This study tests the assumption that social complexity hampers the representative function of decision-making bodies. Data for the study were compiled from interviews with a national sample of 572 school board members in 96 districts. Since size is the basic variable, a series of controls is imposed to ascertain the extent to which variations attributable to size remain stable when individual properties are taken into account. Results indicate complexity operates both to strengthen and to impede the representative function. In more populous districts, board members tend not to define their roles as representing the public's wishes irrespective of personal values. The relative strength of the "delegate" as opposed to the "representative" role orientation of board members in less populous districts may be laid to the relatively undeveloped group life of smaller, more homogeneous communities. In general, perceived conflict with public expectations is highest in large cities. Further, criticism of school boards, personal contact with the board by community organizations, and activity by interest groups (including teachers) are consistently greater in large districts. (Author)
RESPONSE STYLES AND POLITICS: THE CASE OF SCHOOL BOARDS

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RESPONSE STYLES AND POLITICS: THE CASE OF SCHOOL BOARDS

In 1967 there were 23,390 school districts distributed throughout the United States. Some 120,674 board members had formal charge over these districts. Of this total 93% were serving on elected boards. Both in terms of formal governmental organizations and in terms of governmental officials the school districts supplied the largest proportion of the 81,248 units of local government in 1967.¹ When one adds to this the singular functions of school systems, the salience of education to parents and children, and the tremendous investment of financial resources, there is little reason to doubt the political significance of school systems. Yet one searches almost in vain for systematic studies of school districts of the sort characterizing other political institutions in the United States. To be sure the surge of political socialization inquiries and the flurry of reports dealing with teacher militancy and racial desegregation have brought to the fore the essentially political character of schools. There are, also, occasional case studies which treat various aspects of the schools from the point of view of the political process. But only a handful of studies can be described as having approached the public schools as political institutions. Even fewer have couched the attack in terms of how and to what ends school systems are governed.²

This paper treats one aspect of the school system governance, viz., that of the representative function of school boards. In concentrating on boards, we are fully aware that a significant portion of influential actors are being ignored. Case studies, as well as preliminary analysis of our own data, point toward the professional staff as a major source
of innovation and obstruction in school system policy-making. Thus one should be concerned with the representative functions of the professional administrators as well as the lay boards. In another place we will take up this concern with respect to the superintendent's role. On the other hand, it is equally apparent that board members are not simply ratifying agents for the administration on all issues; that even if they were they are not so viewed by their constituents; that the professionals operate under the constraints of anticipated reactions from board members; that ultimately boards nearly always determine the fate of the administrators and not vice versa; and that the principle of accountability to the public inexorably works its will more so on board members than on administrators. To draw an imperfect analogy, trying to understand the governance of local school systems without considering the board would be equivalent to comprehending national politics without paying attention to the Congress.

During the summer and fall of 1968 the Survey Research Center conducted interviews with board members and superintendents in 88 school districts throughout the continental United States. Because of our desire to link the school board study to a 1965 nation-wide investigation of high school seniors, their parents, social studies teachers, and principals, a decision was made to study those boards having jurisdiction over the public secondary schools covered in the earlier inquiry. It should be stressed that this is not a representative sample of all school boards; rather it represents boards in rather direct proportion to the number of secondary students covered. Since most districts are rather small, a straight probability sample of all boards would have yielded a
preponderance of small districts. Thus the sample may be strictly defined as those public school boards having jurisdiction over a national probability sample of high school seniors as of 1965. Although the changes in school district boundaries and population in the 1965-68 interim affect the representativeness of the sample for 1968 purposes, these changes were judged to be slight enough to permit the extraordinary utility of linking up the school board project with the earlier study.

In order to have enough boards from very large cities for analytical purposes, it was necessary to sample from that stratum beyond the rate set by the 1965 design. To this end we surveyed the largest city in each of the 13 largest Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA's), counting the New York-Northeastern New Jersey standard consolidated area as two SMSA's. Having oversampled this stratum, it then became necessary to overweight the boards from the other three stratum used by the Survey Research Center in its classification of primary sampling units, viz., the suburbs of these large SMSA's, other SMSA's, and non-SMSA's. All analyses reported in this paper are based on weighted N's, but we have not let the inflated N's give us the illusion of having more cases than are actually present. The weighting merely adjusts for the oversampling of one stratum. To put the matter in perspective, here are the raw N's and the weighted N's for each of the four classes of primary sampling units, by board members.
and by boards:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Raw N</th>
<th>Weighted N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Members</td>
<td>Boards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Largest cities in 13 largest SMSA's</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburbs in 13 largest SMSA's</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other SMSA's</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-SMSA's</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 550 board members interviewed come from a potential total of 602, for a 91% response rate. All board members were interviewed in 52 of the 88 districts. Of the boards contacted, all but two cooperated. In one case a similar district was selected as a replacement. In the second case an adjoining board in the same county, which was already in the sample, was doubleweighted since it would have been the appropriate substitute for the declining board.

Dimensions in Representation

For all its historical and contemporary currency the concept of representation is one of the thorniest found in the political arena. Scholarship in the area has yielded delimiting but not definitive descriptions. As Heinz Eulau says, "... we can finally say with some confidence what representation is not. But in spite of many centuries of theoretical effort, we cannot say what representation is." Most empirical work has cast representation in terms of a one-to-one relationship, the single
representative on the one hand and the single represented on the other. Following Hannah Pitkin's recent conceptualizations, two writers have urged moving from the notion of individual representatives serving individual constituents on to a plane of systemic, collective relationships. As they put it, a viable theory of representation "... must be constructed out of an understanding of representation as a relationship between two collectives--the representative assembly and the represented citizenry."9

Such a shift has both theoretical and methodological implications. At the theoretical level it means we are more interested in how and with what consequences representative bodies define and play their fiduciary roles. By the same token we become just as concerned with collectivities of constituents and their interests as in autonomous citizens. At the methodological level, we are moved perforce to taking as our units of analysis the decision-making bodies rather than the individuals comprising these bodies. Among other things, this means sampling with sufficient depth and breadth so that comparisons can be made across representative institutions.

Clearly the governing of school districts is not immune to the great issues of representation. Indeed, the local character of school districts provides an ideal laboratory for assaying the rich varieties of representative processes. The task becomes one of reformulating the classic dilemmas of representation into separate, soluble questions. No matter how we frame the questions, however, they ultimately involve the linkage between representatives and those represented.

