IN RESPONSE TO DEMANDS FOR MORE AND BETTER TEACHING ABOUT AFRICA IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION, THE US OFFICE OF EDUCATION REQUESTED THAT THE PROGRAM OF AFRICAN STUDIES AT NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY GENERATE A SET OF TEACHING MATERIALS WHICH COULD BE USED IN INTRODUCTORY UNDERGRADUATE COURSES. INCLUDED IN THESE VOLUMES, THESE MATERIALS PROVIDE REFERENCE SOURCES, INFORMATION FOR CLASSROOM USE, AND ORIGINAL INTRODUCTORY ESSAYS ON THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE.

VOLUME I CONTAINS ABOUT 90 TOPIC SUMMARIES TO AID TEACHERS IN PREPARING LECTURES FOR A 1-YEAR INTRODUCTORY COURSE. THE TOPICS COVER THE SOCIAL, CULTURAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF AFRICA FROM PRIMITIVE THROUGH MODERN TIMES. VOLUME II CONTAINS A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF OVER 2500 REFERENCES DIVIDED INTO 5 MAJOR CATEGORIES: 1) INTRODUCTORY WORKS OR REQUIRED STUDENT READINGS; 2) RESEARCH MATERIAL FOR MORE ADVANCED STUDENTS; 3) AVAILABLE BUT RELATIVELY INACCESSIBLE WORKS SUCH AS DISSERTATIONS, CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, ETC.; 4) AFRICAN CASE STUDIES; AND 5) THEORETICAL WORKS OR CLASSIC CASE STUDIES. VOLUME III CONTAINS 25 ORIGINAL ESSAYS IN 5 MAJOR AREAS: 1) AFRICAN SOCIETY AND CULTURE; 2) PERSPECTIVES ON THE PAST; 3) PROCESSES OF SOCIAL CHANGE; 4) CONSOLIDATION OF NATION-STATES; AND 5) AFRICA AND THE MODERN WORLD. (DS)
THE
AFRICAN
EXPERIENCE

Volume One
SYLLABUS LECTURES

Northwestern University
Program of African Studies
1969

The research reported herein was performed pursuant to a contract with the Office of Education, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Contractors undertaking such projects under Government sponsorship are encouraged to express freely their professional judgement in the conduct of the project. Points of view or opinions stated do not, therefore, necessarily represent official Office of Education position or policy.

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Finally, we would like to acknowledge the continuing help of Mrs. Diana Cohen on all administrative aspects of syllabus preparation, and the day-to-day assistance of Oscar Beard and Vaughn Bishop. We are also grateful to Anne Potter and Barbara Teising for typing under great pressure.
The demand for more and better teaching about Africa is evident in all quarters of American higher education. Part of that demand is for textbooks and other teaching materials which may be of use to the African specialist (who is often called upon to teach courses which extend beyond his field of specialization) as well as to the teacher with relatively little background in African studies. In response to this demand the United States Office of Education requested that the Program of African Studies at Northwestern University generate a set of teaching materials on Africa which could be of use in introductory undergraduate courses. Although these materials were to be designed primarily for those colleges and universities which do not have large library or faculty resources in African studies, it was hoped that they would also prove useful in introductory courses at those universities which do have major African programs. Such a set of teaching materials might also be introduced into some high school curriculums. The three volumes of teaching materials appear under the general title The African Experience. The present volume of TOPIC SUMMARIES (sometimes referred to as LECTURES), the accompanying volume of BIBLIOGRAPHY
(reference sources) and the volume of original introductory ESSAYS have been produced in attempt to meet a need for teaching materials on Africa at several levels.

College Level African Studies in the United States

There are well over forty programs of African studies at present in American colleges and universities. Of these, seven offer degrees in African studies at the undergraduate level, while four others offer degrees at the postgraduate level. Most of the major programs, however, work within the framework of traditional disciplines—students do not earn degrees in African studies as such but in economics, history, linguistics, etc.

The largest programs are all characterized by good library facilities, a depth and balance of teaching resources, and a large number of graduate students. Nearly all undertake interdisciplinary approaches to African studies as a major program objective. In addition to these formal programs, there are many colleges and universities which have a significant number of course offerings and faculty resources in particular disciplines within African studies. There is also a rapidly increasing number of academic institutions which, despite the lack of professionally trained

Connecticut State College, State University of New York at New Paltz and at Buffalo, De Pauw University, Roosevelt University, University of Colorado, and Stanford University.

St. John's University, Howard University, Duquesne University, University of California at Los Angeles.

This group would probably include the programs at the University of California at Los Angeles and at Berkeley, Boston University, Columbia University, University of Wisconsin, Indiana University, Howard University, and Northwestern University.
teachers as well as students, to discover for themselves the integrity and scope of the human experience as it is acted out in all its complexity on the African continent.

Using the Topic Summaries

In constructing the syllabus we have chosen to concentrate on presenting short topic summaries—"mini-essays"—to be supported and amplified by the bibliographic references and essays of the other two accompanying volumes. At first, some thought was given to presenting the materials in the form of a series of detailed outlines. This form was discarded, however, since we felt that most teachers, no matter what source materials they are using, would prefer to create their own outlines. Short interpretive statements briefly elaborating three or four central themes were considered potentially more useful, especially given the "extensions" available in the bibliography and essay volumes. These topic outlines could then be used in several ways: as organizational sources for lecture outlines; as informational or background reading sources for both teacher and student; as brief discussion papers for seminars and informal discussions; or as outlines for direct classroom use.

It was also decided not to include detailed case studies but to keep the topic summaries as general and interdisciplinary as possible. We are by no means opposed to case studies. Indeed, we feel they should be strongly encouraged as a necessary supplement to the curriculum materials. Accordingly, for most topic summaries there is an appropriate selection of case-study sources in the BIBLIOGRAPHY.

As previously mentioned, the topic summaries in this volume are designed primarily as an aid to teachers in preparing lectures. It is
might be possible to add two further types of teaching materials: a data handbook on Africa and a set of audio-visual materials. To date, the first three objectives have been accomplished. A data reference volume, (Black Africa: A Handbook for Comparative Analysis) produced by scholars at Northwestern University is scheduled for publication in late 1970; also some preliminary work has been started at Northwestern in the production of audio-visual materials to complement the other volumes.

Since the bibliography and essay volumes have their own introductions, here it is necessary only to introduce this volume of topic summaries (lectures). One major issue affecting the entire set of teaching materials must first be mentioned, however. This involves the point of view of the two authors. This issue is more complicated than it may at first appear. We have attempted to coordinate an interdisciplinary collection of summary materials. During the course of this project, it became apparent to us that there were many knowledge gaps not only with respect to our own backgrounds and experiences but in the African studies literature as well. But rather than limiting ourselves only to topics for which there is a wealth of scholarly material, we have also taken the liberty of giving our interpretive overviews of the topics selected for this syllabus. (We have tried to make it clear, however, when we are summarizing accepted knowledge and when we are trying to identify broad areas where little research has been done.) If our examples tend to be drawn primarily from East and West Africa, this is a reflection of our own major research experience. The breadth of our personal knowledge was
extended through an intensive review of major reference sources in the
various disciplines by drawing upon the extraordinary cluster of Africana
resources available at Northwestern University's Program of African Studies;
(there are approximately thirty professors with African experience in more
than a dozen departments.),

Furthermore, we have not hesitated to insert our own value judgments.

It is clear that people have different purposes in studying or writing
about Africa. The newly formed Africa Research Group in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, for example, is devoted to research on African affairs
from a "radical perspective." There are several research groups in
London, Paris, and this country, which are clearly conservative--perhaps
even "neo-colonial"--in their selection and treatment of problems. It
is also clear that many aspects of African studies are related to Afro-
American or Black studies, where ideology and scholarship occasionally
blend.

In our writing and topic selection we have not tried to undermine
the old orthodoxies in African studies only to replace them with new ones,
recognizing clearly that even in our lifetime the African experience
will probably be modified beyond the range of our present imaginations.
We have tried to give a balanced view of the problems and contemporary
perspectives involved in studying the African experience. We have tried
to suggest that not all the answers are known and, in fact, that not all
appropriate
the/questions have yet been asked. Perhaps most importantly, we have
tried to present our materials in a way which will encourage all readers,
teachers as well as students, to discover for themselves the integrity and scope of the human experience as it is acted out in all its complexity on the African continent.

**Using the Topic Summaries**

In constructing the syllabus we have chosen to concentrate on presenting short topic summaries—or "mini-essays"—to be supported and amplified by the bibliographic references and essays of the other two accompanying volumes. At first, some thought was given to presenting the materials in the form of a series of detailed outlines. This form was discarded, however, since we felt that most teachers, no matter what source materials they are using, would prefer to create their own outlines. Short interpretive statements briefly elaborating three or four central themes were considered potentially more useful, especially given the "extensions" available in the bibliography and essay volumes. These topic outlines could then be used in several ways: as organizational sources for lecture outlines; as informational or background reading sources for both teacher and student; as brief discussion papers for seminars and informal discussions; or as outlines for direct classroom use.

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As previously mentioned, the topic summaries in this volume are designed primarily as an aid to teachers in preparing lectures. It is
expected that the teacher will read at least one major reference (annotated as "Introductory" in the BIBLIOGRAPHY) as background to each summary. The summaries may also be used in seminars where students and teachers read and discuss them or relate them to case study or topical reports. In either case, students are expected to read the ESSAYS.

The nature of the topic summaries is such that it is possible to regroup them to suit particular classroom needs. In cases where the teacher is focusing upon a single discipline (e.g., economics, history or anthropology) he could select those topic summaries of most relevance. A course unit on African economics, for example might regroup into sequence the following topic summaries: The Nature of Ethnicity (#4), Traditional Economic Systems (#8), The Origins and Growth of the Slave Trade (#27), The Nature of Colonial Systems (#31), Concepts of Social Change and Modernization (#3), Social Change and Modernization in Africa (#34), the several summaries in the sections on Urbanization and Change (#44-46), Adaptation of Technology (#47-49), Economic Systems Development (#62-65), Regionalism and Pan-Africanism (#69-72), and perhaps some selections from Part V, Africa and the Modern World.

A broad two-part (or two-semester) division could be developed using Parts I and II on "Traditional Africa" and Parts III to V on "Modern Africa." If time were limited to one semester or quarter, the teacher might select topic summaries from each of the five segments to give a balanced overview.

The study questions at the end of each of the five major segments are
intended both for review purposes and to indicate broader issues for consideration. The questions, however, might also be used as an introduction to each segment, encouraging students to discover answers from the various sources available to him.

The important point to stress is that the topic summaries form a set of teaching modules which may be shifted around and regrouped to suit a variety of purposes. Although the order of presentation in this volume was purposefully selected by the authors, it should not in any way be considered absolute. Like the topic summaries themselves, the ordering represents an evaluative judgment designed to aid, not to restrict, the teacher in the development of course materials and lectures in African studies. Since lectures #1 and #2 are broad surveys of the entire set of 92 topic summaries, they might provide an appropriate starting point for both teacher and student to discuss the selection and grouping of course topics.
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1. Society and Culture

We have decided to begin with the topic of African society and culture. There are at least 800 ethnic communities in Africa at present, ranging from small scale groups of less than 50,000, to nations of more than 18 million. These ethnic communities continue to form the backbone of African cultural life. It is important to stress that Africa consists of a wide variety of peoples and cultural patterns. Marriage customs vary throughout the continent. Patterns of social rank range from completely egalitarian communities to some of the most elitist states in the world. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify cultural elements which African communities share with one another. The family-oriented nature of the culture is surely one such feature. In the lectures which follow there will be an attempt to "take apart" these societies according to different criteria, including
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INTRODUCTION: MAJOR THEMES IN THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE

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African Society, History, Social Change

This course on the African experience has been divided into five major parts. The intellectual structure of the course and the logic of sequential development are not something to be taken for granted in an introductory course on African studies for American students. Does one begin with the contemporary scene, hoping to gain some criteria of relevance for the study of the past? Does one begin with the past, building up through time to the present? Or does one first try to gain some insight into the core of African culture and society before trying to approach either the present or the past?

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economic systems, family and kinship systems, political authority
systems, linguistic systems, conceptual systems and religion, literature
and oral tradition, and visual and musical arts. It must be realized,
however, that in practice these sectors intertwine and blend together
more closely than is common in European and American society. Political,
economic, and social roles tend to overlap, and the same individuals
find themselves responsible for a broad range of functions in society.
Hopefully, by the end of the section on African society and culture,
students will have some idea regarding the nature of ethnicity, the
ways in which ethnicity changes, the primary patterns of social
organization within ethnic communities, and the way in which these
patterns might effect modern life.

2. Perspectives on the Past

In the second part of the course, we focus on the historical
patterns which seem most relevant to a balanced view of the develop-
ment of the continent. There are four component sections. The first
deals with the earliest history: the geological upheavals which have
shaped the continent, the evolution of mankind in what is now
eastern and southern Africa, the development (in a much later period)
of agricultural techniques, the migration of Bantu-speaking peoples
into central and southern Africa, the growth of the earliest states
of Axum and Kush in northeast Africa, and the development of the
distinctive Nok culture in West Africa.

The second section deals with the growth of centralized states
in Africa South of the Sahara: the impact of Islam after the 7th
century AD on both North and West Africa, the development of the large scale empires of Ghana, Mali, and Songhai during the 10th to the 15th centuries AD, the emergence of coastal states in East Africa (Kilwa, the Swahili culture, Zanzibar) partly as a result of contact with Arab civilizations, the development of states in the Central Sudan (Kano, Sokoto, Bornu) with their close links across the Sahara to north Africa, the indigenous kingdoms of east and central Africa (Buganda, Luba/Lunda, and the peoples of Zimbabwe, whose stone acropolis still stands), and the forest states of West Africa (Ashanti, Benin, and Yoruba). All of these states were large and complex, and based on cultures which were often as sophisticated as pre-industrial Europe. The selection of particular states is intended to suggest both the wide geographical distribution of the early states of Africa as well as their regional variations. The discussion also illustrates the degree to which Africa was not cut off from the rest of the world.

In the third section, we try to sketch the major elements of the African slave trade: the initial trading contacts in forts such as Elmina, the origins and growth of the slave trade (from all points of view - the European slavers, the African communities, and the black slave communities), the abolition of the slave trade by Britain in 1807 and the subsequent dwindling of trade throughout the nineteenth century, and the establishment of states in West Africa for freed slaves (notably Liberia and Sierra Leone). We recognize the sensitivity of the topic of slavery in American society, but have tried to summarize
the core elements of slavery as an historical phenomena, without trying to ignore the fact that it is also a moral issue.

In the fourth section we deal with the impact of colonialism on Africa: the scramble for African territory by European powers in the late nineteenth century (approximately 1885-1914), the nature of African resistance to this conquest (which was largely unsuccessful due to lack of technological resources), and a summary of colonial rule during the twentieth century (approximately 1900-1960). Colonialism is also recognized as a moral issue, but is dealt with primarily as a series of political relationships. We have not been able to explore in detail the economic aspects of colonialism, although many of these are discussed in later sections. Similarly, the psychological impact of colonialism is dealt with in the section on Personality and Change.

3. Processes of Social Change

The third part of the course focuses on the processes of social change. Here we have tried to imply a constant process of change both with regard to the ethnic communities of Africa as well as in the course of historical events. Social change is dealt with as a long-term historical process to underscore the fact that Africa has experienced change long before its contact with the West. In this part we focus on specific aspects of social change, beginning with a brief theoretical overview on the nature of change and modernization. There are five basic sections.

The first deals with individual personality, considering the argument that there is an "African personality" and discussing the
types of changes in personality characteristics which may be occurring in the contemporary context.

The second section deals with education and elite formation: with the precolonial and Islamic patterns of education, the nature of the colonial educational systems (which were often very meager), the way in which educational recruitment tends to determine the next generation of elites in society, and finally, a discussion of the contemporary elites in Africa, (their education, outlook, and tendency toward social cohesion). In general, the twentieth century in Africa has been a period of rapid social mobility. There has not yet developed a rigid class system based on wealth or education, although related patterns of social stratification have begun to emerge.

The third section deals with religion and change: the impact of Christianity, the innovations by local African communities who rejected European versions of Christianity, and the pattern of Islamic reformation (both in a traditional and a modern sense). Religion has been a key factor in mobilizing African communities to social change, whether that change is in the realm of family life or political organization.

In the fourth section, the topic of urbanization is discussed. Urban society in parts of Africa has developed from earliest times and urban life in Africa today may be regarded as basically similar to urban life anywhere: there is a division of labor and an interdependence of persons which allows for high density living. But the speed of urban growth -- the rate of African urbanization has been greater than that for any other continent over the last hundred years -- and its
distinctive relationship to traditional ethnic society has created a range of particular patterns and problems which are perhaps more acute in Africa than elsewhere. Accordingly, the relationships between urbanization and other dimensions of social change are also explored.

The final section deals with the adaptation of technology: the reorganization of agriculture, the beginnings of industrialization, and the growth of modern transportation and communications. It is stressed that the hardware of technology can be rapidly spread in Africa, but that major problems remain in the "software" of technology: i.e. the social organization and skills necessary to make technological systems self-sustaining.


Continuing the discussion of the major themes in the African Experience, there are two remaining parts: Consolidation of Nation-states and Africa and the Modern World. (It would be possible for a teacher to add an additional part on contemporary problems in Africa - such as the Nigeria-Biafra civil war - which would be updated each year).

4. Consolidation of Nation-States

In the fourth part of the course, we deal with the way in which nation-states have been created and have come to be the major contexts
of African political, social and economic life. There were thirty-five independent states in sub-Saharan Africa as of summer 1969, including Madagascar but excluding white dominated South Africa and Rhodesia. On the continent as a whole there are over forty sovereign states, constituting approximately one third of the entire membership of United Nations. The problem of consolidating these states into viable national systems is the major focus of this part.

The first section deals with nationalism and independence: concepts of African nationalism prevalent at the time of independence (ranging from pan-Africanism to negritude), patterns of African nationalism in the attainment of independence (ranging from violence in Algeria and Kenya, to peaceful transition in most of the continent), and the phenomenon of independence itself, including the formal transfer of powers and the informal reorientations which occurred. African nationalism emerged primarily after World War II and reached its peak in about 1960, when most of the continent achieved independence from the European colonial powers. This period was one of intensive political organization, formulation of ideology, and establishment of new symbols (such as the names of new states - Ghana, Mali, Malawi). It was also the period in which the colonial powers, primarily Britain and France, set up political institutions to parallel their own patterns based on the Westminster model and the Fifth Republic model respectively. These political institutions were to be adapted considerably in the post-independence period.

The second section deals with the problems of nation-building in
the post colonial era. The three major dimensions involved in creating unified national communities within the inherited states may be identified as inter-ethnic integration, mass-elite integration, and territorial integration. Most of the African states have had an average of four or five major ethnic groups within their boundaries. It was necessary in some way to work out linkages between these groups, in terms of a common language, a common set of economic interests, and a common agreement as to how decisions in government should be made. At the same time, there had developed in many countries a gap between the educated elites, who were in control, and the masses who were part of a different cultural framework. Ironically, the increases in education only widened this gap. Social mobilization of the masses was necessary for economic development and for the consolidation of the nation-state. Some linkages were necessary to the grass roots level. In most cases, political parties (or the dominant political party) tried to organize itself so that a two-way system of communications was established with the people. In cases where this was not successful, political tensions mounted. Finally, it was necessary to bind together those geographical sections of the country which frequently had not thought of themselves as part of a single unit. Fragmentation existed between coastal and inland regions, or between parts of the country which had been linked through transportation and parts which had not. A unified system of transportation and communication (or infrastructure) was necessary to achieve territorial integration. As a means of linking all segments of the country into a cohesive whole,
African statesmen often tried to develop an ideology which could at the same time mobilize people and bind them together. Concepts of "African socialism" and "consciencism" emerged, along with ideologies identified with the major African leaders (e.g. Nkrumahism, Zikism), as a means of nation-building.

The third section deals with political systems development: with specific types of civilian regimes, with institutions and bureaucracy, with the patterns of participation and mobilization, and finally, with the breakdown of political systems, and the establishment of military rule (in approximately one out of three African states). As mentioned above, the inherited political models were usually French or British based but in most cases were modified into some form of single party system. There have been problems inherent in the single party systems, however, and many of them have succumbed to the military sector. Military regimes have frequently tried to arbitrate over the establishment of new types of political systems more appropriate, perhaps, to the African context than the inherited models or the immediate post-independence modifications.

The fourth section deals with economic systems development: an assessment of resources, the problems of development planning, the institutional growth of economic systems, and the population and social problems which place such pressure on the need for economic development. Economic life in Africa is closely related to agricultural development and to the growth of light industry which is able to substitute locally produced items for costly imported items. The
economic development of Africa, in terms of increased GNP per capita and high growth rates, has been disappointing to many economists. It has also been frustrating to many African peoples, who had hoped for a more dramatic increase in the standard of living. However, there has been a steady growth in the infrastructure and technological development which may eventually pay off in the future.

The fifth section deals with legal systems development: with a survey of legal systems in Africa (customary, Islamic, civil, common law), with the problem of the integration of legal systems, and with the growth of constitutional law. To a large extent, the development of political and economic sectors in Africa will depend on the degree to which an acceptable legal code can be worked out within each of the countries. Such codes will probably incorporate much of the traditional customs of the peoples in its family and civil codes, and turn more to western models in the fields of corporate, administrative and criminal law.

The final section deals with regionalism and pan-Africanism: with the growth of supra-national units of cooperation, with the continent-wide dream of pan-Africanism, and with the day-to-day technical cooperation which is emerging. This is relevant to our discussion on nation-building because in the future the particular states may link themselves into a larger "United States of Africa".

5. Africa and the Modern World

In the final part of the course, Africa will be viewed as part
of a larger global context. In the first section, there is a focus on international relations (African state relations with the Third World, with the former Metropoles, with the United States, with the Communist Bloc, with the Islamic World, and at the United Nations). In the second section, specific problems in Africa of an international character, are examined (such as the problem of race relations in southern Africa, or the problem of decolonization in those portions of Africa still under foreign domination). In the third section, developments in African art and literature are viewed from a perspective of human culture. In the fourth section, the complex set of relationships between Africans and Afro-Americans is opened up for interpretation. And in the final section, the role of social sciences in Africa is discussed.

It is hoped that our concluding on the theme of social science will encourage further study of African topics within the particular disciplinary focus of the student. An argument is made for the contribution of such understanding to the enrichment of human society as a whole.
### PART I: AFRICAN SOCIETY AND CULTURE

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#3. The African Ethnic Mosaic

This lecture will include a broad overview and classification of ethnic patterns in Africa and an introduction to ethnic terminology and concepts. More detailed discussion of basic sociocultural units and ethnicity will be covered in subsequent lectures.

1. Ethnic Distribution and Complexity

Of the 2500-3000 distinct and mutually unintelligible languages in the world, Africa has about 800-1000 (i.e. 33%, with only 10% of the world population). One ethnic classification (Murdock, 1959) identifies 49 culture "provinces", 112 "tribal" clusters and 850 "tribes". The large number of relatively small-scale ethnic communities tells much about the extent and intensity of social communications in traditional Africa and, in addition, is suggestive of the great difficulties of nation-building facing many of the new African states today. Contemporary Nigeria, for example, contains about 200 distinct ethnic groups; Cameroon and Congo, close to 100, depending on the level of classification selected. Although there are certain broad similarities among many of these groups (discussed below), there are just as many differences -- in social structure, economy, language, political organization, etc. -- due in part to ecological differences (e.g. forest vs. grassland) as well as to the uneven geographical impact of innovations in technology and in economic, social and political organization.

It is important to note, however, that Africa contained many large
scale centralized societies. That sub-Saharan Africa was able to create and maintain these larger entities (some with populations in the millions) and in many cases without the aid of written communications or other mechanisms which permitted the growth of large states elsewhere in the world (e.g. the administrative organization associated with large-scale irrigation), is one of the great accomplishments in African history.

Larger scale groups developed in Africa primarily in response to such forces as increased trade and agricultural productivity, population growth, the establishment of centralized authority, the indigenous elaboration of technology, migration and diffusion, and the spread of organized religions such as Islam. The framework for most of African history is therefore not the small scale unit generally called the "tribe", nor the broader cultural and linguistic groups discussed later in this lecture, but the state. Hence the emphasis on states and state formation in the lectures of Part II, Perspectives on the Past. Nevertheless, to understand the historical processes of state formation in Africa and to grasp the nature of traditional African society, one must have some basic knowledge of ethnic group distribution and the broad cultural similarities which can be identified on the ethnic map of Africa.

2. Ethnic Classifications

For general teaching purposes, it is extremely valuable to introduce the student to some of the attempts by various scholars to find order and pattern in the complex African ethnic mosaic. The two following
classifications are probably the most widely used, although several others are available (Murdock, 1959; Baumann and Westermann, 1948; Vansina, 1961).

a. Culture Areas: Herskovits (1962; Ch. 3 includes map) provides one of the simplest and most useful classificatory schemes. He groups together peoples whose traditional ways of life have a high degree of similarity, while attempting to balance a whole range of factors, especially those relating to ecology and institutions. He focuses on a broad level of generalization, sacrificing detail for the larger perspective. His culture areas include: (1) Khoisan (Bushman hunters and gatherers, Hottentot pastoralists); (2) East African Cattle Area (the role of cattle; mixed agriculture); (3) Eastern Sudan ("residual" area; great heterogeneity; a transition zone); (4) East Horn (pastoralism, religion and external contacts); (5) Congo (agriculture, markets and village life; the arts); (6) Guinea Coast (urbanization, economic specialization, high population density); (7) Western Sudan (Islam and herding, cultural cross-roads); (8) Northern areas (desert, North Africa, Egypt). A superimposition of the Herskovits map over one showing major vegetational zones can be found in the frontispiece to Gibbs (1965). For a criticism of the culture area concept, see Bohannan, Africa and Africans, (Ch. 8.).

b. Language Areas: There have been many attempts to classify African languages, but Joseph Greenberg (1955 and 1963) was one of the first to do this based on purely linguistic criteria. Other
classifications were frequently distorted by racial stereotypes, as was true with respect to what has been called the "Hamitic myth". It was widely presumed that many powerful and dominant groups, especially pastoralists, must speak "Hamitic" (="white") languages to signify the source of their power and domination. Thus the Fulani, who provide the ruling aristocracy in the Hausa society of northern Nigeria, were usually classified as Hamitic-speakers, while the Hausa were grouped with supposedly more "primitive" African languages. Due in large part to the work of Greenberg, it has been found that Hausa is actually part of what used to be called the Hamito-Semitic language family (which includes Arabic), while Fulani is grouped in the same family which includes Bantu and West African languages.

The Greenberg classifications (which are discussed and mapped in BERRY) did much to dispel the racial biases which flavored linguistic writings of the past. Based upon a study of "critical" words and their meanings, similarities in grammatical structure and other key linguistic features, Greenberg, in his 1963 classification, identifies four major language families. These may be regarded as equivalent in generality to a category such as the Indo-European language family, which includes English, Sanskrit, Italian, etc. The categories are as follows.

The Congo-Kordofanian family encompasses the Guinea Coast, Congo and most of East African culture areas. Bantu languages are included here, but only as an offshoot of Benue-Congo languages (indicative
of the relatively recent evolution of Bantu as a distinct set of closely related languages). Nevertheless, Bantu speakers cover a larger part of the area of Africa and form a larger proportion of the total population than any other similar linguistic group. (For discussion of Bantu migrations, see Lecture 18). The West Atlantic subfamily of Congo-Kordofanian includes the Fulani, who were formerly classified as "Hamitic" because of their role as pastoral conquerors and their European-like features.

The **Nilo-Saharan** family groups together a wide variety of languages, from Songhai (along the middle Niger) to the languages of the savannah regions of the eastern Sudan and northern East Africa. Note on the map in BERRY the great complexity of languages in the Eastern Sudan, indicative of its important role as a corridor for the movement of people and ideas throughout African history.

The **Afro-Asiatic** family was formerly called "Hamito-Semitic" but this term was discarded by Greenberg. This family interpenetrates with Nilo-Saharan in the Eastern Sudan, reflecting the two-way flow of culture contact in this area. It includes Arabic (Semitic) and Hausa (Chadic) probably the two largest speech communities in Africa. (Especially since most Bantu languages are not mutually intelligible.)

The **Khoisan** family is primarily composed of Bushmen and Hottentot languages, with two small outliers in Tanzania (which reflect the greater areal extent of these peoples in the past.) Most Khoisan languages include "clicks" as an integral part of words. Some nearby Bantu-speakers (e.g. the Xhosa) have also adopted these click sounds.
Chapter 4. The Nature of Ethnicity

This lecture will serve as an introduction to the concept of ethnicity and to the range of aspects of ethnic society in Africa. For a broader introduction to traditional society in Africa, see COHEN.

1. What is an ethnic group?

This question, which is not as simple as it sounds, may best be approached by examining first the various subethnic categories which (together with the ethnic group) form primary units of human group loyalty and identity. The most basic unit is the nuclear family, consisting of a married couple and their children. (See Lecture #9). Beyond the nuclear family, the following groupings can be identified.

a. The extended family consists of two or more nuclear families, joined vertically (e.g. parents and/or horizontally (e.g. cousins). A married adult may be linked to his brothers and sisters, his children, to his parents, and his parents' parents as well. Thus three or four generations, including the nuclear families of fathers and sons (as well as unmarried children) may live under the same roof or in a cluster of adjacent dwellings or may act in other ways as a cohesive unit.

b. The lineage is a corporate group based upon common descent (generally limited to 3-5 generations) and traceable genealogies through either the father (in a patrilineal society) or the mother (in a matrilineal society). The group is assumed to be permanent.
and to a variable extent can hold property as a unit, act as a political unit, a marriage unit, or even an economic unit. It usually has a name (e.g. the family name of the great grandfather) and each member can trace his or her genealogical relations with all others. The lineage can be subdivided or segmented into smaller groups of "closest" genealogical relationship (e.g. extended families).

c. The clan generally consists of several lineages, between which it may be difficult to identify exact genealogical relations but whose members nevertheless consider themselves descended from a common ancestor. A clan may be scattered over wide areas, may or may not act as a corporate group, and may only have a vague notion of common ancestry.

d. The ethnic group is a broad extension of community identity based on an acceptance by self and others of membership in and identification with a society and its culture. It is therefore associated with a whole series of cultural correlates, the most common of which are language, specific descent patterns, social structure and shared values. But since it is based on "feeling" of identity rather than precise genealogies, and may be changeable over time (closely interacting with its human and physical environment) an ethnic group is not always easily identifiable, nor is it always based on exact kinship principles. Also it is not necessarily stable in size, membership or degree of identification.
2. Ethnicity and Group Identity

Ethnicity, which may be defined at this stage as identification with one's ethnic group, is one of the most fundamental categories of human loyalty and organization. In recent years, the term "ethnicity" has come to replace "tribalism" with reference to societies in which kinship or kinship-like relations provide the basis of group identity. The notion of "kinship-like" relations refers to the existence of generalized obligations, some core set of values, and a distinct "we-they" feeling which are similar to the paradigm of "family" in terms of the quality of relationships. (Note the use of such terms as "father", "brothers", etc. in many religious or nationalist movements.) Several addition points should be made about ethnicity.

a. Human beings organize themselves in a variety of ways and each individual, anywhere on earth, usually has a wide range of loyalties and/or identities. An American, for example, may identify in varying degrees with his family, his religious group, his country, his home city or region, etc. Moreover, the relative strength of these loyalties differs from person to person, from place to place and from one time to another. Indeed "American" itself may be an ethnic identity for some people.

b. Most—but certainly not all—traditional societies in Africa were ethnically based, that is they shared a common culture, as well as generated common loyalties and identity. It should also be stressed
that ethnic societies still exist in Africa, as in most parts of the world, and that they exist as positive as well as negative factors with respect to the contemporary problems of new African states.

(See Wallerstein, A. Mercier, 1965.)

c. Although discussed in greater detail in Lecture 5, the adaptive and changeable character of ethnicity must be emphasized. 

Ethnic identity, whether for the African of 1500 or the African of 1970, or, for that matter, the contemporary American or Japanese, is a constantly changing "syndrome" which blends together many different identities.

d. Although ethnicity serves many functions, a primary purpose seems to be "to permit people to organize into social, cultural or political entities able to compete with others for whatever goods and services viewed as valuable in their environment." (Skinner, 1968, p.173.) Thus, as competitive environments change, ethnic identities may change. The following statement by Skinner (1968, p.183) summarizes some of the contemporary relevance of ethnicity, and may be a stimulent to further discussion:

"Some of the names which are now used as symbols for group identity do refer to distinct socio-cultural entities in the past. However, many of the so-called 'tribal' groups were creations of the colonial period. But even those groups for which continuity with the past could be claimed have lost so many of their traditional characteristics that in fact they must be viewed as new entities.

The various groups in contemporary African societies are not competing for ancestral rights or privileges, but for the appurtenances of modern power. In most cases they
seek to control the nation-state where they find themselves, or at worst seek to prevent being dominated by other groups within the state. Even when groups do try to secede from a nation-state, it is not because they prefer small-scale organization per se, but because they believe that a separate organization, or unity with members of the same group across state borders would bring with it a better life.

One of the reasons why Africans rally around descent groups, fictive or otherwise, is that the colonial situation did not provide sufficient scope for the growth and development of those secondary associations which historically have appeared in societies with complex political organizations. The social orders within the more complex traditional African politics decayed during the colonial period. And the incipient classes which began to emerge within the mainly pluralistic colonial society were not strong enough to provide the group identity around which Africans, fighting for political power, could rally. Many an African leader with universalistic values found that he had to appeal to group identity based on descent, if he would galvanize his followers to seek political power, and thus the opportunity to build a modern society."
On the Concept of Tribe and Tribalism

Because of its ambiguous definition, its analytical deficiencies and the pejorative connotations in both popular and scholarly literature, the term "tribe" is being discarded by many social scientists in favor of such less "loaded" terms as "peoples" or "ethnic units". Similarly, "tribalism", with its connotations of primitiveness, atavism and traditionalism is being superseded by the more rigorously defined and analytically useful concept of "ethnicity" to describe the patterns of identity being used by groups competing for power and status in contemporary Africa. To reinforce this trend, neither "tribe" nor "tribalism" will receive much play in this syllabus. But lest "ethnic" and "ethnicity" be construed as mere euphemisms, "tribe" and "tribalism", the weakness of the "tribal" concept must be examined in detail.

1. The Ambiguity of "Tribe"

As a vague referent to peoples among whom kinship or blood ties form the major basis of group identity, the notion of "tribe" may have some value. But this general definition has several faults.

a. It fails to view this form of ethnic identity as a dynamic pattern which can adjust to its immediate position vis-a-vis other organized units and its own local environment. Whatever the "tribe" may be, it is not a constant, immutable unit and it thus becomes nonsense to speak of Africans "reverting to tribalism". Ethnic identities have always been changeable and it therefore is misleading to think of a contemporary identity group as necessarily representing some sacred
b. Secondly, there is the problem of universality. There is no apparent justification for the use of tribe in Africa and not in Europe. Blood ties, real or imagined, and other types of ethnicity are an important basis for societal integration nearly everywhere in the world. Are the Serbians, Polish, Danish or Welsh to be considered tribes? In Africa, there have been no clear guidelines as to what unit should be called a "tribe" and thus the term has been applied indiscriminantly. To say that the Yoruba, Hausa-Fulani and Ibo are the three major "tribes" of Nigeria can not only be uninformative but may be misleading. Thus, "The Ashanti, Baganda, Bakongo, Hausa, Mossi, Ngoni, Songhay, Yoruba and other societies represented the end product of political and other socio-cultural processes by which different ethnic groups have been welded together. All of these societies were internally differentiated, even though class and associations often had a kinship base or were expressed in kinship terms." (Skinner, 1968, pp.172-3.)

c. Also confusing has been the tendency to define African "tribes" by sociocultural characteristics. Such socio-cultural criteria may include any combination of the following: common territory, language, common cultural values, genealogical relationship, cooperation in ceremonial, economic or political organization. But there is no reason to assume coincidence of these features both with one another or with the unit of ethnic identification. These characteristics are important and usually closely associated with ethnicity, but do not
in themselves identify a "tribe". These criteria appear to be hypotheses rather than "real world" social boundaries. (See Fried, 1968, and Dole, 1968).

2. Popular misconceptions regarding "tribe"

Some of the difficulties which have developed around the concept of "tribe" and "tribalism" include the following:

a. "Tribe" has come to be a pejorative term, synonymous with primitive, atavistic society which resists all change, particularly that associated with "modernization". This connotation has proven highly insulting to Africans, particularly when applied to all African societies prior to colonial conquest.

b. Related to the above is the view that prior to the colonial period, most Africans lived in mutually hostile small groups. This fails to take into account the extremely wide range of organized political societies that existed in Africa prior to European penetration, as well as the very complex processes of change and development initiated by Africans themselves or by non-European outsiders. (See Lecture #34 on Modernization.)

c. Finally, "tribalism" is sometimes viewed as responsible for all contemporary problems in Africa. This view both belittles the significant changes which occurred during and prior to the colonial period as well as oversimplifies the reasons for the struggles going on in Africa today. It also fails to recognize the positive contributions of ethnic groups in modern African politics, or the possibility of multiple identities, (e.g. national and ethnic) which are not incompatible.

3. Analytical Deficiencies of "Tribe"

a. Problems of political evolution: the "tribe" has often been
considered a necessary stage between the hunting band and the centralized state in the evolution of political organization. This view is most associated with the work of M.D. Sahlins (1961) and E.R. Service (1962). More recent views (see especially Fried, 1968) have challenged this idea of evolutionary development.

b. Problems of ethnic unit classification: Anthropologists have become increasingly interested in cross-cultural analysis and this has required the identification of comparable units, (See Naroll, 1964 and Fried) The concept of "tribe" has thus far proven of little or no use in this respect because of the logical inconsistencies involved in its definition and usage, (e.g. the lumping of religious groups, language groups, urban groups and territorial locations.)

c. Relevance to the contemporary world: Perhaps the most serious deficiency in the concept of tribe from the viewpoint of social science. is the inadequacy of "tribalism" in dealing with contemporary and even "modern" identity groups, especially those identities which are emerging in the large urban centers of Africa. Ethnicity seems a more appropriate concept than tribalism, detribalism, supertribalism, or retribalization in dealing with urban phenomena.
§6. The Changing Nature of Ethnic Boundaries

1. The Dynamic Nature of Ethnicity in Traditional African Societies

Among other things, ethnic identification is an adaptive mechanism which reflects both internal and external perceptions of group membership at a particular point in time. The African communities which engendered such identity were frequently in a state of flux—cohesive communities were appearing and disappearing, blending and breaking off as a result of an almost continuous series of changes in inter-group relations, including trade, competition for land and animals, migration, and warfare. Conflict and fighting took place not only between ethnically unrelated groups, but within groups which shared a common cultural and even genealogical background as well. This does not mean that there was no underlying framework of community boundary stability. Social boundaries were generally constant within the short run, and clearly identifiable, but they were also sufficiently permeable to permit peaceful absorption of outside groups when the situation arose. Clusters of related peoples developed a veneer of unity based upon sets of linkages which cut across kinship lines and, although these linkages did not always prevent internal conflict, they did provide a structure for cooperative action against outside adversaries. The key feature was an adaptability which permitted relative autonomy for small-scale communities in times of peace but also allowed for a complex system of combination and cooperation when there was stress. (Turnbull, 1964). The volume by Cohen and Middleton (From Tribe to Nation in Africa 1969), explores these patterns of ethnic boundary change in more detail.
2. Ethnicity and Political Evolution

Certain social scientists have viewed all political evolution as a progression from hunting band, to "tribe", to chiefdom, to state, with the major transformation taking place when society shifts from being kinship-organized to being territorially organized and expressed. This transformation, which produces the "state" as a form of socio-political organization, is symbolized by the changes, for example, in the title of French kings from the Merovingian "King of the Franks" to the Capelian "King of France". The equivalent in Africa might be the Emperor of Ethiopia, who is still regarded as "King of Kings", signifying his role as head of the Amharic community and as leader of all the other Kingdoms in Ethiopia. Sahlins (1968, Ch.1) discusses this subject of state formation in detail and elaborates on the shift from "kinship to territory." According to Sahlins:

"The critical development was not the establishment of territoriality in society, but the establishment of society as a territory. The state and its subdivisions are organized as territories—territorial entities under public authorities—as opposed, for instance, to kinship entities under lineage chiefs" (p. 6).

This view has been challenged in recent years, particularly in the seminal articles by Fried and others, (Essays on the Problem of Tribe, 1968). This challenge has not been directed against the "kinship to territory" shift per se but instead has focused on two first, the role of "tribal" organization as a necessary step in political evolution; and secondly, the tendency to view kinship-based organization as a static phenomenon rather than an adaptive reaction which persists throughout the entire evolutionary process. According to Fried:
"...tribes as political structures are ad hoc responses to ephemeral situations of competition...tribes seem to be secondary phenomena in a very specific sense: they may well be the product of processes stimulated by the appearance of relatively highly organized societies amidst other societies which are organized much more simply. If this can be demonstrated, tribalism can be viewed as a reaction to the formation of complex political structure rather than a necessary preliminary stage in its evolution." (Fried, 1968, p. 15).

In this view, therefore, the "tribe" is primarily a reaction formation by a people to external forces. There is no reason, however, not to include internal forces as well. The important point is that this process of solidification, consolidation, fusion as well as fission is a continual one and is not erased with the formation of the state. This further supports the avoidance of the terms "tribe" and "tribalism" which too often form part of an oversimplified dichotomy. Ethnicity, in contrast, provides a more analytical perspective on the overall process and allows for the persistence of kinship-based organization as one of several forces which promote group identity in both the ancient and modern worlds.

Examples of ethnic change are found in all parts of Africa. One good example are the Hausa of northern Nigeria. With the introduction of Islam in Hausaland in the fifteenth century, those peoples who accepted Islam were called Hausa, and those who did not remained Maguzawa. This process of "fission" essentially divided the "Hausa" community into two ethnic societies. On the other hand, in the
nineteenth century, after the Fulani conquest, the merger of the
urban Hausa and Fulani produced or "fused" a new group which has
been called Hausa-Fulani. In more recent times, the Hausa-Fulani have
absorbed many other northern ethnic groups into a "northern" (some-
times called "Hausa" in a broad sense) ethnicity, as a result of
competition and confrontation with "southern Nigerians" (see Melson

It is clear that ethnic boundaries are not constant but change to
accommodate or react to a given situation. In "ethnic Africa", group
identity was and is fluid and it is frequently difficult to distinguish
clearly one group from another because of their "transitional" nature.
It should be stressed very strongly that new vehicles for group identity
and socio-political integration had appeared well before the colonial
period. Large-scale states and empires developed throughout Africa
from earliest times. The factors of Islam, organized trading systems,
language spread, etc., acted to create new frameworks for identification
long before the imposition of colonial boundaries acted to "freeze"
(to some extent) the dynamism of African ethnicity.

3. Plural Societies and National Pluralism

We have stressed above the importance of inter-ethnic contact in
the formation and adaptation of ethnic boundaries. It is important to
recognize, however, that this process of adaptation did not always
result in a blending of one group with another, and that in many cases
distinct ethnic groups retained their identities and interacted with
each other in a variety of ways. This inter-ethnic contact has occurred in traditional non-state contexts, in traditional state contexts, and in modern national state contexts.

In traditional non-state contexts, the most frequent form of cooperative interaction was trade and economic division of labor. This could occur within a particular location, where several ethnic groups shared a common market, or it could occur between two separate territorial areas, as between pastoralists and agriculturalists.

Within a traditional state system, the interaction was usually economic and political. A common market system was shared, and there was some linkage between the political decision-makers—all relevant ethnic groups. (Even between the Fulani and Hausa in the Sokoto Caliphate, or the Tutsi and Hutu in Rwanda). In some cases there was also social contact (e.g. intermarriage, or breakdown of residential segregation), but in most cases there was not, since this tends to be related to "assimilation" rather than "pluralism".

Contemporary events in Africa may lead to the relative submergence of ethnic ties beneath the broader umbrella of the national state. (see Lecture #54.) This was true in an earlier period in European history (e.g. the unification of the Teutonic ethnic groups into Germany) and to some extent is still occurring in Europe (e.g. the breaking down of barriers between various cultural-linguistic groups in Spain). However, many states in Africa and elsewhere have not attempted to break down the identity groups which constitute their polity,
Rather, they have sought to accommodate a multi-ethnic, or multi-national, or "pluralistic" national state. This topic will be discussed in detail in Part IV.

In all three types of multi-ethnic contexts mentioned above (traditional non-state, traditional state, or modern national state), the variety of types of inter-ethnic interaction is perhaps similar. An interesting diagrammatic presentation of the varieties of response to intersocietal contact, ranging from peripheral contact, to pluralism, to full integration, can be found in Banton, (1968, Ch. 4.) Although this study deals primarily with race, the diagrams are equally applicable to the present discussion of ethnicity.

<table>
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<th>Peripheral Contact (e.g., &quot;silent trade&quot; in which people exchange goods without actually meeting).</th>
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<td>(b)</td>
<td>Institutionalized Contact - largely a peripheral contact based upon some institutionalized meeting point (e.g. trade, conflict).</td>
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<td>(c)</td>
<td>Acculturation - a partial merging, with the weaker society making more adjustments than the stronger, and accepting some of the outward manifestations of identity of the dominant group.</td>
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Domination - a "single" society with two categories distinguished primarily by non-ethnic characteristics (income, education, religion, etc.).

Paternalism - "A specialized form of institutional contact depending, unlike domination, upon maintaining the distinctiveness of the interacting societies"

Integration - A reduction in ethnic identity and stratification and the establishment of larger unity based upon associational ties.

Pluralism - Ethnicity far more important as indicator of roles and behavior than in integrated situation. Nevertheless, a larger order exists--but without the clear dominant-subordinant relation of (d).

Several points should be made about these diagrams:

1. The circles are themselves highly variable, reflecting the adaptive nature of ethnicity.

2. The relationships described may be aids for the later lectures.
on nation-building, but should not be regarded as the only way to conceptualize ethnic relations, nor even the primary way which will be used or suggested in later sections of this syllabus.

(3.) No implied directionality should be attributed to the sequence or development of inter-ethnic contact, from one "stage" to another.
Modern Variants of Ethnicity

It might be appropriate to conclude this section on ethnicity in Africa by exploring the relevance of ethnicity on the contemporary scene. As already emphasized, ethnicity is a dynamic form of human group identity. The following is a very brief overview of some variants of ethnicity in contemporary Africa.

1. Urban Ethnicity

The rate of urbanization in Africa is among the highest in the world (see Lectures 44, 45, 46). As part of this process, rural migrants of many different ethnic backgrounds often find themselves in a context in which not only are their cultural values under pressure to adapt to the new environment (see Wallerstein, 1960) but also their ethnic identities are perceived differently, both by themselves, and by others. Thus, migrants to the copper mining towns of Zambia, who came originally from Nyasaland (now Malawi) found that they were considered as a single ethnic identity group (regardless of their original ethnicity), by the inhabitants of urban areas. (see Epstein, 1958 and 1967)

Since the urban context frequently contains ethnic residential groupings, an urban migrant would find that he might be ascribed one ethnic identity during his working hours and another during his evening hours at home. This illustrates the idea of "situational ethnicity" which is critical to understanding modern patterns of ethnic identity. Thus, depending on the situation in which a person found himself, his ethnicity might change. Needless to add, if a migrant returned to his original home outside the city, he would probably be ascribed his
"original" identity. It is important to recognize that multiple or situational identities do not necessarily indicate a particular pattern of cultural or personal values. It is important to distinguish between identities, values, and loyalties.

The idea of multiple identities, especially in an urban context, may be illustrated in northern Nigeria by the variety of terms which may be used to describe types of community identity. Thus people from Kano City are called Kanawa (perhaps equivalent to "Bostonian"); at the same time, a person may be identified as a member of a particular lineage such as the (Fulani) Sullubawa (perhaps equivalent to being a "Kennedy") or as a speaker of a certain language such as Hausa, (which is primarily a "language" group) (perhaps equivalent to being part of the "Spanish-speaking" community in an American city). He may also be identified by his rural home town (e.g. Shirawa people from the village of Shiko.)

2. Regional Ethnicity

Just as the urban context can provide the basis for "situational" ethnicity, so may the regional context. Regional ethnicity, however, is complicated by the fact that regionalism is territorially defined and in its purest form may go well beyond real or even imaginary ethnic ties. The relationships between regionalism and ethnicity provide an exciting, but very complex, field of current social science research. Much of what is usually called "tribalism" in Africa is often a non-ethnically based regionalism or at least a form of identity which goes well beyond ethnic ties. Contemporary politics in Nigeria, Ghana, Uganda, Kenya, and in fact most African states are filled with constant
reference to "Northerners" and "Southerners," the "Easterners," the "Middle-Westerners" or "Midwesterners." Much of the "tribal" politics in the Congo-Kinshasa, as another example, was more accurately "regional."

Skinner (1963) notes: "Interestingly enough, regionalism rather than tribalism is turning out to be the object of group identity and exclusiveness below the national state level in many African countries. Perhaps this appears to be so, since Africans, often ashamed of 'tribalism', readily accept the 'region' as the basis of group loyalty and identification." This notion may be interesting to explore in greater detail with students.

3. Language and Ethnicity

A mutually intelligible language is usually one of the strongest foundations of ethnicity. But whereas ethnic groups are language groups, language groups need not be ethnic groups. The relation between language and ethnicity, while being very close, is also highly variable. In fact, language groups undergo processes of fission and fusion similar to ethnic groups. Hymes (1968) comments on this relationship in general and his examples (largely non-African) are very useful. Ethnic identity may be built around language similarity, as seems to be happening in the "Arab world," or language may be a symbol of ethnic cohesion, as perhaps in Yorubaland.

As has been pointed out in several of the ESSAYS, the colonial impact in Africa often created larger-scale units of sub-national identity than had traditionally existed. Groups such as the Ewe of Ghana or the Kikuyu of Kenya came to think of themselves as a single
unit primarily during the colonial period. Most frequently, language similarity provided the outer "boundary" of this expansion, i.e., formerly autonomous units grouped together (due to both internal and external influences) within broad linguistic limits. It should also be noted, however, that this process was not only generated by colonial contact. The Hausa, the Swahili, the Bangola, and many other "ethnic" groups in Africa are really conglomerations of peoples who have adopted the same language, and secondarily may share other characteristics such as religion. Although a strong Hausa identity may exist (in certain situations) among these conglomerated groups, it may be more accurate to refer to "Hausa-speaking peoples." Alternatively, it becomes rather absurd to talk of the Hausa as a "tribe."

4. Other Forms of Ethnicity

From this lecture as well as the preceding ones, it becomes clear that ethnicity in traditional as well as contemporary Africa is highly "situational" in that it can be reshaped to fit a great variety of conditions and contexts. Beyond the fluid traditional milieu and the interrelationships between language and ethnicity, contemporary variants of ethnicity may be associated with the following contexts and/or criteria, (using examples from Hausa):
### Situation/Criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation/Criteria</th>
<th>Example (From Hausa-speaking people)</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) urban locational</td>
<td>Kanawa</td>
<td>people from Kano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) regional locational</td>
<td>Arewa</td>
<td>people from &quot;the North&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) national locational</td>
<td>Mutum Nijeriya (who also might be Hausa)</td>
<td>people from Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) religious</td>
<td>Maguzawa</td>
<td>non-muslim : Hausa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) occupational</td>
<td>e.g. (blacksmith)</td>
<td>guild-clan in Kano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) matrimonial/lineage</td>
<td>Sullubawa (a family group)</td>
<td>lineage becomes especially important at time of marriage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) socio-cultural</td>
<td>Hausa</td>
<td>people who dress in particular way, and who are muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) language</td>
<td>Hausa</td>
<td>people who speak Hausa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One of the implications to be derived from these observations is that ethnicity, in its many forms, is not simply a pre-modern basis of human group identity which must be erased in the modernization process. Indeed, one of the exciting challenges facing Africa is how to use ethnic identity most effectively as a means of creating and maintaining stable political units able to encourage and sustain rapid economic development.
As outlined in DALTON, traditional economic systems in Africa reflected the basic nature of ethnic society. Economies were generally small in scale and relatively undifferentiated in that economic functions were not very specialized nor distinct from other societal functions (e.g., religious or political). Yet an enormous diversity existed in types of economic organization, levels of technology, dependability of production, and in nearly all facets of economic life. There was an absence of machine technology and applied science, an overwhelming emphasis on subsistence production, and, with very few exceptions, no large scale resource or product markets beyond the local level. (See Bohannon and Dalton, 1965). Whereas market exchange is the major mechanism integrating modern capitalist economies, traditional economic systems in Africa were held together by a form of redistribution called "reciprocity", defined by Dalton as "two-way transfers (gifts and counter-gifts) of goods, money, and services induced by a social relationship between the gift partners." It is with this form of reciprocal exchange and its changing role under the impact of modernization that much of the study of economic anthropology is concerned. (For more detail on this subject, see the works of Karl Polanyi, especially those in Dalton, 1968) The remainder of this lecture will be devoted to several additional aspects of traditional economies not covered in DALTON.

1. Ecology and agriculture

   African agriculture has always suffered from rainfall problems--
too much, too little, or too variable and undependable. In addition, the general poverty of tropical African soils has hindered agriculture. Most tropical soils are very low in humus (due to the rapid decomposition of organic material), are easily leached (thus reducing their mineral content), and are thin and rapidly exhausted. In most savanna and rainforest areas, the relatively insoluble minerals such as iron and aluminum frequently become compacted into "laterite", which is more a rock than a soil. (Although as such may be used as an "adobe" for building houses.) Pure laterite has been called a "pedological leprosy" and "utterly infertile." Faced with these conditions, African farmers outside the few favored areas (e.g., certain volcanic highlands, river valleys, and such areas as southern Uganda) practiced a form of shifting agriculture or bush fallowing. A piece of land would be cleared and usually burned, the ashes providing some extra fertilization, and then cropped for several years until exhausted. The plot was then left fallow for from five to thirty years, with the farmers moving on to another plot. In most cases, the first plot would be returned to after the fallow period. This is a land-exhausting system and has been frequently criticized as a form of "robber economy." Many scholars today, however, consider this system to be a suitable if not inevitable adjustment to environmental conditions given a low level of technology.

2. Patterns of mobility

COHEN, drawing from a large sample of African societies, provides a useful categorization of settlement patterns and mobility in Africa.
The variations he identifies are associated not only with different economies but also with differences in kinship systems, political organization, and other aspects of ethnic society. Cohen estimates that about 3/4ths of African societies have been locationally stable communities, the rest being partially or wholly mobile. A more detailed breakdown is as follows:

### Settlement patterns in Africa

- **10%** - fully nomadic migratory groups with no permanent settlements
- **8%** - seasonally nomadic groups; some fixed settlements
- **4%** - groups which shift between alternative fixed settlements
- **2%** - groups with fixed but impermanent settlements; move after a period
- **27%** - dispersed settlements; fixed, permanent, but not concentrated
- **9%** - small settlement clusters forming local communities
- **36%** - larger, village-type communities, ethnically organized
- **4%** - complex urban communities with some hierarchization in size and function

### Land and territory

African attitudes toward the land is one of the most widely misunderstood aspects of traditional Africa. Here again the confusion arises out of the attempt to transplant Western attitudes to the African context. Perhaps the best general statement on this problem can be found in Bohanan (1964, ch.11). Bohanan points out that, whereas in Western societies land is considered a "thing" or commodity which can be bought and sold like other marketable commodities, Africans regard...
space and land as a basis for regulating social relationships. The organization and "ownership" of space is viewed in terms of social relationships and the positioning of social groups. Africans did not partition their space into parcels but considered it a reflection of their social system. In some cases, specific locations were given particular recognition and either economic or ritual meaning—rain shrines, ancestor's or saint's graves, wells, etc. This provided the key link between social and territorial organization. In other cases, the social-territorial link was more direct. In contrast to the rigidly partitioned, precisely bounded Western map, Africans mapped space genealogically instead of in terms of property and values. Rights to use particular pieces of land depended upon the kinship structure and were constantly changing. This flexibility was true not only at the local level but also for whole ethnic groups. Because of constantly changing territorial "boundaries," it is extremely difficult to map (in the Western sense) the distribution of ethnic groups in Africa.

"Ownership" as known in the West was extremely rare in Africa if it existed at all. Because of their distinctive perspective towards space, Africans were more flexible in the way they organized and allocated rights to use land. There was no "contractual" basis to rigidify the system. Frequently, the term "communal ownership" (vs. individual ownership or title) has been applied to African land use systems, but as Bohannan notes, even this is inaccurate and "farcical."
In nearly all African societies, nobody "owned" land, but a man was given rights to use land as part of his position within a kinship system. These rights of usage (or "usufruct") to a farm sufficient to support his immediate dependents were inalienable but only insofar as he was part of the social-territorial group in that area. Land, therefore, could not be "sold" in traditional Africa for it was not a commodity but an integral part of the whole social structure. As one might imagine, these contrasting views toward the land caused enormous misunderstanding during the colonial period. In certain parts of eastern and southern Africa, European settlers had purchased huge tracts of land, while African leaders believed they had simply permitted temporary rights of usage for pieces of territory not in current use. Some contrasting views of land tenure in Africa are given in Jomo Kenyatta, *Facing Mount Kenya*; Meek, *Land Tenure*; Cohen, *The Kenyan of Bukuyu* p. 79-80; and E. Winter, *Bwamba Economy*. These studies are primarily involved in challenging the widespread simplification of "communal" land tenure by illustrating the degree to which land tenure in parts of Africa often resembled Western notions of "individual" ownership. There is little attention given, however, to the varying perceptions of space and territory in most of Africa.
#9. Family and Kinship

In traditional African society, with its emphasis on social relations, kinship is often the predominant principle of local organization. Kinship, as the criterion for relating individuals, is based upon a recognition either of common ancestry or linkage through marriage; like marriage, genealogical ties between people must be socially recognized, which introduces the concept of "fictive" kinship. This is the case of a formerly unrelated person who is incorporated into a particular category of kinship and is treated and behaves in an appropriate manner. For example, a boy may be brought into a man’s house as an apprentice, with the father/son relationship as a natural and enduring consequence and recognized as such “real” kin and society at large. Kinship is most easily discussed by breaking it down into three main constituents: family, marriage and descent. In many respects the mother/child bond is the basis of the kinship network and forms the nucleus of the family, whose specific type is determined by the rules of marriage and descent. As such, the distinction between family, marriage and descent is somewhat artificial as the three are interdependent and overlapping.

1. Family

A family may be either **nuclear** - a married couple and their children - or **extended** - a married couple, their children, their parents, their children's spouses and children and/or other kin. The nuclear family consists of two bonds - the **affinal** (husband/wife) and **consanguineal**
(blood relationship, i.e. sibling and parent/child). As pointed out in COHEN, most African families are organized around the household, which may or may not be based exclusively on kinship, but which is usually based on some combination of nuclear and extended families. A household is a domestic group - it shares residence and food - and its cycle follows the life cycle of its members. In its expansionist phase, the household may be augmented by the birth of real members or by the incorporation of outsiders; the latter may include foster children, who either retain their genealogical tie to their personal kinship relations or who are incorporated in the fictive manner.

Family residence location is of considerable social importance, and usually follows definite rules. The majority of African societies are patrilocal (living with the husband's family); Some are matrilocal (living with the wife's family), and a few are duolocal (with either) or neolocal (taking up new residence). Residence rules are usually contingent upon environmental factors, economy patterns, descent rules and marriage rules. Once again, households may expand as the result of rules of residence or other social behavior; e.g. in societies with formal age-grades (i.e., a clearly prescribed set of functions and obligations associated with particular age groups) as among the Nuer, Nyakyusa and others, boys move in and out of different residences at prescribed times.

2. Marriage

Traditional African marriage may be viewed from two vantage points -
that of the married pair and that of the community, with the two generally keyed into each other. A particular society may attach great value to *polygynous marriage* (i.e. the man having more than one wife) rather than *monogamous marriage* (one man, one wife). In Africa, the majority of societies in fact do prefer polygyny, and their members generally endorse the practice whenever it is economically feasible. Although it may appear as an extravagance, for a "big man" who maintains a busy schedule of entertaining, it may be cheaper in the long run to have the extra help and the option of parcelling-out household and economic chores. Still, most marriages in Africa are probably monogamous.

Furthermore, not only number of marriage partners but the categories from which they are selected may reflect a distinction between individual behavior (or options) and societal preferences. Thus, an individual (usually termed "ego") may either marry *endogamously* (within a stipulated group) or *exogamously* (outside of a stipulated group). A given community may reflect an exogamous rule of marriage yet make allowances for individual preferences. Both perspectives are important and tie into each other through the generally accepted principle of marriage as alliance formation.

In traditional African society, marriage is less a link-up of two people than it is an alliance of two groups. As mentioned previously, African societies tend to favor polygynous marriage; where this is not of the sororal type (plural marriage to sisters), it institutes a tie-up of at least three separate groups of kin, thereby increasing
the number of people one can count on in time of need. By the same token, since in most African societies a man can make demands upon group members, to marry endogamously simply duplicates or reinforces these ties; but to marry exogamously increases one's circle of support.

Closely tied in with this concept of alliance is the exchange of goods or services which in effect seal the bargain. Thus, for example, in the East African cattle culture area, cattle ownership is prestigious and the animal has not only economic but symbolic value. Where a cow is so highly prized, giving a stipulated number of head as bridewealth provides sanctions against marriage dissolution and by extension, the cutting of ties.

3. Descent

Genealogical relationships are calculated on a basis of biologically traceable links. However, certain blood links (or even "imaginary" blood linkages) may assume a special importance in the perception and social organization of descent. It is through the rules of descent that possessions, rights and obligations are passed from generation to generation.

Traditionally, there are two main types of descent rules. (1) unilinear descent is reckoned through relationship to one parent. This can be either matrilineal (uterine), with the relationship network operating through female links as with the Ashanti of Ghana; or patrilineal (agnatic), with the relationship network operating through
male links as with the Yoruba of Nigeria. Patrilineal descent is predominant in Africa. (2) Bilateral descent relationships, which are less common in Africa, are based not on a single line of descent (either patrilineal or matrilineal) but through both parents (and through them to four grandparents). Thus, ego traces kinship to all of his matrilineal and patrilineal forebears. An example would be the Yaku people in Nigeria.

In short, descent groups result from those people who share the same inherited rights. Returning to the principle of fictive kinship, it may also include those who have been incorporated from outside. Thus, for example, among the Nuer, there is a practice of absorbing stranger Dinkas into the lineage structure and they and their descendents are recognized as full-fledged members with the accompanying rights and duties.

A lineage, which is a unilineal descent group that is generally localized and can trace its genealogical links, not infrequently forms the core of a new community. Among the Yao, a brother and his sisters (a branch of the matrilineage) set up their own village, which is known by the name of the matrilineage, even though it eventually takes on a different character through absorption (i.e. affinity and fictive kinship) of others.
#10. Traditional Political Systems

1. Basic characteristics

Traditional political systems cover a very wide range, from the small scale, family-structured hunting band (e.g. Bushmen) to the large scale states and empires. (see COHEN and HOLDEN.) Since many of the larger kingdoms and states will be discussed in lectures 16-31, the focus in this lecture will be on small scale societies.

a. Lack of differentiation of political sector: Characteristic of most traditional political systems is the lack of clear distinctions between political roles and functions and economic, social or religious activities. Specialized "politicians" were rare, since political leadership was often inextricably associated with economic, social and religious leadership as well. This relative lack of differentiation (or specialization) is one of the most important aspects of traditional society all over the world.

b. The role of kinship: Kinship is the basic social and political fabric of traditional society in most of Africa (as noted in lectures 5-8). Yet, one might consider kinship along with other important factors affecting the nature of political systems: ecology (COHEN); territorial identification (Sahlins, 1968); population density (Stevenson 1968); and the role of "associational" ties not based on ethnicity in the emergence of the state (Krader, 1968).

c. Non-centralization: Although historians have generally given less attention to the so-called "stateless" societies in Africa than to centralized states and kingdoms (Collines, 1968), the former have been a common subject
for political anthropologists, (see Fortes, Evans Pritchard,1940; Middleton and Tait,1958). These societies had few or no specialized institutions or roles of a specifically political nature (e.g., chiefs, courts or councils). At first these societies were thought to have no system or government at all (especially vis-a-vis the African kingdom or state). Later, new questions were asked about how certain political functions were carried out and it was realized that political activities were indeed being performed - the resolution of conflict, the distribution of valuables, decision-making regarding sustenance activities. Some interesting questions to investigate regarding these societies include: (a) how are law and order and security from external attack maintained? (b) how are problems discussed and decisions reached on matters concerning the whole society or a large part of it? (c) who are the leaders (formal or informal)? (d) what is the nature of leadership, influence, authority and succession to authority? These questions might be examined using some of the many available case studies which draw on African examples. (Cohen and Middleton, 1967; Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, 1940; Middleton and Tait, 1958, etc.).

2. Types of African Political systems

There have been numerous typologies of African political systems and most are cited in the Bibliography. There is by no means a universal agreement on any one typology and the composite categorization outlined below must be viewed as a heuristic outline rather than an authoritative conclusion. (To put the African context in wider perspective, see

a. **Hunting bands** are simple egalitarian societies using hunting and gathering techniques to derive a livelihood (e.g. Bushmen, Pygmies). Such bands may be further subdivided into societies based on (1) family organization, with an occasional larger hunting unit under a temporary leader; (2) exogamous patrilocal bands; (3) composite and endogamous bands. Population densities, availability of food supplies and degree of political activity generally increase from (1) to (3).

b. **Acephalous communities**: Dependence upon agriculture and/or pastoralism contributes to a larger scale community, wider economic and political activities and the beginnings of a functional differentiation of society. Kinship, however, remains the basic glue holding such societies together. Like bands, the acephalous (i.e. "leaderless") communities lack formal centralization and are basically egalitarian, although certain elements of ranking become important and in some groups an incipient structure of authority and leadership can be identified. Among the many varieties of acephalous ethnic communities are the following. (1) Those which feature age-set systems, varying in the degree to which the age-set organization cuts across the various subgroupings of the society. With a large population and an organization cutting across many village groups or clan units (e.g. the Nyakyusa of Tanzania) these societies approximate certain aspects of chiefdoms. (2) Those which are based on a village or council ward. These vary
with the degree of authority at the village as distinct from the ward level, which in turn is usually related to the amount of inter-village hostility in the local area. When hostility is high, it is likely that the village rather than the smaller ward will be the center of political life. (3) Those which are based on segmentary lineage systems. These vary by the depth of genealogical reckoning and the degree of physical mobility. Generally, the more mobile groups (e.g. pastoralists like the Somali) depend most heavily upon lineage ties to keep the society together. Less mobile groups can depend more on residential or locality ties.

c. Chiefdoms: This is one of the more controversial types of political system. Kinship still remains the most powerful unifying factor, but society is centralized and at least partially stratified along functional (vs. kinship) lines—that is, specialized groups of rulers, "bureaucrats", religious and military leaders, begin to emerge. Several anthropologists (e.g. Fried, 1967) consider these societies to be the most "fragile" of political types, tending to move either in the direction of acephalous society or toward the fully centralized state. Many scholars consider the need for more coordinated control and direction growing out of trade and increased interaction between ethnic groups to have been a major factor in the genesis of the chiefdom.

d. Centralized states; Many of the characteristics of African state formation will be discussed in later lectures. An excellent survey of this subject can be found in Lloyd's, "The Political Structure of
African Kingdoms" (1965) which could provide the basis for further class discussion. Lloyd stresses both the variety and complexity of African kingdoms and introduces criteria by which kingdoms may be characterized. The two major dimensions used to differentiate African kingdoms are as follows: (1) the degree of autonomy of local groups (which generally decreases with social complexity, thereby increasing the number of levels of superior/subordinate relations); and (2) the mode of recruitment into politically relevant roles (which is a central focus in the Lloyd article).
BERRY clearly represents the two major interests of contemporary linguists working in Africa: to make statements about languages and linguistic patterns in general, hopefully as part of general linguistic theory (as in his discussion of multilingualism, language shifts, language classification, etc.); and to describe specific languages, and language-use situations (e.g. grammars, the differential usage of specific languages in multilingual areas). Since several of the points raised by BERRY have already been discussed in other lectures (e.g. language classification in #3), this lecture will concentrate on some of the special features of African languages and linguistic systems. Many of the following characteristics are not exclusive to Africa, but together they clearly distinguish African languages from those elsewhere.

1. Linguistic diversity

Perhaps only aboriginal South America and New Guinea rival tropical Africa in terms of linguistic complexity. There are nearly 1,000 distinct indigenous languages (not including dialects) on the continent. Few modern African states, therefore, approach linguistic homogeneity. Nigeria alone contains almost 200 languages. The following table provides some contemporary estimates on the number of languages and major language for each of the sub-Saharan African states.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Botswana</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Tswana</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Burundi</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Rundi</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Cameroon</td>
<td>F/E</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Ewondo</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. C.A.R.</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Sango</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
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<td>5. Chad</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>40</td>
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<td>6. Congo-Br.</td>
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<td>Kongo</td>
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<td>7. Congi-Ki.</td>
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<td>61</td>
<td>Kongo</td>
<td>30</td>
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<td>8. Dahomey</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<td>9. Ethiopia</td>
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<td>12. Ghana</td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>Akan (Twi)</td>
<td>57</td>
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<td>13. Guinea</td>
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<td>Fulani</td>
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<td>14. I. Coast</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>Agni</td>
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<td>15. Kenya</td>
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<td>Name of Major Vernacular Language</td>
<td>Percent of Total Population, Speakers of Major Vernacular Language (1964)</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Somali</td>
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1. Predominant European Language (E-English, F-French)
2. Number of major vernacular languages
3. Name of major vernacular language
4. Percent of total population, speakers of major vernacular language (1964)

2. **Multilingualism**

Most Africans speak more than one language. BERRY briefly reviews some of the reasons why Africa is the most multilingual area in the world—the spread of lingua francas as a means of fostering wider communication among diverse linguistic groups being perhaps the most important. Apart from European languages, some of the major "regional" languages of Africa (i.e., languages spoken by a large number of people from different ethnic groups and often with varying first languages) include Swahili (Tanzania, Kenya, and parts of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, eastern Congo-Kinshasa, northern Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique), Hausa (northern Nigeria and throughout West Africa), Arabic (throughout Northern Africa), Amharic (Ethiopia), Pidgin (along the Guinea coast of West Africa), Mande (western Sudanic belt), Lingala (Congo-Kinshasa), Sango (Gabon and C.A.R.), and Zulu (South Africa).

3. **Distinctive sounds**

For a fuller discussion of sounds, see Berry and Greenberg (1959). African languages may include clicks, (interestingly displayed on a popular record, "The Click Song," by Miriam Makeba), the simultaneous labiovelar (kp, bg); simple vowel and consonant systems (i.e. nearly each vowel or consonant having just one sound); a few diphthongs or "abnormal" vowels such as those with umlauts); common initial sounds combining nasal plus voiced stop (Nkrumah, Mboya); and the almost universal use of tone (words are often spelled exactly the same but differ entirely in tonality and meaning.) The tonality of African language is what enables "talking drums" to exist.
The drummer, by altering the tones of his drumming, can imitate the sequence of tones in familiar phrases and sentences, thereby communicating with his audience.

4. Distinctive morphology and semantics

The complex noun classification of Bantu languages, with root terms modified in meaning by adding various prefixes and suffixes, is a common morphological characteristic of many African languages (e.g., Ganda: Buganda, the country; Baganda, the people, Mугanda, an individual; Luganda, the language, etc.). Bantu is actually Ba-ntu the generalized plural form of ntu, or mtu, meaning person. Berry and Greenberg also discuss the many idioms and metaphorical terms distinctive to African languages.
#12. Conceptual Systems and Religion

Before dealing with specifically African conceptual systems, the general topic should be discussed. Albert defines a conceptual system as "a pattern of beliefs and values that define a way of life and the world in which men act, judge, decide, and solve problems." As such, it is equivalent to world view. Every individual has a manner of grasping and comprehending the realities of his world, and this world view is generally a function of the culture to which he belongs. Related to this is mythopoea - the formulation and enactment of myths. This so-called mythopoeic mentality should not be discredited. Its stuff is made up of events and experiences of daily life; its differentiation from science, according to Levi-Strauss (Structural Anthropology, p. 227) "lies not in the quality of the intellectual process, but in the nature of the things to which it is applied... the improvement of scientific thought lies, not in the alleged progress of man's mind, but in the discovery of new areas to which it may apply its unchanged and unchanging powers."

1. Conceptual systems

A conceptual system does not exist apart from other cultural institutions, but may be regarded as the common thread which gives consistency to the different aspects of daily life; it should be regarded systematically, as all of its parts tie together. The Lugbara of Uganda apply a single conceptual scheme, expressed in a separation
of the categories of space and time, to both the mythical and
genealogical past and social present. Genealogy explains and validates
currently-significant social relations; genealogical figures are
within society, mythical figures are outside. The linkage of the two
is social, temporal. One of the general characteristics of
Lugbara myth is the inverted behavior of the personages. In mythical
and genealogical distance, a time scale has no relevance; the same holds
true for geographical distance with respect to spatial categories.
And this extends to socio-spatial categories of any Lugbara group.
"These categories form a framework in which are set the relations of
individuals and groups. But concepts of time and space denote extension
in different dimensions. For Lugbara there are no fixed scales and no
directions in this system of categories." (Middleton in Myth and
Cosmos, p.60) In schemes of time and space the distinction is between
"close" people and "distant" or inverted people; members of Lugbara
society constitute the category of "close" people.

Among African societies, witchcraft (the ascription to a particular
individual of powers to do evil) is common. As a system of ideas, it
has definite implications for social relations and in turn is influenced
by the social structure. As Evans-Pritchard has pointed out, Zande
witchcraft provides an explanation for illness and death. Africans
are menaced by disease and rarely understand its cause or why illness
or disease afflicts a particular person. As a system of thought, it
answers questions of why? Furthermore, it provides a means for
alleviating stress by pointing out a course of action and terminating doubt.

2. Themes in African Philosophy

To generalize about the continent of Africa as though it were homogeneous would be impossible. Yet, certain themes do run through the different African systems of thought.

a. Fatalism: this common belief, suggests the causal impotence of man, on the one hand, and the causal superiority of superhuman forces on the other. Man must act, but despite good performance, he may suffer and/or fail. By and large, fatalism is a self-consistent, faithful reflection of actual human existence, with its unpredicted ups and downs and its often outrageous injustices and undeserved strokes of luck. Among the Tallensi of Northern Ghana, fate takes the form of Prenatal Destiny and works as an innate determinant of an individual's life-history. Before birth, a child's wishes are declared to Heaven, shaping his future. Such a doctrine, in its context, gives explanation which defies ordinary knowledge; and it also relieves society of responsibility if the sufferer is a misfit in the social situation, in his psychological or physical mien.

b. Moral Norms: Another theme common in Africa is the general acceptance of strong social norms, i.e. acting in a manner consistent with the expectations of one's ethnic group. African societies in general stress the importance of routinized interpersonal relations. For example, if a Fulani girl were to become pregnant out of wedlock, her lover would be required to marry her. He would be constrained to embrace a whole series of rites passed down from earliest times to ratify the relationship.
3. Religion

Like conceptual systems, religion (belief in a deity or deities which give meaning to life) is particularistic and associated with distinctive ethnic groups in Africa. Once again, however, several themes are pervasive.

a. Ancestor worship: Reverence for the dead, and belief that the dead are alive in spirit, is a common belief in Africa. (It should be noted that both Christianity and Islam hold this belief in varying degrees). This belief plays an important role in the living community: ancestors are invoked and propitiated because they are not nullified by death. For example, among the Tallensi, "the ancestor cult is the transposition to the religious plane of the relationships of parents and children," i.e. the ritualization of filial piety. (Fortes Oedipus and Job p. ). Tallensi religious institutions are incomprehensible without reference to the social organization, especially the segmentary system of authority and emphasis on the agnatic (male) line of descent. A man's Destiny, which manifests benevolence, "consists of a unique configuration of ancestors who have of their own accord elected to exercise specific surveillance over his life-cycle and to whom he is personally accountable." (Fortes, p.46)

b. Animism: The belief in animism (ascription of life forces to material objects, such as trees and earth) is especially predominant in agrarian societies, where a high value is placed on fertility. This can be likened to sympathetic magic; the African knows that beyond his
labor and efforts are powers over which he has little if any control.
To ensure the optimum of sunshine, rainfall and a bountiful crop, the
forces of nature are personified, and appealed to for benevolent
intervention. For example, the earth is given the image of the giving
mother, whose yield is so important to the society. She is dealt with
as a personality, who can be reasoned with and is invoked accordingly.

Similarly, in those few African societies which are still dependent
upon the forces of nature for hunting and gathering, as for example the
Mbuti Pygmies, animism takes on an active role in daily life. The
Pygmies are totally dependent upon the forest for their diet, clothing
and shelter. When they have a good supply of subsistence materials, they
are grateful to the forest for its generosity; when, however, the hunt
is unsuccessful, they believe that they have in some way insulted the
Forest and through cajoling attempt propitiatory means to rectify the
situation.

Just as a group's philosophy provides the raison d'être for a
systematic way of life (including secular affairs) we may say that the
religious beliefs represent the spiritual forces under which men live.
In the worship of these powers, a society's authority is confirmed.
13. Traditional African Literature

Historical tales, moral parables, political stories and social anecdotes form a major category in African traditional literature. Their motifs are often expressed in myths and animal stories, which in fact may merge. Although such tales, usually told by elders to children, serve to amuse, instruct, admonish, recall, their two major functions are entertainment and socialization. The telling of the tale is an art in itself and makes for great dramatic impact, which is heightened by the fact that recitation usually takes place at night. All societies socialize their young to the beliefs and values of the society. In Africa they verbalize this largely through stories. According to Herskovits: "Animal tales which offer explanations of natural phenomena, or account for accepted modes of behavior, or point morals, are regarded by natives themselves as important educational devices... "...we teach our children through our stories." (in Ottenfong Cultures and Societies of Africa, 1960, p.454)

1. Written versus Non-Written Literature

In many areas of Africa (as where Arabic, Hausa, and Swahili are spoken and written) parts of the literature may be recorded in writing. Yet in other parts where there is no tradition of writing, a formalized lore may still be existent. There is usually a system of professional folklorists, or "rememberers" who keep track of the traditions. Past events are recounted, with contemporary happenings linked in through the art of improvisation. As with written literature, oral lore may be transmitted in a consistent manner; there are special methods to
maintain its faithful representation.

Men can be trained, with the tradition subsequently entrusted to them, or control may be exercised over the recitation of the tradition. For example, among the Rwanda (of Rwanda) there are schools for instructing in classical tradition, which employ specialists as teachers. Here, oral tradition is used in Vansina's sense - "...all verbal testimonies which are reported statements concerning the past" - as distinct from eyewitness account and rumor. (Oral Tradition, 1961). The Rwanda also support other specialists who are employed as a sort of walking library, transmitting their knowledge only to direct successors. Among African peoples with centralized governments, the phenomenon of the official whose duty it is to recite the history at the courts of the rules is common. Thus, among the Rwanda, there are genealogists, to remember lists of kings and queen-mothers; memorialists, to remember most important events of the various reigns; rhapsodists, to preserve panegyrics on kings; and abirru to preserve secrets of the dynasty.

Where a society pays particular attention to preservation of the tradition, and there is no writing to record it, mnemonic devices are often used. For example, material objects are used, such as the Ashanti king's "stool", the history of which represents the history of the kingdom.

2. Symbols in literature

In African folklore, symbolic statements often arise from free
association or play on words. For example, the Bushongo word for "abyss" is sometimes used to convey "king". The explanation for this is that "abyss" is an antonym for "hill", and the king's highest title is "God of the Hills". Myth, tale, proverb and riddle are all forms of African folklore. African animal tales are probably best-known in the Americas due to their infinite variety and number, and the popularity of the Bre'r Rabbit stories. According to Herskovits: "These tales are in many cases regarded as the type forms of the Negro animal-trickster tale, and reference is frequently made to them in identifying a given story found in the folklore of various peoples of Africa itself." (in Ottenberg, Cultures and Societies of Africa, p.445).

Within African ethnic society, tales may be regarded as a unit and a whole cycle of adventures are acted out by well-known figures. In the cycle, action centers about a protagonist of outstanding importance; for example, "...the Dahomean group includes animal-trickster cycles centering about Tortoise and Hare, a cycle having as its central character a trickster of gross undisciplined appetite called Yo, a cycle of tales concerning the adventures of the twins..." (Ibid., p.445), etc.

Rattray (in Akun-Ashanti Folk Tales, 1930, p.XII) discusses the adaption of tales as reinforcements of ways of thought and assigns political implications. "The names of animals and even that of the sky-god himself, were substituted for the names of real individuals whom it would have been very impolitic to mention. Later, no doubt, such a
mild expose in the guise of a story often came to be related qua story. The original practice is still resorted to, however, to expose someone whom the offended party fears to accuse more openly.

3. Themes in literature

Each culture has its characteristic norms which dictate how one should behave. Proverbs and riddles prove useful in this respect, as they reflect morality to a greater extent than most other forms of folklore. That proverbs are significant throughout the African continent is evident from the great number identified with each society. For the Hausa alone, over two thousand have been collected, and this is felt to be only a portion of those in existence. Proverbs are used to inculcate children with the given morality; they are cited as evidence in legal cases; they may be used when subtlety is advantageous. Some good examples are provided in Hausa proverbs: "Even if the lion comes down in the world he doesn't consort with the pig [as Muslims, Hausa are forbidden to eat pork]; "Whoever catches a hyena should know how he's going to release it, i.e. you should know how an enterprise will end before you undertake it" (cited in H.A.S. Johnston Hausa Stories, p.103).

Another important theme in African literature is the myth of origins. This may give a cosmological account of the creation of the world, (including arrival of the gods or nature-deities, functions of the gods and how they interrelate with man) as well as an account of the origins of clans, lineages and even the ethnic society itself.
These stories indicate the world-view of the people, explain the non-comprehensibility of Nature, validate ritual beliefs, and give a sense of time perspective.

African folklore as a whole has several distinctive features: the stories are realistic, or lacking in sentimentality; they are also etiological. One must not lose sight of the fact that the oral/written distinction is somewhat hazy, insofar as most stories, even in Swahili and Hausa areas, were not put to writing until the beginning of this century. Yet these stories do maintain their uniformity, despite the large number of raconteurs and large bodies of literature.

Currently, there is an Oxford University series of publications of African oral literature, and other anthologies of African stories are becoming available. The art of raconteur in Africa, seems to be flourishing even in contemporary Africa, perhaps because of inherent feature of improvisation.
Traditional African art includes both the visual arts (e.g., sculpture, pottery, weaving, metal-work and in a few instances, painting) and performing arts (e.g. music and dancing). In both spheres, there is a academic controversy as to whether the particular art form can be considered "art" of and by itself, or whether the social context in which it is found and its functions within that context are vital to understanding the art form. Thus, religion and music are intimately connected. Yet, to say that African music is only understood in its religious context is to underestimate the potential of the art form, the skill of the composer and the genius of the musician. Broad generalizations about African art and music however, are difficult to make, inasmuch as the art form is integral to ethnic society and differs accordingly. African culture is not so compartmentalized that it would segregate one aspect of the culture (or, for example, put art in museums). Also there is a different blend of audience and performer in the African context characterized by a highly interactive process.

1. Social Usages of Art

WILLET addresses himself to the visual arts and deals with them contextually. That is to say, he regards appreciation of visual art in terms of form and content together. The same piece of sculpture, fashioned in exactly the same manner, in two different societies, may
not convey the same meaning. There are many items of African material culture which may be viewed in terms of function. In this view, the intricacies of design and the actual carving on an African mask, for example, follow a particular pattern for reasons of social usage; in other words, form follows function. Yet few scholars would deny that a material item may also have an intrinsic aesthetic appeal. The question remains as to whether an aesthetic judgment can be made about African art without reference to social context. Leon Seroto, of the Chicago Field Museum, designed an experiment to examine this issue. He showed several pieces of Congolese art to different audiences (African and European) and solicited comments as to the quality and aesthetic appeal. His interviewees all chose the same items as representing the highest quality.

Willet makes the important point that an approach somewhere in the middle of the two extremes (social usage vs. aesthetics) probably comes closer to reality. This means heightening the aesthetic experience (art for art's sake) by taking account of the circumstances in which it was fashioned or used. For example, a piece of sculpture may be made out of bronze, which in a given society is a prestigious metal; hence, the object is artistically appealing as well as serving as a status symbol for its owner. Furthermore, a piece of art may serve religious functions in certain circumstances and secular functions in others.
2. The Visual Arts

In Africa, painting as an art form is rare. It is used mainly as a decorative device for sculpture. There are isolated cases of rock painting, such as that of the Bushmen and their ancestors who have been linked to rockpainting in South Africa, or the hunting frescos at Tassili in the Sahara. In Islamic areas, where visual representation of human beings is theoretically not allowed, the art of abstract design and calligraphy has been developed. In the main, however, visual art in Africa most often takes the form of sculpture. The specific materials used reflect the environment of the people and may even be used to trace migration movements around the continent. The forms of sculpture generally reflect major cultural values. For example, in the East African Cattle area, cattle are a symbol of prestige and are felt to embody cultural values. In most of this area, sculptural art consists of clay models of cattle and men, masks for ceremonies and wooden figurines. As an additional point, one must keep in mind the correlation between complexity of material culture and mode of subsistence. Thus, the Pygmies (a semi-nomadic hunting and gathering group in the Congo) confine their artistic expression to very portable and necessary items, such as the ritual trumpet.

The visual arts may also include (depending on cultural complexity and the leisure-time availability) pottery, textile weaving, and metalwork (in the main for jewelry, but also for such items as gold weights, as with the Ashanti; or weaponry, as with the Hausa).
3. **Music**

Like art, music in African cultures is integral to the culture of which it is a part; yet its functions are not confined to social entertainment and religious settings. According to Merriam "The separation of the 'artist' from the 'audience' is not an African pattern - although specialists are always present, music is participative. Almost everyone can and does sing; many people play musical instruments; most people are competent in at least one type of musical expression. African music is functional on two levels - the music itself is integrated into daily life, and it is performed and enjoyed by large numbers of people within the society." (in Bascom and Herskovits *Continuity and Change in African Cultures*, 1959, p.56) In some societies, poetry is recited as music, and there may be a wide range of types of music/poetry. The Hausa compose and perform liturgical music, praise-singing music, modern secular poetry (either sung or spoken), lullabies, and/or life-cycle songs; in addition, many of the women improvise "pre-Islamic" verse for spirit invocation. Among the Wolof of Gambia, communal work groups provide a solution to manpower needs in cultivation. The group work is efficient, and monotony is minimized by working rhythmically to drum beats and singing.

There is a large variety of instruments in Africa, although this fact is often obscured outside of Africa by the stereotypical emphasis on drums. The range includes wind instruments, stringed instruments, as well as a variety of percussion instruments. It must be kept in mind that music in Africa, like visual art, is area-specific, corresponding
to culture-areas. The specificity is distinguished by the types of instruments used, social uses of drumming, and variation in musicology. It should be noted that talking drums, essentially a communication device based on tonal variation, are more of a linguistic than a purely musical phenomenon.
15. Study Questions: African Society and Culture

The following study questions are suggestions only. Some deal with specific lectures, while others presume a synthesis of materials from the entire section. Some are analytic and some are matters of judgment.

1. What criteria have been used by linguists and anthropologists to classify African ethnic groups? Have these classifications been useful? How might you account for the large number of ethnic groups in Africa?

2. Which of the following types of groups, if any, do you think might pose the greatest problems in the construction of modern African states: language groups, racial groups, ethnic or kinship groups, religious groups?

3. What are some of the ways in which ethnic groups change their boundaries? What is the difference between assimilation, acculturation, ascription, fission, and fusion? How are these concepts related to ethnic social boundaries?

4. Do you think the major economic problems in traditional Africa have to do with poor soil, lack of technology, poor climatic conditions, poor social organization, or some other factors? What is meant by pastoralism? Do most African markets link up different ethnic groups, or are they found only within a single ethnic group?

5. Are most of the marriage patterns in Africa monogamous or polygamous (from the social or the individual point of view)? In cases where a man may have more than one wife, does this mean that there are
more women than men in the community? How might arranged marriages lead to linkage within or between social communities? Does it matter whether the communities are nuclear families, extended families, lineages, clans, or ethnic groups?

6. In a matrilineal descent system, what would you expect to be the role of women? Would a woman's brother, father, or husband be of most importance in her life? What would happen if you tried to integrate a matrilineal and a patrilineal ethnic group?

7. Does it make sense to speak of ethnic communities which are "stateless"? Do all communities need some form of decision-making procedure? What have been some of the largest scale traditional communities in Africa? Are they based on divine kingship? elected representation? Islamic vice-regency? participatory democracy? or some other criteria?

8. What is meant by "tonal" language? How might this be adapted to "drum language"? How do you think Africans of different ethnic groups communicate, if at all, with each other? What is meant by bilingualism? multilingualism? Do you think that any of the vernacular African languages might (or should) be used at the national level?

9. Are traditional African concepts of fatalism similar to Christian or Islamic concepts of pre-destination? What is meant by "high god" or "minor deities" in African religions? Do you see any parallel between African traditional religious beliefs and Greek mythology?
To what extent does African mythology result in an oral literature dealing with the exploits of the gods? What is meant by "reverence for ancestors?" Are ancestors considered to be alive?

10. What are the major categories of African oral literature? In what situations would one find the telling of stories? What are some of the reasons so many of the African languages are not written? Does this effect the quality of the literature? To what extent does modern African literature draw on traditional oral literature? What is the basis of the animal symbolism in many of the African proverbs or stories?

11. What are the major forms of visual art in Africa? Why? What are the attitudes held by traditional Africans regarding their own sculpture? How is African traditional art utilized by the ethnic community? Why have certain kinds of visual art been less common in the Islamic parts of Africa? How does music play a part of African traditional life? Are musicians professional, or does everyone participate? Are percussion and string instruments most commonly found together? Is singing always a part of dancing?

12. What are the features of African society and culture which pertain most widely across the continent? On what features does one find the greatest range of patterns? Do you think it is possible to speak of "African society and culture?" What features are most similar or least) to American society and culture? Do you believe that culture is inherited or learned or both? How would
you argue your position? What are the major similarities and differences between Islamic and non-Islamic portions of Africa?

13. What aspects, if any, of African cultural life do you think have been omitted from the syllabus lectures? Does any of the contemporary autobiographical writing by African novelists help provide insights into African culture and society? (for example child-rearing)

14. Do you think that environmental factors are of major importance in shaping cultural patterns? What would be the relevant environmental factors in Africa?

15. What aspects of ethnic society, if any, would you expect to change most rapidly in modern times? (e.g. language shift? modification of marriage patterns? reorientation economic pursuits? decay of traditional political authority? secularization of conceptual systems?)
## PART II: PERSPECTIVES ON THE PAST

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#16. Continental Origins and Physical Character

1. The Basic Pattern of African Landforms

Africa is a continent of great age and physical stability, consisting primarily of a huge rigid block, higher in the east and almost entirely fringed with escarpments. It is a continent of plateaus, broadly etched into by a series of depositional basins of varying size. The basins are generally filled with more recent deposits, drained by the major river systems, and surrounded by outcroppings of hard, crystalline rocks which form part of what is called the Basement Complex.

This "Basin and Swell" structure dominates the landform pattern throughout most of the continent. The major physical feature in eastern Africa, however, is the African Rift Valley system, one of the most spectacular features on the face of the earth. The Rift Valley consists of parallel faults enclosing a flat valley averaging 20-40 miles in width. The major branch of the African system stretches from north of the Dead Sea through to the mouth of the Zambezi, a distance of over 6000 miles. Note the eastern and western branches in Africa, the string of rift lakes, and the associated volcanic features (Ethiopian Plateau, Kenya Highlands, Mt. Kilimanjaro) on the maps in the background essay.

2. Origins of the African Continent

Most of Africa was once at the heart of a vast supercontinent called Gondwanaland (composed of most of the present African continent plus the Arabian peninsula, peninsular India, Madagascar, Antarctica, Australia, and South America). Much of this supercontinent was glaciated
during an ice age about 250 million years ago. The evidence from this glaciation (boulder clays, striations in rocks) indicates that the southern continents were at that time most likely part of a single land mass. (Additional supporting evidence for grouping has been found in the patterns or rock structure and climatic changes in the geologic past.) Africa at this time had no "coast" and was characterized by a series of large depositional basins of interior drainage, many filled with large lakes.

Gondwanaland started to break apart during the Cretaceous Period (c. 200 million years ago) as the continents began to take their present shape. Evidence for continental drifting has always been impressive and theories of continental drift appeared almost as soon as accurate maps of the world were produced. (Note the startling jigsaw puzzle fit of West Africa and eastern South America--but also note that the edges to fit together are not the present shorelines but the rims of the continental shelves, the true edges of the continents). A systematic theory of continental drift was presented by Wegener in 1910, but despite the mass of evidence from Wegener and others (especially du Toit), the theory was disregarded since no one could effectively explain how the continents drifted apart. In recent years, however, more evidence has accumulated and a mechanism for drifting has been discovered, leading one geophysicist to state that research "should now be turned from the question of whether drift has occurred to the manner in which it has occurred." References to these recent discoveries are found in the BIBLIOGRAPHY. (See: L. Tuzo Wilson, 1963; "Continental Drift," Scientific
3. Impact of Continental Breakup and Subsequent Geologic Changes

As Gondwanaland began to split apart, the marginal blocks drifted away and the African coast came into existence. Rapid erosion occurred along the new continental margins, which were uplifted due to the removal of so much material from along side them. Existing streams were "rejuvenated" and new marginal streams created. More recent geological activity, not directly associated with drifting, resulted in the tilting of the great African block, most intensely in the east and south creating the basic division into High and Low Africa. These movements were accompanied by extensive rifting and volcanic activity (see de Blij, 1964); new basins (e.g. for Lake Victoria) were created and existing ones modified. The rejuvenated streams caused both by the continental breakup and by this more recent geological activity resulted in many changes in drainage patterns. Rivers were often able to erode back from the coast to "capture" portions of interior drainage systems, thus providing an outlet to the sea and draining many of the old interior lakes. Most of the great river systems of Africa are composites of several streams of the past and are typically characterized by waterfalls and rapids near their ocean outlets, where they plunge over the edge of the African escarpment. These features hindered external penetration in more recent human history, but at the same time provide
Africa with enormous hydroelectric potential for future development.

4. The Face of Modern Africa

Evidence of these developments in Africa's geologic history can be seen today in the five major river basins which occupy a large proportion of the continent.

a. The Niger Basin: The Inland Niger Delta, above Timbuktu suggests that the Niger River, which today rises in the Fouta Djallon, just 200 miles from the sea, once flowed into a lake or larger swamp-land in the center of the present basin. This area was drained by a new stream, cutting back from the coast through the rim of the basin, capturing the Upper Niger to form the unusual course of the river today, with its 90° bend at the old delta. The same pattern of "capture" is shown in upper reaches of Benue, the Niger's main tributary. It has partially captured some of the drainage flowing north to Lake Chad and is probably still doing so. Note also the flow of the Senegal and the Gambia. Both originate close to Niger, parallel it for some distance toward the center of the basin, then turn abruptly to Atlantic coast, the Senegal passing through an area of near desert. Further evidence of these changes is seen in the pattern of great waterless valleys at the southern edge of Sahara, showing drainage into the Niger during a moister period in the past.

b. The Chad Basin: Lake Chad, which now ranges from about 10-25,000 square kilometers in size, was once part of a much larger lake which covered about 400,000 kilometers only 2 to 3 million years ago. The larger lake, traceable today in a series of beach ridges, probably centered on the Bodele depression, the lowest part of the basin, which is connected to the present Lake Chad by the wadi, Bahr el Chazal.

Despite these changes, however, the Chad Basin today probably has
more of its ancient geologic character than any of the other major basins. It still lies at the heart of the continent, and has no ocean outlet.

c. Congo Basin: The Congo River, with its narrow outlet to the sea, is studded with a series of rapids and falls that have some of the greatest potentials for hydro-electric development in the world. In the distant geologic past, the main stream probably flowed northwest to Lake Chad and the Bodele depression, but movements contemporaneous with the formation of the Rift Valley created the Congo-Chad watershed and dammed up a vast lake (remnants of which include the present Lac Leopold III). The upper Lualaba once flowed to the Nile but was captured by the lower Lualaba to form Upper Congo. (The narrow gorge at Portes d' Enfer—*Gates of Hell*—at Kongolo is the site of this capture.) The segments eventually linked up with the Lower Congo, draining the ancient lake, and creating the present course of the river.

d. Nile Basin: The White Nile breaks through the downwarped Lake Victoria basin, moves through the vast swamps of the Southern Sudan, and joins with the Blue Nile near the present city of Khartoum. The Nile then completes its 4000 mile course to the Mediterranean over a series of six cataracts in the northern Sudan and southern Egypt. The heart of the ancient basin is probably the previously mentioned swamp-land, called the Sudd (Arabic for "obstruction"), while the famous cataracts mark the exit of the river from the basin and its remarkable seaward journey: over a thousand miles without a single important tributary through an extremely arid landscape.
**Zambezi-Kalahari:** The Zambezi, navigable in its upper courses, breaks through the rim of its ancient basin in Victoria Falls and gorge (343 feet versus 165 for Niagara) and then flows 900 miles to the sea, with many rapids along the way. The headwaters in the past probably fed the interior basin now occupied by Okovango Swamps and Makarikari Salt Flats, but drained away either through stream capture or blockage by its own alluvium. This pattern is duplicated by the smaller Cunene River, which rises on plateau, similarly cuts through plateau edge (in Rio Cuna Falls) and moves away from its former course (to Etosha Pan). The fact that the Zambezi flows across the grain of High Africa to the Indian Ocean probably reflects the drifting away of Madagascar creating the opening to the coast. This also explains the unusually extensive (for Africa) coastal plain of Mozambique and the absence there of the characteristic coastal escarpment (which is displaced into the interior along the eastern boundary of Rhodesia.) The southern portion of the basin is drained by the Orange River, which breaks through the basin rim at Aughrabies Falls.
1. Africa and the Origins of Man

From existing evidence, it appears that man's ancestors first became differentiated from the primates in Africa, most probably in the wooded savannah areas of East Africa.

But in defining man, where is the line to be drawn between man and ape? The question is difficult to answer simply from a study of fossil features, since the definition of "man" generally depends more on mental than physical attributes (e.g., man as toolmaker or as having power of speech). But how can this be determined from archeological finds? Basically, the dividing line is highly subjective and consequently very controversial. Today, the most acceptable definition includes the making of cutting tools; ability to walk, stand, and run in an upright position without difficulty; a prolonged childhood; and other related characteristics.

2. A Classification of Higher Primates

Several views on this question are depicted in figure 1. Through natural selection, homo sapiens is all that remains of the hominid line today. Whether there was a single line of evolution to homo sapiens or one with many branches representing hominid forms which became extinct, is still being debated. The earliest hominids include the following.

a. Australopithecus africanus: This very early form was probably omnivorous, small, light build, more adapted to life in open country,
and possibly a toolmaker in later stages.

b. *Australopithecus robustus*: (often a separate genus *Paranthropus)* was much larger, more "robust" and apelike; huge molars show he was probably a vegetarian, more adapted to forest environment.

c. "Zinjanthropus" is often called "Nutcracker Man" because of the huge size of his molars. (Zinj was an early name for East Africa) Now this type is generally considered another form of *Australopithecus*.

d. "Homo habilis"; ("Handy Man") existed side by side with *Zinjanthropus* nearly two million years ago and like *Australopithecus africanus* in relation to *Australopithecus robustus*, it disappeared earlier than its "cousin", probably after having evolved into a higher form of hominid. *Homo habilis* was probably the earliest toolmaker.

e. *Homo Erectus*: was the hand-ax maker of the Early Stone Age (also called *Pithecanthropus*). This type probably existed around 300,000 years ago and was the creator of the Chelles-Acheul hand-ax culture. He occupied mainly open country, camping near lake shores and rivers. Major areas where remains have been found include Algeria, Morocco, and the Transvaal (South Africa). Many of the most important archeological finds for *Zinjanthropus*, *Homo habilis* and *Homo erectus* were made by the Leakeys at Olduvai Gorge (in Tanzania). The gorge, with its exposed beds filled with fossils, provides a virtually unbroken record of human evolution to modern man, including the best and most continuous evidence on the evolution of early tools. It has been called a "reference book to the human past" and remains so despite many recent archeological discoveries in Africa and elsewhere.
Homo erectus is followed by generalized Homo, which gave rise to many offshoots (Rhodesian Man, and probably Neanderthal) and to Homo sapiens (around 35,000 years ago). During this evolutionary period of over 1 million years, Homo erectus and his hand-ax culture spread throughout much of the Old World. Although many early hominid forms have been found outside of Africa, all existing evidence points to the conclusion that Africa, particularly East Africa, was the major center for the physical and technological development of man during at least the first million years of his existence. "And there is little doubt that throughout all but the last small fraction of this long development of the human form, Africa remained at the centre of the inhabited world." (Oliver and Fage, 1962)

3. The Early Evolution of Human Society in Africa

Perhaps reflecting some of the first variations in hominid ways of life, early man became differentiated very largely by the major type of environment he occupied (especially forest vs. grassland). The different demands of each environment are reflected, in part, in man's physical evolution but much more clearly in the development of man's toolkit. These developments took place during the late Pleistocene period, when wet and dry phases alternated in Africa reflecting the retreat and advance of the great ice sheet covering much of Europe (about 50-25,000 years ago). It was also during this period that modern man distinctly emerged. The following is a brief outline of developments from this period to the arrival of Iron Age technology and agriculture in Africa.
a. Middle and Upper Paleolithic (Stone Age) cultures displaced "hand-ax" culture with a wide variety of tools, made in new forms and of new materials. Bows and arrows and even the first cosmetics made their appearance. During this period there were three developments of special importance. First were the Sangoan Toolkits which reflected man's penetration of the more heavily forested regions of the Congo and Guinea Coast (also near Lake Victoria and the Zambezi). Specialized tools were developed for digging and gathering wild plants. Second, were the Fauresmith developments, being a somewhat less specialized evolution from hand-ax culture by those who remained in the open country from Ethiopia to the Cape. Many settled down near permanent streams and became fishermen. Somewhat later, the descendants of this culture produced the first pottery known in the world. Third, were the Aterian developments which were similar to the Fauresmith, but found in North Africa and Sahara.

b. Later Stone Age cultures represented a further differentiation between forest cultures and those found in more open country. This period begins with the onset of drier conditions about 11,000 years ago and lasted until the arrival of an iron age technology and agriculture (variable time). This period is noted for the occupation by various hunting groups of a very large area of the continent including widely varying environments. (Daniels, 1966) There developed highly specialized technologies with respect to these environments--some scholars feel they were overly specialized and inflexible, therefore unable to adapt easily to a new technology of agriculture and settled life which is introduced later.
c. The development of basic racial stocks occurred later, but it is very difficult to discern the exact patterns of development. "Races" of man evolved with the development of *homo sapiens* from about 35,000 years ago, although they may be related to varieties of earlier forms of man. Broad racial stocks most commonly identified in Africa include the following: first were the Bushmanoid type, ancestors of the present day Bushman. They were probably the dominant type to emerge in the Upper Paleolithic period. They extend from the Sahara through Ethiopia, and from eastern Africa to the Cape, occupying mainly open country. Most scholars feel they evolved in the north and moved south (others believe the reverse).

Second were the Negroid type, whose origins are still obscure. Early Negroid stock probably evolved in heavily forested regions of western and central Africa but becomes distinct primarily on the fringes of the forest. As fishermen, they had a more settled way of life than the Bushman or Pygmy types. As with the Caucasoid type, they were well placed to take advantage of later developments in agriculture.

Third were the Pygmoid type, which remain a major enigma with regard to origins. Scholars are still undecided whether they evolved from Bushman or Negroid stock, or are a totally separate group.

Fourth were the Caucasoid type, including the "Proto-Hamites" in North and East Africa which emerged about 10,000 years ago. Again, their origins are still obscure (either Northeast Africa or Southwest Asia). They were closely linked with early Negroid types in the Sudan.
The Evolution of Man

Higher Primates

Cercopithecoids (Old World Monkeys)

Pongids (Anthropoid Apes)

Pongines (Gorilla, chimp, orangutan)

Hominoids

Hylobatines (Gibbon)

Hominids (see below)

Homo Sapiens (Modern Man)

Three Alternative Views on Human Evolution

About 2 million years ago

Australopithecus (A)
Homo Habilus (HH)
Homo Erectus (HE)
Paranthropus (P)
Neanderthal (N)

1. Simplified View

2. Generally Accepted View

3. Leakey Modification

Homo Sapiens
month out of the year (Muslims follow a lunar calendar), which is called the month of Ramadan (the ninth month of the lunar year), it is required that there be complete abstinence from food and drink during the hours of daylight. People can eat and drink only at night. I'll persons, travellers, children, and several other categories of persons are exempted from fasting.

The fourth requirement is giving charity (alms). Alms are normally given to poor people or to learned religious men (ulama) who distribute it to the poor. There are certain obligations as to what portion of your income must go to the poor, normally set at one-fortieth of a person's annual revenue in money or in goods.

The fifth requirement (for those who are able) is to make a pilgrimage (called hajj) to the sacred mosque of Mecca in Arabia. This is done during the twelfth month (Zulhajj) of the lunar calendar. Muslims from all over the world would participate in ceremonies of remembrance and atonement centered around the kaaba (a large monument in Mecca) and other sacred places. A person may go on pilgrimage as many times as he is able. (A person who has been to Mecca is frequently called "Al-hajj").

In sub-Saharan Africa, the two requirements of Islam that became of central importance were the declaration of faith in God and His messenger Muhammad, and, secondly, the requirement of praying. A standard way of asking if a person in black Africa is Muslim is to ask whether he "prays". It should be noted that there is no "priesthood" in Islam, and every Muslim is regarded as equal in the sight of
The fourth area may have been in Africa. This is still very controversial, yet many scholars feel agriculture developed independently among the Mande-speaking peoples of the Western Sudan. Other scholars feel this development was the result of diffusion from the Nile Valley or North Africa.

2. The Spread of Agriculture in Africa

a. Phase I: Cereal agriculture was developed in the Lower Nile Valley and the Fayum Depression. The diffusion from southwest Asia (about 4000-5000 B.C.) of wheat and barley eventually resulted in Africa's first "population explosion." Probably less than 20,000 hunters and gatherers could have occupied the Lower Nile area before the introduction of agriculture, yet by about 3000 B.C., the labor force for pyramid building alone exceeded 100,000. Today, Egypt is still one of the most densely populated areas in the world.

Population growth was accompanied by widespread urbanization and the development of elaborate forms of social, economic and political organization. Populations spread slowly to Africa north of the Sahara and up the Nile Valley, perhaps as far south as modern Khartoum. The impact of the Sahara desert as a "barrier" or "bridge" is still not fully understood. The Sahara was in a moist phase from about 5000-2000 B.C., during which time both agriculture and pastoralism were possible. Some feel that interaction between Negroid population and the population of the Nile Valley existed, with innovations flowing in both directions. This may have created what one author claims is "the first contact of major cultures in human history", as
Egypt succeeded in fusing Negro and Semitic cultures, (Wiedner, 1962). Recent radio-carbon dates show that true Neolithic culture had reached the Algeria/Niger border region by 3500 B.C.

b. Phase II: Agriculture was developed in the Sudanic Belt from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ethiopian Highlands. The timing is still very controversial. It is often dated 1000-2500 B.C. (Oliver) but may be much earlier. (Murdock suggests 5000 B.C.). The basic ideas of agricultural knowledge are generally felt to have come from Egypt, although their implementation depended upon the domestication of suitable drought-resistant cereals of the savanna grasslands (e.g. sorghums, millets, and in the west, dry rice). These developments resulted in a second, but much slower, build-up of population in black Africa. It does not, however, lead to the growth of very large scale social and political organizations as in the Nile Valley but, in general, takes place in small linguistic "compartments" with little interaction between them. Much of this development is confined to the Sudanic Belt, hemmed in on the north by the progressively drying Sahara and on the south by the equatorial forests, where savanna crops were unsuitable. Nile swamps (Sudd) probably prevented direct spread to eastern African grasslands, but small groups of agriculturists began to appear (after 1000 B.C.) in various localities from Kenya south to Zambia and southern Angola. This was probably the result of the spread of Ethiopian forms of millet (eleusine) and sorghum. These pockets of agricultural settlement will play an important role in the next phase (Bantu migration). The more humid regions of Africa (Congo, Guinea
Coast, Great Lakes Region, Zambezi Valley) were to remain mainly hunting and gathering areas, with perhaps a crude form of vegeculture (based on yams and the oil palm), until the beginning of the Christian era. There has been a general lack of indigenous food plants in the African rain forests, and settlements in these areas, for the past 2000 years, have depended almost entirely on the introduction of food crops from outside of the rain forests.

c. Phase III: Bantu Migrations and the spread of agriculture to the humid areas are of major significance to present population distributions in Africa. The spread of agriculture to the more humid regions has been linked to a combination of three factors: the introduction of Southeast Asian crops to Africa, the growth of an Iron Age technology, and the migration of the Bantu-speaking peoples (who now occupy nearly all of Africa south of the equator.) (As noted in lecture #11, Bantu is a linguistic term. The people who speak the language, although basically black-skinned, display an enormous range of physical and cultural characteristics). Where the Bantu came from originally and how they spread is still the subject of heated debate among African historians. Perhaps the most acceptable outline of the stages of Bantu expansion is given in the following section, based on the work of Oliver (1966). As is true of most statements involving African history and pre-history new information may result in major modifications in the near future. (see BIBLIOGRAPHY for references to Oliver, Guthrie, Clark and Fagen.)
3. Stages in the Migration of the Bantu

a. Pre-Bantu speakers (i.e., speakers of a language which eventually gave birth to most of the present forms of Bantu) migrated rapidly from central Cameroon or Ubangi-Shari woodlands into the woodlands south of the Congo forest. Migrants, following the Congo waterways, enter an area very much like their homeland where familiar crops could be grown. This woodland region, in present Katanga, was an excellent hunting and fishing territory and contained abundant mineral resources (iron and copper). This Bantu Nucleus (Guthrie) becomes the center of population growth and diffusion.

b. Consolidation of settlement and population growth result in the establishment of a bridgehead outward from the nucleus to the Atlantic Ocean coast. The ancestral Bantu grow into their present character, basing their strength on a new iron technology and an expanding list of cereal foods adopted from East African agriculturalists. The spread of the Iron Age permitted improvements in woodworking and in the production of boats, tools and weapons, which were especially useful in hunting and fishing. Iron technology probably came either from the Nile Valley (Meroe) or across the Sahara from North Africa and spread first through the Sudan belt, slowly filtering southward into the forests. (Peoples of the well known Nok culture, in what is today Nigeria, were smelting iron in 250 B.C.).

c. Influences from Southeast Asia (particularly food crops) permit an expansion out of the woodlands into the more heavily forested areas.
Contact with the East African coast brings the banana, coconut and the out-rigger canoe (0-500 A.D.) from Indonesian migrants who had begun to colonize Madagascar (still part of the Malayo-Polynesian language Austronesian) and parts of the coast during the first few centuries A.D., East Africa by this time probably occupied by sufficient numbers of cultivators to absorb both the Indonesian migrants and their crops. Banana cultivation in particular results in a rapid population increase in the Great Lakes region from 500-1000 A.D.

Colonization of central and southern Africa by surplus Bantu-speaking populations included a move into the Kenya and Tanzania highlands and plateaus, while pastoral Bantu (e.g., the Zulu) begin pushing progressively southward. There was a more gradual colonization of both the very dry and the very humid regions, which today contain the greatest number of remnant populations (hunters, pastoralists and some agriculturalists who preceded the Bantu but have been almost totally absorbed). See linguistic map (in BERRY) for remnant groups: Pygmies, (who speak Bantu languages now), Bushmen, Hottentots, Hadza, Sandawe, Iraqw, Gorowa, Tatog, and Dorobo. Many of the most recent Bantu migrants also have "clicks" (from Bushman-Hottentot language) in their dialect. In the areas of relatively recent colonization are found a tremendous variety of physical types and cultures, even among people who speak basically the same language.
1. Africa and Egypt

The question of the interrelationships between ancient Egypt and the rest of Africa has been one of the most tantalizing as well as most perplexing in African history. For an effective overview of this problem, see Collins (1968, pp. 7-62).

a. Who were the Egyptians? There have been strong claims that the ancient Egyptians were Negroes (Diop, 1962) although many scholars feel it is more likely that Egypt was a melting pot of races. To make any racial claims (black or white) to the accomplishments of Egyptian civilization is likely to be either irrelevant or inaccurate.

b. Egyptian influence in Africa (beyond the Nile Valley): This is a very controversial subject, but perhaps a useful way of introducing the question of diffusion vs. independent invention in Africa. Some have attributed all early African achievements to the migration of a super-race of "Hamites" (Seligman). This view is now totally rejected but was replaced by the notion of a diffusion of ideas and institutions (rather than people) from the Nile Valley. More recently, a much greater emphasis has been placed on independent innovation in black Africa.

c. A tentative conclusion: According to Collins (1968: 10)

"Dynastic Egypt was born in the womb of Neolithic Africa. Its ideas and institutions undoubtedly flowed to the south and west against the stream of Negroid, African culture moving east and north toward the Nile Valley. Independent in origin, syncretic in development, Africa should claim a unique, not a synthetic past."
2. Kingdoms of the Nile Valley

The Nile Valley forms a fertile corridor which cuts across the prevailing east-west grain of environmental zones in Africa, thus linking the lower Nile and Mediterranean coast, north of the desert, with the Sudanic belt, stretching from the Atlantic coast to the Ethiopian Highlands south of the Sahara. Whatever the importance of independent invention, these routes, (north-south along the Nile, east-west along the Sudanic belt) became the most important early channels for cultural diffusion in Africa. And in or near the area where the two routes meet, the earliest African kingdoms south of the Mediterranean and lower Nile regions were established.

a. The Kingdom of Kush: During the pharaonic period of Egypt, the middle Nile region of Nubia (now in northern Sudan and southern Egypt) became vassal to the Egyptians. In about the 8th century B.C., the peoples of this region revolted and established the kingdom of Kush, with its capital at Napata. The rulers of Kush eventually conquered Egypt, ruled for about 100 years (as the Twenty-fifth Dynasty of Pharaohs) and Napata briefly became the capital of the ancient world.

After the Assyrian invasion of Egypt (7th century B.C.), Kush became re-oriented southward and its capital shifted to Meroe, about 100 miles north of Khartoum. The Kushites had learned iron-working by that time (perhaps from the Assyrians) and succeeded in establishing a flourishing trading empire, focused on Meroe, which reached its peak
from about the mid-third century B.C. to early into the Christian era. The Kushites developed a distinct alphabet, elaborated advanced architectural forms, and engaged in trade with Africa south of the Sahara, the Mediterranean basin and as far away as the Indian subcontinent. The fall of Meroe occurred around 325 A.D., when the armies of the Ethiopian kingdom of Axum invaded.

b. The Kingdom of Axum: The modern kingdom of Ethiopia is derived from an unbroken line of succession from the kingdom of Axum, located in the northern corner of the Ethiopian highlands. Legend records that the first emperor of Ethiopia, Menelik I, was the product of a marriage between King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba. By the seventh century A.D. the commercial interests of Axum ranged as far as India and Ceylon. The conversion of the Axumite kingdom to Coptic Christianity in about the fourth century A.D. was important in several respects. The culture and civilization of the Amharic people is derived largely from this influence. Also, with the Muslim conquest of the Red Sea area in the seventh century (A.D.) the Amharic people retreated into the Ethiopian highlands, from which isolation they were not to emerge until the Portuguese expedition to Ethiopia in 1541. The early kingdom of Axum was notable for its skill in dry-stone building, hillside terrace cultivation, and for the development of written forms of communication.

c. Contacts with the Sudan Belt: After the defeat of Meroe by Axum, many African historians feel that the royal family of Kush retreated westward along the Sudanic belt, spreading not only their
technology but their social and political institutions (e.g., a strongly centralized political structure based on the concept of divine kingship). The following points, however, are important to remember about this view: it has not been entirely accepted by historians; it has often led to the neglect of other important developments, such as independent innovation in Africa south of the Sahara and alternate routes of diffusion across the Sahara from the Mediterranean coast; there still are enormous gaps in our knowledge which are only beginning to be filled (primarily through archeological research).

3. Nok Civilization

In 1944, near the tin mines of the "Middle Belt" region of Nigeria, a terra cotta figure was discovered. Later excavation in the region revealed further specimens which appear to indicate that a civilization of farmers and probably iron-workers existed in the area from about 900 B.C. to 200 A.D. A comparison between the later bronzes of Ife (in Yorubaland) and the Nok terra cotta figures indicates many stylistic similarities. The origin of the Yoruba kingdoms is still obscure, but there is some speculation that the Yoruba people migrated southward into "Nigeria" toward the end of the Nok era, and established themselves over the people who had produced the Nok terra cotta figures. Professor Willett (1960) suggests that:

"As yet there is no direct evidence of who these people were, where they came from, or when. They seem to have come from the east or the northeast, possibly from Meroe, which collapsed in the early fourth century.... The Yoruba migration legends, both those about their origin and those of diffusion within Nigeria, almost
certainly refer only to the ruling group.

"Yoruba civilization appears therefore to be the result of a small intrusive ruling class, bringing ideas from outside, with a highly artistic indigenous population. The resulting social pattern seems to have borne some resemblance to that of the City States of Ancient Greece, but the unique achievement of the Yoruba was to have possessed such an evolved urban civilization without the knowledge of writing."

There are still many unanswered questions about the Nok civilization (who were the people, did they develop agriculture independently, where did they obtain their knowledge of iron-working?). It seems likely that further research in this area will produce some major discoveries on early African history, particularly with respect to early patterns of culture contact—not only with the Nile Valley but perhaps with other areas of Africa and even beyond.

(It might be worthwhile to show students the photographs of the Nok figures and perhaps the equally magnificent sculpture of Yorubaland which succeeded Nok; both are found in Fagg, 1963.)
The Impact of Islam in Africa

1. What is Islam?

There are several points to be noted in summarizing the nature of Islam. (For further details, see Gibb, 1961) The first is that Islam was established in the seventh century A.D. by the Prophet Muhammad in what is now Saudi Arabia. A person who follows the religion of Islam is called a Muslim (note the English spelling used to be Moslem). Essentially, Islam is built on the Christian and Judaic tradition but added a new revelation from God (Allah) to Muhammad, which came to be called the Quran (or Koran). There are five pillars, or requirements in Islam.

