ABSTRACT

The third volume of this 4-volume report contains the last two speeches, on educational philosophy and the role of reason in society, from the Colloquium on the Culture of Schools held at the New School for Social Research (preceeding speeches are in Vol. II, SP 003 901), reports on conferences on the culture of schools held in Pittsburgh and Washington, D.C., in 1966, and selections from "Anthropological Perspectives on Education," a monograph to be published by Basic Books of New York. Two of the seven papers presented at the Pittsburgh conference are included: "Education and Social Stratification in Contemporary Bolivia" and "Anthropology and the Administration of Schools: A Structural Analytic Approach." Papers from the Washington, D.C., conference are subsumed under four general topics: the schools as cultural instructional systems, the development of curricula in anthropology for schools, the preparation and support of teachers, and the development of anthropology and education. Monograph selections appearing in this volume are: "The Shaping of Men's Minds: Adaptations to Imperatives of Culture;" "Early Childhood Experience and Later Education in Complex Cultures;" "On Communicative Competence;" and "Hippies and Social Change." Further monograph selections appear in Vol. IV (SP 003 903). [Not available in hard copy due to marginal legibility of original document.] (RT)
CULTURE OF SCHOOLS
FINAL REPORT

VOL. III

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE
OFFICE OF EDUCATION

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A "philosophy of education," in the traditional sense of a rather fixed, extended and useful set of principles, by which to guide educational practice becomes less and less attainable and/or useful.

Beyond a narrow statement of a few principles at a very high level of generality, any further extension flies in the face of what we ought to know to be the case. The case is trivialized by being subsumed under the worn rubric of "rapid social change," since this makes us assimilate to it to some increase in the rapidity with which the familiar-feeling processes of, say, the nineteenth century occurred. It is one thing to drive along a road that is getting considerably bumpier; it is another to scheme for passage along one characterized by periodically recurring car-length chasms.

What we now have, or are on the eve of having, is a situation in which society, persons, and appropriately perceived problems are, in their most important respects, radically transformed, not merely from generation to generation, but from semi-generation to semi-generation.

*Dr. Seeley warned that his remarks were "disconnected, inconclusive and somewhat thematic..."
or faster. Thus, whatever was appropriate education - with reference either to content or method - for the high-school or college student of ten or fifteen years ago is no longer appropriate, may well be counter-educative, today.

Nor do I mean this in the relatively trivial sense that curriculum (and method) must be "up-dated," because the logistical growth of knowledge has added a great deal and shown much to be in error. By itself, this might be coped with, though probably only by making it possible, palatable and required for all teachers to become half-time students. (This, in turn, would require a radical alteration in the character-structure, reward-system, reference-group and social organization of many, if not most, but even that is relatively easy).

I mean that each successive wave of "students" (and hence also, ultimately, of teachers) is so radically different, that the crucial problems in and for education are ever radically fresh. What might be called system-properties fade into insignificance as problems in comparison with historic properties, properties of radical novelty on both sides as this tribe of teachers - 1940, 1950, 1960, or what have you - faces that tribe of students. Of course something may be said of inter-tribal intercourse, but it will carry us not very far toward any effective parley.

What is different in each wave strikes very deep (as well also as shallow). It is a commonplace, I think, of therapeutic practice to say that we hardly ever now
encounter the classic forms of hysteria (la grande hystérie) that formed so large a part of the problems confronted by Freud. That - two to three generations - is a large bite of time. My strong impression is that we are witnessing equivalent changes, now, by decades: that children born, say, ten years apart are quite differently brought up. Differently brought up in several senses.

Differently brought up, in the sense that the very character-structure is sizeably altered: the degree of and balance between shame, guilt and anxiety; the characteristic and preferred defenses and defense systems; the amount, source and locus of internal conflict; the preferred resolution or maintenance modes, intrapersonal and interpersonal; the libidinal investments in fantasies, and internal and external, familial and non-familial objects of love and hate; the self-image, general (what it is to be a person) and particular (what it is to be me); the ego-ideal, and the very vision of the place and function of an ego-ideal, and the investment appropriate therein; even, more radically, attitudes toward what it is to be neurotic, or hung up, and hence what the problem is, and hence the mobilization and disposal of energies for various uses. Not to mention sizeable changes by decade, at non-superficial levels, in definitions, cathexed definitions, of what it is to be a man as over against a woman, and what is the normative, desired and desirable degree of difference.
between them, and the desired nature and use of the bridges that are to span the differences desired and deduced.

But it is not only that the formative experiences are different in their bearing on the - in a sense, "mute" - character structure. But that, pari passu, given certain conditions, the personal and shared consciousness of what is afoot (including the awareness of historicity rather than systemicity) changes rapidly, both in degree, and in what it is that is grasped. Thus both the "social structure," and the "culture" of the successive waves of persons, are sufficiently different to raise all the questions of communication across cultural barriers, not in the old-fashioned sense of difficulties of understanding between those who are "there" and those who are not there yet, but in the new sense of communication between two cultures one of which does not prefigure, and the other of which does not prepare for, the one being confronted. The "cultures" of the successive waves are not early and late stages of the same thing, but presumably viable alternatives, indeed alternatives it is intended to make prevail. Indeed, if there is a succession, it is in temporal reversal: the older trying to guess at and readapt their culture to what they take to be the emerging shape of that of the young. And perhaps for the very good reason that it may indeed represent an enhanced appreciation, a more adequate under-
standing and a larger, as well as a more generous, grasp.

This regeneration each generation of, in effect, novel personalities, in a substantially disjunct culture, supported by a society (rather than, properly, a sub-society) makes for two other novel circumstances in the setting of the educational problem. First, the preferred method of divide et impera, of dealing by choice with predominantly competitive, "atomic" "individuals" is quite unavailing. And second, one cannot count upon as motive the tradition in which one is drawn forward by the believed-in excitements and enlargements of "the next stage," presented and modelled by one's just-next-elders in sight. What has to be looked to is the development and enhancement of the culturally immanent logic and resources of each wave, so that some considerable insight, inventiveness and social-creative competence is called for, in place of what was for earlier, luckier educators a given.

The essential source of this continuous discontinuity is not at all the technology (if by that we mean the means whereby material goods are produced), nor the resultant rapid alteration of the conditions of production, as the term is ordinarily intended. The primary source of such dizzying lack of "cultural lag," is social science itself, and its offspring - using that term to represent the fairly reliable "feedback" man has brought
into existence to report, albeit partially, with tremendously increased rapidity and penetration, on what it is that man is doing to man, and what man is and is becoming as a consequence.

Feedback is really a misleading image, since the social and psychological beliefs are either constitutive of the society (of that which is social) or the medium in which the society exists, as community (according to Dewey) exists in communication. Thus a person growing up, especially ab initio, on a different psychological theory (taken as within the compass of self-evident commonsense, and unquestioned assumption) is in a profound sense a different person. And if we allow for the double impact of parents themselves differently brought up employing in each decade quite different child-raising methods (while simultaneously conveying disjunct messages consciously and unconsciously, by word and gesture) even as the child is caught up in his peer and public life in yet another set of authenticated gospels of ultimate things, we should expect, as indeed we find, far-reaching fundamental differences in the children. And as such facts become themselves the subject of authenticated and accredited report, and hence the new nucleus of the unexamined commonsense, felt and known, presumptions as to what it is to be a person—or child, adolescent, adult, parent and the like—the problem
of "intergenerational communication" make ecumenic conferences look like child's play - as, indeed, they may turn out to be.

Now to return to the eternal as the necessary context to and constructed framework for the temporal or historic. Formal education in Western society has been under - has been taken to imply - two rather radically different major mandates. One heads up in what in the modern horrible jargon is called "manpower procurement." The object is, as efficiently as possible, to cut, pare, trim, shape and package people to fill what are aptly called "slots" - indeed, the human "products" are subsequently "slotted-in," with as little "wastage" as may be. The slots are taken as given. And the alleged justification for the procedure is "the needs of the society" - whatever that silly but conclusive phrase may mean. These alleged social needs are set over against what underlies the other mandate; variously, the needs or rights of "the individual." (In case of conflict, the second, it is assumed, must yield to the first). Thus "the task of education" is to hack away at the child until he fits into at least one of the predetermined shapes, while attending to "his needs" (both the natural ones, and presumably the ones growing out of the routine surgery being performed upon him) by the provision of counselling, football, clubs,
gripe sessions, an air of personal interest and warmth (despite the overarching scheme of man-manufacture) in the classroom, and so on.

In the better schools and colleges some further attempt at reconciliation may be made: more commonly, by taking a more relaxed view of what "society" required, and then assuming that what is good for society is good for you; more rarely, very rarely indeed, by proceeding on the assumption that what is good for you is good for society. The formulation is still bad and wrong, but it carries the burden of the more humane and sensible impulses.

I do not propose to treat seriously under the heading of the eternal the manpower-procurement, manning-table model. In so far as it was a constraint laid upon - not a mandate for - education, it had as its historic locus the period between abysmal poverty (when such things must be left to take care of themselves) and the period of mountainous affluence (when such things may and should be so left). Since we are in or on the verge of the second, while we are increasingly obsessed by the thinking appropriate to the first, let me turn to the true task of an education appropriate to the times.

The tasks of a formal education proper to our time and the future are to see to (sometimes only tend of watch over) the co-emergence of: mind, self and society (George Herbert Mead's Trinity) and history and culture.
And not merely their co-emergence, but their enhancement of "building up." The term "building up" is, perhaps, and perhaps necessarily vague enough, but the sense intended is not that in which a building is built up toward a foreknown and preselected plan, but rather the sense in which a symphony, a poem, a good love-affair or a good life builds up toward an ever-open, potentially ever self-capping or culminating non-conclusion.

It must be evident that such a building up — coemergently, again, of mind, self, society, culture, history — cannot proceed as it has done in the past when, even under circumstances of relatively, rapid social change, the theme, as it were, dominated the variations. Within rather narrow — certainly narrower — limits, the main lines of the play, the main dispositions and roles of the players, the balances between act, agency and scene, could be educatedly guessed at, the historic tasks or necessities were enduring and virtually self-evident, or seemed so — all were sufficiently given that while the educator might even then not properly fully fashion the emergent, he might "train him up" to a very high point and safely leave him to continue therein. Our problems are not like that.

What we must now vitally lead or encourage the child to discover is the particular intercept of his history with history in general, the history in which in one sense
his history is caught, and in the other sense, which
enfolds it. What he needs to understand in all particu-
larity is Who am I? Who are we? And in what act am I
with them - are we - engaged?

And by "understand," we cannot mean know about,
for in reference to such subject-matter merely to know about
is to mistake, to put down, to disvalue, to destroy. Under-
standing which permits and furthers and develops the under-
taking grows only out of the undertaking, in and by a full
engagement. So that discovery flows out of commitment,
which it enlarges, clarifies, alters. And such community
as is needed to make tolerable the risks alike of commit-
ment and its examination, and the dialectic growth that
these in their interpenetration give rise to, flows at one
level out of the identity of common commitments, or their
complementarity and mutual support, or - most thinly,
perhaps - out of the bare communality of intelligent
commitment itself.

What is additionally difficult under the new
circumstances is that the context for the process is, as
already indicated, one of radical cultural difference over
less-than-a-generation intervals. And not only cultural
difference, but the virtual facing by one society - "ours"
- of another - "theirs." The image of "teaching" will
hardly any longer serve. With another society one treats
very delicately. If two cultures confront each other, and the relations among their bearers are not war, hot or cold, overt or covert, the mandate upon each is to explore the other, in a tender, respectful, collaborative and perhaps mutually elaborative and enriching relation. Indeed, the enterprise indicated begins to bear some relation to what social research ought to be - the exploration in mutuality by people who are different, of the sources, meanings, values, "causes" and consequences of their differences, with a view to learning from each other, in love and reason, whatever it may be empirically discovered is of value to either or both.

Not only is it clear that action, committed action (is there another kind?; perhaps I should have said highly and deeply and broadly committed action) is going to be and ought to be central for and in education (especially for the proximate historical period), but it seems clear also that what might be called activism is and is going to be central.

Activism as it presently appears is something far better and more sensible than its name implies. It is in actuality - and I commend it - a short and long-run inter-twined alternation in education between on the one hand education in a posture of militance and a state of dispersion, and, on the other, education in relative quietude, receptivity
and (geophysically as well as psychologically) concentration.

Also foreseeable, I believe, is a period of relative permanence for a new location of the balance or new constitution of the mix as between "realism" and "romanticism." The present (and foreseeable) "wave of the future" demands great realism with reference to past and existent states, together with great romanticism with respect to futures and with regard to present means to bring such futures out of the alternative options.

Lastly, the demand for "integration" takes everywhere a new importance and a new turn of meaning. What is to be integrated — in a serious sense, not left out — moves steadily toward the inclusion, both with reference to the world within and the world without, toward all that is there to be taken count of. But the integration sought is no longer — either within persons or between them, or within groups or between them — an integration by melting-pot, nor an integration by and under a hierarchical scheme of values or social units or disposition, nor a mere treaty-state of "separate but equal." It is an integration of the sort that characterizes a good conversation, or a valued social relation in which distinctness (not separation) is preserved, but something that is common and valuable is built up — not over against and superior to and eliminative of what is distinct, but in constant dialectical relation to it, so that each is ever the ground of the other.
What all this calls for by way of organization, new relations, new methods for education - as well as new social context for it and appreciation of it - I leave for another time. But I suggest much of it is before us and around us (perhaps in a primitive state) on the campuses of the high schools and the higher high schools we call "Universities," of our nation. What is peripheral and resisted needs perhaps only to be made central and cherished to embark us on a bright - or brighter - beginning.
It seems to me a momentous fact which has to be taken into account by anyone who would reflect philosophically about education that the so-called "public school movement" has very nearly come to an end. By the "public school movement" I have in mind a rather amorphous, comprehensive, inchoate social movement of the past 8 to 100 years, through which schools have been established, manned and made available throughout this country. No other country in the world has been able to assemble the social resources and put together the support of such a diverse population in support of schools. All of this has been done. And it is this social movement which I think is now passed. One can no more date its end than date its beginning. But, by the same token, it seems beyond doubt that there was such a movement; that outstanding teachers, political leaders, friends of youth of all persuasions, were able to assemble much support for the development of schools; that now one can expect to move from place to place, in the United States, and find, on the whole, a system of public schools providing instruction from the elementary grades through high school, administered and organized in a fairly comparable fashion, staffed with better staffs than they were 80 years ago, or even 60 years ago. And, on the whole, that is an enormous achievement.

But this movement, which I call the "public school
movement, was possible because it was able to depend on certain assumptions about American society which, though not necessarily mutually compatible, we were, nonetheless, able to gather into one social movement, large groups of people who had relatively different social interests. The rich or the established middle class could be persuaded to support schools for the poor on the grounds that only then would we have a skilled labor force properly persuaded of its appropriate role in our society and inoculated against infection from foreign-political and social doctrines. So they could be persuaded.

The "public school movement" could be made to appeal to anyone who was rendered uneasy by the rapid influx of the foreign born. The task of the schools was to Americanize these people. It could be made to appeal to an entirely different group of people who saw in the school the appropriate instrument of social mobility. It could be made to appeal to certain other groups on religious grounds.

I think it is possible to draw out and formulate fairly precisely, a set of assumptions - five or six of them - that characterized this social movement. I do not propose to formulate these or to discuss them. My point is simply that there was such a social movement. It was of such a nature that virtually every class or social group
in America could find something to support within it.

What interests me, however, is that because of the school "movement," the scope of educational thought—the public limits, so to speak—were somewhat narrowly defined. The educational debate was, for the most part, the thought of this movement. Educational theory was the theory of the "public school movement." And since the first order of business was the establishment of schools, it turned out that educational philosophy, to the extent that it existed at all, had to do primarily with issues of public policy involving the establishment and support of schools and schooling.

One of the consequences was that educational philosophy became primarily the source of the supporting ideology of the school establishment. The debate was the debate between camps within the educational fraternity which seldom moved to consider anything except the support and management of schools. The function and philosophy of education, then, was to provide a rationale for the overarching values—I am quoting here the language of the movement—provided a rationale for the "over-arching values" which were integral to a democratic society and presumably were being propagated in every aspect of the school.

What I am suggesting is that this social
movement in American history has come to an end and what it has bequeathed to us is a complex set of institutions at precisely that point when a good deal of the optimism about their power to shape and improve human life is gone. The institutions are there but the evangelical kind of liberal optimism which gave the movement power is no longer there. The result is that these institutions, which were strongly moved by the conviction that they were good instruments for the education of the young, now, in fact, serve quite different purposes which may or may not be germane to education. They are, in fact, admirable instruments - as I have argued other places - admirable instruments for selecting and certifying people to fill a variety of positions in the economic and military institutions in our society.

This is not, however, the point I want to stress. I want to emphasize, rather, that the end of the "public school movement" means that philosophy of education can now be much more fundamental and comprehensive in its concerns. It need no longer be the philosophy of schooling. Educational philosophy, being free from the "public school movement", can once again return to the central issues of considering the education of the public.

In short, it is only in recent years, I think, that the philosophy of education, as contrasted with the
philosophy of schooling, has become possible in this country. Philosophy of education need no longer start with the school - need not even start with the presupposition of certain political and social institutions as given. Such a philosophy can begin with no limitation imposed by the necessity of defending a particular social system.

What then would such a philosophy look like? Well, I think that's really too much to answer. I wish to deal with, or rather simply point out, two themes which seem to be significant. The first is the difficulty in understanding the character of rationality itself, which may well be undergoing important transformation. Second is the fact that if we're to speak of educating the public or educating for the public, then we must attempt to understand in what sense it can continue to make sense to speak of the existence of the public. I shall try to show how these two themes are interrelated and how they may be made to gather up many of the topics of our discussion of the last couple of days.

Stanley Diamond pointed out yesterday that the figure of Socrates constitutes a decisive break in Western thought. I think he is right. This was also Nietzsche's judgment. If I were to point to what marks the character of that departure, I would point to the discovery of the
authority of argument. This was in itself the discovery of the authority of reason or knowledge. And this leads me to Jenks' point about the new middle class power in the possession of specialized bodies of knowledge.

Remember, what Nietzsche tried to express was the important point in his discussion of truth so characteristic of Socrates. He said, if we would think of truth as a lady, then could it not be said that philosophers have not known how to handle women. "The will to truth! Why not untruth?"

The discovery of the authority of argument was part of the same general movement in the direction of secularism. The nature philosophers, you will recall, were concerned to know the cosmos quite independently of any supports from mythology, religion or magic but by the exercise of reason alone. They were quite willing to accept the consequences for thought, and presumably for action, as that distinction wasn't as rigorously drawn in their minds. Presumably they were prepared to accept the consequences in whatever direction reason might lead. Which is to say, in effect, that the ultimate authority over man is not myth or religion or unseen powers but reason. In the Protagoras and elsewhere, Socrates reiterates again and again, that knowledge is a noble and commanding thing. He urges the slave boy of Meno and
and others, to follow where the argument may lead. Pay heed, not to the speaker but to the argument. That is his constant advice. In the Republic and the Protagoras, he is constantly invoking against these people who intend to give long speeches because such speeches always conceal equivocation and other forms of rational mistakes. Pay attention to the course of the argument. Reason is the supreme authority and there is and can be no appeal from it or criticism of it except by the further use of reason. This is, in a sense, what leads to the so-called Socratic paradox – virtue is one thing and that one thing is knowledge. This view clearly derived from the notion of the authority argument and then presented the problem of akrasia, or moral failure. How can it be that the authority to command would be disobeyed? How can it be that someone would know the good and not do it? And so Plato developed several different views as to the source and the remedy of moral failure.

Man is at war against the authority of moral reason – at war in himself between the commands of the passions, the spirit and the reason. There must be discipline and control but clearly it is reason that must rule.

And so the pattern of habit in shaping behavior and pleasures must be regulated, started early, and it is
precisely this process which Plato called Paideia. He was most explicit on this, most clearly, incidentally, in The Laws. There Plato develops the portrait of a society which might be described as one under the authority of experts. That is, it can be said that he committed what some people call the ultimate indiscretion, of placing certain people in control of others, who have no claim to be in control except that they know more.

It was quite clear that the virtues which The Sophists claimed to teach were, without exception, certain civic virtues, or at least virtues cast within the existence of a civic community. These virtues could be taught to anyone. At least, that was the contention.

In Plato, however, the authority of reason is expressed in and through a civic order in which there is a functional division. The proper order of society exists when each person is performing that function appropriate to his rationally determined position.

I would like to suggest that the authority of the expert in Plato was somewhat ameliorated by the fact that there was — supposedly, at least — a conception of an association which was at the same time a community and at the same time a political body — both at the same time. There was, in short, a public which was more than a mere functional association, and education was concerned with the
process undertaken both through and for the sake of the public.

Now, if I push this a bit - what one wants to do, I think, is to turn immediately to another conception within this tradition namely, that of prudence or the marvelous combination of concepts of skill and morality which you find in Greek thought. Let me express this. Prudence was the application of the rule of reason to function. What made it possible to connect up this authority of reason with multiplicity of function was this conception of the polis. It was the notion of the community. There was an over-arching image of what man was and how he was placed within this society.

But what of a society in which managers are possessors of specialized knowledge and in which the expression of rationality has no unity to it. In modern society the uses of rationality vary enormously from one kind of professional group or one sort of activity to the others. This means that the separation of function has no unifying conception of rationality which ties together the various segments of society.

What we have in the modern world is a society in which there isn't any community. We need to think and teach and talk and educate in terms of a global society. There is a tremendous difference talking about a society
and a community. It's pretty easy to love mankind in general and hate your neighbor. It may well be that when we talk about public education, or the education of the public, that one of our fundamental difficulties is that we have now no longer any way of finding what it is that we understand by the "public." Certainly the concept of the polis or the civitas which comes out of classical thought doesn't fit. We can talk about functional associations which are kind of circumstantial relationships between people. They are not, however, clearly discriminable from an ant eater or other forms of insect communal life.

I want, furthermore, to stress the notion of what strikes me as an interesting and rather mysterious thing. I, frankly, find it really almost unbelievable - this notion of the discovery of the authority of argument, because, you know, if you reflect on this, I think you find that it is really an incredible thing. Why the hell should man be under any kind of authority of argument, of reason? Why should it be this noble, commanding thing? This just seems to me a truly genuinely mysterious thing. I don't understand it. I am willing to accept it. But once one does that then we are presented with tremendous problems in the structure of authority in the modern society, which is increasingly dependent upon
The experts are tolerable only so long as we have the kind of accountability or control that Jenks was trying to toy with this morning. The problem of social control becomes extraordinarily important and it must be the kind of control which will still allow people to argue with the experts, the authority of reason. This is part, I think, of the terror that is presented to us by Plato. He is the one philosopher in the history of the West, who faces the problem of the authority of reason head-on and what he comes up with is a thing which is hardly compatible with the kind of social structure that I think we normally want to endorse.

Well, part of this problem arises due to the Socratic and Platonic insistence that there is no criticism of reason except reason.

Now, I would want then to go on in reflecting on this to the figure of Augustine, who wanted to say that there is another way of viewing communities, another way of viewing the civitas. He wanted to accept the Platonic frame of thought but at the same time to say that the basic question about the community was really this: What is the object of love and sharing? And for Augustine, it was a very concrete, specific purpose. It turned people away from themselves to
neighbor and became a fundamental idea in his thought as to what constitutes a human community. I was astonished at some of the things that Oscar Lewis was talking about today because in his picture, the one thing that stands out to me is the creditable durability of love and the questing, searching for this in the midst of all the instability and fear in the lives of the Puerto Rican children.

Well, I have said what I want to say though not in a good way perhaps. It seems to me that it is in some such treatment of this problem - the authority of reason and its relation to community that a new philosophy of educating the public might emerge. This is a crucial problem that the educator has to deal with. It seems to me inescapable that education has to be cast within the context of a community or a public otherwise what do we mean by public education. What is public education for? What do we mean by that?
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION

Goodman opened the discussion by saying that "mandaranism" or rule by self-appointed experts must be resisted. Professors of education were charged with enormous responsibilities which, he implied, they were not fit to assume.

Some two billion dollars a year is budgeted by the Federal Government for education; who is to decide how it shall be spent? Should professors of philosophy engage in making such decisions...bureaucrats? More money for universities?

Green reinterpreted his critique of the rule of reason by pointing out that "reason, as a final cause or as the sole test of the adequacy of conduct is being overthrown for good reasons." The engineer, the doctor and others nonetheless have legitimate claims to authority by the power of their ability to reason in their field. But what happens when this sort of expertise is extended, when authority is given to professional educators of children? The question of how we raise our children is deeply involved in the mechanism of social control and cannot be easily reduced by the uses of reason as presently understood by professional educators.

Wallace said that, although there have long been arguments about "whether or not different cultures cultivate different formal logic," he believed that certain elementary logical principles are common to all
cultures, which consequently imposes on all people an obligation to use logical procedures in answering questions relating to war, the enemy, etc.

Diamond noted that when functional rationalizations and logic became intermeshed, especially when used in connection with religious or scientific purposes, the results could be catastrophic.

Lewis felt that the discussion should return to Henry's definition of enlightenment. Green and Seeley, he further felt, were "alchemists" transmuting a disintegrating world into a happy one. Similarly, Goodman found all sorts of signs of goodness in poverty; but these signs were not really there. He implied that new forms of social life that Goodman and Henry sought would come from a revolutionary impetus.

Diamond defended Seeley and Green by saying that they were not alchemists but social critics.

Green felt that a basic educational problem was the absence of a public, that there was no community toward which one could direct oneself. The only substitute for reason as the final arbiter, he thought, was love and the urge to share.

Goodman defended the poor by saying that they are far more of a "public" among themselves than other social classes.
Seeley deflated youth movements as a panacea by noting that, in spite of the spirit of rebellious inquiry characteristic of many students today, in his experience, the majority of students were content with accepting the principles of formal authority.

Diamond felt that current techniques of mass education, with their emphasis on the mass, imperilled the soul of both teachers and students. As teachers, they, the participants, did not really know what was happening in the student underground.

Jencks took issue with Seeley's contention that affluence creates manpower demands and that these tend to moderate, if not erase, educational gaps. In the shift from a production economy to a service economy, manpower certification is intensified, not simplified. The public school movement had far more life in it that Seeley suspected.

Goodman felt that many students no longer considered a high standard of living a significant purpose; they had turned their backs on the dominant motif of American life. But it was true that a rising GNP created a larger and larger mandarin class. Between students in rebellions and mandarins there seemed to be less and less communication.

Jencks did not think that rebellion in the ranks
would escalate and penetrate very far up the hierarchy.

Seeley responded by saying that much depended on what one meant by service industries. If such "industries" aim to shape other human beings, they could be beneficial, they could promote genuine communication and communion. If, on the other hand, a new kind of manipulation was meant, then the crisis could not be averted.

Henry thought the role of the young had been somewhat exaggerated.

Seeley agreed that neither the young nor anyone else could stop the war in Viet Nam, but that the long-term effects of student protest could be beneficial.

Bancroft thought that some participants exaggerated the potency and optimism of youth...which did not really expect to change things radically and did not think of itself as the new proletariat.

Green took offense at being called an optimist. He made the point again that the ideology of public schools rested on the assumption that in a democracy, individuals were sacred, rational and destined to choose between sets of alternatives. Yet today, people were being treated as "masses" and vectors. He would like to change this tendency, but he thought it rather unlikely that anyone would succeed. Hence he was not an optimist.
with the old before starting with the new. In his experience, the "entering wedge" with educators was re-examination of the old.

Bancroft insisted that many radical issues could be raised in comparatively orthodox terms.

Diamond felt that perhaps this seminar was an example of such tactics. The Office of Education was sponsoring the seminar and out of it might well come proposals for research which had radical significance.
Henry, prodded by the others, summarized the essential points of his paper: Education is impossible because of a system of political economy which people do not want to change. The system featured fixed occupational slots which must be filled, hence education was "tooling up." But education must challenge cultural assumptions. The teaching profession, however, was one of the most vulnerable in America. Henry was disappointed with the discussion so far. He had hoped that some alternative policies addressing themselves to these concrete difficulties would have evolved.

On the specific problem of war in Việt Nam, for example, he felt that the question of effective communication between faculty and students was critical and that draft card burning and other such protests did not contribute to ending the war. The central question remained how to define education: as "tooling up" or an enlightenment; that is to say, the central assumptions of the culture had to be challenged.

Bancroft insisted that, though challenging present assumptions was all very well, making new ones was more necessary.

Seeley disagreed, feeling that both challenge and invention went together.

Henry replied that it was better strategy to deal
Education and Social Stratification in Contemporary Bolivia

Lambros Comitas

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EDUCATION AND SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN CONTEMPORARY BOLIVIA

Lambros Comitas

The Bolivian Revolution of 1952 is regarded by many as the only significant social revolution in contemporary South America. Whether or not this revolution effected any radical change in the stratification system, however, still remains open to question, since Bolivia has received a minimum of scientific attention in comparison to most other Latin American countries. This paper attempts a limited analysis of this critical question through the examination of one key area of social activity, that of education. While the dangers of a relatively narrow focus on a multifaceted problem are many, I should stress, in defense of the procedure, that the core importance of education makes it a productive point of entry for the study of complex social systems. As anthropology shifts to research of complex sociocultural units, the theoretical and methodological necessity for the systematic development of such vantage points becomes obvious.

To place the substantive argument which follows in clearer perspective, I must first deal briefly with two linked issues — first, the functions of education in society; and, second, the social structure and stratification system of traditional Bolivia.

In any social system, those institutions integrally involved with education can have but one of two basic social functions. The first and numerically the most significant is to maintain and to facilitate the existing social order. This function appears to have been operative in the overwhelming majority of societies known. Education, in these cases, provides a fundamental mechanism for maintaining the sociocultural status quo through
systematic and culturally acceptable training of the young for effective participation in the system. In general, the more stable and enduring the society and its culture are, the more congruous is the fit between education and the total system. Where stability is the operative function, any disjunction between education and the social system is predictably remedied through reform of the educational institutions and not through reform of the society. The objective of such institutional reform is to correct the balance and congruity, thereby readjusting the threatened social equilibrium.

In a number of relatively rare cases, the function of education is revolutionary in nature -- to promote and secure the restructuring of a given society through the deliberate introduction of a type of education significantly different from that offered to the older generation. In these cases, educational change historically has followed drastic social, political and economic upheaval, and has been utilized by the new leadership to consolidate, to protect and to refine the revolutionary gain. Education, in these instances, plays a more dynamic and creative social role, helping to reformulate the structure and reorient the values of society. This is a more positive and, I believe, a more defensible view than that taken by Talcott Parsons, who argues that the extreme concern of revolutionary regimes with "education" reflects their need to "discipline." In terms of revolutionary values, the population over which they have gained control but which did not participate in the revolutionary movement (Parsons 1951:528).

Historic examples of the revolutionary function of education are relatively uncommon. Certainly for the twentieth century there are only limited examples even though this century has probably experienced more "revolutionary" activity than any comparable period in the past. Turkey under Kemal Ataturk
In 1923, the Soviet Union in the 1920's, present-day China with its Red
Guards and drastic educational upheaval, and undoubtedly Castr's Cuba, supply
us with illustrations of thoroughgoing revolutionary systems of education. In
these nations, as in a few others, education was or is being used to carry
forward the social restructuring by preparing young citizens for life in a
manner and with a content which radically breaks with the traditions of the
past. In essence, a true revolution requires the development of a new educa-
tion to help build the new society as well as to safeguard against social
reaction and regression and the possible collapse of the new system. How-
ever, if over a period of time, the revolution is consolidated and protected,
the function of education shifts from revolutionary back to one of social
maintenance — to help assure the stability of the new order. Consequently,
while the revolutionary function in education is of fundamental importance
in any radical and permanent reformation of society, it is almost by defini-
tion transitional in nature. The social raison d'être for its existence
diminishes once the social reorganization has been established. If this argu-
ment holds, every "revolutionary" society, to be in fact revolutionary,
needs to initiate and support a revolutionary education, even if only for a
relatively limited period of time. It follows then that an analysis of
education in a society labeled "revolutionary" should be uniquely suited to
assess the intensity and social impact of any centralized attempts to change
the traditional patterns of stratification since such attempts are key to a
successful and completed revolution and education is an integral part of the
process. In addition, through the examination of the organization, operation,
objectives and content of education, a significant portion of the conscious and
unconscious intent of a "revolutionary" regime can be gauged. It is with these
particular ends in mind that I turn to an examination of pre- and post-
revolutionary Bolivia.
Bolivia has an estimated population of only three and one-half million, one of the smallest in South America, despite the fact that it is the fifth largest country on the continent. In economic terms, it competes with Haiti as the poorest nation in the New World, with an estimated per capita income of approximately $150 a year. Culturally, Bolivia is almost prototypical of the Indo-American culture area as defined by Elman Service (1955). Fully two-thirds of the population racially and culturally are identifiable as Aymara or Quechua Indians, the impoverished descendants of the Incaic high civilizations of aboriginal America. The high density of this indigenous population at the time of conquest, the complexity of the pre-Hispanic Indian societies, the harsh nature of the highland environment and the specific forms of socio-economic exploitation were all significant variables in the formation of a social system which existed throughout much of the country's colonial and Republican history, and in some aspects persists to the present day.

Following the Conquest, a sharply segmented society developed consisting at first, of two absolutely differentiated, hierarchically placed social sections, articulated only through the economic and regulative pressures of the socially superordinate segment, which was and remained numerically very small. Composed of the original Spanish settlers and their descendants and of a small but steady infusion of other Europeans, this superordinate group was the carrier of either Hispanic or Western European culture, or the creolized variants of it. With its control of the latifundia and the other strategic resources of the territory, with its domination of a theoretically centralized but essentially loosely integrated political system, with its
preference for Castillian to the almost total exclusion of native languages as mediums of communication, this closed social segment developed aristocratic values and the behavior to match. Not unexpectedly, then, the socio-cultural gulf between the groups and the requirements of the economic system gave rise to upper segment convictions and rationalizations that Indians were subhuman, no more than beasts of burden, and carriers of a culture that could only be despised.

The subordinate segment was totally Indian, and it included the vast majority of the colonial population. Its adaptation to European cultural patterns was selective and incomplete. Only those European elements were assimilated or syncretized which were necessary for social and economic survival. Consequently, a considerable portion of the culture of this social segment remained indisputably either Aymara or Quechua and, over time, even European-derived patterns developed an identifiable Indian cast.

As in the rest of the Andean highlands, two organizational alternatives were possible for the rural indigenous population, depending to a large degree on local circumstance. For inhabitants of economically marginal lands, the modal reaction to the Conquest was social retreat and coalescence into substantially closed, corporate communities with the concomitant development of defensive attitudes and behavior. For the Indigenous inhabitants in fertile and accessible regions there was no choice; forced labor on the latifundia was the rule. In either situation, the Indian population was relegated to subordinate, sometimes almost slave-like, positions in the social hierarchy, positions which generated differential cultural attitudes and styles toward members of the upper segment. Defiance and servility were the reactions to force and there is no evidence to indicate that this behavior and the accompanying values demonstrated even grudging acceptance of or consensus.
about the rightness of the social system. A peasant, speaking of the life of
less than twenty years ago, put it in this fashion:

Before we were slaves because we were stupid, we didn’t understand
what was going on. We didn’t have anybody to defend us and we were
afraid to do anything for fear that the patron would beat us. We
didn’t know why we were beaten. We didn’t know about our rights.
(Muratorio 1966:5)

Throughout almost all of its post-Conquest history, Bolivia was socially
and culturally segmented; the blancos, or masters and exploiters, were cul-
turally European and they occupied the highest status points in the society;
the indios, or exploited workers, were culturally Aymara or Quechua, and they
filled the lowest status position of the system. A structurally intermediate
social segment developed later. Generally referred to in Bolivia as cholas,
the members of this stratum are analogous to the mestizos and ladinos of
other Latin American countries. Primarily town and city dwellers, cholas, of
either Indian or mixed descent, have taken much of Hispano-Bolivian national
culture, but they are not culturally homologous to the superordinate segment.
Concentrating on small businesses, middlemen operations and transport, cholas
traditionally have been disliked by the elites, feared by the Indians, and
avoided by both.

