The purposes of this study were to: (1) document the reasons for the establishment of upper division institutions in the US; (2) identify the thread, if any, which ties the experience of one institution to another; and (3) examine the lessons which can be learned from the early decisions to abolish the first two years of college and to suggest possible applications to existing upper division institutions. This report discusses the historical background of upper division institutions, the experience of some of the early institutions, and the history and experiences of these institutions in the 1950s in Michigan and Florida, and in the 1960s in Michigan, Florida, New York and Pennsylvania. The basic findings were that most new upper division institutions were established less on the basis of existing problems and needs than on either perceived problems and needs (that might reflect the real needs) or on needs of specific interest groups which were often unrelated to those of the local students. In addition, planning rarely attempted to analyze the ways in which this organizational form would meet perceived needs. [Not available in hard copy due to marginal legibility of original document.]
A STUDY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF UPPER DIVISION COLLEGES IN THE UNITED STATES

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE

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The basic purpose of this study of upper division institutions - institutions which admit students only after a minimum of two years of collegiate work and which, themselves, offer only the work of the junior, senior, and in some cases post-graduate years - was to document and record the reasons for the establishment of upper division institutions in the United States. Secondary purposes were (1) to identify the thread, if any, which ties the experience of one institution to another and (2) to examine the lessons which can be learned from the early decisions to abolish the first two years of college and to suggest possible applications to existing upper division institutions.

From the outset, several assumptions were made concerning these institutions. Perhaps most basic was the assumption that, in each case, decisions leading to the establishment of new upper division institutions were based upon local considerations - primarily reflecting the growing numbers of two-year college graduates demanding continued education - and not upon any over-riding belief in the "concept" of an upper division institutions or in the value of innovation per se. This assumption was only partially correct; while local considerations did play a primary and predominant role in early decisions concerning all existing upper division institutions, these considerations were not always based upon the growing needs of graduates of two-year colleges. Rather, while the existence of a "pool" of two-year graduates on which to draw was often seen as a prerequisite for the establishment of an upper division institution, the needs of these graduates was rarely if ever the primary reason for initial consideration of a new, upper division institution.

The second portion of this assumption was also partially correct. Few upper division institutions were created as such because of any over-riding belief in the concept of an upper division institution; on the other hand, the concept of innovation per se did play a role in the establishment of several of the existing institutions. This concept of innovation, however, was often incorrectly applied due to the insular and parochial nature of the considerations which led to the establishment of most institutions. In most cases, planners were not aware of the existence of or experiences of upper division institutions already in operation; this fact led to creation of "innovative" institutions which were, in fact, not so innovative as their planners had originally assumed.
In the case of each institution, a series of questions was asked and eventually answered. These questions included why the specific institution was founded in this organizational pattern, how this decision related to similar decisions throughout the country, what local factors effected the decision to establish an upper division institution, and the extent to which all such institutions - despite the primacy of local factors in early decisions - reflect some sort of universal response to certain universal problems within higher education today.

The initial proposal hypothesized as follows: "In every case, one may assume that the decision to choose the upper-division form of organization was based on certain existing problems or needs, as well as assumptions as to how this form would meet the needs. And, in those instances in which an institution has reverted to full, four-year status, one may also assume that (1) the institution's original perception of its problems was faulty; (2) the institution's assumptions concerning the effects of this form of organization were incorrect; (3) some new factors were added which changed either the initial problem or the correctness of the initial assumptions."

Perhaps the most basic finding of this study is the extent to which the preceding paragraph was not applicable to the establishment of existing upper division institutions. Upper division institutions - and, one may now assume, most new institutions - were based less on existing problems and needs than on either perceived problems or needs which may or may not reflect the real needs of the area or on needs of specific interest groups which were often unrelated to the needs of local students. Furthermore, planning rarely attempted to analyse the ways in which this organizational form would meet perceived needs. Rather, in most instances, the mere existence of a number of public two-year (community or junior) colleges both obviated the need to repeat the first two years and, in several instances, made such repetition politically impossible even if educationally desirable. It should be re-emphasized, however, that the existence of these two-year colleges was not a primary consideration in the initial decision to establish a new institution in most areas.

The basic approach used in this study was that commonly known as the "historical method." Decisions regarding the establishment of a number of new institutions were examined over a period of time by examination of a multitude of source documents: presidents' reports, minutes of boards of control, college catalogs and directories, documents prepared by and for accreditation associations, planning reports and documents, status and progress reports, letters, memos, minutes of meetings and miscellaneous source materials such as newspapers and press releases. In addition, individuals like presidents, planners, and other participants in the original decisions regarding each institution were interviewed in order to gather information unavailable through examination of the "formal" materials which are available to the historical researcher.
Those institutions which were or presently are operating as upper division institutions - and which were the subject of this study - are listed below:

College of the Pacific, Stockton, California (1955-1957).
Concordia Senior College, Fort Wayne, Indiana (1957-).
Dearborn Campus, University of Michigan, Dearborn, Michigan (1959-).
Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton, Florida (1964-).
The New School College, New York, New York (1965-).
Capitol Campus, The Pennsylvania State University, Middletown, Pennsylvania (1966-).
Richmond College, Staten Island, New York (1967-).
University of West Florida, Pensacola, Florida (1967-).

In addition to these institutions, a number of new upper division institutions are presently in various stages of development. Those institutions now being developed have not been included in this study; the author, however, has endeavored to keep abreast of new developments and, where possible, to be of service to those states now planning new institutions. The following list is thus tentative; the fact that a state is listed in no way implies that approval will be given to creation of an upper division institution or that such institution will open. These states have, however, each indicated a basic interest in the idea of an upper division institution and, in several cases, have prepared planning documents and/or received legislative or appropriate Board approval:

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It also appears that several of the more severe problems which are common to upper division institutions - such as a difficulty in achieving an adequate enrollment level - may be the result of the planning process which preceded each existing institution. To the degree that this is correct, the parochialism of most institutional planners is responsible for the continuation and repetition of these same basic errors. If one recommendation for action could be drawn from the results of this study, it would be that states involved in consideration of the upper division form of organization study the experience of states in which such institutions are now in operation before the decision is taken to establish an upper division institution. As a step toward implementation of this recommendation, this report is being sent to officials in each state where consideration of the upper division alternative is known to be going on, as well as to those who participated in the report's development and others who have expressed an interest in its findings.
INTRODUCTION

The basic purpose of this study of upper division institutions - institutions which admit students only after a minimum of two years of collegiate work and which, themselves, offer only the work of the junior, senior, and in some cases post-graduate years - was to document and record the reasons for the establishment of upper division institutions in the United States. Secondary purposes were (1) to identify the thread, if any, which ties the experience of one institution to another and (2) to examine the lessons which can be learned from the early decisions to abolish the first two years of college and to suggest possible applications to existing upper division institutions.

Although some research has been done on the earliest attempts to modify the four-year baccalaureate structure through creation of "bisected" colleges or universities, there has been no research on the origins or development of the post-World War Two upper division institutions. (1) Recent books on innovation in education, such as those by Baskin or Stickler, include little more than footnotes on the upper division experiments, despite chapters on the cluster colleges at the University of the Pacific or the cooperative education program at Dearborn Campus. Other works, such as that of Knoell and Medsker (which deals with transfer students in Michigan, among other states), or Becker (on the new library system at Florida Atlantic University) never mention that the institution under discussion offers no freshman or sophomore classes. (2)


Those institutions which were or presently are operating as upper division institutions - and which were the subject of this study - are listed below:

- College of the Pacific, Stockton, California (1935-1951).
- Concordia Senior College, Fort Wayne, Indiana (1957-).
- Dearborn Campus, University of Michigan, Dearborn, Michigan (1959-).
- Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton, Florida (1964-).
- The New School College, New York, New York (1966-).
- Capitol Campus, The Pennsylvania State University, Middletown, Pennsylvania (1966-).
- Richmond College, Staten Island, New York (1967-).
- University of West Florida, Pensacola, Florida (1967-).

The study did not include specialty schools (such as Pacific Oaks College, Pasadena, California [elementary education] or Otis Art Institute, Los Angeles, California [art and art education]), nor does it include Schools of Allied Health professions (such as Ohio State University School of Allied Medical Professions, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Health Related Professions, State University of New York Downstate Medical Center College of Health Related Professions, University of Florida College of Health Related Professions, or University of Kentucky School of Allied Health Professions) which are often organized to offer the professional or junior/senior year portion only of a baccalaureate degree.

Furthermore, it does not include those colleges or universities (such as Franconia College, University of Florida, University of Minnesota, Temple University, University of Akron, University of Utah, University of Toledo, Boston University, Brigham Young University, Ohio University, Ohio State University, or Michigan State University) which either admit all freshmen to a two-year University College before allowing matriculation at an "upper division" professional school or offer a two-year associate degree within their structure as a four-year institution. The study did include, however, some historical background to provide an understanding of the sources of the ideas which led to both the present upper division institutions and to the universities listed in this paragraph which have formally divided the baccalaureate experience after the initial two years of study.

In addition to the upper division institutions studied, a number of new upper division institutions are presently in various stages of development. Those institutions now being developed have not been included in this study; the author, however, has endeavored to keep abreast of new developments and, where possible, to be of service to those states not planning a new institution. The following list is thus tentative; the fact that a state is listed in no way implies that approval will be given to creation of an upper division institution or that such institution will open. These states have, however, each indicated a basic interest in the idea of an upper division institution and,
in several instances, have prepared planning documents and/or received legislative or appropriate Board approval:

Illinois  New York  Washington
Texas     New Jersey  Florida
Pennsylvania  Minnesota  Colorado

The establishment of any institution invariably leads to certain questions as to why specific decisions were made; in the case of innovative institutions - and especially a series of institutions similar to each other yet different from all others - these questions become even more important. Thus, in the case of the upper division institutions, one may ask not only why a specific institution was founded in this organizational pattern, but how (and if) this decision relates to similar decisions throughout the country. To what extent are upper division institutions merely independent responses to local situations which happen to be similar, and therefore, lead to similar responses? Or, to what extent is the upper division institution a universal response to certain universal problems within higher education today?

One means of discovering answers to the questions posed above and in the original proposal for this study is to examine the reasons, or rationale, for the establishment of each of the institutions concerned. Such examination not only provided answers to the questions of "universality," but also showed the extent to which each given institution had made use of the example provided by those institutions which came before.

Despite the fact that this study must conclude little or no attempt on the part of planners for those upper division institutions already in operation to make use of the experience of those which preceded them, the author believes that this impartial examination of the problems, responses, and outcomes common to the development of all upper division institutions - both past and present - can serve both those now engaged in operation of such institutions and those who may be considering adoption of this specific organizational pattern.
METHODS

The basic approach used in this study was that commonly known as the historical method. Decisions regarding the establishment of the nine upper division institutions listed above (p. 5) were examined by use of a multitude of source documents: presidents' reports, minutes of boards of control, college catalogs and directories, documents prepared by and for accreditation associations, planning reports and documents, status and progress reports, letters, memos, minutes of meetings, and miscellaneous source materials such as newspapers and press releases. In addition, individuals including presidents, planners, and other participants in the original decisions regarding each institution were interviewed in order to gather information unavailable through examination of the "formal" materials which are available to the historical researcher.

The original intent was to tape all interviews; this proved impossible for two reasons. In one instance, the recorder malfunctioned during an interview session; in several other instances, the subjects made it clear that the session would be more productive if a tape recorder were not used. In these cases, notes were prepared and returned to the subject for approval in the same manner as if the tape recorder had been in operation.

Although each interview varied in accordance with the institution under study and with the individual's role within the planning for that institution, all interviews were aimed at discovering answers to the same basic questions:

To what forces or needs was your institution responding when the decision was made to establish (or become) an upper division institution?

Why was this particular form of organization chosen?

From what source(s) did your planners get the idea for this organizational form; was it, rather, an ad hoc response to an existing situation?

To what extent were you aware of other (similar) efforts to establish upper division institutions; what use was made of this?
By whom, and how, was the decision made?

What relationship does this decision have to the position (if any) taken by your accrediting agency or State Education Department?

What specific advantages (or disadvantages) did your institution envisage as a result of the organizational form; on what was this expectation based; what has been the result?