The first requirement of Islam is witness, i.e. a person must make a declaration of faith in the unity or singleness of God and the prophethood of Muhammad. (Muhammad is regarded as the "messenger" - Rasul - of God.) This declaration is sometimes called the shahada. It consists of the statement that "there is no god but God and Muhammad is his prophet." ('la ilaha illallahu, muhammadu Rasulullahi'.)

The second requirement is prayer. There are five ritual prayers which must be said every day while facing toward Mecca. The times set for prayer are daybreak, noon, midafternoon, just after sunset, and the early part of the night. On Friday, prayers are said in a central mosque (church) in all major Muslim towns. On week days, prayers are usually said individually, wherever the person happens to be at the appropriate time.

The third requirement is fasting. It is prescribed that during one
month out of the year (Muslims follow a lunar calendar), which is called the month of Ramadan (the ninth month of the lunar year), it is required that there be complete abstinence from food and drink during the hours of daylight. People can eat and drink only at night. Ill persons, travellers, children, and several other categories of persons are exempted from fasting.

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In sub-Saharan Africa, the two requirements of Islam that became of central importance were the declaration of faith in God and His messenger Muhammad, and, secondly, the requirement of praying. A standard way of asking if a person in black Africa is Muslim is to ask whether he "prays". It should be noted that there is no "priesthood" in Islam, and every Muslim is regarded as equal in the sight of
2. The Spread of Islam to North Africa

ABU-LUGHOD details the way in which Islam was carried throughout the whole of North Africa during the first hundred years after the death (632 A.D.) of the Prophet Muhammad. It extended as far west as Morocco and later also penetrated into Spain. The Arab conquest of North Africa meant that Islam was imposed on the indigenous North African people who were primarily of Berber descent. One of the effects of this conquest was an arabization of the Berber areas and to some extent an integration of these two communities (Arab and Berber) over the centuries. The extension of Islam into Northern Africa resulted in the Moorish civilization with its advanced medicine, university systems, and architecture. North Africa soon began to have its impact on West Africa--both through trans-Saharan trade and through direct conquest.

3. The Spread of Islam in West and East Africa

As mentioned in ABU-LUGHOD, in the tenth century a movement called the almoravids (a Berber movement based in Morocco) assumed control of the entire region of North Africa and began to spread both into Spain and southwards into the Western Sudan. It conquered the established African state of Ghana in 1076. The African successor states to Ghana, which were also Islamic-based, will be discussed in the next lecture. (The three successor states included Ghana, Mali, and Songhay. These are also discussed in HOLDEN.) Fuller details on
the spread of Islam in West Africa, as well as the details on the spread of Islam in North Africa, may be found in Trimingham (1962). The first chapter of Trimingham deals with the expansion of Islam in North Africa, (including sections on the Sahara and Sudan before the coming of Islam; the Islamization of the Berbers, the conversion of the Saharan tribes to Islam and its spread into the Sudan.) The second chapter deals with the Western Sudanic states (including the Sudanic state system: the states of the Senegal, the Soninke empire of Ghana, the Mandinka of Mali, and finally the Songhay empire of Kawkaw.) The third chapter deals with the Central Sudanic states (the state of Kanem-Bornu, the Hausa states, the state of Bagirmy, and the state of Waday.)

For details on the spread of Islam in East Africa see Trimingham (1964), especially the first two chapters in the book. The first chapter has four sections: early Islamic traders and settlers; Swahili coastal town states; the Portuguese interlude and aftermath; the penetration of Islam into the interior. The second chapter includes a discussion of contemporary Muslim communities; the more recent spread of Islam; and characteristics of East African Islam. In short, if one looks at the map of Islamic zones contained in ABU-LUCHOD one can see that Islam spread from northern Africa into western Africa and eastward across the Sudan--from the western Sudan to the central Sudan. From other sources, it also spread into the Horn of Africa and southwards along and eastern coastal zone of Africa.
4. The Impact of Islam on African Society

a. Legal systems: In most areas where Islam was adopted, an Islamic legal system (sharia) was adopted which had a comprehensive range of concerns - from marriage and divorce and criminal law, to administrative law and homicide. Within the Islamic legal tradition, there are four distinct schools. They are known as Maliki; Shafi; Hanbali; and Hanafi. Of these four, the Maliki legal system has predominated in Northern and Western Africa. There are a few scattered Shafi communities in East Africa, but most of the continent is part of the Maliki legal system. Ruxton (1916) has published a translation of one of the major texts in Maliki law, namely the Mukhtasar of Sidi Khalil. For a scholarly interpretation of Islamic law in Africa, perhaps the best source is Anderson, (1954). The important thing about the Maliki legal system, as distinct from the other Islamic legal systems, is that it tends to be the most traditional and most tolerant of local customary law and practice.

As with all schools of Islamic law, however, the Maliki tradition divides human actions into five legal categories: those actions which are required, those which are recommended, those which are morally neutral, those which are discouraged, and those who are prohibited (haram). It should be noted that certain foods (e.g. pork) and drinks (e.g. alcohol) are prohibited by law.

b. Language and literature: The language of the Quran is Arabic.
The Arab conquest of North Africa established Arabic as the major written and spoken language in North Africa. In Islamic areas of both East and West Africa, the written use of the Arabic language (and/or vernacular languages in Arabic script) was important in religious affairs, but also in literary, political, and economic affairs as well. Sometimes the Arabic language would be learned only so that the Quran could be read in Arabic (translation was prohibited) whether or not it was understood by the local people. Yet in those African societies which used the Arabic script to write their own language (particularly in West Africa, e.g. the Hausa, Kanuri, or Fulani) the Arabic script was used to convey the local heritage and literature of the various ethnic societies.

c. Family structure: Islam tends to be patrilineal, i.e., it stresses the male descent line and the prerogatives of the males in inheritance. Also, Islam endorses a system of plural marriage (restricting the number of legal wives to four). These cultural patterns tend to be dominant in Islamic areas. (Only the Yao, of Malawi, and a few minor groups in East Africa have remained matrilineal after accepting Islam.)

d. The sense of community: Part of the Islamic conception of the world is a division of peoples into two categories: those who are Muslim and those who are not. The classical Islamic concept of spiritual/political community (umma) is based on this distinction. One of the results of establishing an Islamic culture area in Africa
may have been to extend the notion of a world-wide Islamic community (dar-al-islam) consisting of diverse ethnic groups and people who share in common certain beliefs and the ability to communicate (to some extent) in the Arabic language. ABU-LUGHOD notes that in recent times the concept of dar-al-islam may have important consequences in the political and international roles of the new African states.
§21. Empires of the Western Sudan

There were three major empires in the western Sudan during the early period (ca. 8th to 16th century A.D.): Ghana, Mali (Melle) and Songhay. Note that the names of two of these empires have been taken by modern African states (Ghana and Mali) and the third, Songhay, was suggested as the name of a proposed state in Hausaland (Niger Republic and Northern Nigeria).

1. Ghana

HOLDEN suggests that there is evidence of Ghana's origin as early as the 4th century A.D. (although the standard date is 8th century). During this period, Ghana was a black African (Soninke) empire. However, by the mid-eleventh century (1076 A.D. is the standard date), the Ghana empire was conquered by the Almoravids. At this time, the empire of Ghana was based on trade. It lay at the crossroads between the trade from salt deposits of North Africa and the various gold deposits in West Africa. The flourishing of this kingdom is directly attributed to its position on the trade routes. The conquest of Ghana by the Almoravids (a dark-skinned Moorish people) was important to the flow of culture between North and West Africa. Islamic culture became indigenous to the Ghana empire. However, for various reasons (some of which are related to the decline in strength of the Almoravids within the North African context), the empire of Ghana declined in the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries, and was finally incorporated totally into the rising empire of Mali, to the west.
It is important to mention the assertion that the Akan peoples of contemporary Ghana (which is more than a thousand miles to the south and east of the old empire) were descendant from the mixture of peoples from the empire of Ghana. While the Ghana empire undoubtedly influenced the states to the south, there is no evidence for an actual migration of peoples.

2. Mali

The empire of Mali grew from the small Mandingo (Malinke) state of Kangaba, largely through the efforts of its first great king, Sundiata. In 1235, A.D., he annexed the Susu empire to the north, and then defeated the Ghana empire. The Muslim empire of Mali was centered in two main cities, Niane and Kangaba, but expanded later to include Timbuktu and Djenne. These latter two cities prompted the trans-Saharan trade and by the year 1400, there were caravan routes across the Sahara of major proportions. (There are reports of a single caravan train of over 12,000 camels.) The wealth of the rulers of Mali became legendary both in the Middle East and in Europe, especially after one ruler, (Mansa Musa) made the pilgrimage to Mecca in about 1324 A.D., He took thousands of Malians with him, and large quantities of gold, which he lavishly gave away to charity. Mansa Musa brought back from Mecca architects and learned men, who helped build some of the mosques and palaces of Timbuktu and other cities. An Arab observer (Ibn Battuta) writes of the advanced state of learning at the University of Sankore (Timbuktu).
After Mansa Musa, the empire of Mali declined, until by the 15th century, it had lost all its eastern territories, including Timbuktu and Djenne. These cities continued to flourish, however, under the Songhay empire.

3. Songhay

By the mid-fifteenth century the Songhay peoples had become well established in the middle Niger region, and had established a capital at Gao. Through a series of conquests, mainly at the expense of Mali (including the cities of Timbuktu and Djenne), the Songhay empire came to dominate the middle Niger region. One of the strongest rulers and builders of the Songhay empire during this early period was Sunni Ali, who ruled from 1464-1492. During the sixteenth century, under the leadership of Askia Muhammad I, the system of government and wealth of the empire became legendary. The University of Sankore, in Timbuktu, continued to be highly advanced, and the police and banking system were well developed. The Songhay state developed river transportation to a high degree, including the use of artificial linkage canals.

The Songhay empire was finally defeated by an invasion from Morocco in 1591 A.D. However, the Moroccans were unable to keep the empire together, and there was no strong successor state.

4. Conclusions

It should be noted that empires like Mali and Songhay at their largest were about one-third the size of the present-day United States (approximately one-million square miles). Administrative skills, as
well as transportation and communications technology were necessary to the conduct of such empires. Islamic learning was particularly important in this process. The University of Sankore taught many fields of learning, and Arabic literature and sciences were very sophisticated for that time. One observer from the period, (Leo Africanus), writes that books were the single largest item of trade in these black African empires.

The empires of Ghana, Mali and Songhay were also illustrative of the processes of state formation in Sudanic west Africa. HOLDEN discusses the influences of Islam in all three empires. Islam provided a model for state organization, including the differentiation of bureaucracy into financial, legal, defense, and other types of ministries. Islam also provided the social contacts for the inter-urban trade which was so important in the growth of empires.

All three empires were horse cultures, and this provided an important element of communications within the empires. (As noted above, Songhay also developed river transportation). All three empires were intermediaries on the trade routes which crossed the Sahara from North to West Africa. (Trade included gold, salt, other minerals, plus handcrafts.)

The time span of the three empires is also significant: each covered several centuries. Although HOLDEN suggests that Ghana may have begun as early as the 4th century, scholarly evidence at the moment suggests that it flourished during the 8th through 11th centuries. The empire of Mali rose and fell over the course of almost three centuries.
(13th through 15th centuries). The empire of Songhay spanned almost
two centuries (fifteenth and sixteenth). These were sustained and
sophisticated empires which have become a source of historical
pride in contemporary black Africa.
§22. Coastal States of East Africa

Like much of African history, the history of coastal East Africa is constantly being modified by new research and archeological discoveries. This lecture is primarily in the form of a chronological outline so as to provide some feel for the historical continuities in this region.

1. The Coast prior to the Portuguese Contact

Trading ports probably existed along the coast even before the Christian era. The earliest important evidence as to this period is found in The Periplus of the Erythrian Sea, a trader's handbook to the commerce of the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean written perhaps about 100 A.D. by an Alexandrian Greek. The East African Coast, called Azania, was at this time only a backwater of the main trading areas, Arab and Graeco-Roman, but grows enormously before Portuguese contact.

   a. 4-7th century A.D.: Very little is known. Perhaps Persia and Axum isolated the coast from the rest of Indian Ocean trading system. Probably this period witnessed the first major absorption of negroid population (migrating Bantu). Earlier populations are not described as negroid.

   b. 7-12 centuries: Islamic influence begins to grow, probably with migrations of Persians, "Syrians" and other Muslim groups. In the latter half of the period, the "Shirzis" migrate from the Persian Gulf area and from other areas along the coast and settle in a string
of trading settlements, now clearly identified at such places as Pemba, Mafia, Mogadishu and, later, Kilwa. Trade by this period was clearly re-oriented from southwestern Arabia to Oman and the Persian Gulf, focusing on Baghdad (the capital and leading center of Islamic world during this period).

**c. 12-16th centuries:** This was the height of coastal civilization. The coast was now an integral part of Islamic world, trading with the entire Indian Ocean fringe and maintaining trade contacts in China and Indonesia. There was interior trade with the African continent at least as far as the Rhodesia-Katanga area. Major trade items included ivory, gold from Rhodesia and copper from Katanga. This period saw the rise of major city-states at Kilwa (which controlled Sofala, entrepot to Rhodesia and Katanga) and Mogadishu. Coins were minted at Kilwa, Mogadishu, and Zanzibar (probably the source of first English gold coins). Other important city-states were established at Pate and Lamu. At the end of this period, Mombasa had grown to major importance and Kilwa was on the decline.

Important themes of this period include: (1) the continuity of Islamic trading cities with pre-Islamic settlements or seasonal markets; (2) the nature of Indonesian contacts in pre-Islamic times; (3) the nature of contacts with the interior; (4) the extent of Africanization of the towns by the 15th century.

2. From Portuguese Contact to 1840

a. The Swahili Culture: There emerged a distinctive coastal
culture throughout the 12th-16th centuries. A language, called Swahili, developed which was primarily Bantu, with strong Arabic, Persian and Indian influences. It was written in Arabic script. Swahili people (mixture of Arabs and Bantu) became important traders and were Muslims. (They probably absorbed large numbers of indigenous African groups.)

b. Portuguese "conquest": In 1505, the Portuguese overran Kilwa and Mombasa. Their main base was at Malindi. The result was a rapid decline of the coast, especially southern sections. (By 1569, Kilwa was almost deserted.) Later (1593) the Portuguese moved their base to Mombasa and built Fort Jesus. The latter was sacked in 1698 by Islamic groups from Oman (Arabian Peninsula), which ended the period of Portuguese domination.

This was a bleak period in East African coastal history. The Portuguese were unable to replace the Arabs in trade, but they did introduce new crops such as manioc (cassava) and maize which rapidly become important food staples throughout East Africa. They did not exploit the region, but left it to stagnate and decay in isolation. They never even governed the coast but merely demanded acknowledgement of their sovereignty.

The Portuguese remained in coastal Mozambique and re-oriented their interests to the interior (Zambezi Valley and Zimbabwe area).
The Rise of Oman, 1650-1840

The Omani Arabs grew rapidly in power in Arabia. They allied themselves with discontented elements along the East African coast and succeeded in displacing the Portuguese north of Mozambique. (Yet even the Omani Arabs did not act as "rulers" since most city-states remained virtually independent).

During this period, the interior opened up commercially, with trade primarily in hands of African middlemen. The major (caravan) route was in central Tanzania, dominated by the Nyamwezi, but reached Buganda (Lake Victoria region) and Katanga. Trade included ivory, copper and slaves. The southern route, from Kilwa to Lake Nyasa (dominated by Yao traders), became a major slaving route. The northern routes from Mombasa, the northern Tanzanian coast (Mrima) and the northern Kenya coast led, respectively, to the Kenya Highlands, the northern interior of Tanzania and Tana Valley in Kenya. Trade was mainly ivory, with the Kamba as leading middlemen.

Zanzibar emerged during this period as the leading ivory and slave market.
4. The Rise of the Sultanate of Zanzibar

This period is really a prelude to European colonization. It begins with the shift of the Court of Oman to Zanzibar under Seyyid Said. From this time (1840), the coast was brought more nearly under a unified government than ever before.

a. Growth of slave trade: Undoubtedly the slave trade had begun many centuries earlier, but in the nineteenth century the early trickle became a flood. (The best short account is found in Alpers, 1967.) It focused on the Zanzibar market and was linked in part to the development of clove plantations on Zanzibar and Pemba islands. Some historians link the low population density of parts of East Africa (especially southern Tanzania) to Arab slave trading.

b. Indian influences: Traders from the Indian sub-continent largely controlled the financing of the slave trade and shipping from Zanzibar. Many Indians settled in Zanzibar and along the coast. (Some had been there for centuries.) In the late nineteenth century they were an important link with Britain, for they claimed British protection and were able to import British goods.

c. Other external influences: American cotton-cloth found a very large market in East Africa. However, the British were most influential, using the Sultan as an ally against the French and latter in their effort to suppress the slave trade. According to Sutton (1966): "The widening of European interests—commercial, political and humanitarian—was the background for the opening of the later history of East Africa, both coast and interior." By late 1880's and early 1890's, the European colonial penetration of East Africa had begun.
5. Summary of Themes

There was a continued absence of unity, confederation or solidified external domination of the East African coast. Instead there were a series of virtually independent city-states vacillating between cooperation and conflict. The overall linkage of the area as a trading system was largely based on Swahili and Islamic culture.

#23. States of the Central Sudan

The most important of the Central Sudanic states have been Bornu, the Hausa city-states, and the Fulani empire. All were located primarily in what is now northern Nigeria, and all have continued to exist, in modified form, up to the present day.

Historically, Hausaland consisted of seven major city-states, of which Kano and Katsina were the most important. These city-states were relatively autonomous, highly centralized, and dependent on trans-Saharan trade. By the fifteenth century, members of the Hausa ruling class were converting to Islam; the Hausa states have continued to be organized according to Muslim principles, more or less, since that time.

Bornu, to the east, was also Islamic in principle, and a competitor with the Hausa states for trans-Saharan trade. In the early nineteenth century, a revolution of oppressed social classes overthrew the Hausa ruling class (although they failed to conquer Bornu), but much of the governmental organization remained unchanged under the Fulani leadership which emerged. Under British rule, there were few basic alterations in the system of government which had existed both in Bornu and the Hausa-Fulani states for a thousand years. All three of the Central Sudanic states were large scale, sustained over long periods of time, drew heavily on Islamic culture, and had written forms of communication based on Arabic script or language.
1. The Kanuri Empire of Bornu

Bornu was founded in about the fifteenth century as a successor state to Kanem. During this period—from the fifteenth century to the present time—Bornu has retained relative autonomy, although it has been part of Nigeria since the turn of the twentieth century. Bornu is one of the kingdoms in contemporary Africa which is distinguished by its longevity. The dynasty may have been founded, sometime in the first millennium A.D., in the kingdom of Kanem—north and east of Lake Chad. In the fifteenth century there was a split in the kingdom of Kanem and the royal clan and its followers fled to the area of present day Bornu. A capital city was set up called Birni Gazargamo. The dominant ethnic group in Bornu has been Kanuri although the empire at its peak encompassed several ethnic societies. There are particular cultural patterns associated with the Kanuri, e.g. a centralized form of government and patrilineal form of descent. In the early nineteenth century, the royal dynasty of Bornu was overthrown by Shehu al-Kanemi whose family has continued to rule Bornu until the present time. Throughout the nineteenth century the Kanuri were primarily concerned to resist the encroachments of the Fulani Caliphate of Sokoto. A cultural history of Bornu is presented by Cohen (The Kanuri of Bornu, 1967) who deals with the "land and people" of Bornu, the history of Kanem-Bornu during the nineteenth century and the colonial period, the patterns of family and household in Bornu, and other aspects of cultural life, such as political organization. The significance of Bornu is partly because of its size and longevity, but also because it has formed an important link on the north-south
routes to Tripoli and other North African towns.

2. The Hausa City-States

One of the best interpretive sources of early Hausa history is by M.G. Smith (1964), who deals with the seven city-states in Hausaland: Kano, Katsina, Zazzau (Zaria), Gobir, Daura, Rano, and Garun Gabas. During the period 1000 to 1500 A.D., these city-states were distinguished by their use of a common language, a common myth of origin, and common cultural patterns; but in other ways were relatively separate from each other. In this pre-Islamic period, the Hausa were predominately agriculturalists, and followed a form of animism called bori. Only after the fifteenth century did they begin to accept Islam on a broad scale, come to engage in long distance trade, and begin to confront their neighboring states (such as Bornu) militarily. During the period 1500 to 1800, the number of North African traders and scholars in Hausaland increased, and cities such as Kano became relatively cosmopolitan.

As mentioned above, the Hausa states came to be dominated by the Fulani, who had come to settle in the towns of Hausaland. The town of Sokoto, however, was created by the Fulani as the center of their empire. (Note: most of the cities in the Sokoto empire, which included most of Hausaland, were Hausa-based towns.) Because of its importance in trade, the Hausa language came to be a lingua franca in the Central Sudan. Town Fulani came to speak Hausa, and peoples peripheral to Hausaland came to use the language, and to adopt Hausa
cultural patterns. By the mid-twentieth century, "Hausa" had extended beyond a mere ethnic society to become a broad cultural and language zone. Hausa continues to be the major language group in West Africa at present, and Hausa styles of life have become a model of Islamic culture in various parts of black Africa. Most notable characteristics include a patrilineal family structure, a secondary social role for women, and an hierarchical status system.

3. The Fulani Empire of Sokoto

From the fourteenth century onward, the Fulani began to migrate from the western to the central Sudan. They were cattle people and for the most part nomadic. Yet many Fulani clans came to settle in Hausaland during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Relations became strained between the town Fulani and the urban Hausa by the end of the eighteenth century. In 1804 a Fulani religious leader named Uthman dan Fodio called for an Islamic jihad (holy war) against the "nominally" Muslim Hausa city-state rulers and in the course of the next six to ten years conquered the whole of Hausaland and many of the adjoining areas. This Fulani theocracy known as a "caliphate" was centered at Sokoto and remained strong throughout the nineteenth century. When the British conquered northern Nigeria in the early twentieth century, they ruled indirectly through the existing Fulani elites. A good account of a Hausa state within the Fulani empire is given by M.G. Smith (Government in Zazzau 1800-1950, 1960) in which he discusses Fulani government in Zaria. Another book, by Last
(The Sokoto Caliphate, 1968) discusses the Sokoto Empire in general with particular reference to some of the political offices in Sokoto. The subsequent significance of the Fulani Caliphate has been two-fold: (1) their political leaders and ideas have dominated northern Nigeria during the colonial and much of the post-colonial periods; (2) the Fulani are one of the most numerous ethnic groups in West Africa—spread from Senegal in the west to Cameroon in the east—and hence they tend to have an intrinsic trans-national outlook on contemporary nation-building.

The Fulani can be divided into three different categories according to lifestyle: the rural pastoralists who tend cattle; the rural settled agriculturists; and the urban Fulani who have been clearly associated with city-state government, yet assimilated into Hausa culture. In fact, the urban Fulani have absorbed so many of the customs and cultural patterns of the Hausa, that today most do not speak Fulani (Fulfulde) but use Hausa as their mother language.

4. Conclusion

The city-states of the central Sudan came into special importance after the period 1500 A.D. and have continued to flourish to the present time. These states have been Islamic in form and were retained more or less intact during the period of British colonial rule.
Indigenous Kingdoms of East and Central Africa

The broad savanna area fringing the Congo basin, stretching from the mouth of the Congo River, southeastwards through Angola, Katanga, the Zambezi basin, and then northwards to the Great Lakes region of East Africa, has been the site of a complex succession of African states and kingdoms. Many of these were very short-lived and most could not match the size, power, and complexity of organization of the Western Sudanic empires. But it must be remembered that the history of many of these kingdoms and chiefdoms, particularly those of central Africa, have only begun to be unravelled, (especially through the systematic analysis of oral traditions exemplified in the work of Vansina, 1966). This lecture attempts to sort out some of the major historical strands of state formation in three major areas: a. the central African savanna (mainly Congo and Angola); b. the Zambezi-Limpopo region; and c. the Great Lakes, or Interlacustrine, region of northern East Africa.

1. "Kingdoms of the Savanna"

The major states in the Congo zone included Kongo, Luba, Lunda and Lozi. Vansina points out that these and other smaller states and chiefdoms in the area shared many general characteristics. All focused almost entirely on the ruler, thus enabling the personalities of particular kings to have enormous impact on the state, its growth, prosperity or decline. Moreover, the nature of political succession in these states encouraged instability and civil strife in the interregnum.
Finally, a complex system of territorial control prevailed in which the outer provinces were considered as tributaries but allowed a great deal of autonomy. Provinces could—and did—break off whenever the circumstances were favorable. Alternatively, political control often meant heavy-handed exploitation. Most of the development of these states took place after 1500 and consequently was linked directly or indirectly to early Portuguese contact and the growth of the slave trade, further enhancing the inherent instability of the area. (Additional information on the Portuguese contact is given in lecture #26) In general, the Portuguese first stimulated and then led into decline the westernmost kingdoms such as Kongo and Ndongo (most of whose territory eventually became part of the Portuguese colony of Angola). In contrast, many of the interior kingdoms (Luba, Lunda) were able to increase their power and control via the sale of slaves and the purchase of arms. Several of these kingdoms were able to ward off Portuguese and Arab control coming from the east as well. Vansina's conclusion on these states suggests: "It is possible that, despite the succession problem, the development of the African states would have gone on had there been no influence from the outside. But as it actually happened, the political structures could not cope with the new stresses fostered by the slave trade and tended to collapse during an interregnum, when their power was weakest."

2. The Zambezi Basin

The Zambezi basin has been the site of trading in gold and copper from at least 850 A.D. and probably much earlier. From about 1100 to
1440, the Karanga people migrated into this area and established an important state, centered on a huge stone acropolis or temple to their king. This was the Great Zimbabwe, the most magnificent of perhaps over 400 stone building ruins in what is today Southern Rhodesia. (African nationalists in fact now call Rhodesia "Zimbabwe") It has only recently been established that these impressive buildings were African creations. The Zimbabwe had previously been attributed, in large part through European racial arrogance, to a variety of sources, from the Phoenicians and Arabs to King Solomon (i.e. his "mines").

In the mid 15th century, the center of power of this kingdom shifted northward and a new capital arose under the leadership of the Monomotapa (after which the state is named). Monomotapa is a Portuguese corruption of the indigenous title, Mwanamutapa, or "lord of the plundered lands." After about 1480, a breakaway state was established in the southern portion of what is now Rhodesia under the leadership of Changa. This state and its rulers, focused in the Great Zimbabwe area, was henceforth called Changamire and grew rapidly in strength as the kingdom of Monomotapa declined in the late 16th century. It was during this period that most of the largest and best walls of Zimbabwe were probably built.

The Portuguese first allied with Monomatapa, but eventually the state was destroyed and the Portuguese driven out by Changamire in the 1690's. (It should be noted that Sofala, on the Mozambique coast, was the major outlet for the trade in this region for most of this period and that Arab traders also ventured inland to reach the sources
of the trade and contributed to the disruption already existing.)

The processes of state formation in this area extended throughout southeastern Africa almost to Capetown where eventually they were to be affected by the Dutch (Boer) developments in South Africa. Most of these states were to be defeated or dissolved by the mid 18th century from a combination of Boer attacks and the far-reaching invasions of the Ngoni (or Nguni), the group which produced the Zulu states, destroyed Changamire, and set in motion many important historical developments in southern Africa. (More information on historical developments in South Africa can be found in the essay by MBATA.)

3. The Great Lakes Region

Clans of Bantu-speaking farmers had developed small chiefdoms in what is now southern Uganda by the 13th century. After 1300, larger kingdoms were established under the leadership of powerful local clans, the most well-known of which were the Chwezi who established the large kingdom of Kitara (later Bunyoro). Subsequent infiltrations by non-Bantu groups (primarily Nilotic) stimulated further state formation as the migrants established themselves as the predominant ruling group in many areas. The Nilotic-related Bito clan, for example, displaced the Chwezi and become the rulers of Bunyoro for 18 generations after about 1500. Further south, the Bahima become the rulers of states such as Ankole, Ruanda and Burundi, which become dominated by a system of vassalage, with pastoral Nilotic rulers and subservient Bantu-speaking agriculturalists. (e.g., Hima lords and Iru farmers in Ankole, Tutsi
lords and Hutu farmers in Rwanda). Processes of fusion and fission, similar to those which occurred south of the equator, also occurred here, but the states were generally more stable. By the end of the 17th century, the power of the Bunyoro state began to be challenged by the Buganda state to the east, which had successfully withstood the attacks of Kitara-Bunyoro and more effectively absorbed the Nilotic and Nilo-Hamitic invaders than was the case in the other states. All were effective in withstanding the violence of the slave raiders (unlike the savanna and Zambezi states). With British penetration, however, the still powerful Bunyoro resisted and were defeated, while Buganda allied themselves with the British and became by far the dominant kingdom of the Great Lakes region during the colonial period. Even at independence, such states as Buganda (under its ruler, the kabaka), Bunyoro, Ankole, Toro, Rwanda, Burundi and other smaller kingdoms remained as powerful entities.
From about sixteenth century until the present day, a number of civilizations have flourished in the rain forest zone of West Africa. Among these have been the Ashanti in Ghana, the Yoruba (of old Oyo) in Nigeria, and the Edo of Benin, Nigeria. All have been characterized by extensive urban social organization, by developing bureaucracies and resources (at an earlier period) military and distinctive belief systems. Most of the rain forest city-states withstood the eastern and central Sudanic Islamic culture, partly because of ecological factors inhibiting the extension of Sudanic horse culture into the dense rain forest area. One of the best introductory books on these kingdoms is edited by Daryll Forde and P.M. Kaberry (West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth Century, 1967), and includes essays on Benin, Ashanti, the Yoruba kingdom of Oyo, the kingdom of Dahomey, the kingdom of Kom in West Cameroon, the Mende chieftains of Sierra Leone, and the Wolof kingdom of Kayor.

1. The Ashanti Empire

The Ashanti rose to power in about 1680 A.D., and expanded from 1700-1750 to the Guinea coast, and up into the savanna zone. They became so powerful that they were not conquered by the British until 1896.

During the eighteenth century, West African kingdoms such as Ashanti were often expanding at the expense of the small neighboring kingdoms; an almost constant state of warfare existed until 1750.
European trading posts along the coast took advantage of this warfare. After 1807, when the slave trade was legally prohibited by Britain and the coast was patrolled by British warships, the British began to establish a protectorate in the southern Ashanti areas, with the result that a series of military clashes occurred between the British and Ashanti. Ashanti was finally conquered by the British in 1900 and in 1901 was declared a Crown Colony. It has continued as a major cultural region in the modern state of Ghana.

From 1750 to 1901, the rulers of Ashanti experimented with the development of a system of government suitable for the administration of the large and complex empire. Basically this was a centralized bureaucracy, which existed side by side with the old system of traditional chiefs whose authority derived from their local people. At the head of the bureaucracy, and as head of the traditional chiefs, was the Asantehene, who consulted the opinions of both but was essentially an autonomous decision-maker. After the British conquest of Ashanti, they interpreted the system as being a "confederation", (see Rattray, Ashanti Law and Constitution, 1929) although this now seems to have underestimated the role of the centralizing bureaucracy (see Wilks, 1967). An American observer in the 19th century (J.L. Wilson) regarded the Ashanti state to be comparable in magnitude and quality of government to that of "second order types of European states".

One of the reasons for the strength of Ashanti was its wealth of natural resources including large gold deposits. In fact, the Ashanti currency during this period consisted of measures of gold dust.
The Akan peoples, who comprised the Ashanti state, were organized into clans, based on family systems in which descent was calculated through the mother's side of the family. Women were often as powerful as men. The queen mother of Ashanti was extremely influential.

The language of the Ashanti, called Twi, is tonal. That is, the pronunciation of words go up and down like tones in music. Consequently, the words could be reproduced on talking drums and messages could travel quickly from one village to another. It is also important to note that although the people and rulers of Ashanti were not Muslim they did incorporate some of the technology of the Sadanic belt and by the beginning of the nineteenth century Arabic was used in the court of the Asantehene. Much of the significance of Ashanti, however, lies in its unique and rich heritage of oral literature, visual and musical art.

2. The Yoruba City-States

In the immediate pre-colonial era, Yorubaland consisted of about fifty city-states of varying magnitude, in what is now the Western State of Nigeria. These major Yoruba kingdoms included (new) Oyo, Ife, Ijebu, Ilesha, and Ibadan. These city-states shared a common language, common religious belief systems, and common myths of origin.

In the eighteenth century, the main Yoruba center was old Oyo, which, like Ashanti, built up a large empire, extending from the savanna to the coast. The power of old Oyo was destroyed by the Fulani of the Sokoto Caliphate during the period 1820-1830. As a result, many Yoruba migrated into the towns to the south, and even founded city-states.
such as new Oyo and Ibadan. The old Oyo dynasty resettled in new Oyo, but by the second half of the nineteenth century, much of the economic power in the old Yoruba empire passed to the newly formed town of Ibadan, which grew into the largest urban center in black Africa (with over a million population today, rivaled only by the more recent growth of Lagos and Kinshasa).

Each of the Yoruba city-states had a ruler (or Oba) with a distinctive title. Although succession to Oba was inherited, the day-to-day power in the kingdom was in the hands of "chiefs" who were frequently non-hereditary. In fact, the Oba was not directly involved in the political decision-making, but performed ritual and ceremonial types of functions. (Ibadan, as a military garrison town, had no Oba.)

The significance of Yorubaland at present is perhaps in its heavily urbanized culture, richness of its art and religious civilization. In addition, partly because of the warfare between the city-states, many of the Yoruba peoples were sold into slavery and became prominent among those groups who settled in the New World. Even today in Latin America and the Caribbean area there are Afro-American groups with distinctive Yoruba language, religion, and cultural identities.

There are several works on Yorubaland which may be consulted for further details, especially the work by Lloyd, Mabogunje and Ave (1967), and Ojo (1967).

3. The Kingdom of Benin

The Edo-speaking people who comprise the kingdom of Benin (in
present day mid-west Nigeria) trace their dynastic organization to the fourteenth century. It was during the reign of their fifteenth Oba (king) that European visitors first came to Benin City (approximately 1485 A.D.). This initial interaction between Portuguese priests and Benin monarchs is recorded in some of the now famous Benin bronzes, in which Benin craftsmen incorporated European figures into the frescos of Benin courtlife.

By the late fifteenth century, Benin was a large and powerful state with an army capable of conducting campaigns at considerable distance from Benin City. By the late sixteenth century, its frontier extended west-wards to coastal areas beyond Lagos and eastward to the Niger River. Within about a hundred years of its initial contact, European relations with Benin were cut off. They resumed later, when in 1897 a British military expedition conquered and burned Benin City.

The city of Benin itself was encircled by an earth wall and dry moat approximately six miles in circumference. Within the city, the area was divided into two sections of town: the royal palace area and the remainder. In addition to the Oba, royalty included seven Uzama who were hereditary nobles and kingmakers. The Oba himself was the head of the religious and administrative aspects of the kingdom. The palace of the Oba of Benin may be visited today and the Benin Museum contains artifacts from earlier periods.

4. Conclusions

The kingdoms of Ashanti, Yoruba and Benin, which flourished as
independent states from the sixteenth to the end of the nineteenth centuries (i.e., until the colonial period) had several things in common. First, a system of inherited kingship with the Asantehene or Obu symbolized the religious and political power of the state. Secondly, in all cases there were large urban centers which formed the center of the kingdoms (Kumasi, Oyo, and Benin City, respectively) with corresponding degrees of urban culture. Thirdly, all three of the kingdoms were engaged in inter-state warfare and international trade.
#26. Early Western Contact

The history of "Western" contacts with Africa can only be understood if placed within a global perspective. It has in large part been Western ethnocentrism which created the "dark continent" whose features and peoples awaited European "discovery." Africa was not nearly as unknown to the Islamic world, which had been in close contact with many parts of Africa for almost a millenium before the major period of European contact with Africa.

1. Ancient Contacts

Mediterranean Africa, Asia and Europe have had some contact with Africa south of the Sahara for at least 2500 years. Most of the early contacts were peripheral and coastal, but much deeper penetration and more intensive interaction developed periodically in ancient times, particularly from Egypt and the Nile Valley. (Some of these contacts have already been mentioned in an earlier lecture.) Although records remain fragmentary, there is some evidence that Egyptian seafarers had sailed along the East African coast, perhaps as far as Sofala (in Mozambique) hundreds of years before the time of Christ. Herodotus, writing in 448 B.C., claims that Phoenicians under King Necho may have already circumnavigated the continent (a feat usually attributed to Bartholemew Dias in 1497 A.D.). By the sixth century B.C., the Carthaginians (Carthage is in present-day Tunisia) and others were trading along the northwest (Atlantic) coast of Africa and may have even been in contact with what is now southern Nigeria. Overland
contacts also have deep historical roots in the ancient interaction patterns between the Sudanic belt and both the Nile Valley and the northern coast. The full nature of these contacts is still being explored, particularly with respect to developments in the Sahara and the role of Berber middlemen in these contacts. It is clear, however, that by the first century B.C., Arab, Indian, Indonesian and Chinese mariners knew more about tropical Africa than their counterparts in Europe.

2. From the time of Christ to 1400 A.D.

European contacts with Africa during the second half of the 1400 year period after Christ were extremely meagre. During this later period, states in the Sudanic belt began to forge close contacts with the North African Islamic world, which acted as a buffer zone between Africa and Europe. Yet the trans-Saharan caravan routes and the East African coastal trade were linked up to a vast network extending from the Atlantic coast of Africa through the Middle East and across Asia to China and the Orient. Africa admittedly was not central to this trading system, but nevertheless was a full participant, with African gold and ivory being in great demand.

3. The first wave of Western European expansion

With its new-found autonomy from Castillian Spain and strategic location facing the open Atlantic, Portugal was the first European country to begin exploring the uncharted coastline of Africa. Partly because of the legends of African gold, and partly in an attempt to
circumvent Ottoman control over the routes to India and the Orient, Portuguese sailors, particularly under Prince Henry the Navigator, searched for an alternative around the African continent. Dias passed the Cape of Good Hope in 1487 and ushered in a major period of Portuguese contact with Africa.

The nature of Portuguese influence varied greatly, but six major areas of impact were as follows:

1. The capturing of Ceuta and other important Maghrib ports by the Portuguese and Spanish in the early 15th century reversed the flow of conquest which had permitted North African dominance in the Iberian Peninsula for about 700 years;

2. The Portuguese established contacts along the West African coast after the 1440's, thereby entering the trans-Saharan slave trade from the "back door." The Portuguese allied themselves with several of the forest states which were by that time beginning to compete with the older and larger Sudanic states to the north. Welcoming Portuguese support at first, these states permitted the Portuguese to establish several trading footholds (for slaves, gold and ivory) along the coast: with the Diola and Wolof in the area between the Senegal and Gambia River mouths; with the Akan peoples along the "Gold Coast", where the Portuguese fort of Elmina was built in 1482; and with the people of Benin, near the Niger delta. These early footholds were to become the bases for the rapidly expanding Atlantic slave trade and the Portuguese were soon joined by other European powers;

3. The Portuguese penetrated
Early Western Contact

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into the Congo basin, beginning in the 1480's. The first major foothold was with the Kingdom of Kongo (in northern Angola). Trade was established, ambassadors exchanged between Lisbon and the Kongo capital, and Christian missions were permitted entry. With Portuguese help, the Kongo became an important base for slave raiding, disrupting and depopulating much of the surrounding area (including the important Mbundu kingdom whose king, the ngola, gave its name to the present Portuguese colony). Eventually, the disruptions generated by slaving destroyed not only the surrounding areas but the Kingdom of Kongo as well, with the Portuguese remaining in what is now Angola (with only brief interruption) to the present day. They penetrated into the Zambezi Basin, and brought similar disruption to the surrounding areas. The most important state to be effected was the Kingdom of Monomatapa, whose previously prosperous trade in gold and silver was ruined and which became virtually a Portuguese puppet state in 1628. The colony of Mozambique ("Portuguese East Africa") is the remnant of Portuguese contacts in this area and along the East Coast. The Portuguese, however, were unable to fulfill their dream of connecting Angola across southern Africa to Mozambique due in large part to the strength of other interior kingdoms in resisting their intrusion. The Portuguese interlude in East Africa is discussed in lecture #22. Christian Ethiopia was also the site of Portuguese contacts, initially as part of the search for the legendary Prester John (presumed to have been a powerful Christian king seeking support from Christian Europe). The
major impact of these contacts was to re-establish Ethiopian relations with Europe.

4. Prelude to colonialism

The period from 1600 to 1800 saw the entry of other European powers into the growing African coastal trading system. The Spanish had closely followed the Portuguese and were the first to take African slaves to the New World. Early in the 17th century, the Dutch began to challenge effectively Portuguese power in the Atlantic basin, capturing much of the slave traffic, establishing many forts along the Gold Coast, and conquering not only much of Brazil but nearly all the Portuguese bases along the West African coast. (The Portuguese were later able to recover Brazil and Angola.) During the rest of this period, a number of other European nations entered into the growing competition for trade in Africa: the English, Scots, French, Danes, Swedes and Prussians all established forts and trading centers along the West African coast, which were later to attract larger-scale government supported trading companies. The groundwork was being laid for the eventual scramble for African colonies. More immediately, the major period of the Atlantic slave trade had begun.
Origins and Growth of the Slave Trade

This vast topic will be treated under three major headings: domestic slavery in Africa; the East African slave trade; and the Atlantic slave trade. For greater detail, special attention should be given to the works of Davidson (1961), Curtin (1967), Vansina (1969), and others in the BIBLIOGRAPHY. See also the sections on the slave trade in Collins, (1968).

1. Domestic slavery in Africa

There is a special supplement of Trans-Action (1967, edited by Ronald Cohen) for a general introduction to the issue of African domestic slavery, and case studies are presented of slavery among the Ashanti, Ibo, Kanuri, Ila (Zambia) and Zanzibar. Slavery, in the sense of an institutionalized subordination of one group (or individual) by another, existed—and still exists to some extent—in parts of Africa. Most forms of slavery in Africa, however, differ greatly from the Western image of slavery and the plantation system. Owners and slaves, for example, were usually of similar if not identical cultural backgrounds. The status of slaves in some African societies was higher than non-slaves. (As with the Hausa palace advisers and body guards.) In general slavery did not prevent slaves from occupying a full range of roles in society. With the exception of the very few places where some form of plantation slavery did exist (such as in Zanzibar), slaves were members of the larger society sharing the status of their master and, after being freed (second and even first generation
manumission was common) were often absorbed directly into the dominant kinship system. The major functions served by indigenous slavery in Africa were: (1) to increase the population and wealth of the dominant group by providing workers and subordinate members of households; (2) to provide a means of absorbing prisoners of war from other ethnic groups; and (3) to work off debt payments by members within the ethnic society.

2. East African Slave Trade

Trade in slaves existed between East Africa and Asia (and from West Africa across the Sahara to North Africa) long before the coming of the Europeans. But compared to the later Atlantic trade, this trade was extremely limited in numbers and geographical extent. Prior to the late nineteenth century, East African trade in slaves was much less important than trade in gold and ivory (although the latter often caused just as much destruction and death). Slaves were brought to the coastal ports by African "middlemen" located strategically along the major trade routes into the interior. The 19th century, however, saw a rapid increase in the slave trade, initially under the Portuguese in the south (Mozambique), who turned for slaves to the East as well as the West coast. Davidson (1968, p. 224) states that at this time, "Portuguese slave exports from the Mozambique coast were running at the rate of about ten thousand per year, very much higher than in any previous period."

A much larger slave trade developed in the central and northern
portions of the coast later in the 19th century, particularly after
the transfer of the Omani capital from Muscat (in the Arabian Peninsula)
to Zanzibar. Zanzibar Town quickly developed into the greatest slave
port in East Africa and Arab and Swahili traders, for the first time in
any large numbers, moved into the interior to compete directly with
African groups in slave raiding and trading. During this period--the
last quarter of the 19th century--the horrors of the slave trade
were most pronounced. Plantation slavery (for the production of
cloves) developed on Zanzibar Island, enormous societal disruption took
place among the people of the interior, and for a long period, no people
residing anywhere near the main caravan routes into the interior
(Extending across the East African countries into Malawi, Zambia and
Congo) could feel safe. In the wake of this disruption, European
contacts increased--first as explorers and soon afterwards as colonialists.

It must be stressed that the annual volume of the East African
Slave trade never approached that of West Africa during the major period
of the Atlantic trade. More importantly, despite the prevalent attitude
in the literature (see Coupland, 1939), current research (Alpers, 194)
suggests that "the East African slave trade as a factor of continuing
historical significance traces its roots back no further than the first
half of the eighteenth century." Prior to this time--really a final
episode in the history of the European dominated slave trade in Africa--
trade in slaves was a very minor factor in East African history.
3. West Africa and the Atlantic Trade

The Atlantic Slave trade represented one of the greatest intercontinental migrations in world history. Today, one third of all people of African descent live outside the continent (proportion surpassed only by that for Europe—almost fifty percent), although the difference between voluntary and involuntary migration is clear. By the end of the sixteenth century, the need for cheap labor in the New World had created an enormous demand for slaves. Before this time, the framework of a vast trading system linking West Africa to Europe had already been established, comparable to the already well-developed Indian Ocean trading system. Like the latter, slaves originally formed a very minor part of this trade, which involved a form of partnership between European merchants and African middlemen. The Portuguese were importing thousands of slaves a year, but this only supplemented an already existing and very profitable trade in European slaves from Venice and elsewhere in the Mediterranean (feeding a system of domestic labor and indigenous slavery similar to that discussed above). Indigenous African servitude had increased by this time in the large-scale centralized Islamic states of the Sudanic belt. Laborers were bought and sold throughout the area and the relatively small external demand could have been met without disruption of traditional patterns. But, as previously noted, these were not slave-based economies—household slaves were members of the community and could aspire to nearly
all positions in society.

What changed this situation entirely was the development of plantation agriculture in the Americas. There were not enough white European slaves, and the indigenous Indian population (after an incredible loss of life) were considered unable to adjust to the plantation system. With the first trickle of African slaves, it was soon found that they were much more skilled in tropical agriculture and mining than the Indians or Europeans and, moreover, appeared to be in plentiful supply. Already established in West Africa, the slave trade rapidly increased as African rulers cooperated with European merchants in their demand for more slaves. Fed by availability of Europeans weapons, encouraged by the enormous external demand, local African rulers—particularly along the Benin-Congo coast—turned to warfare and capture rather than the sale of existing slaves. (Note: this was less true of Ashanti and Dahomey.) The whole power structure in West Africa began to be modified as new states emerged along the Guinea Coast, older forest states became more powerful, and the center of West African socio-economic strength shifted from the Sudanic belt to the coast.

This African slavery chapter in world history lasted for more than 400 years, until roughly the end of the 1870's. There is still much debate as to precisely how many Africans were taken from their homes to be sold as slaves, but higher estimates suggest that 15 million Africans actually reached the New World as a result of the Atlantic trade, (for a lower estimate see ROWE.) Deaths due to slave raiding
and warfare, societal disruption, and the notorious Atlantic voyage, would likely triple this figure. For an interpretation of African settlement in the New World, and for a further assessment of the impact of European slavers on West Africa, see HAMMOND.
Abolition and States for Freed Slaves

The African slave trade created in the European mind an almost complete contempt for African humanity as part of the rationalization for slavery in the New World (see Curti, p. 14). Feelings of racial superiority grew in this fertile soil, as did the drive to bring the "savage barbarians" of Africa into the "civilized" Christian world. Intensifying these developments still further was the situation of Africa being "discovered" by Europeans in ever-increasing detail during the Age of Exploration. The 17th and 18th centuries in Africa are what Basil Davidson has called the Age of Transition, a period of successive crisis and turmoil associated with trade in arms and slaves, the Muslim reformation and revival in the Sudanic zone, the Portuguese invasions and rise of the Sultanate of Zanzibar in East Africa, the collision between Bantu-speaking peoples and the trekking Afrikaners in the south, and many other historical conflicts. By the beginning of the 19th century, Africa was as turbulent a continent as Europe or North America, a situation often interpreted by the Europeans as a reflection on African capability. The missionary zeal to save "savage Africa" was accordingly intensified.

1. The anti-slave trade movement

The slave trade was so profitable that it discouraged other kinds of trade between Europe and Africa. When groups of radical Christians began to react on moral grounds to the importation of slaves into
England, pressures for the abolition of slavery began to build. The abolitionists were supported by those who saw commercial gain in other forms of trade with Africa, and by administrators, especially in the West Indies, who feared that the New World had reached a saturation point which might lead to wide-spread slave revolts. When the anti-slave trade movement met with success in Europe (was made illegal in Denmark in 1804, Great Britain in 1807, the United States in 1808,) it then became imperative to abolish the slave trade in Africa itself.

By about 1842, it was illegal in nearly every European and American country, at least technically, to carry slaves across the Atlantic. This, however, did not mean the cessation of the trade. Only after the U.S. Civil War and the abolition of slavery in Cuba and Brazil in the 1880's cut down the demand from the Americas was the trade finally extinguished in Africa. The surge of European humanitarian and religious interests in Africa and the period of European exploration which accompanied these developments are more appropriately discussed as preliminaries to the "Scramble for Africa". We now look back to examine other after-effects of the African slave trade.

2. States for Freed Slaves

Many "liberated" Africans in the Americas decided, or were encouraged, to return to Africa. They settled in several areas in Africa, including Libreville (in French Gabon), in the Gambia, and Freetown (near Mombasa, Kenya). By far the most significant of these settlements were in Sierra Leone and Liberia, along what had been called
the "Grain Coast" (for "grain of Paradise", a kind of pepper). In both cases, humanitarian and commercial objectives were evident: the former with respect to finding a home for freed slaves and a base for anti-slave trade efforts; and the latter in the desire to establish a base for legitimate trade with Africa. The commercial objectives, for a variety of reasons (see Hargreaves, 1963), were never fully realized. In both Liberia and Sierra Leone, the relationship between the freed slaves and the indigenous peoples proved to be complex. The Americo-Liberians and the Creoles, (from the United States and Great Britain respectively) each came to dominate their new states.

a. Sierra Leone: A small colony had developed around Freetown before the end of the 18th century as a private base for anti-slave activities. It was fully taken over by the British in 1808 as its major anti-slave trade base. As in the other small British colonial enclaves in Gambia and Lagos, European influence in Sierra Leone did not penetrate far inland until around the turn of the 19th century. In 1827, however, the Fourah Bay Institution (now University) was established in Freetown and became an influential center for African education. British missionary activities spread from Freetown into the hinterland and were extended from the 1840's into Yorubaland and beyond in Nigeria. During this period, long lasting contacts were established between Sierra Leone and Yorubaland. One of the earliest Fourah Bay students, for example, was Samuel Ajayi Crowther, an outstanding African linguist who later became Bishop of the Niger.
b. Liberia: Liberia was an American-generated equivalent of Sierra Leone. Begun in 1821 as a venture of the American Colonization Society, the first small settlement of freed slaves became an independent republic in 1847 (although it was not recognized by the United States until 1862, with the beginning of the Civil War). Many feel that the primary American objective in Liberia was to rid the U.S. of its rapidly growing population of "Free Negroes", an unassimilated and potentially troublesome element which had grown in numbers to over 230,000 in 1820. It is noteworthy that of the nearly 12,000 migrants sent to Liberia by 1866, half were not initially free men but slaves who were permitted freedom under the promise to migrate. Many historians consider the Liberian experiment to have been basically unsuccessful. The descendants of the first settlers established an essentially colonial society over the indigenous inhabitants—except that the colonists here were black and did not have the resources to build an economic infrastructure. For an excellent comparative study of Liberia and Sierra Leone, see Hargreaves (1964).

3. Slavery and Freedom

It is difficult to assess the full impact of the slave trade on African societies and individuals. New estimations as to the numbers of Africans who were taken as slaves are still being made (see Curtin and Vansina, 1969). Some notion of the feelings and attitudes of the Africans who were enslaved, however, can be found in the autobiographical
documents edited by Curtin (1967). This paperback volume contains the first published collection of narratives by West Africans from the era of the slave trade. These personal recollections provide a valuable perspective to the topic of slavery.

It is also possible to study the thought of Afro-Americans who returned to Liberia and Sierra Leone in the nineteenth century. One of the most notable figures was Edward Blyden, who was also prolific in his writings (see BIBLIOGRAPHY).
The Scramble for Africa

From approximately 1885 until the outbreak of World War I (1914) the continent of Africa was partitioned by European powers into a territorial pattern which has persisted until the present day. This partition, or "scramble for Africa," occurred primarily for reasons to do with European politics and economics. First and perhaps the most important, there was the military or strategic importance of the coastal areas of Africa, which by now were on the trade routes to the Far East. Secondly, there was the growing importance of commercial outlets in Africa and the need for assurance of raw material supplies for the industrial expansion of Europe.

1. The Congress of Berlin and the "Rules" of Conquest

The "ground rules" for the scramble for Africa were set up, essentially, at a thirteen week conference in 1884/85. Representatives of fourteen European states, plus the United States, met in Berlin to discuss issues such as freedom of commerce in the Congo area and the criteria for effective occupation of territories in Africa. In essence it was decided that the Congo area should remain a free trade zone. With regard to criteria for occupation in Africa, several principles were established. First, the European power had to "effectively occupy" the territories under consideration. Secondly, other states agreed to recognize the authority of the occupying state once it had been established in these territories. The definition of effective occupation became important to the pattern of conquest in Africa. Essentially it
required an on-the-spot display of man-power (military or commercial) in the area being claimed in addition to some sort of treaty with the local peoples. This had the effect of encouraging military expeditions in Africa, and although in certain instances territories were controlled through the signing of non-military treaties, at least two-thirds of the territories in Africa were gained by military conquest.

2. Patterns of European Conquest

Britain, France, and Portugal had long had historic contacts with coastal sections of Africa, but the agreements at Berlin necessitated penetration of the "interior". The partition of Africa into European colonies followed to some extent from the strategic positions of the European powers. These patterns will be described below.

The British were concerned as a primary objective to insure direct communications and control over the north-south route from South Africa to Egypt. The phrase "Cape to Cairo" indicated the dream of empire builders, such as Cecil Rhodes, who wanted to link up the British possessions in Anglo-Egyptian Sudan with the emerging power base in South Africa. This north-south axis directly confronted the ambitions of three other European powers. The first were the Portuguese, who (in southern Africa) hoped to establish east-west linkages between their possessions in Angola and Mozambique. This was thwarted through the efforts of Cecil Rhodes, who established Northern and Southern Rhodesia.

The second European power to confront the British on their Cape
to Cairo dream were the Germans. Under the guidance of Bismarck, German foreign policy hoped to establish a German "middle Africa" stretching from Cameroon on the West to Tanganyika on the East and including some link back to Southwest Africa. German ambitions in Africa were curtailed after the deposition of Bismarck in 1890 by Kaiser Wilhelm and German policy became more concerned with strategies in Europe than in Africa. In fact, agreements were made between the Germans and the British regarding spheres of influence in East Africa, whereby the British further extended their hegemony over what is now Uganda, in return for ceding the island of Heligoland in the North Sea, to Germany.

The major European confrontation in Africa occurred between the British and the French. The French had established control over much of north-western Africa, (the Maghreb), but were also concerned to extend their early contacts in Senegal (on the far western tip of Africa) across the entire Sudanic belt to Somaliland on the eastern Horn. The scramble for Africa was perhaps most dramatic in West Africa. Military expeditions were sent out by both the British and the French and penetrated the empires of the Western and Central Sudan which had been virtually unknown to Europeans before this time. The major confrontation between the British and the French, which is well cited in textbooks on European history, was at Fashoda on the upper Nile in southern Sudan. There it became clear that the British were able to withstand French military pressure and hence retain their north-south linkages from the Sudan to territories further south. The French
relinquished their hope for a linkage between East and West Africa.

For reasons related to the balance of power in Europe, shortly after the turn of the century Britain and France found themselves in alliance, (the "entente," ) against rising German power in Europe. The result of this alliance was the establishment of boundary commissions to negotiate demarcations between British and French areas of Africa. Much of this boundary negotiation was conducted in a spirit of good will. Perhaps the most notable boundary that came out of these negotiations was the line drawn between Northern Nigeria and Niger territory.

Ironically it was the Germans, and later, under the League of Nations mandate, the Belgians who thwarted the British dream of a Cape to Cairo linkage. The tiny territories of Burundi and Rwanda blocked to some extent, the access to the river and lake routes connecting Uganda with Northern Rhodesia.

3. Land and Settlers

The consequences of partition in Africa and the establishment of colonial rule during the period 1885 to 1914 differed between the major regions in Africa. In eastern, central, and southern Africa, as well as in the Maghreb, European settlers often emigrated and began to establish themselves on a permanent basis. In Algeria, many of the French settlers were refugees from the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, (particularly from the area of Alsace-Lorraine). In East Africa the most important settlement area was Kenya, where Lord Delamere actively
encouraged British farmers to establish themselves in the desirable highlands. In Southern Africa the discovery of gold and diamonds in the 1870's and 1880's, resulted in a flood of European fortune seekers, with an attendant host of merchants and suppliers of goods and services. In the Belgian areas, particularly the Congo, there were fewer settlers initially (as commerce increased later the number of Belgian settlers also increased). But the Belgians followed a policy of granting huge tracts of land to commercial companies who were willing to exploit and "develop" these territories.

By contrast, in West Africa there were few if any settlers. This was partly for reasons of colonial policy (the British explicitly forbade land alienation in West Africa) but also because health conditions for Europeans in West Africa were more difficult. The result of these early patterns of settlement have carried over in the present day whereby East, Central, and Southern Africa have experienced different patterns of race relations than those in West Africa.

4. Conclusions

By the time of World War I, Britain and France had emerged as the dominant colonial powers in Africa, the boundary lines in most of the colonial territories had been demarcated, in certain areas European settlers and companies had become established. Perhaps the British and French dominance in Africa may have contributed to the German sense of frustration which helped to precipitate World War I. In most cases, the
military conquest of Africa was conducted by a limited number of European officers, equipped with modern machine guns and armaments, using local African enlisted men. In many cases the demonstration of superior firepower was sufficient to forstall widespread resistance. However, in the next lecture we will consider the types of resistance to European rule that did develop on the part of Africans.
African Resistance and Reaction

CROWDER refers to the phenomenon of African resistance, and points out that for the most part African resistance to colonial conquest was weak. However there were a number of significant instances in which local peoples did organize themselves militarily to withstand the incursion of European power. In retrospect, some of these resistance movements are especially important because of their symbolic value to African nationalist movements.

1. The Resistance of Samory Toure

The empire of Samory Toure, a Mande-speaking ruler of upper Guinea and lower Mali, was founded in the late 1860s when he gained control over a small chieftancy in Kankan. In the 1870s he extended this base into a sizable empire. In the mid 1880s, after the Congress of Berlin, French forces in the area began to confront Samory. In 1885, Samory defeated the French at Nafadie. As a point of honor, the French sent a larger expedition against him which resulted in a temporary truce. In 1887, Samory signed a treaty with the French which ostensibly established a French protectorate in the area. In fact Samory was buying time and he undertook fresh attacks against the French with varying degrees of success and loss.

The culmination of the confrontation between Samory and the French occurred during the period 1891 to 1898. This so-called "seven year war" included thirteen major battles with the French.
French defeated Samory at the siege at Sikasso which was a major stronghold of Samory. (Samory continued to fight sporadically after this however.) Crowder (West Africa Under Colonial Rule, 1968) summarizes the significance of Samory's resistance and military genius. He suggests that Samory was particularly successful at logistics (maintaining a supply of arms, ammunition and horses). Secondly, he had mastered the art of strategic withdrawal. Thirdly, he was an unusually good organizer of men. And finally, his intelligence system was so good that in most cases he had foreknowledge of French intentions and activities. Perhaps for this reason he was able to withstand major French military efforts for a longer period than most other empires in Africa. In later periods, he became a symbol of early resistance to colonial rule. It should be noted that the present President of Guinea, Sekou Touré, is a collateral descendant of Samory and drew upon memories of this early resistance to fortify his own resistance to the French at the time of independence.

2. The Resistance of Ashanti

Early encounters between the Ashanti and the British occurred in the 1820's when British influence was "nominally" extended to the region. However, the British governor, Sir Charles MacCarthy, while fighting against the Ashanti, was defeated and beheaded. Not until 1844 did the British government begin takeover of the administration of the Gold Coast settlement from the Committee of London Merchants. However, Ashanti was still not an acknowledged part of this colonial
sphere. In 1874, the British, under Sir Garnett Wolseley, invaded Ashanti. However, it was not until 1901 that Ashanti was formally annexed to the Gold Coast. During this era there was considerable resistance on the part of the Ashanti to British annexation.

In the Ashanti empire during the late 1880's the British precipitated a series of civil wars which affected the trade between the Ashanti and the coastal areas. This provided the British governors with an excuse for action. In 1891 Governor Griffith tried to persuade the Ashanti to join the Gold Coast voluntarily. Instead the Asantehene attacked those border states which had submitted to the British. The Asantehene declared that the kingdom of Ashanti would never commit itself to the British and would remain independent, although it was the intention of the Ashanti to remain friendly with the Europeans. In 1895 Governor Maxwell sent an ultimatum to the Asantehene. The ultimatum was refused and 3000 troops were sent to Kumasi, which was occupied in 1896. Troops seized the palace, destroyed shrines and deposed the Asantehene, sending him to exile with his queen mother to the Seychelles Islands. Unrest continued in Ashanti. In 1900 the Governor imposed a series of demands which hardened resistance and war was declared. The Ashanti imprisoned the governor in Kumasi along with more than 700 of his troops. Later the governor escaped and fierce fighting continued until 1901. Larger numbers of British officered troops returned to defeat the Ashanti and in 1901-02 Ashanti was formally annexed as a Crown Colony.

The significance of the resistance of Ashanti is severalfold: it
represents a refusal by an independent kingdom with whom the British had been dealing for over 200 years to submit to foreign rule. It also illustrates the protracted period of time that was necessary to establish British rule over Ashanti: roughly from 1820-1900, with fluctuations on both sides as to the degree of success or defeat.

3. Conclusions

The examples of Samory Touré and Ashanti illustrate in both the British and French context some of the patterns of resistance in the late nineteenth century. It should be noted that in many other parts of Africa resistance was also to be found. In Nigeria alone this included the Fulani of Northern Nigeria, the Kanuri of Bornu, the Hausa of Abuja, many of the Ibo, Ibibio, Opobo, Itsekira, and the Edo of Benin. In Central Africa, the resistance of the Matabele is well known. As mentioned in FADEN, many of these early resistance movements have become incorporated into the nationalist lexicon of symbols and history.
#31. The Nature of Colonial Systems

From about 1900 until 1960, the European colonial powers in Africa established systems of administrative rule which were characterized by a mixture of principles and patterns. These will be summarized below.

1. The British colonial system

British rule is notably identified with the policy of "indirect rule" established by Lord Frederick Lugard in Northern Nigeria. The principles of indirect rule required working through the traditional local authorities: in matters of taxation, law, succession to leadership, and community boundaries. Indigenous African communities were allowed to continue under their own leadership as long as that leadership was willing to cooperate with the British. For example, the Fulani emirates of northern Nigeria, for example, centralized authority systems already existed prior to European contact (see lecture #23). In other areas, such as among the Ibos of eastern Nigeria, the effect of the indirect rule system was to create more centralized authority systems. "Chiefs" were appointed to perform the functions of government. (It should be noted that in many of the segmental authority systems, indirect rule was unsuccessful, and a form of direct rule was adapted.)

The most important functions performed by the local authorities, (often called "native authorities") under indirect rule included the following: (1) taxes were often assigned and collected in the traditional way (e.g. in Islamic areas, the system of Zakat was continued); (2) a police force was continued or developed which was responsible to the
local ruler; the local ruler, often with the aid of a council selected from traditional elders, made decisions on a day-to-day basis; the traditional legal systems were continued in most cases, although a defendant might have the choice of being judged by British law.

In formal terms, the British colonial officials were not regarded as having decision-making powers, but rather "advisory" powers. A British "resident" was stationed in a native authority and maintained close contact with the local leaders. In a large native authority (e.g. Kano Emirate, in Northern Nigeria, with about three million persons in 1959), the resident would be assisted by several British "district officers", who would circulate throughout the area and ensure that indigenous authorities were performing their duties. (It should be noted that these residents and district officers did have leverage, financial and military, if it were necessary.)

The effect of the British indirect rule system, which was in fullest effect during the 1920's and 1930's, was to preserve the cultural unity of the local African communities. This may have led to difficulties at a later period when the African states were trying to bridge such cultural differences. It should also be mentioned that local Africans were recruited into the colonial administrative structure (apart from the traditional authorities). However, African civil servants in the English-speaking areas usually retained their cultural heritage, were assigned to their home areas, and usually operated in their vernacular languages.
2. The French colonial system

French rule has been characterized as "direct" in contrast to British rule (as with the British, there were exceptions to this: e.g. the indirect rule policy of the French in northern Cameroon). Direct rule established administrative units which cut across traditional and/or ethnic boundaries. While traditional leaders were often retained on stipend, they performed mainly ceremonial functions, or were regarded as minor clerks. French policy did not recognize the cultural integrity of the local communities in Africa. Administrative districts were organized into "circles" which in turn were subdivided into cantons. There was a tight hierarchical structure of colonial authority, with relatively little devolution of power. French law was applied (a detailed civil code) and French administrators collected taxes.

An important distinction developed in the French African colonies between those who were regarded as "citizens" and those who were regarded as "subjects". Subjects were essentially without rights, (until the constitutional reforms of 1956--the Loi-Cadre). Citizens, however, were accorded the rights of Frenchmen. This small group of Africans essentially represented those who had been assimilated into French culture or those who lived in certain favored coastal areas of Senegal. A meritocracy developed of those Africans who had received a French education, which formed the backbone of the colonial civil service. African administrators were not assigned to their home areas, and were required to use French as the language of administration.
Perhaps as a consequence of this elite development, the French-speaking African states have had less subsequent difficulty in terms of ethnic conflict. They have had more difficulty in terms of reestablishing contact between the French-assimilated elite and the common people. Part of the "negritude" movement in the 1950's was a reaction by French-speaking African intellectuals against the assimilation policy of the French. It was an assertion of the fact that they were African, not French.

3. Other Colonial systems

The pattern of "company rule" is significant in certain parts of Africa. In the Congo, King Leopold of the Belgians had allocated large districts to European mining and agricultural companies, on the condition that these companies administer the areas. Such administrations usually had little regard for local Africans, and some of the cruelest episodes in colonial history came out of these areas. The penalties for non-compliance with regulations were often harsh, including physical mutation. Companies ruled most of the Congo and most of Rhodesia until the 1920's and 1930's, when direct control was recovered by the colonial states.

German rule was also significant in Africa until World War I and was characterized by a very authoritarian system of colonial administration. This system was even more hierarchical in some cases than the French, and German administrators were reputed to be harsh.
After World War I, the German areas came under the control of the League of Nations, and later, its successor, the United Nations. These two international bodies entrusted (or "mandated") the administration of the African colonies to the remaining European colonial powers (i.e., Britain, France, and Belgium). A major feature of rule in the Trust Territories was that inspectors from the United Nations required reports on the conditions of local life, and there was less tendency to colonial abuse.

4. Summary

Colonial systems in Africa were essentially authoritarian and administrative. The European powers did follow different policies, which seem to have affected social and political patterns in the post-colonial period. Perhaps the most important difference in policy was the British recognition of local traditional authority and culture, and the French effort to break down local authority and culture. The effects of these colonial politics are still being felt.
Study Questions: Perspectives on the Past

The following study questions are both analytical and judgmental. While a student should have a clear and documented overview of African history, he should also be encouraged to interpret and even speculate about the issues which are raised in this section.

1. What is meant by "continental drift"? What are the distinctive physical features, if any, of the African continent? In what types of physical environment have African civilizations flourished?

2. What is the evidence for the assertion that all mankind originally descended from Asia? What time period is involved in this claim? At what point, and in what way did human physical characteristics begin to differ?

3. What is meant by Bantu migration? Why is it an important topic in African history? In what way is it related to the "agricultural revolution"?

4. What is known about the earliest black kingdoms or empires in Africa? What was their relationship to Egypt and the Middle East? To what extent should early Egyptians be regarded as "dark skinned"? What are the hypotheses relating the peoples of western Africa to those of the Nile Valley?

5. What are the basic elements of Islam? What parts of Africa may be regarded as Islamic? How might Islamic conversion effect the language, culture, religion, law, political system, and economic network of an African ethnic society? In the early period was Islam spread by the sword or by Muslim trader/scholars (or both)?
How did Muslims regard non-Muslims? Did ethnicity lose all importance in the Muslim empires?

6. Why are Ghana, Mali, and Songhay often considered the high points in black African civilization? Do you think they should be so considered? What did all three empires have in common? What were the differences? What type of political system was used to control the vast areas involved?

7. What are the origins of Swahili culture? Does the term Swahili refer to an ethnic group, a civilization, a language, a religion, or all of the above? What was the nature of the contact between Arabs and Africans along the East African coast? Were the trading cities any different from those in Sudanic West Africa?

8. How have the Hausa, Fulani, and Kanuri empires of the Central Sudan continued until the present? In what way do they provide insight into the pattern of city/state evolution in Sudanic Africa? What patterns of urbanism were represented by such cities as Kano or Katsina (e.g. trade dominant, agriculture dominant, military dominant, etc.)?

9. What is the nature of the dispute over the issue of who built Zimbabwe? Why do many white Rhodesians claim that it could not have been built by black Africans? What is the evidence pro and con?

10. To what extent were the Ashanti, the Edo of Benin, and Yoruba involved with the slave trade in West Africa? What was the nature of their social and political organization? To what extent were
they urban based kingdoms? What were the differences between the forest states of West Africa, and the states of the Central Sudan?

11. What groups were engaged in the capture, transportation, and selling of African slaves? What is the evidence for the magnitude of the slave trade? (in duration, in location of impact, and in numbers of persons)? What impact did the slave trade seem to have on West African communities? What were the cultural carry-overs into the New World by African slaves? How and when did return of abolition occur? Where was the impetus for the freed slaves in West Africa?

12. What were the most important reasons for the "European scramble" in Africa? To what extent, if any, was the United States involved with this scramble? What were the means of European conquest, and the means of African resistance? What were the major differences between colonial systems (if any)? What do you feel are the differences between slavery and colonialism? To what extent have pre-colonial and colonial legacies persisted in the independence era?

13. What has been the history of contact between Arabs and Africans? Between Europeans and Africans? Between Americans and Africans? What has been the history of African inter-state relations prior to western contact?

14. What are the major features of African civilization in historical perspective?
15. What are the problems of studying African history? To what extent will archeology aid in the understanding of African history? What are the problems of written sources of historical evidence? What are the problems with oral data?
### PART III. PROCESSES OF SOCIAL CHANGE

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Concepts of Social Change and Modernization

Social change refers to the processes whereby a society is reoriented in its structures, institutions, values and patterns of behavior. Some scholars prefer the term social change to related concepts such as modernization, westernization, or development, since social change does not imply any particular directionality and hence may be freer from ethno-centric distortion due to the value preferences of the observer. The term "westernization" clearly refers to the processes of adaptation to a North American/European technology and value system. On the other hand, the term "modernization" (which unfortunately is often used as a synonym for westernization) is directional in the type of social change required yet is capable of application in non-Western time and space contexts.

In basic terms, modernization refers to an "increasing complexity in human affairs" (Apter, 1965:3). This complexity refers to social relationships and to the generation and utilization of technological resources to change the quality of human life. There are several dimensions of modernization which should be seen as reinforcing each other.

1. Specialization

Specialization of human occupations leads to a division of labor in which individuals become more interdependent with each other. Specialization also requires institutions to coordinate the endeavors...
of individuals, and to settle disputes which may arise.

2. Secularization

The line between the sacred and the profane varies with each society. Secularization refers to the desacralization of material and behavioral phenomena previously endowed with supernatural or transcendental powers or values. Secularization is usually a precondition to the growth of science and technology in that fundamental inquiry into cause and effect must be examined with respect to "natural" rather than supernatural agents.

3. Urbanization

Urbanization is a form of population concentration characterized by high density and marked division of labor. The complexity of urban life as compared with traditional rural patterns is partly a function of the increased number of social relationships which exist in a city.

4. Mass mobilization

Mass mobilization refers to the involvement or participation of large numbers of persons in the economic and political life of the community. This greater involvement is perhaps necessary to the performance of specialized roles, but results in greater complexity. Mobilization does not require a particular type of authority system, but does require effective communication within a society.

5. Increase in Technology

The ability to manipulate natural elements and principles to desired results is at the core of modern society. The technology of
economic production is perhaps the most visible instance of modernization, but the technology of warfare, medicine, communications, etc. may be directly related to the increase of social scale and complexity.

6. Increase in scale

Increase in scale refers most often to the extension and consolidation of the boundaries of political community to cooperative behavior between states, and to the growth of inter-urban networks. All of these social arrangements extend the potential for division of labor, and specialization, and all of them require an increase in social relations.

7. Increase in Communications

Increase in communications refers to the broad and effective dissemination of messages. Communications may be regarded as part of the general transaction or interaction flow between individuals or groups, and is clearly related to increase in scale. Communications technology, such as printing in Europe, or the transistor radio in contemporary Africa, seems to be at the core of the modernization process. As McLuhan points out, people adapt and react qualitatively to changes in communications media.

8. Increase in Achievement Criteria

Increase in achievement criteria rather than inherited ("ascriptive") criteria seems to be necessary to the effective division of labor, i.e. the specialization of occupations based on skill and ability, rather than status or birth. In a system where roles are established by birth, there
is probably less effective utilization of manpower resources than in a system where individuals rise or fall according to their merits.

9. Summary

Modernization has been regarded as increase in social complexity, which is closely associated with social differentiation within society. Differentiation and complexity usually occur through three major processes:

(1). increase in the scale of human systems of interaction which may be accomplished through increase in technology and communications;

(2) increase in division of labor, or specialization (which usually requires some degree of urbanization, social mobilization and increase in individual achievement criteria);(3) increase in control over natural environment (which is based on technological skills and probably requires some degree of secularization).

Modernization is not necessarily a unilinear process which cannot be reversed. Modernization may occur in stages, with thresholds which are the result of cumulative interaction between several dimensions (e.g. urbanization and technology); or it may follow random patterns. In any case, modernization as a concept should be capable of application in any context (i.e. not only western). In the next lecture, we will examine the dimensions of modernization within the African context and over a long period of historical change.
Social change and modernization have been occurring in Africa for a long time. The degree of "complexity" and "scale" has probably been due to the greater than appearances would suggest, highly developed trade patterns and use of multi-lingualism to extend communications networks. The eight categories of modernization suggested in the previous lecture provide a framework for interpretive analysis of modernization in Africa over time.

1. Specialization/Differentiation

One of the key indicators of specialization is the existence of formal bureaucracies in a state. In the kingdoms and empires described in lectures #19-25, there were, in varying degrees of sophistication, large and specialized bureaucracies. Such bureaucracies were distinct from the military and political sectors, and were characterized by a large number of "roles" or "offices". In the Islamic states, there was frequently a standard set of offices: a "waziri" who was chief administrative assistant to the head of state, a series of "muftis" (scribes) and "alkalis" (judges) who presided over the administration of justice, a "ma'aji" (treasurer) responsible for finance, and an "imam" responsible for official religious activities in the state. Within each of these offices, there were a large number of minor officials.

In many empires, such as Ashanti, (Ghana) there were offices for "interpreter" and "communicators". The question as to recruitment into these offices will be mentioned later (with reference to an achievement/
ascription continuum); yet it should be stressed that many of these offices were held on merit, and not necessarily on heredity. With regard to occupational specialization in the areas of agriculture and light industry, see MABOGUNJE.

2. Secularization

Many of the early Islamic empires were theocracies and many of the non-Muslim empires (e.g. the forest kingdoms) were based on the notion of divine kingship (just as had been the case in Europe until about the time of the Reformation). Yet it was not uncommon in African society for a distinction to be made between the "sacred" and "profane" which allowed for the development of technology and medicine. Thus in Hausa society, some diseases were (and in some quarters still are) regarded as being caused by supra-natural intervention (e.g. paralysis) while other diseases were regarded as "natural" (e.g. smallpox for which the Hausa had devised a genuine inoculation). Hausa pharmaceutical practice, quite apart from faith healing, has been quite sophisticated.

3. Urbanization

As pointed out by MABOGUNJE, urbanization has occurred in Africa from earliest known times. (Adulis, port of Axum), the city-state of Kush (Napata and Napata and (based at Merowe), the trading centers of Kilwa, Sofala, Kano, Katsina, Djenne, Timbuktu and Gao, the large forest urban centers of Benin, Kumasi, and Ibadan, all bear testimony to the development of a complex pre-colonial urban pattern in Africa. It should be noted, however,
that in most cases of pre-colonial urbanization, there was a relatively high degree of division of labor, but a low degree of role independency. Thus an individual may have been a skilled craftsman, yet this role was not separated from his social, religious and political roles. In the nineteenth and twentieth century, the cities which grew up as a result of contact with Europe (such as Lagos, Accra, Dakar, Douala, Nairobi, or Dar es Salaam) did not usually have a legacy of traditional society, with its relative lack of role boundaries, as did those cities with pre-colonial origins.

4. Mass mobilization

Mass mobilization is very difficult to operationalize in pre-colonial Africa. In segmental societies, everybody might participate in economic and political decisions. In large scale hierarchical societies, there was clearly less mass participation. Yet, even in centralized kingdoms and empires, there were frequently mechanisms for consulting the local people regarding political decisions, and with regard to economic decisions, rural farmers frequently took the initiative. (given the level of technology) with regard to crop selection and marketing choices. The fact that West African farmers were so quick to take up cocoa and peanut crops in the twentieth century is a testament to their ability to mobilize, or participate within new systems as they arise.

5. Technology

Technology in Africa has been subject of major controversy among
historians. While the black Africans in the Nile valley were among the first humans to utilize iron for weapons and tools, there are certain peoples of Africa (such as the Bushmen of the Kalahari) who are still using stone age technology. Arab technology, especially in the fields of medicine and architecture, were adapted in the Sudanic zone at an early stage. In the rain forest areas, which were environmentally impermeable to the horse technology which characterized the Islamic areas, there was probably a lower level of technology than in the savanna areas. (It is ironic that it was the forest coastal areas, however, which first had contact with Europeans, and hence acquired western technology earlier than the interior savanna areas). The issue of "diffusion of innovations" (which is probably more important in most cases than independent discovery) is clearly related to the factor of environmental isolation or non-isolation.

6. Scale

The scale, or size, of African communities is clearly a matter on which there is an enormous range. The Songhay empire was larger than present day France. On the other hand, many of the African societies were small in spacial location and population. At the present time, one of the most dramatic aspects of modernization in Africa is the way in which small scale societies are being linked together into larger systems.

7. Communications

The question of communications has also been a controversial
topic in African history. In the Islamic areas, Arabic was frequently used by elites as a written and spoken medium of communication. Thus in northern and sudanic Africa, an area larger than the United States, there has been an effective communication network for many centuries. Arabic has served in much the same way as Latin did in medieval Europe. It is clear however, that most African societies did not utilize written forms of language, and that widespread communication was thus hampered.

8. Achievement criteria

Achievement criteria... were perhaps more important in the pre-colonial period than during the colonial period. In the pre-colonial period there was frequently strong competition between individuals for leadership positions in the larger societies or empires. During the colonial era, both the British and the French ossified the office of "chief" and tried to ensure that succession disputes did not emerge which might threaten the general stability of the colonial regime. Patterns of primogeniture were even instituted in some areas where they had not existed previously.

One should not underestimate, however, the degree to which traditional life in Africa has been based on ascriptive criteria. Succession to occupational role was most frequently a matter of son following father (as in medieval Europe). With the introduction of western education a degree of social mobility developed which might be characterized as based on merit (especially in the French-speaking areas.)
9. Conclusion

Modernization in Africa has been a continuous process from earliest times. Certain aspects of modernization (such as occupational specialization and urbanization) have been more prevalent than others (such as technology or secularization). In the lectures to follow, some of the themes of social change and modernization will be examined in more detail. The question as to the impact of modernization on individual personality structure will be used as a starting point.
35. The Concept of African Personality

Psychological studies in Africa are in the initial stages of development. Most of the existing material on individual behavior, personality, and related themes (e.g. child-rearing, socialization, abnormal behavior, etc.) derives from the work of social anthropologists, who have often approached the subject without well defined concepts or instruments. The focus on personality structure and change within the African context, however, is rapidly becoming an issue both in the ideological literature and in the scientific literature.

1. An African Personality?

There has long been a strong tendency for non-Africans to consider Africans as psychologically homogeneous. Instead of deriving from scientific analysis, this notion is based most often on ignorance, intellectual laziness, or racial bigotry. The extremely heterogeneous African environment, the highly variegated mosaic of ethnic societies, in combination with the clear-cut differences of colonial experience are somehow presumed to produce a generalized "African" personality, devoid of only the most subtle variations. When one considers, however, the desire to rationalize colonial domination, the felt "civilizing" mission of Western Christianity, and the historically pronounced European ethnocentrism, it is clearer why much of the older literature on Africa, both professional and popular, appears to be little more than "racial stereotypes with scientific window dressing."

As LEVINE has noted, these studies have usually been used not only to
derogate or dehumanize the African, but also on occasion to defend him. In more recent times, perhaps to bolster pride and identity and to create closer linkages between all the peoples of Africa, some African leaders themselves have asserted a uniform African "personality," "mentality" or "mind", which appears to gloss over the range of distinctive cultural propensities. These comments on the various proponents of "an African personality" do not intend to suggest there are no broad consistencies in the behavior of Africans or that studies of African personality must be embroiled in racial stereotypes (either positive or negative). LEVINE notes/there are clusters of African social, cultural and psychological characteristics which, when taken together, indicate certain commonalities in personality, in comparison with other major world areas. Although the individual traits are not uniquely African, the particular combination—the personality "profile"—may turn out to be so.

2. Components of Personality

Personality refers to consistencies in the behavior of human individuals which are not due to temporary states of the human organism (e.g. disease, psychoses, anxiety) or to temporary conditions of the environment (e.g. famine, warfare). Like physical traits (height, skin color), personality traits vary widely among individuals and across societies. As with physical traits, one can compare groups of individuals by their "average" characteristics and the degree to which they vary within the groups (in statistical terms, the mean and standard deviation).
Thus one can speak of an African personality if, in fact, there exists a set of traits which, in terms of their statistical tendencies, differed significantly from those of other world groups. Three broad categories of inquiry are relevant here: (1) environmental characteristics (social, cultural, and physical conditions of sufficient permanence and consistency to affect outward behavior); (2) outward behavior; and (3) genetic factors in temperament and personality. As in other areas, the genetic factor has been most difficult to analyze, particularly with respect to separating genetic from environmental influences, (see Doob, 1966). Due to the absence of data on this subject, only the first two categories will be discussed--environmental influences in this lecture, and outward behavior in the next.

3. Environment and personality

Although not limited to Africa nor universal throughout it, the following environmental influences seem to be relevant to understanding African personality patterns (see Levine, 1961).

a. The Economy: The overwhelming dominance of agriculture (with less male involvement than elsewhere in the world); the widespread importance of animal husbandry and pastoralism (more closely associated with males than elsewhere), creating in many areas, as among the Nuer, Masai and pastoral Fulani, a cultural system revolving around livestock; certain acquisitive values are common, producing status distinctions based on wealth, but these are focused on particular material objects (the ownership and exchange of livestock in East Africa; trade and marketing in West and Central Africa; and probably the support of more than one wife nearly everywhere).

b. Family and Kinship: Partly for economic reasons, Africa is the most polygynous major area of the world. Within this context, mother and children occupy separate households more often than elsewhere.
Africa also has the greatest incidence of patrilineality, patrilocality and bride wealth (the latter usually involving marriage payments to the family of the bride). These characteristics all affect patterns of sexual behavior and child-rearing; unilineal descent groups serve political functions in state and stateless societies and are important bases of local organization nearly everywhere.

c. Political organizations: Partly for reasons of ecology, accephalous societies outnumber centralized states in Africa. Yet the latter are more numerous than in any other nonliterate area of the world: chiefs, headmen, and royal or aristocratic lineages play important roles in such societies and individuals tend to display personality characteristics which are clearly associated with status in the lineage or kinship community.

d. Life cycle patterns: Initiation rites (often involving circumcision) are found in nearly every region of Africa, usually occurring at or around puberty, signalling entry into a new status based on age. Also, beliefs and practices relating to ancestors is probably the most prevalent basis for indigenous African religion and seems to be related to the general respect with which elderly persons are regarded. Such clear cut life cycle patterns seem to be related to the processes of apprenticeship which are necessitated in the economic sphere, and the especial respect which longevity commands in an environment with high infant mortality and low life expectancy.

e. Population density: Probably related to each of the categories above is the relatively large size and population density of African
societies, compared to nonliterate societies elsewhere in the world. There are many ethnic groups over one million people in size (e.g. Zulu, Xhosa, Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, Ganda, Yoruba, Ibo, Hausa, Fulani, Mossi) and densities rise to over 1000 people per square mile in some areas of contemporary Africa. The effect of such densities appears to include great complexity in the regulation of interpersonal relationships.
#36. Characteristics of African Personality

With reservations and cautions, LEVINE suggests tentatively certain uniformities in African behavior which appear to reflect important aspects of the African personality, (at least for the primarily agricultural societies in Africa south of the Sahara). It would be most fruitful to examine these personality uniformities together with broader socio-cultural similarities outlined in previous lecture. It should be noted that these personality traits may not be uniquely African.

1. Social Distance Between Persons Differing in Age and Sex

Many of the basic divisions within societies are biological phenomena, such as age and sex. In Africa, age and sex differences are institutionalized so that differences in either element are associated with specific rules of behavior. One therefore can tell a great deal about the role or personality of an individual simply by knowing the individual's sex and age (or generation). Differences in age and sex are manifested in many social activities in the form of avoidance behavior (in-law avoidance, generational avoidance), segregation (separate mother-child households, age-villages, distinctive usage of house space) and highly formalized patterns of interaction ("required" forms of greetings, topics of conversations, etc.) All of these patterns act to maintain a distinct social and emotional distance between individuals as part of the overall structure of society. LEVINE also makes the important point that Africans regard this system as "natural" and "normal", while Westerners, with their own distinctive patterns of behavior, might consider the African impersonal, unfeeling, overly
restricted and a "slave to custom." See COHEN for some idea of how an African might look at Western social relationships.

Status differences based on age and sex are reflected clearly in patterns of deference, respect, and precedence. High status is given to males over females, married men over single men, and men with adult children over others. Thus the senior male within a household has an extremely high position of status. This is a phenomenon which forms an integral part of African social relations. Western visitors to various parts of Africa are often amazed to find women carrying huge headloads, marching several paces behind their unencumbered husbands. When the suggestion might be made to "shift the burden", so to speak, it is often the women themselves who resist most strongly. The age and sex hierarchy is so intimately interwoven with other aspects of African society that to change it in isolation is almost impossible.

2. Emphasis on Material Transactions in Interpersonal Relations

In most African societies, social relationships entail at some point a prescribed exchange or transfer of material goods, food, gifts, financial help, property, babies. The closeness of relationships is often gauged primarily by the material goods exchanged, even between husband and wife. Failure to offer food to a visitor, for example, or failure to accept, may be considered a sign of rejection or hostility.

(As an aside, it is interesting to examine some of the problems involved in the provision of food and medicine to Biafra by the Nigerian
Federal Government. To accept food is a sign of friendship and even deference between individuals. Conversely, one of the most common ways of dealing with enemies is to poison their food. Still further, food and medicine are often considered to contain certain qualities which the consumer will assume if taken. It is no wonder that attitudes over the provision of food to Biafra have been enormously complicated.

4. Functional Diffuseness of Authority Relations

As mentioned in earlier lectures, African authority figures tend to wear many hats at the same time, e.g. their roles and power are not restricted to a single specific function but extend over a whole range of activities. This functional diffuseness strongly affects relationships between leaders and subordinates, each of which is obligated to perform a variety of functions for the other. School children, for example, often act as domestic servants and laborers for their teachers. Similarly, wealthy Africans have a responsibility to take care of their devoted followers. What Westerners might call political patronage and nepotism is often simply a normal and expected fulfillment of responsibilities between leaders and followers.

4. Tendency to Displace Anxiety When Under Stress

This factor is closely associated with the use of witchcraft and sorcery. Disaster or misfortune usually brings about a search for the "cause" among other individuals in the immediate interpersonal environment. Witchcraft and sorcery provide the inflicted individual with a legitimate means of reaction.
5. **Relative Absence of Separation Anxiety**

In marked contrast to Western cultures, Africans are able to manage physical separation from family and close peers without any apparent emotional anxiety. This is perhaps a reflection of the perception of these relationships in role terms. There is much less pity, nostalgia, sentimentality, and self-inflicted guilt feelings than might be found in similar western situations. LEVINE makes the interesting suggestion that this difference is due in part to the more open and regulated way Africans deal with interpersonal hostility and affect. Hostility in Westerners is more often internalized, creating enormous guilt feeling both consciously and subconsciously, which makes separation a stressful situation.

6. **Concreteness of Expression**

Africans tend to express themselves more in concrete terms than in abstract terms. This characteristic may be reflected in the emphasis on material transactions or the tendency to blame and fear others when under stress. The rich metaphorical language of African proverbs—the constant attempt to encapsulate generalized or abstract meanings in very concrete terms—also reflects this characteristic.

Unfortunately, concreteness of expression is sometimes misinterpreted as inability to think in abstract terms. It is clear that this is not the case. As LEVINE notes, generalities and abstract notions may be fully understood but are simply not discussed in general terms.
Thus far, the personality characteristics we have been dealing with are primarily those of traditional ethnic society in Africa. These characteristics and profiles have evolved over centuries of social change and adaptation. In this lecture, the most recent phase of social change in Africa—that induced by European colonialism, industrialization and increased urbanization—is examined with respect to its impact on personality.

1. Ethnic Society: Adaptation or Breakdown?

The effect of European contact on Africans is a major concern of all social sciences and is dealt with in various ways throughout Part III (PROCESSES OF CHANGE). A common problem in handling this topic, however, has been the tendency to oversimplify the impact of European induced social change and to overlook the enormous diversity of reactions to it. In the writings of both European and African observers, one frequently encounters sweeping generalizations about acculturation in Africa. Urbanization and industrialization, for example, are seen as forces of "detribalization," eroding the traditional kinship-based system of relationships, "westernizing" the African, or thrusting him into situations in which he cannot cope (thereby creating widespread anxiety and mental disorder). The few reliable psychological studies which have been made, however, portray a much more complex picture. For example, amount of education and degree of attachment to traditional beliefs are closely associated among some ethnic groups but not among others. Even within the same ethnic group in the same city, there may be major differences in the degree of traditional orientation. Contrasting results are also found with respect to the extent of personal conflict and anxiety induced by rural-urban migration.
It is probably safest to say that we still know very little about personality and social change in Africa. This is due in part to the lack of detailed information on personality in the pre-European contact situation and thus the absence of a clearly identifiable baseline from which to measure change. It is evident, however, that traditional African personality and social structures do not simply break down and disappear under the pressures of modern life. There is instead a very complex pattern of adaptation which varies greatly in timing, speed, effectiveness, amount of stress induced, and outcome not only from individual to individual but from one ethnic group to another.

Based on the few studies which are felt to be reliable, LEVINE hypothesizes several aspects of this adaptation process, with special reference to the broad uniformities in African personality patterns discussed in lectures #35-36. The remainder of this lecture focuses on three additional topics which are, perhaps, of special importance: the concept of "achievement motivation;" the psychological impact of colonialism; and the nature and extent of mental illness in Africa.

2. Achievement Motivation and Social Change

Why do some societies experience rapid rates of development while others barely survive? In attempting to explain cultural growth and decline in human history, the psychologist David C. McClelland, in the now classic study of *The Achieving Society* (1951) focused on "achievement motivation"--an acquired drive for excellence or need to achieve--as a primary factor creating differential levels of economic growth and development among the world's peoples. Deriving from this work, a number of scholars have adapted
the notion of achievement motivation to Africa as a hypothesis to explain
differential levels and rates of modernization among African ethnic groups.

Certain ethnic groups, such as the Kikuyu in Kenya, the Chagga in
Tanzania, the Baganda in Uganda, the Ibo in Nigeria, the Ewe in Ghana and
the Bamileké in Cameroon have been widely considered (both by local
Africans and by international observers) as exceptionally energetic and
enterprising, more easily adaptive to the needs of modern industrial society,
and consequently disproportionately prominent in the national economy and
political life of their respective countries. Regardless of the "accuracy"
of these stereotypes, there do appear to be great intranational differences
in economic and educational advancement in Africa. In recent years, a
growing number of studies have suggested the personality characteristic of
"achievement motivation" as an explanation of these variations.

In a pioneering but highly controversial study, LeVine examined
motivational differences between the three major ethnic groups in Nigeria:
Ibo, Hausa and Yoruba. The study (Dreams and Deeds) analyzed the written
essays and dream reports of schoolboys in an effort to measure their per-
sonal orientation to achievement and/or obedience values. Results confirmed
the common stereotype of the Ibos as highly motivated toward achievement.
This study, although criticized both on technical grounds (e.g., in the
choice of sample subjects, particularly among the Hausa) and conceptual
grounds (e.g. validity of clientship as implying obedience, rather than as
a means toward cooperative achievement) provides an exciting indication of
the potential contributions of psychology to social science research in
Africa.
3. The Psychology of Colonialism

The topic of colonialism as it has effected both colonizer and colonized extends far beyond the realm of African studies. Yet many of the important studies are coming out of Africa. Frantz Fanon, a West Indian psychiatrist, who lived and worked in Algeria, has dealt with the confrontation between black and white races not only in Africa but throughout the world. In *Black Skins and White Masks*, Fanon examines the "psycho-existentialist complex" that emerges from the traditional superior-subordinate relationship between white and black, between colonizer and colonized. In doing so, he both elaborates upon and criticizes the earlier work by Mannoni (*Prospero and Caliban*, 1956) which noted the damaging effects to both superior and subordinate in the colonial relationship.

Less impressionistic and more academic than the works of Fanon and Mannoni are the detailed studies of African perceptions of Europeans, several of which are briefly reviewed in Doob (1965). Perhaps the best of these studies is by the Swedish scholar Jahoda (*White Man*, 1961) who conducted survey research in Ghana (then Gold Coast) in 1952-55. He clearly shows the wide range of perceptions of Europeans held by different groups in Ghanaian society, related to such variables as education, age, political involvement, and degree of traditionalism.

4. The Psychopathology of Social Change

It is frequently assumed that tension and related mental disorders will be greater in rapidly changing societies than in more stable ones, particularly for those individuals moving rapidly from traditional to modern ways of life rather than for those whose life has remained virtually unchanged.
In the modern context, the individual is viewed as being faced with an increasing number of alternative behavior choices and new goal choices. Yet as with so many aspects of the African experience, recent studies have indicated that the relationship between social change and mental disorder is more complex and not easily generalizable. Bohannan (1960), for example, illustrates clearly that suicide and homicide are by no means absent in African traditional societies and are not simply the by-product of societal disruption associated with modernization.

Leighton et al (1963) is perhaps the most illuminating and important of recent studies on psychiatric disorder in Africa. The study was carried out by a team of African and American (Cornell University) psychiatrists, medical doctors and anthropologists in Abeokuta, Nigeria. They discovered that the Yoruba of Abeokuta, in comparison with a selected sample in North America, had more psychoneurotic symptoms, but fewer persons seemed to be suffering from certain or probable psychic disorders. With respect to the percentage significantly impaired by psychic disorders, the figures were 15% for Yoruba rural hamlets, 19% in the Abeokuta urban area, and 33% in the North American sample.

What the study seems to suggest is that social change need not dramatically increase individual tension, and that some societies, like the Yoruba, may be highly successful in accommodating change without a significant deterioration in mental health. Moreover, the study also indicates that when mental illness does occur, it is often treated quite successfully by traditional means and "native" doctors.
#38. Educational Systems in Africa

Educational systems in Africa and their major features—patterns of recruitment, substantive content, relationship of education to modernization, etc.—are examined in this chapter in three historical phases: the pre-colonial period, the colonial period, and the independence period.

1. Pre-colonial Education Patterns

All African societies have had some institutionalized way of transmitting heritage, culture, and skills to the younger generation. Occupational skills were learned through on-the-job apprenticeship. A son usually followed his father's occupation, although sometimes there was division of labor within families. As discussed by MABOGUNJE, pre-colonial occupations usually included crafts (e.g. iron working, weaving, dying), marketing (e.g. long-distance or local trade), healing, farming, and political/legal administration.

Cultural knowledge was transmitted through a variety of agents. Frequently elders would relate the proverbs and stories of the community and its history to children in the evening (since occupational apprenticeship usually occurred during the day.)

In the Islamic areas of Africa there was an elaborate system of institutionalized education. Children between the ages of five and twelve would attend Koranic schools in the mornings and/or evenings, taught by a specialized mallam (teacher). Children would learn Arabic script, certain chapters from the Koran, and the basic elements of arithmetic. Students who wished to continue could attend Islamic secondary schools where religious history, Islamic law, poetry and grammar, and other subjects were
taught. Beyond this point, students might select a particular teacher for work on advanced topics. In the larger Muslim cities of Africa, such specialized learning was frequently conducted at universities. (The universities of Al-Azhar in Egypt, and Kairawan in Morocco are among the oldest universities in the world. The University of Sankore in Timbuktu has been mentioned in lecture #21.)

2. Colonial Education Systems

In French and British colonial territories in Africa, there was a basic parallel in educational structure, but important variation on matters of curriculum, recruitment, and language use. Structurally, the French elementary school was approximately the equivalent of the British primary school (grades one to six). The French lycee was approximately the equivalent of the British secondary school (grades seven to twelve). (In the British system at this same level there were teacher training colleges, trade schools, and the university preparatory "colleges"--sometimes called "fifth and sixth form schools"). In both British and French systems, universities were reserved for highly specialized training.

The major differences and historical development of the British and French educational systems in Africa are discussed in CLIGNET. Both were constructed around the need to fill a labor market, and both were ambiguous with regard to the categories of persons to be selected for education (although in British areas there was more of a tendency to cater to the "sons of chiefs"). Certain differences, however, did emerge by the end of the colonial period: the preference in French schools for the use of a European language (i.e. French) as the medium of instruction (rather than
vernacular languages); the greater centralization of French education as compared to British; and, (perhaps consequently) the greater variability in the quality of education in the British areas. It should also be noted that the number of private schools (mainly missionary) in relationship to public schools was much greater in British areas.

In both the French and British areas, stiff examinations mediated entrance into public schools at the secondary and university level. These were standardized examinations drawn up in London and Paris. Hence, while there might be variation in the quality of education in particular locations, the successful students could be assumed to have covered comparable amounts of knowledge. It was in the private schools, especially missionary high schools in the British areas, where both the quality of education and the substance of the curriculum was highly varied.

In the Belgian areas of Africa, by contrast, there was a heavy concentration on primary education, but almost nothing in the way of secondary and university education. In the Belgian areas education was frequently in the hands of the Catholic church. Also, there was a preference for the use of vernacular languages, rather than European languages, as the media of instruction.

In all three colonial areas (French, British, Belgian), education was used primarily to meet the needs of the administration and the economy. In Belgian areas however, there was very little training of civil servants, and a greater concentration on technical education. In both British and French areas, in the late colonial period, the university system was used almost
exclusively for the production of civil servants. As CLIGNET suggests, this may have been done partly to offset the rising demands of African nationalism.

3. Education Patterns in the Independence Era

There are four major patterns which seem to characterize African educational systems in the post-colonial period: the sharp increase in school enrollment figures (with a full range of consequences, including school-leaver unemployment); the reorientation of school location and recruitment policies to reflect new political realities; the growth of African universities; and the Africanization of the curriculum at all levels.

The average elementary school enrollment as percent of total population in thirty-two sub-Saharan African states in 1965 was still relatively low by international standards: 7% (ranging from 1.1% in Somali to 22.1% in Congo-Brazzaville). Yet the percentage increase within the African states has been most dramatic. The average increase in per-capita enrollment (i.e., enrollment divided by population) from 1960-65 was 34%, and in five countries increases ranged over 100% (Niger 163%, Ghana 126%, Chad 122%, Mali 119%, and Ethiopia 100%).

The same pattern is noticeable at the high school level. Although the average high school enrollment as percent of total population in 1966 was 4.1% (ranging from 21.3% in Ghana, to .2% in Mali), the percent increase in high school enrollment per capita from 1962-66 was 41%. This latter figure included an enormous range from those countries which have suffered decreases in high school per capita enrollment (Burundi, Cameroon, Rwanda, Congo-Kinshasa) either for reasons of political crisis or reasons of
population increase, to those countries which have increased per capita enrollment increases of over 100% (Mauritania, 1,300%, Congo-Brazzaville 619%, Guinea 283%, Ethiopia 214%, Zambia 174%, Chad 140%, Lesotho 120%, Uganda 111%).

One of the consequences of the increase of both elementary and high school education has been a growing rate of unemployment of "educated" persons in many African countries. This may be a temporary phenomenon, during the transition period in which African economies reorient themselves to internal needs, or it may be a continuing problem—one which has already had consequences for political stability in Africa.

One of the reasons for the increase in elementary and high school enrollment figures has been the popular demand for schools by local communities. It is clear that African governments are more susceptible to political demands for education than were the colonial regimes. These political demands, which are documented in detail for southern Nigeria by Abernethy (1969) have led to reorientation of both location of facilities and recruitment policies within the new states. While the patterns are not entirely clear, there appears to be less concentration in the capital city areas, and more opening up of selection channels to all classes within society.

At the university level, there has been an equivalent increase in facilities. Universities have been established in almost all states. While those few universities which dominated the late colonial period are stronger than ever, including University College Ibadan (Nigeria), University of Ghana at Legon (Accra), Makerere University (Uganda), University of Dakar (Senegal), Fourah Bay College (Sierra Leone) and Louvaniun University
(Congo-Kinshasa)--there are now a host of new and beautifully constructed universities in Dar es Salaam (Tanzania), Abidjan (Ivory Coast), Nairobi (Kenya), and many other capital cities. In larger countries such as Nigeria and Congo-Kinshasa, a number of new universities have been added. (There are five major universities now in Nigeria: Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria, Lagos University, Ife University, University of Nigeria at Nsukka, as well as University College Ibadan). (Note: the university situation in Liberia and Ethiopia is impressive, but is not included in this discussion because they have not been colonies.)

At all levels in African education, from elementary school to university, there have been significant attempts to revise curriculum syllabai to reflect new needs. While there is still some interstate standardization, the European orientation has come to be stressed less than counterpart African history, language, and culture.

#39. Education and Elite Recruitment

Social change in Africa is closely related to elite development. As discussed in CLIGNET, education has been one of the major means of creating an elite and "recruiting" new members into an elite. Within the African context, according to P.C. Lloyd (1966, pp. 2-3), the term "elite" designates anyone with an annual income of over $700 who is western-educated. Elite in this sense does not necessarily refer to persons who influence decision-making within institutions of society, but rather to those who may be
regarded as having a special potential for influence in the development of national systems, by virtue of their education and type of employment.

1. Priorities in Educational Planning

   In 1961, at the Conference of African States (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia) on Development of Education in Africa, a twenty year plan for educational development in Africa was designed and approved. There was a follow-up meeting in Paris in 1962 to discuss implementation of the plan. Recommendations regarding priorities in education included: a) development of secondary school facilities; b) training of primary and secondary school teachers; c) teaching of English and French; d) encouragement of research on African languages. Also in 1962, at the Conference on Development of Higher Education in Africa (Tananarive, Malagasy Republic) several additional recommendations were made regarding: a) the need to pool resources for university training; b) the designation of thirty-two "key" African universities; c) the increase of university enrollments; d) special needs for increased enrollments in agriculture, fishery, and forestry; and e) general Africanisation of the curriculum. During the 1960s, there has been an impressive implementation of these goals, as mentioned in lecture #38.

   The educational policy for each African state is determined internally, of course, and there is a wide range of educational strategies and priorities reflected in the national budgets of African states. Yet the general pattern of priorities is probably reflected in the recommendations of the Addis Ababa and Tananarive conferences.

   The implications of these priority recommendations in terms of social
change (elite formation in particular) within the African states is speculation. The emphasis on secondary education was clearly intended to create a class of middle-level manpower capable of clerical or skilled technical work, but also equipped to deal with the multitude of management responsibilities at the middle level in the economic development process. The concentration at the university level on technical expertise (particularly in agriculture) was perhaps intended to replace that class of European technical advisers upon whom many African governments have had to depend, with an indigenous class of technical experts. The emphasis on language research and training was perhaps intended to generate elites which could communicate with fellow Africans at the international level (in French and English), and, through exploration of the possibilities of increased use of vernacular languages in elementary and adult education, perhaps lessen the gap between "modern" and "traditional" social classes. The focus on primary school teachers was clearly an effort to break the bottleneck through which the vast majority of young people would, hopefully, be drawn into the "modern" sector, and perhaps become the "working class" in the new national systems.

2. The Absorption of Educated Elites

In some states the fervor of generating primary school graduates led to unpredicted consequences. The "school leavers", as they were called, were frequently unable to obtain jobs commensurate with their expectations. This often created an unemployment problem in the urban areas, which, according to Gutkind (1968), has produced an embryonic "class" (i.e. social stratum which is cohesive by reason of collective socio-economic status.
rather than ethnic or individual status), linked by a "unity of despair". There has been an increased recognition by African governments of the need to determine manpower requirements as a preliminary to turning out persons at particular levels of education.

This problem of unemployment has not yet occurred at the high school level. Most high school graduates have gotten jobs as office workers either in government or in business. High school graduates with technical skills have been quickly absorbed into the economy, and those who attended teacher training schools were usually assigned jobs for the three to five year period following graduation.

In the future, however, if the African economic systems do not progress more rapidly, the secondary school graduates may find it increasingly difficult to obtain jobs. This is already beginning to happen in those countries where the educational program is geared primarily to an "arts and humanities" curriculum, with little emphasis on arithmetic, natural sciences, or communication skills.

At the university level there has been a continuation of the British and French pattern of selecting only a very few students and expending considerable resources on their training. University graduates have been quickly absorbed into the civil service and into the higher teaching levels, although in the future, this too will depend on the general level of economic development.

Most of the students who attend university in Africa are on full government scholarships. One obligation which usually results from acceptance of these scholarships is the commitment of the first three to five
years after graduation in an occupation and location assigned by the government. The government may assign a teacher to a backward part of the country where he might not prefer to work, or a doctor to a small village hospital. The over-all result is probably a more effective utilization of manpower resources than if all decisions were left to individuals, since most graduates prefer the social life and economic opportunities of the capital city. After the initial obligation to work at a specific task is completed, many of the highly educated persons do prefer to live in the large cities. As CLIGNET describes, some leave the country altogether and get high-paying jobs in Europe or America. This "brain-drain" is becoming a serious problem in many African countries, especially in the smaller French-speaking countries, since there has been a long tradition of black Africans living and working in France. Occasionally these African expatriates do return home, often at a high level of government service. The President of Senegal (Senghor) and the President of Malawi (Banda) had established careers in Paris (teaching) and Scotland (medicine) respectively, before returning to their countries.

3. Recruitment into the Educational System

The questions of where to locate schools, and what entrance qualifications should be established are at the crux of the recruitment problem. Since education is so clearly related to elite formation, it is possible, through selection-of-students policy, to determine the ethnic and social characteristics of the next generation of elites. Most African governments are acutely aware of this situation. They are caught in the dilemma of choosing between a policy which might result in immediate economic
development, and a policy which might effect the future fabric of national integration. If educational facilities are increased around the capital city area, where much of the industrial, commercial, and governmental growth is occurring, there is more likelihood of immediate pay-off in terms of economic development. This means, however, that the educated classes would most likely be from those ethnic groups near the capital city. This might mean increasing the disparity of ethnic groups living in the "interior" or "hinterland". National integration may require that less advantaged groups gain access to the channels of elite formation. Certain states, such as Tanzania, have consciously decided that all groups and sections of the country should develop at the same pace. Other countries, such as Ivory Coast, are developing rapidly in the coastal cities, but less so in the interior. One of the most dramatic instances of low differential selectivity into western education has resulted in national crisis has been the Nigeria case. The Ibo peoples of the former Eastern Region generated disproportionately large numbers of educated persons, who came to dominate many sectors of national life. The Hausa-speaking people of Northern Nigeria, who have long resisted western education (partly because of Islamic apprehensions regarding the missionary-based nature of Nigerian education) become increasingly concerned about the dominance of Ibo elites. The results of this tension were clearly contributing in the Nigerian civil war which began in 1967. Yet the dilemma remains, for if rapid economic development is not attained (at whatever cost to equality of educational opportunity), the African states may well succumb to the explosive pressures of the newly literate urban masses.
The New Elites of Africa

While education is a primary means of generating elites in Africa, it is not the only means. Labor unions, commercial organizations and traditional societies have all produced national and international leaders.

1. Types of Elites in Africa

The labor union movement in Africa was transplanted from Britain and France in the 1930s as a matter of government policy. Most of the African states now have well-established trade unions. Invariably, the leadership of the unions has arisen from within the unions. Yet, since African governments are the major employers, the primary function of the labor elites has come to be the articulation of workers' needs to the appropriate government planning agencies, rather than the mobilization of strikes for higher wages. In fact, many of the labor leaders who emerged in the pre-independence period have been absorbed into the dominant political party. Sekou Toure, President of Guinea, was the leader of the major confederation of trade union organizations in West Africa (Union Générale des Travailleurs d'Afrique Noire). The late Tom Mboya, former minister of economic development in Kenya before his assassination in 1969, was head of the Kenya Federation of Labor. Houphouet-Boigny, President of Ivory Coast, was formerly head of the African agricultural union (Syndicat Agricole Africain).

Indigenous commercial elites in Africa have developed largely as a result of the growth of agricultural cash crops, which often required middlemen between the small farmer and the government buyers. Although agricultural cash crops were exported to Europe in the pre-independence
period through large international companies such as Unilever, there were African middlemen (in British areas called "licensed buying agents") who lent money to the farmers and later purchased the crops from the farmers. Several of these local middlemen in places such as Northern Nigeria, became millionaires. Such agents do not necessarily need a western education as much as rapport with the farmers, good trading skills, and a line of credit. It should be recognized, however, that in most African countries, governments, Asians or European companies still monopolize the "middleman" role. Other types of African commercial elites include those who engage in textile wholesale activities, or those who have gone into real estate in the new cities.

In the field of light industry, many African businessmen have become well established either by themselves, or in conjunction with expatriate firms. In Nigeria, the shoe industry, the match industry, the plastic-goods industry, the rubber tire industry, and many other types of light industry are partially owned and/or controlled by African businessmen. Publishing, banking and the construction industry are becoming an ever important source of indigenous wealth and leadership.

Traditional society in Africa has also produced many leaders who function in the modern sector as well as the traditional sector. Chiefs may be "progressive", and although they derive their authority from traditional societies, they frequently carry some influence among the "educated elites" of Africa, (many of whom are the sons of chiefs). In countries with a house of chiefs, however, traditional rulers may directly participate in the political decision-making process.
In short, there are many types of elites in contemporary Africa. The educated classes constitute, by definition, an important segment. However, leadership has emerged in all spheres, from labor unions to banking.

2. Characteristics of National Leaders

The original heads-of-government in Africa, that is those men who led their states to independence and usually remained as the first president or prime minister, form an interesting group. Most of them were highly educated, (to university level or beyond). The President of Kenya (Jomo Kenyatta) has post-graduate degrees in anthropology from London, the former President of Ghana (Kwame Nkrumah) taught in several American universities. As mentioned earlier, the President of Senegal (Leopold Senghor) had been a professor in France. Many of the heads of state in Africa were doctors, lawyers, teachers, or journalists. (See Figure 1.) They were an elite within an elite and to some extent were effective because they could deal with European administrations as "equals". It is likely that the second generation of political elites in Africa (excluding military regimes) will be less clearly associated with men from the highest ranks of western education, since political effectiveness has come increasingly to revolve around "internal" rather than "external" problems.

In examining the characteristics of national leaders in Africa, several variables seem to be of special importance: age, ethnicity, degree of education, ability in vernacular languages, religious affiliation, and original occupation. Many of the African leaders have written autobiographies which provide insight into the subjective aspects of their character. (For examples, see Azikiwe, Awolowo, Nkrumah). Most of the African leaders...
have also written extensively on their political thoughts and intentions.
(For examples, see Sekou Touré, Julius Nyerere, Boubou Hama, Ahmadu Ahidjo,
Leopold Senghor, Modibo Keita).

INSERT FIGURE #1

3. Social Mobility, Status Crystallization, Class Formation

The achievement of independence and the rapid socio-economic changes
which have occurred in Africa in the last generation have resulted in a
highly mobile social situation. Some rural peasants have become wealthy
through commercial acumen. Education, particularly in the French-speaking
areas, has resulted in phenomenally high rates of social mobility. At
present, this social mobility appears to be slowing down slightly as the sons
of the first generation elite begin to get priority treatment at educational
institutions, and as the number of better paying positions in the economy
get filled by young men who block the advancement of those under them. In
short those who are now the elite are trying to "crystallize" their status,
and to ensure that they become secure within the elite structure. To the
extent that these elites are beginning to control internally the rewards of
the national systems, it is possible to refer to them as a social class. It
should be noted, however, that in comparison to Europe, Latin America, or
the Middle East, the class structure, or elite patterns of Africa are still
highly fluid. Still, one interpretation of the recent coups d'etat in
Africa is that the military is trying to prevent the entrenchment of a
privileged socio-economic/political elite.
### Characteristics of First Heads-Of-State in Africa

(Thirty-two sub-Saharan African states)

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<th>Country</th>
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<td>1. Botswana</td>
<td>Dr. Sir Seretse Khama</td>
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<td>Tswana</td>
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<td>2. Burundi</td>
<td>Andre Muhirua</td>
<td>1962-1963</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Tutsi</td>
<td>Radio technician</td>
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<td>5. Chad</td>
<td>Francois Tombalbaye</td>
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<td>51</td>
<td>Sara</td>
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<td>Priest</td>
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<td>59</td>
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<td>Professor, Organizer</td>
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<td>Gregoire Kayibanda</td>
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<td>Zambia</td>
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The Coptic Church of Ethiopia is one of the oldest Christian churches in the world dating from the fourth century A.D. It is the official church of Ethiopia, and is distinguished by its "monophysite" belief that God and Jesus are one. Until recently, it has been linked to the orthodox church in Alexandria, yet only since 1960 has the Ethiopian church made an impact on Christian communities in other parts of sub-Saharan Africa. The early withdrawal of the Amharic Christian community into the Ethiopian highlands where they are centered today, was the result of Muslim confrontation along the Red Sea coast. This African Christian community flourished for centuries in isolation, developing complex and sophisticated ritual, art, and architecture in their church-centered society.

The Ethiopian Church serves as an introduction to assessing the impact of Christianity in Africa because of the widespread stereotype of Christianity as a European religion. Suffice it to remark that Christianity was flourishing in black Africa before the fall of the Roman Empire and the emergence of Europe as we know it today.

Yet, this lecture will focus primarily on the European planting of Christianity in Africa, African responses to such imported religion, the impact of Christianity on social change, and the role of Christianity in contemporary Africa. For a useful introduction to all of these topics, see Beetham, (1967).

1. The Planting of Christianity in Africa

As mentioned in FABIAN, Christian priests accompanied the Portuguese
the navigators to Africa in the late fifteenth century, prior to the split within European Christianity into Catholic and Protestant groupings. Portuguese priests made contact in the Congo and Benin kingdoms, and significant numbers of Africans were converted at that time. Later, this early Christian influence in Africa was to fade almost entirely, as Portuguese international power became diluted, and as African kings reverted to traditional practices.

The renewal of Christian contact in Africa occurred through the freed slaves from the New World, who were returned to Freetown (Sierra Leone) after 1791, and Monrovia (Liberia) after 1820. Most of these ex-slaves were passionate Protestant laymen, and their evangelism made some impact on the indigenous peoples. Many of the Sierra Leonian Christians later migrated to Gambia, the Gold Coast, Dahomey, and Nigeria, where they converted local peoples.

The European Christian mission movement as we know it today, began in the nineteenth century, and did not gather real momentum until after 1870. Many of the Protestant mission movements were associated with the abolition of the slave trade, and part of the stated intention of the early mission groups was to establish commercial trade in those parts of West Africa which had been formerly dependent on the slave trade for sustenance.

The Roman Catholic Church, meanwhile, through the Holy Ghost Fathers, had established missions in Senegal in 1843, and in Angola and Congo in 1866. In 1878, the White Fathers began work in Tanganyika and Uganda. In 1892, the Society of Jesus began to work in the Belgium Congo. Today, there are more than fifty different Catholic orders in Africa and certain orders, such
as the White Fathers, the Verona Fathers, and the Holy Ghost Fathers, are concerned almost exclusively with Africa. By the end of the 19th century, Roman Catholic activities in Africa were centralized and coordinated in Rome. In general, Catholic missions were prohibited from commercial trade, unlike many of the Protestant missions, who were virtually self-sustaining through trade.

2. Mission Activity in Africa

Three essentials of mission activity in Africa were full-time professional missionaries, the existence of mission stations, and affiliational linkage with European "parent" organizations. Among the Protestant missions there was very little coordination of activity, and a disproportionate number of such missions were evangelical, as distinct from orthodox. Yet, in overview, apart from conversion activities, the Christian churches in Africa seemed to undertake three major fields of activity: literacy, occupational training, and medicine.

Among the Protestant groups, literacy was seen as the means to reading the Bible. The early classes conducted by the missionary himself quickly developed into primary, and later, secondary schools and teacher training institutes. The Bible Association in London commissioned the translation of the Bible into most of the vernacular languages of Africa, which often entailed writing dictionaries and establishing orthographies as a preliminary to the translations.

Occupational training usually entailed instruction in farming techniques, or utilization of literacy skills in the clerical side of commercial trade. The slogan of the Church Missionary Society (CMS) in
the 1850s was "The Bible and the Plough", and, as mentioned above, the intention of the missionaries was to supplant the slave trade with commercial trade. The commercial establishment of the Basle Mission in Ghana, begun in the 19th century, was of considerable magnitude by the time of Ghanaian independence.

Although medicine was seen as part of the Christian gospel of healing, it was also necessary to survival in the tropical zones. Malaria alone in West Africa shortened the life expectancy of European missionaries in the nineteenth century to only a handful of years. Although schools were established almost everywhere the missionaries went, hospitals were much more infrequently established, however, because of the scarcity of missionary resources.

