down, and could only be repaired by an enlargement of opportunities. But this emancipation would only come about as the enabling institutions of assimilation—the schools, the welfare agencies, the vocational services—recognized their failure, and became more imaginative, coherent, and responsive. The attack was directed at a self-protective hardening of middle-class American society, which at once neglected and condemned those it excluded. Yet the attack only very ambiguously challenged the middle-class values themselves. It remained open to either more or less radical interpretation.

To restore their relevance, institutions had to be turned outward again, to look afresh at the needs they should be serving. Only a new agency, detached from the jurisdiction of any conventional department, could reintegrate them effectively, since the causes of poverty were indivisible. Yet this new agency had itself to guard against the common disease of all bureaucracies, by continually refusing to take its own validity for granted. Hence it was to proceed experimentally, testing its programs against methodical research and the reactions of those it served; and by its empiricism, stimulate the agencies it worked with to see the problems in the same objective, self-critical light. The comprehensive approach, the involvement of the people, innovation, research, and reliance on established agencies all fell into place within the framework of this conception of poverty and bureaucratic pathology.

I have found no social analysts who describe better than Harris...
This process rests on the faith that the continual interaction of competing interests and principles will sustain a progressive enlargement of the possibilities of their fulfillment. So, confronted by the dilemmas of social choice, a reform does not seem most characteristically to search for a balance. Instead, it takes each of the incompatible principles by turn, and campaigns for it as if no sacrifice of its alternate were entailed. And this seemingly irrational refusal to come to terms with the fundamental dilemma may, after all, be more productive than accommodation. By repudiating whatever balance has been struck, it continually challenges society to explore new ways of meeting the problem. It raises the dilemma to a higher level of sophistication, where there is both more variety of endeavor, and more coherence, though each still inhibits the other. The debate goes round and round, raising the same perennial issues, but the context of the argument changes.

Morris and Rein have also captured the spirit of compromise which distinguishes American politics from the revolutionary politics of other nations. Each political encounter expects only limited success and the thesis defeated today will return as the vigorous antithesis of tomorrow. They write (p. 236):

To overcome inertia, and dramatize its own necessity, reform seems to proceed most characteristically by polarizing the issue, and insisting upon the side of the debate least honored in the prevailing order. It disrupts the equilibrium between ideals which at their extremes, are mutually irreconcilable. Because of this, the movement of reform tends to be circular, continually addressing the balance by returning to preoccupations against which the last reform was itself a reaction. But although its insight is deliberately partial, its purpose is not simply disruptive, but to provoke a new accommodation. Only revolutions aim to disallow finally the interests and values which oppose them—end even then, since they cannot abolish the complexity of human society, the change is usually less absolute than they proclaim.

But what is the central dilemma which social reform faces in the American system of balance and compromise? It is to balance the diffuseness of innovation with the power to make innovation effective. What may be peculiarly lacking in the American system is the power to develop cohesion and consolidation during and after a period of reform. If this balance is not created, innovation becomes confusion and competing reform groups can cause a stalemate by effectively blocking each other’s action. Morris and Rein write (p. 237):
American society, so liberal in its tolerance of criticism and innovation, suffers from a corresponding impotence to enforce any reintegration. It tends to stultify in stalemate, which can be as frustrating and grossly inefficient as communist orthodoxy. The hundred flowers furnish, but they do not make a garden. Each ideology represents an extreme choice between competing principles. One (ideology) ensures the power to determine how the aims of society are to be reconciled, at the cost of pre-empting all initiative of reform, and so inhibiting the creative energies of its people. The other (ideology) gives this energy full play at the cost of leaving it to expend itself in muddled, abortive effort.

The necessary balance which American reform must establish between the release of creative energy and the organization of this energy into a cohesive program is a constant source of danger to the reform movement and the reformer. Marris and Rein state (pp. 237-8):

The most difficult task of an American reformer is somehow to make the circumstances more favorable, without inhibiting this diffuse and restless energy. He is misled when he mistakes the show of activity for the progress it should stimulate; or when, impatient with his frustrations, he attempts to capture the process itself, and confine it within his own rationalizations. When Saul Alinsky accused community action of "political pornography"—a spurious pretence of intervention—or the Cohns accused CPI (Community Progress Incorporated, New Haven) of seeking to monopolize all initiative, they pointed at the failings to which American reform is most vulnerable, even if they were in too much of a hurry to suppose the worst.

The urban programs described by Marris and Rein show that the mere employment of participative practices in decision-making in large organizations meet with a number of obstacles. Mosher (1967, pp. 520-521) identifies four obstacles: (1) The size and the mechanical difficulty of assembling for effective participation hundreds of individuals who may be affected by decision is one obstacle. (2) The organization hierarchy, which appears to be an essential ingredient in administrative organizations, sets definite limits within which participative processes may be employed. (3) In governmental agencies there is a wide scatter of power to make and carry out basic decisions—partly the result of hierarchy, law, and politics. Mosher (p. 521) writes: "It appears tautological that one cannot share with subordinates power that he does not have himself." (4) Time is an obstacle since the "process of reaching consensus through education, study, discussion, and interaction is slow and laborious."

To overcome these obstacles large organizations use five devices which at least in part utilize the advantages of participation.
(Kocher, 1967, pp. 521-522): (1) There is the referendum on reorganization changes which, unless well-planned, could be mere participatory tokensism. (2) There is the hierarchy of meetings whereby the lowest members of the staff are ultimately reached and encouraged to express their views. (3) There is representation whereby the superior expresses and supports the views of others whom he represents in the decision making. (4) There is delegation to subordinate personnel of authority to consider, plan, and even decide on projected changes. (5) Finally, there is consultation by decision makers with individuals who will be affected by projected changes. Kocher (p. 522), however, cautions that the employment of these devices do not assure effective participation:

This section began with a description of the crucial tasks facing the social reformer—the building of a political coalition, heeding the participatory democratic tradition, and advocating rational policies. We then considered the enormous obstacles to reform, particularly the overdivision of federal power and the confused administrative structure of the executive branch. We then saw how the reform strategies of the period 1960-1964 were based not on traditional democratic theory but on the social realities of our time—as embodied in the theory of the poverty cycle and the theory of the "morbid" life-cycle of bureaucracy. We then stated the central dilemma facing meliorative reform efforts in this country in terms of the disequilibrium and equilibrium alternately established and eventually disestablishing each other. Finally, I described the central dilemma of social reform in the context of our system of balance and compromise—the dilemma involving the balancing of diffuseness of innovation with the power to make innovation effective. Innovation and consolidation are essentially threats to each other. In effect, we have not described a history of reform gradualism which harmoniously progresses with only small ripples in the tranquil waters of evolutionary change. As we indicated earlier in the document, progress has been purchased in American history as the price of stability, and stability, sometimes called "law and order," has been purchased at the price of progress. In the ensuing paragraphs of this section, we shall briefly examine the positions of the conservative, conventional liberal, and radical left to see how they face the dilemma of innovation versus consolidation.

Responses to Crisis and Reform: The Conservative, Liberal, and Radical Positions.

If we examine the responses to our contemporary crises and to the dilemma of social reform, we can identify three basic political positions. The distinguishing characteristics of these positions are (1) the relative emphasis they give to innovation or consolidation—the degree and rate of political and institutional change they endorse and (2) the level of social conflict they are willing to risk in the interest of innovation or in the preservation of law and order. These characteristics, of course, are highly related since extensive change rapidly occurring can raise or lower the level of social conflict. The three basic
positions are (1) the conservative position, (2) the conventional liberal positions, and (3) the radical left position. I shall indicate how each gives rise to responses inadequate to meet the problems and reform dilemmas now confronting us.

The conservative position emphasizes consolidation over innovation and relatively minor changes carried out over long periods of time. This position emphasized the preservation of venerable political and institutional traditions which are a product of the ancient wisdom and long-term efforts of history and which we must safeguard more than change. This position is rooted in basic skepticism of human nature, tinted as it is by original sin and victimized by passions overwhelming reason. The conservative position is often an elitist position of noblesse oblige since it endorses the tradition of a ruling class upon whom history, tradition, and wisdom force the responsibilities for governance of the masses. Although the heir of humanistic and humanitarian concern for one's fellow man, the conservative position in times of crisis and change can harden into demands for the preservation and restoration of "law and order." Conservatives argue that when the often frivolous innovations of the present are pitted against the traditions of the past, that wisdom and cool judgment require that the innovations give way to traditions. Although American conservatives are not usually provoked to harsh reaction and repression it is not inconceivable that a high level of social conflict could result in extreme responses. Presently there does not appear to be an organized reactionary right to oppose the semi-organized radical left. Westin (1968b) argues that both the party of George Wallace in 1968 and the John Birch Society contain more populist agrarian sentiments than endorsement of authoritarian and repressive political measures.

