Humanities courses can help to remedy the compartmentalization of knowledge in contemporary education, promote an integrated conception of a way of life, provide an historical and geographical perspective, counteract the educational impact of the sciences and the pressure of vocationalism, and introduce subjects too often neglected, such as philosophy, art history, and music history. Organization of a humanities curriculum may be by arts and genres, by aesthetic categories, by topics, or by chronology and culture; but if only one course can be offered, historical organization insures the most coherent study of cultures. One method of humanities instruction is team teaching, in which a group of specialists work together to reinforce and learn from each other. The teachers should have received some formal humanities instruction themselves—preferably at least one full-year college humanities course plus a couple of in-depth studies of different cultural periods. Teacher preparation for humanities courses should focus on breadth and integration, which are both the method and the end of interdisciplinary studies in the humanities. (JM)
What is a humanities course and what ought it to comprise? The broadest and simplest answer to this question is that a humanities course embraces several of the disciplines traditionally called humanistic: history, the various forms of imaginative literature, the visual arts, philosophy, and music. The essential thing is not simply that these things be studied, but that they should be studied together; it is the combination of these disciplines into one plan of study which makes the course interdisciplinary. But why, it may be objected, should a course be interdisciplinary? Why should not each subject be taught with stress upon the integrity of its materials, the uniqueness of its methodology? The principles of construction of a novel are quite different from those of a sonata; the beauty of a painting is radically different from that of an aria; a philosophical dialogue has precious little in common with a dramatic dialogue. Each of the nine Muses has her own province and attributes, and we can serve the Muses best by helping students to see each in her distinctness.

Yet there is something to be said on the other side. The compartmentalization of knowledge in modern education is more often lamented than remedied. Even in high schools, where radical specialization is not possible, the several departments of knowledge may remain wholly separate. They may never fuse into that coherent matrix of principles and information, tastes and attitudes, which constitutes intellectual culture. Interdisciplinary courses, provided they are rigorous and not vague, broad but not vacuous, are an evident remedy for the disintegration of knowledge. And this is a powerful argument for offering courses which, like humanities, bring the separate parts of knowledge together. Such a generalization is in itself vacuous, however, unless it can be more precisely specified.

Matthew Arnold once remarked that “The civilised world is to be regarded as now being, for intellectual and spiritual purposes, one great confederation ... whose members have for their proper outfit a knowledge of Greek, Roman, and Eastern antiquity, and of one another,” and he declared that the nation which best equipped its people with that outfit would make the most intelligent and spiritual progress. He was sharply taken up by the scientist-philosopher Thomas Henry Huxley, who supposed, though wrongly, that Arnold intended this statement as a blow at the pretensions of science—that by knowing Greek and Roman antiquity, for instance, Arnold meant simply knowing Sophocles and Virgil; that by the modern nations knowing one another Arnold meant simply that Englishmen should know Racine and Goethe. Arnold was therefore obliger...
ed to explain himself more fully. “When I speak of knowing Greek and
Roman antiquity as a help to knowing ourselves and the world,” he wrote,
“I mean more than a knowledge of so many portions of authors in the
Greek and Latin languages. I mean knowing the Greeks and Romans, and
their life and genius, and what they were and did in the world; what we
get from them, and what is its value. ... I understand knowing (Greece)
as the giver of Greek art, and guide to a free and right use of reason and
to scientific method. ... I understand knowing (Greece) as all this, and
not merely knowing certain Greek poems. ...”

Arnold was right. The object of studying ancient literature is not
merely to have the experience of reading a play by Sophocles or an epic
of Homer. These experiences are good in themselves; but they should
also lead to something further. They ought to form part of our inte-
grated conception of a way of life — a way of life which included the
Parthenon and the “Discobolus” as well as Sophocles and Homer, which
included philosophers like Plato and mathematicians like Euclid, a way of
life that embraced all sides of human nature. To know the Greeks, or any
other epoch, in this way is to acquire more than a literary polish; it is to
gain insight into a view of the world and man, a view that is fruitful in
interpreting and enriching our own lives.

This is part of our object in the humanities: to know the Greeks, or
the men of the thirteenth century, or of the eighteenth, in such a way
that this knowledge becomes part of our own intellectual character and
has an influence upon our lives. To know any epoch in this fruitful way requires
that we know their philosophy and their sculpture, their drama and their
music, their history and their poetry, and their science — and to know all
these things as aspects of one civilization.