The initial step in preparation of the report was to undertake "background" research to discover the historical antecedents to the present upper division institutions. The bulk of this work, as well as field visits to Flint College, Flint, Michigan and Richmond College, New York, New York, was completed before the start of the project period. In each of these institutions - as at each other institution visited - preliminary correspondence with the president and other officials had provided a general understanding of the author's intent and needs upon his arrival on campus. Following a visit to the chief administrative officer on campus, the author then proceeded to arrange interview schedules with persons suggested by the president and, as soon as possible, to enter the files or archives to review the source documents available. Interviews and review of documents continued for the duration of each visit; the chief administrative officer was then formally interviewed at the conclusion of each field visit.

Although the original research plan envisioned visits to ten campuses (including Pratt Institute in Brooklyn, New York), this plan was modified since planning offices for several institutions were geographically separate from the operating campus. For example, the planning for the University of West Florida (Pensacola) and Florida Atlantic University (Boca Raton) was done at the Office of the Board of Regents (Tallahassee); planning for the Capitol Campus (Middletown, Pennsylvania) was done at The Pennsylvania State University (University Park, Pennsylvania); planning for both the Flint and Dearborn campuses of the University of Michigan was done at Ann Arbor. In each case, the author both worked in files and archives and conducted interviews at the central planning location in addition to on the campus of the institution itself.

After the beginning of the project period, field visits were conducted in accordance with the following schedule:

- **July 1 - July 11, 1968**  
  Dearborn, Michigan (Dearborn Campus)  
  Ann Arbor, Michigan (Univ. of Michigan)  
  Ft. Wayne, Indiana (Concordia)

- **September 16 - September 20, 1968**  
  Middletown, Pennsylvania (Capitol)  
  University Park, Penn. (Penn State)

- **October 7 - October 11, 1968**  
  Stockton, California (College of the Pacific)
Visits to the New School, New York, New York and to Pratt Institute, Brooklyn, New York were conducted on a number of single day visits during early 1969.

In several cases - such as those concerning the former Chancellor of the State University System of Florida or the Director, Personnel Recruiting and Research, Personnel and Organization, Ford Motor Company - participants were unavailable for interviews due to the schedule of field visits undertaken by the author. In a number of such cases, correspondence was initiated by the author; the results included letters with pertinent information, telephone interviews, and, in one case, preparation of a document outlining the creation of the Dearborn Campus from the perspective of the Ford Motor Company, a major participant in the early decisions. These documents are listed in the References section of this report, as are each of the interviews.

Following completion of all field visits and background research, this final report itself was prepared. As stated on the title page of this report, points of view or opinions do not represent those of the Office of Education; nor do they necessarily represent those of the officials of the institutions under consideration. Many persons, both on campuses and in central offices, gave of their time and provided access to written materials. Interpretations and conclusions drawn from these materials - or from the facts stated in interviews - are entirely the responsibility of this author.
FINDINGS

Historical Background

Historically, the American college developed both in response to an expanding system of secondary or preparatory education—which increasingly took to itself those basic studies offered in the American college—and to the imported German "University" ideals, which provided both a methodology and a body of subject matter which the college adopted as its own. Thus, by the middle of the nineteenth century, some American educators began to see the existing four-year college as an anomaly. Rather than offering a unified four-year course of study, the American college appeared to these reformers to combine elements of two divergent systems of education, one of which was the logical conclusion of a student's general or preparatory education, while the other was the beginning of professional or research-oriented "university" work.

As early as the 1850's, Henry Tappan of the University of Michigan decided that the work of the American college was really secondary or preparatory in nature; basing his conclusions on the German model of gymnasium and university, he deduced that American colleges (or universities, as they were sometimes called) were not offering truly advanced of "university-level" work. Unlike his later supporters, Tappan did not propose separating the two functions. Rather, once having recognized that two functions existed, Tappan moved to "perfect" the gymnasial function within the University itself.

Another distinction between Tappan and those who would later advocate the bisection of the American college and the relegation of its component parts to either the high school or the university was Tappan's equation of the entire college, as it then existed, with preparatory work. To Tappan, bisection of the college was not an issue, for there was really nothing to bisect. Later educators, particularly W.W. Folwell at the University of Minnesota in the 1870's and William R. Harper at the University of Chicago at the turn of the twentieth century, felt that the university as they saw it should rid itself of its preparatory or non-university functions.

Since Germany had been the source of the university concept and of much of the subject matter being taught in the new American "university,"
many educators turned to Germany for the organizational model on which to base a restructured American system of education. The German system had no "college" as an intermediate step between preparatory and university work; rather, the gymnasium provided all work which was required before entrance to the university, work which was roughly equivalent to that offered through the sophomore year in the American college. As institutions which were called universities developed in the United States during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, educational leaders such as Folwell, Harper, and David Starr Jordan at Stanford suggested that these institutions would not be true universities until they had ceased to offer the preparatory or non-university courses which then constituted the bulk of their freshman and sophomore offerings.

Harper believed that there was a distinction between work "of the same scope of character as that of the preceding years in the academy or high school" and "the real university work done in the junior and senior years" of college. His ultimate solution was a combination of that proposed by Tappan - that the University's role was first to perfect that preparatory work which it, of necessity, offered - and by Folwell - that the proper role of the University could not be achieved until such time as the preparatory work was eliminated from the University entirely. Harper created an institution at the University of Chicago in which the work of the first two years (preparatory) was clearly distinct from that of the last two years (university) and which, through its program of affiliations, would eventually "permit the University in Chicago to devote its energies mainly to the University Colleges and to strictly University work."(1)

Harper's concept of affiliation was an integral part of his plan for an institution which would devote its energies mainly to strictly University work. Affiliated secondary institutions would become, in the strictest sense, departments of the University through University representation on the local board of control and University participation in matters of appointment, examinations, and certification of completion. At the same time, qualified institutions would be encouraged to continue their offerings through the first two years of college, as was begun at Joliet, Illinois in 1902. The end result, Harper hoped, would be "the growth and development of the high school and the probability that this growth will not stop until two years of college work have been added to the present curriculum of the high school" which would

permit that "the higher work be given all our strength on the campus." By 1904, six high schools in five states had developed elongated programs which included two years of junior college work as affiliated institutions with the University of Chicago. (1)

In California, President David Starr Jordan of Stanford was soon to advocate a similar plan for bisecting the existing college through a less formal system of affiliation. Although Jordan was not the first prominent educator in California to promote the separation of junior college work from that of the university - Dr. Alexis F. Lange had been trying since 1892 to foster a reorganization of the University of California which would reflect the distinction between "preparatory" and "university" studies - Lange later wrote that "this propaganda would probably not have gathered momentum very fast without President Jordan's dynamic articles and addresses urging the amputation of freshman and sophomore classes to prevent university atrophy and urging the relegation of these classes to the high school." (2)

In 1907, Jordan's Report to the Trustees of Stanford University recommended "the immediate separation of the junior college from the university or university college" and the requirement of "the work of the junior college as a requisite for admission to the University on and after the year 1913, or as soon as a number of the best equipped high schools of the State are prepared to undertake this work." This recommendation was based upon Jordan's belief that "the college has gradually pushed itself upward, relegating its lower years to the secondary schools, and absorbing two of the years which would naturally belong to the university." The result, according to Jordan, is "a tendency to separate the college into two parts: the junior college, of two years, in which the work is still collegiate, and the university college;" yet, "it is better for the university to be as far as possible free from the necessity of junior college instruction." (3)

In that same year, 1907, the California State Legislature passed the first law in the nation to permit "the board of trustees of any


3. David Starr Jordan, Fourth Annual Report of the President of the University, Trustees Series No. 15 (Stanford: Stanford University, 1907), pp. 18, 19, 20-22.
city district, union, joint union, or county high school" to "prescribe postgraduate courses of study for the graduates of such high school... which courses of study shall approximate the studies prescribed in the first two years of university courses." Yet, despite both Jordan's intent at Stanford and the passage of this trail-breaking legislation, the high schools in California did not respond rapidly enough to allow Stanford to carry through Jordan's recommendations. The first junior college established under terms of the 1907 legislation opened at Fresno High School in 1910. As of 1917, sixteen California high schools were offering post-graduate work with a combined enrollment of over 1250; yet, over 620 of these students were enrolled in two Los Angeles institutions which would close within the next three years. (1)

At Stanford, as at Chicago, a period of nearly two decades elapsed during which time the President continuously proposed the abolition of the first two years, but during which time no concrete steps (beyond the temporary limiting of freshman enrollment at Stanford) were taken. And, although the lower division programs were never abolished at either of these two institutions, the educational thought and suggestions for action of the two presidents contributed greatly to the development of the junior college as a two-year unit, often in its early days closely tied to if not actually a part of the local public high school. During the remainder of the 1920's, junior colleges continued to grow in both numbers and enrollment; concurrently, new experiments - such as the six-four-four plan which created a four-year "middle school" and four-year junior college leaving a student prepared for his "university" education at the start of the collegiate junior year - made continuing discussion concerning the appropriate point at which to break the baccalaureate experience superfluous. Later educators might continue to debate the desirability of dividing the four-year baccalaureate program; for all practical purposes, however, the point at which that division would be made was now set and, in fact, the feasibility of operating institutions containing only two years of "collegiate" study had been demonstrated.

By 1934, thirty-two years after the establishment of the first public junior college at Joliet, Illinois, 521 junior colleges were in operation in the United States, of which 219, or 42 percent, were public institutions. Enrollment in junior colleges had just passed 100,000 students and would grow, by the end of that decade, to over 190,000. Moreover, by the end of the 1930's, over 70 percent of all junior college students would be attending public institutions which, although established at a decreasing rate during the depression, continued to enroll greater numbers and percentages of students due to their convenience and relatively low tuition rates compared to private, four-year institutions. Whether for the reasons advocated by Folwell, Harper and Jordan

or not, the American college had effectively been divided, at least in those locations where junior colleges flourished (1)

Early Upper Division Institutions

Prior to the end of the Second World War, three upper division institutions had been established and the groundwork had been laid for the development of a fourth such institution. One of these institutions was part of the historical development outlined above; the other three were, to greater or lesser degrees, the outcome of the same types of considerations which had led Harper and Jordan to advocate the bisection of the American college.

The first American institution to completely separate its lower from its upper division had been the University of Georgia, then known as Franklin College, which had faced severe internal dissention over the role which science should play and equally severe problems of both finance and enrollment. Following the resignation of the President in November, 1858, the Board moved to reorganize the college, thus having some effect on that problem which the Board identified as central: the youth of the student body. By May of 1859 the Board had proposed the linking of the college's preparatory division (the Academy) with the first two years of existing collegiate study so that students could "be watched over night and day, till fully prepared for the Junior Class." On August 4, the Trustees formally created a "collegiate institute" to perform this function and, on November 3, 1859, announced that "The University of Georgia shall consist of a Collegiate Institution, a College Proper [which would include only the junior and senior years], and University Schools of Science and Philosophy." (2)

Although the new institution was opened in January, 1861 with 130 juniors and seniors, the outbreak of war and Georgia's secession soon caused the loss of seventy-five students who enlisted. Enrollment continued to decline and, following a complete mobilization following the fall of Chattanooga, only twenty students remained in the College Proper. As a final attempt to save the college, the freshman and


sophomore classes were once again added on July 4, 1866; as of January 1, 1864 enrollment had risen again to forty students. It was, however, not enough, and the University was closed "for the duration" in early February of 1864. When the University of Georgia reopened in 1866, it once again offered a full four years of collegiate study within one organizational framework.

Although most scholars interested in the bisection of the early college agree that the University of Georgia represents the first "successful" attempt of an operating institution to eliminate its own freshman and sophomore years, they make little attempt to see these events as anything more than an historical oddity. Yet, the University of Georgia was typical of many of the problems faced by American colleges immediately before and after the American Civil War; what was atypical was the response. And, in a larger sense, the very problems of financial support for an institution combining the function of two educational programs and of the youthful age of the potential students in areas in which preparatory education was not readily available were problems similar to those which led Tappan, Folwell and even Harper to suggest the bisection of the American college.

As stated above, by the 1930's, general agreement had been reached as to the point at which future attempts to divide the four-year baccalaureate program would be made; this point was shaped by considerations such as had led Franklin College to rid itself of its first two years. By the 1930's, too, gradual agreement was being reached as to the definitions to be assumed when describing the organization of American higher education. The rapid expansion of public secondary education, both in terms of universal availability and of the level of instruction, led to an up-graded and more clearly defined college than had existed even as late as the suggestions of Harper and Jordan. Moreover, the work of the freshman and sophomore years, now offered in independent two-year junior colleges often tied to the secondary system, was accepted as being of "college" level, in part because the concept of a four-year college between secondary and graduate study had finally gained a level of acceptance which protected it from further incursions from the German model of gymnasium and university. Finally, the university itself had taken on many of the organizational aspects of the German university - often becoming a federation of schools including but not limited to the English-based college - and this definition, which emphasized structure as well as level of instruction, diminished the tendency to reject certain courses or subjects as "non-university" in nature.