In looking at the representational functions of school boards we take as our point of departure the concept of responsiveness or receptivity. Pitkin's bedrock characterization of representation refers to "acting
in the interest of the represented in a manner responsive to them. Establishing criteria for evaluating the "interest" portion of this definition is a difficult, albeit not completely intractable task. Doing the same for the "responsive" half of the statement is more tractable, however, and is the area we wish to explore. Responsiveness will be taken to mean acting on the basis of expressed preferences by constituents. Thus two conditions must be met: 1) there must be expressions and 2) they must be taken into account.

Governing bodies--school boards included--may range all the way from those which have few if any such cues (or ignore them when present) on through to those deluged with cues which enter into the decision-making calculus. Following Kenneth Prewitt and Heinz Eulau in their study of city councils, we are first concerned with the degree to which school boards are responsive to more or less "organized views in the public," versus the extent to which boards act on the basis of other sources or their own "self-defined images" about the needs of the represented. Of course some organized views receive more weight than do others, but our primary interest here lies in arraying school boards along a continuum of high responsiveness to low responsiveness, disregarding for present purposes the relative success of the attentive publics involved.

Operationalization of group response style rests on a direct inquiry plus a probe to capture the texture of the initial response. Board members were asked: "Do representatives of community groups or organizations ever contact you personally to seek your support for their position?" Three-fifths of the sample replied affirmatively. In a succeeding open-ended question we attempted to assess the board member's valence regarding such persuasion attempts. The grounds for this were that if all such attempts
were viewed negatively, then the representative was not acting in a responsive manner. If positively, then the assumption is that the board member is being responsive to one or more "organized views" in the public. While the vast majority of those who had been approached claimed to approve such expressions without qualification, some 19% did not. Qualifications took the form of specifying that the spokesmen behave constructively and orderly or that the expression be transmitted directly through the board as a whole rather than through them personally. Thus we are left with 49% of the board members professing an unqualified style of group responsiveness.

We transform these individual data into board level data by summing the responses within each board, and then assigning the board a value equal to the proportion of board members taking a positive stance toward group demands. Across all boards the mean is 48%; the range is from 00% to 100%; and the standard deviation is 27. Boards are marked by extreme variability. When one looks across the landscape of school districts, one is likely to find as much or more variety as when surveying municipalities or state legislatures.

The foregoing account of representational responsiveness has the familiar ring of interest group politics. Although local school boards are probably not the constant target of interest groups in the same measure that state and national legislatures are, there clearly is an element of this in the political life of school board members. On the other hand, politics at any level is not simply structured in terms of organized groups making demands on their representatives. Demands, requests, information, and cues flow into a representative assembly from the constituency in a variety of ways; and they may be unattached to specific groups in the constituency or at least not perceived by the representatives as being so attached.
Such modes would seem to be particularly operative in local, main street politics where propinquity and repeated exposure lead to a proliferation of informal linkages between the represented and the representatives.

This consideration led us to look for responsiveness of a less structured fashion. To this end the school board members were asked, "...what sources of information about the attitudes of people in this district are useful to you?" The word "useful" is crucial because it implies that the board member feels positively about the sources, that he is being responsive to them. Taking only the initial replies, it is fascinating to observe their individual versus group character. Here the split is almost even, with 52% simply referring to "people," "individuals," or the "grapevine," whereas the balance referred to specific groups, to specific role occupants, or to demand-making situations. There is a quality of almost happenstance behavior inherent in answers of the first type whereas more purposiveness characterizes those of the second. Neither involves manifest persuasion attempts by those being represented, but it is assumed that information is relayed with at least some preference loading. It should be stressed that the undifferentiated references to individuals undoubtedly included group spokesmen; the point is that they are not cognized as such. Board members are not being consciously responsive to group spokesmen in a demand-making context.

Just as we referred earlier to a group responsiveness style, it seems appropriate to label this one individualized responsiveness. At the board level, the mean percentage of individualized responsiveness is 54%, the range is 00% to 100%, and the standard deviation is 28.

We have, then, two different dimensions of representation: group responsiveness and individualized responsiveness. Before describing the
systemic companions of these dimensions, it would be well to set their interrelationships in place. Significantly there is a moderately strong negative association between the two styles at the board level (r = -.39). Lest this seem to border on the tautological it should be reiterated that the dimensions capture different phenomena; in the one case the incidence of response to organized interests making demands on the board, and in the second the rate of response to individual sources of information which are assumed to carry some explicit or implicit value preferences. Thus a given board could score equally high or low on the two measures, and the fact that the correlation is just moderately negative demonstrates that the two measures are not simply reverse images.

Nevertheless there is a clear lack of affinity between the two, obviously suggesting that responsiveness is a multi-faceted process even within the narrow confines of our own conceptualizations. Our approach here is clearly at odds with the Prewitt-Eulau strategy with city councils. They operationalized responsiveness solely in terms of whether their councils were responding to "attentive publics, ad-hoc issue groups, or self-defined images." Although their precise operations differ from the one we employ for group responsiveness, it is clear that our own group measure strongly resembles theirs and—as will be demonstrated—displays similar concomitants.

By making a second approach at responsiveness from an angle which allows for more personalized, individual indicators it becomes apparent that the group approach is inexhaustive. Indeed, emphasizing group life tends to run at cross-currents to one less structured and more dependent on informal processes. In the following sections we shall see the profound implications of the two different modes for theories of representation.
It is of more than passing interest to note that neither of these styles is connected with the representational roles set forth by Edmund Burke: trustee versus delegate self conceptions. A board's level of trustee orientation bears a weak positive relationship to group responsiveness ($r = .15$) and a weak negative one to individualized receptivity ($r = -.15$). Thus the classic roles appear to tell us very little about these particular behavioral manifestations of representation. As Pitkin suggests, the opposing classical views are embedded in such conceptual complexity that it may be virtually impossible to escape the paradox conjured up by the undifferentiated term, representation. If so, it is not surprising that the trustee-delegate dimension has so little resonance with the more concrete concept of responsiveness.

In seeking out the genesis of board representational patterns we will eschew looking at properties of individual board members. That is, we are not concerned with any particular socio-economic, psychological, or political traits possessed by board members or, indeed, aggregates of members on the same board. Rather, we will consider structural characteristics of the school district. These may be given properties, as in the case of social complexity, or they may be derived from summing the perceptions of individual board members. But all denote characteristics of the particular school district. Our specification of systemic indicators reflects, in part, the findings and explanations set forth by Prewitt and Eulau as well as various paradigms of local politics. The rationale lying behind the selection of particular district-level variables will be introduced as we discuss the findings.