The matrix of time and space, of history and geography, which the
average student possesses is grossly inadequate to organize and clarify
his other knowledges. Many students may think that the Divine Comedy
is a work of the Renaissance, or that Wordsworth was writing in 1700;
that Mozart lived in the nineteenth century, or Michelangelo in the Mid-
dle Ages. Such errors are more than isolated cases of mistaken fact. They
betray radical misunderstanding of the whole course of development of
the human spirit. The man who errs thus does not truly know his place
in world culture, nor can he easily be emancipated from the provincial-
ism of his time and place. To be sure, many of our students will be saved
from these errors by the happy circumstance of not knowing what the
Divine Comedy is and never having heard of Mozart. But this is not the
salvation we require. Our aim is not to be free of knowledge but to be
free through knowledge. To be free from the shackles of our time and
place in the world is to understand where we are, why we are here, what
we have gained and lost in getting here, and whither we might go now.
To understand this means to know the history and geography of our
r civilization; and this is one of the values of a general course in the
humanities.

One also currently hears much about the necessity of redressing the
balance between the sciences and the humanities. One cannot sympathize
with declamations on this subject which are simply reactionary and seem
to regret that men know more science than they used to. Knowledge is in
itself always good, both because it gratifies the fundamental spiritual
appetite of curiosity, and because it serves to organize the other facets of
our lives and to bring them into harmony with reality. Students ought to study science, even more than now falls to their lot. But such improvement in scientific training need not be made at the expense of the humanities. The past decade has seen significant improvements in the way the sciences are taught, whereas matching advances have not been made in the teaching of the humanities. A new mathematics begins to permeate our school systems, a mathematics which puts first principles first and which makes much of the logic of mathematical reasoning, thereby making problem-solving more rational and efficient by grounding it in a more fundamental understanding. A new physical science begins to integrate physics and chemistry by stressing the methodology of science and expounding the principles fundamental to the various physical sciences. A new biology is making its appearance. These advances in curriculum forward the cause of science not by absorbing the student's time to the exclusion of other subjects, but simply by teaching science better. The way for humanists to redress the balance is by teaching their subjects in new and better ways. An interdisciplinary program in the humanities could compensate for any overemphasis upon science, or upon vocational preparation, not by doing away with other subjects, but by itself exerting a more powerful influence upon students.

Humanities courses thus help to remedy the fragmentation of knowledge and to promote intellectual culture; by placing us in the history and geography of civilization, they free us in some measure from the bondage of local and temporary viewpoints, free us for intelligent self-development and action; and they restore the balance of our educational system by counteracting the ever-greater impact of the sciences and the pressures of vocationalism. There is yet a fourth advantage: integrated courses in the humanities afford a convenient avenue for introducing into the secondary curriculum subjects now almost entirely neglected.

Although hundreds of high schools in the United States currently teach philosophy, this number should be increased. Two kinds of philosophical study seem appropriate at the high-school level. One is the study of logic, the other the reading of some of the less intricate works in the substantive branches of philosophy—in ethics, for instance, or metaphysics. The study of logic is most effective when affiliated with the study of mathematics or language. But the second kind of philosophical study can best be introduced in a humanities curriculum. Clearly, any study of the Greeks that does not include Plato or Aristotle must be incomplete. All men, Coleridge declared, are born either Platonists or Aristotelians. Even a high school student might realize the truth of Coleridge's dictum if he actually reads and discusses a dialogue of Plato or part of a treatise by Aristotle. High school students can be shown that these ancient writers are discussing problems which agitate students in the twentieth century: the grounds for believing or disbelieving in immortality, what makes an act right or wrong, how one can know a fact and be sure that he knows it, or how the claims of individuality and of social responsibility can be harmonized. A statue by Praxiteles, a dialogue of Plato, and a play by Euripides represent the same civilization; all have something to say to our intellect, taste, and feeling; and we have not thoroughly studied the Greeks if we leave out the philosopher. Nor have we understood the Middle Ages if we have never read a page by a medieval theologian, nor the eighteenth century if we have never read
Hume or Rousseau, nor the twentieth if we have not scanned Bertrand Russell or Jean Paul Sartre.

Much can be said in favor of teaching an actual philosophy course in the senior year of high school, a course devoted for an entire semester to reading a number of philosophical works adapted to the intellectual level of high school seniors. Let us have such courses. But let us also introduce philosophy into integrated courses in the humanities so that it can be seen as one aspect of civilization, affiliated with other aspects.