The conventional liberal position advocates a somewhat more extensive and faster change than the conservative but insists on the gradualism and traditional framework within which this change must occur. For the conventional liberal position, according to Westin (1968b, pp. 22-23,) the answer to our problems and dilemmas "lies in gradualism, the increasing entry of groups through socialization and increased opportunity into the political system and new modes of citizen participation within the framework of the existing political system. The critical point, I submit, is the belief on the part of the conventional liberal that elite management is the irreducible reality of society, and that citizen participation is more of a therapeutic and cooling phenomenon than it is a question of really sharing power and changing the allocation of resources and values. Carried to its extreme, this position believes that when there is a large black middle class firmly established in the suburbs, with problems about paying the mortgage on the playroom addition to the house and financing the motor boat, stability will be restored to the system." Westin believes that the conventional liberal tradition is the one held by traditional university leadership, urban leaders dealing with the problems of the city, and traditional party leaders viewing the entry of the young into the political mainstream.
Finally, there is the radical left position which advocates the most extensive amount of change carried out over a relatively short period of time at the cost of high levels of social conflict. It is in one sense the revolutionary position since it demands a "radical reconstruction of the political system itself" (Westin, 1966b, pp. 22-24.) Whereas the conservative and liberal positions are elitist, the radical left position adopts the theme of participation and proclaims the value of decentralization, spontaneity, building of community, and so on. Westin (1966b, pp. 22-24) identifies the weakness of the position:

The difficulty with the radical left position in the American context, of course, is that on a good clear day it could probably command less than one-half of one percent of the population. Furthermore, any attempt to radicalize the nation sufficiently to win substantial popular approval for this position is as likely to generate harsh conservative reaction that will insure decades of repression as it is to work in some slow and steady way toward the development of a majority or even a substantial minority. Furthermore, the quality of the radical left position that is hierarchical and authoritarian thereby denies at least three of the four dimensions of citizenship—dissent, equality, and due process. Also the radical left present what can be called an archaic approach to civic participation. That is, in an age of increasing technology and complexity, the radical left defines its position in social and psychological terms that could have meaning only for pastoral societies or communitarian experiments....The thought that citizen participation can be achieved by activating the great mass of students, workers, teachers, and so on, represents a fantasy of individual life that is as mistaken as it is idealistic.

To support this view, Westin points to the difficulties that student radical groups have in attracting and maintaining even minimum levels of student activity and participation except at "electric emergency moments."

In the view of the Center none of these positions promises to fill the need for balance and cohesion while we are facing the dilemmas of social reform. The conservative and liberal positions overweight the balance on the side of stability and preservation of economic, social, and political conditions which are serious obstacles to meeting the problems of race, technology, and the generation gap. In placing the rather blind faith in historical, evolutionary processes of change both conservatives and conventional liberals have failed to note that history does not always result in progress and evolution extinguishes as well as improves various species. The cycle of poverty and the morbid cycle of bureaucracy are as much products of our history as our more laudable accomplishments. What is lacking in their positions is a basic trust in and respect for those groups now living outside the system, the poor, the black, and the young, and the willingness to extend to these people full
democracy—particularly the rights of participation in individual and group decision making, of equality, of dissent and expression, and of due process. A premature and too regular insistence on "law and order" stultifies seriously innovative attempts to reverse historical trends which have blighted the lives of a large American minority. To use the complex legalism of the legislatures and the courts to thwart leaders of reform and change will ultimately undermine the basic dimensions of democracy which support our legal traditions.

Unfortunately, the position of the radical left, with its vehement anti-historicism and its self-righteous programs of reform and revolution, although often embodying the necessary commitment to political and social innovation, fails to understand and utilize those aspects of the American political system which could further social programs. Blindly dismissing this system as a monolithic Establishment, they fail to note how the system encompasses an incredible variety of competing interest, the spirit and practice of compromise which prevents the freezing of agreements and the status quo, a spirit of criticism which challenges all new political and social invention, and a spirit of innovation visible not only in the entrepreneurial activities of the marketplace but also in socio-political enterprises to which Americans sometimes give their thought, money, and energy. Also the radical left, in its moments of dogma and militancy, fails to foresee that the authoritarianism of its own positions surpasses that of the individuals they believe they are fighting. Whereas the American process of social reform, rooted in an enlightened democratic conception, subjects today's achievement to the penetrating light of critical assessment and to the antithetical forces of peaceful change, the revolutionary process of the radical left forces a clash between the thesis of today with the antitheses of tomorrow in a way which guarantees the smashing of one regime by another with the residue of wisdom and democracy growing smaller with each political cataclysm.

In summary, I have described the conservative, conventional liberal, and radical left positions by distinguishing the extent and tempo of change they endorse and the level of social conflict they risk. The conclusion has been that none of these positions offers viable means of meeting contemporary crisis. By ignoring the dilemmas of social reform, especially the complex balance which must be established between widespread innovation and the consolidation and bureaucratization of whatever progress we make, they offer programs which are woefully inadequate and simplistic either in scope and fervor. More important, although each position defends itself with the language of democracy, they often fail to embody the basic dimensions of democracy described in the section which follows.

This section reviewed current democratic government, politics, and institution, the disparity between conventional political wisdom and the critical realities of our time, the obstacles and dilemmas of social reform, and the three basic political stances individuals take when facing these problems. The review points to the overriding need to re-examine the meaning of political and social democracy and to distinguish what is essential from what has been fortuitously contemporaneous in its development in American history. In the next section we shall identify the essential dimensions of democracy and the models of social reform this redefinition supports.
VI. THE DIMENSIONS OF CIVIC PARTICIPATION

This section of the document will define the Center's position as one distinct from the conservative, conventional liberal, and radical positions described in the preceding section. In general our position is that greater civic participation is both possible and necessary in the decade into which we are moving (Westin, 1963b, p. 24). In defining our position this section will (1) propose some basic assumptions about democratic society and participatory democracy, (2) describe four basic dimensions of civic participation—individual and group involvement in decision-making and the rights of dissent, equality, and due process, and (3) describe three current models of civic participation and in each case determine the match between our basic assumptions and dimensions and the characteristics of the model.

Basic Assumptions about Democracy and Participation

Westin (1963b, p. 2) names three basic assumptions of democratic society in its American mode: (1) the belief in rationality based on individual interest; (2) the commitment to large-scale citizen participation; and (3) the quest for "civility" or a style of political life that respects reason, individuality, ordered liberty, and similar characteristics of urban and humane society. These assumptions express the democratic ethic at its ideal level and distinguish participatory democracy from populist and elitist democracy. Levine (1967, p. 237) elaborates the humane and rational aspects of participatory democracy in terms of the following capacities of its citizens:

1. To care for their fellow men; to act with gentleness and consideration.
2. To conquer fear of difference and intolerance for ambiguity.
3. To feel pain when others suffer, anger when others are treated unjustly, or humiliation when others are deprived of dignity.
4. To feel compassion and to commit themselves behaviorally to the ideology of democracy.
5. To act rationally; to base judgment on evidence and to find adventure in inquiry.

Koehler (1967, p. 515) identifies three central tenets of participatory democracy: "the right... for the citizen to have a voice in group or real decision affecting his destiny; the obligation that public policy pursue the community will; and the essential autonomy of the individual."
To clarify further the distinction between participatory and elitist democracies, Robert L. Kegley (1963) distinguishes between the politics of power (the elitist position) and the politics of participation. Participatory politics, he states, is egalitarian; power politics is not. In participatory politics, citizens look horizontally to friends, associates, and equals. In power politics they look vertically to their government. The politics of participation stresses the discovery of political values through common action of the total membership rather than through the mediation of special authorities. Common action allows personal confrontations between large numbers of citizens and develops a sense of personal identity for each citizen. Questions raised about obligation and consent belong to the politics of participation. Questions and theories of political leadership belong to the politics of power.

Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963, pp. 17-19) define participatory democracy by distinguishing what they call "participant political culture" from parochial or subject political culture. In parochial political culture the orientation is to primary relationships, as in the political cultures of African tribal societies. In these societies "there are no specialized political roles: headmanship, chieftainship, shamanism" are diffuse political-economic-religious roles, and for members of these societies the political orientation to these roles are not separated from the religious and social orientations. In the subject political culture, individuals differentiate a political system and the outputs of that system but have little orientation toward specific inputs and toward the self as an active participant. It is a passive political orientation. In the participatory political culture members of the society are oriented to the political system as a whole and to both administrative and political structures and processes, that is, to both system inputs and outputs. Democratic elitism is based on the assumption that most men orient themselves more as subjects than as citizens. Almond and Verba write (p. 162) that "the man whose relation to his government is that of subject--a passive beneficiary or victim of routine governmental actions--would not be found wanting in traditional, non-democratic society." They continue (p. 162):

In democratic societies, on the other hand, his role as subject does not exhaust what is expected of him. He is expected to have the virtues of the subject--to obey the law, to be loyal--but he is also expected to take some part in the formation of decisions. The common thread running through the many definitions of democracy is that a democracy is a society in which "ordinary citizens exert a relatively high degree of control over leaders." Democracy is thus characterized by the fact that power over the significant authoritative decisions in a society is distributed among the population. The ordinary man is expected to take an active part in governmental affairs, to be aware of how the decisions are made, and to make his views known.
A "civic culture," according to Almond and Verba (pp. 492-3) is a mixture of parochial, subject, and participant cultures:

The result is a set of political orientations that are managed and balanced. There is political activity, but not so much as to swamp governmental authority; there is involvement and commitment, but they are moderated; there is political cleavage, but it is held in check... The mixture of attitudes found in civic culture... "fits" the democratic political system. It, in a number of ways, is particularly appropriate for the mixed political system which is democracy.