**Socio-Political Complexity and Responsiveness**

If one starts with the classic conception of representation as a
relationship between single citizens and single representatives; it follows that the task of representation by school board members has become increasingly complicated in contemporary times. In addition to the sheer increase in the size of constituencies as the population grows, there is the additional growth inspired by large-scale school district consolidation. From 1941 to 1967 the number of independent school districts declined from 108,579 to 21,782. With this shrinkage of districts came greater geographical and population heterodoxy even among the smaller districts, which have been the main targets of consolidation. Perhaps even more significantly, the assignment of public education has changed drastically from the founding days of the nation. The demands on the school system range far and wide, and it is a rare board that can blithely proceed with a program unchallenged by the changing values and aspirations of modern society. Thus the simple translation of relatively homogeneous preferences into school policy or, alternatively, the relatively simple range of interests which board members need to consider has been substantially modified.

While not gainsaying the broad social and educational trends affecting school districts wherever they may be found, it is quite apparent that the composition of constituencies varies dramatically as one moves across a socio-cultural map of the nation. Some civil units have much more social, economic, ethnic, and political complexity than do others. This is no less true of school districts than of municipalities. Our own sample, for example, ranges all the way from a rural, sparsely settled, homogeneous school district with less than 1,000 inhabitants to one teeming with over 8,000,000 residents of varied hues and beliefs.

Ideally one would probably compile a composite measure of complexity built with specific indicators corresponding to a model of what makes a
geopolitical unit more or less complex. But many of the desired measures would be either virtually impossible to obtain or too costly. Sociologists and demographers have demonstrated, however, that the larger and more urbanized the area the more complex the set of social institutions and patterns therein. Similarly, political scientists have shown, indirectly at least, that the set of political institutions and processes also vary in complexity with size and urbanism.

Three different but to some extent interrelated measures are employed to describe the social and cultural pluralism extant in the school district's population.

**Metropolitanism:** A dichotomized variable which divides the school districts between those not located in Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (scored 0) and those located within one (scored 1).

**District Population:** The total adult population within the school boundaries.

**Percent Urban:** The percentage of pupils residing in urban places, as estimated by district officials.

Although these three measures are related to each other, the associations are not as high as one might suspect: metropolitanism and percent urban = .45; metropolitanism and population = .24; and population and percent urban = .23. By no means, then, do the measures speak for each other. One reason they are not more closely allied is that metropolitan areas (i.e., SMSA's) contain many rather small to medium sized school districts; these are sometimes no larger than those found in non-metropolitan areas. A second factor is that school districts often include sizeable but varying
The proportion of students from fringe and rural areas. The presence of these students is not directly related to population and metropolitanism per se. 18

The bearing of these three complexity measures on the two forms of responsiveness is shown in Table 1, which contains three types of coefficients.

Table 1

Social Complexity and School Board Responsiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Complexity Indicators</th>
<th>Group Responsiveness</th>
<th>Individualized Responsiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$r$</td>
<td>$r$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitanism</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.45$^a$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent urban</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District population</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^a$All partials are second order, controlling for the effects of the two remaining variables listed.

$^b$This is higher than the Cum. $R^2$ for district population simply because the order of variables established by the group responsiveness results is being maintained.

Whereas the simple and partial correlations are self-evident, the cumulative multiple $R^2$ requires some explanation. To obtain these latter values the three independent variables were employed in a stepwise regression equation whereby the explanatory power of the variables is ordered. The first variable listed is the strongest and is equivalent to $r^2$. The second
variable combines the explanatory power of the first plus the second strongest, and the third combines the first two with the third strongest.

The articulation between complexity and group responsiveness is of the sort one would predict given a group life interpretation of constituency-school board politics. Regardless of the measure used, the more complex the school district the more responsive the board is to group demands. Rather than being an impediment to responsiveness, pluralism and complexity seem to enhance it. In this sense our findings are in full accord with those reported for California Bay Area city councils.19

The contribution of the three measures to group responsiveness is, however, disparate. Emerging as the most powerful predictor is metropolitanism, i.e., whether the school district is within or without an SMSA. A virtue of the Census Bureau's classification scheme is that SMSA's include not only central cities of 50,000 or more but also the remaining part of the county plus contiguous counties adjudged to be socially and economically integrated with the central city. For school districts this means that even some relatively small districts are in the orbit of the metropolis. They absorb and are affected by the modes of group life found in the larger environment. Illustratively, two districts of equal size will encounter distinctly different levels of group politics if one is a Southern rural county district and the other is a Chicago suburb. Metropolitanism seems to capture political life styles much more readily than sheer population or urbanism.

So far the findings support the proposition that responsiveness to the constituency rises in direct proportion to the socio-political complexity of the school district. If we shift to the second column of Table 1, however, it is crystal clear that another sort of responsiveness is inversely
related to complexity. The very conditions which lead boards to be responsive to group demands are those which lessen the responsiveness to individualized sources of preferences and cues. Hence the apparent irony of the complexity-responsiveness nexus revealed by considering group life is abolished and the traditional notions of greater responsiveness prevailing in less pluralistic environments is reinstated.

Again metropolitanism stands out as the most significant of the three complexity variables. The ambience of non-metro districts is conducive to the sort of informal, almost casual inputs of information so characteristic of our images of hinterland America. Board members run into their constituents in a variety of informal settings. Even when these constituents are formal group spokesmen they may not be cognized in that fashion at all. Rather the board member sees him in such roles as fellow merchant, farmer, luncheon club or church member, former high school classmate, relative, friend, casual acquaintance, or perhaps just some resident with whom he passes the time of day. The focus of the communication may or may not be restricted to school district business. In any event the board member is unlikely to read the encounter as one in which a formal group organization is seeking his support for their position. To what extent responsiveness in the group context signifies more "real" responsiveness than that found in the scenario just outlined is a most difficult question and one to which we shall return in the conclusion.

District Harmony and Responsiveness

Even in the tempestuous times of mid-twentieth century United States some school districts are more placid than others. Indeed some school districts seem to be able to cope with their problems over long stretches
of time with a minimum of strife. Others seem to be caught in perpetual conflict. It is the latter which make their way into the mass media. When their proportions become large there is a tendency to presume that all districts are exploding in turmoil. What may best characterize school district phenomena of this type is a model of episodic crises. Most districts experience crises and unrest at one time or another; the difference is that some are marked by frequently recurring episodes whereas others enjoy rather long periods of calm between crises. At the aggregate level some historical periods witness a larger proportion of districts undergoing stress than do others. Although the late 1960's was undoubtedly a time of surge in school district turmoil at the aggregate level, one would still expect to find a great range across school districts.