During the colonial era, the Christian missions maintained a variety of relationships to the European authorities, with regard to literacy, vocational training, and medicine. In the Congo, the Catholic Church was officially entrusted with much of the primary school education in the country. In French areas, however, the anti-clericalism of metropolitan France carried over to the colonial office, and in many cases, the church was prevented from undertaking educational tasks. In British Muslim areas, such as Northern Nigeria, missionaries were prohibited from evangelization (including education) by the colonial authorities who feared that such activities would stir up resistance to European rule. Evangelical groups from the United States, who became increasingly numerous after 1900, were seldom a source of support for the colonial regimes, but were often more involved with medical missions than educational missions.
3. Christianity and Social Change

The Christian missions in Africa were characterized in general by a lack of tolerance for "traditional" cultural practices (especially polygamy). They exerted a powerful influence for social change in the direction of assimilation into rigid, puritanical, European patterns of behavior. It was this rigidity, in retrospect, which seems to account for the rise of independent African churches, to be discussed in lecture # 42.

The Nigerian historian Jacob Ajayi, in a recent volume (1965), focuses on one of the major by-products of Christian missions in Africa--the creation of an educated elite. (For further discussion and references see lectures # 39 and # 40). It should be noted that in many cases, indigenous Africans came to hold leadership and intellectual positions within the local churches (such as Bishop Crowther of Nigeria--a Yoruba), but more often the educational impact of missions was on generations of young African men and women who eventually became secular leaders in secular societies.

A brief note should be made of missionary impact on race relations in Africa. In retrospect, it appears that most missionaries (especially Protestant and/or evangelical) utilized their European racial identities in the subtle balance of power relations with Africans. They became inextricably woven into the European community of colonial administrators, merchants, or settlers. Also, because the missionaries were often slow to relinquish real control to African pastors, they helped to foster, in many areas, a sense of black racial frustration which took both the form of religious independency movements (to be discussed in lecture # 42) and African nationalism. Both of these phenomena have had considerable impact.
on social change in Africa. (It should be noted that lack of transfer of authority to indigenous leaders, and white racism are two distinctively different things. For example, the Roman Catholic priests in Nigeria, and especially in "Biafra" have lived for years on the level of the local people, and are widely admired by Africans for their lack of racism; yet in 1967, according to the official Catholic Directory for Nigeria, seventeen of the twenty-three Bishops in Nigeria were born in Ireland!)

4. Christianity in Contemporary Africa

Although Christianity has increased steadily in Africa, it remains a minority religion in most African countries. There are perhaps fifty million Christians in black Africa today. Apart from Ethiopia and the Portuguese and Afrikaner dominated areas of southern Africa, Christianity is a majority of the population in only five countries: Congo-Kinshasa (40% Catholic, 13% Protestant); Congo-Brazzaville (40% Catholic and 17% Protestant); Burundi (60% Catholic; 1% Protestant); Gabon (50% Catholic; 14% Protestant); and Lesotho (45% Catholic, 38% Protestant). Within West Africa, census claimants of Christianity have increased significantly since 1952. However, even in the coastal areas of West Africa adherents of Christianity has increased at a slower rate than adherents of Islam. In general, the major centers of Christian affiliation in Africa remain the larger coastal cities, rather than the interior.

Church-state relations in independent Africa have frequently been strained. To the extent that Christianity was identified with colonialism, it has become a target of nationalist sentiment (as in Ghana under Nkrumah, or in Congo-Brazzaville). Also, the new governments of Africa feel they
should have a direct policy voice in the educational and medical facilities of the churches. To some extent this potential conflict is being mitigated by the Africanization of the clergy. It has become clear that if Christianity is to thrive in Africa, it must be under the leadership of Africans. This was implicitly recognized by the Catholic Church in their appointment of a Tanzanian as a Cardinal and explicitly during the Pope's visit to Uganda in the summer of 1969. Most of the orthodox Protestant groups have given their African mission churches full independence from foreign control and their leadership is now completely Africanized. The pattern with evangelical groups, however, is different, and the Jehovah's Witnesses, or even the Sudan Interior Mission has remained self-consciously "white" at the leadership level.

It is important not to exaggerate the conflict between Christianity and the new African nations. Most of the African national leaders were trained in mission schools and some remain dedicated Christians. Julius Nyerere of Tanzania is a devout Catholic, as is Leopold Senghor of Senegal. Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia) and Dr. Hastings Banda (Malawi) are Protestant laymen with a quasi-fundamentalist orientation. Even Dr. Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana), according to his autobiography, at one time hoped to become a Catholic priest. The educated elite crowd the big churches on Sundays, and university chapels (in contrast with many American colleges) are well patronized. In short, the future of Christianity in Africa is in the hands of Africans. Whether this will lead to a regeneration of Christianity or to increasing decay remains to be seen.
# 42. Innovation, Synthesis and Independency

According to Barrett (1968), there were over 6,000 identifiable independency religious movements in Africa by the end of 1967. It is intrinsically important to understand these movements as well as to see their impact on social change.

1. The Concept of Independency Churches

A major distinction in looking at indigenous innovations within Christianity in Africa is between the "Ethiopian" churches and the "Zionist" churches. Ethiopian churches (which Webster, 1964, refers to as "African Independent Churches" sic.) have broken away from the formal control and European leadership of orthodox Christian churches, while retaining much of the orientation of the orthodox churches. Thus, there may be an African Methodist Church, or African Congregational Church which are distinguished from the mission-run Congregational and Methodist Churches primarily by the fact that they established their own autonomy and leadership.

In contrast, the Zionist, or aladura (Yoruba word meaning "praying man"), or independency churches in Africa have usually emerged from some established church, but have developed new forms of worship involving emphasis on dancing, a new form of ministry called "prophets," and an prayer-healing activities (believed to have great power against the still believed in power of witchcraft). In the bibliography by Mitchell and Turner (1968) there are over 1,300 references to Zionist churches (excluding Ethiopian churches) in Africa. The Zionist churches may have varying orientations:

- They may be prophetic ("a religious awakening founded and led by a charismatic
figure or a prophet or prophetess:" Barrett, p. 47); they may be messianic ("a movement centered around a dominant personality who claims for himself special powers beyond the prophetic and involving a form of identification with Christ:" Barrett, p. 47); they may be millennial ("a movement which preaches an imminent millennium, Golden Age, or End of the World:" ibid.); they may be nativistic ("an organized attempt on the part of a society's members to revive or perpetuate selected aspects of its culture," ibid.), or a variety of other orientations, such as revivalism or witchcraft eradication.

2. Distribution of Independency Movements

Barrett claims that there are about seven million Africans, as of 1968, who were adherents of independency movements. These people are not evenly distributed in Africa, but predominate in southern Africa, and along the coastal areas of central, east, and west Africa. (They are by definition not located in the Islamic portions of Africa.) The study by Sundkler (1961) which lists about 700 distinct churches in South Africa alone, interprets the phenomena as a channel for the release of frustrations through religious means, where economic and political means are not available. H. W. Turner, who has studied these churches in West Africa, argues that they are the product of an African Christian desire to develop an African form of Christianity. There is probably no simple answer as to why independency movements develop in particular areas, but the growing literature on these movements would make it possible for a student to examine this question in detail. Some of the better known movements include the Nigerian Church of the Lord (Aladura) which began in 1930, the Cherubim and Seraphim founded in
Nigeria in 1925, the Christ Apostolic Church (Nigeria, 1931), Harrism, founded by the prophet William Wade Harris, and primarily located in Ivory Coast; the Society of the One Almighty God, (Uganda, 1914), Kimbanguism (Église de Jésu-Christ sur la terre par le Prophète Simon Kimbangu) located in Congo-Kinshasa, and with half a million adherents, forming the largest independency movement on the continent. In South Africa, there are probably several thousand groups, many of which by 1965, had formed into two large federations: African Independent Churches' Association, and the Assembly of Zionist and Apostolic Churches.

3. Independency Movements and Social Change

One of the major characteristics of mission Christianity in Africa, as distinct from mission Christianity in other parts of the world, was its insistence on not accommodating local customs and beliefs into church style and ritual. Missionaries in Africa were unusually rigid in forbidding any modification of Christianity as they knew it. This may partially explain why so many of the local African churches broke away from the mission churches, and tended toward forms of worship which were more in line with traditional Although styles. / many of these churches allow polygamy to their membership, they take a very strong stand against traditional religious worship and magic. The Zionist type provides a functional alternative to traditional magic in their holy water and strong prayers.

Too often the missionaries had answered the African concern for "this-worldly" health with promises of life after death and the establishment of hospital / A major function of the independency churches in situations of rapid social change is in the area of healing. Disease is a
common problem, and faith healing has become very important in such movements as the Aladura.

The influence of independency churches on the nationalistic movements should also be mentioned. In the Belgian Congo, Simon Kimbangu became a symbol of resistance to the Europeans. During the 1960 independence elections (some years after his actual death), many people of the Kongo ethnic group wrote in his name on the voting ballot and he became a hero within the Abako party. In East Africa, the relationship between independent church movements and the Mau Mau rebellion remains to be explored, but appears to be strong.

Even today, during the period of political independence, the independency churches are occasionally a source of tension with the African governments. Many churches have refused to recognize the sovereignty of any authority other than their own spiritual authority. In Zambia, the Lumpa Church of the Prophetess Alice Lenshina, came into direct and violent conflict with President Kaunda, over a series of minor issues such as saluting the flag.

In summary, the independency churches in Africa were reformation movements from the established Christian groups. They are found primarily in the coastal parts of Africa, where contact with mission Christianity was greatest, but also, where social and political change have been greatest. There does not seem to be any diminution of the groups in the post-colonial era, perhaps because the need for security is even greater than before. In the white dominated parts of southern Africa there has been a great proliferation of religious movements, which seems to be directly related to the intensive heritage of mission activity in the area, plus the general state of repression on the political level.
The Islamic community in Africa has a full range of orientations—orthodox, unorthodox, evangelical, messianic, etc.—comparable in many ways to the schisms in Christianity.

1. Traditional Islamic Reform Movements

There are two usages to the word "reform" within the Islamic context: a) those movements which try to purify Islam by returning to its original form, free from later innovations; and b) those movements which try to adapt to the modern technological world within an Islamic framework.

Within the first usage of reform, there have been several types of movements in African Islam: a) the sufi movements; b) the wahabi movements; and c) the Mahdi movements. "Sufi" refers to "mystical", and designates those denominations which are organized around a primary Muslim 'saint', and who believe in the powers of direct revelation. Sufi brotherhoods, as they are called, tend to emphasize the powers of direct communication with God (Allah) through training of the mind, body, and spirit. This may take the form of hypnotic ecstasy, or solitary asceticism. They emphasize the essence of religion, communion with God, and are usually less concerned with the legalism of organized religion.

The wahabi movements are usually a reaction against the excesses of sufism. They espouse a return to the "original" state of Islam, which, they feel, was austere and rational. They rely only on the Koran as a source of revelation, rather than on "direct" revelation as a supplement to the Koran. The best known wahabi movement was not in Africa, but in Saudi Arabia,
where in the nineteenth century a wahabi state was created which continues to the present day. In West Africa, there have been wahabi movements in many of the large cosmopolitan cities. An observer, however, should be cautioned that "wahabi" has become a pejorative term and in some areas implies "secular".

The Mahdi movements are premised around the belief that the Islamic messiah, the Mahdi, has returned, or will return to earth, and that the end of the world is at hand. Most Muslims believe in the concept of the Mahdi, although only a minority believe he has returned to earth. It is generally acknowledged that the Mahdi will return to earth at the end of a Muslim century. (The last Muslim century 1300 AH began in the year 1882 AD; the year 1400 AH will occur in 1979 AD.) The best known Mahdi movement in Africa occurred in Sudan at the end of the nineteenth century. The Mahdi of Khartoum (of recent film fame) defeated the British forces under Gordon, and drew allegiance from many groups across the Eastern, Central, and even Western Sudan. Those persons in present day Sudan who believe that the Mahdi did come in the nineteenth century, believe that the period of time since 1882 is an interim period, until the time when the world comes to an end and those who have accepted the Mahdi will get their reward. They are trying to live exemplary lives, according to the "purest", Muslim standards.

It should be noted that at the end of the nineteenth century in Pakistan, another Muslim leader--Ghulam Ahmad--declared himself to be the Mahdi. His followers are called Ahmadiyya, and in the twentieth century many have come to Africa as Muslim missionaries, setting up modern schools and medical clinics. The Ahmadiyya are particularly strong along coastal
West Africa, where there has not been much traditional Islamic influence.

2. Modern Islamic Reform Movements

The predominant form of Islam in Africa has been the sufi brotherhoods. The best known of these in West and North Africa have been the Qadiriyya (based on the "saint" Abdul Qadir, of Baghdad), and the Tijaniyya (based on the "saint" Ahmed Tijani, of Fez). In East Africa, the Qadiriyya is also strong. Within each of these brotherhoods, there have been numerous factions, or sub-denominational groups.

In both the Tijaniyya and the Qadiriyya, there have been certain branches which have become identified with modernistic reforms. One of the most significant groups were the Mouridiyya in Senegal, who were a branch of the Qadiriyya. The Mourides, under their leader Ahmad Bamba organized in the 1920s and 1930s some of the most powerful of the peanut cooperatives in Senegal. The movement became involved in modern politics, and is identified with a "socialist" orientation.

Likewise, one of the branches of the Tijaniyya, under the leadership of Ibrahim Niass of Senegal, has organized its followers into modern sector activities, and has been largely responsible for the intensive revival of literacy (in Arabic) which has occurred in Islamic West Africa in the past twenty years.

In short, many of the modern day Muslims are trying to adapt their beliefs to a world of rapid communications, transportation, and technology. Some of the religious issues which have arisen within these groups have been: a) whether the Koran should be translated from Arabic into vernacular languages; b) whether the Islamic legal system should be modified,
particularly with regard to status of women; c) whether the Islamic pro-
hibition against usury prevents capital investment and accumulation through modern banking practices.

3. Islam and Social Change

The Muslim populations in Africa are not lagging behind other areas in social change. Some states, such as Mali, Guinea, Tanzania (to say nothing of Algeria, Tunisia or Egypt) which are largely Muslim, have taken the lead in radical reform. Muslim leaders in Africa, such as Sekou Touré (Guinea), Modibo Keita (Mali), Ahmad Ahidjo (Cameroon), or Aminu Kano (Nigeria) are clearly identified with social change.

Because Islam in Africa has not been as rigid as Christianity, especially with regard to traditional African family customs, it seems to provide a transition for many Africans into the modern world. It is a universal religion, is not identified with colonialism (or, in most areas, with racism) and is gaining converts at a rapid rate, both in East and West Africa. As mentioned in ABU-LUGHOD, about a quarter of the states in Africa have Muslim majorities. In West Africa, approximately one-out-of-two persons is Muslim. Also, the four major vernacular languages in Africa (Arabic, Hausa, Swahili, and Fulani) are all identified with Islamic cultures. The major question facing Islam in Africa is whether it can adapt to the technological modernization of the contemporary period without fundamental reformation.
1. Pre-European Urbanization

As MABOGUNJE clearly points out, urbanization in Africa was not simply the outgrowth of European contact. Important urban centers, closely associated with trade and/or the growth of centralized state systems, grew up in the Nile Valley and along the Mediterranean coast (Thebes, Luxor, Carthage); in the Sudanic Belt and northern Guinea Forest fringe in West Africa (Timbuktu, Gao, Kano, Kumasi) and along the East African coast (Mombasa, Zanzibar, Kilwa). Moreover, many of these cities were in contact with one another within, as well as between, these broad urbanized regions (inter-regional contact involved primarily oceanic trade between the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea and the Mediterranean; and the trans-Saharan caravan trade between northern Africa, the Sudanic belt and southward into the forest).

Equally important, however, is the fact that many of these cities, particularly those in West Africa, were quite different in form, function and character from the modern industrialized city of the West. (The characteristics of what has come to be called the "Preindustrial City" are described in Sjoberg, 1960). Many cities, for example, were much more culturally homogeneous than cosmopolitan, acting as the center of economic, political and socio-cultural influence for a particular ethnic group. In most Yoruba towns in southwestern Nigeria, even today, the bulk of the population consists of farmers. Nevertheless, few if any scholars would deny that the
large settled communities which pre-dated European colonial contact were indeed cities in virtually every sense of the word.

Interesting source materials for specific cities in precolonial Africa include Miner (1953) on Timbuktu, and Lloyd, Mabogunje and Awe (1967) on Ibadan. The Ibadan study, in particular, provides an excellent basis for an intensive study of an African city, past and present.

2. The City and Modernization

With European expansion into Africa, the city everywhere became an important element in the African cultural landscape. Herskovits (1962, 263-4) writes:

In some instances, indigenous administrative and trading centers, like Kumasi in Ghana or Segou in Mali were continued. Elsewhere, towns were created to fulfill these functions, as was the case with Luluabourg, established as the capital of Kasai Province in Congo, or Lusaka, the Northern Rhodesian seat of government. Mining operations were responsible for the founding and rate of growth of other centers. In some, growth was extremely rapid. Enugu, capital of the Eastern Region of Nigeria, was founded in 1909, following the discovery of coal nearby. In 1953, it had almost 63,000 inhabitants, and by 1960, 80,000.

Africa remains the least urbanized of all the continents, but its rate of urban growth is probably the most rapid in the world. The problems generated by this rapid urbanization and associated industrialization are outlined briefly in MABOGUNJE and discussed in greater detail in lecture #46. Below are listed some of the major functions of cities in the modernization process (see Breese, 1966):

a. Contact with outside world: Diplomatic representatives, tourists, businessmen and other foreigners tend to concentrate in the major towns, especially the large capital cities. These cities are also focal points for international networks of air travel, postal and telephone communications,
radio hookups, etc. Most external information is therefore filtered through the urban areas.

b. **Center of political and economic power:** Because of their focal position with respect to both internal and external communications, the city is usually the headquarters of government and administration, and of industrial, commercial and other enterprises. National politics in most African countries tend to be heavily concentrated in the urban areas, often just in the capital city. Think of the ease with which national politics is modified after a coup d'état, which, more often than not, involves a small group of people in one small portion of the capital city.

c. **Center of origin and diffusion of social change:** Cities are major agents of change. Innovative ideas and creative leadership tend to evolve primarily in the cities and, again due to their centrality on the communications network, the cities become the centers from which the impact of these developments spreads to the rest of the country.

d. **Magnet for human and capital resources:** Cities, particularly the capital cities, have powerful attraction for rural populations. Moreover, the cities tend to attract the most talented or best educated individuals, the most skilled laborers, and the wealthiest sources of capital investment. Once spending some time in the city, even if not enough jobs are available, few find it easy to return to the rural areas. Similarly, once the economic strength of a city is established, its magnetism for further investment is increased.

3. **Contemporary Urban Patterns**

MABOGUNJE provides statistical and cartographic information on
contemporary urban patterns. He distinguishes between four major types of urban centers in modern Africa.

a. **The traditional city:** "a city which in general has failed to integrate effectively into the new spatial economy and transportation network." Miner's work (1953) on Timbuktu could provide an excellent case study here.

b. **The rejuvenated traditional city:** A city which has successfully linked up to the modern economic infrastructure. As MABOGUNJE notes, these cities often reflect a complex economic and social "dualism", with "old towns" standing in dramatic juxtaposition with modern commercial and industrial cities. See volume mentioned above on Ibadan.

c. **The colonial city:** A city well laid out and planned by colonial authorities, yet populated almost entirely by African migrants. These include most of the prominent port cities of tropical Africa such as Lagos, Abidjan, and Accra. The several studies on Freetown (Banton, 1957; and Riddell, 1970) make the Sierra Leonean capital an excellent source of case study materials (even though it was founded prior to the colonial period).

d. **The European city:** Markedly segregated, with a powerful non-African flavor, these cities are closely associated with large numbers of permanent European (and Asian) settlers. Epitomized by the cities of the Republic of South Africa, they are often characterized by attempts to prevent permanent African residence. Although changing rapidly, many cities in the independent Black African states of eastern Africa (e.g., Nairobi, Lusaka) show strong resemblances to the more clearly European cities of the Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia.
e. Further comments: Cities may be classified in a variety of ways in addition to the typology suggested by MABOGUNJE. One alternative might be as follows: (1) Trading towns, including ports (Kano, Port Harcourt, Abidjan, Mombasa, Kampala); (2) Industrial towns (Tema in Ghana, Jinja in Uganda, Bulawayo in Rhodesia, many towns in the Republic of South Africa); (3) Mining towns (Kimberley, Johannesburg, Lubumbashi, the Zambian Copperbelt towns, Que Que, Jos, Tarkwa); and (4) Administrative towns (Kaduna in Nigeria, Zomba in Malawi).

In this functional classification, however, it is extremely difficult to distinguish clearly between the different types because most of the larger towns combine many of the defining characteristics.
It is useful to distinguish between urbanization—a process of urban growth involving population movements and a whole variety of induced changes and contrasts with pre-existing conditions (e.g., in economic specialization, socio-political segmentation, etc.,)—and urbanism, the way of life in towns. Although there is a strong association between the two, the correlation is not complete. One may increase more or less rapidly than the other. Certain African rural areas, for example, may contain very few towns but nevertheless display many of the characteristics of urbanism. Urbanization must not be considered as identical to Westernization, "detribalization" or even industrialization. This lecture will concentrate upon urbanization and social change; yet the patterns which emerge are probably the major components of urbanism in Africa.

1. The Urban Family

Most scholars consider the family, if it is actually contained within the town (rather than remaining in the rural area), as continuing to be the prominent unit of urban social organization. Many changes, however, tend to occur in the traditional patterns of family organization, resulting in what is usually interpreted as a relative decline in the importance of the family vis-a-vis other forms of social organization. Allowing for regional variation, the following general trends have been widely observed in Africa: (a) increased importance of the nuclear family vis-a-vis the extended family, although the latter is often reshaped as a type of welfare system for new migrant relatives; (b) increased independence of women in some cities,
particularly with their entrance into the labor force; (c) smaller family size, influenced by a tendency to marry later (especially among the males), the uneven sex ratio in most cities (more men than women) and the decline of polygamy; (d) greater variation and diversity of family life, reflecting the heterogeneity of the urban environment, greater inter-ethnic marriage, etc. (For a criticism of some of these generalizations, see Clignet and Sween, 1969).

There has been a tendency to oversimplify these changes by considering urban family life as inherently unstable, and the traditional system as being rapidly destroyed by progressive secularization and other disruptive influences. It is probably more accurate, however, to consider the changes as not necessarily resulting in a breakdown, but in a restructuring and diversification of family roles and relationships. It is worthwhile here to remember the discussion on the flexibility and dynamism of "ethnicity" (see lectures #4,5,6,7). Herskovits' definition (1962, p. 292) of "re-interpretation" is extremely relevant here: A process in which "sanctions and values of a given tradition under contact are applied to new forms, combining and recombining until syncretisms develop that rework them into meaningful, well-functioning convention."

2. Voluntary Associations and Ethnicity

The distinctive characteristics of the urban milieu are seen perhaps better than anywhere else in the voluntary associations which have developed in Africa over the years. Little (1968), who has studied their history and organization in West Africa, views them as an important "adaptive mechanism" assisting in the adjustment of migrants from the rural
areas "by substituting for the extended group of kinsmen/grouping based upon common interest which is capable of serving many of the same needs as the traditional family or lineage." Furthermore, in terms of the urban milieu, the African voluntary associations "provide an outlet for the energies and ambitions of the rising class of young men with a tribal background" and "encourages him to mix with persons outside his own lineage and, sometimes, tribe," thus helping "him to adjust to the more cosmopolitan ethos of the city." Little views as particularly important those associations he terms the "traditional-modernized" type, since "their combination of modern and traditional traits constitutes a cultural bridge which conveys, metaphorically speaking, the tribal individual from one kind of in sociological universe to another." (Gutkind, 1962, p. 182).

Thus the urban African becomes entwined in a new and complex network of social relations which essentially involves two components: ethnic kinsmen and non-kinsmen (friends, neighbors, workmates, etc.). Within this framework several observations may be made:

a. Ethnicity: Ethnicity remains a powerful force for social organization in the city, although the boundaries of the ethnic group are often re-defined much more widely than in the rural milieu. This redefined kinship network provides an element of stability in a highly fluid situation. Ethnicity, as Epstein points out (1967), serves as a force for social categorization within the city, a guide to behavior, a badge of identity, a marital and social activity source, a friendship network, and a base for forming a variety of associations (mutual aid and burial societies, political pressure groups, etc.). Epstein also comments on the evolution of these
ethnic associations: initially dominated by traditional elders; later serving young men seeking positions and status; still later developing into large scale "Tribal" Unions which provide the organizational structure for nationalist movements and competitive political parties; or evolving into exclusive social clubs for small groups of immigrants with generally high social status.

b. Non-ethnic voluntary associations: These groups provide similar functions but in addition cut across kinship ties to establish a broader fabric for social, economic and political organization. Such associations include occupational groups and trade unions, religious associations, political parties, youth and age-groups, various mutual aid societies, etc. These may be initiated on an ethnic basis and often remain closely associated with ethnic organization, but tend to become more clearly trans-ethnic over time.

3. Social Stratification and Differentiation

Key factors here include the growth of voluntary associations, progressive economic specialization and industrialization, and the vital role of education. This topic, with a specific emphasis on elite formation, is discussed in CLIGNET.

4. Economic Organization

See MABOGUNJE for full description. In general, urban centers entail greater division of labor and, hence, interdependency.

5. Political Processes

It is worthwhile here to summarize briefly some of the general conclusions about the political consequences of urbanization and social change
made by Coleman (1963, p. 536-7). These observations provide a good transition to the following lecture on urban problems.

a. As centers where the modern elite subsociety is concentrated, the urban areas are the primary if not exclusive locus of national (vs. local or regional) politics.

b. Rural-urban links, however, are maintained through the circulation of labor and the retention of traditional contacts by the urban dweller. The cities therefore are major agents for the diffusion of modernity into rural areas.

c. The "magnetism" of the city has frequently attracted more migrants than the urban economy can absorb, resulting in major problems of unemployment and the creation of large dissatisfied elements.

d. Commercialization and industrialization have not always led to social or political integration or the emergence of a large African middle class. One reason for this has been the strong commercial control of alien groups such as the Asians (Indians and Pakistanis) in East Africa and, to a much lesser extent, the "Lebanese" (from all over the Levant) in West Africa.

e. Differential modernization has frequently intensified intergroup tensions. Education and economic wealth have not been evenly distributed along communal, racial and ethnic lines, creating a new pattern of "haves" and "have-nots".

f. There has been a general secularization in urban areas, but religious organization remains a powerful political force.
Many of the problems of urbanization have been touched upon in the previous lecture. Many others are problems which are shared by cities all over the world: alienation, congestion, health, impersonality, psychological stress, etc. Some of the distinctive problems of African urbanization are summarized by Herskovits (Human Factor, 1962 p. 286):

"The world-wide movement of peoples to towns and cities, thought not peculiar to Africa, was accelerated there. Where these centers did not exist, they were created. Where they developed out of earlier centers, they changed both in form and function. Moreover, urbanization in Africa took on a particular character. Here city dwellers not only had to solve the usual problems of urban life everywhere--questions of housing, of health and hygiene, of recreation, of juvenile delinquency--but the complexity of these problems was compounded by other factors. In the areas of permanent non-African settlement, city life sharpened a sense of differentials based on race, on standard of living, on education, on economic opportunity and the like, since in the city these were experienced at close range, and thereby served to multiply the frictions arising out of continuous propinquity. Even where multi-racial tensions were minimal, the rapidity with which those who migrated to the towns had to adapt themselves to life in the new setting introduced special problems into what is at best a difficult enough process, even in those parts of the world where the city in its later forms had long been known.

It is also important to emphasize here again that "detribalization" is an inadequate concept in describing social change within the city. Ethnic identity provides, and will no doubt continue to provide for many years to come, a fundamental mechanism for adjustment and absorption into urban life. African urban problems are thus very much like the broader problems of nation-building: to create (via some kind of synthesis between tradition and modernity) stable, cohesive, and developing plural societies from the amalgam of different groups occupying the same area (groups being defined on the basis of ethnic, racial, religious or other "primary" characteristics).
For references on specific urban social problems, and urban integration problems in Africa, see the BIBLIOGRAPHY. The remainder of this lecture will focus on problems of social congestion, single city primacy, and urban systems growth.

1. Social Congestion

Many African cities have grown so rapidly that population numbers far surpass the availability of jobs and the ability of the city to provide sufficient housing and services. This has been called "over-urbanization" and clearly results in social congestion. Kinshasa (formerly Leopoldville), in Congo, for example, has grown from a city of about 400,000 just before independence in 1960, to nearly 1.5 million in 1969. The results of this phenomenal growth here and elsewhere in Africa include excessive congestion, very high unemployment or underemployment rates, the growth of squalid slum-like squatter communities (called bidonvilles in Kinshasa and other French-speaking areas), enormous pressure on existing health and medical facilities, and many other problems associated with overcrowding. In many cases, although not all, the rural areas have also suffered from the urban drain on its able manpower. Many African governments, reacting to these problems, have begun to promote "back to the land" movements, encouraging a redistribution of population out of the larger cities and into the smaller towns and rural areas. An interesting perspective on this problem is provided by Mabogunje (1965) (with reference to Nigeria), in an article titled "Urbanization--A Constraint to Economic Development."

2. Single City Primacy

Related to the problem of over-urbanization is the tendency in many
countries for economic and political power and development to be concentrated in a single city, nearly always the capital. It is often contended that these "primate cities" so dominate their countries that they drain investment and manpower from other areas, hinder the development of other urban centers, and consume more than they produce in terms of revenue. On the other hand, it has also been noted that most developing countries can afford only one "great world city" and that primacy can characterize highly developed countries as well (e.g., Stockholm in Sweden). Whether primacy is a problem—assuming that the city can "handle" its larger population—is therefore an open question. Whatever the answer, primacy is a prominent characteristic of many African countries. Soja (1968), for example, points out that Nairobi, with 3% of Kenya's population, has close to 50% or more of the total urban population, postal traffic, radios, television sets, and telephones of the country. About 17% of the entire African labor force is employed in Nairobi and, more importantly, these laborers earn 28% of all wages paid to Africans. Furthermore, one can estimate fairly accurately the level of development of any area in Kenya by knowing the degree to which it interacts with Nairobi—an indication of the powerful role of the primate city in shaping the patterns of modernization in a country.

3. The Growth of Urban Systems

The growth of urban systems is closely related to the question of single city primacy. There has been a tendency in the literature on African urbanization to stress intensive case studies of individual cities, exploring their internal social, psychological, economic and political character. But often these cities cannot be put into proper perspective without
considering the larger urban systems in which they are embedded. It is important, therefore, to consider the growth and problems of whole systems of cities as part of the more general study of urbanization and social change.

African urban systems (which include the individual urban nodes within an area, the linkages between them, and their relationship with surrounding rural areas) have emerged most dramatically from the colonial superimposed structure of transportation, communications, administration and economic organization. The cities themselves are key points of concentration in what MABOGUNJE calls the "spatial economy" of the country, and act together to coordinate and control the modern systems of trade, industry, education and politics. The degree to which traditional urban centers did or did not interact with the superimposed system marks the distinction between "stagnant" and "rejuvenated" traditional cities suggested in MABOGUNJE. Perhaps the most significant question, however, is to what degree have African urban systems become effectively interactive with traditional society in general. In most of the developed countries, the indigenous populations "grew up" within a modern space economy; whereas in Africa and elsewhere the modern space economy has been grafted onto a very different foundation. Moreover, the transplant has "taken" in only a few areas. Viewed in this perspective, therefore, the problems of urbanization are intimately related to the larger problems of political and economic integration, economic development and stagnation, and the nature of social change and modernization.
Agricultural Reorganization

One of the most powerful forces of social change in Africa has been the introduction and extension of a monetary economy, particularly with respect to cash crop agriculture. Agricultural reorganization has become a major agency for change in the rural areas, and through the encouragement of rural mobility, on the urban areas as well.

1. The Importance of Agriculture in Africa

Even today, at least 75% of all Africans are farmers and farm products dominate the export economies of all African states except South Africa, Congo-Kinshasa, Zambia, Sierra Leone and Mauritania (which are primarily mineral producers). But for a number of reasons, some technological and some environmental, African farmers are only one-third as productive as the world average. The majority still produce primarily for subsistence. Although there have been very few major food shortages in Africa, the rapid rate of population growth and the increasing demands for rural labor by urban industry and commerce are likely to place great strains on the agricultural sector in the future.

At the same time, there is great scope for increased yields and the extension of cultivated land through social and economic reorganization and technological development. This will require, however, major transformations in the economic and political systems of most African countries.

2. Agricultural Change

Herskovits (1962) outlined three major phases of agricultural development in colonial Africa: the early period of conquest and concessions,
during which the money economy was extended on a large scale and European establishments and settlement were introduced; an intermediate period of agricultural development schemes, conceived of on a large scale, generally remote from the masses and resulting in little cultural change; and lastly, a period when new agricultural methods were introduced and greater emphasis placed on land reform. The end result at the time of independence was, for most African countries, a pronounced dual economy, one segment composed of relatively advanced commercial African farmers highly specialized in the production of cash crops for export, and the other consisting of the majority of the population, basically subsistence farmers with perhaps a small surplus for sale. One of the major problems facing African agriculture today arises from the difficulties in effectively accommodating traditional agricultural systems geared to producing food crops for local consumption to modern systems of cash crop production for local and overseas markets. (See Abercrombie, 1967). The two sectors remain poorly interconnected and developments within the modern sector often remain isolated and without major impact on the larger population.

Agriculture has not been neglected since independence, but many of the same mistakes made during the colonial period have been repeated, particularly with respect to the large-scale schemes. Great emphasis has been placed on heavy capital investment and mechanization, despite the failures of earlier projects (e.g., the Groundnut Scheme in Tanganyika) during the colonial period. Little concern has been given to the capacities and needs of the individual farmer. Frequently, the value of crops produced is too low in comparison to capital invested. Piece-meal mechanization may actually
increase labor demands (e.g., a tractor will clear and plough more land than the farmer can possibly do himself—but how will he be able to weed and harvest this extra land?). Little attention has been given to the location of new projects and schemes. Many have been located in isolated areas without proper provision of transport and marketing facilities.

3. A "False Start"?

A stimulating but controversial statement on the problems of agricultural development in Africa can be found in Rene Dumont's *False Start in Africa*, and his "more objective" UN Report, *African Agricultural Development*. These volumes provide a fruitful basis for discussion as well as excellent lecture material. (Dumont is a French agronomist, of radical political persuasion and clear "pro-African" orientation; yet the volumes are extremely critical of the new African governments for their failure to effectively use foreign aid and their propensity to exploit the peasant farmer.) Dumont makes specific suggestions as to how the African countries can create conditions to make foreign aid more effective. These include the following: (1) increased government efficiency (many of his comments here—on austerity and participation in manual work—are mirrored in the policies of Tanzania's Julius Nyerere, particularly in the "Arusha Declaration"); (2) improved training of personnel, particularly those in supervisory and advisory positions; (3) closer attention to related developments which encourage change, such as land reform, increased availability of popular consumer goods, and community development projects; (4) closer integration of all aspects of the agricultural system, especially with respect to soil conservation and fertilization, more mixed farming, better marketing and credit facilities,
and the development of various forms of cooperatives; (5) a speeding up of industrialization, particularly with labor-intensive rather than capital-intensive priorities, to overcome the severe problems of underemployment; (Dumont notes that these steps may require larger economic federations of existing states, a subject which will be considered in lecture #70).

4. Case Studies

Numerous case studies of development schemes are available in the literature. From the colonial period, two extremes can be found in the disastrous Tanganyika Groundnut Scheme and the relatively successful Gezira Scheme in Sudan (Hance, 1967). See also the volume on the Zande Scheme (Reining, 1966).

Despite the many problems of agricultural development, some genuine success stories exist. These include the growth of cotton cooperatives in northern Tanzania, the Kilimanjaro coffee industry, the Ghana cocoa industry, the previously mentioned Gezira scheme, land reform and tea and coffee production in Kenya, agricultural diversification and productivity in Ivory Coast and Gabon, and many others.
1. The Present State of Industrial Growth

South Africa is the only state in Africa which has gone beyond the early stages of industrialization. With about 7% of Africa's population, South Africa accounts for about 40% of the continent's industrial output. It produces 43% by value of African minerals (including 80% of its coal), generates twice as much electric power as the rest of the continent combined, has the only large iron and steel industry, and is beginning to move into the final stages of industrialization, producing capital goods and equipment for its own industries.

In the rest of Africa, the net value of total industrial output is little more than 3 billion dollars, or about that of Sweden. In sub-Saharan Africa, only Rhodesia, Kenya and Congo-Kinshasa have as much as 10% of their GNP derived from industry.

Ewing (1968) categorizes African countries into three groups: those that have begun to change the structure of their economies and approach more advanced stages of industrial production (only Tunisia and the UAR); an intermediate group with a fairly wide range of industries, relatively large population size, but not yet significantly changed in economic structure (Algeria, Cameroon, Congo-Kinshasa, Ethiopia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Rhodesia and Senegal); and those smaller countries where industrialization has barely begun (the remainder, the most promising of which include Congo-Brazzaville, Guinea, Mali, Tanzania, and Uganda).

Although industry is poorly developed in Africa, it has played a
major role in the growth of the more modern, urbanized sectors of African economies. Total industrial output increased 400% since the start of World War II (albeit from a small base), a rate 60% higher than in the developed countries. But this high rate of growth has not yet brought about the major structural transformations of African economies (such as the shift in proportions of agricultural vs. industrial employment) that many economists consider the most important features of economic growth. This has limited the impact of industrial expansion on per capita incomes.

2. Types of Industry

Industrial output can be divided into two categories: producer goods (basically mining and heavy industry) and consumer goods (light manufactures). The development process has been closely associated with the shift in balance between these two categories, with the former increasing much more rapidly than the latter. Industry in Africa has begun to follow this pattern, but two major qualifications have to be made. First, the importance of mining is much greater in Africa than in the rest of the world (still probably over 50% of industrial output vs. about 10% of the world as a whole, and less than 25% for other developing areas). Furthermore, the major share of African industry (excluding South Africa) still consists of small-scale light industries (led by the food, drink and tobacco industries, closely followed by textiles and building materials such as cement and bricks). While these industries, which convert local agricultural and mineral raw materials, have a vital role to play, the major task facing African industry is to diversify industrial output by such policies as giving high priority whenever possible to those industries which are the foundations of a modern economy (e.g. metals, engineering, chemicals).
and promoting wherever feasible import substitution. (discussed in next section)

3. Strategies for Industrial Development

a. Import substitution: Africa is one of the most trade-dependent areas of the world, with a much higher share of her total output derived from imports and exports that even the United Kingdom. As is common in most developing countries, raw materials (processed and unprocessed) are exported, while manufactured goods are imported. This situation places Africa at a disadvantage in two ways: prices tend to fluctuate much more widely for raw materials than for manufactured goods, putting African producers at the mercy of world market prices (usually established outside the continent); and local production of manufactured goods is discouraged by the lower prices of imports. Many economists have considered import substitution as an essential policy to reduce these problems.

"If all the items imported at present were to be produced domestically, the manufacturing output could increase three to four times . . . The present heavy import dependence in Africa is thus a double-edged advantage. It indicates a large potential for import substitution and at the same time furnishes in the form of foreign exchange the very resources for carrying it out . . . Far-sighted management of the import structure is thus of crucial importance" (U.N.: Industrial Growth in Africa, 14-15)

b. Industrialization through protection: Most African countries have come to erect substantial tariff barriers and other protective devices in order to promote local industry, particularly with respect to import substitution (which is unlikely to be successful without them.) As previously noted, there is great scope for growth through these policies in Africa, but they have been criticized by some economists for diverting investment away from the key growth industries producing capital and intermediate goods.
Here we have a clear example of the unfortunately frequent conflict between short-run and long-run strategies—a conflict which can only be resolved through some kind of compromise and balance (the nature of which is still an open question in economic theory).

c. **Regional coordination:** Many economists "believe" (another center of controversy!) that industrialization in Africa will be impossible without the larger markets created by regional economic groupings of states. Many industries simply cannot exist within the small existing market areas of Africa because they require the "economies of scale", called by one economist "the main engine of growth." The arguments for the grouping of African economies as an essential condition of industrial development appear to be overwhelming, yet relatively little progress in this direction has occurred thus far, (see lecture #70.) since the practical problems involved are overwhelming. One of these problems, of course, is location of industry.

d. **Concentration vs. dispersal of industry:** There has been a great deal of emphasis in economic literature on the concept of "growth poles", i.e. the notion that countries should select those locations where the potentials for growth appear most promising and concentrate effort on these areas in the hope of stimulating the most rapid transformation and development of the entire economy. The major problems arising from this policy, however, is that the impact of industrialization in the developing countries is often restricted by such factors as poor transport, low personal incomes, low education levels, etc.—that growth tends to become "polarized" without effectively "trickling down" through other sectors of the economy. (These terms are Hirschmann's; Gunnar Myrdal calls them "backwash" vs. "spread"
effects). This results in an increasing gap between the more and less favored areas (sections of a state, or states within an economic union), and is likely to increase the possibilities for internal turmoil. Again, some kind of balance is needed.

4. The Prospects for Industrial Development

Despite the present situation, it does appear possible that Africa can reach present levels of development in Western Europe by the beginning of the next century. (This says nothing, of course, of reducing the gap between Europe and Africa, which is likely to increase). The problems are immense and no clear paths have been universally agreed upon. What has become clear, however, is that economic development contains a powerful political component, particularly with respect to the need for greater economic cooperation between African states. Indeed, the problems involved require a coordination of all branches of knowledge and experience.

49. Transportation, Communications and Spatial Systems

SOJA, Hance (1967), and Ewing (1968) contain broad descriptive surveys of transport and communication development in Africa. In this lecture, some of this factual and descriptive information will be built upon to illuminate another major factor in the processes of social change and modernization in Africa. This factor is primarily spatial, or geographical, although it involves other disciplinary approaches as well. For African case studies using this approach, see Taaffe et al. (1963), Soja (1968) and Riddell (1970).
1. The Spatial Approach to Modernization

The themes of modernization and social change have become important foci of interdisciplinary research in the social sciences. In many studies, however, they are viewed as rather abstract processes divorced from time or place or as historical developments confined to specific areas or peoples. But it is clear that social, economic and political change take place in space as well as over time. They have a "geography" in that their impact differs significantly from place to place and, more importantly, they result in major transformations in the way space is organized. Taaffe et al. (1963) and SOJA, for example, illustrate the far-reaching changes which take place with the growth of transport networks--new centers emerge and grow rapidly, others decline, as the relative locational advantages of points in space become altered by the changing patterns of accessibility generated by transport growth. In lecture #48, geographically uneven levels of industrial development are referred to as problems in economic planning and in the formation of regional economic organizations.

The important point is that the spatial perspective of geography can provide a framework for the analysis of social change. Throughout Africa, the industrial-urban and technological developments usually associated with contemporary forms of modernization were not primarily indigenously generated. They evolved as the result of the superimposition of a new system of social, economic and political organization and behavior over a mosaic of predominantly small-scale traditional societies. The new system, based on the colonial territories which have emerged as today's independent states, encompassed much larger frameworks of circulation and interdependency.
(See the discussion of "scale" in Wilson and Wilson, 1945) The superimposed structure (consisting of urban, administrative and transport subsystems) acted as the channels through which the forces of change were introduced and around which the new patterns of organization and behavior evolved. Following along these lines, we can identify three major dimensions applicable to the spatial analysis of modernization: structure, diffusion and response.

2. Spatial Structure

The discussion in SOJA of the historical and regional patterns of transport growth outlines perhaps the most important component of spatial structure with respect to modernization: the selection of routes into the interior, of ports from which to start these routes, and of the major centers to be developed along them has had a powerful influence on the patterns of modernization in Africa. Great port cities such as Mombasa, Dar es Salaam, Lagos, Port Harcourt and Dakar emerged as the major contact points between interior Africa and the rest of the world. Many older centers, less fortunately located with respect to the new routes, often declined to insignificance. In the interior, cities such as Nairobi grew from scratch because of their strategic location along the new railway lines. The development of road and particularly railway lines provided the structure through which traditional Africa encountered most directly the forces of change generated from outside the continent. (Note, of course, that much indigenously generated social change had always taken place in Africa. We are discussing here the major changes instigated by colonial contact.)
3. Diffusion of Modernization

The modern system thus became interwoven with the traditional base in only a few areas, which grew into the major nuclei of modernization and social change for the masses of the population. Change was most rapid in these areas and the African population interacting most closely with them provided the bulk of the indigenous social, economic, and political elite. In a sense, the urban, administrative and transport systems provided the structure through which modernization diffused and became concentrated. In those areas where major centers of modernization were located in areas of ethnic groups with high propensity to change (achievement motivations?--see these groups lecture #37), came to dominate the economy and often the politics of their respective countries (e.g., the Ibo and Yoruba in Nigeria, the Akan and Ewe in Ghana, the Kikuyu in Kenya, the Ganda in Uganda, etc.).

The extent to which modernization diffused unevenly and became concentrated in a few major nuclei is one of the most outstanding features of contemporary African states. In many cases, however, this concentration of development has caused problems. It has often hindered a wider impact of modernization on the masses of the population, cemented the dominant position of particular ethnic groups, and created ever-widening gaps between the more and less developed areas and peoples. This has been particularly disconcerting for the independent states of Africa since the structure upon which these differences emerged originated in the objectives and demands of the colonial power--or, on occasion, merely out of convenience or coincidence. Whether African states should continue to build upon this colonially generated structure (which may indeed lead, in the short run,
to the most rapid rates of growth) or to attempt to create new structures more attuned to their long-run needs (especially with respect to "evening out" somewhat the inequalities of modernization) is one of the most formidable and perplexing questions facing the new states.

Response:

4. Modernization and Nation-Building

This segment on modernization and social change has included discussion of the continuities of social change in Africa, the impact of social change on personality, the role of education, religion, urbanization and the adaptation of technology (agricultural, industrial, and infrastructural). All of these topics form an introduction to the next segment—Consolidation of Nation-States. The concepts which will be covered in the following lectures include nationalism, nation-building, the growth of political, economic and legal systems, and the prospects for wider regional and continental unity in Africa. Social change and national systems development clearly go hand in hand.

#50. Study Questions: Processes of Social Change

As with the earlier study questions, some are intended to synthesize lectures, others are intended to review major points of the lectures, and others are judgmental or evaluatory.

1. What are the major elements of social change theory? What are the major elements of modernization theory? Are these concepts too broad to be of any analytic use? To what extent are the concepts capable of
being translated into a pre-western African context?

2. To what extent are individual personalities a reflection of general cultural values? Within the African context, what are the types of personality traits where one might find most range and variation? Discuss how display of emotion might be regarded as a personality trait. How might the recognition of mental illness be difficult in a situation where "deviation" or "inability to function in society" are blurred by rapid social change and "normlessness".

3. What have been the major differences, if any, between the French, British, and American educational systems? What have been the major adaptations made by the new African states since independence in the field of education? What are some of the problems of a low literacy rate? of a high literacy rate? In what language do you think elementary school children in Africa should be taught?

4. How does the educational system affect the formation of new elites or even the rise of social classes? Can government policy determine this pattern? What educational policies do you think would be most useful to the African states in terms of economic development? in terms of national integration? Given the high cost of education, who should pay for it (central governments, local governments, parents)? What might be some of the reasons why African parents might resist western education? Do you think the Christian churches should continue to play such a large role in African education?

5. What is meant by the phrase "the new elites of Africa"? To what extent do these elites continue to maintain contacts with their ethnic and
traditional communities? Do you think they should or should not break off all links? The present generation of leadership in Africa is highly educated. Do you think that intellectuals make good politicians? Are there any alternative elites which might be more suitable to the tasks of nation-building? Do you think that the new African states are being dominated by any particular set of elites?

6. Trace the history of Christian contact in Africa. To what extent have missionaries collaborated with colonial regimes? Is Christianity still identified with European culture, or has it become indigenized? How might Christianity affect the kind of traditional African society and culture discussed in the first segment of this syllabus?

7. How do you account for the dramatic proliferation of syncretist sects in Africa? What, if anything, do these sects have in common? Do you think they provide a legitimate form of religious expression? To what extent do they effect the process of social change? What kinds of conflict might you anticipate between the sects and the new African governments?

8. Discuss the two major types of Islamic reforms. What, if anything, do they have in common? Are there any parallels between traditional reformism in Islam, and the nativistic, or revivalistic forms of Christian movement? How might modernization reform be conducted in an Islamic state? Is there anything inherent in Islam to prevent or to enhance modernization?

9. Trace the development of urban society in Africa. To what extent has it been dependent on trade? To what extent has it been a pre-western
phenomenon? What types of cities emerged during the colonial regime? How do you account for the dramatic increase in rates of urbanization at the present time? Do you think that African governments should control immigration to the cities?

10. What is different about urban life compared to rural life? What specific examples of "division of labor" and "functional differentiation" can you think of, either in an American or an African context? What is likely to be the difference between an ethnically homogeneous African city, and an ethnically mixed African city? What characteristics do you think should be most important in the selection of a capital city?

11. What are some of the major problems of urbanization? How does it affect family life? economic? political life? To what extent is there an "urban crisis" in Africa at present? What is meant by "return migration"? Do you think that city planners can anticipate some of the social problems of the city? If you were a city planner in Africa, or a technical assistant in that field from the United States, what basic demographic information would you need? What priorities would you establish in planning?

12. What types of technological advances are being made in African agriculture? Do you think the African states should put resources into agriculture, or industry, or both in equal proportions? What form of land ownership do you feel would be most productive?

13. What types of industrialization have occurred in Africa? What are the problems of industrialization? What kind of industrial trade unions exist in Africa? Do you think they should be allowed to strike against
the government in cases of state-owned industries?

14. Do you think that air transport will do away with the need for large scale railroad construction in Africa? What pattern of transportation and communications exist at present? What is meant by the spatial structure of modernization? How might you may the diffusion of modernization in an African country? Why are so many large African cities seaports?
### PART IV: CONSOLIDATION OF NATION-STATES

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#51. Concepts of Nationalism

Nationalism refers to the demand for political autonomy on the part of a society which feels itself to have a high degree of common interest and identity. In the African context, there have been many different types of nationalism. Some have focused on the national states—most important as the locus of sovereignty in the modern world— inherited from the colonial period. Others have focused on the supra-national level.

1. National Level Nationalism in Africa

The boundaries of present day African states emerged at the turn of the twentieth century as a result of negotiations between the European and colonial powers—as modified by patterns of African resistance mentioned in lecture #30. These boundaries provided the framework for the emergence of administrative structures. Civil services were established, commercial planning took place within these units, and political decision making was usually left in the hands of the governor of each territory.

The African nationalist movements which emerged after World War II for the most part, focused their grievances and claims on the national level. Political parties were established which (with important exceptions in the French areas) operated within the national contexts. The result was that the national contexts became increasingly important in the day-to-day operation of affairs.

Because the nationalist spokesmen frequently could not think of a rationale for accepting the very symbol of foreign rule—the national
boundaries of the colonial era—there was less explicit ideological writing about the national units in Africa (Ghanaian people, as distinct from Kenyan people, or Ivoirien people) and more focus on the "African" level (contrasting Africans with Europeans). The national boundaries were accepted as "temporary", and a prelude to some future consolidation of African peoples.

In the immediate post-colonial period, however, there was an increase in the nationalist literature which did focus on the inherited states as the "natural" bearers of African destiny. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, in his volume I Speak of Freedom refers to the process whereby "Ghana is born", and discusses the "building of a new nation" with reference to Ghana. He discusses "Ghana in world affairs", "Ghana and the United Nations", and the constitutional core of "the Republic of Ghana". Nkrumah still remained one of the most articulate of pan-Africanists, but even he was drawn into the necessity of fostering a Ghanaian nationalism as a means to that end.

Other African spokesmen experienced the same upsurge of state level nationalism. Senghor attributed the breakup of the Mali federation to the fact that Senegalese and Malians were more conscious of their territorial differences than anyone had realized. The proposed East African Federation constricted itself into the component nationalisms of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. Kenneth Kaunda began to write specifically about Zambia, and Sekou Touré about Guinea.

The backbone of this national level nationalism was the fact that peoples in a particular country ostensibly had clear common interests which were different from the all-African level (e.g. Ivory Coast,
Nigeria, and Ghana were strong competitors for the world cocoa market. Citizens of particular countries also began to develop a sense of having worked together and sharing a common destiny.

2. Sub-national Level Nationalism

Most of the educated elite which led the nationalist movements prior to 1960 were very definite in their rejection of ethnicity as a basis for modern nationalism. Ethnic nationalism occurred most commonly in situations where national boundaries had cut across major ethnic group lines and hence had divided communities with a will and a potential capacity to reunite. The Somali looked to their cousins in Kenya and Ethiopia and demanded reunion. The Kongo people, at the mouth of the Congo River and divided into three states (Congo-Brazzaville, Congo-Kinshasa, and Angola), began to demand a separate state. The Ewe of Ghana and Togo began to demand reunion.

This particularistic form of nationalism did not generate a large body of literature in support of its claims. Political and sometimes violent action was often undertaken to enforce these felt demands for ethnic autonomy. African statesmen were concerned about the problem of irredentism, but few were able to devise ways of reconciling nationalism at the state and ethnic level.

It should be mentioned that a number of sub-national nationalisms did emerge in the post-colonial period. Katanga nationalism, based partly on the ethnic cohesiveness of the Lunda people and partly on the economic self-interest of the mineral rich province, demanded secession from Congo-Kinshasa in 1960. The Nilotic people of southern Sudan demanded
independence from their Arab countrymen. In 1967, the Ibo peoples of Eastern region Nigeria, demanded their own political autonomy in the form of Biafran nationalism. The Baganda, with recognized autonomy since independence, reassert their subnationalism in 1966 in response to the imposition of a unitary state; the deposed king (Kabaka) of Buganda went into exile in London, where he wrote The Desecration of My Kingdom (1967).

The remarkable thing about African states is that relatively few ethnic communities have demanded political autonomy. There are at least 150 ethnic groups cut by international boundaries, to say nothing of the large scale kingdoms (such as the Ashanti or Yoruba) within particular countries which have had a strong potential for nationalism (see Witstrand, 1969).

3. Supra-national Level Nationalism

In the period prior to African independence, as mentioned above, much of the nationalist attention was focused on the supra-national level. Nationalists frequently identified themselves as "Africans", which was natural in light of the fact that many of them had lived in Europe or the United States where they had been ascribed this identity, and also, that the anti-colonial struggle was directed against "Europeans".

There were important variations, discussed in PADEN, on the theme of "African nationalism". Some nationalists favored a Eur-Africanism, which legitimated the rights of Africans, but recognized the close relationship of Africa with Europe. Others espoused a form of marxism-socialism, which was localized in the form of "African socialism". Others focused on the "blackness" of Africa, and elaborated concepts of "negritude", (which was
widely interpreted as excluding North Africa from the mainstream of African nationalism.) Others were emphatic in wanting to include North Africa into a continent-wide form of Pan-Africanism. Still others saw Africa as a major component in a coalition between all of the colored peoples of the world—a bloc which came to be known as "the Third World". Finally, there were many African nationalists who thought in terms of regional federations of African states. Some espoused an amalgamation of French-speaking states, others of English-speaking East African states, and still others of English-speaking West African states.

These variations on supra-national level nationalism were most noticeable in the pre-independence period. However, it is likely that some of them will regain importance in the future (see lecture #69).

#52. Patterns of African Nationalism

In 1945 in London, a handful of African expatriates met and demanded that colonialism in Africa be abolished. There were few at that time who thought they would see an independent Africa within their lifetime. Fifteen years later, by 1960, most of Africa had achieved independence. The achievement of independence was not without struggle, yet for the most part it was peaceful. It required enormous energies and discipline to establish political organizations which were capable of both enforcing their demands, and at the same time of accepting the increasing burden of responsibilities in the administration of new states.
1. Early Patterns of African Nationalism

In the 1920s, there developed in British West Africa organizations which might be termed the first genuine nationalist movements. To some extent in the 1930s, there emerged new, usually urban-based organizations which were also focused on the evils of colonialism. It was not really until during and after World War II, however, that the demand for independence began to take organized form. During World War II, it became apparent to the Africans, both on a mass and elite level, that the European powers were vulnerable, and also that Africans were helping the "Allies" fight a cause for human freedom and justice which should rightly include themselves. On several occasions during the war, President Roosevelt declared the opposition of the United States to the idea of colonialism. When the French-speaking African leaders met with General de Gaulle in Brazzaville in 1944, there was a frank discussion about the reforms which were needed in Africa after the war. French-speaking Africans were invited to participate in the constitutional reforms of France which led to the establishment of the Fourth French Republic in 1946.

In Britain, a post-war Labor government decided to grant independence to India (which later split to include Pakistan) in 1947. This trend was not lost on African students studying in London during this period. In almost all of the British territories in Africa, constitutions began to be introduced which gave an increasing control of government to local Africans. Nationalist political parties began to form in almost every African state.

2. Violence and Non-violence

In only two countries did widespread anti-colonial violence develop:
Algeria and Kenya. Unlike most of Africa, these two areas contained large numbers of European settlers. Frenchmen from Alsace-Lorraine had migrated to Algeria after the German conquest of Alsace-Lorraine in 1870. They included persons from all walks of life. In Kenya, British farmers had been encouraged to migrate to the fertile highlands area since the early 1900s, while after World War I many British soldiers were attracted to Kenya by low land prices and other features. There was still another surge of immigration after World War II, stimulated largely by unfavorable post-war conditions within Great Britain itself.

In 1954, there was a coordinated uprising in Algeria in seventy different localities, led mainly by a few hundred young men with limited weapons. Within eighteen months, these young men had organized themselves into the Front of National Liberation (FLN), and eventually forced the French to place 500,000 troops in Algeria. By 1960, the toll on both sides was high. At least 250,000 Algerians had been killed, and another 250,000 were refugees outside the country. The French were suffering such heavy losses, with no apparent sign of victory, that in 1958, the French military took over the government of France (and established de Gaulle as President) largely on the pretext of bringing a swift end to the war. On July 5, 1962, Algeria became an independent republic, as a result of political negotiations.

In Kenya, the history of Mau Mau as a nationalist movement is still controversial, although the recent volume by Rosberg and Nottingham (1967) is a major contribution to our understanding of this movement. (Compare
their findings with the Corfield Report, 1960, which presented a strongly pro-British evaluation). Rosberg and Nottingham view Mau Mau as part of an ongoing process of African political development, begun in the 1920s which received little positive response from the colonial government. Outbreaks of violence eventually took place leading to the declaration of "Emergency" in October 1952 (lasting eight years). During the Emergency, with large numbers of British troops stationed in Kenya and with the many severe reprisals taken by the colonial government against what they perceived as a primitive and virtually psychotic uprising, many lives were lost and the movement splintered in various directions. To a great degree, Mau Mau became an internal civil war among the Kikuyu (largely between the landless and those loyal to the colonial government). In all, only about 30 Europeans were killed (slightly more Asians) against about 1700 Kikuyu and other "loyalists" and 10,000 "Mau Mau" (probably mostly Kikuyu). Nearly 90,000 were detained until the "rebellion" came to an end. The uprising, however, also remained a political movement which eventually led to independence for Kenya in December, 1963 (under the leadership of the one individual the British held largely responsible for Mau Mau, Jomo Kenyatta). Although Kenya received its independence later than most other African states, many view Mau Mau as one of the key turning points in colonial history, a violent indication of the desire for greater African political control.

By contrast, in most of the rest of Africa, the philosophy of non-violence became an integral part of the nationalist movement. Spokesmen such
as Nkrumah of Ghana, and Nyerere of Tanzania drew explicitly on the experience of Gandhi. This philosophy of non-violence was most articulate in English-speaking Africa. In French-speaking Africa, especially after the administrative reforms of 1956, there was in general a residual of goodwill between French politicians and African leaders, perhaps dating back to the war years. In 1958, only one French-speaking state (Guinea) voted to discontinue its relationship with France.

3. Nationalist Political Parties

In French-speaking Africa, the political parties which developed after the war were usually linked with political parties in France. Thus, there existed an African branch of the French socialist party, communist party, etc. These parties were organized in French-speaking Africa as "interterritorial" parties, i.e. as trans-national parties, but with national branches. In most cases, the parties ultimately broke with their French counterparts. The most notable of the trans-territorial parties were the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, (RDA) founded in 1946; the Indépendants d'Outre-Mer (IOM) founded in 1948; the Mouvement Socialiste Africain (MSA) founded in 1957; and the Parti du Regroupement Africain (PRA), founded in 1958.

In English-speaking Africa, nationalist parties were limited in scope and concern to the particular countries. As will be discussed in lecture #58, at the initial stages there were usually several parties in each of the countries. Yet in almost all countries (with the exception of Nigeria, and possibly Uganda) by the time of independence, a consolidated nationalist
party had been achieved. For example, in Ghana this was the Convention People's Party (CPP); in Tanzania, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). In Nigeria, the strong regionalism and federal structure encouraged single parties within each of the three regions: in the east, the National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC); in the west, the Action Group (AG); and in the north, the Northern People's Congress (NPC).

In all cases, political parties during the nationalist period were concerned to pressure European colonial powers into a transfer of government. The primary technique in this process was to campaign in elections on the basis of an independence platform, and to demonstrate that they were able to assume the responsibility of government as it devolved upon them.

1. Independence

During the fifteen year period from 1950-1965, most of the African states achieved independence. In this lecture, we will discuss the timing of independence, the process of constitutional reform, and the meaning of independence.

1. The Timing of Independence

Figure #1 provides a summary of the sequence and timing of independence. It will be noted that Ghana was the first wholly black African state to achieve independence (1957).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Short form</th>
<th>Long Form</th>
<th>Date of Independence</th>
<th>Former name or names</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kingdom of Libya</td>
<td>Dec. 24, 1951</td>
<td>Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Republic of the Sudan</td>
<td>Jan. 1, 1956</td>
<td>Anglo-Egyptian Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>Mar. 2, 1956</td>
<td>French Morocco (also Spanish Morocco, Tangier Zone, Zona Sur del Protectorado de Marruecos)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Republic of Tunisia</td>
<td>Mar. 20, 1956</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td></td>
<td>Republic of Ghana</td>
<td>Mar. 6, 1957</td>
<td>Gold Coast (also Ashanti, Northern Territories, Trust Territory of Togoland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td></td>
<td>Federal Republic of Cameroon</td>
<td>Jan. 1, 1960</td>
<td>Cameroun (or French Camero as) and Southern Cameroons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td></td>
<td>Republic of Togo</td>
<td>Apr. 27, 1960</td>
<td>State of Togo (French Togoland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td></td>
<td>Malagasy Republic</td>
<td>June 27, 1960</td>
<td>Madagascar and Dependencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo-Kinshasa</td>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>June 30, 1960</td>
<td>Belgian Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Somali Republic</td>
<td>July 1, 1960</td>
<td>Somalia and British Somaliland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahomey</td>
<td></td>
<td>Republic of Dahomey</td>
<td>Aug. 1, 1960</td>
<td>Dahomey</td>
</tr>
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<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Aug. 5, 1960</td>
<td>Upper Volta (also Volta)</td>
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<td>Ivory Coast</td>
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<td>Aug. 7, 1960</td>
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<td>Chad</td>
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<td>Republic of Chad</td>
<td>Aug. 11, 1960</td>
<td>Chad</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>Aug. 13, 1960</td>
<td>Central African Republic (also Ubangi-Shari)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congo-Brazzaville</td>
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<td>Republic of Congo</td>
<td>Aug. 15, 1960</td>
<td>Middle Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
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<td>Gabon Republic</td>
<td>Aug. 17, 1960</td>
<td>Gabon</td>
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<td>Senegal</td>
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<td>Republic of Senegal</td>
<td>Aug. 20, 1960</td>
<td>Senegal (also part of the Federation of Mali)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
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<td>Sept. 22, 1960</td>
<td>Soudan (also part of the Federation of Mali)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Short form</td>
<td>Long Form</td>
<td>Date of Independence</td>
<td>Former name or names</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
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<td>Islamic Republic of Mauritania</td>
<td>Nov. 28, 1960</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Apr. 27, 1961</td>
<td>Sierra Leone (colony and protectorate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>United Republic of Tanzania</td>
<td>Dec. 9, 1961</td>
<td>Tanganyika and Zanzibar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kingdom of Burundi</td>
<td>July 1, 1962</td>
<td>Urundi (in Ruanda-Urundi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td></td>
<td>Republic of Rwanda</td>
<td>July 1, 1962</td>
<td>Ruanda (in Ruanda-Urundi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria</td>
<td>July 3, 1962</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td></td>
<td>Republic of Kenya</td>
<td>Oct. 9, 1962</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dec. 12, 1963</td>
<td>Kenya (colony and protectorate)</td>
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<td>Malawi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>July 6, 1964</td>
<td>Nyasaland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Republic of Zambia</td>
<td>Oct. 24, 1964</td>
<td>Northern Rhodesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia, The</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Feb. 18, 1965</td>
<td>The Gambia (colony and protectorate)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Tanganyika becomes independent in 1961; joins with independent Zanzibar in 1964 to form Tanzania.

2. The Process of Constitutional Reforms

In English-speaking Africa there had been a relatively long period of involvement of African spokesmen in the affairs of government. In many territories, Africans were electing representatives to urban city councils by the 1920s. In West Africa, Councils of Chiefs were established in most territories by the 1930s. In the post-war period, written constitutions were enacted in most territories, establishing procedures for elections, and for African involvement in local and national government.
The most important vehicle for involvement on the national level was the "Legislative Council", which was comprised of representatives from different districts throughout the country, and, in East/Central Africa as well as from the major non-African ethnic/racial communities. Elections were often held "indirectly" or by stages, at first, as in Nigeria in 1951. By 1951 there was (moderately qualified) universal adult suffrage in Ghana. Africans were elected to the Legislature, and African-dominated cabinets were appointed from these legislatures. "Self-government", which refers to the complete control of the cabinet and legislature by Africans, usually preceded formal independence by a year or two, so that British withdrawal was "phased" to this extent.

In French-speaking Africa, there had always been a distinction between the African citizen and the African subject. The African citizen was a full participant in French political life. He could vote in French elections and could be elected to French national office. (Houphouët-Boigny was a cabinet member in France in the mid-1950s). The French-speaking Africans had hoped that the Fourth Republic Constitution of 1946 would extend citizenship to greater numbers of Africans. They were disappointed, however, with the 1946 constitution, which eventually emerged as a compromise between factions in France, to the neglect of the Africans. But in 1956, with the passage of the Loi-Cadre, citizenship was extended to a vastly increased number of Africans. In 1958, after de Gaulle had assumed power in France, the Fifth Republic constitution extended almost complete autonomy to the African states. They were to continue to participate in French national life, and to form a "community" of associated
In the referendum on the Fifth Republic Constitution (September 1953) only Guinea voted against continued affiliation with France. By 1960, however, most of the French-speaking states had decided to declare their complete independence from France, although most of them continued in close association within the French Community.

It should be noted that the pattern of political transfer in the Belgian areas was different from that of the British and French areas. Until 1958, the Belgians made no preparations at all for the establishment of political institutions in the Congo. In that year there were violent riots in Leopoldville, and King Baudouin of the Belgians announced constitutional reforms. Essentially, the reforms allowed for the establishment of political parties, which immediately proliferated. A Round Table Conference was held in Brussels in January 1960, which was attended by the party delegates, and elections were held in May. Because of the large number of political parties, it was necessary to form a coalition ("national government") after the elections, with Patrice Lumumba as Prime Minister, and Joseph Kasavubu as Head of State. Immediately upon independence in June 1960, there was a series of national crises in Congo which prevented the development of civilian government.

3. The Meaning of Independence

The transfer of powers to African states has sometimes been interpreted as a mere facade for the continued influence of European power in Africa. It is argued, for example by Nkrumah (1965), that Britain, France and Belgium have continued to exert political and economic influence in
their former colonies. This assertion will be examined more closely in lecture #77. It should be mentioned, however, that much of the political activity and orientation in independent Africa has maintained a strong neutralist stance vis-a-vis Europe. There can be no question that political independence was a turning point in African history. Political decision-making was now firmly in the hands of African statesmen, and if they were subject to pressures from at home and abroad, this did not distinguish them from politicians in other states, both new and old.

§54. Interethnic Integration

During the colonial period, the problem of interethnic relations was largely solved by the fact that the colonial administration most often dealt directly with each of the ethnic groups separately. This is the classical definition of a plural society: one in which two or more communal groups exist within a context, but have only economic, not political or social relationships with each other. One of the major problems of the independence era was to build new kinds of linkage between different ethnic groups. This was particularly complicated when ethnic groups had different status levels within the new states.

1. Interethnic conflict

In a number of important cases, ethnic groups in the post-colonial era felt that they had genuine grievances. In Nigeria from 1961 to 1965,
the Tiv, who numbered over one million, were in a state of active guerrilla rebellion against the government. Since the Tiv were a segmental people, with no real political hierarchy, it was extremely difficult to deal with this situation. The Tiv were protesting the imposed governmental authority, and, in particular, the fact that Hausa-Fulani elites "dominated" them at the regional level.

In another case from Nigeria, that of the Hausa and Ibo, there was a tenuous political coalition for the first few years of independence, which finally broke up, and took the form of interethnic conflict in many of the northern cities, where the Ibo had migrated. During the summer and early fall of 1966, the Ibos emigrated back to the Eastern Region, and in May 1967 declared their independence as "Biafra". While the British had been in Nigeria, ethnic migration could occur without political consequence. With the removal of the British, ethnic groups in competition for scarce goods, had to confront each other.

This same pattern had been first noticeable in the former Belgian areas. In the Congo, Luba peoples had immigrated into the urban areas of the Lunda people of Katanga. Apart from the international aspects of the Congolese civil war, much of the conflict had an ethnic dimension. In Burundi and Rwanda, the ruling-class Tutsi people were confronted with violence when the masses of the population, who were Bantu-speaking Hutu, demanded a larger voice in government.

In many parts of Africa interethnic violence was averted, but political tensions have remained high. In Ghana, the Ashanti people have confronted
the coastal Ga, Fanti and Nzima. In Guinea, the inland Fulani have been balanced off against the coastal Malinke. In Kenya, the Kikuyu have jealously guarded their favored position against other groups such as the Luo, Baluya, and Kamba. In Mauritania, there has been a delicate situation between the Moorish populations, and the black African populations. In Cameroon, the northern Fulani have been able to balance off such southern groups as the Bamiléké, the Basa, and the Fang. In Gabon, the Fang have dominated the political scene vis-a-vis an array of minority groups. In short, there are few countries in Africa which do not have potentially active problems of interethic competition or conflict. Lesotho, Botswana, and Somali remain the only sub-Saharan countries based on a single ethnic group.

2. The Processes of Interethic Integration

In the literature on integration, there are usually five processes, or types of linkage, which are regarded as significant in the over-all phenomenon of integration.

The first is simply cooperative interaction between groups. This may be based on marginal benefit to each group, and does not entail their loss of identity. Trade relations are a good example of this type of linkage.

The second type of linkage is functional dependence. This is a stronger linkage than mere cooperative interaction, and although it is based on a division of labor, (and hence trade), the economics of the situation link groups together in a vital way: i.e. groups become dependent on each other, and (in some cases) could not survive without each other. Thus, if one group can raise cattle (or other protein foods), and another
group raises staple agricultural goods, some exchange is necessary for each to maintain a given level of subsistence.

The third and fourth types of linkage are value congruence and identity congruence. Value congruence refers to the fact that groups share the same values, and hence may be able to interact in broad areas of social and political life. Identity congruence means that the two groups are willing to think of themselves as members of an identifiable system. This does not necessarily mean that they forego their own ethnic identities, but merely that they be able to utilize an additional identity, usually that of the national state.

The fifth type of linkage between groups is the establishment of a common authority which is respected by each side, or, alternatively which has the coercive potential to enforce its claims.

These five types of linkage--cooperative interaction, functional dependence, value congruence, identity congruence, and existence of central authority--lead not only to integration, but to political order, since violence and confrontation can usually be averted in an integrated system through various mechanisms of conflict resolution.

As an addenda, it should be noted that there are three dominant patterns of ethnic relations in integrated systems: the first is a pattern of assimilation, where the subordinate groups take on the values and identity of the dominant group; the second is a pattern of amalgamation, where the blending of two groups produces a third, and new group the third is a pattern of cultural pluralism, where each group retains its own identity,
but is willing to interact and become interdependent on other groups.  
(Compare with discussion in lecture #4.)

3. **Interethnic Integration in Africa**

The pattern of assimilation in Africa has been common for centuries. The Hausa have assimilated many of the surrounding minority peoples; the Ashanti have assimilated many of their neighbors; the Fang have been very inclusive in their social boundaries; and in East Africa, the category of Swahili has come to include a growing number of peoples.

The pattern of amalgamation is likewise well represented in traditional Africa. The blending of the Hutu and the Tutsi, in Rwanda and Burundi, resulted to some degree in the creation of a new group, called the Rwanda.

The pattern of cultural pluralism is perhaps the most widely distributed pattern. Groups live in close proximity to each other and maintain full relations, but retain their identities. This pattern is most common in the urban areas, such as Accra (with Ga, Ashanti, and Fanti quarters), or Freetown (with its Creole, Mende, Temne and Limba populations). However, it is also found in rural areas, as in the zone between Bornu and Hausaland.

In the modern, national state context, these same patterns appear. In Liberia, the policy of assimilation (into Americo-Liberian culture) has been long established. Some states, such as Ghana under Nkrumah, seemed to be working toward an amalgamated identity which might be called "Ghanaian". In countries such as Ivory Coast, there is a recognition of the diversity of peoples, yet a sense of national integration seems to exist.
It remains to be seen which policy of interethnic integration will be most productive in nation-building.

#55. Mass-elite Integration

A second problem of national integration in the post-colonial period has been the so-called "mass-elite" gap. The idea of elites has been referred to earlier in lecture #40. In essence, the process of western education has created a stratum of men and women who operate in the "modern sector", and who have de-emphasized their linguistic, ethnic, and cultural heritage. This has been problematic to the extent that these people must continue to deal with the traditional sector in the state, and must generate widespread support for the building of political and economic structures. In one sense, this is the social form of the economic dualism discussed in lecture #47.

1. Problems of Mass-elite Conflict

Much of the literature on political development in Latin America stresses the way in which the masses of people become frustrated with their standard of living, or with their political leaders, and apply pressure, often through violence, which results in the rapid turn-over of political leadership.

In the African context, this pattern has not yet emerged to the same extent. Yet in Nigeria, it appears that the first coup d'etat against
the civilian regime (January 1966) was well received by most elements in the country. There had been an increasing frustration with the political elite, who were regarded as corrupt, self-seeking and short-sighted. The General Strike of 1964, which was supported by labor unions throughout the country, was largely a protest against the Nigerian national leaders, rather than simply a demand for higher wages. The civilian take-over of government in Sudan, in 1964, was directed against the military junta, and was perhaps motivated by these same factors.

The symbol of political elitism in Africa was frequently the Mercedes-Benz car, which seemed to be a favorite with politicians (called, in Swahili, the Wa-Benzi). There was a strong reaction by the masses in Upper Volta, when it appeared that some of the highest level politicians were spending more time in Paris, in grand style, than at home.

In other countries, by contrast, leaders have been very conscious of the need to appear to maintain close connections with the grass roots level. President Nyerere of Tanzania has walked many miles by foot to demonstrate that a big car is not necessary to economic development and to symbolize the closeness between the mass and political leaders. President Touré of Guinea has not forgotten his trade union origins. The late Tom Mboya of Kenya held regular office hours each week, which were open to ordinary people from the streets who wanted to bring their problems directly to persons in political power.

2. Types of Mass-elite Linkage

Perhaps the most important structural linkage between political leaders
and the people have been the political parties. Scholars such as Thomas Hodgkin and Ruth Schachter-Morgenthau, writing as early as 1960, began to distinguish dominant political parties into those which were "patron" and those which were "mass" parties. Patron parties were essentially oligarchies, consisting of local notables, and not involving large memberships. The NPC of Nigeria, was considered an "elite" party, while the CPP of Ghana, or the PDG of Guinea were considered mass parties.

In time, however, these distinctions have tended to diminish insofar as most ruling parties have broadened into mass parties, with the dramatic rise of the single-party-state. (Although note CRAWFORD YOUNG's reference to "oligarchic party states".) Yet a wide variety of party structures exist. Of particular relevance to the linkage between mass and elite is the party structure at the grass-roots or local level. Some parties give considerable latitude to local branches, even to the extent, as in Tanzania, of choosing their candidates for national elections. In other party structures, such as in Mauritania or Niger, most decisions are made at a central level.

Vertical structures within political parties may be used for communications from top-to-bottom, from bottom-to-top, or both directions: what Nyerere describes as a "two-way, all-weather road". In Ghana under Nkrumah, there was an elaborate party structure at the local level, but its major function was to transmit information and decisions which had been made by the CPP central committee. In Ivory Coast, by contrast, the local branches of the ruling PDCI seem to transmit demands and information up to
the national level, where pragmatic negotiations are then conducted between representatives from various local groups. In Liberia, the True Whig Party of William Tubman has probably represented a two way flow of communications, but the local level group was largely restricted to the Americo-Liberian community which constitutes only 2% of the Liberian population.

3. The Representative Function of Elites

One of the most problematic aspects of nation-building in Africa has been the way in which interethnic and mass-elite relationships intersect. Even though western educated elites may be cut off from their ethnic heritage, the relatives of those elites, and the broader ethnic communities, may continue to regard the elites as representative of their particular ethnic interests. "Ethnic arithmetic" at the political elite level has continued to be an important factor in satisfying the various ethnic groups in a country that they are "represented". A recent study, (Mitchell, Morrison, Paden, 1970) shows that in the thirty-two sub-Saharan African states, there was less communal violence in those states in which the cabinet was representative of the ethnic pluralism of the country as a whole. On the other hand, it was also shown that when the cabinets were representative, much of the conflict in the country was focused at the cabinet level itself. Some balance, thus, seems necessary between the demands of elite stability and communal stability. One frequent solution has been to have political elites from the very small minority groups, which cannot threaten any of the larger groups. President Nyerere of Tanzania, or former President Nkrumah of Ghana or General Gowan of Nigeria seem to be examples of this pattern.
Finally, it should be noted that "ethnic arithmetic" in the broad sense includes any type of communal pluralism within the state. In some areas this will be religious, racial, or regional pluralism, rather than "ethnic" pluralism in the narrow sense. Some type of representational factor seems necessary for local people to feel that they have a stake in the new nation.

#56. Territorial Integration and Boundaries

A third problem of national integration in the post-colonial period has been that of territorial boundaries, both external and internal.

External boundaries had been established in the early colonial period, and were arbitrary to the extent that they often cut across ethnic communities. Of equal importance was the fact that in some cases, mainly between territories of the same colonial power, boundaries were left vague and undemarcated, since it was not anticipated that boundary disputes would arise. In still other cases, lands which had belonged to traditional kingdoms in the pre-colonial period, but which had been allocated to other territories, again came into dispute in the independence era.

Internal boundaries between provinces or regions were also subject to dispute. For example, Bunyoro (Uganda) demanded the so-called "lost counties" be returned to her from Buganda control. Regionalism within countries, as between "Northerners" and "Southerners" in most of West
Africa, has also been a source of tension. Some type of territorial linkage was clearly necessary within countries if centrifugal forces, or demands for regional autonomy, were not to threaten the national state.

1. Problems of External Boundary Conflict

In the post-colonial era, the Moroccan government has tried to enforce its claim to much of Mauritania, which it considers as traditionally part of the domain of the king of Morocco. Nation-building in Morocco was felt to require the re-establishment of the old empire. Throughout the early 1960s the Morocco-Mauritanian border was closed and there was sporadic fighting.

The boundary between southern Algeria and Mali was an example of an undemarcated zone. Since both were French territories, it was not felt necessary to do more than put a line of broken dots on the maps. With independence, the exact territorial limits of each state became a matter of national concern, and border tensions ensued.

The problem of international boundaries cutting across ethnic lines, usually resulting in a minority portion of the community in another country, has led to a variety of types of "irredentism", or demand for reunion. The Ewe in the old Transvolta region of Ghana, which was a trust territory under British administration, demanded reunion with their fellow Ewe in Togo in the years immediately prior and following Ghanaian independence (ca. 1956-1960). Both sides engaged in significant fortifications, and sporadic shooting occurred. The President of Togo, Sylvanus Olumpio, who was assassinated in 1963, constantly announced that President Nkrumah was
plotting to overthrow him as a means of dampening the hopes of Ewe irre-
dentists.

The Republic of Somali has engaged in "shifta" raids into both Kenya
and Ethiopia to reinforce their demands for lands which the Somali pastora-
lists have been using for years. It is written into the constitution of
the Republic of Somali, that one of the goals of nation-building must be to
unite all Somali peoples, (including those in other countries). At present,
the border fighting seems to have abated, but the potential for further
contlict still remains (see for further discussion of boundary problems,
Widstrand, 1969).

2. Problems of Internal Regional Conflict

In almost every country in West Africa there has been a recurrent
pattern of political tension between the southern coastal areas and the
northern savanna areas. Historically, these two zones consisted of kingdoms
and empires which seldom overlapped the ecological boundary (Old Oyo, in
Nigeria was an exception, but was destroyed in the 19th century). The
colonial administration often reinforced this difference by dealing with
"northern" and "southern" peoples as two distinct categories. Even when
these regions were formally amalgamated, as were Northern and Southern
Nigeria in 1914, it was frequently decades later before any administrative
linkages were established. (In Nigeria, the first direct political contact
between northern and southern leaders occurred in 1951).

In other parts of Africa, there has been an amalgamation of terri-
tories during or after independence, which has necessitated the creation of
new national linkages. The two best examples of this have been Cameroon and Tanzania, which are at present, the only two federations left in Africa (excluding Nigeria at present due to its "constitutionless" status.) In 1961 as a result of United Nations-sponsored plebiscites, English-speaking Northern Cameroons became part of Nigeria, and English-speaking Southern Cameroons united with the French-speaking portions of Cameroon. At present, Western Cameroon is English-speaking, and Eastern Cameroon is French-speaking. The government of Cameroon is trying to establish policies of bi-lingualism which will unite the country (similar perhaps, but in reverse ratio, to the problems of Canada).

The Federation of Tanzania consists of Tanganyika and the island of Zanzibar. After the revolution in Zanzibar in 1964, the new government in Zanzibar petitioned for merger with Tanganyika. Policies are being initiated, especially with regard to the balance of leadership between the two regions, which will hopefully link the units together into a centralized state.

Many examples could be cited of instances where external boundary adjustments have created a problem of internal territorial integration. One interesting case has been the merger of Eritrea into Ethiopia, which in the mid-1950s took a federal form, but has later shifted to a unitary form.

3. Types of Territorial Linkage

With regard to international boundaries, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) has established a Mediation Commission to assist in arbitration. This Commission has been of considerable use in the Morocco-Algerian Border dispute. According to a 1964 OAU resolution, the existing external
boundaries in Africa were to be respected, and the existing territorial states were to be the basis of future Pan-Africanism (see lecture #71).

Internally, many of the processes of linkage cited with regard to interethnic integration are also appropriate to territorial integration, for it is frequently difficult to separate ethnic vs. regional bases of identity. The establishment of an economic, transportation, and communications infrastructure between the component regions of a state seems to be especially important (i.e. "co-operative interaction" and "functional interdependence"). The existence of an acceptable central government also seems important (even when that form of government is federal).

The issue of value congruence and identity congruence is of major concern to leaders in the process of territorial integration. One of the major means of influence the growth of common values and identities has been the conscious policy of developing a "national ideology". This will be the subject of the next lecture.

#57. The Role of Ideology in Nation-Building

Ideology refers to those values and beliefs which are held about society as a whole, and which provide legitimacy to present policies and serve as an imperative to future action. Ideology may be used to explain poverty or social deprivation, or it may be used to explain and justify social domination. It may be used to break up a colonial empire, or to weld
together a new state. Ideology may either be explicit, normally taking the form of writings or speeches by spokesmen; or it may be latent, the unarticulated feelings of the masses. Most societies, whether traditional or modern, have some organizing principles which may be regarded as a dominant ideology. Ideological conflict occurs when competing or incompatible values and beliefs are juxtaposed within a context.

1. Ideological Conflict in Africa

The major ideological conflict in twentieth century Africa has been between modern and traditional values and beliefs. Traditional values may espouse the restricting of community membership to those with common language, culture, or kinship. Modern values may espouse the extension of community membership to national or continental or even universal boundaries. Traditional beliefs may be pre-scientific, while modern beliefs may be scientific.

This ideological dualism which exists in most states, should not obscure the fact that many aspects of traditional society may not be in conflict with modern values. In Tanzania, the political authority structure of most traditional societies is egalitarian. It is less difficult for the leaders of Tanzania to adopt an egalitarian ideology at the national level because this is already part of the political culture of most people. Likewise the hierarchical structure of traditional society in northern Nigeria may carry over into modern politics and may or may not be incompatible with modernization. (Centralization of authority is frequently a necessary prerequisite to increase in scale).
A type of ideological conflict which is perhaps more noticeable to the world outside of Africa is the so-called capitalist/socialist dispute as to the purposes of the state and the means of organizing economic life. States such as Ivory Coast and Kenya have become associated with a "capitalist" approach, and states such as Guinea or Tanzania have become associated with a "socialist" approach. (It should be noted that in no country in black Africa is there a flourishing communist ideology.) To a large extent, the capitalist/socialist debate in Africa is artificial. Due to colonialism, there was little development of persons who could emerge as "captains of industry". By default, the governments of the independent African states have become heavily involved in all aspects of economic life. On the other hand, there are few large-scale African societies which are not characterized by a class of traders (sometimes women, as in Ghana and Yorubaland) who are among the most astute merchants in the pre-industrial world. The debate as to capitalism/socialism is largely for external consumption, although increasingly "African socialism" (to be discussed later) is a rallying ideology in the process of nation-building.

2. The Sources of African Ideology

The three major sources of contemporary African ideology have been traditional precepts and values, Islamic jurisprudence and ideology, and Western thought (primarily British and French).

In a recent volume by W. Kofi Abrahams, *The Mind of Africa*, the author explores his own Ashanti cultural heritage as a source of modern ideas. By contrast, Islamic ideology, especially of the "advice-to-rulers" variety,
has been existent in written form in West Africa since the fifteenth century. Islamic ideology has strongly effected at least a dozen states in Africa, and in a few states, such as Mauritania, Morocco, and the Republic of Somaliland, it is the official state ideology. (Likewise, Coptic Christianity is the official ideology of Ethiopia.)

The sources of western thought in Africa have been more noticeable to western observers. There are clear echoes of Rousseau in the writings of those who espouse "totalitarian democracy". The references to John Locke are frequent in the writings of the "liberal democrats". The influence of Karl Marx, particularly his early writings on alienation, is noticeable in most of the ideological writings which emerged during the struggle against colonialism. For a discussion of these themes in Africa, see Mazrui (1967).

The influence of twentieth-century Europeans on African ideological writing is acknowledged by many of the African writers. Senghor draws heavily on the liberal Catholic ideas of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Nkrumah drew explicitly from a Leninist tradition, while Kenyatta has drawn on many of the values and ideas of Malinowski. The acknowledgement of this influence does not detract from the genius of many of the African writers. The writings of Mamadou Dia of Senegal, Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria, or Julius Nyerere of Tanzania will take their place among some of the world's greatest political literature. The prolific insights of Kwame Nkrumah may be granted a new respect by future generations of Africans. One of the consequences of the fact that most heads of state in Africa are
well-educated intellectuals has been that in every state volumes of political writings have emerged in both the nationalist and the nation-building stages.

3. Types of "Modern" African Ideology

There are many references in the BIBLIOGRAPHY which indicate the wide range of ideological writings in Africa. At this point, it seems appropriate to list only major identifiable categories of ideology. Many of these categories of ideology will be returned to in later lectures.

The first ideology is Negritude, best known through the writings of Senghor. Basically, negritude was a reaction to the assimilationist policy of France which tried to make black Frenchmen out of Africans. Negritude was an ideology which asserted that "black is beautiful", and that the African cultural heritage is impossible of assimilation by western culture. This ideology was especially relevant in the struggle for independence, but has had less political relevance in Africa since independence.

A second ideology has been called conscientism, after a volume of that title written by Nkrumah (1964). Consciencism asserted that the emergent African ideology should be a synthesis of Euro-Christian, African traditional, and Islamic heritages. It was an ideological plea for a type of pan-Africanism based on continent-wide "value congruence".

A final category might be termed African socialism, although both Nkrumah and Senghor would claim to fit that description. African socialism asserted the values of egalitarian society, and the importance of "justice" in the distribution of economic wealth. This ideology was espoused by
many leaders in the early period after independence as a rallying symbol. It has come to take on a variety of meanings depending on its context, ranging from Kenya to Guinea.

#58. Types of Civilian Regimes

As has been mentioned in lecture #53 most of the inherited political systems in Africa were either of the British Westminster model or the French Fifth Republic model. Crawford Young refers to the characteristics of regimes at the time of independence as distinct from the later "post-independence" phase, i.e., after major adjustments had been made. In this lecture the focus will be primarily on political parties in Africa as they emerged in the post-independence period.

1. The Role of Political Parties in Africa

Political parties may be regarded as functioning both as inputs to the political decision-making system (articulating and aggregating demands by the people), as converters of political demands into decisions, and as outputs from the system (insofar as the government party may be responsible for the enforcement and execution of the law).

In Africa, these functions have assumed different importance in different time periods. Prior to independence, political parties functioned to rally (or aggregate) the people around nationalist demands which were then presented to the colonial government. In the independence period, the
dominant party served as the government itself. To some extent, there was a tendency for the various coalition components of the nationalist party to fragment after the major goal (independence) was won. However, this tendency was resisted by various means, and the parties took on the new goals of unifying the country and promoting economic development.

In the study of political parties in Africa, there are certain accepted categories of analysis. The first category is usually the party structure and organization. Most parties have an annual convention, or congress, made up of delegates from throughout the country. These delegates select a central working committee to represent them during the year, and this committee in turn selects a national executive committee which handles the executive functions of the party. The chairman of the party is usually the most powerful figure in the party, and if the party is governing the country, the party chairman usually becomes the prime minister.

A second category is membership requirements. The organization of parties at the lower levels will vary. Some extend membership to anybody who is willing to join; others try to limit party membership to those with an active interest in politics. Some local districts elect representatives to the national convention directly, while others do so indirectly.

A third category is the nature of party "ancillary elements". These may include a women's branch of the party, a youth branch of the party, and frequently a labor union or farmers branch of the party. These ancillary branches are usually directly represented on the national working committee and may retain some autonomy in their own affairs.
A final category may be the nature of party goals and purposes. While the dominant parties receive most attention in Africa, there are frequently many smaller parties, often splinter groups, which act more like third parties or even "interest groups" in the United States. Such parties may exist both in a "one-party" system or a "two-party" system. To use examples from Nigeria, they may be regionally based, (e.g., Bornu Youth Movement), ethnically based (e.g., the Tiv party), religiously based (e.g., some of the revisionist Muslim parties), locationally based (e.g., Kano Peoples Party), personality based (e.g., the Zikist youth parties, after Azikiwe), special-cause based (e.g., the Socialist Workers and Farmers Party) or based on occupational interests (e.g., the Labour Party). In practice, such parties act like interest groups in the articulation and protection of members' interests.

2. Single Party Systems in Africa

In most cases, the nationalist party which led the drive for independence continued in the post-colonial period as the government party. Those members of parties which were excluded from government had the choice of acting as the "loyal opposition" or of joining the dominant party. In many cases, because of the scarcity of quality leadership, key leaders from an opposition party could be coopted (through prestige, power, or wealth) into the ruling party. In some cases, opposition parties were banned as detrimental to the unity of the country. The result was a single party state.
Political scientists working in Africa, such as Coleman and Rosberg (1964), have found it necessary to distinguish two major types of single party systems: the pragmatic-pluralistic type, and the revolutionary-centralizing type. These types are distinguished on the criteria of ideological concern, degree of popular participation, and certain organizational aspects. Pragmatic-pluralistic states, such as Senegal, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, and Cameroon, were interpreted as national coalitions of various interest groups within the country. Revolutionary-centralizing states, such as Guinea, Mali, and Ghana were seen as ideological one-party systems with a high degree of centralization.

In single party systems, of whatever variety, dissent and opposition usually do not disappear, but are contained within the party itself. Most frequently, the locus of decision-making changes from the legislature (which consists of persons from the dominant party) to the central committee of the party.

3. Other Party Systems in Africa

There are three other types of party systems in Africa: no-party (or embryonic party) systems, two-party systems, and multi-party systems. No-party systems, such as Ethiopia, are usually historic oligarchies. Ethiopia was one of the two African states (along with Liberia) which was not a colony, and hence did not have an anti-colonial nationalist movement. It appears that Ethiopia has been trying to set up a single party system and will probably have one in the future.

Two-party systems in Africa have been relatively rare, although
modified varieties have existed in Zambia and Uganda. In Ghana until 1960 the United Party stood in opposition, but was then made illegal. In Kenya, the activities of Oginga Odinga and the Kenya Peoples Union (KPU) represent less of a two-party system than a minority party within a one-party system. In Nigeria in the 1964 election, there were two national coalitions: (1) the Nigerian National Alliance (N.N.A.) consisting of the dominant northern party (N.P.C.) and the governing western party (N.N.D.P.); and (2) the United Party Grand Alliance (U.P.G.A.) consisting of the western region opposition party (A.G.) the eastern region dominant party (N.C.N.C.), and the northern opposition party (N.E.P.U.). This two-party coalition was ill-fated and a year later, the military took over.

Multi-party systems have been more common than two-party systems but seem to be highly unstable. The Congo (K) and several of the French-speaking areas have had multi-party systems (partly the result of "list" voting procedures), yet many of these parties were minority parties, and acted as interest groups.

In short, the dominant form of party system in Africa has been the single party system. Further aspects of these systems will be considered in the next three lectures.

#59. Institutions and Bureaucracy

This lecture will examine legislative, judicial and executive institutions in the new African states. In considering executive institutions,
special emphasis will be placed on the structure of the civil service bureaucracy. Note that in many states with military regimes, the civil service virtually runs the country.

1. Legislative Structures

As mentioned earlier with regard to political parties, decision-making in a one-party state may reside in the central committee of the party rather than in the legislature. Yet all civilian regimes in Africa have continued some type of legislature. In most states it is unicameral. In several sub-Saharan states, it is bicameral; Botswana, Burundi, Congo (Kinshasa), Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, and (formerly) Nigeria.

Where there is an upper house, a variety of means have emerged for selecting membership (although in many cases the "traditional" leaders form the upper house). Thus, in Congo (Kinshasa) the upper house is elected by the lower house; in Kenya and Liberia, it is elected by the citizens, but with regional representation; in Burundi, it is elected by the citizens without regional representation; in Ethiopia, Lesotho, Botswana and Nigeria, the upper house has been appointed by the chief executive and consists mainly of specified traditional leaders.

Terms of office in the lower house will also vary. Most states (both French-speaking and English-speaking) have a five year maximum term. A few have four year terms (Ethiopia, Liberia, Senegal); and one (Burundi) has a six year term.

Most national legislatures meet twice a year, once for a separate budget session. Certain other legislatures, particularly those in
English-speaking Africa, meet only once a year.

Although the role of a national legislature in a single party system is less important than in a system whereby an opposition party may ultimately secure power, it should be stressed that debate does continue within the national legislature of a one-party state. Frequently such debate is an important indication of the subtleties of feelings within a country. In most African states, a verbatim record is kept of such debates, comparable to the American Congressional Record, or the British Hansard. Verbatim records are less readily available from the legislative "committees" which play such a vital role.

2. Judicial Structure

There is a complex judicial structure in every African state. The most important question regarding such structure is its relationship to the political decision-making process, and the "autonomy" of the judiciary. In a few states, the Head-of-State is empowered to remove supreme court judges (Sierra Leone, Ghana-under-Nkrumah, Burundi); in other states the Head-of-State must also have the approval of the national legislative body (Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda); in still other states the Head-of-State may appoint a special tribunal to investigate and dismiss judges (Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia). Certain states make it explicitly impossible to remove supreme court judges (Chad, Congo-Br., Dahomey, Senegal, Somali and Togo), and the remainder of the states have no constitutional provision for removing judges (e.g. Cameroon, C.A.R., Congo-Ki., Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Sudan, Upper Volta).
More detailed aspects of judicial structure will be discussed in lecture #68.

3. Executive Structure

The chief executive in a country is usually the prime minister. (In a few systems, the President is chief executive.) Certain countries have retained traditional rulers as heads-of-state (as distinct from heads-of-government): in Burundi, prior to the coup, the chief executive was a hereditary office; in Ethiopia, the Emperor is head-of-state; in many former British territories, immediately following independence, the British Queen (Elizabeth II) continued as titular head-of-state.

In most African countries, the chief executive is the head of the dominant political party, and is elected by universal suffrage. In a few states, however, he is elected by the legislature: e.g. Botswana, (formerly) Congo-Braz., Mauritania, (formerly) Nigeria, and (formerly) Uganda.

The most important power of the chief executive is his prerogative to select a cabinet of ministers, who serve as heads of executive departments (or ministries), as well as serving as links to the political party and legislature. The number of ministers that may be appointed is usually left to the discretion of the chief executive, but the normal range is between ten and twenty. These ministers have the responsibility of translating government policy into action. Most African states have ministers of foreign affairs, economic development, communications, local government, internal affairs, finance, transportation, and agriculture.

The structure of a ministry, or department, is divided into three main categories: the leadership level, which consists of political appointees;
the professional level, which consists of "tenured" civil servants who are appointed and promoted on the basis of merit or examination; and the clerical level. Each minister usually has a Parliamentary Secretary, who is also a political appointee, to assist him. These men work with the Permanent Secretary and Deputy or Assistant Permanent Secretary, who are the top civil servants. Under the Permanent Secretaries there are usually a number of functional divisions, each with a Chief of Division (for example a ministry of agriculture might have divisions of research, training, fisheries, veterinary medicine, forestry, development, game and wildlife, etc.). These divisions may have separate field stations or offices at the local government level.

With the increase in military regimes in Africa has come an increased importance of Permanent Secretaries. These men often come to make the day-to-day decisions which are the backbone of executive administration. These men are usually well educated and highly professional.

At the time of independence, the primary concern was to Africanize the highest levels of the civil service. (The political level had, of course, been Africanized). In most African states these high level civil service posts are now held by Africans, although in a number of the French-speaking countries, (plus the English-speaking states of Southern Africa, such as Malawi, Lesotho, Botswana) European technical experts are heavily involved in the executive administration.

The two main structural problems which seem to have emerged regarding the civil service in Africa have been as follows: the relationship of the
civil service to the political party structure; the relationship of the national civil service to local government. Thus, in Ghana during Nkrumah's later years, there was an exact parallel of offices within the government party and the civil service, and questions as to rights of jurisdiction created tension which clearly contributed to his overthrow. This same parallelism of party and civil service is evident in Tanzania today. With regard to local government, the problem centers on the disparity between the well-educated professional civil servants at the national level and the relatively untrained administrators at the local level. The bottleneck in administration is most frequently at the local level. Most African states have set up Institutes of Administration on a "crash-course" basis, to train large numbers of persons for local level government.

#60. Participation and Mobilization

In lecture #33 the concepts of social mobilization and participation were defined, and included as part of the general process of increasing complexity. The idea of participation was also mentioned in lecture #55 (mass-elite integration) as a central type of linkage in the process of national integration. In this lecture special attention will be paid to the electoral process as a means of popular participation in the processes of government. Other mechanisms of participation, such as party structure, interest groups, and mass media, will also be mentioned.
1. Early Electoral Experience in Africa

Although the four "communes" in Senegal had elected representatives to the National Assembly in Paris since the nineteenth century, most of the French-speaking areas of Africa held such elections immediately after World War II. In the period from 1945 to 1960, there were elections at all levels (regional, national, and to the National Assembly in Paris): an average of about six elections per country.

English-speaking West African states also had a relatively brief but extensive history of pre-independence electoral experience. In the English-speaking central and eastern Africa, however, experience at both local and national elections began at a slightly later point (approximately mid-1950s), except for elections restricted to the indigenous European community.

In reviewing the literature on these pre-independence elections, it is important to note the common restrictions on suffrage. Thus, in Nigeria, particularly in the North, there were a series of "stages" whereby the popular vote selected certain candidates, who then had to be approved by a college of electors. This "indirect" voting prevailed until the 1959 federal election, when, for the first time in Nigerian history, there were direct elections based on universal suffrage (excluding women in the north, who still do not vote). In East and Central Africa, various experiments at procedures such as multiple voting in Tanganyika and dual rolls (one for whites and one for Africans or based on property) were undertaken as a means of securing a racial balance in the legislative council. Also there were usually educational, occupational or property qualifications. In
French-speaking Africa prior to 1956, voting was restricted to "citizens", i.e. resident French and Africans who used the civil code. It is not surprising that one of the common slogans during the independence drive was "one man, one vote".

Still, a large number of Africans did have the experience of participating in elections prior to independence, and furthermore, elections did become more or less accepted as the legitimate means of selecting national leaders.

In every country, the pre-independence election of crucial importance was the "independence" election, i.e. that election which demonstrated that the African government had national support to lead the state through independence, and in most cases for its first four or five years. It is important to stress that the African states thus came to independence with elected governments. In all cases, however, these elections were held in the colonial period, usually a year prior to independence. In reviewing the case studies on independence elections, data are frequently available on the number of persons registered, the number of registered persons who voted, and the percentage of votes cast for the dominant party. One measure of the legitimacy of a regime is probably a high voting turnout and/or a high percentage of votes cast for the dominant party.

2. Post-independence Elections

Because of the time period permitted by law between elections (usually four or five years) most African states did not have to confront the issue of elections during the early years of their independence. By 1963-4,
however, there were pressures for elections. In some cases elections had already been held, as in Ghana, the first all black African state to achieve independence from the colonial powers. Electoral commissions were usually set up, consisting of high level civil servants, and frequently high level political figures as well.

The results of these "first generation" post-colonial elections were mixed. In most cases, the dominant party was returned with an overwhelming majority. (The Westminster model of "winner-take-all", in particular, led to massive government victories.) In other cases, as in Sierra Leone or Nigeria, some national crisis was provoked by the elections, with the result of military intervention. Only in Somali Republic was a dominant party replaced (through electoral means) by an opposition party. Yet despite the tendencies for elections to reinforce the position of existing government, they did seem to become a symbol of mass participation in national politics.

Since the pattern of military take-overs will be discussed in the next lecture, it might be useful to focus on some of the innovations which emerged in the "first-generation" post-colonial elections. One innovation, explicitly based on the American concept of the "primary" election to select from several candidates within a party, was undertaken in Tanzania during the 1965 election. Although Tanzania was a one-party state, President Nyerere was concerned it remain a democratic one-party state. Consequently local constituencies were allowed to nominate their own candidates, and anyone within the party could be nominated. An interesting result was that
much of the cabinet level leadership of the government party (TANU) was displaced and a new infusion of local-based leadership was absorbed within the party.

3. Other Modes of Participation

Three major means of participation in the political process within the African states have been as follows: working within the party structure at the local level; working through interest groups which have direct contact with government; and utilizing the mass media for the dissemination of messages.

In many African states, the party is open to all who wish to participate at the local level. There may even be women's leagues, or youth branches to encourage the participation of particular groups. In Ghana under Nkrumah, there was an effort to involve as many people as possible in party activities. A Young Pioneers club, based on the Soviet model, was established for small children, and even the churches were encouraged to engage in party activities.

The growth of organized interest groups in Africa has been a remarkable feature of the past twenty years. Most of these groups are located in the rapidly growing urban centers, and are organized around occupational groups (e.g. the Butchers' union, or transporters' association), around religious groups (various Muslim and Christian leagues, and improvement societies), or around social groups (radio clubs, funeral societies, hobby groups). (We have mentioned ethnic interest groups in lecture #46.) Most of them have been able to establish direct access into the political process, both
local and national, and to exert influence on behalf of their members.

Finally, many Africans are availing themselves of the explosion in mass media. Although many newspapers in Africa are under close government supervision, they do provide, to some extent, a two-way vehicle of communication. As the number and distribution of newspapers increases, so does the number of "letters to the editor". A number of private printing presses have also sprung up which print a wide range of literature, including political tracts. Radio clubs have sprung up in which young people not only correspond with each other, but with the radio stations. Mass participation in national life has come to be accepted as a basic right by many Africans.

#61. Elite Instability and Military Rule

In sub-Saharan Africa since 1958, there have been twenty-five "successful" coups d'état in fourteen different countries. There have been 17 "unsuccessful" coups. In North Africa, Nasser came to power in Egypt through a coup; the present Algerian government was initiated through a coup and the recent take-over in Libya has been dramatic in its precision and anonymity.

In most cases, the military assumed control from a civilian regime, but in some cases portions of the military took over from an existing military regime, (e.g. Nigeria in July 1966, or Dahomey in 1967). In one case, (Sudan, 1964) civilian forces took over control from the military. This
increasing evidence of "elite instability", and the important role of the military in Africa must be carefully interpreted. African patterns appear to differ from those in Latin America, where there has been a long period of independence, and a deeply entrenched social elite, which often provides most of the military officers. In Africa, military institutions are a more recent phenomena, and have been recruited from all strata in society. The high frequency of African military take-overs is a reflection of transition problems (including political instability) in the immediate post-colonial period.

1. The Military in Africa

At the time of independence, the military forces in most sub-Saharan African states were very small. A number of states had no military at all. Most had forces ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 men. Only a few had over 10,000 men, and the largest armies (those in Congo-Kinshasa, and Ethiopia) numbered only 35,000. In most cases (excluding Ethiopia) these armies at independence had European officers at the highest levels. (In Congo-Kinshasa, the July 1960 mutiny of the Congo army was directed against its Belgian officers.) One of the first tasks was to Africanize the officer corps. Large numbers of Africans went to the military academies in Britain (Sandhurst) and France (St. Cyr). Some countries such as Ghana began to accept training aid from the Soviet Union. Officers who returned from European training were usually imbued with the professionalism, discipline, technical skills, and austerity of their European counterparts. By the mid-1960s, most armies in Africa were officered by Africans of this
professional quality.

The functions of African armies have been varied. Ghanaian, Ethiopian and Nigerian troops were among the finest of the United Nations contingent in the Congo. In those states which had irredentism movements or border disputes the military was often involved in border patrol. Internally, military force was occasionally used to quell disturbances within a state, as during the Nigerian General Strike of 1964. In other cases, the military was used internally to engage in engineering and developmental tasks. (Israeli military advisers in Ivory Coast helped establish a corps civique, whereby military recruits were located in villages along the Ivoirien border and taught to engage in agriculture improvement and educational services.) To some extent the military as an institution came to symbolize both modernization and national integration (since most armies were relatively integrated, some even having ethnic quotas). It is against this background that the military coups must be viewed.

2. Military Coups d'état in Africa

There have been several different patterns of coups in Africa. In some cases, as in Dahomey, the military took over just prior to elections, and then returned control to an elected civilian regime. In other cases, as in Burundi or Nigeria, the military reflected the basic social unrest within the country. The question as to why coups have occurred in some countries, and not in others, has been a matter of much speculation. Coups seem to occur in both large and small states, in both French- and English-speaking states, and in most of the major geographical regions.
The following table summarizes these patterns:

Figure #1

**Coup in Sub-Saharan Africa**
(in time sequence)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7. Sudan</td>
<td>October 30-Nov.15 1964</td>
<td>Civilian counter-coup overthrows Abboud.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Upper Volta</td>
<td>January 3, 1966</td>
<td>Col. Laminzana (Chief of Staff) overthrows President Yameogo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Comment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>February 22, 1966</td>
<td>President Obote assumes all powers and suspends constitution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>July 8, 1966</td>
<td>Prince Charles deposes King.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>November 28, 1966</td>
<td>Prince Charles (who had proclaimed himself King Mwami Ntare V) overthrown by Col. Micombero.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>March 21, 1967</td>
<td>General Lanzana seizes power from newly elected Stevens.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>April 18, 1968</td>
<td>Counter-coup by non-commissioned officers. Stevens returned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>November 19, 1968</td>
<td>Military committee ousts Keita.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>May, 1969</td>
<td>Pro-Arab military dismisses civilian government.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. **Military Regimes in Africa**

As evident from the above outline, coups have occurred for a variety of reasons. In several cases the military has not formed a regime. Yet in cases where the military does form a regime, the first task has usually been to form a "national council" (consisting of military officers, but sometimes civilians are included). The council usually seeks to do
several things immediately: secure international recognition, legitimate its position within the country (usually by focusing attention on the "evils" of the former administration, e.g. corruption), secure its physical survival by precautions against the return of former elite elements, encourage the civil service to continue with the administration of the country, and announce "constitutional reforms" to be forthcoming.

In some cases, such as Congo-Kinshasa, Sudan, and Nigeria, military regimes were also faced with impending or actual civil war. In the case of Nigeria, the size of the army was approximately 10,000 at the time of the coup, but increased to approximately 100,000 within two years due to the secession of Biafra. The impact of such a military regime is likely to be much greater than in a situation where the military regards itself as a "caretaker" government until the politicians can agree on workable rules of political process.

In several of the French-speaking countries (e.g. Dahomey, Togo, Congo-Kinshasa), the military has returned control voluntarily to civilian regimes. In English-speaking Africa, Ghana in September 1969, held elections and turned control of government over to the successful party (The Progress Party of Kofi Busia); and the counter-coup in Sierra Leone returned control to the civilian government of Siaka Stevens. It is difficult to predict the future role of the military in African political development, except to note that many African armies seem to regard themselves as the "watchdogs" of effective civilian government.
#62. An Assessment of Resources

The focus in this lecture is on the physical resources of Africa as a preliminary to a discussion of economic problems of nation-building. More detailed analysis by country or by resource can be found in most of the general geography texts listed in the Bibliography and in the Oxford Regional Economic Atlas of Africa.

1. Energy Resources

There is very little good-grade coal in Africa, which has hindered both transportation and the growth of industry. Africa, however, has the greatest water power potential in the world (about as much as Europe, North America, South America and Australia combined). Huge hydroelectric stations—one as big as any in Europe—were in operation in Katanga by 1950 (the Congo basin probably leads the world in hydroelectric potential). Other important projects either in operation or approaching completion include Owens Falls (opened in 1956 in Uganda, on the Nile and serving much of East Africa), Kariba (the highly strategic installation serving Zambia and Rhodesia), Aswan in Egypt, the Volta River in Ghana, Edea in Cameroon, Kainji and Shiroro in Nigeria and Konkouré in Guinea. Other large hydroelectric schemes exist in Mozambique (one of the largest schemes in the world, financed largely by South Africa, is now in progress here), Ethiopia, Angola, Sudan, in the Maghrib states, and throughout the Congo Basin (which, near its outlet, was to have the world's largest project—at the Inga Rapids—before
being postponed due to the political troubles of 1960). Yet, only a small proportion of the water power potential has been developed and much hope for future industrial development is understandably placed on this rich resource.

With regard to future sources of energy development, Africa has the world's largest known reserves of uranium ore (Republic of South Africa, Gabon). This could prove a major asset for industrial development. Finally, from an oil-poor continent, Africa has emerged in the past 20 years as an increasingly important petroleum producer. The largest known deposits are in Libya, Algeria, Egypt, Gabon and Nigeria, the latter having experienced a spectacular growth since 1960. Other significant deposits are being worked in Angola (especially the tiny exclave of Cabinda), Congo-Brazzaville, and Morocco. On the other hand, rather extensive investigations throughout the eastern half of Africa have not proved very promising as yet.

2. Other Mineral Resources

There is a vast wealth of mineral resources in Africa and the rate of discovery of new mineral deposits has been increasingly rapid. It should be noted, however, that minerals at present are almost entirely for export in raw form and do not contribute as much as they could to increased employment and local industry. Also important is the concentration of minerals in a few outstandingly rich areas, the most notable of which are the Witwatersrand, or Rand, area of South Africa which produces most of the world’s gold (one of South Africa’s greatest
diplomatic strengths on the international scene) and the Katanga-Copperbelt of Congo-Kinshasa and Zambia. It has been estimated that not more than ten countries in tropical Africa exceed the world average in mineral output per capita; (highest, in approximate order are South-West Africa, Zambia, South Africa, Congo-Kinshasa, Swaziland, Rhodesia, Ghana, Morocco).

In addition to copper and gold, Africa is also fairly rich in iron ore (South Africa, Rhodesia, the three Maghrib states, Sierra Leone, and huge new deposits in Liberia, Mauritania and Guinea--the latter containing the world's largest known deposit of lateritic iron ore). But in tropical Africa, iron deposits are not found near high-grade coal, thus hindering the growth of an iron and steel industry, at present levels of technology. Other important minerals include diamonds (the vast majority of the world's industrial as well as gem diamonds come primarily from Congo-Kinshasa, South Africa, Ghana and Sierra Leone); bauxite (from Guinea and Ghana, where it is playing a major role in stimulating local hydroelectric and industrial development, although neither is yet a major world producer); cobalt (over 50% of the world's total from Congo-Kinshasa, while Zambia and Morocco also are among the highest in the world); manganese (South Africa, Ghana, Morocco and Congo-Kinshasa are among the top ten producers); vanadium (South-West and South Africa rank behind only the United States); chrome ore (South Africa and Rhodesia rank among the top four in the world); tin (Congo-Kinshasa and Nigeria together account for 10% of world production); antimony (Algeria and Morocco), and asbestos (Rhodesia, Swaziland, and South
Africa are among the six largest producers). In short, most mineral resources necessary for economic development are available, although unequally distributed among the African states.

3. Agricultural Resources

Africa's soil, although rich in minerals, is generally thin and not very fertile. Most of the rainforest and savanna soils are heavily leached latosols, markedly deficient in many soil nutrients and, especially when cleared of vegetation, very low in organic matter. Throughout much of Africa, the traditional response to this low fertility has been a pattern of shifting cultivation, in which patches of ground are cleared, cultivated for a limited number of years, and then left fallow to regain fertility. This system, although highly adaptive to the tropical environment (given low levels of technology), can rapidly exhaust soils and lead to extensive soil erosion, especially when population density is increased. In addition to improved farming techniques, the two most frequently mentioned aids to Africa's soil problems have been the use of chemical fertilizers and the wider introduction of mixed farming. Both have enormous potential, but face major problems--due to the intrinsic difficulties in the use of fertilizers in a tropical environment (e.g. washing away), their high costs, and the enormous barrier to mixed farming arising from the prevalence of the tsetse fly. The latter is indicative of how closely intertwined are many of Africa's problems: soil fertility can be improved with the application of animal manure, but the tsetse fly must be eradicated for animals to survive.
Many consider the climate of Africa to be the greatest influence in retarding economic growth. About 60% of Africa is steppe or desert, with low and unreliable rainfall. Another third, at least (most of tropical Africa), is savanna, with its distinctive dry season and, more important, unreliability and inconsistency of rainfall. Excessively wet years often follow years in which drought prevailed. One can understand the importance placed on water-control schemes in Africa, both large scale (Gezira-Managil in Sudan, Office du Niger in Mali) and small scale (small dams, wells and reservoirs). Hance (1967) concludes that only 12-15% of tropical Africa has a climate which, under present techniques, is suitable for agriculture—although this amounts to about 1/3 the area of the United States.

4. Physical Impediments to Development

The resource situation is such that, although certain favorably endowed "islands" exist, Africa as a whole is beset by many physical problems. Listing them briefly, they include the following: (1) lack of energy and mineral resources in many areas (especially East Africa); (2) the large areas of poor soils and vegetation (the best usually consist of areas of volcanic and alluvial soils, which are relatively limited); (3) widespread climatic handicaps, particularly inadequate and unreliable rainfall; (4) poor physical accessibility to the interior, due to the huge size of Africa, the frequency of rapids and waterfalls on rivers near the coast, and the small number of good natural harbors and inlets; (5) the prevalence of pests and disease-bearing organisms affecting both animals and man.

All of these impediments, however, do not form impenetrable barriers to
development. Modern science and technology—disease control, irrigation and hydroelectric schemes, improved fertilizers, better transport, more detailed resource surveys—have already produced promising results. Given the rapidly increasing mineral inventory, the enormous scope for improving the generally low yields of agricultural crops, the potentials for mixed farming and the expansion of cultivated land, many if not most of these problems can be reduced significantly in the future—providing that social, economic and political developments keep pace with technological progress and economic growth keeps in advance of the growth of population.

#63. Planning for Development

Development planning is a critical issue in contemporary Africa, where the absolute standard living is low and where an increasing rate of economic improvement is probably necessary for states to survive in the modern world. As RIVKIN suggests, there is controversy between experts as to the best types of development plans for given circumstances, yet, "there can be little question that the formulation of a correlated and realistic series of development goals, priorities, policies, and approaches is urgently required."

1. The Nature of Development Plans

A development plan is a comprehensive blueprint outlining policy and co-ordinating the allocation of investment over a given time period so as to achieve broad socio-economic objectives. Most development plans are
national because of the budget implications; yet regional plans also exist. At one extreme, a "perspective" plan sketches goals to be pursued over a 15-20 year period. In contrast, a short term plan usually assumes the form of a capital budget of expenditures for perhaps one year. In between are medium term plans, usually 3-5 years, which indicate planned policy more specifically than perspective plans but do not necessarily commit expenditure.

According to the West Indian economist, W. A. Lewis, (1966), who has worked extensively in Africa, an idealized plan generally includes the following types of information: (1) a survey of current economic conditions (e.g., national income, productivity, foreign trade and trends in each major sector); (2) a survey of the current social situation (population changes, education, health, housing, and social security); (3) an evaluation of progress under the preceding plan; (4) a statement of the general objectives of social and economic policy; (5) estimates of targets for each sector during the plan period; (6) suggested measures for increasing the rate of economic growth (e.g., measures to stimulate saving and investment, to increase productivity, and to improve the institutional framework of economic activity--such as land reform or reorganization of the labor market); (7) a program of government expenditures (capital and recurrent).

Development plans can vary widely in the nature of their objectives. Some countries may elect to consume more now and allocate less to capital formation. Others may chose short-run sacrifices to gain future benefits. No one choice is "better" than the other since value decisions are involved. Plans also differ in that they reflect different resource endowments. One
would expect provision for cocoa production in a Chanaian plan but not one for Botswana. Another difference involves the relative importance of the public, as distinct from the private sectors in each country, although this may in itself be a result of planning.

2. Formulation, Implementation and Revision

One of the major problems in formulating plans is the inadequacy of statistical data upon which to base projected targets. Data collection has been given high priority in most African countries and the amounts of data available are increasing rapidly each year. Before the plan is formulated, the various separate ministries collect and submit base data and request specific considerations in the plan. At implementation, the support of the leading decision-makers and ministries is required. In addition, the planning ministry must have authority over the other ministries to ensure that the crucial decisions are taken. Lack of support from other ministries and the lack of authority of the planning ministry has frequently been a major cause of failure in development plans.

Even with the full support of the various government branches involved, the plan is usually never completely on target since it is virtually impossible to forecast precisely the reactions of the various sectors to the autonomous and induced changes in the plan. One obvious reason is that negative rather than positive control is most often exerted over the private sector. For example, the plan can state where the private sector is not to invest (very clear outlines of this are given by the Tanzanian government), but can at best can only encourage investment in areas the planners consider
favorable. Often the plan may appear unrealistic—sometimes deliberately to prevent internal tension or to attract greater foreign investment.