In political terms, early Bolivia and the viceroyalty of which it was a
part can best be categorized as a conquest state with a stratification
system based on the unilateral application of force. Later developments
during the Republican period did little to effect fundamental changes in the
bases of social inequality. Social accommodations to force did not lead to
acceptance of the system. In this regard, Bolivia was never feudal, as was
Medieval Europe, where unequal distribution of opportunity could be part of
the normal order of things and where social consensus could validate inequality (Smith 1966:166). In a recent article, M. G. Smith has referred to a
variety of basically nonconsensual societies as unstable mixed systems. He notes for the Latin American variants in this category, among which I would include Bolivia, that:

Systems of this sort may endure despite evident inequalities, dissent and apathy, partly through force, partly through inertia, partly because their organizational complexity and structural differentiation inhibits the emergence of effective large-scale movements with coherent programs. (Smith 1966:172.)

For present purposes, it is not necessary to find the precise sociological label for traditional Bolivia. It suffices to state that rigid stratification was at the root of the system, that aspects of cultural and social pluralism were evident, and that the structure successfully inhibited social mobility. Status in traditional Bolivia was characteristically ascriptive based on birth into a particular social stratum and community. Differential rewards accrued to each social segment and the system of distribution of such rewards was first protected by naked force and then by a juridical and political system dominated by the elites.

In such a social framework, it is not difficult to understand why systematic formal education for the Indian population was not considered a necessary governmental or social function for well over four centuries. The efforts made in education, particularly on the university level, were essentially reserved for the children of the social elite and were located in urban centers of population. Urban education in Bolivia has long continuity. Aside from occasional lip service to the idea of Indian education and the occasional mission or parochial school in the countryside, almost no educational facilities were extended to the Indian until 1929. (Flores Mena yo 1953:345). In that year, the State decreed that agricultural proprietors with more than twenty-five workers were obliged to establish primary schools on their estates for the Indians and that these schools were to be under the
direction of the Minister of Public Instruction and the Rector of the University (Flores Moncayo 1953:340-343). From the little evidence available, and given the temper of the majority of landholders, the edict had little practical effect. From the early 1930s through 1951, there was growing agitation from the more socially conscious members of the elite for the development of educational facilities for the rural masses. In part, this agitation stemmed from the socially broadening experiences of the Chaco War (1932-35), in which Indians were taken into the army and, for the first time, left the Altiplano and the high valleys (Quilén 1963:2). For some Bolivians with high status, the unique experience of fighting alongside the Indian against a national enemy allowed for the development of more benign attitudes toward the indigenous population. It is during this difficult period of Bolivian history that the problems of the Indian began to be considered seriously by the intelligentsia and that the first hesitant action was taken to provide the Indian with a modicum of education. Just prior to the war, in 1931, WARI SATE, the forerunner of the Núcleos Escolares Campesinos, or Indian nuclear schools, had been opened (Pérez 1962:80-95). The nuclear model, a radical concept in rural training, provided for a central school which was located generally in a large pueblo and which supported a number of smaller and more limited sectional schools in surrounding villages and hamlets. In 1935, a supreme decree authorized sixteen such nuclear clusters throughout Bolivia, a very limited step towards the solution of the problem of Indian education. Nevertheless, the rhetoric and stated intent of this decree is of significance in that the lack of social cohesion in Bolivia is clearly enunciated and the value of education in effecting a change is posited:

It is the obligation of the State to integrate the native classes into the life of the country, invigorating their education in all the centers of the Republic and to assist equally the different ethnic groups that comprise the nation. (Flores Moncayo 1953:349.)
In the early years, from 1931 and up to 1944, the curriculum of the nuclear school was formal and academic, similar to that of the urban primary schools and the other rural schools maintained for non-Indians. It had little or no specific relationship to the need of the campesinos (Nelson 1949:22). In 1945, however, on the advice of an American educational mission, all of rural education was reorganized. While retaining the nuclear school format, the basic objective became that of preparing Indians for rural life. In theory, these schools offered to the campesino child a four-year curriculum emphasizing agricultural and vocational subjects and personal hygiene and giving secondary importance to reading, writing, and arithmetic. The language of instruction in these schools tended to be completely in Spanish. Justification for a markedly different system and content of education from that offered to the urban population was seen in the distinct needs of the campesino, "...a man who works the land, who holds the spade and plow and who has a different life from the urban man." (Quitón 1963b,)

Despite these stirrings, the expansion of educational facilities in the countryside before 1952 was fundamentally limited. Up to 1946, only forty-one nuclear centers with 839 small sectional schools had been established (Nelson 1949:16). On the eve of the Revolution, these numbers had not changed significantly. By 1951 (and here I must utilize unreliable government figures), only 12.9 per cent of the rural school-age population — ages five to fourteen — had ever been matriculated at any school (Plan Bienal 1965:10). At that time, the official illiteracy rate for Bolivia was about seventy per cent, from which I estimate an illiteracy rate for the rural population of well over ninety per cent. Linguistically, the process of castellanización, or the attempt to make Spanish-speakers of the Indians, had made little headway. Few rural Indian women knew Spanish, and a very large majority of men remained monolingual in either Aymara or Quechua. Semi-trained
teachers, an emasculated curriculum, lack of financial and political support from the government, and attacks from local landlords kept expansion and progress to a minimum. From all indications, it can safely be concluded that the impact of formal rural education in pre-Revolutionary Bolivia was weak, that it had little apparent effect in integrating the social segments, and that it had accomplished little, if anything, towards the amelioration and economic uplifting of campesino life. In the Bolivia of 1951, there remained an almost perfect congruence between the pattern of social stratification and the marked differences in the national allocation and use of educational resources.

In 1952, a combination of social and economic events forcibly propelled Bolivia into the twentieth century. After a series of coups and counter-coups, the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) assumed power. The MNR, a party of urban intellectuals and politicians with widely differing ideologies, led, guided and occasionally diverted the several elements in Bolivia clamoring for change and recognition. With a sweeping platform of social reform, in total opposition to the ideas and wishes of the traditional elite, the MNR had to assure itself of the support of the Indians, that social segment which until this time had never been allowed participation in Bolivian national life. To ensure this support, a number of basic socio-economic actions were taken which transformed the power shift of 1952 into a frontal attack on the traditional order of Bolivian society. First, universal suffrage was granted to all adults, with no requirements for literacy or understanding of Spanish. Secondly, pressured by the tin miners, the most highly politicized workers in the country, the MNR nationalized the vast holdings of the three most important tin barons. Finally, and most importantly, propelled more quickly by the extra-legal seizures of latifundia lands by organized campesinos,
the government legislated a national agrarian reform, returning to the Indians land that once belonged to their forefathers. Through this legislation and its execution, the government, supported by campesino strength, weakened the power of the superordinate segment. The partial redistribution of the country's national resources and the newly mobilized but politically potent force of the campesinos formed the scene for social change.

Although the social fabric of Bolivia was unquestionably altered during the twelve years of MNR control, the extent and form of this restructuring is as yet unclear. In addition, significant questions still remain as to how far the revolutionary leadership intended to carry its reform, to what extent it was willing to institutionalize and legitimize change and to what degree they were ready and able to incorporate the Indian into the new system so as to permit his free competition for position in society. In short, was the government the fulcrum for deliberate change of the traditional principles which regulated access to advantageous status positions? Satisfactory answers to these questions are difficult to find; inadequate and sometimes misleading national statistics, lack of archival research and the pervasive fog of official propaganda tend to obscure the issues, as important as they are to both scholar and administrator. However, as I have already indicated, an examination of education since the Revolution of 1952 should suggest some answers. Theoretically, if the political transformation of 1952 was revolutionary in its essence, education should clearly reflect this fact.

Despite the social and economic crises which beset the new government, by 1955 it had implemented a new Code of Education, laying out the structure of an educational system which exists to the present. The basic goal of the new education was to integrate the nation. In the words of President Paz Estenssoro in 1955, "The educational system which we are introducing corres-
ponds to the interests of the classes which constitute the majority of the Bolivian people." (Soro 1963:206.)

Organizationally, the Code provides for a multiple division of educational responsibility, allocating such responsibility to a number of governmental and quasi-governmental bodies. In this schema, the Ministry of Education, for example, has direct authority only for urban education — the formal schooling of children living in the cities, the capitals of departments and provinces, and other large population centers. In this urban system, legal provision is made for pre-school, primary, secondary, technical-vocational and university cycles for the clientele which it serves. Furthermore, the Ministry has the additional responsibility of training teachers for its own school system, of preparing the curriculum, of setting the length of the school year, and of almost all other academic and administrative matters.

Philosophically, the objectives of urban education are little different from those of pre-Revolutionary days and fall well within the Western tradition from which they were derived. On the primary school level, for example, the school is seen as the catalyst for the cultural formation of the child, taking into consideration its idiosyncratic characteristics and its biological, physical and social needs. The social structural significance of this practically independent section of Bolivian education is that it coincides, to a very considerable degree, with the Spanish-speaking sectors of the population, and with those geographical areas dominated by the descendants of the traditional elites, the small and amorphous middle class, and the cholas. In this regard, the urban system continues, with minor modifications, the Bolivian tradition of a classic, academic education for the socially and economically privileged segments of the nation.
The Ministry of Asuntos Campesinos, or Peasant Affairs, is responsible for the education of the rural population as well as for other activities directly relevant to rural life. Through fundamental education, the goal is to train the campesino child to function in his milieu and to aid in the uplifting of the rural community. Deliberately, all instruction is given in the Spanish language, continuing the policy of castellanización, so that eventually, in theory, a common language will unify the nation. Provisions are made for nuclear schools, sectional schools, vocational-technical schools and rural normal schools, but none for secondary schools or for university level work. The stated objectives of rural education are basically different from those of urban education: To develop good living habits in the campesino child; to teach literacy; to teach him to be an efficient agriculturalist; to develop his technical and vocational aptitudes; to prevent and to terminate the practices of alcoholism, the use of coca, the superstitions and prejudices in agronomy; and finally to develop in the campesino a civic conscience that would permit him to participate actively in the process of the cultural and economic emancipation of the nation. This system of rural education, in essence, is a continuation and expansion of the experiments of the 1930's and 1940's. While it is a system designed for the cultural and economic uplifting of the campesinos, significantly, it provides no mechanism for the movement of the rural student into the secondary and university cycles. Structurally, except for the possibility of limited training in the rural normal schools or through migration to the cities, the campesino terminates his education at the end of the primary cycle, if he is fortunate enough to reach that stage.
Several numerically less important systems of primary education also exist. For example, the Corporación Minera de Bolivia (Comibol), the national mining corporation, administers and supports schools in the mining areas of Bolivia, and Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB), the national oil corporation, is responsible for schooling in the oil and oil refining territories. Although an educational coordinating council exists, with representatives from all agencies concerned, in fact, each agency with educational responsibility has de facto control of the educational destinies of its clientele.

With well over a decade having elapsed since its inception, what have been the results of this educational structure for rural Bolivians? Most importantly, there has been a substantial physical expansion of the rural school system. By 1965, there were 5,250 government and private schools in the countryside, a five-fold increase over pre-Revolutionary days. Admittedly, many of these schools are little more than crude adobe shelters. Nevertheless, by 1964, 38.2 per cent of the rural school-age population was registered at school, an increase in enrollment of about 250 per cent since 1951 (Plan Bienal 1965:10). In six Altiplano and Yungas communities with rural schools which were studied by anthropologists during the period from 1964 to 1966, the percentage of inhabitants who claimed any elementary schooling ranged from 31.3 per cent to 49.4 per cent, with a mean of 43.4 per cent. However, few campesinos in these communities progress further than the second year. For example, in one Yungas high valley community from this sample, composed of long-resident Negroes and transplanted Aymara, the mean number of years of education for ages twelve to twenty-two is 2.2 years for the Negroes and 2.0 years for the campesinos. The mean number of years of
education for those over twenty-two years, and therefore less affected by the educational reform of the MR, is 0.12 years for the Negroes and 0.71 years for the campesinos (Newman 1966:78).

One sign of the value placed on education by Indians is that the majority of rural schools have been constructed by campesinos with materials donated and gathered by the community and with only limited State aid. Schweng (1966:54) reports on Pillapi, an expropriated hacienda near Lake Titicaca:

...the interest in education the campesinos showed was moving. After the first school was built in 1955 at the expense of the project, the other schools were built by the campesinos themselves. They made the adobe bricks, leveled the ground, dug the foundations and provided all the unskilled labor.

However, a serious drawback is that over ninety per cent of these schools lack adequate furniture and sufficient teaching materials. The rural normal schools lack laboratories and libraries; the few industrial schools lack machinery for practical lessons and, as a result, students and student teachers learn only theory without practical experience.

Despite rudimentary facilities, however, the educational aspirations of the campesinos are very high. Many campesinos perceive education as the catalyst for social mobility, as the means by which they or their children will escape from the hard and unremitting toil on the land. Theoretically, by learning Spanish and attaining literacy, they can move more readily to the urban centers, find better employment; if they choose, they can begin the process of becoming cholos. Others see education as a general panacea for their life condition but have little idea as to what specifically can be gained from it. For some in this group, education is endowed with magical qualities. There are even a few campesinos who view education as necessary for the preservation of a traditional way of life. This particular point of view was lucidly presented by a lillikata, or leader of a traditional ayllu.
In an isolated community in the hills overlooking the Altiplano,¹⁰ his position, while simple, was structurally revealing: Since the central government requires literacy as a prerequisite for holding local political office, the paucity of eligible candidates makes it possible for traditionally unacceptable persons to be selected. This often has led to intra-communal clashes between the official and the traditional systems of authority. Consequently, in one old man's opinion, schools were necessary to provide a supply of literate and traditionally acceptable leaders. In essence, he was choosing to change just enough so as not to have to change. Formal education, where it exists, may well have different meanings for the population. Nevertheless, as noted by Olen E. Leonard (1966:26) in a recent study of the Altiplano:

The school is the source of greatest pride in each community. Almost all the heads of families seem to admit that the improvement of their educational system has been one of the better attainments of communities during the last decade.

However, for the less than a third of the rural school-age population attending school,¹¹ the possibilities for learning are limited. To begin with, the teacher is required to teach in Spanish even though he may be less fluent in that language than in his native Aymara or Quechua. The non-Spanish-speaking Indian children are instructed from the first grade; therefore, in a language they cannot understand. To compound the problem, an extreme form of rote instruction is utilized: As the teacher speaks, the child copies the words into his course book, which is graded for accuracy, neatness and artistic quality. Memorization and recitation are uniformly stressed almost to the complete exclusion of the use of observation and experimentation. Lack of equipment and lack of training on the part of the teachers effectively precludes any vocational or technical training, so that the student generally
receives only rudimentary instruction in the fundamentals of reading, writing and arithmetic. With the language barrier, which is never completely surmounted, much of even this hard-learned literacy is eventually lost.

Schweng (1966:54-55) makes much the same point for his Altiplano community:

In their educational effort, the schools were handicapped by the Government's insistence on using the schools as an instrument of "castellanización," for forcing the use of Spanish on non-Spanish speaking Indians to the exclusion of their native tongue. The mother tongue of the children of Pillapi was Aymara and no other language was spoken at home; the women spoke Aymara only and there were only a few fathers who spoke even a little Spanish. But in the schools, from the first grade, the language of instruction was Spanish and Aymara was not taught at all. The continuation of this policy after the Revolution was in strange contrast with the cult of the Indian encouraged by the Government and the freedom given for the use of Indian languages, Aymara and Quechua, in politics. Forcing Spanish made teaching very difficult and the educational effort wasteful. Without opportunity for using the language most children soon forgot the little Spanish they picked up at school in the two years they customarily attended. They learned less than would otherwise have been the case.

The policy of castellanización has also compounded problems of cultural and ethnic identity. If one of the basic objectives of the rural school is to cultivate a sense of pride in being an Indian and a campesino, then instruction in Spanish, a language inextricably associated with the superordinate elements of Bolivia and of little direct value in an Aymara or Quechua community, widens rather than narrows the social gap. The language of instruction in this case tends more to divorce, rather than weld more closely, the student to his rural context. In any case, the goal of making Spanish the cornerstone of national cohesion is far from being realized. For example, of the four basically Aymara communities in the study sample, none had more than 1.2 per cent monolingual Spanish speakers, and these were almost always government officials assigned to the community. Aymara monolinguals ranged from a high of 84.4 per cent in one community to a low of 42.5 per cent in the most acculturated village. Self-professed bilinguals in Spanish and
Aymara ranged from a low of 10.5 per cent to a high of 49.6 per cent.12

Aside from linguistic barriers and a truncated and unrelated curriculum, the low quality of rural education is also a function of the inadequacies of rural teachers. While urban teachers are required to have a secondary school and a normal school diploma, rural teachers need only a primary school certificate, plus six months in a rural normal school. In many cases, even these minimal requirements are not met, so that a large number of rural teachers have not completed the primary school. Teachers’ salaries are low in all parts of the country, averaging about $40 a month. As a result, teachers’ attendance in school is often sporadic, since other work is sought to augment the income. This is particularly true of male teachers. In addition, with a politically strong teachers’ union which makes it almost impossible to fire a teacher, the educative process stagnates. A normally short school year is shortened further by student participation in scores of national and religious holidays which require days of special preparation before the event, by political crises which close the schools, by teachers’ strikes, and by teacher absenteeism.

As a consequence, the campesino child receives, from the rural school system, little formal preparation for modern life, and this is clearly reflected in the educational statistics. Student absenteeism rates are very high and usually attributed to the need for the child to assist in family work, but they are also related to the actual, as opposed to the stated, content of the programs, the lack of teacher preparation, and the scarcity of teaching aids and classrooms. The desertion or dropout rate is extraordinarily high. Of each one hundred campesino children ages five to seven years, only thirty-seven enter the first grade, and six complete the sixth terminal year (Plan Bienal 1965:15). Finally, the problem of illiteracy has not been
solved. While the official illiteracy rate has been modestly reduced from 63.9 per cent in 1950 to 63.0 per cent after fourteen years (Plan Bienal 1965:5), I would speculate that even this limited gain was made in the urban areas.

In providing expanded educational opportunities for the campesinos, the MNR corrected what it believed was a glaring injustice of the old order. As far as a limited economy permitted, the campesino was granted the right of formal schooling, which, in the past, had been essentially reserved for the privileged classes. In this regard, the government provided an institutional structure to help meet the rising aspirations and demands for education. In many of the remote areas of Bolivia, the school, for the first time, became a factor in the socialization of the campesino child. Abstractly then, the very extension of educational services to the rural masses can be considered revolutionary.

An analysis of the structure and content of rural education, however, leads to diametrically opposed conclusions. The balkanization of the educational enterprise, the multiple allocation of responsibility, the differing educational goals for different socioeconomic groups, in my opinion leads inevitably to further qualitative distinctions between these groups. In fact, the more efficient each section of the total educational system is in the training of its wards, the more distant becomes the ideal goal of integration through education. Furthermore, since the divisions in Bolivian education correspond closely with the old social divisions of Bolivian society, and since the rural segment is virtually barred from participation on the secondary and university levels, the effect is to institutionalize, in education, the stratification patterns of the past. Given the structure of education, there is no opportunity, short of physical relocation and cultural transformation,
for the campesino to receive that level of training which will allow him to compete successfully for the advantageous positions in society. It is of more than academic interest to note that most of the sharply stratified societies which have made resolute moves toward modernization and toward a consensual form of social structure select unitary systems of education to aid in the process.

Conservative rather than revolutionary thought is also seen in the content of rural education. Subject matter and mode of instruction reflect both patronizing and paternalistic features. A leit-motif of the educational philosophy is the suppression of all cultural elements in campesino life which are considered dysfunctional, but little is offered to replace that which is suppressed. When this is combined with the central decision to give highest priority to training for rural life, the campesinos, from an educational perspective, are sealed off from social movement in the society. A short-run gain for the national economy is a long-run investment in the continuance of a sharply stratified state. I do not argue here for absolute homogeneity for all sectors of Bolivian education, but for Bolivian youth to have institutionalized opportunities to move, if qualified, from one differentiated educational sector to the other. This would provide an important condition for an open society and would decrease the social dangers which will ensue when unrealistic aspirations hinged to education are not realized.

This cursory review suggests that, in education, the Revolution of 1952 and the fourteen years of MNR dominance did little to modify the hierarchical order of the socially significant segments of Bolivian society and did little, if anything, to provide new, institutionalized forms of social articulation. It is obvious that, whatever else the directives were that emanated from the center of the system, they were not revolutionary in effect.
The considerable social change which Bolivia has experienced during the last fourteen years seems to be more the result of a partial splintering of the traditional order than a thoroughgoing social reform. It is a change generated, in the main, by an uncoordinated but mass pressure from a discontented social base. One can then speculate that the post-1952 phase of Bolivian history represents a period of campesino coalescence and emergence which, if not diverted, will lead to serious upheaval before resulting in reform and social regrouping. In this present process of coalescence, any opportunity for formal education is of value. This is perhaps the true legacy of the present system.
Footnotes

1 An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the 65th Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, November 17-20, 1966. I am grateful to the Research Institute for the Study of Man, New York City, to the Institute of International Studies, Teachers College, Columbia University, and to the Columbia-Cornell-Harvard-Illinois Summer Field Program for research support while I was in Bolivia for varying periods of time in 1964, 1965 and 1966.

2 Accurate economic statistics for Bolivia are difficult to obtain. However, the 1966 edition of the Gallatin Annual of International Business puts Bolivia's per capita income at about $154, the second lowest in Latin America, Haiti being the lowest. This positioning compares favorably with that established in Mifoto Usui and E. E. Hagen's reliable 1957 survey, World Income, which lists Bolivia's per capita income as $99, the lowest in Latin America, and Haiti's at $100, the second lowest.

3 During the Colonial period, educational institutions, located principally in the cities and large towns, were under the direction of the Roman Catholic Church. With independence, public education became the responsibility of the government. At this time, Marshal Sucre promulgated legislation establishing primary, secondary and vocational institutions in all capitals of departments. During the first decade of the twentieth century, the structure and content of Bolivian education, still primarily located in areas of large population concentration, was strongly influenced by a Belgian educational mission led by Dr. George Rouma, a pupil and colleague of Dr. Ovidio Decroly, the noted Belgian educator.

4 In September, 1944, an agreement was signed between the Bolivian Ministry of Education and the United States Government creating the Cooperative Educational Program to assist in the development of Bolivian education. In 1948, this organization was replaced by the Interamerican Educational Cooperative Service (SCIDE), which was sponsored, in conjunction with relevant Bolivian ministries, by the United States' International Cooperation Administration. SCIDE gave technical assistance in rural education, industrial education and agricultural vocational education.

5 The Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario was founded in 1940 by Victor Paz Estenssoro and Hernán Siles Zuazo with a platform of social change and nationalism. In 1951, the MNR unexpectedly received the largest number of votes in the general election, but the takeover of the government by a military junta prevented the party from taking power at that time.

6 Utilizing one issue, these are the same fundamental questions raised by Richard W. Patch (1960) and Dwight B. Heath (1963) in their debate over whether agrarian reform in Bolivia was a result of grassroot pressure or of central government action.
The data on the objectives of rural education were taken almost verbatim from the official Código de la Educación Boliviana (Ministerio de Educación y Bellas Artes 1956:136).

The purpose of the Consejo de Coordinación Educativa is to ensure the basic unity of Bolivian national education. It is chaired by the Minister of Education and includes, among others, the Director General of Education, the Director General of Rural Education, the General Inspector of Education for the Schools of the State Mines and Petroleum areas, the National Director for the Protection of Minors and Children, and the Director of Vocational Education. Other interested ministries are also represented.

This is a three-year project of the Research Institute for the Study of Man under Peace Corps grant No. PC(W)-397. The basic objectives of this anthropological-epidemiological study are to assess the impact of Peace Corps public health programs in Bolivia and to provide social scientific guidelines for future public health programming in Bolivia and in structurally similar contexts. The research included intensive community studies of Sorata, Coroico, Reyes, San Miguel, Compi and Villa Abecia, as well as several shorter, selected studies of surrounding villages.

This is a community in the Province of Carangas situated at approximately 14,000 feet above sea level. It is possible, from the pueblo site, to view almost the entire Altiplano region of the Andes. The community is part of an enclave of Aymara-speaking campesinos, partly surrounded by Quechua populations. Archeologically and anthropologically, this relatively inaccessible and little studied section of Bolivia offers much to the serious scholar.

Although in 1964, 38.2 per cent of the school-age population in the rural areas were officially counted as being registered in schools, the number actually in full attendance was and continues to be much lower. One estimate for 1961 (SORO 1963:199) is that only about one in ten rural children attended school.

Data on language was generated from a census collected at an early date in all communities studied by the Research Institute for the Study of Man. A comprehensive sociological survey, which included a long section on language and education, was undertaken at the close of the field study in 1966. This data is currently being computer processed and will be utilized as the basis for several forthcoming papers and reports.


PLAN BIENAL. 1965 (?), *Plan del Sector de Educación y Formación Profesional, 1965-66*, La Paz (?), Bolivia. (Mimeograph.)


ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF SCHOOLS
A STRUCTURAL ANALYTIC APPROACH

The renaissance in American education which dates from shortly after World War II has been characterized by vigorous innovation in the curriculum and the infusion of a variety of new techniques and materials in the schools. Sparked largely by forces outside the schools, dissatisfaction with the status quo led to a wave of curriculum reforms, new administrative arrangements, and the development of a vast new technology which, whether one applauds or laments the outcomes, must be credited with giving a new look to education. It is not the same establishment it used to be.

First, scholars and scientists have gone into the classroom and have created, tested and revised materials that contain the best knowledge available today. Second, growing largely out of this restiveness over the curriculum and out of advances in electronic technology, the computer and its associated technology promises and threatens to shape the next series of dramatic changes in education. Third, new approaches to teaching and to the preparation of teachers have begun to appear both within and outside of the educational establishment. Finally, new administrative arrangements such as the ungraded primary school, the educational plaza and flexible scheduling programs suggest major changes in the environment within which education will develop.

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Each of these developments, however, has come about largely in isolation from the other and often there is little or no relationship between a new piece of curriculum or technology and the administrative arrangements necessary to see it into place in the schools. A classic example is what happened to the so-called "teaching machine." The teaching machine, a programmed learning device, was a resounding failure in this country because the educational system simply was not ready for it either in terms of deciding what to put into the machine or devising some means of using what came out of it. Consequently, when one encyclopedia publisher began selling teaching machines door to door long before either the machine or the educational community was ready, the bubble burst and another promising educational innovation was a failure.

This separatism within the educational system is, however, unrealistic when one looks at the operation of the system. Schools are not random associations of teachers, students and administrators but rather are well ordered systems with a well defined institutional structure and a normative system. Schools themselves are part of a well articulated institution which has an existence apart from all others, including the state. As in any organic structure, all of the parts must be understood before any of the parts can be systematically developed. If we consider that the school consists in four major domains—the students or learners, the instructors or teachers, the materials taught or the
curriculum and the administrative and cultural environment within which all of this takes place—the spatio-temporal arrangements within the school, "the administrative climate," the ways in which teachers and pupils are deployed, the traditions, customs and folklore of that school which makes it different from others—if we consider all of these factors then we are looking at the school as a social system and it becomes amenable to the same kinds of structural analysis as any other social system. And, of course, the school itself must be considered as part of other cultural, administrative, and social systems.

Education, however, has never really been looked at in this systematic fashion, particularly by educators. In fact, while there have been some studies of social climate in the schools, most research has concentrated on the learner as part of that system and, in recent years, on what is taught in that system. Little or no attention has been given to the total organizational structure of education viewed as a system and even less to any analysis of the structure as a device for administrative or management training. What is necessary here, and what this paper is intended to suggest, is that just such a theoretical framework must be employed if we are to understand and manage educational affairs as a system. Each of the behavioral sciences has now adopted this "system" approach which looks at behavior as part of a relational pattern of elements rather than as a series of discrete
acts. Whether it is in the structural analysis of kinship systems, a behavioral gestalt or a social system, the intellectual methodology is the same; elements in constant and active relationship cannot be fully understood in isolation from that interaction because constancy is an illusion when human behavior is properly seen as a series of interactions.

This awareness of systematic interdependence is now developing slowly and in only a few places in education and there is a new expression of education as a total system of related organizations, behaviors and outcomes rather than the separate analysis of curriculum, administration and teaching. In part this derives from the practical experience of educators who have seen piecemeal attempts at educational improvement fail and have come to realize the relational interdependence of the educational system. The very promising "curriculum revolution" of the 1950's and the 1960's was far less successful than it might have been because it had as its motive and its mode the improvement of education through the improvement of one component--and only one component of the system--the curriculum. There is now ample evidence that improving the curriculum is a necessary but insufficient step in school improvement unless there are concomitant changes in the rest of the system. In large measure, however, education's growing self-image as a complex system of relationships and interlocking functions comes from the influence of the behavioral
What is necessary is some theoretical framework within which to project this new approach.

One of the most promising approaches here is in the use of structure-analytic techniques based largely on the work of Levi-Strauss as well as a number of classical and contemporary sociologists. In essence this method proposes that structures consist, actually of models which describe both static positional elements and dynamic relations within a structure. As used here, a structure consists of a model having the following characteristics:

1. First, the structure exhibits the characteristics of a system. That is, it is made up of several elements, none of which can undergo a change without affecting changes in all the other elements.

2. Second, for any given model there should be the possibility of ordering a series of transformations resulting in a group of models of the same type.

3. Third, the above properties make it possible to predict how the model will react if one or more of its elements are subjected to certain modifications.

4. Fourth, the model should be so constituted so as to make immediately intelligible all the observed fact.

5. Finally, there are within the structure, numbers of substructures, managing communications, subordinate-dominant relationships, the conferring of status and the like.
Using this approach, one can begin to make some sense out of what is happening in education and how elements of the educational system interact.

First, consider the school as a formal structural organization, an institutionalized complex of explicit, specified goals, rules and procedures for decision making, internal and external communication structures and behavioral relationships. In recent years, the growth of educational institutions in size, complexity and importance has resulted in even more formal organization of the school along bureaucratic lines similar to what has already occurred in business, industry and government. It is important to point out here that while most schools are part of the governmental structure, they are a separate and distinct bureaucracy of their own which is really only quasi-governmental in character. That is to say, school systems and individual schools have a basic function to educate and socialize which is quite apart from the governmental function to govern and control.

In its character as a formal organizational structure, the school can be described in much the same way that behavioral scientists have described other formal organizations undergoing the process of bureaucratization. The process in education as elsewhere is a response to the demand for increasingly complex services (in this case educational and socializing services) and for improvements in the nature and degree of control over the organization in order to insure these
services by translating organizational goals into concrete action. One of the first evidences of this process in an organization is the formal explication of the organizational purpose and the goals of that organization. In most cases the organizational objective is fairly easily stated and widely accepted. The objective of business, for example, is fairly well accepted as producing goods and services for a profit and few Americans, at least, would argue with this. Education is not so fortunate since the organizational imperative "to educate" means a wide variety of things and is open to continuous public debate. As a result, there are conflicts in organizational values and objectives and, as is always the case where conflict is present, there is strain and tension in the system. The tension erupts in a variety of relationships--administrator and teacher, teacher and student, school and community--but its results are usually felt within the system first. Consider, for example, what has happened in recent decades in the administrator-teacher relationship as part of the subordination structure. The problem of administrator-subordinate relationship is one which is usually problematic in any organization where the expertise of the subordinates is of a different order from that expected of the administrator. Thus, in education, the professional characteristics of the good teacher are not necessarily those of the good administrator and may, in fact, be antagonistic. Problems arise when the administrator, who despite the role he learned as a teacher now has an entirely
different functional role in the organization, exerts control over teachers in order to produce conformity to the organizational objectives of the school as he sees them or as he sees the community and the school board as viewing them. So long as there is not a great disparity between his view and those of the professional staff, all proceeds fairly smoothly. But when the administrator's view and that of the faculty are not in focus, tensions increase. How should the administrator respond to what they tend to view as a challenge to their legitimate authority? There are a variety of responses which have been attempted by educational administrators in schools and colleges. One is for the administrator to attempt to legitimate his authority by appealing to his own background as a professional teacher. This is sometimes successful but more frequently fails because the administrator's claims to expertise as a professional teacher are illusory and, at best, outdated. A second possible approach is to fall back on the legitimation of authority on strictly legal grounds in terms of incumbency in office. While this technique is sometimes successful in business and is a common phenomenon in government--particularly the present one--it is often disastrous in education where the prerogatives of the professional, particularly in higher education, are as firmly legitimated in tradition as the authority of the administrator. Finally, there is the legitimation of authority which comes from defining administration as a distinct specialization of its own, with skills and training which mark
the individual for this role rather than for one of the teacher professional roles in the subordinate structure. This method of legitimation has been quite successful in business and government where the executive and the public administrator are recognized specialties in their own right. In education, however, the process has been somewhat delayed and confused by the insistence that administrators must have had previous experience as teachers. This insistence is now less pronounced in higher education but it is still a major controversy and problem in public education. The solution to this problem is one of the most important and compelling of the new liaisons between the behavioral sciences and education, for expertise in the behavioral sciences—and perhaps even a specialization in one of the behavioral sciences—is increasingly coming to be viewed as the best preparation for the community and human relations work which is the most important function of the modern educational administrator.

A second important early step in the development of a formal organization is the formalization of a hierarchical structure with defined statuses and superior-subordinate roles, a "chain of command" and "table of organization" and a defined communications structure. At the same time, there is also a growing demand for specialization and a consequent refinement of the division of labor. New procedures and regulations come into being to recruit, allocate and promote individuals within this hierarchy and each new status is carefully defined in terms
of rights and responsibilities. With this increasing specialization, the formal organization comes to be a series of interdependent but to some extent autonomous groups of specialists or organizational parts. In education, for example, the various schools and departments of a university or the departments of a high school are parts which retain varying degrees of autonomy. It is possible to look at the degree of "functional autonomy" or mutual dependence of parts of an organization and rate organizations in terms of their relative degree of independence as contrasted to system interdependence. Organizational systems which have a high degree of functional autonomy for their parts are usually not very strongly centralized systems. In a school system, for example, functional autonomy of parts would suggest a high degree of individual discretion on the part of the member schools to determine educational policy and practices, choose materials and recruit personnel. What is important here in the analysis of the school as a formal organization is the accepted principle in organizational theory that tensions are produced in an organization both by the tendency of the parts to seek greater functional autonomy and the seemingly natural effort on the part of the central hierarchy to seek greater system interdependence. Balancing these forces is a neat trick for any administrator and is just as difficult within a school as

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within a school system.

A third characteristic of the formal organization is that it develops a series of very specific rules and procedures which come to regularize and routinize action within the organization and between the organization and the outside world. As a consequence, there is a growing depersonalization of relationships in the hierarchy of the organization and between members of the organization in their organizational roles and the world outside. In the school organization this is seen in the accumulation of administrative regulations concerning conduct and procedures and attempting to regulate as much as possible what is taught and how it is taught. As you know, education differs from other bureaucracies in the unusual emphasis which is given to teachers and professors having relative autonomy in job performance. Even here, however, there is constant encroachment by the bureaucracy through standardization of curricula, school or system wide testing programs or regents examinations, and state requirements which place strict limits on how much freedom of choice a teacher actually has. In the field of higher education there is still considerable freedom from bureaucratic controls but social and political pressures are now such that even here conformity producing mechanisms are operative. Essentially, it is a matter of the goals and procedures of the formal organization coming to take precedence over individual professional decision making.
The flourishing of rules and procedures in education also operates to depersonalize and some would say dehumanize relationships between teacher and student and teacher and administrator and eventually between school and community. In many ways, this depersonalization comes to be viewed as professionalism and becomes ingrained in teacher and administrator behavior and role expectations. In time, recruitment and promotion policies are formalized to reflect these same "professional" values and they become part of the preparation of educational personnel in colleges and universities. The behaviors associated with the new role become the expected ones and, as Talcott Parsons has explained, since repeated acts of conformity increase the expectation of conformity, the roles become more and more standardized and conformity is taken for granted. We tell these same teachers to be innovative and creative and then fret that they are not.