Another subject largely ignored in the secondary schools is art history. The visual arts are very often the most obvious point from which to grasp the character of an epoch. They are certainly the easiest and most obvious way to study the development and evolution of civilization. In the time required to study closely a single play by Shakespeare, one can canvass the whole sweep of Renaissance and Baroque painting. In the time required to analyze a single symphony by Beethoven, one can scan two centuries of architecture. And the study of art history is essential for developing the taste of students. One learns to see the beauties of architecture, to distinguish good from bad design in the buildings that daily envelop us, by studying the manifold styles of building from ancient times to the present. Nor will an understanding of architecture ever come from practical exercises in the art studio; the principles of the art are found in buildings—in the Pantheon, the Cathedral of Chartres, Rockefeller Center. And one simultaneously learns more than architecture in such study: one learns the variety of human culture that can give rise to such diverse expressions.

In painting, sculpture, and the beauties of nature too, the same principles of form and line and color, the same expressions of character and feeling are to be found. Practical work in the art studio, to which art education is now largely confined, does little to awaken the student’s sensibility to the manifold styles in which beauty may be found. Indeed, the instructors of such exercises, since they themselves are often practitioners in a particular style and may be insensitive to and intolerant of other styles, often restrict rather than enlarge the student's visual sensitivity. If the instructors are enthusiastically contemptuous of art works that have subject matter, as is frequently the case, the result may be to restrict the student’s moral sensitivity as well, by teaching him to be systematically blind to the insights into human character and feeling, and into the expressions of external nature, which painting and sculpture afford. One of the great organs of human education, education both of the moral and the aesthetic sense, is largely lost to us because our educational system does not employ the vast resources bequeathed to us by the ages of art.

Music history also suffers in the usual high-school curriculum. In any humanities course, music ought to be correlated as far as possible with other materials of the course. If the course is chronologically organized, time can be set aside during the study of the classical and medieval worlds to treat the grammar of music and to train students in the reading of simplified scores, a skill which greatly facilitates this study of music. "The grammar of music" implies not only an understanding of what a theme is, what different meters are, and the like, but also architectonic principles—the nature of a fugue, of theme-and-variations, of a sonata-allegro movement, and so forth. Then, beginning with a brief presentation
of medieval music, this aspect of culture can be brought into relation with
the others. The difficulty remains, to be sure, that music of the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries bulks larger in the repertory than the visual
arts of those centuries. But if the material in the grammatical phase of
the musical instruction is aptly chosen, the student will already have
learned some works of Bach and Mozart, Beethoven and Chopin, works
which he can fit into the cultural continuum he will study later as ex-
amples of Baroque, Classic, and Romantic styles.

The final justification for the introduction of humanities courses into
the secondary schools is, then, that such courses create an opening through
which a number of subjects valuable for intellectual, moral, and aesthetic
development can be introduced into the curriculum.

Some passages in the discussion thus far have presupposed a course
that is chronologically arranged, a course in cultural history. This is not,
of course, the only mode of organization for such a course. No subject is
taught in a greater variety of fashions than integrated courses in the
humanities. In general, however, four modes of organization prevail: by
arts and genres, by aesthetic aspects or categories, by topics, and by
chronology and culture. The first of these modes, organization by arts and
genres, tends to separate the materials—literature, art, and music being
taught in distinct blocs and often by different personnel. Such a program
has its values; but they are for the most part the values of a course in art
appreciation, plus a course in music appreciation, plus a course in the
appreciation of literature. Much is to be learned by combining a group of
dramas of contrasting kinds, for instance, and treating them together to
elicit both the characteristics of drama generally and the distinctive traits
of these particular kinds; or by simultaneously studying the problems of
Grecian and Gothic architecture, Baroque and contemporary architecture,
stressing both the persistent problems of architectural design and the
variety of possible solutions to these problems. Added to these separate
values, if such a course is well taught, will be a sense of the analogies
between the arts—the insight, for example, that the plot of a novel func-
tions somewhat like the sonata form in a symphonic movement or like
the pyramidal composition of a painting of Virgin and Child. Similarities
in style can also be studied: the student can perceive that the “Laocoön”
is akin to Berlioz and the “Discobolus” akin to Beethoven, both in the
way the formal components are handled and in the kind of expression
exhibited.