The question of district harmony or consensus has interesting implications for school board responsiveness. May we expect boards to be more or less responsive under conditions of tension? In terms of representational theory, it is important to know whether responsiveness waxes or wanes in response to varying levels of district harmony. As we shall see, the answers depend in part on how one goes about conceptualizing responsiveness.

To gauge the level of district harmony we employ two sets of relationships, one between citizens and boards and the other between citizens alone. The first looks at the public support rendered the school board while the second considers the tension level within the district over matters of educational policy. While it would be quite helpful to have the reports of residents themselves, the perceptions held by board members about these matters can be used as surrogates and, of course, have unique significance in their own right.
Mass Support: A cumulative index score for each board built from responses to three questions, one dealing with the degree to which the board takes unpopular stands, a second indicating the prevalence of board critics in the district, and a third describing the amount of congruence between the board's ideas of appropriate board behavior versus the public's ideas. The range of this index is .20 to 2.80; the mean is 1.71; and the standard deviation is .66.²²

District Consensus: Based on answers to a single question asking the board members if there is "... any tension or conflict among people in the district on questions having to do with school policies." Boards are arrayed according to the percentage of members replying negatively. The range of scores is from 00% to 100%; the mean is 44%; and the standard deviation is 28.

An immediate point to make about these two indicators is their strong affinity for each other, r = .74. As citizen support for the board increases so also does inter-citizen agreement, if we are to judge by the board members' perceptions at any rate. On reflection this symmetry is not at all unreasonable. Over the long run there should be a reciprocal relationship between the district's support levels and its internal disension. When board support begins to falter a typical manifestation is policy conflict among the layity. If the board has presented a unanimous front, the opponents express their displeasure by criticizing the board. The policy supporters uphold the board, and the battle lines are thereby defined. Alternatively, a split board will engender similar splits amongst the constituency with an overall decline in board support levels. Of course the process may begin at the mass level. Educational policy splits
among the citizenry would seem to lead inevitably to an overall lowering of support for the incumbent board. Regardless of the genesis, mass support and district consensus undoubtedly feed on each other. Methodologically, the high intercorrelation of the two variables means that great care must be exercised when they are employed in multivariate analysis.

Both mass support and district consensus show a strong negative relationship to group responsiveness at the zero-order level (Table 2).

### Table 2

**District Harmony and School Board Responsiveness**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District Harmony</th>
<th>Group responsiveness</th>
<th>Individualized responsiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mass support</td>
<td>-.59</td>
<td>-.36(^a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District consensus</td>
<td>-.51</td>
<td>-.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)These are first-order partials, controlling for the effects of the other variable listed.

Of the two, however, support appears to be far stronger, as shown by the variance explained figures (R\(^2\)). Because of the high overlap between support and consensus it is possible that the stepwise regression used to generate the cumulative R\(^2\)'s might be giving artificially higher "explained variance" to mass support. This variable enters the equation first since it is the more powerful of the two. It would thus incorporate that portion of the variance common to each independent variable. The partials, however,
show that citizen support is indeed the stronger of the two variables when the remaining variable is held constant in the relationship. A comparison of the standardized regression coefficients (betas) demonstrates the same pattern.

Is it not a contradiction in terms to say the more supportive the district the less responsive the board? Not if responsiveness is defined as a state in which the representatives pay attention to and are affected by group demands among the represented. Imagine a board beset by scandal or fiscal chaos. As board support dwindles, a corresponding increase in group demands sets in. Although all board members will not be responsive to these pressures, it seems likely that a majority will. Conversely, picture a board which has just executed a series of magnificent coups. As support waxes, there is less "need" for group pressures and so, by definition, group responsiveness falls off.

One might well suspect that the observed relationships are a function of social complexity. Both support and consensus vary inversely with metropolitanism ($r = -.57$ and $-.45$, respectively), the social complexity indicator of greatest power in accounting for responsiveness. Yet with metropolitanism held constant both indicators continue to have a noticeable affect on group responsiveness: $-.35$ for district consensus and $-.39$ for mass support. The relationships are maintained at an even higher level using the other indicators of complexity. The conclusion to be reached, therefore, is that district harmony has a distinctive independent effect on group responsiveness.

Turning to district harmony and individualized responsiveness (Table 2, col. 2), we find a set of findings at odds with those for group responsiveness. Now the relationships are positive instead of negative, although they
are also of lesser magnitude. The common finding with group responsiveness is that mass support is again the stronger of the two harmony variables. As in the case of group responsiveness, the extraordinarily greater variance accounted for by support is not simply a function of its being seized first in the stepwise regression, as the partial coefficients reveal. Nor is the positive association with citizen support just reflecting the hidden influence of social complexity. Controlling for metropolitanism does depress the original relationship somewhat ($r = .15$), but controlling for population size and percent urbanism has much less effect ($r = .38$ and .36, respectively).\textsuperscript{23}

Why should support for the board be positively linked to individualized responsiveness whereas it is negatively so for group responsiveness? The answer would seem to lie in the nature of the transactional process occurring under each circumstance. As stated earlier, individualized transactions are not necessarily marked by pressures, demands, and threats. They do consist of cues, and one may legitimately assume that these cues usually, but not always, have affective content. These cues may simply consist of feedback for the board, signals that their actions are being kindly or poorly received. Or they may be expressions of preferences on pending policies, but such preferences are not seen by the boards or their constituents as strong pressures and demands. Even when the cues consist of outright pressures, the settings of the transactions may be such that the petitioner does not see the outcome as zero-sum. Overall, boards relying on "unattached" individuals for cues are not in a state of siege.

These various conditions do not suggest a pattern in which a board is simply ignoring the public and acting in terms of a "self-defined image" of what is best for the school district. Rather, they suggest a far subtler,
less strident mode of responsiveness. It follows that if neither the represented nor the representatives see their transaction as pitched battles between citizens and boards or citizen group against citizen group, then the behavior of the board will be looked on with more favor (less disfavor) than is the case where group tensions and demands are high. Compromises and losses are inevitable in the latter case. It would also follow that the fabric of interpersonal ties which attend individualized responsiveness would tend to soften the impact of board behavior when it does run counter to segments of the constituency. Again the result would be less diminution of board support than when articulate, public group demands are rejected or compromised by the board. Group members and identifiers would not have the intervening factor of personal relationships with or knowledge of board members by which they might understand or at least sympathize with the board's ultimate posture. Finally, the existence of individualized contacts and—perhaps more crucial—the belief that such contacts are possible, would seem to be a stronger generator of support when compared to districts where one can only have a say through organized publics.