What has really transformed the informal social system which was the school into the new formal organization which is the school bureaucracy, however, is the shift from a traditional, static model of organization to a new model which emphasizes rational, planned effort toward agreed upon goals. Alvin Gouldner has described each of these models. The traditional model, which he calls the "natural system" model and traces back to the analytic approach of Comte and the French Positivists he describes as follows:

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2 Talcott Parsons, The Social System, (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951), Ch. VI
The organization, according to this model strives to survive and to maintain its equilibrium, and this striving may persist even after its explicitly held goals have been successfully attained. Organizational structures are viewed as spontaneously and homeostatically maintained. Changes in organizational patterns are considered the results of cumulative, unplanned, adaptive responses to threats to the equilibrium of the system as a whole. Responses to problems are thought of as taking the form of crescively developed defense mechanisms and as being importantly shaped by shared values, which are deeply internalized in the members. 3

The "rational model," which is characteristic of bureaucracies in government and industry and which he derives from the work of Max Weber, he sees as follows:

In the rational model, the organization is conceived as an 'instrument'—that is, as a rationally conceived means to the realization of expressly announced group goals. Its structures are understood as tools deliberately established for the efficient realization of these group purposes. Organizational behavior is thus viewed as consciously and rationally administered, and changes in organizational patterns are viewed as planned devices to improve the level of efficiency. The rational model assumes that decisions are made on the basis of a rational survey of the situation, utilizing certified knowledge, with a deliberate orientation to an expressly codified legal apparatus. The focus is, therefore, on the legally prescribed structures—i.e., the formally 'blueprinted' patterns—since these are more largely subject to deliberate inspection and rational manipulation. 4

4 Ibid., pp. 404-405
As education has moved from the traditional to the rational model of organization, the rules, role expectations, communication nets, and the hierarchic structure of the school are all designed with the rational ends of the system in mind. The formal organization's structure and its functions thus change as the society's goals for it, or at least the perception of these goals by the organization's policy makers, change. In our time, for example, we have seen the subtle shift of emphasis from universality to equality of opportunity in education bring about some far-reaching changes in the schools. In both cases, of course, the social motive has been the same: the rationalization of social mobility through education as the prime objective of the school.

There are many other aspects of the school or college as a formal organization which are responsive to behavioral analysis. Its relationship with the general institutional structure of society, for example, presents some interesting economic questions concerning the allocation of resources to education and the educational functions of other institutions. Similarly, the fixing of organizational objectives by various groups and agencies in society brings in a series of interesting questions for political analysis dealing with such interactional relationships as those between school and community and administrator and school board. There are also the dynamic relations among a variety of people--teachers, administrators--students and parents.
While each of these systems, the formal organization of the school, the cultural and sub-cultural worlds of teacher and student, and the behavioral system of interactive personalities is amenable to systematic analysis in its own right, their detailing should not suggest that they actually exist as separate entities. Each is no more than a convenient analytic abstraction in which the behavioral scientist charts the movements and confrontations of his data. Thus, in structuralist terms, "each has nothing to do with empirical reality but with models which are built up after it." That is to say, each of these systems is by its very nature as a structure, a representation of some part of the real world and is subject to representation in a variety of forms. All of the types of models available in the behavioral sciences—statistical models, simulation models and so forth—can be used to represent these structures and so reduce to manageable form the phenomena which are operative in schools. Basically, however, two types of models would seem particularly valuable for both the actual management of schools and for the preparation of administrators. First, it is possible to construct a variety of mechanical models—models on the same scale as the phenomena represented—describing individual schools or school systems and taking into account the peculiar and particular characteristics of the individual school or system. Such models are of particular use in preparing administrators and represent one step beyond the current use of case-study materials which often are precious
and almost fictitious representations based upon hypothetical rather than real schools. The use of simulation techniques, now well established in the behavioral sciences, would allow for the development of a variety of strategies of administration which could be derived from the models rather than from actual or imagined school experience. A second type of model of value here would be the construction of a number of statistical models—models where elements are on a different scale than the phenomena represented—designed to represent characteristics of particular types of schools or school systems. Usable in much the same way as mechanical models, these statistical representations have the added advantage of allowing for the introduction of far more variables than in the more restricted mechanical model. Using both types of models, it would be possible, for example, to compare schools and school systems operating under different administrative systems and in a variety of community settings and to extrapolate comparisons of a variety of cultural and behavioral phenomena.

What I have tried to suggest in this paper is that the administration of schools and the preparation of administrators for the schools is rather badly in need of some systemic approach to the study of the administrative process. With the present tendency for education to become increasingly a community rather than school-centered program, these problems seem certain to grow rather than to diminish. At present, with few exceptions, administrators are trained and operate
without any device which allows them to recognize and isolate levels of reality which have strategic value in school administration. I suggest further that there are, in fact, structures within the school and in the school's relationship with the community which allow for representation as models in much the same way as other social structures and that these models have considerable promise in both the preparation of administrators and in the administration of schools.
The Conference, the third in a series of conferences sponsored by the Culture of Schools Program, was called by Stanley Diamond to discuss the accomplishments of anthropologists interested in schools and the transmission of culture, their immediate activities, and their views of further developments that might be recommended to and/or undertaken by various institutions or the American Anthropological Association.
I. THE SCHOOLS AS CULTURAL INSTRUCTIONAL SYSTEMS

Purpose of the Conference. Geary described the two purposes of the conference: first, a need to consider the feasibility of a more ambitious, stock-taking conference on Anthropology and Education next year; and second, exploring the roles that various institutions or the American Anthropological Association might take to promote and further anthropological research on education, broadly conceived. If a conference were to be held, consideration could be given to curriculum development, teacher education, direct observation and other research, research demonstration, and educational systems in various societies.

Frantz reported that we may be in a period that will provide an extraordinary opportunity for anthropologists to embark upon more research, both at home and abroad, on formal and informal educational institutions. A reorganization in the U.S. Office of Education seemed to have brought greater interest in involving social scientists: professional (disciplinary) associations, departments, institutes, and individuals. Anthropologists therefore may have greater opportunities than ever before to engage in significant and sustained research in this area. The new International Education Act, for example, when funded will provide for the kinds of studies, seminars, and training programs that should integrally absorb anthropological specialists.

Topics for Anthropological Research. Wax opened discussion on a paper he had written for the Conference. In it he outlined what he considered to be the distinctive approaches of anthropology; some of the principal research questions that could be asked; and the areas, such as metropolises and new nations, which might need special attention in the immediate future. There was general agreement about a dearth of anthropological studies. More cases studies of schools, viewed as systems, or of schools seen within community contexts, were critical to add to the understandings we might obtain and document through publication. In addition to studying schools as systems, it was necessary to examine their relation to other educative systems or networks, such as mass media, informal social groups, fraternities, camps, and so on. Diamond said one of the most significant changes in the means for transmitting culture was the world-wide development of formal associations. Hence the increasing claims made by formal educational institutions upon the time and loyalty of young people was probably accompanied by a decline of traditional loyalties based upon kinship, local residence, etc. It was urgent, therefore, to compare educational structures and processes, as seen within community or society contexts, cross-culturally.

It was also noted that there was a growing demand for and acceptance of anthropology in the curriculum of schools, yet no research had been done on the reasons for the demand, how much success or satisfaction had been derived by teachers or students, and whether it was being supported for an indefinite period or was now enjoying only faddish support. Whether or not the Anthropology Curriculum Study Project, sponsored by the AAA, will be effective, for example, depends upon the nature of the larger school systems themselves, and these in turn are significant parts of communities. Some participants suggested that the development of anthropological curricula might be a more important role for anthropologists than the study of schools and other educational systems.
Wax's paper suggested that comparative research might begin with an awareness of the variable types of schools, and of their relations to their socio-cultural contexts. On the latter, the relationships could be either homogenetic or heterogenetic (i.e., primarily carrying on either a single or multiple cultural traditions). Questions should be asked about the place of students and educators in the wider community; of the demographic features of the population toward whom schooling was directed; of the socio-cultural characteristics of the students and staff; and of the organizational structures of the school systems. All these factors might vary significantly with the type of school (and its goals): preparatory academy; urban, suburban or rural schools; reformatories; mission-operated boarding schools; schools for disciples of various kinds; vocational and trade schools; night schools; colleges, universities, and professional schools; etc. In view of such diversity the concept, "culture of schools," was potentially misleading, even in the U.S.A., because of overgeneralization.

Hymes spoke of a new research focus among sociolinguists, attention being given mainly to urban dialects and their behavioral correlates. Comparable research by anthropologists might be modelled after this approach, with attention being paid to life-styles—including the selective use of different subcultural modes of behavior according to the situation. Kimball and Wax pointed to the value of more concentrated studies of informal age groups, and the fact that there were probably several teen-age subcultures in a complex society like the U.S.A. A further area for research was to study the relationships between behavior and the physical environment—the architectural, esthetic, and ecological milieu of the classroom, school grounds, and the wider community.

Conceptual Approaches. In his paper, Wax mentioned some of the main assumptions and concepts used by anthropologists, saying these should serve well in studying educational questions: comparative and historical frameworks; a contextual and holistic approach combined with empirical, concrete materials; and so on. (In a paper given at the AAA Annual Meeting last November, and distributed to conference participants, Kimball also delineated these features of anthropological research, and in addition cited the utilization of induction and the common use of a natural history approach.) There was general assent that holism was important. Several participants asked, however, whether anthropologists should study schools as social systems first, and then move on to study them contextually within communities, or whether communities should be initially understood before analyses were made of educational systems.

Research Techniques. The need to maintain as much freedom from bias as possible was discussed. Fuchs and Leacock said it was very difficult in many research projects to avoid an identification with "deprived" persons, or others, outside the control structure, such as pupils, teachers, and sometimes parents (in cases when they had little or no representation on school boards). Others argued that at times it was impossible to be totally objective, especially when verified findings indicated educational personnel and resources were distributed unequally. Ehrich and Kimball, however, advocated making a distinction between educational research and educational reform, even though this might be more difficult in the U.S.A. since we were natives studying our own culture in such cases. Reforms, they said, should not be the major concern of anthropologists, but rather of administrators. In contrast to educators, who are programatically oriented, social scientists can make explicit their data on how a system is organized, patterned, and operates or functions over a period of time.
Wax cited the difficulties experienced by many in gaining access to schools for research purposes. Since schools are of important concern to so many different groups, at least in the U.S.A., any research project or its results may be unfavorable to one or more such groups. Research data are sometimes reported in sensational terms, and this can create a reluctance by school officials to tolerate further studies. Political groups frequently have taken sides on the issue of doing or learning of the results of research; community factions, or segments of school boards, have often formed around such findings (or other data, or supposed data, about curriculum content, pedagogy, etc.). Parsons and Owen cited cases in which their studies had provoked noisy public reactions. (Kimball's paper also suggested that during the 1930's, when research revealed the significance of social class variables upon many U.S. educational systems, these studies were often labeled un-American.)

These difficulties were sometimes compounded by the practice or need to disguise a community when the research data were reported. It was pointed out, however, that it is quite possible to study schools humanely and that there was little difficulty gaining access when anthropologists were prepared to help and ready to be empathetic. There was a recognition, but little discussion, of the decreasing likelihood that the anonymity of communities could be preserved, at least in the U.S.A., since funds were coming increasingly from federal sources; the Government also was insisting on "clearing" questionnaires more and more, and requiring that consent be given by subjects being studied (in many cases). Another variable is that while the data of psychological and statistical studies are often aggregated, anthropologists usually pay particular attention to the salient individuals, statuses, and subgroups in social systems, and these identities are often more difficult to conceal. There was general agreement that a researcher had an ethical obligation to collect, interpret, and publish his data in a fashion that would not handicap any future investigators. In short, it was suggested that good anthropological field techniques should obviate some of the difficulties. It had to recognized, however, that there is an enlarging audience of "patrons" for research about schools and education (as Volcott says, in quoting Smith), in contrast to an audience of professional peers to whom most anthropological studies have been addressed.

Research vs. Action. Variable orientations were evident among the participants about the proper role/s of anthropologists. Ehrich, Kimball, and others spoke of the necessity for confining activities to basic research, except when acting as consultants or participating in conferences. Others felt that results were enriched, despite whatever threats might arise for continued employment or free investigations, by means of action-involved research, i.e., active participation in an actual role within the system rather than filling a role or position that was based on the outside (as a research from a university). While action-oriented research was acceptable to some of the conferees, for others direct action meant a forfeiture of the fundamental role of a researcher.

Aids for Research and Training Programs. In discussing what useful research aids could be developed, several recommended the compilation of a complete and annotated bibliography on Anthropology and Education that would also include a review of research. The hope was expressed that the files developed by the Culture of Schools Program would be continued by another person or center, if Diamond were to end his initiative on this matter. Suggestions also made were that a sourcebook
XI. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CURRICULA IN ANTHROPOLOGY FOR SCHOOLS

Hanvey opened the session with a twenty-minute film of a high school teacher guiding a class through one lesson of "The Great Transformation" unit. The film was made by the Anthropology Curriculum Study Project to help train other teachers, and it aimed to show how students could be stimulated to classify data, draw inferences, and posit interpretations about archaeological materials.

Collier started discussion by presenting a list of reflections on the experiences of the ACSP staff. She said there was nothing in the educational system that did not influence the effectiveness of the curriculum, and this had to be considered when developing anthropological and other materials. The Project had established several conditions by choice: the development of material for specific grade levels; an intention to serve all but the lowest in ability; a goal of modifying behavior; and the production of selective anthropological ideas and data that could contribute to an understanding of the development of man's capacity for culture, cultural variety, processes of biological and cultural change, and methods for analyzing observed human behavior. Teachers were also being helped in their preparation through detailed teaching plans (and the training films). Collier spoke further of a number of conditions that resulted from the nature of anthropological subject matter, such as providing a liberating/threatening experience for students, and the appeal of the material to many administrators. She wondered, however, what was meant by "liberating" experiences.

To approach the Project's goals, she said, would involve (university) scholars and (secondary) school personnel moving closer together and creating shared understandings. So far, a few teachers and students had been permanently affected by the new classroom materials, whereas a larger number apparently had not been affected. Finally, Collier reported that the National Science Foundation and Office of Education were inclining toward giving less money in the future for curriculum development projects, and more for stimulating cooperative programs between schools and colleges, i.e., in-service training.

Bailey, Owen, and others spoke of their work on curriculum materials at the University of Georgia and the University of California, Santa Barbara—at the elementary and junior college levels, respectively. Collier said the ACSP was mainly interested in what behavioral consequences would follow the exposure to anthropological materials. Would they, as many have postulated, help bring a "liberating" experience to the students? Bailey asked what values were designed to be transmitted through anthropological materials: Was cultural relativism one of them?

Owen wondered if the teachers' handling of these materials could be controlled. Was it possible via such projects to introduce materials successfully and permanently into the classroom? Should we think of developing a permanent curricula to offer schools at all grade levels? Collier said the interest extant for using anthropological materials was certainly greater than the ACSP's capacity to deliver at the present time. Although the present interest may be a fad, she said the schools which had used ACSP material were usually continuing to do so.
Frantz asked whether, if more curricular programs were likely to be accepted, they should be directed to teachers or to administrators—that is, who was mainly responsible for initiating changes in the curriculum. Teachers, preferably, Collier replied. Bailey said the times were most favorable to introducing new material since there was considerable curriculum revision now going on. For many, anthropology is a "magical" word. Inquiries to the Georgia project, however, came mostly from suburban schools, and this implied some kind of middle-class bias for their materials.

Owen observed that he was confident a strong demand existed across the country for immediate materials. Collier noted that the ACSP had sought to move cautiously in distributing its materials since considerable testing and revision was still underway. They had discovered that teachers best learned the content of the unit lessons through handling the physical materials; and, curiously, individuals without formal training in anthropology tended to do better than those with such training. Also, the latter tended to give answers readily to students' questions, whereas the units had been designed to encourage students to develop their own powers of observation and analysis (as was suggested in the teaching film Haynvey had shown).

Thomas asked why anthropology was being taught. Bailey and Collier replied that it already was being taught, often often poorly, and that non-anthropologists were choosing whether or not to introduce it into the schools; the Project and the AAA were certainly not sending around salesmen to sell the new course materials. Owen noted that a course on American Indians is taught very widely in California elementary schools; on the other hand, the framework of social studies, generally at the secondary level, was almost exclusively historical. One reason for teaching anthropology, he thought, was that it could provide a conceptually richer framework to the student through the introduction of such terms (and data bearing upon) evolution, function, and interdependence.

Bailey said the Georgia project always introduced anthropology as anthropology, not as a reworked History or Social Studies. When the latter was done, he thought the material became trivialized and the study of other people still continued through ethnocentric lens. Kimball asked whether these curriculum projects were attempts to provide a broad perspective for all social studies, or were efforts instead to get a foothold in the curriculum for factual anthropological materials. Collier said the ACSP did not envisage their materials as designed to provide full, year-long courses.

Fuchs thought the use of anthropological materials might best be extended via collaboration with historians and educators. Gearing noted that in California it appeared that History as a discipline was to be "relegated" to the high school level rather than being placed throughout the grades.

Ehrich said the anthropological perspective was important—a necessary context for presenting other materials. He thought anthropology should not be introduced too early in the schools, and perhaps not at all; it was a philosophic subject, one that seeks to tie together much data provided by other disciplines. Leacock argued that anthropology, however, is data-oriented even though materials may get interpreted and translated in the classroom. Parsons asked what concepts should or could be taught to students. Both perception and cognition, he said, are related to experience; fourth-graders, therefore, ought to be able to learn anthropological concepts—perhaps not those about the Arunta, as taught in the Georgia project, but certainly those which related to their own experiences.
Owen said he had observed children were able to recognize functional relationships and the interdependence of cultural and social practices. He thought the introduction of concepts could begin in kindergarten. Since anthropologically untrained teachers often introduced the material, it might be necessary to provide them a "choreography"—a systematic but flexible form in which to present the material, and by which they could move from one to any of a number of related concepts. Later, he added that "choreography" does not dehumanize the teacher, since such a plan would allow for much flexibility during the instruction process.

Discussion turned then to children's understanding of roles, particularly those based upon kinship and a consciousness of in- and out-group affiliations. Parsons said the early classroom materials might treat the roles of children, parents, status, etc., but that generalizations should be delayed. Thomas likened kids to a tribal society, but urged that role consciousness (conceptual awareness) should not be taught too early; since identity crises came at adolescence, this might be the best time for teaching about roles. Gearing said that five year-old children already had a consciousness of "we-ness," though, hence it might be possible to make them more comfortable if teachers laid out the multiple nature of their identities quite early in life. Anthropologists especially, he added, should guard against trivial notions of what constitutes the experience of a child. Because the Arunta, for example, are not visually and behaviorally present does not necessarily mean they are experientially remote to (U.S.) children. Hymes suggested that a number of useful models from linguistics might be helpful in studying this question.

Kimball commented that this discussion seemed to be all about learning from books, whereas direct contact (through fieldwork or other interaction) was what made groups become "real." Owen reported that Hopi baskets mean nothing to very young students, but that simulating a Hopi council meeting in the classroom provides a meaningful behavioral experience. Collier asked whether instruction in anthropology could really do without books, and Kimball noted that some of the ACSP units do this when they deal with artifacts, fossils, classification, etc. How then, Collier wondered, can we get students to move to a higher level of understanding. Kimball indicated this could possibly be done through internships for teachers. The question was, however, whether to schedule field experiences for budding teachers or to simulate events in other societies for the students. Bailey observed that so much material (books, filmstrips, etc.) already existed, and wondered what anthropologists might do with them. Should they screen the materials? Write annotated bibliographies, etc? Colin Turnbull, he added, did some of this each year for Natural History magazine.

Looking Ahead. Since materials for classroom use were steadily accumulating, and various projects were moving ahead with much success, Gearing suggested that the conference return to the questions which prompted the meeting: Would a stock-taking conference next year be worthwhile? In addition, what should various institutions and the AAA seek to do? What priorities should be established for future work? Textor suggested that only a stock-taking conference be held next year, and the proposed sourcebook on anthropology and education be postponed. The important question, he said, was to establish a list of research priorities: in basic research, action research, and developmental work. The proposed conference should focus attention on what can and ought to be done; if it does, then more feedback with persons currently interested in this field can occur.
Wax asked about the levels on which change was occurring. There is a need, he thought, for revolutionary proposals to be made for "deprived" schools—basic structural revisions, not just curricular changes. Collier said that curricular changes are highly visible, but only a small part of the total picture: implementation, experimentation, and so on must proceed side by side. Owen stated that curricular change is the cutting edge of the knife which can bring changes elsewhere in the educational system; although he wished research on the "culture of schools" to continue, he thought the immediate need was to develop anthropological curricula.

Leacock said that parents in New York City were requesting scholarly help in their attempts to direct or modify public schools, and she asked if this were an appropriate topic for action research. Kimball responded that the involvement of parents in the system should be a topic of high research priority.

Hanvey followed up Wax's point about the need for anthropologists to propose a radically different type of school system (going beyond mere curricular changes), and cited Cornell University project at Vicos, Peru, as an example of what he had in mind. Wax added that if the AAA were to state that such and such a program were needed, sufficient funds could probably be raised. Wolcott asked if any changes to date had been made as a result of anthropological studies of schools. Wax replied that the major problem of U.S. public schools in their monopoly of educational systems, and that students should have choices of where to attend, types of curriculum to follow, etc.

Byrnes agreed that drastic changes were needed, and observed that the appearance of change (and actual short-term innovations) could serve to disguise a lack of basic change. Eddy commented that schools are rather unique institutions, unlike some hospitals, insofar as they were intimately bound up with government. Hanvey asked whether it were possible the AAA might take over the school system of a small town, and to create there a new model of the educational enterprise. While this should be a public school, he added, many innovations such as breaking the five-day-a-week pattern could be introduced. Diamond thought such an effort might be supported within a "model city" or "model school" context, which the current federal administration seem interested in furthering. Frantz said a local newspaper recently reported that Antioch College had contracted to operate two schools in a slum area of Washington, D.C., presumably to introduce radical changes. He doubted that the AAA was equipped to take on such a huge project, however, and added that many large projects of directed culture change, such as at Vicos, had not been very successful. Owen added that the Santa Barbara school system had experimentally suspended the use of traditional disciplinary formulae, but that it had backfired dramatically.

Kimball stated that, in reality, effective change can only be accomplished through existing school systems. Anthropologists also seldom make good administrators, he thought. Ehrich observed that if any person or group wished to implement such an extensive program of educational change, they should be encouraged; but if no one present had plans to do this, then the time given to discussing an improbable event could be used more productively in examining other topics.

Concluding Notes (post facto). Looking back, it seems that two emphases existed about the use and extension of anthropological materials below the college level. Some participants advocated more of such activity, speaking of the great demand and the excellent receptivity now being given the materials. Various reports indicated that even young children were able to grasp allegedly difficult anthropological concepts, and that through simulation, role-playing, etc., an appreciation of cultural differences (and perhaps behavioral changes) could be effected.
Other conferees preferred to describe the chief value of anthropology as the new perspective that could be provided, rather than primarily providing new data or contents. They questioned whether anthropology should be taught below the college level, although they probably shared the normal anthropological bias of preferring heterocultural content in many courses. Both groups recognized the need for major reforms in (U.S.A.) schools—whether in administration, curricula, or pedagogy—but saw no likelihood that anthropologists could or should initiate these changes. In the main, it was thought that the contributions of scholars were not likely to be in administration, and the former needed to recognize that educators rather than they would decide which changes could or should be made.

The problem of schools offering variable course content (etc.) to populations having different ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic characteristics was discussed. No conclusions were drawn (suggesting an agenda for some future conference); recognition was given however to the problem of plural curricula, the acculturative pressures of most "middle-class" schools, and the implications of learning theory for the encouragement of greater knowledge, wider perspective, higher motivation, and clearer group identifications.

The relevance of linguistic models for comprehending subcultural variation was appreciated. Could the use of differentiated curricula be supported by anthropological data? The session ended with no attempt to "solve" the basic (U.S.) American question—whether culturally relativistic differences were to be legitimized and furthered or hindered by virtue of certain choices. Similar problems face most nations (not only new ones), of course, regarding choices of standard curricula and languages of instruction. However, there was insufficient time to explore these questions; only further comparative research in various societies could allow serious recommendations to be formulated.

Finally, it was observed that virtually nothing is known yet of the results of exposure to anthropological materials by teachers, students, or administrators (or, indeed, the anthropologists). Nor do we know how much "anthropologizing" of traditional curricular materials has been occurring. Indeed, we are only beginning to ask the significant question of what effects curricular activities, in contrast to extra-curricular ones (such as informal age groups, the mass communication media, etc.), have upon the transmission of culture.
III. THE PREPARATION AND SUPPORT OF TEACHERS

Theory and Commitment. Drawing upon his paper, "Educational Development and Anthropology," presented at the last AAA Annual Meeting, Kimball opened the session by identifying six broad major areas that included all aspects of the educational enterprise: the training of school personnel; the organization and management of schools; the specification of curriculum and preparation of materials; pedagogical practices; the relations between school and community; and the philosophy of education. He went on to suggest that four areas of theory were applicable to the study of educational systems: learning theory, culture theory, theory of organization, and theory of change.

Kimball described the U.S. educational system generically as having drawn many of its features from the "Methodist Ethic." He thought the best contributions which anthropologists could make toward understanding education would derive from detachment—a striving for the same objectivity they desired when they studied foreign systems. (Quoting his paper: "If our perspective and method are to be useful to American education then we must learn to keep our analysis free of culture bias to the same degree that we demand such objectivity in our work elsewhere. Otherwise we had better steer clear of advocating educational reform since its practitioners are far more competent that we are in their spheres.")

Wax indicated he held a different view, one which Redfield delineated in The Little Community, as he believed a humanistic-holistic approach allowed a legitimate place for action roles by the researcher. Even outrage, he said, should be an acceptable device to gain information and perhaps to bring about changes. Gearing remarked that judgments about a system should not be rushed; like others, anthropologists may be too fast in making judgments but too slow in acting. Frantz suggested that, as had been demonstrated in the previous session, the mere publication of research data served to place a scholar and his results in the public realm; there, popular values and program commitments were often both extensive and contentious. Kimball went on to say that objective scientific description should be separated from personal orientations; although straight reporting might create problems, anthropologists could make their best contributions as consultants in this case, not as reformers. Wax replied that the publication of a monograph will stimulate responses from the public, and no scholar’s findings were ever complete or fully verified. Parsons suggested that anthropologists could at least inhibit their grinding of axes. Owen mentioned the problem of anthropological reports and interpretations seldom possessing the reliability of the findings of, say, biologists. Information often led then to ideological indignation. Ehrich remarked that indignation was often based upon ignorance, at least in terms of the anthropologists’ means for achieving understanding.

Teacher Preparation. Hanvey turned the discussion toward an examination of the preparation and support of teachers. He had provided participants with sheets giving a set of nine "facts and propositions" about teachers—their skills, duties, isolation from scholars, receptivity to change, and so on. Among those most relevant to anthropology were: few school teachers have had college work in anthropology; schools often are able to go through the motions of innovation without sustained effort along particular lines, especially in the social studies; academic
specialists frequently express contempt for school teachers, and anthropologists in particular might be expected to see teachers in the context of the school culture; teachers and schools tend to define the problem of teacher preparation in terms of a lack of substantive knowledge—a jug which needs to be filled with more courses—rather than one of finding means for understanding how knowledge is generated and verified; and, finally, new institutional arrangements may be necessary to bring scholars and teachers together since college courses are probably not the best means of teacher preparation.

Hanvey observed also that many teachers of teachers never visit schools, and others who prepare curriculum materials seldom do research on the effectiveness of the material. Much innovation is used but with little intent to bring about radical modifications. Wax said he had found his students were grateful for "meat" in social science courses, but he had only been able to reach them superficially; hence their exposure often resulted in the acquisition of a "trivial liberalism." Ehrich commented on the value of learning to accept the art of what is possible. Gearing said anthropologists might help teachers to better understand school systems in order that they could live more easily with their situations.

Leacock pointed to the teacher's role as the one of central importance in the structure if change were to be initiated. There was a need for teachers to develop more professionalism, she thought, in order for them to realize their potential as agents of change. This remark prompted Owen to ask whether it was being advocated that anthropologists assume the role of reformer or administrator. Hymes commented that tribal systems had roles, too; a school could be studied as a conceptual isolate in the same way as were tribes or hospitals. Owen replied that the discussion was concerned with introducing changes, however. Hanvey noted that the question of social change was immediately faced when deciding what to prepare teachers for.

Weinstein spoke of a successful venture at Purdue University in which the mathematics department had approached the College of Education to ask how, given a new math curriculum, they could help improve the training of teachers. This endeavor had resulted both in joint collaboration in developing materials and in the joint upgrading of teacher preparation. Owen emphasized again that whereas curriculum was only a small part of the knife, it is the cutting edge for making changes in schools. Parsons asked if this suggested that anthropologists and educators might work out more joint activities. In response to a question, Gearing indicated he was now serving on a California state-wide committee that sought to revise social studies curricula in the secondary schools. The reception to their work had ranged from tolerance to enthusiasm. Parsons said a comprehensive statement was needed from anthropologists what Anthropology had to offer to Education. Eddy suggested there was considerable need to educate educators as to what anthropologists could offer, i.e., to indicate that a classroom could profitably be studied as easily as a tribe.

Thomas asked, "Who are the teachers? Where do they come from?" There should be more knowledge about their origins and career development, he said, as well as the assumptions and premises they use. For example, in Oklahoma teachers normally assume that culture is hereditary, etc. Gearing suggested that the fundamental task of anthropologists toward teachers was to train them to become competent observers of the school and community. But in addition, Fuchs added, anthropologists should do more research and assist in the education of teachers. Owen indicated that few anthropologists now have any part in training teachers. How can anthropologists articulate with persons who now provide such training? What are the points of entry for anthropologists to become involved? How can anthropologists "subvert" educators in order that they also can help teach teachers? One way, he suggested, was through joint seminars with the staff of departments of education.
Gearing suggested the question was one of resistance, and that the development of curricula was an excellent way to enter into the heart of training programs. Hanvey thought that in-service training would be much more important than pre-service courses. Hymes indicated that the social structure and communication patterns of schools were crucial in determining whether or not anthropologists would or could be used by educators. What are the chances, he asked, of the content of anthropological courses being a success? Gearing thought it was assumed that the ACS materials were good for educating teachers. If so, he asked, do they help make teachers become agents of change? Hanvey replied that several teachers who used ACS materials had given up their positions, but he did not know what this meant about their having been "educated." Bailey commented that in-service courses are generally relevant to the teachers' tasks, whereas pre-service courses tend to be less useful because they lend themselves to overgeneralization.

Eddy indicated that Social Foundations of Education courses tend to be given early to students, whereas methods courses come at the end of their training. She suggested student teachers should receive internship training rather early; in this way, anthropology might contribute knowledge to the social aspects of pedagogy. The first year of teaching, she added, was the most critical one in the teacher's career. Fuchs agreed, and said that teachers often have the best results in their initial year or two. Leacock made the point again that no matter how well-trained the teacher, she or he had to work within the social structure of the school. Many of the problems they face during the first year are so great that teachers, especially those who try hardest to introduce changes, are dismayed, and either voluntarily or otherwise stop teaching. Those tending to remain have accommodated most to the system, and often they are of lower quality. Perhaps all that anthropologists can do in this situation is to keep trying to proffer observations and analyses, and to suggest valid reasons for changes to be made, and the likely consequences to follow. Eddy remarked further that perhaps anthropologists might also provide better training for administrators.

Owen asked about the means by which anthropologists could enter into existing school systems. He suggested two ways in which individuals with M.A. degrees in anthropology could be used: (1) as teacher supervisors—persons who supervise and try to advance social studies; and (2) as resource teachers—individuals within school systems to whom teachers turn for intellectual leadership. Parsons cited the difficulties of certification in California, whether or not such persons had specialized in anthropology. Ehrich asked whether, in reality, it was possible to manipulate students to assume these roles; he thought it would be difficult in view of the traditional orientations anthropology professors provide their students. He also wondered whether the group was talking about introducing or directing changes by overt, covert, or informal means.

Thomas said that teachers, at least some of them in Detroit, often are not sure what schools are for; some schools seem to be "containment areas," and the administrators and teachers look like a discipline structure; yet the teachers believe the schools are for other purposes. It is really necessary to know what teachers are doing, he said, if anthropologists intend to help them. He confessed he did not comprehend the esoteric terms used by many educators, and said a fundamental vocabulary might be developed in order to talk with them. Gearing added that beyond the matter of vocabulary, teachers operate with the assumption they are simply applying knowledge. In the first year, teachers have the discovery of seeing in schools what they have learned in classes. They should be taught to observe better and to ask more insightful questions. Wax suggested that the teacher shortage resulted partly
from "overprofessionalism." The shortage was produced by demands for more and more training, and better-trained teachers desired better and better schools in which to work, hence an endless cycle operated. The way out was not to add more courses (even in anthropology) to the teacher training curriculum, however.

Owen mentioned the increased enrollment of Negroes, especially in central metropolitan schools, and said they brought a different culture to the schools than had their predecessors or most of their current teachers. In many schools (such as Watts, California, and New York City), both students and adults outside the schools were taking action to try bringing about radical changes in school administration and curriculum. Many of these children were negatively committed not only to schooling, but also to the dominant U.S. culture (its "White Anglo-Saxon Protestant" norms). He lamented that we natives are virtually bereft of accurate accounts of what actually transpires in such schools, and that until this was known anthropologists and others would be acting or advising in a dangerous vacuum.

Kimball agreed that the world is becoming very different. He spoke of efforts during the past months to revise a social studies program in Florida. He pointed out that: the teaching of social studies is overloaded with history (and often prejudicial history), which makes it more difficult for those trained in (other) social sciences to obtain jobs; there is a lack of good curriculum material to use in any revised plan for giving more emphasis to the social sciences, although this is changing quickly; it is difficult to modify courses because of the rigidity of different academic disciplines and educational bureaucracies. Finally, he noted, college courses may not be the best means of teacher preparation; rather, in-service training could probably be emphasized with profit. In many colleges, there was a real fundamental argument as to which discipline would be awarded the "capstone" course to offer teachers. He thought this was a misconceived point of emphasis, though, and suggested that anthropologists at least might make their best contributions in an early Social Foundations of Education course. The Florida committee is likely to report that the problems of change are great, but it may advocate a fifth year of study or in-service courses.

Textor said that Stanford University was having some success in teaching students how to observe, then to report and interpret data on a selected ethnic group to members of a colloquium. Wax suggested that more local adults should be involved with schools. They might benefit from contacts with anthropologists and other external experts, just as teachers and administrators allegedly do, but few opportunities exist for such contact. Such a scheme had worked with upper class parents, hence it might possibly do so with lower class parents.

Parsons said it was necessary to learn the language of educators, and that anthropologists should not give up the search to understand schools; after all, they claimed an ability to understand whole villages, and even larger groups. It was necessary to study "successful" schools (those providing continuity for "White Anglo-Saxon Protestant" middle class norms) as well as poor or "unsuccessful" ones (e.g., Watts, California). If the teachers in some schools are defined as "enemies," as holders of power, who will be defined as "friends?" Anthropologists may be able to help as community ethnographers even if they can be of little assistance inside the school. Thomas expressed agreement with this, and cited examples among American Indian communities. Owens added that anthropologists should not be trying to revise the whole educational system in the U.S.A. Rather, they should make available to educators and the public what they now know and what they can further study.
Looking Ahead. Textor asked for a list of priorities which might be drafted and drawn to the attention of anthropologists. Hanvey mentioned three: the study of big city school operations and problems; more research; and the further development of curricula. Fuchs noted it was increasingly important that anthropologists study schools because industrialization, etc., was encouraging the transmission of culture around the world more and more through formal institutions. Leacock urged that a framework be established to help coordinate research at all levels, since it was unrealistic to decide upon priorities. Knowing of a postulated framework, individuals could then do research and analysis at different levels. Wax wondered who might be interested in funding a large, coordinated research program. Hymes and Hanvey noted that anthropologists are doing more and more research on education, but so far there was no organized focus or coordinated scheme.