Although Almond and Verba limit their consideration of participation to the governmental sphere, the Center is interested in the growth of participation in both the private and public sectors of American life (Westin, 1961a, 1963b). In Section IV we briefly alluded to the demand for greater participation in the private structures of society—in the governance of schools and universities by students and teachers, in the conduct of industry by workers and professionals, in the reorientation of the labor unions by the membership in expanding their concern beyond work rules, wages, and pension plans to include choices about the directions of industry, in the role of the church by the younger and dissident clergy as the church leaves behind a purely spiritual ministry and engages more in the problems of poverty, race, and war (Westin, 1961a, pp. 25-26). To illustrate the demand for greater participation in national religious conventions, Westin (1961a, p. 26-27) refers to the controversy at the Unitarian-Universalist convention of 1966 which almost wrecked the convention. The issue was over a black caucus which met and demanded an independent position within the Church and the appropriation of a lump sum of money which the caucus would spend as it saw fit. The demand was denied on the ground that the Church was unthinkable to see a color line within the Church and that it should do only what was just on an integrated basis. In 1968, there was a showdown within the Church and the convention voted to accept the program of the black caucus and to grant them a lump sum of money to spend not only for proselytising but also for recruitment and programs in the inner city. It is interesting to note what the Church saw on a short-term basis to be a threat to equality of participation it later saw on a long-term basis, undoubtedly with some degree of anxiety, as more involvement and participation of the black membership. The growing demand for greater participation within hierarchical authoritarian church structures furnishes some of the most dramatic examples of both the necessity and probability of greater civic participation in the decade ahead.

Basic Dimensions of Civic Participation

In identifying the dimensions of civic participation, Westin (1961a, 1963b) views participation as a continuum, with "civic competence" at one end and "civic impotence" at the opposite end. Depending
on the degree of competence or impotence each citizen felt, he could be located at some point along this continuum. That point, however, would be determined by how he felt in all four dimensions of civic participation: significant involvement in decision-making, the right of dissent, equality of legal treatment and social opportunity, and the right of due process. These rights, and their corresponding duties and responsibilities, represent conditions or states by which the degree of quality of democratic citizenship participation could be measured at any particular time for the society as well as for the individual (Westin, 1960b, p. 5).

Westin (1960b, p. 5) refers to two of the dimensions, involvement in decision-making and dissent, as matters of choice and two, equality and due process, as matters of status. The dimensions of choice represent conditions or rights within which each individual is free to participate in a particular mode or not to participate. The dimensions of status are rights which must be automatically given to every citizen without his laying an individual claim to or without obliging him to exercise them. Westin (p. 7) defines the dimensions of choice as follows:

1. The right to significant involvement in the decision-making processes in public and institutional life. This right has both an objective and subjective aspect. Objectively, it is measured by the legal right to participate and the objective conditions of economics, social norms, and community organization which allow and facilitate such involvement. But it also has the subjective element that an individual may feel excluded or included in ways that are not necessarily directly aligned with the objective realities. The extent to which the subjective and objective aspects of involvement are in harmony will be a revealing index of the state of participation on the part of the citizenry.

2. The right of dissent, including criticism, opposition, protest, and withdrawal.

Westin (pp. 8-9) defines the dimensions of status as follows:

3. The right to receive equal legal treatment and equitable distribution of social opportunity without regard to such "involuntary" individual statuses as race, religion, sex, and social origin.

4. The right to fundamental fairness in procedure (due process) whenever sanctions against an individual are proposed or applied by public or institutional authorities.

We conclude that civic participation includes both status and choice. Participation is the central means in a democratic society by which the authoritative allocation of values should be made.
What happens when the civic participation fails to provide the requisite choices and statuses? Vestin (p. 9) identifies adverse results which correspond to each of the four dimensions: the individual will experience a feeling of powerlessness because of insufficient involvement in the decision-making processes; he will perceive a violation of personal identity because of insufficient protection of dissent; he will experience feelings of discrimination and inequity because of the imposition of unequal treatment; and he will experience feelings of arbitrariness and injustice because of the absence of due process. Each of these four emotional states marks the citizen who finds himself in a position of total civic impotence. Conversely, a powerful enjoyment of civic statuses and choices leads to feelings of civic competence. (Vestin p. 9) concludes:

All of this can be summed up by saying that the citizen in a democratic society is one who is able to command a response from his environment when he feels his vital interests or status is at stake. The important citizen is one who either knows or thinks that he cannot command such a response.

To what degree are the present political and social conditions in America favorable to the exercise of the rights of civic participation? First, increasingly large numbers of citizens feel that they are victims of decisions which are made without their involvement and participation. The frequent references to a faceless, imperturbable, and inexorable Establishment and the bureaucratic "machinery" of the governmental and private institutions are testimony of subjective feelings of impotence and non-involvement and of the perception of forces and events sweeping over them and clearly beyond their control. Also, as Vestin (1963b, p. 24) has noted, the leadership of American institutions shows little inclination to create the conditions under which far more individuals than at present will want to and will have the opportunity to participate in decision-making. The motivation for the necessary institutional redesign must come from pressure and demand and occasionally, but rarely, in anticipation of future crises.

Second, increasingly large numbers of citizens are demanding the right of dissent in both speech and behavior. Vestin (1968a, p. 64) argues that dissent may be the least secure of the four dimensions of civic participation. Vestin argues (pp. 63-64) that the American culture has its own distinctive conception of what is legitimate and illegitimate in both substance and method. His theory is that Americans allow enormous civil liberties for people whose criticisms and actions come within the conventional liberal consensus or even slightly right or left of center. Unlike England, however, where the security and homogeneity of the population leads to much higher levels of tolerance, groups in America which place themselves outside the liberal consensus are often branded as traitors and subversives. The typical response to controversies over academic freedom and political protest is that "If you don't like our constitutional system, why don't you go elsewhere?" Such a response is a powerful expression of the belief that there is a typical American way, and individuals who
challenge this system ought to get cut. Westin (p. 65) notes that we have yet had "an institutionalized toleration of any view which comes into fundamental collision with American economic, political, and religious norms."

While traditional low levels of toleration severely restrict the exercise of the right of dissent, there are often forces at work to legitimize dissent and, in general, expand the number of individual choices. First, the national television system and the great amount of occupational mobility are breaking down sectional, national, and religious differences and pose an interesting problem for dissent: Does the effect of nationalizing the culture result in true toleration of diversity and dissent or does it produce people who are so homogeneous that they can afford toleration because a few cranks and nuts are not really going to influence patterns of belief and behavior? Second, the courts, particularly the Supreme Court, for over a decade have expanded the areas of accepted dissent as, for example, in the rights to picket, demonstrate, and protest. The pressure on the courts came from the civil rights movement and pushed far ahead the right of dissent. A third force for expanding the right of dissent and for freedom of expression is the younger generation, especially in the guise of the hippie and yippie and their philosophies and practices of sex and drug usage. Westin (1966c, p. 71) believes that all the signs indicate that there will be more liberation and freedom in individual and group expression and dissent. It is unlikely that censorship will be reinstalled on movies and book and magazine publication. Westin (p. 75) has even hypothesized a "hunger for expressiveness, love, revelation of one to another for reasons of connection and affiliation which may require us to reconstruct our institutions to give people early in their lives experience with those kinds of relationships." Such individualization of life-style would require greater freedom of expression and the fuller exercise of the right of dissent from conventional life-styles.

Despite the forces expanding the areas of dissent, Westin (1966c, p. 25) believes securing more productive and effective norms of dissent will continue to be a source of great struggle in which even those groups favoring greater participation will frequently deny its right to others. Westin writes. "There is cause for pessimism that the black community, in its present stage of development, has little commitment to civil liberties as opposed to civil rights. One can understand this in historical and sociological terms, but it does not augur well for the future." The area of dissent will continue to be most fragile even in an era of increasing participation.

The right of legal equality and the equitable distribution of social opportunity is at the heart of the current social conflict (Westin, 1968b, p. 25). Westin (1967a, p. 47) observes that it is possible to have legal equality while society fails to distribute equally its rewards and privileges. There are two current theories
of how we should restore the right of equality to black people (Westin, 1969a, p. 47). One theory is that we should from now on be color blind and treat everybody equally. The other theory is that we should remain color conscious and shoulder the obligation "to take extraordinary measures to correct inequalities that have been created as a result of social and political practices of one hundred years since emancipation." Unlike dissent which, you recall, involves the exercise of choice, equality is a status to which civil liberties automatically attach. For society to deny individuals and groups equality of treatment is to incur heavy social obligations for reform.

Westin believes that the right of equality is more securely established in American tradition than the right of dissent. He (1969a, p. 54) states:

In terms of the white community there is an enormous ethic of equality in the treatment of religious and nationality groups, in which you can see the saga of the American system worked out over the last one hundred seventy-five years as one of an enlarging theory and practice of equality. There has been a reciprocal Americanizing of the immigrant and non-white groups which has had the effect of changing the assumptions of American culture itself. For example, there have been many changes in Catholicism and the lusitan movement as they came to America and are acculturated. If you look at the Mason in Europe or the Catholics in Ireland, Italy, or France you can see what very different institutions and philosophies they have from those same units represented here. And so I would argue that there is a high commitment to equality which has seen its ups and downs but is a progressive one in American politics.

Louis Hartz (1955) has argued that precisely because America escaped the period of feudalism, in which there was a caste system with its deference and attitude toward government as essentially the natural creation of the privileged classes, we were able to develop a system in which there was a theory of a general American ethos which did not permit the rise of family aristocracies. Three generations of the Adams family learned the fact that there is no place in America for nobility and aristocracy because one must cater to the masses and because there is a disrespect for the aristocracy. Equality, therefore, has firm political roots in American history--both in the institutions we did develop and the institutions like feudalism and caste systems we fortunately by-passed.