The Electoral Process and Responsiveness

Up to this point we have seen that social complexity and mass support for the board are strongly related to responsiveness style. It would be a mistake to label these variables as non-political. Certainly the levels of mass support for particular political institutions and actors is a key political variable, as the systems-oriented scholars have repeatedly affirmed. Social complexity also may be thought of as a political variable since the style and scope of political life are typically different in more complex
environments. Thus in introducing electoral factors we are not looking at political factors for the first time in our analysis. Rather we are injecting another aspect of political life in the school district which presumably has a bearing on the question of representation.

Two types of electoral factors will be considered. On the one hand there are a number of legal and structural constraints governing the selection and election of school board personnel. These regulations are by no means uniform across school districts. Despite the efforts of educators and good government forces to make the governance of schools uniform, sui generis, and "non-political," a variety of institutional frameworks have managed to persist. It is always an important question to examine the effects of legal parameters on the behavior of political bodies, and school board responsiveness should be no exception.

A second set of electoral factors has to do with the structuring of office competition and office retention. These factors are, for the most part, not part of the legal framework per se. This will involve looking at school board elections in the same fashion that one might examine those for city councils or state legislatures. Elections are viewed as the ultimate sanction and check on the behavior of representatives. It will, therefore, be of more than passing interest to see if the structuring of competition is reflected in the responsiveness of boards.

A) Legal Constraints

Appointed/elected: Appointed boards are scored 0, elected 1.

District/at large: The former include those either having specific residence requirements or those electing members from subdivisions of the district; district boards are scored 0, at large 1.
Term of office: Boards are divided into those with 2-3 year terms (scored 1), 4 year terms (2), and 5-6 year terms (3).

Coterminous referenda: A measure denoting whether the district usually or sometimes votes on bond proposals, tax millages, etc., at the same time that board elections are held; those which do not are scored 0, those which do, 1.

B) Competition Structure

Partisanship: To the boards having de jure partisan elections (26% of total) have been added those where 40% or more of the present incumbents were elected as part of a slate. Non-partisan boards are scored 0, partisan 1.

Office sponsorship: A continuous variable reflecting the proportion of present board members who were either appointed to office, were encouraged to run by members of a previous board, or both.

Electoral opposition: A dichotomous variable based on the absence (scored 0) or presence (1) of contested seats in the last primary or general election preceding the date of the study.

Forced turnovers: The proportion of incumbents defeated in immediately previous elections. Unfortunately, the number of elections used varies due to unequal election frequency and to varying amounts of available data. In no cases are more than four elections used.

We turn first to the official mode of gaining board position, i.e., by appointment or election. One reason for discussing this feature initially is that the remaining variables deal only with elected boards. There is
a good deal of mythology about the responsiveness of appointed versus elected officials in public life. The common view is that elected officials are more responsive because they know they can be sanctioned by defeat at the polls. A minority view holds that appointees can at least be more eclectic in their responsiveness since they are not under the constant threat of the electorate. One of the extolled virtues of the public education system in the United States is its local control via predominantly elected boards. But are these boards more responsive than appointed ones?

Since we are working with a handful of appointed boards (raw N = 13), our conclusion must be tentative. On balance, however, the results lend only partial support to the virtuous image of elected boards. Compared with appointed boards the elected ones are somewhat less responsive to group pressures, but somewhat more responsive to individuals. The association is sharply focused by using the asymmetric measure, Somer's D (see Table 3).26 Inferentially, elected boards are indeed more sensitive to individual voters because of the potential sanctions. Conversely, appointed boards, perhaps keyed in to larger segments of the district's political profile, can afford to pay more attention to group interests.

These relationships are of a magnitude to suggest that the method of gaining office in and of itself has at least something to say about responsiveness. There is, however, the sneaking suspicion that other factors lie behind the apparent connection. For example, appointed boards occur more often in larger districts. On the other hand, they are also more common in the South; and in terms of metropolitanism, appointed boards in our sample were found as often outside as within SMSA's.

After controlling one at a time for the variables previously introduced in the analysis it became apparent that the admittedly modest associa-
### Table 3

Relationship between Appointed versus Elected Boards and Board Responsiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Appointed</th>
<th></th>
<th>Elected</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Raw N = 13</td>
<td>Wt. N = 19</td>
<td>Raw N = 75</td>
<td>Wt. N = 166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group responsiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>(1) 18%</td>
<td>(2) 09%</td>
<td>(1) 32%</td>
<td>(2) 24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) 37%</td>
<td></td>
<td>(3) 22%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>(4) 35%</td>
<td></td>
<td>(4) 22%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \tau_b = -0.15 \quad \text{Somer's } d = -0.33^a \]

Individualized responsiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Appointed</th>
<th></th>
<th>Elected</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Raw N = 13</td>
<td>Wt. N = 19</td>
<td>Raw N = 75</td>
<td>Wt. N = 166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>(1) 43%</td>
<td>(2) 29%</td>
<td>(1) 23%</td>
<td>(2) 26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) 28%</td>
<td></td>
<td>(3) 24%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>(4) 00%</td>
<td></td>
<td>(4) 27%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \tau_b = 0.19 \quad \text{Somer's } d = 0.44 \]

\( ^a \) Somer's d is an asymmetric measure of association for ordinal variables. In the present instance the responsiveness scores are the dependent variables. Both the \( \tau_b \) and Somer's d coefficients have been calculated on the basis of uncollapsed responsiveness scores. The corresponding Pearsonian coefficients are \( r = -0.19 \) and \( 0.23 \) for group and individualized responsiveness, respectively.