The value (symbolic and real) of plans will clearly decline unless they are systematically revised and made more realistic. Revision is customarily done on an annual basis.

3. Central Issues in Development Planning

a. Agriculture vs. Industry: One group of development experts emphasize the central importance of industrialization and the related importance of supra-national economic cooperation between regional groups of developing countries. This group maintains that in the long run the terms of trade are turning against primary producers and that primary production additionally involves market instability. The problems are made still more acute if, as is the case with many African countries, there is a dependence on one or a few commodity exports. Traditional economic doctrine, however, drawing on the principle of "comparative advantage" suggests that African countries should concentrate on the production of those commodities for which their resources are best suited. There appears to be an increasing concentration on agriculture in the more recent African development plans, partly as a result of unsuccessful industrialization schemes. At the same time, however, the plans reveal continuing efforts at diversification and the importance of large industrial schemes such as the Volta River Project (Ghana) which often prove most attractive to foreign investment.

b. "Permissive" vs. Direct Investment: Planners recognize the need to consider social as well as private benefits from investment—investments
in what is called social and economic overhead (education, health, welfare, infrastructure) which does not produce directly and immediately measurable economic benefits. But some planners criticize the emphasis placed on such "permissive" investment (for example, infrastructural elements such as roads or telephones) which are safe for governments since their effectiveness cannot be easily measured and they cannot be easily criticized. Nevertheless, transportation is considered by others one of the key factors in promoting development, and infrastructural investment remains the largest sector for investment in most development plans. This issue as well as others (e.g., the mobilization of domestic resources) are discussed further in RIVKIN.

4. Conclusions

Most of the major issues in development planning do not have purely technical answers, since social values, and a host of unpredictable factors are involved. The nature of African planning may well be described as experimental and formative. It is necessarily so because of peculiarly local conditions and the limited transferability of conventional monetary and fiscal techniques to economies with low monetization. Planning lacks the precision it has attained in Europe and is further complicated by political aspects of nation-building which may, on the surface, appear to the westerner to be economically non-rational.
#64. Development of Economic Systems

The preceding two lectures and several in Part III (#47-48-49) clearly illustrate the enormous challenges and problems involved in African economic development. In this lecture an attempt will be made to examine certain historical aspects of African economic development and to assess the relationship of economic development to nation-building. A discussion of social and demographic constraints in economic systems development will follow in lecture #65, while the prospects for regional economic union, a key factor in the future of African development, will be covered in lecture #70.

1. The Colonial Inheritance

Given the problems involved in restructuring the colonial economy, it is not surprising that independence did not bring about increased rates of development for most African countries. Working with the generally low levels of productivity which characterized traditional economic systems in Africa, the colonial powers constructed new systems geared primarily to European needs. Although some efforts were made in health, education, transport development and the introduction of monetary economy, the major goal was to make each colony self-supporting and to protect and encourage metropolitan investment. Thus colonial economies became geared to the export of primary commodities (agricultural and mineral) and consequently subject to the vagaries of world (or metropolitan) market prices for these goods when not protected by preferential price "supports" by the colonial power.
Little inter-territorial trade developed and the entire infrastructure (i.e., the underlying foundation of education, transport, administrative organization, etc., upon which the economy is built) evolved as a means of maintaining internal peace and serving the external orientation of the economy. Most of the major transport routes, for example, were corridors to the coast and siphons for export commodities. There was very little local processing of produce or minerals and many situations developed in which a product such as sisal would be exported only to be imported at higher prices in the form of rope or sacking.

The general result of colonial economic policy was the creation of dual economies, in which a skeleton of modern technology and organization was superimposed on a base which remained little changed and subsistence-oriented. Development in the post-colonial period has been powerfully shaped by this legacy of dualism and directed toward inducing changes which could bring about a more effective integration of the various economic systems.

2. Contending with Economic Dualism and Regional Inequalities

In some African economies, there has been "growth without development," or an increase in real per capita income without concomitant changes in the underlying political, social and institutional framework. An example is the case of Liberia (see Clower et al, 1966), where rubber and iron ore production have increased rapidly in recent years, as has the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), but the impact of this growth has been restricted to a small sector of the area and population of the country and has not brought about major changes in the economic system. In essence, this
represents a continuation of the dual economy and is likely to be unfavorable to improved standards of living in the long run.

In those economies where significant development has occurred, the economic system has evolved and become more specialized, functionally differentiated and interdependent. Concurrently there have been the beginnings of a shift from resource-based to market-oriented activity, with secondary processing and import substitution. But even in these cases, the dual structure of the economy and regional inequalities of income have often become further intensified.

Classical economic theory assumes that regional inequalities in an economy will not persist given the assumption of free factor flows within a country. (Note: factors of production include capital, labor, raw material, and management.) In reality, however, there has been a tendency for economic inequalities (within developing countries as well as between the developing and developed world) to increase. Some economists feel that the reasons for this lie primarily in the dynamics of spatial interaction between "mature" and "immature" regions. The former generally consist of major urban centers and hinterlands. Given an initial surge of development, the "mature" regions attract flows of labor, capital, and commodities from surrounding areas, which, consequently, suffer from what Myrdal calls "backwash" effects. This initiates a cycle of cumulative causation, in Myrdal's terms, which worsens the situation by further widening the inequalities or "gap". At the same time, however, expansionary momentum from the growth of the city (or region) may produce "spread" effects on nearby areas.
favoring development. Should this outweigh the backwash effects, the cycle may be reversed.

In Africa, the major existing centers of wealth (e.g., the large "primate" cities) are generally growing more rapidly than the rural areas, thus making the dualism more pronounced. This is viewed with concern by most African leaders because of their commitment to the political and economic integration of the entire nation-state and their desire to involve the whole population in the challenge of development. Attempts have been made in several countries (e.g., Kenya, Nigeria) to encourage people to move back to the farming areas from the big cities. Special tax benefits and other privileges are offered private investors if they chose to locate a factory in a small town rather than the capital city. Large scale projects, such as the creation of cooperative village schemes in Tanzania and the extensive resettlement projects in the former "White Highlands" of Kenya (the former European farming area now being settled by African smallholders), are aimed directly at erasing many of the structural and regional inequalities produced during the colonial period. In practice, however, it has been found very difficult to reverse the cycle of cumulative causation—to counteract the backwash effects—once the cycle has started. Complicating the problem still further is the fact that the process of evening off development by reducing regional inequalities is costly, often involving much social and economic overhead investment in education and infrastructure. Equalizing development within a country may actually slow down the rate of development in the short run; conversely, working with the existing structure may produce more rapid immediate gains in national income.
3. Achievement and Prospects

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is not really a satisfactory measure of the growth of economic systems, since it may represent "growth without development" and does not indicate internal regional variance. Yet it is a useful indication of the actual level of production within a country, and RIVKIN suggests comparisons between the African states may be based on this criterion.

In 1960, the only tropical African countries which had a GNP per capita of over $200 were Senegal, Ghana, Gabon, and Southern Rhodesia. Since 1960 only Gabon has continued to grow rapidly and uninterruptedly. By 1965 (see RIVKIN), the list of African states with GNP per capita over $200 came to include also Zambia and the Ivory Coast (as well as South Africa, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya). Liberia and Swaziland were added by 1966, with significant growth also taking place in Angola, Cameroon, Ethiopia, the Malagasy Republic, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nigeria (before the civil war), Sudan, Kenya, and Uganda. Although $200 GNP per capita is not a large figure, the growing list of countries in this category suggests that progress has been made.

It is probably too early to evaluate effectively the growth of the economic systems in African countries since independence. While there is probably little basis for unbridled optimism, it is unnecessarily pessimistic to conclude with René Dumont that "Africa has gotten off to a bad start."
Population Pressure and Social Factors in Development

Development throughout the world has been a process in which economic, political and social factors have been closely intertwined. Indeed, Adelman and Morris (1967) associate national modernization with "the progressive differentiation of the social, economic, and political spheres from each other and the development of specialized institutions and attitudes within each sphere." One of the key characteristics of underdevelopment in Africa, therefore, is the degree to which the economic sphere is not differentiated from the matrix of social and political organization, both traditional and modern. Political aspects of economic development, and vice versa, have already been mentioned indirectly in the lectures on national integration (#54-55-56) and considerable attention is given to the subject by RIVKIN.

In this lecture, we focus on two additional factors of national development: demographic patterns, and socio-cultural change.

1. Is Africa Overpopulated?

This question is discussed briefly in SOJA/PADEN, with the general conclusion that although over-all densities tend to be fairly low for most of Africa, there are many pockets of extremely high densities. Hence, population pressure of some kind exists in roughly 47% of the area of Africa and for about 45% of its population. (See Hace, 1968). One must add to this the fact that the African population is growing at one of the highest rates in the world (again varying from area to area). Simple arithmetic would illustrate that economic growth must keep pace with this high rate of
population growth just to maintain the same level of per capita income. Unfortunately, arithmetic growth is not relevant, since economists estimate that countries whose populations are growing at 2% per year will need a rate of economic growth appreciably more than 2% (perhaps over two or three times that figure in some cases). This puts the question of "population explosion" in a different light with regard to its potential impact on national development. High rates of economic growth may have little impact on individual citizens if population growth is very high. The answer to this problem does not lie simply with curbing the growth of population (in some countries this is not only unnecessary but possibly could hinder development). What it does require is close attention to demographic characteristics in economic planning. They must be considered intrinsic parts of all development plans.

2. Sociocultural Elements in the Development Process

From Karl Marx to Talcott Parsons, social scientists have long recognized the importance of changes in social organization and values in economic growth. Only recently, however, have "non-economic" factors received prominent attention by theorists and planners in development economics. Many of these factors are included in the quantitative analysis of Adelman and Morris (1967). The remainder of this lecture will examine some of the variables used in that study and will assess the relevance of such variables in the growth of economic systems in Africa.

a. Character of Basic Social Organization: Economic development has usually been associated with changes in family structure growing out of
increased differentiation and specialization within society. One example of this is the greater emphasis on the nuclear family and/or individual as the basic unit of social organization in modern society. When family ties and obligations extend more widely, as they do in much of Africa, the economically successful individual is often obliged to distribute his wealth to a large number of family members, thus discouraging capital formation and encouraging consumption. The emergence of the nuclear family is thought to aid development by more closely linking individual effort and rewards, encouraging achievement motivation, placing more emphasis on merit rather than traditional status in the allocation of roles in society, and perhaps even facilitating family planning. It should be noted, however, that the cross-cultural basis of these generalizations have not yet been fully explored.

b. Extent of Social Mobility: Like many social variables, the key aspect here is attitudinal. Individual attainment, innovation, and entrepreneurship may be promoted if increase in social status is commensurate with increase in economic status. Also mobilization for economic development will occur in more depth if opportunities to obtain skills and education are open to all classes. A somewhat related variable is the opportunity for adult literacy and general availability of education (see lecture #40). Africa, in general, has not had the major problems arising from rigidly structured traditional hierarchies of status (epitomized perhaps in the caste system of India). Educational and economic achievement have tended to be more clearly recognized and rewarded than in many other
developing areas. Because of low levels of educational development, however, most African countries still rank low on this variable.

c. Degree of Cultural and Ethnic Homogeneity: The early stages of development nearly always tend to accentuate cultural and ethnic differences. Old orders are disrupted without the implantation of alternative, tightly integrated forms of social, economic, and political organization. Thus it is reasonable to assume that cultural and ethnic heterogeneity on the national level is likely to hinder development. Many African countries are among the most heterogenous in the world (e.g., Nigeria, Kenya, Cameroon). Others, however, are relatively homogeneous (Libya, Tunisia, U.A.R., Somalia). While homogeneity does not insure development (and in several cases is only symptomatic of small scale organization), it clearly facilitates social cooperation.

d. Degree of Social Tension: Change is almost by definition disruptive. It is still not clear, however, whether the strains and conflicts of change slow down development or actually become important mechanisms for more rapid transformation. (This view has already been mentioned in the introduction to the ESSAYS with respect to political instability.) Although more study is needed, it is likely that a certain amount of social tension and instability is functional to the growth of economic systems in the early stages of development.

e. Modernization of Outlook: We have already mentioned the importance of attitudes and values in the development process. This variable refers more specifically to the degree to which attitudes and values favorable to innovation and change exist within both the mass and the elite, and in both cases the sense of participation in the ongoing process of development.
This participatory dimension is associated by Daniel Lerner (1958) with a kind of "psychic mobility", a feeling of identity with and importance in the major changes taking place. The difficulty in measuring such attitudes, however, is representative of the problem of obtaining statistical or "concrete" indicators of development as well as the inter-disciplinary nature of problems involved in the study of economic development and nation-building.

3. Conclusions

This brief examination of demographic and sociocultural factors in the growth of economic systems is in many ways an extension of earlier discussions on the "Processes of Social Change." Yet the problems of national and/or regional economic development also telescope into the broader question of Africa's role in the modern world. The problems of African economic development, whatever their magnitude, cannot be ignored by the developed countries, for the international linkages of all national economies are such that problems in one area may affect all parts of the world. The international dimension of economic systems development will be discussed in more detail in Part V.

#66. Legal Systems in Africa

Legal systems are the codes of conduct which societies enforce upon their own members for the resolution of conflict, and the maintenance of
"justice". Such systems may be written or unwritten. In any case, legal codes may range from those where broad general principles form the framework of law, to those in which specific precedents form the corpus of law. In the African context, there has been an overlay of legal systems: colonial legal systems were often superimposed over the existing traditional systems. These traditional systems were either of the Islamic variety (called "Shari'a law") or were peculiar to each ethnic society. This latter type is called "customary law".

1. The Role of Customary Law

Customary law in ethnic societies was usually unwritten. Each society had its own way of resolving conflict. Some scholars (Allott, 1966: 433) note that in less complex segmental societies, such as the Kikuyu of Kenya, or the Ibo of Nigeria, there was frequently an informal judicial structure with emphasis on the role of third party arbitration. Also, there was more emphasis on civil wrongs than criminal wrongs. This is in contrast to those societies like the Hausa-Fulani emirates which were centralized, some of which had well developed judicial systems and a full elaboration of types of criminal offences and punishments.

Customary law has been modified everywhere, but it may have greater force in those areas of British colonization where rule was indirect (e.g. Nigeria, Uganda) rather than direct (e.g. Kenya). In most cases, criminal law was fundamentally modified even though civil law might be relatively unchanged. In the French and Portuguese-controlled areas customary criminal law was not recognized at all. The trend everywhere is to encourage criminal
law in written code form. Customary social law is particularly important in the area of family law and property law, for throughout Africa (in both British and French areas) the customary ways of dividing inheritance and regulating marriage and divorce, and allocating land continued into the post-colonial period. One of the major tasks of the independent African governments is deciding the place of customary law in an integrated legal system.

2. Islamic Law

As mentioned in the lecture on Islam, most Islamic law in black Africa follows the Maliki school. This school is based on the writings (called the Muwatta) of a scholar named Malik Ibn Anas who lived in Arabia shortly after the time of the Prophet Muhammad. Two major works have subsequently been added to the category of primary sources: the Risala of Ibn Abi Zayd Al-Qayrawani and the Mukhtasar of Sidi Khalil. These works cite precedents which are felt to be applicable to judicial decisions.

The major source of Islamic law, however, is the Quran itself. Certain things are recommended or prohibited in the Koran and have the force of law. Another source of Islamic law in Africa is the hadith, or reports about the decisions and statements of the Prophet Muhammad, and how he adjudicated particular situations.

Islamic law, in essence, divides all human behavior into five categories: prohibited, discouraged, neutral, recommended, and required. It has been applied in many parts of Sudanic West Africa in a very legalistic manner. Thus, drinking of alcohol or eating of pork, or collection of
Of equal importance to the substance of Islamic law in black Africa are the procedural requirements and the judicial structure. Thus, for example, procedure requires that the evidence of a Muslim witness be weighted much more than the evidence of a non-Muslim, and that of a man, more than that of a woman. Elaborate judicial structures, often based on dynastic succession within learned families, were established in the larger Islamic state systems. Even in the small forest towns, a learned man was usually available to arbitrate cases.

Anderson (1954) has described the variations within Islamic law in Africa and particularly its relationship to the colonial system and social change. One of the important problems within contemporary Islamic law is how to interpret new types of behavior and action. Some conservative Muslims maintain that all innovation is bad, while the reformist Muslims argue that the consequences of decisions should be considered.

3. European Law in Africa

There have been three major European legal systems in Africa: common law, civil law, and Dutch-Roman law. The common law area includes most of the British areas. Such common law refers to principles of jurisprudence and doctrines of equity which have developed over the centuries in England.

The civil law areas included the French areas, plus those of Belgium,
Portugal and Spain. Such law was based on the codification which emerged in Europe during the time of Napoleon. It is usually regarded as more legalistic and detailed in statutory scope than common law.

The Roman-Dutch areas include the Republic of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland.

European law in Africa was established during the colonial period but has served as the base for legislative codes in the post-colonial era. ROLAND YOUNG documents some of the areas of European law, or "received law", in Africa which most often conflict with customary or Islamic law (e.g. land law, criminal law). However, many areas of European law deal with "modern sector" behavior and hence are not likely to come into direct conflict with customary or Islamic law. Corporate law is perhaps such an example.

One of the major problems in the post-colonial periods has been to consolidate the various legal systems which exist within a country into a single system. In many African states, Islamic law and customary law have been continued in certain categories, such as family disputes. The next lecture will deal more specifically with problems of legal integration and conflict-of-law in Africa.

#67. The Integration of Legal Systems

The supremacy of national legislation is the prerequisite of a sovereign unitary state. In a federal system, local law may have equal
status, but it is essential that the relationship between national and local legal jurisdictions be well demarcated. If in some areas of action, "law is the command of the sovereign" (i.e. positive law), then law will play an important role in the transformation of African societies and in the consolidation of nation-states. In this process, there has been a major effort to consolidate and integrate the various legal systems, traditional and modern, into a single national legal system.

1. The Process of Legal Integration

The three main aspects of legal integration deal with structure, values, and personnel. In many African states prior to independence, there co-existed two or three different legal structures within the state. In states such as Guinea, Kenya, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Somali and Sudan there existed a separate Islamic legal structure, which in fact, carried over into the post-colonial period. In Ethiopia, there was a separate religious legal structure based on Coptic (Christian) law. Problems arise when a plaintiff could use one legal structure, and a defendant use another. That is, in a situation where the consolidation of nation-states leads to inter-ethnic and inter-religious contact there is a greater need for a unified judicial structure for conflict resolution, and for the rules on conflict-of-law.

The two major ways in which structural integration may occur are the creation of a single set of courts or the linkage at the appeals level of the various legal systems. Thus, courts of appeal would be able to decide issues of appropriate jurisdiction, procedure, and substance.
States may be reluctant to abolish existing legal structures (either customary or Islamic) even if it were politically possible, if they are meeting the needs of the people and if the people are fully supportive of the traditional legal structures. In cases where the state does try to abolish such traditional structures, arbitration may occur outside the formal legal system. That is, people will go to learned men for legal decisions in local disputes. This informal law is an interesting social phenomena in contemporary Africa.

With regard to the integration of legal values or concepts of jurisprudence, a more difficult problem exists. People are usually socialized slowly over time into new value systems. Beliefs and values regarding family life are particularly impermeable to change. Thus, a new state such as Ivory Coast may outlaw plural marriage, but it is difficult to enforce this set of values in the face of widespread acceptance of the idea of plural marriage. As a means of dealing with such a problem, the government of Ivory Coast has said that the law does not apply ex post facto to existing plural marriages but will apply to future marriages. Since marriage laws affect inheritance settlements (e.g. legal heirs will include only those of a legal marriage; the children of second and third wives would be cut off without any inheritance,) it may take considerable time before the full impact of these marriage laws is felt.

2. The Integration of Legal Personnel

The two major professional roles in any modern legal system are those of judge and lawyer. One key to legal integration in the new states is to train young judges and lawyers who are familiar with both European law and
with traditional law. African states have increasingly come to establish their own law schools, although many law students continue to receive their specialized training in France, England and the United States. Because of the rapid changes in African national law, however, there is an increasing tendency for African states to require a short training period at the local law schools after a student has returned from abroad.

In cases where the Islamic legal structure is regarded as legitimate in the national context, there is an effort to train young Islamic scholars in the more modern versions of Islamic law. In London, there are advanced courses in Islamic law, and also many African students attend universities in Arabic-speaking countries, such as the U.A.R.

A major obstacle in the process of legal integration is the lack of trained personnel. In countries such as Nigeria and Ghana there are third and fourth generation African lawyers. In other countries, there are almost no lawyers at all. By 1965, according to Peasley (1965) the states with the most lawyers (in absolute, not per capita terms) in sub-Saharan Africa included Ethiopia (1,967) and Nigeria (1,600), with a major gap then to the country with the third largest number: Ghana (400), Kenya, Liberia, Sudan and Tanzania all had over one hundred practicing lawyers, but a number of states, such as Rwanda, Dahomey, Mali, Togo, Gabon, Guinea and Upper Volta each had less than ten indigenous lawyers. While these figures have increased substantially in the past five years, they are still indicative of the shortage of trained legal personnel.

A number of American universities, such as Syracuse, Columbia, Yale
and Northwestern, have initiated programs whereby young American lawyers can work in Africa, on a one or two year basis, to help meet the needs for legal personnel. (The "African Legal Center" does most of the recruiting.) Other countries are also assisting.

3. Variations on Legal Integration: The Northern Nigeria Example

Northern Nigeria was ruled indirectly by the British from 1900 until 1960. During most of this period they allowed the Islamic legal structure to service the needs of most of the north. In non-Islamic areas, as well, customary legal structures were elaborated into "native courts". In cases where a plaintiff or defendant wanted to subject himself to British law, the British "Resident" served as magistrate. Only in 1959, did a Panel of Jurists examine the situation in Northern Nigeria and recommend a unified legal system. Thus, Islamic law, with the exception of family law, became a matter of civil legislation (based largely on the Sudan legal code.) The Islamic legal structure was retained in matters of family law, with a separate Shari'a Court of Appeals. A defendant could "opt out" of an Islamic legal structure into the northern regional legal structure. A number of problems arose from this dualism including the status of non-Northern Nigerians in the northern legal system.

Those problems were not resolved when the military took over the government in January 1966 and again (a counter-coup) in July 1966. Since that time the military government has divided the North into six separate states and put all legal personnel (including Islamic legal experts) on a civil service basis. The exact status of legal systems within the particular
states of Nigeria will remain undecided until a national constitution is adopted.

4. Conclusions

There are many case studies of legal unification in Africa which illuminate the problems involved and also many of the creative approaches to solving these problems. Senegal and Tanzania have both been particularly innovative in this area. (For references see BIBLIOGRAPHY.)

#68. The Development of Constitutional Law

The history of constitutional development in Africa has been mentioned in the lectures on colonialism and independence. Briefly, in the French-speaking areas there were three distinct relevant constitutional documents prior to independence: the Fourth French Republic Constitution of 1946, the Loi-Cadre Reforms of 1956, and the Fifth French Republic Constitution of October 4, 1958. (Only Guinea, which rejected this constitution became technically independent. The other states were part of the Franco-African Community until 1960.)

In the British areas, each state varied: in West Africa there were two or three different constitutions prior to independence. In East Africa, there were earlier provisions for legislative councils, but only one formal "independence" constitution. In all British cases, the constitutional debates took place in London, and included Colonial Office officials and
representatives of major political groups within the particular African state in question. (Note: the debates over the Central African Federation in 1953 were not fully representative.) Since independence, there have been a number of modifications in African constitutions, (e.g. the Nkrumah Constitution) including the current pattern of constitutional review which is occurring under most military regimes.

1. Characteristics of Independence Constitutions

The states of French-speaking Africa had almost identical constitutions, (see Lavoff and Persir, 1961, for comments and texts.) In almost every case they described themselves as democratic and secular. All had an initial section on human rights. Most of the regimes followed a presidential model, as discussed in lecture #59. Constitutions were divided into sections, with a series of articles in each section.

These sections may be summarized below in prototypical form:

(1) Section One: matters of state sovereignty, such as the symbols of sovereignty (national emblem and anthem), official language(s), the designation of a capital city, and the guarantee of universal suffrage; (2) Section Two: description of the duties of the President of the Republic; (3) Section Three: discussion of the national assembly; (4) Section Four: details of the relationship between the government and the assembly; (5) Section Five: aspects of international treaties; (6) Section Six: scope of the supreme court; (7) Section Seven: spheres of judicial authority; (8) Section Eight: powers of the High Court of Justice (consisting, in most cases, of deputies from the assembly who have the power to judge members of
government for derelict of duty); (9) Section Nine: nature of the Economic and Social Council; (10) Section Ten: role sub-national collectivities; (11) Section Eleven: relations with other sovereign states; (12) Section Twelve: procedures for revision of the constitution (usually as follows: "at the initiative of the President or the members of the national assembly ... an amendment may be presented to three-quarters of the members of the assembly and must be approved by a majority; it is then submitted to the country in the form of a referendum ... "); (13) Section Thirteen: general matters. In most cases, the independence constitutions of the French-speaking areas were short: about ten pages in length.

By contrast, the British-area constitutions of independence were usually long and complex. The Nigerian Constitution of 1960 is over 150 pages, although this includes each of the regional constitutions which were included as part of the national constitution. The constitution of the federal state of Nigeria was divided into chapters, which in turn were divided into sections. These chapters are summarized below in general terms: (1) Chapter One: the federation and its territories; (2) Chapter Two: eligibility for citizenship; (3) Chapter Three: "fundamental rights" of citizens; (4) Chapter Four: duties of the governor-general (later, the office of the president, when Nigeria became a republic); (5) Chapter Five: role of parliament (composition, procedure, legislative powers); (6) Chapter Six: executive powers; (7) Chapter Seven: role of police; (8) Chapter Eight: role of courts; (9) Chapter Nine: finances; (10) Chapter Ten: role of civil service; (11) Chapter Eleven: miscellaneous powers.
procedures for amendment were difficult and complex, including the requirement that a majority of the regional legislatures consent.

Part of the initial constitutional complexity of Nigeria and other British areas, (especially Kenya and Uganda) was that the internal relations between regions and/or ethnic groups was a matter of more explicit constitutional concern than in the French-speaking areas. Hence a fuller set of "civil liberties" were elaborated and a more detailed delineation of local government prerogatives was established.

2. Constitutional Conflict and Crisis

The military coups, as described in lecture #61, usually reflected some constitutional crisis. Military coups, however, had one of three different types of effect:

a) they perpetuated the basic constitutional patterns but replaced the incumbent leaders (as in many of the smaller French-speaking states);

b) they fundamentally changed the nature of the constitution regime (as in Ghana);

c) they established constitution review commissions which left open the question as to which type of government would be recommended (as in Nigeria).

Constitutional crises or abuses are always a matter of perception and interpretation. In the case of Nigeria, a major crisis developed in December 1964, after the federal elections, as to whether the President (Azikiwe) or the Prime Minister (Balewa) had certain decision-making powers. In Uganda a similar dispute occurred which resulted in the Prime Minister (Obote) suspending the constitution and deposing the Kabaka of Buganda (then President).
In Ghana, President Nkrumah proposed, and had ratified, an entirely new constitution, which essentially gave the CPP leadership complete powers over all aspects of the state. In Kenya, greater centralization was imposed by amendment. By 1965, most of the French-speaking states had modified their 1960 constitutions in a number of important ways (see lecture #59).

It is of considerable importance in considering constitutional crisis to inquire about the role of the supreme courts. It will be noted that there is no reference to "judicial review" in the United States Constitution, yet by precedent this has become the guiding doctrine granting the court powers to review the enactments and behavior of the legislative and the executive branches. In Africa, the issues which divided states internally were so fundamental that the supreme courts became very cautious about asserting themselves as arbitrators. Both in Nkrumah's Ghana and more recently (summer 1969) in Zambia, unpopular judicial decisions have led to dismissal of judges.

3. Constitutional Review under Military Regimes

In most states under military rule, the main corpus of laws on the statute books continued to be enforced by the civilian courts. In a few areas, martial law was declared, but in general the military left the day-to-day legal issues to the courts.

What is of concern to the military regimes are the fundamental processes by which laws would be enacted, i.e. with the nature of the decision-making process. In both Nigeria and Ghana constitutional review commissions were established by the military. Under General Ironsi in Nigeria, a
unitary form of government was proposed. It was in partial reaction to this plan for centralized control that the counter-coup occurred with its stress on a return to federalism. Volumes of literature, both legalistic and political, have come out of the subsequent period. Chief Obafemi Awolowo combines both in his book *The People's Republic* in which he proposes a particular type of federalism—one based on linguistic groups.

In Ghana, a constitution has been drafted and elections were held in August 1969. A number of political parties were formed to contest the election, but two major parties emerged. The success of the Progress Party, under Dr. Kofi Busia, has resulted in the military regime (i.e. The National Liberation Council) turning over power to this newly elected civilian regime, but with a three year extension of certain reserved powers for the military. It is likely that in the future other African states will explicitly incorporate the role of the military into constitutional law.

In conclusion, the growth of constitutional law in Africa has reflected the full range of economic, political and social problems discussed earlier. The extent to which integrated legal systems will emerge is clearly dependent on the resolution of fundamental issues of constitutional law.

#69. Concepts of Supranationalism

As noted in PADEN, certain pre-independence concepts of nationalism encompassed units which were larger than the national state boundaries deriving from the colonial period. They included concepts of
Eur-Africanism, Marxism-socialism, negritude, Pan-Africanism, Third Worldism and African regionalism. The next four lectures will deal with the question of broader African contexts in relation to issues of nation-building and will provide a bridge to the discussions of African international relations covered in Part V.

1. The Rise of National Self-interest

As many of those who worked hardest to create supranational communities in Africa had feared, independence ushered in a period of inward-lookingness, a period in which the territorial boundaries inherited from the colonial era became even more formidable barriers to inter-territorial cooperation. The problems of nation-building proved so challenging and all-involving that little energy remained for the building of interstate linkages. Perhaps the most important single illustration of this development was the failure of attempts to federate East Africa (Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika—Tanzania after 1964). Contiguous and under one colonial power since World War I, the East African countries had enjoyed the benefits of territorial cooperation throughout much of the colonial period and by 1960 had already progressed far toward economic union. In 1961, the old East Africa High Commission (established in 1948) was replaced by the East African Common Services Organization, an even more powerful and independent coordinator of inter-territorial activities in transportation, communications, trade and banking. Yet in 1962, Uganda began to doubt the wisdom of larger federation, and by 1966, only a remnant of earlier inter-territorial linkages remained.

(Note: there have been recent attempts at resuscitation.)
The year 1963 marked an important turning point for supranational concepts in Africa. Pan-Africanism was revived but significantly reoriented with the establishment in 1963 of the Organization of African Unity. The OAU continued to foster the dream of continental unity, but with the clear recognition that the basic units were to be the existing states. Moreover, from 1963, it became increasingly evident that economic unions were much more likely to be successful than political federations, a realization which has come to characterize inter-state relations in Africa ever since.

2. Relationships Outside Africa

Eurafricanism (see PADEN) died a formal death with the independence of former French West and Equatorial Africa and the eventual decline of the French Community. The ideas of Eurafricanism, however, continue to be a rationale for close links with France for several countries (Ivory Coast and Gabon are perhaps the prime examples), and in some ways the non-ideological associateship of former French territories with the European Common Market (see lecture #77) is another continuation of this concept. A similar pattern has emerged for many of the former British territories—a decline in the importance of the Commonwealth as a political community accompanying the retention of close economic ties with Britain.

Many view these continued forms of Eurafrican relations as a form of neo-colonialism, a term which was not widely used until after 1960. Eurafricanism as a concept has also plunged further into disrepute for many African countries due to Portuguese support for this concept (i.e. the notion that Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea are integral parts of
Portugal and not colonies. Even South Africa has begun to speak of a similar concept as characterizing her relationships with independent Black Africa.

Marxism-socialism in Africa (see PADEN) has likewise suffered a decline. Most of the regimes materially supporting socialist ideas in Africa, such as Nkrumah's Ghana and Keita's Mali, are now gone and nearly all the military regimes which replaced them and other civilian governments have tended to be non-ideological (except perhaps the Central African Republic under Bokassa). The Simba rebellion in Congo (Kinshasa) was socialist-oriented and wished to set up a "peoples republic" centered in Stanleyville (now Kisangani), but was unsuccessful. Marxism-socialism has not disappeared, however, but has been significantly transformed and made more distinctly African under the banner of African socialism. In one form or another—and there have evolved a great variety of forms—African socialism has become official government ideology in many African countries. In some countries (such as Kenya), it refers primarily to the importance of economic planning and the recognition of traditional cultural values, without negating the importance of free enterprise, dependence on foreign aid and investment, and the need to establish various institutions of capitalist economic systems (such as a stock exchange). In other countries, such as Tanzania under Julius Nyerere, African socialism has evolved as a creative, innovative, and distinctly African philosophy of government. In addition to reducing dependence on foreign aid, Nyerere has stressed egalitarianism, the importance of hard work for everyone (including the elite), the enormous importance of agriculture as the basis for development, the social security
derived from traditional ethnic patterns, and, symbolizing all these values, the concept of "Ujamaa"--Swahili for "familyhood", a powerful sense of cooperativeness. More than any other leader in Africa, Nyerere has attempted to implement his policies of African socialism, particularly through the now famous Arusha Declaration. Detailed attention to the Declaration (which is published) would provide a fruitful classroom exercise.

The concept of third-worldism (see PADEN) has also declined rapidly in Africa after 1963 (see lecture #75). Just as national introspection diluted the efforts at Pan-Africanism, so the problems of nation-building and the establishment of the OAU weakened interest in uniting "all peoples of color, all peoples of poverty". There appears, however, to be an increased ideological interest throughout Africa in the example of Communist China and the works of Mao Tsetung are now widely available in European and vernacular languages. (For example, since 1966, Hausa versions have been readily available in all large cities throughout Northern Nigeria--reputed to be ideologically conservative--and radio Peking broadcasts regularly in Hausa.)

3. Negritude

The concept of negritude, like Euroafricanism, withered after independence, when assimilation into French civilization was no longer a major political issue in Africa. Negritude remains an important literary and cultural movement, but even Leopold Senghor, one of the major proponents of the concept, has increasingly moved away from the stress on "blackness" (as distinct from "whiteness") to a more general emphasis on African culture and its contributions to world culture.
There is the possibility, however, that a more narrowly racist emphasis on blackness could blossom with respect to black African relations with Arab Africa. There have been indications of this primarily in the extremely bloody rebellion in Sudan—the three southern black provinces fighting the predominantly Arab North. Refugees and guerrilla fighters appear to have crossed into neighboring black African states (Uganda, C.A.R., Chad), and tensions are increasing in those areas. Similar internal situations (i.e. mixed Arab and non-Arab populations) exist in fact in countries such as Chad, Central African Republic and Mauritania. In the latter country, the introduction of Arabic language as a requirement in schools and administration caused African-Arab riots in early 1966.

It is interesting to compare the rise of black nationalism and particularly black separatism in the United States with the earlier forms of negritude in Africa. In this light, it is not surprising to find that many Afro-Americans have reacted emotionally against African leaders who do not support, without qualification, global solidarity of blacks. The reaction to the speech by the late Tom Mboya in New York's Harlem in March 1969 is perhaps an example of this.

4. Conclusions

The trend toward national (as distinct from supranational) bases of political and economic cooperation in Africa has become overwhelming in the post-colonial period. The reasons for this are probably complex, but certainly include the enormous resources required to maintain and consolidate the inherited national systems, and the erosion of some of the original
rationale for such concepts as Eurafriicanism, Marxist-socialism, and negritude.

#70. Emergent Patterns of Regionalism

As previously stated, efforts at political federation in post-independence Africa have not yet been successful. The Mali Federation disintegrated, the East African Federation was never established, and the Federation of Nigeria has become embroiled in a lengthy civil war. At the same time, however, there have been some promising developments with respect to economic unions, the primary concern of this lecture.

1. The Colonial Legacy of Regionalism

The broad regional patterns which developed during the colonial period are described briefly in SOJA/PADEN and numerous case studies of colonial groupings of states (economic and political) are included in the BIBLIOGRAPHY. It is sufficient here simply to note again that many of the interterritorial linkages which developed during the colonial period—particularly with respect to shared colonial power and language—have continued to shape inter-African state relations in the post-colonial era.

2. The Rise and Fall of Political Regionalism

All that remains of both pre- and post-colonial attempts at formal political regrouping in Africa are Ethiopia (with Eritrea now formally incorporated), the Republic of Somali (consisting of former British and Italian Somalilands), Morocco (incorporating Spanish and French Morocco and
other small pieces of Spanish territory), and the ongoing federations of Cameroon (English-speaking southern Cameroun and French-speaking Cameroun), and Tanzania (Tanganyika and Zanzibar). Unwilling to surrender their newfound authority and sovereignty, challenged by overpowering internal problems, most new states of Africa appear to have set aside temporarily the task of political federation and accepted, like Western Europe, the notion that the goal of economic union must precede political federation. This, however, does not mean that political considerations are disregarded, for the task of economic union has also become a political problem. As Hazlewood (1967) notes: "'Seek ye first the Political Kingdom' may as a slogan have lost some of its popularity, but it is as well to remember that it is a precept which will continue to guide the actions of the politicians." It should also be noted that economic integration always requires some political channels of conflict resolution.

3. The Concept of Economic Union

There are various types of economic integration. Customs unions generally involve a discriminatory trading area with common import tariffs and free or preferential internal access, plus common institutions for economic coordination and planning. This represents the critical step toward full economic integration. More limited are attempts at cooperative export marketing, joint development schemes, and the joint operation and development of particular services such as transport, power, and research. Somewhere in between is cooperative planning for industrial development, usually involving a joint market and a variety of mutual agreements (e.g., to avoid duplication).
There are five major (but overlapping) arguments for such economic linkages. (1) They permit countries with small internal markets to benefit from economies of scale accruing to industries which require large markets. (2) They promote greater specialization based upon the comparative advantages of each unit for particular resources or industries. (3) They reduce vulnerability to external factors such as price fluctuations because of greater diversification. (4) They produce a larger unit potentially more powerful as a bargaining agent. (5) They attract more industries than would normally locate in the smaller units.

According to conventional economic theory, an economic union would be beneficial only if it creates new trade and not simply diverts that trade which already exists. This, however, requires well developed domestic trade and a complementarity in the economies of the potential partners--situations not commonly found in Africa. The key arguments for African economic integration revolve around the idea of larger markets and stimulus to new ventures, particularly industry. Many economists feel industrialization will be impossible without regional economic integration. Thus, contrary to conventional theory, African economic integration is usually forced to involve a diversion of trade from external sources to higher cost intra-union ones. Moreover, "infant industries" generally must be protected even when external sources are cheaper. This built-in short run inefficiency, is one of the major barriers to economic integration.

In addition to the above problems (and the whole range of political problems directly involved in integration efforts), difficulties include the
lack of well developed inter-state transport and communications networks and the vast array of operational questions involved in creating a union: what is the optimum size of the unit (it should not be too large or too small)? What is the best time for integration? (Should it wait until the benefits of national economies are reaped, such as attracting competitive foreign capital or increasing import substitution?) How can existing economic inequalities between African partners be overcome? (The latter has perhaps been the most vexing of all operational problems.) Should the poorer partners receive payment of fiscal compensation? Should special protective barriers be constructed within the union to give preference to one of its units? Should the poorer unit be made more attractive to industry?

These questions almost inevitably become political ones. It is interesting to note that one of the major reasons for the recent resurrection of the idea of economic union in East Africa has been the agreement to establish the East African Development Bank, into which Kenya deposits a greater proportion of funds than either Uganda and Tanzania but is permitted to withdraw proportionately less. It is evident that this kind of "sacrifice" is essential for the prospects of any African economic union.

4. Economic Unions in Africa

The major economic unions which have begun to emerge in Africa (full economic integration exists nowhere) include the following.

a. Common African and Malagasy Organization (OCAN): This includes Senegal, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Togo, Dahomey, Niger, Cameroon, Gabon,
Congo (B), Chad, Central African Republic, Congo (K), Rwanda, and Malagasy Republic. It was established in 1965 (formerly OAMCE), when Mauritania withdrew, and is primarily a union of French-speaking states devoted in large part to cooperative relations with the European Common Market. Senegal and Cameroon have tended to assume leadership.

b. West African Economic and Customs Union (UDEAO): This includes all of former French West Africa minus Guinea; (established 1959; new treaty 1966.) Economically dominated by Ivory Coast, which is not one of its greatest supporters. It is essentially unstable and relative ineffective.

c. Entente: This includes Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Togo, Dahomey, Niger; (formed in 1959 with just Ivory Coast and Upper Volta.) It is a fairly well developed union dominated and promoted strongly by Ivory Coast (which also maintains a poorly developed free trade area independently with Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone).

d. Central African Economic and Customs Union (UDEAC): Formed in 1966 with the addition of Cameroon to Equatorial Customs Union, which consisted of former French Equatorial Africa. It became basically defunct after Chad and C.A.R. joined the UEAC.

e. Union of Central African States (UEAC): This includes Congo (K), Chad, and C.A.R. Formed in 1968, it reflects the growing importance of Congo (K) in Central African affairs.

f. East African Community (EAC): This includes Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and was formally established in 1967, although based on much older patterns of cooperation. There is great interest in a wider union
expressed by many surrounding countries, with Zambia and perhaps Ethiopia and Somali the most likely prospective partners.

One might also add the Maghreb Union (Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco and Libya), which shows signs of increasing integration. In addition, there are a number of more specialized economic unions: (1) The West African Monetary Union (UMOA) consisting of the same members as UDEAO minus Mali and plus Togo; (2) The Central African Monetary Union (UEAC) consisting of the same members as the old UDEAC; (3) the Organization of Senegal River States (OERS) consisting of Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, and Guinea; (4) The Niger River Commission consisting of Mali, Guinea, Upper Volta, Ivory Coast, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, and Cameroon; (5) The Lake Chad Commission consisting of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon.

There has been proposed a West African Economic Community, to include all of West Africa from Senegal to Nigeria. This has not progressed much beyond a provisional treaty for a West African Iron and Steel Community, but must be considered an important focus for the future. Continent-wide organizations will be discussed in the next lecture.

### 71. Pan-Africanism and Continental Unity

In the previous lecture, patterns of economic and political integration were examined for regional groups of states. In this lecture we take a continental view and examine the growth of wider inter-state relations involving larger groups of African countries.
1. The Period of "Universality": 1957-60

During this period, there was a strong attempt, influenced largely by President Nkrumah (Ghana), to create and maintain a broadly based union of African states. The period basically begins with the founding by President Nasser (Egypt) in 1957. Its primary aim was to bring together the more radical African nationalists and to provide a basis for closer interaction between Communist powers (China and the Soviet Union were members) and the Third World.

In 1958, Nkrumah took the initiative in an attempt to establish an explicitly political organization designed to bring together all African states regardless of ideology. He convened the first Conference of Independent African States (CIAS). The CIAS had two sessions in all: one of governments and another, a year later, of political parties and trade unions. The continent-wide focus of CIAS was reflected in the fact that initially even South Africa was invited. At the first meeting, informal agreements were reached on the needs for facilitating cooperation on foreign policy matters and in the continued drive against colonialism. Yet Ghana and Guinea, upset with the pace and weakness of these early agreements, undertook a more forceful effort for African unity at the All African Peoples' Conference (AAPC) in December, 1958, at Accra. This weakened CIAS, which eventually disintegrated after it was unable to absorb effectively the new French African states and their diversity of views. An additional outgrowth of these developments was the establishment of the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa (PAFMECA) in 1958. Centered in Dar es
Salaam, PAFMECA aimed to bring together the different nationalist movements in East and Central Africa, to discuss and exchange ideas, and to act as a channel of mediation when necessary. Unlike CIAS, it lasted until 1964 by which time (expanding to include black Southern Africa as PAFMECSA), its functions had been assumed by the OAU.

2. The Period of Particularism: 1960-63

By 1960, the period of universality had ended, due in part to divergent African views over the Congo crisis and the growing mistrust of Ghana and Nkrumah. The new francophone states began their process of regrouping first with the Unione Africaine at Malgache (UAM) in 1961 (the predecessor to OAMCE and OCAM). In the same year, cross-cutting language lines, a clear ideological division emerged with the formation of the "Casablanca" (radical) and later "Monrovia" (conservative) blocs. UAM was itself ideologically based, as evidenced by the exclusion of French-speaking Guinea and Mali. Even PAFMECA was basically a regional organization rather than Pan-African. There were several attempts to bring these diverging groups together, especially after the Congo crisis began to subside temporarily. Eventually, this led, in May 1963, to the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), an important milestone in the post-colonial history of Africa.

3. Intra-African Organization Since 1963

The OAU represented a compromise between radical and conservative ideologies in Africa. There was general agreement on certain issues: membership should be open to all independent states; the functions of all
other African groupings (except purely functional regional organizations such as UAM, which re-emerged as OCAM), should be assumed by the OAU; and machinery for conflict resolution should be created." The major compromises arose between the "conservative" demands for non-interference in internal affairs, (including respect for sovereignty and existing territorial boundaries, and condemnation of subversion--essentially a powerful support for a status quo regarding internal African affairs), and the "radical" demands for international non-alignment and continued struggle against colonialism (especially with respect to southern Africa). In essence, both views were accepted. These agreements set the tone for inter-state activity in Africa for the years which followed.

Six major trends can be identified which have characterized intra-African organization since 1957 and particularly since the formation of the OAU (see Hoskyns, 1967). These include the following: (1) the abandonment of any organizational approach to federation or political union (re-enforced further with the deposition of Nkrumah), accompanied by a greater acceptance of functional cooperation for specific objectives, especially economic ones; attempts at political union--as between Tanganyika and Zanzibar--were to be left to the individual states; (2) a re-orientation away from attempts to achieve a single voice on international affairs and a stronger concern for regulating relations between member states; (3) a growing support for regional economic cooperation; (it is interesting to note that Nkrumah opposed regional groupings--he was bitterly hostile to the projected East African Federation--contending that regionalism would hinder continental
unification in much the same way that national introspection had hindered the growth of regional unity, i.e. by reinforcing existing cleavages;)

(4) a greater emphasis on the "linkage" role of governments and Heads-of-State as distinct from political parties or pressure groups; (the notion that extra-governmental organizations, including trade unions, could act as foundations of wider unification has been virtually abandoned;)

(5) a continuing lack of domination of the continent by any particular state; (Nigeria, the only state with the size, population and wealth to become a continental leader, has been beset with internal problems. Indeed, there are some who feel that disunity in Nigeria has been encouraged by other African states and by certain European powers such as France and Portugal;)

those states which have developed leadership qualities in Africa have done so primarily on the consistency of their ideologies and stability of their governments: pre-coup Ghana, Ivory Coast, Tanzania, and Ethiopia, and more recently Cameroon, Gabon and Zambia; (6) finally, and related to many of the other trends, there has been widespread agreement that the territorial boundaries inherited at independence outline the basic building blocks of continental unity and are no longer simply the artificial "scars" of colonial history.

In summary it is clear that nation-building in Africa is occurring primarily at the national state level although the continental linkages which are beginning to emerge (e.g. the O.A.U. and the economic unions) would suggest that the dream of a United States of Africa may some day be accomplished.
In this lecture, we will examine the activities of international organizations in Africa as a further aspect of inter-state linkage in Africa. Again, the stress is on suprastate regionalism and Pan-Africanism.

1. Activities of the OAU

Various specialized agencies of the Organization of African Unity have played an important part in African inter-state relations since 1963. There is a Commission on the Problem of Refugees, and other commissions concerned with economic and social affairs, education, health and nutrition, defense, research, law, transportation and communication. We will discuss in brief detail here the activities of two additional agencies, the African Liberation Committee and the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration.

a. Liberation: The Liberation Committee has had relatively little impact. More pressure was probably brought to bear on colonialism before 1963. The Committee has tried to encourage unified liberation movements and attempted to organize boycotts and sanctions against the remnants of colonialism. The most notable success has been with FRELIMO, the Mozambique Liberation Front, but lack of cooperation between independent African states has hindered support in other Portuguese areas (Guinea, Angola). The most prominent failure has been with regard to Rhodesia, but this has been due in part to the disunity of black nationalist movements in Rhodesia as well as the inability to enlist more direct support from Britain and other non-African powers. All member states have broken relations with the Republic
of South Africa and Portugal (except Malawi), but this has had very little impact.

b. Settlement of Disputes: Despite a number of important setbacks, the OAU has emerged as the major vehicle for the resolution of conflicts between African states. Even before the establishment of the special Commission in 1964, the OAU had successfully mediated in the boundary conflict between Algeria and Morocco and provided a useful channel for contact in the Ethiopia-Somali border dispute. That the North African countries chose to go to the OAU rather than the Arab League (whose offer to mediate was rejected) proved a valuable stimulus to the early growth of the OAU. In 1964, with Morocco dissenting and Somali absent, the OAU formally pledged "to respect the frontiers existing on [the] achievement of national independence"—a major step in solidifying the territorial integrity of the former colonial boundaries. Relatively little success was achieved, however, in fully resolving the Somali-Ethiopia-Kenya dispute over Somali's claims to all land occupied by the Somali people. Although the OAU was useful in bringing the disputants together, temporary settlement of the problem was based mainly on bilateral negotiations and the mediational skills of President Kaunda of Zambia in 1967. Likewise with regard to the Congo rebellion of 1964-5 and the Nigeria-Biafra conflict of 1967-present, the OAU has failed to achieve its goals, although both of these major conflicts were (and are) complicated greatly by influences from outside Africa. Both also presented of one African state against another (forcing a new pledge against subversion of this type in 1965) and Nigeria-Biafra regarding a deviation from the
principle of territorial integrity caused by the recognition of Biafra by four African states (Tanzania, Zambia, Gabon, Ivory Coast). This deviation, like the conflict itself, remains unresolved.

2. The African Development Bank

The formation of the ADB in 1964 (after several years of proposals and negotiations) marked an important step in the creation of a continental agency for development finance. Totally African (governmental) in ownership, officers and executive personnel, the ADB is aimed at facilitating intra-African investment and trade, acting as a channel and focus for foreign aid and investment, and actively promoting development projects which are multi-national or regional in scope (e.g., the Tanzam Railway between Tanzania and Zambia). Although the United States has supported the objectives of the ADB and agreed to channel much of its aid through it (and thus assist multi-national development), the Bank still has extremely limited capital ($250-350 million) and has not been particularly successful with respect to other sources of foreign capital (most notably French). Despite these problems, the ADB is likely to become increasingly important in future African economic development, particularly with the growth of regional economic unions. It has already accomplished one major feat: an agreement on a voting formula among member states taking into account differences in population size, national product, income per capita and international trade. These factors were used to determine the subscription quota for each state, which has a base of 625 votes plus one for every share ($10,000) subscribed. In 1968, vote allocations ranged from $3,625 for the
UAR, $3,075 for Algeria, and $3,035 for Nigeria, to $725 for Togo and $715 for Dahomey.

3. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

Since 1961, the ECA has become a major pressure group promoting and providing technical advice to projects and proposals for economic integration. Green and Krishna (1967) identify five major elements in the "ECA position." These are as follows: (1) an emphasis on large sub-regional groupings, which include Eastern Africa (Ethiopia through "Zimbabwe"—the proposed name for an independent black Rhodesia), West Africa (Mauritania to Nigeria), North Africa (Maghreb, Sudan) and Central Africa (the old UDEAC plus Congo-Kinshasa); (2) an insistence on industrialization, including export processing, as central to economic development strategy and economic integration; (3) a stress on the need for coordination in transport, communications, finance and trade (the latter based primarily on industry and secondarily on agricultural specialization); (4) creation of appropriate channels to present coordinated African positions to international bodies such as the United Nations Trade and Development Conference (UNCTAD) regarding trade, commodity agreements, and international aid and finance; (5) opposition to European Economic Community (EEC—"Common Market") Associateship arrangements in Africa, which are viewed as hindering regional trade and industrial planning and development. (For more on the EEC, see lecture #75).

4. Some General Conclusions

Pan-Africanist activity today centers primarily on the promotion of
relations and settlement of disputes between states. The earlier desires for continental political unity as well as the strong emphasis on liberation and anti-colonialism have been deemphasized (temporarily?) for practical and political reasons. Due largely to the enormous challenges of nation-building, Africa has become much more nationally introspective. There has been as yet no major shift of power from the individual states to any of the existing supra-state bodies, including the OAU.

The colonial legacy of regionalism and territorial boundaries continue to be perhaps the most powerful force shaping inter-state political development in Africa. The division between francophonic and anglophonic Africa is particularly important in this respect and has hindered efforts at comprehensive unification. It has also permitted outside powers, through political and economic pressure, to try to "divide" the African states. Nevertheless, some degree of inter-state cooperation has been achieved, especially in the OAU, which may encourage greater inter-state cooperation and a more solid common front toward the outside world in the future.

#73. Consolidation of Nation-States: Study Questions

As in the other study question sections, some questions will be specific, others of a general or synthesizing nature and others will be judgmental.

1. When and where did African nationalist movements begin? (Do they begin in Africa or by African expatriates in Europe and America?) What
are the early forms of nationalism in Africa? To what extent did African nationalism take on racial overtones? What was the reaction of the respective colonial powers to African nationalism? How was the timing of independence determined? Why did West Africa achieve independence earlier than East or Central Africa?

2. What is meant by "nation-building"? Do you think the major problems of national integration in Africa are inter-ethnic, mass-elite, or territorial? (Note: There is no correct answer to this; just an evaluation). What types of ideology do you think have been most successful in building national integration? Do you think African states are more concerned with national integration or pan-Africanism? Does it seem to matter (in the process of national integration) whether a state has one, a few, or many ethnic groups or what cultural patterns they possess? What are the potentials for conflict in each of these situations? Do you think that French and English should be used as the languages of national integration in Africa, or should some vernacular language(s) be selected? What accounts for the existence of irredentism in Africa? Why do you think there has been so little violent irredentism? Do you think that the "mass-elite" or gap was caused by the colonial powers/by a particular type of education? (or is it inevitable in developing countries?) What can be done to close this gap, or do you regard its continuation as inevitable? Who should arbitrate in African state boundary disputes? How should inter-state conflict be resolved?

3. Why have one-party states developed in many African states? Do
you feel this is an infringement on individual liberties? How is opposition expressed in a one-party state, both of the pragmatic-pluralistic variety and the revolutionary-centralizing variety? What types of political systems were inherited from the colonial powers? What were the weaknesses of these systems within the African context? What changes have been attempted and with what success? What role does the civil service play in African nation-building? What type of persons are employed in the civil services?

What function do you think elections play in a one-party state? Why have elections been associated with political crises in Africa? What indicators do you feel best represent electoral "legitimacy" in the African context? What are the major means of mobilizing the citizens to economic and political involvement?

What are the major indications of political instability in Africa? Has such instability been relatively violent or non-violent? In interpreting these events, do you feel that military rule is a relatively permanent form of government in Africa or a transition back to a new form of civilian rule? Do you think that deposed leaders such as Nkrumah will continue to play an important role in African nation-building? What types of political systems in Africa seem to be most stable?

4. What are the major resources of Africa? What will be necessary for the effective utilization of these resources? Do you think that African states should concentrate on agriculture or move into industrialization? What kind of planning is necessary in Africa? Does planning at present seem to be effective? How could it be improved?
What is meant by "infrastructure?" To what extent has an infrastructure been built in Africa? What are the major unsolved problems of African economic systems development? How do population pressures and social factors bear on these problems?

What are the best measures of economic development (e.g. GDP per capita? diversification of the economy? strength of export sector? amount of investment?). What is meant by "growth without development"? What political or ideological factors seem to impinge most clearly on economic development? What are "backwash" and "spread" effects and how do they influence development?

5. What elements in customary law, Islamic law, and European law in Africa seem to be most similar and/or dissimilar? Do you think that customary law and Islamic law should be discarded by the new states? Do you think that the diverse legal systems should be integrated? How would you persuade people radically to change their marriage and family law? What can be done, if anything, to ensure some comparability of legal framework within the various African states, on the assumption that at some future point they might want to work more closely with each other?

How does constitutional law affect the integration of legal systems? What have been the developments in constitutional law since World War II? How would you change African constitutions, if at all, to reflect the political realities of changing societies? Do you feel that the military, rather than the supreme court should "guarantee" the constitution?

What are the major problems of legal personnel development? What would you recommend be taught in an African law school?
6. What are the major concepts of supra-nationalism? Are they identified with particular African spokesmen? with different periods in time? What kind of regionalism emerged during the colonial period? Why did the French break-up their two large federations (in west and equatorial Africa)? How does the legacy of economic regionalism affect patterns of inter-state cooperation and conflict? What factors do you feel are most important in inter-state economic integration (e.g. infrastructural linkage, common currency, free flow of raw materials/manpower/goods, telecommunications, free flow of capital, etc)? What effect would a supra-state regional market have on investment priorities and location of industry?

Is Pan-Africanism primarily an ideological and political program, or an economic program? What would be the differences between these two approaches? With what particular African spokesmen are these two approaches identified? Has ideology changed? increased or diminished in effect since independence?

What has been the role of the OAU in the post-independence period? What are the prospects for political federation in Africa? for economic union? What are the major advantages of economic union? Are there any disadvantages? Why do you feel it has been so difficult to establish economic (or political) unions in Africa? What are the prospects for a United States of Africa?
PART V: AFRICA AND THE MODERN WORLD

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In 1950, there were four African states in the United Nations. In 1968, there were 38 African states out of a total United Nations membership of 124, for a total of 30.6%. At present, almost one out of three member states in the United Nations is African. The dramatic increase in African participation at the U.N. has come to symbolize the new African role in world affairs.

There are three major topics which will be discussed in this lecture: the general impact of Africa on the United Nations, the issues at the United Nations of most concern to the African states, and the relationship of the African states to the specialized agencies.

1. The Trusteeship System and African Independence

The involvement of the African states with the United Nations began prior to the independence of most African states. A number of African territories were actually administered by the United Nations as "trusts"; (they had been inherited from the mandate system of the League of Nations, which was extended to the former German and Italian territories after World War I.) After World War II, the United Nations Trusteeship Council was charged with insuring that the particular trust territories were being advanced to independence by the respective European powers (Britain, France, Belgium). Inspection teams made on-the-spot observations and recommendations. The trust territories of Africa included Tanganyika, British Cameroon, French Cameroon, British Togo, French Togo, Ruandi-Urundi,
There and former Italian Somaliland and Libya/ was a point of contention with the Union of South Africa, which refused to place South West Africa—a former German colony—under the U.N. Trusteeship system. In 1966, the General Assembly of the United Nations voted to revoke the South African mandate over South West Africa, but has been unable to shake South Africa's control of the area, (now called Namibia by African nationalists.)

The United Nations began to prepare early in the 1950s for the self-government and independence of the trust territories. In the case of (former Italian) Somaliland, a specific ten year deadline for independence was established. Many African statesmen came to New York to present evidence before the Trusteeship Council, and hence gained familiarity with the workings of the international body.

2. African Membership and Involvement in the U.N.

The major impact of independent African states on the United Nations has been the sheer increase in U.N. membership as a result of inclusion of the African states. By October 1968, with the membership of the small state (formerly Spanish territory) of Equatorial Guinea, it was clear that any ex-colonial territory in Africa, of whatever size, could make its voice heard in the international forum. It was also clear that African resources for staffing this increased involvement in the U.N. were limited; as late as 1967, thirteen of the thirty-eight African states appointed Ambassadors to the U.N. (i.e. heads of permanent missions) who were also Ambassadors to the United States. Yet, as a symbol of African participation in world affairs, the United Nations has been paramount—a fact
recently confirmed (in September 1969) by the election of a female delegate from Liberia as President of the United Nations General Assembly.

In retrospect, one effect of African involvement in the U.N. was the need for enlargement of the major U.N. organs, such as the Security Council, and the Social and Economic Council. Another effect was to help increase the importance of the General Assembly as the debating forum of the world.

In 1960, however, at the time of independence (and U.N. membership) for most African states, there were two critical issues which dramatized the impact of the African states on the U.N. The first was the general tension of the Cold War, which made it possible for African states to hold the balance of votes on most East-West issues. The second (and related) issue was the Congo crisis, which began in the summer of 1960. Although this lecture will not elaborate on the Congo crisis, it is necessary to mention the role of the United Nations in the Congo, and the African impact on that role.

With the mutiny of the Congolese army against their Belgian officers in July 1960, a crisis developed in the Congo, including the statement by Belgium that her nationals would be protected, and the threatened secession of Katanga (see lecture #56). Although the Republic of Congo was not yet a member of the United Nations, the Security Council met at the request of the Secretary-General (Dag Hammarskjold) to consider the alleged "aggression" of Belgium. On July 14th, a U.N. peace force was created by resolution (in which troops of the permanent members of the
Security Council were disallowed). A U.N. Operations in the Congo (ONUC) mission was established, but there was considerable controversy as to its purposes and powers. The details of the U.N. involvement in the Congo are available in Young (1965) and Hoskyns (1964). Suffice it to remark that African troops were the backbone of the U.N. contingent against the Katanga secession, that the whole Congo episode became a Cold War issue, and that the African states themselves were deeply divided over the issue.

3. U.N. Issues of Concern to African States

The experience of the U.N. in the Congo produced a sharp reassessment by African states of their role in world affairs. They consciously came to take a "neutral" stance on Cold War issues, (African states have abstained on more than half of all "cold war" votes), and began to build their own machine—through the Organization of African Unity (see lecture #71)—for the resolution of conflict between Africans. They increasingly came to focus on problems of colonialism in southern Africa as an issue on which there was widespread African agreement.

It is clear from the voting record and speech topics which issues did concern the African states. Judging from the number of speeches by African spokesmen in both the plenary and main committee meetings (there have been an average of about 1,000 speeches by Africans each year), the issue of South Africa and decolonization in southern Africa comprised the overwhelming bulk of African concern. These topics were four times more common than the second major topic, which was economic development and aid.
Other topics, such as admission of China, problems of refugees, the nature of international law, and disarmament, were raised, but in statistically insignificant proportions.

As early as 1962, the African states were successful in steering through both the Security Council and the General Assembly a resolution calling for an arms embargo and voluntary economic sanctions against South Africa. This issue illustrates, however, the relative inability of the African states actually to influence the international behavior of the three most powerful western states (Britain, France, and the United States). None of the major powers has refrained from trading with South Africa, and the French have even continued to sell arms. (It should be noted, in fairness, that the United States established an arms embargo prior to the U.N. resolution.)

Many Assembly resolutions have in fact been passed from earliest days of the U.N. condemning South Africa. The Security Council in April 1960, ten days after the shooting at Sharpeville, censured the South African government for its actions in that tragic episode. (Discussed further in lecture #81.)

After 1965, much of the African and U.N. focus changed to Southern Rhodesia. Voluntary sanctions were voted by the General Assembly (on British request) and in 1968 mandatory sanctions were voted. Although some international business concerns have circumvented the sanctions, and South Africa and Portugal have openly aided Rhodesia, the sanctions have been supported by the major powers.
Increasingly, the Portuguese position in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea is also coming under attack from the African states at the United Nations, (for details, see lecture #82). These resolutions range from general condemnation of Portuguese colonialism in Africa, to specific grievances by African member states (e.g. in July 1969, Zambia complained that Portuguese plane engaged in anti-guerrilla activities--crashed on Zambian soil.)

In short, African activity at the United Nations has kept alive the issue of decolonization and racism in southern Africa and has served to unite the African states around a common issue and goal. In the long run, it may be this unifying function which will be of most importance.

4. African Involvement in U.N. Specialized Agencies

The United Nations specialized agencies are concerned with problems of health, welfare, international cooperation, and economic development. These are matters of deep concern to African states, and in an undramatic day-to-day manner, Africans have become increasingly involved in the specialized agencies. And the agencies have become increasingly involved in Africa.

The International Labor Organization (ILO) has an African regional office in Lagos (Nigeria); the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) has an African regional office in Accra (Ghana); and the World Health Organization (WHO) has an African regional office in Brazzaville (Congo-Br.). An Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) was established, with headquarters in Addis Ababa, (Ethiopia). (See lecture #72.)
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, who is responsible directly to the General Assembly, has assumed ever increasing responsibilities in relation to the vast numbers of refugees in Africa, now numbering nearly a million. These refugees are mainly from white-dominated southern Africa and Portuguese Guinea, the southern Sudan, and Rwanda. Working with host governments and voluntary organizations, the UNHCR has provided legal status and stimulated rural settlements for refugees in asylum countries, notably Tanzania, Senegal, Uganda, Burundi, Congo-Kinshasa, and the Central African Republic.

The budgets of all U.N. specialized agencies have increased severalfold in the past ten years. The specialized agencies also have published a wealth of survey material on development problems in Africa. Some of these are on an individual state basis, and others are arranged thematically (e.g. role of women, structure of civil services, problems of demographic survey, etc.). These materials are publically available from the United Nations at a nominal cost.

§75. Africa and the Third World

The momentum for independence in Africa gathered speed with the independence of India in 1947, which the British Labour Party (in power) encouraged. Indians had long been in contact with Africa and Gandhi had in fact lived in South Africa where he developed and practiced the notion of satyagraha, (i.e. passive resistance to create change).
The independent state of India continued the demand for de-colonization throughout the Third World, including Africa. By the mid-1950s, it was clear that many of the Third World colonies were to become independent and an important bond began to develop between the peoples of the world with experience under colonization. This bloc came to be known as the Third World because it was not part of the west or the Soviet blocs. (Communist China is a marginal exception, since she had not been a formal colony but had suffered from European/Russian imperialism.) These countries had several things in common: they were "people of color", they had for the most part experienced colonialism, and they did not want to become involved in Soviet-American disputes. This latter feeling resulted in a policy of "neutralism" (excluding China) which in the 1950s was not acceptable to either the west or the east. It was not until the Moscow Conference of November 1960, that the principle of "co-existence" between the Soviets and the Third World was accepted, and about the same time (with the retirement of U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles) the United States also accepted "neutralism". During the 1960s, however, the Third World countries have begun to pursue their own "national interest" policies (which often conflicted with each other in the pursuit of international markets and investments, to say nothing of boundary disputes.) In short, an age of national foreign policy had arrived. (See lecture #69).

1. The Origins of Third-world Solidarity

The first major conference where African and Asian statesmen met
together was held at Bandung (the Conference of Asian-African states) in April 1955. In attendance were Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai, Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser; and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. (Kojo Botsio and other prominent Ghanaians were at Bandung as "observers".) The major theme of the conference was "anti-imperialism", and as a direct result of the conference, several of the Asian states established diplomatic representation in those few African states which were independent. In particular, Egyptian-Chinese trade and cultural relations were firmly established.

One of the later outcomes of the conference was the decision to set up an "Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee", which held its first conference in Cairo in December 1957-January 1958. The second conference was held in Conakry (Guinea) in 1960. Increasingly, however, the organization became identified with a pro-Soviet foreign policy and Chinese-Soviet disputes were largely responsible for the decline of AASC. Also, with the burst of independence in Africa in 1960, the AASC has been superseded by various pan-African efforts. (See lecture #69).

In the 1960s, the African states have continued to maintain relations with the Asian states (although many do not have formal relations with China). But the initial impetus to "third world unity" seemed to fade as the decolonization process reached fruition and as the harsh realities of nation-building preoccupied national attention.

Since independence, Africa has had minimal relations with Communist China. The Chinese have extended assistance to Guinea, Tanzania, Somali
Republic, Mali, Algeria, and Congo-Brazzaville, but have been restricted in most other African countries.

Increasingly Japan has developed trade relations with Africa. Inexpensive transistor radios and textiles as well as quality items have been easily accessible to the African market, to the extent that Nigeria (under the civilian regime) had to restrict trade with Japan because of the impact on Nigeria's balance of payments reserves. (Japan is increasingly becoming an importer of African raw materials.) It should be mentioned that Hong Kong, through its Commonwealth connections, has also been a major supplier of inexpensive textiles, clothing, and plastic goods to Africa.

2. African Relations with India and Pakistan

India, more than other Asian countries, has had a long and intimate involvement in the African continent. In 1960, just prior to independence in East and Central Africa, there were approximately one million Indians living as semi-permanent residents in Africa. Most of these Indians were living in South Africa (477,414, mostly in Natal province) stemming from the labor migrations beginning in the 1860s; in East Africa (329,134) stemming from early coastal settlement and British efforts in 1896 to attract railway workers; and in Central Africa (19,081).

Indians in South Africa had long been involved in the struggle against white discrimination and domination. Gandhi founded the Natal Indian Congress in 1894, and led a passive resistance movement in South Africa from 1906 to 1914. When English-speaking Africans demanded their
independence in the 1950s, the example of Gandhi's success in India was very much part of their thinking. After Indian independence in 1947, Nehru led the major efforts in the United Nations to demand independence for the African states. In Kenya and Tanganyika, Indians were fully involved in the independence movements.

In the post-colonial period, however, there have often been tensions between the Indians and the Africans in certain African countries. "Asians" (a general term to cover Indians and Pakistanis) in Kenya and elsewhere in East Africa were given the choice of becoming British (Britain had unrestricted "commonwealth" citizenship) or local citizens. Many in Kenya took British citizenship rather than become Kenyan citizens, and most chose to go to England rather than India or Pakistan, probably for economic reasons. (It was felt that "Africanization" in several of the East African states would restrict future job opportunities.) In December 1967 a crisis was provoked when the British government began to restrict their entry.

The Indian government has continued to maintain a strong interest in Africa, particularly in the area of cultural relations. Also, since there is a clear difference among East African Indians between those who are highly educated and professional and those who were minor traders or clerks, the Indian government has tried to attract technical and professional skills back to India. In short, the East African "Asians" verge on being "persons without a country", a situation which is potentially fraught with social conflict.
As mentioned above, "Asians" includes those Indians who "became" Pakistani after the division of India in 1947. The government of Pakistan has become increasingly interested in Africa, especially in those areas which are predominantly Islamic.

3. African Relations with Caribbean and Latin America Countries

The two major sources of African linkage with the Caribbean and colonial Latin American areas have been, first, the common experience with metropolitan France or England, and secondly, the African cultural ties which persisted after slave settlement in the New World.

The British and French colonial holdings in the Caribbean area meant that West Indians had close educational and cultural contact in London and Paris. Thus, Aimé Césaire and Franz Fanon became active participants in French-speaking African development, while George Padmore and Arthur Lewis have played major roles in English-speaking African development. (See BIBLIOGRAPHY for references by these men.) Several English-speaking West Indians have interacted with Africa after migrating to the United States, e.g. men such as Edward Blyden, Marcus Garvey, and, more recently, Stokely Carmichael (see BIBLIOGRAPHY). In addition, several scholars on Africa, teaching in the U.S.—such as M. G. Smith, Hollis Lynch and, Wilfred Cartey—are West Indian, (see BIBLIOGRAPHY).

The cultural linkage between Afro-American communities and Africa will be discussed in lecture #86. Suffice it to remark that most of the Latin American and/or African states have not yet begun to develop fully their potential for interaction. Brazilian/African relations seem to be increasing and, because of the Portuguese position in Africa, are likely to be of major political significance.
Africa and the Middle East

The Islamic World consists of approximately 500 million persons distributed along a west-east belt stretching from Morocco to Indonesia and China. This Islamic zone represents all major races of the world. As mentioned in lecture #20, Muslims share a common belief system, cultural heritage, and an acceptance of Mecca (in Saudi Arabia) as the center of the Islamic world.

The Arab world, by contrast, consists of those persons who speak the Arabic language as their mother tongue and who regard themselves as Arab. While most Arabs are Muslim, many of the Lebanese and Palistinian Arabs are Christian, and in historical fact, the Christian Arabs have been among the most ardent supports of pan-Arab movements. About 70% of the Arabs in the world live in Africa (primarily North Africa, especially Egypt). Other Arabs live on the Arabian peninsula (Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the coastal Sheikdoms), on the eastern rim of the Mediterraneain (e.g. Lebanon, Syria, Jordan), in the fertile crescent area (Iraq) surrounded by Turkish peoples to the north, and Persian (Iranian) peoples to the east.

The relationship between Africa, Arabs and Islam presents a complicated and interwoven picture. In light of the growing importance of Middle Eastern political problems, especially between Arabs and Israelis, it is important to explore those relationships which have most relevance to Africa. Although the history of relations between Pakistan and Africa have
been extremely interesting and important (including the Muslim Pakistani missionaries, called Ahmadiyya, who came to West Africa in the early twentieth century), this topic will not be dealt with in this lecture.

1. Africa, Arabs, and Islam

Islamic patterns in Africa have been dealt with in lectures #20 and #43. In brief, the Ottoman (Turkish) empire, which regarded itself as being the seat of the Islamic Caliphate (in Istanbul), had nominal control over most of North Africa and even the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan until approximately the time of World War I. At that time, Arab nationalism began to reject Turkish dominance and, in collaboration with the British, set up the Arab state system more or less as it appears today.

Historically, relations between "black" African and "Arab" Africa have ranged the full spectrum from co-operation to conflict. Arab slave raiding in Africa, however, which persisted until the early twentieth century (see lecture #27), was clearly a major negative impact, but Islamic ties remain strong. As Arab states began to emerge in the twentieth century, they sought to develop their own national identity (e.g. as Egyptians, Moroccans, or Iraqi), worked to develop closer links with other Arab states (as evidenced by the creation of the Arab League in 1945), and attempted to reconstruct relations with black Africa. President Nasser of Egypt symbolized the desire to link these multiple identities (national, Arab, African) in his volume The Philosophy of the Revolution (English version, 1959).

With African independence, many of the states along the Sudanic belt
found themselves with mixtures of Arab and Negro populations, but with an Islamic legacy and an Arabic lingua franca. Such states as Mauritania, Niger, Chad, and Sudan came to symbolize the inextricable interaction of Arab and Black Africa.

Black Africans found it increasingly easy to make the pilgrimage to Mecca where they came into intimate contact with Arab/Islamic civilization. An air route had been established between Kano (Nigeria) and Khartoum, as early as 1935. In the post-colonial period, there have been twice weekly flights from Kano to Cairo and each year during the month of pilgrimage, a large number of chartered flights are available to Saudi Arabia.

Also, in the early twentieth century, a significant number of Lebanese Arabs (from "Greater Syria") had become established in many of the urban centers of West Africa (see Winder, in Fallers, 1967). In 1960, they were estimated to number about 15,000. They were engaged in trade and light industry, and were in many respects comparable to the Asians in East/Central/South Africa. However, most of these Lebanese were Christian rather than Muslim. There developed a complex set of relationships between the Lebanese and West Africans which seemed to result in mixed feelings of economic frustration/dependence on the part of many Africans. Like the Asians in East Africa, Lebanese were given the choice of taking out local citizenship at the time of independence, but most did not.

2. Political Linkage between North and Sub-Saharan Africa

In 1960, the Congo crisis produced an ideological division in Africa,
described in earlier lectures. The "Casablanca" group which emerged from this division is particularly important in terms of relations between North and West Africa, since it included states such as Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, along with states such as Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. Although this linkage was officially abandoned in 1963, the impact was not lost.

When the Organization of African Unity was established in 1963, several of the North African delegations, especially U.A.R., wanted to link the political interests of North and sub-Saharan Africa even more closely by introducing the Arab-Israeli conflict as an agenda item. It is extremely significant that the African states voted not to consider this conflict, on the grounds that it was not the proper concern of the O.A.U.

Since 1963, the Arab-Israeli conflict has been a matter for policy by each of the African states individually, rather than collectively. Thus, during the June 1967 war, Mauritania and Sudan both broke diplomatic relations with the United States because of its alleged support for Israel. Likewise, some states (or even regions within federal states, such as late Northern Nigeria under the Sardauna, Ahmadu Bello) refused to accept Israeli technical assistance. However, the bulk of the African states have regarded themselves as a potential collective mediator or buffer in the Middle East dispute. To this extent, Israeli foreign policy in sub-Saharan Africa (which has tried to keep Africa "neutral") has been successful.

3. Israeli and Egyptian Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa

In addition to an active political and economic program in Africa, the Egyptians have also tried to promote cultural (mainly Islamic)
solidarity between North, West and East Africa. Radio Cairo has been broadcasting in Hausa and Swahili since the 1950s, and a large number of scholarships are available for African students to study at Al-Azhar University in Cairo. Part of the difficulty in achieving Islamic solidarity has been the diversity of sects within African Islam, and the historic links between West African Islam and groups in Morocco, Tunisia, and Sudan which are often bitterly opposed to Egyptian leadership in religious matters.

The Israelis, likewise, have regarded Africa as a major field of their foreign policy. Israeli relations were established with Ghana in early 1957, and a number of important Ghanaian (and later Nigerian) commercial ventures were financed by Israelis. Israeli technical advisers have been active in many countries of Africa and African labor leaders have visited the labor unions and kibbutzim of Israel. A full description of these programs is contained in Kreinin (1964).

The extent to which the Arab-Israeli conflict will involve non-Arab African states remains to be seen. Israel has been successful in projecting an image of economic development through "cooperative" approaches which is attractive to many African states. On the other hand, there are indications that the Islamic zones in black Africa are increasingly being linked to Arab Africa.
During the twentieth century, Britain, France, Belgium and Portugal have become increasingly involved in African affairs. The colonial system was decisive in linking African and European economic systems. It also created European language zones in Africa, and has resulted, in most cases, in continuing European political influence on the continent. The term "metropole" refers to the fact that London, Paris, Brussels and Lisbon were the centers of decision-making regarding Africa for most of the colonial period. While countries such as West Germany, Italy, the United States, Japan, and the Soviet Union are becoming involved in African economic development, the major influence continues to be the former metropoles. This influence may be economic, political, or cultural. It has sometimes been called "neo-colonialism". This lecture will focus primarily on British and French relations with Africa after independence. In general, France (under de Gaulle) has exerted a far greater influence on her former colonies than has Britain.

1. Metropole/African Economic Relations

Monetary zones in Africa have continued to be either French-based (the franc zone) or British-based (the sterling zone). A few African states (Ghana, Guinea, Mali) refused to have the value of their money linked to European monetary systems and tried to establish their own local currency. In most cases this has not been successful due to inconvertibility.
problems, since such "soft" currency is not readily accepted by other countries engaged in international trade. Mali and Ghana have both recently returned to international monetary standards, and Guinea is considering the possibility. One drawback, of course, is that a devaluation in the European currency (e.g. the 1969 devaluation of the French franc) usually results in the necessity for devaluation in Africa. (This did occur in most of anglophonic Africa in the French-speaking states in 1969, but did not/cluding Nigeria and East Africa) after the 1967 devaluation of the British pound.)

Investment in Africa has also continued to be dominated by ex-metropole commercial and industrial concerns. Although American investment is increasing, it is still only a fraction of European investment.

Trade patterns also continue to be heavily dominated by the ex-metropoles although more so in the case of many ex-French states. In many African states, well over half of all exports go to the former metropole (e.g. in 1962, Rwanda 85%, Dahomey 80%, Sierra Leone 80%, Cameroon 70%, Senegal 70%, Chad 60%, Gabon 59%, Somali 52%, Togo 52%, Ivory Coast 50%). Conversely, many African states are still dependent on their former metropole for more than half of all imports (e.g. in 1962, Dahomey 75%, Mauritania 73%, Cameroon 70%, Congo-Br. 67%, Ivory Coast 66%, Gabon 62%, Senegal 60%).

Most foreign aid to Africa comes from Britain and France, or from combined resources through the European Economic Community (EEC). In the case of France, this latter pattern is particularly important as a multilateral source of economic aid to Africa. Shortly after the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957 establishing the European Common Market (the "Six"),
the French-speaking African states (excluding Guinea) (including the
Belgian areas and Somali) became "associated" with the EEC, and these
"eighteen" states were eligible for both trade and aid advantages. (Note:
Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Nigeria developed "special relations" with
the EEC.) In several of the French-speaking states, French aid is given
for recurrent budget items as well as for development projects.

Most of the larger African states have tried to diversify their
international economic relations. Thus, Nigeria has come to trade with
Japan, Germany, Italy, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Ghana
(under Nkrumah) explicitly tried to redress the imbalance of its economic
(and political) relations by establishing contact with the Soviet bloc
countries.

2. Metropole/African Political and Military Relations

Political independence usually does not mean the end of political
influence. The British Commonwealth countries (including most black
African anglophonic states, except Sudan) meet regularly to discuss issues
of mutual concern. Most recently these discussions have focused on the
problem of Southern Rhodesia. (It should be noted that political influence
is a two-way process; when Tanzania broke diplomatic relations with Britain
over the Rhodesia issue, there was pressure within Britain to intensify
formally dead, continues as a reality in Africa through O.C.A.M. (see
lecture #70) or through bilateral ties with France.

The symbols of political sovereignty, however, have been carefully
preserved by most African states. One such negative symbol in Anglophonic Africa came to be "mutual defense" agreements with the former metropole. Nigeria abrogated her defense agreements with Britain under considerable internal political pressure. Most French-speaking states (exceptions include Mali, Guinea and Upper Volta) do allow French troops to be based within their territory. The actual influence of French and British armed forces is clearly apparent in the background of African politics. Gabon called in French troops to put down an attempted coup, and Tanzania and Kenya called in British troops to put down an army "mutiny". Britain and France continue to train most African officers, and most of the African states are heavily dependent on their former metropole for military aid (e.g. Burundi 100%, Cameroon 80%, C.A.R. 80%, Congo-Br. 80%, Dahomey 80%, Sierra Leone 80%, Upper Volta 80%, Zambia 80%). French military bases exist at Dakar, Fort Lamy, Tananarive, Diego Suarez, and Djibouti. In addition, France has a peace corps type program whereby members of the French army are given civilian status and fulfill their military obligation by working on development projects. (They also have a regular civilian peace corps program.) By contrast, the British peace corps program--called "Voluntary Service Organization" (VSO)--is apparently detached of political or military implications and is administered by non-governmental agencies.

3. The Idea of Neo-colonialism

African statesmen such as Nkrumah were concerned about what they called "neo-colonialism", i.e. the continuation of colonial patterns in the independence period. They were concerned about economic dependence
(e.g., trade, investment, monetary zones, and control of development priorities), political dependence (e.g., the pressures which could be brought to bear to influence the internal and external policies of African states, the "balkanization" of Africa, the use of British or French troops, plus the direct intervention of European states in African politics, as in the Congo crisis), and cultural dependence (the predominance of the French and English languages, the influence of western styles of dress, etc). Nkrumah called for the emergence of a pan-African economic system which was not dependent on Europe, a pan-African union of African states which would strengthen the voice of Africa in the world, and the emergence of an "African personality" which would be an authentic representation of the people of the African continent.

Other African statesmen, however, such as Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast, argued that linkage to Europe was necessary for African development and that the real danger was European disengagement from Africa. He considered "neo-colonialism" to be a myth to the extent that decisions about dealing with European influences were being made by Africans themselves, on the basis of "national interest". Dr. Hastings Banda of Malawi has developed a similar "pragmatism" which even includes economic cooperation with South Africa.

The idea of "neo-colonialism" has often been extended to include United States and Soviet influence in Africa, since, it is argued, alien rule is the essence of colonialism, and that in present-day Africa, many African states are being manipulated by the international powers.
It is not the purpose of this lecture to argue for or against the concept of "neo-colonialism". It is sufficient to point out how the concept is being used and to try to delineate the actual economic and political links which do characterize African relations with the former metropoles.

The United States has had a relatively recent history of relations with black Africa (excluding the earlier slave trade and return of freed slaves to Liberia). Until the African states became independent, United States relations with Africa were officially handled through the appropriate European power. In fact, there was no African Bureau in the State Department until 1961. Instead, the African colonies were regarded as appendages to the relevant European desks.

Since 1958, the increase of United States interest in Africa has been dramatic. Even so, it has usually been acknowledged that official U.S. policy in Africa is largely dependent on U.S. policy toward the NATO countries in Europe. Thus, the United States has essentially supported the European powers--especially France and Britain--in their relations directly with Africa. (The U.S. has not, however/ supported Portugal.) At the same time, three factors have made it necessary for the United States to follow an independent foreign policy in Africa: (1) at least one-tenth of
the population of the United States is Afro-American, and hence Africa forms a significant part of the cultural heritage of the United States; (2) the opportunities for investment and economic development in Africa are considerable and American business is often in direct competition with European business for raw materials and markets; (3) the stability and peaceful development of African states is in the national interest of the United States, since major disruption in Africa (such as the Congo) is likely to involve the United States and the Soviet Union in some type of confrontation. Of these three factors, the latter has probably been of primary importance.

1. Economic Relations

United States private investment in Africa increased significantly during the period 1960-65. By 1965, there were major U.S. investments in Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, and Zambia. The U.S. foreign aid program extended insurance to cover political risks (e.g. expropriation) at a nominal cost. It should be mentioned that U.S. private investment in South Africa has also increased during this period. Projecting current rates of investment, however, the economic interests of the United States are probably more clearly tied to black Africa than to the white South African regime. Interestingly, one of the major U.S. private investments in Africa during the 1960-65 period was Kaiser (Aluminum) finance for portions of the Volta River Project in Ghana (during the Nkrumah regime); this has apparently been extremely profitable to Kaiser (which gets Volta power at low rates for the smelter at Tema).
and has been the backbone of Ghanaian development plans.

U.S.-African trade has also increased. Much of American economic aid has been tied to the purchase of American heavy equipment, so that companies such as Caterpillar, Ford, and General Motors have become involved in modern African markets. In return, African states have exported agricultural and mineral products to the United States. U.S. foreign aid has concentrated heavily on two categories of the African countries: those which are felt to have the greatest economic potential (e.g. Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya and Congo-Kinshasa), and those which for various historical reasons did not have traditional access to European aid, (e.g. Liberia and Ethiopia), although this is changing.

It is important to note that the relationship of U.S. aid to the "containment" of communism has continued to be an important criterion for Congress in the allocation of U.S. aid. In 1965, the two largest aid recipients in Africa, per capita, were Guinea and Egypt, both of whom were also getting extensive aid from the Soviet bloc.

Perhaps the most innovative U.S. program in Africa, with respect to socio-economic development, has been the U.S. Peace Corps program. At the request of African states, Peace Corps volunteers have been primarily engaged in teaching, although agricultural and community development projects have also been common. The "do-it-yourself" approach of the Peace Corps in Africa seems to have been useful and a catalyst to local initiative, although there are both European and African critics who question the relative lack of "technical expertise" in the Peace
Corps compared to other types of technical assistance programs.

In summary, American economic relations with Africa in the areas of investment, trade, aid, and technical assistance have been relatively small, but are increasing.

2. Political Relations

The most important political fact about Africa for U.S. official policy is that it is not located on the periphery of the communist world, and hence does not fall within the "containment" policy area. African states, furthermore, have emphatically stressed that they do not want to become involved in the cold war. Instead of an east-west division of world interests, they have begun to stress a north-south axis. Africans are concerned with the completion of decolonization in southern Africa, with the problems of racism, and with the disadvantageous nature of the terms of trade between northern/rich/white countries (including the U.S., Europe, and the Soviet Union) and the southern/poor/colored countries (e.g., Latin America, Africa, Asia). It is within this context that the revolution in black-white relations in the United States is having an impact on United States-African relations, mainly in the direction of causing U.S. policy-makers to take more note of the political sensitivities of African states on matters of race relations.

There have been several crises of confidence between the African states and the United States on issues which have racial and/or colonial overtones. The first such issue was the Congo-secession crisis of
1960-1963, in which official U.S. policy (which supported the United Nations troops in suppressing the secession of Katanga) was apparently being counterbalanced by international (including U.S.) private business interests which seemed to be supporting Tshombe.

A second crisis of confidence also occurred in the Congo when the United States sent in airplanes with Belgian paratroopers to Stanleyville on November 24th, 1964, to airlift American and European citizens who had been caught in the middle of the "Simba Rebellion". It was alleged by several African states that the U.S. was both intervening in African politics and was concerned only with the saving of white people.

A third crisis of confidence has occurred over the white take-over in Southern Rhodesia (to be discussed further in lecture #82). In this situation the United States supported Britain, but did not urge the use of force which many African states felt was appropriate. This stand tended to confirm the impression that the United States tacitly supports the South African white regime as well.

3. The African Impact on Race Relations in the United States

The African states have had a major impact on race relations and civil rights in the United States. By demanding and achieving independence during the period 1955-65, they served as a catalyst to much of the civil rights movement. African students were actively involved, in some cases, in the U.S. civil rights movement. On the other hand, most African states have tried to avoid taking a racist position themselves on the issue of white-black relations. Even states such as Kenya, or Algeria, with
histories of anti-colonial violence, there is clear evidence that the African governments are working to create multi-racial societies rather than mono-racial societies. This will be discussed in more detail in lecture #88.

#79. Africa and the Communist Bloc

There are a variety of means of contact between the Communist Bloc and Africa: in some cases, there are communist parties in the African states, although most of these are illegal and very small; in other cases, the contact is through international organizations such as the World Federation of Trade Unions; in still other cases, the contact is diplomatic and/or economic through normal bilateral channels.

1. Internal Communist Parties and Influence

It will be remembered that one of the earliest and largest of the trans-national political parties in West Africa, the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA), was officially allied with the Communist Party in France. This alliance was broken in 1950, and the RDA (and its territorial organizations) began to follow independent African policies.

The actual existence of communist parties in Africa in the 1950s and 1960s has largely been limited to the northern and southern rim of the continent. Within sub-Saharan Africa, the colonial powers prevented, in most cases, the growth of internal communist parties. There have been
small communist parties in Algeria and South Africa. There is a small (approximately 1,500 persons) Madagascar Communist Party. Several political parties have had the active support of the Chinese or Soviet government (e.g. the Union des Populations du Cameroun and certain groups in Congo-Br.). In Nigeria, a Communist Party was formed in 1961 with an estimated 500 members, but this party has played no role in Nigerian political life.

In many African states, the communist party is outlawed. This is true of South Africa, where the remnants of the communist party work underground in active cooperation with banned African nationalist movements. The South African Communist Party publishes a regular journal in London called *The Africa Communist*, which gives news from around the continent. Most South African communists are white and many are now in exile.

The communist party is also outlawed in Tunisia, Sudan, Morocco, and U.A.R. In Ghana (under Nkrumah), Mali (under Keita), and still in Guinea the dominant African nationalist parties were not hostile to communist parties in other countries, but, being official one-party states, did or do not allow internal party formation by any other groups.

2. International Communist Organizations

McKay estimates (1963:216) that in 1961 there were about 40 communist inspired "friendship associations" operating in Africa, including both a Soviet Association for Friendship with the Peoples of Africa (set up in April 1959), and a Chinese African Peoples' Friendship Association (set up in 1960).
Of more significance, however, have been the international communist organizations, such as the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) or the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). The WFTU was formed after World War II in cooperation with the western trade unions, but by 1949 the cold war had divided the unions, and the Western trade unions broke off to form their own International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). The WFTU continued under communist leadership, and one of its major member organizations has been the French communist union, the Confédération Générale des Travailleurs (CGT). Many of the unions in French-speaking Africa were affiliated with the CGT, and hence with the WFTU. In 1956, Sékou Touré of Guinea broke with the CGT and formed CGT-Africaine. Within the next two years, Touré had led most of the African unions out of both the CGT and the WFTU, with his formation of the Union Générale des Travailleurs d'Afrique Noire (UGTAN). Although UGTAN maintained cordial relations with WFTU, it followed an independent line and eventually led to the formation of an All African Trade Union Federation (AATUF).

3. Communist Bloc Relations with Africa

In 1958, the Soviet Union created an African desk within the Foreign Ministry and began to establish diplomatic and consular representatives in Africa. McKay estimates (1963;229) that in 1961 eighty-five or more Soviet bloc trade delegations came to Africa, most of which were able to negotiate trade agreements. Also by 1961, there were 1,250 Soviet technicians in Africa, of whom about 450 were in U.A.R.
The sub-Saharan African states which developed most trade with the Soviet Bloc countries have been Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Sudan. Major Soviet aid recipients in Africa have included U.A.R., Guinea, Ghana, Congo-Kinshasa, Sudan, Somali and Tunisia. One of the major Soviet projects in Africa has been the Aswan Dam in U.A.R.

On the diplomatic side, most of the Eastern European countries, plus the Soviet Union and China, have been actively engaged in establishing contacts in Africa. A summary of the initial programs of each bloc country is contained in Brzezinski (1963).

There have been a host of cultural exchanges between the Communist bloc and Africa, ranging from scientific delegations to arts, drama, sports, and broadcasting. African students also have received scholarships for study in the Communist bloc countries. The People's Friendship University (later called Patrice Lumumba University) was established in Moscow in 1960 for students from the Third World. In 1961, the estimated number of African students studying in bloc countries was about 1,200, most of these in the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. The major African countries sending students were Guinea, Algeria, Sudan, and Somalia.

Just as there has often been tension and competition between the United States and France (under de Gaulle) in Africa, so there has been competition between the Russians and the Chinese in Africa. The Chinese had established diplomatic relations with Egypt, Sudan, Guinea, and Ghana by 1960, but in 1961, they became involved in a major way in Somalia. This
was partly in response to Russian support for the Ethiopians in the Somali-Ethiopia border skirmishes. Sino-Soviet competition has also occurred in Congo-Kinshasa, in Guinea, and in Burundi. During the 1965 tour of Africa by Chou En-lai, there was an apparent attempt by the Chinese to encourage African support for China (vs. the Soviet Union) on the basis of racial criteria. It is extremely important that Sékou Touré of Guinea, perhaps reflecting his Muslim heritage and his preference for ideological rather than racial alignments, rejected the Chinese overtures.

The Chinese have become involved in a major railway project to link Tanzania and Zambia, but both African governments are maintaining a careful balance of aid donors, including the Soviet Union, the United States, Canada, Great Britain, and others.

In short, the Chinese have become involved in only a few countries. The Soviets have set up contacts in a much broader range of countries. Most recently, the Soviets have aided the Nigerian Federal government in their prosecution of the Biafran civil war and as an apparent result have secured a stable relationship with Africa's largest state. (Certain Nigerian officials claim that Chinese are supporting the Biafrans, but the evidence for this is sketchy.) Finally, it should be noted that with the overthrow of President Nkrumah in Ghana, Soviet and Chinese technicians have left Ghana; (a few Russians have now returned).

In the future, it is likely that Soviet and Eastern European relations with most African states will be "regularized" if it becomes apparent that the political elites of Africa (most of whom are middle-class
nationalists) are not threatened by the relationship. In contrast, Chinese activities in Africa, which seem to be primarily focused on support for radical opposition groups (or groups in exile) within most African states, will probably continue to be strained (or non-existent) at the official level.

§80. Race Relations in Southern Africa

Africa's most serious international problem lies within its own borders. The continent is split--ideologically, politically, and strategically--between the independent African-controlled states and the last major remnants of colonialism and white control in Africa (the Republic of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique.) At the roots of this division are basic political and moral conflicts over the nature of government, the importance of majority rule, the use of force, and, overlapping all the others, the role of race in human relations. Race relations in southern Africa is an international problem not just because African states want it to be. It has global significance because of its increasing role in shaping the relations within and between all nations and, perhaps most important, because of its relevance to the very essence of humanity: man's relationship with man. In this lecture, race relations throughout southern Africa will be discussed. In lecture §81, the situation in the Republic of South Africa will be examined in
greater detail. In lecture #82, the remnants of colonialism (especially Portuguese Africa) will be discussed.

1. The Regional Structure of White Control

The political, economic, and ideological heartland of white domination in southern Africa lies in the Republic of South Africa, more particularly in the urban and rural areas stretching from the Transvaal, through Orange Free State and into Cape Province. Fringing this heartland is a complicated set of buffer regions separating it from black Africa to the north. This buffer zone consists of five major components.

a. The Portuguese Colonies of Angola and Mozambique: About 350,000 whites retain control over more than 11 million blacks in these two territories. Particularly important to South Africa is southern Mozambique, where the port of Lourenco Marques serves as a major outlet for the highly industrialized Witwatersrand area of Transvaal.

b. Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe): A key link in the buffer zone since Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965, Rhodesia has moved steadily closer to South Africa economically and ideologically.

c. Former High Commission Territories (Swaziland, Lesotho, and Botswana): These states are legally independent enclaves within the South African economic sphere of influence (to which they are tightly tied). Although each is strategically located with respect to the heartland and potentially a base for anti-South African activity, all three are so dependent economically upon South Africa that they must struggle to avoid becoming de facto Bantustans.
d. Bantustans (Within the Boundaries of South Africa): The first Bantustan to be established was the Transkei. Although they have some degree of legal autonomy, the Bantustans and other "Bantu areas" scheduled to be consolidated into Bantustans are essentially internal colonies of South Africa. (See lecture #81).

e. South West Africa (Namibia): This former German colony and League of Nations Mandate remains under South African control despite the 1966 U.N. statement recognizing it as a U.N. trust territory. South Africa treats this area as an integral part of the state and in recent years has extended into South West Africa its apartheid policies.

Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, the Bantustans, and South West Africa essentially form the major inner portion of the buffer zone, with Angola, Mozambique, and Southern Rhodesia the outer flank. It might also be added that Malawi (under Dr. Hastings Banda) retains close relations with South Africa and has become increasingly dependent upon South African aid.

2. Race Relations in the Portuguese Territories.

Duffy (1962) notes the following:

"Until 1930 native police was only incidental to the administration and exploitation of Angola and Moçambique. The African majority was ignored, enslaved, or 'pacified', depending upon the necessities of the age, and Portuguese actions and attitudes were based on little more than expediency."

Since 1930, a policy was instituted permitting Africans to enter a privileged class of assimilated persons--assimilados--and thereby become Portuguese citizens. To do so, the African had to be eighteen years of age, prove his ability to speak Portuguese, submit a birth certificate,
a certificate of residence, a certificate of good health, a declaration of loyalty, two testimonies of his good character, and pay various fees equivalent to sixty dollars. In return, he could travel around his own country without receiving permission, did not have to pay the head tax, was exempt from contract (forced) labor, could receive (theoretically) the same pay as a European doing the same job, vote, and become certified as "Europeanized". In 1950, Angola had about 30,000 assimilados (out of nearly 4 million Africans) and Mozambique just over 4,300 (out of 5.7 million Africans). Since that time, there has probably been no significant increase in these figures.

Before some minor reforms in the early 1960's, the population of Portuguese Africa was divided into two legal categories: the indígenas (non-assimilated Africans) and the não-indígenas (whites and the assimilated African or mulattoes). In reality, the assimilados formed a third category although they were legally considered "non-indigenous". Race relations were guided by these three divisions, which became progressively more restrictive as population pressure in Portugal generated a stream of unskilled and often poorly educated migrants to the colonies. Thus, although theoretically aimed at assimilation, Portuguese colonial policy has been essentially based on cultural racism and inequality.

3. Race Relations in Southern Rhodesia

There has been a "color line" since the establishment of Southern Rhodesia in the 1890s. It was reinforced by the rigid partitioning of land between black and white and the favorable government policies toward
European immigration (e.g., the maintenance of artificially high salaries, even for relatively unskilled labor, in order to attract larger numbers of migrants). Up until about the time of UDI in 1965, there was a slow but progressive lessening of the social and economic gap between the African and European populations through improved education, economic development and urbanization. Whereas the Portuguese professed a policy of assimilation, the explicit goal of the British settlers in Southern Rhodesia has been a "partnership" between the races in which, after some unspecified time, Africans would eventually attain a policy of political equality. Racial restrictions and segregation were, therefore, not generally written into the law and there were some indications of increasing fluidity and interaction in the racial situation.

The election of Ian Smith followed by UDI, however, reversed this slow process of change and Southern Rhodesia today shows every sign of adapting the South African "model" of racial relations.

#81. Politics and Race in South Africa

Although there is some evidence that internal racial policy in South Africa still resembles what has been called baaskap ("boss-dom", a virtual master-slave relationship), the official racial policy of the South African government is based on the somewhat less restrictive concept of apartheid, or "separate development". Apartheid is presented as South
Africa's official solution to the challenge of cultural and racial pluralism—a solution which is perhaps without parallel anywhere in the world. Asserting that integration and racial mixing leads to cultural and moral decay as well as biological/genetic degradation, the South African government has presented a blueprint for separate living in which each major ethnic/racial segment of the population would develop at its own pace leading eventually to political independence of each group but close economic interdependence. Each group—White, "Bantu" (black African), Coloured (mixed race) and Asian—would have their own "homelands" where their distinctive cultures could be preserved in "pure" form. The "theory" of apartheid, however, has thus far borne little relationship to the realities of economic and racial relations which will be examined in greater detail in this lecture.

1. Racial Distribution in South Africa

The Republic of South Africa (RSA) has a population of about 20 million and is divided into four provinces: Transvaal, Orange Free State, Natal and Cape Province. Of this population, about 68% is African (or "Bantu" as they are called in RSA), consisting mainly of two groups, the Nguni (including the Xhosa, Zulu, and Swazi) and the Sotho (north and south Sotho and Tswana). Europeans represent about 19% of the total and are divided into two major groups: the Afrikaners (descendents of the early Dutch settlers and those who speak Afrikaans as their home language), and the English. The Afrikaner/English proportions are roughly 60-40. The Coloureds are a mixed racial group (Hottentot, Afrikaner, African)
forming almost 10% of the population. Almost all live in Cape Province and about 60% or more speak Afrikaans. The remaining 3% are Asiatics (mainly Indian), who are regionally concentrated in Natal Province, especially in the city of Durban. The white population is heavily urbanized, but does not form the majority in any major city in RSA. In Johannesburg, the nearly 370,000 whites are outnumbered almost two to one by Africans.

2. The Origins of Apartheid

In more than half a century of existence, South Africa has systematically attempted to consolidate white power and dominance, despite frequent and often quite forceful African resistance. The major turning point for white control came in 1948, when the National Party, led primarily by Afrikaners, swept into power. From this time, the social and territorial separation of races began to be firmly solidified through a massive battery of discriminatory legislation. Africans were completely removed from the voting rolls and from all positions of influence regarding the law-making process. In essence, South Africa legislated a reversal of major historical trends which had been affecting the entire world. In order to rationalize this move and to guarantee white supremacy, the policy of apartheid was developed. Sources of support were sought in Old Testament theology as interpreted by the South African Dutch Reformed Church, which incorporated apartheid into its religious teaching. More subtle support came from simple expediency--the view that apartheid was the only possible course given the uniqueness of the South African racial situation. (It
was argued that more "moral" alternatives could not work.) In this way, the Afrikaners were able to rally the English-speaking population to their side and subsequently enforce apartheid laws and policies with the creation of perhaps the most formidable police state the world has ever known. Alan Paton, the leading white South African writer has called apartheid "the finest blend of idealism and cruelty ever devised by man."

3. What Apartheid Means to the Black African

Africans cannot vote, have no political standing or influence, and no recognized right to protest against anything in the 86% of South African territory which is considered the white "homeland" (with its overwhelming non-white majority!) Passes or permits are required to travel, to change address, to seek work, to enter a town, to reside in town, to be out after dark. It is a criminal offense to sit on a park bench, ride a bus, or enter a hotel, restaurant or toilet which is for "whites only." An African who was born in a town and lived there for fifty years cannot by right reside somewhere else and then return to his birthplace for more than 72 hours and cannot have African friends visit him for more than 72 hours. Until an African has lived in a town for 15 years and worked for the same employer for 10 years, neither his wife nor his dependent daughter is entitled to live with him for more than 72 hours. Any policeman is entitled, without warrant, to enter and search at any time any premises in a town where he believes an 18 year old boy might be committing the criminal offense of living with his father.

The press, with very minor exceptions, is tightly controlled. An
Intricate network of African informers pervades every corner of the country. Barbed wire surrounds most of the African urban compounds. The prison population proportion is one of the highest in the world. Any direct criticism of government policy is almost invariably met with severe repression. A black man and a white man cannot sit down for a cup of tea together without a special permit. All major critics of apartheid (white or black) are viewed as Communist sympathizers and many, including Alan Paton, are severely restricted in what they can write and even in the number of people they may invite to their homes.

On a more general level, apartheid means the creation of poor, semi-autonomous Bantustans in a horseshoe-shaped area surrounding the developed heartland of South Africa. These Bantustans such as the Transkei would be forced to remain almost totally dependent upon white South Africa, which hopes to join them with similar labor resource zones in Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland and parts of South West Africa. Today, the Bantustan area contains about 43% of the African population in only about 13% of the area of RSA. Some of this land is fertile and well-watered but nearly all is overcrowded and badly affected by soil erosion. It could not, without enormous financial aid, support viable African economies even with just its present population. The remaining Africans (57%) live outside these areas and probably the majority of these have never seen their supposed "homelands." The South African government has expressed willingness to invest heavily in the Bantustans, but this has been met with resistance by white businessmen who claim that they are being discriminated against and that
which is based in Congo-Kinshasa and is supported by the thousands of Angolan refugees who have fled into that country.

Although Dr. Salazar, the prime architect of contemporary Portuguese policy in Africa, retired as head of state in 1968, (having served since 1930), there is no indication of a change in Portuguese policy. The liberation movements are also growing in their determination to achieve independence, and are both carrying out military activities and making appeals to the United Nations.

2. The Issue of Southern Rhodesia

From 1890 to 1923, Southern Rhodesia was administered under Royal Charter by the British South Africa Company. Since 1923, it has been a "self-governing colony", dominated by the local white settler group. A small number of Africans had the vote on a restrictive (but color-blind) franchise, but there were no Africans in the legislature until 1962. At that time voting rolls were divided on an economic basis which allocated only a small number of seats to the low income group. Under this arrangement, Britain gave up its "reserve powers", but did not extend independence to Rhodesia. From 1953-63 Southern Rhodesia had been part of the Central African Federation, with Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi)--a federation always opposed by African spokesmen who resented the domination of white settlers in Southern Rhodesia.

In 1964, a year after the federation was dissolved, Zambia and Malawi became independent, and white Rhodesians demanded the same status. Britain refused on the grounds that the Rhodesian government was not
The three major zones of colonialism (defined as external alien rule) in Africa today are the Portuguese territories, the Southern Rhodesian situation, and the few remaining Spanish and French areas. Although the Republic of South Africa's control over South West Africa (Namibia) has been declared illegal, it will not be considered in this lecture.

1. The Portuguese Territories

There are five Portuguese territories in Africa (population estimates are for 1965): Angola (5,000,000 population, including 230,000 whites), Mozambique (6,300,000 Africans, 130,000 Europeans, 50,000 Asians), Portuguese Guinea (600,000 Africans, 7,000 Europeans), Cape Verde Islands (165,000 Africans, 3,200 Europeans), and São Tomé and Príncipe Islands (62,000 Africans, 1,200 Europeans).

All five are regarded as Overseas Provinces of Greater Portugal. All or parts have been ruled by Portugal for over 400 years. Portugal has come to be economically dependent on the larger of these territories: Angola and Mozambique contribute approximately 25% of the Portuguese annual budget.

Portugal does not consider these territories to be "colonies" but integral parts of Portugal. As mentioned in lectures #80-81, Portugal has followed a policy of "assimilation" (unlike South Africa) whereby a relatively small proportion (about 2%) of Africans have become citizens by
learning Portuguese, becoming Catholic, and occupationally self-sufficient (see lecture #80 for further qualifications). The Portuguese government feels itself to have a "Christian civilizing mission", and is proud of its "official" non-racial history. (Portugal has encouraged racial inter-marriage, and a significant number of persons in Portuguese Africa and Portugal are mulatto.)

For those Africans who do not assimilate, however, there has been a system of forced labor and lack of rights which approaches certain forms of slavery. A pass-card system similar to that in South Africa, large scale use of physical punishments, and a highly efficient intelligence service keep close control over the African population.

For the past several years, there have been increasing numbers of guerrilla liberation movements in Mozambique, Angola, and Portuguese Guinea. There are "nationalist" governments-in-exile in Tanzania, Congo-Kinshasa, and Guinea respectively. The Portuguese government has responded by drafting Portuguese young men to fight these movements (with NATO planes). Villages which are suspected of sympathy for the nationalists are bombed in air strikes. A major liberation movement in Mozambique has been FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Mocambique), which, until his recent assassination in Dar es Salaam, was led by Eduardo Mondlane (a Northwestern University Ph.D. and former Professor at Syracuse). A second major liberation movement has been COREMO. In Angola, there are several liberation movements and one problem has been to coordinate their efforts. One of the main movements has been the UPA (União das Populações de Angola),
which is based in Congo-Kinshasa and is supported by the thousands of Angolan refugees who have fled into that country.

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In 1964, a year after the federation was dissolved, Zambia and Malawi became independent, and white Rhodesians demanded the same status. Britain refused on the grounds that the Rhodesian government was not
supported by the majority of the population. Ian Smith was elected Prime Minister and in November 1965 unilaterally and unconstitutionally declared Rhodesia to be sovereign and independent. The phrase UDI (Unilateral Declaration of Independence) became a rallying call for European settlers in Rhodesia and a symbol of repression and racism for Africans.

The irony of the Rhodesian situation is that African states have demanded that Britain fulfill its "legal colonial right" to suppress the "rebellion". It was clear to African leaders of all persuasions by 1965 that Britain was anxious to encourage an African majority government in Rhodesia. Still, the rebellion of Ian Smith created a new type of colonialism in the minds of African spokesmen, for local white minority rule now appeared comparable to the repressive South African situation. Despite the imposition of economic sanctions against Rhodesia on British request, and in accord with resolutions passed in the United Nations, the government of Ian Smith has survived, largely due to the support of the South African and Portuguese governments.

Prior to UDI, there were two African nationalist movements in Rhodesia (or "Zimbabwe" as the nationalists called it): the Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union (ZAPU) led by Joshua Nkomo, and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) led by Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole. Both leaders (and many supporters) are in prison but both parties have continued to work in exile, although separately, for the independence of Zimbabwe. As the guerrilla thrusts have increased, South Africa has supplied arms and some troops to support the white Rhodesians.
The population of Southern Rhodesia in 1964 was approximately 4,210,000 of whom only 217,000 were Europeans. The issue of the freedom of the four million Africans has become a matter of high priority for both the individual adjacent African states and the Organization of African Unity.

3. Spanish and French Enclaves

The territory of Equatorial Guinea (consisting of the island of Fernando Po and the mainland area of Rio Muni) became independent from Spain in the fall of 1968. Yet the territory of Spanish Sahara is still actively claimed by Mauritania, and Ceuta is claimed by Morocco. Current Spanish claims to Gibraltar (from the British), which is within viewing distance of the African continent, are based on principles of "decolonization" which would seem to be applicable to the few remaining Spanish colonies on the northwestern rim of Africa. There are no apparent movements, however, to end Spanish control of these areas.

As mentioned in earlier lectures, most French colonies in Africa gained their independence in about 1960. The French Territory of Afars and Issas (FTAI), however, remains a colony of considerably strategic importance to France (located on the straits between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean). Also, the capital city of Djibouti has become a major port and railhead into Ethiopia. Of the 81,000 total population (1960) there were 30,500 Afar peoples, 24,000 Issa peoples, 3,000 Europeans, and about 6,000 Arabs. Although a recent plebiscite was held in FTAI in which the population voted to remain associated with France, many observers
have questioned the pressure brought to bear on the voters, and have noted the active and armed nationalist activity in the area.

4. Conclusions

The remnants of colonialism in Africa are almost exclusively concentrated in the southern portion of the continent. European settlers, as in Kenya and Algeria prior to independence, are prepared to use power and force to maintain their positions. The result has been a potential for violence which will clearly have major international repercussions, parallel perhaps to the continuing Middle East crisis. The Republic of South Africa is probably the key to the future of white domination in southern Africa. Many African nationalists, however, have increasingly concentrated on the "buffer zone" states first, since if isolated from each other, they are more vulnerable.

#83. Contemporary African Literature

In the CARTEY essay, a thematic and interpretative approach is taken to African literature. Students should be encouraged to read the actual African authors and develop their own interpretations. In this process it is important to realize that much of the literature written in French has not yet been translated; hence students should be cautious about generalizing about "Africa" from the English sources alone. (This would perhaps be comparable to generalizing about European literature on the basis of English literature.) In Africa, writers are using English,
French, and vernacular languages. Although the literature in English and French is more likely to be accorded a place in world literature, in the long run it may be the vernacular literature (e.g. Swahili, Hausa, Yoruba) which may more truly come to be regarded as "African literature". For purposes of this lecture, however, attention will be focused on the English and French speaking authors, and their contribution to world literature.

1. Contemporary African Authors

As CARTEY stresses, African literature must be placed in social context. Since there is a wide diversity of social contexts in Africa, it may be useful to review some of the biographical characteristics of the major African authors and to try to relate these details to the social context in which the author is working. Chinua Achebe, for example, is "minister of information" for Biafra, while Wole Soyinka is currently in jail in Kaduna for alleged subversive activities against the Nigerian Federal Government. In both cases, the civil war situation in Nigeria has clearly affected their recent writing.

In broadest terms, African authors may be grouped into four categories: (1) English-speaking West African; (2) French-speaking West African (including Cameroon); (3) English-speaking East African; and (4) Southern African. Within these major cultural contexts, it would also be important to know the national and ethnic identities of the authors, so that background reading or cultural influences could be
undertaken, if desired, by students. An author's educational history may also be important, as well as some notion of the range of literary forms which he is capable of using (e.g. poetry, drama, novel, short story). This information is usually available from the literature itself, but is summarized in figure 1.

**figure #1**

**Biographical Characteristics of Authors**

Cited in BIBLIOGRAPHY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Literary Forms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. West Africa (English-speak-ing)</td>
<td>1. Achebe, Chinua</td>
<td>Nigeria (Biafra)</td>
<td>Ibo</td>
<td>Ibadan University</td>
<td>novel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Ekwensi, Cyprian</td>
<td>Nigeria (Biafra)</td>
<td>Ibo</td>
<td>Pharmacy</td>
<td>novel/short story</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Tutuola, Amos</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Yoruba</td>
<td>little formal education</td>
<td>novel/stories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Soyinka, Wole</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Yoruba</td>
<td>Ibadan University</td>
<td>novel, drama, poetry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. West Africa (French speak-ing)</td>
<td>5. Bete, Mongo</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Bete</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>novel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. Oyono, Ferdinand</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td></td>
<td>Paris/Diplomat</td>
<td>novel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. Diop, David</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td></td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>novel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Themes in African Literature

In CARTEY, there are six categories selected to represent the range of thematic concerns of the contemporary African writers. (mainly novelists). Some of these themes, such as confrontation of black and white, have a geographical (e.g. South Africa) or time (e.g. colonial period) context. Others, such as "the nature of Man", are not bounded by time and place.

a. Autobiography: Examples are given of Peter Abrahams, Camera Laye, and others, who have used the story of their own lives to illuminate the rich mixture of feelings, thought, and behavior, which are perhaps, prototypically Africa. The work by Laye, in particular, is not an
historical autobiography, but an interior monolog of the sort found in James Joyce's early writings.

b. Confrontation of Black and White: Writers such as Achebe, Oyono, and Bete, deal with the impact of colonialism on traditional societies. Ngugi of Kenya focuses more directly on white settler/African relations, and all the South African writers find that their universe is defined by patterns of black/white relations.

c. Alienation: This refers, in particular, to the discontinuity of feelings and relationships of the younger, educated, urban Africans from their older, traditional, rural families. The "generation gap" is probably large in Africa, and the urbanization rate, as mentioned earlier, is probably the highest in the world. It is against this setting that African authors have sought to define new identities and to reassess old ones.

d. Search For the Political Kingdom: Nigerian writers in particular have been caught in the cross-tides of political crisis and have used their pens to draw in fine point the corruption and chaos of the civilian regimes, the frustration of their military successors. There are a few authors who look to the future for brighter days. The recent volume by Armah (Ghana) *The Beautiful Ones Are Not Yet Born*, is perhaps an illustration of this type of writing.

e. Negritude: This is primarily a phenomenon found in French-speaking Africa, coming to a peak in the 1950s and early 1960s when the realization that Africans were not Frenchmen reached its climax.

f. The Nature of Man: In many ways this theme encompasses all of the others yet goes beyond them in its search for the universal in mankind,
the depth and breadth of human emotions and behavior which only incidentally are acted out within an African context. Some of the stories by Amos Tutuola, although particularistic in their reliance on Yoruba proverbs and legends, are truly universal in their representation of quest for moral and spiritual truth.

3. The Readership of African Literature

It is important to identify the audience for whom African literature is intended and the actual patterns of readership. Most African authors find themselves caught between several worlds: the western (often university) world of their academic colleagues, the traditional world of their childhood, and the emerging world of contemporary African life. Furthermore, some of the writers from South Africa or Portuguese territories are in exile, and their works are prohibited in these areas.

As a result, many African authors have claimed to be writing for themselves. They are their own critics and audience. Historically, many of the African writers were read more widely in Europe than in Africa. This is changing dramatically, however, as secondary schools and colleges in Africa have begun to offer courses on African literature and as inexpensive editions are available both in the original language and in translation throughout the continent. It is clear that African authors are increasingly writing for an African audience.
Architecture refers to the full range of structures built by man, from rudimentary shelters to grain elevators and skyscrapers. Their arrangement in space and interrelationship in form and function as part of the urban scene represents urban design. This, however, also involves a scale which extends beyond simple clusters of buildings to include the patterning of activity areas (residential, commercial, industrial, etc.) within the city. At this scale, urban design represents a major component of urban or town planning. Both of these scales of urban design—individual structure and clusters of related buildings, and the broader patterns of urban "ecology"—will be discussed in this lecture with regards to their distinctive developments in the African context. To an increasing extent, African cities and modern architecture are having an impact on international patterns of the building arts.

1. Buildings and Architecture

Many of the traditional residential structures in rural Africa achieved an attractive and distinctive form which reflected a close adjustment to the local environment and available resources and technology. Nearly all were simple structures built with various combinations of grass, thatch, clay and mud, with reinforcements of wood branches, wattle, and occasionally woven basketry. In the more centralized societies, political and religious buildings were much larger and more imposing structures—the stone cities of Kush; the massive churches, palaces, and stelae of
Ethiopia; the palaces of the Yoruba kings (see Ojo, Yoruba Palaces); the mosques of Timbuktu and Djenne.

In those areas where pre-colonial urbanization existed, urban architectural style often represented a dense clustering of much the same type of house which existed in rural areas. Thus the typical Yoruba town consisted of compact groups of compounds densely packed near the Oba's palace in the center of the urban area. Each compound generally consisted of a rectangular clay and laterite structure surrounding a central court, which was rimmed with a terrace and protective "awning." The compound consisted of several rooms to house the extended family and was fairly cool and comfortable. In the Islamic urban areas, however, buildings followed the form of Middle Eastern houses--rectangular in shape, sometimes with two stories, built with mud generally reinforced with branches. The flat roofs with low parapets provided airy terraces where, in the cool evenings, the family could gather together. Large portions of such cities as Ibadan, Kano and Mombasa still consist of structures very much like those which the local people have lived in for generations. The major concession to "modern" architectural materials has often been the adaption of corrugated iron, "tin" or aluminum roofs and the widespread use of cement.