But analogies among the arts can be better handled in a course or-
organized by categories or by chronology. The term “categories” means
such aspects of works as subject, style, function, and structure. In some
categories, discussion might naturally dwell at especial length on particu-
lar arts: the problem of subject, for instance, would be prominent in treat-
ing non-objective painting or program music, that of function in archi-
tecture. Other categories would be of great importance in all genres: the
structure of a pieta, of a sonata-allegro movement, of a philosophical dia-
logue, of a tragedy. So too with style. But discussion of style (like discus-
sion of ideology) leads very naturally to chronology, to the correlation of
styles, or of ideological content, with the broad movements of cultural
and intellectual history. It is not enough to see that rhythm as a structural
element enters in some sense into both painting and music; we make
fruitful use of such an analogy only when we observe that the rhythms
and symmetries of a Mozart symphony have much in common with those of a painting by David, and that the rhythms and symmetries or asymmetries of a symphony by Berlioz are like those of a painting by Delacroix. This last insight, however, suggests the importance of distinguishing a Classic from a Romantic style, and if one pursues this thought, he is immediately in an historical framework.

The third kind of organization, by topic, is perhaps the most common of all, but its disadvantages are serious. This plan consists of imposing a dialectical schematism upon the various materials of the course; polarities such as "The Individual and Society," "God and Man," "Freedom and Authority," "Man and Nature," and the like are employed as the fundamental rubrics. Handled with subtlety and flexibility, such polarities can often afford insights into individual works and synthesize diverse materials. But dialectical schematisms tempt one to simplify and distort the particular works in order to make them fit the categories, or even to employ the categories as a device for promoting some favorite taste or point of view. And in any event, this approach diverts attention both from the formal characteristics of the works studied and from the historical context in which the works subsist.

For situations where only one humanities course can be offered, the historical organization insures that the materials of a given culture will be studied together. One might learn more about the drama or the symphony by studying these in isolation, but he would learn less about civilization. The student needs to see the stream of civilization as a whole and to grasp his place in that stream. Teachers can more easily cross-index a historical course by topic or genre than elicit the character of an epoch in civilization from materials scattered through a course that is organized non-historically. Meaningful comparisons between a Greek play, a Shakespearean tragedy, and a drama by Ibsen are possible even if the three works are separated by several months in presentation; but grasping the coherency of Greek or Renaissance or Victorian culture would be difficult if some aspects of those cultures are omitted wholly and others are treated only in alien contexts. Historical organization integrates the materials of the course and reinforces that matrix of time, space, and development within which any cultural fact, including our own existence, ought to be seen.

THE TEACHING OF INTEGRATED COURSES

The chief temptation to abandon the historical organization results from team teaching. When a team of specialists teaches a humanities course, they can more easily budget their time and coordinate their efforts when each handles his specialty in a block and from his own viewpoint. But team teaching is not always the best way to treat a humanities course. It has its advantages, to be sure, and it is often the only feasible method. A given faculty may include members who are qualified in their separate disciplines but none of whom considers himself to be adequate in the other disciplines of an integrated course. And more positively, the team affords a greater variety of personality and approach; the student's interest may be better maintained, and he may gain more insights if one instructor lectures and another conducts discussions, if one instructor is devoted to formal analysis and another to explication of a work as an
expression of a culture or as a treatment of a human problem, and so forth.

But team teaching does not guarantee that the diverse subjects of the humanities program will be adequately related, even when the various members of the team attend each other's class sessions. The facets of the course have not entered into one consciousness to be seen and felt as parts of one civilization, of one way of living, of one way of seeing the world and man. The instructor himself should certainly accomplish what is expected of his students! If they are expected to comprehend the Greek way, or the spirit of the Renaissance, or of the modern world, so should he! One may argue that the members of the instructional team will understand these matters, but that understanding and teaching are not the same, and the shoemaker should stick to his last. This objection takes too pedantic a view of teaching! The teacher who is exploring an area outside his own specialty has a sense of adventure and enthusiasm which may be infectious. True, he may err; but his freshness may compensate for his naiveté. Students will be working alongside a more developed mind that is undergoing the same experience they encounter—entering fresh territories and assimilating them to the kingdoms already conquered.