The correlation between being appointed or elected and responsiveness had great persistence. This led us to look upon method of office attainment as an intervening or conditioning variable residing between environmental complexity and public support on the one side, and responsiveness on the other.
Indeed, we shall see that several of the electoral variables seem to operate in this fashion. The process at work can be demonstrated by reexamining the basic metropolitanism-responsiveness correlations according to two categories—appointed and elected boards:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metropolitanism—-all boards</th>
<th>Group responsiveness</th>
<th>Individualized responsiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>r  .56</td>
<td>r  -.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;  &quot; appointed boards</td>
<td>r  .71</td>
<td>r  -.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;  &quot; elected boards</td>
<td>r  .55</td>
<td>r  -.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since they make up such a large part of the sample, it is not surprising that the relationship for elected boards scarcely differs from that for all boards. Without doubt, though, the relationship for group responsiveness is heightened among appointed boards; and that for individualized responsiveness is depressed among appointed boards. For each type the condition of being appointed exerts a salutary effect on the metropolitanism-responsiveness nexus, in the one case raising a positive correlation and in the other lowering a negative one.

If anything, then, serving on an appointed board seems to heighten the propensity of responsiveness, given social complexity variations. Just why this occurs is not easily answered, nor need we concern ourselves in detail with answers. It is sufficient to suggest that the workaday political lives of both elected and appointed board members are marked by similar concerns, interests, and motivations. As we shall see momentarily, the fear of electoral sanctions is not a particularly grave one for elected board members. Appointed boards may, in fact, overcompensate in their responsive behavior in the absence of officially being
"the people's choice." Finally, to great numbers of the constituency, whether the board of education is elected or appointed is probably an unknown fact for many and an irrelevant one in a tactical sense for others.

Our findings—tentative due to the small number of appointed boards with which to work—cast serious doubt on the facile assumption that the form of election produces the substance of representation. Admittedly, we have tapped but one aspect of representation, albeit two conceptualizations of this aspect have been advanced. As students of the executive and bureaucracy have long contended, there is no reason for supposing that appointed officials are not governed by at least some of the same constraints of representative democracy as those attending elected officials. At the level of national politics, for example, departmental and agency officialdom is characterized by varying modes and levels of responsiveness. The key question is whether responsiveness varies among officials with similar constituencies, depending upon their manner of attaining office.

For school board members the answer to the question is not encouraging for those placing their bets on elected boards as being more responsive. At best, elected boards exhibit more receptivity only in the individualized mode. At worst, elected boards depress the linkage between structural conditions promoting either group or individualized receptivity. Obviously the fact that appointed boards are determined by elected officials is a complicating, qualifying condition to this conclusion. As typically posed, however, the issue simply involves the virtues of appointed versus elected governing bodies.

Our treatment of the other electoral variables will be necessarily brief since we will deal with them in more detail subsequently. At the absolute level the remaining three legal parameters have a very modest
connection with either type of response style, no correlation being higher than $r = .25$. There is some slight evidence that the legal constraints abetting one type of responsiveness serve to depress the other type. This is clearest with respect to the venerable debate topic of district versus at large elections. Controlling for metropolitanism and board support, it turns out that at large elections slightly depress group responsiveness ($r = - .15$), but slightly improve individualized responsiveness ($r = .09$). Overall, though, the direct effects of legal parameters approach triviality.

Taken nation-wide, the competitive milieu of school board elections is not fierce. Illustratively, in the last election preceding the summer of 1968 some 23% of the districts witnessed no ballot opposition at all. Similarly, in 44% of the districts no incumbent standing for reelection had been defeated over the past several elections. In slightly more than a third of the boards over 25% of the present incumbents had first been appointed to office and in slightly more than one-half over 25% had been solicited to run by board members. Such sponsorship signifies a more closed than open structure of office seeking and attainment. Finally, allocating ostensibly slate- dominated board elections into the partisan category still left three-fifths of the districts without regularized competition between interest aggregations. It should also be noted in passing that on half of the boards no more than 25% of the incumbents were definitely committed to seeking another term. Inferentially, the force of competition, the threat of defeat, and the desire to remain in office are of little moment for many school boards in keeping them responsive to their publics.

Still, school boards do vary extensively in their competition structure, and it behooves us to observe the consequences of these variations
on responsiveness. The classic argument, of course, is that the more structured and intense the competition the greater is the responsiveness. The presumption is that less responsive boards, or particular members thereof, will be ousted because they are not responsive. This is at the heart of the theory that free, competitive elections invoke responsiveness.

Nevertheless competition characteristics have only a tenuous tie with responsiveness. With metropolitanism and mass support held constant, the strongest relationships are the positive ones involving forced turnover ($r = .12$ for each type of responsiveness). Nor are the results consistent in that those boards having contested seats in the last election were less responsive than those with contests ($r = -.10$ and -.11 for group and individualized receptivity, respectively). The key to responsiveness appears to lie outside the structure of competition.

Taken as a whole, the seven electoral measures fail to make as strong a contribution to responsiveness as do the three social complexity and two district harmony variables. Altogether the twelve variables dealt with account for 49% of the variance in group responsiveness and 40% in the individualized style (Table 4). Using step-wise regression metropolitanism and mass support alone account for 40% of the variance in the group mode and 35% of the variance in the individualized mode. Clearly the addition of the electoral dimensions will not markedly improve our statistical explanations. Even if the electoral measures are forced into the regression equation first, they account for no more than 12% of the variance in group responsiveness, with the performance being somewhat better at 18% for individualized responsiveness.
Table 4

Mass Support, Social Complexity, and Board Responsiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group responsiveness</th>
<th>Individualized responsiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Simple</td>
<td>Partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>r</td>
<td>r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass Support</td>
<td>-.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitanism</td>
<td>.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remaining ten variables</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^aExcludes appointed boards.

^bPartials are first order, controlling for the effects of the other listed variable.

^cThis is higher than the Cum. R^2 for metropolitanism because the tabular ordering of variables established for group responsiveness is being maintained. Metropolitanism contributes 32% of the explained variance; mass support adds 3%, bringing the total to 35%.

The Mediating Function of Electoral Processes

The foregoing account scarcely supports the proposition that electoral characteristics have much to do with a key element of school district politics. Does this mean that the heralded importance of electoral variations as determinants of representational democracy is, in reality, a fraud? While some might agree that this is so on other grounds, we believe that within the confines of our responsiveness dimensions there are grounds for asserting that electoral properties do make a difference. 30

In the first place the contribution of the electoral variables refuses to disappear even in the regression analysis, especially in the
case of individualized response style. This staying power is all the more noteworthy when it is realized that the complexity measures in particular summarize a wide gamut of socio-economic-political processes which are essentially cumulative in nature. These are processes reflective of more momentous aspects of political life than, say, whether the school board is nonpartisan or partisan.

