One of the most significant changes in patterns of authority and influence in higher education during the last quarter century is the great growth of faculty power, coupled with rapid faculty professionalization. Several studies have pointed out that under ordinary conditions, ruling "elites" take over faculty affairs, and participation on senate committees is limited to a relatively small number of faculty. The faculty is often distrustful of the administration and joint participation on committees does not necessarily relieve the tension. Decentralization of decision making and authority, however, does seem to be a useful devise in reducing conflict. The methods used in resolving conflict closely relate to the power struggle. The division is between the principle of shared decision making and shared authority in a community with common interests as exemplified by the AAUP, and the assumption of permanent conflict of interest between faculty and administration requiring confrontation, sanctions, and collective bargaining, as propounded by the AFT. Another issue is the composition of governing boards which are now primarily composed of lay members. The time has come to broaden the representation on the boards, to include faculty members and students, and increase the opportunities for discussion. (AP)
PROFOUND CHANGES are occurring in patterns of authority and influence in higher education. In some institutions there is an internal struggle for participation and power among students, faculty, administrators, and trustees. In response to campus disruption, external forces are increasing their pressure on colleges and universities. Legislatures are considering punitive laws for controlling disruption and violence. Some governors are asserting political or personal power, or both, over public institutions. Pressure groups—from left or right, from the intellectual elites to the dispossessed minorities—are trying to use universities to protect their interests or to realize their aspirations. Systems of public institutions are also impinging on the autonomy of member colleges and universities, in many cases leaving institutions frustrated in their efforts to determine their own destinies.

One of the most significant changes during the last quarter of a century is the great growth of faculty power, coupled with rapid faculty professionalization. Either by formal delegation or tacit approval, college and university faculties have attained a high degree of professional self-government. They exercise effective control of the education and certification of entrance to the profession; the selection, retention, and promotion of their members; the content of the curriculum; work schedules; and the evaluation of performance. The individual faculty member's independence is enhanced by the principles of academic freedom and tenure.

PATTERNS OF PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNANCE

Except in crisis, a limited group of faculty members conducts the business for their colleagues. The report of the Study Commission on University Governance at Berkeley observed that "... there is a marked tendency for a relatively small number of faculty members to monopolize the membership of the most powerful committees and to rotate the chairmanships among themselves." In other words, oligarchies take over the machinery of faculty government. The Study Commission observed that the combination of Academic Senate oligarchy and bureaucracy tends to discourage appointing faculty members with unorthodox or dissenting views to major committees. The oligarchy tends to be essentially conservative.

The fact that under ordinary conditions, ruling "elites" take over faculty affairs has been recently documented. An ongoing study of senate committee membership for...
the period 1965-68 at the University of Minnesota reveals that during these three years 10 percent of the university staff had served as members of three to six different Senate committees. Furthermore, a little more than an eighth of the committee members had accumulated six to ten years of committee service. Thus, a small number of people were potentially able to exert a high degree of influence on faculty and university affairs.

A comparable record of participation in faculty government was found at Fresno State College in California (Deegan, McConnell, Mortimer, and Stull, 1959). There, 56 persons out of a faculty roster of 417 served on three or more different committees during the three-year period. Sixteen of these served on four committees, and seven on five.

A recent study of senate committee service at Berkeley (Mortimer, 1970) for the 10-year period 1957-67 showed that two-thirds of a representative faculty sample had served on no senate committee. Of those who had served, 47, or a little more than 10 percent, had been members of three or more committees. Among committee chairmen the concentration was greater. Of 138 chairmen, 50, or 36 percent, had served on three or more committees. From 54 to 61 percent of committee members were full professors, and from 67 to 76 percent of committee chairmen were at the top rank.

Essentially the same pattern of participation in faculty government characterizes all three institutions. The degree of participation in senate committees is relatively limited. A very small number of faculty, while not completely monopolizing membership, engage extensively in committee service. The most powerful committees are heavily weighted with people at the top ranks. The oligarchs constitute what is essentially "the rule of the elders." With these academics in power, one would hardly expect galloping educational reform.

It is difficult to change this power structure. After the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley, some of the faces of the oligarchy changed, but the Establishment survived without making many concessions.

The formal relationships between faculty and administrative lines of authority vary from institution to institution, and one cannot always infer the nature of such informal relationships as those mentioned in the preceding paragraph from the organizational structure. At the University of Minnesota, administrative officers serve on many senate committees. A recent study showed that, excluding student and alumni members, nearly 10 percent of the total number of committee appointees were members of the central university administration, and another 41 percent were deans, associate or assistant deans, or directors of special programs.

Likewise, at Fresno State College the president and the academic and executive vice-presidents are ex officio members of the senate. Although there are no members of the central administrative staff on four senate committees, such as the Committee on Committees, central administrative officers are ex officio members of all major college-wide committees.