Thus, the stage had been set for the first major attempt to completely eliminate the first two years from a four-year institution since the days of the Civil War. Appropriately enough, the attempt occurred in California, where the system of public junior colleges was the most extensive in the nation and where, for over thirty years, officials at the University of California and at Stanford had been advocating such a split. Yet, the change came not at one of these
well established institutions, but at an institution in central California which had, throughout its existence, been forced by circumstances to change and adjust to conditions" which it faced as "a relatively unknown college." (1)

The College of the Pacific opened at its third location in its seventy-six year history at Stockton, California in the fall of 1924. During the next four years, enrollment at the college grew to a peak of 976 during the 1928-29 academic year; yet, the costs of relocation and reliance upon tuition for most required funds limited the institution's ability, even during the years of prosperity, to build an adequate endowment. With the onset of the depression, enrollment (and, with it, tuition income) declined, reaching 842 during the 1931-32 academic year and 707 the following year. On September 28, 1932, President Tully C. Knoles reported to the Board of Trustees that the College had a "cash deficit of $54,069.58 for the current year... [and] it was proposed by the Comptroller that each employee of the College take a two months' cut in salary in addition to the fifteen percent formerly agreed upon." (2)

By the opening of the 1933-34 academic year, the situation was becoming critical and in October, 1933 a special Faculty Coordinating Committee was created to search for possible ways of saving the institution. One solution, suggested by Professor and Debate Coach Dwayne Orton, was that the College of the Pacific establish a separate junior college division without alteration of the traditional four-year curriculum or of the academic standards at the four-year institution. Creation of the junior college would provide for increased revenues, while retaining the College's traditional academic standards which were seen as one major drawing card during the depression years. Furthermore, the new junior college division was seen as being "in line with the trend in American liberal education which recognized the first two years of the arts college as the concluding period of the student's general education." (3)

1. Robert E. Burns, interview held October 7, 1968 at Stockton, California.
Although the new junior college division enrolled sixty-five new students, President Knoles was still not satisfied with the College's enrollment. In the spring of 1935, an attempt was made to secure legislation authorizing County Superintendents of Schools of the State to pay tuition costs for students attending College of the Pacific Junior College, a step which might have increased junior college enrollment through creation of fiscal parity with existing public junior colleges. The bill "was not brought on the floor of the State legislature for consideration," President Knoles reported to the Board, "through fear of unconstitutionality." The next logical step was consideration of establishment of a public junior college using Pacific's underutilized facilities and faculty. On June 10, 1935, President Knoles reported that "he had been informed that it would be entirely legal for the Stockton High School unit under its Board of Education to organize itself in a High School-Junior College District.... to rent such buildings or rooms of the College of the Pacific as would be designated for the use of the Junior College." (1)

The exact moment that President Knoles first considered establishment of a public junior college in a cooperative arrangement with the College of the Pacific is unclear. In his President's Report of October, 1935 (after the new public institution had opened), he explained that "for a number of years various education leaders in the state have commented upon the possibility of the organization of public junior college classes on the part of the Stockton School Board in connection with the College of the Pacific." Professor Orton has stated that President Knoles discussed with him the possibility of a "coordinate arrangement of public and private institutions" as early as the spring of 1934 during early consideration of the College of the Pacific Junior College. And both Orton and Burns recollect that Knoles had long felt that, educationally, the College of the Pacific could - in Knoles' own words - "concentrate upon the work of the Upper Division and graduate year, frankly recognizing in fact what is recognized in law in California that the Lower Division is a part of secondary education." (2)

The ultimate result of the decision to establish (and, on the part of the College of the Pacific, to support) a public junior college in Stockton - and the concomitant decision to eliminate the lower division from the College of the Pacific and to rent the unused facilities to the public institution - was creation of a four-year academic program, half public and half private, sharing the same campus. The decision was based, to a great extent, in Knoles' beliefs concerning


the appropriate administrative and educational structure of a college; these beliefs, in turn, were based upon the thinking of such educators as Jordan, Lange, and Ray Lyman Wilbur, then President of Stanford. Moreover, Pacific's need to decrease costs while increasing revenues - combined with increasing public pressure for a public junior college in Stockton - made elimination of Pacific's lower division in conjunction with creation of a public junior college an alternative which would benefit all concerned. On April 1, 1939, President Knoles reported, "My enthusiasm for our enterprise grows with experience. The College is realizing much more fully upon its facilities [which were being rented, in part, to the junior college which shared Pacific's campus], all competition for students in the lower division is removed, and an adequate base for the Senior College is fairly assured. Strife could arise, but if frank understanding is practiced I can see nothing but continued good." (1).

Both "frank understanding" and "continued good" existed for slightly over a decade from the elimination of College of the Pacific's lower division in 1935. During that period, however, changes had begun which would force a reconsideration of the cooperative status between Pacific and Stockton College. One such change - that of the name from Stockton Junior College to Stockton College - was the result of a reorganization by the Stockton Board of Education (the Board of Control for the junior college) of its total offerings into a six-four-four plan of organization in 1944. This reorganization tied the junior college much more closely to the "lower" public offerings; the change to a four-year status - coupled with the influx of students to both institutions following the Second World War - created severe strains on the shared facilities. Finally, new personnel, who felt loyalty neither to the shared campus nor to the working arrangements instituted in 1935-36, were employed; moreover, the junior college itself had begun to develop (and desire) an identity of its own, separate from that of the College of the Pacific. (2)

By the end of the decade of the 1940's, both President Burns and Chancellor Knoles felt that relations between the two institutions were rapidly deteriorating. Yet, although Knoles felt that "relations between the two schools had reached a place where cooperation is almost impossible" - a situation which Burns attributed to "a cantankerous school board with a new and difficult administrator" and the fact that "academic cooperation... is coming to a point where there is little more than a rental of our facilities" - Burns nonetheless suggested "that we sit tight, but watch the situation very carefully." Burns


realized that advantages - particularly savings and the large number of
students drawn to a tuition-free institution from which Pacific could
choose its junior class - existed; by late 1949, these advantages had
not yet been overcome by disadvantages, both existing and potential. (1)

By the end of 1950, however, three specific problems had arisen
which crystallized the areas of disagreement and led to the end of the
sixteen year experiment as an upper division institution. President
Burns has stated that "if the Korean War hadn't come along, I suspect
we might still be an upper-division - graduate institution." Although
this sentiment is probably an over-statement, the war did have immediate
effects upon both institutions. On November 10, 1950, the College of
the Pacific Board of Trustees approved establishment of an ROTC unit
on campus to "protect" Pacific students from the draft, which took
423 students from the junior college which was unable to offer an ROTC
program. This fact, coupled with the fact that the end of the sophomore
year in a "bisected" institution was a logical point at which to draft
men needed for the armed forces, led Burns to believe that College of
the Pacific might not continue to receive adequate numbers of transfer
students from the junior colleges of the State. (2)

Two new problems had also arisen. President Burns reported that
the American Chemical Society had refused to accredit Pacific's
program since, in the words of the Society, "the present organization
of the College of the Pacific cannot permit the Department of Chemis-
try to retain proper control over the caliber and scope of the lower
level course and training." In addition, Burns had just received
notification that all intercollegiate athletic events with Pacific had
been cancelled due to pressure on other colleges from the Pacific
Coast Conference, which had expelled the College for continuing to
allow sophomores from Stockton College to participate on its teams. (3)

Burns believed that the problems with the Chemical Society - and
anticipated problems with Phi Beta Kappa and the engineering accrediting
body - could be solved only through addition of a lower division, or at
least through the addition of lower division courses in those areas in
which the college wished subject-matter accreditation. Considering the
continuing difficulties being encountered in relations with Stockton

1. College of the Pacific, "Minutes of the Board of Trustees, October
25, 1948-June 18, 1955," pp. 325, 329; Robert E. Burns, "President's

2. Burns, interview; College of the Pacific, "Minutes, October 25,

5, 6.
College, Burns saw no real reason to continue operation of College of the Pacific without a lower division. Although the rental contract with Stockton College had realized $47,000 the past year, Pacific officials realized that they were not receiving adequate income to offset wear and tear on the buildings. Furthermore, income from tuition from a new lower division would exceed required expenses by approximately $3,000 a year for a lower division of two hundred students and by $68,000 a year for a lower division of four hundred students. (1)

Based on these reasons, Burns recommended establishment of "a pilot lower division as sort of a model, highly selective group" consisting of three hundred students, the number withdrawn from Pacific's campus over the past year as Stockton College continued to move into new buildings. Moreover, Stockton College would be permitted to continue to rent any space remaining on the Pacific campus and an effort would be made to allow enrollment of Stockton College 13th and 14th year students in the new R.O.T.C. program. In the fall of 1951, the College of the Pacific lower division was reopened after sixteen years with an enrollment of 202 freshmen and 68 sophomores. (2)

Although the College of the Pacific's experiment had come to an end, it had not failed, in any sense of the word, because of an inherent weakness in the concept of an upper division institution, although this would not always be the case with other institutions. In Stockton, the initial plan had been developed as a cooperative venture between a public school board and a private institution; over the course of the years, through changing conditions and personnel, that cooperation had gradually lessened, increasing the stress on both institutions. Yet, the public institution, with its broader base of support and of potential students, and with a growing desire for an independent identity, did not react to these stresses in the same way or to the same degree as did the College of the Pacific. Pacific's reaction was due, in great measure, to the additional pressures brought to bear by outside forces - specifically accreditation bodies, athletic conferences, and the war - which would not or could not adjust their own requirements to the unique conditions on the Stockton campus, as well as to the feeling (and, perhaps the reality) that the unique administrative and organizational relationship with Stockton College had outlived its usefulness.

While the period of the great depression caused hardships in many American institutions of higher education - and provided, to a great

extent, the impetus for the elimination of Pacific's lower division - it provided at least one institution, The New School for Social Research, with a unique opportunity for expansion and service which, at least indirectly, would also lead to creation of an upper division institution. At the beginning of the decade of the 1930's, the New School was a relatively disorganized forum for individual lecturers and other forms of adult education, a status which it had enjoyed virtually since its inception in late 1918. By the end of the decade of the 1930's, the New School offered a graduate degree program unique in the United States and would soon open an upper division college, itself unique in its philosophy, faculty, students, and course offerings.