Herbert Cans (1968) observes how middle-class Americans use the demand for individual "liberty" as the justification for keeping their wealth and position and for getting more. Individual "liberty" is given a higher priority than social and economic equality. Cans writes:
Whether liberty is demanded by a Southern advocate of states' rights to keep Negroes in their place or by a property owner who wants to sell his house to any white willing to buy it, liberty has become the ideology of the more fortunate. In the years to come, the "have-nots," whether they lack money or freedom, will demand increasingly the reduction of this form of liberty. Those who ask for more equality are not opposed to liberty per se, of course; what they want is sufficient equality so that they, too, can enjoy the liberty now virtually monopolized by the "haves."

Gans' analysis shows that the dimensions of civic participation are rooted in political and social conditions, and that equality, as a civic status or condition, has priority over dimensions of civic participation which involve civic choice. Gans believes there is no necessary conflict between liberty and equality. "The society," he states, "we must create should provide enough equality to permit everyone the liberty to continue his own life without creating inequality for others, and that this, when it comes, will be the Great Society."

Perhaps the most secure of our rights is due process. Due process relates to participation because it reflects whether or not a set of rules and procedures can be provided to accommodate social conflict in ways that all individuals would find procedurally fair, using whatever norms of fair procedure the society has developed (Westin, 1968c, p. 69). Due process relates to dissent whenever society decides to suspend the norms of fair procedure to punish the dissenter or when it decides what proper limits of dissent must be. Due process relates directly to equality whenever the original rules contain intrinsic inequalities or the interpretation of the rules in new situations is discriminatory. Westin (1968b, p. 25) believes that due process is the most secure of the four dimensions of civic participation and that American society has established its pragmatic value. The more equality that comes into our society, the more due process almost automatically follows with it. Often the growth of due process, which the commitment of the courts and lawyers even in the current crisis shows is a continuing upward curve, precedes the securing of substantive equality.

Westin (1968e, pp. 49-50) observes that an inherently discriminatory rule or the social realities and consequences of a neutral rule can weaken or suspend the right of due process. For example, an inherently discriminatory rule is that the individual facing criminal charges is not entitled to have counsel appointed for him. Since an adversary system of justice depends upon counsel to defend the individual, to allow the conviction of an individual because he could not afford to hire an attorney is inherently unjust. The neutral rule, of course, requires the court to appoint counsel for those individuals unable to hire their own. The social realities of the poor, however,
still explain the application of due process because they cannot afford to have the most competent counsel available, they cannot afford private investigations to gather important evidence, and they cannot pay witnesses to attend court. Levine (1963a, p. 50) also notes that the poor cannot afford a transcript of court proceedings, so important in appeals to higher courts. Similarly, the right to bail is a neutral rule, a civil liberty, but the financial realities of the poor make its application to them unfair. Judges have discretionary power to set high or low bail and prosecutors, in the case of the poor, are unchallenged in requesting high bail. There is no one around to argue that low bail is a civil liberty since the individual held in custody for six to eight months or longer will often lose his job and cannot easily help in the preparation of his own defense.

Although there are these infringements upon the right of due process, especially in the case of the poor and minority groups, Restin (1953a, pp. 51-52) believes that due process is the most cherished and observed of our four dimensions of civic participation. He writes that "there is a high level of agreement that the rules of the game ought to be accepted by the rich and poor, left and right, northerner and southerner, and so on, because everybody is aware that the rules might be evoked in a discriminatory way against him." Restin believes that after moments of political extremism, as in the McCarthy period, due process is in the first point of resiliency or snap back. Senator Joseph McCarthy challenged the rules of due process because they were blocking his imposition of stricter limits of dissent. When it finally came time to discipline McCarthy in the Senate, the charge brought against him was his disregard for the procedures of fair investigation and of proper procedure. The charge of McCarthy's failure to observe due process quickly mobilized public opinion against him. We see in the McCarthy hearings the relationship of dissent and due process. Due process becomes the target of those who want to move against the dissenters. This is also the mechanism by which the more liberty-minded individuals snap back (Restin, 1963a, p. 53).

In summary, we have identified four dimensions of civic participation on a continuum stretching between civic competence and civic apathetic. The dimensions of involvement in decision-making and dissent also fall within the category of choice, representing conditions or rights within which each individual is free to participate or not to participate. The dimensions of equality and due process fall within the category of status or rights which must be automatically given to every citizen without his laying an individual claim to and without obliging him to exercise them. The dimension of involvement in decision-making is the overarching dimension and embraces the three remaining dimensions. If we rank the rights of dissent, equality, and due process in terms of the strength or security they enjoy in the American political tradition, we would give the first rank to the right of due process, the strongest, and the third or lowest rank to the right of dissent, the most fragile of the dimensions of civic participation. The degree of powerlessness, percep-
tion of violation of personal identity, feelings of discrimination and inequity, and feelings of awareness and injustice the
citizen experiences is proportionate to the degree he is denied the
enjoyment of these dimensions of civic participation. To the degree
that a citizen can command a response from the political and social
environment in defense of his choices and status is proportionate to
the degree he enjoys these basic democratic rights.

In the following section of this document, I shall explore the
degree to which models of social action and reform embody these
dimensions of civic participation.

Models of Social Reform

Mathews (1968) has distinguished at least three models of social
change and reform evident in contemporary political and social life
in America and elsewhere. These are (1) the mass protest model, (2)
the program model, and (3) the community development model. In this
section I describe the characteristics and relationships of these
models and their "fit" with the dimensions of civic participation.

The mass protest model is best illustrated by the all-black
mass membership organization with hierarchical decision-making, existing
in the Jim Crow South. The mass-based organization has several dis-
tinguishing characteristics. Usually there is only a small active
membership. A demonstration mobilizes the "troops" and successfully
appeals for demonstrators from allied groups. In periods of low
tension and tranquility, great divisions exist within the organi-
ation. In periods of high tension, demonstrations, arrests, brutality,
and so on, great cohesion exists. The leaders of these organizations
have charismatic appeal. These organizations, to maintain internal
stability and discipline, usually require broad goals and ideology
and, in moments of confrontation, a single issue or focus. In the
case of the black organizations, there must be a high degree of racial
consciousness and a high identification between one's own self-
interest and broad racial goals (Mathews, 1968, p. 20). The mass
protest organizations are "intermittent" in the sense that they
require activity only sporadically and for short periods of time.
During dormant states an elite subunit maintains organizational life.
It becomes a mass organization only during confrontation when it
recruits wide support from the community. Mathews (p. 30) states
that "in its mass dimension it is not a membership organization.
Participants commit themselves for the duration of the action. The
next action may mobilize different participants." High organizational
flexibility is necessary to meet complex and changing problems.
Following Iddo (1965), Mathews (1969, p. 31) renders this model of
mass protest organizations: "Conflict creates unity; control is
exercised by a small group of leaders; loyalty and obedience is
insisted upon; meetings are held to inform and to gain and demonstrate
support of leaders."
How well does the mass protest model embody the dimensions of civic participation? Clearly there is a high level of involvement during protest periods, but decision-making, especially during dominant states, but also during periods of confrontation, seems to concentrate in the hands of elite oligarchies. The organizations themselves, however, consist of minority and dissident groups largely unrepresented in the mainstream of American political life and therefore provide unique opportunities for civic participation. The organizations clearly exercise the right of dissent and, in fact, are a major source of strength, except in their extremist moments, strengthening the tradition of dissent in American politics. The issues which cause the protests and confrontations are largely issues of inequality, particularly unequal housing and educational opportunities and unequal job opportunities and welfare benefits. The process has often protected the right to protest and demonstrate. It is often threatened by the revolutionary intransigency of the protestors who claim temporary immunity from the rules of due process long enough to "get" and punish the protestors and demonstrators.

The program model is best illustrated by the Tennessee Valley Authority and the blue area projects sponsored by the Ford Foundation and the President's Commission on Juvenile Delinquency (see Section IV above). In this model community action is initiated from above or outside the community. The "program" coordinator extends, or initiates programs by existing agencies to eliminate overlap and to provide new and integrated services (Luthers, 1968, p. 61). According to Mathews (p. 61) the goals of the model are "social planning, interagency coordination, reshaping of agencies to fit problems, the provision of individual services, and some citizen participation in planning decisions." Program administrators often resort to formal or informal cooptation to achieve program goals. In formal cooptation there is the appearance of sharing authority for public opinion purposes while the real exercise of authority remains in the hands of the program administrators. In informal cooptation there is an actual sharing of power in response to pressures from the local bureaucracy upon whom the program depends. This type of cooptation results in often vast program changes and, as in the case of TVA, often causes the program to realign itself with conservative local elements. The program is then shaped by local intermediaries rather than by the people.

How well does the program model embody the dimensions of civic participation? Mathews (p. 60), following Selenick's (1949) analysis, gives these reasons for the ineffectiveness of civic participation in the typical program model: the first priority is program administration and responsibility rather than program development with citizen participation; there is external control over membership size and representation and over the selection of leadership; areas of civic decision-making are severely limited; there is tight control over access to the group by outsiders; and there is a routinized service
program. According to Harris and Rezin (1967, pp. 167-8), the grey area projects did not include a single poor man or woman. Efforts to organize the lower class largely attracted individuals who were upwardly mobile. When the programs attempted serious innovation by some form of community organization, they found crises of dissent and often had to choose against the bureaucracy. Mobilization for Youth was nearly destroyed in a witchhunt for subversives (Mathews, 1968, p. 43). There is considerable doubt whether or not these programs greatly expanded equality of opportunity for the poor they were to serve. Mathews (p. 41) writes: "The Doctrine of Stimulation by which the federal carrot is supposed to stimulate local institutions to use their own resources and which carries with it loose federal administrative controls, was unsuccessful in inducing a significant increase in local resources." Federal funds were diverted from the poor into the hands of voracious, self-aggrandizing bureaucracies. The frequency of criminal misappropriation of funds indicates the abuse of the process. Bureaucratic "due process" resulted in program annihilation.