Quite a different situation exists at Berkeley. There, the elected Committee on Committees almost never appoints a central administrative officer to senate committees. The exclusion of principal university officers from membership on senate committees makes effective administrative leadership difficult. Furthermore, exclusion sets the stage for confrontation; that is, committees face a responsible administrative officer with ready-made decisions which he must either accept, attempt at this late stage to have the committee reconsider, or veto.

Under stress there is considerable tension between faculty and administration at Berkeley. In contrast, at the University of Minnesota there have been few instances over the last decade of serious differences or great tension between faculty and administration. It seems reasonable to hypothesize that the close collaboration of administrative officers and faculty members in major committees is one reason for the relatively high degree of trust that characterizes faculty-administrative relationships at Minnesota.

It would be unwise to assume that the distrust at Berkeley and the rapport at Minnesota are the products of administrative inclusion or exclusion on senate committees. At Fresno State College, as pointed out above, central administrative officers are ex officio members of all college-wide committees except those which are designated explicitly as senate committees. Thus, the Fresno administrators have the opportunity to participate fully in the decision-making process. Yet a larger segment of the faculty, although not the majority, suspects the motives of central administrative officers, resists their participation in decision making, and seems to desire confrontation more than collaboration. It is obvious that factors other than joint participation are at work. They include such matters as the behavior of governing boards, administrative style, faculty-unionism and struggles for power among faculty factions, the degree of decentralization of decision-making authority (faculty and administration may tacitly agree to divide responsibility and authority and to keep out of each other's way), political intervention, constraints of system membership and coordination, and many others.

Various means of reducing tension or conflict have been adopted or proposed. One of the devices which characterizes the multiversity is to decentralize decision-making authority to the lowest possible levels of the organization, and to hold central review by either faculty bodies or administrative officers to a minimum. Thus, at the University of Minnesota, for all practical purposes, personnel decisions and curricular actions are taken at the departmental level, although they may be, at least perfunctorily reviewed centrally in some of the schools and colleges. However, there is little intervention in these matters either by university-wide faculty bodies or administrators.

If tension reduction is the principal goal to be attained, decentralization of authority is apparently a useful device. Whether it is productive of either educational integrity or budgetary efficiency is quite another matter.

Closely related to the struggle for power in college and university governance are the methods used for resolving
controversy and conflict. The issues are exemplified in the attitudes which distinguish the American Association of University Professors from the American Federation of Teachers. Crudely put, the division, on the one hand, is between the principle of shared decision making and shared authority in a community with common interests, and on the other, the assumption of permanent conflict of interest between faculty and administration requiring confrontation, collective bargaining, and coercive sanctions.

The AAUP's principle of shared authority and responsibility has been defined as follows:

... among the faculty, the administration, and the governing board there is an inescapable interdependence and ... these three components have joint authority and responsibility for governing the institution ... The essential and overriding idea is that the enterprise is joint and that there must be adequate communication among these components, and full opportunity for appropriate joint planning and effort.

The policy of the American Federation of Teachers, on the other hand, is to confront power with power. Using the industrial analogy, Dr. Israel Kugler, President of the American Federation of College Teachers, AFL-CIO, put the position as follows:

The board of trustees is the board of trustees: the managers are the president and the host of deans. It is those groups that wield the power and authority and determine the destiny of a university. To be sure, there have been a web of faculty senate and councils which simulate the original role of policy-making that university faculty once had. The advisory nature of these bodies provides them with some active role in curriculum and student affairs, but virtually no part to play in raising the necessary finances to provide professional salaries, work load, and working conditions.

The AFT believes that college faculties should resort to collective bargaining to advance their interests. Said Kugler:

Collective bargaining provides negotiations under conditions of equality between the trustees-administrators and the teaching staff. The cant and hypocrisy of all sorts of advisory intramural faculty committees, senate, and councils are swept away and real negotiations can take place.

Whatever one's view of unionism, collective bargaining, and the strike; one is forced to conclude that collective bargaining will become much more common.

Faculty members, especially in institutions with traditions of state surveillance by governing boards and of overriding administrative authority, may be expected to challenge trustees and administrators and to assert and demand their own autonomy. The growing spirit of confrontation which characterizes many institutions led an observer of the academic scene to say recently, "We seem destined ... to move increasingly toward relationships of an adversary type, characterized by confrontation and bargaining, backed by force, by threat, and intimidation."

GOVERNING BOARDS

Presumably the governing board should play a key role in sensitizing a college or university to its public responsibilities, while at the same time protecting and enhancing its intellectual freedom. With few exceptions, the governing boards of American institutions are composed of lay members, except that presidents sometimes serve ex officio, and fairly frequently now faculty members sit on the governing bodies of institutions other than their own. However, there are only a few instances in which faculty serve as trustees of their own college or university.

In some universities, student activists and some faculty members have attacked the principle of lay governance. They have charged that trustees represent privilege and power, and not the broad interests of a pluralistic society; that trustees would, if they could, restrict the academic freedom of faculty members and students; that they still think that going to college should be a privilege and not a right; that they favor a hierarchical system of government and administration in which decisions are made at the top and imposed down the line; that they continually interfere in matters which faculty or students, or faculty and students, should control.