The depression in the United States paralleled equally troublesome times in Europe and, in the early 1930's, New School Director Alvin Johnson conceived of the idea of providing refuge for European scholars through creation of a University in Exile. With Hitler's advent to power - and through the generosity of Hiram Halle, a New York businessman - Johnson and Emil Lederer, an Austrian economist, developed the idea of bringing large numbers of German scholars to the United States and of providing a centralized location in which the scholars could recreate the ideals of a European university. Concurrently, Johnson saw the opportunity to create a true graduate faculty as a capstone to the educational offerings of the New School. (1)

Thus, an institution that had begun as a group of prominent American scholars giving lectures to an adult public had overnight added a graduate faculty composed of some of the finest European scholars. Yet, Johnson's desire to protect and conserve the individuality of the graduate faculty, as a group, led in 1936 to creation of separate boards of trustees for the graduate faculty and for the remainder of the New School. As seen by Dr. Hans Simons - a member of the University in Exile and later President of the New School - the University in Exile was a homogeneous and somewhat introspective group of exiles operating within, but not as an integral part of, the New School. (2)

Following creation of the Ecole Libre des Haute Etudes in the early 1940's as yet another free-floating unit within the New School, many members of the faculty and administration felt that a reevaluation of the School's organizational structure was required. Following "many months of deliberation on the reorganization of the New School," Johnson recommended an organization which divided all offerings - with the exception of the Institute for World Affairs and the Ecole Libre - "for administrative convenience" into a School of Politics and a School of Philosophy and Liberal Arts. The Graduate Faculty was divided along


the same lines, although it retained its own Dean and Board of Trustees (until 1946). Hans Simons was named Dean of the School of Politics, while the School of Philosophy and Liberal Arts would be under the direction of the present Associate Director of the New School, Miss Clara Mayer. (1)

Yet, the new organization had not resolved the problem of integrating the Graduate Faculty into the institution; Dr. Simons, in particular, felt that the Graduate Faculty required some sort of "underpinning" to bring it into contact with the institution as a whole and with general students in particular. Dr. Johnson, noting a pretty scanty enrollment in the graduate degree programs, was in favor of some means "to equip students who had been drop outs... to help them to reach the level where they could enter the graduate programs." According to Dean Clara Mayer, there was also an "effort to coordinate the programs of people who had some specific goal in mind." The end result, developed by Dr. Simons from an idea by Emil Lederer, the Dean of the Faculty, was the creation of the New School Senior College. (2)

The specific event which appears to have coalesced these divergent dissatisfactions was the introduction in Congress of the G.I. Bill in early 1944. Under this legislation, the federal government would provide financial support for veterans who wished to further their education; of equal importance to those at the New School, the returning veterans represented a newly opening reservoir of more mature and experienced students. The idea of the New School's creating a baccalaureate program limited to the junior and senior years was endorsed by New York State Commissioner George Stoddard, especially since Stoddard was planning the creation of twenty Junior Colleges of Applied Arts and Science throughout the State, and saw creation of a "senior college" as providing a possible capstone to this new educational system." Thus, agreement was reached, although what the State saw as a capstone for future junior college students was seen by the New School more as an opportunity "to underpin the structure of the Graduate Faculty by connecting it with a small number among the whole student body who can be prepared for graduate work." (3)

One additional reason for the decision to operate the college in this manner - although never stated by any of the principals - might be the background of those involved in the creation of the New School Senior College which opened in the fall of 1944. Lederer, Simons, and the vast


2. Simons, interview; Johnson, interview; Mayer, interview.

majority of the Graduate Faculty had come to the United States with the University in Exile; their entire background and training had been in the great German universities where competent, mature students, having completed a rigorous preparation in the gymnasia, came for an independent intellectual experience known as higher education. Thus, it would be perfectly normal to develop a program at the New School in which the student body was expected to have completed whatever "general education" might be required before coming to the College, the major function of which was to provide a selection of courses from which the student might chose and whatever guidance the student himself might desire.

The early New School Senior College, whatever the primary reasons for its establishment as an upper division institution, was not directly related to contemporary educational developments regarding the time structure of the baccalaureate degree in the United States (except insofar as all developments could be traced back to the initial German influence on one's perception of the role of the college vis-a-vis the preparatory institution). Simons, Johnson, and Mayer were all totally unaware of the experiment which had been started eight years earlier at the College of the Pacific; Johnson was "aware and uninterested" in the theoretical developments of the early twentieth century which concerned themselves with the appropriate amount of time and the division of courses for a collegiate education. According to Simons, the new senior college was not consciously modelled on any other institution, primarily because the New School's preferred clientele was not the regular high school graduate, age eighteen to twenty, but the older and more mature adult who returned in order to continue his education: the kind of student who had been the central concern of the New School since its inception. (1)

Although the New School Senior College would be greatly modified in the mid-1960's - at which time it would develop its present form and emphases - the early development of an upper division institution at the New School in 1944 has a distinct place in any history of bisection and/or upper division colleges. The Senior College at the New School was primarily a result of three factors: the history and philosophy of those associated with the New School, the influx of organizations at the New School preceding the Second World War, and the War itself, at least as it had its ramifications in passage of the G.I. Bill. Thus, in 1944, the New School joined College of the Pacific as one of the two upper division institutions then in operation in the United States.

That same year, 1944, the first concrete step was taken toward creation of the third (and presently longest continuously operating) upper division institution. At that time, the Board for Higher Education of the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod was requested at its annual convention "to make further studies regarding the advisibility

1. Johnson, interview; Mayer, interview; Simons, interview.
of changing over to a four-year college course in preparation for entrance upon a three-year course in theology in St. Louis. As a first step in conducting the necessary studies, an Executive Secretary, Dr. Martin J. Neeb, was employed for the Board in January, 1945. (1)

The educational system of the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod had begun in 1839 with the establishment of a theological seminary and "supporting college" in Perry County Missouri. From that date until 1935, the Synod's system "took the standard program of studies of the theological faculty of a German university as the pattern for the seminary and that of the German classical gymnasium as the pattern for the pre-professional college." Through the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, several additional preparatory schools were established and the designation "college" was introduced into the system; yet, "there appears to have been no conscious attempt... to accommodate the pre-professional school to the pattern of the contemporary American college." Finally, in 1935, the decision was made to extend the three year seminary course to four years, and to award the baccalaureate degree after the second seminary year (or the fourth year of higher education). Yet, the six-year "gymnasia" (now known as high school and junior college) remained as the only preparation for "graduate," "seminary," or "professional education." (2)

By the United States' entry into the Second World War, demands for a reconsideration of the basic structure of the educational system as it related to its primary goal - ministerial education - were growing. These demands grew in part from a need to facilitate transfer among institutions and to other graduate schools, in part to provide a broader education for the ministry, and in part as a result of the new and rapid growth and role of American junior colleges; the United States' entry into the Second World War made the need for some reform even more urgent, as the Synod discovered that a four-year college course with a recognized baccalaureate degree was required for appointments to chaplaincies in the Armed Forces. Although a baccalaureate had, since 1935, been awarded following two years of Seminary study, the seminary itself was not accredited, in part due to its failure to require the baccalaureate for admission. Thus, "fully aware of the planning and discussion coming out of the University of Chicago under President Hutchins' leadership in the early forties," members of the Board for Higher Education of the Synod once again began to consider a restructuring of the Synodical system of education. And, although there is no indication that any of those involved were aware of developments at the

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College of the Pacific or the New School, "we were encouraged, of course," Executive Secretary Neeb has stated, "by the fact that a reputable university [the University of Chicago] was willing to examine long standing traditions in depth and to undertake experimental innovation in the same area in which we had an interest." (1)

Between 1944 and 1947, eighteen separate proposals for the restructuring of the educational system were submitted to the Board for Higher Education; yet, it was felt that "any changes in the present program could have value only to the extent that they might improve or expand the Church's ability to preach, teach, and apply the Gospel. Based on this assumption, a new document, "The Objectives of Ministerial Training," was prepared by Dr. Neeb and members of the Board and approved at the Synod's 1947 convention; each of the eighteen proposals for restructuring was, in turn, considered in terms of these "Objectives." Thus, those proposals which involved a move to subsidize students' upper division education at another institution as a means of providing an educational program more in line with that now current in the United States were eliminated as they would remove ministerial students from Synodical schools. Other proposals fell into two major categories: those to establish a separate two- or four-year institution to provide the education required between the end of the junior college and the start of seminary would, assuming that the seminary would now require the baccalaureate degree for admission; and those to attach two years of education to one or more of the system's existing junior colleges. (2)

Following a detailed examination of all proposals, the Board's recommendations, ultimately adopted by the Synod, were "that the present Junior College system be maintained." The Board also reported that "earnest efforts to agree on the propriety of selecting any one of the proposed plans... revealed a wide divergence of opinion; however, after an objective discussion of the premises offered and of the relative merits of the various plans, the Advisory Council (College and Seminary presidents) concurred with your Board in the following Recommendation: That Synod establish a Senior College as an additional unit in the professional training of ministerial students." The Board then proceeded to define a Senior College as an institution "on the level of the junior


and senior years of the American college system." Finally, the Board was instructed to undertake studies regarding the location, curriculum, and plant requirements for the new Senior College. (1)

Between 1947 and 1950, the next regularly scheduled Synodical Convention, discussion and planning for the new institution proceeded under the direction of the Board's Executive Secretary. Thus, by 1950, the specific aims and governing structure of the new Senior College had been determined, although a location was still to be chosen. At the 1950 Convention, the 1947 resolution establishing a senior college was reaffirmed, the sum of $2,750,000 was allocated for construction of the new campus when a location was finally decided upon, and a Committee of 99 - including the president of each of the 36 regional synods, parish clergy, and representatives of other specific divisions of clergy and laymen - was appointed to assist the Board in locating a site for the Senior College. (2)

The Committee of 99 met at the Board offices in St. Louis in January, 1952 and recommended that the Senior College be located either in the Chicago or Milwaukee suburban areas, primarily because of the geographical distribution of both the potential students and existing student body. On November 18, 1952, an option was placed on a 126-acre site northwest of Chicago, giving the impression that this would be the location of the new institution. Yet, before the next Convention was convened on June 17, 1953, "an unsolicited offer was made by the Indiana Technical College of Fort Wayne to purchase our Synod's Concordia College at Fort Wayne." After careful consideration of all alternatives - and the assurance that another location within Fort Wayne could be found for a new institution - the Synodical Convention decided to abandon plans for the senior college in Chicago and to plan instead for its development in Fort Wayne, Indiana. (3)


Thus, by 1953, the basic decisions regarding both structure and site for Concordia Senior College had been determined, although the institution would not open with students until 1957. And, although the decisions on site selection provide interesting examples of the interaction between the Board for Higher Education and the local boards of control for constituent institutions in the Synod's educational system, the basic decision to establish an upper division institution, as opposed to some other form of institution, had been taken as early as 1947 and had been reaffirmed in 1950. By the time the Committee of 99 had been appointed, the basic structural decisions had already been made.

The decision to establish an upper division institution at Concordia reflected, to a great extent, the influence of the German university concept on American colleges and universities, as did the decision to establish a similar institution at the New School Senior College. Most simply, the Board for Higher Education of the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod created a senior college because, although it possessed a complete preparatory (gymnasial) system of education modelled directly on the German educational structure of the mid-nineteenth century, its "university" level, consisting only of the theological seminary, required two additional years in order to parallel the common American pattern. The specific impetus to bring Synod's system into a parallel with the American pattern was probably the Second World War; yet, "reformers" within the Church had been pressing for both educational and structural reform for over thirty years.

The decisions taken at Concordia and the New School in the 1940's mark the end of one major chapter in the history of upper division institutions in the United States. Prior to 1950, consideration of basic educational questions - such as the appropriate structure of a baccalaureate degree, the distinction between "university" and "non-university" work, and the best point at which to divide the baccalaureate experience among several levels of institutions - led to the suggestion of several alternate organizational patterns, one of which was the upper division institution. Following 1950, the existence of rapidly growing systems of public junior colleges - themselves an outgrowth of many of the same questions which had led to the first upper division institutions - made consideration of alternate patterns of organization extremely difficult. Given the pattern of two-year junior colleges and a growing demand for increasing numbers of baccalaureate degrees, planners now turned to new questions involving the best way in which to provide for the industrial and educational needs of their communities. In several instances, answers to these new questions pointed to the same organizational pattern arrived at by those considering earlier questions in Stockton, New York, and Fort Wayne: the upper division college.
The 1950's: Michigan

Although the University of Michigan had considered establishing undergraduate programs in several Michigan cities including Flint during the late 1940's, the Flint community's drive to secure a four-year institution began in earnest in mid-1950, in large measure due to the efforts of Michael Gorman, then editor of the Flint Journal. Initial impetus came from approval of a $7 million bond issue in Flint on June 6, 1950, of which $1.5 million was to be used for construction of new buildings at the local junior college; concurrently, Charles Stewart Mott - one of the founders of General Motors, President of the Mott Foundation, and a noted Flint philanthropist - stated that the Foundation stood ready to provide $1 million toward construction of a four-year college for Flint. Three days later, at the urging of Mr. Gorman - a close personal friend of University of Michigan President Herbert Reuthven, Provost James Adams, and several members of the University of Michigan Board of Regents - a Citizens' Committee was established; among the twelve members were Gorman, Frank Manley of the Foundation staff, J.A. Anderson of General Motors A.C. Sparkplug Division in Flint, Everett A. Cummings, president of a local bank and member of the Flint Board of Education, and W. Fred Totten, President of Flint Junior College. At its first meeting, held June 25, 1950, the Committee decided that "a complete study should be made of the question of a four-year college for Flint." (1)