The community development model does not direct its efforts to individuals. According to Mathews (1968, p. 61), this model embraces a people-directed process based upon the people's perception of their needs and the discovery or creation of community. Mathews states that this model "assumes that the problem is one of group motivation and, therefore, it attempts to create community feeling, or discover re-feeling in common symbols and meanings, in goals and problems uniting people, in feelings of common purpose, or belonging, of being neighbors." It is a model which emphasizes self-help and a feeling of ownership, sponsorship, and involvement in the group. Following Clinard's (1966) study of the Delhi project, Mathews (pp. 62-65) identifies these additional model characteristics. There is wide community participation (as high as 80 per cent in the Delhi project). Project areas kept together people of the same caste, occupation, or religion. In the beginning organizational units were small, comprised of twenty-five to fifty-five families—a genuine effort to get to the people rather than to their leaders. Since local bureaucracies will deny legitimation to the projects, legitimation with the people is an essential condition for success of self-help projects. When success itself results, more legitimation is established. The leadership was indigenous to the community and recruited from those identified as community of crisis leaders, those who offered services or suggestions, men with previous self-help experience, and women showing pride in their homes.

How well does the community development embody the dimensions of civic participation? Of the three models we have considered, the community development model allows the highest level of individual and group involvement in decision-making. A careful building of membership with the people when the project will benefit develops meaningful civic participation and provides its own legitimation of power especially in facing the opposition of traditional leadership and bureaucracy. The
exercise of dissent becomes crucial because of the struggle which arises between traditional and indigenous leadership and the new and traditional modes of organization, a struggle which continues until local authorities realize the important role municipal institutions can play in community development. Equality is assured because the community councils from the start are controlled by the very people who will profit by the new social and economic resources the development of their communities will provide. The process is promoted especially in the sense that social realities catch up with inherently just rules as improvement in economic and social conditions provide an appropriate context for rule application.

In summary, this section of the document has reviewed some basic assumptions about democratic society and distinguished participatory democracy from more primitive conceptions such as elitist democracy and parochial and subject political cultures. The essential characteristic is the commitment to large-scale citizen participation as well as a belief in rationality of individual interest and a quest for equality. We also reviewed the basic dimensions of civic participation—involve in decision-making, dissent, equality, and due process. Finally, we described three contemporary models of social action, the mass protest, the program, and community development models to see how well they embodied the dimensions of civic participation. This analysis makes clear the superiority of the community development model and the tendencies toward bureaucratic conservatism in the program model and oligarchical elitism in the mass organization model.

In terms of our four conceptions of man we can see in the fine meshing of self and community interest how the community development model is also the model for the development of Civic Man. By building the type of organizations or councils which will exactly meet the needs of the individuals in the group, the political and social environment is radically transformed and the Alienated Man need no longer feel that there is a government organized against or existing in spite of him. Success in small community organizations is tangible and personal as well as intrinsically legitimate and public. The formal and informal political and social barriers which now separate the Private Man from the larger community of which he is a part rapidly vanish as the productive involvement in community life replaces the need to find one’s satisfaction exclusively in private spheres of activity. The program model is largely motivated by conservative thinking and aspiration to change as little as possible in political and social structure and to use that structure as the chief instrument of social reform. It expresses the now evanescent hope of the Private Man that all the political and social premises around which he has organized his world will remain intact along with their present institutional and legal expression. In fact, the very political and administrative structures which undermined the program model, for the Private Man, become a protective wall between the private and
public sectors of his life. In the mass protest model, especially in its authoritarian and hierarchical mode, during dormant periods, we find vestiges of the Elite Man and a rather paradoxical distrust of the very masses the organization wants to lead.

It is possible that in meeting the crises of our age that there are roles for each model and each type of man. Mathews (1968, p. 29) following Wilson (1966) has suggested such an assignment of roles. The mass protest organization stimulates and mobilizes widespread support for the issue. The greg model provides for the occasion for influencing and hopefully coopting traditional leaders and public officials. Finally, the community organization maintains the openness and fluidity of communication which avoids polarization and stalemate. This combination of models provides the charismatic Elite Man his moment to command loyalty and obedience in open confrontation. It provides for the cooptation if not the conversion of Private Man and their political echelons now lodged in bureaucracies about to be infused by the program with new light and energy. It provides Alienated Man the challenge and the authentic opportunity to exercise control over their own social destiny. Finally, it provides ample opportunity for Civic Man to make the development of their communities a combined source of public and private concern.

In the following section of the document we shall explore the implications of our theory of civic participation for civic education in a period of crisis.
The winds of change now buffeting American politics and society will
alone drastically alter the conditions under which we must live and
die and eventually alter our responses to those conditions—our styles
of living and our underlying conceptions of the good life, the good body
politic, and the good society. We cannot entirely trust, however, to
the blind drift of events. If the following decade demands that we
must enter an era of reform in which we alter our conception of man and
society, explicate the fallacies of traditional political theory, wrestle
with the crises ripping society apart, and preserve and enhance the
trend toward civic participation and mass democracy, then understanding
and acceptance of what is happening must combine with the concrete
effort to guide change in desirable directions.

In this section of the document I shall consider what political
and social interventions in the rush of contemporary historical events
are possible and desirable. I limit myself to interventions in one
institutional system, the educational system, not only because this is
the American institution which chiefly occupies the center, but also
because it is the institution which can best pave the way for new
political conceptions and roles for the meliorative reform of itself
and other institutions.

The section divides into three parts: (1) It begins with a
consideration of what civic education should be at a time when insti-
tutions are dissolving. (2) Then we look at the present role of the
school in civic education. (3) Next we examine and critique the
literature on political socialization for what guidance it gives us in
achieving our new educational mission. (4) Finally we examine the
literature on authoritarian personality and group dynamics for guidance
in delineating new functions for civic education.

The New Civic Education

It is impossible to squeeze our analysis of contemporary political
and social dilemmas and our projected trends for the seventies into the
contemporary format of a single institution or one sphere of activity of
that institution, as in the case of the school and civic education.
Our analysis forces the conclusion that American institutional life is
rapidly dissolving in a post-agrarian and technological society and
that only the threads of democratic tradition will remain.

The new civic education must create the new democracy. American
institutional life will experience a number of dramatic changes. First,
some institutions will disappear, such as the party convention and the
Electoral College, those which the communication media and expanded
political participation have made anachronistic and, indeed, undemocratic
when they threaten to flout the popular will. Second, there will be
drastic changes in the institutions which remain, especially in the way they are managed. The university, for example, will survive but the power alignments among policy-making boards, state legislatures, federal funding agencies, university administration, faculty, and students will sharply alter. Third, there will be new institutions which combine private and public interest and control. Current examples are the Satellite Corporation and urban development agencies. Finally, there will be new institutional relationships at federal, state, and local levels. Federal funding of local educational projects frequently bypasses state control and develops new relationships between federal and local agencies. A metropolitan area which embarks on the solution of problems of air pollution, clean water supply, traffic flow, and public transportation does so largely by ignoring traditional city and county jurisdictions and establishing new governmental and administrative relationships.

The new civic education must develop in the student the awareness of the consequences of these institutional changes. Institutional changes disturb and even disrupt traditional power alignments and the traditional structure of social rewards. Changes, therefore, meet with sometimes monumental resistance which only the pressure of crisis and demand can overcome. Even the reformers become contentious as they struggle to shape the new power alignments and reward system for maximum self benefit. Institutional change has powerful effects and never is a panacea. The dilemmas of social reform, described in Section 4, are ample evidence of the delicate balance which exists between institutional innovation and the consolidation of reform. Yesterday's reform becomes today's problem in a never-ending cycle which keeps Civic Men busier than could any Calvinistic conscience. We are not even certain, as Kasher (1967, p. 534) reminds us, that increased participation in the effort to reorganize public institutions contributes to employee support for reorganization or reduces his future resistance.

What should civic education provide the student who must somehow develop adequate orientations for the welter of institutional change he will experience? First, it must provide a rational and analytical approach to political and social problems. The student must grasp the complexities of the political and social realities of his time and see the necessity of adopting options and programs which must be modified in time. There are no panaceas and permanent solutions. He must understand that the consequences of institutional change are often as monumental as the forces which brought it about. Second, civic education should provide the student with a meaningful link between what he is as an individual with a particular ethnic background and the larger context of political and social change within which he plays out his life. The relationship between primary and secondary groups are transient and blurred and must be re-established in a way which provides students of all ethnic backgrounds some meaningful continuity between the private life of the home and neighborhood and the public life of school and politics. Third, civic education should provide the student some theory of social change. The student must see that institutional reform is part of a historical process to which he can relate and that it is
not chiefly the result of political conspiracy and chicanery. He must also understand that as an autonomous individual, with his own needs and style and his own sense of what is happening and what should be happening, that he can and should resist change.