Textor indicated that the value of a list of priorities would be to inform the profession what this group considered were the most urgent, manageable, and practicable tasks to be undertaken. Owen said that teacher preparation and training should not be ignored. Ehrich recommended any list of priorities should be stated as a series of questions rather than positive statements. Leacock came back with the statement that it was often difficult, if not impossible, to separate basic research from action. Textor undertook a summary statement by saying there were three types of activity of value to all (?) school systems which anthropologists could undertake: basic research, action-oriented research, and action. The last involved anthropologists who aimed to introduce innovations, including the training of teachers.

Discussion concluded with suggestions that Textor, Leacock, and possibly others seek a draft of major research topics which anthropologists might be encouraged to undertake. It was recommended that these be introduced at the start of the last session of the Conference.
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANTHROPOLOGY AND EDUCATION

Leacock and Textor opened the discussion by presenting a list of needed research and other activities. The most important kinds of holistic and problem-oriented research needed would include the following:

1. Ethnographies of Schools

   A. Changes
      (1) Occurring "naturally"
      (2) As a result of guided or conscious planning

   B. Comparative
      (1) Domestic
      (2) Foreign

      In both, to focus on different community situations, i.e., school and community relations. Attention to factors of ethnicity, class, religiosity, etc. Comparison by types of schools, too (vide Wax)

   C. Teacher performance during the first year and years of teaching
      (1) Socialization of the teacher into the school system
      (2) The curriculum and methods of teaching, as seen within the context in which the teacher must perform
      (3) Structural changes needed for teacher to fulfill expected duties

   D. Autonomy of local schools to direct change; demonstration projects
      (1) American Indian
      (2) Urban Negro
      (3) Spanish-speaking (Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban)
      (4) French-speaking (Haitians, French-Canadians)
      (5) Religious and other special communities

2. Bibliographies

   A. Of Materials on other peoples—as approved for use in schools
   B. Readers and annotated bibliographies for teachers of teachers
   C. Long-term extensive reviews for anthropologists

3. Development of Anthropological Curricula (especially early college level)

4. Teacher Training and Support

Hanvey spoke of the probable utility and value of raising the quality of anthropology courses now offered in colleges. With improvements, these might be able to serve as models for presenting substantive matter, as well as pedagogically. It certainly appeared to him that schools were now ripe for anthropological contributions, particularly in slum areas. He expressed his disappointment that some anthropologists had not yet established an experimental school in which all
manner of innovations in anthropological content, perspective, and operating procedures had been undertaken. Frantz indicated a school of this kind would certainly be welcomed, but it would probably require some well-established institution to fund and operate it. The AAA had no staff resources to embark upon such a venture. Thomas suggested such an experimental school might be tried by some local school where a number of anthropologists were able to wield much influence. Lyons asked if anthropologists and educators might get together sometime to explore such a possibility.

Wolcott said he felt that three important things had come out of the previous session: all the participants were probably involved in teacher training; there were numerous opportunities for anthropologists to get serious about the implications of their methods and knowledge; and anthropologists appeared to be very sensitive to their academic appointments and status differentials (which was in itself a topic worth investigating). Textor and others agreed that anthropologists interested in education needed to be accorded full-fledged joint appointments, with jural rights in two departments.

Ehrich noted that collaborative interdisciplinary ventures often started among persons with lower academic ranks, but that prestigious people may be able to run interference to help expand and solidify such cooperation. Bailey also thought such programs moved better when planned informally, and among persons with lower rank, since the formalities could be arranged "at the top." Kimball suggested that explorations of the relations of anthropology to (other) behavioral disciplines vis-a-vis education would be one of the best preliminary efforts to undertake. From such seminars often arose new curricula. If the AAA could issue a recommendation encouraging such efforts, this might stimulate more collaboration on the campuses. Owen said that the Social Science Research Council possibly could serve as a medium to aid collaboration. Frantz indicated the U.S. Office of Education this year had begun to support several research seminars of this kind, and it was likely to fund additional kinds of joint efforts in the future, if Congress appropriated sufficient money. One common deterrent to further collaboration among different disciplines was the parochialism of some department heads.

Possible Future Conferences. Gearing noted the slippage of time, and suggested that conferees move on to discuss other possible future activities. It was obvious, he said, that the major job of stock-taking could not be undertaken at this conference. Two questions therefore should be examined: (1) whether to hold a major conference sometime next year, provided funds are available; and (2) what roles and activities might be sponsored by the AAA if the proposal to hire a research stimulator-coordinator is approved by the Executive Board and the Office of Education. If such a grant is awarded, it would undoubtedly include funds for the prospective conference as well, Frantz said.

Ehrich recommended that some formal stock-taking should be undertaken before a major conference was held, and that these materials should be prepared for circulation and discussion. Who, he asked, was going to do these jobs? There also should be a document coming out of this Conference. Eddy wondered whether one large conference or several small ones oriented around particular topics should be planned. Owen suggested that short "position papers" might be prepared by individuals here as a supplement to the present conference report; these could serve as the base for the next major conference, and even gathered perhaps to make a short sourcebook.
Gearing reflected that there was a need for some very serious pieces of writing to be done. Quoting Irvin DeVore, he said, if the AAA were to do anything, it ought to be done well.

Disseminating Information. Frantz asked whether there was yet a need to publish anthropological materials on education in one publication, either an existing journal or a new one. Ehrich said it was unrealistic to start a new journal, as there was not enough research material to carry it. Possibly, he added, one of the present educational journals, or a special section in the AAA Fellow Newsletter, would be better. Eddy mentioned the Journal of Educational Sociology as a likely outline. Hanvey suggested School Review as a good journal with lots of prestige. Owen added there might be "something" like Trans-action that could be started. Fuchs suggested the Fellow Newsletter again, but Ehrich said this did not reach educators. Wolcott reported that nothing about Anthropology and Education had appeared in the American Anthropologist during the last three years, and wondered if the AAA's official journal could be used. Kimball reported that Human Organization had carried a number of articles on Anthropology and Education.

Bymos mentioned that sessions on Anthropology and Education might usefully be scheduled in future Annual Meetings of the AAA, and Bailey responded that four such sessions had been held in recent years. Owen thought such sessions could help to validate the role of anthropologists' doing research on educational systems. Leacock added that a plenary session at the Annual Meeting might add some stature to these efforts.

Returning to the question of the prospective major conference, Gearing said that for each topical category there might be the following made available: stock-taking articles—overview, summary, and full bibliographies; "think" papers, accompanied by data, to serve as bases for discussion—these might be submitted to multiple reviews in the Current Anthropology fashion; and an edited version of discussion which could be combined with the first two. Ehrich said it would certainly help if the papers were circulated beforehand for discussion. Textor thought a stock-taking conference a year from now should have first priority, with the development of a sourcebook occurring later and being issued independently.

Weinstein asked if there might be steering committees appointed on particular topics; if so, this might be better than a small select committee of a few people trying to plan a large conference. Frantz mentioned that if the research stimulator-coordinator appeared in time on the scene, he could do lots of spade work by writing and traveling around the country.

Organizing for the Future. Ehrich asked who would take up responsibilities now for the future. Thomas and Owen suggested a committee composed of Gearing, chairman, Wax, Collier, Hanvey, and Kimball; Frantz would extend what support he could, as time allowed. All those named agreed to serve as an ad hoc committee, and to take further responsibilities at Gearing's call (which will depend upon the availability of funds for the major conference).

Kimball asked what was meant by "stock-taking," as the literature already contained numerous articles on the uses of anthropology in education; therefore, the stock-taking should be made at a higher level. Gearing thought the papers to be written for the conference could be of two kinds: general review articles, and empirically oriented studies. Frantz said that if these were well done, they might be published as a book, or a special issue of the American Anthropologist, or a Monograph of the Society for Applied Anthropology (the last would provide a large audience outside anthropology; but then so might the first alternative, a book).
Kimball reported on a talk given by Paul Miller, Associate Commissioner of Education, at the recent Annual Meeting of the Society for Applied Anthropology. The basic problems of U.S. education today, as Miller described them, included: (1) education for women; (2) vocational education; (3) international education; and (4) educating more outstandingly able people to run our own country.

Textor then distributed some brochures about the Stanford International Development Education Center (SIDEC), explained its staff, program and purposes, and answered questions. Parsons likewise briefly outlined plans underway at Berkeley to develop a new doctoral program in Anthropology and Education.

Frantz then described the main parts of a draft proposal recently submitted to the AAA Executive Board and, for review, the U.S. Office of Education, which had indicated they were quite interested in funding some new activities by the Association. The proposal was built around earlier suggestions made by Steve Boggs, and it included some of the ideas for action that had been integral to the Culture of Schools Program, directed by Diamond. The proposal sought to establish a program or "center" (all of one man, plus a secretary) concerned with Anthropology and Education, and would be sponsored by the AAA. The main activities of a newly-funded anthropologist would be to stimulate anthropological research on education, both subculturally and cross-culturally; to get organized the conference being discussed here; and to coordinate (or get coordinated by a commission or committee) the present curriculum development projects in anthropology. Since there was now no articulating structure or joint planning, and since attention needed to be given to the early college level, there was good reason to think of establishing such a commission, as other professional associations had done.

The Executive Board of the AAA had approved in principle the creation of this program, but even if funds are awarded it can flounder unless an imaginative and dynamic person is found to serve as the research stimulator-coordinator (or whatever title he will have). Several prospects for this key position were named by conference participants, and they debated whether the person should be young or old, and whether a Ph.D. would be essential for getting a rapid start. The value of launching such a program with a luminary who would take leave from his regular position for a year or two was mentioned.

The conference closed with the participants expressing gratitude to Stanley Diamond, whose Culture of Schools Program covered most of their expenses, and who had suggested that a broad, informal conference should be held to explore possibilities for the future; to Fred Gearing, who asserted much initiative in organizing and chairing the conference; and to the Executive Office of the AAA for its assistance.
MANUSCRIPTS FOR A PROJECTED MONOGRAPH ON
"ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON EDUCATION"

to be published by
Basic Books

Stanley Diamond, editor
The Shaping of Men's Minds: Adaptations to Imperatives of Culture

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Introduction

One of the earliest and most significant of anthropology's discoveries was that culture is a particular way of shaping the mind. More than being a series of habits and patches of exotic customs, of ways of earning a livelihood, or of being clothed and adorned, anthropologists learned that the essence of a culture is to be sought in the material and intellectual symbols to which people respond in their social relations and in meeting their basic necessities. Indeed, many anthropologists are agreed that in their daily lives people in all societies respond to cultural symbols rather than to objective reality. Close on the heels of this insight was the awareness that the symbolizations of cultural life do not have their roots in race or any other aspect of biology but that they are learned as the result of systematic and consistent experiences to which the individual is exposed in the course of growing up.

With this also came another significant realization that has served as one of the cornerstones of modern anthropology, namely, that one way of conceptualizing a culture is that it is a self-perpetuating system. Thus, an important group of anthropologists asserted that one of the most important tasks in the study of culture is to seek an understanding of the means by which social systems shape the minds of their members in order to assure the perpetuation of their cultures.
These principles underlay much of the work of Sapir (1949) and Mead (1939), among others, especially during the 1930's.

During the 1940's, these concepts were given an added dimension as a result of Hallowell's investigations (1955) of the psychological components of acculturation among the Ojibwa, in which he found that the adoption of formal features of Euro-American culture, especially of material items, did not necessarily involve the reshaping of modes of mind; instead, he found that traditional patterns of cognition, motivation and emotional functioning can often covary with the radios, guns, clothing, and money of their conquerors. More than suggesting that appearances can be deceiving, and in addition to the idea that culture is manifest in more than directly observable phenomena, these findings - sharpened further by the Spindlers' (1955, 1962, 1963) studies of the Menomini, among others - contributed immeasurably to our understanding of some of the processes in sociocultural and psychological adaptation. Most recently, these hypotheses and insights have been explored systematically and comparatively by Goldschmidt (1965) and his coworkers (especially Edgerton 1965) in East Africa.

With growing attention by anthropologists generally to the concepts emerging from the study of biological evolution, and the timely resurgence of interest in the processes underlying the evolution of social organization, the conviction has been strengthened among anthropologists that it is the population, rather than the individual, which is the adaptive unit. Whether the problem under investigation is a group's modes of marriage, political organization, or manner of controlling impulses, the cultural patterning of behavior must be seen, at least in part, as a complex set of adaptive mechanisms which are designed to assure the group's self-
perpetuation under highly specific conditions. Similarly, it is commonly accepted by many anthropologists today that although there is variability in every society - for example, with regard to marriage, law, economic arrangements, political organization, the psychological makeups of individuals, and the like - it is the adaptive mechanisms in the population which must be focused on.

Adaptation refers to the relationship maintained by a group to its environment. The adaptive mechanisms that develop in a population to facilitate its survival are not only to be found in its technology and in its economic, political, and legal organizations, but also in patterns of cognition, motivation, and impulse control. Whether we are dealing with technology, formal institutions, or psychological processes, patterns of institutional organization must be seen as aspects of adaptation by a population to highly specific environmental pressures. The environment in regard to which a group develops its sociopsychological adaptations is highly complex and, as a matter of fact, includes most of the universe in which the individual is expected to live and make his way.

I am going to deal in this paper with a limited aspect of the ways in which society shapes the individual's mind. Specifically, I am going to distinguish between socialization and education and examine their relationships to each other. My contention is that the proportion assumed by one vis-a-vis the other is an adaptation to certain imperatives in the sociocultural environment, especially its structure of social relations.
In terms of the principal focus of this paper, the modes of upbringing in a society - the means by which the mind is shaped - are to be regarded as mechanisms which designed to create the kind of person who is going to be
able to meet the imperatives of the culture in which he is going to participate as a mature adult, especially in respect to the maintenance of effective social relations. The notion that modes of shaping the mind must be understood within the total sociocultural context in which they develop is expressed in the following programmatic statement. If we substitute the phrase "any social system" for "the kibbutz" in this statement, it has universal or cross-cultural applicability: "Education of the children cannot be for educational purposes as such. . . . Rather it must be intrinsically tied to the major objectives of the kibbutz and to prepare the children for the kibbutz way of life. . . . The kibbutz is a complicated economic, social and political organism and all educational efforts must be directed to prepare the children to accept the institution and to serve its aims" (Golan, quoted in Stern 1965: 118).

I am going to concentrate on the imperatives of social relations because I want to stress that the individual in society confronts a complex set of realities that are foreordained, over which he has little (if any) control, and which are the products of his society's history. I emphasize this because of the proclivity among many behavioral scientists to disregard the principle that men must adapt to the realities in which they find themselves. I also emphasize this in order to make explicit the idea that programs which advocate changes in modes of socialization and education must be congruent with the cultural realities for which individuals are being prepared.

By definition, the concept of culture includes change. Social systems not only prepare their succeeding generations to maintain their ways of life, but they also seek to prepare their members for new conditions.
of life, for new modes of acquiring a livelihood, and for new political realities when these undergo change. In the discussion that follows, I am going to speak of cultures as if they were stable systems, but this will be done only for heuristic purposes and for the sake of parsimony; one of my basic premises is that when a culture changes, there must be congruent changes in the manners of shaping the minds.

Socialization and Education

My point of departure is that socialization and education are two fundamentally different processes in the shaping of mind. They are found in all societies, albeit in different proportions. Although socialization and education are aspects of growing up in all social systems, their quantitative roles in preparing individuals for participation in adult cultural life vary from one society to another. This variation is an adaptive response to — or a function of — different cultural imperatives.

By the socialization of children I mean the activities that are devoted to the inculcation and elicitation of basic motivational and cognitive patterns through ongoing and spontaneous interaction with parents, siblings, kinsmen, and other members of the community. These activities are geared toward the creation of attitudes, values, control of impulses, cognitive orientations, and the like, in the course of daily and routine activities, both within and outside the household. Education is the inculcation of standardized and stereotyped knowledge, skills, values, and attitudes by means of standardized and stereotyped procedures. Such procedures and content exist in all cultures, ranging from the repetitive
recitation of lore, myth and etiquette by grandparents to grandchildren around open fires in crude shelters to the stereotyped instruction of large groups of children and adolescents (and sometimes adults) by non-kinsmen, using electronic media of communication, in elaborate and permanent buildings.

Socialization consists of such daily events in the life of a child as a parent exostulating "No!" when the child does something undesirable or receiving a reward after having done something well. The interaction between the parent and child might be predictable - as when a child tortures a cat or a younger sibling - but it is not stereotyped and standardized in the sense that the interaction occurs at regular times, in predictable ways, and at set places.

I hypothesize that the quantitative role played by socialization in the development of the individual is in direct proportion to the extent to which the network of kin relations coincides with the network of personal relations. Correlatively, education tends to increase proportionately with the degree to which the network of kin relations fails to coincide with the network of personal relations.

Education does not take place only in schools, although, as will be seen, such institutions play an important role in the shaping of mind. Education - in the sense of formal, stereotypic, predictable learning experiences - takes place in even the most primitive societies. One example of this is Hart's description (1963: 410) of puberty rites among the Tiwi; the implications of this passage for other societies in which there are initiation ceremonies are readily apparent.
"Among the Tiwi of North Australia, one can see the traumatic nature of the initiation period in very clear form, and part of the trauma lies in the sudden switch of personnel with whom the youth has to associate. A boy reaches thirteen or fourteen or so, and the physiological signs of puberty begin to appear. Nothing happens, possibly for many months. Then suddenly one day, toward evening when the people are gathering around their campfires for the main meal of the day after coming in from their day's hunting and food-gathering, a group of three or four heavily armed and taciturn strangers suddenly appear in camp. In full war regalia they walk in silence to the camp of the boy and say curtly to the household: 'We have come for So-and-So.' Immediately pandemonium breaks loose. The mother and the rest of the older women begin to howl and wail. The father rushes for his spears. The boy, himself panic-stricken, tries to hide, the younger children begin to cry, and the household dogs begin to bark. It is all terribly similar to the reaction which is provoked by the arrival of the police at an American home to pick up a juvenile delinquent. This similarity extends to the behavior of the neighbors. These carefully abstain from identifying with either the strangers or the stricken household. They watch curiously the goings-on but make no move that can be identified as supporting either side. This is particularly notable in view of the fact that the strangers are strangers to all of them too, that is, they are from outside the encampment, or outside the band, who, under any other circumstances, would be greeted by a shower of spears. But not under these circumstances."

In terms of the hypotheses to be explored in this paper, I would like to take exception to one statement in the foregoing paragraph and,
at the same time, add another dimension to the difference between education and socialization. I do not think that the comparison between the Tiwi experience just described and the American family's reaction to a visit by the police is apt—even though the overt behavior might be similar—because of its implications for the individual. In American society, having one's child picked up by the police as a delinquent is—at least in some circles—considered to be unusual, if not an idiosyncratic, experience. It sets one off as different from most other people. But the staged performance among the Tiwi has quite different consequences: it establishes a bond of common experience with others.

One of the pitfalls in many applications of psychological theories to the phenomena of culture is the prevailing implicit assumption that the formative experiences of early life have their effects—in the manner of information in-puts—only at the times at which they occur. Without gainsaying the determinative effects of early life experiences for the shaping of personality, what is often overlooked is that adults frequently think back to their experiences in growing up, and that recollections of things past themselves have their effects. All adults look back from time to time on their childhood and adolescent experiences in the privacies of their minds and—whether aware of it or not—distinguish between those experiences which were shared with all peers and those which were unique or idiosyncratic. The latter are important in contributing to a sense of personal identity—the sense of being unique—while the shared experiences contribute immeasurably to identification with other members of the group. When an adult thinks back to the experiences of his childhood and later stages of development, each formative
event also contains, explicitly or implicitly, a recollection of whether he alone had a particular experience or whether it was one that all people like him had gone through. In addition to its other consequences, an experience that is recalled as unique is an important contributor to the sense of exclusiveness which each person must maintain. An experience that is recalled as one that had been undergone by others—a vision quest, group circumcision, marriage, learning how to hunt or cultivate, a doctoral oral examination, and the like—is an important psychological contributor to the feeling of "I am like all the others." This, too, is necessary for social life, and can be generated by socialization or educational experiences.

I suggest that the experience described above by Hart for the Tiwi makes its mark three times, each with its own effects on the mind. The first occurs when a pre-pubertal child observes this happening to an older sibling or neighbor. His terror must be profound. The second occurs when it happens to him. Painful as the event must be when he is called for, he must somehow recall having seen this happen to others, and it certainly contributes to his sense of being a Tiwi, in addition to its other repercussions for him. The third time that the incident leaves its mark is when he is an adult, when he observes its occurrence in the lives of future adult Tiwi. This observation must strengthen his bond with others in the group, knowing that he had undergone the experience and that it is now part of the lives of others: it is part of becoming and being Tiwi. As will be discussed more fully below, the preponderance of such shared institutionally stereotypic experiences in the course of growing up, vis-a-vis more idiosyncratic experiences,
contributes to the sense of sameness with others, and is an adaptive response to the pressures of certain types of social systems.

Another example of stereotypicality and standardization of instruction which can be designated as education is provided by George Spindler from the Menomini. "Grandparents still tell children 'bedtime stories', and the adults in the group remember when their grandparents told them stories. 'Grandmaw told us kids a story every night before we went to sleep. First thing next morning she would ask us what the story was about. If we couldn't tell her, she would tell the same story again the next night. She would do that until we could tell her what the story was about.' What Grandmaw was looking for was the moral point of the story, 'that we shouldn't offend anybody's feelings,' or 'not to envy what someone else has got'" (Spindler 1963: 389).

I am not trying to establish a taxonomy on the basis of which one particular behavior or another with respect to children can be designated as an example of socialization or education. Instead, my concern is with the proportion of the two to each other - and their institutional contexts - in the total experience of growing up and in being prepared for participation in the culture. The balance struck between the two in the shaping of mind, and their placement in different institutional settings, is in itself a formative experience; the proportions which are maintained in this regard are preparations for different styles of life. Socialization:

Socialization - the inculcation of basic psychological patterns through spontaneous interaction with parents, siblings, and others - is the predominant mode of the shaping of mind in social systems in which
kinship is the primary principle in the organization of economic, political, and other social relations. One of the salient features of kinship as a standard for the organization of social relations is its emphasis on particularistic criteria in recruitment and in the evaluation of behavior. This is best expressed in the fundamental paradigmatic dictum that your brother is your brother, and you must get along and cooperate with him, regardless of how you feel about him. Such a value is often given religious and ritual validation in many societies in which kinship is the principal articulator in the organization of social relations, as in the rule that brothers may not sacrifice together when they are in a state of enmity. Expectations for performance, bases of reciprocity, access to the desiderata of the culture, and the like, are phrased in terms of who a person is instead of what he has accomplished. The particularistic values of kinship prescribe that solidarity and anchorage - what I have referred to elsewhere as "sociological interdependence" (Cohen 1964) - are to be sought within narrowly defined sociological limits, often within the boundaries of the corporate kin group or the community. An excellent example of particularism in social life is provided by Wilson for the Nyakyusa (1959: 201): "In [traditional Nyakyusa] thought moral obligations are limited to kinsmen and neighbors: they do not extend beyond the chiefdom except to those relatives who may live beyond its bounds."

The predominance of socialization - vis-a-vis education - in the shaping of mind is thoroughly congruent with an emphasis in the social structure on particularism. This must be seen in two different frames. On the one hand, it is a mode of upbringing which prepares the individual for responsiveness to particularistic criteria. On the other hand, it
represents a consistency between the overall institutional structure of the society and its methods of culturalizing its future members. The latter is an especially important consideration because a society's modes of bringing up its children are not something apart from the total institutional structure of the society. If it is correct to characterize a culture as, *inter alia*, a self-perpetuating system, it is necessary to acknowledge explicitly that the enculturation of the future members of the society is one of the most important institutional activities of the group. Since one of the features of a social system is the achievement and maintenance of consistency in the values and criteria of its principal institutions, there is usually also an attempt to achieve and maintain consistency between the group's methods in shaping the mind and its other institutional activities.

The family is almost always the primary locus of socialization, and relationships within it are governed by particularistic considerations. Thus, as Parsons has described the articulation of socialization and family organization (1964: 48-49), "In the case of the family . . . the paramount value is particularism-quality; it is the maintenance by the family as a collective unit of an appropriate 'style' or pattern of life, including of course the treatment of children as part of this. But in this subsystem the father-husband role is differentiated in terms of the primacy for this role, *i.e.*, the second place for the family, of the particularistic performance pattern, *i.e.*, of responsibility for the interests of the collectivity in its *relations to the situation*, while the mother-wife role is differentiated in terms of particularism-quality (from her husband's); it is, that is to say, the more direct embodiment
of the familial values."

In family-socialization, the child learns behaviors and feelings that are appropriate to his family, his parents, his siblings, and the like, in addition to expressive patterns that are appropriate to general social life. Of course, children become aware at very early ages that there are other families and that there are variations among them with respect to customary and permissible conduct; but when family-socialization predominates as the context in which the mind is shaped, children also learn very early that it is to the norms of their own and closely related families to which they must respond. Where the family is the principal institutional vehicle for the transmission of culture, the embodiment of familial values serves as a prototype for an adult style of life in which the individual is expected to respond in terms of particularistic criteria—behavior that is appropriate to his kin group, his age set, his cult, his sex, and the like.

In no society, however, is the shaping of children's minds confined exclusively to the family. Another important locus of socialization is the network of kinsmen outside the household, and kinsmen are often assigned responsibility for the imposition of particular disciplines and the transmission of particular skills and knowledge to each other's children. The socialization of children by extra-household kinsmen is also intimately tied to a particularistic orientation in the culture as a whole, and kinsmen are responsible for a significant portion of the upbringing of each other's children in societies in which the network of kin relations coincides with the network of personal relations. Furthermore, as I showed in The Transition from Childhood to Adolescence (1964), the members of a child's
descent group (e.g., clan, lineage) are obligated to participate in his up-bringing in societies in which is found the rule of joint legal liability, that is, the rule of law that if the perpetrator of certain unlawful acts cannot be apprehended or meet his liability, then it falls on members of his descent group, usually in a predetermined order. One of the aims that I attributed to being brought up by members of the descent group in addition to parents and others is that it helps to establish an identification and solidarity with the descent group. Thus, this practice can be viewed, among its other connotations, as a means of inculcating an orientation to the particularistic values of certain kin groups. Correlatively, the rule of joint liability embodies particularistic criteria within the legal system; it does not assert that all men are equal under the law but, instead, connotes that different rules of law obtain when men are kinsmen than when they are not.

Peer groups and socialization: Another important locus of socialization — which, though it is found in all societies, has not received the systematic attention it warrants — is the peer group. Although the peer group is an important feature of the individual's growth in all societies, there seem to be very important — if not fundamental — differences in the relationship of the peer group to adult institutions, depending on the general orientation of social relations in the culture. Peer groups are particularistically oriented but, at the same time, are almost always prototypes of adult structuralizations of social relations, at least in part, and they are important vehicles for the transmission of adult patterns of authority and cooperation. It appears that in societies in which the network of kin relations coincides greatly with social relations,
parents play an important role in overseeing and controlling the content or nature of peer group activities. On the other hand, it appears that in societies in which the network of kin relations does not coincide with social relations, parents are not directly involved in the behavior and activities of their children in relation to peers; instead, they seem to focus their control on the children's choice of friends.

This can be illustrated by reference to three different cultures. Among the Nyakyusa and Gusii, where kinship plays an important role in economic, political, and other spheres of activity, parents are directly involved in the behavior of their children within the peer group. In contemporary American society, in which kinship is not supposed to be a factor in recruitment and evaluation of performance, parents do not seem to control the activities of the peer group directly; instead, their influence appears to be confined to choice of friends.

In societies like Nyakyusa and Gusii, each of which is ethnically homogeneous, children learn the idiom and values of kinship—and its significance in the organization of social relations—from their earliest days. The choice of friends in the formation of peer groups does not present much of a problem in societies like these because group memberships and affiliations are largely predetermined. On the other hand, in a heterogeneous society, like contemporary United States, group memberships and affiliations are not foreordained, at least ideally. Hence, one of the principal concerns of parents is to teach their children the criteria by which peers are to be selected. This is not to say that parents in American society do not influence the nature of social relations within their children's peer groups; they do, but by indirection. I suggest that
it makes a great deal of difference whether parents explicitly control social relations within the peer group - as among the Nyakyusa and Gusii - or whether they do so indirectly, as in contemporary American society. This is a matter for further research, but it must be viewed within the context of the organization of social relations within the culture at large.

Among the Nyakyusa, children - especially boys - are incessantly pressured into peer-group participation, and the latter association is one of the major vehicles in the shaping of the individual to become a good Nyakyusa. "One of the values most constantly stressed by the Nyakyusa is that of *ukwangala* which, in its primary sense, means 'the enjoyment of good company' and, by extension, the mutual aid and sympathy which spring from personal friendship. It implies urbane manners and a friendliness which expresses itself in eating and drinking together; not only merry conversation, but also discussion between equals, which the Nyakyusa regard as the principal form of education. 'It is by conversing with our friends,' said one of our witnesses, 'that we gain wisdom (*emahala*); it is bad to sit quite still in men's company. A man who does this is a fool; he learns no wisdom, he has only his own thoughts. Moreover, a man who does not spend time with other people is always dirty, he does not compare himself with any friends. For we learn cleanliness of body in company, those who are dirty learning from their more cleanly friends. . . . It is better to live with other people." (Wilson 1963: 66).

To make certain, in part, that the individual does not develop "only his own thoughts" (my interpretation), "the value of good fellowship with equals is constantly talked about by the Nyakyusa, and it is dinned into boys from childhood that enjoyment and morality alike consist in eating
and drinking, in talking and learning, in the company of contemporaries. The solitary and aloof, those who enjoy the company of women (as opposed to direct sexual satisfaction) and those who seek intimacy with members of another generation, are derided" (Wilson 1963: 163).

"Men and boys are expected to eat regularly with age-mates. . . . From the time a small boy begins to herd he is encouraged to bring home two or three friends to eat with him, and in turn he visits each of them. Since boys have no fields of their own until they marry, but co-operate in cultivation with their parents, it is to their own mothers they go for food, and parents are proud of a son bringing many friends. 'Perhaps,' said Angombwike, 'a son will come with his friends and cut a huge bunch of bananas, and take thick milk and eat with them. When the father comes back his wives will tell him: "Your son has eaten all the thick milk and cut a banana bunch!" Then he will ask: "How many men were with my son?" 'Six!' "Ah, he's a chief!" the old man will say, smiling proudly.' 'And formerly if a young man came home often alone to eat, his father would beat him, or even take a spear and wound him, and when people asked why he would say: "This great fool comes alone to my place, again and again." "It is good to eat with friends, for boys to go round in groups of four or five" (Wilson 1963: 67).

Another illuminating description of the relationships of childhood peer groups to the adult generation is provided by LeVine and LeVine for the Gusii of Kenya (1963). Noting that the structure of peer groups is often determined by economic considerations, such as whether families have cattle which have to be herded (1963: 170), they observe that "at home and in the pastures, older children dominate younger ones. To some
extent this is promulgated by parents, many of whom said they felt it important for one child to be in charge of the others and tell them what to do, and who select the oldest of a group of children for the position of leadership. Since the parents may hold the appointed leader accountable for misdemeanors by and harm befalling the younger children, he is highly motivated to keep them in line and boss them around, though he is not permitted to punish them. In herding groups consisting of children from several homesteads, the oldest dominates the others, ordering them about, occasionally beating them, taking whatever articles they own.

Parents consider such behavior natural and even proper, but they do not accept the idea of the group or its leader dominating a boy so as to make him ignore or violate his parents' wishes. In fact, parents do not entirely recognize the existence of children's groups beyond those of siblings, and they try to maintain direct control over their children regardless of the amount of peer activity" (LeVine and LeVine 1963: 171).

Now compare the foregoing accounts from the Nyakyusa and Gusii with material from a village in contemporary New England. From the descriptions of Nyakyusa and Gusii peer group relationships, it can be gathered that parents are very concerned with the structure of relations within the group. In the New England community, called Orchard Town by Fischer and Fischer (1963), one gathers that parents are primarily concerned with the choices of friends made by their children, and little with the structure of relationships within the group. "Although the parents try to give the play groups considerable autonomy, they do continue to exercise some influence, mostly indirect, on their elementary school child's choice of playmates. Mothers sometimes make critical remarks to their
child about undesired playmates and also show differential hospitality to neighbors' children according to their suitability as playmates from the point of view of morals and manners" (Fischer and Fischer 1963: 994).

The role played by the peer group in the shaping of the individual's mind for participation in the culture represents one of the major gaps in our knowledge of how culture is transmitted and perpetuated; nor, aside from a few brief ethnographic descriptions, do we have systematic comparative information about the role played by the peer group in cultural change. More importantly, however, peer groups are not only the province of children; they are also the concerns of adults who, it can be hypothesized, make certain that these networks are maintained in culturally approved manner in the interest of the transmission and perpetuation of the culture. But we know very little, at least in any systematic fashion, about the activities of adults in attuning the peer group with the rest of the social structure. While it is clear enough from the data that adults play an active role in Nyakyusa and Gusii peer groups in limited spheres, we need to know whether they do so in others, and from which aspects of peer-group activities their influences are systematically excluded. We also need to know how adult values with respect to seniority are conveyed from household to peer group. And, importantly, in terms of the hypotheses being explored in this paper, we need to know whether there are any significant differences in the socializing roles of peer groups between societies in which the network of kin relations coincides with the network of personal relations and those in which the two are disparate (cf. Parsons 1964: 221-229).
Techniques of socialization: Just as the social nexuses devoted to the upbringing of children differ in the roles that they play according to the emphasis in the social structure on particularistic values, so are there also important variations in the techniques by which children are taught to respond to expectations in their performances. It is not necessary to belabor the point that children in all societies are disciplined and rewarded and that children are subjected to pressures for conformity in all societies.

In societies in which socialization plays a greater role in the shaping of the child's mind than does education, the techniques of the former are generally designed to elicit conformity to small-group pressures. Many students of patterns of child upbringing (see, for example, Pettit 1946) have stressed the important role of guilt and ridicule in the systems of socialization - and the general eschewal of corporal punishment - in many primitive societies. Many anthropologists and others have quoted parents' assertions that corporal punishment is "cruel" and that they "love" their children too much to punish them physically. Unfortunately, however, these statements fail to relate the techniques of socialization to the total social systems in which they are used, that is, to the goals of such modes of upbringing.

We have several excellent studies of social systems in which the elicitation of guilt is an important technique in gaining conformity in children. (Although many authors have sought to distinguish guilt and shame, I assume that there is little difference between them, or that they are at least correlative.) Among the best of these are DeVos' analysis of Japanese patterns (1960) and Dorothy Eggan's of the Hopi (1956). What emerges consistently from these studies is that a heavy reliance on
the elicitation of guilt is a systematic means of training people to respond to the pressures for conformity from a small and solidary group. Mrs. Eggan made this clear for the Hopi (1956: 361-362):

"For through the great strength of the emotional orientations conveyed within the kinship framework and the interwoven religious beliefs, young Hopi learned their world from dedicated teachers whose emotions were involved in teaching what they believed intensely, and this in turn engaged the children's emotions in learning. These experiences early and increasingly made explicit in a very personal way the values implicit in the distinction between a good heart and a bad heart. For public opinion, if intensely felt and openly expressed in a closely knit and mutually dependent group . . . can be more effective potential punishment than the electric chair. It is perhaps easier to die quickly than to live in loneliness in a small community in the face of contempt from one's fellows, and particularly from one's clan from whence . . . comes most of one's physical and emotional security. Small wonder that the children who experience this constant pressure to conform to clan dictates and needs, and at the same time this constant reinforcement of clan solidarity against outsiders, are reluctant as adults to stray too far from the clan's protective familiarity or to defy its wishes."