At some point before January 19, 1951, Gorman sent a detailed memorandum to Provost Adams outlining some of the thinking of the Flint Committee. Noting that enrollment at the Ann Arbor campus was growing rapidly, and the "Flint is substantially the largest community in Michigan without a four-year college," Gorman then discussed the required capital and operating costs, projected enrollment, and sources of support for a new institution in Flint; among the latter was listed approximately $1.7 million which the Board of Education had on hand "for a new Junior College." Based on this letter, Adams obviously assumed that the Flint community favored a four-year institution and, at the February 15 meeting of the Board of Regents, "reported on the proposal to expand Flint Junior College under the general supervision of the University." At its February meeting, the Board appointed Professor Algo D. Henderson to undertake a study of the proposal; in March, they asked that Henderson include the entire question of branch campus operations for the University of Michigan. (2)


Henderson's report was completed in April, 1951. After a general survey of other states' experience with branch campuses, Henderson reported that "the University of Michigan probably cannot meet the future demands for its services on a single campus," and concluded that there was no reason why the University should not establish additional units in other locations where sufficient local need existed. A survey of the state had shown that only Flint could demonstrate such a need, although "it seems probably that Flint could successfully establish and operate a public college of its own." Henderson's report did not address itself specifically to the question of relations between a University branch and the existing junior college, except to imply that such institutions could coexist since "junior colleges have only a limited program, and the state should be alert to provide four-year colleges in regions where the population warrants and where private institutions or other public colleges do not sufficiently take care of the needs." (1)

During the summer of 1951 - while Regents' action on Henderson's report was still pending - Marvin Niehuss was appointed to replace Adams as Provost of the University; on January 18, 1952, the new President, Harlan Hatcher, "reported informally to the Regents on the progress made to date in discussion with representatives regarding the proposed relationship between the University and Flint Junior College." In March of 1952, President Hatcher asked Professor Henderson to set up a joint committee with interested Flint citizens to refine the possibilities which were being discussed and to make recommendations for use before the Regents; following several meetings with a group from Flint, including Cummings, Totten, Anderson, Manley, and George Gundry, Chairman of the Flint Board of Education, Henderson submitted his second report on May 20, 1952. Henderson's basic conclusion was that, despite certain legal and financial difficulties which the Flint representatives had raised, "the University would prefer to operate a single, integrated four-year unit" in Flint. (2)

By this time, however, Henderson's recommendations were unacceptable to the Flint Committee. On April 30, 1952 the Flint Committee had submitted its own recommendations: "That the Board of Education officially confer with authorized representatives of the University of Michigan with a view to determining the nature and extent of the interest of the University of Michigan in the operation and administration of the third and fourth years of a four-year college program in Flint." Flint's desire to create an upper division institution was based upon a decision


"that the identity of Flint Junior College should be maintained," partially out of community pride for an institution which had been in existence for thirty years, partially to insure the continued operation of a number of community and adult education programs which the community college offered, and partially because of the existence of a trust fund, left to the junior college by the late W.S. Ballenger, which would "go elsewhere should Flint Junior College cease to exist." (1)

The Flint position was formally presented to the University on October 10, 1952 and, on November 18, Henderson presented an analysis of the "new" position to President Hatcher. Despite difficulties which Henderson anticipated in operating two separate institutions, the decision was made to continue discussions "from the constructive viewpoint" to see if agreement could be reached. Finally, following several months of discussion regarding possible means of implementing the Flint plan, Henderson submitted, on May 6, 1953, his final report to President Hatcher. After reviewing the history of the negotiations - including the fact that "initially the Flint Committee placed emphasis upon the funds to finance a four-year college" while "in October 1952 your committee was advised that the Flint Board desired to retain the Junior College" - Henderson outlined eight disadvantages to the junior-senior college plan: separate administrations, definition of space priorities, relations between extra-curricular activities at the two institutions, duplication of library, separate public relations staffs, prospects for "competition rather than cooperation" between the two institutions, potentially disproportionately high costs of an upper division institution, and the fact that the University's program "would be dependent for students upon a junior program not under our control." Since "your committee has not been able to see the same merit in participating in a divided operation in Flint that we believed lay in either of our earlier proposals," Henderson's report served to mark the end of one major period of negotiations, and conversations were suspended indefinitely. (2)

The discussions lay dormant until, on December 8, 1954 - more than eighteen months after the last formal communication - Everett Cummings, now President of the Flint Board of Education, wrote to the Board of Regents suggesting that conversations be reopened. Cummings' letter was in reality the culmination of one series of discussions as much as it was the beginning of another. Once again, as in 1950, Michael Gorman had acted as a catalyst. "So many committees have been involved with

1. Flint Citizens' Committee, "Summary of Progress Reports," p. 4; Cummings, interview; Totten, interview; Flint Board of Education, "Suggested Proposal to the University of Michigan in Reply to their Proposal of May 18," October 9, 1952.

negligible avail," wrote Gorman, "that I felt someone with a sympathetic interest in both directions might make a contribution by informally seeking an area of potential accord." Gorman's contribution, made during November in a series of private meetings with Niehuss and Hatcher, was to outline a plan for the operation of two institutions in Flint which presented a satisfactory solution to the problems cited in Henderson's May, 1953 memo to Hatcher. (1)

Gorman's suggestions, repeated in Cummings' letter to the Board of Regents, centered on three points. Noting that enrollment at the University had reached record proportions - increasing the need for branch offerings - Gorman sensed "a new urgency" and was "convinced the matter has reached the stage where it is even more important to the University than it is to Flint." Gorman also suggested that the request to the Legislature for funds be made separately from the regular University budget, both to increase the effect of Flint efforts to lobby on its behalf and to stress its development as "an alternative for State help which might forestall the movement toward broad aid for Junior Colleges" which the University had previously resisted. Finally, and most important, Gorman suggested a University position which would both mitigate against unfortunate and expensive precedent while also solving some of the practical problems raised in Henderson's last report. Gorman's suggestion, repeated by Cummings and adopted by the University, was that the University should announce itself willing - as a general rule - to offer faculty and administration for the third and fourth years only "in a community ready to supply buildings and maintenance" and to insure adequate local support, both financial and in terms of students. (2)

Following Gorman's recommendations - which were also to play an important role in both the creation of a second upper division institution in Michigan and in the decision to end the upper division only operation in Flint - events moved swiftly. On January 17, 1955, President Hatcher wrote to the Board of Regents supporting Cummings' request and recommending that a formal agreement between the University and the Flint Board be negotiated. A University Planning Committee, chaired by Professor Harold M. Dorr, was established in February, and Vice President (formerly Provost) Niehuss successfully presented the University's case to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives in early April. On April 13, the formal donation of $1,000,000 by the Mott Foundation was made, assuring that construction of needed facilities could be accomplished "to supply buildings" without cost to the State.

1. Cummings, interview; Niehuss, interview; Michael Gorman, letter to Roscoe O. Bonisteel, November 12, 1954; Everett A. Cummings, letter to Board of Regents, University of Michigan, December 8, 1954.

Finally, agreement was reached that "facilities which are now available to the Junior College students would also be made available on an equal basis to the Senior College students, subject to programing and scheduling, without cost to the state" and that no state funds would be required for either construction or maintenance of facilities for 1,000 students. "State funds," wrote Niehuss, "will be required only for operation of the educational program and for the building operating expenses." (1)

The decisions leading to the establishment of Flint College - formally created by the Board of Regents on March 10, 1955 - were greatly affected by local considerations both within Flint and within the University of Michigan. Yet, despite these local considerations, which, of necessity, would vary from one community and situation to another, the pattern of events in Flint was typical of the pattern to be followed in the establishment of later upper division institutions elsewhere in the country. By the mid-1950's, many areas were beginning to experience or to anticipate increasing demand for higher education as a result of the post-war "baby-boom." By the same time, publicly supported systems of junior colleges were rapidly expanding and gave promise of providing increasing numbers of students an opportunity for at least two years of college education.

Given the existence of these junior colleges, educators were no longer concerned with theoretical or educational problems which might question the existing organizational structure. Rather, when need for increased baccalaureate education was determined - whether because of specific industrial demands or because of projected numbers of students - planners in the public sector acknowledged the existence of junior colleges and investigated ways of providing baccalaureate education with the least financial and educational duplication of effort. In Flint - the first public upper division institution - planners saw the upper division as a satisfactory means of providing additional publicly-supported education beyond the junior college.

Flint College opened for classes in September, 1956; by that date, negotiations leading to Michigan's second upper division institution were already underway. These discussions, primarily with the Ford Motor Company of Dearborn, Michigan, had their base in developments within the Company dating back to a 1947 decision to eliminate "captive teaching staffs" and to draw upon existing educational institutions for educational programs. The Company's trade school was liquidated in 1952; concurrently, a series of studies were begun to determine Ford's ongoing manpower needs and to identify resources to meet them. Based on a study completed in February, 1955 - and upon past experience, which demonstrated that many

engineering graduates reluctant to enter manufacturing engineering (as opposed to product engineering) and business graduates loath to enter plant management - a decision was reached to explore possible means of encouraging local community college graduates - seen as a new pool from which to recruit personnel - to enter the production area and then to acquire engineering and/or management credentials. (1)

In August of the same year, Archie A. Pearson, Manager of the Company's corporate-level training department, conceived the idea of developing a Ford facility to provide the required education for community college graduates and of inviting nearby public and private institutions of higher education to offer junior and senior level courses which might lead to engineering or business degrees. Following Company approval of the idea, Pearson contacted Dr. R.H. Scott, Professor of Management at Wayne University and a personal friend, to explore the concept; Scott recommended working through one institution, such as the University of Michigan, rather than attempting to deal with a number of institutions and Boards of Control. Taking this suggestion, Pearson next approached another friend, James Lewis, Vice President of Student Affairs at the University of Michigan and, through Lewis' efforts, met with Marvin Niehuss, Executive Vice President of the University, on August 31, 1955. (2)

The University of Michigan was in an excellent position to be receptive to Pearson's ideas. Just seven months earlier, under Niehuss' direction, negotiations leading to University approval of the upper division institution in Flint had been completed, including the policy statement developed by Michael Gorman that the University might replicate the Flint decision given adequate local financial and student need and support. Furthermore, since the early 1950's, a campaign had been underway across the state to create new state universities from former teachers colleges and to create a state institution at Wayne University, then a Detroit municipal institution. Each newly created state university meant additional competition for state funds; the University of Michigan was eager in Dearborn - as it had been in Flint - to establish a base of operations on which it could draw for both legislative and financial support.

Initial conversations between Lewis and Niehuss from the University and Pearson and C.H. Anderson, Director of Personnel, from Ford, concerned the Ford proposal for a cooperative education center in Dearborn. Almost immediately, the University suggested development of a separate branch,

1. Arthur W. Saltzman, "Development of the University of Michigan-Dearborn Center," unpublished statement written for this study, December, 1950; Ford Motor Company, narrative for slide presentation regarding proposed Dearborn Center, n.d.
2. Saltzman, "Development."
similar to that in Flint, which would be independent of Ford, open to all students on an equal basis, but would offer those programs of study which both Ford and the University deemed desirable. At no point in the discussions was development of a lower division seriously considered; Ford's needs were centered at the upper division and graduate level, and the University had no desire to duplicate either its own Ann Arbor offerings nor those of the local community college. The most important single decision taken during the early months of discussion was that by the Ford Administration Committee on January 11, 1956. On that date, the Committee tentatively agreed to provide a cash grant for construction and a building site for the proposed institution, thus making Dearborn eligible under the "Gorman" policy. At the same time, the Company appointed a formal negotiating committee and asked that the proposed institution include both graduate education and an extensive cooperative program. (1)

Although "negotiations" were to continue between Ford and the University for another ten months before public announcement of the new institution was made, the decisions taken by the Administration Committee, coupled with the University's desire to acquire a base in Detroit, had, for all practical purposes resulted in the creation of a new institution in Dearborn. From that point on, details of the student body, site requirements, and specific curricular proposals were developed. University proposals were ready by mid-July; by mid-September, procedures for the formal request of the Ford gifts (money from the Ford Fund, the Company's charitable fund and land from the Ford Foundation, which held title to the land under consideration) had been developed. And, although the eventual donor of land was later changed to the Company itself, all documents had been jointly reviewed and were ready for formal submission by early November, 1956. (2)

On November 5, 1956, President Harlan Hatcher of the University sent a letter to President Henry Ford II outlining the University's desire "to extend our program to a select area outside of Ann Arbor" as a means "of meeting the need for more college-trained graduates in specialty fields." Following a brief description of the program to be offered, Hatcher stated that "the University invites the Ford Motor Company [or Ford Fund] to participate in the development of this proposed educational center" through a gift of the Fair Lane properties.