Finally, civic education should provide the student the opportunity to remake the mode of his human relationships. As the power relationships and reward structures of institutional life are changing about him, he must also change the power relationships he has with people inside the institutions in which he participates. What are the appropriate relationships with authority, with ethnic minorities, with the dissenter, and so on, in a participatory democracy? To handle such relationships within the new democratic ethos the student must learn to use new techniques, as evidenced in the retraining of local police forces in the handling of racial minorities and student protestors. Interpersonal relations are learned and civic education can provide the opportunity for the student to experience openness and directness and to avoid the language of power. The fact that many individuals today display the psychiatric symptoms of isolation, loneliness, and emotional superficiality implies the strong need for deeper interpersonal involvement.

Clearly the schools and civic education are charged with a crucial and noble mission. In the section which follows we want to compare the traditional school conception of its social role with the weighty responsibilities of civic education in the seventies.

The School and Civic Education Today

In the decade of the seventies the school will increasingly become the ideological battleground of the political factions appearing as the traditional liberal consensus dissolves. Partly by historical accident and partly by design, conservative, liberal, and radical left opinion has turned to the school as the chief agent of preserving the republic, moderating reform, or revolutionizing American institutions. In this section of the document we shall consider the traditional role of the school in the present political system.

In traditional political theory the role of the school is embodied primarily in the maintenance of the system, to supply the society with the trained personnel to carry out its normative functions. In this maintenance role the school transmits the political culture of the past to students who eventually assume adult responsibilities. As great research centers the schools, or universities, add to our storehouse of knowledge and to the burgeoning technology and profits but always within the framework of the middle class consensus and American business and government ethic. Westin (1968c) describes the system-maintenance activity of the university:

...the university, as the principal storehouse and organizer of knowledge, the training ground of experts, and the certifier of talent, has reached a new position of prominence and influence
Faculty members and university administrators move about the consulting posts and policy councils of business, labor, government, civic groups, and the foundations in unprecedented numbers, and the path for students recommended to these organizational establishments by the faculty-administrator certifier is a shining career highway.

Because of the ceiling on and frustration of career aspirations, American teachers, in the degree and style of their political participation, emphasize systems-maintenance and systems-compliance (Zeigler, 1967). Largely recruited from the middle class, teachers' allegiance to middle class values, according to Zeigler's (p. 29) evidence, increases with teaching experience. This situation is exacerbated for male teachers who often enter the profession to increase their chances of upward mobility only to find later in their careers that their salaries are no higher than those of their female colleagues and that many of their initial hopes for advancement are forever thwarted. In effect, the male teacher who originally entered his profession to improve his socioeconomic status finds in his later career that he is indeed downward mobile. Zeigler (p. 25) observes that "one method of creating a Radical Right is to take a male, place him in the incongruously feminine teaching role, keep him there for years at a low income, and allow his hopes for advancement to fade as his experience increases but his situation does not change." The tendency of downward-mobile individuals is to cling desperately to the values of the class from which they have departed (p. 47). The downward-mobile teachers are the most conservative teachers. They are also politically cynical and alienated. They are excessively cautious about their political involvements. Only 20 percent of teachers believe that it is proper and desirable to participate in sanctionable or "unsafe" activities (p. 69).

In effect, teachers often see themselves as left out of the political process. Yet the school is a major agency of political socialization. Zeigler (p. 50) asks "Is it possible for teachers who are cynical and alienated about the political process to convey to their students how necessary it is to participate in the political process? If a teacher believes that his participation in the process is futile, can he conceal his sense of futility and frustration from students and successfully teach them how to become politically responsible citizens?" There is rather bitter irony in the ordinary classroom situation presided over by a politically disenchanted teacher, convinced that his is not the best possible world, yet using textbooks suffused with the cheery image of suburban living and an Enlightenment optimism which guarantees man's ultimate triumph over inequality and injustice.

There is equal irony in the fact that high school social studies teachers, despite their unhappy socioeconomic status, believe that it is empirical truth that America has the best type of government yet devised by man (Zeigler, p. 116). There is no evidence that either liberal or conservative teachers encourage students to undertake critical
evaluation of American institutions. Zeigler (p. 119) writes:

The classroom operates basically to reinforce a belief in the desirability of maintaining the status quo. It is very doubtful that the classroom experience of students encourages them toward radical politics. If there is brainwashing in the high schools, it is clearly not for indoctrination in socialism; rather it appears aimed at the production of optimistic, uncritical citizens. The political world of the high schools is not the world of politicians.

The traditional role of the school in the political system as one of systems-maintenance is underscored by a study by Edgar Litt (1966). As part of his study, Litt compared the values found in civic textbooks with those articulated by community interest groups such as PTA officials and religious, civic and political leaders. He found considerable congruence between community and textbook values. For example, when the community emphasized the democratic creed, "the rights of citizens and minorities to influence governmental policy through non-tyrannical procedures," 52 percent of the textbooks contained a corresponding emphasis. When, however, the community leaders placed little stress on the resolution of political problems through group conflict, only 47 percent of the textbooks contained a corresponding emphasis. It appears that the schools are sensitively attuned to system cues in the selection of the content for political socialization.

One link between the school and community that can result in systems-maintenance or systems-challenge is the socioeconomic and ethnic composition of the student body and the school faculty. Educational theorists and social engineers see in the social composition of the school a major instrument for the shaping of political beliefs and attitudes (Dawson and Prewitt, 1969, p. 167). When the student body and faculty consist almost exclusively of black, lower-class elements, one expects in the decade of the seventies that the school will challenge the dominant values of the political culture and invest a significant part of its effort in promoting beliefs and behavior which challenge and shake the system. We can also entertain the theoretical hope that school integration will bring into balance the forces of systems-maintenance and systems-challenge to create a new political consensus incorporating the political participation of those minorities now outside the system. The very fact that former black demands for school segregation and decentralization reflect changes in the black leadership's program for the political socialization of the black child. In the decade ahead the political socialization of the black child will emphasize his binding links to the black community and his relatively autonomous relationship with the white community. It is too early to predict whether such a program of political socialization can ever produce the political balance and ethnic cohesiveness required by the American political system.

Beyond systems-maintenance one can convincingly argue that school practice presents an authoritarian model of decision-making. Decision-
making moves down through an elaborate, medieval hierarchical structure, with the central governing boards and administrative elites at the top and the classroom teacher and student at the bottom. There is an elaborate array of intermediaries, some of whom are agents of the central office sent into the school to enforce administrative and curricular decisions made at the top and others of whom are local administrators who are the middle link in the chain of administrative command between the central office and the single school. Within each school the same hierarchical structure and flow of decision-making from top to bottom is neatly replicated so that each school principal can boast a microcosmic hegemony corresponding exactly to the grand design of the central board and superintendent. Within each classroom the teacher is invested exclusively with the power of decision-making and, unless philosophically, pedagogically, or politically moved, shares little of this power with the students. The students, then, form a politically impotent group who soon discover that their only means of representing their interests and influencing decisions is through conscious cooptation, quiet systems-subversion, or loud and dramatic protest and demonstration. In essence, then, the authoritarian model of the school presents a model of decision-making hostile to the values and practices of participatory democracy.

We now want to consider in some ideal sense the importance of the school in the political socialization of the child. First, the school portrays the ideals and norms of the political and social system. Ideally, it can emphasize the rights and obligations of the citizen to participate in government. Beyond focusing on the right and obligation to vote, the school can provide sufficient understanding of procedures open to citizens for legitimately influencing government. It can delineate the role and importance of conflict in the operation of the political system. Second, the school is the child’s first and most vivid example of how group membership and organization can achieve desirable ends. In its own institutional governance and its depiction of current political process, the school should vividly teach and demonstrate how achieving political goals and influencing political officials is facilitated by participation in organized groups and political parties. The school should provide the evidence for and the opportunity to study the efficacy of community action and pressure groups. It should provide occasion for the development of social skills necessary to carry on profitable group work. Third, the school should present a realistic portrayal of the political process. Hess and Torney (1967, p. 218) have noted that the school ignores the "tougher, less pleasant facts of political life" in America. They state that "while it would probably be unwise to discuss political corruption in early grades, the process of socialization should include a somewhat more realistic view of the operation of the political system." Finally, the importance of the school lies in the influence it has in shaping the child's self-concept and his political self. Educational systems produce Private Men, Elite Men, and Civic Men. An educational system which consciously or unconsciously teaches the strict separation of public and private life and develops a false optimism about the presumably mechanical success with which the system meets crises and solves problems undoubtedly
produces Private Men who experience relatively low levels of anxiety and guilt in pursuing almost exclusively private fortunes and aspirations. An educational system which devotes its major attention to the education of elites which will assume the powers and responsibilities of decision-making in the public and political sectors of American life undoubtedly produces Elite Men whose sense of noblesse oblige and social mission will silence misgivings which arise when they snuff out the pleas and demands of the minorities and the unrepresented dissenters with the heavy weight of their own decrees. An educational system can also produce Civic Men who value civic participation, who understand and in practice honor the rights of dissent, equality, and due process, who accept conflict as a dimension of political behavior, and who find their highest satisfaction in their citizenship roles.

In summary, I have described the traditional role of the school as one of systems-maintenance. This role is played out in the basic conservatism of most teachers, in the acceptance of the status quo by most social studies teachers, and in the school’s sensitive attunement to community cues in the choice of textbook material. The authoritarian model of most decision-making within the educational system clearly fails to meet the basic requirements of participatory democracy. The socioeconomic and ethnic composition of the school can be the basis for maintaining or challenging the system. This examination of the role of the school in the political socialization of the child reveals that the school ordinarily fails to carry out two vital functions—the transforming of the political culture so that students view and experience politics in a new light and the creating of political culture so that students study the need and the process of creating new political communities and institutions.