The objection that an instructor may know a subject yet not be prepared to teach it, rests on a false premise: that one can possess knowledge in the abstract and yet be unable to apply it. One would be absurd to argue that he understood the law of cosines but could not solve the problems in trigonometry that involve that law. It is equally absurd to argue that a humanities instructor may understand Greek art without being able to teach it. What one understands clearly, one can teach. Either, then, the members of an instructional team do not understand the various materials of the course, in which case the student is asked to accomplish what his professors have not managed; or the instructors do know those materials, in which case they can and should teach them, and in so doing share the intellectual experiences of their students.

The minimum requirements for a team of instructors is that each instructor teach part of the materials that fall in the province of every other. The English teacher ought to try his hand at analyzing the "Last Supper"; the musician should debate the issues of a Platonic dialogue; and so on. This does not imply that an instructor wholly unversed in literature attempt to teach Sophocles, or that one who has had no training in art try his hand at Michelangelo. But any mature and interested person can sufficiently train himself to play his part in a cooperative teaching effort—that is, to participate in the work outside his own specialty. A team should not be merely an aggregate of individuals, each performing separately, but a group working together, reinforcing and learning from one another.

Still, it is no doubt best that people giving instruction in the humanities actually have had some formal instruction themselves, and this article will outline what such instruction might comprise. Anyone prepared to teach a humanities course ought to have had a course of the kind he will be teaching. This implies at least one full-year humanities course. Usually such courses are pitched at the sophomore level in college; their staffs often have superior qualifications and certainly have broad interests; and the students who voluntarily enroll in such courses are generally above
average. If the course is historically arranged, so much the better—especially if the student studies world history previously or concurrently.

But what should follow this broad introduction to the humanities? It will not do for the student to follow up his survey with a random selection of courses in literature, art, music, and philosophy. To be truly useful, courses should fit together into a pattern, the parts of which support each other. But no one can hope to cover uniformly the history of Western culture—its belles lettres, its philosophy, its architecture and painting and music. The ideal must give way to the possible. The best compromise is to elect a set of courses that canvass the different disciplines but are restricted to a few periods of history. One can acquire a fair understanding of eighteenth-century culture, for instance, from a cluster of three courses. A course in belles lettres need not be a survey; indeed, a course concentrated upon the eighteenth-century novel or eighteenth-century poetry would be at least as valuable. Then a course in the art of the eighteenth century—perhaps in Rococo and Neo-Classicism in France. Or a course in the classical period of music would fit in well. And any thorough study of the age would be incomplete without some knowledge of philosophy, without having read some works of Voltaire, Rousseau, and Hume.

Two periods of cultural history studied in this way, especially two strikingly contrasted periods, will equip the student with the breadth that he needs to work in an integrated program. But perhaps the integration itself is still missing. A cluster of courses in the eighteenth century, for instance, ought to be crowned with a seminar that is itself an integrated course. Such a seminar might be devoted to the later eighteenth century in Britain. It could canvass Hume, Gibbon, and Burke (the greatest of British writers of philosophy, history, and political rhetoric); the novel and didactic and lyric poetry; architecture from the Palladians to Robert Adam and Chambers and Nash; painting from the time of Kneller through Hogarth to Reynolds and Wilson and Gainsborough; landscape art from William Kent to the picturesque school at the close of the century. Such a course naturally presupposes that the students have previously acquired knowledge of some aspects of the period; it attempts to present a comprehensive picture of an entire cultural complex. Music has been omitted, to be sure, because there is no British music of distinction in the eighteenth century. The lack could be supplied in another seminar: the international Romantic movement, for example, would comprise Berlioz and Schumann alongside Delacroix and Turner, Wordsworth and Hugo.

The exact course prescription for a student taking an interdisciplinary minor in humanities and majoring in one of the humanistic disciplines might be as follows: (a) A broad humanities survey, two semesters in length: six hours; and (b) Two periods of concentration, each comprising a course in the history of the period, one in the art of music of the period, one in the literature, plus an integrated seminar embracing all aspects of the epoch: twenty-four hours—but only eighteen chargeable to the minor, since at least six hours will fall within the major preparation. A third item could be added to the preparation as an elective: a course in aesthetic theory that would both provide models of philosophical analysis and enhance critical sensitivity to the visual, musical, and literary arts. “Aesthetic theory” implies theory as developed systematically
by philosophical writers. Santayana’s *Sense of Beauty* would serve as an instance—but, of course, more than one of the many alternative systems ought to be examined. Systems of criticism in the various arts may also be canvassed in an aesthetics course, but ventures into criticism should stay closely tied to general and systematic principles. Wölfflin’s *Principles of Art History* is an example. Courses in “appreciation” and applied criticism are not aesthetic theory.