2. University of Michigan, "Cooperative Education Project," July 13, 1950; Saltzman, "Development;" University of Michigan, minutes of meeting between representatives of Ford Motor Company and University of Michigan, September 14, 1956; University of Michigan, minutes of meeting between representatives of Ford Motor Company and University of Michigan, November 3, 1956.
plus 210 acres, in one case, and through a donation of $6.5 million, in the other. In the accompanying document, "Request for Funds for University of Michigan-Dearborn Center," the University tied its Dearborn requests to a larger, state-wide "planned program of expansion in keeping with its history and responsibility to the State." The components of the program as stated in the "Request" document were similar to suggestions originally made by Michael Gorman in the Flint negotiations: "extension of the University's facilities to other communities in the State where clear needs exist and where such communities are prepared to assist the State by contributing toward the cost of new facilities" and a willingness to establish upper division institutions where "the operation of the college will be in close cooperation with the existing junior college." (2)

Official announcement of the offer was made at the Fair Lane estate in a joint news conference held December 17, 1956 by President Harlan Hatcher of the University and Henry Ford II, President of the Ford Motor Company and the Ford Motor Company Fund. On January 6, 1957, a joint meeting of the Michigan House and Senate voted unanimously "that this body urges the Regents of the University of Michigan to accept this generous gift." The formal offer, conveyed in writing to Hatcher on January 24, 1957, was "gratefully accepted" by the Regents at their regular meeting on February 16, 1957. Thirty months later, in the fall of 1959, the University of Michigan Dearborn Center was opened with 14 students. (2)

The 1950's: Florida

Although Florida's two upper division institutions were not finally established until the early 1960's, decisions taken in the 1950's led directly to the later actions; the 1950 decisions were necessitated, in great measure, because Florida had "enjoyed the benefits of a well-managed system of status quo higher education" for nearly fifty years. Finally, in 1954, a consulting group, chaired by A.J. Brumbaugh and including John E. Ivey, John Dale Russell, and Earl J. McGrath, was engaged by the State Board of Control; the consultants' report, in the form of preliminary recommendations, was presented to the Board of Control on January 20, 1955. Recognizing that Florida was beginning its planning from an almost non-existent base of public higher education,

the Commission recommended immediate establishment of a system of public community colleges, additional state colleges, and a means for coordinating all public and private two-year and four-year higher education within the State. (1)

Almost immediately, delegations from several metropolitan areas converged upon both the Board of Control and the State Legislature to begin their bids for the new institutions which were to be established. During the following legislative session - before the Brumbaugh Report had been formally published - new institutions were authorized for Hillsboro (Tampa), Palm Beach, and Escambia (Pensacola) counties; pressure was now increased on the Board of Control to formally establish each institution. The Brumbaugh Report, when officially published, heartily approved the legislative decision to locate a new institution in Tampa, but stated that "the legislation which authorized the establishment of a state university in Palm Beach County is sufficiently restrictive to preclude using it as authority for establishing on the lower East Coast an institution in a location nearer to Miami in which it is most needed." On December 18, 1950 - largely on the strength of the consultants' recommendations, the Hillsboro delegation became the first delegation to secure a resolution from the Board of Control establishing "their" new institution. (2)

On January 7, 1957, the Board agreed to accept an abandoned airfield in Boca Raton as a site for the Palm Beach institution and, on September 16, requested Dr. John Ivey to prepare a tentative plan for the new institution, which had yet to be legally established. On November 1, 1959, Dr. Ivey presented his recommendations to the Board, recommendations which called for creation of "a quality institution" with "a new type of cooperation between a university and several junior colleges" to make it "unnecessary for the University to offer an extensive program of freshman and sophomore work on its campus." Yet, Ivey's basic emphasis was on creation of graduate programs and a "quality" institution; the report's seeming failure to provide for


South-East Florida's need for a baccalaureate-granting institution and the feelings of some Board members that the proposed institution would be "both too idealistic and too expensive" led the Board to accept the report "subject to further refinements and revisions." In May, 1960, Dr. Brumbaugh was asked to return to Florida "to evaluate and to refine the tentative plans provided to the Board by Dr. John E. Ivey, Jr." (1)

Proponents of the Escambia institution, however, were not having similar success. Part of this failure was due to initial attempts to secure approval based on the use of Corry Field in Pensacola as a site for the institution; this Navy installation, originally scheduled to be abandoned in June, 1958, was eliminated as a possible site on July 19, 1957 following a Navy decision not to build new facilities in Southern Alabama. More significant, however, was the attempt to create a new institution to the conversion of Pensacola Junior College to a four-year program, a move consistently opposed by the State Department of Education and the Board of Control. As early as July 17, 1956, the Pensacola Chamber of Commerce had petitioned the Board to convert the junior college to a four-year program; repeated attempts to secure approval, both at the Board and in the Legislature, were defeated over the next two years. Finally, despite local estimates that a four-year institution would enroll between 1,000 and 2,500 students, the Board declared that it "saw no need for a university in the Pensacola area in the foreseeable future" and that it would not approve conversion of the junior college for that purpose. Thus, despite legislative authorization secured three years earlier, the Pensacola institution was defeated, at least for the remainder of the fifties. (2)


The initial suggestion in 1962 to reconsider the status of Flint College and the possibility of its becoming a four-year unit came from representatives of the Flint community rather than from the University of Michigan. In early 1962, Dr. Lawrence Jarvie came to Flint as Chief Executive Officer of the Flint Board of Education and General Superintendent of Community Education; according to Dr. Jarvie, "it appeared to me inevitable that the State of Michigan had to have another University Center ... The natural location, after I looked at the state as a whole, was in the Flint area." Other Flint residents viewed the expansion of the public system of education through the creation of new State-supported universities as a potential threat to Flint which, although the first Michigan community to secure a branch campus, might now be left with "only" an upper division institution while other communities developed real university centers. Finally, despite optimistic forecasts of potential enrollment made during the 1950's, the Flint institution had never enrolled over 525 students up to 1962. (1)

According to the public press, Executive Vice President Niehuss of the University had stated that "it seems certain that these centers [Flint and Dearborn] will have to consider extending their offerings to the freshman and sophomore years." Niehuss, however, feels that he was mis-quoted and had simply stated that "the could be extended to four-year colleges." Nonetheless, Niehuss has stated that, the prior month, first informal contact between the Flint community and the University regarding Flint's expansion had been made. And, the following month - on December 17, 1962 - a dinner meeting was held in Flint at the invitation of Charles Stewart Mott. Both David French, Dean of Flint College, and Niehuss received the impression that Mott would be willing to offer financial support for construction of an expanded institution in Flint. By the end of the evening, a joint committee of Flint residents (Jarvie, Roy Brownell, a trustee of the Mott Foundation, and Guy J. Bates, member of the Flint Board of Education) and University personnel (Niehuss, French, and Harold Dorr, Dean for Statewide Education) had been created "to explore in depth the future of higher education in the Flint area." (2)


The Committee's deliberations and study continued over most of the following year, and it was not until February 12, 1964, that the first report was made to the Flint Board of Education. On that date, the Bates Committee, as the joint committee was now known, presented its findings: "Present opportunities for college study, especially at the lower division level, are limited in scope... and a hyphenated four-year program does not and cannot adequately serve the educational needs of the seven-county Flint area." The Committee then recommended that the Flint Board of Education invite the University of Michigan to develop a four-year college in Flint at the earliest possible date. (1)

The University of Michigan Board of Regents acted quickly and favorably to the formal Flint request, transmitted on April 3, 1964. While commenting that "the success of this operation at Flint College has been gratifying," the Regents moved to "accept the principle of the proposed cooperative program" with Flint, a program which would involve a shift in emphasis on the part of the community college to a more vocationally-oriented curriculum while sharing the liberal arts offerings with the expanded University branch. With Regents' approval - and with all representatives of the Flint educational power structure except the community college itself in agreement - the decision to end the upper division program at Flint College had, for all practical purposes, been taken, although a combination of politics and power struggles were to provide a period of confusion and potential delay until the expanded program began admitting freshmen, as requested by the Regents, in September, 1966. (2)

Jarvie, members of the Board of Education, the Mott Foundation, and other interested groups (with, again, the exception of the junior college) were in favor of an expanded program for a variety of reasons, including the possibility that this might force the community college to offer more vocational or technical programs while continuing to draw adequate "transfer" students because of its differential tuition structure. Furthermore, many local Flint residents were deeply concerned about the expansion of University programs in other areas of the state which might leave Flint in a secondary position.

In 1964, when Flint College was created as an upper division institution, the University of Michigan had favored a unified program while the community had supported the idea of a completely separate institution, partially due to local pride in the junior college and partially due to financial and legal considerations involving a trust fund which was tied to the junior college. The eventual University


decision, based upon assumptions of adequate enrollment and cooperation with Flint Community Junior College, was to accept the local offer - which included monetary support for new facilities - and to generalize this action into a statement of policy which was then applied to the Newport situation and later to Flint again: the University would provide educational offerings where a community demonstrated both need and a desire for such services, as well as a willingness to offset the costs of facilities and initial maintenance.

By 1962, Dean French still felt that "in general, there was good cooperation between the Flint College and F.C.J.C." Although the lofty assumptions concerning enrollment had proven mistaken, size alone would not have prompted the University to expand its program without the initiative of the Flint community. This initiative, based on a desire to have a full four-year college (or University Center) in Flint, was accepted by the University not because of any failure of the original assumptions concerning Flint College, but because the 1964 events had "happened as an historical accident, not as a deliberate attempt to demonstrate a new educational structure." The University was not committed to Flint College as an educational or experimental unit, it had developed because circumstances and community pressure dictated when circumstances and community desires changed, Flint College changed with them. (1)

The 1960's: Florida

On December 10, 1960, Dr. A.J. Brumbaugh made his report to the Florida Board of Control on recommendations for the new University in South-East Florida. "The University," he stated, "will look to the community junior colleges of the State, and especially those in the southeastern coastal area, to provide the basic education of the freshman and sophomore years." Thus, Ivey's plan for a reduced freshman and sophomore program had become, in Brumbaugh's report, an upper division institution. According to Brumbaugh, "the concept of an upper division institution to be established at Boca Raton, Florida emerged from consideration of several possibilities by the Planning Commission of which I was director;" according to then Executive Director of the Board of Control, J. Broward Culpepper, "the idea of developing a new institution where the emphasis is upon upper level undergraduate and graduate work was reviewed well before the Brumbaugh Report of 1961... which was supposed to be a follow-up on the Ivey report to crystallize in more detailed fashion the steps which might be followed for developing the new institution." Regardless of the exact moment at which the idea for an upper division institution entered the planning for the new Boca Raton institution, there is every indication that the idea was relatively current in Board offices before Brumbaugh's arrival, and that

It had not been Ivey's intention to completely eliminate the freshman and sophomore classes. (1)

Regardless of the exact source of the upper division idea in Florida, the plans had a sound basis in reality. Southeast Florida required an institution with a strong emphasis on research and graduate education; a decision not to offer freshman and sophomore years was also seen as being in line with "the emphasis on economy in government" under the new Governor, Farris Bryant. In addition, many legislators felt that the existing programs at Tallahassee (Florida State University) and Gainesville (University of Florida) were in desperate need of support and that new institutions should not be created until these institutions had been strengthened. Brumbaugh's proposals, by assuring the seven counties of south-eastern Florida that their new or proposed community colleges would not be threatened, gathered vastly needed legislative support for the proposed institution. "The institution was created," Brumbaugh has written, "as a response to local pragmatic needs as opposed to educational theories based on known or assumed models." According to Culpeper, "we were not influenced by other institutions in the planning for Florida Atlantic University. (2)

Brumbaugh's report was formally adopted on July 15, 1961 and, in the 1961 legislative session, money was allocated to make possible the opening of Florida Atlantic University in 1964 as "the first college in the nation to forego freshman and sophomore classes" (according to the first catalog). Thus, by 1963, "the public policy structure (the Board of Control, its chief executive officer, Dr. Broward Culpepper, certain legislators, and the Governor, etc.) had committed itself to the model provided by the Brumbaugh Commission Report for Florida Atlantic University." This commitment, although not so obviously stated at the time, was both a factor in and reinforced by the decisions regarding establishment of a new institution in Pensacola, first authorized in 1955 and promoted unsuccessfully by various groups from Pensacola and Escambia County through the remainder of the decade of the Fifties. (3)

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2. Kenneth R. Williams, interview held November 14, 1963 at Boca Raton, Florida; Brumbaugh, letter to Altman; Culpepper, letter to Altman.