Most of the larger cities in Africa, however, especially those designated by MABOGUNJE as "Colonial" and "European", and major portions of the "rejuvenated traditional" towns, are composed (at least in the central areas and wealthier suburbs) of Western European or European-
influenced buildings. During the early colonial period, most construction was derived from 19th century European architecture. It was plain and practical, but too often ugly and unsuited to the local environment.

Since World War II, however, there has been a remarkable growth of contemporary architecture which has transformed the urban scene in Africa. Every major European architectural office is represented in Africa, often working closely with local architectural firms and designers to create an effective blend between African and Western forms and styles. They have produced some of the freshest and most attractive solutions to tropical architecture and urban design, especially in the construction of major public buildings. The degree to which these structures and styles have been accepted by Africans has suggested to many observers a high degree of commonality between traditional African forms and contemporary European forms, especially with respect to simplification, economy of decoration, and functional orientation. African architectural students who frequently move from simple huts to the modern LeCorbusier-like buildings at the major universities (some of which, like Ahmadu Bello in northern Nigeria, with large architectural degree programs) appear to make the shift with much less "shock" than might be expected. Furthermore, it is remarkable how aesthetically pleasing and "comfortable" many of these modern buildings appear on the African landscape.

Some of the outstanding examples of modern architecture in Africa include such hotels as the Ambassador in Accra, the Pan-Afric in Nairobi, the Kilimanjaro in Dar es Salaam, and the Premier in Ibadan; the University
College Hospital in Ibadan (designed by a Chicago firm); and nearly all the major African universities. The University of Ibadan, largely designed by the British firm of Maxwell Frye in conjunction with local architects, is particularly attractive. The careful attention to ventilation through the use of louvered vents and concrete sun-screens has produced a remarkably airy and cool atmosphere. In addition, light colors are used in the concrete and the grillwork. Some of the more recently constructed faculty residences, such as those for the Rockefeller Foundation visiting faculty, are especially well designed. Huge screened-in porches surround spacious living and dining rooms, from which they are separated by sliding glass doors. These houses tend to remain cool even during the day—without air conditioning (which is available in the bedrooms and study).

2. Urban Design and Town Planning

Town planning is both a practical necessity in Africa and an aesthetic challenge. As mentioned in lectures #44-46 on urbanization, most large African cities are growing at rates which are among the highest in the world. Planning is necessary to ensure that transportation, sewage, health, shopping and residential facilities are available. Such planning is occurring both within African metropolitan government circles and by contract with European firms.

The Institute of Tropical Architecture in London, for example, is working closely on at least two major town planning schemes in Africa: the Agege suburb of Lagos (Nigeria) and the Gezira township in Sudan.
Indigenous sociologists as well as engineers and architects work together to design the urban infrastructure and provide the cost accounting which will both be acceptable to the local people and within the financial means of the government. Published town planning reports are available for many major cities in Africa, such as Kaduna, Kano, and Kampala. One of the earliest and most imaginative town planning schemes (beginning in the early 1950s) which has come to fruition, has been the Tema project in Ghana. Since Accra is not an ocean port, the nearby site of Tema was selected and developed, virtually from nothing, into a modern, well-planned combination residential, industrial and port town.

The large cities in French-speaking Africa, to an even greater extent than in English-speaking Africa, are modern and well designed. They tend to be laid out in a grid-like symmetry which is reminiscent of Paris (or Washington D.C., which was the first planned city in the United States). In several French-speaking areas, the "traditional" cities have been bulldozed down to make room for a more grid-like reconstruction of modern cities, (for example the Hausa town of Tahoua in Niger Republic).

In other areas, however, the traditional towns have remained standing in immediate proximity to the "new cities", often providing an aesthetic reminder of the cultural dualism of modern Africa. The old and new cities of Fez, Casablanca and Marrakesh (in Morocco); and the same urban coupling in English-speaking Africa (e.g. Kano, Sokoto, Ibadan, and Maiduguri in Nigeria) is not unique to Africa (it is perhaps best illustrated by Istanbul, Turkey), but has become characteristic of many cities in Africa.
The growth of modern airports, which are usually several miles outside of town, has resulted in the mushrooming of modern supporting complexes, (including new hotels, clinics, shopping districts, tourist facilities, etc.) These developments provided an aesthetic and practical challenge. The airport and supporting complex of Dakar is perhaps one of the most beautiful in the world, overlooking the warm beaches and linked by modern highway to the city of Dakar. The airport in Lagos has precipitated the development of a wealthy and modern supporting complex.

In summary, the growth of towns and cities in Africa has often resulted in the overcrowding and shanty-towns described in lecture #46. It has also resulted in some of the most imaginative architecture and urban design observable in the modern world.

## Visual Arts and Music

The best in contemporary African art and music represents a striking blend of traditional African styles and motifs with a variety of "external" influences, primarily Western and, to some extent, Arabic-Islamic. At the same time, however, there has been a proliferation of "poor imitation" art, often crudely executed and highly commercialized (such as the "airport" curios which have been imported in increasing numbers to Europe and America). In this lecture, some attention will be given to both of these distinctive features of contemporary African art and music.
1. Contemporary Visual Art in Africa

Traditional African sculpture played an important role in liberating "Modern Art" from its nineteenth-century naturalism. Although much of the social meaning deriving from its functional use was neglected, traditional African interpretations of form and expression powerfully influenced such outstanding Western artists as Picasso, Braque, Klee, Roualt, Modigliani, Derain and Vlaminck. Today, African artists have become increasingly part of a cosmopolitan world of modern art, working with both universal genres and distinctly African themes.

In the period just prior to the late nineteen-fifties, there appeared to be an aesthetic lull in African art. Traditional art seemed to be "fossilizing", as traditional carvers either became carpenters or joined together in co-operatives to produce curios for Western tourists. As noted in the excellent volume by Ulli Beier (1968), an Austrian refugee, who encouraged the growth of contemporary African art through his many workshops, this "airport art" was

"... hideous because it is carried out without conviction or care and simply repeats the empty forms of tradition. In many areas the carvers have become completely cynical and specialize in forging antiquities."

The spirit of optimism and confidence which preceded independence, however, generated an enthusiastic rebirth of African art, first in the form of bright and colorful "popular art", and then in what Beier calls "the coming of the intellectual African artist." Popular art (within the African context) produced the oddly attractive cement lions on Yoruba
houses and the elaborate concrete and wooden grillwork on homes and public buildings; the elaborate paintings and murals throughout Africa; and the new attention to textile design and embroidery. The "intellectual African artist" on the other hand, has produced some of the finest contemporary world art in nearly every medium. Even tourist art in certain areas has begun to evolve away from empty imitation of "traditional" art and toward original and interesting forms. One good example is the appearance of tremendously diverse and non-serialized carvings of the Makonde, a group who migrated from Mozambique to Tanzania (mainly Dar es Salaam) to work for the tourist shops (see A. Stout, 1967).

Perhaps the outstanding artists' colony in Africa has developed in the city of Oshogbo (Nigeria), largely focused at the Mbari Mbayo Club. Beier, who played a major role in Oshogbo, describes in detail the incredible range of art and artists to emerge in this area. In his Contemporary Art in Africa, (1968) there are descriptions and illustrations of the intricate and surrealistic gouaches and etchings of Twins Seven-Seven (one of the best-known of the Oshogbo artists), the beadwork and mosaics of Jimoh Buraimoh, the sensitive and sophisticated oil paintings of Muraina Oyelami, the gentle and decorative aluminum reliefs of Asiru Olatunde and the incredibly enchanting cement sculpture of the Oshun Shrine (produced in large part by Suzanne Wenger, an outstanding Austrian artist who has lived in Nigeria since 1950, became deeply absorbed into Yoruba culture, and is now a priestess of Obatala, the Yoruba creator god). The enormous individualism in the art produced in Oshogbo alone illustrates
how difficult it is to speak of "African artists" in general.

It is appropriate to conclude this section with one further quote from Beier (p. 14)

"The African artist has refused to be fossilized . . . the African artist does not hesitate to adopt new materials, be inspired by foreign art, look for a different role in society. New forms, new styles and new personalities are emerging everywhere and this contemporary African art is rapidly becoming as rich and as varied as were the more rigid artistic conventions of several generations ago."

2. Contemporary Music in Africa

As in the other arts, contemporary music in Africa is emerging as a blend of traditional and modern influences. Much of this music is becoming available in the United States through record albums and visiting African performers. Thus, the songs of South African vocalist Miriam Makeba (Kapp Records), the Afro-percussion of Olatunji (Columbia label), and even the innovative chorale music of the Missa Luba (Philips label), sung by Congolese (of the Luba ethnic group) are all readily available. The visiting performances of the Ballet Africaine or the Ghana Dancers (under the direction of Master Drummer Dr. Nketia) are known both through live performances and through television coverage.

In Africa itself, however, there is an extremely broad range of musical innovation. This seems to be occurring in three distinct contexts: (1) the universities; (2) the churches; (3) the night-clubs.

In the African universities, both through formal disciplines and through informal improvisation, there is a broad range of experimentation. At Makerere University (Uganda) recently, the first all-African opera was
performed (i.e. composed, directed, and performed by Africans). At University of Ghana (Legon) there has been two decades of experimentation with synthesizing of West Indian calypso, West African High-life, and European classical music forms. The solo guitar improvisation of musician-scholars such as Onyena or Wiredu are clearly precursors of the Bach jazz in this country.

In the churches of Africa, musical innovation has occurred largely in the Zionist and independent churches (see lecture #42). Traditional drumming is used in some of the European imported hymns, which are modified almost beyond recognition. The Missa Luba and Missa Bantu of the Congo are Roman Catholic masses performed to African rhythm. (Both are available on Philips records). As an aside, it should be mentioned that Islamic liturgies (called Ishirinya) have also been modified to African musical style. This is noticeable throughout the entire Sudanic belt.

The night clubs of Africa are world famous for their High-life. This blend of jazz, calypso, and African traditional music is found in the dozens of clubs which have mushroomed in every African city. Dozens of small-scale African recording companies turn out albums by named bands which are avidly collected by young urban men and women.

In all three of these contexts (university, churches, clubs) there is an experimentation not only with musical forms (e.g. rhythm, harmony, scale, pitch) but with instrumentation as well. The electric guitar and the saxophone have joined with the full range of tonal drums and beaded calabashes to express the dynamism of the new Africa.
What has been the imprint of the Afro-American community on the modern culture of the Western Hemisphere? This question, which is the basis of all "Afro-American Studies" programs, can only be posed in brief in this lecture. Yet it is clearly related to African studies, for this black "diapora", transplanted from Africa primarily by force, consists of nearly a third of the world's black people. Only three aspects of Afro-American culture will be dealt with in this lecture: survivals of African culture and influence in the New World; the historical interpretations of these survivals and their incorporation into New World cultures; and the contemporary re-evaluation of the African legacy by both descendants and non-descendants of the African tradition.

1. African Cultural Survivals

The nature of African influence in the Americas and the degree to which it has survived appear to be related to three main factors:

(1) sheer numbers or degree of concentration of the African population;
(2) the patterns of segregation and physical isolation separating black Africans from other peoples;
(3) and the relative technological and economic stagnation (or growth) of the areas in which Afro-Americans are found. Consequently, probably the most direct and longest-lasting African influences in the New World exist in Brazil (especially the Northeast), in Haiti (which remains overwhelmingly African in its population) and in many other Caribbean islands, (where the population is also primarily African in descent). Here the full range of African influences--in
language, folk literature, religion, art, dance and music--can be identified as prominent elements of contemporary society. The Yoruba language, for example, is still spoken in northeast Brazil (and in parts of Cuba), along with Fon (from Dahomey) and Kambundu (from Angola). Yoruba religion, often blended into the Catholic Church, still remains clearly identifiable in Brazil and many other areas.

Nearly all of Spanish-speaking America represents a second major pattern. Generally much less dependent in the past upon African slaves than Portuguese-speaking Brazil (where the African slave trade formed one of the central facts of its history), most of Spanish America has probably been much less directly influenced by the African legacy. Where large numbers of Africans were brought in, as in Mexico, they played an important role in cultural and economic development. The slave system tended to be less brutal than in Brazil and the United States and the Catholic Church tended to act as a distinct tempering influence. Van den Berghe (1967) notes that:

Of all the multiracial societies created by the expansion of Europe since the late fifteenth century, those of Spanish America stand out as exhibiting only traces of the racist virus. Indeed, most of these countries constitute such limiting cases that one may more properly speak of ethnic relations.

A third pattern has been shaped by the rigid segregation and racism of the early period in the United States. Here the influence of African culture was much less direct and/sublimated except when it served to reinforce the master-slave relationship. African cultural survivals either became submerged beneath the attempts to create a homogeneous American culture
or were utilized as popular stereotypes (generally disparaging) to characterize the minority black population. Nevertheless, the number of African cultural survivals within the black community in the United States is much larger than generally presumed. The Gullah dialect of coastal South Carolina and Georgia, for example, still contains thousands of words of African origin. Afro-Americans throughout the country still have basically African first names or "Americanized" equivalents. First names in West Africa often reflected particular events or feelings at the time of birth. A child born at the time of a good harvest, for example, might receive a name representing the bountifulness of the earth. Eartha Kitt, the Afro-American singer, claims this as the source of her own first name. Many other African words have entered the general vocabulary: goober (for peanut), gumbo (for okra), juke (as in jukebox) and samba (the dance). The Brer Rabbit stories and southern folktales of the tortoise and the hare (like "Miss Nancy" the spider stories in Jamaica), clearly have African origins. The samba, rhumba, tango, malaguenha, and even the Charleston can be traced directly to African words and rhythms. Foster's "Camp-Town Races" is virtually identical to a song Yoruba women still sing to their children. Jazz and blues are overwhelmingly African-influenced. African artistic skills played an important role in the industrial development of the U.S. South—in weaving, toolmaking, building construction and decoration. (See HAMMOND for further discussion of these cultural survivals.)

2. Use and Misuse of the African Legacy.

Interpretations of the African legacy in the New World, as previously
mentioned, vary greatly. In most of Latin America, the powerful African cultural influences have prompted many scholars to re-evaluate the contribution of Africa to their cultural heritage. This, of course, is particularly true in Brazil. (The degree of racial prejudice in Brazil is still a controversial question. Most Brazilians claim there is no race discrimination, only class discrimination. Van den Berghe, 1967, and Banton, 1967, however, take a very different view.)

In the United States, however, the acknowledgment of the African legacy has been greatly complicated by the use of African cultural survivals by the predominant white population to create a racial stereotype. This has been a common development in the history of race relations in the West. As Van den Berghe (1967) notes:

There is no question that the desire to rationalize exploitation of non-European peoples fostered the elaboration of a complex ideology of paternalism and racism, with its familiar themes of grownup childishness, civilizing mission, atavistic savagery, and arrested evolution.

Thus much of the African legacy was selectively interpreted as part of the mythology of white racial superiority. Condescension accompanied the recognition of distinctive Afro-American cultural characteristics while, at the same time, public policy proclaimed the complete erasure of African culture among black Americans and their absorption into the melting pot of the predominant American culture.

3. Contemporary Re-evaluations of the African Legacy

Merely identifying African survivals in the United States, given the
complex system of race relations mentioned above, is thus a delicate procedure in large part because of the prevailing white attitudes toward some of these survivals. Thus "Sambo" is a legitimate name in West Africa, but has become a pejorative name in the United States. On the other hand, there are probably many more cultural survivals than is generally recognized. For example, family names such as "Peul" (the Fulani word for themselves) clearly became anglicized in some instances into "Pool"; (the pronunciation is exactly the same). It is becoming increasingly evident that a complete re-evaluation of the African legacy must be undertaken letting the chips fall where they may. As HAMMOND states, however, the search for "Africanisms" is much less important than "the need for scholarly attention to such important questions as the effect of Negro slavery upon the quality and content of American life and culture and upon development of the America's critical problems of racism and poverty."

Part of the impact of Africa on the modern world will be in the rekindling of interest in African culture, through which, perhaps, a better understanding of western culture may be achieved.

#87. Afro-American Interpretations of Africa

As discussed in TURNER, there have been a full range of Afro-American interpretations and feelings about Africa; the shifts in feeling over time are particularly important and are likely to increase in intensity in the future.
1. Intellectual and Literary Interpretations

Increasingly in the twentieth century, the majority of Afro-American writers and intellectuals have tried to come to grips with the question of African identity. One of the earliest intellectuals was W.E.B. DuBois, who did his Ph.D. at Harvard on the topic of the African slave trade. Later, he came to write extensively about the place of Africa in the modern world (see, for example, The World and Africa) and the relationship of Afro-Americans to Africa. His early position suggested that Afro-Americans were neither African nor American, but a unique amalgamation of the two cultures. While he did not espouse a "return to Africa", many of his mature years were spent in support of the nationalist movements and the pan-African efforts in Africa. He eventually took up residence in Ghana under the Nkrumah regime, where he died and is buried.

The intellectual and literary career of Richard Wright is parallel to DuBois in many ways. He felt initially that Afro-Americans were neither African nor American, but a unique amalgamation. However, he too later took up residence in Ghana. His initial interpretation of Africa is contained in a volume entitled Black Power, which is an honest account of his difficulties as well as satisfactions in adjusting to African society.

The career of James Baldwin took him into "self-imposed exile" in Paris in the mid and late 1950s at precisely the time when many of the African intellectuals in Paris were involved in the negritude movement. Although Baldwin had close contacts with the circle of Présence Africaine writers and intellectuals, he did not become involved in the negritude
movement. In some of his essays (e.g. Nobody Knows My Name) he records his impressions of the Paris African writers. In the early and mid 1960s, Baldwin visited Africa for the first time, and the experience seems to have had a profound, if subtle, impact on his writing. In his most recent novel (Tell Me How Long the Train's Been Gone) Baldwin creates the protagonist as an Afro-American actor who through interior monologue recalls not only his own ghetto childhood but also his reverence for the beauty, mystery and warmth of Africa, the distant motherland.

Among contemporary writers and intellectuals there is a wide range of references to Africa. Pulitzer Prize poet Gwendolyn Brooks seems to question the relevance of Senegalese poet Senghor to the life and death issues of the Chicago ghetto (see In the Mecca). Others, such as Samuel Allen and Mercer Cook have been actively engaged in the translation of French-speaking African writers for an American audience.

In the late 1950s, the Présence Africaine literary group in Paris gave impetus to the creation of the American Society of African Culture (AMSAC), located in New York. AMSAC has sponsored conferences to explore the relationship of Afro-American culture to African culture, and many of these conferences have been published in book form (see Africa Seen by American Negroes, 1958; and The American Negro Writer and His Roots, 1960). AMSAC has also published a journal, African Forum, which deals with a full range of political, social, and literary issues.

2. Popular or Mass Interpretations

Perhaps the most significant shift in the 1960s, has been the way in
which Africa has become a reference point for the ordinary Afro-American, and is no longer the exclusive purview of the Afro-American intellectual. The manifestations of this shift have taken a variety of forms: political, social, and cultural. "Afro" fashions, hair styles, mannerisms and even the changing of names and use of Swahili slogans have become especially evident in the younger elements of the black community.

In terms of the mass media, journals such as Ebony and The Negro Digest, which have always covered Africa from a more-or-less middle class point of view, have been joined by journals such as The Liberator, which seeks to recreate or continue black nationalism in radical form within the United States. The Liberator differs from many earlier Afro-American journals in being brutally frank in its dislike for these contemporary African leaders (such as the late Tom Mboya of Kenya) who have taken a non-radical approach. Interestingly, The Black Panther Journal (which is an organ of the party), differs from many of the black nationalism approaches by stressing the solidarity of all oppressed groups rather than just black groups. In this, there seems to have been a conscious adaptation of the Nkrumah model (which is partly distinctive in its emphasis on cooperation between ideologically radical forces, whatever their skin color). The letters from Eldridge Cleaver (writing from Africa) to Stokely Carmichael in Ramparts (September and October, 1969) focuses precisely on the issue of "class" solidarity vs. "racial" solidarity.

The various Afro-American Muslim groups in the United States have
also come to stress identification with Africa. The Nation of Islam (commonly called "The Black Muslims") led by Elijah Muhammad from his Chicago headquarters, grew out of the Moorish Science group in the inter-war period, and began to look to black Africa as the homeland to which all Afro-Americans must someday repatriate. The writings of Malcolm X (see for example, The Speeches of Malcolm X at Harvard, 1968) clearly emphasize the fundamental importance of African identity to the reconstruction of black dignity in America. The first visit of Malcolm X to Africa (on his return from Mecca) in spring 1964, is recorded in his autobiography (1966). He is clearly overwhelmed by the positive reception he received in the various African countries. The split between Malcolm X and Elijah Muhammad (which led Malcolm to establish a counterpart organization in New York) was partly over the issue of the appropriate relationship between Afro-American muslims, the international world of Islam, and the black portions of the African continent. Malcolm appeared to be moving away from a black racist point of view, toward closer cooperation with Muslim communities throughout the world, whatever their color. The reaction of Eldridge Cleaver (who was a follower of Malcolm rather than Elijah Muhammad) to this matter is contained in Soul on Ice (1968).

Finally, it should be mentioned that television programs by Afro-Americans (especially in the northern urban areas) such as Black Journal or Our People seem to devote a significant proportion of time to the question of Afro-American interpretations of Africa. Such mass media is explicitly geared to the "ordinary" black person in America.
3. The Back-To-Africa Movements in America

The back-to-Africa movement of the 19th century, which focused on the return of freed slaves to the newly-created state of Liberia (meaning "Liberty"), has been discussed briefly in lecture #28. It was mentioned that the majority of the returning Afro-Americans of the 19th century seemed to reflect a disdain for the "pagan" Africans which led both to Afro-American missionary efforts among the African peoples, but also to the almost complete separation of the Americo-Liberian community from the interior "Protectorate" Africans. In short, the Liberian experiment was a return to a physical homeland, but not to a cultural homeland.

In the 1920s in New York, a second major back-to-Africa movement gained momentum through the efforts of Marcus Garvey. Garvey saw in the future a United States of Africa, which would give dignity to black men everywhere. He tried to raise money and manpower to enable the "black diaspora" to return to Africa and participate in the rebuilding of Africa. He died before he was able to achieve his own dream of returning to Africa, but his writings were collected and published by his wife (see The Philosophy of Marcus Garvey).

The Garvey movement had an impact outside of the New York area. Malcolm X recounts in his autobiography how his father (before his murder in Michigan) had been a Garvey follower and recruiter in the mid-west. The back-to-Africa movement of the Nation of Islam, mentioned above, seems to have derived some impetus from the Garvey movement.

On the contemporary scene there are a variety of movements which have
focused on the issue of whether Afro-Americans should or should not return to Africa. Yet surprisingly few individuals or groups of Afro-Americans take up residence in Africa. Some, such as the Black Hebrews (of Chicago) have migrated to Africa to begin a communal life. But other groups, such as those who espouse The New Republic of Africa (based on the demand for five southern states in the United States) have resisted the back-to-Africa movements and have stressed the need to build a sovereign state on the North American continent. The majority of those Afro-Americans who feel an identity with Africa seem to prefer to remain the United States.

4. Africa and Black Studies Programs

The demand for black studies programs in American educational institutions has raised the question of the relationship of African studies to Afro-American studies. A whole series of questions arise from this issue, and are being resolved in many different ways, depending on local needs and circumstances. Some of the questions seem to be as follows:

a) If Afro-American studies are to be related to African studies, what aspects of African studies should be stressed? (e.g. the pre-western empires and states? the confrontation between Europe and Africa? the rise of contemporary culture in Africa?)

b) What African languages, if any, should be taught in American schools? (e.g. only those with a written literature such as Amharic? those with a political vocabulary of racial confrontation such as Swahili in East Africa or Zulu in South Africa? those such as Yoruba or Twi from
West Africa where most Afro-Americans came from originally? or those languages such as Hausa in West Africa which are among the largest language groups in Africa?) For a discussion of the rationale for studying Swahili, see Ron Karanga (in Robinson, 1969, p. 54.)

c) in what ways should Afro-Americans ensure that they have some control over the inquiry into their historical roots? (The early work of W. L. Hansberry, Rayford Logan, and Elliott Skinner is well known and was important in the reassessment of African history and culture.) What should be the relationship between nationalist mythology and historical reality in Black Studies? (See Kilson, in Robinson, 1969, for problems of the intellectual validity of Black Studies.) Do the younger generation of Afro-American scholars who are working in African studies (such as Sylvester Whitaker, James Gibbs, Martin Kilron, John Willis, William Brown, Joseph Harris, etc.) have any special responsibility to the Afro-American community?

For an excellent discussion of these and other issues, see the proceedings of the Yale Symposium on Black Studies in the University (Robinson, 1969).

#88. African Interpretations of America

The impact of Africa on the Afro-American community has been considerable, although it will be the task of future historians to sift and judge the subtleties of this impact. Part of the impact has been politically
symbolic: the fact that within fifteen years nearly forty African states were able to cast off colonialism and attain their freedom. Part of the impact has been literary: the message of the negritude writers who rejected assimilation into European civilization. Part of the impact (especially since 1963) has been to legitimize a variety of types of black leadership. Future developments in Africa may do much to influence both white and black America.

1. African Students in America: Interpretations

At the moment there are several thousand African students studying in the United States. In the past, although the numbers were fewer, it may be useful to encourage students to speculate about the parallels between the different types of leadership styles in Africa and within the black community in the United States. Certain parallels in personality type might be found for example, in the following: Sékou Touré and Eldridge Cleaver; Julius Nyerere and Martin Luther King, Jr.; Houphouet-Boigny and Whitney Young; Jomo Kenyatta and W.E.B. DuBois; Leopold Senghor and James Baldwin; Kwame Nkrumah and Adam Clayton Powell; Nnandi Azikiwe and Roy Wilkins; Patrice Lumumba and H. Rap Brown; Obafemi Awolowo and Floyd McKissick; Kenneth Kaunda and Ralph Abernathy; Aminu Kano and Jesse Jackson; Modibo Keita and Stokely Carmichael. It will be noted that all of the African leaders mentioned, (with two exceptions: Kano and Awolowo) have been presidents or prime ministers of sovereign states.
African graduates returned home to become prominent in all aspects of national development. Many of them have recorded their impressions of the United States in various written forms. The autobiography of former President Nkrumah (Ghana--The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah, 1957) contains chapters on his experience at Lincoln University, and his work in this country afterwards. The collected speeches of former President Azikiwe of Nigeria (Zik, 1961) include many given to various audiences in America both as a student at Lincoln University and later. He stresses his respect for the "democratic experiment" in America, but is essentially concerned about the potentially constructive relationship between Africa and Afro-Americans.

One of the most perceptive students writing about America has been the Nigerian author, J. P. Clark, who wrote America Their America (1964) on the basis of his graduate experience at Princeton University. The book expresses what might be described as "culture shock" at both the values and behavior of mainstream white America, and at the anomie of Harlem.

One of the few African students who focused his graduate research on groups within the United States has been Essien-Udom, who is currently chairman of the Department of Political Science at the University of Ibadan (Nigeria). Working out of the University of Chicago, he undertook a major study of the Nation of Islam ("Black Muslims"), which was later published as Black Nationalism--A Search for Identity in America (1962). (Although he is not Muslim), his sympathetic yet scholarly approach to the subject has made the book a classic.
2. African Statesmen: Interpretations

A large number of African statesmen have visited the United States, either through private auspices or on official business at the United Nations or in Washington, D.C. The central characteristic of most African leaders has been their reluctance to "get involved" in the internal politics of the United States (at least publically), since they are required to work with whatever government is in power. However, even on the official level there are three major themes which seem to characterize the observations of such leaders: their opposition to racism in any form (white or black); their opposition to colonialism and imperialism in any form; and their priority need to further the economic development of their respective countries. Thus, they tend to be critical of racist elements in the United States; they tend to be critical of those aspects of United States foreign policy which appear to be imperialistic; yet they admire the level of economic development which has been achieved by the United States.

The innovative and dynamic aspects of American technology, combined with the considerable scope of American financial resources, are frequently regarded as a sharp contrast with the European states (including Britain and France).

Several of the African leaders, however, have been more verbal in their comments on American society—both black and white. One of the most recent episodes (spring 1969) has been the confrontation of the late Tom Mboya (Minister of Economic Development in Kenya) with portions of the Black community in Harlem over the issue of "back-to-Africa" movements.
Earlier in the year, the Kenya parliament had debated the issue of unrestricted migration permission for Black Americans who wished to return to Africa. It was decided that Afro-Americans would have to go through the same procedure as any other would-be-citizens, (including those from other African states). In his presentation of the reasons for this position by the Kenya government, Mboya expressed his own views that Afro-Americans might help Africa more by fighting racism and economic oppression in this country than by retreating to Africa. (For an elaboration of Mboya's views on this topic, see his article in the New York Times Magazine July 1969). A bitter controversy developed at the Harlem meeting, and has continued in the mass media since that time; (see, for example, the July 1969 issue of The Liberator.)

In contrast to Mboya's attitude toward Afro-American repatriation that of Kwame Nkrumah. Although his ten years experience in this country may have given him a more detailed backlog of specific grievances, his major criticism has been the "capitalist" system itself. In many of his latter books (e.g. see Neo-Colonialism, 1965) he came to identify American capital with international finance, and international finance with the continued domination of the African economic and political systems.

3. The African "Common Man": Interpretations

Most Africans have had no opportunity to visit the United States. Their interpretations of the United States are usually based on two sources: the news media within Africa, and Americans (both black and
white) they meet in Africa. The news media, particularly radio, extend to all parts of Africa and broadcasting is increasingly conducted in both European and vernacular languages. The ordinary African has an opportunity to listen regularly to international news, including items regarding the U.S. In Northern Nigeria, for example, a farmer with a transistor radio might listen (in Hausa) to Radio Nigeria, Radio Kaduna, Radio Moscow, Radio Peking, Radio Vatican, the B.B.S. the U.S.I.S., Radio Cairo, the French overseas broadcasting service, and any of several broadcasts from surrounding countries (e.g. Dahomey, Niger, Chad, or Cameroon). Most of these broadcasting services would carry news about the United States, yet the net result is frequently a series of conflicting interpretations.

Thus, the major source of interpretations becomes first, or second, or third hand observations of those Americans who, for some reason, are in Africa. Such Americans fall into several major categories. First, and probably the largest single group, have been the various American missionaries. Probably a majority of these missionaries are from evangelical sects. Nearly all of them are white, and many are from the southern part of the United States. Such missionaries are usually dedicated to life-time work in Africa, speak the local languages, disapprove of local customs, frequently convey a subtle type of "separate but equal" racism (or at best paternalism.)

The second largest group of Americans would consist of those who have some connection with the American government. This includes Embassy personnel, A.I.D. personnel, and the Peace Corps. There seems to be a
marked difference in the perception by ordinary Africans of the A.I.D. technicians and the Peace Corps volunteers. A.I.D. technicians tend to remain isolated from the African community, and in fact usually prefer to set up "little Americas". Their salaries are usually several times higher than their African counterparts, and there is frequently a pride in the display of material objects. Many of the A.I.D. technicians seem to come from the American mid-west, are usually early/middle aged and white, and most have only two-year commitments in Africa. This image of affluent, technically oriented, homogeneous, ethno-centric America is sharply off-set by the Peace Corps volunteers, most of whom are recent college graduates, are primarily from the east or west coast of America, are ethnically integrated, are getting salaries comparable to their African counterparts, and who pride themselves on speaking local languages, eating local foods, and learning local customs.

The third group of Americans is a miscellaneous category of businessmen (of whom there are relatively few in Africa), foundation executives, visiting scholars, and ordinary tourists. The perceptions of these groups are probably much as one would expect.

It is important to note that until recently, most Americans who visited Africa were white, and African perceptions of them probably corroborated their general images of "Europeans", (see lecture #37). With the independence of Ghana in 1957, a number of Afro-Americans have gone to Africa in a variety of capacities. Several have been U.S. Ambassadors (e.g. in Ghana, Senegal, and Upper Volta); a number have been...
involved in Peace Corps Administration or Consular service; a fairly large group have been in business or publishing; and the Peace Corps and academic groups have been heavily represented by Afro-Americans. Although it is extremely difficult to generalize, it is probably true to say that most ordinary Africans regard Afro-Americans as Americans first, and black men second. Skin color is used less frequently in Africa as a means of categorizing people than language and/or culture. Since Afro-Americans are perceived as culturally and linguistically American, they have tended to be labelled "American".

In short, there is probably a great deal of confusion or mixed imagery regarding social and political developments in America, yet at the same time, there is a great deal of insight regarding the full range of race relations "between Americans".

#89. Africa and the Concept of Social Science

In the essay by PADEN, the concept of social science is discussed in terms of basic concepts, priorities of research, methods of data collection, methods of data analysis, and problems of research in Africa. It will be the purpose of these final three lectures to summarize some of the social research which has occurred in Africa, to indicate some of the research currently going on in Africa, and to examine the frontiers of future research. While research frontiers may not be of immediate interest in an
introductory course on Africa, they may serve to indicate the areas of concern and ignorance within the social sciences, and perhaps to challenge younger people to consider committing their own intellectual resources to the problems ahead.

1. The Idea of Social Science

Social science is primarily a process which seeks to record observations about human behavior and to discover the interrelationships between various kinds of human behavior. These two functions are often called "data collection" and "data analysis". Much of the training in social science requires attention to methods of collection and analysis, since the concern to remain as objective as possible can only be met if the procedures by which data are collected and analyzed are made clear and explicit. The credibility of one's conclusions in social science are partly based on whether one's procedures have been credible. This does not mean that proper procedures will always result in proper conclusions. The sequence of procedures is basically the same as in the natural sciences: one identifies a problem, proposes hypotheses, tests the hypotheses, and draws conclusions.

One of the most difficult things to do in cross-cultural studies is to identify meaningful problems rather than just transfer those problems which are relevant in a western context to a non-western context. The entire intellectual structure of this volume of lectures implies the existence of a series of problems or question areas. A student who has gone through the materials in this volume should be able to do several things.
First, he should be able to identify the range of issue selection, i.e.
he should know what was not included as well as what was included.
Secondly, he should be able to discuss the types of data sources which are
available on all the major topics; (for example, much of the existing data
at the moment on the early empires of the Western Sudan depend on a handful
of Arabic manuscripts; the evidence for the civilization of Nok rests at
the moment on a few fragments of terra cotta dug up by archeologists; the
evidence for the skin color of the early Egyptians rests on some frescos
along the Nile valley.) Thirdly, he should be able to identify the way
in which inferences regarding general conclusions are drawn from specific
instances (e.g. conclusions regarding marriage patterns in Africa from a
sample of about 90 ethnic societies). And he should be able to recognize,
in both the lectures and the essays, when the authors are giving their own
personal judgments and when they are giving "facts". It will be noted
that this volume is not intended to be a presentation of social science
findings on Africa. If this were the case, the volume could not be
written, for there are too many questions yet untested. This is a volume
for teaching purposes, and part of the teaching process should be to
encourage the student to discover the problems for himself. Hopefully, the
study question sections will help in this process.

In this discovery process, certain concepts may be useful to the
student. The idea of national or social systems is fundamental. A
system refers to a "universe" in which the component elements are inter-
active, that is, a change in one will produce a change in another. This
concept of system may help the student to see African societies and empires not only as isolated interactive universes in their own right, but also as elements in a larger system of international trade and inter-urban linkage. European or Arab contact with black Africa usually implies some type of larger system. One of the most obvious examples of this is the so-called "triangle trade", in which European powers of the 18th century bought slaves in Africa in exchange for manufactured goods, traded the slaves in the new world for raw materials, from which the manufactured goods were produced to purchase more slaves.

Much of the problem in contemporary Africa is one of creating national systems, i.e. of establishing linkages between the various elements within a country so that there is an interactive effect. At the same time, the African states are being linked up to a variety of international systems, including one which might be called a "pan-African" system. The future development of a pan-African system will probably depend less on the rhetoric of ideologically committed statesmen than on the technical and infrastructural linkages which are being forged bit by bit.

2. Methods of Data Collection

There is no fixed number of techniques which qualify as appropriate methods of data collection. Data may be inferred from a fragment of pottery, from a radio-carbon dating, from an autobiographical book by an African leader, or from the price of yams in the Ibadan market. The student should be able to judge what kinds of data are appropriate to particular problems.
In PADEN, five types of data collection are mentioned, which seem to represent the major methods of contemporary social science. In most cases, a combination of methods would be used, i.e. the so-called "multi-method" approach.

a. Participant observation: Clearly a major type of data is that generated by participants in the activity under observation. When Connor Cruise O'Brien writes about the United Nations in the Congo (see To Katanga and Back) he is drawing on his experiences as a member of the United Nations team in the Congo. When Jomo Kenyatta writes about initiation rites in Kikuyu society (see, Facing Mount Kenya) he is writing as a participant. When a young Ghana student named Emmanuel Hevy writes about his experience as An African Student in China he is drawing on his (somewhat bitter) experiences.

The three examples above, however, also illustrate the major problem of participant observation: the fact that a participant often has an "axe to grind". Thus, certain guidelines are necessary both to evaluate the existing participant observation literature, and to encourage future studies. Such guidelines are discussed in PADEN.

b. Interviews: The process of interviewing is basic in both journalism and social science. Since scholars are seldom able to participate in all of the historical events which interest them, they try to talk with persons who were witness to such events. There are several different types of interviews in social science: open ended, closed, in-depth, retrospective, etc. The idea of oral history interviews is discussed by
Vansina (1961). The type of interview selected will depend on one's research problem. Perhaps students could design interviews with hypothetical Africans, as an exercise in methodology.

c. Survey Research: Students are probably familiar with the Gallup polls, or the Roper Surveys in the United States, particularly in an election year. There are several such survey units in Africa. Are such attitude surveys practical and/or desirable in Africa? What are the problems of such surveys? How do attitude surveys differ from demographic surveys (e.g. census)? At present the O.A.U. (working with Columbia University) is collecting in Addis Ababa all of the studies which have been done in Africa.

d. Documentary analysis: Most African states have national archives which contain the hundreds of thousands of documents which the colonial and/or independent governments of these countries have generated over the years. In addition, some national archives also have private papers which have been donated. Such documents may provide data on a whole range of problems.

e. Experimental techniques: Particularly in the field of psychology, experiments are important in getting immediate and first hand observation of "reactions". Since these techniques are not widely used they will not be discussed here.

3. Methods of Data Analysis

In PADEN, two major types of analysis are discussed: comparative analysis and developmental analysis. Students should be familiar with both
types and might be required to demonstrate how they are able to combine the two approaches.

Students who have some familiarity with statistics may wish to experiment with different types of analysis, but even the non-statistically trained student should be able to analyze rates of change, indexes, percentages, averages, and standard deviations.

The technology of data analysis is becoming increasingly complex, primarily as a reflection of increasingly complex data and the magnitude of the questions asked. Computer analysis is of course entirely dependent on the quality of the input of data and on the programming and interpretive skills of the person who is doing the analysis. Yet it promises a means of dealing with social complexity in a way which has hitherto been impossible.

#90. Conducting Social Research in Africa

A discussion of the ways in which social research has been conducted in Africa may indicate both strengths and weaknesses of the present state of knowledge about Africa.

1. A History of Social Research in Africa

Social research, as mentioned earlier, is a process of problem selection, hypothesis formation, testing, and concluding. In the past this process was often less "rigorous" than it is today. Some of the earliest
scholars who recorded observations about social patterns and historical
developments in Africa were Arabs such as Ibn Battuta (*The Travels of Ibn
Battuta*, translated by Gibb, 1962), Moorish Africans such as Leo Africanus
(see *The History and Description of Africa*, translated by John Pory in
1600 AD), and various Europeans, such as the Portuguese navigators and
explorers. By the 16th century, the empires of the Central Sudan all had
scribes and/or scholars who were able to record history in written form.
(For a later example of this see Muhammad Bello, *Infaq al-Maisur*--a
history of the Fulani and other Sudanic peoples--translated by Arnott,
1924).

With the increase in western contact, especially in the 19th
century, there were a large number of European scholar/explorers such as
Barth (*Travels and Discoveries in North Central Africa*, 1857), Denham
and Clapperton, (*Narrative of Travels and Discoveries in Northern and
Central Africa in the Years 1822, 1823, and 1824, 1826*), and Lander (*The
Travels of Richard Lander into the Interior of Africa For the Discovery of
the Course of the River Niger*, 1835). Such scholars were interested in
geographical as well as ethnographic data, but very clearly exemplify the
problems of ethnocentrism in "cross-cultural research".

In the twentieth century, certain colonial administrator/scholars
continued this tradition of recording observations, but came to focus on
social patterns. They also began extensive translations of Arabic material.
Men such as Palmer (*Sudanese Memoirs*, 1928), Marty (a twelve volume set of
studies on Islam in West Africa, from 1915-late 1920s), Rattray (*Ashanti*
Law and Constitution, 1929), Delafosse (Les Noirs de l'Afrique), and many others began to provide an initial foundation for modern African studies. (It should be noted that much of this early material has subsequently been "redone" by African and European scholars.)

In the inter-war period and subsequently, a new breed of scholar--the anthropologist--was attracted to Africa. Englishmen such as Evans-Pritchard (see African Political Systems, 1940) and Radcliffe-Brown (1935) who had worked with Malinowski in London began to provide a "new" framework for cross-cultural analysis--the structure/function approach--and began to generate a series of detailed ethnographic case studies. At the same time, Frenchmen such as Balandier (who worked primarily among the Fang of Gabon) and Mercier (who worked in urban centers in Senegal), approached their studies from a more sociological and geographical tradition, but using essentially the case study method. American anthropologists such as Herskovits (who as early as 1930 was writing about the "culture areas of Africa") were distinctive in trying to get past the colonial framework in viewing African society, and in trying to place African cultures within an historical perspective.

During this same period, African scholars began writing their own historical and ethnographic accounts. Men such as Joseph Danquah (The Akan Doctrine of God) and Kofi Busia (The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System of Ashanti), both of Ghana, Jomo Kenyatta (Facing Mount Kenya) of Kenya, Kenneth Dike (Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta: 1830-1885) of Nigeria, and Amadou Hampate Ba (L'Empire Peul de Macina,
1818-1853) of Mali, wrote accounts of particular aspects of their own ethnic societies, or areas.

With independence, African scholars such as W. Kofi Abrahams (The Mind of Africa of Ghana, Cheikh Anta Diop (The Cultural Unity of Negro Africa) of Senegal, 'Ali Mazrui (Towards a Pax Africana) of Kenya, and others began to reinterpret in a fundamental way their African cultural experience.

In the mid-1950s, two developments occurred of major importance: universities were established in African countries which began to shift the bases of academic pursuit to the African countries, and a broad range of scholars from disciplines other than anthropology began to do research in Africa. At the same time, a number of institutes of African studies began to emerge, throughout the world.

By the mid-1960s, a new phenomenon emerged: African graduate students primarily based in the African universities were beginning to undertake post-graduate research themselves in significant numbers and to relatively publish such research. Such young African scholars as Cheikh Tidiane Sy (Senegal), Saburi Biobaku (Nigeria), Ade J. F. Ajayi (Nigeria), E. A. Ayande (Nigeria), Bethwell Ogut (Kenya), Adu Boahen (Ghana), Bernard Chidzero (Central Africa), are focusing primarily on African history. Other young scholars such as B. J. Dudley, Akin Mabogunje, T. M. Yesufu, H. M. A. Onitiri, Victor Uchendu and many others are working mainly in the contemporary social sciences.

2. African Research Institutes

By 1960, the "Big Four" universities in sub-Saharan Africa were as
follows: University of Dakar (Senegal); University of Ghana ("Legon", in Accra); University College Ibadan (Nigeria), and Makerere University (Kampala, Uganda). Since 1960, a number of institutes of higher learning have been transformed into national universities (e.g. Fourah Bay College, Sierra Leone; University of East Africa, Nairobi), and almost every remaining African country established a national university (see lecture #38).

Within these university communities, a number of research institutes have developed. At Ibadan, the Institute of African Studies, (dealing primarily with the arts, languages, humanities, and archeology), and the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research (NISER: dealing with political, social, and economic development) were built into major research coordinating bodies. In Ghana, the Institute of African Studies at Legon came to focus primarily on historical and cultural research. The Institut Fondamental de l'Afrique Noire (IFAN) at Dakar sponsored both social science and natural science research, and has generated a series of IFAN centers in almost all of the French-speaking African states. The Institute of Social Research at Makerere, the larger East African Institute of Social and Economic Development and the University of East Africa Social Science Conferences have come to encourage and support a full range of social research in East Africa.

More recently, the Economic Commission for Africa, located in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) has come to serve as a "bank" for social science data (including census data) from all parts of Africa. At the moment, computer facilities are being set up in Addis Ababa to accommodate the vast accumulation of data. The Haile Selassie II University in Addis Ababa, may
eventually come to be a major research center because of its proximity to the ECA data sources. Another activity in Addis Ababa has been the Organization of African Unity (OAU) project in developing an *Encyclopedia Africana*. This project was originally started in Ghana, but after 1966 was transferred to the OAU. The two immediate projects are to create an encyclopedia of African biography, and an encyclopedia of African country profiles.

European and American scholars who wish to undertake social research in Africa at present usually attach themselves to a research institute or university in Africa. These institutions serve to coordinate research so as to avoid unnecessary duplication, and to call attention to national priorities. Recently, the various research institutes of Africa have set up annual conferences of institute directors to discuss problems of research.

3. Problems of Social Research in Africa

One of the major difficulties of social research in Africa has been the language problem. Anthropologists usually learned the language of the group with whom they were living. But the problem becomes magnified when the focus of research is on multilingual urban areas or multilingual national contexts. Three different types of solutions have emerged: team research rather than individual research; research by indigenous scholars who are multilingual; and greater use of interpreters.

A second problem of research has been the relative lack of background or related studies upon which a scholar can build. Often, it
becomes necessary to engage in basic demographic, linguistic and historical research before a particular contemporary problem can be dealt with. Many of the African scholars are addressing themselves to this dearth of demographic, linguistic and historical studies, and are also engaged in re-evaluation and interpretation of much of the scholarly literature that came out of the colonial era.

A continuing problem is the lack of finances for major research in all areas. It is clear that if archaeological excavation became a high priority within the new African states, much of the existing ignorance about the pre-colonial empires and movements of peoples would be clarified. Yet such research is extremely expensive. In the next lecture, the question of research priorities will be discussed. For further discussion of research problems in Africa, see Paden.

#91. Research Frontiers in Africa

There have been two recent volumes dealing with the question of research priorities in Africa: Robert Lystad (ed) The African World (1965), and Gwendolyn Carter/Ann Paden (eds) Expanding Horizons in African Studies (1969). The African World gives a detailed and balanced summary of research being done in the various disciplines (including the natural sciences), while Expanding Horizons consists of interpretive essays which assess the future directions of both disciplinary and interdisciplinary
research in Africa. In this lecture, some of the conclusions of Expanding Horizons will be summarized as a means of stimulating thought on research priorities in Africa. These essays are not intended to imply any official ordering of priorities, and it is clear that in the final analysis the African states will draw up their own priorities.

1. Social Science Priorities

Drawing on the essays in Expanding Horizons, the following points may be summarized. In economics, the controversy continues over formal economics versus functional economics. The approach of scholars such as George Dalton and Paul Bohannan (e.g. see Markets in Africa) who view economics as a part of larger social systems (i.e. as performing functions) seems to be the major and continuing concern in African economic research. A third approach, represented by Irma Adelman, stresses multivariate analysis using computer techniques, with an inclusion of social and political as well as economic variables.

In geography, Peter Gould calls for new techniques of computer mapping of modernization patterns, greater application of central place theory, and other approaches of spatial analysis. Ed Soja elaborates on how transaction flow analysis (of goods, services, messages) could contribute to an understanding of communications linkages which are particularly vital to national integration.

In anthropology, Victor Uchendu stresses the need for cultural studies within the national contexts rather than simply using the ethnic society as the unit of analysis. Ronald Cohen emphasizes the need for
anthropologists to engage in social change studies, particularly regarding modernization of attitudes and values.

In political science, Ali Mazrui underscores the sensitivity of many topics in contemporary Africa, yet feels the major need is to examine problems of national integration, particularly the role of ethnic groups in helping or hindering unity. Robert C. Mitchell, Donald G. Morrison, and John Paden discuss the possibilities of multivariate analysis of problems of national integration.

In linguistics, Jack Berry and Joseph Greenberg continue a long-standing dialogue on priorities of socio-linguistics. Berry reports on multilingualism research in Accra, and calls for more studies of bilingualism and multilingualism in Africa.

In history, Isaria Kimambo calls for an emphasis on local histories, studied through techniques of examining oral tradition. In archeology, Frank Willett stresses the need for greater communication on existing work between scholars (perhaps through a newsletter, since publication of archaeological results seems to take longer than publication in other disciplines). He also discusses various recent scientific techniques (such as thermo-luminescence) which might be used in dating and tracing elements in objects recovered from the past.

In psychology, Marshall Segall argues that there is no uniquely African psychology, but only human psychology. He also argues, however, that certain circumstances in Africa may have produced patterns of human behavior which might not be available for research elsewhere.
In sociology, Remi Clignet stresses the need for systematic urban studies, using all of the known techniques. He reports on research in Douala, based on computer analysis of complex census tract data.

Finally there is a concern expressed by Sterling Stuckey and Peter Hammond that Afro-American studies be included in African studies. Hammond reports on research in "tri-ethnic" (i.e. Indian, Afro-American, and Euro-American) areas of the southern United States, and argues that African studies should include the history and culture of Africans who live outside of the continent of Africa. Stuckey emphasizes the need for research on the psychological effects of racial oppression.

The general consensus of the volume is that social science research about Africa should be interdisciplinary, since the concepts and methods are so clearly overlapping. The two major areas identified for interdisciplinary priority attention were urban studies and national integration studies.

2. Arts and Humanities Priorities

Portions of the volume (Expanding Horizons) also deal with the arts and humanities. In the area of sculpture and visual art, Robert P. Armstrong argues for a theory of pure aesthetics which can be used as a standard for judging African art. Klaus Wachsmann discusses the field of ethnomusicology, and suggests new analytical categories of synthesis.

In the field of drama, considerable attention is being directed to playwrights such as Wole Soyinke, and also to the manner in which contemporary African drama is performed within an African context.
In literature, the major issues of academic discussion seem to be the genre employed by contemporary African writers, the audience, the thematic concerns, and the use of symbols. The developing maturation of the younger African writers also seems to be of major interest to scholars. In short, the concern in the arts and humanities seems to be with the full panoply of African cultural life, with the adaptation of such cultural heritage to contemporary circumstances, and with the relevance of such culture for human aesthetic experience.

3. Natural Science and Technological Priorities

The three major priorities in natural science research in Africa at present are probably in the fields of medicine, agriculture, and engineering. Medical research institutes exist at most teaching hospitals in Africa (such as University College Hospital, Ibadan), but important research is also conducted outside the African continent (e.g. the Institute of Tropical Medicine in London). Medical research is concerned with a wide range of problems, including cycle cell anemia, yaws, leprosy, tuberculosis, meningitis, measles, sleeping sickness, malaria, heart disease and cancer.

In addition, veterinary medicinal research institutes exist in most African states, and seem to be focusing on development of cattle breeds which are resistant to sleeping sickness. In the field of biology and zoology, an initial priority is simply the classification of African wildlife and insects.

Agricultural research institutes tend to focus on whatever the major
cash crops happen to be. In Ghana, Ivory Coast and Nigeria this includes cocoa, and considerable research has been done on swollen shoot disease. In East Africa this includes tea and coffee. Experimentation with different types of soil enrichment is also a priority.

Engineering schools deal with a full range of problems, as discussed in Kliphardt, from hydro-electrical constructions to town planning. Experimentation with building materials indigenous to the African continent may well produce substitutes for costly imported materials. Also, experimentation with sun reflectors in countries such as Niger, seems to have produced low cost alternative sources of electrical power.

4. Professional School Priorities

Research priorities vary with each of the professional schools, such as law (priorities including the "restatement" or "unification" of laws), business (including research on possible consequences of particular types of international economic relationships), journalism (including distribution of readership studies), education (including child development, and bilingualism research), and administration (especially the effects of administrative reform on local communities).

Almost every African state has a range of professional schools and most of the associated research institutes publish bulletins. Students with particular interests in such topics could examine such research bulletins, (perhaps at the U.S. Library of Congress) and keep up-to-date on research and development.

5. Conclusions

There is a wide range of research occurring in Africa at the moment,
some oriented to practical concerns and others more theoretically oriented. As Peter Gould suggests, however, with regard to the role of theory in geography, there is nothing as practical as good theory. In overview, it seems likely that the natural sciences will focus on the question of environmental control and resource utilization, in keeping with national priorities of economic development; the social sciences will probably examine problems of social change (including urbanization) and national integration; and the arts and humanities will probably focus on the preservation of cultural heritages and the new syntheses of art forms which are emerging from modern Africa.
Study Questions: Africa and the Modern World

The following study questions are both analytical and judgmental. A student should have a clear overview of Africa's role in the modern world but should also be willing to identify and discuss the values and moral implications involved in each of the major issues.

1. What has been the impact of Africa on the United Nations as an organization? Do you think that very small states should be allowed to have voting status equal to large states in the General Assembly? What other alternatives are there for small African states to have a voice in world affairs? Do you think that African states will be willing to give up sovereignty some day to merge into a United States of Africa? What would be the difference in impact on world affairs if the African states spoke with a single voice?

2. Does it make any sense to lump Africa together with other poor, ex-colonial, non-white countries and refer to them as the "Third World"? Does the Third World have any common interests? Is the racial criterion (i.e. "non-white") more or less important than the economic (i.e. "poor") or the political (i.e. "ex-colonial") criterion? How serious is the potential conflict between Asians and black Africans in Africa? What would likely be the role of India or Pakistan if such a conflict developed?

3. Does it make political, economic, or cultural sense to include North
Africa with the rest of Africa for purposes of political analysis? Are the North African states more likely to act as "Arab states" or as "African states" on international political issues? How is the Islamic linkage likely to affect African attitudes toward the Middle East crisis?

4. What is meant by neo-colonialism? What are the advantages and disadvantages to Africa of close economic links with Europe? What is the general state of relations between the African states and their former metropoles? How important was President de Gaulle to the close links between France and most of the French-speaking states? What has been the fate of states which have cut back contact with their former metropoles (e.g. Mali, Guinea, Ghana)?

5. To what extent has Soviet/United States competition carried over to Africa? What might be the strategic significance, if any, of Africa in such East-West competition? What types of trade relations have developed between the United States and Africa? Why has communism made little headway in the internal politics of most African states? How does "African socialism" as an ideology effect Soviet and/or American relations with Africa? To what extent has the Sino-Soviet conflict been carried over into Africa?

6. What are the white South African arguments against majority rule? against any form of black political participation? What is the philosophy of apartheid? Have African resistance movements been possible in South Africa? What are the various means of decolonization in
Portuguese Africa? (including the possibility of rapid change in Portugal itself.) Does the United States (through NATO) support the Portuguese effort at repressing African nationalists? What courses of action were open to Britain when faced with the rebellion of white Rhodesia? In what way, if at all, is the potential for conflict in southern Africa similar to the Middle East crisis?

7. Which of the arts in Africa have made the most significant contributions to world civilization? Is the contemporary form of most African arts—i.e. a synthesis of modern and traditional forms—turning out to be a dilution or an enhancement of African creative genius? Is there anything distinctive or unique about African urban design? Why has West Africa (both French and English speaking) produced a disproportionate share of African writers? Which languages should African writers use in their literature, poetry, drama, music? Are there any thematic differences between writers using French and those using English as a vehicle of expression?

8. What is meant by African cultural survivals in the New World? Why and how have the patterns differed in Portuguese-speaking vs. Spanish-speaking Latin America? in North America? What has been the African contribution to culture in the United States? Why have Afro-Americans often felt reluctant in the past to identify with African culture? What are the pros and cons of the Back-to-Africa philosophy? What is the rationale, if any, for the selection of Swahili as a "semi-official" language of black nationalism in the United States?
9. What have been the range of interpretations of the U.S. by African students studying in this country? What types of relationships have Africans in the United States had with Afro-Americans? To what extent is the concept of "diaspora" appropriate to a description of African/Afro-American linkages?

10. What have been some of the distortions in perception of Africa by westerners in the past? by Arabs? Does social science have any claim to "objectivity"? Is a particular technique of data collection--e.g., interview vs. participant observation--likely to produce differences in social science "conclusions" regarding social patterns in Africa? What should be the units of social science analysis in Africa: the individual? the ethnic group? the urban centers? the national state? the continent as a whole? Who should set research priorities in Africa? Why? What priorities would you (the student) set, if asked? Who should do research in Africa, and how might it be organized: in the social sciences? the arts and humanities? the natural sciences? the professional schools?
The African Experience

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REFERENCE SOURCES FOR AFRICAN STUDIES

Hans Panofsky

A commentary to a bibliography should be a clarification of the nature and the extent of the material under examination; and beyond that it should offer additional bibliographic aid as a guide to further research and to provide an overview of the total field of studies. In this essay we propose to coordinate various bibliographic listings and to offer as a further accession tool a guide to subject and area bibliographies. We will also note in a swift glance the major concentrations of holdings of Africana in this country and abroad. Hopefully the users of the African Curriculum materials will look upon this bibliographic volume not as an appendix to the course, but rather as an essential aid in building a knowledge of the extensive literature on Africa and in indicating the availability of information on each segment of the course.

The contents of this bibliography (2,514 references) have been selected with the idea of providing an introduction to the various aspects of African studies, and also a guide for more detailed research. The references have been divided into five categories: 1) introductory works or required student readings; 2) research material for more advanced students; 3) available but relatively inaccessible works such as foreign language studies, unpublished dissertations, conference proceedings, or articles from journals with a limited circulation; 4) African case studies; and 5) theoretical works or classic case studies, not necessarily from an African context, which offer general ideas and concepts.
In order to be able to handle with confidence this rich fare one must become aware of the overall resources in the field of Africana, of the organization of these materials, and of the bibliographic aids available to the students and researchers.

THE NATURE AND ORGANIZATION OF AFRICANA

Almost every bibliographic collection of Africana has started as an offshoot of limited and special pursuits as a repository of mission and travel literature. Increasingly, however, these nuclear collections have lost their specificity to become data sources for cooperative academic activity grouped around issues or sets of problems, while continuing to serve the more traditional self-contained activities of individual scholars. The trend of today's scholarly research on Africa has been to rely more and more on information generated in Africa; and collections have tended to become bodies of material from Africa even more than about Africa. This has brought about the characteristic and problematic feature of the acquisition and organization of primary material and statistical, demographic, political, and oral data.

This organization problem is particularly acute for unique material; it is a hard task to collect any body of literature from such a vast and bibliographically unexplored area as Africa where, until relatively recently, publishing, the book trade, and national libraries were practically non-existent as organized structures. In spite of the difficulties, the last two decades have witnessed a significant level of organization and cooperation which has brought much of the unique material within reach of widely dispersed Africanist scholars. Still, a very great deal remains to be done in order to avoid duplication of efforts and to achieve full bibliographic coordination and dissemination.

Organization of Africana at the national level has been envisioned but not yet attained. It would be an invaluable help to the scholars of all disciplines and would make possible the flourishing of comparative studies which have hitherto been impossible for lack of reliable and controlled data. The bulk of the major collections consists of monographs and secondary sources which can be roughly divided into retrospective and current.
Retrospective sources are generally those which are out of print and are available solely through antiquarian dealers or via inter-library loans. Current sources are those which are available through normal commercial channels. Periodical literature and newspapers may fall into either category, but where the content has not been satisfactorily analyzed a major problem exists in evaluation and distribution of these resources.

The storage of this rapidly expanding body of material, and its bibliographic control, and retrieval, is taxing many a library system. The predicament of libraries reflects a shift in knowledge organization—that is, an increasing departure from disciplinary compartmentalization toward a concentration of resources by research problems. In this process inroads are made into and across different academic fields.

DIRECTORIES AND PERSONALIA

Turning for a moment from the body of literature about Africa, to the body of scholars and specialists producing it, one is struck by the great variety of people, distributed worldwide, directly concerned with the production of information about Africa. It is interesting to note that in the past records and data from Africa were not the productions of scholars but were the works of civil servants, government officials, traders, educators, the keepers of oral traditions, and the like. It is difficult to gather much information about such authors; in fact, anonymity is the rule for most of them, especially civil servants. African politicians, however, who have generated much data on Africa, may be more visible. Some are described in Ronald Segal's Political Africa, (London: Stevens, 1961), a who's who of personalities and parties; and more recently in The New African, (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1967), a guide to contemporary African leaders, compiled by fifty correspondents of Reuters News Agency. There exists a Who's Who in East Africa (Nairobi, Marco Survey, 1965-66), and one for southern Africa (which is restricted to whites). Well-known African leaders may also have entries in the British Who's Who; and other notables may be included in Current Biography and Biography Index, both published in New York by the H. W. Wilson Company.
Two particular listings of scholars who have worked on Africa deserve notice. In 1963 the UNESCO Secretariat prepared a Directory of Social Scientists specializing in African studies. Over 2,000 scholars are listed alphabetically, and a subject and geographical index is included. For listings of Americans especially, the UNESCO directory can be supplemented by the Directory of Foreign Area Fellows, 1952-1963, issued by the Foreign Area Fellowship Program, and more currently by the Roster of Fellows of the African Studies Association, issued annually.

MAJOR BIBLIOGRAPHIC RESOURCES

A student of Africa will certainly collect a number of books in his field, but he will collect as well a very great number of references to publications he does not own and, so he will often want to make use of the library. Increasingly, Africana librarians feel that they should be in a position not only to provide access to all published sources but to know of the location of unpublished ones as well--especially those which can be borrowed on inter-library loan or through other arrangements, or where a microfilm copy can be prepared. The basic guide to any library is its catalogue, which at present is usually in card file form. The size of a library is not always indicative of the size of its specialized collections; there are some relatively small libraries which have large African holdings. We are fortunate in having a guide to American library and archival collections on Africa: Peter Duignan, Handbook of American Resources for African Studies, (Stanford, Hoover Institution Bibliographical Series, no. 29, 1967). Almost one hundred library and manuscript collections and a somewhat larger number of church and missionary libraries or archives are described either by their curators or by Dr. Duignan. Although the amount of information supplied is not always in relation to the importance of the libraries, this handbook does draw attention to the location of widely dispersed collections, many of which contain unique material. With regard to British collections, the Standing Conference on Library Materials in Africa has issued the SCOLMA Directory of Libraries and Special Collections on Africa (2d. ed.; London: Crosby Lockwood, 1967). The best existing guide to French institutions is

A brief description of some of the more important libraries in the United States with major Africana collections, may be useful at this point. Not surprisingly, the Library of Congress (L.C.) must be mentioned first. By general agreement L.C. has more of most things, including Africana; and consistent with normal library practice, the material on Africa is dispersed according to subject matter. Some of the highlights of L.C.'s material on Africa are listed by Helen Conover in Duignan's *Handbook*, pp. 40-51. Harvard University's Widener Library may well rank next in importance for Africana. One may consult the published computer print-out of the shelflist section pertaining to Africa. Books are arranged alphabetically, chronologically, and according to geographical classification. Another library at Harvard, the Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology, has published an important catalogue. This is an author and subject catalogue, reproduced from catalogue cards and comprises fifty-five large volumes.

The New York Public Library is virtually a second national library and has great strength in Africana; particularly good are its North African holdings and official documents from all over the continent. Also well known is the Schomburg Collection of Negro History and Literature, administered as a branch of the New York Public Library. About half of the volumes of the Schomburg Collection pertain to Africa. The nine-volume
catalogue was published in 1962 by the G. K. Hall Company, and the first supplement of two volumes has already appeared.

Among other important collections on Africa in the United States are the libraries at Boston University; the University of California at Los Angeles; Howard University; Northwestern University; and Stanford University, including the Hoover Institution. The Boston University catalogue of African Government Documents has been published in a second edition. Howard University has published A Catalogue of the African Collection in the Moorland Foundation, 1958. The Africana Department of Northwestern University had its author and title catalogue published in 1962 by G. K. Hall. Since that date it has issued six times a year the Joint Acquisition List of Africana which enters alphabetically the Africana acquired by major research libraries in the United States.

Since 1962, American publications on Africa have been listed annually in U. S. and Canadian Publications on Africa. This work is issued by the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. The 1965 issue contains around 2,000 items arranged by topics and area, and includes an author index. A similar endeavor is that of the African Bibliographic Center in Washington, D. C. which issues a series of bibliographies, the most useful of which is probably A Current Bibliography on African Affairs, published monthly by Greenwood Periodicals, Inc., in New York City. An important aspect of these two bibliographies is their indexing of chapters in the increasing number of anthologies that are being published.

Among libraries overseas, particular mention must be made of the University of London's School of Oriental and African Studies and that of the Colonial Office. Catalogues for both these institutions have been published by G. K. Hall. African libraries, except those in the Republic of South Africa, remain quite small. In recent years, however, great efforts have been made by many libraries to collect publications pertaining to their particular countries.
AREA AND SUBJECT BIBLIOGRAPHIES

Having mentioned some of the more important libraries on Africana, it is necessary to provide an evaluation of the bibliographic aid now existing for Africana. Perhaps the best place to begin is with the numerous guides which reflect the various approaches to classifying Africana. There are several guides reflecting the different approaches: these are usually ordered by subject and by country, and within these are numerous specialized bibliographies. First of all, a general guide that cannot be too strongly recommended is Helen Conover, Africa, South of the Sahara: A Selected Annotated List of Writings (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1963). Over 2,000 items—books, journal articles, and government reports—are arranged geographically in this volume; and an author, title, and subject index are included. The fact that this work does not include works published since 1963 does, of course, detract from its value. Those who are overwhelmed by the size of Miss Conover's selection may wish to consult Kenneth M. Glazier, Africa, South of the Sahara: An Annotated Bibliography, 1958-1963, Hoover Institution Bibliographical Series, no. 16 (Stanford, 1964). This list is limited to 150 annotated titles with quotations from, and references to, book reviews; it is limited to books published in English.


With regard to archaeology and prehistory the very impressive Atlas of African Prehistory, compiled by J. Desmond Clark, was published by the University of Chicago Press in 1967. This pioneer work of scholarship will help to relate human evolution to its natural setting in prehistoric Africa.
Those who need a more detailed bibliographic survey on prehistory should consult the Council for Old World Archeology (COWA) Survey published in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Areas nine through fourteen in this survey cover different parts of Africa.

For guides to the growing historical literature on Africa one can recommend strongly the *Journal of African History*, published by Cambridge University Press, which has appeared three times a year since 1960 and will come out four times a year after 1968. This journal includes discussions of new findings as well as reinterpretations of old ones. The book reviews are of a higher standard than those of most other journals. For an overview of the field of African history see Philip Curtin, *African History* (New York: Macmillan, 1964). This is a brief bibliographical essay of fifty-five pages. Those who require a strict bibliography may wish to consult Vernon MacKay's chapter in *Guide to Historical Literature* (American Historical Association, 1961), pp. 745-69. An increasing amount of African history is also to be found in the quarterly *Historical Abstracts* (Santa Barbara, California) and the annual *International Bibliography of Historical Sciences*, published by the Oxford University Press.

African studies was the major preserve of anthropology until about the 1940's, and so it is not surprising that the anthropological literature is relatively well indexed and even abstracted. This is largely the work of the International African Institute, a membership organization founded in London in 1928. The Institute produces the quarterly journal, *Africa*, largely anthropological and linguistic in coverage. Each issue includes a lengthy bibliography on Africa classified into broad thematic categories. Since 1950, the Institute has also published the quarterly *African Abstract* which includes abstracts, arranged geographically, of the more important articles already listed in *Africa*. There is an annual index, arranged by author, ethnic group, and subject. The Institute has published a part of its catalogue in book form. To date, volumes on the ethnology, sociology, and linguistics of West Africa, Northeast Africa, East Africa, and South Central Africa and Madagascar have appeared. Within each volume the entries are arranged by country and tribe, with ethnological entries being
separated from linguistic entries. A concise base-line study pertaining to particular ethnic groups is found in the Institute's "Ethnographic Survey of Africa." These brief case studies of approximately one hundred pages each have been appearing since 1950.

A reference has already been made to linguistics in connection with anthropology. Increasingly, however, the former is treated as a separate discipline. The annual Bibliographic linguistique (Utrecht, Spectrum) is important in this field. The Handbook of African Languages, (International African Institute) with its several issues written by various authors--particularly A. N. Tucker and Malcolm Guthrie--contains numerous bibliographical references. The Handbook is an attempt to list and classify African languages.

Resources pertaining to political science are poorly served bibliographically. Useful general bibliographies are the International bibliography of Political Science, one of a series issued by the International Committee for Social Science Documentation. (Others in this series include Sociology, Economics, and Social and Cultural Anthropology.) The Bulletin of the Public Affairs Information Service, usually cited as PAIS, tends to be more up to date than the International Bibliographies. The African Section of the Library of Congress has prepared guides to official publications of former British East Africa, French Equatorial, and West Africa, the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, Sierra Leone and Gambia, Madagascar, and Nigeria. For Nigeria, in fact, the guide was initially issued in 1959 and revised in 1966. These guides, however, frequently list only official government publications.


To keep really up to date with African political happenings, insofar as these are recorded, one has to rely on newspapers--in particular, the Times (London), Le Monde (Paris), and the New York Times. Some of the more
important events are usefully summarized, usually two months after their occurrence, in the "News in Brief" section of Africa Report (Washington, D. C.). A publically available source on foreign radio broadcasts and newspapers are the translations in the Central Intelligence Agency's Foreign Broadcast Information Service & Daily Report on Africa (U.S. Department of Commerce, Joint Publications Research Service).


Bibliographical work on economics, insofar as it pertains to Africa, has largely been accomplished by the Library of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. They issue accession lists and guides to statistical publications. Also useful is the publication by the Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa, South of the Sahara (CCTA), now merged with the Organization for African Unity (UAU), Inventory of Economic Studies Concerning Africa, South of the Sahara, ca. 1960, and its supplement.

With reference to agriculture, a model for amount and detail of coverage is the Library of Congress, Agricultural Development Schemes in Sub-Saharan Africa (1963). This bibliography contains 1,783 well-indexed entries.

Labor in Africa has been well documented bibliographically. William H. Friedland has compiled Union, Labor and Industrial Relations (Cornell, Center for International Studies, 1965), an annotated bibliography listing 683 items alphabetically by author and with a subject and area index. The

Sociological research has only recently been undertaken in Africa. A useful bibliography is the one compiled by the Department of Social Anthropology, University of Edinburgh, African Urbanization, a reading list of selected books, articles, and reports (London: International African Institute, 1965). To keep up to date in the field of urban studies as it pertains to Africa one should examine regularly African Urban Notes, a research newsletter which has been issued periodically since 1966. Use of newsletters as a means of noting new publications and current research is likely to spread to other disciplines. A very useful listing of censuses is to be found in Texas University Population Research Center, International Census Bibliography: Africa (Austin, Texas: Bureau of Business Research, 1965), which can be supplemented by the Population Index issued by the Office of Population Research at Princeton.


Law has its Journal of African Law; and there is a Center of African Law at Columbia University, which is publishing a digest of African law as well as a newsletter. We may expect a great bibliographical output once the new law center being developed in Addis Ababa is fully established.
For sources on education in Africa there are a number of fairly helpful bibliographies. Especially important is John W. Hanson and Geoffrey W. Gibson, *African Education and Development Since 1960* (Michigan State University, 1966), which summarizes all major studies through 1965 with compact annotations and evaluations. Cole S. Brembeck and John P. Keith, *Education in Emerging Africa* (Michigan State University, 1963) is a select annotated bibliography. Those who want to investigate education in more depth can be referred to the University of London Institute of Education, *Catalogue of the Collection of Education in Tropical Areas* (London: G. K. Hall, 1964); this appears in three volumes--author, regional, and subject indexes, respectively.


We are poorly equipped with bibliographies concerning anything but material in the printed medium. With regard to film we have the recent UNESCO *Catalogue Selectif International de films ethnographiques sur l'Afrique noire* (Paris: UNESCO, 1967) and the much more modest African Studies Association Committee of Fine Arts and Humanities, *African Film Bibliography* (1965).

With regard to academic work in progress, one can consult *Africa,* compiled by the United States Department of State, Office of External Research. Useful too is: Centre International de Documentation Africaine (CIDESA), *Bulletin of Information on Theses and Studies in Progress or Proposed* (Brussels). Dissertations on Africa completed at United States Universities by 1960-61 are

NATIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHIES ON AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Most bibliographies are really national listings of publications issued in or about a particular country. There should be retrospective bibliographies and current supplements. We have few retrospective ones. Two good ones do exist for Ghana (Gold Coast): A. W. Cardinall, A Bibliography of the Gold Coast, issued as a companion volume to the Census Report of 1931. No less than 5,168 items were identified by this amateur bibliographer as having something to do with the Gold Coast. This bibliography has been updated by A. F. Johnson, A Bibliography of Ghana, 1930-1931 (London: Longmans, 1964) and David Brokensha and S. I. A. Kotei, "A Bibliography of Ghana: 1958-1964," African Studies Bulletin (September, 1967), pp. 35-79. Hopefully an annual national bibliography will be issued in Ghana in the future.

current national bibliographies, the only satisfactory one is the annual
**Nigerian Publications**, issued since 1950-52 by the Ibadan University Library.

For the last four years annual compilations have been made of books and
journals about Africa published outside that continent. As mentioned above
the Hoover Institution has issued since 1962 a series entitled **United States
and Canadian Publications on Africa**. The British publish through their
Standing Conference on Library Materials on Africa **United Kingdom Publications
and Theses on Africa**, and the Germans publish **Afrika: Bibliographie 1960-61**
(Bonn: Deutsche Afrika Gesellschaft).

**REFERENCE RETRIEVAL PROJECTS**

The need for bibliographers and librarians to cope with the rapidly
increasing flow of publications has led toward cooperation and mechanization.
No one institution alone can meet all the requests made of it. In the
United States a number of libraries have formed the Cooperative African
Microform Project (CAMP), which is administered by the Center for Research
Libraries in Chicago. CAMP holds master negatives of bulky and infrequently
used research material and has begun to distribute guides to some of its
collections.

The African Studies Association in America has, through its Archives-
Libraries Committee, fostered cooperation and helped bring about the
establishment of an African Section at the Library of Congress. On an
international level too, cooperation has given rise to the Standing Committee
of African University Libraries; a series of conferences have also been held,
the most ambitious of which was the International Conference on African
Bibliography which hoped to foster rationalization of diverse and duplicate
efforts and to bring publications on Africa under bibliographical control.

Various methods have been developed for the automatic retrieval of
bibliographic data. Perhaps the most successful of these computer techniques
has been that called **Key Word in Context (KWIC)** and the more advanced **Key Word
Out of Context (KWOC)**. KWOC is used in the present volume. These indexing
devices were invented by the late Hans Peter Luhn of the International
Business Machines Corporation. They include the arrangement, by computer,
of entries according to author and/or by each word of the title, except those specifically excluded. In the case of KWOC, these terms are arranged alphabetically along the left hand margin. The advantages of this system are that input is relatively inexpensive and that the bibliography can be updated easily. Its disadvantage is that the imprecision of a title may fail to give a proper clue to the subject matter; descriptors or annotations may be added, however, to reduce this problem.

To attain some degree of bibliographical control is obviously a costly matter. But small-scale, amateurish efforts will not suffice to bring order into the mass of publications on Africa. What is needed is a large-scale effort or series of coordinated efforts to analyze and index all publications on and from Africa. This information must be placed into an electronic memory with the ability to reproduce it rapidly, and at a reasonable cost, when and where needed.

So far the most substantial attempts to handle Africana in a new way have been done in France by the Center for Analysis and Documentary Research for Black Africa (CARDAN); Rene Bureau, the Director, and Francoise Izard, the former Director of CARDAN, describe their work in the African Studies Bulletin (December, 1967), pp. 67-81. They have analyzed and abstracted a large amount of periodical literature and have experimented with the development of a standardized language (Syntol), thus opening the way to automatic retrieval on a large scale. The Library of Congress and many other libraries in the United States are experimenting along similar and different lines. Before very long, one or more of these centers will not merely analyze the data, but, even more important, will supply the sources on demand.

THE FUTURE OF AFRICANA LIBRARY FACILITIES

This essay has tried to give an overall picture of the field of Africana and to underline the shift in knowledge organization which allows for the concentration of materials from different disciplines or across disciplines within a geographic area—in this case, Africa. The increasing production of, and demand for, primary documentary material in the form of
research data, conference papers, political ephemera and official publications, and the like, all require different technical handling if they are to be made available in a significant way. One must realize that no great improvement can be expected in the inflow and analysis of Africana without a closer and more rational cooperation between institutions in America and those in Africa, Europe, and elsewhere. Great efforts must converge toward the creation of national bibliographic centers in each country or region of Africa. This cannot be accomplished unless qualified professionals are trained and employed to provide for these basic necessities of scholarship.
GUIDE TO THE BIBLIOGRAPHIC VOLUME

John N. Paden and Edward W. Soja

This bibliographic volume has been arranged into four parts: syllabus references (sections 1-92); further bibliographic aids (sections 93-95); selected ethnic and country case studies (sections 96-97); and an author list.

The syllabus references are subdivided into five major thematic categories: Traditional African Society and Culture, Perspectives on the Past, Processes of Social Change, Consolidation of Nation-States, and Africa and the Modern World. The ninety-two syllabus sections covered by these five categories are intended to provide a sequential introduction to a wide range of related aspects of African studies. The five categories and syllabus sections, directly coordinated in Volumes I and II of this series, are paralleled by the essays in Volume III.

Within each of the ninety-two syllabus sections of the bibliography is at least one work which is regarded as introductory to the subject under discussion. These major references have been annotated to indicate the scope of the work, strengths and weaknesses, and when appropriate, some note is made regarding the author of the work. The remaining references, intended to supplement the annotated introductory references, have been divided into four additional categories. First are further references which may be useful to teachers and for more detailed research projects such as student term papers. Next, a category of general theory has been included which cites references that do not deal directly with Africa but which provide insight into the general problems or theory of a particular subject. These general theory references may be especially helpful to persons outside of the specific academic discipline of a given topic. The next category is
less accessible sources, including literature in unpublished form, in foreign languages (primarily French), and in journals with limited circulation. Finally, there is a category of case study material which may illustrate the more general points made in the introductory or reference sources. All references have been arranged alphabetically within each of the five annotational categories; and these, in turn, are arranged sequentially within each syllabus section.

The second part of the bibliography provides further bibliographic aids. Section 93 lists reference bibliographies dealing with Africa, including those discussed by Mr. Panofsky in his introduction to this volume. Section 94 lists alphabetically some of the major journals dealing with Africa. The place of publication of the journal is mentioned, the date of founding, the number of publications per annum, and a brief description of the substantive coverage of the journal. Section 95 lists some of the major atlases, maps, and directories dealing with Africa.

The third part of the bibliography lists selected case studies of ethnic groups in Africa. Twenty-seven ethnic groups were selected from the much larger number existing in Africa, largely because of the recurrent reference to these groups in the first and third volumes of this series. Also in this third part, each country and major region of Africa has been listed alphabetically and key works cited. With both the ethnic and the country case studies, a selection was made from the large number of possible reference sources in order to direct the student to sources which are accessible and illustrative in nature.

The fourth part of the bibliography is a complete listing in alphabetical order of the authors cited in the first three parts of the bibliography. The section (1 to 97) of the bibliography where the reference occurs is noted, and the full particulars of the work are given. Complicated cross-referencing is eliminated in favor of greater readability.

The format of this bibliography is the Key Word Out of Context (KWOC) retrieval system. We have followed this format, however, more for the sake of compiling future bibliographies than for the sake of easing the preparation of this volume. With the rapid increase of publications on Africa, it has seemed imperative to be able to generate up-to-date bibliographies without having to retype all of the references. This can be done using KWOC computer
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NEW YORK--MACMILLAN CO. 1956
09.

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PAINE DEVIRE ED
MEN OF TRIBAL AFRICA. LONDON ROUTLEDGE AND KEGAN PAUL 1963
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SALINS MARSHALL
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THE FAMILY-- SOME COMPARATIVE CONSIDERATIONS. IN HAMMOND ED. CULTURAL AND SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY NEW YORK HAMILLAN CO. 1964 PP 163-188
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LESS ACCESSIBLE

CHAPPELLE JEAN
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09.

LESS ACCESSIBLE

CHAPPELLE JEAN
DE LA NAISANCE A LA MORT (LIFE AND DEATH) Chapter 8. IN MULADES NOIRES DU SAMARA. PARIS, LIBRAIRIE PLCN 1957
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STRUCTURE DES SOCIETES TRADITIONNELLES EN AFRIQUE NOIRE. TRAITEMENTS DE STRUCTURES DE MOBILITES AFRICAINES 1 1965 PP 15-27
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09.

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BRINGING UP CHILDREN IN GHANA. LONDON GEORGE ALLEN AND UNWIN 1962
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COKER G B A
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CASE STUDY

COHEN RONALD
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CASE STUDY

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CASE STUDY

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Finally, the editors of this volume would appreciate suggestions for inclusions or deletions or annotational corrections to this bibliography in the hope that up-to-date sets of references may be kept available to those who are teaching or studying various aspects of the African experience.
PART ONE: SYLLABUS SECTIONS

1. MAJOR THEMES IN THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE: TRADITIONAL SOCIETY AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

AJATI J. P. ABE
ESPRI I.A.

A THOUSAND YEARS OF WEST AFRICAN HISTORY: A HANDBOOK FOR TEACHERS AND STUDENTS.
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FROM THE WEST-N VONT OF VIEW, SLIGHTLY ECCENTRIC, WITH REGARD TO STYLE, CONSTRUCTION ETC.; YET ALTHOUGH NEW TO REPRESENTATIVE OF PLANT-LITTE LITERATURE IN SPANISH-ENGLISH. THE VIOLIN, Huld IS BE CALLED "THE CITY NOVELS," BECAUSE HIS NEXT SCULPTURE SEEMED TO ACHIEVE HIS PROBLEMS OF TRANSITION IN THE NEW RUSH CENTRES. 1804 TRAINED AS A PHARMACIST. SEEMS TO THE LACK OF AN EXPLORATION OF THE SIGNIFICANCE BETWEEN WITH OTHER WRITERS.

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**Research Frontiers in the Study of Africa**

Lynden Robert Ed.

**Purpose of the Book**
To summarize current stage of academic research on Africa in most of the major disciplines. Three parts—
1. Historical and Sociocultural
2. Physical-Biological (Geography, Botany, Zoology)
3. Legal and Educational

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THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE

VOLUME THREE A
INTRODUCTORY ESSAYS

Northwestern University
Program of African Studies
1968

The research reported herein was performed pursuant to a contract with the Office of Education, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Contractors undertaking such projects under Government sponsorship are encouraged to express freely their professional judgment in the conduct of the project. Points of view or opinions stated do not, therefore, necessarily represent official Office of Education position or policy.
PREFACE
Gwendolen Carter

Multi-disciplinary working together is the hallmark of Northwestern University's Program of African Studies, the longest established such program in the United States. It was with particular interest, therefore, that its large group of African specialists accepted the challenge presented by the United States Office of Education of preparing curriculum materials to be used in introducing African studies in colleges and universities in the United States and abroad. The major contributions to the three parts of the African Curriculum Project (a basic syllabus, annotated bibliography, and a book of original essays) have been made by Dr. Edward Soja and Dr. John Paden, of the Departments of Geography and Political Science respectively. All members of the Program staff have shared in the discussions that have helped to shape the form of particular sections of the project, and many of them have contributed essays in their own fields.

When African studies were established at Northwestern in 1948, there was urgent need for highly trained researchers and professors to broaden and deepen knowledge and understanding of the past and present of the people and lands of a diverse and complex continent—a continent with which so substantial a percentage of the American people have ties of blood and history. Throughout the 1950's concentration remained on graduate work that combined rigorous disciplinary training with analysis of data drawn from field work in Africa. This emphasis continues and, in fact, the need for such trained scholars grows with the increasing demand for highly skilled teachers. In addition, there is now a greater general awareness of the significance of
introducing students in this country to the rich heritage and rapidly evolving political scene of Africa. This concern, coupled with student demands, has led colleges and universities to introduce disciplinary and/or interdisciplinary courses on Africa for their undergraduates. In fact, in many school systems this significant process now begins at the high school level.

The material presented in Northwestern's African Curriculum Project can be used in a wide variety of ways and at a number of levels. The ninety class units comprising the syllabus can provide a year course at the freshman-sophomore or junior-senior level. Equally it can be adapted to the needs of the higher grades of high schools. Should time be limited, individual units of the syllabus can be grouped together in any way deemed appropriate by the teacher. Thus the historical, or the geographical, or the political units can be extracted to form courses concentrated on a particular discipline, although a multi-disciplinary approach to African studies is perhaps the most rewarding way of introducing the interrelatedness of varied aspects of the African experience.

The bibliography has been prepared with particular care so as to concentrate on those works that are suitable for undergraduate study and that take into account the results of contemporary research. The flood of highly colored and misleading material on Africa in American films and on TV makes it particularly important that our educational institutions present an accurate and balanced picture of this important continent. It will be noticed that the bibliography is presented in such a way that it can be kept up to date easily with modern computer techniques; at the same time it can be used easily by those who simply need guidance, at any level of study, on accurate and suitable material about Africa.

In addition to the basic syllabus and the annotated bibliography, there is the collection of original essays contained in this volume. These essays embody the basic information and most stimulating systematic approaches to particular aspects of African studies. Moving from analysis of traditional structures to the consideration of modernization and of African leaders' own distinctive efforts to blend long established ways of thinking and action
with answers to contemporary needs, and from prehistory to the events of today, the essays provide a remarkably comprehensive consideration of the broad panorama of African life and achievements. It can be confidently expected that the book will take an important place among those used frequently by all concerned with African studies.

No syllabus, bibliography, or essay remains fully up-to-date, especially in regard to so rapidly changing a continent as Africa. What this material seeks to do, however, is to provide a firm basis of knowledge and a comprehensive over-all framework within which new material can easily find its place. In the process of preparation all those concerned with Northwestern's African Curriculum Project have learned much. We hope that the contribution of this work to others will be as great.

Gwendolen M. Carter
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The editors of this volume are especially grateful to Mrs. Diana Cohen and Mrs. Ruth Graf for administrative assistance on all aspects of this volume, and to Ann Paden for editing the essays under more hurried circumstances than usual. Similarly, our two typists, Miss Sue Larson and Mrs. Phyllis Phelps, have worked long and efficiently in the production of the typescript for reproduction. Mr. Frank Jordan, a graduate student in Geography, has prepared most of the maps in this volume, and Kevin Sherman and Marian Atwood have assisted in the day-to-day details of production.

In addition, we would especially like to thank Dr. Robert P. Armstrong, Director of Northwestern University Press, for advice on both production and substantive sides of the volume, and the Program of African Studies at Northwestern University for general assistance and cooperation. We reserve our deepest gratitude, however, for the contributors to this volume, who have taken time from their full schedules to meet our ever-impending deadlines and to read and comment on the papers of other contributors in an effort to make this a truly integrated volume.
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INTRODUCTION:
THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE

Edward Soja

In 1956, the former Anglo-Egyptian Sudan became independent. Within its nearly one million square mile area were contained not only a major economic success of the colonial period--the vast Gezira irrigation scheme along the Nile--but also physical and human evidence of great African accomplishments in the much more distant past. In the area of Nubia, for example, close contacts had been established with ancient Egypt for nearly a century beginning about 700 B.C. For thousands of years this area acted as a pivotal point in the patterns of culture contact between the Lower Nile Valley and sub-Saharan Africa--a culture contact which was emphatically not unidirectional but consisted of a two-way flow of innovative ideas and technology between the kingdoms of the Nile Valley and the predominantly Black peoples south of the Sahara.

In 1957, the colonial territory of the Gold Coast emerged as independent Ghana, a name filled with memories of a glorious African past but also imbued with the hopes for an equally glorious African future. Ancient Ghana, which reached its zenith in the tenth and eleventh centuries A.D., was the earliest of a series of African states and empires which developed in the Sudan belt, the savanna region lying south of the Sahara and north of the Guinea Coast forests and stretching eastward from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ethiopian Highlands. Although its gold deposits were a vital component in the trade of many of these ancient states, contemporary Ghana lies beyond the major centers of Sudanic state formation. Its name was selected to recall the rich heritage of Africa and to symbolize the dream for future unity and achievement.
By September, 1968, when Swaziland achieved independence, the roster of independent African states had reached over forty. Except for Rhodesia, which unilaterally declared its independence under white minority rule in 1965, the African empire of Great Britain had completely disappeared. Only tiny French Somaliland remained of the French empire, the only large empire left was Portugal's (Angola, Mozambique, Portuguese Guinea), and local rebellions left even this last remnant of colonialism very tenuously linked to the European power. (See Figures I and II)

Thus, within half a generation, a most remarkable series of interrelated events had taken place in Africa. Dozens of new and independent actors had entered the international system and helped to produce major transformations in world politics. A "Third World" emerged to modify the bipolar power structure which prevailed in the post-World War II period. New words and phrases exploded into our vocabularies symbolizing not only the transformed contemporary context but also the radically new demands for the future: "the revolution of rising expectations," "the challenge of nation-building," "non-alignment," "neocolonialism," "the developing countries," "modernization."

At the same time as Africa achieved an independent presence in world affairs and began to chart its future, it also rediscovered its past. The end of colonialism created a new perspective on the contemporary world which requires not only an understanding of current situations but a deeper knowledge of their historical development—a knowledge of the powerful processes of social change which have transformed not only the former colonial territories but the rest of the world as well. It is within this context that an assessment of the African experience is essential.

Moreover, changes have also taken place within the academic world which have begun to erode boundaries between disciplines and foster the growth of interdisciplinary approaches to contemporary problems. Africa is complex. Its area can contain that of the United States more than three times over. Its three-hundred million inhabitants are organized into about fifty political units (comprising over one-third of the entire United Nations membership), identify themselves with hundreds of different ethnic groups, and speak nearly a thousand distinct languages. The variations from place to place in African
FIGURE I: COLONIAL SPHERES OF INFLUENCE - 1924
FIGURE II: PATTERNS OF INDEPENDENCE
economies, societies, political organizations, and ecology rival that anywhere on earth. This complexity and variation had hitherto discouraged generalization, to the detriment of African studies. Today, however, intellectual reorganization as well as the urgency of Africa's problems has led to a reduction in academic compartmentalization and the growth of the inter-disciplinary cooperation and interaction necessary to handle the complex and multi-dimensional questions facing the student of Africa.

The primary objective of this volume is to survey in a series of original essays, each revolving around a particularly important theme, the African experience—the sum of objective and subjective responses by Africans to the challenges and problems facing all mankind. As such, the volume provides a wide-ranging introduction to African studies as well as to the perspectives and methods of social science research on Africa. The contributing authors were, in many cases, asked to synthesize an enormous body of experience and research activity in a short essay which explored the subject matter and presented challenging questions and problems for future research. In addition, each author was asked to consider the interdisciplinary relevance of his theme, with the result that no single contribution stands alone. Each is directly linked conceptually within the over-all framework of the volume, while several groups of essays form highly interrelated sets sharing similar approaches, terminology, and conclusions.

These original essays, however, also form an integral part of a larger set of instructional materials, prepared by the African Curriculum Project, which similarly display the objectives of disciplinary as well as thematic coordination within the field of African studies. Directly linked to this volume are two additional volumes: one a computerized bibliography of over 2500 reference sources, and the other a syllabus of some ninety lecture outlines specifically designed for a one-year university course in African studies at the undergraduate level. Each lecture outline corresponds to a section of the bibliography, which in turn contains subsections covering annotated introductory sources, further basic reference sources, less accessible materials, general theoretical works, and specific case studies.
The bibliography also contains an author list and separate sections covering other bibliographies; atlas and archival sources; ethnic, regional and national case studies; and major academic journals on Africa.

All three volumes composing The African Experience revolve around essentially identical thematic frameworks. Some lecture outlines adapt material covered in the essays for classroom presentation. Others cover topics not dealt with in detail in the essays but which are nevertheless considered essential to an understanding of the African experience. In all cases, the corresponding section of the bibliography offers an opportunity for student and teacher to extend their backrounds into the available African studies literature.

Because of the highly integrated nature of these materials, it is appropriate here to discuss briefly the thematic framework used and the basis for its selection, particularly with respect to the essays in this volume. The focus of Part I, "African Society and Culture," is on "traditional" Africa, not as an historical entity nor as a contemporary anachronism, but as a dynamic form of human expression, identity, and organization. Traditional or ethnic Africa is viewed not simply as a baseline of change but as a particular way of life which has characterized the bulk of Africa's population for the major part of its history. It is a way of life in which kinship or blood relationship provides a primary basis of social cohesion, political behavior, economic organization, and artistic expression. Contemporary change in African societies and cultures, when viewed against the traditional context, can be seen as an accelerated and far-reaching manifestation of forces which have been operative in Africa for many centuries, rather than as the sparks which transformed a static and stagnant population.

There has been an attempt throughout this volume to avoid use of the term "tribe." Not only has the term assumed pejorative connotations for many indigenous Africans, but it has not proven a very effective concept for analytical purposes. It is extremely difficult, for example, to develop valid criteria for selecting the particular level at which the term should be applied. Moreover, the changing nature of group identity is easily overlooked.
by the static nature of the term "tribe" as it is used in the literature. Similarly, the terms "tribe" and "tribalism" have lacked cross-cultural applicability. What is called a tribe in Africa is often called a "nation" or "nationality" in Europe and North America.

A growing number of scholars have reacted to these deficiencies by substituting a terminology associated with the concept of "ethnicity" to designate those forms of behavior based primarily on kinship relations, whether real or classificatory. This usage provides an effective analytical concept applicable both across cultures and at various time periods, including the present. It also stresses the adaptability of this form of human identification to changing societal and physical contexts. The three volumes of *The African Experience* follow this usage.

A more detailed discussion of terminology is given in the essay by Cohen, which presents a broad and systematic characterization of traditional African social and political organization. As such, this essay provides an introduction to the essential components of ethnic Africa. The major ethnic groups mentioned in this essay and all others in this volume are shown in Figure III.

The Cohen essay is followed by examinations of traditional economic organization and processes (Dalton), the distribution and study of African languages and oral literature (Berry), the achievement and orientations of African visual art (Willett), and the evolution of African urban design and architecture (Cordwell and Cordwell). In all of these essays the continuities of African society and culture are emphasized, and each is directly relevant not only to the study of Africa's past but even more so to an understanding of its present and future.

Part II is entitled "Perspectives on the Past." Although more specifically historical in focus than Part I, the essays here are also directly concerned with contemporary problems. The introductory essay by Rowe identifies a number of significant themes in African history ranging from the evolution of man in Africa to the movements for African independence. Rowe's essay is also an illustration of the dramatic changes which have
taken place within the academic discipline of history with respect to a continent once dismissed as having virtually no history.

Several of the themes outlined by Rowe are more intensively developed in the essays which follow. Abu-Lughod, for example, discusses the Islamic factor in Africa, its growth and spread, and the role of Islam in modern African politics. African state formation provides the central theme of the essay by Holden, which focuses particularly on the growth of centralized political institutions in the Western Sudan from the eighth to the sixteenth centuries. The relevance of the West African slave trade to the growth of Afro-American culture in the New World is explored in the essay by Hammond. And finally, the imprint of colonialism on the African experience is analyzed by Crowder for the former colonial territories of West Africa. It is noteworthy that each of these primarily historical essays also concern themselves directly or indirectly with contemporary problems not only in Africa but also in the United States.

"The Processes of Change" provide the focus for Part III. Again, this section is introduced with a wide-ranging essay, by van den Berghe, which reviews many of the concepts and themes discussed in previous sections, while at the same time supplying an overview for subsequent essays. Some of the more important topics mentioned in this essay, such as the problem of ethnocentrism in the study of Africa, are evaluated in greater detail in the essay by LeVine, which presents a very thought-provoking elucidation of the concept of an African personality. LeVine's treatment of the individual personality in a changing environment is expanded further by Clignet in his analysis of education and the growth of African elites. A similar expansion in scale moves the analysis of change to a study of urbanization and its impact on the individual and on the larger society. The last essay in this section, by Soja, further expands the scale of this analysis to the study of communications and transportation within their spatial and historical contexts.

The next group of essays is concerned with "The Consolidation of Nation-States." Paden introduces this section with a survey of pre-independence concepts of nationhood including ideas such as negritude
and Pan-Africanism. From the pre-independence period, the emphasis shifts to the contemporary problems of nation-building. The essay by Zolberg explores the broad dimensions of Africa's search for order and stability, particularly with respect to the difficulties growing out of the mass-elite and interethnic relations evolved during the colonial period. The theme of nation-building is then broken down into some of its major components in essays on the growth of political systems (Crawford Young), economic systems (Rivkin), and legal systems (Roland Young). By emphasizing the task of integrating the traditional with the modern, each of these essays effectively relates materials covered in preceding sections.

Part V covers a variety of important topics relating to "Africa and the Modern World." The first essay in this section, by Mazrui, examines Africa's role in international relations, particularly its position within the Third World. It is followed by essays covering African literature (Cartey), the role of technology (Kliphardt), and journalism and the mass media (Hachten). Concluding this section is a provocative analysis of the relevance of Africa to the Afro-American experience (Turner).

It is quite clear that no single collection of essays can effectively cover the entire African experience. What the contributors have attempted to do here is identify some of the most significant dimensions of this complex subject, to examine them primarily within the perspectives of social science, and to interrelate these dimensions in a framework of interdisciplinary effort and methodology. The concluding essay by the editors summarizes the fundamental concepts of social science language, methodology, and types of analysis and relates social science to the study of Africa by drawing upon examples from the contributions to this volume.

It will become apparent to the readers of this volume that certain regional emphases emerge in our survey of the African continent. Perhaps most obvious is the stress on Black Africa; conversely there is less emphasis on Arab North Africa and white-dominated southern Africa. Even within Black Africa, there is more detailed coverage of West Africa in comparison with other major regions (for example, in the essays on state formation, the slave trade, and colonialism). This emphasis has not
developed from preconceived objectives but rather from the selection of themes considered most relevant to an understanding of the African experience. The basic demographic data support this pattern of coverage in that the bulk of the population of Africa is found in the area north of the Zambezi and south of the Sahara. Moreover, West Africa contains considerably more people than any region of comparable size anywhere on the continent. But perhaps most important is the greater direct relevance of Black Africa--and particularly West Africa--to the American readers, Black and White, to whom this book is directed.

All three volumes of The African Experience are intended for teaching purposes. The editors would consequently welcome any comments from users of these materials particularly with respect to the integration of the three volumes, the effectiveness with which they can be used to present the subject matter, and the reaction of students to the material covered. Any suggestions for additional materials or modifications in the existing structure and focus of the three volumes will also be appreciated and considered in any future revision.
AFRICAN SOCIETY AND CULTURE

1 TRADITIONAL SOCIETY IN AFRICA
2 TRADITIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEMS
3 LANGUAGE SYSTEMS AND LITERATURE
4 VISUAL ART IN AFRICA
5 URBAN DESIGN AND ARCHITECTURE
The continent of Africa is a stage upon which the drama of human development and cultural differentiation have been acted since the beginning of history. Yet the continent is so large and the people so diverse that even to approach an understanding of this complexity in any comprehensive way is an overwhelming task. By identifying a number of themes or topics, each of which probes only a limited set of African experiences, the editors of this volume hope to make this complexity more understandable. It should be remembered, however, that given the enormous volume of material now available on Africa—and it is constantly expanding—each of these topics could in their turn be further broken down for even more intense examination.

In this essay we will consider in general terms the study of traditional societies of Africa. Let us examine first, therefore, the two basic concepts being used; "tradition" and "society," to see whether as categories they do adequately represent the avalanche of material upon which our accumulated knowledge is based.

Within anthropology, and now increasingly in other disciplines, the concept of "traditional" has proved to be useful. In Africa, what is called the traditional period refers fundamentally to the non-Western or pre-Western contact situation. We know that African society was never totally cut off from contacts with the outside world; but what we mean to connote is that quality of African social life in which contact with the Western world was not a significant part of the lives of the vast majority of the population. There has of course been contact with the West, especially trade
relations at the edges of Africa, for a very long time. In some places, such as along the West African coast, this contact has stimulated significant changes in the historical development of society over the past several hundred years. However, these changes were not in the direction of a Western model of society.

Following this distinction, our conception of traditional thus also refers to social life in which the direction of change and development in society is primarily determined by indigenous events and patterns of behavior. For the majority of African peoples, such changes generally have taken place slowly in response to local problems and to neighboring African peoples.

Similarly, the traditional aspect of African social life refers to a quality in which both the leaders and the masses of the people were (or are) not dedicated to the goal of changing the nature of their society. In modern Africa such rapid and planned change is a primary focus of national ideology and is promoted actively by the state. The whole idea of "underdeveloped" or "developing" implies a gap that must be filled and produces what could be called a "catch up" ideology; that is, it is thought that the gap is undesirable and must be closed. To close the gap, a number of processes are initiated, especially those aiming at industrialization. This in turn implies an increase in urbanization and wage-labor, and a radical change in the basic social organization of African society. The relative absence of this "catch up" ideology and of the stresses and changes induced by it is an important characteristic of traditionalism.

Finally, and combining the previous facets, traditionalism reflects a genuinely indigenous quality in each society and culture, such that most of a society's social and cultural institutions are rooted in its own adaptations to its own patterns of growth. This is somewhat difficult to define in clear-cut operational terms but is, I believe, a real and ultimately even a measurable facet of socio-cultural existence. There is a difference in adapting or creating a local pottery style based on new experience as opposed to giving up pottery entirely due to the greater
utility and attractiveness of imported steel enamelware. Similarly, there is a difference in creating a mutual-aid society based on aspects of traditional social organization as opposed to taking out an insurance policy from a newly-founded corporate business enterprise devoted to selling insurance to the public.

I am not suggesting that either of these modes, the traditional or the modern, is necessarily more valuable. Each has its own value in its own context. The Africans themselves and the conditions of their lives will ultimately decide what mix of traditional and modern elements are to go into the development of their new states. My objective here is merely to point out that there are clusters of characteristics that can usually be thought of as traditional for purposes of identification and analysis.

The concept of traditional is not without its detractors. There are those who feel that a dichotomy between "traditional" and "modern" creates an artificial division which obscures the facts of change in times past. Given the merits of such criticism, there is still the problem of magnitude of change. It is assumed in this essay that the kinds of changes involved in contemporary modernization in Africa are so widespread and profound that they provide a watershed in the history of the entire continent.

Thus, we may isolate in theoretical terms a set of practices called traditional which may be applied to any society in which a radical change has affected the entire way of life of the people concerned. The notion of traditional then refers to the set of conditions that existed before radical change took place.

Turning to our second major concept, "society," like "traditional," is an abstract and relative idea. Basically it refers to a group of people whose boundaries are defined by whatever criteria seem appropriate to the problem being examined. Thus a family, a small group, or a small village can be thought of as a society; or a city, province, region, country, group of countries; or possibly the entire world population. The term is applicable as long as there are identifiable criteria for putting people into a category which involves some form of interaction.
These interactions usually increase in frequency in inverse proportion to the scale of the unit. There also tend to be significant modifications in the nature of these interactions as the scale is changed from one level to another. Thus the number of interactions among and between all members changes significantly when we go from family to village to province. By scale is meant quality that can be shown to increase and decrease; and scale as we are using it refers to two aspects of society: that of the space involved and that of the numbers of actors occupying this space. Human actors are the basic units, while space and number are variables that determine what scale society we will be referring to within traditional Africa.

THE INDIVIDUAL ACTOR IN TRADITIONAL AFRICAN SOCIETY

Within the scope of this essay I wish to examine the individual African only from the point of view of the social systems within which he or she operates. It is now widely accepted that actors in differing cultures may not have the same set of personality features; and, furthermore, that there appear to be clusters of personality traits that are characteristically "African." These psychological features crosscut local variations in social life and reflect the similarities in African society rather than the differences. The prevailing common feature can be summarized briefly as an emphasis on social relations as a primary value relative to others, whatever the particular form of organization in the society itself. This implies a lack of individual alienation in traditional society as a result of a strong bias against alienation in traditional cultural values and personal attitudes to life.

Discussing this point with a young Tanzanian I was surprised by the intensity of his feeling. After deriding North American attitudes toward social relations, referring to his own experiences in the West he rushed into a description of the greetings that would be extended to any stranger who came to Tanganyika. He assured me that if I visited him, there would be a large crowd at the airport to greet me; and I would be shown the entire city
because, "that is the way we do things." He promised that in his country I would never be alone, as he had been in mine.

Experience teaches people that group membership is a prime necessity for marriage, for political membership in a community, and for obtaining a livelihood. In most of Africa, marriages, especially first marriages, concern the family groups uniting through the spouses more than they do the bride and groom; and without kin support, marriage is often extremely difficult. In Northern Nigeria, if a man is accused of a crime or moral offense of some kind against his neighbors he is called to court. He and everyone else knows this means he must appear in court with his brothers, his father, and perhaps his father's brothers and his father's father. If he receives a fine, then all people related to him through the male line, both men and women, contribute to its payment. Corporate kin responsibility is widespread throughout Africa, and the social security of kin membership has often been noted. Many of the migrant laborers such as the Mossi of Upper Volta\(^1\) and the Mambwe of Zambia\(^2\) returned periodically from their wage labor in Ghana and the Copperbelt respectively. They are reported to feel that life can not be tolerated without their kin membership, symbolized in land ownership, and the status they receive from being members of the traditional political structures of their people.

Furthermore, social advance usually means obtaining and maintaining an increasing number of social relationships. Greater income or wealth means more dependents, which results in more prestige and feelings of achievement for the individual concerned. While increased wealth may be spent on new consumer goods in modern Africa, income rise must also be seen against the traditional background requiring a concurrent increase in number of dependents.

Gainful employment is also a question of group membership. In Northern Nigeria most people acquire the requisite skills for their occupation within the family. Alternatively, the head-of-family pays a non-kin member to take the trainee as an apprentice; the boy is then taken into the household
of the master where he must show loyal obedience at all times in return for his training. This is not only true for such traditional crafts as barbering, candy-making, and trading but also for newer skills such as truck-driving and sometimes even for skills associated with the lower levels of the civil service.

Within the sphere of traditional values, moral prescriptions are clearly focused on interpersonal relations. In Northern Nigeria parents admonish their children constantly about behavior norms to be learned concerning interaction with people. These are not abstract standards, such as "Honest is the best policy," or "An apple a day keeps the doctor away." The Kanuri of Bornu, Nigeria, say to their children, "You must treat so-and-so in such-and-such a way"; "Remember to take your shoes off when you pass in front of the chief's house"; or "Your religious teacher surpasses your father (in fatherly qualities)." Literally dozens of specific prescriptions about interpersonal behavior are drilled into children at a very early age.

The cultural contrast between traditional African values and those of the Western world have been dramatized by African writers and novelists. William Contin in his novel, The African, has his hero rage out against "the European's exaggerated individualism, his constant exhausting of the single human being, at the polls, in the classroom, and in the sight of God." When South African Peter Abrahams, in his autobiography, Tell Freedom, asks a man who was running away from an industrial job about his people the man answers, "I am my people." This view may be extended to include political implications, as in Nkrumah's book, Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah.

Although little is known as yet about the relation of personality to society in Africa, it would seem that the cultural emphasis on social relations can be associated with certain personality characteristics. If a person is continually made to feel that his obligations to other people are the most important part of his life, then his anxieties, his personal goals, and his security must derive primarily from these relationships. In our society it is possible for a career-oriented bachelor novelist to find satisfaction and even to achieve status in his individualistic
relationship to his work. In traditional African society an individual would not be likely to seek such isolation from institutionalized personal relationships, and certainly the approval and support of the society would be withheld from any member who did wish to pursue a solitary or individualistic occupation. Jahoda, in a systematic study of attitudes in Ghana, suggests that Africans consider their own way of life to be superior to that of Western society with regard to social relationships in that "greater value... attached to their kinds of social relationships."

Evidence of this point comes from other parts of Africa as well. Marwick has pointed out that in Central Africa anxiety over the breakup of traditional social relationships in new urban centers is likely to lead to more, rather than fewer, accusations of witchcraft during the modernization period. In other words, fear of malevolence and increased attribution of evil-doing to others as expressed by accusations of witchcraft increases when people feel their important bases of security, that is their stable social relationships with others, to be breaking up. Dr. Field has made a similar observation in Ghana.

To suggest that Western life is antithetical to African life in its manner of social relationships would, of course, be quite misleading. However, the tradition in Western culture that leads us to admire individuals who sacrifice social relations for ideals when necessary is in sharp contrast to African culture in which social relations are always at the center and are considered to be the most important ideals.

In contemporary Western society we admire the lone hero who acts in accordance with ideal standards of values rather than submitting to social pressures. On our TV screens the cowboy combats evil in society; and then he rides off alone into the sunset. The viewer is made to feel that the moral purity and the Samson-like strength of the hero is revitalized in his solitary communion. Popular entertainment thus dramatizes the ideals which in the life of the more average man, are eroded and corrupted by the psychological and economic necessities of his social life.

Africans conversely, feel that only through social life can the highest ideals of morality be realized. Among the Kanuri of Nigeria the man who lives alone is called "ngudi," or unfortunate, and he is not to be
trusted because his lack of social ties indicates that he may not be bound by the moral precepts of his own society. Africans as individual actors in their traditional society are strongly oriented to their fellow actors, rather than to some highly developed notion of conscience or superego; and certainly not to one based on relationships in which the man-god relation pervades or intervenes among and between the man-man relationships. African morality stresses the man-man relationship and individual matters of conscience stem from this fact. As a generalization, it can be said that to compare the Westerner to the African is to go from high levels of narcissism to very low ones respectively.

KINSHIP IN TRADITIONAL AFRICA: GENEALOGY AND DESCENT

Like individuals everywhere, every individual born into a traditional African society is a member of a local residence group and kinship system. In some cases, these are the only major organizations in the entire society; in other cases they are the smallest scale social units and are imbedded into larger organizations. In all cases, however, kinship involves three categories of interpersonal relations: genealogy, descent, and affinity.

Genealogy refers to the biological relationships between an individual (called "ego" in kinship terminology) and those persons who are related to him through a network of biologically traceable links. As a category, genealogy is less important than descent or affinity. This is due to the fact that the fundamental determinants of genealogy are biological; given bisexual reproduction and the incest prohibition, most human genealogies are very similar. They do vary somewhat in depth (number of generations) and range (number of persons per generation); but since these variables refer for the most part to cultural norms, this aspect is in many respects a function of descent and affinal relations.

Descent as an aspect of kinship refers to the way in which a set of loyalties, obligations, rights, and duties are passed on to succeeding generations. From the actor's (ego's) point of view, it refers to the patterns and precedents by which are determined the rights and obligations of new members born into families, with respect to other members of the family.
Genealogical links join the actors to a set of relatives, but descent has a variable capacity to create groups that may act corporately. Thus, for example, descent groups can hold property in common, act as a political unit, a marriage unit, and even an economic unit. The degree of corporateness is generally low or absent when descent groups are bilateral (usually referred to as cognatic). In a bilateral, or cognatic, group, ego reckons descent through both parents and all four grandparents. On the other hand, when descent groups are unilineal (or reckoned through only one parent) corporate activity is easy and very often practiced. In Africa there are three types of unilineal descent: patrilineal, which means reckoned through males only (also referred to as agnatic); matrilineal, which means reckoned through the female line (also referred to as uterine); and duolineal (sometimes called double unilineal or bilineal). Duolineal descent describes a situation in which ego is a member of two unilineal descent groups. Often, as with the Yakô (Nigeria), this means a patrilineal and a matrilineal group. The difference between bilateral and duolineal is that in a bilateral descent group ego is related to four grandparents, and in a duolineal descent group he is related only to two grandparents.

The types of descent groups in Africa fall into the following classification: Given the relative accuracy of our present statistics, 85 per cent of African descent is unilineal and only 15 per cent is cognatic. Of the unilineal descent groups, three-quarters of the different ethnic groups are traditionally patrilineal, and most of the remaining one-quarter are matrilineal, a small number of groups (almost all in West Africa) have duolineal systems. Africa then is a continent in which unilineal descent is the most dominant form; and among the unilineal descent groups, the patrilineal descent form is by far the most frequent.10

Why these regularities should exist on a continent so large and so diverse is an important question—but one for which there is as yet no clear-cut explanation. Unilineal descent is associated with corporate activities by descent groups, and Africa is dominantly unilineal. Unilineal descent groups in Africa are in fact widely used for organizing social life. Their adaptability is enormous; they can serve multiple functions across
a wide spectrum of activities, and the means for their continuity are simple and universal—namely, marriage and birth. Although exact data are lacking it would seem that the elaboration of such groups into "nesting" or segmentary units of increasing scale is a function of the degree of population mobility within a geographical context. In other words, the less an African group remained in settled stable villages using the locality itself as a basis for social organization, the greater the tendency for individuals in groups to unite on the basis of actual or putative descent (clanship). This tendency can increase to such an extent that in a mobile population such as the northern Somali several million people can be linked into one overarching patrilineal descent system.

Unilineal descent is dominant in Africa partly because it is used as a means for organizing corporate group life. But this function does not account for the prevalence of patrilineal systems rather than matrilineal or duolineal systems. Why this should be becomes an even more intriguing question when a leading anthropologist, G. P. Murdock, concludes that in Black Africa "matrilineal descent prevailed generally in the not too distant past."11 By implication Murdock is suggesting that for most of its traditional period Black Africa has been primarily a land of matrilineal descent. Why or how such a monumental continent-wide change occurred in African social history is not at all clear. Has there been some great ecological change, or demographic change, or technological change—or has patrilineal descent spread southward from North Africa for reasons we do not yet understand?

On the other hand, it may be that the problematic change from predominantly matrilineal descent systems never occurred. That is, it may be that Africa is not only dominantly patrilineal, but that it always has been. My reasons for supporting this view are as follows: Matrilineal descent is essentially an unstable descent system depending first upon high divorce rates which prevent fathers from having long periods of association with their own children, and secondly, upon an ecology in which simple hoe agriculture is the dominant form of food-getting activity. Any tendencies away from such features seem to provoke tendencies away from matrilineal descent. The so-called matrilineal belt of Tropical Africa is an area where these conditions obtain.12 (See Figure) On the other
DISTRIBUTION OF RULES OF DESCENT

hand, most of Africa is open, dry, savanna country where cattle keeping or at least mixed farming has been practiced for a very long time. The correlation between nomadic pastoralism and patrilineal descent is one of the oldest and best established in anthropology. This results from the fact that men care for herds of animals, and herds can be most easily and efficiently maintained as a corporate holding among a group of agnates (that is, a group of persons related through the male line) who then live off the proceeds of the herd. Surplus animals may be used to pay the costs of marriages, thereby recruiting women who carry on the group by contributing their childbearing properties to it. Although it is possible to obtain a stable group of men related by descent through using either bilateral or matrilineal principles, each of these systems has a difficult problem with corporateness. Either the group is not the same for every member (bilateral), or the men tend to be dispersed rather than together (matrilineal).

KINSHIP IN TRADITIONAL AFRICA: MARRIAGE

Another aspect of kinship, after genealogy and descent, is that of affinity, that is relationship by marriage. Although there are bewildering numbers of different marriage forms in Africa, there are also some clear-cut patterns that do predominate. Marriage inception almost always entails some form of consideration or value provided by the groom and/or his group of kin, friends, and supporters to the girl and her group. This pattern pertains in almost 90 per cent of African societies; 80 per cent are in the form of bridewealth payments, and 10 per cent are bride service arrangements. Only 1 per cent of the sample material used indicates that marriage inception is accompanied by a dowry to the girl instead of bridewealth payment or bride service. Women are traditionally considered to be of value to the prospective spouse and his group; and to obtain such value, some compensation must be made to the group giving up the girl. Her value lies partly in her fecundity as a childbearer and partly in her contributions to the work force of the group she joins through marriage.
Marriage inception patterns in Africa must also be seen as divided into primary and secondary marriages. Primary marriages are first marriages for one or both partners; the term secondary marriage refers to subsequent unions. In general there is an age gap in Africa such that women marry earlier, sometimes before puberty, while men contract their primary unions later. The later the age of primary marriage, the less stringent are the rules of premarital chastity. Secondary marriages are less formal, less expensive, and each party to the marriage depending on age and social status has more freedom to contract the union on his own.

Single-spouse marriages (monogamy) and plural marriages (polygamy) are found in Africa. Within the sphere of plural marriages, Murdock notes that 88 per cent of all traditional African societies allow for some form of polygyny, in which a man may have more than one wife. The practice of polyandry, where a woman may have more than one husband is relatively rare. This should not be taken to mean that all polygynous societies in Africa practice the custom uniformly; in some, only a minority of the people actually live in polygynous families, while in others well over half of all marriages are polygynous at any given time.

Why this should be so is an extremely complex problem. In some societies, bridewealth payments are traditionally high, and even though polygyny is possible, it is in fact available only to those with wealth. On the other hand, women help with farm work and cook. Without such help, men cannot carry on normal lives as mature members of society. If bridewealth payments, and the supply of women, do not create constraints, then polygyny increases where it is valued.

The dominance of polygyny as an African institution has led to an interesting theoretical problem about the supply of women. If most African societies prefer polygyny, but sex ratios approach a 1:1 relationship, where do the extra women come from? One hypothesis claims that only a few successful men are able to gain extra wives. Research has shown, however, that in a number of cases where we have data the ratio of married women to married men is 1.5:1, while over-all sex ratios remain at approximately 1:1. Another hypothesis suggests that age disparity at first marriage produces significantly
more marriage years for women than men creating thereby an artificially or culturally induced surplus of women. This hypothesis requires that there be an age disparity at first marriage when there is a high rate of polygyny— and commonly there is. But in many of these same societies women leave marriage to become single, old women while men go on being married until they die. This corrects for the imbalance at marriage inception but still leaves the sex ratio problem unanswered. (It also creates an age-class of old, unmarried women who are taken care of by their kin group.) It has recently been suggested that the problem can be solved by looking at interethnic relations and hypothesizing that politically dominant groups import a surplus of women from less powerful neighboring groups and thus the polygyny rate is a correlate of political dominance in a region.16 But like many other problems in our understanding of African society, or in social science in general, final solutions escape us.

KINSHIP IN TRADITIONAL AFRICA: FAMILY LIFE

Family life in Africa, in general, can be classified into one of two types. First there are families that include one married generation with their children, that is, nuclear, families (56 per cent in our sample of African societies). Secondly, there are variant forms of extended, often polygynous, families (44 per cent of our sample) in which marriage units from two or more adjacent generations, linked by descent ties, live together as a family.