A Hopi wondering whether he is of "bad heart" is experiencing the guilt which is attuned to the imperatives of life in a Hopi clan. It is an effective orientation of mind to the social realities of the clan world.

"There was, therefore, a constant probing of one's own heart, well illustrated by the anguished cry of a Hopi friend, 'Dorothy, did my son
die is the old folks said because my heart was not right? Do you believe this way, that if parents do not keep good hearts children will die?'

And there was a constant examination of one's neighbors' hearts: 'Moven-sie, it is those --- clan people who ruined this ceremony! They have bad hearts and they quarrel too much. That bad wind came up and now we will get no rain.' Conversation among the Hopi is rarely censored, and the children heard both of these women's remarks, feeling, you may be sure, the absolute belief which these 'teachers' had in the danger which a bad heart carries for everyone in the group (Eggan 1956: 361).

Training for sensitivity to group pressures for conformity by means of eliciting guilt does not take place in a vacuum; instead, it always takes place in the concrete interactions between the child and highly specific individuals who are charged by the social system with the responsibility of producing the guilt, of manipulating it, and of teaching the instrumental responses by which it can be assuaged. Usually, it is the mother who is most often responsible for this training, and the reasons for this are understandable. The mother is generally the most highly affectively charged individual in a growing child's life and he often spends more time with her than with any other person.

But what is important in this connection is not only that the mother is the central object of the child's guilt but that she performs this role as the representative of the group. This is abundantly illustrated in DeVos' analysis of the deep undercurrent of guilt as the psychological fulcrum in traditional Japanese socialization. Guilt toward the mother in this situation is specifically related to the child's failure to meet expectations that are phrased in terms of the individual's duties and
obligations in respect to the family and extended kin grouping. The overt phraseology of the consequences of transgressions, as taught in Japanese socialization, — laziness and other nonproductive behavior — is that they "injure" the parents. But the thrust of the argument is not lost on the child, who also sees and hears his parents themselves responding consistently to the pressures of the kin group and community. Furthermore, the systematic use of guilt as a means for eliciting conformity during childhood and adulthood must also be seen as an integral aspect of the particularistic orientation of a social system. It is in terms of the consequences for a specific solidary grouping — family, lineage, community, and the like — that an individual in such societies must weigh his actions. Guilt can become an object of humor and a primary concern of psychotherapeutic systems when its elicitation is inappropriate to — and incongruent with — the imperatives of a social system in which the principal (or at least growing) emphasis is on universalistic values and criteria.

The systematic development of sensitivity to ridicule and the loss of esteem by the group is another technique of socialization that is intimately tied to an orientation to particularistic values and to life in relatively self-contained and solidary groups. It is not the ridicule of everyone to which an individual is taught to respond in many primitive and peasant societies, but rather to the threats of loss of esteem of the specific group in which he is expected to find his social and emotional anchorage. Ridicule is only effective when an individual's self-value is equated with the worth placed on him by the group with
which he is expected to identify, and within which he expects to function. It is an extremely potent means of assuring conformity when the solidary, limited, and circumscribed group constitutes the individual's universe and in which he seeks to secure a place. Ridicule is a rejection -- or at least a threat of it -- by the universe as it is subjectively experienced; the narrower the social stage on which the individual can maneuver during his life, the more effective it is as a device of control.

The individual must learn the idiom and nuances of ridicule if it is to be an effective weapon in the hands of the group; hence, the sensitivity to ridicule and threats of loss of esteem must be established early in his life. It might be self-evident that pressures to conformity are ineffective if people have not been sensitized to them, but the point has to be made explicit if we are to untangle the skein of a culture and its mechanisms of self-perpetuation.

It is in contrast with guilt and ridicule that corporal punishment can be understood as a technique of socialization. Corporal punishment is rare as a standard means of socialization in primitive and peasant societies because of its personalized quality. It is an activity that takes place in a dyadic context; its goal is to elicit conformist response to the demands of a particular individual who is exercising -- or who is capable of exercising -- force. The impact of corporal punishment is not only physical; it is also social and emotional. Specifically, the emphasis in corporal punishment is on person-to-person relationships at the expense of an emphasis on response to group pressures to conformity. One of the socioemotional messages conveyed in the relatively regular reliance on corporal punishment -- as, for example, in Alor (DuBois 1944: 137) or in
a highland peasant Jamaican community (Cohen 1958) - is that if one can avoid detection by the punishing agent he can "get away with it." By contrast, one of the lessons taught in societies in which great reliance is placed on guilt and ridicule - and these are generally groups in which the individual is constantly exposed to group surveillance - is that the group is always present, even if it is only one other person who symbolizes the group, and that it is almost impossible to escape detection.

Corporal punishment as an important technique of socialization is eminently suited to preparation for participation in a social system in which social relations are highly atomized; it is incompatible with preparation for participation in a social system based on solidary and firmly bounded social relations. But the close correspondence between corporal punishment in socialization and atomized relationships among adults does not rest exclusively on the fact that corporal punishment generally takes place in the context of a dyadic relationship. Corporal punishment in childhood arouses intense emotions in children, and evidence provided from animal experimentations suggests that this mode of socialization is effective in heightening and strengthening the emotional bond between child and parent; as I have tried to show elsewhere (1964), such intense relationships are established at the expense of wider extra-familial identifications.

While extrapolations from experimental work with animals should not be taken literally, they can be very suggestive for understanding human behavior. Scott has observed in his review of animal experimentation (1962: 950-955) that "all [the] evidence indicates that any sort of strong emotion, whether hunger, fear, pain, or loneliness, will speed up the process of
socialization. . . . We may also conclude that the speed of formation of a social bond is dependent upon the degree of emotional arousal, irrespective of the nature of that arousal. . . . In short, it seems likely that the formation of a social attachment through contact and emotional arousal is a process that may take place throughout life, and that although it may take place more slowly outside of certain critical periods, the capacity for such an attachment is never completely lost.

"Evidence is accumulating . . . that given any kind of emotional arousal a young animal will become attached to any individual or object with which it is in contact for a sufficiently long time. . . . It should not be surprising that many kinds of emotional reactions contribute to a social relationship. The surprising thing is that emotions which we normally consider aversive should produce the same effect as those which appear to be rewarding. This apparent paradox is partially resolved by evidence that the positive effect of unpleasant emotions is normally limited to early infancy by the development of escape reactions. Nevertheless, this concept leads to the somewhat alarming conclusion that an animal (and perhaps a person) of any age, exposed to certain individuals or physical surroundings for any length of time, will inevitably become attached to them, the rapidity of the process being governed by the degree of emotional arousal associated with them."

I have suggested in my exploration of initiation ceremonies (Cohen 1964) that this might provide an explanation for the widespread use of physical—especially genital—mutilations in the course of these rites of passage. Specifically, I hypothesized that these painful experiences might help to strengthen the attachments to the kinsmen who are performing
the operations in order to add to the individual's feelings of solidarity with the kin group of which they are all a part. But when corporal punishment is one of the principal means of socialization, it contributes to the emotional attachment between parent and child, and this is almost always at the expense of wider identifications.

**Socialization and traditionalism:** Finally, socialization - vis-a-vis education - is oriented to traditionalism. As is well known, there tends to be a direct relationship between levels of sociotechnological development and the rate of cultural change. Without going into the reasons that the rate of change of a society is locked into its culture - and must be seen as an aspect of the culture - the fact also remains that every society maintains a highly specific attitude toward change; this is part of its value system, and it must be inculcated as part of the process of the shaping of mind. I hypothesize that in those societies in which the rate of change is slow and in which change is disvalued, socialization will predominate in the upbringing of the members of the group. I am not suggesting that socialization is in any way a source of a slow rate of change or that it is responsible for negative values associated with change. If a causal relationship is in order, I would hypothesize the converse, that a slow rate of change is a sociocultural feature which can underlie the predominance of socialization in the transmission of culture.

One of the most outstanding characteristics of socialization - especially within the family - is the high affective charge that is associated with almost everything that is learned within that context. The reason for this is that, especially in children, the content of learning is
often inseparable from the identity of their teachers. Furthermore, this is an important aspect of particularism in general—what states a proposition is directly relevant to its value. It is a general characteristic of highly traditional people that they are not only fundamentalist in outlook but that they are also generally guided by particularistic values in the organization of their social relationships and by particularistic criteria in the evaluation of performance.

Because agents of socialization (as distinct from agents of education) are so highly charged emotionally, the patterns of behavior which they inculcate—socially acceptable norms, the organization of social relationships, modes of belief and of thought, and the like—are equally charged. What is important with respect to the maintenance of traditionalism and resistance to change is that the relinquishment of such patterns can often arouse—unconsciously, to be sure—anticipations of loss of love and primary security, while the retention of traditional modes can elicit equally deep and subtle connotations of approval, reward, and a sense of belonging. This is not to imply that a predominance of socialization in the total experience of maturation will lead to a complete rejection of change; adults are usually oriented to reality and do adapt when the conditions in which they find themselves require change. But what is important is that the requirements for change do elicit different degrees of resistance and personal turmoil in different societies. The reliance on agents and techniques of socialization for the transmission of culture is an adaptive mechanism in many societies whose rate of change is slow and who, therefore, maintain negative values in connection with change.
This relationship between traditionalism and a predominant reliance on socialization - in which, to reiterate, the latter is the dependent variable - is illustrated by "the early learning hypothesis," explored by Bruner (1956) on the basis of material from the Mandan-Hidatsa. Bruner suggested that what is learned early in life is resistant to change while that which is learned later in life is most susceptible to change. In a discussion of Bruner's analysis, I added to his hypothesis the suggestion (Cohen 1961: 112) that what is learned inside the family is most resistant to change and that which is learned outside the family is most susceptible to change.

This discussion of the relationship between traditionalism and socialization would be incomplete, however, without pointing, at least in passing, to another very important variable. In social systems in which change is disvalued, the individual more or less tends to grow up, live out his life, and die among the same people. In such environments, as noted, there tends to be little chance of escaping the scrutiny of affectively charged people for long. This relatively stable grouping of people are those with whom some of the most fundamental patterns of behavior were learned in childhood. The shame, guilt, need for approval, desire for belongingness, and the like, which are learned during the earliest years of psychological vulnerability are always the strongest; and the patterns of behavior which they underlie also tend to remain the strongest when the associations with those in whose midst such patterns were acquired are retained.

Also, in most such societies, the family is a unit of both production and consumption and involves the most inalienable ties; in addition to its symbolization of solidarity, such a family also carries with it the
sociological footfall and emotional implications of one's parents, grandparents, and the traditions which they represent. In such social systems, people behave traditionally and tend not to follow their own inclinations because, in part, of the scrutiny of those with whom they have been in lifelong association and who are the symbolic reminders of the emotions associated with things their parents and other affectively charged persons had taught them (Cohen 1961: 106-111). Thus, the experiences of childhood not only often underlie adult modes of behavior, but it is also important to recognize that the institutional structures in which adults participate underlie the means by which the culture is transmitted, as in the balance struck between socialization and education.

Education:

Education - the inculcation of standardized knowledge and skills by standardized and stereotyped means - is the predominant mode of shaping the mind in social systems in which non-kinship and universalistic considerations are of primary significance in the organization of economic, political, and other social relations. Although, as noted above, education is found in all societies, it begins to assume a predominant role in the course of history when it is institutionalized in schools. Considered as techniques of society for molding the individual to serve the aims of the social system, socialization and education are in competition. Coleman has noted this in his introduction to Education and Political Development (1965: 22) when he referred to "the wide gap between the modern and traditional sectors of the developing countries. Yet," he observes, "it is the very existence of this gap which . . . elevates the formal educational system to a
more determinative role in the political socialization process, and diminishes, if it does not extinguish, the role of the family, the prime socializer." While the latter assertion in this statement is somewhat overdrawn, it does point clearly to the proportionate relationship between socialization and education. The family is not faced with extinction; like all other social institutions, it is merely changing adaptively to meet new sociocultural pressures.

Every social system tends to insist that its members be quite blind, especially with respect to history. Every culture requires that the people participating in it see the institutions of their society as unique, as outgrowths of present and immediate needs, and as expressions of its genius. Were this otherwise, most social systems would find it more difficult than they do to win loyalty and allegiance. Hence, most people in society tend to approach an understanding of the institutions by which they live in a manner akin to the proverbial blind man who is trying to describe an elephant. We thus observe many people - behavioral scientists among them - variously suggesting that our contemporary educational institutions are designed to cope with the demands of an industrially oriented technology; a mechanism for transmitting knowledge gained by our contemporaries and by other societies at different times in history; an institutional complex devoted to the life of the mind; a means of transmitting political values; an instrument for eliminating social inequality; a key to utopia, in which Everyman will be "creative" and self-expressive, and the like.

However, when we remove our historical blinders and look at educational institutions from their beginnings in human history, and at our own
systems of education as outgrowths or products of history, we must conclude that they are all — and none — of these. Instead, we are compelled to look at them as changing adaptations to changing sociocultural environments. As private citizens taking personal stands, we might not like what we see — there are, after all, some advantages to blindness — but a social system is more than, and different from, the sum of personal stands and likes or dislikes in the polity. Few institutions in history have been changed by conscious and deliberate means, except through violent revolution. Furthermore, no educational system in history — or at least any of which we know — has been consciously and deliberately transformed without first having over the entire social system to which it is an adaptation. Our task here is to understand the elephant rather than to write a manifesto for or about one of his hind legs. How and why did formal educational systems first develop, and what do today's have in common with the first schools?

One of the important lessons which can be learned from studies of cultural evolution is that a social system in complete equilibrium — one which manifests only the characteristics appropriate to the stage of development which it represents — is almost non-existent. An important derivation of the axiom that every culture is, inter alia, a changing system is that it is generally possible to find in each the retention of some social patterns that are indicative of its earlier modes of adaptation and the emergence of patterns that anticipate a subsequent stage. While I recognize the teleological element in this proposition, this is not an appropriate place at which to tarry and argue its feasibility, and I will use it as an axiom and a point of departure for the following analysis.

If we examine the historical emergence of schools in the context of
stages of cultural development, rather than chronologically, their first recorded appearance seems to have occurred during the stage represented by some West African societies, such as the Kpelle, in the form of the so-called "bush" schools (see Gibbs 1965; Watkins 1943). "The Kpelle have an incipient class system that distinguishes three classes" (Gibbs 1965: 214). While kinship does play an important role in the organization of social relations among them, it is secondary to tribal fraternities and other secret societies. These, too, are embodiments of particularistic orientations, though somewhat less so than kin group organizations, like the lineage.

"Kpelle culture has two conflicting dominant themes. The first is a stress on personal autonomy and the individual achievement of status. Eligibility for high rank such as chieftaincy is not ascribed primarily on the basis of birth as a member of a particular lineage or clan as it is in many middle-range African societies. Rather, it is achieved on the basis of individual effort. A Kpelle may climb ahead of his fellows through the possession of certain obtainable skills. Most important is the ability to work hard, that is, to farm well, and to manage his economic resources skillfully. . . . The counterweight to the theme of individual achievement is the stress on conformity and regulation as exemplified in the tribal societies. Through the initiation ["bush"] schools they assure the continuity of basic Kpelle values and by the application of combined ritual and secular sanctions, they ensure adherence to those values. This means that individual Kpelle are guided by the same expectations in the competition for power. They play by the same rules and for the same stakes, which means that no one goes too far in the means he uses to acquire position."
If he does, the sanctions are forceful and effective. Through its officials, the Poro [tribal fraternity, secret society] regulates the speed with which a man with a following may acquire formal political or Poro office" (Gibbs 1965: 229-230).

In terms of the hypotheses being explored in this paper, the "bush" schools of the Kpelle and other West African societies constitute an intriguing problem. On the one hand, these cultures exhibit many of the characteristics of societies in which socialization predominates over education. Until adolescence, the household is the principal context in which the individual matures (Gibbs 1965: 207-210). On the other hand — and, at first blush, somewhat anomalously — they have a system of schools for initiates; this schooling, however, is not compulsory, and nowadays the person who does not attend does not suffer any severe social disabilities (Gibbs 1965: 221-223). In some of these West African societies, attendance at these schools during early adolescence lasts several years.

How can we reconcile the presence of schools in a social system with the fact that kinship and secret societies — matrixes which inevitably subserve particularistic values and orientations — play such important roles in the organization of its economic, political, and other spheres of social relations? One of the keys to this paradox is the fact that after each group has completed its period of instruction, the buildings of its school are abandoned or destroyed; in either event, they may not be used again for any other group or for any other purpose. Moreover, Professor Gibbs informs me (in a personal communication) that his recent investigations among the Kpelle indicate that there is a minimum of formal and standardized instruction in Kpelle "bush" schools.
There are strong parallels between the formalized training of Kpelle youths during their initiation ceremonies and that which is found among many Australian aboriginal societies. While none of the Australians can be considered to have "schools" to an extent approaching those of the Kpelle, it needs to be borne in mind that Kpelle "schools" are part of the secret (Poro) society. As a result, and in view of the high degree of particularism represented by the secret society, the formal and specialized training received by youths in Kpelle initiation schools must also be regarded as important contributors to the maintenance of particularistic values.

In the light of these considerations, it can be suggested that these "bush" schools are not schools at all, if we mean by a school an institution with specialized personnel, permanent physical structures, special apparatus (of which texts are an important part), formal and stereotyped means of instruction, a curriculum, and rationally defined manifest objectives. The Kpelle and others like them have, as it were, tasted the educational cake without ever really having it or being able to eat it. So-called West African "bush" schools represent a symbolic elaboration or maximization of the universal process of education within the limits permitted by the social structure.

The retention of the school structures after each age grade has "graduated" and the adoption of a curriculum and standardized instruction would be incompatible with the total institutional structures and value systems of these societies. If they were not repetitively demolished or abandoned and were allowed to be used again, the schools would soon come to be used more extensively, at earlier ages, and as a much more integral vehicle for the transmission of the culture. They would thus replace the household and
other primary local groups as the principal mold for the shaping of the individual. If a standardized curriculum and formal and stereotyped instruction were introduced, the particularistically oriented sector of the culture's value system - household, kin group, secret society - would be subverted because, as will be illustrated below, such means of instruction are designed to serve universalistic values. The recurrent demolition or abandonment of these "schools" and the eschewal of standardized instruction represent an avoidance of a pattern of upbringing that is incompatible with the rest of the social system.

Schools and states: The development of schools - the institutionalized predominance of education over socialization in the shaping of men's minds - is a characteristic feature of state societies. Not all state societies develop schools, but the important point is that schools do not emerge historically prior to the creation of states. By a state society is meant here a society in which "a single person, by whatsoever name he may be distinguished, is entrusted with the execution of the laws, the management of the revenue, and the command of the army" (Gibbon I: 52).

The essence of education - vis-a-vis socialization - is that one of its principal emphases is on universalistic values, criteria, and standards of performance. It is in these terms that, from the point of view of the total social system, education competes with socialization. The thrust of learning acquired in a context of socialization is the identity of the teacher - who states a proposition is the relevant consideration. The impact of learning in a context of education is that "who states a proposition is as such irrelevant to the question of its ... value" (Parsons 1954: 42); instead, the relevant consideration in education is what is being taught and learned,
regardless of who teaches it. One of the underlying premises of a system of education - whether it is conducted on an individual basis or in schools - is that teachers can be changed daily, or that the child can go from one teacher to another, without altering the content of what is being learned.

It is the universalistic orientation which is inherent in education which makes it eminently suitable as a predominant mode of shaping the mind to prepare people to serve the aims of a state society. There are two outstanding characteristics of a state society that are relevant to our present consideration which serve the growth of universalistic values in the society as a whole. First, one of the goals of a state is to subvert local - especially kin - sources of solidarity, loyalty, and authority. Engels was among the first to make this conflict clear (1942 edition: 99) when he spoke of "the irreconcilable opposition between gentile society and the state; the first attempt at forming a state consists in breaking up the gentes by dividing their members into those with privileges and those with none, and by further separating the latter into two productive classes and thus setting them one against the other." Spencer also observed this when he asserted (1891: 283) that "naturally, as a whole nation becomes more integrated, local integrations lose their separateness, and their divisions fade . . . though they long leave their traces. . . ." As Diamond put it in his reconstruction of the building of the Dahomean state (1951: 3-4), "The civil power must, in one way or another, subvert kin solidarity and deflect that esprit de corps towards itself, in order to extend its authority throughout the social structure." "It appears that the whole region of [Dahomey] from the northern boundary of Whydah to Yoruba country was, up to the beginning
of the seventeenth century, divided into tiny local sovereignties. . . . These autonomous sovereignties were probably localized clans, or clusters of clans, each with a paramount chief. . . . [As] the scattered kin societies within the Whydah-Abomey axis were coagulating into civil society . . . the Aladaxonu became the civil authority, building and manipulating a power structure that was designed to wrest from the subordinated kin groups their customary political, social, economic and religious functions" (Diamond 1951: 10, 14).

A second major task confronted by a state in the legitimation of its authority is that it must establish an ideology - if not a reality - of uniformity among its polity. While there are many ways by which states accomplish this, one is the attempt to inculcate a universalistic or uniform and standardized set of symbols to which all the members of the society can be trained to respond uniformly. Such symbol-systems must be implanted early if they are to be effective. The implantation of standardized responses to the symbol-system of the state can appear in many guises, but their goals are the same - to contribute to the establishment of conformity to the aims and imperatives of a state system. Whether the means to this end take the form of uniform dress for schoolchildren (or even for their teachers), standardized sacred books and paraphernalia or fetishes, flags, pictures of culture heroes or rulers which students face throughout the school day, and the like, the object is to present all future participants in the society with uniform ideological symbols. The goal is to make these symbols integral parts of shaped minds, so that responses to them in adulthood will be uniform when the state bureaucracy feels that it needs to use them to gain acquiescence or mass participation in an activity of the society.
Without going into a discussion of why some state societies develop school systems and others do not—though it can be noted in passing that writing is a necessary, but not the only, requisite—it is essential to bear in mind that schools are an important part of the political bureaucracies in those state societies in which there are schools. It goes without saying that each part of a state bureaucracy has its own relevant and specialized tasks: the collection of taxes, control of religious organization, management of economic activities, administration of law, leadership of the military, and the like. Similarly, the educational part of a state's bureaucracy has its relevant and specialized tasks, to implant politically meaningful and legitimating symbols and to elicit approved and appropriate responses to those symbols as one means among many for the maintenance of order and uniformity of response throughout the polity. If we are to understand educational institutions in terms of their provenience, we must remember that schools were not established originally to foster the life of the mind or the spirit of free inquiry. That they have in a few cases become devoted to such pursuits is another matter, and they are exceptional. But every organization and bureaucracy is self-serving; this is no less true of a state system than any other. Every state organization constantly looks to the sectors of its bureaucracy to make certain that its interests are being served. To expect that a state will allow its schools to serve aims other than those of the national political structure is to expect that a state will not behave like a state.

To take some examples from contemporary societies, we can ask, of what relevance is a daily oath of allegiance to a flag—and the flag itself, which the child faces throughout the learning period—to the acquisition
of knowledge and skills? Of what relevance is the ubiquitous portrait of Washington, Mao, or Lenin to the teaching of grammar and the use of a slide rule in an American, Chinese, or Soviet classroom? Of what relevance is a cross in a religiously sponsored school to the learning of geography, history, literature, and the like? The relevance is this: As part of the state bureaucracy, schools are generally maintained under the sponsorship of the state organization which controls and supports them in one way or other. Just as courts are part of the state bureaucracy and display the material symbols of the state organization of which they are a part, so do schools. The relevance is also this: Learning is a rewarding experience for most children. Hence - as every variety of behavioristic psychology has demonstrated repeatedly - it is hardly a startling insight to suggest that, whether anyone is consciously aware of it or not, the child comes to associate everything he learns with the state's symbols which face or envelop him while he is learning. These symbols become as much a part of his mind as the alphabet and the concept of zero. School is not only the place to learn arithmetic; it is also the place to learn zealotry.

One of the major institutional sources for the spread of universalistic orientations in a state society, and thus a major underpinning to the predominance of education over socialization - however indirect - is to be found in its legal system. A fundamental distinction which can be made between customary and formal law. While traces of each can always be found in the application and practice of the other, there are nevertheless basic differences between them, especially in the roles that they play in total legal systems. Generally speaking, customary law is made up of established laws, but without formal or impersonal procedures. Customary law is enforced in
face-to-face relationships within the community, and justice—however it is culturally conceptualized—emerges more or less automatically in the community. When customary law prevails in a society, the personalities of the individuals involved in a dispute, and the backgrounds of their previous interactions, are of considerable importance. Thus, a man with a reputation for belligerence is a priori at a great legal disadvantage when accused of assault. The force of customary law is the consensus of the community. Customary law is therefore often interlaced with particularistic values—who has committed an act is sometimes more important than the act itself and the evidence in the case—and generally predominates in societies whose value systems are heavily particularistic. Correlatively, the predominance of socialization over education is an important technique in preparing people to serve the aims of a legal system in which particularism often obtains.

Formal law, by contrast, is made up of established laws which are administered through formal—that is, stereotyped—legal procedures. Lawyers and judges are frequent accompaniments of a system of formal law; they are specialized technologists who study the wordings of the law with microscopic care, focusing on precedent and stereotyped procedures. The criteria that they are expected to apply in the administration of law are impersonal: rules of evidence, solemn ritual, the claim that the law is the respecter of no person, and the like. Thus, one of the most fundamental premises of a system of formal law is that it is grounded in universalistic orientations.

What is important in this connection is that formal law tends to become predominant over customary law in state societies or conditions of urbanization. One of the reasons for this is that both sets of conditions tend to favor the disparity between kinship networks and those of social relations.
as well as universalistic orientations. The processes underlying these trends are readily apparent, and need not be spelled out here.

But legal systems do not operate in a vacuum; if they are to be effective in the maintenance of order in long-range terms, they must be in harmony with the general value orientations of the polity. The fostering of universalistic values and criteria is one of the goals of a state organization, as, for example, in the ideal that all citizens are subject to the same laws, regardless of origin and affiliation. Schools serve the same ends. Thus, for example, it is not mere coincidence that schools and courts are currently among the major battlegrounds between the universalistic orientations of the central American government and the regional or community particularism of many sectors of the American South. The histories of colonialized societies also repeat this pattern with recurrent regularity.

How does education contribute to the predominance of a universalistic orientation; that is, why do social systems in which the balance of values and the criteria for performance are weighted on the side of universalism favor a reliance of education, vis-a-vis socialization, in the shaping of the minds of polities? Whether a curriculum is devoted to catechetical instruction, skills (like learning the multiplication tables), executing "proper" penmanship, learning the dates of wars and treaties (in which one's own society somehow always manages to emerge as wronged or righteous, or both), the names of rivers, mountains, cities, or ports, such learning is wholly independent of family background, ethnic or religious affiliation, regional membership, or any other nexus which is a natural breeding ground for particularistic orientations. While I do not intend to suggest that there is no difference between learning a catechism and the other subjects
mentioned; the essence of education is that there is only one correct answer to a problem or to a question. The essence of a universalistic orientation is that there is only one correct way of behaving within the society as a whole - no matter where one goes within its borders - and that there is only one standard of loyalty to the state. The bane of university professors who demand that the student-products of secondary schools think for themselves instead of performing by rote is the fruit of a successful state system rather than of the ideology of any particular system of schooling.

It is in these terms that an educational system without regular and recurrent examinations is difficult to imagine. (I am speaking here principally of what are called in our society elementary and secondary schools, in which the overwhelming majority of the population are educated. One consequence which can be anticipated from mass college education is an even heavier reliance on procedures like examinations.) The manifest or rational purpose served by examinations is, of course, to determine the degree to which material has been learned. But there is also a latent purpose served by examinations, namely, the application of universalistic criteria for the evaluation of performance: There is only one correct answer to a question and everyone is evaluated by the same criteria. I suggest that this is the more important of the two in terms of the preparation of the individual for later participation in a social system in which universalism is the predominant orientation.

The techniques of education - especially in rote and standardized learning and in the use of examinations - explicitly deny and conflict with the conveyance of particularistic values and criteria. Individual differences
in personality, or family, kin, and community backgrounds and traditions count for little, if anything, in the procedures of education. Instead, what is emphasized is uniformity.

The pressures of a society encouraging the training of students for a universalistic orientation are familiar to most of us. Let me give one concrete example from my own experience. In an introductory course to cultural anthropology in which there were several hundred students—hardly conducive to getting to know each student, and thus in itself encouraging the application of impersonal and universalistic standards—considerable emphasis is placed in the first part on the dynamics and mechanics of kinship organization. One of the students in the class is an extraordinarily bright person with promise of a very successful intellectual career. While she performs much better than most of the other students in answer to essay questions, she is unable to cope with a single problem in kinship analysis, and is in danger of failing the first half of the course. In talking with her, I learn that she comes from an ethnic group in which kinship obligations and reciprocities constitute the central moral focus of life. One result of her attempts to become "Americanized" is her total inability to cope with kinship on an intellectual level. For a professor to take this problem "into account" is to run counter to the institutional demands for the evaluation of students by universalistic criteria. To disregard such a problem, and allow the evaluation of the student to be carried out on a calculating machine, poses its own ethical dilemma.

Techniques of education: There are several facets to the uniformity which is the inevitable by-product of education. Most readily apparent is the demand for standardization in performance. In this connection, one of
the most important factors is the child's awareness that he is learning precisely the same things as all his peers throughout the realm, and that he must give the same responses. He does not know what the authority for this is and whence it derives, but that is one of the points of it all: he is expected to acquire the realization, which is not necessarily conscious, that such authority exists. He is not trained to conceptualize that authority as localized in a nexus of named lineal ancestors or collateral kinsmen.

Nor is he expected to associate that authority with a particular teacher of unique personality, whose attributes he might adopt for his own. Children tend to identify with those people who meet their needs, including those who teach them. Identification is an important source of particularistic values, and a society whose predominant orientation is to universalistic values must make certain that lasting emotional identifications do not become part of the mind that is being shaped for participation in that culture. Thus, an important aspect of the educational systems of societies that are primarily universalistic in their value orientations is that when these orientations become increasingly pervasive in the institutional structure there is a parallel tendency to thwart or interfere with identifications of children with their teachers. One of the ways by which this is accomplished is by having children taught by a variety and succession of teachers. Whether a child's teachers change annually or several times a day, one of the consequences is to break into or seriously weaken any tendency to identify with a particular teacher. Such identifications during the formative years are dangerous to a social system whose principal reliance is on universalistic values and criteria; and in the social system of the future, hints of which are already upon us, this danger will have been obviated even more by mechanical or
electronic instruction on a mass scale.

Another very important facet of the uniformity which is instilled through education as a technique in the shaping of men's minds is the allocation of standardized rewards and punishments for standardized performance. There are no surprises for the student who excels above all others in his grade - unless he is fortunate enough to experience surprise in knowledge itself. He knows in advance - and such knowledge is as important to an educational system as the multiplication table and the chronology of wars and culture heroes - which mass-produced medals he will receive, and which accolades, monetary awards, conscription status, occupations, and the like, will be his due as a result of universalistically evaluated performances. What needs to be stressed in this connection is that this is not an expression of an "educational policy." It is, instead, the policy of a state system which seeks to maintain its authority and control through the establishment of homogeneity throughout its polity. One of the means to this end is the inculcation of reflexes of mind by which the individual is brought to expect automatic standard consequences for standard performance.

It is necessary to reiterate at this point that no society achieves these goals overnight. The dominance of universalistic values and criteria is a gradual process of accretion at the expense of particularism; the latter is displaced slowly and, in the experiences of many individuals in the society, painfully. Similarly, the development of techniques of education in the service of these goals is also a gradual process, and must be understood as an aspect of history, not unlike parallel developments in the legal sphere of social organization or in patterns of recruitment to the state bureaucracy. An excellent illustration of this is provided in Dore's *Education in Tokugawa Japan* (1965), which, unfortunately,
stands alone as an analysis of the development of an educational system in tandem with a nascent state organization.

**Education, stratification, and change:** It would be misleading to convey the impression that educational systems, especially in state societies, are designed to prepare people only for universalistic values and criteria for performance. All educational systems are discriminatory to some extent, whether by sex, social class, caste, ethnic or religious membership, or the like. These differentials in education are not only unequal distributions of privilege with respect to education but they are also preparations for differences in access to participation in the political apparatus. Educational differentials not only perpetuate systems of social stratification but are also affirmations of the relative political statuses of the groups making up a social system. Such institutionalized inequalities continue to serve as seedbeds of particularistic values. But they are also in conflict with a state's rational ideology which seeks to establish homogeneity. One of the consequences of the elimination of social enclaves or ghettos, and the like, is to remove the sociological bases of particularistic values in the society. Uniform mass education is an important means to this end.

Hence, it is necessary to understand that education per se is not a vehicle of mobility in a system of social stratification. Whether we speak of the emancipation of women in primitive and peasant societies, of the access to higher status by commoners in modern emergent states, or of the mobility of ethnic groups in the United States, and although education almost invariably plays a role in these events, access to the educational system is always one aspect of the lowering of barriers generally. In
these terms, the opening of schools to groups who had previously been barred from them is a by-product - not a cause - of social mobility.

I suggested above that the predominance of socialization in the shaping of the mind is oriented to traditionalism. In similar vein, I hypothesize that as the rate of change in a society accelerates, and as positive valuation of social change increases, commensurately greater emphasis is placed on education in preparing people to serve the aims of society's institutions. Just as a correlate of socialization is the affective charge of learned patterns, one of the consequences - if not a goal - of education is the relative "neutrality" or "secularization" of acquired knowledge. One of the ways by which this is accomplished is by impeding the development of strong emotional identifications between student and teacher; another, and closely related, is the reliance on non-kinsmen as agents of education.

An increasing reliance on education is adaptive to a rapid rate of change and to a high valuation of change because it contributes to the development of a habit of mind by which the individual evaluates an item of information in terms of its utility instead of the particular individuals or settings in association with whom it was learned. It not only contributes to an amenability to new knowledge but also to new social responses to changing conditions. Education, especially when it predominates over socialization, contributes to the establishment of a particular attitude toward change.

Conclusion

The study of educational institutions has been one of the step-children of social science, and has often been left by default to the educationists.
The consequences are analogous to child neglect, abandonment, and abuse. What I have tried to show in this paper is that educational institutions - and others involved in the self-perpetuation of culture through the shaping of man's mind - warrant, and are amenable to, the same modes of analysis that have been developed by anthropologists for the study of kinship and marriage, legal and political institutions, economic activities, and religion and social stratification.

I am not seeking to idealize education. There are many standards which, when applied to the fruits of educational systems, cast a pall on one's hopes for the future of man. But that is sentimentalism, which is inappropriate to standards of universalism. I have, however, tried to place some aspects of education in an historical perspective in order to try to understand whence we have come - so that we might perhaps better appreciate where we are and get some hints into where we might be headed. While I do not think of education as the panacea to the ills of mankind, I have tried to convey the idea that, no matter what its other by-products, it has contributed much to an amelioration of the human situation. It has not done this alone; it has, as a matter of fact, committed some of its own horrors, about which we are sometimes too silent in our classrooms. But with other sociocultural developments of which it is an integral part, the predominance of education over socialization has contributed somewhat to the ability of a few people to realize their personal potentials - people who, in previous stages of cultural development, were charged with heresy, sorcery, or unconscionable deviance and sentenced either to the stake or to bland compliance. That most educated people have substituted the gray flannel suit for the gray flannel loincloth is not entirely the
fault of the educational institutions of society.