It may be objected that although the foregoing prescription proposes preparation in only two disparate periods of cultural history, the candidate thus prepared will teach other periods as well. But to study two periods with sufficient thoroughness to get a sense both of the analogies and the diversities of the different aspects of a given culture enables the student to examine other periods by himself and in the same fashion. After all, education is not only the imparting of knowledges; it is the inculcation of skills, and above all, the skill of extending one’s own education. Provide the student with models of analysis and synthesis, and if he has the intellectual initiative without which he can neither be educated himself nor educate others, he can carry on.

We should attempt to do no more, in principle, even with the student who is majoring in inter-disciplinary studies. One cannot cram into a four-year program all that a student would need to know to be conversant with all sides of Western culture in all epochs since the Greeks. The humanities major would survey three periods instead of two; but he, too, would be presented only with incomplete models of the structure he must complete for himself in a lifetime of study and experience. If one postulates an area major of fifty-two hours in the humanities, it might comprise the following: (a) A broad humanities survey: six hours. (b) A sequence of history courses canvassing Western civilization from the ancient world to the present: twelve hours. (c) Literature courses—not broad surveys, but detailed studies in particular periods, so selected that one falls in each of the three periods of concentration: nine hours. (d) Art history and music history, selected as with the literary studies: nine hours. (Music history becomes pertinent for a secondary-school teacher only with the Baroque. Art history could be recommended for Classical, Medieval, and Renaissance periods, but either art or music for more recent periods.) (e) Three integrated seminars in the periods chosen for concentration: nine hours. (f) Aesthetic theory: three hours. (g) Other philosophy courses, selected to reinforce one or more of the periods of concentration: four hours.

Such a major concentration in humanities for secondary-school teachers is at present hypothetical, although in a few years humanities courses and programs may become so numerous and extensive that appointments can be made specifically to teach them. The immediate need, however, is certification of minor programs adapted to teachers whose primary appointment is in one of the humanistic disciplines and which will better equip such teachers to contribute to humanities programs. It is also true, however, that a considerable number of teachers already established in their profession have come to be engaged in humanities courses, often as members of a “team.” What can such persons do to strengthen and broaden their own training? If such a teacher still has his master’s program ahead of him, the answer is easy. The rules for certificates requiring the master’s degree vary from subject to subject and from state to state. But
consider the case of a teacher with a B.A. (or B.S.) in English in the State of Indiana. His master's program requires eight hours in English and suggests (but does not require) four hours of professional courses. Eighteen hours would be available for establishing what one might call a "graduate minor" in humanities, time enough to fit in two clusters of courses concentrated in two periods of cultural history. One can assume that a graduate English student can prepare himself in the belles lettres of other traditions; the problem is to provide the training in the ancillary disciplines. Such a student might choose a concentration in the ancient world: ancient art, Greek philosophy, and an integrated seminar in the Hellenistic period. Or he might concentrate on the nineteenth century: nineteenth-century painting, work on some group of nineteenth-century philosophers (perhaps the British Utilitarians), and an integrated seminar in Romanticism. Such a battery of six courses would be a very good outfit for a humanities teacher, and most graduate departments will readily give permission to students zealous enough to be thus preparing themselves for interdisciplinary work. Certain kinds of music courses may presuppose too much "theory" for the outsider; but a distinguishing feature of the humanities in general is that there usually are few prerequisites. Any intellectually mature person can work competently in a graduate course in Shakespeare, Aristotle, or the Italian Baroque.

A teacher who has received his master's degree and desires only to strengthen or broaden his competences by further university study could in the progress of a few summers outfit himself in just this same way. The two axioms that dictate the design of a program under whatever conditions and stipulations are breadth and integration. A derivative theorem is that preparation should ordinarily consist of clusters of courses which are unified by cultural epoch and which include integrating seminars.

Breadth and integration are, indeed, both the method and the end of these interdisciplinary studies in the humanities. To respond to and be knowledgeable about painting and architecture, music and poetry, fiction and philosophy, the course of history and the beauty of nature—and to form from all these responses and knowledges a system and a pattern that is one aspect of a coherent personality—this is the goal.