There is another manner in which the effects of electoral processes may be observed. If we grant that such overarching elements as social complexity and mass support are the major determinants of response style, then we may look for differential patterns as the electoral environment varies. That is, we may expect electoral processes to serve as a mediating or interpreting device in the articulation between complexity-mass support and responsiveness. This is similar to the familiar argument that electoral institutions and outcomes filter or regulate the connections between mass beliefs and broad societal forces on the one hand, and the behavior of elites on the other.

Our procedure is to separate out subcategories of the electoral variables, in a sense holding them physically constant while observing the association between metropolitanism and responsiveness. We do not present the results for the district harmony-responsiveness nexus, but they yielded directly comparable results. First the legal and then the competition structure variables will be treated. The results are given in Table 5. Each of the three legal properties has an effect on the metropolitanism-individualized responsiveness association. The initial negative connection is exacerbated among at large districts, those where coterminous school referenda are held, and those where term of office is shorter. The case of the electoral units would appear to be an instance
### Table 5

Relationship between Environmental Complexity (Metropolitanism) and Responsiveness, by Electoral Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Group responsiveness</th>
<th>Individualized responsiveness</th>
<th>Proportion of sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>r</td>
<td>r</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All boards</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>-.57</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election area</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At large</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Districts(^a)</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>-.64</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>-.44</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coterminous referenda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>-.78</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>-.44</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of term in years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>-.68</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>-.75</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-6</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral opposition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.66</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>-.48</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced turnover</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No(^b)</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>-.74</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>-.42</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office sponsorship</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>-.70</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>-.42</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No(^c)</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>-.66</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>-.44</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)Includes school districts electing from subdistricts and those with subdistrict residence requirements.

\(^b\)Includes 3% where forced turnover ranged from 1-10%.

\(^c\)Partisan includes districts with legally partisan elections and those where slates are active.
where the distance between individual board members and their constituents are widened. Given a greater geographical as well as population base, the board members are less able and likely to engage in the kind of face to face, more personal transactions accompanying individualized responsiveness, or, if they do, they do not find such contacts very helpful in going about their business of serving as the people's representatives.

The effects of school district referenda coinciding with school board elections are more difficult to explain. Since they usually involve money, these referenda command as much or more interest from the voters and generate a plethora of demand-making encounters. Our guess is that coterminous referenda add yet more complexity to that already occasioned by the components of the metropolitan culture. In general, it would seem that the less noise and multiple stimuli there are in the environment the more easily individual preferences can be successfully communicated to boards. The periodic convergence of board elections and referenda may simply augment the dissociation between social complexity and individualized responsiveness by injecting a recurrent choice-making process which ordinarily divides the school district rather severely. We are not altogether pleased with this explanation, partly because it is not counter-balanced by movements in the group responsiveness dimension.

Long terms of office very nearly vanquish the negative association between social complexity and individualized responsiveness. Traditional theories of accountability would hold just the opposite, that long terms would further depress an already negative picture. This would follow from the insecurity of shorter terms and the resulting rationale of frequent contacts with the constituency in order to maintain oneself in office. What actually seems to happen is that a longer term enables board members
to override the compelling force of social complexity. This may be due to their becoming more recognizable and approachable by "unattached" individuals, regardless of the social complexity at hand.

It is also quite significant that term of office is the sole one of the three legal variables which also has a bearing on the complexity-group responsiveness linkage. Again the effect is heightened responsiveness, and there is an orderly rise in the correlations from shorter to longer terms. Repeated exposure is probably one explanation for the phenomena. Another is that boards with longer tenure conceivably feel freer to be responsive to various sorts of groups because there is a longer period of time in which bad group experiences and outcomes can be tempered. Threats of immediate retaliation against the board members by potentially dissatisfied group claimants would be discounted more so than where all or half of the board members may be up for immediate reelection. What we are suggesting is that, given social complexity as a powerful incentive for group responsiveness, the leisureliness of longer terms accentuates this incentive.

Turning to the impact of the competition structure, the effects are more severe and consistent than those for the legal parameters. Our rationale for introducing these variables is predicated upon forces of competition acting at the interface between social complexity on the one hand, and responsiveness on the other. Most theories of representation and electoral behavior hold that as competition becomes more severe, the responsiveness of the representatives increases. This is not the same as saying that the articulation between the preferences of the represented and the representatives rises. Quite the opposite: as competition decreases the probabilities of having symmetry between constituents and
elites would seem to rise. Rather, what we are saying is that more competition reflects greater diversity of views, that these views are more likely to be transmitted to elites, and that the elites will be more responsive in the sense of acting on the basis of the views. All of this would constrain the overarching connection between metropolitanism and responsiveness. In effect we are hypothesizing that, given this strong connection, there are additional effects contingent upon the competition structure.

Foremost among the contingencies are the simple matters of electoral opposition and forced turnovers. The lack of opposition in the immediately previous election completely destroys the association between metropolitanism and group responsiveness and exaggerates the negative one with individualized responsiveness. Similarly, the lower the rate of incumbents forced out of office over the past several elections the lower is the responsiveness in each dimension.

Despite our earlier evidence showing the relatively low intensity found in office-seeking and retention, it is nevertheless patent that competition acts as a strong mediating force between the environment and a school board's receptivity to constituents' claims and cues. Those who hold that competition increases responsiveness would be vindicated by these findings even though the relationship is not a simple, direct one. What seems to happen is that competitiveness does bring the boards into more contact with the public and presumably results in their viewing public cues and demands in a more favorable light. Whether this stems from greater initiation on the part of the constituency or the board is difficult to determine, although both sources are probably involved.

Board sponsorship also has a pronounced effect on the linkage between
social complexity and response style. Where incumbent boards are more successful in bringing onto the board ostensibly like-minded colleagues, the basic linkage is moved in favor of less responsiveness, for both the group and individual categories. Boards less successful on this score show the opposite pattern. One can imagine the contrasting situations. Board members who bear sponsorship feel a greater insularity from the public in that they have been virtually annointed by the board in being. Chances are their electoral victory came more easily than that for the rank outsiders, who were not annointed. This sense of privilege leads to greater protection from forces in the environment, with less vulnerability to the components operative in more complex socio-political environments. Feeling somewhat less a part of a self-sustaining and annointed dynasty, the boards with fewer sponsored members are, in turn, more susceptible to forces increasing their responsiveness.

The final variable, presence or absence of partisanship, is the weakest of the competition structure factors. The correlations for group responsiveness are barely affected, although the movement is in the direction hypothesized if one postulated a model of competing interest aggregations located at the interface between complexity and receptivity. But the effects are more noticeable for individualized responsiveness, with the presence of partisanship lowering the overall negative complexity-responsiveness association. Again, the argument seems fairly straightforward. In the absence of a more competitive structure (i.e., partisanship) a primary influence such as complexity works its will more readily upon boards.