In stressing what seem to be the principal goals of education, I have also tried to convey the hypothesis that educational institutions were never designed - and thus cannot really be criticized for failing - to convert people to the intellectual life. That a few individuals have managed to develop a commitment to the life of the mind despite the ends and means of educational institutions sheds light only on man's evolutionary capacity, and on little else. Thus, when I say that education contributes to the establishment of a particular attitude toward change, I do not wish to sound like a commencement orator and suggest that it establishes these attitudes in the minds of all - or even most - who pass through its portals. It contributes to the establishment of these attitudes in the culture, which is very different than the sum of its carriers. While 20th century educated man often sounds like a socialized medieval peasant when faced with the inevitability of adaptive social change, the important fact is that many of these adaptive changes do take place nevertheless. He sounds like a medieval peasant; the important thing is that he behaves like one less and less. With a few relatively insignificant exceptions, he watches witch hunts on his TV screen, but does not ordinarily seek to lead them. He might personally empathize with Watts and Cicero, but education has played a role, albeit a small one, in the fact that the world is no longer all Watts and Cicero.

Thus, what I have also tried to say in this paper is that any social development - such as the unfolding of the potentials of educational institutions - never occurs rapidly. Nor are the consequences of educational experiences, such as attitudes toward change, ever established in a vacuum...
and without the support of other social institutions. I am not suggesting the eschewal of a critical stance with respect to educational institutions; but to demand that they be changed immediately, or to insist on new educational philosophies as though they were coffee in a vending machine, is to espouse an extreme anti-intellectualism which is grounded in the same assumptions as are found in the thinking of the manufacturer who has programmed his dyes to produce little artifacts on demand or at monotonously regular intervals.

I have also tried to make a methodological point in this paper. This is that if we wish to measure the successes and failures of educational institutions - and it should be noted that most critics of school systems have been quite cavalier about making explicit the criteria by which they attribute success and failure in this regard - we do not focus on individuals but, rather, on generations. The danger in surveying individuals is that one can almost invariably find what he is looking for if he is skilled in designing survey instruments; is it any wonder that so many survey-tested hypotheses seem to be borne out? In order to understand the consequences - as well as the content - of education, it is necessary to compare generations or historical periods in the cycles of a society's development. Did education have the same effects on people who completed their schooling in 1867 or 1937 as on those who finished in 1967? Why were schools different 30 or 100 years ago? If they have retained anything from these earlier periods, why did they do so? Attitudes and institutions do change, often without the awareness of the members of the society. If we confine our time-spans to a single day, or even to five years, we necessarily have to
conclude that nothing has changed. If, however, we adopt an historical perspective we might emerge with a much more balanced picture.

I have tried to illustrate the hypothesis that the means adopted by different societies to shape the minds of their growing members are mechanisms of adaptation to the sociocultural environment. Historical analysis is essential to the study of adaptation generally; it is also indispensable to an understanding of educational institutions in particular. Without such understanding it is impossible to take sensible action.
Footnotes

1. I want to thank Professor James L. Gibbs, Jr., for his very helpful comments about this paper and for sharing with me some of his unpublished observations on the Kpelle of Liberia. I alone am responsible for errors and misinterpretations in this paper.
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Early Childhood Experience and Later Education

In Complex Cultures

Education in a complex society may be seen as merely an extension of the educational process found in simpler societies, but taking longer, requiring more specialized institutions, and involving progressive absorption into wider or narrower segments of the total society. Or it may be seen as involving, from the very start (from the moment that a rattle is put into an infant's hands, or a set of alphabet blocks is spilled on the floor) a set of assumptions which are different in kind from education in a primitive society. Both approaches have their uses. By taking the former, Hart (1955) and Yehudi Cohen (1964) have been able to point out striking correspondences between the treatment of the prepubertal and pubertal young, and the initiation ceremonies and educational experiences to which they are subjected. I have used the same approach in discussing such questions as the way in which children learn sex roles or control of impulse (Mead, 1930, 1931d, 1935). It may be said that where we are concerned with character formation - the process by which children learn to discipline impulses and structure their expectations of the behavior of others - this cross-cultural approach is very valuable. It provides insights into such subjects as conscience formation, the relative importance of different sanctioning systems, sin, shame and pride, and guilt, and into the relationships between independence training and achievement motivation.
It may be argued that the younger the child, the more we are concerned with educational processes which are universal, and of fundamental importance throughout life, and least imbued with the specific cultural differences which distinguish a Frenchman from an Egyptian, or an Eskimo from a Bushman or from an American. All infants must be weaned, but only a certain number will ultimately be asked to master calculus or a dead language. All infants must learn to respond with enthusiasm or apathy to adult incentives, but only a certain number, in identified countries and at particular periods, will come to care about the controversies between Stoics and Epicureans, or between fundamentalists and contextualists. So it has been fashionable in many areas in which the relationship between child development and later character has been studied, to concentrate on uniformly present experiences, ignoring the subtler and more difficult problems of what as well as how the child is learning.

Take, for example, the question of reward and punishment. It is relatively easy to characterize systems of child rearing as using either reward or punishment in certain distinguishable proportions. The reflections of this learning can be followed in later life, and differences can be demonstrated in school performance of children who act out of fear of being wrong, as compared with those who actively seek rewards for being right. Such reflections can also be recognized later in the conformist behavior of the civil servant - secure unless he makes a positive mistake - and in the freer behavior of the politician.
who must perform in some positive manner if he is to be rewarded by election. It is upon the recognition of identifiable sequences such as these, that constructs like David McClelland's (1953) achievement motivation are built.

**Literacy**

But we may instead ask what happens if we stress what a modern society requires its new members to learn, rather than start with the relationship between early disciplines and later learning. We would then, for purposes of study, juxtapose two societies - one which required that children learn to read and the other which did not. We would not consider learning to read in terms of motivation, of who taught the child his letters, or whether, while learning, the child had his hands-smacked, or had honey put on his tongue. We would say, instead, that learning to read involves first the idea that there is such a thing as reading, that artificial marks which are small, regular, identifiable and recurrent, have meaning. We would note that when someone who can read looks at one book, he utters a particular series of words, while if he looks at another book, he utters a different series of words. Children often learn this elementary fact by associating sequences of words with pictures, and "read" by reciting a memorized sentence that goes with a particular picture. They may then move to the over-all "look" of the sentence - whether it is long or short, or contains a certain number of capital letters. The child
who does this is not learning to read, but is, in fact, learning an 
early form of reading badly. He is dependent upon past experience and 
upon the extraneous and irrelevant likeness between the contours of 
words, but is skipping the stage of learning that is the essence of 
reading - the arbitrary correspondence between symbols and sounds.

So one child may learn, depending upon the kind of home in which he lives, that there are many, many books, that the pages of each yield different materials, and that if he can learn to decipher these pages he will have a new experience, as compared with another child who learns to repeat, from minor clues, a sentence which an adult has read to him. This fundamental piece of over-all learning is probably determinative whether individuals will be literate or non-literate, no matter how much schooling they are exposed to. The history of developing countries - in which education is imposed, often in a different language, on people who own no books and read no newspaper - has demonstrated how it is possible to make a people formally literate, able to read and write simple information, decipher signs and keep lists and records, although they do not ever read; in the sense that they pick up a written object of unknown content. Sometimes, children from non-reading homes may learn by accident, later in life, that reading is a way of opening a window to something new. These individuals experience a tremendous sense of freedom and enlightenment, comparable in freshness but often greater in intensity, to the experience of a child who for the first time reads something new by himself. Elementary education geared to establishing
literacy but not reading ability in people who are thought of as "the masses" or even "the people" carries with it a continuation of what the child has learned at home. It strengthens the concept that reading is simply saying what you know is there (for example, whether today is Monday or Tuesday, or if it is the first or the second of the month) instead of being a way of finding out things you don't know, or of reading a new story whose end you don't know.*

* Those who have not learned to read fiction as children may be dangerously uneducated, unable in later life to exercise the discipline which separates fact from fantasy in the practical world.

One of the familiar phenomena of the American scene in the post World War II years, is the terrible boredom which reading parents feel towards Dick and Jane, the reader based on the simple expectation that learning to read is learning to reproduce correctly only what is in the reader.

A terrible degeneration accompanies the shift from teachers who read, to teachers who do not read. It is often found in developing countries, as missionaries are phased out in favor of native speakers who never read but can teach competently enough from a text. Teachers who read can teach children what reading is about; teachers who have not learned to read but have only learned to be literate, cannot do this.
So we may usefully compare the infant in a primitive preliterate home, the infant in a literate but non-reading home, and the infant in a reading home. The infant in the primitive home never sees any event which suggests that there is a substitute for the spoken and heard word. If his father wants to send a message to his brother-in-law in the next village, someone has to go and tell him. If it is important to know whether a debt consists of forty dog's teeth or only of thirty, there is a lengthy debate with supporting evidence, and the matter is likely to be clinched by the dictum of whichever participant is most respected or known to have the most accurate memory. There is no way to go back to the event in question except in memory, and people's memories differ. Whether the child will learn that an event actually did occur, and that different people give different versions, some more accurate than others, or simply that the world consists of claims and counter-claims which are designed to promote the purposes of one person rather than another, depends on the particular culture. This may seem a very small point, but it is perhaps not an accident that those people whose interest in relating past events is simply to validate present purposes, may, when writing comes to them, use it for forgery rather than for records. In contrast, those people who have been deeply concerned over establishing the actuality of an event, take delightedly to the possibilities of script which can provide them with accurate records and cross-checks on the process. This difference between regarding script as accurate and reliable, and regarding it as something to be manipulated, reflecting as it does much earlier attitudes - recurs at many levels of the use of records. It is seen, for example, in the fundamentalist approach to the Scriptures, which is
based on an excessive reverence for the written word among people who themselves could read but did not write. It is seen in other peculiar manifestations, such as the willingness of otherwise well-trained scientists to believe that a film, in which they are dependent on the experimenter to identify the subjects nevertheless is convincing proof that something occurred.

So, in the primitive home, into which the idea of script will penetrate with conquest and community development programs, there are already a series of underlying expectancies which will partly shape the ways in which reading and writing will be learned. One of these expectancies will be the amount of curiosity which is cultivated within the particular socio-cultural setting. If there is a strong interest in the strange and the unknown, then the groundwork is laid for looking at pictures and later reading books about that which is not known. Or one may find the society in which there is strong genealogical interest. Where writing is done by individuals it is used primarily to preserve the history of the family, the only photographs in which people are interested are those of family members. The intermediate position in which pages of Life magazine are pasted sideways on the wall to cover a crack, or as meaningless decorations, are active preparations for the rejection of reading. Probably the single picture pasted sideways is more threatening to the future literacy of children in the family, than the differences in abstract and concrete thinking which are being so heavily emphasized today. The picture pasted sideways means that the symbolic nature of
position in space is ignored, and also very often that even the representational quality of the picture is ignored; it becomes a bright red splotch on a grey wall.*

* We may ask whether the present popularity of the kind of pop art in which pieces of newspaper are cut into decorative shapes is not a rebellion against the arbitrary nature of script.

The first introduction of a primitive people to script may come in a variety of ways. A government official may come into the village and try to take a census. As people repeat their names, he writes down their responses, often with the most faulty approximations. But still, since people remember things like the order in which they gave their names, they can recognize their names the next time the official comes. At this point, another essential piece of learning may occur: Writing is seen as a way in which people can get the better of you, know who you are, relate your past actions to the future, check on whom you married, how many children you have, and where you live. In New Guinea, natives almost invariably responded in this way to government attempts at census-taking. It became fashionable to have a "government name" which was used for no other purpose, and which people remembered only with the greatest difficulty from one governmental visit to the next. Instead of records being considered a way in which one becomes securely placed in the world, so that over a period of time one's identity becomes firmer
and more unassailable, record-keeping is thus turned into a hostile act. This response of the illiterate to the record-keeping abilities of the powers that be, is reflected at a higher level in current attitudes toward a central computer. Such concern is constantly expressed as a fear that knowledge of who you are will only be used to do you damage. In New Guinea, the response means that electoral rolls are almost impossible to compile, that savings bank accounts lie dormant because the depositor has not claimed them - in fact, has often forgotten the name under which they were deposited - and that individuals who need treatment for leprosy or tuberculosis may either go unidentified or receive double doses of treatment. *

* It has been fashionable to discuss such attitudes towards one's name, as "primitive magical thinking" and those who do would assimilate the fear of their written name to fears of what others can do to them through waxen images. But it is perhaps more useful to simply consider whether first encounters with reading and writing are experienced as ones in which other people have power, or you have power. If the more salient is power in the hands of others, then protective measures may follow. This may also be reversed as when relief clients learn that an ability to produce long sets of dates and figures gives their claims an appearance of versimilitude. The client who has learned to rattle off a set of dates without any concern as to their accuracy will in due course believe that his investigator saves time by fabricating his record.
On the other hand, a first experience with writing may be brought by missionaries. If the missionaries refer their power and superior wisdom not to lists of the natives' names, but to lists of other peoples' names and deeds, the power of the Book, as compared with the power of the hand-made list or record, can become salient. The aspiring young native will want to learn to read that book also. Indeed, his ability to read it aloud, to read different things from different pages, will give his prestige among his non-literate fellows. He comes among them clothed in a mantle of external and higher authority, conferred by books which he can vocalize and they cannot. The prestige of all sacred texts, read by the elite, memorized by the humble, and in cases where religion is transplanted from one language group to another, often "read" in the sense of being pronounced without respect to meaning, can be referred to this experience in which the one who reads has power not shared by those who do not.®

* One of the puzzles of the modern world is the failure of the African peoples south of the Sahara to adopt script, a failure which has severely compromised the speed with which they can avail themselves of civilization. But if it is remembered that they were offered the memorizing type of learning of the Moslem world in which neither innovation nor imagination was encouraged, and the record-keeping of the trader and slaver, when they themselves had highly trained and highly trusted memories, this failure becomes more explicable.
The ease with which literacy can be spread, among the children of immigrants, or within a class or group to which education was previously unavailable, is partly explained by the obvious power that educated children acquire over uneducated parents. Any association of reading or writing with increased autonomy and authority can be made attractive. This was so even where the parents were also literate, as among the shetel Jews; as soon as a boy could argue with the elders, he was treated with respect and permitted to show a verbal assertiveness which was denied him as a smaller boy enjoined against physical aggression. "And the love of learning was born" (Zborowski, 1955).

If we shift from the consideration of a primitive people experiencing script for the first time, to children learning from their immediate surroundings what script is about, we find that early learning may be equally determinative. What is a book? One of many, standing on shelves, one of many kinds—some read by Daddy, some by Mommy, some by older siblings, some recent presents, some heirlooms, some read by Mommy when she was a little girl. What is a book? Something that Daddy is writing and you mustn't disturb him or he won't get that chapter finished. What are those long shiny pieces of paper with printing all over the back that Mommy gives you to draw pictures on, but she says they are part of Daddy's book. Why did grandmother look so stern when you knocked that book off the table, and why did she start talking about the way your dead grandfather felt about books? How does writing your name in the front of a book make it your book? What does "dedicated"
mean—so that this book, which is dedicated to you, is somehow more yours than any other book, but nobody reads it to you because you aren't old enough? What is the difference between books with pictures for children and books without pictures for grown-ups? Why don't grown-ups need pictures to tell them what Red Riding Hood looked like? What tells them? What is a dictionary, and why are Daddy and Mommy always having a kind of fight that ends with one of them going and getting a dictionary, and one looks pleased and one looks angry? What is an engagement book, and what is an address book, and what is the difference between the telephone book Mommy made, and the big one that is printed? And what is printing? How do they make so many copies of the newspaper that are all alike, and yet there is only one copy of each book in the house? Why, if someone gives you a second copy of "When We Were Very Young" does Mommy say, "Oh, we have that; we'll give it to Jimmy"?

For the child in the home of those who not only read but also write books, a book becomes something that is made by the kind of people you know. A book is something that you yourself might write. In fact, you can begin now, folding pieces of paper together in book form and covering them with imitation letters. Or if you are a little older, write the beginnings of a story, labeled "Susan Lane, her book". Children from such homes passionately enter into reading. If they have difficulties, it is because they have serious problems of eye coordination, or deep emotional difficulties, or occasionally because they have got so far ahead of themselves that the discrepancy between what they can read and what
they can write is unbearably frustrating. Such children have no image
of a house that does not contain books, of an adult who does not often
have a book in his hand, or of an individuality of which books are not
a part. The hazards here are hazards that come from the overevaluation
of books. The child whose eyes coordinate more slowly may become
frightened and his parents may share his fright. "Maybe he isn't going
to read" is a statement almost equivalent to "Maybe he isn't going to
be human". The child who wants to learn, but who is held back because
parents have been warned not to attempt to teach their children
prematurely, may give up. The bright moment passes, never to be
regained. But attitudes towards the importance of reading have been
established for good or ill, long before the child goes to school.*

* The importance of a library, either a very large private library,
or a public library, is the sense it gives a child that there are more
and more new and different books to be read. Ownership of a few books,
and no use of librarians and no books in parents' library, means that
children learn that reading is essentially a self-limiting and terminable
part of life summed up in the wry joke, "She has a book".

It will be by careful detailed ethnographical study of different
kinds of homes, of which the two quoted above represent extremes, that
we should be able to chart, and correct for, children's earliest learnings
about reading and writing. Inevitably, experience will be diverse and
defective in respect to the goals held up by a society in which reading is absolutely essential. In addition to the kinds of broad learnings that have been sketched in here, there will be many idiosyncratic miscarriages; children to whom letters or numbers come to have magical significance; children who learn to read secretly and so become unintelligible to those around them and children who block completely on part of the symbolic process. But these individual early sequences can only be fully identified, allowed for and treated, if the broader cultural outlines associated with class and occupation, region and religion, are better known.

Abstract Thought

Much of the current discussion of the relationship between types of thinking displayed by school children in the United States, which distinguishes between abstract and concrete thinking, lacks comparative perspective and so fails to take into account many significant dimensions. However, when the various explanatory schemes for the development of thought which have evolved within one culture, or which include material from other cultures taken out of context, are subjected to comparative scrutiny, the kind of links between early childhood experience and type of thinking which individuals will display as adults can be distinguished in outline, however lacking we may be in detailed research on their implications.

Whether one follows the classical outlines of Binet (1916), the original schemes of Piaget (1926), (with their inclusion of Levy
Bruhl's (1923) armchair use of primitive materials, modified in the late 1950's in confrontation with living cross-cultural material), (Piaget, 1950; Tanner and Inhelder, 1960) or the developmental schemes of Gesell and Ilg (1943), it seems clear that we must take into account when, from whom, and in what way children encounter kinds of thinking such as the Binet interpretation of proverbs, the Piaget demand for a recognition of the conservation of matter, or the Gesell-Ilg recognition of mathematical pattern as a recurrent spiralling capacity. Every intellectual capacity which is later tested by achievement, test, or observation, is intimately linked with early childhood experience, with the level of education of parent or nurse, with the structure and furnishing of the home, with the content with which the members of the family and the neighborhood are preoccupied, and with the availability of the apparatus and technology on which abstract thought is dependent.

The child who is cared for in infancy and early childhood by individuals of a lower level of education than the child will later be expected to reach, faces a different educational situation than one who is reared from infancy by parents who represent the same level of education to which the child is expected to aspire. Whether it is an explanation of time or space, money, or the telephone, or a recognition of the child's attempt to search for some generalization among disimilar objects, the highly educated parent or surrogate will meet the child on a different level than will the uneducated nurse, child nurse, or peasant grandmother. Where the educational level is lower, crude, or folk, concrete explanations may be given which will coexist in the child's
mind and interfere with later learning required by the school. This situation is further complicated by the relative intelligence of nurse and parent, which need not be proportional to their educational level. If the nurse is actually more intelligent, but less literate and less widely experienced than the parent, the child may develop considerable confusion about modes of thought. If the nurse or grandparent is able to draw on a folk level of thinking, rich in imagery and metaphor, while the parent represents the first generation of schooling - arid, disassociated from his or her primary learning - this may lead to the kind of repudiation of the intellectual life in which poverty and immediate existential experience are opposed to the hypocrisy, or aridity of formal learning.* The importance to the total character structure of the

* Sarte's analysis of his repudiation of this grandfather's pretentious and unscholarly intellectual life, gives a detailed account of the effect on a child of exposure to a type of intellectuality which he feels cannot be respected and must be repudiated. (Sarte, 1964)
(2) those who grow up with a lower level of thought at home than that encountered in church and school; (3) those who grow up in homes where no abstraction is ever made, and who in many cases are taught by teachers who came from similar homes, and who have only attained a schoolroom acquaintance with educated thought.

High intelligence occurs in all social strata and every ethnic group. A few individuals from primitive tribes or severely disadvantaged groups have risen to great intellectual distinction. But emphasis on these conspicuous exceptions has obscured the equally significant fact that the absence of a nurturing environment stunts and stultifies the mind of a child so that in most cases high natural intelligence is never realized. Early contact between young children and highly intelligent, highly educated adults is the best means we have yet devised for giving children a chance to escape the limitations imposed by uneducated parents and limited homes. This was evidenced in the striking contrast between the style - as expressed in posture, gesture, expression, and responsiveness - of the infants reared in Anna Freud's (1943) special residential home for children during World War II, where the children were cared for and taught by highly educated refugees, and that of children of the same class who were cared for by lower class adults with limited education.*

* Based on visits to residential nurseries through the United Kingdom in 1943.
But the failure to make finer discriminations than rural and urban, educated and uneducated, colored and white, professional and non-professional, rich and poor, is likely to obscure the issue, especially in the United States. In some ethnic groups – notably Eastern European Jewish groups – parents in the poorest home, with the simplest occupations and very little formal schooling, may still provide a premium on thinking and exegesis that supports the child in school. Even before he enters school, the child learns the rudiments of analytical thought. On the other hand there are homes in which the father's highly paid occupation and specialized education is never made manifest, or where the children are left to the care of unintelligent and uneducated nurses. In such homes the children are more handicapped than those in a very simple home, where the Bible is read with reverence, and the preacher is expected to discuss Scripture like an educated man.

When we are dealing with large populations or with whole ethnic groups in the midst of transition or with large urban immigrant groups with a given background, it may often be possible to establish some regularities. Such regularities can be discerned in the contrast between the adaptation of Japanese and Chinese immigrant children in California, or between the intellectuality of Eastern European and Middle Eastern Jewish children on the East Coast of the United States. But any attempt to generalize without research into the specific group is dangerous. What we need is more basic research on the one hand, and more devices for assaying the quality of pre-school experience on the other.
The consequences of the difference in the intellectual tone and interest of those who are most in contact with a small child, involves a variety of factors, some cultural, some idiosyncratic, some familial. On the cultural level it is possible to work out in some detail the consequences for later learning of living in houses constructed without benefit of any precision measurement, without clocks or calendars, or even toys which embody some of the principles on which education is postulated. The house built to specifications - the fine machine tool, the clock and calendar, the thermometer and barometer, the compass and the blender, the thermostat and the TV set - all carry a set of messages which can be absorbed in early childhood and later transformed into an interest in mathematics and computers. This can be so even when there is no adult in the home capable of explicitly fostering a child's interest in abstraction. Similarly, the city child learns from plants that mother keeps for show, or father keeps to impress the neighbors, or from herbs growing in the window box, things about a part of the universe that he would not otherwise experience. The regularities in the homes of any group of children can be analyzed for these mute messages which equip them, long before they enter school, for receptivities far beyond the level of the backgrounds from which they come. All this learning will be enormously reinforced if at least one adult in the home understands and explains a short circuit, or the principle upon which the thermostat operates. But the artifacts that are the products of science nevertheless carry their own teaching: the child who comes from housing built on the basis of explicit geometrical knowledge, makes a different order of discovery of
geometry than the child who comes from a circular thatched dwelling, of from a crazy, sagging hut made of broken pieces of tin. In turn, the child who comes from a squatter's town built partly of thatch and partly of fragments of tin which have been shaped to recognizable geometrical forms, learns still something else about pattern as independent of materials.

Conversely, it is possible for homes to so smother children in words and high-level generalizations, that their ability to work from direct perception of shape and size and material may be permanently impaired. High levels of verbal precocity may accompany very rudimentary understanding of basic physical and physiological relationships (Newman and Krug, 1964; Parens and Weech, 1966; Weisberg and Springer, 1961; Wieder, 1966).

It should be borne in mind that each of the situations which I have dealt with may occur on a cultural, society-wide basis. They may be characteristic of particular families and therefore incongruent with the over-all cultural emphasis. They may even be attributes of one individual within a family who gives the young child some extraordinarily deviant and unorthodox intellectual exposure. When the familial or individual style deviates from the wider style, the educator has still another element to cope with - the unexpected language of particular children that render them incomprehensible, unpredictable and maladjusted in the schoolroom with its standardized expectations.
Language learning before school age

In the 1920's it was argued that whatever difficulties children had on entering school because they came from homes where a foreign language was spoken, would be eliminated by the third grade. The most significant attempt to refute this argument was a study of bilingual and monolingual children, in which the effects of a type of bilingualism associated with different contexts such as home, school, and play, were shown to be reflected in later school achievement. The design of this study has since come under criticism; there are still no definitive studies on the subject. However, from related fields, there have come some suggestive observations which should be taken into account.

Jakobson (1941) has assembled evidence to show that the way in which a language is learned by an initial dichotomizing of a large unstructured repertoire of sounds, which are then progressively elaborated into a structured system can be found to be repeated in the loss of the mastery of speech which occurs in traumatic amnesia. This study suggests, and the suggestion is supported by observations in other fields, that children learn the phonemic structure of their language at a very early age. It may be hypothesized, although there is no evidence yet in support, that certain fundamental morphemic generalizations are also learned early, and that fundamental ways of viewing the world, with contrasts between durative and punctuated action, with insistence upon sources of information and matters of this sort, are also learned within
the first three or four years of life. At present, it seems probable that the ability of the child to learn other linguistic and thought patterns is not so much a question of the interference of the latter pattern by the earlier one, as of the conditions of learning the two patterns. If two or more languages are learned, either sequentially or simultaneously, but one is the language of play and the other the language of discipline; if one is taught within the intimate environment of the home and the other in the more demanding and impersonal environment of school; if one is a language which is spoken by all the members of the child's environment, and the other spoken only by servants, or only by parents, or only by teachers then the learning of the two patterns will be affectively weighted, and the learning will be of a different sort.

When, for example, a Spanish-speaking child is taught English by a teacher whose mother tongue is Spanish, and who has only a classroom mastery of English, the situation is profoundly different from the case in which a child is taught English by a native English speaker with a good idiomatic knowledge of Spanish, or by a teacher who speaks no Spanish at all. It seems likely, but it has never been properly studied, that if the mother tongue is a dialect in which literacy is never attained, rather than a literate language in which literacy is first obtained, the results for the child's subsequent use of language will be very different. The success of the Colonial Dutch in teaching literacy and languages in Indonesia was based on teaching literacy in the mother tongue, followed
by literacy in Malay (the Indonesia *lingua franca* in the Netherlands Indies), followed by Dutch taught by native speakers, followed by English, French or German, taught as another formally-mastered European language, by Dutch native speakers. Here a sequence of teaching had been developed which was severely mutilated when the school system was revised, and Dutch dropped out. English teaching deteriorated markedly when the Dutch step was removed and Indonesian teachers were asked to go directly from Indonesian – a second language related to their own mother tongue – to English, a language which they had learned as a second European language, from Dutch native speakers.*

* Based on exploratory field work in 1957-58, in Bali, under NIH Grant No. M-2218.

Experience of this sort suggests that it is most important to explore the relationship between different kinds of language learning, and to identify breaks and continuities in the sequence within which different versions of the same language, or different languages, are learned. The most significant situations may well be those in which significant adults in the child's world do not share a knowledge of the different varieties of speech with which the young child has to cope; different degrees of identification of these versions may be most important. For example, children who speak a dialect, identified and labelled as a dialect, in a country like France or Germany or Italy, may
have parents who speak the dialect at home, but use the standard language in all formal and public situations. Such children may be far less handicapped than those who speak a version of the language which is treated, not as a dialect with an identifiable style of its own, but simple as class-typed, or regionally- or ethically-typed, as in lower class urban English in the United Kingdom, "bad English" in the English-speaking Caribbean, or the typical speech of Southern rural Negro Americans in the United States. If the mother tongue is treated as an inferior version of the standard language, rather than a dialect, movement becomes much more difficult back and forth between the phonemic, morphemic and cognitive structures of the two forms, the home language and the school language.

When, as is so often the case, the teacher has an inadequate grasp of the standard language and can only operate within a formal school context, the children with class-typed or race-typed speech are deprived of any formal grasp of the differences between the two forms. On the other hand, the teacher who is a native speaker of the standard language cannot recognize that the prevalent "mistakes" in grammar or spelling or thought found among children whose home language is "poor English" or "bad English" are, in fact, intrusions into the standard speech from unrecognized dialect.*

* I am indebted to the field work of Dr. Rhoda Metraux, in the Caribbean, for my understanding of the significance of the failure to identify Caribbean dialects as dialects, and to a brief visit to her field site in
Montserrat, W. I. in the summer of 1966 for an opportunity to listen to the sliding relationships between standard English and almost completely unintelligible dialect, indulged in by both native dialect speakers and native English speakers born on the island, with minimal consciousness of the way in which they handle equivalent utterances (NSF Grant to AMNH; No. MH-07675-04).

Field work in the village of Peri, among the Manus speaking people in 1964 and 1965, where an Australian teacher, without a knowledge of either Manus or the Neo-Melanesian lingua franca (pidgin) was teaching English, gave me a further opportunity to compare the children's progress in English and the problems they encountered, with the progress of Manus-speaking children on Balowan, in 1953, with a native English-speaking teacher who also spoke fluent Neo-Melanesian. (1953, Admiralty Island expedition, Grant from the Rockefeller Foundation to the AMNH; 1964 and 1965, NIH Grant No. MH-07675-02-03 to the AMNH).

Experience therefore suggests the importance of making as articulate as possible the varieties of a language or of different languages which a child learns as an infant, as a toddler, in nursery and pre-school, in elementary school, college and university. Such articulacy would include a detailed study of the various types of mother tongues, recognized dialects, recognized dialects associated with illiteracy and low prestige, unrecognized versions of the standard speech, standard expectations among
the non-standard speech speakers of what the standard language is like,
divisions of experience which are learned in each language, counting,
body parts, names for bodily functions, recitation of dreams, fantasy,
disciplined logical thinking, authoritarian moral dicta, sacred
scriptures, poetry, etc. Complimentary to such an analysis, we will
need the language style of the standard language and such contrasts as
the Dutch emphasis on learning to speak foreign languages rather than
on learning to listen; the Chinese emphasis on learning to read a cross
language script and to hear different languages while speaking them
imperfectly, and the contrast between learning English, Spanish, Russian
and German spelling. Of particular interest would be the consequences
of the older and later German experiences, in which a teacher was
accustomed to correct for local dialects and still teach the children
to spell as they spoke, and the post-war experience when (owing to the
wartime dispersal of populations throughout Germany) this was no longer
possible.

This material was a by-product of the analysis by Rhoda Metraux
(1955) of a large sample of Anderson Story Completion Forms written by
German children.

Similar interesting comparisons could be made between children's
progress in a standard language which is not their mother tongue, in the
Soviet Union where the Russian-speaking teacher is faced with a group of
children with a common language, and in the United States where, in cities
like New York, the teacher is faced with children speaking several mother tongues, as well as unrecognized dialects of English.

Detailed analysis of some of these situations should yield a set of early childhood deutero-formulations of the order of: "Real speech is how we speak at home; THEY speak and insist that I learn to speak in another way which has less reality." "Different people of the same kind speak different languages; it will be necessary to learn them all."

"Different people of different kinds, some of higher or lower status, or greater or lesser warmth, speak different languages, learning these languages must include these extra-linguistic differences."

There are, of course, the much more extreme cases of children reared in foreign countries who learn to speak their nurses' language, but whose parents do not. When the children are removed to their country of origin, the original nurse-tongue may be completely suppressed, only appearing as grammatical or phonemic intrusions, or under conditions of extreme amnesic stress, while providing a background for unrecognized cognitive confusions. Even more extreme are the cases where children, after having learned to speak, are adopted across a complete linguistic, cultural and racial border, and are required to learn the new language from foster parents who know nothing of their mother tongues - as with Chinese, Korean, or Vietnamese war orphans adopted at the age of two or three in the United States.

Such deutero learning may be very potent in determining children's later ability to learn, to think in the abstract terms which are
presented in the second, standard language. Access to their unconscious creativity is also affected. On the other hand, if these deuterio learnings can be identified and articulated so that the mother tongue or the nurse tongue is treated with dignity as having equal reality standing with the standard language, much of the damage of such weighted compartmentalization can probably be avoided.

It will be particularly important to explore the later effects on thinking ability of the co-existence of two languages: an infant or child language which remains rudimentary and undeveloped, unused since childhood, and a standard language which is reinforced with literacy, literature, and disciplined thought. The state of teaching the deaf in the United States is a case in point. American teaching of the deaf has until very recently repudiated the use of sign language, and insisted that deaf children be taught lip reading. The sign language, a language which uses many condensations for morphemes in addition to a manual alphabet, has continued to be used as a disapproved subsersive form of communication among deaf children. Since it is not taught by competent and self-conscious teachers, as it is, for example in the Soviet Union, dialects grow up; the deaf can easily recognize the great variety of divergent forms characteristic of sign language in the United States. But as the children do not connect the sign language with literacy, and no attempt is made to relate it systematically to standard English, it remains essentially the language of preliterate nursery years. In the
Soviet Union, the use of a manual language coexists on formal terms with lip reading, reading and writing, and very small children demonstrate an impressive mastery of thought and language.*

* Unpublished field work on teaching of the deaf in the United States, by Rhoda Metraux and Margaret Mead, and in the Soviet Union by Margaret Mead. NIH grant to AMNH Factor in Allopsychic Orientation in Mental Health. NIH Grant No. M-3303.

But the situation of the deaf is only an extreme and dramatic example of what happens when any form of communication, including the modalities of touch, taste and smell, is developed in childhood and left unrecognized and undeveloped by later formal teaching. Many cultures, including the highly literate versions of our own, depend upon using such separations to dramatize the difference between intimate and informal and distant, impersonal and formal relationships. As a result the uncultivated, preliterate modes of early childhood become the modes of communication within marriage, often carrying with them as unrecognized baggage, the unbridled fears and hopes and fantasies of early childhood, so that records of the intimate life of highly cultivated people contrast astonishingly with their level of sophistication and humanization in less intimate contexts (Hall, 1959; Ruesch and Prestwood, 1950; Corer, 1963; Frank, 1956; Wiener, 1966; Birdwhistell, 1959, 1962).
Remembrance of such earlier forms of once efficient and now disallowed communications has many repercussions in learning situations at the beginning of school. In establishing a nursery school in a Southeastern city in the early 1940's, for white children who had had Negro nurses, it was found necessary to bridge the gulf from home to school, by including in the nursery school staff, a warm Negro woman who fed the children to counterbalance the young white teachers who stood to the children for a different affective style.

It is probably impossible to overestimate the extent to which languages are the carriers of different kinds of thought. Quite aside from the resolution of the adequacy of the Whorfian hypothesis about the relationship between language and thought, the simple fact that more or less cognitively disciplined, socially hierarchical, or emotionally toned kinds of speech are used by the same individual puts a burden on the transfer of learning. In the extreme case, the multilingual individual who has "lost" his or her mother tongue through migration, adoption, etc., may experience extreme hiatuses in thinking processes. Such an individual may be denied all access to poetry as a form, or be unable to move easily through different levels of consciousness, or through different kinds of imagery. The sorts of imagery associated with primary process thinking - the figures of speech of classical rhetoric - may become so disturbed that little or no congruence remains between image and word. This is the case of a great deal of American slang where the visual image is lost in favor of an inexplicit motor image.
Another conspicuous area of significant early childhood learning comes in the way a child experiences within the familial group cues to styles of intellectual behavior which are sex typed. Sex identity is imposed on children from birth; different terminology, different tones of voice, and different expectations, reinforce and elaborate underlying biological differences. Ways in which the world is to be perceived or represented may be so deep that when given pencils or crayons, children who have never drawn will nevertheless be sharply differentiated by the time they are five or six. Boys, for example, may draw scenes of activity from real life; girls draw patterns for cakes or clothing. Both style and content are conveyed to children very early, together with permission or prohibition about experimenting with styles of behavior culturally assigned to the other sex.