The stability of relationships of any particular set of actors within the family governed by two analytically distinct sets of factors: a) those resulting from the structural and functional features of kinship, and b) those resulting from the nature of local residence groupings. Marital unions have been found to be more or less stable depending upon descent type, rural-urban distinctions, socio-economic status of the husband, fertility of the wife, and the degree of wife absorption into her husband's group. In general, patrilineal descent is associated with more stable family life than matrilineal descent, with bilateral descent being associated
Traditional Society

with both high and low stability of marital unions. Rural marriages are more stable than urban marriages, low status is more stable than high status, fertile marriages are more stable than infertile marriages, and higher absorption is more stable than lower. Given these factors, in general I would estimate that traditional African unions are highly unstable even though there are celebrated cases such as the Nuer of the Sudan and the Zulu of South Africa, where divorce is rare or nonexistent. 17

For family life in general this implies several distinct qualities. In those societies where divorce is common, high divorce rates mean that children lose household contact with their mothers. This follows from the fact that 78 per cent of traditional African societies require the wife to live at her husband’s family residence, or at least at her husband’s own residence. That is, the great majority of marriages are patrilocal (where the wife may live with her husband’s family) or virilocal (where the wife lives with her husband, but not necessarily with the group of the husband’s agnates.) At divorce mothers leave the house, generally taking only unweaned children who may have to be returned to their father’s house when they are weaned. Children must therefore adjust to their mother’s former co-wives, or to subsequent wives of their father as senior females in the household.

Sibling relationships in African families, therefore, are complicated by polygyny and high divorce. The concept of full and half sibling is widespread and in many cases the sibling bond is extended to cousins. These may be parallel cousins (children of parent’s siblings of the same sex), especially where unilineal descent is emphasized; or as in the cases of the Hausa, the Tuareg, and the Kanuri, they may be both parallel and cross cousins (children of parents’ siblings of the opposite sex). This makes for a three point scale, at least, of social proximity among siblings—full, half, and cousin. In segmentary societies where agnatic ideology can produce extremely wide and inclusive use of sibling terms, there may be even more categories of sibling relationship. At the level of the nuclear family, however, the distinction between full and half siblings is important at the death of a father; full siblings still share a mother, while half
siblings now each have a different surviving parent. The tendency then for siblings to break up at this point and go their own way is a function of the genealogical difference between them.

The relationship of co-wives is, as implied above, a difficult and tenuous one at best. Given widespread polygyny, the possibility that a traditional marriage may involve co-wives is fairly high. In all cases that I am familiar with, co-wife relations—especially their relations to the common husband—are confined by rules which protect what might be called a right of equal treatment, or as nearly equal as possible. Obviously, the inequality of man to women ratio in such a marriage creates scarcity (access to the husband) and competition among the wives. But such tensions are carefully controlled by rules. Thus, among the Kanuri of Nigeria, a man must take nightly turns having each wife in his sleeping hut or room whether he has sexual relations with her or not. To avoid such a responsibility is tantamount to open conflict—which is what it leads to automatically. A very widespread variant of the equal treatment rule is that of senior wife (the first one married by the husband among his wives). Often she has special privileges and is regarded as the senior female authority in the household of her husband. Often the authority and status continue down the marriage order so that marriage order itself is a status hierarchy among the women. Sexual attractiveness, domestic skills, fertility, the importance of a particular wife's own descent group and other qualities also tend to vary the ideal ordering and to create jealousies and tension among the women.

Father-child and husband-wife relations in Africa are generally defined culturally in terms of respect, obedience, and loyalty. These terms refer to the hierarchical qualities surrounding the role of husband-father in his relations to the other family members. In practice there is much variation, but the essential concept of adult male dominance over family life is extremely widespread and is considered to be a morally superior role expectation.

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION: THE HOUSEHOLD

Turning from role network aspects of the family to the spatial criteria for organization, the most widespread local unit for social organization is
the household or domestic group. Such units overlap with kinship systems but are not identical to them. Because of the life cycle of individuals, domestic groups generally are organizationally dynamic; as pointed out by Fortes, domestic cycles have three phases. First there is an expansionist period that covers the marriage union until the birth of the last child. This is then limited by the duration of the last wife's fertility. Secondly, there is a fission phase in which children reach adulthood and marry. The children's marriages then lead to the real or potential breakup of the original unit. Finally, there is a replacement phase in which the children take over the roles of the previous generation and the concomitant power and authority such roles involve with respect to the resources of the original domestic unit.18

What factors affect the nature of the domestic group and determine widespread characteristics of domestic groups in Africa? First there is the life cycle of the individual members. Consistently high infant mortality rates lead to naming customs that may delay full membership in the society. Growing up in an African household means belonging to a larger group of people than simply the nuclear family. The child must learn to interact appropriately and gracefully with such people and to treat each one according to a traditionally defined role. As already noted, combinations and permutations of such interpersonal relations are infinitely more complex in a typical African household than in its Western counterpart. Thus the child must sort out the subtleties of full, half, and cousin sibling differences and similarities, wife and co-wife distinctions, seniority among male and female household members, as well as the idiosyncrasies of the individual actually filling such roles.

For example, in most African societies there are not simply differences in age, sex, or seniority of one's relatives as there are among Westerners. With some relatives there are strict avoidance relations which must be learned to prevent disruption of local social life. Usually such customs involve not eating with the person, not looking at them directly, and often if the avoidance is a male-female one, they must not even be in the same group together. Such relations must be handled gracefully and with the proper etiquette. Because any individual will have many prescribed relationships and because
they vary in their quality, social learning is complex for an African child. Thus, where a Western child may have mastered the use of quite complicated technology by the age of five, his traditional African counterpart will have learned how to behave toward a more complicated set of relatives using a more complicated set of cultural responses.

After childhood, the rules and preferences of residence guide the practices concerning who will move at the time of first marriage. As noted above, in the majority of African societies it is the woman who relocates, though in general she does not move very far. Nonetheless, households lose their own women at marriage and gain stranger-women through marriage. Similarly birth and death create shifts and changes which require adjustment. New members mean that the intricate web of household relations must be altered to fit the new member into the group. Conversely the death of a member means that a link in the role network has been lost. Should all of the role obligations held by the deceased be carried on? In many African societies there is a tendency to answer in the affirmative especially with respect to marriage. This means that there are institutional means for continuing a marriage through the custom of marrying a surviving spouse to a brother, or sister, of the deceased partner. This is known as the levirate and sororate. Thus, spouses are assured that their relations to a descent group will be maintained even after the death of one of the marriage partners. In the levirate, a woman is often married to a dead spouse's younger brother while in the sororate the dead wife's younger sister replaces her with little or no recompense to the girl's kin group.

Ecological factors are important in determining the size and annual changes in composition of the domestic group. Thus semi-nomadism which is widespread over many parts of Africa produces a breakup of the group on an annual basis, with the herders leaving home to return later. Land shortage or poor soil fertility may cause domestic groups to break up because individual members want new or more farm plots. Also, housing size limitations and possibilities for expansion are factors. In most of Africa the usual household plan is that of the compound. This includes one or more huts inside an enclosure. In rural areas then, the group may accommodate more members simply by building more huts and enlarging the enclosure. In
areas of climatic extremes, such as the Sahara and Kalahari Deserts, environmental conditions are more likely to control the size of dwellings and therefore the size of domestic units.

Economic factors also affect the size and nature of the domestic group. Thus access to greater economic resources is correlated with larger household size in terms of wives, clients, and the successful operation of patrilocal marriage preferences. Conversely economic indigence is correlated with smaller household size, as in parts of West Africa, with the institution of "pawning." Pawning involves the seconding of a member from the debtor's household to that of the creditor. The pawn thus transferred works off the debt incurred by his or her household head. Underlying this correlation is the attractiveness to younger members of economic opportunity outside their natal households either in other domestic groups or in other regions of the country altogether.

The practice of "fostering" is widespread in Africa as a means of adding to household size. Often children are raised in a number of households, or are given to a particular relative, often a childless woman, to be raised. These practices are not the same as adoption, as these children are kept aware of their natal kinship relations even though they are raised in household other than that of their natural parents. Sometimes fostering is an aspect of clientage. This occurs when a man gives a child to a powerful person to be raised in the latter's household. The hope is that the child will develop a profitable relationship with the household head that will bear fruit as the child grows older.

Many African households are also expanded by taking in adult clients as servants, followers, or apprentices. Formerly, the practice of domestic slavery (male and female) was used to expand household size. Patterns of slavery in traditional Africa, however, varied significantly depending upon the socio-political structure of the societies concerned. In general, acephalous, or non-centralized, societies absorbed slaves into descent groups within a stipulated number of generations, so that slave ancestry was constantly discounted over time. In a few cases, as in the Sahara, slaves became a special caste of settled oases people who maintained a subservient position to their former masters, the desert nomads. In the more complex
centralized societies slaves were a more permanent group, although various manumission procedures were practiced. It is important to note that many of the most important offices in the West African emirates and kingdoms were reserved for slaves. Slavery can be more accurately described as a legal status rather than a social status. In many cases persons became slaves when captured in warfare, and often such persons retained or acquired considerable status in the host society.

From the point of view of the wider society it is important to note that the cycle of household organization could to some extent be controlled by using such institutions as fostering, clientage, and slavery. If the relationships between a household head and his household members are not based on kinship alone, then he can maintain the organization or expand it as he becomes capable of doing so. Such an organization can come to be a powerful political force in the local community, or it can serve as a nucleus for the development of a new community or a ward organization within an already well-established community. Such control over household expansion is associated with the more complex chiefly and centralized state societies rather than the acephalous ones. In cases where such large-scale expansion of a household unit occurred within the simpler societies, as in Bonny, Nigeria, the household became a focal point around which more complex social and political organizations developed.

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION: COMMUNITY PATTERNS

Community patterning refers to the forms of organizations in which localized groups of people, in households and kin groups, interact with one another. The bases of such units vary from specific, fixed geographic areas to larger, and sometimes shifting, systems of alliances based on marriage and/or descent. These circumstances may occur concurrently as in the case of the Kung Bushman bands who are a) basically patrilocal (with temporary uxorilocality—that is, residence with the wife's relatives—based on bride service), and b) isolated spatially for most of the year from other bands. In such cases community boundaries are clear-cut and precise. Similarly among the settled villages of West Africa, even though marriage
and descent lines may not correspond, geographic boundaries between villages are clear-cut; although they may change over time due to ecological, political, or economic conditions of the specific locality in which the villages are found. On the other hand, among the Tonga of Zambia Colson tells us that community boundaries are defined as a) neighborhoods, or localized areas in which people have rights to land use, and b) vicinages, or wider groupings that take in several neighborhoods and are defined as areas in which intermarriage between groups takes place. Outside of the vicinage all people are considered "aliens" and among aliens non-Tonga speakers are "foreigners." Because vicinage is defined by affinal ties, it is basically a shifting set of alliances rather than a fixed one. Therefore, community boundaries in such cases cannot be said to be fixed and clear-cut. They are stable at any one point in time; but they vary with the interaction (marriage) patterns of the community members.

As already noted above, the degree to which community life in Africa is associated with marriages is striking. The occurrence of endogamous demes, that is communities revealing a marked tendency towards local intracommunity marriage, is characteristic of 67 per cent of our African societies sample. The opposite pattern is that of local exogamy, that is a localized descent group in which individuals must marry outside of the group. Local exogamy characterizes 26 per cent of the societies sampled. The remaining 7 per cent is made up of several variant patterns running from agamous communities with no rules or tendencies at all, to exogamous communities in which there are no descent links governing the marriage practices. Thus, African communities are predominantly in-marrying localized groups, but in a significant minority of cases there is a tendency toward localized community exogamy.

Another criterion for characterizing community organization in Africa is the mobility-stability continuum. Murdock has developed a series of eight categories along a continuum. At the one end of the scale are fully migratory or nomadic bands (10 per cent); next are semi-nomadic communities whose members wander in small bands for at least half the year but occupy a fixed settlement at other times (8 per cent). At the next point on the scale are communities that shift as wholes from one fixed settlement to another, as in cases of flood-plain living, or from which a substantial
population moves to camp during part of the year, but leaves a remnant group behind to occupy the settlement (4 per cent). Increased physical stability is found in communities that have compact but impermanent settlements whose locations shift every few years, usually because of soil depletion (2 per cent). Next are communities made up of dispersed neighborhoods, family homesteads, or households (27 per cent). This is followed by communities made up of separate small families in which several of the separated units are conceived of locally as a single community (9 per cent). The next most stable community type, and by far the most frequent, are communities made up of compact and relatively permanent settlements, each not much different in structure and functions from the others (36 per cent). Finally there are complex communities in which a local village, town, or even city, is surrounded by satellite outgrowths, hamlets, and households (4 per cent).

Summarizing these data we can say that in 76 per cent of the traditional African societies, community life takes place in locationally stable communities, while in 24 per cent of the societies people live a fully or partially mobile existence. These figures, however, do not account for the forced relocation in new territory of formerly stable groups subjected to the expansionist pressures of neighboring peoples. This produces another form of mobility, characterizing such groups as the Tiv (Nigeria) and the Nuer (Sudan), which is not considered in the Murdock data. If we consider these relocated peoples along with the traditionally impermanent groups, in all likelihood the proportion of mobile African societies would be well over 25 per cent.

In population size, traditional African communities appear to cluster around two characteristic levels. The upper limit of the first group would be about 1,000 persons, with a median in the range of 100-200 persons per settlement. Almost 75 per cent of the communities falling into this category have between 50-400 persons per settlement. In the second group, which includes settlements of over 1,000 persons, two-thirds of the communities have one or more indigenous towns with populations greater than 5,000, but none more than 50,000. For the remainder (only seventeen societies in all), the distinguishing feature is the existence of one or more indigenous
cities of 50,000 or more inhabitants. Within the entire sample, two-thirds of all African societies have no communities larger than 1,000 persons, while the rest are characterized by having towns of at least 5,000 people. This division of societies into small and relatively large-scale categories reflects in general the contrast between the more widely dispersed populations of eastern and southern Africa and the larger population clusters in West Africa. There are, of course, some notable exceptions to this generalization, such as the denser and more urbanized populations of the Ethiopian highlands and the East African coast.

POLITICAL ORGANIZATION IN TRADITIONAL AFRICA: NON-CENTRALIZED SOCIETIES

The ways in which African communities are organized politically reflect ecological, historical, and political factors in the society at large. The idea of a separate political sector in traditional society, however, is not always present. There is widespread lack of differentiation among functions in a majority of traditional African societies. Constituted authority not only serves strictly political functions but is often responsible for a wide variety of economic, social, and religious activities as well. This broad, and often diffuse, political structure provides one of the most comprehensive ways of describing community patterning and intercommunity relations in traditional African societies.  

The boundaries of African political systems are defined by the limits of the jural community. The set of persons within this legal zone is called a polity. The basic feature of the polity is the ability of its members to settle disputes among themselves through institutions utilized for conflict resolution. Outside the polity there are no such institutions, and, therefore, conflicts at the interpolity level may result in war, an indication that the issues of a conflict cannot be adjudicated. In many African societies violence within the polity and between polities has a totally different character: violence increases significantly in quality and intensity outside the polity unit. It is important to note that the polity does not necessarily correlate with ethnic groups, language, or religion. In some African societies there are many polities, while in other societies the entire group is part of a
multi-ethnic polity which encompasses differing cultural entities.

At the least complex level of polity are hunting and gathering bands which may include twenty to fifty people each. Heads of constituent household units confer on decisions and resolve conflict among themselves within the band. Unresolved conflicts can lead to band fission, although such an outcome is generally considered to be injurious to all concerned because the resource base must then be divided. There may or may not be a headman; and if there is, his power is limited. Women gather food in the area near the camp while men hunt further afield. Cooperative activities such as communal hunts are possible when ecological conditions are able to sustain such activities. The basic unit is a domestic one generally made up of a monogamous or polygynous family with the possible additions, temporary or permanent, of affines in the form of sons-in-law or the unmarried kin of either spouse. Relations between bands are based primarily on marriage which is generally patrilocal with the possibility of extended bride service. Among the Congo Pygmies there are also economic relations between band headmen and local Bantu villagers in which forest products are exchanged for those of agriculture. It is important to remember that in a continent of several hundred million people there are at most a half a million people living in hunting and gathering bands. This is approximately one-fourth of one per cent of the total African population, and their numbers are dwindling steadily.

When agricultural techniques of production are utilized, as they are for the bulk of Africa's people, then, degree of physical mobility of the population becomes an important determinant of the political structure. Mobility is a function of several phenomena: population expansion, the proportion of pastoralism to horticulturalism in the subsistent state, soil fertility, and intergroup relations between ethnic units. Given the dominance of an agricultural technology in Africa, traditional polities can be divided into two types: the non-state, or acephalous variety, and centralized states. Although there are varieties of political systems that seem to hover between these two basic types, the distinction is nonetheless useful and applies to a large majority of African authority systems.
For the acephalous, agriculturally based, polities the problems of continuity of membership, rights over property, and prerogatives of offices increase enormously over those of the hunting band. In addition, basic resources for subsistence and continuity of the group such as land, cattle, and storable surpluses, tend to be alienated from the individual or his domestic unit. A widespread institution for handling such problems in an acephalous polity is that of unilineal descent groups. Such groups increase in scale and in the numbers of activities which they tend to govern in proportion to their degree of population mobility. In the more mobile cases, clans are common as means of linking lineage segments to one another in a set of ever-widening relations. The polity here is often quite large and may cover great amounts of territory, since new groups have split off from parent groups to find pasturage or for other reasons. Yet in this process of segmentation the new groups remain in contact with, and maintain the memory of, their relations to the parent group. In warfare these contacts can be reactivated, and several related communities can be united against a common foe.

As groups settle down into more or less permanent villages, however, the locality itself, rather than lineage, may serve as an organizing principle for community relations. It is common for the more sedentary of the acephalous societies to subdivide and use village groups as jural communities (or polities); these tend to be autonomous with regard to one another once they are formed.

Also in acephalous societies, religious congregations tend to be associated with the mobility factor. The more mobile segmentary societies may link up religious activities with their nesting sets of lineages and clan organizations so that religious offices and functions become part of the over-all lineage and clan structure. The individual actor obtains his religious duties and obligations from his lineage role. In more sedentary populations, on the other hand, cult membership may reside in one or more closely related sets of lineages; and membership in such cults is often based on local residence whether or not ego is a member of the founding or original lineage of the village.
With regard to lineage relations, there are variations in the degree to which ideal and normative behavior correspond. Recently it has been suggested that the nomadic Bedouins of North Africa who seem to guide their interpersonal and intergroup relations by the principles of a classic segmentary lineage system, do not in fact practice such norms. Instead they link up to groups that are genealogically very distant, leaping over genealogically closer segments to form alliances for reasons of self-interest.22

The way in which descent groups can form the core around which communities develop is indicated over and over again in the anthropological literature on Africa. If, for example, patrilineal descent and patrilocal marriage residence practices come together, as they often do in Africa, then a core settlement starts to grow. This group is related by descent through the male line. Each adult man may head his own household but feel closely allied to his agnates in surrounding houses. The senior male heads the organization and represents it, either to other settlements or neighboring wards of a village or town. In-marrying women provide or represent affinal links to other lineage groups nearby and out-marrying females of the descent group perform these same functions with respect to the core groups. If, as is often the case, the men practice the same occupation or set of occupations, then any occupational specialization in the society at large places all groups in a position of economic interdependency and specialization. Non-core members are either clients or brothers-in-law who use affinal connections as recruitment channels into other residential groupings than those of their own lineage.

Crosscutting such lineage links, especially in eastern and southern Africa, are age-set organizations. These organizations generally unite all the members of the community within specified age brackets. Such age-groupings may provide specific services to the community. Invariably the young men assume military roles, which in some cases also involves enforced bachelorhood. In one extreme case, that of the Nyakyusa, a new village site is created for the age-set members as each new group of boys reaches puberty. In general, older age groups provide leadership and decision-making skills for the wider community.
Explanations of age-set organizations vary. Wilson attempts to explain the phenomena by using Freudian ideas concerning the fear of parent-child sexual knowledge and possible relations. Thus age organizations by separating parents and children create institutional buffers to the psychic strain imposed on such relations through the Oedipal conflict. The Nyakyusa themselves explain their society in this way. I would support another type of explanation: Almost all of the societies with age-set patterns have strong orientations toward a) cattle, b) intergroup hostility, and c) the need to protect herds. Herds are tended by young boys who develop strong social links across lineages; they also become warriors together. These needs and interaction patterns are then institutionalized and expressed in the customs surrounding the elaboration of age-set organizations.

A somewhat different crosscutting function is served by the widespread use of initiation rites and secret society memberships. Such initiations, among the acephalous sedentary peoples of Africa, link up the young boys within a community and often across several neighboring communities. The boys are removed from their families and tutored in the sacred lore of the adult male societies; then they are "reborn" into their communities as beginning adults. Such age-graded organization has been interpreted in several ways. Some authors emphasize the idea that these rituals dramatize the entrance into manhood of the new members of the society and provide a basis for solidarity and cooperation among the group that will eventually become the dominant decision-making body for each community. Others suggest that the elaborate rituals and rites represent a cultural recognition and dramatization of the fact that the child must be taken away from his natal family, especially his mother, and become to some extent an independent member of the wider community. Both of these ideas, that of separation from a natal group and that of solidarity with a new group, seem to be important in formulating an explanation of such initiation rites.
POLITICAL ORGANIZATION IN TRADITIONAL AFRICA:
CENTRALIZED STATE SYSTEMS

At the level of chieftaincy, and centralized state systems, community patterning is basically similar to that already discussed with reference to acephalous societies. However, there are important differences. Recruitment to office is through traditional lineage or widespread clan organizations and the jural community is enlarged in scale beyond that of the local settlement or clan group. Disputes can be settled at points along an authoritative hierarchy going from local household heads to village heads to the chiefly office beyond the village. The chief very often fulfills functions in addition to that of conflict resolution. Generally he is a religious leader, and as a military commander he unites his people against others outside his domain. Elsewhere I have suggested that African chieftaincy is often attractive to peoples surrounding centralized chieftaincies, but not having this institution themselves, and that the evolutionary path from non-chieftaincy to chieftaincy lies through differential ranking of kin groups (often clans) in mobile societies and the differentiation of groups based on wealth in the more sedentary groups.

African states vary in the degree to which they can maintain centralized control over their constituent parts. They are generally multi-ethnic polities, and there is always some form of central bureaucratic organization surrounding a monarchy that has dynastic qualities. The basic problems lie in the relations between the central government and its constituent local settlements, between the kingdom and surrounding peoples, and in the methods used to recruit personnel into the political system. The latter problem is crucial since it is the major determinant of centralized power. It varies with the hereditary rights to office of the subordinates in the state. When these rights are not clearly hereditary, or when slaves and/or eunuchs can be used in positions of authority, the state is more centralized in the monarch and his councillors. When power positions and rights are more stringently hereditary, the authority of the monarch decentralizes and the kingdom is weakened.
Centralized political authority solves certain problems of organization and resource adaptation that arise from situations in which local groups have to coordinate control of their external relations with surrounding groups. Some of these problems can be isolated. First, there are difficulties brought about by increasing cultural heterogeneity within a polity as it absorbs groups from outside, and the associated or at least similar problems of social stratification with the differentiation of various elements within the society. Secondly, there are problems arising from the movement of a group into a new territory in which leaders decide to control the local population as subordinates; in this case the leaders may found a dynasty. Thirdly, there are problems facing groups that surround a centralized state and are stimulated to emulate it for reasons of power and prestige and for defense. Fourth, there is the pattern of acephalous groups attaching themselves to apparently superior ritual leaders in order to share in the blessings of supernatural powers. Fifth, there are states that result either from vassal or tributary states becoming independent, or from integral parts of older states breaking away under the leadership of dissident factions, royal usurpers, or rebellious nobles.

Traditional African kings are usually held to be sacred or divine. At the very least they are felt to embody some supernatural attributes. The rulers were rarely despots; their kingdoms involved a chain of authority running from the monarch down to the local residential groups, in which the intermediaries represented those below and those above to each other. This dependence is typically expressed in tribute, in the form of taxes, labor, or more symbolic objects. As there is always some concept of representativeness or accountability by superiors in the hierarchical chain to those over whom they have authority, pressure groups, factionalism, and political patronage were constant features of the African centralized state.
THE CONCEPTS OF TRIBE AND ETHNIC SOCIETY

A final aspect of traditional African society that is of great importance, but which is extremely difficult to capture in any definitive term, is the concept of a whole society itself. This concept has been spoken of in the past as the "tribe"; and this reference has given birth to contemporary ideas of "tribalism" and in more complex thinking to such notions as "detribalization"—meaning usually urbanization and the loss of identity in the modern situation. Yet, as we have noted, the patterns of African polity do not necessarily correspond to cultural or ethnic groupings. In Africa, and very likely elsewhere as well, ethnic identity has been forming, reforming, and disappearing, for literally thousands of years.

The problem is made even more complex by a number of other non-congruences. Race and language are not clearly bounded within so-called ethnic entities. Vast numbers of Africans, perhaps most Africans, are multilingual so language differences are not necessarily a barrier between groups. Descent groups, language groups, residential units such as towns, cities, local regions, and subregions, religion, even occupation (especially with respect to pariah activities such as blacksmithing) all serve to give identity and ethnic-like qualities to segments of population that subdivide so-called "tribes" and may even cut across several widely recognized ethnic groups.

What then is an African "tribe"? The simple answer often used by former colonial officials, journalists, or political parties in contemporary Africa, is that it refers to groups who are politically significant subdivisions in a nation, and who possess some widespread consciousness of common identity and cultural distinctiveness. Yet it often goes unnoticed that so-called tribes may have great variations within their own group, even possessing named subgroups. Moreover, people can define their own group, even though it may, indeed does, change through time. 28 The reasons for this are complex and have been discussed elsewhere. 29 The important point, not often mentioned by the non-specialist, is that a "tribe" is never
an immutable entity. On the contrary it is exactly the opposite—and to be understood at all, it must be seen as an adaptive identity that changes in relation to outside forces as well as to a number of important internal forces. Once this point is clear, it becomes nonsense to speak of "reverting" to "tribalism" or of "ancient tribal rivalries." Instead we must ask questions about the traditional ethnic identities in an area, the relationship of these to the traditional and modern political structures, and then ask what has produced the contemporary ethnic identities and solidarities (or lack of them). Partly to emphasize the non-static nature of the "tribe," and partly to allow greater flexibility of conceptualization and description, the term "ethnic society" is being used increasingly by social scientists in place of the term "tribe."

To name something is not to know it. There are in Africa clusters or categories of peoples who have had some traditional similarity to one another. But whether these clusters represented any real social units in the past is a matter for research, not speculation. Nevertheless, within and sometimes across these units there were, and are today, real working societies. The forms of social organization they developed stemmed out of fundamental human needs that are shared by all men everywhere. All men want a good life for themselves, their families, and their communities. In Africa the potentialities of the environment and the traditional technology used to exploit them have produced genuine on-going societies and cultures. As already noted at the beginning, such societies are ones that are capable of adapting and changing in response to their own indigenous needs. This is the essential and fundamentally important quality of traditional African society, for it allows us an insight into the nature of human potentialities. Man's problems are often very similar, but as stimuli or challenges they have produced many possible solutions. Traditional Africa is not just an exotic jigsaw puzzle of tribal groupings, but represents a wide range of experiences in attempting to solve the problems of human existence.
NOTES


10. The quantitative data for the generalizations in this paper have been obtained through the facilities of the Africa Data Bank: Instability and Integration Projects, operated under the auspices of the Council for Intersocietal Studies at Northwestern University. The sample sizes range from 55 to 92 with all areas of the continent represented. The author wishes to express gratitude to this program for permission to use these materials.


12. Ibid., p. 28.

14. This does not mean to imply that corporate groups never obtain among people with bilateral descent or matrilineal descent—they do, as the Kanuri (Nigeria) and Suku (Congo) material will illustrate. However, to do so requires either patrilocal residence (Kanuri) or "home" territory (Suku).


17. This statement implies comparison with countries like the U.S. where divorce rates reach 25 per cent; that is, 25 per cent of all marriages end in divorce. I consider such a rate low, while rates of 60 per cent or more are high.


27. See Jeffrey Holden, "Empires and State Formation," in this volume, for a further elaboration of the characteristics of African state systems.

29. Cohen and Middleton, From Tribe to Nation.
Traditional African economies used to be a subject of interest only to a few anthropologists and agricultural economists. Since the middle 1950's, interest has deepened and widened for several reasons. The end of colonialism was followed by an explicit drive to "modernize" the newly independent states of Africa, particularly to develop them economically: to commercialize and diversify production, to create new economic institutions such as modern banking and taxation and extend them nationally, and to incorporate modern technology in production lines. Intelligent development policy required understanding not only the present structure and performance of African economies, but a knowledge of their economic history as well. Those concerned with changing Africa's future must understand its economic past and present. African governments, aid-giving governments of Europe and America, United Nations agencies, and philanthropic foundations, such as Ford and Rockefeller, all sponsor research designed to improve our understanding both of traditional economies and the changing economies of Africa today.

The colonial revolution in Africa (and Asia) and the need for intelligent analysis and policy for the purposes of economic development and modernization, has profoundly affected university subjects, particularly teaching and research in the social sciences. Anthropology, economics, sociology, psychology, and political science now contain subfields of specialization concerned with traditional and modernizing Africa. An entire university establishment of lecture courses, seminars, doctoral degree programs, field research projects, and new journals, all concerned with African studies, has come into being.
Economic anthropology, has attracted considerable interest since the 1950's. It studies the structure and performance of village-level economies under traditional and modernizing conditions. To the older literature of ethnographic description is being added analytical writings which delineate principles of socio-economic organization, measure levels of performance, and make systematic comparisons between primitive and peasant economies, as well as between these economies and their modern and developed counterparts.  

Economic anthropologists, however, have been confronted with problems in the creation of a theoretical framework. Among the most acute of these problems is that of the unavailability of sufficient quantitative data to measure economic performance effectively. There is a base of factual knowledge of industrialized capitalist and communist countries stated in quantitative terms that has no counterpart in traditional African economies. The structure and performance of large industrialized economies in which money and pricing are pervasive are capable of quantification at all levels. Total national output, its composition, and growth, are measured by national income accounting; and the production activities of individual business firms are measured by cost and profit accounting. Indeed, that branch of statistical analysis called inter-industry economics, associated with the name of Wassily Leontief, creates a set of accounts for an entire national economy showing the relation of each sector supplying resources and acquiring products to every other sector in quantitative terms.

Quantitative information about the structure and performance of traditional African economies is rare. There are very few village-level economies for which the following kind of information is known: How much buildings, equipment, and foodstuffs of all kinds is produced per year? What are the fluctuations in output experienced from year to year? How equal or unequal is the distribution of ordinary consumption goods, compared to prestige and "treasure" items? What proportion of produce is self-consumed, given away, sold locally or involved in external trade transactions?  

The absence of quantitative information is in part due to the difficulties in measuring and collecting such data in the field; there are also difficulties, moreover, in acquiring quantitative information in economies that do not use money and prices. Where social scientists have
been able to make quantitative measurements in the field, their analyses of structure and performance have been markedly improved.

Another difficulty, which will be discussed in greater detail later in this essay, relates to the separating out of a distinctly "economic" sector from society as a whole. Culture and society, economy and technology, polity and religion, mutually influence one another in both modern industrialized societies and in traditional African societies. In traditional society, however, this integral connection is one of its central features. An earlier generation of anthropologists talked of "patterns" or "configurations" of culture. They were impressed by the congruence or mutual fit of the different sectors of a given culture. More recent writers have shown us how economic, technological, social, and cultural features mutually affect one another not only in the traditional but in the modernizing societies as well.

SCALE AND DIVERSITY OF TRADITIONAL AFRICAN ECONOMIES

To understand the distinctive features of traditional African economies, one must first understand what they share with all other economies. The economies of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Tiv of central Nigeria may be regarded as systematic arrangements to provide societies with material goods and specialist services. The need to structure such provisioning, that is, to have an "economic system," stems from the recurrent physiological needs of persons for food, clothing, and shelter, and the recurrent social needs of communities for services such as defense, religion, and dispute settlement. Societies consist of people, who, as individuals require continual material sustenance, and as members of a culture, polity, and neighborhood have shared needs for community services. Both private and public life require continual provisioning.

The means of provisioning any society are basically the same. The Americans, the Russians, and the Tiv make use of 1) natural resources, such as land, minerals, forests, and waterways; 2) human resources, such as skilled and unskilled labor; 3) tools and technical knowledge; and 4) organizational procedures, practices, devices, and activities that we call
institutions, such as, division of labor, rules of land tenure, foreign trade, forms of money, and market places. (There are others, such as trade unions, that are used only in certain types of economies or certain kinds of economic activity.) The economies of the U.S., Soviet Russia, and the Tiv differ with regard to the quantity, quality, and diversity of the natural resources and human labor at their disposal; the quantity and quality of the tools and technical knowledge they have; and the kinds of structured arrangements or institutions they make use of.

With reference to traditional Africa, it has been noted that, "it is this smallness of scale, so hard for a modern European to grasp imaginatively, which is the fundamental characteristic of primitive life." Traditional Africa comprised thousands of small economies. If we examined them separately, without comparing them to the familiar economies of present-day Europe and America, we would be struck by their diversity. They differed with regard to the quantity and quality of natural resources at their disposal, and therefore the principal foodstuffs they relied upon. Some were hunters, gatherers, or fishermen precariously depending on natural environment for livelihood. Others were herders living off their herds and flocks; more were agriculturalists. Most combined several of these subsistence activities. Many of the hunters, gatherers, and herders moved with the seasons, and some of the shifting agriculturalists moved every few years. Others were permanently settled.

We would be struck too by the diversity in their tools and technical knowledge. Although most of the peoples of traditional Africa display ingenuity in their knowledge of local plant and animal life, some had few tools beyond digging sticks, containers, and spears, while others could make poison to kill fish, pipelines for irrigation, and traps to ensnare large animals.

When we examined their organizational arrangements for growing crops or hunting, we would again be impressed by diversity. The customs governing land tenure, the ways of organizing work, the rules for allocating produce, and the procedures for conducting external trade varied within and among economies.
If we looked at the measurable performance of traditional African economies we would similarly be struck by diversity in the amount of goods produced or acquired; variations in the amounts from year to year, the frequency with which hunger or famine threatened, the extent of material inequality among households (or among stratified groups) within each economy, the range of material items and services produced or acquired, and the intensity of work.11

The same is true for the social and cultural characteristics of community life. Aside from diversity in natural resources, tools, economic institutions, and measurable economic performance, we would find diversity in religion, language, and political organization.

But if we compared traditional African societies with the industrialized national societies of present-day Western Europe and North America, we would see that even though they differed among themselves, as a group they differed more sharply and systematically from the U.S. or France, for instance. The most important differences are in size and effective integration (the extent and forms of mutual dependence and shared culture). Here, language betrays us. "Economy," "polity," "culture," and "society," have no size dimension attached to them. They are elastic words which we stretch as needed. We speak of the "economy" of a hunting and gathering band consisting of twenty persons in the Kalahari Desert, but we use the same word to speak of the "economy" of the United States comprising two hundred million people. So too with the words "culture," "society," and "polity."

African societies, with important exceptions in the Islamic areas, did not have that set of mutually reinforcing, large-scale, integrative institutions which characterize modern Europe and America--institutions through which are expressed socio-economic interaction, cultural identity, and common awareness by millions of persons.

African polities were neither organized along the lines of modern nation-states, nor did they provide the range of common public services that modern governments do. To be sure, lineage heads, chieftains, and kings existed; but their political jurisdictions and their activities to promote community cohesion extended only to hundreds, thousands, or
exceptionally, a few hundred thousand persons. In contrast, the modern nation-state creates a focus of common allegiance of much greater scope. Millions of citizens are made subject to common laws; all sectors of the nation pay common taxes and receive back common educational services, roads, and other social services. In parliamentary democracies, the millions of citizens identify themselves with common political parties and participate in nation-wide electoral processes.

Traditional Africa spoke hundreds of languages. To be sure, a few were spoken by millions of persons, others were mutually intelligible, and many Africans spoke more than one language. But most languages were entirely local. These were, moreover, non-literate cultures or cultures in which only a tiny fraction of the population was literate. It is not too much to say that literacy is to culture what machine technology is to economy. The absence of written language and literature limits wider cultural expression, awareness of external events and people, and knowledge of alternatives, just as the absence of machine technology limits wide economic interaction. Clearly, two of the important reasons for the small scale of traditional African economy and society were the absence of literacy and of widely shared language.

THE ABSENCE OF MACHINE TECHNOLOGY AND APPLIED SCIENCE

The absence of machine technology and applied science in traditional Africa is a matter of great importance. The major consequences are obvious: industrialized economies produce a quantity of output per person roughly fifteen to twenty times as great as do traditional African economies; moreover, there is continual growth in output in industrialized economies—an average factory worker in the U.S. sees his real income at least doubled over his working life. The range of material items and services produced and imported by developed industrialized economies is enormous; hundreds of thousands of items are bought by households, business firms, and governments. The automobile, modern surgery, the paperback book—all the results of applied science and machine technology—create a diversity and quality of material life which vastly affect culture, society, and polity, as well as economy.
The principal lines of production in traditional Africa were agriculture and herding. The absence of pesticides, chemical fertilizers, disease-resistant seeds, irrigation facilities, veterinary medicine, and the other technical knowledge and equipment available to American and European farmers and herders meant an unusual and direct dependence on physical environment; that is, there was a high degree of ecological dependence. The absence of machine technology also meant low productivity and uncontrollable fluctuations in output. In agriculture and herding, applied science is a substitute for and a controller of physical environment; irrigation equipment creates its own rainy season. Similarly, agricultural synthetics (for example, dacron for cotton), as well as the specialized equipment and technical knowledge applied to U.S. agriculture, may be regarded as man-made devices to reduce ecological dependence, to increase material abundance, and to decrease the incidence of drought, flood, and disease to plant and animal life. Traditional African economies could not significantly control or compensate for the vagaries of physical environment. Their underdeveloped technology also meant that they could not make effective use of all the natural resources, such as minerals, in their physical environment.

The absence of machine technology in Africa meant also the absence of a most characteristic feature of modern life: the factory system within massive cities. In modern industrialized economies of both the capitalist and communist sorts, the use of machine technology makes special forms of large-scale, economy-wide economic organization necessary (resource and product market integration in the U.S. and the "command" economy of central planning in the U.S.S.R.). Special forms of local organization are also necessary. Engineering efficiency requires a factory system because machines must be operated in a special sequence, and the use of machines requires extreme specialization of labor; that is, workers of the machines do one task, or few tasks, repetitively. Machine technology also requires a labor force that has special skills and is disciplined to a special set of work habits—for instance, punctuality and the eight-hour workday. Wherever industrialization has taken place a laboring force "committed" to sustained factory employment has been created, typically from a first
A generation of factory workers who had to unlearn agricultural work habits.15

Aside from the engineering constraints—that the efficient use of machines requires factory organization and that workers acquire a special set of work habits—there are economic constraints also created by machine technology. Machines are expensive; economic efficiency (that is, low costs) requires that machines be used within a larger economy organized so as to assure the certain supply of labor and material resources to work the machines, and the certain disposition of the machine-made products.16 Under capitalist institutions national and international market organization (including the price system and what we shall call general purpose or commercial money) allocates the inputs and disposes of the outputs of the factory system. Industrial communism employs a functionally equivalent set of institutions (sometimes called a "command economy") to service the requirements of machine technology.17

THE ABSENCE OF MARKET ORGANIZATION

Traditional Africa lacked not only machines and applied science, but also large-scale integrated resource and product markets with their accompanying monetary systems, which were created in response to the Industrial Revolution in Europe and America.18 That traditional Africa lacked machine technology and the factory system is obvious; machines are visible. That it lacked resource and product market integration (the institutional network of capitalism) is less obvious, partly because Africa had some petty markets (which were different in scope and function from integrative national markets) and partly because only a portion of market institutions takes tangible form (for example, banks and business firms); the rest consists of transactional rules and rules of law which are less visible.

In an economy integrated by market exchange institutions all the natural resource and labor ingredients of production are organized for purchase and sale at money prices: land and minerals, tools, equipment, and buildings; unskilled, skilled, and professional labor; power, transport, and communication services, all are sold to producing firms. The seller's return is a money income in the form of wage, salary, fee, rent, interest, or profit. The seller then uses his income to make purchases from the enormous range of consumption
goods and services produced by business firms, to pay taxes, and to save in one form or another. All persons depend on market sale of their labor or property for livelihood. Purchase and sale at money price is the dominant transactional mode in our economic system. Millions of households and hundreds of thousands of business firms are integrated, that is, they are made mutually dependent, by purchase and sale transactions. The monetary and pricing arrangements integrate the nation-wide system and also govern the network of international market transactions such as imports, exports, lending, borrowing, and investing.

In a national market economy, households, villages, and towns--the local community counterparts of African villages--depend for livelihood on customers and suppliers external to their local communities. Just as machine technology and applied science reduce reliance on the vagaries of nature and climate, large-scale market organization reduces the economic dependence of persons on their friends, neighbors, and relatives within the local community.

THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF TRADITIONAL ECONOMIES

Traditional African economies differed from the economies of industrialized Europe and America in the several ways discussed. More particularly, their small size and undeveloped technology meant low productivity and extreme dependence on physical environment. The absence of market integration and commercial money created local social dependence (that is, the need for household, lineage, or tribal cooperation and mutuality) in production processes.

There is a domestic technology which does not change from one generation to another and which supports a subsistence economy of each household, domestic group, or band. The whole society consists of a number of such domestic groups or local bands linked together by cross-cutting ties of kinship and affinity. . . . This network of kinship ties provides almost the sole framework of social action, within which a variety of activities are performed. Everyone of the same age-group and sex participates in the total range of activities. . . . In such societies the level of technology sets narrow limits to the choice of means adopted to the attainment of certain goals; but within these limits rational action is "hemmed in" by the social prescription of means and ends; economic rationality is severely limited. The norms of economic conduct are embedded in a total set of norms; there is relatively little autonomy for economic criteria of evaluation.
This description of a typical simple society is meant to point up those socio-economic characteristics of traditional societies which differ sharply from the social context of industrialized national societies.

In the most complex form of society there is a reversal of most of these characteristics. There is a machine technology which is continuously changing, partly as a result of the organization of science and partly as a result of pressures within the economy itself. The division of labor, a necessary concomitant of this technology, cuts across domestic groupings and, indeed, most other ties in the society. Each individual is involved in many networks of interpersonal and impersonal relationships, which are governed by different and specific norms and interests. No one participates in all or even most social activities... different individuals, groups, or categories of people internalize different norms and different sets of norms... Unity and order... are maintained largely by economic interdependence, by the efforts of central administration, and by acceptance of certain diffuse values and identification with common symbols. ... Rationality is less "hampered" by the immediacy of social relationships, and economic rationality, in particular, is allowed considerable scope for expression.

Traditional African societies were not only small, but were also semi-isolated--culturally separated from one another by language, religion, and polity. Inherited animosities kept others apart, and the risks of travel and poor facilities of transport and communications contributed to physical isolation. In these locally contained communities in which the people all know one another and in which the same persons share many activities and relationships, custom is tenacious. Children grow up to lead much the same lives as their parents led. Traditional practices and values are transmitted intact. Cultural and physical isolation means the absence of knowledge of real alternatives; whether in child-rearing practices or techniques for growing crops, the traditional African community did not have much knowledge of different, alternative ways. Choice was severely limited by the knowledge and techniques within the experience of the local people.

To deviate from traditional practice, moreover, was risky. To experiment with new crops or new techniques of production was to risk hunger if the innovation failed. To introduce non-edible cash crops successfully, such as was done with cocoa in Ghana and cotton in Uganda, there had to be food markets locally or the growers had to be able to grow the new crops
together with sufficient foodstuffs simultaneously.\textsuperscript{21} Where social rank was sharply defined, for the lowly farmer to be too ambitious or too successful was to risk punishment by social superiors for attempting to rise above his station and thereby to threaten more highly placed persons.

But even where social rank was not sharply stratified and the boundaries of permissible activities not clearly circumscribed, sanctions for doing the traditional were strong. Mutual dependence meant mutual obligation. To fail to appear at a work party to clear your cousin's land, to fail to pay first-fruits to your chief, to fail to contribute to your younger brother's bridewealth, would be to invite retaliation by cousin, chief, and brother--people upon whom you depended to reciprocate when you needed them. European colonialism in Africa eroded these attributes of traditional society, and in so doing induced socio-economic change. Cultural and physical isolation were lessened, and Africans thereby gained knowledge of new alternatives. Cash-earning by sale of crops and labor outside the community lessened mutual dependence within the local community.\textsuperscript{22}

Anthropologists analyze religion, polity, and the rules and roles of kinship (marriage, descent reckoning, lineage) in detail because these permeate all activities, including economic activities. One cannot understand the organization of traditional African economies without understanding their cultures and societies.

Several terms and summary expressions are conventionally used to point up this interpenetration of economy and society in traditional life. Traditional societies are referred to as "organic" (rather than "mechanical"); "Gemeinschaft" (rather than "Gesellschaft"); "status" societies (rather than "contract" societies); "subsistence-based" (rather than "commercial-based"). These terms all convey the point that underlying social relationships provide the rules and channels for the allocation of land and labor, for work organization, and for the disposition of produce. From the viewpoint of individual persons, it is the roles of husband, father, brother, lineage member, elder, chief, neighbor, and friend that determine how and where one works, and how much of what range of material goods one has command over.\textsuperscript{23} There is a sense in which it is
true, therefore, that one consequence of organic social organization in traditional African economies is that a minimum level of material sustenance is guaranteed to all persons. In the absence of market organization, land and labor are acquired as a matter of social right and in emergencies such as illness or accident, persons draw on their social relationships to receive gifts and food.

PRODUCTION PROCESSES IN TRADITIONAL AFRICA

Production of any sort—farming, herding, manufacturing—in any kind of economy, may be regarded as comprising three component processes: 1) the acquisition of natural resources, labor, and tools; 2) the organization of work tasks; and 3) the disposition of produce. If we contrast the organization of agricultural production in a traditional African subsistence farm and an American commercial farm, we can point up some distinctive features of African economy.

In the typical case, the African acquired farm land, at no cost to himself, as a right of membership in a social group, that is, because of his lineage or tribal affiliation. This right to land was inalienable as long as he was a member in good standing. The African had a right to use the land but usually not to dispose of it in any way he pleased or to leave it unused.

Almost invariably the land is not regarded as the private property of individuals, but rather as vested in social groups, whether these be tribes, clans, lineages, or extended families. Always individuals have the right to cultivate and to enjoy the produce of the land they till, but their rights in a particular piece of land are conditional. They depend, usually, on the community's acceptance of them, also on actual residence and cultivation. If a cultivator leaves an area which he has been living on and cultivating, after a time his rights in this area of land lapse. . . . Very often the allocation of cultivation rights is the responsibility of a lineage or clan head, or of a village headman. But the person who exercises this authority is not thought of as "owning" the land; rather he administers it on behalf and in the interest of the community he represents.

By contrast, in American agriculture rights of acquisition or use of someone else's land are acquired by money purchase or rental; and no previously existing social relationship between buyer and seller, or landlord and renter, is necessary.
So too with tools and farm labor. The African typically made his own digging stick or hoe, and he and his wife (or wives) and children supplied the ordinary farm labor. For tasks requiring an unusual amount or intensity of labor, such as clearing land or harvesting, the African drew on his social relationships—neighbors, friends, age-mates, clients, kin—whom he thanked by feeding and sometimes by hosting a beer party at the end of the work day, or he reciprocated by helping clear their land and harvest their crops. In contrast, the Iowa wheat farmer purchases his tools and equipment and hires most of his labor at a money wage. Unlike the African who depends on local social relationships, the American farmer depends on a variety of impersonal markets for the resources and labor needed in farming.

The African farmer's own household consumes most of what he produces. Some portions of produce may be given as gifts, paid as tribute to chiefs, or sold. The American farmer sells almost all he produces. As with an American manufacturing firm, the farmer's money proceeds recover the money costs of production (tools, seeds, pesticides, labor, transport, interest on loans) with the residual being profit, out of which he pays money taxes.

In traditional society, the African farmer's activities are an integral part of his local community only. He relies on no person or agency external to his community for livelihood. The Iowa farmer is utterly dependent on strangers outside the local community: on chemical firms in Pittsburgh to provide him with pesticides; on factories in Detroit to provide him with tractors and other farm machinery; on banks in Iowa City to lend him money; and, ultimately, on households in several states to buy the bread made of the wheat he produces. Forde and Douglas summarize the basic characteristics of traditional economies, as being characterized by:

"... preoccupation with the daily and seasonal food supply, limitation of transport, difficulties of storage, overdependence on one or two major resources. These restrictions derive mainly from a low level of technical knowledge, which severely limits productive capacity. ... The economic unit is small and, save for occasionally bartered specialties, does not transcend the population of a small village. Social relations are of the personal, face-to-face kind. Everyone has known everyone else from childhood, everyone is related to everyone else. The sick and unfortunate are able to depend on the kindliness of immediate neighbors. The sharing of tools and of supplies to meet individual
shortages are matters of moral obligation between kinsfolk and neighbors. Impersonal commercial relations hardly exist. The group which lives and works together has strong feelings of solidarity, partly because they are isolated from other groups by poor communications.

"The small size of the social group within which production is organized and exchange effected also reduces the opportunity for specialization. Such skills as are practiced are known to everyone of the appropriate age and sex . . . in the community. Certain kinds of work are traditionally assigned to men, others to women, but full-time specialists are very rare. The work of the potter, boatbuilder, smith, or magician is a voluntary spare-time task.

"In such a setting economic relations have not been separated out from other social relations. There is no question of one man working for another whom he knows only as an employer. Men work together because they are related to each other, or have other social obligations to one another. Important economic processes are thus embedded in wider social needs, and are inextricably mixed with politics, ceremonial, and general festivity . . . . In an economy for which these general conditions hold true, economic exchange is necessarily limited. Markets remain undeveloped because the advantages of internal exchange are slight. The household provides for its daily needs from its own production. Surpluses cannot speedily be sent to areas of scarcity because of the difficulties of transport. . . . if the surplus is to be used at all, it must somehow be distributed at once, because of the technical difficulty of storage. As everyone produces much the same range of articles as everyone else, there will be little demand locally for any excess production. Often the only way an individual can dispose of a surplus is by holding a lavish feast or simply by giving it to kinsmen and neighbors who will feel bound to repay one day."

**ANALYTICAL CONCEPTS FOR NON-MARKET ECONOMIES**

Thus far, we have described traditional African economies in non-technical terms. In the last ten years, anthropologists and a few economists have created special concepts to analyze the preindustrial economies of Africa and elsewhere. Just as the special conceptual vocabulary devised by economists—oligopoly, marginal productivity, elasticity of demand—allows for a more precise and systematic analysis of market economy, so too with the use of special analytical concepts in the analysis of non-market economies.

It is useful to regard all economies as being composed of sectors or segments, such as domestic as compared to foreign trade sectors; agricultural
as compared to industrial sectors; the public as compared to the private sector. Economies are never of one piece; they are mixed in several senses. Even in our economy in which market purchase and sale and the price mechanism so permeate and integrate the system, a portion of goods and services are transacted differently: gift-giving on ceremonial occasions (Christmas, birthdays, weddings), obligatory military service (the draft), the free provision of elementary education (regardless of the taxes, if any, one pays) are obvious examples. We could summarize the mixture of modes of transaction in the U.S. economy by saying that market exchange is the dominant and integrative, but not the only, mode of transaction. It is dominant because the greater portion of the economy's total output is disposed of by market sale. It is integrative because the basic resource ingredients of labor, land, minerals, and technical equipment are channeled to production processes through market sale. In the U.S. economy, the gift-giving transactions that we shall call "reciprocity," are much smaller in amount. We may define them formally as two-way transfers (gifts and counter-gifts) of goods, money, and services induced by a social relationship between the gift partners. Fathers and sons exchange gifts at Christmas because of their kinship tie. The proper ratio of exchange, that is, what is an adequate return gift, is determined by social criteria such as the closeness between the two, their age, and status. A rich father who gave his six-year-old son a Christmas present costing fifty dollars is not enraged by receiving in return a two-dollar gift. The closeness of their kinship and their utterly different status sanctions the unequal exchange. If the son were a prosperous man of forty and the father an impecunious man of eighty, the socially sanctioned ratio of exchange would be reversed. We shall call reciprocity a socio-economic transactional mode because of its double dimension: material transfers induced by social relationships. And just as there are many variations of the general transactional mode we call market exchange, such as pure competition, oligopoly, and monopoly, so too are there varieties of reciprocal transactions.

Just as market exchange transactions occur in all phases of capitalist production, reciprocal transactions may occur in all phases of traditional African production. There are economies in which reciprocity is the dominant
and integrative mode of transaction. This is especially so in societies lacking formal political organization.

"Redistribution" refers to upward and downward transactions between the political center and its village-level constituencies. In chiefdoms and kingdoms, rank and file persons pay tribute in the form of goods, labor, or military service, upward to the central political authority which uses the receipts for its own maintenance and to provide public services, such as defense and religious ceremony. Schapera has written with respect to southern Africa that,

... by virtue of his official status as head of the tribe, he also played an important part in the economic organization. He received tribute from his people, both in kind and in labor. He was given a portion of every animal slaughtered or killed in the chase; the lobola (Bridewealth) for his chief wife was paid by the members of the tribe; he had the right to call upon his subjects to perform certain tasks for him, such as building his huts or clearing the land for his wife's gardens; above all, he received fees for hearing cases and fines for misdemeanors, all this accumulation of wealth by the chief was really made on behalf of the tribe. One quality which was always required of the chief was that he should be generous. He had to provide for the members of his tribe in times of necessity. If a man's crops failed he would look to the chief for assistance; the chief gave out his cattle to the poorer members of his tribe to herd for him, and allowed them to use the milk; he rewarded the services of his warriors by gifts of cattle; his subjects frequently visited him in his kraal and during their stay he fed and entertained them.

In traditional Africa, the intimate connections between economy and social organization are expressed also in what anthropologists call "prestige economy," or, more accurately, prestige sectors or spheres of economy. These refer to a special set of valuables or "treasure items" (for example, cattle or blocks of camwood) which are highly prized and paid out in a special set of transactions (for example, bridewealth or bloodwealth) involving honorable fulfillment of obligations, social status, prerogatives and rank. These treasure items and the social situations in which they serve as necessary means of reciprocal payment are charged with emotion and moral fervor. They are symbols in the sense that in our culture wedding rings, sports trophies, military medals, family heirlooms, and crown jewels are symbols. They play socio-economic roles, however,
that have no close counterparts in Western societies. They are, indeed, a kind of "social money" for a circumscribed set of reciprocal transactions in the prestige sector. The conditions under which an individual acquires and pays out treasure items—the permissible transactional situations—are carefully prescribed in non-market economies. They form a superior sector or sphere of exchange when contrasted with ordinary subsistence goods and the permissible modes of acquiring and exchanging them.

EUROPEAN INFLUENCE ON AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT

Each period of African history is marked by different sorts of social change. Current social science research, however, has concentrated more on the kinds of change presently underway in the brief period since political independence than on the events of precolonial and colonial Africa.

In precolonial Africa, the important changes experienced were principally of the sorts experienced in preindustrial Europe. Ravages of nature, such as epidemic disease, decimated peoples or the plant and animal life upon which they depended. People moved in Africa, as they did in Europe, in response to physical decimation. So too with man-made ravages, such as slave-trading, wars, and their consequent military and political subjugations. Kingdoms rose and fell in Africa as they did in Europe. And, as in Europe, portions of Africa were also converted to new religions, and foreign traders brought new goods and foodstuffs from other continents. For Europeans to have regarded precolonial Africa as dark, stagnant, or static was merely an indication of ignorance of African archaeology and history.

With the period of European colonization, some different kinds of change came about. Where enclaves of ordinary Englishmen, Dutchmen, and Portuguese were planted, as they were in eastern and southern Africa, bits of European economy, polity, and culture were transferred. Black Africans in these areas were employed as agricultural, commercial, industrial, and household servants on the periphery of European life and culture. In most of Africa, however, the Europeans were present not as enclaves of private farmers or merchants, but in much smaller numbers as colonial administrators,
missionaries, and teachers, and as individual, and frequently isolated, managers and technicians of plantations and mines in an otherwise all-Black setting. For most of colonially administered Africa without permanently settled European enclaves the changes induced were slow and piecemeal.

A frequent pattern of sequential change during the colonial period might be called "cash income growth without development." Many forces worked in the same direction to propel Africans into earning cash income by selling wage-labor and cash crops. Colonial regimes put an end to tribal warfare and provided public health services, thereby reducing death rates; population growth created land shortages where traditional agricultural technology remained unchanged. One response to the land shortages was to grow cash crops and sell wage-labor. The need to pay colonial taxes in cash and the attraction to Western merchandise and services such as education (which required a cash outlay), similarly propelled Africans into cash-earning activities. In retrospect, these were the beginnings of that massive set of long-run changes required for economic development and modernization.

THE STUDY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT AT THE VILLAGE LEVEL

Politically independent Africa is barely fifteen years old, but it has generated intense awareness of Africa and intense interest in its past, present, and future. Increasing numbers of economists, sociologists, political scientists, psychologists, geographers, and historians have joined the anthropologists in doing field work and other research on traditional and modernizing Africa.

Just as several of the social sciences have converging interests in the processes and problems of transforming the newly independent national economies and societies of Africa—what the economists call macro-development and the political scientists call modernization—so too are there now converging interests in what we shall call "micro-development," that is, processes and problems of socio-economic change at the local community level in present-day Africa.
The literature of micro-development is of two sorts: case studies of specific village-level communities based on fieldwork experience, and attempts at theoretical insights and generalizations relating to many small communities. The best of the specific case studies answer questions of theoretical interest and also provide insights of use to those who make policies for community development: What in traditional economy and society makes for receptivity or resistance to economic and technological innovations? Under what impetus, and in what sequence have African communities experienced economic and social change? Once Africans have moved into new cash-earning activities, how have traditional social organization and culture changed? Under what conditions has successful transition to cash-earning activities taken place? Under what conditions has recent social and economic change induced novel sorts of conflict and malaise within communities?

The theoretical literature is not based on any particular fieldwork experience but on many such published empirical studies. Gunnar Myrdal, applying an idea he found useful in his famous work on the American Negro, An American Dilemma, shows how the condition of underdevelopment (traditional societies) consists of an interlocking set of economic, technological, and socio-cultural forces, which he calls "cumulative causation." Adelman and Morris how how these many forces can be measured, and which modernizing innovations are the most important in the different stages of transforming traditional economies. In a quite remarkable application of psychoanalytical theory, Everett Hagen shows how personality formation in traditional societies affects entrepreneurial initiative. Neil Smelser shows that the new activities and institutions that comprise development and modernization generate similar processes of structural transformation and require new forms of social and economic integration.

Ethnographic case studies of individual villages and tribal groups provide us with many good descriptive accounts of specific African economies. These first-hand accounts by anthropological fieldworkers frequently include descriptions of historical and recent change as well. There are also some good descriptive summaries of the salient characteristics of traditional economy. To these are being added analytical accounts which compare the
organization and performance of traditional African economies with traditional economies elsewhere, and with developed industrial economies.  

We are only just beginning to analyze the organization and performance of preindustrial economies and the processes of their transformation in a comparative framework. Africa is particularly important for such comparative studies. For the Inca of Peru before the Spanish conquest, Aristotle's Greece, or a thirteenth-century English village, there are only the fragmentary accounts derived from historical documents. For Africa, there is a rich literature recording the first-hand field work observations of trained social scientists. Compared to Asia and Latin America, Africa presently is at an earlier stage of transformation from traditional society, so that a great deal of information about early sequences of modernization is still attainable through fieldwork. The size and diversity of Africa, moreover, mean that information on a great many specific matters relating to traditional as well as modernizing economies can be provided by African studies. Old theoretical problems can be investigated, such as the conditions under which feudal institutions appear and disappear, and new practical policies formulated, such as how to increase agricultural productivity.

NOTES


11. S. Deane, Colonial Social Accounting; and Samuels, Income and Wealth.


15. See Reinhard Bendix, Work and Authority in Industry (New York: Harper and Row, 1956). Labor "commitment" means a disciplined labor force which shows up on time, does not change jobs frequently, and does not stay away from work unnecessarily. Commitment does not necessarily mean the workers enjoy factory work.


22. There were exceptions. For an example of how wage-labor outside the local community served to strengthen traditional structures within, see William Watson, Tribal Cohesion in a Money Economy (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958).


28. One indicator of adequacy of the return gift is that the social relationship (which includes the gift-giving) remains unimpaired.


34. Schapera, "Economic Changes."


37. See Dalton, "Theoretical Issues."


47. Hagen, Social Change.


49. See Bohannan, The Economy; Gulliver, "Arusha Trade"; Watson, Tribal Cohesion; and Richards, Land, Labour and Diet.

50. See Forde and Douglas, "Primitive Economics"; Beattie, Other Cultures; and Sahlins, Tribesmen.

51. See Polanyi, Trade and Markets; Dalton, "Traditional Production"; and Dalton, "Theoretical Issues."


53. See De Wilde, Agricultural Development.
The single most impressive linguistic fact about Africa is surely its multilingualism, not only in the sense that the number of languages spoken is large, but that in almost every community, certainly in every urban center, two or more languages exist in a kind of symbiosis, each bearing part of the communicative burden. Most urban Africans find it necessary to use more than one language regularly. The Federation of Cameroon is an example--albeit an extreme one--of the linguistic complexity of the new African nations. In this relatively small state at least one hundred African vernaculars are spoken. The vehicular languages include two pidgins (one English-based, the other indigenous), Pidgin English and Ewondo populaire, and five major indigenous lingua francas, Douala, Bulu-Yaounde, Mbum, Fulani, and Hausa. And there are two "official" or "national" languages: English and French.

We are still counting the languages spoken in Africa, but the figure usually given is eight hundred. This is certainly on the low side; a thousand might even be too conservative an estimate. This would represent at least a fifth of the languages of the world. Very few of these African languages are major languages in the sense that they can claim even a million or more speakers. Most of them are unwritten, only superficially studied, if at all, and certainly not susceptible as yet to being catalogued with any precision.
Why Africa should be the most multilingual area in the world is a challenging question which can only be answered by conjecture. In the known historical cases of language imposition or change, multilingualism in an area seems often to have favored the extension of a single language over that area, usually in a period of administrative and economic domination following military conquest. Acceptance of an imposed language usually starts with its use by an elite who function as intermediaries between the subject people and their conquerors. The new language then gradually filters down through the mass of the population.

This type of language spread is characteristic of Africa during the colonial period. But lingua francas existed in Africa in the precolonial period, and they too spread in very much the same way. The large Muslim empires were always ruled by an elite from a particular ethno-linguistic group. The expansion of internal and external trade tended to favor traders of the dominant group, and it thus became expedient for others to learn their language in order to carry on trade. The widespread use of Malinke and Hausa over an extensive area of West Africa today is no doubt due to their linguistic dominance in the empires of Mali in the one case and of Sokoto and Gwandu in the other.¹

The "opening-up" of Africa in colonial times created even more favorable conditions for the spread of lingua francas, but also introduced the European languages themselves as competitors. Certainly the expansion of Hausa in the West and of Swahili in the East during the last century owes something to the suppression of the inter-ethnic warfare and the establishment of rail and road communications in the colonial and postcolonial periods. But these languages might well have extended themselves further and faster had they not been confronted by the spread of European languages in addition to the changed political pattern brought about by the colonial powers.

Lingua francas are by definition second languages, and despite the proliferation of these languages and their rapid and extensive spread in Africa under the impact of Westernization, there are very few instances of a people giving up their mother tongue in favor of a lingua franca,
however insignificant their own language may be, and however useful the lingua franca. Stable bilingualism is a characteristic condition in Africa and in places it is known to have endured for centuries. Language attitudes (about which all too little is known either in Africa or generally) are undoubtedly important factors in the perpetuation of multilingualism. The ethnic language is connected with a sense of group identity and loyalty to traditional ways and ancestors; the lingua franca, which is more widely understood, is useful and is often the linguistic avenue to material success. Language loyalties remain strong in Africa and concern for the mother tongue and what it represents appears to outweigh the inconveniences of multilingualism.

Planners who see linguistic unity as essential for the economic advancement of newly emergent states in Africa, and politicians who would encourage it in the interests of nationhood, are basically unrealistic if they believe that linguistic unity can be achieved in anything like the foreseeable future. On the existing evidence, few of Africa's hundreds of languages are in any real danger of extinction. Where there is failure to impose a single language in a community, diglossia (a special type of bilingualism) usually results and is often institutionalized, as in the Islamized empires of the Western Sudan. In Mali, for example, it seems that the subjected peoples continued to use their own languages for intragroup communication, but used Malinke, the language of an elite, for communication with their rulers. Arabic, the sacred language of the state, was the language of external affairs.

In communities where more than one language is spoken, not all languages have the same range of uses. Different social relations are expressed in different languages; and distinct social functions call for the use of other languages. Some languages are rarely written, and speakers of these languages must use another language for their correspondence. Different kinds of topics may elicit a language preference. In these sorts of multilingual communities speakers change languages much as monolingual speakers change styles, using the one that is considered most appropriate in a given situation. In Ghana, for example, a middle-class
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Ghanaian whose mother tongue is, say, Ga, will certainly use that language with Ga-speaking intimates and within his family circle. He is likely, however, to address inferiors, such as watchmen and servants, especially if they are from northern Ghana, in Twi, however badly he or they may speak that language. In other contexts which are interpreted as "modern," or if the servants to whom he is speaking come from outside Ghana, especially from Nigeria, he may use "Kru" (or Pidgin) English. Certainly on most formal occasions he will judge standard English to be the appropriate language in which to address mixed groups. Most of his correspondence, too, however intimate, will be in English though he would have learned to read and write Ga in school.

LANGUAGE CLASSIFICATION IN AFRICA

Confronted with the extreme linguistic diversity of Africa, it is understandable that language classification has occupied an important position within the field of African linguistics. Furthermore, African linguistic classifications have attracted great attention from other disciplines, particularly history and anthropology, due to the insights they provide into patterns of ethnic interaction, population migration, and culture contact.

Since Bantu languages cover a greater proportion of sub-Saharan Africa than any other group of similarly related languages, it is also not unexpected that Bantu has been a primary focus of African linguistic research. The essential unity of the Bantu languages was recognized at an early date. It is generally thought to have been noted first by Lichentenstein in 1808 in a paper which suggested a division of the languages of southern Africa into two groups: Kaffir languages and Hottentot. Subsequent classifications of African languages added three more families to the Bantu: the Sudanic, Hamito-Semitic, and Bushman. This four-fold classification of the languages of sub-Saharan Africa was generally accepted until the late 1940's.

In 1949 and 1950, Joseph H. Greenberg published a series of articles with the general title of "Studies in African Linguistic Classification." In these articles Greenberg presented what purported to be a new and
comprehensive "genetic classification" of all African languages. That is, this classification not only categorized languages, but also sought to trace their origins and growth. In fact, he addressed himself primarily to two major problems.

The first problem was the theory of the Hamitic group of languages which Carl Meinhof had put forward in 1912 in his *Die Sprachen der Hamiten*. Meinhof's theory, in fact, had very few adherents by the time Greenberg published his attack; the theory had already been subjected to severe and basically sound criticism by Drexel in the early 1920's. Meinhof's views, briefly, were that the Hamitic languages in present-day Africa were represented in their "purest" and oldest form by the Fulani language; and, further, that the Bantu languages had descended from an admixture of a language such as Fulani with a Western Sudanic one. Hottentot, which some authorities had grouped with Bushman because of its "clicks," and which others thought to be Hamito-Semitic because of the presence of a masculine-feminine distinction in its nouns and pronouns, was, for Meinhof, an Hamitic language strongly influenced by Bushman. Similarly, Masai was typologically Hamitic, heavily influenced by Eastern Sudanic languages. (Figure I)

Greenberg rejected entirely Meinhof's notion of Hamitic. He brought Semitic, Egyptian, Berber, Cushitic, and Chadic together into a single higher level grouping which he called Afro-Asiatic. In the Greenberg analysis Fulani was shown conclusively to be related to Wolof, Serer, and Biafada (as Mlle. Hamburger had suggested years earlier); and it was therefore as much a Western Sudanic language as the others. Masai was returned to Eastern Sudanic and Hottentot was put back with Bushman and a few other languages in groupings first labeled "click" and later "Khoisan."

Greenberg secondly, and more importantly, addressed himself to a problem propounded by Diedrich Westermann, who in his studies of what he called the Western Sudanic languages had suggested that these languages were related, albeit distantly, to the Bantu group. Greenberg accepted the proposed linkage, but restated it as a much more recent and closer relationship. The Bantu languages were now seen as an off-shoot of a
subgroup within Western Sudanic itself. This was undoubtedly one of the most controversial parts of Greenberg's otherwise fairly conservative classification. Two other controversial points were his Khoisan grouping and his subsumption of the so-called "Nilo-Hamitic" and Nilotic languages under a single family.

Greenberg's articles occasioned a considerable amount of controversy when they first appeared. In retrospect it seems that in Europe, at least, where the articles were not at first well received, the adverse reaction was due as much to the intemperate language with which Greenberg made his case and to the uncritical acceptance with which American scholars in other fields heralded his work, as it was to any serious misgivings about his hypotheses. Greenberg's recent reduction of the number of postulated independent language families from sixteen to four is a more radical and consequently more controversial formulation.5 (Figure II)

There is, however, a basic difference of opinion about language classification involved in the lessened but continuing debates over his work. In traditional comparative-linguistic practice, the only acceptable proof of cognation (genetic relationship) is the establishment of precise sound correspondences. Greenberg, however, has used the techniques of "mass comparison": that is, he has long lists of putative cognates (words thought to have a common root) among languages for which he claims an interrelationship, but nowhere does he advance the types of regular phonological transformation rules that would satisfy some critics. Until such time as these processes of transformation are elucidated, Greenberg's claims will continue to be regarded by some as merely speculative hypotheses.

In an area of language comparison where the traditional methods are especially productive, Greenberg's neglect of them has seemed all the more reprehensible to his critics. The chief critic, and the only one to offer a serious alternative to Greenberg's hypothesis concerning the relationship which obtains between the Bantu languages and those of West Africa, is the Bantuist, Malcolm Guthrie. In a well-known article, Guthrie asks whether the features that appear to be common to West African languages and Bantu
languages display the same regularity of correspondence as that found within the Bantu language family itself. He finds that they do not, and concludes, therefore, that the Bantuisms in West African languages are due to the incorporation of Bantu features into languages of quite distinct origin.

Greenberg's cognate lists (similar forms with much the same meaning) are impressive; but it is doubtful whether it will be possible to establish correspondences between items in the Niger-Congo group with the regularity that is such a feature of the Bantu languages. Certainly a great deal more work will be needed. Meanwhile, for those linguists who take an "operational" view of language comparison, explanations of structural resemblance in terms of "borrowing" or "common descent" or quite simply "chance" are all equally irrelevant. It is to historians and students of social change that Greenberg's classification is most likely to appeal, since it is the first and as yet the only complete genetic classification of African languages and one which can seemingly offer corroborative linguistic evidence in support of non-linguistic hypotheses regarding population origins, migrations, and interactions.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF AFRICAN LANGUAGES

The question of strict genetic relationship aside, it is true that the languages of Africa show many striking resemblances in structure and idiom. In moving from one language to another which need not be related in any conventional sense of the term, the linguist frequently experiences the most lively feeling of *déjà vu*. There are, for example, some sounds which are common in African languages but not elsewhere: the "clicks" of Southern Africa and parts of eastern Africa are found only there. Also, the labiovelars (that is, sounds produced through combined use of the lips and the soft palate, as in the sounds gb or kp) so widely spread throughout the languages of the Western Sudan have not been reported from outside Africa except in one insignificant instance.
GREENBERG'S LINGUISTIC CLASSIFICATION (1955)
(adapted from Studies in African Linguistic Classification, 1955)

FIGURE I
I. CONGO-KORDOFANIAN
IA Niger-Congo
IA1 West Atlantic
IA2 Mande
IA3 Voltaic
IB Kordofanian
II. NILO-SAHARAN
IIA Songhai
IIB Saharan
IIC Maban
IID Fur
IIIE Chari-Nile
IIE1 Eastern Sudanic
IIE2 Central Sudanic
IIE3 Berta
IIE4 Kunama
IIF Koman
III. AFRO-ASIATIC
IIIA Semitic
IIIB Egyptian
IIIC Berber
IIID Cushitic
IIID1 Northern
IIID2 Central
IIID3 Eastern
IIID4 Western
IIID5 Southern
IIIE Chad
III A
III B
III C
III D
III E
III F
III G
III H
III I
III J
III K
III L
III M
III N
III O
III P
III Q
III R
III S
III T
III U
III V
III W
III X
III Y
III Z
IV. KHOISAN
IVA South African
IVA1 Northern Khoisan
IVA2 Central
IVA3 Southern
IVB Sandawe
IVC Hatsa

GREENBERG'S LINGUISTIC CLASSIFICATION (1963)
(adapted from The Languages of Africa, 1963. Copyright 1963 by Indiana University)

FIGURE II
The structure of words in African languages is such that they frequently end in a vowel or a nasal consonant and often begin with a nasal or combination of nasal consonants. Almost every one of the languages spoken south of the Sahara is tonal, using pitch distinctions to differentiate words in much the same way as most European languages use stress.

Certain grammatical constructions are typically African (though not exclusively so). True adjective constructions are rarer than in European languages; constructions with so-called "adjectival verbs" or with abstract nouns are used to express the same concepts as the European adjective. Thus for "I am hungry" the equivalent expression in many African languages would be something like "hunger holds me." In West African Pidgin or Creole English the phrase is, in fact, exactly that: "hungry catch me." Similarly, phrases corresponding to "it is black or red or tall or short" would be verbal predicates in many African languages, as if we were to say in English "it blacks, reds, talls, or shorts."

Comparison is nearly everywhere expressed by means of the verb "to surpass"; so that the word-for-word translation of an African equivalent "I am bigger than he is" would read "I am big surpass him" or perhaps "I surpass him as to size."

Though reduplication is by no means exclusively an African feature, it is so very common in African languages that it perhaps deserves some mention here. It is used to form plurals of nouns and verbs and in the formation of adverbial and other constructions. For instance, to say "come immediately!" in Hausa, one would say, literally, "come now-now!" Reduplication is especially a feature of the characteristically African "ideophone" or "lautbild" as the German scholars called it (that is, a sound which suggests the meaning of the word, as in "squish").

In the Bantu languages, an elaborate system of noun classes functions in much the way that gender does in European languages. Thus in Swahili the noun for "shoe" belongs to a class which is marked by the prefix vi in the plural; and so in accordance with a system of agreements which functions throughout the phrase "all my shoes are red," the words dependent grammatically on "shoe" also take the vi- prefix: viatu vyote vyangu viko.
vye vikundu. Similarly, the same root noun is modified in meaning by prefixes associated with different noun classes. Therefore, the Baganda (singular: Muganda) are the people who occupy the area north and west of Lake Victoria in East Africa, an area which is called Buganda in their language (Luganda). The name of the modern state in which the Baganda are located is Uganda—the Swahili form for Buganda.

Resemblances in idiom are less easy to state precisely, but the use of words for body parts to denote spatial relationships is very common, as is the use of a locative verb with the meaning "to have" and the use of "child" to indicate a diminutive. The range of different meanings associated with single words parallel each other in many languages so that "eat," "win," "conquer" are expressed by the same verb; and "to hear" may also mean "to understand," "to feel," and "to perceive."

Linguists differ in the importance they attach to these similarities, whether they require explanation and, if so, in what terms. Unrelated languages that have a good many characteristics, words and idioms in common elsewhere in the world are sometimes said to form a linguistic union (sprachbund). The half dozen languages spoken in the Balkan Peninsula are interesting in this respect and the Balkanist linguists have done much to develop sprachbund theory. Linguistic unions, they hold, are as real as language families but are due to causes other than common descent; the same substratum, for example, or reciprocal influences, or a common civilization and religion. In the case of Africa, as Westermann suggests, wholesale borrowing over an extended period of time has been a significant factor.

WRITTEN LANGUAGES IN AFRICA

Relatively few of Africa's many languages can be said to have a written tradition. Those languages that have a well-established writing system in daily use by the community, or at least the literate sections of it, are likely for the most part to have acquired it only in the quite recent past; and the system itself is most probably based on the Roman
alphabet or on some adaption of it such as the Africa script, as recommended by the International African Institute.

There are exceptions to these statements. There are a few languages with a long tradition of writing and which employ scripts other than the Roman. The Arabic script has been applied to a number of African languages, sometimes in special versions like the ajami script of the Western Sudan. Technically, ajami refers to any language other than Arabic which is written in Arabic script. Swahili, Hausa, Kanuri and Bambara-Malinke, for example, have all been written at one time or another in Arabic script. In nearly every case, however, the Arabic has now been replaced or supplemented by the more adaptable Roman alphabet. The Ethiopic, a Semitic script of respectable antiquity, is still used to write Ge'ez, Amharic, and Tigrinya; and the Greek alphabet in modified form was used for Coptic and Old Nubian.

Over and above all these "imported" scripts, Africa has a few indigenous examples of written languages. Somali is unofficially, but widely, written in the so-called Osmania script invented by 'Ismadu Yusuf Kəradīd. The Vai script, a syllabary (that is, a set of characters, each of which denotes a syllable rather than a single sound) devised by Momadu Bukele in the 1830's, is very popular still in Liberia and is used by Vais, generally in informal correspondence. At least four neighboring West African languages, Mende, Loma, Kpelle, and Bassa, have recently acquired similar scripts which undoubtedly owe something to the Vai inspiration. These latter are syllabaries, but in 1936 a true alphabetic script was discovered by Adams among the Efik in southeastern Nigeria where it was used in writing the secret language of a religious sect. Better known, perhaps, and better studied, is the Bammum script invented by King Njoya of Southern Cameroon. Originally conceived as a logographic system (that is, with symbols representing words or groups of words), it was gradually changed by successive royal decrees first to a syllabary and later to a true alphabet.
TRADITIONAL AFRICAN LITERATURE: ORAL AND WRITTEN

To say that most African languages are still unwritten is not at all to say they have no literature. On the contrary, all African peoples have within the basic corpus of their oral traditions some which deserve to be called literature or verbal art. A concern for forms of expression beyond that of the casual language of everyday communication is shown in these traditions. These forms of expression are recognized indigenously as "art" and are characteristically designated as such by formal stylistic devices as well as by other indications of design.12

Poetry in verse is, for the most part, restricted to the Islamized peoples of Africa: the Fulani and Hausa in the West, the Swahili in the East, and the Nubians and Berbers in the North. Among some of these peoples there exists a learned poetry which employs verse patterned after classical Arabic forms. This exists side by side with popular poetry, composed and recited in the traditional African style. In much of Africa the poetic traditions of its peoples are contained in song, but not all song-texts constitute literature in any sense of the term. The songs, for example, which intersperse prose narrative (cant-fable is everywhere used as an effective means to enliven the performance of raconteurs) are largely composed of nonsense-words and have interest only for their rhythmic or prosodic content. On the other hand, much of what is sung in Africa can be called--without violence to traditional terminology--lyric, or melic, poetry.

Sometimes sung, sometimes recited, and found everywhere in Africa are praise-poems. These are of such importance in the poetry of African peoples that they are usually treated as a separate genre. Praise-poems are composed not only about kings, chiefs, and headmen, famous warriors, and other prominent individuals, but also about ordinary people. There are also praise-poems about ethnic groups and their sub-divisions; and about animals, both wild and domestic; plants, trees, crops, rivers, hills, and other natural features; about clothing; even about railways and bicycles!
In some societies the composition of praise-poems was originally a task imposed on all boys going through the initiation rites preceding the creation of an age-set, and every well-brought up adult was able to compose and recite a respectable eulogy on appropriate occasions. The composition of praise-poems is also in some societies the business of professional bards who not only recite their own compositions but declaim the traditional poems which have come down from earlier times.

Prose-narratives, both fictional and non-fictional, are part of the cultural tradition of all African peoples. The latter category includes historical tales (that is, official traditions aimed at recording the history of ethnic groups, lineages, clans, and families) and myths which have an essentially religious or didactic character. Folktales on the other hand are fiction. Their main purpose is to amuse the listener, though rather frequently they contain a moralizing or didactic element which may be summarized for the audience in the form of a concluding proverb.

By far the best documented of African prose-narratives are the animal trickster tales, but in some areas human tricksters like Yo, and trickster deities like Legba of the Dahomey cycle recorded by Herskovits, are almost as important. Not all tales have tricksters. There are tales of ogres, witches, and werewolves; of children, especially of twins and orphans; and of children-who-are-born-to-die. Some tales are told simply to pose a problem to the audience and end unfinished with a question.

Intimately connected with narrative forms, often as integral parts of them, are the two other major genres of African oral literature: the proverb and the riddle. The importance of the proverb in Africa cannot be exaggerated. As is well known, proverbs enter into almost every form of interaction. They are also used as literary devices for thematic statement in poetry and in heightened or elegant prose. Riddles are equally widespread but they have not received the attention of scholars to the same extent as proverbs. Their primary purpose is of course to amuse; but, this apart, they serve almost as many and varied functions in African societies as do proverbs. They are often used in greetings and nicknames, in informal education to
train the memory of children and to sharpen their wits, and as a form of indirect abuse. They are even used in some societies as a kind of alarm; a feature of riddles among the Chagga (Tanzania) is that they may be sung to warn others of imminent danger.

Of the written literature of Africa, not all is of recent origin or of European derivation. The literature of Ethiopia, for example, consists of writing in Ge'ez, which is classical Ethiopic, and in Amharic, the vernacular, that replaced Ge'ez and is now the official language of Ethiopia. The earliest known manuscripts in Ge'ez date from the fourteenth century, though the oldest compositions are certainly of a much earlier period. Amharic has been used for serious literary purposes for over four hundred years and today possesses a flourishing literature which includes plays, verse dramas, history, biography, and a recent popular genre, the allegorical novel composed partly in prose and partly in verse.

In Nubian, documents of a religious nature, largely translations from Greek, date from the eighth century to the beginning of the fourteenth century and are of great interest because they are the only true evidence of an early language still spoken by Negroes in Africa.

The Swahili literary tradition goes back for more than three hundred years, and in this respect is without parallel among the Bantu-speaking peoples of East Africa. Its origins are in the Arabic writings that the Sayid families brought with them when they settled in East Africa, especially the didactic and homiletic, that is, moralistic, verse and the popular tales of Islam. These compositions were later paraphrased into Swahili, often with an interlinear Arabic version in the text. The earliest Swahili manuscript known to scholars is the poem Ntendi wa Tambuka written in Pate (now in Kenya) for the Sultan Laiti Nabhani in A.D. 1728.

Elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa Islam produced at a relatively early date produced a literate elite which for the most part preferred Arabic as the medium of communication. The Tarikh-es-Soudan of Es-Sa'di, who was born in Timbuktu in A.D. 1596, is perhaps the best known example of an early indigenous work in Arabic of any considerable literary merit. It is only one of many works in Arabic from the Western Sudan.
THE EUROPEAN INFLUENCE ON AFRICAN LITERATURE

Such instances of earlier literatures apart, widespread writing by Africans cannot be said to have begun on any scale much before the middle of the last century. The assumption of responsibility for education, first by European missionary enterprises and later by the colonial governments, marked the beginnings of literacy in most of Africa. The different policies of the colonial powers toward African languages had differing effects on the literary output of Africans. The official British and Belgian educational policies assigned a place to African languages, both as a medium and a subject of instruction. In sharp contrast, the French prescribed the exclusive use of French. As a result, French West Africa in the preindependence period produced a whole new literature of its own in French. In British Africa, on the other hand, in the same period a meager output in English reflected all too often the neo-Victorian tastes of uninspired schoolmasters. Africans under the British were encouraged to participate in the reduction of their languages to writing and to translate European classics and describe their local customs and traditions in their own languages. This "literature of tutelage," as it has been called, contains few authors of stature. It belongs properly to the years before World War II and no longer exists, except in South Africa.

In the former British territories of West Africa, the literary efforts of Africans since the 1950's have tended to be channeled into English forms; but in East and Central Africa, the vernacular pamphlet still constitutes the bulk of published work. Swahili is the language most widely used and in addition to verse, some Swahili prose of real merit has appeared. Robert of Tanga (Tanzania), for example, has written a biography, an autobiography, and several volumes of essays in Swahili—all of which have been well received.
The present situation in Africa, then, is one in which two literatures exist side by side: a written and an oral. Of the many questions such a situation poses, some can be answered with greater or less assurance now. Others at best must remain the subject of individual conjecture and hypothesis for many years to come. It seems reasonably certain, for example, that written literature will ultimately supersede the oral tradition, which may then be preserved as true folk literature.

What is less certain is whether English and French will continue to replace the vernacular languages as the media of creative writing. Faced with a choice of a vernacular or a world language in which to write, Africans over the past two decades have opted for the language which offered them the wider audience and perhaps the easier apprenticeship. But others before them have had the same decision to make, and not all have been willing to forego communication with the majority of their countrymen. Much may depend on the success which attends attempts like those of the Nigerian writers to "Africanize" their English (French attitudes being what they are, it is difficult to imagine anything of the kind happening in French).

But, how much will the new writing in whatever language be influenced by the co-existing older oral styles? The traditions which seem so far to have most influenced younger African writers are often adopted in the literary language of their choice. There have been some fairly obvious attempts to use the devices of oral literature with differing degrees of success. The early South African writers, Mafolo and Plaatje especially, interspersed the prose of their novels with the songs and moralizing sentiments that are such a feature of the African story-teller's art; and Rabearivelo and Renaivo of Madagascar, even when writing in French, struggled to free themselves of French influence and patterned much of their poetry on the poetic dialogues long popular in their native land. Other African writers in French have occasionally cast their material in the traditional form of the folk tale: Dadie, Birago Diop, and Jean Malonga are among these writers.
But the more subtle influences—and perhaps the more important in the long run—are less easily identified. A disproportionate amount of scholarly attention is still being given to the new writing in Africa, but there are encouraging signs of a re-awakening of interest in the oral compositions. The answer to many questions about the future of each is dependent upon the direction of the other.

LINGUISTICS AND THE STUDY OF AFRICA

The history of African linguistics is by no means a long one. The serious study of African languages goes back little more than a hundred years. And for a good part of that time, much of the work was done by foreign scholars, such as missionaries, administrators, and others not primarily interested in linguistic study for its own sake, but forced into offering some account of the languages they lived and worked with. There are a few notable exceptions, but for the most part these accounts are, by today's standards, amateurish and inadequate.

It was not until the twentieth century that African languages claimed the attention of professional linguists in any significant numbers. These scholars brought a much needed technical expertise in such matters as tonal analysis and accurate phonetic description. In the years immediately following World War II interest in African languages increased, first in London with the massive expansion of faculty at the School of Oriental and African Studies (as a direct result of the recommendations of the Earl of Scarborough's Commission) and later, as independence for most of Africa became a real and immediate possibility, almost everywhere else. The United States under the National Defense Education Act and through government agencies like the Peace Corps has had a late, but enormous, influence on these studies. Before the Second World War, the great names in African linguistics were for the most part German; now the field is truly international. There are larger and smaller centers of African linguistics in most capitals of Europe, in several universities in America and, more importantly perhaps, in several of the newly independent African countries themselves. There are some impressive examples of recent international cooperation, as in
the *Journal of African Languages* and in actual field surveys. The first such survey was begun in 1956 in West Africa, and later, in 1966, the *Survey of Language Use and Language Teaching* in East Africa was begun. A cause for satisfaction in all these developments is the growing number of professional African linguists working on their own languages. There are areas of language description that ultimately only the native-speaker can hope to handle adequately, and it is usually in his own language that the linguist does his best work.

With the growing numbers of linguists professionally engaged in these studies it is reasonable to expect that the development and application of theoretical linguistic insights to Western European languages will provide a cross-fertilization with insights from the African language field. Equally promising are the beginnings of interdisciplinary research in which linguists have begun to take a proper role alongside their colleagues in history, sociology, and other related disciplines.

One such area is the collection and study of African oral data. The historian working in precolonial African history must handle, even collect, his own oral data. The relevance of linguistics for such research is obvious. The historian Vansina, in his *Oral Tradition*, has written:

> When one comes to study a testimony composed in the language of a people without writing, it often happens that no description of the language exists, or that, if there are any, they are not to be relied upon. In that case the research worker's first task will be to study the structure of the language before he can even begin to collect testimonies. This amounts to saying that a historian must either have had a fairly thorough linguistic training, or must work only among peoples whose language has been studied by a competent linguist. In any case, the historian must always indicate the linguistic studies on which the interpretation of his documents is based. [13]

Going on immediately to discuss "a second problem, that of knowing the exact meaning of words used in a testimony," Vansina seems to refer briefly (though not explicitly) to "situations théorique" and to recommend the textual methodology first developed by the anthropologist Malinowski. In his *Coral Gardens and Their Magic*, Malinowski treats native words in perhaps the fullest cultural context of ethnographic description in English.
These problems of definition and statement of meaning by translation are not, of course, peculiar to historical studies; they are crucial problems in most of the social sciences.

As well as the contributions of linguistics in an applied or ancillary role, there are some historical questions of interest which linguists are uniquely equipped to handle. These include problems of dating. The much debated techniques of "glottochronology" have tried to provide answers to a whole range of problems in the historico-comparative field, from the establishment of specific languages no longer distinct, such as Proto-Bantu, to a detailed consideration of the distribution and form of sets of terms (for example, those for food-crops, crafts, domestic animals, and for politically significant terms like "chief").

The techniques of glottochronology are derived from two basic assumptions: 1) that there are certain situations and things for which all languages have a "basic vocabulary" of words; and 2) that the rate of change in this "basic vocabulary" is constant over long periods of time. Consequently it ought to be possible to compute the interval of separation between two documented but undated stages of a language by comparing the proportions of unchanged basic vocabulary or to compute the approximate date of a common ancestor by comparing the basic vocabularies of two or more related contemporary languages in order to estimate the most recent date at which they could have been identical.

The results of M. Swadesh's recent work on a number of West African languages is still to be published. Meanwhile there are two papers which apply glottochronology on a limited scale to Bantu problems. This is, however, a controversial area and there are many who would agree with the view of glottochronology recently expressed by Robert Hall:

We are therefore justified in being cautious with regard to the degrees of relationship and the time perspectives which glottochronology may seem to indicate. There are too many possible variables entering into the situation; the structure of human speech as a whole (and especially that of lexicon, which is one of its most easily changeable parts) is too flexible to be as rigid in its rate of change as, say, an individual radioactive element. To arrive at even an approximately valid measurement of any aspect of linguistic change, we would have to have far more extensive and accurate data for a number of related
languages, and over many more centuries, than there is any hope of of our ever having. In all probability, any hope of being able to apply valid statistical techniques to the measurement of linguistic change is illusory, and had best be abandoned; our best approach to language history is still through comparative reconstruction, which does not depend on arithmetical or mathematical measurement of any kind.

Place and clan names are also matters for linguistic investigation. The author has examined some putative principles of onomastic (place name) investigation in languages with little or no recorded history, and there are papers by Steve.as and Tait along similar lines. As Professor Kuper has recently pointed out "A historian who uses language as evidence of diffusion or borrowing requires the assistance of both the formal linguist and the sociolinguist." The body of oral traditions belonging to an African people is important to the historian who sees these traditions as unwritten history. Yet, as mentioned above, much of what the historian collects for his own purposes others will regard as unwritten literature or spoken art. Nketia has shown very clearly in his The Funeral Dirges of the Akan People what can be expected when the texts of traditional verbal art are subjected to a stylistic analysis which uses the established techniques of linguistic description. As yet few scholars have followed Nketia's example, but a number of recent papers promise exciting insights into the non-casual language of various African peoples.

It requires little effort to extend almost indefinitely the range of topics on which the African linguist could potentially contribute. Linguistic considerations enter into the description and analysis not only of individual and folk styles in unwritten literature but of the differences between the prose and non-prose forms of a language, the use of a language in song, especially in respect to the relation between musical and lingual pitch patterns (where the language is tonal), and in a variety of other ways. As yet only small beginnings have been made to implement these potentialities.

The areas of interdisciplinary effort so far mentioned have involved "pure" linguistics. Equally exciting and interdisciplinary in scope is the study of socio-linguistics. Joseph Greenberg has indicated the scope of
this field and its relevance to African studies in general in his contribution to Robert A. Lystad's The African World: the relation of language differences to social class, the differential social roles of different languages co-existing in the same society, the development and spread of lingua francas as auxiliary languages in multilingual situations, the factors involved in the differential prestige ratings of languages, the role of languages as a sign of ethnic identification; language in relation to nationalism, and problems of language policy, for example, in education.\(^{21}\) There is also a more specific and detailed statement by Berry and Greenberg in a recent issue of the African Studies Association Bulletin.\(^{22}\)

The relevance of sociolinguistic inquiry to the many practical problems confronting the emerging African states is immediate and obvious. In general the linguistic communication system is an overall factor in economic development, and in the area of political action the often distressing discrepancy between stated official policy and national behavior may have its origins in language and translation. In modern African societies, ideologies have replaced myth as the means by which institutions and political actions are sanctioned, but the ideologies are largely framed in English or French. They are thus intelligible to only a limited elite.

There is growing acceptance in Africa that simple solutions to language problems are at best unrealistic. Multilingualism is a fact with which the majority of Africans are willing or learn to live. Even in their new and Westernized world. In this world, both in school and later life, the vernacular languages have a place. Indeed from the viewpoint of national mobilization and development, the vernaculars are dismissed only at considerable cost. Thus, Karl Deutsch has said:

Disclaiming native languages as mere "vernaculars" is fraught with many costs. These costs include some educational retardation; forcing all children through a language barrier for their access to education; making linguistic and verbal aptitude a crucial test in the selection of scientists and engineers, and thereby sacrificing a substantial part of the nation's potential technical and scientific talent; reducing appreciably the reading speeds and comprehension scores of at least a part of the personnel forced to work in a language which is not native to them; and the less readily calculable but not negligible damage done to the self-image, self-esteem and sense of identity of at least some part of the population.\(^{23}\)
Once there is acceptance that the vernacular languages have a proper and important role in the life of a nation, the problems of standardization and modernization assume a new dimension. In all these problems of language engineering, cooperation between linguists and other social scientists is clearly required.24

NOTES


3. The most influential of these language classifications are those of Carl Meinhof and Diedrich Westermann. Alice Werner provided a popular and readable account of Meinhof's and Westermann's theories in The Language Families of Africa (London: Kegan Paul, 1930). For earlier views about African Languages, Cust's A Sketch of the Modern Languages of Africa (two volumes; London: 1883), should be consulted.


7. An explanation of "operational" may be found in J. Berry, "Structural Affinities of the Volta River Languages and Their Importance for Linguistic Classification" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1952).


11. See, for example, I. Dugast and M. W. D. Jeffreys, L'écriture des Bamum (L'institut Français d'Afrique Noire, 1950).


VISUAL ART IN AFRICA
Frank Willett

APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF AFRICAN ART

When we speak of African art, people usually think first of sculpture, especially in wood, as most of the collected material is in this form; there is also sculpture in stone, mud, pottery, bronze, and even iron. Painting also exists as an art form in Africa; in fact, the oldest art we know in Africa consists of paintings on the walls of caves and rock shelters. Painting today, however, is usually restricted to the decoration of sculpture and the decoration of house walls. Neither is commonly seen in the West; painting on sculpture has often been removed by the collector, and decorations painted on walls are almost impossible to collect as originals and so are known generally only from photographs in the literature.

The scope of African art also includes music and dancing which are not only important art forms in their own right, but are far more widespread than sculpture and painting. In this essay, however, we shall confine ourselves to the visual arts—sculpture and painting—though, as we shall see, these cannot be studied profitably in isolation from other forms of expression. Take for example a carved wooden mask. In museums we usually see these exhibited for our admiration of their sculptural form; yet as Kenneth Murray has shown, they are intended to be seen in movement in a dance; frequently one which is inferior when held in the hand looks more effective than a finer carving when worn with its costume. It is, moreover, essential to see masks in use before judging what they express, for it is easy to read into an isolated mask what was never meant to be there.
A mask, then, is only part of a whole complex of a costume worn in a dance and accompanied by music. Unfortunately, the overwhelming proportion of the masks in our museum collections have been torn from this context without any record being made of these related arts.

Although it has often been claimed that African art was "discovered" at the beginning of this century, this is not strictly true. African sculptures in the Ulm Museum in Germany were collected in the seventeenth century. Although these were regarded as curiosities at the time of their collection, by the late nineteenth century there were large numbers of art objects in museums, and serious study of them began in an atmosphere permeated with the idea of evolution. The Pitt-Rivers Collection, now at Oxford, was established with the specific intention of demonstrating evolution in all human artifacts. The earliest studies of art were directed at producing theories of the origin and development of art. Unfortunately there was no dated ancient material available, so contemporary material was studied. Such study led to the "degeneration theory," which asserted that slavish copying of an original led to purely geometric forms; the supposedly archaic features in the contemporary material were called "survivals." It is perfectly clear today that art had multiple origins, although it is usually an unprofitable task to seek them. We content ourselves instead with recording the historically documented materials and studying the relations between them.

The old method, which we may call the "ethnological approach," was pursued more intensively on American and Oceanic material than on African. One of the most influential workers in the field was Franz Boas who worked entirely on American Indian material, most of which is symbolic and two dimensional. His most important contribution was to demonstrate that identical forms could convey different meanings in different societies, and thus to demonstrate that form and content cannot be studied separately. Boas himself, however, did not seem to have realized the importance of this, nor have many of his pupils. From this demonstration of the link between form and content the basic principle of the ethnological approach to African sculpture has been developed; that is, that a knowledge of the
content and context of a work of art is essential to its understanding and even to the full appreciation of its aesthetic qualities.

In contrast to the ethnological approach is the "aesthetic approach," adopted chiefly by practicing artists, which considers that knowledge of the content and of the function of the work of art are unnecessary to its appreciation. In the extreme form of this approach such knowledge was held to interfere with aesthetic enjoyment.4

These two schools of thought have gradually converged. Anthropologists pay increasing attention to aesthetics, while art critics pay attention to the cultural background--for what is form but a means of conveying content? Yet the bulk of the general literature on African art as a whole has adopted the essentially "objective attitude--the approach which asks "what does this sculpture mean to me?" This is understandable when the authors are practicing artists, but it does detract from the value of their books.5

Vatter, however, tried to set the artist in his social and cultural background, pointing out that the artist's role is not, as in Europe, to express his own personality, but rather to serve the community.6 From this he goes on to argue the widespread stereotype of the artist as anonymous. In most cases the artist is not anonymous; rather, the collector simply had never bothered to ask the name of the artist. Indeed the better the artist, the better his name is known over an extensive area.7

A number of important studies of continuing value were prepared between 1930 and 1950, based mainly on material which was available in museum collections.8 Gradually, however, it became apparent that study in Africa was necessary to resolve many problems and to provide reliable documentation. Melville Herskovits, a pupil of Boas, was the first to undertake a study of African art in the field (in Dahomey as part of a wider piece of research).9 Herskovits' pupils, William Bascom and Justine Cordwell, followed this example. Similarly, several students of the Belgian scholar Olbrechts worked in the field: Maesen, Vandenhoute, and Biebuyk are the best known. And from France, Marcel Griaule worked among the Dogon with his students Denise Paulme, Germaine Dieterlen, and J.-P. Lebeuf. Most of these workers have concentrated in their writings on the areas in which they did their field work.
One of the most influential writers on African art, William Fagg, began his work with studies of the collections in the British Museum, and only later undertook field work. Much of his research has been centered around exhibitions of African sculpture which he has organized in many parts of Europe. As a result, his main contribution has been in the improvement of documentation of African, and especially Nigerian, art. His study of the sculpture of Benin and his work in distinguishing the Owo style has brought order to these researches; he has identified also the individual styles of a large number of artists whose works he has illustrated.°

THE DATA AVAILABLE FOR STUDY

There are essentially three main sources of information available for the study of African art. We have first the museum collections, both public and private; but the value of museum collections as sources is limited by the quality of the documentation of individual pieces. The studies based on them are similarly limited, as Kjersmeier pointed out in explaining why he could give only a general idea of the sculpture of the Ibo, Ibibio, Ijo, and Efik of Nigeria.11

As a second source, we have the literature based on observations in Africa. Early travellers made passing references to art. Ibn-Battuta observed masked dancers in the Sudan as early as A.D. 1352; Dapper described the bronze plaques decorating the palace in Benin (Nigeria) in 1668 (yet by 1702 when Nyendael described the palace in great detail, mentioning the bronze heads supporting carved tusks, the plaques apparently had been taken down). These references afford valuable dating evidence, but in general such early references do not usually describe the art in detail nor illustrate it accurately. Anthropologists' accounts are generally of greater value, even though in many cases the art object is viewed by the anthropologist simply as a social fact, rather than as something of interest in itself. Their studies do at least help us to understand the setting of the art.

The most valuable sources of information, however, are studies of African art and artists done in the field. Unfortunately for the student of art, as African societies adopt more Western modes of life many of the
institutions which required the traditional art objects are being abandoned. Art in most of Africa is thus either dying out or is being substantially modified. The need for intensive field studies of African art, both by anthropologists (who are in any case very much preoccupied at present with the phenomena of social change) and by art historians, is most urgent. Increasingly, we are becoming aware of gaps in our information which can be filled only by investigations in the field. We must see that these investigations are carried out as a matter of the greatest urgency, partly as a means of better understanding those materials which are already stored in museums, secure from the termite and the weather at least, if not from greater threats.

INTERPRETING THE DATA

African sculpture is an expression of the world view, or the philosophy, of the society which produced it. Since nearly every ethnic group has its own view of life--its own ethical and religious system--it is difficult, indeed dangerous, to attempt to generalize about African art. We can make some statements about the conditions in which art is found, but generalizations about the art itself are likely to be wrong.

We can assert, for example, that since African hunting societies migrate to follow their quarry, their homes are likely to be simple and their possessions few. Their homes are not likely to be decorated, and their domestic utensils will probably have only the simplest ornament; incised ostrich egg shell containers are used among the Bushmen, for example. Nevertheless, hunting communities do express their artistic impulses, usually on natural features, producing engravings on exposed rocks and paintings in cave shelters. Very probably these are made on occasions when the small bands of hunters collect together to form larger groups for religious or ceremonial purposes. Similar considerations apply also to pastoralists who, although they travel with their herds, were able to produce a large number of the fine Tassili paintings in the Sahara. Major achievements in art seem to depend on the regular return to such centers or else the permanent occupation of a village or town, which is usually possible only for agricultural communities.
The area in which wood sculpture is found in Africa probably corresponds roughly to the area of forest and woodland, not as these exist today, but as they extended in the past. The forested and wooded areas of Africa have been reduced in size by increasing desiccation of the climate over the last 4000 years and also by the hand of man in clearing the forest for his farms. Movements of people have further obscured any correspondence there may have been in the past, but wood sculpture is not likely to have arisen in an area where trees did not once grow.

Attempts have been made to contrast the arts of the rainforests and the dry savannas: it has been claimed, for example, that the peoples of the forest do not form large social groups—that they live in isolated communities in fear of the forest and each other, and that the continuous fight to keep their clearings from being encroached upon by the forest absorbs all their energy and depresses their spirits. In contrast, the peoples of the savanna built up empires (Ghana, Songhai, the Sokoto Empire) with state organizations, large and specialized administrative machinery, governing classes to patronize the artist, and public feasts and ceremonies to use his products.

This is a very imaginative picture, based not on observed facts, but rather on how a European might expect an African to react to his environment. The Pygmies of the Ituzi Forest (Congo-Kinshasa) whose life is quite arduous are some of the most happily disposed people in the world and look upon the forest as a friendly provider of food. Moreover, some of the most important of the city-states arose in the forests: Benin, Ijebu, and Ife, in Nigeria, for example. In any case, the savanna states of the Sudanic zone were not as centralized as many European scholars have imagined. The power of the savanna state authorities was over people as sources of labor rather than over land. Administration usually operated through family and village heads, whose authority derived from their role in the ancestor cult and their connection with the land. In addition, and of major importance, was the fact that many of these empires were based on Islam and thus discouraged or even prohibited the representational art though in many areas this survived as a means of serving the ancestors, not the court.
On the other hand, with regard to the rainforest zones, Griaule points out that

the Bambara, the Kurumba, and the Baga ... have certainly not founded states. But they have created certain institutions, like that of initiation which can develop ... an accumulation of material; in the life of art they play the role of a state by establishing rules which extend beyond narrow horizons and remain applicable, with some variations, to the larger districts. 

This concept of institutions as patrons of art is a valuable idea. One thinks at once of the Poro Society, best documented from Liberia, but influential also in Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Ivory Coast.

Margaret Trowell has made generalizations about African art which are quite different in scope. She distinguishes three types of art which she calls "spirit-regarding," "man-regarding," and "the art of ritual display." This classificatory device has the great merit of emphasizing the function of the art in the society which produced it, though any one society may produce sculpture which belongs in more than one category. The sculptures of the Dogon (Mali), both ancestor figures and masks, are clearly directed toward influencing the world of the spirits, whether of the ancestors or of the animals and trees around them; similarly the sculpture of the Kalabari Ijo (Nigeria) pays attention to the spirits rather than to man. Yet the Yoruba (Nigeria) have masked dances, the egungun, which are directed both at insuring that the ancestors will rest in peace and at entertaining the living. On the other hand, their house posts and sculptured doors on houses and in palaces are intended for the glorification of the house-owners, while similar carvings in shrines are for the honor of the spirits worshipped there.

Clearly then, we need to have detailed studies in the field before we can understand the sculpture of any one society. Such studies have frequently disproved many of the generalizations formulated by scholars working only in museums, and in so doing have often produced positive interpretations of an innovative character. It has been found, for example, that although sculpture in Africa is very commonly painted, the paint is often applied without any attention to the sculptural form. In the case
of Kalabari masks, Horton has discovered that the painting is not simply an embellishment of the sculpture, but is the means of effectively bringing the spirit to occupy the mask.19

A feature of African sculpture which intrigued scholars from the first is the fact that the head is almost invariably shown disproportionately large. For a long time this was thought to be a childlike characteristic due to the carver paying more attention to the details than to the over-all proportion. Field studies from many parts of Africa, however, have shown that sculptors begin by dividing up the block of wood very carefully into separate parts which will eventually be the head, body, and legs. In this way the proportions are deliberately established at the outset of the work and are not due to a lack of skill. One of first to observe this technique was a French doctor, Robert Hottot, traveling among the Teke on the lower Congo as early as 1906; unfortunately his most valuable observations were not published until after his death.20

There is a danger in studying African art of generalizing from data observed among one people as if they were typical of Africa as a whole. Scholars, however objective they may attempt to be, remain human beings, and their individual personalities will lead them each to investigate different phenomena. Consequently, we do not have a homogeneous collection of data covering the various peoples of the continent. One worker may have recorded certain artistic phenomena among one group of people, and similar observations elsewhere might demonstrate that the phenomena were widespread; but only too often the requisite substantiating observations have never been made. In consequence, books on African Art as a whole may tend to generalize from observations made among a single group of people as if these were typical of the entire continent.

The present need, and it is most urgent, is to fill such gaps in our knowledge, and in some cases these gaps are very wide indeed. Before we can make general statements about African art, we need far more information. A brief survey of some of the problems which have been studied will help to clarify our ideas of what still needs to be done.
SOME STUDIES IN AFRICAN ART:
THE FUNCTION OF ART

It has commonly been asserted that there is no "art for art's sake" in Africa and that all African art is religious. In Western society when art critics speak of "art for art's sake," they mean that the artist produces an object which is valued for itself—which does not attempt to instruct or edify—a product in which the artist is concerned exclusively with the solution of artistic problems of composition, color, or form. The content of the work of art is secondary to these considerations. The final product, however, does have an acquired social function—it may be used to decorate a room, for example, but may also be a status symbol.

This restricted attitude to art appears to be of recent origin. At one time all European art had a social purpose—whether to instruct the faithful, to edify the devout, or to commemorate the noble. Traditional African art similarly has its social purposes, but there are some products whose purpose is less clearly defined. The Fon of Dahomey, for example, make brass castings of animals and of people at work or in processions, which have no religious or didactic intent. They are made as objects of beauty by the brass-smith and in this respect are to be considered as examples of "art for art's sake." Yet they do have a social function which is entirely independent of the subject represented; since brass is regarded as a semi-precious metal, these castings are objects of prestige. Only the wealthy can afford to buy them, and they are displayed in the home both as objects of beauty and as status symbols.21

Similarly, it is not true that all African art is religious. Adrian Gerbrands has demonstrated this very clearly,22 using the documented pot lids collected by the Fathers Vissers among the Woyo of Cabinda, just north of the mouth of the Congo River. It is the custom among these people for the husband to eat separately from his wife. When the wife has a disagreement with her husband she covers his food with a wooden lid sculptured with figures which convey through the proverbial expressions they represent the suffixance of her dissatisfaction. (The wife chooses an
occasion when her husband in entertaining his friends, so that they, representing the community at large, can arbitrate.) She usually receives a number of these lids from her mother and mother-in-law when she marries, but if she does not possess one appropriate to her problem, she has one made.

The lids vary in complexity. One shows a round pot supported on three stones. With fewer than three stones, the pot would fall over; hence, it signifies the proverb: "All good things come in threes" (that is, a husband must give his wife clothes; a wife must cook for her husband; there must be children). This lid, therefore, is a general indication that there is something lacking in the marriage. The husband himself will know what.

In some cases the lid is decorated with a large number of objects including audio-visual puns: such as the *conus* shell, called *neosse*, which sounds like a sucked-in sound of annoyance, and means, "I am angry and am going to tell you why"; or another shell called *zinga*, a word which also means "life," hence family life and harmony, and so conveys the exhortation to "live in harmony with your family." Clearly this is purely secular art.

Nevertheless, although there are other examples of secular art, it is true that a great deal of African art has a religious purpose. At the same time, however, even within the field of religious sculpture, there are a great variety of practices. It is usual for the act of carving itself to be hedged around with rituals, since the tree which provides the wood is generally regarded as the home of a spirit which needs to be placated. In the case of sculptures which are to provide a home for a spirit, such as the masks and ancestor figures of the Dogon, it is easy to see that a conflict between the two spirits inhabiting the wood must be avoided. But where no later spirit occupation is involved, as in Yoruba drums, and even in the case of secular objects such as stools, the spirit of the tree nonetheless has to be propitiated.

It sometimes comes as a surprise to find that, despite the investment of religious meanings, old carvings are commonly neglected. This is especially true of masks which in use are thought to be occupied by the spirit only
during the ceremonies; but it applies also to fetish figures, in which the "medicine," or magical substance, houses the spirit power, and so by removing this medicine, the figure can be deconsecrated.

THE MASK AS AN EXAMPLE OF ART IN CONTEXT:
STUDIES AMONG THE KALABARI AND THE DAN

There is a serious disproportion between the small number of field studies of African art and the large amount of African sculpture in collections. Few people interested in African sculpture see it in use and so form their impressions from museum displays. A museum will usually possess only the wooden part of a mask, and this may be displayed under a spotlight which projects a single interpretation onto the sculpture. To appreciate the carving as it was conceived by the artist, we need to see it in movement, possibly above eye-level, and perhaps illuminated by the intermittent light of torches. Moreover, to isolate the mask is to take it from its meaningful context. Often the mask itself is only part of a costume, and it does not come to life until the costume is worn—with the music and dancing the mask becomes inhabited by the spirit. Indeed, there are many ceremonies in which costumes are worn which hide the face but which do not employ sculptured masks at all (as in some Yoruba egungun ceremonies) and others in which the dancer's face is painted but no mask is worn (as among the Kossi of Guinea and Sierra Leone); yet the total effect is similar to that of the masked dances.

It is surprising, too, to find that many African masks are not seen at all when they are in use. Robin Horton, describing the sculpture of the Kalabari, has shown that many of their masks (such as the Otobo masks which represent a water spirit with human and hippopotomus features) are worn on top of the dancer's head so that the main features of the sculpture are facing the sky, and the mask as a whole is hidden from the eyes of the spectators by a ruff. The whole masquerade is directed toward the spirit, not toward the spectator—an excellent example of Margaret Trowell's class of "spirit-regarding art."
Horton's study has exploded a number of myths about African art. Because we look upon sculptures as objects of beauty, we imagine that the works are regarded as beautiful by their makers and users. Yet the Kalabari view their sculptures with apathy or distaste; even when the spirit is being invoked, the mask itself does not attract admiration. The sculpture in fact may evoke repulsion; a man's ugliness will be compared to a spirit sculpture, or even to "the sculpture of a god by one who does not know how to carve." Moreover pregnant women are advised not to look at sculptures "lest their children acquire its big eyes and long nose, and so turn out ugly." The Kalabari, in fact, often keep sculptures of spirits in dark shrines which people may not enter and cannot see into. In one case, even the priest does not see the sculpture, which is hidden behind a screen of skulls.

In contrast, however, the Kalabari ancestor memorial screens are intended to be seen. These screens are of interest, too, in that they constitute another exception to the generally accepted idea that African sculpture is subtractive (carved out of a single block of wood), for these are additive (that is, carved in sections and fitted together).

This carpentry may reflect European influence resulting from the slave and palm oil trade in the Niger Delta. The screens seem to have originated as a form in the eighteenth century, and perhaps were modeled on the rectangular bronze plaques at Benin, which in turn seem to have been originally inspired by European woodcuts in books.

And not all Kalabari masks are hidden from view. The central character of the Ngbula play, for example, is a native doctor whose ugliness, which is emphasized in the headpiece, helps him to drive away evil spirits. Horton points out, however, that the Kalabari do not possess any masks which represent beauty (in contrast to the Ibo who have pairs of masks representing ugliness—the elephant spirit—and beauty—the maiden spirit).

Examples of African sculpture exhibited in museums are commonly considered representative of the style of the people from whom they were collected. This is an oversimplification; for, whereas it is true that many sculptural styles have a distribution which limits them to one small area, some styles are distributed far more widely. Sometimes a mask is
acquired by trade from another area—Ibibio masks carved at Ikot Ekpene in Southeastern Nigeria are commonly used by unrelated peoples on the west side of the Niger River. At other times, a single group of people will use different styles of sculpture for different purposes, as when a mask-using cult has been introduced from an adjacent area or where there are localized cults with markedly different styles, as among the Bembe of the eastern Congo.28 The same ethnic or religious society may use a variety of styles of masks in different areas, as in the Poro Society mentioned above, an example of an institution which encourages the production of art for ceremonal purposes. Among the Dan of Ivory Coast, the Poro Society uses the traditional masks of the ancestor cult which are very smooth and sleek in form; whereas, in contrast, among the neighboring Ngere Poro masks are highly cubistic in style and usually only roughly finished. Moreover, it has been shown that both these styles may be carved by the same individual artist.29

In use the Dan masks vary in ranking and function, but this differentiation is not related to their appearance. For the Dan, the mask is a channel of communication between men and the high God, Zlan; but the real intermediaries are the spirits of the ancestors who are invoked through the mask. The power of the mask is reflected by the social prestige of the owner. A man can reach prominence only with the help of the ancestors; his very success then, demonstrates that the ancestors favor him. An inherited mask retains its power over the ancestors, and the more prestigious the owner was was in life, the more powerful he will be as an ancestor. Similarly, old masks which span several generations are considered especially powerful. The prestige of a mask is thus an acquired characteristic which cannot be deduced from its appearance; to understand and interpret and individual mask, the appropriate history must be collected in the field.

Again, masks of identical appearance may have quite different functions, and these too are classified into categories of higher and lower rank. The use of the mask among the Dan is regulated by the godmaster, the priest of go, the highest imaginable power. In his hut is the
powerful fetish which is the source of his power, as well as the actual presence of the ancestors, for prominent people are buried in the hut and their masks are kept there. These masks are of the highest rank, followed by sacrificial masks on which heads of families sacrifice to their ancestors. Next come avenging masks, who act as police and judiciary combined; these sometimes act independently of the go-master, thus forcing him to employ one of his highest ranking masks in order to maintain his authority. Other high-ranking masks include those used in initiation, not only to teach the initiates, but also to entertain those who have remained behind in the village. On the edges of the forest and savanna, surrounding the village, are the sagbwe masks which have their own hierarchy; their task is to protect the village, especially from fire—a major hazard. The lower status categories of masks are described as dancing, singing, begging, and palaver, and are mainly intended to entertain. They often teach as well, and frequently fear of the supernatural can be detected in their audiences.

Masks can move up these hierarchies—usually on the death of their owner if he has achieved eminence in his lifetime. Thus, there is no correlation between the rank or function and the form of a mask. Masks may also be demoted if they are damaged, for they have to be beautiful in order to please the ancestors. Formerly, damaged masks were thrown away but now they are often retrieved and sold to Europeans; this is why so many of the specimens in European museums are inadequately documented.

AFRICAN AESTHETICS

A number of important studies of African art have been based on the Dan and related groups, the most recent being that of Fischer who worked closely with four sculptors, Tame, Si, Tompieme, and Son, studying their individual development. He has shown, for example, that although they use similar tools, they use them in different ways, and that these techniques change with time even for the individual artist, just as his style changes. Several observers have remarked that the Dan carver will often work voluntarily, inspired, for example, by a beautiful face; but they do not attempt to represent faithfully what they have seen. Si expressed the attitude well in criticizing a spoon carved by Tompieme to represent his daughter's
"That isn't carved, it's a photograph," he said; "some abstraction from reality is necessary in a work of art."

Such observations have rarely been recorded. It has usually been assumed that there was no vocabulary in African languages to permit aesthetics to be studied. The first aesthetic studies were experiments in ranking groups of sculptures. More recently Robert F. Thompson solicited criticisms of a number of sculptures from Yoruba informants. He recorded their comments fully and then analyzed the frequency with which reference was made to various criteria. He found that moderate resemblance is of primary importance—that is, the sculpture should look like a man, woman, animal, or whatever—but the degree of resemblance has to be somewhere in the middle between exact portrayal and abstraction. Balanced visibility is also sought—an evenness of sculptural emphasis so that no one part of the sculpture stands out more than another. The surface of the sculpture is expected to be smoothly finished. Symmetry is also expected, though a slight degree of asymmetry, as in the turn of a baby's head in a mother and child figure, is acceptable. Human beings are also expected to be portrayed in their prime. Facial expression is expected to be one of composure ("coolness" is the Yoruba word). These criteria were established by informal discussions of works of art, not by direct questioning; they appear to be valid criteria. It is interesting to compare them with any good description of Yoruba sculpture and to note that some have been remarked upon by sensitive Western observers: the moderate naturalism has always been pointed out; the careful finish has been observed but not always mentioned; symmetry of pose is generally regarded as a basic African characteristic, as is the portrayal of human beings in their prime. Balanced visibility and composure of expression seem not to have been expressly remarked upon, yet these characteristics are obviously there to be seen in all good Yoruba sculpture. The judgment of sympathetic American or European observers, such as curators of collections of African art, of what is good and bad in Yoruba sculpture would probably agree with the judgment of the Yoruba themselves, even without knowing the criteria which Thompson has demonstrated. Yet without
the demonstration of these criteria by field research, we would not have been justified in inferring them. In later fieldwork Thompson has been able to show that the concept of "coolness" is admired in the other arts as well and is a reflection of a moral ideal. Armed with these criteria, the Western critic is able to check his own intuitive judgments of Yoruba sculpture by reference to the qualities the artist was seeking.