The upshot of the analysis is that electoral charteristics of the school district do leave an imprint on the responsiveness of school boards.
Appreciation for the magnitude of the differences thereby created can be gained by squaring the simple correlations in Table 5 to obtain measures of explained variance. But the imprint occurs because these characteristics provide differential settings within which the strong elements of socio-political complexity (and mass support) operate. It seems probable, therefore, that tinkering with the legal framework and fostering more competition for office would--sooner or later--affect the response linkage between constituents and school boards. At the theoretical level, our simple model of environmental pluralism and mass support as prime determinants of responsiveness must be modified. Not that they no longer successfully predict response style; rather that the degree of success is systematically affected by electoral variations.

Conclusions

We have presented two contrasting styles of school board representation: one style responds to formal groups while the other responds to unattached individuals. Most recent work by political scientists has been based upon the assumption that groups perform the function of mediating between the individual and his government and that response by elected officials--if it occurs--will be to the demands of organized publics.

Such assumptions present some irony. Certain facets of classic democratic theory, for instance, assert that the close proximity between citizen and government at the local level enhances the representational process. Yet empirical research on city councils--research which is corroborated by our analysis of school boards--indicates that the less complex the environment the less the responsive interaction between elected officials and organized interests. By the same token, it has been presumed that popular
support for a governing body would signify high responsiveness by that body to attentive publics in the constituency. But this clearly is not the case.

While our research does support the paradox of diminished responsiveness to groups as the complexity of the represented unit decreases and the level of public support increases, we found that these factors do not, in fact, necessarily reduce responsiveness on the part of local officials. Rather, the agents being responded to differ. Thus the less complex the district, and the higher the mass support the more responsive is the board of education to individualized preferences.

It is at this point that we diverge from the conclusions of the Bay Area City Council inquiry. In the absence of response to ad hoc groups or attentive publics, the city councils seemed to be pursuing a self-defined image of their representational role. Now this could in fact be the case; it is not difficult to imagine city councils and school boards marked by virtually complete neglect of constituents' desires. Yet this would seem to be an unusual state of affairs, for even the craggiest councilmen and board members are still social animals and it is inconceivable that most fail to be affected (though in varying degrees) by communicated preferences from their constituents.

For this reason we allowed for responsiveness along other than group lines. Our guess is that the Prewitt-Eulau city council study would have uncovered the same sets of relationships had individualized responsiveness been introduced in addition to group responsiveness. This is not to say, of course, that the relationships observed between structural conditions and group responsiveness among city councils and school boards are incorrect. Rather, it is to argue that responsiveness assumes many forms and not all
of them are revealed in the group mode. It is also to argue that the forces fostering responsiveness in one mode typically act to depress them in the other. Finally, it is to say that neither mode is necessarily more "systemic" than the other.

Whether one mode is more desirable than another in a representational sense is a most trying question. Like all normative questions it must be answered in terms of the criteria for desirability. If diversity and structuring of demands are criteria, for example, then those districts with high group responsiveness are probably being more representative. On the other hand, if elite-mass congruity and relatively open access are the criteria, then those districts marked by high individualized responsiveness would be termed "better."

The two dimensions of representation have implications for controversies about the territorial scope of school districts. To solve the racial and social ills of urban education it is proposed that control be radically decentralized in the central cities. To solve the economic ills of urban education, the proposed salvation lies in some form of "Metro" government or "Metro" school districts. If our findings can be extrapolated to large scale movements in either direction, the gains and losses in terms of representation become apparent. With decentralization, public support and individualized responsiveness would increase—and goals which urban minorities are espousing. With "Metro," support would diminish but group responsiveness would climb. As our analysis suggests, these movements would be tempered according to the particular electoral milieu in which they transpire. Such are the dilemmas of representative democracy.
Notes


3. Actually 95 districts were surveyed to meet sampling requirements for other analyses.


5. Since approximately 90% of the school population is embraced by districts
combining both elementary and secondary grades, the sample may be said to approximate coverage for all school districts—given selection probabilities governed by size and given differential drop-out rates.

6. These weights also reflect slight initial adjustments made for the 1965 sample to correct for inequalities in selection probabilities occasioned by lack of precise information at the time of sampling frame construction.


9. Kenneth Prewitt and Heinz Eulau, "Political Matrix and Political Representation: Prolegomenon to a New Departure from an Old Problem," American Political Science Review, 63 (June, 1969), p. 428. Our own thinking and analysis have been heavily influenced by this article. Portions of the present paper are unabashedly replicative.


13. Boards were arrayed on a trustee dimension after summing individual responses to two questions asking respondents whether and why they felt board members should "do what the people want" or "follow their own judgment."


18. Further constraints are statistical in that 1) metropolitanism is a dichotomous variable and 2) percent urban is rather highly skewed toward the upper and lower ends.


21. The use of elite perceptions to categorize constituency characteristics is a common procedure. Strictly speaking, however, one can only say that these are imputations about the purported phenomena. To be conservative one should interpret the following analysis in that view.

22. In building this index each board member was first given a score of from 0.0 to 3.0 depending upon the number of his three responses indicative of public support for the board. A mean for each board was developed by summing individual scores and dividing the total by the number
of board members.

23. An examination of the partial betas (slopes) indicates that the relationship between mass support and individualized responsiveness is partly spurious, due to the fact that metropolitanism is related both to individualized responsiveness and to mass support. This is much less true when population or urbanism are considered.


25. The proportion of boards falling into each half of the dichotomy on this and the ensuing variables is shown in Table 4.


28. The strength of metropolitanism and mass support are not similarly affected in the reverse situation. Controlling for the five strongest electoral variables simultaneously the coefficients are .52 and -.51 between metropolitanism and group and individualized responsiveness, respectively. Corresponding coefficients for mass support are -.52 and .31 for group and individualized responsiveness, respectively.

29. The various electoral measures were also subjected to factor analysis.
and the major factors then used instead of the separate indicators in the regression equations. Both the theoretical and statistical results were less satisfying than those obtained by using the indicators singly.


32. Prewitt and Eulau, *loc cit*.

33. Assuming that sheer number of local sources used is a guide to diversity supports this conclusion: the correlations between number of sources and group responsiveness is .50 and that for individualized responsiveness is -.48.