The campaign for a new institution at Pensacola was given new life on March 22, 1961 when Governor Farris Bryant stated that Pensacola Junior College should be converted to a four-year institution, a position long advocated by many leading Pensacola citizens. Between March and June, when the State budget was finally passed without funds for such a conversion, stiff legislative battles raged both within committees — where the delegation from Escambia County had significant strength — and in the Legislature as a whole, where it did not. The final budget did, however, appropriate $100,000 for a study in Pensacola and, on February 16, 1962, Dr. John Guy Fowlkes was appointed to conduct this study of Pensacola’s educational needs. Finally, on July 21, 1962, the Fowlkes Report was publicly presented in Pensacola. “The data previously presented,” Fowlkes concluded, “build a forceful case for the establishment of a four-year institution within the Pensacola area not later than 1970.” (1)

Fowlkes had also concluded, as an assumption on which his final recommendation was based, that a two- and four-year institution could operate successfully within the same community; yet, this very statement, while pleasing advocates of a four-year institution, worried advocates of conversion of the junior college. Yet, surprisingly, the wording of the Board minutes do not report Fowlkes’ recommendation of a four-year institution; rather, they report the suggestion of a degree-granting institution in Pensacola. Furthermore, it appears that, despite the public debate in Pensacola, Culpepper had already made the decision to create an upper division institution by October, 1962. (2)

According to Phillip F. Aebler — former administrator at the junior college, member of the Legislature, and now Vice Chancellor of the State University System of Florida — the wording of the original Fowlkes Report which proposed a four-year institution was probably a semantic error made before the implications of such a statement were apparent. Furthermore, according to Culpepper, “during that time of conflict (after July 21, 1962) I took the position that the nature and type of the new institution should be based upon a plan of organization which would meet most effectively the needs of the state.... I do not have any recollection of changes being made in the Foulkes report.” Yet, on October 30, 1962, Culpepper’s assistant, Herbert Stallworth, wrote to Fowlkes to report completion of the typing of the final draft of the Fowlkes study. “Of the corrections indicated on the manuscript, most are typographical errors,” Stallworth wrote. “Also, when reference is made to the proposed institution in the Pensacola area, the institution...


is designated as a "degree-granting public non-profit institution." And, in the final analysis, was the study itself, focused discussion on the "non-transfer" of the four-year degree-granting institutions now spoke of the four-year college-granting institutions, adding "such a degree-granting institution could still naturally be a four-year institution." (1)

On November 19, 1960, the State Junior College Advisory Board formally constituted a committee, including Executive Secretary James L. Wittenbarger, "to work with a similar committee in the Board of Control to develop a statement regarding community Junior College," the first draft of that document, dated January 6, 1961, presented a detailed rebuttal of the arguments for a four-year college occurring in the public forum and recommended that "the Board of Control request of the 1961 Session of the Legislature the establishment of an upper level degree-granting institution in the Pensacola Area." Final public announcement of the decision in favor of an "upper level degree-granting institution" came at the February 6, 1961, meeting of the Board of Control. Interestingly, perhaps, at least in January 73, Stallworth had written to Culppepper reminding him of a proposed four-year institution as requested by Florida's educational leaders, but recognizing that it was essential the real situation in which to find existing in the two-year institution, which, nonetheless, could add "Florida's educational objectives," when it is suspicious to do so should such a move come to be considered to be good sense." (2)

The decision to establish an upper division institution in Pensacola, formally made on February 6, 1961, was the result of a number of factors. Perhaps most basic was the determination by Florida in 1960 that a four-year program could be justified and needed, even though this was diametrically opposed to the Board's own decision in late 1959. Although never stated, one reason for the Board's support of a four-year position may have been the realization that some alternative had to be planned to convert the junior colleges to the Board's mandates, essentially rejected all conversion attempts, both for economic reasons, because it might lead to wholesale conversion attempts on other institutions, and because, at least from the Board's statements, the need for a four-year program had not been demonstrated. Board action to create a new

1. Phillip Ashler, interview (Ii November 13, 1961) at Tallahassee, Florida; Stallworth, letter to Altman, Culppepper, letter to Altman; Herbert Stallworth, letter to John Guy Fowlke, October 18, 1961; John Guy Fowlke, Providing for Educational Beyond High School in the Pensacola Area (Tallahassee: Board of Control, 1962), p. 64.

institution based on the earlier community demands of need would be difficult to defend against those supporting conversion; the logical answer was for the Board to develop its own independent statement of need, not tied to proposals for conversion, from which it could then determine the most satisfactory response.

Once the Board had admitted need, several alternative forms of organization were available. Despite continuous pressure to convert the junior college, the Board had never seriously considered such a proposal. The two remaining alternatives - creation of an independent four-year institution and creation of an upper division institution - were both considered and, despite the fact that educational considerations may have lent support to the complete four-year institution, "elements present in the real situation" led to the ultimate decision to create a two-year institution which would build on the local junior college. A model for this type of institution - Florida Atlantic University - already existed in Florida, although F.A.U. would not admit its first students for over a year, thus reducing its value as a "test case" for the concept of upper divisionism in Florida.

The Pensacola institution, soon named the University of West Florida, was basically a response to a situation, and not a conscious attempt to continue any "experiment" which may have, coincidentally, been started through the pragmatic decisions surrounding the creation of Florida Atlantic University. Four years after its formal creation, in 1967, the University of West Florida admitted its first class making Florida the only state then to have two upper division institution in operation.

The 1960's: New York and Pennsylvania

The New School Senior College had remained virtually the same since its creation in 1944, despite efforts by President Simons in the late 1950's to create a four-year, day-time program in its place in order to complete the "underpinning" of the Graduate Faculty which the creation of the Senior College had begun. Yet, a number of serious weaknesses had developed within the Senior College, including the fact that "for all practical purposes the present B.A. program is the simple accumulation of 120 credits provided these credits are distributed in a certain arbitrary fashion," that "the administration carries the burden of the program rather than the faculty," and that changes in the total New School offerings "are made in the best interests of the adult non-credit student rather than the BA matriculant." Moreover, as noted by the Middle States Association during an unsuccessful bid for accreditation of the New School programs, "the basic elements of a 'major' or of progression in a curriculum, are not definite and clear." (1)

Moreover - although never intended as a major effort - the New School Senior College had never enrolled large numbers of students: by 1960, after sixteen years of operation, the program had graduated a total of 409 students with the baccalaureate degree. The original purpose had been to provide pre-graduate work for a small number of part-time adults; in 1960, the average student was still slightly over 35 years old and required five years to complete the two-year program. Thus, the original purposes appeared to be successfully met; the arrival of a new President - who almost immediately initiated "an analysis of every program in the institution and of its resource base, and of its academic character and quality" - and the naming of a new Dean in 1964 provided the impetus for a review of the purposes themselves in view of the changing societal and student needs of the 1960's. (1)

During the very first months of the new President's - Dr. John Everett - presidency, a series of discussions took place with the new Dean - Dr. Allen Austill - faculty, and students; one virtually unanimous conclusion was that the existing Senior College should be abolished. Yet, the new proposal was not to create a four-year institution, as at Flint, but to create an upper division institution for full-time, day session, college-age students, a population distinctly different from that traditionally served either by the New School as a whole or by the Senior College in particular. A full-time program would imply both a full-time student body and faculty; the latter would be required if the new program were not to suffer the same lack of supervision and continuity which had weakened the old Senior College. Concurrently, a day program would provide better use of facilities; a continuing upper division program would not require large investments for language or science laboratories. Finally, Everett and Austill felt that a significant population of highly-qualified students were dropping out of "what traditionally have been called very good colleges" and might be attracted to a quality program which would present "things in terms of meaningful interrelationships rather than just building blocks." (2)

On July 6, 1965, Everett reported on his thinking to the Board: by the end of September, Austill had developed a proposal which now included possible sequences of courses, divisional structure, and


student body characteristics. On the basis of Austill's report, Everett agreed to hire two consultants to develop syllabi in the humanities and social sciences. In October, the Educational Policy Committee of the Board reacted "enthusiastically in favor" of the proposal and recommended its continued development, which proceeded quickly in part because "there was no one to defend the kind of educational program we were presently running at the baccalaureate level." Finally, on February 4, 1966, the Educational Policy Committee again heard President Everett's report and recommended the new program to the full Board; the New School College was born. No action was ever taken to eliminate the old senior college; rather, a motion was approved to begin the new program in September, 1966. (1)

The New School College, as reconstituted, did not remain the only upper division institution in the City of New York for long; within one year, a second institution - approved in late 1965 - would open on Staten Island as a part of the City University of New York, the municipal, tuition-free system of higher education in New York City. The institution on Staten Island was similar in many aspects of its development to the University of West Florida in that community sentiment on Staten Island had long been in favor of a four-year college. Professor Arleigh B. Williamson, soon after his appointment to the Board of Higher Education (Trustees for the City University), had begun to push for the creation of such an institution. After sounding out various members of the Board and representatives of the State Education Department and the City government, Williamson decided "that the expeditious thing to do was to get a foot inside the door toward complete higher education and that foot in the door would be a community college." Yet, the idea remained that, at some future date, the proposed community college could and would be expanded to a four-year institution. (2)

Following the establishment of the community college, which opened with 177 students in the fall of 1966, Williamson "let the thing lie fallow" until 1962 when the Board's Committee to Look to the Future presented its report. Noting that "at present, each borough in the City has a Senior College campus except Richmond [Staten Island]," the Committee recommended that "very shortly, the Board of Higher Education initiate a detailed study of the need for a Senior College [four-year institution] in New York City parlance to serve the Borough of Richmond." Accordingly, and in line with Williamson's initial thinking, the Board on December 17, 1962 appointed a committee "to give special consideration to the possible development of the Staten Island Community College into


a four year college." The Chairman of that committee — and of the committee which had originally established the community college on Staten Island, was Professor Williamson. (1)

Although neither the Regents nor the Trustees of the State University were then on record as opposing conversion of community colleges, State University Vice President Boyd Golder informed Williamson that "the State was not going to permit community colleges to develop into four-year colleges. By September, 1963, the Board of Higher Education had modified the Williamson committee charge to "Explore the Need for Establishing a Four-Year Program in the Borough of Richmond;" despite this change, Paul Orvis, University Dean for Two-Year Colleges at the State University wrote to Gustave Rosenberg, then Chairman of the Board of Higher Education, expressing that "our Trustees have been concerned over several newspaper reports with regard to the potential conversion of the Staten Island Community College to a four year college at that location." To which Rosenberg replied, "it is the clear intent of this Board that the two-year college in Staten Island continue in the future as a two-year institution." The move to convert the community college to a four-year institution was officially dead. (2)

Williamson's first formal report to the Board presented the results of a study — directed by Peter S. Spiridon of Staten Island Community College — which had begun the previous November. This report, approved in principle on September 30, 1964, demonstrated a need for a four-year institution on Staten Island and recommended "the establishment in the Borough of Richmond, as a part of the City University of New York, of a four-year college, on the pattern of its other senior colleges." According to both Spiridon and Williamson, the Committee's basic goal was to determine the need for a full four-year college on the Island, and they fully expected that a four-year institution would then be established "because," as Williamson has stated, "we saw no other way to do it" since the State had eliminated the option of converting the community college. Yet, some members of the Board challenged the idea of a full four-year college which would compete with the community college and, on December 21, 1964, a new committee was created which, according to Williamson, was to describe


Williamson has stated that, during the early stages of the preparation of the second, or "implementation," report, "it dawned on us that we could establish two years despite the community college," and that this was the germ of the idea for an upper division institution on Staten Island. The idea of an upper division institution had already appeared in writing in the 1964 City University Master Plan, prepared by Dean Harry L. Levy, who "became aware of the upper-division college movement through conversations in 196- with my fellow-members of the Steering Committee of the Social Studies and Humanities Curriculum Program of the American Council of Learned Societies and Educational Services Incorporated, at least one of whom came from Florida, where the experiment was being launched." Yet, neither Levy nor Williamson had yet connected the needs on Staten Island with the Master Plan statement "I was aware of that statement," Williamson has said, "but it had not occurred to us, when the first report came out, that this might be the expedient thing to do." (2)