Thompson's analysis should not mislead us into thinking that Western sensitivity will produce judgments in all works of African art which will coincide with the aesthetic standards of their makers. Among the Lega (eastern Congo-Kinshasa), for example, Biebuyck found that all the traditional sculptures used by the Bwami Society in their rituals were judged to be "good," by which was meant that they fulfilled their functions. "Criticism of their appearance is inconceivable." As a result, celluloid dolls obtained by trade and used in the ritual enjoy equal regard with the traditional sculptures in ivory and wood. This is surprising because the traditional objects served to demonstrate membership in the prestigious association and only initiated members could possess them; moreover, each traditional carving used in the ritual is associated with a proverb which expresses the ideal of moral beauty to which initiates aspire. It seems strange that objects which are presumably inexpensive and easily obtained should be accepted for use in this relatively exclusive society. Biebuyck observed that the possession of large numbers of the traditional objects reflected great prestige for the owner; for in order to acquire them he must have taken part in many rituals, and he must have served as head of the funerary ceremonies of other high-grade members since the objects are acquired chiefly by inheritance. It is this very fact, however, which explains the acceptance of the foreign artifact, for the numbers alone are what matter; the quality and age of the pieces are of no importance.

ARTISTIC INDIVIDUALITY AND ART HISTORY

One of the most interesting aspects of the study of African art in recent years has been the demonstration that the African artist is an individual. Most of this work has been done in Nigeria, where Kenneth Murray's pioneering
work is recorded in the files of the Department of Antiquities. William Fagg's work among the Yoruba has already been mentioned, and Sieber's work in Northern Nigeria is also noteworthy. One of the first individual artists to be recognized, however, was the master of Buli, a Luba district in the southern Congo, whose work was identified by Olbrechts. A recent study by Willett and Picton has attempted to establish the criteria by which the work of individual sculptors may be identified in a society in which the apprentice works with the master in major works. This is a problem familiar to the historians of European medieval art, and it demonstrates again that African art is art and can be studied in just the same way as any other art. The serious study of African art is still young, but despite this, rapid progress has been made in some aspects of the work. In 1950, Griaule was able to write

"It is hardly possible... to envisage the evolution of this art. Our knowledge is too fragmentary: that is to say that we shall not speak of historical art, where the data are non-existent." Less than two decades later, there is a substantial and growing literature dealing with the history of sculpture, especially in West Africa; and, thanks to the techniques of archaeology and of radiocarbon dating, we can already sketch the outline of the succession of artistic styles even though the precise details of connections remain obscure.

On sites at Taruga and Nok (Northern Nigeria) we have radiocarbon dates of 280 B.C. + 120 (I-1457) and A.D. 207 + 50 (Y-474) from deposits which contain the oldest known sculptures from Africa south of the Sahara. These Nok figures are highly sophisticated in style and are worked in terracotta. They are now commonly thought to be ancestral in some way to the naturalistic sculptures of Ife, which are found in brass as well as in terracotta. Ife sculptures in brass have not yet been recovered by archaeological excavation, but terracotta sculptures excavated in 1963 were found to have been already broken and collapsed in buildings which were occupied about A.D. 1060 + 130 (B.M.-262). Stylistic studies in Ife have shown the development of this art into the modern Yoruba style. Oral traditions as well as stylistic studies have demonstrated that the Benin bronzes also derive from the Ife tradition; their evolution has been well demonstrated by William Fagg.
Another remarkable style of bronze casting is represented by finds made at Igbo Ukwu in southeastern Nigeria. Radiocarbon dates from different parts of this site are A.D. 840 ± 145 (I-1784) and A.D. 850 ± 120 (I-2008), much earlier than had been considered possible. The mound at Daima in the extreme northeast of Nigeria has furnished evidence of the evolution of culture from a late stone age through to recent times. In these deposits there are simple sculptures in terracotta whose evolution is currently being studied and dated by radiocarbon. The results of the study should throw light on the evolution of "Sao" terracottas found in Chad by Lebeuf, for which only two radiocarbon dates have so far been published: A.D. 1700 ± 90 (Gsy-92) and A.D. 1785 ± 100 (Gsy-93). The sculptures at Daima begin earlier than a level dated A.D. 450 ± 670 (I-2371) and A.D. 480 ± 270 (I-2370) and continue much later.

A much neglected field in art history is the study of architectural history. The archaeologist will have an increasingly important role to play in recovering plans of buildings and evidence for dating. At present, the study of the Zimbabwe complex (Rhodesia) is the outstanding example of a published study of this type, though clearly there will be others. That the data need not be restricted to stone buildings has been demonstrated by the excavation of mud walls at Benin.

Other points of growth for the future study of African art will clearly center on studies of individual artists, their training, and the development of their style. The uses and meanings of art in the society also need much more explanation. Horton's work on the Kalabari has recorded a great deal of their iconology, as has Bastin's work on Chokwe art. At the moment such works are quite exceptional. And of course we need to know more about the standards of assessment of art in different societies. That these problems be studied in the field is a most urgent need as the traditional arts are being eroded away by changes in the societies which produce them.
Traditional African art is subject to change due to a number of influences originating outside the continent. One of the oldest of these is Islam. Islamic religion and cultural patterns have been so firmly established in North Africa, the northern parts of West Africa, the Horn and along the East Coast that they can be regarded almost as a traditional way of life in these areas. At the same time, in many respects, these areas belong with the Islamic world as a whole. This is especially true of their art, for Islam discourages the representation of nature and encourages instead elaborate ornamental designs. As early as the eleventh century the area from the Senegal River northwards and into Spain fell within the Almoravid Empire; and although this rule collapsed in the following century we find no representational art in this area. The conversion to Islam, however, was not always total. The conversion of the Nupe (Nigeria), for example, probably began some centuries ago and was considered complete by the early nineteenth century, yet some pre-Islamic cults are still practicing among the Nupe. A number of their masks were collected in Mokwa in 1911. In general, however, most Nupe art of the present day consists of strictly non-representational ornament—for example the decoration on sculptured doors and stools and on embossed and repoussé brass and silver work.

Christianity, too, has long been an influence in Africa. Coptic Christianity in Egypt and Ethiopia goes back almost to the time of Christ. Nubia was Christian from the sixth century until the early seventeenth century when it was finally converted to Islam. What ideas and artistic motifs may have been transmitted to the peoples of West Africa, we do not yet know. Sporadic attempts at proselytization were made by European missionaries on the West coast of Africa from the fifteenth century onwards, the most substantial result of which was the establishment of the Portuguese-speaking Christian kingdom of Kongo. This kingdom reached its height in the first half of the sixteenth century (a Bakongo bishop was ordained as early as 1521). However, there was a war with Portugal in 1665, after which
Christianity was rejected by the Kongo people. The Christian period, is commemorated in a crude series of cave paintings at Mbafu (Congo-Kinshasa), and the emphatic naturalism of sculpture in the lower Congo area may well be due to European influence.

Christian missionaries in general, even up to the present day, have been culpably ignorant of indigenous African religions. In attempting to undermine these religions, they have attacked the sculptures which gave expression to spiritual ideas in the often mistaken belief that these were idols and the object of worship. There have also been iconoclastic movements of a non-Christian type—the Atinga cult, for example, in 1951, was responsible for the destruction of sculptures on a massive scale throughout southwestern Yorubaland in its attempt to root out witchcraft and sorcery. Fortunately ecumenism is overtaking these parochial attitudes. A pioneering effort was made by a group of Society of African Missions (S.M.A.) fathers in Nigeria who established at Oye Ekiti a center for craftsmen who employed traditional forms of sculpture, weaving, embroidery, leatherwork, and beadwork to help in the worship of the Christian God. The scheme was closed down after a few experimental years, but Father Kevin Carroll was able to continue privately to encourage a number of sculptors, who, although not necessarily Christian themselves, were told stories from the Bible and carved them on doors, screens, and sedilia for a number of churches. The visual representation of these stories correspond to the sculptures, paintings, and stained glass in the European churches of the Middle Ages which served both to inspire Christian sentiments in the worshippers and to instruct those members of the congregation who could not read. Father Carroll has described this work himself. The plates in his book show that the traditional sculptural forms are well able to convey the ideas of the new religion. Yet, there is a close association between traditional forms of sculpture and traditional religions; and as Christianity or secular humanism replace traditional beliefs, this sculpture tends to decline and die out. Father Carroll's work affords a real hope of replacing the religious basis for art and resuscitating the traditional art before it dies completely.
There are other influences which are also undermining the traditional bases of sculpture in African societies. The migration of young men to the towns takes away many of the candidates for initiation, and thus reduces the demand for ritual art. The increasing interest in African art throughout Europe and America has resulted in certain able and well-known artists being overworked, to the detriment of their art. Easier transportation has also led to the development of a souvenir trade, the products of which are sometimes known as "airport art." These carvings, often in ebony (which seems never to have been carved in Africa before the death of Queen Victoria's consort, Prince Albert, gave a filip in England to all things black) bear slight resemblances to traditional forms and are carved with European tools to fulfill the European's stereotypes of African art. Identical pieces can be bought at any international airport in Africa. If the term "art" implies an individual creation by the artist, then airport art is non-art.

The European demand for African sculpture has not always been so debasing in its effects. The Afro-Portuguese ivories, made in the sixteenth century to suit European taste without doing too much violence to traditional form, are of high artistic quality. Most of them seem to have been made at Sherbro off the coast of Sierra Leone.55

Western education is also influencing the work of African artists. Since the colonial period, artistically talented people have been drawn into the European educational system; and if they have cultivated their gifts, it has been along European lines. "Modern" (as opposed to "traditional") African artists have been trained as Western artists; many of them see the traditional art of their own society from outside rather than from within. They no longer subscribe to the religious beliefs which gave meaning to the art of their ancestors and so see the external forms of the traditional sculptures, but may not be any closer to grasping the inner meaning than were Derain, Vlamink, or Picasso who saw African art simply as new interpretations of natural forms.
The wheel has come full circle. Modern art was liberated from nineteenth-century naturalism by the example of African and other non-European art forms--now African artists are being absorbed into the cosmopolitan world of modern art, which seems, as a result of the modern media of communication, to have lost regional distinctions. This offers a new hope for mutual understanding; but perhaps equally important, the study of traditional African art may provide the newly independent states with their best hope of acceptance and understanding by the world at large--a world which already recognizes African art as part of the heritage of the whole of mankind.

NOTES


7. See for example W. B. Fagg in The Artist, ed. by Smith, pl. XV and pp. 119-20.


17. Mostly conveniently described in Griaule, *Folk Art*.


19. Ibid., p. 21


27. Illustrated, for example, in Fagg, Nigerian Images, pls. 118, 119.


29. Reported and illustrated in Gerbrands, Art as an Element of Culture pp. 89-90.

30. These observations, based on Vandenhoute's work among the Dan, are derived from Gerbrands, ibid.


33. Gerbrands, Art as an Element of Culture, reports the experiments of Himmelheber and Vandenhoute, pp. 67-93.


35. D. Biebuyck, Individual Creativity.


38. Olbrechts, Plastiek van Kongo. Since then, more pieces by the same hand have been discovered; see, for example, Olbrechts, "La Statuaire du Congo Belge" ("Statues from the Belgian Congo"), Les Arts Plastiques (Brussels, 1951), fig. 3.


42. Radiocarbon dates are expressed with a standard deviation which shows not the absolute range of possible dates, but the limits within which there is a two to one chance that the true date lies. Doubling the standard deviation increases the probability to nineteen to one, while trebling it makes the chance 997 to 3--almost certainty. The number quoted in brackets is the laboratory reference number which serves to identify the particular sample which furnished the date. For an account of the technique involved, see W. F. Libby, Radiocarbon Dating (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955). A shorter account, especially helpful to the non-specialist, is H. Barker, "Radio Carbon Dating: Its Scope and Limitations," Antiquity, XXXII (December, 1958), 253-63.


Although the layman usually uses the term in referring to a single building, architecture refers to a diversity of structures, from rudimentary shelters to civic centers. In this essay, we will use the terms "architecture" and "urban design." There was a time when these subjects would have come under the heading of "material culture": materials, techniques of building, and forms of individual houses were included with pottery, tools, and baskets. Yet, rare was the field worker who saw in forms and materials the relationship of an individual building to its larger complex (such as a compound or village), which may be a graphic reflection of the social institutions, political hierarchy, and even the world view of a people. Just as kinship terms can reveal the unseen structure of a society, so can architecture and urban design give physical evidence of the social organization and belief systems of a people. The environment can to some extent dictate both material and form, but the process of selection by which man arranges these elements may reveal much of the tenacity of belief and the culture base of taste.

Since urban design has been included here with architecture, the manner in which this term is used should be delineated. Design, or architectural design, is the process of relating a building to other buildings. In Africa, as elsewhere, architectural design reflects family structure and political institutions. This relationship can be appreciated by watching the flow of human beings through their physical environment and observing the use they make of it. The rationales regarding space between buildings,
freestanding walls, and location of trees, grass, or bush are of great importance. The formation and containment of open space, either as pathways or roads for commerce and trade, or for ceremonial occasions, falls within the broader aspects of what will be called urban design, or city planning. The pleasure human beings derive not only from color and form in art but from the arrangement of objects as well applies equally to the individual art form and to the design of towns and villages. The component parts of this over-all arrangement—a chief's larger home, a market, a sacred grove, a dance space, and converging paths—seem disparate until the invisible social order, the group's perception of the supernatural, and the nature of feasts, dances and public ceremonies, plus the flow and massing of human bodies at given areas, change the components into a total stage where actors give meaning to the props.

Urban environments in Africa, whether hamlets, or villages, or cities, essentially differ only in complexity, much as in nature: the basic pattern and material of cells remain the same, whether the cells which combine to form an organism are one or millions. So it is with the multiplication of the individual house, first within the compound or kraal, then the quarter or hamlet, and finally the larger village and city. Even Ibadan (Nigeria)—the largest traditional Black African city, with a modern population of almost one million—the whole is but a complex arrangement in five quarters of the individual ile teme (household), with the same wandering alleys to be found in any Yoruba hamlet or village.

THE EARLY EVOLUTION OF SHELTER FORMS

Shelters erected by man have gone through a long evolution. Nevertheless, the basic needs of protection from the elements, comfort and security when sleeping, concealment of pregnant females and the young, and defense against natural enemies or human rivals have remained essentially the same since the dawn of human history. The forms of shelters, however, vary with ecological conditions and technological development as well as with social organization.
The physical evidence we have of early man in Africa points to the development of physical characteristics which facilitated upright gait over long distances. It is likely then that early man was able to move in families or bands over considerable distances in search of food and safety, and was probably not, as has been thought, a constant cave-dweller. More likely early man in Africa used the plentiful trees and grasses of the great savanna grazing lands to make his campsites comfortable and to afford protection from sun and rain alike. It is only in the past few years, however, that any material evidence of the existence of very early shelters in Africa has been discovered. Even in the neolithic villages in the West African Sudan no evidence remains of the type of shelters built, although traces of stone hearths indicate that early man in this area dwelled in nucleated sets of households. Very little of the vegetative matter which probably made up most of the early shelters would survive, however, due to the rapid rate of organic decay characteristic of the tropical environment.

Between 5000 B.C. and 2500 B.C., during the Makalian "wet phase" of the Pleistocene period, the Sahara was not a desert. In fact, rich grasses, rivers, and trees drew game animals and peoples with cattle into this huge region. Evidence of many hundreds of years of occupancy is found on the overhanging rock walls of the Massif of Tassili in the central Sahara where polychrome drawings of great naturalism and technical virtuosity record the hunting, gathering, and herding life of this early population. Observations on the supernatural and deities, the passing of men with chariots and horses, and what appears to be an early form of abstract writing which is not hieroglyphic are also recorded on the rock walls. As the Saharan region passed into a drying phase, ultimately producing the extreme arid condition we know today, these peoples moved to the north and to the south and east to challenge Egyptian peoples for their fertile lands.

The peoples of the Sahara could not have carried a large amount of portable material culture with them, but they did have knowledge of cattle-herding and some technology. That which they carried in their minds, vital to the survival of themselves and their descendants, was the capacity
for social organization and cooperation, without which there would not have been enough food for all. These skills probably contributed to the growth of the complex cultures and the great kingdoms which arose at various times from the Atlantic to Lake Chad and from the Sahara to the Guinea Coast.

A test of the social strength which bound these communities came centuries after the first settlements when population pressures pushed peoples further southward into the more humid areas fringing the Guinea Coast. Those who went south, carrying with them their tools and cattle, met the invisible barrier of tsetse fly, carrier of sleeping sickness, through which only a trickle of the livestock could pass. The beginnings of the forest settlements owe much to this invisible wall which kept cattle herders confined to the northern open grasslands.

KUSH AND AXUM

A theme in urban development which occurred simultaneously with the expansion south of Sudanic peoples, was the development of architectural monuments and urban technology by the Kushites, the "Black Pharaoahs" of Egypt.

Our knowledge of the earliest known kingdoms of Black Africa, Kush and Axum, has only been accumulated in the past fifty years. During this period archeologists have uncovered the physical culture of Kush, between the third and fourth cataracts of the Upper Nile, and of Axum in the mountains of Ethiopia. It was the great scope of the architecture in these areas that confirmed the existence of kingdoms of which there was only the barest mention in the writings of Greek and other Mediterranean historians.

The peoples of Nubia, the large region straddling the Nile in what is today the northern Sudan and southern Egypt, were of the same basic farming stock that produced the Egyptian culture further north. But in Nubia, which remained in closer contact with peoples of the Sudanic belt, portraits in various art forms are found clearly portraying the Nubians as dark-skinned. For about two thousand years these people lived in close relationship to the Egyptians, often under their domination. But in 725 B.C. they invaded the north and for a period, became the "Black Pharaoahs" of Egypt. After
666 B.C., however, the Nubians retreated to their original homeland, where their culture became less imitative of Egypt and more distinctly indigenous.

The iron weapons of the Assyrians that had vanquished the Egyptians in the Delta wars forced a reassessment of metal technology by the Egyptians. Although iron had been known in the Middle East for over a thousand years, the Egyptians were late to exploit its potential. It was the Kushites of Nubia who seized the initiative in iron production; and in the period that followed the peoples of Kush were among the greatest smelters of ore in the known world. They moved their capital from Napata south to Merowe, not only to be further from Egypt, but, it is suspected, to be close to the ore fields found in that area. By 100 B.C., Merowe was a metropolis of palaces, temples, markets, and a center for industrial production of iron. Its architecture of public buildings, initially borrowed from the Egyptians reached a point where it had a distinctly "African" feeling, constantly enriched by the influx of peoples from the Sahara. The last of these immigrants, the Noba, settled peaceably beside the Kushite Nubians, and their straw towns rose beside the stone cities of the Kushites.

The kingdom of Axum developed to the south of Kush in the mountains of Abyssinia (now Ethiopia). Axum was founded, it was said, by the son of the Queen of Sheba--whose black beauty was famous--and King Solomon of the Twelve Tribes of Israel. Middle Eastern culture traits existed within this black kingdom, for Axum had developed strong trade links to the north with peoples such as the Kushites, the Romans (in Egypt), and the Greeks.

Axum extended its influence along the Red Sea coast and further into the interior of present-day Ethiopia, while trading cities developed in conjunction with the equally expansive cultures of southern Arabia. After the fourth century B.C., however, the Arab contact was supplanted by Greek influence from the north. At the same time, Egypt shifted its focus of trade to India and the Far East and made use of the Red Sea port of Adulis, whose hinterland contained the great city of Axum. The Greek Coptic culture of Egypt thus strongly influenced the peoples of the Ethiopian (or Axumite) interior.
The people of Kush and Axum had long had peaceful trade relations and Axum traders went north to deal with Romans, Greeks, and Egyptians. The continued immigration of the Noba from the Sahara into the area between Kush and Axum created a tension, however, which finally provoked the Axumites to war. During the fourth century A.D., Ezana, the King of Ethiopia invaded Nubia and fought the Noba northward, pursuing them into the heart of the Merowe territory, burning cities of straw and razing the Kushite cities of stone. Kush was never to recover. The place of the Kushite retreat, or the fate of her kings, is not known. Kushite cultural influence was long felt to the west and south, however, and recent finds of Nubian ware in the Sahara and Sudan, as well as cultural evidence found in many West African societies, has suggested to scholars an important unchronicled migration.

It is generally thought that Ezana of Ethiopia, or his successor, was converted to Coptic Christianity. In Axum, Christianity became so strong that it served to separate that population from the neighboring ethnic groups, who remained pagan, or later became Muslim. Thus, the Ethiopian, or more properly "Amharic," civilization, with its unique interpretation of architecture and art influenced by Coptic Christianity, developed in isolation. Among churches built in Axum are those with the floor plan of the cross sculptured down into massive rock. The powerful religious devotion evident in the laborious construction of these churches, palaces, and stelae is perhaps symbolic of the lonely status of the Ethiopian church in Africa surrounded by Muslim and animist peoples. Not until the "discovery" of Ethiopia by Portuguese navigators in the sixteenth century--after the introduction of Christianity--did the Ethiopian church make direct contact with the Christian community of Europe.

COASTAL AND INTERIOR EAST AFRICA

Adulis was one of the first of the great trading cities of East Africa, but many were to follow in the same tradition. City-states grew all along the Indian Ocean Coast of East Africa. Kilwa, Mafiz, Zanzibar, and Mogadishu,
to name a few, became African cities trading with most of the periphery of the Indian Ocean and obtaining goods from as far away as China. The coast architecture built by Africans is reminiscent of Arabian and Indian architecture, yet at the same time maintains a distinctly local mode of construction. The material used for mosques, palaces, and markets was carved coral block with rough coral and stone fill also used to make massive sea walls. Further inland, however, at Zimbabwe (the capital and trading center of a large state located in what is present-day Rhodesia) much of the construction is of dressed stone block used in bricklike forms. At first this block dressing appears to have been a gargantuan task, but examination of the surrounding area reveals outcroppings of layered rock, consisting of aged, weathered material, which can be fractured into conveniently handled rectangular forms, much like the stone of the Cotswolds in southwest England.

The nineteenth century Europeans who encountered the cattle-herders and mixed agriculturalists in the interior of East Africa had no inkling of the centuries of trade in gold, copper, and ivory with the Indian Ocean civilizations, and no indication that they were looking at the descendants of peoples who had built the mysterious walls, forts, and palaces which they attributed to some vanished super-race, or peoples whom, they speculated, must have been European or Arab.

With the prevalence of nomadic pastoralism and shifting agriculture, the interior peoples of East Africa produced an architecture of simplicity and importance. Larger scale societies, with a full set of hierarchical classes and centralized political institutions were found in the Great Lakes region, particularly north and east of Lake Victoria. Some, like the Baganda (of what is now Uganda), were able to maintain a permanently settled existence based upon plantain agriculture in this relatively well-watered region. The Baganda are also responsible for the construction of rounded larger houses of grass whose trimmed eaves produced a structured and distinctive architectural form. The relation of space, form, and function in the grass dwellings is rivaled only by the grass palaces of the Bamenda and Bamum in Cameroon, where intricately carved houseposts and lintels
contrast beautifully with the golden grass-stalk bundles beside them in the wall and roof construction.

As in any society, there were builders who, no matter how impermanent the materials of wood and grass used in making homes, took pride in the appearance and in the aesthetic creativity of a house made to the perfection of the building technique. Often, the care and virtuosity of a builder went beyond mundane utility in a structure to produce a universalistic prototype of architectural form.

WEST AFRICA AND THE CONGO BASIN

West Africa was the site of large-scale empires and trading states stretching throughout the Sudanic belt and into the forest zone. Much of this area formed part of the vast trans-Saharan trading system, linking West Africa with the Mediterranean coast, while an additional zone of external contact existed along the Sudanic belt eastward to the Nile Valley. From these external contacts came many forces—particularly those associated with the spread of Islam—which influenced the architecture and urban design of the region.

In the large urban centers, influenced by trade and Islam, such as Timbuktu (Mali) and Kano (Nigeria), the construction of buildings followed the form of North African and Middle Eastern houses—rectangular shape, sometimes two stories, built with mud, and reinforced by tree branches and brush in certain areas. The flat roofs with their low parapets are typical of hot, dry climates where in the cool evening family members can use the airy roof terraces. The heat of the day is kept out by the thickness of mud walls. The palaces and mosques, though ambitiously large, had an "African" interpretation characterized by strength and simplification of design.

The African craftsmen who supervised such building, adapted a concept of Arabic design—one using surface tiles and delicate perforated tracery—as used in the Mediterranean area to a concept which echoed a design of a sculpture style found in West Africa from the Benue River to the forests of Sierra Leone. This particular style uses stark planes and angles so that
there is a strong play of shadow and light from projections and hollows so that the design is far more powerful in effect than one with smooth forms and low surface decoration. When this concept is carried over into architectural construction, the effect of strong highlights and shadows over the surface of the general form of the building gives a sculptural quality that makes the West African adaptation of Islamic architecture a reflection of the total style of all West African art.

It must be remembered, however, that in the vast areas between the walled cities of West Africa, there were myriads of small villages and hamlets of Africans who hunted and farmed. They spoke only their indigenous tongues and writing was an unknown art. The dwellings of these peoples varied in material from mud reinforced with branches of wood, to mud and thatch, wattle and thatch, and woven basketry and thatch. The traditions and forms of buildings were often based on beliefs in the supernatural so real in the physical world that to vary a floor plan or reorient a house in another direction would risk the wrath of ancestors and deities alike. Everywhere there was an attention to detail, both in technical use of materials and in aesthetic decoration, that is found only where time and available free labor make it possible.

Not all architectural design of West Africa, however, is either an adaptation of North African Islamic patterns or the indigenous mud and thatch forms described above. Certainly, material and social needs have combined in other traditions to provide monumental buildings of enduring beauty. One example of this is the storage towers of the non-Muslim Dogon of Mali. These towers are three stories in height with stone and mud-mortar construction. Some are rectangular, resembling houses made by cliff-dwellers of the southwest United States, while others are conical. The precision of their construction and the over-all effect of clusters of many of them in conjunction with houses of the same style, but varying in shape, is impressive taken in context.

Another example is the old palace of the Oni of Ife (Nigeria) which was still extant in 1912. The outer walls of the palace were constructed of terracotta brick, with gate posts at the entrance containing bricks on
which there were patterns and designs, some of which were of animals and humans. The first-hand accounts we have of the palace describe its walls as weathered and broken, in bad shape and poor repair, but apparently made of fired clay and representative of a technique known and used in funerary figures by the Yoruba people of Ife for centuries.

Though stones covered with mud have been used in West Africa, the most common building material is clay, whether for round or rectangular houses. The technique of clay building consists of digging a trench of about one and a half to two feet deep, and as wide as the width of wall desired, usually eighteen inches. Dry clay is then pounded into small lumps, mixed with water, and dumped into the trench, where it is tamped down by the end of a log. About every eighteen inches in height, the wall is allowed to dry, then the next layer of mud is applied on top. The ridged roof with eaves is made from bamboo stalks laid at right angles to each other with interstices varying from four to six inches apart. Over the roof frame are laid bundles of thatch or dried wide-leaved plants. In more recent times a few bamboo poles support the fire-resistant corrugated iron roofs, which, without the insulation of palm ribs and mud laid on top of interior walls, make the houses very hot after midday.

Variations of architectural and urban design within the vast Congo Basin runs the gamut from clay construction all the way to exquisitely woven mat walls. Among the Bakuba (Congo-Kinshasa), the entire area between the frame of the house has woven walls that are part of the construction of the house. The attention to detail by the Bakuba peoples has placed every aspect of their creative aesthetic productions—from house building and costumes to drums and cups—on a high plane of artistic endeavor. The Mangbetu (Congo-Kinshasa) have mud walls, but overhanging roofs form a rain-sheltered small gallery running around the house, which serves to protect painted murals whose bright colors enliven the compounds.

The social structure in both West Africa and the Congo in the precolonial period was such that it was possible for men of rank to command a great deal more labor for any architectural projects and for their subsequent decoration than is now possible. Payment was in goods rather than money, and there was
a competition among artisans in virtuosity. This meant that anyone in a chiefly position could command the services of many artisans at one time to produce a royal abode that would reflect his prestige and his status in society. In dry seasons the farmers had time to spend on artistic embellishments of their own goods, although in the present money economies a farmer might prefer to find a cash-earning occupation during the dry season. Then, too, a man might have a number of wives and concubines or slaves to maintain a house or compound in perfect condition. This would mean the replacement of any torn matting or woven wattle work. In the case of Benin (Nigeria) compounds, in which the chiefs' homes have courtyard after courtyard with pluviums, the women wash the walls with liquid slip or clay to cover any dirt, then polish it with a rough leaf when it dries so that the walls in places resemble a finish of polished rust-red stone. Early European travelers also mentioned a whitewash which was used on interior walls. It is still used today, though primarily in chiefly houses. Generally, the men do the heavy work in building, but it is the women who provide the patching, and fetching and carrying of small material and water, and often the decorating is left to them.

BUILDING INTERIORS AND USAGES

The interiors of houses and larger buildings are generally simple and are changed only by the addition of furnishings; but there are exceptions. First, storage can either be in small rooms within the home, or it can be in separate small buildings within the compound. A household may consist of a man, his wives and children, and his grown sons and their wives and children. In this case the house or compound may have a kitchen and porch or some place for the head of the household to meet with cronies, or constituents (in the case of chiefs); and there will be additional smaller abodes of one room for each wife and her younger children or girls, a separate house for older unmarried sons, and houses for newly married sons and their brides. The later houses are often no more than one small room.
There is a community space in the center of the compound for cooking, washing, and conversation. In some areas, this compound would have a wall about it, in others there might be apertures making paths between rectangular or cylindrical houses and leading to streets. In northern Dahomey, cylindrical, one-room houses with contiguous walls form a compound in a ring, resembling a medieval castle. To make storage rooms in a circular building can present a problem; this is solved in Ghana by building double walls with at least two feet of space between them, and this space is further subdivided for closets. Thus, though a house should have no corners to harbor ghosts, one may form them inside the walls, which can then be shut off.

The spaces before the homes of chiefs on squares and streets were planned for ceremonies involving larger groups of people than ordinarily would pass through such an area. There are many variations in the placement of the house of a village head in relation to other houses and in the internal planning of a combination dwelling and meeting place of a village head or chief who must serve as judge, arbitrator, and often religious head of a small society.

Most village or town chiefs have an open area before their compounds, even if this is only an indentation to make slightly larger an otherwise small passage. This allows for a gathering of people before his portals. In West African societies such as the Bini (Benin), Yoruba, and Dahomeans, a covered porch is provided both outside and inside the outer wall of the compound so that people may gather to discuss local affairs, gossip, or listen to a paid drummer play praises to the chief or a visiting dignitary of equal or higher rank. The first courtyard may be used as a courtroom or for religious ceremonies. And, facing the gate may be a receiving room whose interior is piled with objects and furnishings that the owner thinks are particularly fine and prestigious; this may also be his private bedroom. Beyond these rooms other walls and rooms create further courtyards where the wives live and in which laundry and cooking is done. In some older homes, there may also be a courtyard around which are small shrines for various deities and to the ancestors.
THE INFLUENCE OF EUROPEAN ARCHITECTURE

The impact of Western European architecture of the nineteenth century on Africa through the public building program of the various colonial powers, produced some tragi-comic results. Fortunately, to indulge in a value judgement, the aesthetic damage was done from the top down; and since there were relatively few people at the top anywhere, Victorian tastes took a long time to work their way down to the average man in the city and into his dwelling. Public Works Department (PWD) architecture, as it was known in British protectorates and colonies, had a sort of ugly charm of its own. Later variations in the nineteen-twenties and thirties provided impractical examples of European-designed buildings which proved to be completely unsuited to the environment in which they were built.

Portuguese influence can be recognized in the coastal cities of Nigeria, as evidenced by the ornate and delightfully sculptured wall decorations, originally worked in mud but now coated with a veneer of cement to save the relief decorations from rain. These styles were introduced by former slaves--Bini, Dahomean, Yoruba, and Ibo--who had purchased their freedom by hard work in Brazil, hired a ship and returned to their homelands, bringing with them the physical evidence of their years in a Portuguese culture--songs, costumes, architecture, and language.

The influence of returned ex-slaves and, later, the newly rich cocoa growers or emergent professional classes in West Africa produced a unique problem in housing design. This was brought about by the desire to build European-style two-story houses for the sake of prestige. Yet, the heads of families who built such dwellings were often faced with problems stemming from the interaction patterns of traditional family living. With the numbers of people in the extended family requiring housing but with no room in the two-story house for expansion, the stage was set for domestic problems.

The years since the Second World War have seen a burgeoning of contemporary architecture in the large cities of Africa on a scale one could not have predicted. Every major European architectural office working in contemporary idiom is represented both in East and West Africa,
The British particularly were in the fore in this movement. Contemporary design, after a few false starts and missteps, has provided some of the freshest and most delightful solutions to tropical housing and planning. The immediate acceptance of the contemporary idiom by Africans suggests that there is a commonality between the traditional African forms, and the contemporary European forms—that of simplification and economy of decoration. African architectural students who enter Legon (Ghana) or Ahmadu Bello (Nigeria), to name two of many new universities, often step from the mud and thatch of village homes to Le Corbusier-style buildings with far less of a cultural wrench than one might predict.

**A GLIMPSE AT THE FUTURE**

Up to this time, village planning on a small scale, well within culturally acceptable patterns, but with modern buildings and sanitation, has been moderately successful. Urban renewal, however, starting with removal of population groups to new sites in Western-style modern buildings, followed by total clearance of the old site, has produced an undesirable cultural shock to which many—particularly the older people and women—cannot adjust, even with time. Religious sanctions bind the African to a given compound because an ancestral founder is buried beneath its family altar, and remains of the founder's descendants are often scattered beneath many of its hardpacked earth floors. To leave these homes is to cut oneself off from the past and, in some societies, to incur the wrath of the ancestors.

The independent states of Africa are producing professionals in many fields; but, as in the United States, the builders still far outnumber the architects and planners. Architectural training is being offered in a number of universities, and some farsighted professors have introduced the production of mass housing through types of prefabricated units. Problems of the rising cost of urban living and increasing urban population will require the solution through such means, but it will also require wise and sound village planning with local industries to relieve overcrowding of main cities.
Research and experimentation in building materials is an open and promising field. For many years Nigeria has had its own plywood factories, and someday the ubiquitous cane grass will probably be made into a form of building board. The problem of how to ship cement in tropical climates so that it arrives in powder form, rather than as hard-set mass in a sack, is still present. But a counter solution is to use clay block which is compressed in a special machine. When sun-dried, such blocks have the same excellent building qualities and insulation as Mexican adobe bricks. Also, West Africa is one of the few places in the world where one can get so tired of polished mahogany in its superabundance that it is often painted.

The African architects, planners, engineers, and sanitation and water experts who are increasingly working together in teams will hopefully be able to plan and build for a future without wrenching the cultural past from their people. They will combine the aesthetic triumphs in materials and designs of their ancestors with the technical knowledge of today and join these as a bridge to the future.
PERSPECTIVES ON THE PAST

6 MAJOR THEMES IN AFRICAN HISTORY
7 AFRICA AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD
8 EMPIRES AND STATE FORMATION
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The study of African history is a new phenomenon in the American academic scene. But its development and expansion in the last ten or twelve years has been remarkable. No courses or seminars on African history were offered at any major American university prior to 1957.

In that year Boston University introduced a seminar and the following spring semester saw the first lecture course at Wisconsin. Today African history has become recognized as a respectable course of instruction in colleges and universities across the United States and is being introduced increasingly into the curricula of high schools as an important part of world-history courses.

It seems hardly a coincidence that 1957 saw both the independence of Ghana—the first African colonial territory to achieve sovereignty—and the introduction of African history into American classrooms. In an era of dramatic news from the African continent, the appearance of new figures at the United Nations representing new states, the increasing American diplomatic involvement in Africa, and the increasing importance of the policy of "non-alignment" in a world previously dominated by cold war politics, American interest, however belated, in the background to these events was understandable. So too, was interest by black Americans in the history of Africa before the colonial era. No longer was it deemed satisfactory in world-history courses to pass over the "dark continent" with a few generalizations referring to the achievements of sturdy missionaries and explorers like Livingstone and Stanley, or summing up the "scramble for Africa" as a reflection of European power.
diplomacy, or characterizing the European colonial impact in terms of the policies of "Direct" or "Indirect Rule." No longer, in short, was it possible to view Africa simply as a scene of European activity determining the destiny of natives, passive or truculent as the case may be. The very term "native," associated by force of habit with superstitious, primitive, and unpredictable behavior ("the natives are restless tonight") was as manifestly out of date as the racist stereotypes which it reflected.

Stereotypes, of course, are indicators of ignorance as well as of raw prejudice. Knowledge helps to dispel stereotypes, and as centers of knowledge, university history departments would be expected to introduce courses in the area of African history. This they have done, but only tardily and after a great show of reluctance. The reasons for that reluctance are threefold: 1) the natural mental inertia which characterizes academics at least as much as other human beings (some would say more so) and makes it hard to break out of established patterns of thought and behavior; 2) the customary practice, transformed into a principle, that history is concerned entirely with written documents; and 3) stemming from that principle, genuine doubts about the validity of methods being proposed for utilizing "oral data" to recover the history of non-literate societies.

The first type of objection was perhaps typified by an eminent Oxford professor who pronounced African history as non-existent; history is the record of human change and achievement, but Africa, he asserted, presented the monotonous spectacle of arrested development where the only discernible movement was the pointless gyrations of generations of savages. The second type of objection was voiced by those historians who agreed with Lord Raglan in his view that human memory is so fallible that only written sources were worth considering. Raglan defended his view with the assertion that two generations after Napoleon, French peasants could be found who did not know the Emperor's name. The third objection was shared by historians who were convinced by the great cultural anthropologist Malinowski that in African states such traditions as were remembered served the immediate functional purpose of legitimizing whomever was in power. The traditions
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provided an historical "charter," and in the process history was so twisted or selectively presented as to be useless as a source.

These were formidable objections which could only be met effectively by practical demonstrations of their inaccuracy or exaggeration. Research beginning in the 1950's at newly-founded African university colleges began to demonstrate that, though cut off from centers of diffused knowledge in the Mediterranean and Near East, southern and central Africa nevertheless experienced development in iron and copper technologies, in political and military organization, and in techniques of social control. Northern and western Africa, of course, were geographically better situated to gain advantage from the exchange of ideas, most notably the spread of Islam and Islamic culture.

Throughout Africa researchers used a variety of sources and methods to assemble bits and pieces of history into more meaningful patterns for interpretation. In the process, they demonstrated the necessity of an interdisciplinary approach. From the work of ethnographers came knowledge of African cultures; from linguists came information about language diffusion and the spread of "loan words" useful for tracing paths of migration, contact or trade. Historians also took account of material remains exposed and evaluated by archeologists, and wherever possible added eye-witness reports from literate travelers (for example, in Arabic or Portuguese documents). A rigorous method for analyzing and utilizing oral traditions was outlined by Jan Vansina in a book published in 1961, de la tradition orale.3 His basic assertions were that 1) oral traditions were not comparable to the fallible memories of French peasants concerning Napoleon, but were usually preserved by skilled and trained specialists, frequently making use of "memory devices" to ensure accurate retention of details; and 2) while any single tradition might be biased or "doctored," other oral accounts could be found among the clans, occupational castes, or rival lineages of a "royal family." By means of comparison and critical analysis the most plausible version might be obtained, just as with conflicting written documents in European historical practice.
By these methods, and through increasing cooperation in research among specialists in archeology, linguistics, botany, ethnology, economics, religion, and political science, the African past ceased to be terra incognita and began to yield much new knowledge and many new questions for further research. Since the beginning of the 1960's, books, articles, doctoral dissertations, and even new scholarly journals have begun to deluge the African history specialist to the point where he can now legitimately join his colleagues in European and American history in complaining of his inability to keep up with the published literature. Where only a few years ago worried historians of Africa were calling for a crash program to locate and preserve historical sources, both those on paper and those in the minds of old men, scholars now are increasingly concerned with the practical problems of utilizing the masses of material they have uncovered. Some may even yearn secretly for the "pioneer days" of comparative freedom and speculation before the onerous weight of source material had fully descended upon them.

Thus, in a very short time, the newly generated interest in African history has yielded visible results. Where once the Ford, Carnegie, and Rockerfeller foundations felt the need to stimulate an almost nonexistent American scholarly interest in Africa, African studies now have established a continuing momentum. Research and publication largely centered in African Studies Programs has attracted increasing numbers of graduate students. They, in turn, have gone into the field to carry out their own researches and have returned to take up teaching and consultative positions, thus adding to our understanding of Africa and helping to spread that understanding beyond the narrow circle of specialists.

AFRICAN HISTORIOGRAPHY BEFORE THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

What is new to America is not necessarily new to Africa. Of course it is true that scholarly interest in Africa on the present scale in terms of sophisticated techniques, money for research, publication of findings and sheer numbers of scholars in the field has never been seen before.
But long before Americans began to wonder if Africa had a history, indeed long before America was known to exist, historians were investigating the African past.

Among the earliest scholars concerned to learn more about Africa were those whose world was centered on the Mediterranean basin and who viewed the African land mass close at hand as it stretched away from the southern shoreline into the unknown. Herodotus sought information about the history and social life of peoples living to the south of Egypt just as he did for the barbarians of Northern Europe. It is from his writings, for example, that the report comes of a three-year Phoenician voyage around Africa c. 595 B.C., though Herodotus recorded the account with some skepticism. Strabo and Polybius, Greek historians in the Roman era, traveled the known world gathering information, much of it now lost, but some of it about Africa. Polybius witnessed the Roman sack of Carthage and recovered there an account of a Carthaginian voyage (c. 470 B.C.) down the West African coast as far as Senegal, and perhaps beyond. Whatever works Carthaginian scholars may have produced seem not to have survived the Roman destruction. Roman historians, such as Pliny, were interested in Africa; but like a later generation of imperialists, they were concerned for the most part in recording the deeds of Romans within and beyond the bounds of their African empire. In the second century A.D., in Egypt, Ptolemy collected the records of travelers and traders along the East African seaboard to draw up his famous map showing the Nile river rising in two large central African lakes bordered by the snowcapped "Mountains of the Moon." His map was far from accurate, but the basic facts were correct, as the explorer Speke discovered 1,500 years later. Today you may stay in the "Mountains of the Moon" hotel near the shores of Lake Albert, which feeds the Nile, with the snowcapped Ruwenzori Mountains in the distance. But certainly the greatest of early African historians and one of the great scholars of all time was ibn-Khaldun.
Born in Tunis in A.D., 1332, ibn-Khaldun witnessed the decline of Islamic civilization and sought an explanation in history for the conditions he found. At first he set out to record and analyze the history of the Maghrib (the western fringe of North Africa), a territory which, from long residence and frequent travel, he knew intimately. His purpose was similar in part to that of earlier historians—to draw wisdom from the past experience of men—but there was a difference. Concerned as he was with the spectacle of Islamic civilization in decay, particularly in North Africa where political disorganization and petty feuding left visible scars on the once prosperous countryside, ibn-Khaldun wished first of all to analyze political history to discover the most enlightened system of government. An academic activist of his time, he hoped (by unscrupulous means if necessary) to put the lessons of history to work by placing himself in a position to influence those in power. Like some other academic activists, his early efforts led to disillusionment, and he concluded, wisely, that he still had much to learn. Retreating from the political arena, he took refuge in scholarship, searching the accumulated writings of the Islamic world for deeper insight. His critical mind soon discerned that perhaps the greatest weakness of historiography to date was the lack of a "scientific" method of analysis. Historians of the Islamic world, like Herodotus and Strabo before them, simply set down what their informants reported, sometimes with critical comment, but often without. There was no effort to create an analytical framework within which to place the acquired information. Ibn-Khaldun set out to create such a framework, and the results of his efforts have led him to be characterized as "the father of modern social science."

Recent scholarship has led to some revision of ibn-Khaldun's place in intellectual history. He did not invent his new "science of culture" in a complete break with previous accepted thought, for there was a strong secular stream of thinking among many Islamic scholars leading in this direction. But ibn-Khaldun did take that stream further than anyone had before and he culminated the achievement with his great work of history, completed shortly before his death in 1406. The work was composed of an introduction and three "books." The Introduction (Muqaddima) set forth the
problem of historiography as ibn-Khaldun saw it. Book One dealt with his new analytical method treating history in terms of human organization and culture rather than as a simple stream of events. Book Two related a "universal history" (that is, of the Islamic world in which he lived). Finally, Book Three contained his originally planned history of the Maghrib. Within these three books was to be found the sum of his political experience, first-hand knowledge from extensive travels (he even interviewed Tammerlane during the siege of Damascus), and results of years of study in the libraries of Damascus, Cairo, Mecca, Tunis, Fez; and Granada. It is difficult to do justice to such a seminal work, but one example—his analysis of the nomad-sedentary conflict—may suggest the richness of ibn-Khaldun's contribution to history.

In his investigations of different types of human culture, ibn-Khaldun observed that the life of pastoral nomadic cultures is basically similar whether Arab, Berber, Turk, or Mongol. Their economic mode of life, following flocks to and from areas of intermittent rainfall, requires a simple political system, usually one based on kinship loyalty. At the same time the tent life, with its lack of material possessions and permanent defenses, leads to a hardy and occasionally predatory way of life. The migrations of the nomads bring them periodically to marginal pasture land on the fringes of sedentary agricultural settlements. Conflict over these lands, which are usable either as pasturage or for expanded agriculture, ensues. The sedentary culture, controlling larger populations through a more complex political organization, must defend itself against the incursions of the highly mobile nomadic pastoralists. A measure of the health of any sedentary state is its ability to do so. But organized states controlling population and wealth appear subject to cycles of growth and decay—their economic prosperity leading to luxury, comfort, and eventual unwillingness to stand up to a challenge, whether internal or external. One of these challenges is the ever-present nomadic threat on the fringes of settlement, and in the course of history the time comes when a weak sedentary state is unable to withstand the nomadic pressure and collapses. But in such a case, observed ibn-Khaldun, the nomads who capture
the state are unable for long to impose their own rule over the society, because their transitory culture and unsophisticated political institutions render them incapable of coping with the complex problems of state politics or identifying with its best interests. More often the nomadic invaders loot and sack, and then withdraw. 4

The world of ibn-Khaldun, that is, the world of Islam in the fourteenth century stretching from North Africa to the Middle East and beyond, was pre-eminently a land of contact and conflict between agriculturalists and nomads. The sedentary dwellers of the Mediterranean fringe, the Nile Delta, and the Fertile Crescent were frequently locked in struggle with the pastoralists of the Sahara, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Iranian Plateau. Ibn-Khaldun was thus describing and attempting to understand a central theme in Islamic history.

Just as ibn-Khaldun was the historian of his own society, drawing inspiration from its past achievements and directing his efforts toward a comprehensive understanding of its needs and potentialities, so in African states further south, professional classes of historians were using their understanding of the past to serve the needs of their own societies. But there was a difference. The historians of tropical African states, the keepers of oral tradition, knew the value of history as a means of binding people together in shared loyalties; but they were without writing. Thus, they were concerned above all to preserve, rather than to analyze, annotate, or revise. Within this limitation, they did evolve a variety of effective techniques for achieving their purposes. Individuals, lineages, and clans were highly conscious that their status and identity was to a great extent dependent on the reputations and accomplishments of their forebears. For example, in the detailed clan histories (which go back some four hundred years) of the Buganda kingdom in East Africa, the early migrations, order of arrival, and original settlement areas of the clans are regarded as especially important. So too are carefully preserved biographical sketches of members who brought prestige to the clan by deeds of valor or attainment of high office. As recently as the 1950's, any candidate for political
office in Buganda was required publicly to recite his own lengthy genealogy to prove himself worthy of the position.

In states where a ruling clan or lineage existed, the importance of preserving an account of the significant events of each ruler's reign was clearly recognized, for history not only adds prestige to a royal lineage, it provides the "charter" (as Malinowski recognized) legally justifying its right to office. No effort is spared to insure the careful retention of such histories, which have been found to extend back as far as four or five centuries in the Great Lakes Region of East-Central Africa.

In Rwanda, where Professor Vansina carried out extensive research, songs and epic poems were among the devices used to transmit accounts memorized word-for-word from one generation to the next. Other states used the memory device of buried or stored pots within which pebbles or objects were placed signifying specific facts. The kingdom of Dahomey, in West Africa, used this technique to maintain a population count and record the economic wealth and military strength of the state. In the Empire of Bono-Mansu (Ghana) each buried pot represented a single ruler's reign and gold nuggets within the pot signified his years in office. Rwanda and the Akan states of Ghana preserved objects associated with particular historical events.

By these methods, Africans were able to record and retain such facts of history as they desired; and, like the Gibbons and Macaulays of a later era, they were not above imposing their will upon history. Jeffrey Holden's essay in this volume quotes a professional historial (called a "griot") from the West African Sudanic state of Mali who takes pride in revealing his power "to teach what is to be taught and to conceal what is to be concealed." 5 He was not the only one. In a splendid piece of historical detective work, Ivor Wilks and Margaret Priestly demonstrated that the official history of Ashanti concealed the very existence of one of their kings (Osei?, 1712-'717) who brought disgrace to the state by not only losing a war with a rival power, but losing his head to the victors as well. Unable to display the bedecked royal skull with the rest of those of his dynasty in the state "museum," Ashanti authorities decided to suppress the whole episode. 6 It is a measure of their ritual-political
power and organization that this drastic measure succeeded until the mid-
twentieth century. Not many African states, however, could command this
degree of loyal and fearful obedience. In most cases it seems safe to say
that where one set of traditions may present an "official history," other
traditions kept by political rivals, uninvolved clans, or disinterested
occupation groups (such as blacksmiths, herbalists, or mercenary soldiers)
may reveal a different version of the past.

All these historians—from Herodotus to ibn-Khaldun, from the official
historians of Ashanti to the griots of Mali—demonstrated the tendency to
impose their own views on history. Some may simply have been influenced
by an established frame of reference, such as the unquestioned superiority
of Greek civilization, or the distressing decline of Islam—or God's
ordained path to civilization and virtue—or the implicit importance of
genealogical identity and status. Others exercised more deliberate influence
over the history they recounted, principally by omission, as in the case of
Ashanti. And all of them reflected a primary concern with their own
society or culture and the place of history within it. Later European
historians were to show themselves no different in this respect.

TWENTIETH CENTURY HISTORIOGRAPHY

European historical writings (as opposed to earlier travelers' accounts) began to be concerned with Africa only as Africa fell within
European imperial orbits. And then, predictably, the historians' concern
was with European activity in Africa. The actors were English, French,
German, or Portuguese, playing their roles against an indistinct African
background with a supporting cast of nameless thousands. Certainly there
was much in this drama to stimulate the imaginations of desk-bound scholars.
They wrote of pioneer explorers and missionaries who followed (or were
driven by) their ambitions and ideals, braving disease, savage beasts, and
beastly savages to "open up" Africa to the outside world. And then came
the drama of the empire-builders: determined captains like Lugard and
de Brazza who raced each other into the interior armed with maxim guns and
treaty pads—and equally determined power magnates, who played the
"great game" of land grabbing from a distance: men like King Leopold of Belgium, who claimed all of Equatorial Africa from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, or Cecil Rhodes, who wanted to "paint the map red" from the Cape to Cairo.

Local histories written on a less grand scale, and with much less melodrama, followed. These histories of individual colonies and studies of colonial administrative practice were often undertaken by resident civil servants with time on their hands. Claridge's monumental History of the Gold Coast (1915) falls into this category, though it was largely concerned with Ashanti-British relations in the decades leading up to British annexation. Delgado's Historia de Angola, Geary's Nigeria under British Rule, and Roberts' History of French Colonial Policy are further examples among many.

The Role of Africans in the Study of African History

Some colonial officials, however, turned their inquiring minds and formidable talents toward the study of the peoples they were governing. This was particularly noticeable in Islamic area, where the fascination was intense and such administrator-scholars as Marty (French West Africa), Delafosse (Sengal, Mali, Niger), and Palmer (Nigeria) made their mark. The administrator-scholar was also common, though to a lesser degree, in non-Muslim areas; Sir John Gray is an outstanding example. In the course of a long and distinguished colonial career, Sir John (who had taken a history degree at Cambridge) wrote important monographs on Uganda, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Portuguese East Africa, and the Gambia. His researches and those of like-minded administrators, formed the opening wedge of a new scholarly concern for the neglected role of Africans in African history.

While academic historians continued to pursue their European-oriented studies of Africa, or ignored Africa entirely, Sir John was busily questioning elderly Africans in their own language about personalities and events before the coming of Europeans. In the Buganda Kingdom in Uganda, he found the pre-existing African state had left a rich legacy of remembered and recorded history. Utilizing these sources, in 1934
Sir John Gray wrote an account of the reign of Mutesa (ruler of Buganda from 1856-1884) which remained the definitive statement until the 1960's.

Sir John Gray's research in Uganda was made comparatively easy by the existence of a number of historical works written in the vernacular by Africans. Having achieved literacy in their own language through missionary instruction (so that they might read the Gospels), a number of Africans in Buganda set out to record their own oral traditions, that is, the histories of their rulers and their clans. Some of these they printed on the mission press and circulated in editions of a dozen or so copies. As early as 1893, one leading Christian convert named Apolo Kagwa was writing a history of recent events and keeping a personal diary. Subsequently, in the next two decades he published five books of recorded history, custom and folklore. Other Christian chiefs were recording the traditions of their clans as well. The largest of these, entitled Makula (meaning treasure), was compiled over a twenty-year period and exists in six immense handwritten volumes of some 2,400 pages. Nor was interest in Buganda history confined to those few scholars who produced books. In the first two decades of the 20th century, vernacular journals published at the missions had a wide circulation, and in their pages points of historical interpretation (largely issues of questioned veracity) were argued between correspondents.

Elsewhere in Africa during the same period, men with scholarly aspirations who had been educated by Christian missions were writing the histories of their peoples. In 1895 the Reverend Carl Reindorf, an African convert of the Basel Missionary Society, published History of the Gold Coast. Two years later in Nigeria, the Reverend Samuel Johnson completed the manuscript History of the Yorubas (eventually published by the Church Missionary Society in 1921). In Southern Africa in the 1920's J. H. Soga was writing his two books The Southeastern Bantu and Ama-Xosa Life and Customs, both issued from the press of Lovedale mission.

These African Christian writers were expressing newly acquired but strongly held beliefs in their histories. They saw the purpose of history as essentially threefold: 1) a means of retaining identity in a period of
Major Themes in African History

social-political flux and changing values; 2) a source of pride in past achievements at a time when Europeans were assuming arrogant attitudes and denying educated Africans entry into European society; and 3) a medium of moral instruction with which to reinforce the lessons of their personal creed, which emphasized the wickedness of the pagan past as against the future promise of Christianity, literacy, and material progress.

Yet it is important to qualify the above observations by pointing out that the literate Christian historians were still essentially chroniclers, faithfully setting down oral traditions and eye-witness accounts for the most part as received, and reserving their comments and moral admonitions for the preface, conclusion, and occasional asides. As chroniclers, they were maintaining and continuing the traditional African historiography of the keepers of oral history. They were also closely paralleling the experience of literate Muslim griots of West Africa who had written (and continued to write) Arabic and Hausa chronicles of their own states which they seasoned strongly with Islamic doctrine and moral exhortation. For both sets of scholars, God was manifesting Himself in history, and men were called upon to behave accordingly.

If modern academic historians have been reluctant to discover theological purpose in history (with the notable exception of Arnold Toynbee), they have nevertheless demonstrated a moral fervor in some of their writings on Africa. This has been evident in some of the over-enthusiastic pro-African writing in recent years; it is also visible in the more traditional European-oriented accounts. Where once historians of the colonial era ignored non-Europeans entirely, the rise of nationalism intruded on academic consciousness and a spate of books ensued which recognized African political and educational attainments. But even these books still concentrated on the colonial devolution of power, which was often alleged to be planned, smoothly carried out, and a triumph for enlightened European leadership. Equally awakened by nationalism in Africa were Soviet and East European historians, who hastened to apply Marxist analysis to yet another set of proletarian revolutions. Their interpretations raised new questions unexplored by other Western scholars, but the theoretical
framework provided by Marx and Lenin was awkward and ill-fitted to the African experience. In both cases, preconceived ideas almost untouched by detailed research into African history were being applied.

The detailed research now being carried out hopefully will provide a more solid basis on which to erect theoretical structures. But much of the groundwork still remains to be done. Meanwhile the directions taken by research seem to be influenced by two considerations: 1) research distinctly varies according to the changing political and social conditions in modern Africa; 2) it changes too, as the development of new research techniques both suggest and permit new paths of historical inquiry.

The Effect of Changing Environment on Research

Considering first the African political environment, it is obvious that change (as from a condition of colonial subjection to a strident and forceful nationalist movement) will affect the questions asked by academics concerned with Africa, including historians. And as the political situation rapidly evolves, so do the attitudes and expectations of scholars. For example, in the early 1960's the wave of nationalism crested as many new states attained their goal of independence. The atmosphere was expansive; it was a moment of success and congratulation. The opponents of African self-determination, whether reactionary settler groups in Africa, or racists in America preaching the dogma of black inferiority, were confounded. Under skillful leadership, nationalist movements had overcome severe difficulties of organization, communication, divided ethnic loyalties, and colonial delaying tactics to win an impressive success. Political scientists hurried to analyze political parties, sociologists became absorbed with the process by which new loyalties were forged, and social scientists directed an increasing interest toward the new elites.

Historians, as usual, trailed the pack several steps behind the last of the social scientists. But they too became absorbed in investigating the origins of nationalism, for one of the self-imposed tasks of the historian is to discover and explain how things came to be the way they are. This "acorn approach," which seeks to ferret out the seeds from which today's mighty oaks took root, insured that the spectacle of flourishing nationalism would
eventually attract its historical researchers. Meanwhile, conditions in Africa were changing; the expansive mood quickly passed, new and critical problems arose, and academic attitudes and interests were profoundly affected. This was evidenced in a recent conference where historians wished to invite interdisciplinary comment from political scientists on particular problems in studying nationalism. It was found that the political scientists (invited because of their previous studies of nationalist movements) were no longer interested. Newer questions involving national unity, military coups, and social cleavage in the independent African states now beckoned them.

But the fact that historians are influenced, however belatedly, by modern events indicates that Malinowski's "charter" may be a relevant criticism of history today—if not in the sense that history is deliberately distorted, at least in the sense that historians recognize current interests and concerns and to a certain extent serve those interests and reflect those concerns. This represents a potential danger, lest history permit its necessary freedom of interpretation to become eroded in the course of performing some service, such as providing the historical basis for teaching national unity, or strengthening national sentiment by glorifying the African past. So far, however, such attempts are remarkable by their absence. There have been a few mythmakers, but not among the ranks of trained scholars, African or European. Only occasionally in scholarly discourse does the suggestion arise that Africa is qualitatively different, and that research undertaken by African scholars will provide a new element beyond mere language skill and cultural background—a mystical quality of African understanding or analysis beyond the powers of any non-African. This prophecy is yet to be fulfilled.

On the other hand, as African studies have progressed, the early defensive attitude displayed in some scholarly writings has tended to disappear. The setbacks experienced by some independent African states in maintaining political stability have not resulted in a return to defensive writing, despite renewed attacks from right-wing groups in the West. Instead, a more balanced attitude prevails than either the unrealistic
platitudes of the 1950's or the uncritical enthusiasm for newly independent nations and charismatic leaders of the 1960's.

MODERN RESEARCH TECHNIQUES

The questions historians ask determine in part the answers they will get. And just as current events in Africa and in the academic world affect the questions asked, so do developments in research techniques. As long as written documents were deemed the only respectable source for historians to utilize, the field for historical research and the questions that could be posed and answered seemed very closely circumscribed. Some researchers who ventured into the area of oral sources found them to be complex, full of symbolism, and difficult to assess and interpret. How could one be sure that he was getting an accurate rendition of a genuine tradition; and how much of the original tradition was useful evidence, as opposed to myth? Opinions differed, and many old hands in Africa could gleefully point to one or another researcher who had been "sold a bill of goods."

Professor Ivor Wilks at the Institute of African Studies in Ghana reports a typical incident. He asked an elderly informant what he knew about the foundation of the neighboring settlements of Fort James and Fort Usher, two long established slave-trading posts on the coast of Ghana. Hardly pausing for breath, the old man started off with "There were two brothers, James and Usher, and they quarrelled . . . ." Now, Wilks knew from easily accessible documents that Fort James was named after the English king and Fort Usher after a former British governor, unlikely siblings in any case, the more so since they lived two centuries apart. In fact, as Professor Wilks was well aware, the story of the two brothers quarrelling and then founding neighboring settlements is a commonplace formula in Ghana as a logical after-the-fact explanation when the actual history is unknown. Here was another fable to be added to the collection of myths and inventions that appeared to litter the field of oral history.
Oral Tradition

It was to deal with this and related problems that the Belgian historian-anthropologist Jan Vansina directed his efforts in the 1950's. The results of his investigation and analysis appeared as a published doctoral dissertation in 1961, *de la tradition orale*, which was subsequently translated into English and re-published in 1965 with the title *Oral Tradition*. Vansina recognized the problem he was up against. Indeed, its immensity was self-evident. He recognized also that the climate of academic opinion on the topic ranged from purely skeptical to avowedly hostile. Hence his published approach was extremely rigorous, closely defined, and laid out with almost mathematical precision. A younger generation of historians were to march off to Africa clutching this book to their bosoms, as nineteenth century missionaries had their Bibles, convinced alike of the validity of the Vansina method and of their own inability to meet its exacting standards.

Vansina defined oral tradition as any testimony about the past which is received second-hand (as opposed to eye-witness accounts). These testimonies, which he called "oral documents," could either be in "fixed text" in which every word was memorized like a poem, or "free text," that is, a general account of events. Vansina then proceeded as follows:

1) First he set out all types of oral testimony in their richness and variety: "official traditions of ruling groups; clan histories; traditions belonging to special castes or artisan groups; testimony given by individuals (as opposed to groups); testimony given in verse, epic, or song; testimony given only on ritual occasions; testimony "owned" as the private property of individuals or groups; stereotyped fables (such as the quarrelling brothers); symbolic forms in which traditions may be related; and so on.

2) For each of these categories he described strengths and weaknesses in terms of accessibility and reliability.

3) All sources had then to be approached by the researcher with every critical faculty alert to the possible distortion, symbolism, and ritual importance in each particular type of testimony.
4) All versions of a tradition had to be recorded and handled alike, for there is no single "true" version; and every tradition, even manufactured ones, tells one something about a society.

No wonder researchers were daunted, for it was implicit in Vansina's method that in order to deal profitably with oral traditions, a researcher needed to have an intimate understanding of the society he was investigating. Vansina, however, went on to demonstrate that for the trained, observant, and patient field worker the rewards of properly assimilated oral history could be immense. In the last fifteen years he has written a history of the Bakuba kingdom in Central Congo, investigated the remembered history of the Tyo or Teke in Congo-Brazzaville, and he has organized the collection of hundreds of traditions in Rwanda which will form the basis of an historical account of that state. In addition, he combined a study of oral traditions and early Portuguese and Dutch documents to write an outline history of state building in the Central African Luba/Lunda area, one of the seminal books of modern African historiography.9

Since Vansina's vindication of oral traditions as an historical source, many more researchers have applied the technique with varying degrees of rigor and varying degrees of success. Few seriously question the potential value of oral evidence anymore, though many scholars look critically upon one another's efforts in this field. But even when best utilized, oral traditions have serious limitations as historical sources. First, they may not contain a chronological component; and the further back in time one goes, the more likely that even relative chronology will prove faulty (as for example, when the name of one king is given to represent four or five individuals, or even a dynasty, a procedure referred to as "telescoping"). Secondly, Vansina's models for oral tradition were obtained from well-organized states or chieftaincies which had existed over long periods of time. It is far more difficult to recover traditions from non-centralized societies, or from states which were conquered, or have vanished in recent times. Thirdly, there is the problem of "feedback" which sorely afflicts some areas in Africa. This typically occurs when the researcher enters an
area already researched or written up by someone else and the answers he gets are those of the new historical version, sometimes right out of the pages of some other scholar's (or in one notable case, his own) book.

**Survey and Interview Techniques**

In spite of these difficulties, oral evidence is being sought all across Africa, much of it not the transmitted traditions investigated by Vansina, but first-hand accounts by eye witnesses. These are being used by historians and other scholars interested in African reactions to the well-publicized government policies of the colonial era, and, where informants are still living, African reactions to the colonial conquest. Similarly, oral evidence is sought by historians interested in "grass roots" reactions of the African peoples. In this connection, the relatively new techniques of social survey, employing questionnaires and mass interviews, are now being experimented with to see whether large-scale collation of information can be achieved without serious loss of reliability. This kind of "development history" using mass data and computer processing has both a useful potential and an obvious drawback. It is obvious that the data emerging from a computer is only as good as that fed in, and the problems of framing an adequate questionnaire and administering it in the right circumstances with properly trained assistants are indeed formidable. It is not to be doubted, however, that increasingly attempts will be made by historians to obtain reliable survey data; the kinds of questions that are being asked now in economic and social history can hardly be answered otherwise.

**The Chronology Problem**

Turning to the more distant past, one of the most difficult problems facing researchers is that of establishing a firm chronology. Oral testimony supplies only a very tentative and relative chronology for the events related. The sequence is usually known, and events such as battles, famines, and political crises, are located in the reign of a particular ruler whose predecessor and successor can be named, but not dated. In the kingdom of Buganda, the ruler periodically moved his capital; and events,
at least for the nineteenth century, can be chronologically located not only within a particular reign, but within a much shorter period when the capital was on a particular site, such as Banda Hill, Mulago, or Rubaga. But unless one of these capital sites can be connected to some firmly dated event (for instance, the visit of the explorer J. H. Speke to the capital site at Banda in 1862), the historian cannot relate his information to changes taking place elsewhere in Africa or the world.

Attempting to solve this problem of chronology, scholars have exercised considerable imagination and ingenuity, largely in vain. For a while, many historians were sanguine about the possibility of establishing a number of fixed dates by solar eclipses. A number of oral histories relate incidents such as that when in a particular king's reign darkness came at noon and the ruler called on his ritual experts for an interpretation of the omen. Since astronomers have enough information to plot eclipses, both future and past, it was hoped that by systematically charting the dates and paths of eclipses in the last few centuries oral testimony could be strategically pinpointed for a few fixed dates. Unfortunately historians were unaware of the frequency of this celestial phenomenon; it was found that there were so many eclipses and partial eclipses criss-crossing Africa in each century that one was left with several equally plausible dates for each recorded incident. Work continues along these lines with an occasional success, but with much less optimism. In African research, as elsewhere, the formula holds true: "the more we know, the less we know for certain."

Other attempts to approach the chronological problem have been somewhat less imaginative, but perhaps equally frustrating. Using king-lists, some historians have attempted to work out a theoretical average length of reign for a particular political system, and then count backwards from the earliest known date. By this method, if an average reign is reckoned at twenty years and the fourteenth ruler is known to have attained office in 1880, one would count backward (20 years, times 13 rulers, equals 260 years) to 1620 as the roughly approximate date when the ruling lineage began, and thus, by inference, the state was founded. One need not be an expert in either history or mathematics to find fault with this line of reasoning.
How can one determine an "average length of reign"? Some rulers live long, others are poisoned by their brothers on the way home from the coronation ceremonies. Aware of this, historians then search the traditions for indications of how each ruler met his end and who succeeded him. The succession system, of course, is of crucial importance: if son succeeds father, reigns may be relatively long; but if brothers succeed each other, then an elderly ruler will very likely be followed in fairly quick order by a number of equally elderly surviving brothers. It is important then, to have precise information about the succession system throughout the period in question and the genealogical position of each ruler. Even so, the margin of error becomes unpleasantly large as one goes further back in time.

Genealogically charted king-lists, large-scale sampling, and oral interviews, are just three among many new techniques being applied by historians in their attempts to recover the African past. The formidable obstacles presented by research in Africa have stimulated an attitude of problem solving and experimentation which contrasts sharply with the routine practices of an earlier generation. Where once historians plotted their unswerving course to determine the shortest distance between two archives, the modern historians of Africa are setting out in new directions, occasionally getting lost, and having to retrace their steps, but experiencing the satisfaction of intellectual as well as factual discovery along the way.

SOME CURRENT THEMES IN AFRICAN HISTORIOGRAPHY

The emphasis placed by historians on certain aspects of the history they recover is expressed in terms of themes. These vary, as demonstrated above, according to the cultural background, environment, and world-view of the particular historian, the problems of his time, and his view of the role of history in society. What constitutes major themes in the writings of Herodotus, Ibn-Khaldun, the Reverend Carl Reindorf, or Sir John Gray may no longer seem important to historians of the 1960's. Some of the themes one finds expressed in modern texts appear self-evident;
for example, the slave trade, which had such a far-reaching impact on African and world history. Other themes arise only because of new research techniques and concerns: bureaucracy and state formation in precolonial Africa, or religious protest movements as mechanisms for mobilizing pan-ethnic loyalties. As new techniques are evolved, new research undertaken, and present studies completed, the themes of African history will change. Here, then, are some aspects of the history of Africa that historians now view as particularly significant.

The Origins of Man, the Neolithic Revolution in Africa, and the Introduction of Metallurgy

The work of Louis and Mary Leakey at Olduvai Gorge in East Africa has revealed the earliest direct ancestor to man, Homo Habilis (nicknamed "Handy Man") who lived from two to three million years ago. In addition, the unique siting of this ravine, cutting down through some three hundred feet of ancient lake sediment, has split open the earth to reveal a history of stone-tool development in which the progressive levels can be read like pages of a book.

Early man in Africa learned to walk on his hind feet, speak words, make stone tools, and later shaft them with spear handles and arrows. About fifty thousand years ago fire began to be used. At one stage, Africa may have exported its stone hand-axe culture to Europe. Then about 8000 B.C., peoples in the Near East domesticated plants and animals. From there, these food-producing techniques seem to have spread into Africa. But the process of domesticating plants may have been evolving independently in Africa as well; claims in particular have been made for the domestication of millet in Western Sudan, where the Niger River forms a vast flood plain similar to the Tigris Euphrates and the Nile Delta. The desiccation of the once fertile Sahara region, during the last 2000 years B.C., created a formidable but not entirely impassable barrier to the diffusion of new discoveries, and is often cited as a cause for the technological backwardness of Africa vis-à-vis Europe in later centuries. Nevertheless, techniques of iron-working, originally developed by the Assyrians, probably crossed the Sahara from...
Carthage and reached the Nok area in central Nigeria at about the same time (c. 300 B.C.) as it reached Merowe in the upper Nile from Egypt. Its subsequent spread across all of Africa is related to the next major theme in African history.

The Bantu Migration

Linguists working in Africa early in the twentieth century were struck by the remarkable similarity of African languages spoken across vast areas of equatorial and southern Africa. Later, linguistic classification confirmed this observation and linked the Bantu language family, as it was called, to West Africa. The degree of similarity could only reasonably be accounted for if the far-flung present-day Bantu speakers had originally and relatively recently migrated outward from some core area. (The time factor is a matter of dispute, but educated guesses often range around 2,000 years ago or at the beginning of the Christian era.) Here is a fascinating puzzle for Africanist scholars to wrestle with. Where was this core area (or areas), and why did the Bantu migrate? Was migration initiated by increased population due to the introduction of new crops? Increased population because of the introduction of iron blades for hoes, scythes, adzes and axes? Or military superiority owing to iron spear blades and arrow heads? These suggestions have all been put forward. At present most scholars hold that the Bantu expansion was relatively slow, not a sudden wave of conquest; hence agricultural development seems indicated. One thing does seem certain on the basis of the present evidence: in central and southern Africa, the introduction of iron was usually associated with the migration of newcomers, presumed to be Bantu speakers.

The point of origin for this dramatic migration of peoples is also disputed. Historians following the linguistic analysis of Joseph Greenberg have argued that the Bantu expanded from the Nok region of Nigeria, an attractive theory in view of the known presence of iron-working and agricultural techniques associated with domestic crops such as yam, millet, and sorghum. However, the proposed migratory path had to cross the Congo forest zone, seen by some scholars as a major obstacle. Historians
following the linguistic analysis of the British scholar, Malcolm Guthrie, have argued for an expansion outward from a core area in the savanna region of the southern Congo. This theory is strengthened by the probable introduction of important Southeast Asian food crops (bananas, yams, coconuts) from Madagascar into continental Africa. Compromise efforts to combine the two theories of origin have so far appeared contrived, and much regarding this question will hinge on future research. It should be pointed out, however, that the question of the distribution of food crops, indigenous and introduced, remains a crucial one, and might easily be considered a separate theme in its own right. Certainly in a later era, when American crops such as cassava, sweet potatoes, maize, and peanuts were introduced, beginning in the sixteenth century via the slave trade, the effect on African subsistence efforts, population growth, and resulting political activity was evident.

Trade

An obvious major theme for almost any period of African history is trade. In the Horn of Africa it helped to account for the rise of Axum and the eclipse of Meroe in the first centuries of the Christian era. In later centuries, Red Sea trade stimulated the rise of the Muslim states of Ṭfat and Adal, threatening Christian Abyssinia, and motivated Portuguese aid to the embattled Christians. On the East African seaboard, the regularity of the monsoon winds brought a contact with the Near East and India that was recorded as early as Roman times. City states rose, competed for dominating shares in the gold and ivory exports, and later fought the Portuguese interlopers in the sixteenth century. In central Africa, long range trade routes radiated outward from the Katanga copper mining area, whose wealth has lost none of its attractiveness in more recent times. And in West Africa, trade was all important; gold and forest products, such as kola nuts, were exchanged for Saharan salt and manufactured goods from North Africa. The importance of trade was politically recognized as states, large and small, were organized partly so that the inhabitants could better control commerce and enjoy its profits. And along the paths of commercial exchange moved literacy, Islam, and cultural exchange. In all these areas,
historians are concerned both to chart the patterns of trade over time and to relate its economic stimulus to evolving social and political structures.

State Building

Closely involved with trade in some, but by no means all, cases is the rise of centralized political rule, which created new techniques for controlling larger and often more heterogeneous populations. In investigation any of the countless examples of state formation in Africa, historians are concerned to assess the degree and type of external stimulus, where it exists. Were political techniques "borrowed?" If so, from whom and with what local adaptations? Was there an external challenge in the form of military aggression or natural disaster? What was the effect of local environment? (For example in the Lozi Kingdom of the Zambezi Flood Plain, with its dry elevated settlements forming political subunits and its organized mass agricultural efforts as the flood waters recede, or on the Kilimanjaro mountain slopes where generous rainfall and fertile volcanic soil supported a dense population which shared similar culture traits but were politically separated into feuding petty states by the deep ravines running up the mountainside.)

What techniques were invented or adapted to create new loyalties and insure obedience? (In the Pare Highlands of Tanzania, efforts were made to transform ritual authority over rainmaking into political authority by the deliberate creation of new "national" religious ceremonies.) Long before Moise Tshombe appeared on the scene, mercenary soldiers were employed in many parts of Africa to provide a centralizing ruler with reliable coercive power. Studies in military organization and technology have branched off from state-building analysis to become an important subtheme in recent African research. Similarly, the role of literacy and the creation of a state bureaucracy, (though not necessarily related to each other), have been the subject of modern historical investigation, particularly in West Africa. For the precolonial Ashanti state, Professor Wilks carried out an intensive study of the process of bureaucratization, beginning with the creation of appointive offices with chains of command and responsibility, continuing through the division
of administration into departments according to function, and, finally resulting in a specialized civil service with an identity and special interests of its own. Undoubtedly similar research into the bureaucratic structure of African states will be undertaken wherever surviving sources, human or institutional, still exist.

Another subtheme of state formation concentrates on the development of partially Westernized African states in the nineteenth century, sometimes termed "secondary empires." These states owed their existence to a newly acquired local superiority in European arms, administrative techniques, or some other borrowed advantage (hence the term "secondary"). Some even acquired the assistance of European missionaries as diplomatic agents in dealing with gradually encroaching European powers, as in Basutoland in South Africa, Buganda in East Africa, and Abeokuta in West Africa. Most of the budding "secondary empires" were prematurely terminated by the colonial conquest.

The Slave Trade

The slave trade has always fascinated historians and it continues to do so. It cost so many lives, forcibly transplanted so many people, lasted so long and had such enduring aftereffects. Yet for all the scholarly research hours expended and books published on this theme, in many respects the surface has hardly been scratched. Many books on the slave trade seem to travel the same ground over and over again without adding significantly to our knowledge. The same well-known sources are quoted to re- evoke the suffering and horror, reawaken the pangs of guilt, and restate the most bloated of estimates for the numbers of lives expended and bodies transported. On the other hand, there has been a tendency for colonial apologists to diminish the degree of European responsibility for the presumed ravages of the slave trade by recalling pre-European customs of slavery indigenous to some African societies. In fairness, however, it must be recognized that the sources that would permit deeper studies are widely scattered and difficult to collate. That, however, also holds true for other themes in African history.
New efforts are being made, notably by Philip Curtin and Jan Vansina at Wisconsin, to plot systematically the numbers of slaves shipped and where they came from during each decade of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It appears from their initial efforts that the figures for the nineteenth century trade have been greatly exaggerated. For modern writers to continue to use these early estimates, which issued largely from abolitionist propaganda, suggests that the emotional issue and the need to pronounce guilt is strong even today.

Africanists presently viewing the slave trade are approaching it with new questions and from new directions. There is much to be learned about the trade within Africa before the European slaver's ships were ever sighted. Other questions concern the effect of the trade in state formation and destruction, the economic effect of depopulation in some raided areas and regroupment in other resistant areas, and the way in which previously isolated cultures reacted to the exchange of information, ideas, and material goods in the process of furthering the trade in human beings. The late Karl Polanyi compiled an economic study of the slave-trading state of Dahomey which showed, among other things, that a significant proportion of captured slaves were used as plantation labor by the Dahomeans for the production of palm oil. Dahomey further demonstrated how an external trade created an internal market economy and market-mindedness facilitated by circulating currency in the place of customary barter.

If the larger issue of the African Diaspora is included with the slave-trade theme, one can include the returnees from Brazil and the West Indies, some of whom became agents of the trade, others of whom settled in Sierra Leone and in Yoruba areas to become agents of social change.

Islamization

Studies in West Africa concerned in part with earlier themes of trade and state building have revealed a rich Arabic and Hausa literature closely related to Islamic issues in history. Indeed, in this area the "data explosion" of source material is particularly noticeable. The institute of African studies in Ghana estimates that there are at least 20,000 extant manuscripts useful to the study of Ghanian history of which only 500 have thus far been catalogued. The Fulani Jihad of the early nineteenth century in
Northern Nigeria produced a large body of contemporary documents, of which at least 300 are currently available to scholars. This wealth of source material permits research into many questions of a social and political nature about the process of Islamic growth in West Africa, and about its characteristics and effects. The field is a new one and the manuscript source discoveries are recent. Unfortunately those perhaps best qualified to study Islam, the specialist-scholars of Near Eastern Studies, have hitherto regarded West Africa (in fact, all of Africa outside of Egypt) as a backwater area on the fringe of true Islamic culture and therefore not a rewarding field for study.

Within the overall theme of Islamization, attention seems presently concentrated on the reform movements of the nineteenth century, probably because these were dramatic, significant in terms of wider issues, and above all well documented. As movements intended to purify Islam, their impact was felt in all aspects of society; H. F. C. Smith, at Ahmadu Bello University in Nigeria, credits them with sparking a nineteenth century "literary renaissance" in the Central Sudan.

Social and Cultural History

If a major theme of Islamization is expressed in terms of social and cultural change, it is representative of the growing interest by African historians in similar questions for all periods. Religious conversion, literacy, changes in life and values are being investigated in the sixteenth century Kongo kingdom as well as in twentieth century Kenya. Conversion by Christian missionaries, by Muslim Dyula traders and scholars, and by modern messianic movements equally invite attention. So does the adoption of Masai culture traits and military weaponry by the neighboring Kikuyu and Nandi of Kenya, or the supposed spread of Ntemi ritual chieftaincies into Northern Tanzania. Far from being "stagnant," Africa was experiencing continuing social change in the pre-European period. Rapid Westernization in recent decades is, of course, well known. But even here current research is qualifying earlier generalizations by demonstrating the selective nature of the Westernizing process.
Field work within social and cultural history ranges from biographies charting the changes of belief and way of life of a single individual at one end of the spectrum to studies of institutional change at the other. "Development histories," such as the work done by James Graham in Tanzania on migrant labor, cash-cropping, and receptivity to, or rejection of, colonial agricultural schemes, easily fall at the institutional end of the spectrum. So would the "urban history" projects now under way in a number of African countries. Research in social and cultural history will undoubtedly continue to grow in coming decades, for this is where new interest and research skills are being mobilized.

Resistance, Rebellion, and the Politics of Survival

It was to be expected that the spectacle of independence movements in mid-twentieth century Africa would stimulate studies of earlier struggles to defend African sovereignty against the colonial onslaught. Similarly, the origins of modern nationalism were sought in earlier rebellions and political protest movements. Once initiated, these studies have proved fascinating in their own right, revealing a new interplay of forces, motivations, and aspirations.

It is now recognized that last-ditch resistance to European conquest and large-scale rebellions in the period of European rule were more than just reactions to European initiative, more than blind resorts to violence in the face of hopeless odds. Colonial administrators, ironically, were the first to recognize that Africans might be fighting for something, as well as against certain impositions. But the official view customarily confined such motivations to the purely selfish ambitions of a few backward-looking chiefs and witchdoctors, or in later periods, unscrupulous political agitators. Modern studies, such as that of Terence Ranger on the 1897 revolt in Rhodesia, and John Iliffe on the 1905 Maji-Maji rebellion in German East Africa, have gone far to penetrate the rhetoric of repression and reveal the internal anatomy of rebellion in all its complexity. There were mixed motives involved and internal rivalries that were in existence long before the colonial era. In both of the above, the leaders of rebellion were religious authorities who had little political
power, but whose spiritual status could transcend local political and ethnic divisions. Appeal was made to supernatural forces to aid in driving the Europeans out, but quite understandably the rebels then looked forward to inheriting European possessions and wealth. These were not, therefore, attempts to deny the present and return to the past. Yet the past was important, for it provided a priestly leadership unstained by the shame of earlier political and military defeat. When the pressure of new economic demands by colonial regimes was painfully experienced by the mass of peasant agriculturalists (hitherto relatively unaffected by the loss of sovereignty at the top), the result was a mass uprising with a religious leadership to give it direction.

Research into some well known, and some relatively unknown, rebellions is just now gathering momentum. Studies of the other side of the coin—deliberate collaboration by African authorities with their colonial overlords—have hardly begun. There are many cases where a responsible African leadership saw more advantage for their people in cooperation, often in instances where long-time rival groups were seen to be in opposition. Of course, personal ambitions were important too, and substitutes could always be found for a deposed chief. But no chief could govern long without the support of his people, and to gain that support, he had to be visibly serving their immediate or long-range interests. In the era of alien domination, what has been called "the politics of survival" could thus take on many different patterns and shapes.

These, then, are some of the themes which emerge from current research into African history. The technical and financial resources necessary to systematic study have only recently become available, and Africa today is yielding an historical experience which may compel new directions in research, new themes, and new understanding.
NOTES

1. A special debt is owed to the following works:
   Basil Davidson, East and Central Africa to the Late 19th Century

   John Fage, "History," in The African World, ed. by R. Lystad

   Mushin Mahdi, Ibn Khaldun's Philosophy of History

   Daniel McCall, Africa in Time Perspective (Boston: Boston

   Nassif Nassar, La Pensee Realiste D'Ibn Khaldun

   Merrick Posnansky, Prelude to East African History

   Terence Ranger, ed., Emerging Themes in African History

   Robert Rotberg, A Political History of Tropical Africa

   John Sutton, "Olduvai: Discoveries and Publications," Tanzania
   Notes and Records, LXV (March, 1966), 95-96.

   Leonard Thompson, "African History in the United States,"

2. At Howard University the late Leo Hansberry lectured on African
   history before 1957, following a life-long interest in Africa as the
   origin of American Negroes; but he was not given a position of tenure
   and ultimately severed his connection with Howard.

3. Jan Vansina, de la Tradition Orale, Annales du Musée Royal de
   l'Afrique Centrale, Sciences Humaines, No. 36 (1961), English translation

4. A recent example of the difficulties of constructing a working
   urban government by nomadic conquerers was experienced by T. E. Lawrence
   at the capture of Damascus in 1918. The situation was vividly, if not entirely
   depicted in the film "Lawrence of Arabia."

5. See the essay by Jeffrey Holden, "Empires and State Formation,"
   in this volume.

7. Students of English history are familiar with the "acorn approach" which focuses much attention in the 1880's and 1890's on a miniscule group of political eccentrics and malcontents whose words and deeds quite properly went unnoticed at the time. Yet, they are studied as the seeds from which the Welfare State in the 1950's was to grow.

8. Manufacturing myths has been the monopoly of popularizers, as in American experience with its instructive patriotic literature composed for the benefit of youth (for instance the story of Washington and the cherry tree by Parson Weems).


AFRICA AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Ibrahim Abu-Lughod

Africa has constituted an important part of the Islamic world for over one thousand years. It is, therefore, justifiable to speak of the interrelationship of Africa and the Islamic world and to try to assess the relative importance of a universal religious system as a determinant of the kind of secular relations that may prevail between the two. One may also try to assess the implications of such a common bond in terms of international politics. These questions may indeed be crucial both for the student of international politics and for policy-makers engaged in shaping foreign policies. The task in this essay, therefore, will be to explore the nature of the common bond and to assess its influence, not only upon the historical development of African states but also upon the way African society has related to a larger world.

SKIN COLOR AND THE SAHARAN BRIDGE

Until very recent times, students of Africa and many others made a clear distinction between Black Africa, or Africa south of the Sahara, and North Africa. While the factors making for such a clear distinction varied, an underlying assumption was the fact of color. It was assumed that skin pigmentation, so significant an element in Europe's social thought throughout the nineteenth century, could be used as the basis for the division of Africa into at least two undifferentiated wholes. Yet, North Africa, by nineteenth-century European standards, was probably not considered white; the ambiguity of how to classify North Africa along the skin pigmentation continuum is apparent in European works of the nineteenth century. Yet,
Despite the confusion in ascribing a skin color to North Africans, many writers of that period nonetheless referred to color as the differentiating factor between the two Africas. (This distinction excluded the unique problem of "white" South Africa.)

Today, the weight of historical, cultural, and political evidence militates against this kind of distinction. To take skin pigmentation as the significant variable introduces more problems than it solves. Even in contemporary times, with the sovereign state system firmly established in Africa and with human movements greatly constrained by the "closed" frontiers of that system, it is enormously difficult to draw a meaningful boundary between the two Africas on the basis of skin pigmentation. Any observer would immediately notice the gradual shading of color as one moves southward. The tremendous mixture of peoples, stirred by great population movements in the history of the continent, has given rise to an infinite variation in skin color. A traveller in North Africa itself would immediately be struck by the variation in skin pigmentation in all regions of North Africa, from the Atlantic to the Red Sea.

The distinction between the two Africas is frequently linked to the existence of what seems to be a natural barrier, namely the Sahara, the vast and inhospitable desert separating the two Africas. But one must note that the geographic separation, while true in modern times, was more apparent than real prior to the nineteenth century. Until the advent of the European colonist the great Sahara was actually the organic link between the two Africas and historically it has served as a bridge between them. Peoples have always moved back and forth across the Sahara, and trade and culture have been transported with them. The variations in skin pigmentation which exist today in Africa reflect a history of extensive contact and interpenetration throughout the entire northern half of the continent, cutting across, rather than being compartmentalized by, the Sahara.

The view of the Sahara as a barrier is a reflection of the ethnocentrism of our present age. For until very recent times the Sahara did indeed serve as an effective barrier—but against the European, rather than the African. The European approach to Africa has always been by sea rather
than overland; but for the African, the caravan routes connecting Africa south and north of the Sahara have been traveled for countless centuries.\(^2\)

The re-orientation of these trade routes toward the Atlantic to the south of the Sahara and along the Mediterranean borderlands to the north was a direct consequence of the Europeans coming to Africa. Even with this re-orientation, however, the trade routes traversing the Sahara never really died; they simply receded in importance. One of the questions that remains to be answered is whether these functional linkages between North Africa and Africa south of the Sahara that were weakened by the European invader can be recreated--links that are increasingly important to the political ties envisioned by Africa's leadership.

Given the minimal importance of color to the separate identity of Africa either south or north of the Sahara, and re-emphasizing the crucial historical function of the Sahara as a bridge between the two Africas, it is necessary to ask whether the distinction between the two Africas can still be maintained with any degree of seriousness. We have suggested that the Sahara acted as a link in terms of the movements of people and goods between the two regions. But it acted in an equally significant way as a bridge for the transmission of ideas and cultural patterns, the most important of which, for our purposes, were those associated with the spread of Islam. This resulted in the emergence of cultural patterns which further linked the two areas.

To the extent that Islam and its resulting cultural imprints became a yardstick which could measure the differences as well as the similarities between regions, it has become increasingly necessary to differentiate between those portions of Africa that were affected historically and socially by the Islamic system from those that remained outside of the cultural matrix of Islam. To the extent that Africa could be differentiated along religious lines and subdivided according to the geographic boundaries of religious influence, the criteria of color, as well as environmental barriers, must be relegated to the background. Until the advent of Christian missions one would have been justified in dividing Africa along the religious dimension on the grounds that the religious system of...
Islam gave rise to specific patterns of social and political life that were at great variance with those of pagan areas. In recent times one might be justified in speaking of three divisions along this dimension: Islamic, Christian, and pagan.

There is no doubt that the introduction of Islam into Africa was of great importance to the later development of the continent. If for no other reason than to understand the religious affirmation of many citizens within contemporary African states, an affirmation that may be of political significance in the future, the Islamic factor in African life ought to receive its due from the student of modern Africa. It is to this element that we shall now turn our attention.

MUSLIM COMMUNITIES AND STATES IN MODERN AFRICA

It is almost impossible, even today, to obtain a clear picture of Africa's population in terms of religious affiliation. What is being made more evident, however, particularly in those African states committed to systematic census enumeration, is that the proportion of Islamic adherents has been significantly underestimated. In some cases these findings may have put an entire political system in jeopardy, as was the case in Nigeria. For many years it was commonly assumed that Muslims constituted approximately one-third of the total population of Nigeria, and the federal structure of the Nigerian state was shaped partly in accordance with that ratio, although an official basis for the regional division of Nigeria was territorial rather than religious. In the 1962 census it was reported that the Muslim population was considerably larger than the politicians who had framed the federal structure thought it to be. The consequence was felt immediately. Among politicians and bureaucrats the validity of the entire census was called into question; and on a popular level, riots and demonstrations broke out which foreshadowed political pressures towards constitutional revision. The integrity of the entire federal structure was challenged and the attempted secession of the Eastern Region of Nigeria from the federation in 1966 may have been in part a response to fear of Northern Muslim domination. It is not
improbable that the fear of similar consequences in other areas of Africa where religious affirmation of citizens may be translated politically leads to an implicit acceptance of existing myths and prevents the conduct of an up-to-date census. The complete lack of any formal census in Ethiopia may reflect this fear.

The student of modern Africa is therefore compelled to use outdated and often inaccurate data regarding religious distribution patterns in Africa. Authoritative sources such as the Demographic Yearbooks of the United Nations are at best outdated and at worst grossly incorrect. For certain African areas the demographers of the United Nations project the population figures on the basis of 1946 data, which even then were known to be wrong. The information presented in this essay is based on all existing resources, and with recognition of the serious problem of establishing validity.3

Taking the continent as a whole, it is reasonably safe to state that at least one out of every three Africans is Muslim. These individuals believe, to one degree or another, in the basic tenets of Islam, practice certain of its rituals, and identify themselves with a community of believers within their immediate society as well as in Africa generally and beyond Africa. These Muslim populations are unevenly distributed; and religious tensions, with consequent political tensions, also vary from one area to another. If one were compelled to draw a line below which Islam becomes a relatively minor facet of African life, that line would be drawn just above the tropical rainforest belt and stretch from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. (FIGURE I)

While gross numbers may be misleading in terms of political implications, almost half of Africa's independent states (fifteen out of thirty-eight) contain a majority population that is clearly Islamic in identity.4 Five other states contain Islamic minorities of sufficient strength and numbers to exert strong pressure on the political system to exact concessions which would guarantee the continued viability and importance of the Islamic groups to the system as a whole.5 While this is not the place to indicate the significance of religion as a factor in the political life of the
community, it is important to remember that in the case of Islam the question assumes greater relevance precisely because historical Islam has been more than a spiritual system regulating the relations of man to his Creator; it has given rise to a social and political system and has helped in the emergence of distinct cultural patterns, as well as intellectual trends, that continue to affect the modern political life of the community. To some extent, Africa's political formulation of its goals of independence and the type of social and political order that was and is desired by its articulate leaders has been affected by this Islamic factor. As has been suggested elsewhere, much of Africa's ideology, while derived from Western political and social theory, has drawn on indigenous sources of ideas and patterns that were decidedly Islamic in nature. 6

The fact that nearly half of Africa's independent states contain Muslim majorities does not necessarily qualify them for designation as Islamic states. For such designation, constitutional provisions would be needed to translate the religious affirmation of people into concrete state commitments, goals, and principles. Upon examination of the various constitutional documents of the African states, one finds that approximately one-fourth of these states classify themselves officially as Muslim states. 7 By their definition, they include an article in the basic law of the country to indicate to the world at large that they are indeed Islamic states; precisely what this means is a different problem altogether. But for symbolic affirmation, for purposes of official holidays, and perhaps for purposes of law and legislation, such states may indicate a preference for those policies which are perceived to be compatible with their Islamic identity. That such a course of action is neither simple nor clear-cut is obvious from an examination of the various policies carried out by the states that designate themselves as Islamic. 8

Another group of independent states, while containing Islamic majorities, acknowledge their identification with Islam in a cultural sense only. 9 Their constitutional documents and the public pronouncements of their leaders affirm the basic secular orientation of the state by refusing to insert a constitutional provision for an official state religion. While thus affirming
Fig. 1: Islamic Areas

- **Muslim majority**
- **Significant Muslim minorities**
their commitment to a secular course of public policy, a commitment to Islamic goals results from the pressure exerted by their Muslim constituencies. Thus far, the public behavior of these states has not been significantly different from those states that have affirmed their commitment to Islam through their constitutional documents.

It is perhaps significant to point out that those states which have inserted a religious clause in their constitutions are easily identifiable as Arab or Arab-influenced. Where Arab influence has been minimal, African states have apparently opted for a more secular orientation. We will come to this point later on when a typology of Islamic penetration is analyzed.

One would expect that in societies undergoing the process of modernization, as are most African societies, religion would play a more important role in politics than in societies that have been modernized and tend to be secular. One would suspect that in premodern societies, the religious affiliation of the majority of the people would play a critical role in the election of high public officials. While in general this may prove to be the case, Africa presents interesting contrasts indeed. Senegal is a country in which the majority of people are Muslim; yet the president is Roman Catholic and his Muslim competitor was deserted by coreligionists on other grounds. Eventually, the religious affiliation of a majority may translate itself politically by their refusal to accept a head of state who is not Muslim. This is one of the imponderables of religion and politics in Africa. All we can say at this point is that a Muslim majority does not guarantee an Islamic system, nor does it necessarily lead to the emergence of such a system. Economic, social, and political factors have to be taken into consideration before we can assess the potential of religion as a factor in the political life of new African states.
THE EARLY FORMS OF ISLAM IN AFRICA

While one may postpone final judgment concerning the centrality of Islam in contemporary Africa until more concrete and authentic data become available, it is important at this stage to determine the process by which Islam became a factor in African life.

It will be recalled that Islam emerged as a universal religious system in the seventh century A.D. in Arabia. At that time, the Prophet Muhammad, living in Mecca, received revelations from God (Allah), which were recorded as the Koran, or Holy Scripture. These revelations did not repudiate the Scriptures of the Hebrew Old Testament or the Christian New Testament, but rather asserted themselves as a further, and final, addition to all previous revelations contained in the Judao-Christian heritage.

The subsequent diffusion of Islam was multidirectional and to some extent followed the routes that were already familiar to the Arab disciples of the Prophet. Africa's contact with Arabia certainly predated the emergence of Islam; it is well known that the Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula had carried on trade relations with Africa, having settled on the east coast of Africa long before Islam emerged. The same is true of the North African populations before they were Arabized and Islamized. Yet with the emergence of Islam something new developed in the nature of the contact and interaction which characterized Arab-African relations. From the seventh century it was the self-appointed task of the traders, the settlers, and others to share their belief systems with the African populations with which they had contact.

To the extent that Islam made its appearance in Africa contemporaneous to its emergence in the Arabian Peninsula, we are indeed justified in speaking of Islam as one of the indigenous African religious systems. The fact that the earliest adherents of Islam were external to Africa, although including Africans living in the Arabian peninsula (it will be recalled that the first Muslim prayer caller, Bilal, was an African resident in Mecca at the time of
the Prophetic Mission), does not militate against the indigenousness of Islam to the African continent. Therefore it should not surprise the student of religious systems to find specific African manifestations of the Islamic system which to some extent differentiate it from its Asian counterpart and perhaps explain some of the underlying reasons for its successful expansion in Africa.

In tracing the expansion of Islam and with it the Islamic community in Africa it becomes evident that expansion was neither steady nor was it accomplished through uniform methods. Yet one can chart its progress through the centuries and one can at the same time chart the type of carriers who made Islam a factor in African life. The first spurt of activity corresponds to the period of early expansion from the Arabian Peninsula. It will be recalled that the Arabs, as part of the Semitic community of the Arabian Peninsula, had experienced historical movements of expansion that took them into the Fertile Crescent and into Egypt. But this demographic expansion, instead of leading to the ethnic absorption into the population among whom they settled, resulted instead in the cultural and religious conversion of the host populations. The expansion of the Arab population into the adjacent areas, accomplished at first through the military conquest of already decaying political and military powers, placed the Arabs in a position of political control over these areas. Their adherence to Islam, the ideology which inspired their expansion, made it subjectively possible for them to offer the population a choice of equal treatment and full participation in the new social and political system. The result was the Islamization and the Arabization of the host population. This was the process which established an Arab-Muslim community throughout the North African coast. Within a relatively short period of time the entire area of North Africa, stretching from Egypt to Morocco, came under Arab control; and with that control went the establishment of Islamic centers of worship, education, and public law that marked North Africa indelibly as an Arab-Islamic territory. Had North Africa not been won to the incipient Arab-Muslim community, conceivably the history of West Africa would have been quite different; for subsequent West African history was to a large
extent determined by activities and movements emanating essentially from North Africa. This is a point to which we shall return in a later section.

The relatively rapid entrenchment of Islam and the Arabs in North Africa resulted in two simultaneous processes: the use of Arabic became widespread, and centers of learning were established in North Africa which were in meaningful interaction with other intellectual centers concerned with language, law, theology, and history in Egypt, Iraq, and elsewhere in the Arab world. Eventually Arabic language and literature gave North Africa its ultimate identity as an Arab area. A process of Arabization had taken place which resulted in the linguistic and, to some extent, ethnic transformation of the host population. On another level, although the Arabs who settled in the area were numerically insignificant, the simultaneous process of Islamization was taking place.

Both Arabization and Islamization were equally significant in North African history, and each of these two factors had different implications for the region. Arabization meant that subjectively the North Africans, regardless of historical justification for such a classification, viewed themselves as an integral part of the Arab community. While during the medieval period this ethnic factor was not particularly critical, it became of central importance once the system was transformed into a modern one in which justification for ethnic and linguistic nationalism was sought. While the factor of Arabization drew North Africa into the vortex of Arab politics and in modern times introduced itself into the problems of international relations, the Islamization of North Africa made it part and parcel of a community that was universal in its belief-system and transnational in its aspiration. Some tension between the two identities was perhaps inevitable under certain conditions, and eventually North Africans had to stress one or the other. A stress on the Arab identity might lead to negative consequences in terms of internal social and political organization, while a stress on the Islamic identity might help in the expansion of certain norms and ideals. Historically, the North Africans were to use both factors selectively to the advantage of the expanding community. The positive and negative effects of
this kind of selective use of both processes will be dealt with in a later section to illustrate its importance for contemporary African relations with the Islamic world.

The point should be made, however, although North Africa became increasingly Arab and Moslem and, in cultural and political terms, began to interact more intensely and positively with the rest of the Islamic world (which had its epicenter in the Arab world), there was never a reduction in the amount of interaction between Africa north and Africa south of the Sahara. What was affected was the type of interaction, with cultural and ideological interchanges playing an expanding role. Up to the time of the Islamization of North Africa the interaction was for the most part economic in nature. The caravan routes traversing the African continent had their termini in North Africa; these were the routes by which African goods, gold, and other commodities were shipped from areas south of the Sahara to a North African terminus. The three most common caravan routes ended in Morocco, in Algeria, and in Tripolitania (Modern Libya).

Forms of interaction other than trade were also present. Historians and archaeologists know that certain cultural implements—ideas, art, and other forms of cultural expression—were transmitted by these trans-Saharan routes, but the extent of this cultural transmission is open to question. A visit to a North African museum will indicate the extent to which North African aesthetic expression was influenced by its counterpart in Africa south of the Sahara. This aspect of cultural exchange, then, while not initiated at the time of Muslim ascendance, did intensify and became more central in the period following North African conversion.

THE EXTENSION OF ISLAM IN AFRICA

The successful Islamic penetration of sub-Saharan Africa was largely dependent upon the vitality of North Africa; for soon after its conversion, the Muslim community of North Africa began to introduce its new system of values and norms to the population with whom it had always interacted. Historians are prone to attribute the Islamic expansion into the interior of Africa to the hard work and devotion of the traders and peripatetic
missionaries. There is no doubt that some areas of Africa were exposed to the Islamic faith through these individuals; but the historical evidence quite clearly reveals the fact that major acts of conversion of substantial portions of Africa, especially on the west coast, were primarily the result of sustained religious-military efforts on the part of newly converted African peoples. This use of military conquest as a technique for spreading the faith constitutes one of the most interesting chapters in the history of Islamic penetration into Africa. (See Figure II)

The process of conversion started in significant and systematic fashion about the tenth century A.D. By then, much of the interior of the North African region had been won to the new faith. The interior and mountainous regions of this area were inhabited by a population ethnically different from that found along the Mediterranean coast. Whereas Arabs continued to settle on the coast and to interact chiefly with the Arab world and with southern Europe, the peoples of the interior still looked southward for their contacts. It is reasonably well known that the human links between sub-Saharan Africa and Mediterranean Africa were provided by the Berber communities which inhabited much of the region between coastal North Africa and the West African Sudan. Strategically located at the termini of the trade routes, traditionally warlike and mobile, the Berber tribes often intruded into both areas of Africa. By the tenth century they had been won to the Islamic faith. Yet their conversion, while creating a religious bond with the rest of the inhabitants of the region, did not eliminate the ethnic tension between the Berbers and other groups. Furthermore, their residential isolation and traditional mode of life made them suspicious of the increasing encroachment of the cultural superstructure of the urban Arab Muslims. Despite these tensions and suspicions, however, the religious bond became increasingly viable and a kind of unity prevailed.

Such symbiosis and integration as occurred was largely the product of a new movement within the Islamic system that emerged essentially to bridge the gaps existing between indigenous communities and the urban-based, formalistic Islam which was associated with a power elite dominated by Arab Muslims. Historically the movement that brought about this increased integration
became known as the Sufi (mystic) movement; Sufism was one of the movements in North Africa that assumed a dominant role not only in cementing the relationship between the Berber communities of North Africa and the Arab dwellers on the coast, but also in facilitating the large-scale conversion of other areas of Africa. By the tenth century, one of these movements, known as al-Murabitun (the Almoravids), assumed total control of the entire region of North Africa and from that position pushed in both directions—northward into Spain and southward into the interior of Africa. What is significant about this movement, aside from the fact that it represented the first significant movement in the history of the Islamic community in which the political leadership was either dominated or inspired by an organized Islamic fraternal order, is that its dynasty was Berber-dominated, that it seriously thought in African terms, and that it actively sought the conversion of Africa.

It accomplished its early objectives not through the normal historical contacts, but by a large-scale military offensive, admittedly inspired by religious zeal, against Ghana, an established African state. The Ghanaian state then was ruled from 1076 to 1088 A.D. by a Berber Dynasty originating from North Africa. This pattern of interaction was to continue throughout the succeeding centuries. The conversion, peaceful or otherwise, of individual groups of Berbers, and, later, of Black Africans, resulted in the political and military dominance of those groups which, soon thereafter, assumed the responsibility of expanding the frontiers of the faith. For the most part, that expansion had to be accomplished at the expense of an already existing state structure in which the dominant elite was pagan. The displacement of that elite placed the new Moslem elite—whether Berber or Black African—in a position of control, and it was through that political and military control that other aspects of Islamic culture were established. No sooner had the displacement succeeded than the religious counterpart of the military-political elite began to function effectively. The setting up of an Islamic legal system, one of the most important aspects of Islamic culture, and of an educational system centered around the Mosque became questions of paramount importance. Ultimately, of course, it was these
FIGURE II: AGENTS OF ISLAMIZATION
institutional structures that became significant in implanting Islam as a faith throughout the regions that were controlled militarily or politically.

Three aspects of the Islamization process of the interior of Africa ought thus to be noted. In the first place, the agents who carried it to the interior were, ethnically, indigenous Africans, whether Berber or Black African. At no point did the Arabs of the North play any significant role in the Islamization of any area in the interior. In the second place, this indigenous factor is responsible to some extent for the relative political independence of the African Muslim communities. At no point in the history of the Islamic world did any non-African Islamic state attempt to intrude deep into the African interior; it is doubtful that any such attempt could have succeeded. In the third place, the strong connection between religious and political power (exemplified by the control by the religious order of the political movements which carried Islam into the interior) gave African Islam a characteristic not common in the rest of the Islamic world--throughout history, African areas were to a large extent controlled by the Sufi religious orders which in turn competed effectively with the established political elite. The history of many West African areas can be viewed as the periodic eruption of these Sufi religious orders in search of political control.

These characteristics of African Islam had given rise not only to the political independence of African areas and their isolation from the mainstream of the Islamic world, but also to a cultural independence that aided and occasionally hindered the political independence of these areas. No sooner had religious orders succeeded in setting themselves up as the mainstays of orthodoxy in the areas of their control than they established indigenous cultural centers to serve the particular religious and cultural needs of the community. Whereas the original African Moslems had sent their sons to Cairo, Fez, and other North African areas to be educated, in due course local centers of education and learning under the control of local leadership and supported by existing political dynasties of African states south of the Sahara were established. And it was these institutions that ultimately produced a distinct intellectual leadership for the African community that
could deal with the problems of adaptation of Islam to the African interior. The centers of learning at Timbuktu and Jenne eventually assumed an importance for Africa equal to those at Cairo and Istanbul for other Islamic areas.

The cultural and political independence of large areas of Africa did not necessarily mean the total severance of all ties with the Islamic community outside Africa. On the contrary, links continued to be fostered; pilgrims traveled to Mecca (Arabia), performing their religious duties and traversing the Islamic world, and scholars continued to exchange ideas across "national" frontiers. Yet, the vitality of African Islam was not dependent upon what was going on elsewhere. The relationship of Africa to the Islamic world was that of equals, united by a common profession of faith and subordination to a common set of values and norms.

The penetration of Islam into areas other than the Western and Central Sudan provides interesting contrasts indeed. For one thing, Islam never reached very far inland from the coast of East Africa, nor did it affect the lives of as many Africans, and to the same extent, as it did in the West African areas. Furthermore, and perhaps equally significant, the agents of Islamization were decidedly different and, as a consequence, the nature of the Islamic system on the east coast of Africa was quite different from that of West Africa.

We indicated earlier that the east coast of Africa was quite well known to the Arabs of the seventh century. It could be expected that once Islam became established in their society, they would make some attempts at conversion; yet, the evidence indicates that the early efforts at conversion, if any, were rather unsuccessful. Apparently, the Arab settlers and merchants, long accustomed to trade and interaction with other Africans on the east coast, continued, even in their new-found identity as Arab Muslims, to conduct their relations with the host population just as their predecessors had done in previous periods. In so far as we can determine, there was no serious endeavor on the part of the Arab-Muslim traders of the seventh century to convert the host population to their new religion.
Conversions did take place, however, although somewhat more gradually and less dramatically than in North or West Africa. Equally important, such gradual conversion occurred as a result of an ethnic settlement of fresh immigrants from the Arabian Peninsula who came to Africa in search of a haven from the religious persecution that periodically erupted in Arabia. The first such settlement took place sometime in the eighth century A.D. At that time a group of Arab Muslims crossed to East Africa for political and physical safety; they were escaping from pressures exerted by the ruling Islamic dynasty, the Umayyads (whose capital was in Damascus), against the followers of the fourth Islamic Caliph, 'Ali, who supported a rival claimant to the institution of the Caliphate. They had been designated heretics by the orthodox followers of the Ummayyads. At the time these Arab followers crossed to East Africa, the banner of disobedience was carried in the name of the grandsons of the Caliph 'Ali. These immigrants, who became known as the Zaydiyyah, established themselves as a separate, and almost self-sustaining, community of believers, and refrained generally from actively proselytizing among those Africans with whom they came into contact.

This group was followed by another wave of migrants who crossed into East Africa by the tenth century. Unlike the first who were classified as heretics, or Shi'a, the second one was largely composed of orthodox Muslims. Although the two migrant communities were united by a common belief-system, they were also set against each other by their political allegiances and theories of legitimacy. Their political beliefs were sufficiently at variance to generate a good deal of tension between them so that they remained separate communities with a certain degree of residential isolation. In time, the two communities clashed, and the earlier wave was compelled to move southwards, gradually being incorporated by the African Bantu-speaking peoples. The victorious Sunni (orthodox) community established a closely-knit social and political system which eventually engendered the distinctively urban Islamic system so common elsewhere in the Islamic world. It was the second community that succeeded in establishing urban centers, such as the present city of Mogadishu. Yet despite their victory and their settlement, the second community also refrained from active proselytism. Accordingly, the African
converts to Islam on the east coast of Africa were the result of other types of processes than those of proselytism or military conquest. But because of the smallness of the community and its abstinence from active involvement with the inner workings of the African system, it continued to depend on the active cultural and economic life of the Arabian peninsula. For many centuries to come both East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula remained the "home" of this East African Arab-Muslim community.

A third wave of migration issued later from the Persian city of Shiraz; accordingly, these migrants became known as the Shirazis. Like the first wave, they were heterodox Muslims. Their encounter with the already established Sunni community was therefore one of tension. The difficult relationship compelled them to set up a separate communal settlement which served only to exacerbate the existing tension characteristic of the orthodox-heterodox relationship. Zanzibari Arab politics until the Revolution of Zanzibar in 1963 were largely shaped by the historical conflict between the Sunnites and the Shirazis; pre-Revolution Zanzibari political parties to some extent also reflected this historical schism. This third group of migrants adhered to the tradition of their predecessors and refrained from any overt act of proselytization.

Although the successive waves of Arab-Muslim migrants to East Africa failed to produce an indigenous African-Muslim community, in due course such a community did emerge, mostly through a slow process of interaction and intermarriage with Africans. The result has been the Swahili people in East Africa and the much more widespread Swahili language--primarily a combination of Arabic and Bantu. This mixed Swahili community, however, remained relatively small and confined primarily to the narrow strip along the eastern coast of Africa from Somalia to present-day Tanzania. A final wave of migration, that of Sunni Muslim Arabs from the present territory of Masqat and Oman, took place in the nineteenth century when the Omanis succeeded in assuming control over the coast of East Africa.

Although the Arab Muslims in East Africa did not actively proselytize, there is at present a large and influential Islamic community on the east coast of Africa. It includes Arabs (or Arabized Africans), Indians, Swahili, and several other groups of African Muslims. The Black African Muslims now
outnumber all other Muslim groups as the result of an important stimulus from new immigrants from the Indian subcontinent who throughout the twentieth century have assumed a most active and systematic role in converting Africans. In East Africa this conversion has been accomplished primarily by the Isma'ilis under the overall leadership of the Aga Khan. In West Africa the Ahmadiyya of Pakistan have served the same function in this century. Although the Islamic community of the east coast is substantial in number, it is divided within itself in terms of basic doctrines, attitudes, orientation, and background. While the original settlers may have had good reasons to be antagonistic toward each other, instead of gradually working out a social and cultural compromise in their new milieu, they opted to perpetuate the original schisms; this had significant social implications. For example, the original communities tended to segregate themselves spatially and occupationally, interacting with one another only in narrowly limited roles. Not only did they maintain this pattern of social interaction among themselves but, in essence, they transferred their initial and personal schisms to the new African converts. In due course, Africans were incorporated through marriage into clans of the Arab settlers and, on the basis of such incorporation, claimed descent from some ancient Arabian tribe and inherited its traditional attitudes and values. Thus, the initial dispute became rooted in new soil among people who had no connection either with the ethnic origin of the community or with its ideological dispute.

This brief discussion of the Islamization of East Africa sheds light on a number of significant points. In the first place, the "Arab" orientation of this area is self-evident. The Arab settlers in Coastal East Africa continued to look to the Arab homeland for guidance and inspiration. At no point did they develop a positive African outlook. It is precisely in these African areas that social or religious movements originating in the Arabian Peninsula found fertile soil. In part, this "Arab" outlook may explain the early interest of Somalia in receiving aid and assistance from a country like Egypt. It also helps to explain why Egypt has succeeded thus far in playing a larger role in the affairs of some East African states than in the affairs of the West African states.
Secondly, and more importantly, Islam in East Africa remained essentially an Arab religion. Almost all Africans who were converted to Islam were *ipso facto* Arabized or absorbed into the mixed Swahili community. Historically, this meant the spread and use of the Arabic language and technology. The moderate success of the Wahhabi movement (which established the conservative "Saudi" Arabian state) on the east coast is explained partly by the "Arab" character of this area.

Finally, the later conversions of Africans accomplished through the organized activities of the Isma'ilia and others, while enlarging the community numerically, added to the hostility implicit in their relations with it. These movements for the most part had their origin outside the Arab world, derived their strength and support primarily from the Indian subcontinent and were consequently viewed by orthodox Muslims with ambivalence and suspicion. In their communal existence in Africa today, they tend to perpetuate Indian or Pakistani patterns, to segregate themselves from other Muslims and to organize their community life separately. Educationally, economically, and socially they remain aloof from their coreligionists.

This enumeration of divisive factors must not obscure the positive contribution of Islam to the area. The spread of Islam on the East African coast, as elsewhere, introduced a unique system of law, provided a basis for a cohesive social order, and furnished its adherents with an identifying ideology and culture which could, when properly manipulated, form the basis of a separate "national" existence (as among the Somali).

AFRICAN ISLAM IN THE COLONIAL ERA

The advent of European colonialism in the mid- or late nineteenth century affected Islamic areas of Africa differentially. First of all, paradoxically, the Europeans inadvertently assisted the spiritual expansion of Islam while weakening its political control. Secondly, the European preserve unwittingly contributed to the decline of traditional Islamic forces and assisted radical Islamic reform and leadership. Finally, it contributed substantially to the modernization of Islamic areas.
It will be recalled that when the Europeans advanced militarily into Africa they clashed with the existing political and military orders. In many parts of West Africa these political systems were controlled by the Islamic religious orders which had effected a successful alliance with the political elite. These existing regimes were no match for the modern European powers, and in some cases they had already lost a great deal of legitimacy and support. Political control rested to a large extent on feudal basis of social organization, on an arbitrary system of government, and on an ideational system that was decidedly medieval in character. In the initial phases of the European confrontation, the established elites offered considerable resistance, but gradually they were defeated everywhere in Africa.

It was at this point of their defeat that the European powers had to evolve a policy to contend with indigenous elites in the future. During the initial stages of European colonialism, the pre-existing elites were thought to constitute a threat and, accordingly, the European powers evolved hostile policies that were calculated to bring them to an end. In time, however, a more effective approach commended itself to the colonial powers, largely through the observations of officers in situ who recognized that the religious orders and their political counterpart had an extensive network of contacts, controlled large-scale social organizations, and were in communication with large sectors of society. If these orders could be satisfied and won over, they could perform invaluable services and could assure a certain degree of stability and tranquility.

By the end of the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth century, colonial policies towards Muslim elites became quite clear. They were to be encouraged and assisted, provided they were willing to collaborate with the European powers. Certain of the Muslim religious elites opted for this alternative, perhaps out of their own weakness or for anticipated gains. This collaborationist response had been common with minor exceptions to all Islamic elites in northern Africa. Two of these elites involved the Sanusi religious order that had its origin in Libya and the Mahdi movement of the Sudan. In both cases, the European powers found it necessary to defeat them
Both movements had emerged in response to internal tensions and had aspirations to displace pre-existing corrupt elites. Both movements were reformist in nature and aspired to extend their doctrinal and political control over other Islamic areas. Their zeal and ideology made it imperative for them to carry out the struggle against the European occupation to the bitter end; and, consequently, they were almost destroyed by the European powers. With their eclipse, however, no national elite emerged to collaborate with the European powers and their reputation remained untarnished. Ironically, in present-day Libya and Sudan, the descendents of these two movements have returned to political power.

This early pattern of interaction between the European powers and the elites of Islamic Africa had three important consequences for the later evolution of Africa. First of all, the spiritual expansion was facilitated by the European powers who looked with favor upon such expansion as long as it did not pose any kind of political threat. Secondly, Muslim settlers and merchants began to propagate their faith in areas hitherto prohibited to them by constant insecurity. This was made possible by European "pacification" of the interior of Africa. Thirdly, a convenient escape for energies was provided by this outlet for religious enthusiasts; otherwise, these energies might have been harnessed for politically disruptive activities in the central areas where colonial control was most entrenched.

Thus, this type of interaction made it possible for Islamic religious orders to undertake missionary tasks successfully and thereby expand the frontiers of Islam at the expense of the ethnic religions. That these Islamic orders in effect competed with Christian missionaries seeking the conversion of Africans in no way disturbed the colonial administrations. Their major concern was the successful pacification and acquiescence of the population, and this was partly effected by colonial support for expansion of the orthodox Islamic religious orders.

It should perhaps be observed that this pattern of interaction was typical of both British and French areas. It is conveniently assumed that the two types of control effected by both powers, namely the "indirect" control adopted by Britain and the "direct" French control, resulted in
different policies insofar as Islamic religious orders were concerned
The actual events, however, turned out to be much the same for both areas. Where the indirect principle was applied, the colonial state provided sanction and legitimacy for the feudal religious-political center, exercised by the chiefs and emirs; this was quite clear in the pattern of Northern Nigeria. Where the direct principle was applied, authorities often exercised control directly on behalf of the religious elites and suppressed political challenges to those religious leaders.