What guidance does the behavioral and social science literature provide in reformulating civic education to accomplish its creative mission of the seventies? The most relevant literature is that on political socialization, which we shall now examine.

Political Socialization

In this era of the behavioral sciences we can no longer naively believe that widespread behavior uniformity is the product of only relatively haphazard natural events or that institutions turn out best when we studiously avoid any deliberate intervention in their evolution. We no longer believe this about institutions and probably most of us no longer believe it about children. The fact that we have raised generations of flag-waving patriots, each poised to meet the “enemy” on his own or their own shores, each experiencing the same quickening of the pulse when hearing the awesome, shrill notes of national anthems, and each intoning with the same ritualistic cadence the pledges to flags, is not entirely attributable to the accidents of nature. Cultural anthropologists are quick to point out that there are children whose observance of tribal rituals has nothing to do with patriotism and manifest destiny and much to do with helping the child see himself as an extension of nature and universe. Clearly some process intervenes
between the child and the political and social symbols and institutions to which he ultimately pledges his effort and allegiance—a process called political socialization.

Socialization is a two-way process (Dawson and Prewitt, 1969, pp. 15-16). On the one hand the child's admission to society is purchased at the price of retraining, restricting, and even obliterating his libidinous tendencies, a process of repression which Freud attributed to the censorious functions of the Superego. In the less picturesque language of Dawson and Prewitt (p. 16), socialization is "the closing up of certain behavioral options. An initially wide range of alternatives becomes narrower as one is socialized." On the other hand, the child relinquishes these options in exchange for the new options he can enjoy only when he "joins" society.

Dawson and Prewitt prefer to emphasize the positive aspects of socialization in their definition of political socialization. Political socialization, they state (p. 17) is the developmental process through which the citizen acquires a mature political self. The "political self" is a convenient reference to the package of political orientations of each individual. These orientations are diverse attitudes, feelings, and beliefs.

Greenstein (1965) notes the unconscious nature of much political socialization. It includes "all learning, formal and informal, deliberate and unplanned, at every stage of the life cycle, including not only explicitly political learning but also nominally non-political learning of politically relevant personality characteristics."

We can round out our definition of political socialization by relating the process to political culture. Political culture "is the pattern of distribution of orientations members of a community have toward politics" (Dawson and Prewitt, 1969, p. 27). It includes national political traditions, national folk heroes, the spirit of public institutions, the political passions of the citizens, and formal and informal rules of politics. Political culture also includes political stereotypes, styles, and moods. Dawson and Prewitt (p. 27) identify three types of tasks which political socialization performs for the political culture: (1) It (political socialization) maintains political culture when it transmits that culture from old to new citizens. (2) It transforms political culture when it leads some or all of the citizenry to view and experience new aspects and qualities of political life. (3) It creates political culture under conditions of dramatic change when, for example, it produces a new political community.

In the political life of America, and in most nations, the processes of maintenance, transformation, and creation occur simultaneously. Rather than forming mutually exclusive categories, the processes suggest a continuum, with the maintenance function at one end producing a political culture in one generation merely replicating the orientations of the previous generation and with the creation function at the other end producing drastic discontinuities.
in the saga of a nation. The polarization occurring on the American political scene can be attributed to the divergent emphasis opposed groups are giving to maintenance and creative processes.

We can also consider the development of political socialization over the life span of the individual. Political socialization is a life-long and cumulative process. There is ample evidence that the process of political socialization continues through-out the individual's life span, although not all aspects of the political self at particular ages and stages may be equally affected. The level of conflict and the resulting fluidity in the contemporary political scene often provides the occasion for significant and even dramatic change in adult political orientations and behavior. Political learning is not only continuous throughout the life span but also cumulative. The orientations the child acquires in his early life determine the style and content of his adult orientations.

Hess and Torney (1967) describe four models which explain the methods or processes whereby children acquire civic roles. They (p. 18) define roles as the "expectations set up by the system (such as rules, laws, and customs) and by the expectations of other individuals." In the development of civic roles the child has an image of what he can expect from the system and he has his own attitudinal and behavioral response to his system image. Hess and Torney (pp. 19-22) describe the four models as follows:

**The Accumulation Model.** This view assumes that the acquisition of political expectations proceeds by the addition of units of knowledge, information, attitudes, and activities.

**The Interpersonal Transfer Model.** This model assumes that the child approaches explicit political socialization already possessing a fund of experience in interpersonal relationships and gratifications. In subsequent relationships with figures of authority, he will establish modes of interaction which are similar to those he has experienced with persons in his early life.

**The Identification Model.** This model stresses the child's imitation of the behavior of some significant other person—usually a parent or a teacher—when the adult has not attempted to persuade the child of his viewpoint.

**The Cognitive-developmental Model.** This model assumes that the capacity to deal with certain kinds of concepts and information sets limits on the understanding that can be acquired of political phenomena. This model assumes that it may be possible to teach a given concept to a child who has not reached an appropriate developmental level: socialization is related to the phase of cognitive development.

No single model explains development at all the stages; these models apply at different stages (Hess and Torney, 1967, p. 22). The
Interpersonal Transfer Model describes the child's first approach to the political system and how his needs and past expectations influence this approach. Although the Accumulation Model is inadequate to explain early attachment to governmental figures and to the nation, it does describe the contribution of the school in building a fund of political knowledge. The Identification Model describes how the child develops preferences for particular parties and candidates. The Cognitive-developmental Model explains how the child grasps the more abstract and complex concepts of political processes. Later we shall consider how these models relate to the three tasks political socialization performs and the implications of both models and tasks for the reform of civic education.

Finally, there are the agencies of political socialization. These are the family, church, peer group, school, and the communications media. There is no general agreement about the relative influence of these agencies. Hess and Torney (1967, pp. 217-218) believe that the school "plays the largest part in teaching attitudes, conceptions, and beliefs about the operations of the political system." The family, they claim, develops basic loyalty to country. Coleman (1961) claims the major role for the family, relatives, and peer group and a minor role for formal education. Dawson and Previtt (1969, p. 205) reconcile these positions in describing the pattern of "waxing and waning" influence of the various agencies. These agencies, they state (p. 205) fall into three categories:

The first consists of agencies which have authority over the growing child. The parents and teacher are the most important examples. In the second category are agencies which stand in positions of equality with the learner. Age peers in school, friendship cliques in youth, and work associates in later life, as well as relations in secondary groups, are examples of these types. In the third category are political experiences themselves. Having contact with political authorities, voting, paying taxes, obeying laws, receiving benefits, and so forth, are examples of such political socialization experiences. The political happenings that one learns about through the media are in this category also.

This review of the literature on political socialization suggests that it mostly consists of a fairly elaborate terminology which fails to lend itself to studies which support the conceptualizations with data and which fails to analyze contemporary political and educational processes in a way which sheds useful light on the problems we face. The literature has a largely anthropological and personality theory bias and fails to come to grips with other social science literature having a more solid theoretical base. The very concept of socialization is not carefully related to the psychological concept of stimulus-response learning, to mathematical models of social behavior, to Freudian psychology, and to cognitive, field, and role theories in social psychology. The literature on political socialization, therefore, stands strangely alone, without a strong theoretical framework of its own and essentially unrelated to stronger and more
elaborate theories in the related disciplines. Whether or not the present formulations will produce research which will shed important light on preschool and school socialization processes remains to be seen. To do so research on political socialization must come to grips with the most powerful theories in psychology, sociology, and political science and produce an interdisciplinary formulation which is powerful enough to analyze the processes of civic education and which furnishes experimental evidence supporting particular interventions which will significantly contribute to the mission of the new civic education.

The Educational Literature

There is also the educational literature on civic education which takes the form of research and debate. A central issue of the debate concerns the relative importance of transmitting knowledge, teaching methods of inquiry, and focusing directly on the development of democratic behaviors and values in the student body. The Council for Basic Education (October, 1963, p. 3) asserts that the characteristics of responsible citizenship "are not directly teachable matters, but are the by-products of ordered knowledge." Lane and Sears (1964, p. 60), however, write that "pouring knowledge into the electorate won't help much; teaching men how to use knowledge, how to conceptualize, appraise evidence, infer causality--there lies a task worthy of a great teacher." The position of the Center, as outlined in the section which follows, recognizes the importance of teaching and learning the appropriate subject matter and methods of inquiry but stresses both the pedagogical and social need to develop in the student specific democratic behaviors.

Many scholars are in basic disagreement with the notion that ordered knowledge should guide the social studies. James P. Shaver (November, 1967, pp. 583-9) has noted a discrepancy between what the social studies ought to accomplish and what a program directed by the key concepts of the social sciences would accomplish.

We find in social studies publications an abundance of grand statements about responsibility for citizenship education and the need to educate reflective, intelligent, rational citizens to participate in the decision-making processes of a free society. Yet "social studies" curriculum projects, textbooks, and classrooms reflect little direct concern with analytic concepts appropriate to analyzing public issues. The paradox is not surprising, however, if one takes into account the subservience of educators to the notion of the social studies as adaptations and simplifications of the social sciences. The scientific commitment is to adequate description, not to application in practical circumstances. In consequence, social studies educators arc caught between uttering commitments to education for rational citizenship and perpetuating curricula which are based on criteria that seem in large part irrelevant to this objective.
Rather than rely solely on the social sciences as a guide to curriculum formation, Shaver would orient the social studies toward contemporary issues, introducing social science material where relevant. Recognizing that public policy discussion rests on questions of value, information and concepts from outside the social sciences would have to be introduced.