There is also great divergence in such cultural styles. In one culture, the small girls may be permitted to behave like boys, even in their stance and posture, as in Manus, where significantly the girls have taken to schooling as readily as the boys before puberty; their capacity to learn interrupted only by different expectations at puberty. In contrast, among the Iatmul, early childhood experience places the boys with the girls, with mothers as first models; only in late childhood is a male model superimposed on a female model. But in Bali, each child is firmly assured of his or her sex identity, reared from earliest childhood to differentiated behavior, and individual children are given permission to experiment with the behavior of the other sex.
As a child learns its sex identity, it learns its appropriate cognitive style, and arrives in school with deeply ingrained expectations of what learning will be about. When the cultural style is rigid and extremely incongruent with the realities of human abilities, disturbances in ability to learn are inevitable. This is so because of the child's already fixed sex identification and belief. For example, that mechanics or mathematics are masculine and art is feminine, and because the teachers, as part of the same culture, reflect the same sex-typed expectations. Children who deviate in abilities very sharply from expectation, experience great difficulty in learning. This is exacerbated if, within the family, a child's proclivities for some sex-typed form of intellectual or artistic behavior is not only deviant from the cultural norm, but also reinforced by temperamental similarities with the parent of opposite sex. If a boy is both musical beyond the expectation for his class and region for male behavior, and has a musical mother with whom he identified; the complications are doubled. The school can help break down these very early, obdurate learnings, particularly if the school system presents at every stage, both male and female models, in sufficient profusion so that children's earlier arbitrary learnings will be questioned rather than perpetuated. But small sensitive responses in early childhood to the cognitive style of the parents of own and opposite sex can provide one of the often seemingly inexplicable blocks to learning, or a pathway of unusual facilitation, as when a certain high school provided an unusual number of good science students, all of whom went to
the university from which the science teacher - also a first class athlete - had come. As in other cases, knowledge of the cultural style, by class and region, can facilitate teaching in school. Where the learning capacities of a particular child are complicated by idiosyncratic learning, additional analysis is required.

Finally, it is important to recognize that pre-school children may be learning ways of dealing with life which are radically opposed to the expectations on which the school system is built. The American school system is based on the belief that children should and will accept more and better education than their parents had. (The parent who insists that what was good enough for him is good enough for his children has been treated as a gross reactionary.) Such institutions as the Parent Teachers Association are postulated on the parents' enthusiastic support of this position, whether it is reflected in the pride with which the first report card is exhibited, or in the foresight with which the parents enroll a child at birth for a particular school or college. Each piece of infant learning, mastery of a new skill, learning to count or reciting a nursery rhyme or the alphabet is greeted in this model American household as a precursor of achievement which will eventually outstrip that of the parent. The child's learning is never begrudged; the child who suffers is the child whose early achievements do not promise such later educational success.

This is the model - a model based on the style set up by hopeful immigrants from older societies who emigrated of their own accord to find
better opportunities for themselves, and particularly for their children. Our whole educational system has been postulated on this style. It was therefore with a terrible shock that Americans woke up, in the late 1950's, to a recognition that for some thirty million or more Americans there was no such expectation. The enthusiasm, bred of immigration to a wider and more open world, has died among those who failed generation after generation to make the grade. It had only a fitful life among those who had not been immigrants out of self-propelling hope, but who had been brought here as slaves, or pushed here by desperation and starvation within their own borders, or who were slowly reduced to despair as their traditional ways of life became less and less congruent with modern American life. In such families achievement is not rewarded. The child is not gazed upon as one who will go further than his father, but instead is clutched or pitied, loved or rejected as part of the misery, poverty, deprivation or grudgingly accepted low status which his parents, grandparents, and great grandparents have known, and from which they have no genuine hope of escape. This is the child who is a drop-out from the first day of school. Deeper than the marks of a different intellectual style, of a failure to grasp the meaning of literacy as access to new experiences, deeper than the learning that comes from the content of the home and from the cues given by sex and temperament, is the mark laid upon the small preschool child by his parents' expectations of his achievement. It is this cultural factor that we are just beginning to appreciate and allow for; it is this deep block to achievement with which programs like Headstart are attempting to deal. Without seriously coming to grips with this
discrepancy between a school system built for the first generation of aspiring immigrants and pupils who are the product of many generations of low expectation and despair, we will not be able to reconstruct our schools so as to provide the type of education that will be needed in the coming world.

But the reconstruction will need to provide ways through which children from whom little is expected may learn to expect much. It will also need to rescue those children - equally the victims of our one-way convictions of progress - from whom too much is expected, and who are therefore branded as failures. Instead of a single-track notion of education from which those with the "wrong" cultural backgrounds were automatically excluded, and within which those with the "right" social backgrounds were often severely punished, we need to construct a system in which all sorts of lateral movements are possible, as some of the children of rural migrants become poets and physicists, and some of the children of lawyers and physicians and bankers become first-rate automobile mechanics or hospital orderlies. To accomplish this, the school needs to be more explicitly geared to compensate and balance, to take advantage of and when appropriate undo, the enormous strength of preschool experience.
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I want to thank Dr. Bailey and Dr. Gordon for inviting me to participate in this research planning conference on language development in disadvantaged children. My assignment from Dr. Bailey has been quite simply, and open-endedly, "a theoretical paper." One connotation of "theoretical," I am afraid, must be that I know too little about the actual subject to say something practical. Good practical work, however, must have an eye on the current state of theory; it can be guided or misguided, encouraged or discouraged, by one or another theoretical view. Moreover, the problems of language development in disadvantaged children have a particular pertinence just now for theory. The burden of my remarks will be that the practical problems and theoretical problems indeed here converge.

It is not that there exists a body of linguistic theory that practical research can merely apply. It is rather that work motivated by practical needs may help elicit and help build the theory that we need. Let me review the present state of linguistic theory in order to show why this is so.

Consider a recent statement:

"Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely homogeneous speech-community, who knows its language perfectly and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and errors (random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the language in actual performance".

From the standpoint of the children we seek to understand and help, such a statement may seem to be almost a declaration of irrelevance. All the difficulties which confront the children and us seem to be swept from view.

One's response to such indications of the nature of linguistic theory might be what can be called "pick-and-choose." Useful models of language structure, after all, can be of benefit in ways not formally envisioned in the theoretical statements of their authors. Some linguists (e.g., Peter Rosenbaum, Lita Gleitman) are using transformational generative techniques to characterize ways in which some speaker-listeners in the same general speech-community differ from one another; moreover, some of these differences clearly involve imperfect knowledge of the language. Perhaps one's attitude, then, ought to be simply to disregard what linguists say about theory, as being primarily concerned with something not of primary concern to us. One can point to various models of language structure available to us--Trager-Smith-Joos, tagmemic, transformational-generative (in its MIT and Pennsylvania and other variants), stratificational; note that there are distinguished scholars actively involved with the use of each in the analysis of English; regret that linguists remain unable to agree on the analysis of English (let alone on attitudes towards schooling and children); and pick and choose, depending on problem and local situation, leaving grammarians otherwise to their own devices.
Only to "pick and choose" would be a mistake, however, for two reasons: the sort of linguistic theory quoted above, despite its narrowness, is relevant in a special way that is important always to have in mind; and there is a body of linguistic problems and data that will be left without theoretical insight, if linguistic theory is left with such a narrow definition.

First, as to the special relevance of the view of linguistic theory cited above. Its representative anecdote (to use Kenneth Burke's term), the image it puts before our eyes, is that of a child, born with the ability to master any language with almost miraculous ease and speed; a child who is no mere passive object of conditioning and reinforcement, but who actively applies a truly cognitive skill to the unconscious theoretical interpretation of the speech that comes its way, so that in a few years and with a finite experience, it is master of an infinite ability, that of producing and understanding in principle any and all grammatical sentences of its language. Then the image of the unfolding, mastering, fluent child is set beside the real children in many of our schools, the theoretical basis of the image is seen for what it is, not a doctrine of irrelevance, but a doctrine of poignancy. Such theory is based on the essential equality and potential of each child in his or her capacity simply as human being. It is noble in that it can inspire one with the belief that even the most dispiriting conditions can be transformed; and it is an indispensable weapon against views which would explain the communicative difficulties of groups of children as inherent, perhaps racial.

Second, as to the narrowness for our needs of the theoretical standpoint just described. It is, if I may say so, rather an Adam and Eve, a Garden of Eden standpoint. I do not think that the restriction of theory to an ideal speaker-listener is merely a simplifying assumption of the sort all scientific theories must make. If that were the case, then some explicit place for social complexities might be left, and no such place is defined. In particular, the concepts of linguistic competence and linguistic performance, as discussed in the work from which the quotation is taken, do not provide the theoretical scope that is required. Linguistic competence is understood as exactly concerned with idealized knowledge of language structure—semantics, syntax, phonology. Linguistic performance is understood as concerned with the modifications introduced by the processes that have often been termed encoding and decoding. Some aspects of performance have a constructive role to play, e.g., cycling rules that help assign stress properly; but if the passage quoted above is recalled, and if the examples of performance phenomena in the chapter quoted are reviewed, it will be noticed that the note struck is one of limitation. I do not think this note of limitation to be accidental. Rather, I take the motivational core of the theoretical stance to be one which sees linguistic competence as an idealized Garden of Eden sort of nover, and the exigencies of performance as rather like the eating of the apple of the Tree of Knowledge, thrusting the one perfect speaker-hearer out into a fallen world. But of this fallen world, where meanings must be won by the sweat of the brow, and recreated in labor, almost nothing at all is said. The image is of an abstract and isolated individual, not, except contingently, of a person in a social world.

I take such limitations to disclose an ideological aspect to the theoretical standpoint in question. The theoretical stance of any group should always be examined in terms of the interests and needs unconsciously served. Now a major characteristic of modern linguistic theory has been that it takes structure as primary end in itself, and tends to deprecate use, while not relinquishing any
of its claim to the great significance that is attached to language. (Contrast classical antiquity, where structure was a means to use, and the grammarian subordinate to the rhetor). The result can sometimes seem a very happy one. On the one hand, by narrowing concern to independently and readily structurable data, one can enjoy the prestige of an advanced science; on the other hand, despite ignoring the social dimensions of use, one retains the prestige of dealing with something fundamental to human life.

In this light Chomsky is quite correct when he writes that his conception of the concern of linguistic theory seems to have been also the position of the founders of modern general linguistics. Certainly if modern structural linguistics is meant, then a major thrust of it has been to define the subject matter of linguistic theory in terms of what it is not. In de Saussure's linguistics, as generally interpreted, la langue was the privileged ground of structure, and la parole the residual realm of variation (among other things). Chomsky associates his conceptions of competence and performance with the Saussuring conceptions of langue and parole, but sees his own conceptions as superior, going beyond the conception of language as a systematic inventory of items to renewal of the Humboldtian conception of underlying processes. The Chomsky conception is superior, not only in this respect, but also in the very terminology it introduces to mark the difference. "Competence" and "performance" much more readily suggest concrete persons, situations, and actions. Indeed, from the standpoint of the classical tradition in structural linguistics, Chomsky's theoretical standpoint is at once its revitalisation and its culmination. It carries to its perfection the desire to deal in practice only with what is internal to language, yet to find in that internality what in theory is of the widest, or deepest, human significance. No modern linguistic theory has spoken more profoundly of either the internal structure or the intrinsic human significance.

This revitalisation flowers while around it emerge the sprouts of a conception that before the end of the century may succeed it. If such a succession occurs, it will be because, just as the transformational theory could absorb its predecessors and handle structural relationships beyond their grasp, so new relationships, relationships with an ineradicable social component, will become salient that will require a broader theory to absorb and handle them. I shall return to this historical conjecture at the end of my talk. Let me now develop some of the particular sorts of data which motivate development of a broader theory. And let me do this by first putting forward some alternative representative anecdotes.

As against the ideal speaker-listener, consider Bloomfield's account of one Menomini he knew:

"White-Thunder, a man around forty, speaks less English than Menomini, and that is a strong indictment, for his Menomini is atrocious. His vocabulary is small; his inflections are often barbarous; he constructs sentences of a few threadbare models. He may be said to speak no language tolerably. His case is not uncommon among younger men, even when they speak but little English."

Bloomfield goes on to suggest of the commonness of the case that "Perhaps it is due, in some indirect way, to the impact of the conquering language." Social factors are suggested to have entered here not merely into outward performance, but into the inner competence itself. And the one thing that is clear in studies of subcultural differences in language development is put by Courtney Cazden in her excellent review article as follows:
"The findings can be quickly summarized: on all the measures, in all the studies, the upper socio-economic status children, however defined, are more advanced than the lower socio-economic status children."

The point of course is not that social factors enter only to interfere. The differences just summarized involve positive social factors on one side as much as negative ones on the other. It may indeed be the case that some or many lower socio-economic status children excel in aspects of verbal skill not observed or measured in the tests reported.

The generic role of social factors has been stressed by Labov, reporting on information as to ability to perceive phonological contrasts:

"The contention that native speakers can hear phonemic distinctions much better than nonphonemic distinctions was not borne out by the evidence. Instead, one might say that the ability to perceive distinctions is determined largely by the social significance of the distinction to the listener."

Here are recurrently found differences within one and the same speech-community, entering again into the inner competence itself. It seems clear that work with disadvantaged children needs a theory of competence that can take account of socially conditioned differences in a natural and revealing way.

What would such a theory be like? No one knows better than those here today that very little of the content of such a theory can now be specified. Permit me, however, to take up again the representative anecdote of the child in order to sketch briefly what a broad (as distinct from a narrow), or perhaps a strong (as distinct from a weak) theory of linguistic competence would entail. Recall that in terms of the narrow theory one is concerned to explain how a child can come to produce and understand (in principle) any and all grammatical sentences. Consider a child with just that ability; it would be disadvantaged in a severe sense. Someone who went about producing any and every sentence without concern for anything else might be quickly institutionalized. We have then to account for the fact that a normal child acquires a knowledge both of proper sentences and of their appropriate use. He or she develops abilities to judge when to speak, when not, and what to talk about with whom, in what way, and when and where.

It is especially important not to confuse an account of such abilities with an account of performance. The broad theory, like the narrow theory, has both competence and performance aspects. Indeed, one of the chief dangers of leaving the field of linguistic theory to the narrow view is that it may encourage one to relegate all questions of use to the category of performance. As has been noted above, performance here amounts essentially to the exigencies of realization and interpretation in encoding and decoding. The abilities with which a broad theory of competence is concerned are in the first instance equally matters of underlying intuitive knowledge, of "mentalistic" competence, just as much as are the abilities with which grammar and semantics are concerned. Moreover, although the notion of rules of use carries with it an indication of restraints, such rules are not to be taken just as limitations on an otherwise infinite capacity. First of all, such rules are not a late grafting. Data from very early in life, the first years of acquisition of grammar, show children to develop rules for the use of different forms in different situations (Susan Ervin-Tripp, personal communication). Competency for use is part of the same developmental matrix as competency for grammar.
Second, like competency for grammar, competency for use has a dimension of productivity. Within the developmental matrix in which children acquire the knowledge in principle of the set of sentences of a language they also acquire the knowledge in principle of a set of ways in which sentences are used; and they internalize attitudes toward a language and it uses, and indeed, toward language itself (including, e.g., attentiveness to it) or its place in a pattern of mental abilities.

The words "in principle" in the last sentence should no doubt have been in quotes. No child has knowledge of all sentences, no more than he or she has knowledge of all applications of rules of use. The matrix formed in childhood continues to develop and change throughout life in both respects. Either or both may indeed be supplanted. Competence in either respect is not a matter of childhood alone, but of the succeeding stages of life as well. Perhaps here one should contrast a "long" and a "short" range view of competency, the short range view being interested primarily in innate capacities as unfolded during the first years of life, and the long range view being necessarily concerned with the continuing socialization and shifting competence of lives through adulthood. In any case, here is one important respect in which a theory of competency must go beyond a narrow one, if it is to be of value to work with disadvantaged children. For when one is dealing with recurrently found differences, social in part or whole, with intent to change, one is presupposing the very possibility that competency that has "unfolded" in the "natural" way can be altered, perhaps drastically so, by environmental factors. One is assuming from the outset a confrontation of different systems of competency within the same community, and focusing on the way in which one affects or can be made to affect the other. In short, one's theoretical perspective can be limited neither to young children of pre-school age nor to homogeneous communities. One encounters linguistic phenomena that certain not only to the structures of languages, but also to what has come to be called interference between them: problems of reception, understanding, and acquisition of habits due to the perception of the manifestations of one system in terms of the structures of another.

Since the interference one confronts involves language features and features of use together, it would be well to adopt the phrase introduced by Alfred Hayes into the Yeshiva conference last October, and to speak of sociolinguistic interference.

...new speech habits and verbal training must be introduced, necessarily by particular sources to particular receivers, using a particular code with messages of particular forms via particular channels, about particular topics and in particular settings—and all this from and to schools for whom there already exist definite patterning of linguistic routines, of personality expression via speech, of uses of speech in social situations, of attitudes and conceptions toward speech. It seems reasonable that success in such an educational venture will be enhanced by an understanding of this existing structure, because the innovators' efforts will
The notion of sociolinguistic interference is of the greatest importance for the relationship between theory and practice. First of all, notice that a theory of sociolinguistic interference must begin with heterogeneous situations, whose dimensions are social as well as linguistic. Situations of a sort from which the narrow theory seems in principle to cut itself off. (The fruits of such a theory in the understanding of language systems can of course be utilized in dealing with sociolinguistic interference.)

Second, notice that the notion of sociolinguistic interference helps one see how to draw on a variety of researches for practical purposes, researches that might otherwise be overlooked or set aside. (In saying "set aside," I have in mind the issues raised by treating the practical problems of education as problems in "second-language learning." ) Now, one main virtue of the notion of sociolinguistic interference is that it fits into a conception of an integrated theory of sociolinguistic description. And such a theory of description does not begin with the notion of a language, or of counting numbers of languages, but with notions which have to do with codes and numbers of codes. In particular, such a theory of description recognizes that the historically derived status of codes as separate languages, related dialects, alternate styles, or whatever, is entirely secondary from the standpoint of their use in actual human relationships. From the functional standpoint that a sociolinguistic description must take, quite different means can be employed in equivalent ways for equivalent ends. A striking example from another area, that of modes of address, is that the function served by shift of second person pronoun in French, tu : vous, may be served by shift of entire language in some situations in Paraguay (Guarani : Spanish). In short, we have to break with the entire a language : a culture tradition of thought, a fixation that has dominated linguistic thought for generations and indeed centuries. In order to deal with the practical problems faced among disadvantaged children, theory must begin with the conception of the speech habits of a population. Within those speech habits, it may find one language, three languages; dialects widely divergent or divergent by a hair; styles almost mutually incomprehensible or barely detectible as different to the outsider; but these objective differences in terms of linguistic structure are secondary and do not tell the story. What must be known is the attitude toward the differences, the functional slot assigned them, the use made of the varieties so distinguished. Only on the basis of such a functional description can comparable cases be established and valid theory developed.

Now with regard to sociolinguistic interference among school children, much relevant information and theoretical insight can come from the sorts of cases variously labelled "bilingualism", "linguistic acculturation", "dialectology", "creolization," whatever. The value of an integrated theory of sociolinguistic description to the practical work would be that (1) it would attempt to place studies, diversely labelled, within a common analytical framework; and (2), by placing such information within a common framework, where one can talk about relations among codes; and types of code-switching, and types of interference as between codes, one can make use of the theory while perhaps avoiding connotations that attach to such labels as "second-language learning." (I say "perhaps" because of course it is very difficult to avoid unpleasant connotations for any terms used to designate situations that are themselves intrinsically sensitive and objectionable).
William Stewart's suggestion that some code relationships in the United States might be better understood if seen as part of a continuum of cases ranging to the Caribbean and Africa, for example, seems to me from a theoretical standpoint very promising. It is not that most code relationships in the United States are to be taken as involving different languages, but that they do involve relationships among different codes, and that the full series illuminates the part. Stewart has seen through the different labels of dialect, creole, pidgin, language, bilingualism, to a common sociolinguistic dimension. Getting through different labels to the underlying sociolinguistic dimensions is a task in which theory and practice meet.

Let me now single out three interrelated concepts, important to a theory of sociolinguistic description, which have the same property of enabling us to cut across diverse cases and modes of reporting, and to get to basic relationships. One such concept is that of verbal repertoire, which John Gumperz has done much to develop. The heterogeneity of speech communities, and the priority of social relationships, is assumed, and the question to be investigated is that of the set of varieties, codes, or subcodes, commanded by an individual, together with the types of switching that occur among them.

The second concept is that of domains of language behavior, which Joshua Fishman has dealt with insightfully in his impressive work on Language Loyalty in the United States. Again, the complexity and patterning of use is assumed, and the focus is upon "the most parsimonious and fruitful designation of the occasions on which one language (variant, dialect, style, etc.) is habitually employed rather than (or in addition to) another."

The third concept is that of linguistic routines, sequential organizations beyond the sentence, either as activities of one person, or as the interaction of two or more. Literary genres provide obvious examples; the organization of other kinds of texts, and of conversation, is getting fresh attention by sociologists, such as Harvey Sacks, and sociologically oriented linguists, such as William Labov. One special importance of linguistic routines is that they may have the property that the late English philosopher Austin dubbed performative. That is, the saying does not simply stand for, refer to, or other thing; it itself is the thing in question. To say "I solemnly vow" is to solemnly vow; it does not name something else that is the act of vowing solemnly. Indeed, in the circumstances no other way to vow solemnly is provided other than to do so by saying that one does so. From this standpoint, then, disability and ability with regard to language involve questions that are not about the relation between language and something else that language might stand for or influence; sometimes such questions are about things that are done linguistically or not at all.

These three concepts do not exhaust those that are relevant to the sort of theory that is needed, and a number of scholars are developing related conceptual approaches, such as Bernstein, who has been mentioned, Harvey Searle, who will speak later in the conference, and others. But the three concepts do point up major dimensions: the capacities of persons, the appropriateness of situations, and the organization of verbal means for socially defined purposes.

In the context of interference, let me take up another aspect of communication relevant to work with disadvantaged children. I have so far not justified the scope implied by the word "communicative" in my title, and in fact I shall continue to focus on language, since it is the center of our interest here. But let me introduce one principle with regard to interference that does call for the larger perspective of communication in general.
Phenomena of intonation, tone of voice, expressive phonetic features, and other parts of paralinguistics; phenomena of body style, gesture, and other parts of kinesics; all that Edward Hall designates as the "silent language" and the "hidden dimension"; these things need only be mentioned to be recognized. Yet it is remarkable how easy it is for us to forget them. In Dr. Cazden's review article, she makes an important critical point, namely, that a common finding may easily be given two quite different interpretations. The example cited may be evidence of the point I wish to make now. Bernstein has interpreted a greater use of "I think" among higher-status subjects in terms of egocentricity-sociocentricity contrasting with "ain't it", whereas Loban has taken a like result as evidence of cognitive flexibility (grouping it with "I'm not exactly sure"). The question arises: did Bernstein's English subjects say "I think" (egocentric) and Loban's California school children "I think" (cognitive flexibility)? Clearly the import of data can not be assessed apart from the co-occurring set of intonational and expressive signals.

The question of communicative interference poses itself here in two ways. There is first the problem of interference between differing sets of expressive signals. Of this there are many examples in education and the transmission of information, e.g., Steven Oliver reported some years ago that Mesquaki Fox children near Tama, Iowa, interpreted the normal loudness of voice and directness of teachers as "mean"-ness and as getting mad.13

Second, there is the problem of interference with regard to relations between co-occurring codes within a single message. The principle of concern here can be put as an instruction: "Find out where the information is." A child is making use of a set of modalities, as he or she communicates, and interprets communication, and only one of them is discursive language. One of the essential features of Bernstein's model for restricted and elaborated types of codes is that the grammatical and lexical restrictiveness of the first type is accompanied by intensified paralinguistic activity with regard to other cues of subjective intent, such as the paralinguistic. (I may mention that I have found Bernstein's model very useful cross-culturally). In such a case the two parties to a communicative exchange may be putting their main information in different places, and likewise looking for that of the other in different places. The situation is further complicated by what the late Dutch linguist de Groot called "the law of the two strata", namely, that when the discursive and the expressive import of a message conflict, the latter signals the real intent. Quite possibly some teachers are not reading their students at all, and some children are reading their teachers all too well. In any case, a theory of competence that is to be of much help in assessing an array of signals and a battery of functions, such that what is signalled lexically in one case may be signalled with expressive intonation in another, and so on. The theory of competence can not be limited to the referential use of language.

Here indeed is the point at which the sort of theory of competence one needs must depart most decisively from the orientation of the sort of theory first discussed. When one takes into account the full set of functions served in speech in relation to the means diversely organized to serve them, one's starting point and orientation shift. A linguistic theory in the narrow sense, in so far as it deals with use, looks out from language; structure precedes, functions of use follow. A theory in the broad sense looks in at language in the contexts of its use; functions guide, structures follow.

Such a broad theory of competence is essentially sociolinguistic. As such, it makes three assumptions:
(1) Each social relationship entails the selection and/or creation of communicative means considered specific and appropriate to it by its participants;

(2) The organization of communicative means in terms of social relationships confers a structure that is not disclosed in the analysis of the means separately;

(3) The communicative means available in a relationship condition its nature and outcome.

These three assumptions are rather simple and obvious, but to take them seriously is to define an area of linguistic investigation almost wholly unsystematized and theoretically little understood. To take the first assumption: a social relationship gives rise to a use of communicative means that distinguishes it. Now it is probably a sociolinguistic universal that the speech of men and women can be distinguished in every society. Yet articles on men's and women's speech are few; they are also very revealing. They deal with men's and women's speech when markers of the distinction intrude themselves into the ordinary analysis of the language. For the vast majority of societies where the markers have not so intruded, we are largely ignorant.

The fact is evidence of the second assumption: the way communicative means are organized in terms of a social relationship is unlikely to appear unless one begins with the social relationship, then looks for the means.

The third assumption is perhaps the simplest, the most obvious, and for some reason, the most resisted by some linguists. Put colloquially, it says with reference to language that what people have to work with affects what they can do. In it lies the heart of the element of truth in what is often called the Whorfian hypothesis. Partially the question is one of performance, as brought out by Cazden:

"When we shift...to the difference between the speech of a middle-class child and a lower-class child, however, we are looking not at the total available in the language as a system of symbols, but at what is actually used by particular persons at the moment of constructing an utterance." In important part the question is also one of competence, a competence which is in part an individual matter (cf., Sapir, "every individual's language is a distinct psychological entity in itself") and in part a matter of social group. Each child in a classroom has a competence definable in terms of what is normally and habitually available to it for utterance and comprehension, a competence partially unique to it, largely shared and predictable in terms of its social origins and experience, and never identical with that of a dictionary, a grammar, or an ideally fluent speaker-listener.

With regard to disadvantaged children, the goal of an integrated theory of sociolinguistic description would be to guide accounts of the range of settings, function, and means, and their interrelationships, acquired by the children. Of these the school setting would be one, but not the only one; and major purpose would be to place the school setting in the context of other settings, so as to delineate the true communicative abilities of the children and to show the extent to which the performance in school settings was not a direct disclosure of their abilities, but a product of interference between the system that they bring and the system that confronts them; or a setting simply largely irrelevant to the direction their abilities and competence otherwise took. In part the problem is one of conflict of values and of perceived interests. Indeed, since the beginnings of stratified society and the use of writing, it has been characteristic of much of mankind that a desired or required linguistic competence has stood over against men, as an alien thing, imposed by a power not within their control. Even in the
simplest case, of course, sociolinguistic competence is achieved along specific lines, not merely released. In the complex circumstances of our own society it is hard to see how children can be expected to master a second system, complementing or replacing their own, if the process is not perceived as intrinsically relevant, or enjoyable (preferably both).

Much more needs to be said and done with regard to the conceptual content of sociolinguistic description, regarding interference, competence, etc. In other writings I have outlined schemes for "the ethnography of speaking", or "ethnography of communication", together with some notes and queries about children's acquisition of language; I shall not go further into that here. Rather let me sketch what might illustrate a practical framework for the use of a sociolinguistic description.

As Dr. Gordon reminded us at the earlier conference, it is hardly our task to say what the goals of the disadvantaged should be. If one prime consideration is to be chosen, probably it is jobs. From this standpoint, a rough scale can be defined in terms of the concepts of repertoire, domain, and routine. For each one asks how many and what kind, moving from the minimal to the maximal requirements for use of a more-or-less standard set of speech habits. For purposes of the scale, the single concept of fluent speaker is replaced by a rough division into fixed, flexible, and facile use.

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The minimal competence (lowest rung of fixed) could be characterized as use of a single routine in a single domain without need to switch within one's repertoire. Additional considerations might be that the channel be writing, thus permitting revision and correction somewhat at leisure, and that the demands on the one part of the repertoire be of the transactional or restricted code sort. Jobs of this sort are probably today mostly taken care of by form letters, or, in the vocal sphere, by recordings, to be sure. Perhaps the need only to receive, not to send, might be added to define the minimal rung.

The maximal competence (facile) could be characterized as use of multiple routines in many domains with facility at switching between parts of one's verbal repertoire, both sending and receiving.

Medial competence (flexible) could be defined in terms of the empirical situation, if some intermediate set of needs and abilities with regard to routines, domains, and repertoires can usefully be recognized.

Some such scale could be used to conceptualize and analyse the requirements of situations, such as types of jobs; the capacities of persons; the aims and levels of a program of training.
What sorts of interference may occur, what sorts of learning and change may be required, cannot of course be postulated in advance. Sometimes the question will be one simply of dialect markers, of the social rather than the referential or expressive information called for in the situation. (My own quite unrealistic preference would be to leave dialect alone, insofar as markers are all that is involved). Sometimes the question will be one of added skills in the use of syntax or narrative, and so on.

(Ultimately I should hope that concern for language use might get to the aesthetic and clarifying and truth-telling roles it plays in our lives, and that we might someday have a conference on the ways in which middle-class and verbally fluent individuals are disadvantaged. A critique of the use of language among the disadvantaged would indeed not be hard to mount, and there are even some who argue that a withdrawal from the ordinary uses of language altogether is under way in rebellion. But no government is about to spend much money to get the government to use language in a more satisfying, beautiful, clarifying, or truthful way.)

Let me conclude by summarizing the way in which concern with language use among disadvantaged children fits into the present stage of linguistic theory.

First, it is of course not mandatory that the term "linguistic theory" be used in one particular way. If one wishes to reserve "linguistic theory" for the narrower sort of competence, then "sociolinguistic theory" will do for the broader sort of competence. That is essential is that concerns of the nature of language and its use not be preempted in the name of "linguistic theory" by a narrow view. The understanding of language use involves attention not only to participants, settings, and other extra-linguistic factors, but also attention to purely linguistic phenomena, and the discovery and statement of new features, organization, and relationships in the data of language itself, when viewed from the more general perspective of social relationships. That is essential is that conceptions of speakers, listeners, and competence, take into account as quite normal in the world the situations of diversity of codes; see the child as acquiring and indeed, achieving, narrowly linguistic and broadly sociolinguistic competence together.

In this regard a sociolinguistic theory is not a departure from past linguistic insight. The narrow theory earlier discussed has known how to reculer pour mieux sauter. It has found in von Humboldt, and more recently in Jespersen and Sapir, instances of fresh insight into the structuring of language which it wishes to renew and to capitalize. Sociolinguistic theory is in an analogous position. In von Humboldt it finds not only a generative conception of rules, but also a concern with the individual worlds created in and through language; a concern not only with universals, but concern also with the particulars in which they are embodied; a concern with the infinite capacity of man that implies also the determinate form such capacity requires for realization in each person; an understanding of human nature, the human essence, as not so much a state of being, as in each case a unique existential achievement, in Jespersen it finds a grammarian who devoted himself to universals, productivity, and to understanding mankind, nation and individual from a linguistic point of view. In Sapir it finds a pioneer of structuralism, the autonomy of linguistic form, and proper insight into phonology, who also urged that:

"It is peculiarly important that linguists, who are often accused, and accused justly, of failure to look beyond the pretty patterns of their subject matter, should become aware of what their science may mean for the interpretation of human
conduct in general. "Whether they like it or not, they must become increasingly concerned with the many anthropological, sociological, and psychological problems which invade the field of language."

There is under way now, I think, a shift in emphasis in linguistics, one that is partially completed, and which the work with disadvantaged children may help to complete. The emphases can be shown in terms of two dimensions: one distinguishes language structure and function, and one distinguishes the study of a single language or community from comparative perspective.

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The earlier set of emphases can be said to have been (from left to right, and first top, then bottom), with regard to the structure of a single language, find the invariance; with regard to structures comparatively, find diversity; with regard to functional aspects in a single case, assume diversity, and the variation of parole (and assign anything that interferes with the invariance and system of structure to this category); with regard to functions comparatively, assume invariance (the functions of language are universal; all languages are functionally equal).

The emerging set of emphases can be said to be, with regard to the structure of a single language, find the variation with regard to structures comparatively, find the invariance. The relationships of emphasis in other words are reversed. Both these emphases are well established now in the new interest in social dialect, linguistic varieties, styles and levels, on the one hand, and the different approaches to universals of language on the other. The rest of the new set of emphases, reversing the former set, is only coming to be realized: with regard to functional aspects of a single case, find the invariance (the sociolinguistic system); with regard to functions comparatively, find the diversity (take the functions of language, or of a language, as problematic for any given group).

It is precisely with regard to these last two sectors that the problems of the study of disadvantaged children and the needs of theory converge. The understanding of sociolinguistic systems as a basis for handling interference between them, and the nonidentity of the functioning of language in different social groups are problems common to them both. Perhaps this common interest can help to end the division between linguistic theory and the concrete, existential human world, the world of actual human relationships, that has dogged the study of language for so long.
FOOTNOTES


2. A continuity with more recent American structural theory is seen in the concern with what linguistics is taken not to include, as reflected in attitudes toward words that tag the external. In the heyday of Bloomfieldian linguistics "meaning" and "mentalism" were dirty words; today, for some, "context" is.


6. Cf. Labov on the priority of subjective evaluation over performance in social dialect and process of change, pp. 84-85.

7. Cazden, op.


13. Steven Pols, American Anthropologist 62:


15. Labov, op. 96-99, discusses opposing value systems in the New York speech community.

17. Labeau's sixth level of the acquisition of spoken English, full range, would be maximal with respect to switching within repertoire and among domains, but perhaps admitting degrees with respect to routines. His fifth level, consistent standard, seems to define a medial area of some flexibility short of complete facility.


I am not sure what this means, except that the irrational, the absurd, and the emotional are going to play a greater part in our politics. Ideologies who are puppets of rigidity and cold reason, however, will be the last to figure out these divisions in the society. Feel rather than theory...

—Jack Newfield

The point in sabotage without sacrifice is to figure out things to do which are real and radical but which shouldn't send us to solitary confinement because we're the nice people and should be out of doors and enjoying ourselves.

—E llen Maslow

THE HIPPIES AS A FORCE FOR CHANGE:

SOME SPECULATIONS

AND PROVOCATIONS

Daniel Schechter
19 College Cross
London, England

May 17, 1966
We are the monkees and we just monkee around.
We're too busy singing to put anybody down.
—Pop Song

Do not practice what you preach; preach what you practice.
—Paul Goodman

What do you make of them?

This is the question which a sometimes amused and frequently upset society asks itself about the surfacing of a new bohemian phenomenon, known popularly as the hippie culture. It's the newest, most grandiose, perhaps bizarre scene to come along in some time. It has its own music, way of dress, style of life, and code of values. There are hippie magazines, underground newspapers, artifacts of all shapes and sizes, and a common language. These descriptions are plentiful—in fact, one writer has suggested that the hippie culture has already made the transition from scene to scene—and no self-respecting mass circulation magazine has not published a full-color spread on the exotic, drug-using, love-proclaiming, drop-outs, who have rejected traditional political protests along with the rest of the society.