Studies of the composition of governing boards and the attitudes of their members give some credence to these charges, although there is a great deal of diversity from board to board and member to member. However, it should be noted that the studies report trustees' professed attitudes, not their actions. Over ten years ago, Lazarfeld and Thielem (1958) reported that trustees and regents as well as administrators of colleges and universities of superior quality supported the academic freedom of social science faculties. The recent studies of trustees' attitudes should now be followed by studies of trustees' behavior, in order to determine how they act in crises concerning issues of academic freedom, faculty and student participation in governance, campus control of educational policy and program, and the faculty's prerogatives with respect to its own membership.

Is lay governance anachronistic? Governing boards composed exclusively of laymen are no longer adequate to the task of running colleges and universities, large or small. Before proposing an alternative, however, one should consider the functions which laymen have performed and still may be able to perform in building bridges between institutions and society. It is instructive to look at the British experience.

The faculties of Oxford and Cambridge are self-governing societies. "They are," said Lord Robbins (1966) "syndicalist organizations—pure examples of producers' democracy. There are no representatives of the public as such concerned with, or responsible for, their ultimate decisions." The conditions under which the Red Brick or civic universities were established made the imitation of Oxford and Cambridge inappropriate. The civic universities originated as teaching institutions sponsored by local people who hired the teachers and admitted the students. "It was natural, therefore," said Sir Sydney Caine (1969) "that when they attained university status it was a nonacademic group, composed largely of representatives of local government authorities and other local organizations which emerged as the effective executive authority."

Sir Sydney went on:

The standard constitution of the new universities ... provided for a Council with a majority of such lay members but with some academic representation, controlling finance and, in form at least, appointments; and a Senate, entirely academic in composition, dealing with "academic" matters.
It is significant that the new universities established after the war have all followed the Red Brick tradition by establishing governing bodies composed both of lay members and faculty representatives.

It is the membership of academics on governing bodies that has distinguished the British from the American universities. Lord Robbins takes the presence of faculty members on university councils for granted. In the report of the Committee on Higher Education and in subsequent presentations, he considered it necessary to justify lay members rather than to comment on the necessity of faculty representation.

Over time, the balance of influence between the academics and the public representatives has changed. Sir Sydney Caine has pointed out that the academic members and academic senate have increased their power at the expense of the laymen, and that this trend is likely to continue.

RECONSTITUTING GOVERNING BOARDS

The time has come in American higher education to reorganize patterns of authority. First, lay members of boards of trustees should no longer be confined mainly to those who represent wealth, position, or political power. Even the public university, in the past, has responded primarily to the articulate, the influential, and the powerful in society. That it must now become responsive to a wider range of economic interests, and to a pluralistic political constituency, as well as to a more diverse pattern of ethnic and cultural backgrounds and aspirations, we can no longer ignore.

Second, governing boards should be reconstituted to include a substantial proportion of faculty representatives. Faculties quite rightly will not accept token representation. One or two faculty members in a rather large governing board, however conscientious they may be, will find it difficult to express the interests of a diverse constituency or to wield much power when critical decisions are made. Here again, the British precedent may be instructive. As of 1962, according to the Robbins Committee Report, the proportion of senate representatives on university councils ranged roughly from something less than 20 percent to approximately a third. In American universities and colleges, it would seem appropriate for faculty representatives to comprise from a fourth to a third of the voting members.

Third, student representatives should either become voting members of governing boards or formal arrangements should be made for continuing substantial student representation at meetings of the board and its committees.

Fourth, to supplement formal association of students and faculty members with governing boards there should be numerous opportunities for joint discussion of college and university affairs among trustees, administrative officers, faculty members, students, alumni, and other constituencies. To this end, formal councils should be established or special task forces should be created, or both.

In institutions where the faculty has gained a large degree of authority and influence, it may in the future lose no small part of its control. In large and complex universities whose support flows from many sources and in which there will be increasing internal and external pressure for "efficient management," faculties may lose whatever influence over the allocation of resources and detailed budgeting they may have won previously. Faculties will be increasingly frustrated in academic planning and administration as educational decisions are made more and more by external agencies. Institutions which are members of systems such as the California State Colleges or the State Universities under the Board of Governors in Illinois now find themselves constrained by a remote system-wide governing board and by the policies and practices of a distant central administration. Faculties in particular institutions are limited in their authority to introduce new curricula, develop graduate studies, or expand research activities. Frustrated by all these impediments, faculties may become increasingly contentious and resistive to both internal and external constraints. The redistribution of power in higher education will not proceed smoothly or amicably. It will be accompanied by turbulence, controversy, and even conflict. The resolution of conflicting forces and purposes will be beyond the capability of any one faculty or administration, any one institution, any system, or any state. It will call for statesmanship of a high order, leadership capable of mobilizing the efforts of all who have a stake in the maintenance of intellectual freedom in the university and in the society.

REFERENCES