On September 1, 1964, E.K. Fretwell came to the City University from the State Education Department where, in 1966 and 197-, he had co-authored statements supporting the concept of an upper division institution in New York State. When Fretwell arrived, he found that the general concept of an upper division institution was well accepted; he began "to make sure that in any documentation coming out of the City University reference was made to a bachelor's degree granting institution" rather than to a four-year college. On November 11, 1964, Fretwell wrote to University Chancellor Albert Bowker "I am convinced that we should plan for an upper division college for Staten Island.... My conversation with Professor Williamson yesterday (I took the initiative for talking with him) convinces me that there is pretty good general agreement as to what we're aiming for." (3)


Although the draft of Williamson's second report, based to a great extent on an earlier memo from Fretwell, was not completed until mid-April, 1965, and the Board of Higher Education did not approve the creation of the new institution - Richmond College - until June 21, 1965, the basic decision to establish an upper division institution appears to have been made by Fretwell's November memo to Bowker or, if later, by a January 21, 1965 meeting between Fretwell, Levy, and Williamson at which time Fretwell reported on visits made to existing upper division institutions in Dearborn and Boca Raton. Following that meeting, Fretwell sent Williamson a set of documents which he had collected; Fretwell also noted that the Flint campus was adding two years to its program, but this was dismissed as "a result of statewide enrollment pressures." The following month, Fretwell sent Williamson a memo which became the base - along with new Spiridon studies - for Williamson's April 13 report. Following assurances of support from both the State Education Department and the Mayor's office, the Board approved Williamson's report and Richmond College was established. (1)

According to Fretwell's February draft - repeated in the April Williamson report - there were eight reasons for establishing an upper division institution on Staten Island. Such an institution would make possible upper division opportunities sooner than if a new institution were started, class by class, with the freshman year; would provide a high quality student body since community colleges would screen out the uncapable; would, at the same time, provide opportunities for "late bloomers" whose potential was recognized only after admission to the community college; would strengthen the masters degree by linking it more closely to the baccalaureate in an institution which could then concentrate on upper division and masters study (shades of Jordan and Hutchins); would make effective use of resources through partnership with the community college; would draw stronger faculty through the promise of only junior, senior, and graduate instructional responsibilities; and would provide for a more relevant and immediate tailoring of offerings to the needs of the local community. (2)


Yet, Williamson's first intention, dating back to the early fifties, was to convert the local junior college; only when this option was blocked by the State Education Department did he move to consideration of a full four-year institution. When this alternative was questioned by other members of the Board of Higher Education, the second Williamson Committee was created to determine how a four-year institution could be created without overly threatening the existing community college. And, according to Williamson, the final decision to create an upper division institution "was an expedient; we thought that if we could do this, if it was practicable to do this, if there were antecedents to do this, or if we could work the matter out in practical terms, this would serve as an expedient for not making the Staten Island Community College a four-year college. It was only after we began to work on this, to implement this expedience, that we discovered that this had virtues in itself." (1)

Williamson perceives the creation of Richmond College as an "expediency;" President Eric A. Walker of The Pennsylvania State University has characterized the planning and development of The Capitol Campus as a striking example of a pragmatic response to a fluid situation. Prior to July, 1969, the University had no intention of establishing an additional unit, let alone an upper division college, in Harrisburg, where it already cooperated with four other institutions in the operation of the Harrisburg Area Center for Higher Education (RCCA). Several private liberal arts colleges served the baccalaureate needs of the area, and the Harrisburg Area Community College, which had opened in 1968 as the first public community college established under Pennsylvania's new 1966 "Community College Law," already enrolled over 450 students. (2)

Suddenly, in late July, Governor William Scranton learned that the Air Force was planning to close the Olmsted Air Force Base in Middletown, Pennsylvania, approximately ten miles southeast of Harrisburg. Almost immediately, Scranton contacted President Walker to ask "if it might be possible for Penn State to establish a graduate school which would utilize part of the Olmsted Air Force Base, and which might enhance the economy of the area." Walker asked C.W. Wyand, Chairman of the University's Administrative Committee on Long-Range Development, to prepare a proposal for the development of the Olmsted facilities and, in August 19, 1969, Wyand submitted a "confidential, preliminary working draft" to Walker. Wyand's report, which became the basic planning document for the new institution, recommended not simply a graduate school, but development of an upper division college which could also offer associate degrees in selected technical areas in which the new college would have both the faculty and facilities to

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1. Williamson, interview.

provide the necessary courses. (1)

On August 24, 1965, Walker wrote to Scranton outlining his thinking on the proposed Olmsted institution. A graduate school alone, Walker wrote, would not be large enough to support the necessary faculty and research; an undergraduate institution, which would make better use of the available facilities, would compete unnecessarily with other institutions in the area. An upper division and graduate institution, on the other hand, would complement the efforts of neighboring institutions, relieve some of the enrollment strain on the University Park campus, and allow for maximum utilization of faculty, classrooms, library, and laboratory facilities. Walker also reported that he had already discussed this proposal at a meeting with some of the "opinion formers" in Harrisburg and felt "there is a large measure of acceptance of the idea." Furthermore, since the State wanted to demonstrate its capacity to utilize the available space at the earliest possible date, Walker assured Scranton that "we feel certain that if such a combination of programs were put together, it could be started in the fall of 1966 on a trial basis." (2)

According to Walker, the Capitol Campus was not modelled on any existing institution, but was the logical outgrowth of the factors cited in his letter to Scranton. By the end of August, 1965 - less than two months after Scranton learned of the proposed closing of the Olmsted facilities and three months before the Governor formally requested that the University be the applying agent for these facilities - the basic decisions concerning the organization of the new institution had been made, dependent only upon approval by the Penn State Trustees and the Governor, and the willingness of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, to whom title of the airport had been transferred, to release the property to the State for this purpose. (3)

On November 14, 1965, the Governor formally requested that the University develop the Olmsted complex as an educational institution; by that date, the basic decisions regarding the institution's purpose and structure had already been made and agreed to by Walker, Scranton, Roger W. Rowland, Chairman of the Penn State Board, and Clifton Jones, Secretary of Commerce for the State of Pennsylvania. Two weeks later, the Board's Executive Committee approved "an academic program to be operated as an integral part of the University" as a Commonwealth Campus in Middletown and, on January 8, 1966, the board approved the establishment of the Commonwealth Campus. Also in the intervening period,


2. Walker, letter to Scranton.

3. Walker, interview.
the State Board of Education was "notified" of the potential campus, although Severino Stefanon, Secretary to the Board, has stated that "at no time did The Pennsylvania State University request approval from the State Board of Education for the establishment of the Capitol Campus," nor, under the general regulatory powers granted to the Board, was such approval necessary. (1)

Planning continued up to and through the opening of the Capitol Campus with eighteen students in September of 1966. According to Walker, the institution was not really opened until September, 1967, when the first full class would be admitted, but it was necessary to have some students in the building from the beginning. Thus, fourteen months after the Governor's first approach to President Walker, the first students - transfers from the University Park Campus and from other Commonwealth Campuses - were enrolled to begin work toward as yet undefined bachelor's degree programs in humanities and social science. (2)


2. Walker, interview.
CONCLUSIONS

The initial proposal on which this project was based hypothesized that "in every case, one may assume that the decision to choose the upper-divisional form of organization was based on certain existing problems or needs, as well as assumptions as to how this form would meet the needs. And, in those instances in which an institution has reverted to full, four-year status, one may also assume that (1) the institution's original perception of its problems was faulty; (2) the institution's assumptions concerning the effects of this form of organization were incorrect; (3) some new factors were added which changed either the initial problem or the correctness of the initial assumptions."

Perhaps the most basic finding of this study is the extent to which the preceding paragraph was not applicable to the establishment of existing upper division institutions. Upper division institutions - and, one may now assume, most new institutions - were based less on existing problems and needs than on either perceived problems or needs which may or may not reflect the real needs of the area or on needs of specific interest groups which were often unrelated to the needs of local students. Furthermore, planning rarely attempted to analyse the ways in which this organizational form would meet perceived needs. Rather, in most instances, the mere existence of a number of public two-year community or junior colleges both obviated the need to repeat the first two years and, in several instances, made such repetition politically impossible even if educationally desirable. It should be re-emphasized, however, that the existence of these two-year colleges in itself was not a primary consideration in the initial decision to establish a new institution in most areas.

The primary pattern of development of upper division colleges in the United States since the Second World War has been as follows: determination of additional need for baccalaureate-level education - whether based on student or industry need - followed by a decision not to (1) duplicate an existing junior college nor (2) convert such an institution to four-year status. Given the organizational pattern of two- and four-year institutions extant in the United States today, the only alternative is creation of a two-year segment to provide the required baccalaureate education. Desire for an upper division institution per se has not influenced the initial decision to establish some institution; rather, the upper division form has been the last acceptable
alternative for a previously-conceived-of institution, once conversion of a full four-year institution have been rejected.

Upper division institutions since 1956 have been universally public; prior to that date, they were universally private. This split provides instruction as to the changing reasons for the establishment of upper division institutions. At least to some extent, early upper division institutions were based on considerations as to the appropriate educational functions of "colleges" or "gymnasia" as distinct from "universities;" included in these considerations were questions as to the appropriate place at which to separate general from special or professional education. By the end of the Second World War, this place had been established as the end of the sophomore year - or of the students' junior college experience. Following that date, public institutions - which are much more responsive to both the growing numbers of junior colleges (which are predominantly public in these areas) and of their graduates, as well as to pressure from local industries or politicians desiring creation of an institution to serve the specific needs of their area - have been, and will continue to be, the rule.

Perhaps regrettably, the fact that future upper division institutions will be public for the reasons stated above has other implications. Public institutions have been affected to a much greater degree than is desirable by the availability of land or facilities. Capitol Campus was begun for this reason, several other institutions were established on the condition of available land or facilities, and the University of West Florida was not established in the late 1950's in large part because of the sudden unavailability of a naval base, the availability of which was one of the prime arguments in favor of establishment of a new institution at that time.

Moreover, the fact that institutions have been established with a unique (and potentially difficult) organizational form without consideration of basic educational questions beyond "need" for a baccalaureate institution has meant creation of problems - particularly a failure to meet enrollment goals, an inappropriate utilization of faculty, or a difficulty in faculty retention - which are not, due to lack of planning, used even as lessons in the development of future institutions. Many of these difficulties can be prevented through adequate and appropriate planning processes, particularly with reference to the decision to establish an upper division, as opposed to another form of college. "Baccalaureate need," even if properly determined, does not insure that an upper division institution will operate effectively, despite the existence of one or more community or junior colleges in the "immediate area." Moreover, assumptions regarding commuting - both in general and as it relates to the community or junior college graduate - must be reviewed.

As the initial assumptions concerning establishment of upper division institutions were incorrect, so were those concerning the decision to "revert" to a full, four-year status. To the extent that assumptions concerning how this form of organization would meet existing
needs were never made (except, again, for some determination of a need for baccalaureate education), the "failure" of these assumptions could play little or no part in a decision to abandon the upper division form of organization. To the extent that such assumptions included a need for baccalaureate education on a scale which would be reflected in adequate student enrollment, then it may be said, however, that the initial planning assumption was incorrect.

It would be more proper, however, to conclude that, in the case of both College of the Pacific and Flint College, "new factors were added which changed" not the initial problem or assumptions but the situation in which the institution operated. At Pacific, these factors included the advent of the Korean War, the imposition of accreditation requirements, and the steady deterioration of relations with the public junior college on which Pacific relied for its students. At Flint, these factors included a change in the community's desire for an upper division institution, both reflected in and reinforced by the availability of significant funds to allow the University to take the position which would have been preferred a decade earlier when funds, among other reasons, led the University of Michigan first to establish an upper division institution.

Thus, in one sense, there are no lessons to be learned from the "reversion" of these two institutions which can be applied to existing or future institution as a guideline for incorrect assumptions to be avoided. In another sense, however, there are specific and severe lessons, especially from the experience of Flint College: an institution established in an experimental form - with all the concomitant problems associated with the operation of an upper division institution - must have firmer support and reason for its being than the refusal of a State agency to allow conversion, the sudden availability of a plot of land, or the desire of a legislative delegation to secure an institution for its constituents. Only with such a base of support will the institution - when difficulties do arise - have the necessary commitment and reason to continue operation as an upper division institution while seeking to correct its problems rather than rejecting the upper division form of organization and, in many cases, not looking beyond that rejection to the basic causes of its difficulties.
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