But the important questions are not the ones raised in the popular press; they are descriptive or pathological, while the ones which must be raised are political. What does this phenomenon mean in terms of society? Is the hippie thing just an irrelevant lark for individuals, or does it have some meaning for those seeking social changes and basic reforms in the system?

To speak of the "hippies" is to suggest and impose a collective image on people who are, after all, individuals, many of whom would reject the
identification. In the popular press, "hippies" have replaced the "beatnik" as an amusement on a larger and possibly more dangerous scale. As has been noted, they have not dropped out of the society in physical terms because the geographical location of their communities means that, willingly or not, they are still in the society if not of it. Their growth—and the form they have used for it—may be due to the attention of an existing and expanding network of cultural transmission, principally the mass communications media. For all sorts of reasons rooted in society, the young tune in, and are turned on, by those transmissions.

This tentative consideration of the "hippies" as a force for internal change within America only extrapolates and projects certain tendencies and possibilities. We by no means suggest that the hippies can or will be the only or the primary force for change. This perspective shares the view set forth by Gabriel Kolko that, "Rational hopes for the Twentieth Century now rest outside America and in spite of it, and the least the American political and intellectual resistance may do is to encourage the efforts of those elsewhere who have more options than we do to build a new democracy and society." 1 Thus, a perspective for changing the United States must include the prospect of liberation movements throughout the Third World challenging and resisting American hegemony and aggression.

Within the United States, the left by itself has little chance of transforming the society. It is small and confronts a society with enormous resources for absorbing and using dissent, requiring and then institutionalizing conflict, and enclosing and integrating demands for qualitative changes. In this situation, it is necessary to re-examine the stresses and tensions within the social structure as well as the strategies for change with some political imagination.

Faced with the spectacle of what appears to be an often confusing, absurd, and irrational phenomenon, and one which, to boot, rejects them, the political radical confronts the anti-political hippie with a mixture of ridicule, admira-
tion, disgust, and even contempt. While such a response may be understandable, it avoids speculating on a possible creative function that hippies may perform; a function which may also prove valuable to the politically serious activists. With the hope of being provocative rather than definitive, this is an attempt to do that.

I

There is no question but that the hippies—and the society which seems to spawn the disaffection they feed on—is here to stay, at least for a little while. LIFE's self-admitted "square" observer warns: "I believe the hour of the hippie—which could well enlist enormous numbers of young people from all over the country—is coming and the most sensible thing we can do is to take a good look at this bizarre new scene." 2

On the left, there seems to be a great deal of ambivalence about the hippies. They are often dismissed in less than serious terms as parasites, politically naive, and even dangerous because of the illusions of freedom they animate. "If more and more youngsters begin to share the hippie political posture of unrelenting quietism," argue the new leftists of Ramparts, "the future of activist serious politics is bound to be affected." 3 More directly and, to be sure, for reasons of his own, Senator Robert Kennedy recently bemoaned the fact that "so many of our young people have turned from engagement to disengagement, from politics to passivity, from hope to nihilism, from S.D.S. to LSD."

But the other side of revulsion is attraction, even fascination. There is something about the hippie style, its peaceful and intensely honest nature, which strikes a resonant chord among both those who are disaffected and many who
claim not to be. Again, LIFE's Loudon Wainwright confessed: "The hippies jarred me, but there is much about them that is instinctively appealing. Those I met use the word 'love' a lot and dispense it freely among themselves and outsiders who don't bug them. It's a weapon of astonishing power." In a similar vein, Ramparts commented that the "hippies have shown that it can be pleasant to drop out. . . . Hippies have a clear vision of the utopian community... (which)... necessarily embodies a radical political philosophy: communal life, drastic restriction of private property, rejection of violence, creativity before consumption, freedom before authority, de-emphasis of government and traditional forms of leadership." Moreover, although most hippies do not engage in traditional forms of confrontation protest politics, most are consciously and quite openly opposed to established society. They are plainly outside the consensus of values.

There is every reason to expect the hippie culture will grow. Not only do they intersect with 'normal' adolescent rebellion, but they claim to embody an alternative way of living. Expanding hippie communities, with their own shops, cultural life, fledgling institutions, have grown in both New York and San Francisco, with smaller centres in at least twenty other cities. The alienating features of American society—well documented by social critics in almost every area of life—do not seem to be destined for quick transformation. The school systems, the Vietnam War, the institutionalised dishonesty, euphemistically called the 'credibility gap,' will all continue to spawn disaffection and drop-outs. All of this can take on far more sizable proportions as more and more youngsters mature. By 1970, over one half of the population will be under the age of 25. This is bound to have some impact on political culture.

Yet the hippie movement cannot be assessed simply by microscopic examination of its components, nor by taking it at its own word. To do so is to
possibly miss its basic significance or lack of it. A good deal of criticism on the left has focussed on exhibitionism, the massive exploitation of the 'hippie market' by entrepreneurs, its obsession with facades, its political innocence, and non-ideological, even utopian, moralism. "They are just a carbuncle on the affluent ass of this country," a friend told me. "Their dropping out is just a sign of despair that has not broken in any real way with the society. They depend on the culture for their own self-definition, and they couldn't exist without the mirrors the society provides. No, they just want to look at themselves." Yet, even if this indictment is essentially correct, the hippies may, in a way they do not quite intend, expose certain basic weaknesses in the social fabric which, in turn, may make them a potent force for change.

It is fashionable among observers of the contemporary scene to see the hippies as generational rebels, who will soon settle down or be seduced by the affluence and comforts of their society. Since most of them are middle-class in origins and orientation, some feel that they too will be absorbed if not soon ignored. Surprisingly, the conservative English historian, D. V. Brogan, recently considered this possibility but found another just as probable: "But the protest may have other meanings too, and perhaps something good and new and really rebellious will come out of the ostentatious defiance of the American way of life which is more than an attraction for the San Francisco tourist trade." 

It is not surprising that the traditional left and even new left groups find the hippies disconcerting because they have rejected their method. That is, they have forewarned active militant action on behalf of change. They have chosen not to get involved. But perhaps the way to fight the system is not to confront it on its own terms? This hypothesis underlies much of the hippie outlook. At least one peace activist has already complained that "our tactics for changing America are dictated by the terms the culture offers us for changing it." Moreover, he observes that peace demonstrations have often been followed...
escalations, which testify not simply to the peace movement's impotence, but suggest a more complex societal need. It may be that the society needs the appearances of dissent, the visibility of protesters, to give credence to its claims at being a free society. "You are fighting here," a general recently told American troops in Vietnam, "to defend the right of those peace creeps to freely demonstrate." The existence of dissent—however impotent and shaped in the image of the society it nominally rejects—it may be, might be a necessary presupposition so that the society might continue its own sophisticated forms of social control. This feeling has led to the articulation of a new maxim, popular among some hippies: "Fighting the system only reproduces the system."

II

Most of the current political movements to change society, no matter how conflict-oriented, have framed their objectives and developed their strategies within the framework of enlightenment ideas about men and human progress. That tradition sees progress as inevitable because men are capable of positively exerting control over their social and material environments. Within this framework, a body of ideas developed which suggested that human freedom is solely the result of man's rationality. Even Marxism itself, grew out of and reflects this tradition. It argues that man can make his own history, but not always under conditions of his own choosing. It is a theory of social change which centres on the expectation of rational revolutionary actions by an exploited class, which, at the proper historically determined moment, would transform society.

The Marxian model of social change through class conflict has obsessed, divided, and excited generations of scholars, revolutionaries, reformers, and politicians of every persuasion. It has principally shaped the style and strategy of revolutionary and reform politics. Yet, at bottom, the Marxian model
draws on the rational traditions of the enlightenment and mirrors many of its positivist assumptions. It emphasises reason and projects the eventual liberation of man within an inexorable historical process. Most of the debates about its validity, as well as the attempts to organise on the basis of its analysis, have likewise been enclosed within this tradition.

No sooner had Marx and his generation committed their thoughts to paper, than did a new generation arise which sought to expand, complete, and go beyond the easy assurances of rationalistic ideologies—be they democratic, liberal, or socialist. There was the rise of psychology—the penetration into the nature of the individual and collective unconscious—by Freud and his followers. There was the work of the political sociologists—Weber, Sorel, Mosca, Michels, Pareto, and now the contemporaries—who have more precisely defined the process of politics and explained more facets of political behaviour. At the end of the Nineteenth Century, as H. Stuart Hughes records in Consciousness and Society, there emerged a fundamental irrationalist challenge, which has made an enduring contribution to Twentieth Century ideas. "...Obsessed, almost intoxicated with the rediscovery of the non-logical, the uncivilized, the inexplicable," its thinkers were "profoundly interested in the problem of irrational motivation in human conduct." (p. 35)

They made an important impact on the consciousness of their age and raised problems to which contemporary writers, philosophers, and particularly, the hippies are yet trying to give meaning.

It may be that it has been an overemphasis on reason which has resulted in man's present alienation from himself, from others, and from nature. Certainly, this is a principal conclusion one draws from the literature and social thought which has had the greatest influence on the hippie reaction to society. Their cultural tastes lean heavily towards writers like Norman Mailer and Jean Genet; towards existentialist philosophies; towards the Theatre and Cinema of the Absurd; towards the drug-crazed visions of a William Burroughs; and to the angry and, some would say, alienated sounds of jazz and folk rock. Naive materialism is no.
rationalistic and limited tradition of western thought. Rather than live with hopes for a better future, hippies seek to live a better present. Their behaviour, clearly non-rational in the conventional view of the west, is an attempt to reject and replace key western values with a new radical and humanistic philosophy.

Another peculiar trait in the west has been a zeal to dominate history, a zeal from which hippies seek to fundamentally divorce themselves. "Only in the cultural and spiritual origins of Western Civilization is there a command to exploit the fruits of the earth," argue Stillman and Pfaff, "and to shape the course of human affairs: to bring about a consumption—an immortality—which involves history itself... (and philosophies of withdrawal or of passivity... have constantly been regarded as lapses from the central western tradition)." For that tradition of domination has also spawned ideologies which rationalise drives for power unequalled in human history; drives which have resulted as well in unique crimes of violence and destruction. It is not without significance then that the hippies turn not to Marxism and western philosophies for inspiration, but instead, however inauthentically to the east—to Zen, Buddhist prophecy, Indian mantras, Hindu swamis, and various nuances of oriental religion. In part, this is why many hippies want nothing to do with the corrupting and perverting force of power in any form. This may be another factor why much of the "hippie culture" is incomprehensible on its own terms in the west.

A great deal has changed since Marx wrote in the Nineteenth Century. There is an extensive literature which discusses and seeks to explain these changes in society. That literature also attempts to account for what many feel has been the encapsulation of the proletariat in highly industrialised societies, as well as to analyse the new capitalist modes of mixed economy, the changing social realities, etc. These changes are meaningful and complex but need not be discussed here. The point is that as the society changes, so must the methods of changing it. The search for agencies of change can not be limited by rigid and limited conceptions of change.

The thrust of the new left groups in the United States and Britain is to define
new and relevant strategies of change.

Those new strategies for change are just emerging. They are often experimental, innovative, and lack the ideological 'certainty' which always characterised old left attempts to organise trade unions among the working class. In many cases, those strategies have taken the form of an activist confrontation politics—that is, the mobilisation of people to protest certain injustices or organise and press for specific reforms. In many cases, those movements also appeal to the 'conscience' of the majority, to its guilt, and sense of justice. Although they have elevated new issues into the public arena, they have not achieved much substantive change. This is no doubt in large part due to how conditioned and insulated that 'conscience' is by institutional loyalties. In the United States, for example, the civil rights movement has not ended discrimination, much less closed the widening gaps of racial inequality. The peace movement, large and vital as it is, has hardly achieved its objectives. In fact, its largest protests against the Vietnam War have been followed by even larger escalations of the conflict. On the other hand, the American labour movement, although organised through a violent conflict process, has institutionalised many gains, but can hardly be considered an agency for basic change.

There are many explanations for this. There are the analyses which detail the processes which limit trade-union actions and document the institutionalised nature of racism, the nature of the permanent arms economy, the scope of unrepresentative institutions, as well as manipulative and antidemocratic political forms, etc. There are histories of specific movements which record the processes of absorption, co-optation, compromise, and the partial incorporation of demands. The sociological literature is also now replete with studies which indicate that conflict is necessary for the society's stability.
"Cleavage, where it is legitimate—contributes to the integration of societies," writes S. M. Lipset. Trade unions provide a good example. Lipset argues that instead of seeking to change the system, "Trade unions help to integrate their members into the larger body politic and give a basis for loyalty to the system.... Consensus on the norms of tolerance which a society or organization accepts has often developed only as a result of basic conflict and requires the continuation of conflict to sustain it. Thus, the very conflict which radicals hope will topple a particular system may in fact often only help stabilize it. American society is also studded with the visible 'successes' of many people who set out to create change and ended up being changed. Radicals call that "selling out."

In his grim indictment of advanced industrial societies, Herbert Marcuse argues that: "The struggle for the solution has outgrown the traditional forms!"

The totalitarian tendencies of the one-dimensional society render the traditional ways and means of protest ineffective—perhaps even dangerous because they preserve the illusion of popular sovereignty. This illusion contains some truth: "the people" previously the ferment of social change, have moved up to become the "new ferment" of social cohesion.

After detailing what he identifies as new and effective methods of domination characteristic of advanced industrial orders, of the ways they control, anesthetize, and repress forces for change and negation—Marcuse ends on a note of despair. The only truly revolutionary demand in this period, he argues, is one for the end of domination,—"the absolute refusal." Interestingly, the groups he thinks might be the only ones capable of such a demand are those which exist outside the money economy, Negroes and the lumpen-poor. He pins his only hope on these the non-traditional actions of "outsiders." Yet even Marcuse was unable to envision a project the emergence of the hippies as a 'total oppositional' tendency—as a form of negativity. It may be, however, that it is not only man and society that has become one-dimensional: radical conceptions of change may also be so afflicted. Put simply, there are many stresses and tensions in a society which create change and disequilibriums in a social system. Movements bent on change are just one, and often, despite their self-image, the least decisive of such forces. Societies have other
contradictions and forces working within them for change. These may be demographic, technological, political, religious, and ideological. Change takes place on all these levels, often at once with each variable affecting one another. Successful movements are usually the ones which prove able to exploit opportunities provided by these stresses. In an increasingly complex and changing society, the new type of effective movement may bear no resemblance to the old.

III

In this context, it may be that the hippies are America's "great cultural revolution," its force for a new consciousness. This revolution, fed by the disaffection and alienation of the young middle class, has already adopted a total oppositional stance. The depth of its rupture with the society and traditional political forms—of the left—is almost complete. Because of their estrangement from politics, the hippies may in fact be already following the advice of the psychologist Norman O. Brown: "The next generation needs to be told that the real fight is not the political fight but to put an end to politics...From politics to Life. And therefore revolution as creation; resurrection; renaissance instead of progress...Revolution is not a slate wiped clean but a revolving cycle."8

And lest it be objected that such advice is otherworldly and utopian, we have Professor Marcuse's indictment of Marxism as "not utopian enough," as well as his picture of the frightening ability of society to deny the "subversive imagination"—its ability to prevent even the conceptualization of qualitative alternatives to the present system.

In that case, it may be that Dr. Shane Mage is correct to assert that "Today we can be relevant only if we are utopian." Anything less is a posture which can be quickly absorbed by the society. Anything less inevitably gets reduced to realpolitik-type strategies which result in the co-optation of radicals, the castration of radical programs, and the betrayal of revolutions. Such dangers...
may even be built into the very process of politics. Suggest Stillman and Pfaff:

In an important sense, politics are a futile enterprise. They are not a making of something, a construction of a real thing that may be measured and completed and left to endure. Of all the ways in which men and nations seek to build that which outlasts themselves, politics is the least secure. And in politics, the most remarkable achievements are often the unplanned, unmapped ones. The great programmatic solutions often prove the most disastrous failures. And those which combine utopian goals with the resources of State power produce calamity.

Thus a stance which is, in a real sense, anti-politics may be the one the political structure is best able to deal with. It may be the one which is the most demoralising and will find the most resonance from a variety of social groups. Thus it is the idea of the free hippie which, as it is fed through the communications media, is exciting and animating expressions of the young and may cause the most radical forms of disaffection. An anti-politics consciousness—or at least one which fundamentally rejects the manipulative, bureaucratic and life-destroying political systems—can be a powerful force for internal decay.

Paradoxically, what is considered the 'utopian' position may in fact even be the realistic one. It may be that continued commitment to a radical politics—with or without a specific socialist component—is that has become utopian. "Their optimism as to the possibility of making major social or political changes may be well justified," contends activist-tank Kofsky. "It seems to me that all our activity is nothing more than the equivalent of Pascal's wager. We gamble—and fervently hope that our efforts will be effective; but we do not know. Small wonder, then, if occasionally and for a brief period, we succumb to despair." 10

In their conclusion to Monopoly Capital, Baran and Sweezy, both longtime socialists, curiously believe that continuing the 'process of decay' will be more effective than revolutionary action in the system is to be overthrown:

If we confine attention to the inner dynamics of advanced monopoly capitalism, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the prospect of effective revolutionary action to overthrow the system is slim. Viewed
from this angle, the more likely course of development would seem to be a continuation of decay, with the contradiction between the compulsions of the system and the elementary needs of human nature becoming even more insupportable. The logical outcome would be the spread of increasingly severe psychic disorders leading to the impairment and eventual breakdown of the system's ability to function even on its own terms. (p. 366)

While it is true that Baran and Sweezy are more optimistic about the possibilities of a world revolution against American hegemony, and are careful to consider this question of change within a global context, it may be that the best and most realistic strategy for internal change is to encourage such a systemic breakdown. If one considers the hippie phenomenon, itself a 'psychic disorder,' then it may indeed be a potent force for "the continuation of decay."

By seeking to drop out and order their lives differently, the hippies reject the legitimacy of the society. Such a posture might have serious consequences for the society's continued stability. After all, the established political institutions expect and demand to be taken seriously! Dissenters are required to play by the rules—not to invent their own. With the breakdown of such respect, with the spreading of poisonous cynicism, a real rupture between a system and its citizens is apt to develop. Interestingly, Arthur Schlesinger, the historian and former presidential advisor as well as a key ideologist of the new corporatist state, finds this trend quite threatening:

Nothing is more disturbing than the defection of so many of the young from the purposes and institutions of a society which they claim to find stifling and absurd and which unquestionably gives them a profound feeling of impotence and meaninglessness. While much of the rhetoric of contemporary youth seems to me...overwrought and even hysterical, those over 30 would be foolish not to see in it the symptoms of deep and alarming disquietude. The hippies have expanded the notion of the 'credibility gap' from the arena of presidential politics to the entire society. Such a posture could be an important element in provoking what sociologists call a "crisis in legitimacy." Such crises, according to S. M. Lipset, "are primarily a recent historical phenomenon following the rise of sharp cleavages among groups which are able because of mass communications to organize around different values than those previously
considered to be the only acceptable ones." 13

A crisis in legitimacy is a crisis of change. It is clearly a phenomenon which is related to changes brought about by other forces in the society. Yet such a crisis may be aided by a continued assault on the icons and values which for so long have served as elements of integration and cohesion. Many of the new elements of our culture cannot be assimilated into the mainstream. Its strength lies in its new and intense efforts at liberating consciousness.

The first step towards changing society is understanding how it works; one will not strive for freedom until one is convinced that either slavery is unbearable or that freedom is attainable. As people become aware of the different levels of domination that exist—political, economic, and even socio-psychological—they have taken a step towards a new consciousness. That new consciousness can be a product of education, some knowledge of struggles, experimentation with drugs, as well as an outgrowth of the self-righteousness, intelligence, and disgusted reaction to adult cynicism that characterises both the political and non-political subcultures. They sense the inauthenticity of their society and resent its multiple dehumanizing features. "I have seen mature graduate students crack up in giggles of anxiety listening to the Secretary of State expound our foreign policy," reports social critic Paul Goodman. "When I questioned them afterward, some said that he was like a mechanical man, others that he was demented." Such an observation suggests that the consciousness which ridicules existing institutions, and those that fill the roles within them, will not easily be absorbed.

Furthermore, in being dysfunctional for the social system, the attitude of contempt for the "legitimate" authorities could prove quite functional for radical movements out to overthrow them. As Raymond Williams explains in Culture and Society, "...In our own society, because of the way we produce, there is so large a degree of necessary common interest and mutual effort than any widespread withdrawal of interest, any general mood of disbelief can quite certainly be disastrous." (p.304)
At a recent socialist scholars' conference, one professor went so far as to suggest that the chemical LSD could easily stand for "Logical Socialist Drug." In his paper Dr. Shane Mage provided Marxian rationalizations for the program process advocated by Dr. Timothy Leary. That process has been summarized into the dialectical trinity, "Turn In, Turn On, Drop Out," "means not a verbal recognition that people will live in a paradise some decades hence, but the living realization that liberation, the creation of a fully alienated existence, is a process that every one of us can begin right here and now." Mage went on to "envisage this prospect":

More and more young men and women will achieve inner liberation and then simply drop out. A new utopianism, in short. This process is already met by police repression, but that is merely a futile attempt to resist the irresistible. Our dying capitalism has not the shadow of an idea, a vocation, a role to divert the utopian flow. Centers of expanded consciousness will arise and multiply. They will take no political action to change society from within, and for this very reason the overwhelming power radiating from them will, I predict, work a very remarkable alchemy....

(The socialists at the conference were not 'turned on' by this optimistic prognosis.)

IV

The new hippie cultures will continue to be spontaneous, unplanned, undisciplined, and operate outside the very legitimizing norms of a centralized industrial society: the acquisitive, utilitarian, self-discipline-oriented socialization patterns, the elitist-bureaucratic patterns of organization, etc. While their intent may not be to provoke a crisis of legitimacy, the unintended consequences of their behaviour may be a prod in that direction.

On the other hand, if the phenomenon does not grow significantly, the hippies may lose their independence and find themselves absorbed quite easily. The hippies are already a healthy market for entrepreneurs of every type. This same danger faces the younger political radicals. Fears Jack Newfield:

To be a radical in America today is like trying to punch your way out of a cage made of marshmallow. Every thrust at the jugular vein draws not blood but sweet success; every hack at the roots draws not retaliation but fame and affluence.... Already there are signs that the
middle class enjoys being flogged by the new radicals while ignoring their criticisms....

Another radical journalist, Andrew Kopkind, sees the hippies as just 'another pawn in their game': "In a much more subtle way, the whole society—automated, repressive, post-industrial—uses the hippies as an escape model, a source of alternatives to the constellation of relationships which seem so extraordinarily futile and depressing... But the system needs the rebel. If he did not exist, he would be invented, which in a sense he is—and all the better, because he can then be controlled." This danger is real, but this fear may be premature.

However used and certainly abused the hippies are, they are having an impact on the tone and style of radical politics among the young. SDS, for example, recently proclaimed a program of moving "From Protest to Resistance." Its language is now charged with a rhetoric and intensity that confuses and intimidates traditional socialists, and most adults. During the 1966 student strike at Berkeley, an alliance between the hippies and the activists lent a new euphoric note to student protest. The Strike Committee adopted the Yellow Submarine as one of the symbols of the movement—a symbol that represents:

The growing fusion of head, heart, and hands; of hippies and activists, a celebration of our joy and confidence in our ability to care for and take care of ourselves and what is ours; and we adopt this unexpected symbol of our trust in our future and our longing for a place free for all to live in. Please post; especially where prohibited. We love you.

This is a new note. Throughout the strike, there was the recognition that...

- the administration cannot be forced to build for us... that task is ours...
- a community which has seemed submerged has revealed itself again... What is needed now is the building of institutions fit for this community's expression and growth." Added to the traditional direct action methodol-ogy, were gestures calculated to "Love them crazy, blow their minds, groove." 18

The hippie-activist alliance was a short-lived phenomenon. Most of the hippies have since withdrawn into "their thing" as have the activists settled back into theirs. It is still arguable which community will prove to be the most potent either force for change—if any. To be sure, each is a minority with influences dispr-
portionate to its numbers. Each is engaged in a form of guerilla warfare against the society. The politicos, alternating between periods of despair and commitment, continue their political assaults. The new hippies confront the culture and traditional values and norms. Together, in their own ways, the assaults of the young are prompting a reaction. "...The disturbing aspects of this undeclared war," fears the Sunday Times' Harry Brandon, "is the growing danger of important basic American values being undermined and American politics being distorted." 19

V

The process of expanding consciousness, of undermining and changing values, of encouraging disaffiliation, is having an impact on the cultural and political tone of the society. It is threatening to the powerful and disturbing to the complacent. It does have the effect of polluting respect for institutions which require tacit, if not active, assent. At the same time, that process poses an alternative style of living, more honest codes of values, and the germ of an idea about the way society might be organised.

By themselves, the hippies may do nothing more than weaken the traditional 'moral fibre' of the nation. Their "total assault" on the society, their eating away at the fabric of the values which underlie the substructure of legitimacy and symbolism that make for a society's cohesion will work their way back, into the through the media transmission belts.
mainstream, via-the-media. Like a cancer, it could eat away at vital organisms and thus contribute to the decay of the body politic.

The hippies are a diverse lot. They cannot be taken as a cohesive force. Among their ranks one finds serious artists, writers, poets, ex-politicos, as well as fans of pop-music, "teeny boppers," the non-talented, the hangers-on. They are also an international happening, confined and spawned in advanced industrialised
society. The counterparts to the San Francisco and New York hippies are to be found throughout western Europe, in Japan, and elsewhere. In England, an observer reports: "that great variegated mass too glibly dubbed 'the underground' snarls and rattles itself into the public consciousness."

It is a feeling of being at that point in history when irresistible forces deliberately neglected suddenly gather themselves for a push, and one is surprised because its momentum has always been tacitly sensed though not publicly acknowledged. 20,

And in America, hippie guru Allen Ginsberg invokes the hope and the spirit of poet Walt Whitman:

In my opinion it is by a fervent accepted development of comradeship, the beautiful and sane affection of man for man, latent in all the young fellows, north and south, east and west—it is by this, I say, and by what goes directly and indirectly along with it, that the United States in the future (I cannot too often repeat) are to be effectually welded together, intercalated, annealed into a living union." 21

That was Walt Whitman, over ninety years ago.

Another poet in Ireland, Yeats, could cry:

The preposterous pig of a world, its farrow that so solid seem
Must vanish on an instant did the mind but change its theme.

It may be poetic phantasy to expect that the American mind can be changed, but it may be pure phantasy as well to expect that change can come without "the change of theme," the new consciousness. This, then, is the function, the need—and the hope.

VI

Just as social movements are not the only force for political changes, hippie activity is not the only force for either a new societal consciousness or continued decadence and breakdown. Attempts by hippies to extol the virtues of cultural withdrawal will continue. Artists, writers, poets, film-makers and musicians
will go on: beseeching, preaching, and communicating. An international underground press syndicate (UPS) already services thirty publications, which are read by more than 500,000 people. In addition, there is a host of small magazines, theatre groups, new film-makers, etc. These efforts are important, but they may not be the decisive factor in expanding the "hippie underground."

Other forces for increasing and enforcing disaffiliation and, eventually, a new consciousness, are the increasing popularity of drugs, the new technology of mass media, and the awesome potential of cybernetics. Since these developments are still in process, one is easily apt to underestimate—but perhaps also to overestimate—the magnitude of these changes and influences. Yet a look at each suggests ways to examine specific indicators of what might prove to be increased decadence or positive transformations.

Drugs: A key agent in expanding consciousness among hippies and increasingly throughout the youth subcultures, have a variety of drugs. Their use has mushroomed, and their control is widely recognized as a major social problem by constituted authorities. Millions of young people smoke pot, use LSD, and experiment with other drugs. Only a small proportion of drug users are addicts, while most find this pursuit pleasurable and important for personal growth and expansion. The illegal status of drug use, accompanied by police repression, tends to increase the bonds of solidarity and cohesion among the youth cultures, which are increasingly considered centres of deviant behaviour. Curiously, the more the society which youth mistrusts counsels and legislates against drug use, the more the use spreads. It is no wonder that parents and authorities are everywhere alarmed by the spread of a phenomenon they do not understand and cannot contain. The recent outcry by women in Britain about the widely admired pop singers who spread the cult of drug-taking was typical. "Debunk these pop stars who have our children shrieking for them," one lady demanded. "Do something to humiliate them and save our young
it is—yet little, if anything can be done.

Electronic Media: The very media which social critics fear are instruments of domination may also be forces for a new consciousness and awareness. Whole new value systems may be nurtured by autonomous developments in communications technology. Principal advocate of this view is Marshall McLuhan, whose work suggests that "societies are shaped more by the nature of the media by which men communicate than by the content of the communication." Widely read and respected among hippies, McLuhan argues that: "All media work us over completely. They are so pervasive in their personal, political, economic, aesthetic, and social consequences that they leave no part of us untouched, unaffected, unaltered." McLuhan and his followers offer detailed descriptions of how the media shape and nurture consciousness. Most relevant for this discussion is McLuhan's view that today's young people, as the first generation to be reared in an electronic culture, instinctively understand the new environment, reject the rational—visual—past, and thus live "mythically and in depth."

Cybernation: Although by all accounts we are just on its threshold, the cybernation revolution poses immense prospects for social change.

Automation is clearly causing changes and conflicts within capitalism. It promises to both do away with the traditional working class entirely, and could conceivably rupture the traditional link between jobs and income. Advanced welfare measures as well as a guaranteed annual income could insure the elimination of extreme forms of poverty. Work as it has been traditionally known could become obsolete within highly developed countries. In this new context, the hippie alternative—which already rejects the society's materialistic achievement orientation—may have more practical relevance. With increasing economic security, the lumpen—poor, who live by non-middle—class values, could give new form and energy to expanded resistance movements.

The needs of the new technology itself create demands for a new class of professional, technical, white—collar and highly skilled manpower. These brain workers
are drawn principally from the middle class, and trained increasingly in massive new multi-universities or "knowledge factories." Yet the de-personalised nature of those institutions—their necessary bureaucratisation and status quo orientation—inevitably create reactions as well as bonds of generational solidarity. Student rebellions on the "Berkeley model" have become more commonplace and serve as action schools for a new oppositional consciousness. Reform efforts at universities like these have not been enormously successful, and thus the desire to drop out into hippie communities is fueled by the hypocritical nature of institutional responses.

Within the larger society, the new technology—especially the advent of the computer—is producing subtle changes throughout the entire social fabric. A special supplement in the New York Times of January 11, 1967, predicted that the widespread use of computers would have a major impact on contemporary ways of thinking:

Old ways of thinking, working, and living are being transformed by the computer's impact on the ways man operates in his relation to his daily environment.

These changes are bound to require new sets of values concerned with human effort—its quantity, quality, motivation and social utility. Exactly what those values will be remains uncertain, but it is already clear that man at least will have to fashion new concepts of work and leisure. 23

The computer technology is shaping a new environment; inevitably it will call forth new ways of reacting and challenging the new economic modes of domination. The replacement of men by cybernated machines is also creating vast numbers of rejects—the non-employable poor and the voluntary drop-outs, the institutionalised and subsidised, who threaten to become too numerous to assimilate or contain.

All of these forces, feeding and being fed by, what we call the hippie culture, are only barely measurable at the present. Unquestionably, they are contributing to the spread of a new consciousness.
VII

The new consciousness is a force for social change. It is a necessary force but a non-conventional one. It is a force which rejects society rather than embraces it; one which withdraws from political structures rather than confronts them. It counterposes the "Politics of Love" to a politics of power and hatred. Its impact, as we have shown, may be felt in a way which it does not quite intend. Nevertheless, its determination is intense. Listen to how Tuli Kupferberg, one of its advocates, proclaims the alternative:

The society corrupts even those who would overthrow it. Because of this incredible impasse, because of the terror stalking our society (which is now almost one universal society), because of the unbelievable complexity and vastness of what must be changed—because in a word it seems hopeless—some of us are saying—very well—we have tried for a hundred years (or all of our lifetimes)—No more waste of our beauty, of our love. We will try to do for ourselves what the rest are either unable or rather unwilling to do for themselves or let us help them accomplish. 24

Kupferberg, a poet, writer, and member of the Fugs, a popular underground folk rock group, acknowledges he doesn't have the answers. He insists, however, "we need new approaches." In a recent attempt to define the politics of love, he considers arguments against his half-formulated concepts. Here are some of his considerations:

IV. Argument: What happens to the rest of the world while you love?
Answer: A politics of love is not NECESSARILY a politics of isolation. There is room for many forms. Some WILL retreat. Some will retreat for a time and return refreshed. Some will always be in the center of struggle.

V. Argument: How will you avoid the draft, taxes (contributing to death?)
Answer: We will avoid the draft. We will avoid taxes. We will be sly. We will be honest. We will go to jail. We will be free. [Hippies do join draft resistance movements and ask, "Suppose they gave a war, daddy, and nobody came?]"

VI. Argument: Your retreats will be destroyed. This is a totalitarian world.
Answer: We will evolve techniques of defense. Man's spirit, (his biology), is on our side. Retreats are not all physical. We will corrupt our enemy with love.
He also deals with how the hippies hope to survive ("the crumbs of affluence feed even the apostates"); how they plan to take over the economy ("I don't know"); and finally, he dismisses the ultimate retort of those who lack the political imagination to contemplate the revolutionary implications of the hippies.

VIII. Argument: You are stupid, insane, naive children.

Answer:

Who else can save us?

The hippie style of opposition has already been recognised as a danger to the status quo. Liberals find it "alarming" while rightists would crush it. It is not without significance that one of the first acts of the fascist military regime in Greece was to ban the wearing of beards, mini-skirts, and beatnik appearances. The example of freedom is always threatening and will not be able to preserve its autonomy in a completely totalitarian society. Thus, the hippie communities require some 'space' in which their 'alternative societies' can develop. In America, it is only the liberal and radical movements which combat increasing totalitarian tendencies and thus protect the relative freedom which allows the hippie alternative to survive and grow.

But at the same time, as Fruchter and Kramer assert, "In an environment where the possibilities of fundamental change are obscure, where even the desire for change based on assumptions different from those of the society presents itself as either irrational or pathological, there is a continuous pressure towards finding ways to 'separate' from society." 25 Such a pressure always may appear as utopian. Nevertheless, a meaningful radical politics—a serious movement of opposition—must reflect some commitment to values that the society denies and attempt to keep alive truly revolutionary resistance to a society "that continually expands its restricting, damaging influence, not only over the way people live, but over
Just like Romulus and Remus, the hippies and the activists will go on arguing about which one of them is the real revolutionary. But objectively, they will be dancing together, and needing each other.
Footnotes

6. S. N. Lipset, Political Man, p. 22.
7. Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, p. 256.
13. Lipset, op. cit., p. 84.
15. Conference
18. Ibid.

21. Walt Whitman, Second Preface to The Leaves of Grass, as incorporated into an address delivered at Arlington Street Church, Boston, November 19, 1966, and reprinted in International Times, No. 7, p. 5.


26. Ibid.

A TRIBUTE OF HUNDRED

people, stopped dancing and car-
ying on when the lights at the
Balloon Farm above the Dom
on St. Mark's Place were turned
cut out last Tuesday night. The cur-
tains on stage were still ricketly
close, and the strains of the Na-
tional Anthem, amplified to the
10th decibel, filled the hall with
Kate Smith patriotism. Then the
curtains slowly parted, and there,
centre stage, under the iridescent
lights, was a big portrait-picture
of Lyndon Baines Johnson, ethe-
real in his cheshire gravity. A
romantic moment for contempla-
tion? Not on your Fat Side life.
A man came out on stage with a
sledgehammer and demolished
the picture in three seconds.
Blackout. The audience shrieked
with coliseum joy.