Using a different approach, Robert Frogge (February 1967, p. 114) also attacks the idea that knowledge of the social sciences will produce democratic behavior.

The belief that knowledge of history or political science, logic or the scientific method, or the like, automatically causes one to think and act in ways consistent with the democratic ideal is, at best, a gross oversimplification. Such a model appears to assume that behavior emanates from something other than beliefs and values. It disregards the fact that an ability to recite the fundamental principles of the democratic society in no way insures a propensity to act on the basis of them.

Frogge concludes that personality pattern, beliefs and values are key determinants of social behavior, that these determinants are not affected by the transmission of knowledge or a formal method of inquiry, and that civic education, therefore, must seek to condition basic behavioral patterns.

There are a number of attempts to reform civic education curricula. Inspired by successful curriculum revision in science and mathematics, guided by the knowledge of teaching techniques, motivated by a deepening concern with social problems, and encouraged by the ready availability of funds, curriculum planners are simultaneously working in different directions.

Fenton (1967, pp. 4-5) has classified current projects in the social studies according to three general purposes: (1) to state objectives and formulate methods of evaluation; (2) to revise teaching strategies and develop critical thinking; (3) to improve the training of teachers. Fenton also notes that there is little communication among projects with different purposes. With some notable exceptions, the creation of new materials is proceeding independently of efforts to improve teacher training. Specific efforts to revise teaching strategy have little relation to new ideas of what should be taught. Most important, those concerned with these areas seem to have little concern with the establishment of objectives and the evaluation of the strength and weakness of their curricular innovations.

Some Psychological Literature

The research of a group of psychologists at the University of California on prejudice also furnishes little guidance for the proper
conduct of civic education in the seventies (see Adorno et al., 1950). They observed that many Americans who were anti-Semitic also tended to be anti-black, anti-Mexican, anti-Oriental and, in fact, quite generally prejudiced. They were also able to distinguish between individuals who were quite generally prejudiced and those with only specific prejudices. They discovered that the generally prejudiced did not necessarily have direct contact with the groups they hated or disliked and they attributed their prejudice to deeply ingrained personality characteristics which fell under the general rubric of "authoritarian personality." Their theory was that persons subjected in their younger years to very strict parental control learned to bury their resentment and acquiesce to such control, while developing authoritarian personality structures which allowed them to alternate between deference to authority and the expression of their hidden hostilities toward vaxk objects, like minority groups, which could be safely attacked. Some psychometric personality data supported their theory but the research has always bore the mark of the post-World War II period in which it was carried out and describes rather than explains prejudiced persons. As a literature of educational import it is at best diagnostic rather than prescriptive. Its theoretical framework leans heavily on those aspects of Freudian personality theory which are essentially divorced from any political and social context. The crucial and relevant transactions between the individual and society which determine role structure and enactment are not revealed in this research literature.

The research on small groups, role theory, and organizational change has probably much more relevance to civic education. Mosher (1967, p. 516) summarizes the findings of this research as it pertains to participation:

1. Participation in decision-making within a group or larger organization increases one's identification and involvement with the group and the organization.

2. It also identifies him effectively with the decision itself and motivates him to change his behavior and to make the decision successful.

3. It contributes to his motivation toward the accomplishment of organizational or group goals—i.e., it helps fuse groups and organizational goals.

4. It contributes to morale in general, and this usually contributes to more effective performance on the job—i.e., higher productivity.

5. A primary factor affecting "participativeness" is leadership style.

6. Participative practices contribute to "self-actualization" of the individual in the work situation and to the lessening of the differentials in power and status in hierarchy.
Although, as Mosher (p. 519) points out, these findings have particular limitations, they do furnish guidance to the type of decision-taking processes and styles which the school can teach and, indeed, embody in its own organizational format.

If one of the tasks of the new civic education is to create the interpersonal interactions appropriate for participatory democracy, we can turn to the literature on the laboratory method of human relations training. Schein and Dennis (1965, p. 291) have described how unfreezing of old attitudes precedes changing the attitude and freezing the newly developed attitude and behavior pattern:

...the unfreezing forces which are generated in a laboratory setting can be roughly classified into the following categories: (1) isolation from accustomed sources of support—colleagues, family, and regular routines; (2) removal of self-defining equipment, status, title, etc.; (3) loss of certain areas of privacy; (4) lack of confirmation or actual disconfirmation of the roles which are appropriate in the back-home setting; (5) breakdown of hierarchical authority and status structures in favor of the kind of peer culture and informal status based on laboratory norms; (6) a set of laboratory norms about the value of the learning process and the method of learning; and (7) deliberately created lack of structure to heighten consciousness of self and to create unavoidable dilemmas.

Morton Deutsch (1963, p. 477) goes on to describe the "unfrozen" trainee:

Presumably as trainees get unfrozen and learn new attitudes about "openness and authenticity of communication" with regard to personal reactions of others, they achieve the ultimate objectives of laboratory training: increased understanding, sensitivity, and competence in regard to oneself, others, and groups. "Openness and authenticity of communication" are encouraged by the same processes and by discussion of the theory and specific problems of giving and receiving feedback.

Deutsch (p. 477) further comments on the state of knowledge in this area:

It has borrowed from individual and group psychotherapy, from role and organizational theory, from psychodrama, and from applied anthropology as it has tried to stimulate trainees to develop and open an inquiring mind about their personal and group functioning. It has shown a healthy eclecticism, as befits a new area. However, it has not yet developed a self-inquiring research attitude which has sufficient vigor to counteract the evangelistic tone of some of its enthusiastic supporters, nor has it been sufficiently tough-minded in evaluating its own effectiveness.
Undoubtedly some modified form of interpersonal sensitivity training, especially that form which has a higher level task-orientation than is now common, can prove useful to students in civic education acquiring those social skills and attitudes which are appropriate to organizations with high levels of individual and group involvement in decision making. The exact dimensions of that training, however, will require further experimentation because of the limited applicability of present human relations laboratory techniques and because of the lack of solid findings with which to determine the strengths and weaknesses of present training methods.

In summary, we have portrayed the mission of the new civic education as the creation of the new democracy as old institutions disappear or drastically change and new institutions are born. The new civic education must teach the student the enormous consequences of institutional change especially in the realignment of power and in the change in the structure of rewards. Now most schools and most school teachers devote their efforts to systems-maintenance rather than systems-change and, thereby, provide a civic education which is as mechanistic as it is conservative. There are certain bodies of social science literature to which we can turn for guidance in establishing the new civic education. The literature on political socialization, however, requires further empirical and theoretical development before its present formulations become sharply analytical and relevant to educative processes. The literature on the authoritarian personality is at best of diagnostic importance in the schools but does not shed light on the transactional processes out of which interpersonal relations are largely born. The research literature on small groups, role theory, and organizational processes and the description of human relations laboratory training provide for richer suggestions for what civic education should teach and the manner in which the school and the classroom can be managed. The educational literature thus far has been fairly conservative, reflecting the current ethos which emphasizes subject matter and cognitive processes selected and taught within an institutional framework which is neither questioned nor modified.

In the position paper in the first volume of our report, Civic Education for the Seventies, we concluded that it is imperative to present another volume of this same series which should inform the new civic education.
CONCLUSION

The transcribed document has stressed the importance of expressing the objectives of civic education in behavioral form. We have no doubt arrived at that moment in American history where we can no longer accept pious statements in lieu of responsible acts of participation in national and community affairs. If the decade of the seventies can provide the social tranquility and the political resignation of the poor, minority groups we might continue a little longer with old social and educational programs and nostrums in the hope that their bare operation would shine through their imperfect and abortive expediences and light the way to political and social justice and equality. But we have every reason to believe that the crises we face now are deep and almost ineradicable and that the disingenuous optimism of the high school social studies teacher and textbook are not enough to meet them. Levine (1967, p. 264) viewing the crises of race and poverty in our cities, writes:

DENUNCE the crises or believe that it will be lost in the shifting winds of history, may constitute comforting guiding fictions for many. But for those who hear the anger and anguish of the voices of the inner cities and who also hear the battle cries coming from small towns and suburbs, the crisis is real and the time for planning is now -- for the forces march to their own drums and the cadence quickens and the course is head-on collision.

Martin (1963b, p. 23), acutely aware of the crises in technology, writes:

It has long been an article of faith among humanists that "the unexamined life is not worth living." Today, as technology changes drastically the conditions of men in society, making us ask what it is that really distinguishes men from the computer, we may need another principle as well: "The nonparticipative life is a surrender of human spirit." Public education in America should be addressed, above all, to the fostering in each individual of the warings between self-examination and civic participation.

The educational system of the decade ahead must find the inventiveness and spirit to produce the citizens and the quality of participation our remnant political and social problems cry out for. It must somehow raise the horizon of the private man so that he can see beyond the perimeter of his personal life to the public participation which gives him personal significance. It must somehow lower
the horizon of the Elite Man so that he can view in realistic terms the limitations of his unmonitored and isolated decision making and the human and pragmatic virtues in allowing all individuals a larger share in controlling their destinies. It must convince the Alienated Man to enter or re-enter a system which is preferable to his needs, aspirations, and life-style. Finally, it must produce the Civic Man who finds in the participative life the solution to our problems and his own personal fulfillment.
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