This pattern of interaction between the colonial powers and the dominant Islamic religious groups—those whose control was perpetuated by the colonial powers—had important implications for the development of nationalist movements in Islamic areas. It became more and more obvious to those who were seeking political autonomy for their areas that a serious obstacle presented itself in the form of an entrenched elite which anticipated a weakening of its own power in the event of relaxation of external control. By the same token, the colonial powers often saw any nationalist challenge to the entrenched religious elite as an indirect challenge to its own authority; a weakening of the control exerted by the traditional religious elite would have meant an increase in the power of organized groups that derived their legitimacy and support from the secular basis of society. An examination of practically all African areas with Islamic constituencies would reveal quite clearly that the challenge to external control automatically meant a challenge to the internal traditional elite which collaborated politically with the colonial power. Thus when a modern group, not overtly political in nature, advocated an internal reform such as the establishment of a secular school system based on modern principles, it was opposed by the established system of administration, often at the behest of the traditional religious-political elite. This kind of symbiosis resulted, in the end, in the emergence of nationalist movements that were antiforeign as well as antireligious in tone. The secularist trend of a country like Guinea or Senegal or Mauretania cannot be understood without reference to this early symbiosis between the traditional religious authority and the European power.
In areas where Muslims were not in the majority, the story differs somewhat but not greatly. While the nationalists evolved programs of political action and vision that were designed to transcend the fragmentary system (in which the fragmentation was based on a tribal, ethnic, linguistic, or religious basis), they did so in order to marshal public support for independence. But independence would have meant a reorganization of the entire political structure and the abolition of those privileges that had been granted individuals or groups; in the end it would have given rise to a group whose cohesion would have sprung from territorial loyalty. The Muslim groups, supported by the colonial power, saw in the emergence of such an independent polity a threat to their existing autonomy and privilege and perhaps feared that independence would bring about a curtailment of their internal power. There is no doubt that such would be the case if the state were organized on the basis of secular principles. Accordingly, Muslim groups in Nigeria or Ghana were in the main hostile to the young nationalist movements and, perhaps as a result of negative pressure, postponed the day of independence. Once independence was attained, such Islamic minorities continued to present special problems for the new polities.

The antinationalist stance of Islamic groups and their lack of contribution to the nationalists' struggle for independence did not mean, however, that the Islamic community did not contribute to the process of independence. This contribution was often made indirectly and mostly on the bases of the Islamic ideology. It will be recalled that the successful struggle for independence in Islamic areas required large-scale political organization with effective networks in important areas where the struggle was launched. What happened, in fact, was that secular organizations with political and economic programs for the future succeeded in enlisting a good measure of public support. These secular organizations succeeded in forging effective links among the various citizens of the community for secular ends. But it must be remembered that the members of the community had already been prepared for collective endeavor, largely through the Islamic religious orders. They were long accustomed to the discipline and organization necessary for collective action. The secularist leadership
did provide a new program, but it relied on the existing organizational base. It should also be remembered that the communal emphasis and solidarity already present for the Muslims had succeeded in giving rise to distinct communities on the basis of law and education that were markedly different from other communities, whether African or European. The basis of solidarity was used and manipulated by the nationalist leadership for secular and more programmatic ends. Unlike non-Islamic areas of Africa, the principle of self-definition did not consume much of the energy of the Islamic nationalists and they utilized the existing principles of solidarity for further political action. Where other areas had to struggle to forge a link between diverse ethnic groups, the Muslim community was already there. What they needed was a program to which the population could commit itself for the establishment of a new order.

Finally, it should be stated that the nationalist agitation for independence in Islamic areas differed from that of other areas in what it chose to emphasize. Non-Muslim African areas often emphasized the racial bond and conceived of the colonial struggle in racial or anti-European terms. In Islamic areas the struggle, when not waged in secular terms of an economic or political nature, was waged in the name of the Islamic community. For Muslims, the world is divided; but the division is on the basis of faith not color. (Thus, Europeans are thought of as "Christians" rather than "white men.") The racial tensions so characteristic of African areas are notably absent in the Islamic culture zones.

On the whole, colonialism was disruptive to the Islamic communities in Africa, territorially, culturally, and ideationally. Yet, it is obvious that there were certain gains. Increasing proselytism attracted new members to the faith and augmented the number of believers. At the same time, colonialism facilitated the movement of peoples across continents. The presence of the Ahmadiyya, the Isma'ilis, and other Asians in Africa can be attributed to the colonial system. While their presence has ultimately had an adverse effect on ethnic and national cohesion, it has at the same time increased the internationalism of African Islam. An increasing dependence of African Islam on Islamic communities elsewhere has become a factor of
importance throughout the continent. The lines of communication among Muslims, regardless of their nationality and locale, have been thus opened; the use and effect of these links will have implications for the entire Islamic world.

AFRICAN ISLAM IN THE POST-INDEPENDENCE ERA

The emergence of the independent African states reflects the successful culmination of the nationalist struggle for the separate units demarcated by the former European colonial powers. These units, as is well known, were carved out without regard to traditional cultural geography, that is, ethnic groupings, language, economy, religion. Territorially, then, they had no exact previous counterparts; culturally, they represent diverse backgrounds and efforts. Yet, as separate units, each has had its own history and development. Over the years, these colonial units which have become the new African states have built certain affinities and exhibited certain patterns that may ultimately prove to be too strong and viable to give way to efforts at wider integration.

Common to all of the new states, however, are a number of factors that are important for the determination of the Islamic element in their political and social life. They were all subjected over a period of time to an intensive process of modernization, urbanization, and development inspired or carried out largely as a result of European control. These had the effect of disrupting certain of the traditional institutions, undermining part of the traditional norms and values, and replacing them by others. The emergence of secularist trends, in part as a result of these large-scale processes of modernization, is perhaps of critical relevance to our discussion. Such trends of secularization are evident throughout Africa and the rest of the Islamic world and they have had an important effect not only on the value system of the believers, but additionally, and perhaps more importantly, on the institutional bases of society.

Partially as a result of these processes, the new African states with Islamic majorities have tended to assume a secularist stance. They are likely to conceive of their future in secular terms, subordinating religion to the
exigencies of social and political development. On internal levels such a
development may be desirable. But at the same time, the African states
have been struggling to bring about greater national integration and unity;
in doing so they may utilize instrumentally those factors which underlie the
system and which may aid the process of national unification. It is at this
level that the religious factor assumed a certain importance. Although no
uniform practice holds true for all African states, it is quite clear that
religion has played an important role in the political life of states such
as Algeria, Somalia, and the Sudan. National development and the attempt to
bring about a greater degree of national cohesion in these states have been
significantly affected by increasing reliance on the Islamic factor.

Yet Islam may play another role, given the appropriate conditions.
Many of the African states, Islamic or otherwise, have attempted (thus far
unsuccessfully) to bring about greater unity on the supranational level.
Their commitment to some kind of broader unity has resulted in a number of
regional attempts at unification. The organization of African Unity is in
part a response to this commitment to restructure the presently fragmented
map of Africa. Regional confederations may eventually prove to be the most
feasible means to this end. It is in the context of regional unification
that Islam may prove to be a factor of importance, for here the Islamic
bond among adjacent states may be emphasized and used as the basis for
regional units. The ideological commitment of North African states to closer
union is in part explainable by their common religious affiliation. Whether
it will take place is, of course, dependent upon other factors.

The immediate relevance of Islam to international politics has been
noted by several of the Islamic states, and their recognition of that relevance
prompted them to reinforce their identity with one another in religious
terms. Thus, for example, Egypt began her activities in Africa with a built-in
asset, namely, its identity as an Islamic modern national community. It has
assisted morally and materially in the effort of other Islamic communities
in Africa to utilize religion as a justifying factor, though obviously helping
to gain political advantages as a result.
One may note another important use of Islam in African developments: its role in the submersion of an otherwise explosive ethnic division in the population. It will be recalled, for example, that North Africa's population is in part divided into the Arab and the Berber groups. Ethnicity historically had been a divisive factor that was conveniently utilized by the colonial powers. The North Africans themselves recognized the divisive ethnic element and in its place emphasized their solidarity on the basis of the common Islamic faith. Thus far this emphasis has succeeded in maintaining the national integrity of the countries in question but, as the process of modernization gains greater momentum, it may be that the religious element will not prove viable and ethnic tension may reassert itself.

At this point in history, it is difficult to foresee the precise role which Islam will play in the development of internal and regional African politics. Whether the international efforts represented by such groups as the World Islamic Congress will ultimately succeed in giving rise to a community of independent states united by religion or with some degree of coordination in their policies is also an open question. As this juncture, one simply ought to note that the Islamic factor is present in Africa, and that it will have considerable affect on future internal and external developments throughout the continent.

NOTES

1. This question was discussed lucidly by L. C. Brown in "Color in North Africa," Daedalus, (Spring, 1967), 464-480.


5. Ethiopia, Tanzania, Upper Velda, Ivory Coast, and Cameroon.


7. Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Republic.


10. The discrepancy between the religion of the president and that of the majority of the citizens in a country like Senegal and the significance of such a discrepancy is discussed in Ali Mazrui, "Islam, Political Leadership and Economic Radicalism in Africa," Comparative Studies in Society and History, IX (April, 1967) 274-91.


EMPIRES AND STATE FORMATION

Jeffrey Holden

THE STUDY OF AFRICAN STATES

It is still difficult to make meaningful generalizations about the political history of Tropical Africa before the European conquest of less than a hundred years ago. Gaps in source material exist, but the general picture is of vast and valuable primary data waiting to be collected and processed. Once the systematic collection of this data gets underway, there is every reason to expect that Africa will be shown to have made an even greater contribution to the universal history of political ideas and statecraft than is documented at present. Premature generalizations have done much harm to African historical scholarship, and in this essay we will not be afraid to leave questions unanswered. We will, however, try to ask the right questions.

Efforts have been made by scholars to place African societies and political systems within analytical categories, and to isolate certain characteristics to which these peoples and states are subject. The two main groups of scholars to have made this attempt are the Marxist historians and the non-Marxist Western scholars. Marxists, with some differences over the appropriateness of terminology, see African societies as having followed a universal sequence of development from primitive communalism to tribalism to feudalism, with corresponding developments in their modes of production. This establishes the distinction between states and prestates, depending on whether the social structure is class or preclass. The "state" only comes into existence when property inequality has produced antagonistic classes. Rigorous attempts have been made recently to fit those historical African
societies which were preclass, and therefore prestate, into a Marxist category known as "Oriental despotism," which is the political system associated with the Marxist "Asiatic mode of production." More will be said of this later. Inadequate data leaves the success of this attempt in question, and deductions made on the basis of this classification, where data are lacking, are hazardous. But discussion has been fruitful; and although the analytical technique involved is a century old, it appears still to be useful.

Non-Marxist scholars usually have been asking rather different questions, and, on the basis of case studies in African political anthropology, have attempted to construct typologies of political systems which would cover the complexity of the African examples. From these attempts certain trends can be observed, such as the transition from "segmentary" to "unitary" political structures. Correlations can be established between types of political authority, such as that based on kinship, and the corresponding political systems, such as the segmentary state, the pyramidal state, and the hierarchical state. Predictions based on observation have been made, not always wisely, such as that a segmentary state based on kinship loyalty is likely to be less stable than a unitary state in which political authority is based on such factors as wealth, coercive power, and religion. The complexity and diversity of Tropical African states still makes the erection of such typologies very unsatisfactory.

For purposes of this essay we will not attempt a survey of the full range of African states. Such a survey would produce only a patchwork of names, dates, places, each with a brief inventory of cultural, political, social, and economic achievements. It will be our purpose to describe and analyze the political continuum which existed within a more limited geographical area, namely the states of the Western Sudan: that is, the area of West Africa south of the Sahara and north of the equatorial forest, from the Atlantic to Lake Chad, in the period from about the third to the seventeenth century, A.D. This vast area, with very large populations, does exhibit some degree of continuity in political innovation and state formation processes, but before we examine this area more fully, we should indicate the extent at least of state formation in other areas. (See Figure)
STATE FORMATION IN EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICA

One of the earliest states in Africa was Kush, located along the Nile in what is today northern Sudan. Kush existed as an independent political entity (though not continuously so) from the eighteenth century B.C. It was characterized by a diversity of agricultural and manufactured products and became a commercial and political power of international significance by the late seventh century B.C. We know that one Kush dynasty ruled for one thousand years, that its inhabitants used a literary language which had developed a cursive script probably by the third century B.C., and that a vast iron industry at Merowe was at its height in the sixth century B.C. But we can only guess at how the state came into existence and, more importantly, to what extent its political ideas or techniques spread elsewhere.

Axum, in modern Eritrea and Ethiopia, was founded from Arabia in the second century B.C., only 400 miles from the later Kushite capital of Merowe. It reached its territorial and administrative peak some six centuries later. We know of its codified property law, its advanced social and religious organization, its complex urban architecture, and its trade links with Greece and Rome. But although Kush was conquered and for a while administered by Axum, it is not realistic to regard the latter as a successor state to the former in the same way that medieval Songhai can be said to have inherited the political, economic, and cultural role of Mali. We do know that the rulers of Axum from the early fourth century A.D. were of the Monophysite Coptic denominations, and that Christianity probably played an important role in the solidification of the state. We can say that in some ways modern Ethiopia has evolved from Axum.

After the eighth century A.D., when the people of Axum had withdrawn into the Ethiopian Highlands, there is a dearth of significant information on eastern Africa, until the beginning of the sixteenth century. We do have accounts of Arab and Indian settlement along the East African coast during the period from the seventh to the eleventh centuries. Kilwa (in modern Tanzania) became the leading commercial town of East Africa during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, a commercial prominence which lasted until
the mid-fourteenth century. Its rhymed coinage almost certainly predated that of India and Persia, and its control of the raw materials of the interior (gold and copper in particular) made it a formidable economic as well as commercial power. The development of Kilwa and that of other coastal city-states (for example, Mogadishu, Lamu, Mombasa), shared many common features which together comprised a fairly coherent series of related characteristics. But despite the Arab, Indian, and later, Portuguese, immigration, which strongly influenced the political nature of these coastal states, there is a dearth of helpful documentary sources on the East African coast until the fourteenth century.

Zimbabwe (in modern Rhodesia) was another African state whose extensive and complex archeological remains are thought to have been in continuous use from at least the twelfth century to the beginning of the nineteenth century A.D. The city of Zimbabwe was the capital of the Karanga empire, which stretched from the Zambezi to the Limpopo and encompassed an area of rich gold workings. Although complex stone architecture and other archeological discoveries are not in themselves adequate indications of advanced social, economic, and political organization, the collection of oral histories and the first-hand descriptions of early Portuguese visitors to the area virtually confirm the existence of a centralized political system. Nevertheless, many significant questions about the nature and extent of this system remain unanswered and await further historical research.

Mention also must be made of the Central African states of Kongo and Ngola (modern Angola). These were territorially large states which were later to be powerfully influenced by contact with Portuguese Christianity. Throughout most of the southern Congo Basin this contact led to the disintegration of existing African states, although disintegration was in some cases delayed by an initial period of increased prosperity based upon expanded trade. Like Zimbabwe, these states have become better understood in recent years through the techniques of oral history.
CRITERIA FOR STATE SELECTION

Emerging from this brief summary are certain fairly obvious criteria which will be used to determine the over-all significance of the states to be discussed. The size of the population and territorial area affected, and the time span covering the initiation, development, and continuous application of political techniques are significant. Other major bases suggested for evaluation of African state-formation are: the degree to which one state can be said to be the successor of another and the nature of this inherited role; the extent to which the political forms under discussion can be described as "indigenous"; and the availability and weight of reliable data, both documentary and oral, and the manner in which they can corroborate each other.

We might, bravely, add another. This would concern the influence of these political systems upon the the attitudes of the people within their control. We will try to examine, for example, the success of the ruling groups involved, in creating among their subjects and citizens a degree of identification with the state, or in some cases, with the nation. This may shed light on such contemporary questions as whether the "identity" of Mande (Mali) some four hundred years after its disappearance as a large scale political system still has a functional evocation among the Mande-speakers scattered throughout West Africa? Clearly it does have an influence, although the technique of isolating and evaluating this influence is difficult and must await future research.

Time Span Coverage

This set of criteria for state selection would suggest that were more space available, our study of the Western Sudan would be continued into the later period characterized by the sequence of Islamic state formations in the late eighteenth and throughout the nineteenth century. These very closely related political movements took place over the area from Senegal to Bornu and began some 150 years after the economic, cultural, and to a degree, political unity of the area had been destroyed by the Moroccan conquest.
of Songhai. Here there is a great wealth and accessibility of contemporaneous, indigenous, documentary data to assist an analysis.

Unlike the equally interesting cases of, say late eighteenth-century Ashanti (in modern Ghana) or in nineteenth-century Buganda (in modern Uganda), many of the Western Sudanic state-builders using the Arabic script could speak for themselves in written form. For example, the main founders of the Sokoto caliphate, (centered in what is now Northern Nigeria) Uthman b. Fudi (Usman dan Fodio) together with his son, Muhammed Bello, and his brother, Abdullahi, left almost 300 known books and articles, many dealing directly with the reasons for, and the difficulties faced in, their attempts to create a new state. This literary profusion was continued by their followers and descendants. As evidence of the existence of a sense of common destiny and nationality—a crucial, if sophisticated, aim of statecraft—such writings are not conclusive; but without articulation of purposes and goals, which in essence is what these writings constitute, the question cannot even be broached. When these primary sources are combined with the stock of past and present-day local, oral accounts and the European eye-witness and archival sources (which, of course, are also rich for Ashanti and Buganda), the states to be researched enter a different category of historical analysis.

Despite the existence of these sources, a current bibliography of African political history would in no way reflect the predominant position of the Western Sudan in African history. This neglect may, in part, be attributed to the understandable but unfortunate reluctance of academics, both African and non-African, to research into themes which are not connected with the European contact. Whatever the reason, this neglect has caused a serious distortion in our view of African history and has produced a vastly inadequate appreciation of significant historical determinants of the modern African state systems. This essay, in dealing with an area where European influence was almost non-existent until eighty years ago, is a minor attempt at a corrective focus.

Elements in State Systems

Major elements of a traditional state system would include the following:

a) a ruler or ruling class; b) citizens or subjects; c) a value system
linking entities to subjects and legitimizing the authority and actions of the rulers; d) mechanisms to insure that the aims of the ruler are achieved without frustrating the aims of the subjects that they withdraw their acquiescence to the exercise of his authority. The later mechanisms within the political system consist of a set of functions, more or less common to any political system, and a set of structures to perform these functions; these would vary greatly from time to time and from place to place.

It will be our purpose to examine these elements in the political systems of the Western Sudan, covering a period of over a thousand years, and using historical sources which are unique in Tropical Africa for their breadth, depth, and detail. Emphasis will be placed on the continuity and evolution of the political structures under examination as they respond to changes in the economic, social, and cultural environment. Our primary focus, however, will be on the establishment, legitimation, and maintenance of authority.

THE WESTERN SUDAN IN PERSPECTIVE

The term "Sudan" (Arabic for "black") refers to the 3,000 mile-wide region stretching eastward from the Atlantic to the Ethiopian highlands and lying between the Sahara to the north and the rainforest to the south. Lake Chad is generally considered as the dividing line between the eastern and western sectors, although occasionally a "central" Sudan is distinguished which includes the areas on either side of the lake. The Western Sudan, in the latter case, would then extend roughly from coastal Senegal to the borders of Northern Nigeria with its major focal centers in the Senegal and upper and middle Niger River basins. It is this delimitation of the Western Sudanic region which will be used in this essay, although occasional reference will be made to some areas in the Central Sudan as well.

Several factors may be briefly noted which would qualify the Western Sudan, thus defined, as one of the cradles of world civilization, rivaling the valleys of the Nile, Yangtze, and Tigris-Euphrates in its influence upon the history of man. From neolithic times basically the same groups of
people have inhabited the Western Sudan, producing a relative cultural homogeneity and a deep sense of continuous and shared history. The desiccation of the fertile land of the Sahara, which occurred roughly between 2,000 and 500 B.C., resulted in the desert as we know it today and appears to have produced a chain of migrations and interactions between nomads and sedentary people, between pastoralists and cultivators, which was still in progress during the period from the third to the seventeenth centuries A.D. Certainly the ecological changes in this area and the resultant population movements must have been a factor affecting the formation of the relatively large-scale political units which came to exist.

The antiquity of the civilization which developed in the Western Sudan is illustrated by the presence of iron tools and weapons, smelted locally, dating back to the fourth century B.C. Agricultural innovations and favorable natural conditions made the area a leading producer of cereal, while the abundance of gold and the scarcity of salt had inspired a large-scale trade network by the early years of the Christian era. By the time of our first reliable historical references, in the eighth century A.D., the Western Sudan was already the scene of well-developed urban life, a center of advanced agriculture from which surplus products were able to sustain the towns, and an integral part of a large-scale, intracontinental trading network. Over the next thousand years these advances were to continue and would produce in Ghana, Mali, and Songhai the highest levels of social and political development in precolonial sub-Saharan Africa.

**THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AUTHORITY IN THE WESTERN SUDAN**

Space permits only a brief speculation about the origins of these Western Sudanic states and the establishment of their ruling groups, although the methods by which the dynastic and territorial foundations are remembered are interesting and instructive. These methods mainly concern oral traditions which are memorized by specialist groups who act as official historians, and who often perform a crucial ideological function insofar as they are officially required to "edit" history as well as remember it.
... without us the names of kings would vanish into oblivion, we are the memory of mankind ... I teach kings the history of their ancestors so that the lives of the ancients might serve them as an example, for the world is old, but the future springs from the past ... I learnt the origins of Mali and the art of speaking. Everywhere I was able to see and understand what my masters were teaching me. But between their hands I took an oath to teach only what is to be taught and to conceal what is to be concealed.

Oral traditions tend to telescope and conceptualize events which probably took place over long periods of time and involved several people instead of the single hero in whom is vested the credit for the collective achievements of the period. The settlement of immigrant groups in an uninhabited place, or their seizing or accepting authority over the original occupants, or the gradual transition of nomadic pastoralists into sedentary cultivators, is usually told as an event in the life of a single founder-hero. Early documentary references in Arabic to the foundation of Ghana's ruling dynasty only repeat these oral traditions, so even in written documents we are sometimes left with a very impressionistic outline.

THE STATE OF GHANA

Traditions have Ghana's "origin" going back to the fourth century A.D., and possibly as early as the third century B.C. But however the starting point is calculated, it is of importance if the people concerned chose to remember a particular person or event as beginning their political system. The Ta'rikh al-Sudan, or "History of the Western Sudan," an invaluable locally written seventeenth century manuscript, states that Ghana's first ruling dynasty was "white." We know, however, that by the tenth century the rulers of Ghana were black. We can perhaps conclude that there was a change of dynasty although some continuity in political structure was maintained. An alternative explanation is that the "white" rulers became black through intermarriage over six or seven centuries; this explanation would indicate a synthesis of different political traditions and perhaps techniques.

By the mid-eleventh century, when our accounts become fuller, the ruler of Ghana was firmly established as head of his own lineage, as
direct ruler over large groups of Soninke cultivators, and as the recipient of tribute from a large number of minor, neighboring monarchs. The farming peoples of this area had long been familiar with the idea of membership in a large-scale political unit; contact with the representatives of the ruling head of that unit, and the demands made by them, may have been slight, however—we have no evidence on this point. The leaders of other political formations, from Takrur on the Atlantic to Gao on the middle Niger, had similarly become accustomed to the fact that tribute should be paid to any ruler with enough long distance power at his disposal to enforce his demands and enough military strength to protect the tributary state and to secure trade.

Inevitably, these peripheral tributaries ended their relationship with the center when the rulers of Ghana were weakened by the Almoravid invasion and by the capture of their chief city in A.D. 1076. This incursion of Berber Muslims was short-lived. Ghana as a ruling dynasty and as a political system did not come to an end when the local Susu conquered its towns early in the thirteenth century and attempted to take over its sphere of authority. It survived, in shadow, paying tribute to emergent Mali, at least until the mid-fourteenth century.

THE STATE OF MALI

Within about fifty years of the Susu invasion, the political unity of what had been the empire of Ghana was restored and enlarged, with the addition of many more tributaries by a dynasty of another Mandigo-speaking group. The establishment of the authority of Sundjata, revered as the founder of Mali, was by military means, but the point remains that to some extent he had inherited, through his own efforts, a political system. The defeat of an enemy in battle did not entail the dismemberment of his territory or the radical alteration of his political-economic-cultural complex. It meant the assumption of the political rights and obligations, as well as the material wealth, of the defeated predecessor. It might also mean the elimination of his family to prevent rivalry for the throne. A later ruler, Mansa Wali,
however, was confident enough of his power at the head of the Mali state to leave it for a long pilgrimage to Mecca.

The state structure of Mali did not seem to have been much shaken by succession disputes which deposed three rulers in about twenty years and which temporarily put a freed slave, Sakura, on the throne. A nine-month civil war and several other succession disputes may well have weakened the loyalty to the man in power, but the centralized structural framework of the empire, strengthened by Islamic bureaucratic techniques, remained solid.

THE STATE OF SONGHAI

In 1464, Sunni Ali assumed office as head of the Songhai people (often spelled Songhay) which were centered around the ancient town of Gao. According to the Ta'rikh al-Fattach, another important Western Sudanese history written in the sixteenth century, he was the fifteenth head of a dynasty founded by Mande, or possibly Soninke. The power base of this dynasty in Gao was already well established when Sunni Ali set out to reconstruct the declining Mali empire from the East. His conquest was relatively easy, and the vast and complex system of the Mali empire seemed to be waiting for a ruler with adequate coercive force and disposable wealth. With these resources, the new ruler was to restore the relationships and loyalties which by then were centuries old. The administrative achievements of Sunni Ali were often undertaken without utilization of his Muslim subjects in the urban areas. Later, in 1463, Askia Muhammad usurped the throne with a change of dynasty, consolidated Sunni Ali's conquests through his well-equipped and experienced calvary and river navy, and deliberately used Islam as a device to bind these enormous areas together.

As late as 1583, at the end of the long reign of Askia Da'ud, the highly complex empire was apparently functioning more or less without strain. Trade was secure, and the perennial external threats from the Tuaregs (nomadic Berbers of the Sahara) were being controlled. Yet, within ten years, a tiny Moroccan army, using firearms for the first time in
the Western Sudanic area, had not only defeated the Songhai armies but were in the process of systematically exploiting the wealth of the system in a way which had not been attempted before.

The Moroccans were operating under a different set of conditions than had previously governed military campaigns, conquests, and tributary relations in the Western Sudan. They took out resources and put nothing back, except an administration whose sole purpose was exploitation. Furthermore, they apparently had no interest in, or resources for, administering an area wider than the middle Niger, and there was not an indigenous dynasty able to do so. The end result was a destruction of the political unity of the Western Sudan. Trade became insecure and shifted eastwards (where Hausaland and Bornu reaped the benefits). Towns declined and Islam stagnated. A clear watershed is provided, therefore, to end our survey of the manner in which central political authority was established over the territorially vast empires of the Western Sudan.

**LEGITIMATION OF AUTHORITY IN THE WESTERN SUDAN**

We will now examine the means by which authority was legitimized in the Western Sudan. At this point, the institution of kingship assumes a crucial role. With few exceptions, centralized political systems in Africa have taken a monarchical form, and the Western Sudanic states have followed this pattern. Some Islamic states in the Western Sudan in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries could best be categorized as democractic republics (for example Futa Toro), but these Islamic communities which espoused the sovereignty of the group as a whole, were not a threat to the monarchies of the medieval empires.

Separating, for the moment, the office of ruler from the powers of the ruler, we find the "office" already hallowed by tradition in our early descriptions of Ghana. The court ceremonial described by Al-Bakri in A.D. 1065 and the distinction between what the king wears, and what his nobles wear, are surely pointers to the way in which the monarch gradually set himself above not only his subjects but the members of his own lineage. By the time of
Ibn Battuta's visit to Mali in the 1350's, the king, or "Mansa Mali," wore trousers which were exclusive to this office. This was part of a process of elevating the office, if not always the office-holder, above the normal authority of lineage status, even if the lineage had become "royal."

RITUAL REINFORCEMENT OF AUTHORITY

Theories of divine kingship or at least of a ritual leadership, were often employed to enhance the mystique or magic of the ruler's office. To look to North Africa or Egypt for the source of the diffusion of these concepts of divine kingship, seems hardly necessary and probably misdirected. Religion was invariably harnessed to the ideology of the ruling groups, at times in very obvious ways. In Ghana, for instance, gold nuggets which were mined were handed over to the king—in part, because it was regarded as bad luck to discover one, but the ruler had sufficient religious power to overcome whatever evil influence might be attached to the gold. As ritual ruler, the king becomes more than just the contact between his lineage members and their ancestors; he attempts to become the living representative of all the ancestors of all the lineages included within the political unit, which, through administrative and ideological means, is being shaped into a kingdom or empire.

Apart from some extreme examples in Bornu, the function of "ritual" leadership common among the Western Sudanese monarchs was generally blended with other functions and corroborated these other functions. The king was head of the government, the judiciary, and the army, as well as being the chief lawmaker. These were the functions of kingship, combined in the person of the office holder, and these were the rights and obligations, privileges and duties which, despite war and conquest, were handed over intact to each successor to royal power. The ritual function should not be underestimated; it is most clearly important in matters related to the succession to leadership.

Some information about the ritual aspects of high office can perhaps be gleaned from linguistic evidence concerning the various titles of the king. "Ghana" when used as the king's title, appears to have meant
chief of war: he was also called Kaya-maghan, or chief of the gold. Throughout the Western Sudan spoken words have special powers, and the name given to a king in a myth of origin, can be very enlightening. Such names are generally connected with attributes such as health, wealth, and fertility, and they emphasize the ritual role of the king as protector of the land and the families on it. Assumption of the throne, therefore, buttressed by the ritual sanctions which surround it, was the most common and most efficacious means of legitimation.

The Influence of Islam on Legitimation

The adherence to Islam of many rulers may not have been intended to enhance their legitimacy, but it clearly could have had this effect. In the first place, Islamic law, which was codified and taught in the schools, laid down quite clearly the various aspects the ruler's role and the basis on which he held his authority. In Islamic theory, this was because God willed it and thus he was chosen by the Muslim community. Withdrawal of one's allegiance to the temporal ruler was a grave sin. The return of Askia Muhammad from Mecca to Songhai after his appointment as Caliph for the Western Sudan presumably added another unifying, legitimating factor to the political system. The detailed nature of Islamic law, with its regulations for taxation and administration, could also be expected to provide a theoretical legitimacy for the core of the royal administration, as well as for the royal power itself. There is, of course, no historical answer to the question of whether Islam did help to legitimize these states; this would require knowledge regarding the attitudes of the subjects to the claims of the ruler.

The Islamic factor worked in reverse, however, and a non-Muslim ruler could never be sure in times of religious upheaval, or during wars or crises in general, of the loyalty of devout Muslims. The Western Sudan has been famous not only for its accommodation between Islamic and traditional beliefs and practices, but also for its periods of fanatical proselytization and intolerance. Sunni Ali was very severe on the Muslims of Timbuktu for what he considered their lukewarm support of him against the Muslim Tuaregs. It seems that their chief judge, however, viewed himself as an independent ruler of a Muslim city within the largely non-Muslim state of Songhai.
Later, the Askia's secretary and adviser is supposed to have betrayed him when confronting the Moroccans because of his coolness toward Islam and his encouragement of pagan practices. Strictly interpreted, Islamic doctrine did not permit a Muslim to live in a pagan state; and in times of religious upheaval, withdrawal of allegiance from the pagan ruler, followed by emigration, followed in turn by holy war, was a common pattern.

Clearly a ruler embracing Islam faced possible gains and losses. He gained a broader base for his legitimacy, if not among all his subjects, at least among the Muslim traders, many of them foreigners, staying in his realm. The vast and ancient trade network had brought many non-Saharan trading families into permanent residence in the towns of the area. A separate residential area for "white" Muslim traders within the urban complex of the Ghana capital was noted by Al-Bakri. The Susu invasion of Ghana soon produced an emigration of the Muslims to Walata, away from the rule of a non-Muslim king. The same emigration occurred when the pagan Denianke dynasty was established in the Futa Toro region (in Senegal), with such cities as Takrur, Sila, Berissa, rapidly declining in consequence. Dia Kossi of Songhai became Muslim, we are told by the Ta'rikh al-Sudan, to please the traders upon whom he relied for caravan trade. Different peoples needed different spurs to their loyalty, and the effort to secure over-all legitimacy was always a tightrope.

The Muslim ruler stood to lose the loyalty of those of his subjects who were non-Muslims and who were most concerned with the survival of the old beliefs and rituals. Presumably this is one of the major reasons why pre-Islamic customs and rituals were allowed and maintained in the courts of the Muslim rulers. This was noticed of all the rulers of whom we have descriptions. Dia Kossi made no attempt to force his new religion upon his subjects, and even such a thoroughgoing Muslim as Askia Muhammad was careful to retain these traditional observances.

THE MAINTENANCE OF AUTHORITY IN THE WESTERN SUDAN

We now turn to the maintenance of political authority which has been "established" and "legitimized." It is here that we can deal with the
practical side of Sudanic government and observe the clearest lines of development. Two major issues are involved: first, the maintenance and extension of the ruler's authority over both the core and the periphery of the empire, and secondly, his authority over other members of the ruling elite. The essence of the political relationship between ruler and ruled is the monopoly of coercive force held by the ruler. The fact that in most traditional African political systems there were institutionalized channels for the subjects to make their voices heard and to exercise sanctions against misrule, does not invalidate this relational principle.

Administrative Structures

The head of a mere lineage, meeting traditional problems with traditional resources, would outwardly differ little from his peers. He would not need many officers to assist him. The development of an administration when the area and nature of his political authority is enlarged, however, becomes necessary and indeed, provides a valuable indicator as to the scale of this enlargement. The "Oriental" system, referred to earlier, administered its vast domains with only three departments of state: those concerned with finance, war, and public works—or as one author has put it: plunder at home, plunder abroad and reproduction of self. In the Sudanic region, 'Uthman b. Fudi taught and wrote that oppression exists only because government exists and that the number of public officers should be kept at a minimum. Governments, however, seem to develop a momentum of their own which inevitably makes for enlarged and more complex administrations. In this way, a lineage head could become an emperor.

By the time of our first full accounts of Ghana in 1065, the ruler has with him at court his counsellors, the town governor, and the sons of princes. Already, therefore, there are indications of a palace administration and a government. Possibly the princes' sons, and not their fathers, were there because the latter were concerned with provincial administration. To keep the families of provincial administrators at court as hostages for the loyalty of their fathers is a practice well-known to this area. At the Mali court in 1352, there was both an inner circle of officials and an outer circle of cavalry commanders, executioners, heralds, and so on. Sunni Ali
(1464-1492), after dividing the empire into provinces, insured that his local governors had administrations of their own; and Askia Muhammad (1495-1528) took over this bureaucratic framework, enlarged it, and made it more detailed and complex than ever before. Aside from the military administration, there were separate civil officials in charge of justice, finance, royal buying and selling, farming, forestry, wages, property questions, court arrangements, food supplies, and other functions. From at least the eleventh century, when al-Bakri tells us that the Ghana ruler's major ministers were Muslîms, the royal administration can be assumed to have had a literate bureaucracy supporting it. The effect of this factor in strengthening and standardizing the administration and in spreading awareness of the law and decrees of the central government must have been great. A literate bureaucracy is also more open to the diffusion of new administrative techniques, which in turn can help buttress its own power.

Finance and Taxation

The ever-increasing size of administration meant growing problems of finance. This was generally handled through gifts to the officials by the ruler or by the granting of what amounted to privileges-of-exploitation on their own behalf. Though greatly enlarged in size and detail, this disbursement is still only a continuation of the process whereby the ruler expropriates from society a disposable surplus with which he then secures the loyalty of his followers. The title-holder was usually an administrator in the Western Sudan, and the collection and retention of part of the royal revenue was a routine way to reward the elite.

Seen as a burden upon those who paid the "taxes," namely the traders and craftsmen of the towns, the tributary monarchs, and the farmers of the countryside, there seems to have been a steady increase in oppressive exploitation. Askia Muhammad, for example, was apparently able to exact one-third of Kano's revenue as tribute. In Kanem-Bornu under the rigorous rule of Mai Idris Alooma (1570-1602), the spiral effect of enlarged administration, necessitating increased taxation which in turn necessitated and facilitated further extension of the administration, was seen at its clearest.
With the growth of administrations, the numerous administrators began to constitute a barrier between the ruler and his subjects, thus further attenuating the links of lineage and traditional loyalty. Access to the royal ear must have been more and more limited to the chosen few. Another important development to be noted at this stage lies in the extension of the concept of "public affairs" which the expansion of the administration indicates. More and more activities and problems which had formerly been conducted and settled by traditional, local, or kinship institutions were now becoming the concern of the central government. The scope of "public affairs" increased step by step with the enlargement of the public power.

Communications are clearly crucial for the maintenance of centralized authority, so that the imperial existence can be observed and made familiar, and for its decisions to be received and obeyed. This necessitates large-scale public works, and it is the provision of surplus wealth and availability of labor to accomplish these which has led some scholars to observe similarities between the "Oriental despotism" system and that obtaining in, say, early sixteenth-century Songhai.

The Extension of the Bases of Authority

Let us now turn to the ruler's maintenance and extension of authority vis-à-vis the ruling elite—the normal source of a potential rival. We have seen that the earliest basis for the ruler's authority lay in his position as lineage head and as repository of vital ritual functions. Within this framework, traditional institutions were in operation to control and balance his exercise of authority. At the same time it would seem that the ruler could enlarge his authority both within the limits allowed him by tradition, and outside those limits, in opposition to the customary restraints imposed upon him.

In the former case, within the traditional limits, he might, for example, build up a basis of acquired wealth, by operating as a trader in a personal capacity. This would not necessarily preclude his use of the state machine to serve this enterprise, and the distinction between his personal and official power and wealth would be blurred. Another basis for the ruler's wealth was possession of force adequate to collect protection money. Thus, the Ghana
ruler's import, export, and productivity taxes on trade and gold mining had the effect of building up a surplus of wealth which was at his disposal and presumably without traditional restraints on its disbursement. One of many examples of the ruler intervening in trade is given by Leo Africanus who tells us that in Kanem-Bornu in the early years of the sixteenth century only royal agents were allowed to trade slaves for horses. The colossal fortunes amassed by the Mali and Songhai rulers can be regarded in this light, though by this period extension of the political authority of the ruler had long broken out of the strictly traditional limits set to it.

This accumulation of mobile wealth by the ruler (gold, agricultural products, livestock) was paralleled by his acquisition of a servile labor force, still presumably within the customary limits of his authority. The Ta'rikh al-Fattach tells us of the twenty-four servile castes of specialist workers which the Songhai ruler in some way had inherited from the days of the hegemony of Mali. If these castes then can be regarded as a kind of domain of the office of Mansa Mali and thus of the Askia of Songhai, this is a vivid example of the institutionalized continuity between Mali and Songhai. These castes had specific obligations to perform for the ruler, such as the provision of a hundred spears and a hundred arrows yearly from each family among the groups of metal workers. The sailors and fishermen had to provide dried fish, canoes, and crews. Other castes provided bodyguards and palace servants. Still others cut grass for thatching and as fodder for the cavalry.

These castes seem to have been of great antiquity, but there is no indication that the disposal of the wealth they produced was limited by anything other than the ruler's inclination and exigencies of state. Some of them, in fact, were eventually disposed of by sale, though this seems to have been a breach of tradition. The demand for compulsory labor from freemen was also probably against ancient custom, though in late fifteenth-century Kano we find Muhammad Rumfa demanding labor of his free subjects.
To this fund of acquired wealth (gold, goods, and labor), we might with qualifications, add land. The statement that the ruler was owner of the land is best regarded as a juridical fiction, probably stemming from his ancient ritual function of allocating land to fellow lineage members. Land, however, was allocated to officials for the support of their office and was also available to the ruler, and others, for the settlement of slave plantations. This later development was probably more common in Hausaland and Kanem-Bornu than further west. In 1450, the ruler of Kano, at that time a tributary of Kanem-Bornu, sent out expeditions specifically for the acquisition of slaves and is said to have established twenty-one settlements, each one containing one thousand royal slaves. In Kanem-Bornu at the time of Mai Idris Alooma, slavery was becoming institutionalized in new and wider forms, side by side with, and probably due to the demands of, the growing weight of the administration.

The ruler thus established a secure basis in wealth to support his attempt to shake off the restraints on his authority and power set up by the traditional lineage systems. This wealth would also support him against his rivals within the elite. However, as other members of the royal lineage became administrators, they also could move toward the establishment of a non-traditional power base.

The traditional opponents to a ruler's enlarged power are usually to be found in such institutions as his council, whose membership would originally be representative and perhaps hereditary. Whoever controls the investiture ceremony would also be expected to be a force for the preservation of customary, limited authority, with potent sanctions at his disposal. In sixteenth-century Hausaland we find examples of traditional councils in conscious counterpose to the court officials, the former seemingly retaining some of their ancient representative quality. This process can perhaps be seen as part of a gradual transition from a "segmentary" to a "pyramidal" to a centralized political system. Yet the inference of law and custom and the attempt to limit the centralized power of the ruler can perhaps be seen behind many of the depositions of the rulers of Mali and Songhai. Oral traditions on the whole support this interpretation, but evidence is still inadequate.
There was here, as everywhere, a difference between the formal law or "constitution" and actual procedures. It is not clear whether the introduction of a codified law, as in Islamic states, makes for more or less flexibility on the part of the government. In the medieval period the newness of Islam was generally accommodated to traditional practices and beliefs and seems to have produced a greater adaptability to change. This is part of what has been described as the "open predicament," where the availability of alternative modes of thought and behavior is held to produce the possibility of a leap beyond the traditional belief systems. Thus, breaches made in the traditional structure of law and beliefs, may have made possible the extension of royal power in other areas.

In general, the ruler attempts to increase his power by such techniques as controlling the succession process, appointing his kinsmen to administer the provinces, and by making ritual additions to the office of kingship. At a later stage, however, he begins to recruit to the administration personnel whose loyalty to him is personal and not due to traditional lineage ties. His wealth and control of the army enable him to secure this loyalty.

The new basis for recruitment to the elite is therefore central to this extension of authority: power and privilege being accorded to the king's men on the basis of achieved status rather than ascriptive right—that is, recognized merit (or expected loyalty) rather than hereditary position. From the evidence, it is quite likely that in early Ghana tribute was collected by servile officials who had their own administrative staff for particular regions. Slave officials are common and often influential in administrations, such officials being unable, of course, to have an independent hereditary power base from which to contest the authority of their master. A servile royal bodyguard to strengthen the palace against traditional threats is a common feature of this period and area. Slaves, however, were known to challenge successfully their royal masters, as when the slave Sakura usurped power in Mali. Under Mai Idris Alooma in Kanem-Bornu this process was well advanced, and although the old customs were preserved, the Mai depended very much on officials whom he had
appointed personally, such as the palace eunuchs, whose most important attribute was that they would not be in a position to build up a dynastic challenge to the ruler. Other candidates for office under a ruler protecting himself from the perpetual rivalry of members of the royal lineage would tend to be affinal and/or maternal relatives or loyal supporters from non-royal groups within the ruling class. The creation of new chieftaincies, or offices, is usually a sign that the ruler is centralizing power in his own hands by creating chiefs who will be unlikely to have natural bonds of loyalty with the older traditional chiefs. The extension of the administration by Sunni Ali and Askia Muhammad must surely be seen in this light. A point to note is that this tendency to promote officials from outside the traditional circles of recruitment produced, at the top, a considerable degree of two-way social mobility which may well have affected relations with non-ruling segments of the community.

In summary, then, the ruler built up a solid basis of wealth and force; his administration grew in order to cope with new conquests and peaceful expansion of control. The administration was maintained by this wealth and in turn created more wealth. At this level the state can be said to be centralized—central authority was exercised over outlying provinces, and public power intruded more and more into the life of the village, the family, and the individual. At a different level, the state became centralized when the ruler asserted his control over various hereditary office holders, using his wealth and power to secure the services of officials who have no basis of power other than through him. By these means the centralized political authority of the rulers of the Western Sudan was maintained over a vast area for a thousand years.
SLAVERY AND THE NEW WORLD

Peter Hammond

The Black ancestors of many Americans began arriving in the New World from West Africa in the early 1500's, nearly five centuries ago, and long before the migration of most Americans' European and Asian ancestors. The importation of these old-stock, Black inhabitants to the New World affected profoundly the historical and cultural development of almost every American nation--from Chile to Colombia in South America, all of Central America, the islands of the Caribbean, and most of North America from Mexico to Canada.

During the more than four centuries that the slave trade was in operation, between four and five million West Africans were captured, sold into slavery, and brought forcibly to the New World. Today their descendants number close to one hundred million, not counting the several million Indian and white Americans whose partial African ancestry is no longer apparent from their appearance.

But despite the many nations and the enormous numbers of peoples involved, the consequences of the centuries long, intensive, forced migration of West Africans to the New World are still poorly understood, partly because a number of misleading myths have been kept alive--such as the idea that Black Americans had come from so many parts of Africa and were possessed of such differing cultures and languages that their traditions were necessarily lost in the confusion, or the idea that the blacks abandoned their own "inferior" customs once they had a chance to adopt the "obviously superior" culture of the whites--and partly because much about the African aspect of the Black Americans' origins still remains to be learned.
From what is known there appear to be three principal dimensions to the problem of accurately assessing the effects upon New World cultures and upon individual Americans of the centuries of intensive contact with West Africa. First the part of West Africa from which the ancestors of most Black Americans were taken and sold into slavery needs to be identified. Then the institution of Negro slavery and its relation to the plantation economy need to be examined. Finally the post-emancipation phase of Afro-American cultural history requires attention.

To attempt such an assessment in a short essay, it is necessary to generalize about West Africa, about slavery and the plantation, and about the more recent historical past of the Afro-Americans. This is not so difficult. For while the parts of West Africa from which slaves were taken varies in specifics of environment and culture, just as did the interrelated institutions of slavery and the plantation, and while there have been important local differences in the post-emancipation history of Negro Americans in various parts of the New World, a generally accurate over-all picture can nevertheless be drawn.

WEST AFRICAN ORIGINS

Most Africans captured and sold into slavery in the New World were taken from an area along the West coast of the continent which stretches from what is now Senegal and Gambia in the north, south through Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, Dahomey, and Nigeria and across the coastal region of Cameroon through the Congo and into Angola.

Slaves were also brought to the Americas from other regions of Africa, but only later, after the first arrivals from the West African coast had established a pattern of life and an accommodation to slavery to which later Africans could adjust relatively easily. Most non-West African captives were taken from Portuguese Mozambique in East Africa. Smaller numbers came from Tanzania and Kenya, further north on the East African coast. A negligible number were brought from Ethiopia and from the huge interior of the continent, and practically none from the countries of North Africa.
Although the peoples of West Africa, from whom so many Americans are descended, possess distinctive cultures and speak many languages—several hundred dialects in Nigeria alone—the cultural and linguistic differences which separate them are less significant for an understanding of Afro-American cultural history than are the underlying similarities which united the peoples from this region.

Most of the coastal area of West Africa is heavily forested, temperature and humidity are high, and rainfall is heavy. From very earliest times up to the present, the peoples of the forest region have made their living in one of two principal ways: as fishermen in the coastal waters of the Atlantic or in the larger rivers, and as farmers working garden plots cut out of the thick rainforest. Inland and to the north where rainfall and vegetation are more sparse, farmers cultivate cereals, mostly millet and sorghum, during the few short months of summer when there is adequate rain. Herding is also an important activity in this drier zone. Most cattle, sheep, and goats are tended by pastoral nomadic groups, principally the Fulani.

Farmwork, the herdsmen's tasks, and fishing are all organized on the basis of strong family ties. Kinsmen may share ownership of the land, or of the animals they tend collectively. Family organization complemented by cooperative relationships between neighbors also provides the organizational basis for the distribution of almost all food, housing and household materials, clothing, and other consumption goods. Traditionally markets have functioned primarily as an adjustive mechanism for the reallocation of surpluses.

Kinship is equally important in the organization of traditional West African social life. The extended family—a man and his wife, or wives, his dependent children, his married sons, and their wives and children—often inhabit a single compound residence, usually located near the similarly organized households of other closely related family groups. Most kinsmen trace descent through the paternal line. However, a number of West African peoples, especially in the forest zone, are matrilineal, reckoning descent through the female line. But, whatever the specific family organization, the
authority of the male family head has always been strong, both in the regulation of activities within the kin group and in the life of the local community.

Because most West Africans live close to the level of subsistence, producing little in excess of their basic material needs, and also because of the emphasis on sharing surpluses, there has been little opportunity for the private accumulation of wealth necessary for the development of social classes. Beyond the family, age-grade and other ascriptive ties are the principal alternative bases of community organization.

The political systems of most West African coastal peoples also appear to have developed out of systems of status and authority based on family organization. Among centralized societies, the right to hold political office, as a village or provincial chief, or as king, is usually passed on from father to son within a descent group regarded as the founding family of the local population sector, village, province, or kingdom. In the many West African communities which lack any tradition of centralized authority, the relations outside the kin group are regulated and conflict is controlled by religious leaders or other ritual intermediaries with limited power.

Religion in West Africa is also significantly influenced by family organization. Ancestor worship, that is, the veneration of the protective spirits of deceased members of the kin group, is an important aspect of the belief systems of nearly all the peoples of the rainforest region. Living members of the family endeavor to maintain a benevolent relationship to their ancestral protectors by means of periodic sacrificial offerings, and by conducting their affairs in accordance with the ancestors' rules.

Worship of the powerful beings believed to vitalize the natural environment is another characteristic aspect of West African religion. These deities are also propitiated with sacrificial offerings and through the observances of other rituals, especially taboos and prohibitions relating to land use, hunting, fishing, and the gathering of wild foods.

Other gods and a rich variety of major and minor spirits are also venerated, providing the West African believer with a diffuse field of sources of supernatural support. If one god fails him, there is almost
always another to turn to. Worship of the supernatural often takes the form of dancing, to the accompaniment of rhythmic drumming, singing, and hand clapping, intended to induce possession by various spirits and deities.

While music and the dance are highly developed as esthetic forms, most music is related to religion. Specifics of musical style vary considerably from region to region, but the similarities between the musical traditions of particular peoples are greater than the differences—the use of overlapping call and response patterns, the stress upon rhythm, percussive sounds, multiple meter, and off-beat phrasing are used throughout West Africa. Sculpture, wood carving, brass casting, and iron work are also widespread and popular esthetic forms. Finally, myths, proverbs, and fables, most transmitted orally, often by professional poets and storytellers, serve as an important esthetic mode for the expression of values, and often as a repository of historical traditions—lessons from the past which serve as useful guides for action in the present.

Although the many languages and dialects of West Africa are often mutually unintelligible, most of those within the forested coastal belt are structurally quite similar; they are as closely related, for example, as the Romance languages of Western Europe. Furthermore most West Africans are bilingual and probably speak one of the several widely understood trade languages, such as Hausa, Bambara, and Nioula.

BEGINNINGS OF THE SLAVE TRADE

Although slavery existed in West Africa before the Europeans appeared there, it was generally a more benign institution than that developed by the colonists in the Americas. In West Africa, there was no technological or economic basis for the profitable employment of a large slave labor force. Most farmers held the right only to the amount of land they needed and could work themselves. According to the rules of the economic and social systems which still prevail throughout most of West Africa, men are expected to redistribute among needy kinsmen any land they hold in excess of their own subsistence requirements.
Where slaves, usually captives taken in war, were held, their masters typically worked in the fields beside them. Often they lived as members of their owners' households, and frequently they married or were formally adopted into the slave owners' families. Only a few despotic rulers—often West African kings whose traditionally limited wealth and power had been greatly expanded by the profits they took as intermediaries in the European sponsored slave trade—made use of slave labor on a scale and under conditions of oppressiveness comparable to those which prevailed in the Americas.

The Portuguese and Spanish explorers, forerunners among the European slave traders, had originally made contact with the coastal peoples of West Africa in order to establish provisioning stations for ships sailing south around the African continent en route to the rich trading centers of the East Indies and mainland Asia. Later, missionaries were sent out; diplomats followed. Several West African rulers reciprocated, sending their representatives to Lisbon, Madrid, and to the Vatican Court in Rome.

At the time, during the late fifteenth and very early sixteenth centuries, slavery was a familiar institution in parts of the Mediterranean world. The Turks and the Moors held Europeans in bondage; and in Spain and Portugal both captive Arabs and smaller numbers of European and African slaves were held. However, it was only with the discovery of the Americas in the later 1400's that slavery became important as an economically profitable institution.

The fertile tropical and subtropical lands bordering the Caribbean and the islands of the West Indies were rich both in minerals and in agricultural potential. But workers were needed to exploit the new territories. The small, widely scattered Indian populations of the Caribbean region were inadequate to meet European needs. Lacking the centralized political systems which might have made conquest of the Indians possible by establishing domination over their leaders, the whites often had to kill most of the inhabitants of an area in order to control it. In any case Indian populations were too small in number to meet the labor needs resulting from the expanding European-controlled mining operations and the spreading plantation system.
And so West Africa took on new interest for Europeans who until the discovery of the New World had been interested in the region primarily as a stopping place for ships in the East Indies trade. Initially, efforts had been made to maintain friendly relations with the blacks in order to safeguard trade routes, to protect the provisioning stations, and somewhat incidentally to save souls. These motives gave way to an economically and politically more compelling interest: the need for laborers to work the rich new lands across the Atlantic. The missionaries' original purpose was reinterpreted to justify their converts' enslavement. The traffic in West African bodies was rationalized and justified both on the basis of providing the blacks with an opportunity to benefit from contact with the "superior" culture of the Europeans and, by conversion, to increase their chance of salvation.

By the seventeenth century the provisioning stations and missionary settlements along the West Coast of Africa had been transformed into slave trading forts. The Europeans as before remained in these fortified settlements, most of which were located either on easily defensible coastal promontories or on offshore islands. From there the already well organized network of trading relationships with nearby ethnic groups was expanded and transformed. From the exchange of guns, ammunition, rum, and other manufactured goods for food supplies and small quantities of gold and other minerals, trade turned to the exchange of weapons, spirits, and other goods for human captives.

The neighboring West African groups among whom slave raiding was encouraged often had long-standing traditions of mild hostility toward one another; or, more exactly, they shared no common interests and were often in conflict over territory at their frontiers. This indifference of ethnic groups to the welfare of neighboring peoples, who shared no recognition of common cultural identity or interests, facilitated the white traders' efforts to incite open hostilities. By promoting warfare, the traders justified the capture of prisoners who were then sold to the European slavers and shipped off to the Americas.
Most of the West African states among which warfare was induced were small in both population and territory. Since most slave-raiding forays were made against neighboring groups, most captives were taken quite near the coast, rarely from more than a few hundred miles inland. Consequently, although Negroes taken from different parts of West Africa were distinct from one another in many aspects of appearance, custom, and language, they none the less shared essentially similar geographical and cultural origins.

The trade routes between Europe, West Africa, and the New World formed a triangle. From European ports, manufactured goods were shipped south to the West African slave-trading forts. There, other ships specially fitted out as slavers (designed to accommodate the maximum number of persons in the minimum space and with only the most primitive facilities for keeping the human cargo alive) set out for the Americas. Over the four centuries of active slave trade millions of West Africans died in passage from disease or injuries resulting from overcrowding and mistreatment. But the profits from slave trading were high enough to allow for such losses. Those that survived the trip were unloaded at slave markets established initially on the islands of the Caribbean.

Spain and Portugal were soon joined in the trade by British, French, Dutch, and Scandinavian slavers. Most of these European powers soon set about developing colonial empires on the American mainland as well, at first in the coastal region of northeastern South America from what later became Brazil through the Guianas, Venezuela, and Colombia, then into Central America from Panama and around the Gulf of Mexico and into the southern part of what later became the United States.

The third side of the trade triangle was formed by ships sailing out from New World ports for the burgeoning markets and factories of Europe carrying the goods produced by captured West African laborers—sugar, coffee and tobacco, cotton, gold and silver.

It was from the island slave-trading centers of the Caribbean that the first blacks were dispersed to the mainland and inland throughout tropical and subtropical America—wherever minerals were available or conditions were
right for the development of plantations. Later, especially in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, slave cargoes were taken directly to ports on the mainland itself.

With time, of course, the numbers of the originally West African slave populations were augmented by natural increase, and thus new generations of Americans were born to slavery. It was into these already well-established slave populations of the Americas that later captives from West Africa were introduced. The cultural traditions which developed in these early black communities were strongly influenced by the customs of the first arrivals. Slaves from Dahomey predominated among the earliest black cargoes landed in Haiti, for example, and specifically Dahomean cultural usages persist even today among the Haitian peasantry. Where the Yoruba were settled early and in large numbers, as in Cuba and northeastern Brazil, Yoruba cultural usages prevailed. The smaller numbers of slaves coming later, from other parts of West Africa, directly, or by way of the West Indies, found it easy to adjust their customs to the prevailing Afro-American culture patterns already established.

THE INSTITUTION OF SLAVERY AND PLANTATION ECONOMY

Just as the specific West African cultural and geographical origins of the slave populations differed from one New World region to another, so did the institution of slavery itself. In colonial areas under Catholic control, for example, recognition of the slave as a man with a soul, and thus a human being with rights which his owner and the political system were formally required to respect, affected the legal definition of the slave's status, his conditions of work, the circumstances under which he might be emancipated, and his position in society once he was free. Over time there was a tendency in all parts of the New World to equate racial identity with social status; but in the Latin areas of the New World this association was never as immutable as in the territories under Anglo-Saxon control. In the Latin American regions there persisted as part of the legacy of slavery in Spain and Portugal, the tradition that the status of slave was simply one of several possible positions a man might have—an admittedly disadvantageous position, but one
which might be altered in several ways. A slave might work to purchase his freedom. He might petition his master or the government for his emancipation. Or he might be freed at his owner's death. That a slave might wish to be free was regarded as natural. Assisting him to obtain his freedom was defined as a religiously and ethically commendable act.

In contrast, in most of the New World territories under British, French, and American control slavery was a new institution, specifically developed as a legal means of defining the economic, social, and political position of the captive black workers in such a way as to provide for the most profitable exploitation of their labor, and to assure perpetuation of the institution of slavery itself. To provide for the continuity of the system, it was necessary to justify enslavement of the children of slaves and to assure the continued servitude of those few blacks who were able, despite the obstacles placed in their way, to acquire proficiency in the culture of the dominant whites. Enslavement of the West Africans had originally been justified on the basis of their cultural "inferiority" and "heathenism." To perpetuate the system it was necessary to make the fact of being black, or of Negro descent, reason enough for enslavement. This rationale gained needed support from development of the useful concept of the Negroes' innate, racially-determined inferiority. At worst the blacks were animals; at best, children. Enslavement of people who were by nature to be unfit for freedom was clearly and conveniently justified. The fact of being Negro and the fact of being a slave were thus almost irrevocably linked.

Most of the earliest plantations were established in the lowland areas immediately inland from the coast of the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico, and the South Atlantic where it touches the southern United States. The most profitable plantation operations involved the large-scale, intensive cultivation of cash crops of coffee, sugar, and cotton, using large gangs of slave workers. As in West Africa, most field work on the plantations was done with the hand-held hoe. There was little irrigation, and fertilizers and draft animals were not usually employed. In many ways the technology to which the slaves were forced to adjust was similar to that they had known in West Africa.
In striking contrast to the familiarity of the technology and of tasks the slaves were required to perform on the plantations, was the radical transformation of the black workers' economic and social position. This was especially true for male slaves. In West Africa, they and their kinsmen owned the farmland they worked, the tools they used, and the goods they produced. And, of course, they owned themselves and the right to their own labor. They were in control of their family-based work organization, and together with the other local family heads they also controlled the community-wide economic system. All this was totally changed under slavery. Black laborers did not own the land they worked, the tools they used, the goods they produced, or even themselves. They were property--part of their master's capital goods--to be utilized in production or sold on the market in accordance with the slave owner's economic interest.

The economic powerlessness of the slaves affected nearly every other aspect of their lives and strongly influenced the distinctive patterns of the Afro-American subculture which was emerging throughout the New World. Such powerlessness limited the black man's ability to control his own destiny and that of his family and community. In West Africa an important aspect of a man's authority had been and still is today derived from his control over the allocation of almost all goods--land, tools, and what is produced by them--which his dependents required to meet their material needs. As a chattel in the New World, the black man's economic powerlessness resulted in a loss or lack of authority within his family, and sharply limited his authority within the slave community as well. In dealing with white-dominated society his powerlessness was even more complete and was further reinforced by a variety of laws limiting his right to hold property, to engage in certain occupations, or to sell his own labor.

In the Americas, under slavery the strong, male-oriented family of West Africa could not exist. The slave family in the New World was generally centered around the mother. The role of the black father was frequently no more than biological. Aside from his function as progenitor, he was largely expendable. The existence of strong family ties within the black
community was a threat to the slave owner's most profitable use of property and to the perpetuation of the slave system itself.

In West Africa the male-dominated household was typically an integral part of a closely organized system of extended kinship relations, complemented by associational ties of various sorts such as, bond-friend relationships, joking alliances, secret societies, and voluntary associations. But in the Americas the matrifocal slave family became the only stable social unit within the otherwise purposefully nucleated and inevitably unstable slave society.

However, New World slave society was not entirely without internal structure. The superior social and economic position of house servants and slaves who worked as artisans was accompanied by differences in behavior, in speech, manners, consumption patterns, and other aspects of life style. House servants had both a better opportunity to model their behavior upon that of their masters and greater material means for emulating aspects of their owners' living habits.

Despite the various restrictions usually placed on the status of freedmen--on their right to hold property, to exercise the franchise, to live in particular areas, even to dress in particular ways--all of which were enforced with the intent of inhibiting their social mobility and preventing them from competing with whites, these "free people of color" usually occupied a somewhat more elevated social position than did the blacks, field hands and house servants alike, who were still enslaved. A few ex-slaves owned slaves themselves. With time, further differences in social class developed within the free Negro population based on differences in economic status and frequently also on degree of "white admixture." These distinctions were for the most part a reflection of the social class divisions of the dominant white society.

Under slavery, changes in traditional West African patterns of political activity were as drastic as those which marked the alteration of economic and social relationships. Slaves were almost universally excluded from authority positions, except within the servant hierarchy.
They could neither vote nor hold office. While they were subject to punishment under the law, they were permitted no part in law making or in its enforcement. Even their access to the courts was limited largely to litigation involving other blacks, and most such conflicts were settled outside the formal judicial system. Most of these same limitations on participation in the political system were extended to free Negroes as well.

THE DEVELOPING BLACK AMERICAN SUBCULTURE

The sphere of cultural expression least affected by slavery was religion. In fact, to the extent that religion provided a means of channeling black frustration and hostility in a manner not threatening to the dominant social order, the Negro observance of many aspects of traditional African religious practices was often actually encouraged. The degree of retention of traditional West African religious observances was largely a function of the cultural isolation of the various New-World Negro groups. Among the bush Negroes of Dutch and French Guiana, for example, many aspects of West African religion were retained in almost pure form: the West African names of the deities, specific beliefs concerning their powers, and the observances involved in their worship. Elsewhere, among other Afro-American groups in closer contact with European culture, as in Haiti and Brazil, aspects of African religious belief and practice were more often syncretized with elements of Roman Catholicism. Thus, St. Patrick, alleged to have driven the snakes out of Ireland, is identified with the Dahomean snake deity, "Dambala Wedo," by voodoo practitioners in Haiti; and in Brazil, "Yemenja," the Yoruba goddess of the waters and of purity was fused with the Catholic image of the Virgin Mary.

In those parts of the Americas where the black population was less culturally isolated and has as a consequence become more highly acculturated, elements of West African religious practice were often reinterpreted. This can be seen in the United States in the use among fundamentalist sects in the rural South and in the store-front churches of the northern ghettos, of repetitive, rhythmic body movements made to a syncopated musical
accompaniment, intended to induce possession, but not by an African deity, or by a being from the voodoo pantheon, but by the Holy Ghost himself.

The greater tolerance by white society of traditional black religious observances provided also for development of one channel for status achievement and authority within the black community—the role of religious leader. Access to positions of religious leadership was facilitated by the importance given to criteria such as strength of personality and evidence of contact with supernatural power, as opposed to formal education and wealth. Thus, during the centuries of New World slavery, the only leaders in the black communities of the Americas were religious leaders, and the only organizations permitted the blacks were religious organizations.

Partly as a result of the close relation between art and religion many of the West African forms of esthetic expression brought to the Americas by the enslaved blacks were retained. Music and dance, as well as a variety of plastic and graphic art forms, are an integral aspect of most indigenous forms of worship in West Africa. Vocal and instrumental music, dancing and the symbolic representation of supernatural beings in the form of sculptured figures and masks have been for centuries essential aspects of observances in West Africa in which worshippers attempt to achieve some control over the supernatural powers which they believe affect their destinies.

As with the religious beliefs and practices, the degree to which traditional West African esthetic forms have been retained, syncretized with aspects of European or Indian art, or reinterpreted has been largely determined by the relative cultural isolation of particular black populations. For example, in parts of the forest regions of the Guianas where escaped slaves from the Dutch- and French-owned plantations fled into the interior and re-established West African patterns of life, West African oral literary traditions were retained in essentially pure form. Characteristically West African tales such as one concerning the Spider Trickster, "Anansi," continue to be told with most elements of their original narrative style and plot intact.
Elsewhere, where contact between the captive blacks, their descendants, and the whites has been more intensive, the proverbs, folktales, and riddles which are the most characteristic forms of West African oral literature have been more extensively reinterpreted or syncretized. "Anansi" has become "Miss Nancy" among Negroes in Jamaica, for example. In the U.S. South another stock West African character, the Hare, has become Brer Rabbit.

Although most of the languages brought to the Americas by the West Africans were related in their essential linguistic elements—underlying morphology, grammar, and syntax—they were usually sufficiently dissimilar on the level of vocabulary to be mutually unintelligible. Consequently, in nearly all areas of the New World new languages developed as a means of communication among the captive blacks themselves, with whites, and with the Indians. Out of the merging of the distinctive linguistic traditions of these three groups—West Africans, Europeans, and American Indians—creole languages developed which took specifically different form in the different areas where slave populations were settled. In Haiti, for example, and in other of the Caribbean islands intermittently under French and Spanish control, a creole language developed in which essentially West African speech patterns were overlaid with a vocabulary derived from French, Spanish, and several West African sources. Elsewhere, the principal European linguistic element added to the mixture was Dutch. In the islands of the West Indies which ultimately passed from Spanish to Dutch control, a distinctive creole, called Papiemento developed which incorporated aspects of Carib Indian speech as well; and in the more remote areas of Dutch and French Guiana, a derivative language called Taki-Taki was spoken. In the Sea Islands off the coast of South Carolina and Georgia a language called Gullah emerged which is still spoken by much of the coastal Negro population of the Southeastern United States.

The factors of greatest significance in explaining the persistence or disappearance of the distinctive subculture which developed under slavery among most Afro-Americans has therefore been the relative
geographical and cultural isolation of particular groups and the relative
technological and economic stagnation of the areas in which they are found.
The latter relationship, between the degree of such technological and
economic stagnation and the relative pace of culture change, is particularly
striking. Where the single-crop oriented plantation system established under
slavery has persisted, as in most of Haiti, in northeastern Brazil, in the
Guianas, coastal Venezuela and Colombia and in parts of the U.S. South, the
rate of change in other aspects of culture has also been slow. Consequently
elements of West African culture and of the distinctive subculture developed
by Afro-Americans has been most persistent in these areas. Centuries-old
patterns of life have continued because there was little reason or
opportunity for them to change.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL FORMS
IN THE POST-EMANCIPATION PERIOD

In the more isolated regions the economic arrangements developed under
slavery have also persisted. Even today most of the land is still in the
hands of the dominant white minority, who also own most of the tools used in
the processing, transport, and marketing of whatever is produced. Most
black workers in such areas still live on the periphery of the market
economy, still producing most of their food in small gardens, and sharply
limited by their meager income from participating—except as credit
purchasers or petty entrepreneurs—in the money-oriented, white-controlled
market. Many, working as share croppers, tenant farmers, or migrant workers,
are so chronically in debt to the land owners and the stores which advance
them food and clothing against future wages, or the value of their share
in the harvest, that their money income is spent before they receive it.

The chronic precariousness of their economic position is exacerbated
by the absence of available alternative forms of production or means of
marketing either their goods or their labor. Where a single-crop economy
is still in operation, the farmers must sell their cash crops at world
market prices which they cannot control; and in most instances they lack
both the skills and the capital necessary to develop other means of making
a living. If they are in debt they frequently cannot leave the land to seek work elsewhere; if they have paid their debts there is often no money left for such travel. Where technological innovations are occurring, where mechanized farming is being introduced or crop lands are being converted to livestock range, unskilled labor is no longer needed. Thus, the blacks often lose even their marginal position in the economy and are pushed out entirely into idleness and onto welfare, or are forced to emigrate.

The consequences of the technological and economic impasse which is so often a paramount characteristic of the black American subculture is reflected in nearly every aspect of their way of life, including social organization, relationship to the political system, religion, forms of esthetic expression, and even language.

A prominent social consequence of the stagnant technologies and economies of many areas in which Afro-Americans are found, and/or of their exclusion from new forms of technological and economic activity, has been the persistence of the matrifocal family and the characteristically unstable role of the male as a source of economic, social, and emotional support within the family. Another consequence is the fact that most blacks throughout the Americas continue to belong to the lowest social class—if they are not, in fact, relegated to a separated pariah-like caste.

In turn, economic instability and insecurity, and inferior social status are manifested in the peripheral and precarious relation of the Negro to the political system. In a few areas the tradition, developed under slavery, of excluding Afro-Americans entirely from participation in government still persists. Negroes are discouraged, intimidated, or actually refused the rights to vote, to seek political office, to testify in the courts against whites, and to enjoy equal protection of their property and civil rights. In most instances, the only agencies of government which most Afro-Americans actually know well are the police force, the police courts, and the prison system.

Religion is an important aspect of Black American subculture; and in religion the retention, syncretism, and reinterpretation of Africanism is particularly high. As with economic and political deprivation, this
phenomenon is explained by the continued, and general, cultural and social isolation of black Americans. Today, as they have for almost five centuries, Black religious leaders and their Black churches continue to serve as the principal source of cohesion and group action within Afro-American communities. Esthetic forms distinctive to Afro-American sub-culture still relate to religious behavior and as with secular forms, persist most strongly among Negro Americans who are most isolated culturally.

The languages distinctive to black communities in the New World also tend to be perpetuated in those regions in which the Negroes' cultural isolation is greatest and where the technology and economy have been slowest to change. Creole is still the language of the majority in Haiti and related creole languages are predominant on most other islands of the Caribbean. The majority of the bush Negroes of the Dutch and French Guianas continue to speak Taki-Taki. On the Sea Islands of Georgia and South Carolina and along the coast of the southeastern United States Gullah still prevails among many blacks, and "de-Gullahfied" dialects of English are spoken by the black and white majority throughout the rest of the South.

AFRO-AMERICAN CULTURE CONTACTS

Thus far contact between West Africa and Afro-Americans has been one way. From time to time small numbers of Negroes have "returned" to Africa—ex-slaves were sent back to Liberia from America in the nineteenth century, and some Afro-Brazilian families have maintained intermittent contact with their kinsmen among the Yoruba of Nigeria for centuries. But most Americans, black and white, have had neither occasion nor opportunity to visit West Africa or to acquire an objective understanding of its culture. For a long time Negro scholars and intellectuals, especially in the United States, shared the whites' negative bias toward African culture and frequently denied its relevance as an aspect of their cultural past. As for the unpleasant subject of slavery, it was apologized for, piously condemned, or ignored—rarely, until quite recently, has it been analyzed objectively.
In the last decade attention given to the newly-won independence of many of the former West African colonies has precipitated a growing awareness among Americans of the richness of West African culture and of the vitality and value of many of the cultural traditions distinctive to the Black American community. The result has been a sort of reconciliation with the West African aspect of American racial and ethnic identity, and a growing appreciation of the full dimensions of nearly five centuries of Afro-American culture contact.

In this reconsideration of the Americas' cultural ties to West Africa, the interesting but occasionally somewhat esoteric search for "Africanisms"—retentions in forms of religion, dance, and music, fascinating though they may be—is beginning to give way to an appreciation of the need for scholarly attention to such important questions as the effect of Negro slavery upon the quality and content of American life and culture and upon development of the Americas' critical problems of racism and poverty.

The ancestors of present day Afro-Americans contributed more to the New World than jazz, spirituals, chicken gumbo, and Brer Rabbit. For four centuries they contributed without pay their labor, and often their lives, to the economic development of nearly every American nation—not only to development of the plantation economies of the tropics and subtropics and to the shipping fortunes of New England, but to the accumulation of capital derived from the profits of slave labor that significantly helped finance the industrialization of much of Western Europe and all of North America.

At present, the most compelling issue related to the study of Afro-American culture contacts does not concern the academically interesting identification and analysis of Africanisms in New World culture, but the attainment of a proper understanding of the historical and cultural causes of a centuries old black-white conflict—a conflict first violently manifested in slave revolts, later in race riots, and now in near insurrection—a conflict which is still far from resolved.
To attempt an evaluation of colonialism in Africa when few of its countries have been independent for more than a decade and while some are still under colonial rule is clearly premature. What follows therefore is not so much an evaluation of colonialism as an exploration of the criteria by which it is likely to be judged in the future. This exploration is made with particular reference to France and Britain in West Africa. Colonialism in Africa presents so many aspects that to encompass the whole of Africa in the framework of this short chapter would be impossible except in a superficial way.

A major obstacle in evaluating colonialism arises from the great variations in its impact. There were seven European powers in Africa during the colonial period: Britain, France, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Belgium, and Germany. And in South Africa people of European stock, although they have long since gained their own independence from Britain, maintain a colonial relationship with the majority of African inhabitants of the country. The policies of the various colonial powers in Africa can easily be distinguished from one another, though each power did not apply its policies in a uniform fashion. Britain pursued a very different policy in West Africa from that in East Africa. The French, more inclined than the British to uniform solutions to colonial problems, treated Algeria as a département of France and Morocco as a protectorate in which she recognized the Sultan as sovereign; in Senegal she pursued a policy of political assimilation in one part of the country and of paternalistic direct rule in the other. With the exception of the politically assimilated Quatre Communes of Senegal, France's administration was
uniform for West and Equatorial Africa. But where there were European concessions, as in French Equatorial Africa, Ivory Coast, and Guinea, her policy was modified considerably. Within the framework of such differences, however, each colonial power succeeded in imposing its own personality on the territories it administered. The most striking testimony to this is the way in which Togo and Cameroon differ from the rest of French-speaking Tropical Africa as a result of their short period under German rule. Even today the German imprint is striking to the most casual visitor.

Moreover, Africa was not a tabula rasa on which the colonial powers freely drew the pictures they wished. The variation in patterns of colonial rule in Africa was very much a response on the part of Europeans to the varied structures of African society. Different policies had to be adopted for the centralized Muslim state from those for the acephalous society. Where a colonial power like France determined to establish a uniform administration for West Africa (outside the Quatre Communes of Senegal) she had to contend with the reduction in powers of the traditional rulers of centralized states and with the amalgamation of peoples who had known no political entity above the village into manageable administrative units. Even when she succeeded in breaking up the precolonial states in the Senegalese hinterland she had to contend with the emergence of a type of political leader which did not fit into her administrative framework: the Caliphs, or marabouts, of the great Muslim brotherhoods like the Tijanniyya and the Mouridiyya. The variety of traditional political organization in Africa is not indicated even by the vast number of ethnic groups inhabiting the continent. Within some ethnic groups political organization differed considerably from area to area. Perhaps the most notable example of this is the Yoruba of Western Nigeria.

The greatest obstacle to an assessment of the achievements and failures of colonialism in Africa, however, is the difficulty of viewing this recent period of history objectively. The history of colonial rule in Africa is unevenly documented, and much of the available literature is in the nature of an apologia or polemic. Few people can take a neutral stand on the question of colonialism. One is either for or against, even if one has had
no colonial experience either as ruler or subject. This comes out very clearly in debates on colonial issues at the United Nations. The majority of writers who are nationals of one of the former colonial powers tend either to seek justification for colonial rule or to be more critical of it than Africans themselves. The majority of African scholars have a bias against colonial rule which leads to ready condemnation of that which was bad, and sparing praise of that which was good. It will be a very long time, judging by the American experience, before the colonial period of African history can be judged as dispassionately as Roman rule in Britain is today.

THE BRITISH AND FRENCH IN WEST AFRICA

Though an evaluation of colonialism in Africa may not be possible at this stage of history, we can establish some of the criteria by which future generations, less emotionally involved in the many issues raised by colonialism, will attempt their evaluation. To do this, we will refer to the experience of French and British rule in West Africa.

West Africa as an area has several advantages for such a task. With the exception of Portuguese Guinea, all its territories have been independent for at least eight years--some for ten years. The multiplicity of problems experienced by the thirteen countries of West Africa since independence has tended to focus attention on the evils of the present rather than those of the past. This, coupled with the fact that they have had their independence for a comparatively long time, and, with the obvious exception of Guinea, have achieved it in comparatively harmonious relationship with the outgoing colonial powers, has meant that colonial rule is viewed less bitterly than elsewhere on the continent.

This area has another advantage in that it had no white settlers. Though there were large European populations in Senegal and Ivory Coast, settlement was never on the same scale as in Kenya or Algeria. Even in Ivory Coast where land was "sold" to Europeans, the Europeans never thought of the colony as the home in which they would retire and in which their children would live. As far as the administrators of France and Britain were concerned the European presence was incidental to the governing of Africans.
In discussing colonial rule in West Africa, and in Africa generally, one of the first problems is to decide whether "colonial rule" is the appropriate term to describe the European occupation and administration of Africans. "Foreign rule" may well be the term future generations of Africans will choose to describe an administration which their forefathers did not want and which for the most part was imposed by force or threat of force. We shall use the term "colonial rule" because the term is for the present the generally accepted one, and also because the European occupation of Africa is a special instance of the occupation of one people by another.

Technologically, the occupying powers were overwhelmingly superior to those they had occupied. Before the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century, the disparity between African and European technology had never been so great as to allow the latter to contemplate occupation of the interior. But at the end of the nineteenth century the African had no answer to the recoil-operated Maxim gun. The European considered his technological superiority as one more proof of the racial superiority he assumed over the African. Social and "scientific" theory in the nineteenth century asserted the inferiority of the non-white races and established a hierarchy, at the bottom of which was the Negro.

The European therefore never felt that there was anything wrong in occupying the African's land, even if this had to be done by force. Indeed he considered his occupation positively beneficial in that Africans would thereby be brought into the orbit of his superior civilization. Since he believed he had a right to occupy these lands, he never considered himself a foreigner in them. Thus it was possible for the French to talk in terms of "Overseas France" and Portugal in terms of her "Overseas Provinces" when referring to their African possessions.

Finally, there was another distinction between the colonial empires of the twentieth century and those that preceded them: telecommunications and the steamship kept the colony in constant touch with the metropolis. The expatriated European therefore did not feel alienated from his mother land.

A major difficulty in discussing colonial rule in West Africa is in deciding exactly what period of time we are concerned with. Both France and Britain had been installed as colonial powers in West Africa since the
beginning of the nineteenth century, but they possessed only minute enclaves on the coastline—France in Saint Louis; (Senegal); Britain in Sierra Leone, the Gambia, and the Gold Coast forts. Not until the end of the nineteenth century did France and Britain extend their coastal colonies into the interior. By 1900 much of West Africa was not yet under colonial rule; and much of that which was, was not effectively "pacified." But by 1910 France and Britain can be said to have been firmly in the saddle in West Africa.\(^1\)

The usual terminal date given for colonial rule is the date when each territory gained its independence; but in assessing colonialism in West Africa, however, there is a strong case for taking 1945 as the terminal date. Prior to 1945 the colonial powers, France and Britain, were the sole arbiters of the fate of their subjects. What international criticism of their policies there was—and this was remarkably little—had a negligible effect on the decisions they made. With the outbreak of the Second World War, West Africa, from being the private preserve of France and Britain, became of concern to America and Russia because of its value to the Allied war effort. West Africa not only supplied men and materials for the war but was also of immense strategic importance to the defense of the South Atlantic and as a staging post for the Allied campaigns in North Africa and the Middle East. Both Russia and America were resolutely anti-colonial, and both openly criticized the colonial policies of Britain and France. The Americans forced on Britain that clause in the Atlantic Charter which recognized the right of all peoples to self-determination. At the end of the war the United Nations, with its own mandated territories, became a forum for criticism of colonialism. Both France and Britain accepted the need to liberalize their colonial regimes and to allow their colonial subjects increased participation in their own administration. This liberalization was such that colonial policy could no longer be made without consulting Africans.

There is then a major difference between prewar and postwar colonialism. After the war the colonial powers in West Africa were not only subject to, but responded to, international and African pressure in determining their policies. In discussing Colonial rule in West Africa, therefore, we will be primarily concerned with the period ca. 1910-45.
THE COLONIAL RATIONALE

The European powers justified their occupation of Africa on the grounds that they were bringing order and civilization to a chaotic and barbarous continent. They were bringing light into the "heart of darkness." This was very much an *ex post facto* justification. The Scramble for Africa, from about 1885 until the beginning of World War I, was not of course the result of a rush on the part of European powers to secure territory in Africa in which they could carry out charitable works for the African, but the result of deep economic and political fears about each other's intentions in Africa. All would have preferred to have kept out of Africa administratively, or at least to have reduced their administrative obligations to a minimum. But fears that one of them might secure so large an area in Africa that it would upset the balance of power in Europe, or that areas in which they had trading interests might be occupied by a rival intent on establishing a monopoly of trade, led them to pre-emptive action. Furthermore, the disturbed state of many parts of the continent at the time led traders, anxious to secure their sources of supply, to put pressure on their governments to occupy the areas in which they were interested. Where railways were seen as the best method of opening up the interior to European commercial exploitation, the argument in favor of occupation was even stronger. European capitalists and governments were not inclined to risk the enormous sums of money involved in building railways unless they had control over the lands through which they passed.

To disguise their fundamental economic interests in occupying Africa, the Europeans salved their consciences by introducing arguments about their own inherent moral and racial superiority to the Africans. They drew a picture of Africa as a continent without any meaningful culture or history, of peoples who indulged in slavery, cannibalism, and human sacrifice, and who were constantly at war with each other. Only outside intervention by the European could save Africans from themselves, and bring them into the orbit of the modern world.
The African Negro was depicted as indolent, incapable of innovation, reversionary in character—in sum, a grown child in need of a stern father to guide him. Thus he could be taxed without his consent or without representation, because if he wished to be regarded as civilized he "must share the common burden of civilisation." He could also be forced to work, for late-nineteenth-century Europe conceived of work as a moral duty. Thus the French and British compelled the African to work on roads and railways designed to facilitate the export of crops needed in Europe. The French, in order to meet their domestic demands for African crops, forced the African to cultivate those crops, and justified this form of naked exploitation on the grounds that they were curing the Negro of the "idleness that keeps him in a state of absolute economic inferiority" and argued that it was therefore necessary to use the institutions by which he ruled, in this case slavery, to improve his circumstances and afterwards gently lead him into an apprenticeship of freedom. Scorning work, the black is not aware that, for us, work ennobles a man's character.

Such interpretations took little or no account of the debilitating diseases from which the African suffered, which lowered his physical endurance drastically. Nor did they consider the extremes of climate that made sustained work much more difficult than in the temperate zones. The context of the African's apparent "laziness" was conveniently ignored to justify colonial occupation. Also ignored were the achievements of the African past. The empires of Ghana, Mali, Songhai, Benin, and Oyo found no place in the European history book. Great cultural achievements, admired today, were dismissed as barbarous. Where, as with the Ife heads, such achievements could not be disregarded, they were attributed to white initiative. Fantastic theories of wandering Romans were thought up to "explain" the achievements of the Ife sculptors. So, too, where African political achievements in the construction of states and empires could not be ignored, the genius for them was attributed to a mysterious, light-skinned, non-Negroid race of Hamites.

The original goal of occupation by the European powers—economic exploitation—was superseded by a moralistic goal of trusteeship where the
European powers would act as guardians for "irresponsible" Africans. If colonial rule were to be judged in terms of its original economic aims, it would be judged remarkably successful. The colonies cost the colonial powers almost nothing and they were able to secure the products they wanted largely on their own terms. If, however, colonial rule is judged in terms of the lofty aims of the "civilizing mission" we shall see it is found wanting. As "trustees" the colonial powers were very much like the parent who sends his child to school only so long as is necessary to prepare him to go out into the world and earn his own living. They were not prepared to make the sacrifices necessary to send him to high school and university.

**COLONIAL CONQUEST AND AFRICAN RESISTANCE**

A commonly accepted thesis during the colonial period was that the Africans readily accepted European conquest and occupation. Since they were so easily conquered, it was assumed that they welcomed colonial rule. That some did, cannot be denied. The Yoruba historian Samuel Johnson wrote of the conquest of Ijebu-Ode by the British:

> To the vast majority of the common people it was like the opening of a prison door; and no-one who witnessed the patient, long-suffering and toiling mass of humanity that week by week streamed to and from the coast with their produce, could refrain from heaving a sigh of gratification on the magnitude of the beneficial results of the short sharp conflict.4

The colonial powers frequently described what was often the bloody conquest of Africa as the establishment of peace. A well-known book on former French West Africa describes the French conquest as "La Paix Francaise."5 While many Africans did accept colonial occupation passively, and at times with relief, the majority resisted. The penalty for resistance was often savage. In Sierra Leone the British in their ten months' war against Bai Bureh resorted to systematic burning of the towns and villages that supported him. In the Western Sudan large towns were razed to the ground by French columns, and prisoners were given as slaves (captifs) to the African soldiers. In contrast to their aims of imposing "civilization" on the Africans, the Europeans frequently resorted to standards of warfare that would not have been tolerated in Europe.
For the most part African resistance was weak. Few states had standing armies. Their weapons were inferior to those of the Europeans; the Maxim gun quickly dispelled the conventional African cavalry charge or the massed head-on attack of infantrymen, usually equipped at best with dane guns. Some African leaders like Bai Bureh or Lat Dior (Senegal) were able to adapt fighting techniques to deal with European superiority of weapons. They appreciated that guerrilla warfare was the only way in which the army of a small state could deal with the European forces. Samory Touré alone among the rulers of the major states of the nineteenth-century Western Sudan was able to adapt his military strategy in such a way that a large army could contain the French. By a series of strategic withdrawals, a scorched earth policy, and the brilliant use of military intelligence he kept the French at bay. Often the hardest battles fought by the Europeans were against the stateless societies like the Ibo, and against the tiny chiefdoms of Ivory Coast. There, "pacification," the euphemism so frequently used by the European to describe his military occupation, was village by village. African states rarely combined with their neighbors in common defense against the European invader.

In at least two-thirds of West Africa the European gained his right to rule not by treaty, but by conquest. Colonial occupation was accepted where it was seen as the means to ending otherwise interminable wars with neighbors, or of avoiding occupation by a rival state, or of gaining access to European trade. It is, nevertheless, essential to an understanding of the colonial period in West Africa to appreciate that the majority of people were reluctant to sacrifice their sovereignty to the European.

THE IMPACT OF COLONIALISM ON AFRICAN LIFE

For the vast majority of West Africans life was not radically changed by the imposition of colonial rule. Many Africans live today in much the same way as they did before the conquest. Comparatively few were affected economically by colonial rule. Only a tiny percentage of the population became wage-earners in the urban centers. Earnings from cash crops like cocoa and coffee brought wealth to farmers in Gold Coast, Ivory Coast, and
Western Nigeria. But the other main cash crops—goundnuts, palm oil, cotton—earned the peasant farmer little more than enough to pay his taxes. The reality of colonial rule for most Africans was not an economic revolution in their lives, but the presence of the European administrator, who symbolized the new order of things. If the European colonial powers brought nothing else to West Africa, they brought a peace which they were unable to maintain among themselves at home. The European administrator represented in his presence the end of wars and slave raids and the guarantee of freedom of movement for everyone. He was an agent for stability rather than change. Stability in itself of course represented change, but once peace had been established the European district officer saw himself for the most part as a conservator rather than an innovator.

This was particularly true of British West Africa where policy was to rule the people "indirectly" through their own institutions, which were designated "native authorities." The British attempted to develop such institutions as the basis for local self-government. Such institutions had, of course, evolved to deal with situations utterly different from the Western world into which the colonial powers insisted they were initiating the African; and, as in the obvious case of the Northern Nigerian emirates, they tended to act as breakwaters to Western innovation. It is significant that it has been independent Africans, Western-educated, who have dismantled the British system of native authorities and tried to replace it with a Western-oriented system.

In French West Africa the chiefs did not run their own native authorities. French rule was much more direct than British, and the chief was essentially a functionary of the French administration without any powers of his own. He merely carried out the orders of the French administrator. Unlike his British-administered counterpart he had no courts, no police, no prisons of his own. He did not have the right to any of the taxes he collected, as did the British chief. Often the chief was not even the one who traditionally had the right to rule but was appointed because he had shown loyalty to France as a soldier or clerk in the administration. Chieftaincies were streamlined, either being increased or decreased in size, to establish uniformity in the size of administrative units in West Africa. While the
French concept of the role of the chief was more innovative than that of the British, it did not change society radically; for it allowed no initiative to the African, whether chief or subject. However, in the long term, by whittling away the traditional power of the chief, it did prepare the way for removal from the political scene of chiefs, who were representatives of the conservative forces in West Africa. By contrast all the British West African colonies at independence had constitutions in which the chiefs continued to play a political role.

The systems of administration in both French West Africa and British West Africa did not do much to initiate change. Innovations, such as regular taxation, did little to improve the lot of the peasant. The bulk of the money raised was spent on supporting the administration, or on providing an infrastructure of roads, railways, and ports which passed through only those areas that were of economic interest to the colonial powers. The vast majority of Africans, in some cases as much as ninety per cent of a territory's population, as Suret-Canale has shown,6 were unaffected by these developments. Where taxation forced Africans to cultivate cash crops for the first time, the result was of little benefit to them. Over and above the labor used for their subsistence crops, they could usually afford only to cultivate sufficient cash crops to pay their taxes and buy a few yards of imported cloth. They rarely had sufficient resources to grow a surplus so that they could purchase anything more. Even today many farmers in cocoa-rich Western Nigeria can earn only enough from their crops to pay their taxes. In areas where no cash crops could be grown men were forced to migrate to earn money. But by the time they returned home they had only enough to pay their taxes and buy a small selection of imported goods.

Though European administrators undertook a wide variety of tasks, including in the case of the French administrator the enforcement of obligatory cultivation of crops, their primary role was that of keepers of the peace. Significantly both French and British administrators had judicial powers, those of the French being much greater than those of the British. The French administrator had judicial authority in all criminal cases, since the native chiefs were deprived of all their judicial powers in criminal matters. Also the indigénat, or summary administrative justice, to which all Africans with the exception of a tiny minority of assimilated citizens were subject, gave the administrator the power of imposing fines and imprisoning
without trial for up to fourteen days. The **indigénat**, to which even chiefs were subject, was bitterly hated by the African and resulted in the French administrator being more disliked by the people than his British counterpart, who because of the native authority system was more aloof from them.

**THE IMPACT OF COLONIALISM ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT**

Many writers on colonial rule in Africa have seen it as the prelude to an economic revolution. Yet, as we have already intimated, the standard of living for the average peasant did not improve substantially under colonial rule. From an economic point of view, then, in what way can colonial rule be seen as a revolutionary influence?

The cash crop revolution in Africa—the change-over from a subsistence economy geared primarily to providing food and goods for immediate local consumption to one geared to producing crops for export overseas in exchange for cash or for bartered imported goods—is invariably attributed to colonial rule. But in fact this change-over had been undertaken autonomously by Africans in the nineteenth century; groundnuts, cotton, and palm oil were being produced for export in sizable quantities outside the spheres of European administration. The imposition of alien administration, then, was not a prerequisite of cash crop production. What colonial rule did was to intensify and extend the area of that production through the imposition of taxes and by building railways and roads that made it possible for peasants to export crops economically to the coast.

New crops, notably coffee and cocoa, were introduced under colonial rule; because of their high price on the world market these crops produced real change in the economic status of the cultivator. But coffee before 1945 was produced on a very small scale by Africans, and then only in Ivory Coast. Only cocoa in the Gold Coast, Western Nigeria, and to a lesser degree in Ivory Coast (where European planters were installed), involved a large number of peasants. In the Gold Coast the massive increase in the production of cocoa was due largely to the peasant farmer himself. Most of the feeder roads and bridges necessary to link the cocoa areas with the government railway or
road were built by him. He modified his system of land tenure and arranged for the import of tenant farmers to cope with the rising overseas demand for cocoa. The phenomenal increase in cocoa production in the Gold Coast from 12 tons in 1892 to over 118,000 tons in 1917 was primarily to the credit of the cocoa farmer himself. As Sir Hugh Clifford, Governor of the Gold Coast, and later of Nigeria, declared:

"This man, reputed to be lazy by the superficial globe-trotter or the exponent of the damned nigger school, has carved from the virgin forest an enormous clearing, which he has covered with flourishing cocoa farms. Armed with nothing better than an imported axe and matchet, and a native-made hoe, he has cut down the forest giant, cleared the tropical undergrowth, and kept it cleared. With no means of animal transport, no railways and few roads, he has conveyed his produce to the sea, rolling it down in casks for miles and carrying it on his own sturdy cranium. Here is a result to make us pause in our estimate of the negro race."

Before 1945 the colonial powers did little to improve the agriculture of the African. This was partly because of their lack of knowledge about tropical African agriculture, and partly because of the minimal amounts they devoted to agriculture in their annual budgets and capital schemes. This was despite the fact that the bulk of colonial revenue was derived directly or indirectly from agriculture. The research stations and experimental plantations they established and the work of their small corps of agricultural officers brought some results but to a later generation.

With the exception of the Germans in Togo, the colonial powers in West Africa were concerned exclusively with the improvement of export crops. Subsistence crops like cassava, yams, and maize were of no interest to them, though during the 1914-18 war a hard-pressed France did import these. Agricultural research was characterized by an almost total lack of interest in the crops on which the mass of Africans depended for sustenance.

Similarly, the roads and railways of the colonial powers were not designed to develop internal trade but to facilitate the evacuation of the cash crops required by Europe. Only incidentally did internal trade develop as a result of the new roads and railways. This transportation network and the allied telegraph lines nevertheless constituted a revolution in communications. But it was only in the years immediately preceding
independence that the second stage of this revolution was embarked on: the development of a system of roads to facilitate internal trade.

The introduction of a portable currency was not as great an innovation as some suppose. Africans in many areas had developed their own forms of currency, though, as in the case of the manilla and the cowrie shell, these were very cumbersome. Colonial coin was only slightly less so, for the produce buyer traveling upcountry had to load donkeys with sacks of it, since paper money was not accepted until late in the colonial period and payments were usually of a small order necessitating the use of the lower value coins. Much trade continued to be conducted by barter, as it still is today in the more economically backward areas of West Africa.

The most dramatic change brought about by colonial rule was in the structure of the economy itself. In the nineteenth century Africans not only had produced the crops required by the Europeans but also had acted as the middlemen responsible for collecting and delivering them to the European exporters on the coast. Some Africans had been exporters in their own right. Toward the end of the nineteenth century the European started encroaching on the African's role as middleman, and by the 1920's the African had been edged out as agent in all but the smallest transactions. The new middlemen, however, were not the Europeans but the Lebanese and Syrians. Immigrating to West Africa in the late nineteenth century from their bitterly poor homeland, they were able, through great business acumen, a willingness to live in conditions intolerable to their African and European counterparts, and an acceptance of marginal profits, to cut both African and European out of the middleman trade. The Europeans facilitated this by showing themselves more willing to give credit to the Lebanese than to the African, whether such credit was given through their banks or in the form of an advance of goods from their import-export houses.

Similarly, the few African importers and exporters who had established themselves were cut out of business by the large European commercial firms. They did not have the capital resources available to these firms, they lacked the contacts these firms had in Europe, and they did not have the same access to bank credit. The European firms had priority of space in, and
cheaper rates on, cargo boats through the notorious West African Shipping Conference. Also some of the factories in Europe supplying these European firms with textiles and other stock-in-trade goods for the African market were owned by the same parent companies. As if this were not enough, the slump that followed the 1920 boom killed off all but a handful of African import-export businesses. They were caught with too large a stock on credit and insufficient capital reserves to tide them over the difficult two years that followed the slump.

By the outbreak of World War II, the West African economy was dominated by a handful of expatriate trading companies, which exercised a quasi monopoly over the market. Even where two firms were ostensibly in competition, by mutual agreement they paid the same prices for labor and for crops. The most notorious example of combination by European firms was the Gold Coast "cocoa-pool" of 1937-38 when nine expatriate companies agreed to pay a fixed price for cocoa much lower than that which prevailed on the world market. The laissez faire colonial governments usually turned a blind eye to such exploitation, though they were forced to do something about the cocoa-pool because of the severe reaction (a coordinated strike) of the Africans.

The companies did not plow back their profits into West Africa, and they rarely established secondary industries to process crops in West Africa before shipping them to Europe. Thus palm oil was exported to Europe for conversion into soap and then re-exported to Africa. The only major industries to develop under colonial rule were the extractive industries: tin in Nigeria, gold in the Gold Coast, iron in Sierra Leone. There was no mining of consequence in French West Africa.

The colonial economic regime was a primitive one designed essentially to provide Europe with the raw materials she needed from Africa. Benefits to Africans were secondary and incidental.

THE IMPACT OF COLONIALISM ON EDUCATION

If there was any aspect of colonial rule that was revolutionary, it was the spread of Western education. For the African, Western education
represented the key to the understanding of the technological superiority which had enabled the white man to occupy and rule Africa so easily. Western education with its emphasis on individual achievement attacked the very basis of traditional life with its ideas of corporate identity and mutual responsibility.

Though assimilation represented an important strand in French policy, the pursuit of a successful assimilationist policy could be carried out only through education, and the French provided much less education for the African than did the British. The French realized this, but were anxious to control the size of their elite so that only enough educated Africans were produced to fill the jobs the French were prepared to make available to them. The British government did not spend significantly more per capita on African education, but because they gave Christian missions much wider scope for establishing schools, there were many more educated Africans at all levels in British West Africa than in French West Africa. In French West Africa the great majority of children went to government schools; in British West Africa the great majority attended mission schools. The notable exception to this was in Northern Nigeria where government policy prohibited missionaries from operating in the Muslim emirates.

In either case the numbers educated before 1945 were small. In 1944 only 76,000 children were at school in French West Africa, out of a population of about fifteen million. Only a handful of these were at a lycée, or secondary school. In British West Africa conditions varied from territory to territory. In 1939 Northern Nigeria, with a population larger than that of French West Africa, had only 25,067 children at school. But the year before, the Gold Coast (Ghana) had 76,000 children at school, as many as all French West Africa in 1944, and of these a substantial number went to secondary school.

Though the number of children going to school in relation to the population was small, the impact of education was enormous. The child was initiated into the world of his colonial master, and found that it was a possibility, although remote, for him to become a doctor, lawyer, or engineer. At secondary school he learned about the political ideals of the
metropolitan powers: "democracy," "one man--one vote," "no taxation without representation," "liberty, equality, and fraternity," "all men are equal in the sight of the law," "habeas corpus." Increasingly, he began to wonder why these ideals and principles were not applied to him. Thus in educating the African the colonial rulers were engendering the end of colonial rule.

Not all those educated became lawyers and doctors or even clerks and minor civil servants. The vast majority gained only a basic knowledge of the three R's, enough to make them so discontented with rural life that they migrated to the towns to secure jobs as shop assistants, messengers, drivers, mechanics, store keepers, stewards, and even laborers. The migration of the youth to the towns was one of the most dramatic results of colonial rule. The new administrative and commercial centers acted as magnets to the partly educated youth, desperate to escape the monotony of agricultural work, the authority of their elders, and the restrictions of traditional society. The towns became the melting pots of different ethnic groups, of new ideas, and of new aspirations. The towns were the hunting ground of those with political ambitions in the years that followed the Second World War. Though a young man working as a clerk or laborer could earn as much in a month as his family at home did in a year, Western education by stimulating his ambition had sown discontent in him. The successful politicians of the post war years were the ones who harnessed this discontent. The city did not, however, prove the disruptive or dislocating force it has become in the Western world. The newly arrived immigrant sought out his kinsman or townsman and lodged with him till he found a job. People of the same ethnic group or town formed credit unions or voluntary associations where they discussed their common problems and helped one another. Religion, too, provided an anchor for the immigrant. Ethnic religions could rarely be exported to the towns since the priests stayed at home and shrines could not be moved; immigrants therefore became Muslims or Christians, thus attaching themselves to a new community. In some cases, notably in Freetown, churches and mosques were organized on an ethnic basis.

It was in the towns that Christianity and Islam made their most spectacular progress under colonial rule. While Islam tended to be a
conservative force, Christianity, with its emphasis on individual accountability and its insistence on the equality of all men, added fuel to the discontent that educated Africans felt with a regime which insisted on the superiority of the colonial master over his subject. Only now are Western education and Christianity in Africa being studied in depth as the revolutionary forces they were during the colonial period.

THE IMPACT OF COLONIALISM ON GOVERNMENT

Before 1945 Africans had negligible influence on the way they were governed. Major policy decisions regarding administration, agriculture, and economic development were made by the colonial governments without consulting those most affected. The French at one time described their policy in Tropical Africa as one of "association," but this was very much the association of horse and rider. The horse did not decide where it wanted to go. In both British and French West Africa the rider, or administration, was almost exclusively European. Africans in British West Africa were specifically excluded from the administration proper until the Second World War; and where they were employed as doctors they were on a separate and junior scale to their British counterparts, however high their qualifications and however long their experience. In French West Africa it was possible for Africans to serve in the administration on equal terms with the French, but the number so employed was insignificant.

In French West Africa the outlets for African opinion were minimal. Under the indigénat, African sujets who criticized government actions could be imprisoned without trial for fourteen days, and there was little to stop an administrator putting the offending person back in prison for a further fourteen days when he came out. There was no free press. Denied legitimate expression of grievances and aspirations, some Africans resorted to the alternative of violence. Large numbers of Africans broke into open revolt against France's policy of recruiting Africans for service on the European front during World War II, and workers staged illegal strikes. Only in Senegal was there any possibility of political expression. In the Quatre Communes (Dakar, Saint-Louis, Rufisque, and Gorée) Africans had the rights of citizens, and elected their deputy to the French National
Assembly. They also elected their own conseil-général and municipal councils. Their press was as free as any press in Tropical Africa. The two African deputies of the interwar period, Blaise Diagne and Galandou Dio supported the policies of metropolitan France. The former even became Undersecretary of State for Colonies and in 1930 at Geneva defended France's policy of forced labor in the colonies.

In British West Africa the legislative councils to which a few African members were elected, and others nominated, provided some outlet for grievances and hopes. But those elected came from the sophisticated coastal towns only, and the vast hinterlands were represented, if at all, by nominees of the administration who could be relied on not to oppose government policy. Where elected, or even nominated, members did oppose government policy, they were faced by an overwhelming official majority committed to supporting the policy of the governor in whose hands lay their prospects of promotion.

As in French West Africa the most significant form of protest was of the extra-constitutional kind: illegal strikes such as the Sierra Leone railway strikes of 1919 and 1926; the Cocoa Strike in the Gold Coast in 1937-38; the Aba Women's Riots in Nigeria in 1929. By such methods Africans were able to bring their grievances to the attention of the administration and force it to action. The Gold Coast Cocoa Strike resulted in a Commission of Enquiry that strongly condemned the European companies and eventually led to government marketing of cocoa with profits used to the benefit of the producer. The Aba Women's Riots led to a Commission of Enquiry that recommended the dismantling of the unpopular warrant chief system of administration in Eastern Nigeria.

Though the political institutions of the interwar years were relatively impotent, when the colonial powers in West Africa decided to liberalize their regimes to allow greater African participation in government, these institutions served as the basis of the liberalization. The French introduced conseils-généraux like that of Senegal for all the other colonies of West Africa, which could now send deputies to the French National Assembly. The British extended the competence of their
legislative councils to cover the whole of the territory, rather than just the coastal colony. They increased the number of elected members and gave a majority to the unofficial members.

The people who took advantage of this liberalization were of course the educated elite, supported by the urban educated. The postwar years were characterized by a change-over from the old formula that the Europeans were trustees for the African, and sole arbiters of what was "good" for him, to one of partnership in which the African had an increasing say in his destiny.

CONCLUSION: AN EVALUATION OF COLONIALISM

The colonial period in Africa's history is still considered by many Africans as its most important. Yet, when future generations come to view it in a deeper perspective than is possible for us today, the changes that took place as a result of colonial rule will appear less dramatic than they do now. The apparent break that colonial rule represents will seem to be less important than the underlying continuities of African history.

Future generations will probably see as the most significant result of colonial rule the amalgamation of diverse states and ethnic groups into new political units, which formed the basis of the newly independent states of Africa. Yet the continuity of African history is unhappily demonstrated in the attempt of the Ibo of Eastern Nigeria to break away from the Federation of Nigeria and form a state based on their precolonial identity as Ibos rather than as Nigerians. Almost every state in Africa has had this problem of the competing nationalisms of precolonial and postcolonial Africa, the former often being described as "tribalism." While the colonial powers were responsible for the creation of these new colony-states, they did little to foster among their subject-inhabitants a sense of identity with the new political unit within which they were forced to live. The colonial powers on the other hand did provide these colony-states with a vital tool for their survival as independent countries: a lingue franca--the French and English languages in the case of West Africa.

Perhaps the most devastating effect of colonial rule was to sap the confidence of Africans in themselves, by its insistence on the absolute
superiority of the white man's world. African religions and culture were damned and those of the white man held up as the only valid one. Thus was produced what President Sékou Touré has called "the colonial mentality." The Yoruba even to this day say:

"Aiye d'aiye Oyinbo"--"The world has become a white man's world."

Perhaps the most urgent task of independent African nations is to cast off this colonial mentality so that they can not only assert but also believe in their equality with those who ruled them for sixty years.9

NOTES

1. Parts of Ivory Coast were not pacified until 1914; much of Upper Volta and modern Mali were in open revolt against the French in the First World War, protesting against recruitment of soldiers for the European front; the British sent their last "punitive expeditions" against the Ibo as late as 1918.

2. Sir Fredrick Lugard, Revision of Instructions to Political Officers on Subjects chiefly Political and Administrative (Known as the Political Memoranda) (Lagos, 1906; London, 1919), Memo No. 5, para. 6.


7. The Times (London), June 2, 1925.

8. Nigerian research workers undertaking a social and economic survey of the peoples whose land is being flooded by the Niger (Kainji) Dam found barter a common means of trade in the area.

III

PROCESSES OF SOCIAL CHANGE

11 MAJOR THEMES IN SOCIAL CHANGE
12 PERSONALITY AND CHANGE
13 EDUCATION AND ELITE FORMATION
14 URBANIZATION AND CHANGE
15 COMMUNICATIONS AND CHANGE
SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE PRECOLONIAL ERA

A common misconception concerning social change in Africa is that prior to the colonial era the pace of change had been slow. "Traditional" or "tribal" societies were viewed as isolated from one another and evolving only gradually until they were suddenly "opened up" by contact with Europe. The rapidly accumulating body of historical facts about Africa clearly contradicts any notion of static traditional societies. Precolonial Africa changed at least as fast as Europe and Asia until the late eighteenth century.

The "neolithic revolution" (that is, the development of a polished-stone, agricultural, and sedentary civilization) took place along the Nile and Niger Rivers between 6000 and 7000 years ago, only slightly later than in the Middle East, roughly at the same time as in eastern and southern Asia. Contacts with Europe and Asia across the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean, and regular trans-Saharan trade have a history of 3000 to 4000 years. Greeks, Romans, Phoenicians, Arabs, Indonesians, and Persians have had extensive contacts with Africa since the dawn of recorded history and settled in North and East Africa, and in Madagascar. Christianity penetrated Ethiopia long before it reached most of Europe, and Islam swept over North Africa within a century of its inception.

By the early eleventh century Islam had crossed the Sahara, and in the following centuries most of the Black population of the Sudanic belt, from Senegal to Somalia, became Muslim. Great kingdoms such as Ghana, Mali,
Songhai, Morocco, Bornu, Kanem, Dahomey, Ashanti, Kongo, Luba, Lunda, Oyo, Benin, Kush, and Axum, to name but a few of the larger ones, rose and fell. Vast armies swept over the savannas. Entire societies migrated in successive waves. Agriculturists displaced hunters like the Pygmies and Bushmen. Pastoralists conquered agriculturalists. Muslims from East and West Africa made the pilgrimage to Mecca. Trade caravans established regular circuits and markets, and merchants traveled thousands of miles. African gold, ivory, and other luxury goods reached Europe and Asia centuries before Prince Henry the Navigator sent his sailors off to "discover" the coast of West Africa and well before the voyages of Columbus.

Clearly, political turmoil and economic interaction were accompanied by profound cultural changes. New food plants from Asia, and later from the Americas, revolutionized agriculture. Metallurgy spread from the lower Nile to the entire continent. Techniques of warfare, animal husbandry, and artisanal production diffused with migration, trade, and conquest. Language groups, such as the Bantu and Hamitic, expanded with great rapidity. The implantation of Islam in the Sudan transformed a wide range of social institutions such as kinship and political structures. Politically acephalous or uncentralized societies became states. Social classes developed in hitherto egalitarian cultures. Games, folktales, musical instruments, and sculpture styles traveled with people. Cities sprang up in North Africa, the Sudan, Yorubaland and Rhodesia.

When one considers the cultural heterogeneity of Africa today, one gets a glimpse of the extreme complexity of social change during the last several millennia. Almost all of this history, except that of the last four to five hundred years, is lost to us. But broad outlines of African cultural history are now being brought back to life, due largely to the efforts of a new generation of scholars who patiently collate oral traditions, date potsherds, compare vocabulary lists, and analyze genetic distributions.

During the more recent past, the period of the slave trade was characterized by a quickening of the pace of change in the areas where slaving was most intensive: the coast of West Africa from Senegal to Cameroon, the Angola region, and the coast of East Africa from Mozambique to Kenya. The
trade in human chattel took different forms and had different effects in various parts of the continent. It was most complex in West Africa, especially in Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, and Ghana; and this is where its effects were most profound. The main direction of long-distance commerce gradually shifted from the trans-Saharan routes of the north to the sea routes of the south. Thus, Sudanic cities like Timbuktu and Gao declined, while coastal cities such as Accra and Lagos boomed. Some groups of coastal peoples gained a new-found power through the acquisition of firearms. Warfare between West African nations intensified and became chronic. Traditional political systems with intricate checks and balances in the exercise of power became transformed into slave-raiding war-machines ruled by absolute despots such as the Dahomean kings of the eighteenth century.

In East Africa, the Portuguese sacked most of the flourishing coastal cities and disrupted the long-standing trade with Arabia, Persia, India, and Southeast Asia, until the Persians and Arabs reestablished their control over the East African coast from the seventeenth to the middle of the nineteenth century. At the Cape of Good Hope, permanent European settlement began in the mid-seventeenth century and expanded, much like the North American frontier, to give rise to the white-dominated Union (now Republic) of South Africa with its large urban, mining and industrial complexes.

Next to the Dutch settlement at the Cape, the French conquest of Algeria in 1830 marked the most important extension of direct European control in Africa. After a few more decades of European trading, military, and missionary activities, the "Scramble for Africa" was unleashed in the 1870's; and by the turn of the twentieth century, all of Africa except for Liberia, Ethiopia, and the remaining Turkish possessions of North Africa had been partitioned between Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, Belgium, Spain, and Italy.

Although the colonial era lasted only for some 75 years, and although the European regimes were firmly established only for the short quarter century between the two world wars, the changes which took place under colonialism did much to shape contemporary African states. But any understanding of modern Africa calls for an analysis of the complex interrelations between precolonial societies, the colonial system, and the anticolonial reaction.
THE COLONIAL IDEOLOGY OF CHANGE

Although traditional African societies were dynamic even before coming into contact with the West, Europe did bring a new element into the situation. For the first time, an encompassing ideology of change was imported. Contrary to most political ideologies and social philosophies which tend to rationalize the status quo and favor inertia, colonialism imported ideologies which stressed the desirability of change. Imbued with a self-confident feeling of superiority, most European administrators and missionaries shared the belief that Africans must be made to renounce their "idolatry" and their "barbarous" and "immoral" practices. Polygyny, bridewealth payments, witchcraft, and clitoridectomy had to be stamped out. "Indolent" and "ignorant" peasants had to be shown how to "rationalize" their agriculture, how to improve their livestock, and how to work steadily for wages and pay taxes. In short, the "natives" needed to be shown the way to progress through the guiding hand of benevolent white teachers.

Paternalism, common to all colonial regimes, was politically conservative; but it was, nevertheless, an ideology of change. There were, of course, some white settlers who believed that Africans were genetically inferior, and hence, that attempts to change them were doomed to failure. Some Europeans were able to foresee that the very changes introduced by the West, especially in the educational sphere, would undermine white domination; and, therefore, many advocated a policy of leaving Africans as they were. (The Afrikaners in South Africa were probably most consistent in this approach, but even they were quite unsuccessful in preventing the changes they opposed. Ironically, even apartheid is an ideology of change, though of reactionary change. The South African government is engaged in a losing race back to the nineteenth century.) The dominant ideological theme of colonialism, however, and its most basic rationalization, was the notion of the "civilizing mission" of the West.

Other proselytizing movements before colonialism, notably Islam, had tried to change Africans. In its early phases, Islam, like Christianity, was a fairly revolutionary doctrine; but by the time it reached sub-Saharan
Africa, it was largely content with a simple profession of monotheism and adherence to a few religious practices. Muslim missionaries, unlike so many of their Christian counterparts, did not generally lash out in anger and moral indignation against the entire indigenous way of life. They accommodated themselves to it to a greater extent than most Christians, especially most Protestants; and as a consequence the Islamic religion soon came to be regarded as indigenous to Africa south, as well as north, of the Sahara. With the exception of a few waves of puritanical reformism such as the Jihad of Usman dan Fodio in the early nineteenth century, Islam in Black Africa was not an ideology of change.

Today paternalism in its colonial form seems outdated, yet numerous programs of economic development, technical aid, military assistance, overseas volunteers, and revolutionary agitation which foreign countries try to export to Africa and other "developing" areas are still based on an assumption of Western (or Eastern) superiority. The "developed" countries, East or West, are the teachers; the Third World is expected to play the part of the grateful recipient.

The emerging ruling classes of the newly independent states have also eagerly adopted a pervasive ideology of change. Everybody is in favor of change, especially of economic development. The conservative Western powers see in economic development an instrument of influence and an antidote to social revolution and political instability. The Communist countries view economic aid as an entree to ideological infiltration and as a ferment for more profound changes. The ruling elites of the Third World favor development largely because it is fashionable, prestigious, and frequently lucrative to themselves. Thus, an ideology of change has become a common universe of discourse between the world's bureaucratic and technocratic elites, however different their aims may be. Only peasants seem, by and large, to be reasonably satisfied to stay as they are; but then, unlike the experts, they do not know what is good for them.

Ideologies of change introduced during the colonial era took several forms and their effects were varied. Intricate though the relationship is between attitudes toward change and actual change, few people would deny
that ideology has a bearing on the rate and direction of change. Often, of course, the changes are not the ones anticipated by the "changers," Ideologies frequently contain internal contradictions and call forth their antitheses. Thus, the discrepancy between Western and Christian ideals of democracy, brotherhood, and equality, and the tyranny of colonial rule was seized upon by African intellectuals in calling for independence. In South Africa, the official ideology of racial separation and inequality has led to the development of a counter-ideology of African nationalism, egalitarianism, and non-racialism. The French and Portuguese ideology of assimilation of a small elite of "black Europeans" in their colonies led to the rejection of Western culture by some intellectuals and to the development of the concepts of nègritude and africanité.

Many of the changes introduced during the colonial period were ideologically motivated, at least in part; and these changes in turn initiated a long chain of further changes beyond the intentions of the initial promoters. For example, the introduction of Western education in Africa was linked with missionary efforts at religious conversion. However, many graduates of mission schools instead of becoming devout Christians, used their skills for political ends, and became leaders of liberation movements.

WESTERNIZATION AND THE COLONIAL LEGACY

Change in contemporary Africa (and in other non-Western countries) is all too often equated with Westernization. It is frequently assumed that as predominantly rural societies become urbanized, industrialized, and modernized they will increasingly resemble the industrial nations of Europe and North America. To some extent, of course, this is true. Modernization and development impose certain constraints, raise certain problems, and bring about other changes which do in fact lead to a certain structural convergence and homogeneity between industrial countries. For example, urbanization and industrialization almost invariably result in higher living standards, more centralized government, lower fertility, greater longevity, replacement of human labor by machines, and so on.
Given a certain level of technology, the range of workable solutions to the satisfaction of human needs is relatively limited. This means that in certain broad structural characteristics, all industrial societies are somewhat alike. Striking similarities, for instance, were found in the distribution of income and in the prestige ranking of occupations in countries as diverse as the Soviet Union, Japan, Sweden, Great Britain, France, and the United States. (This order of similarity can also be found between cultures at comparable levels of pre-industrial technology. The complex, pre-industrial societies of medieval Europe, North and West Africa, China, and pre-Meiji Japan were also alike in important respects. So are the hunting and gathering societies of North America, southern Africa, and Australia.)

Having noted that these broad similarities exist between industrial countries, it does not follow that agrarian societies in the process of development are becoming Westernized. Indeed, the evolution of countries such as Japan has shown that "advanced" non-Western countries remain culturally quite different from the Western countries which they once appeared to have emulated. No society which is exposed to external change reacts simply by taking over an alien culture in its entirety. Adoption is always quite selective, technology being the most readily "borrowed" aspect of a culture. When new elements of a foreign culture are taken over, they are usually adapted and reinterpreted in terms of the borrowing society. The latter in turn modifies and adjusts itself to external change through a series of new changes in terms of its own internal dynamics. Thus, when the spread of urbanization in Africa made traditional forms of social security obsolete, there developed various forms of voluntary mutual-aid associations that were not in any sense "imitations" from Europe. Frequently, though not always, based on ethnicity, these associations were original, creative, and specifically African responses to changed conditions.

In spite of considerable change in recent decades, the cultural impact of Europe in Africa as a whole has been relatively limited. African societies have shown remarkable resilience in the face of foreign constraints. This is striking when one compares Africa to the Western Hemisphere. Except in
the Andes and the Maya area, the pre-Columbian societies of America have been shattered to pieces. Nothing like the extensive Europeanization of the Americas took place in Africa, except for the Western Cape region of South Africa.

To discuss reasons for these differences in degree of Westernization would take us too far afield—we would have to compare the colonial regimes, to examine the impact of conquest and slavery, to analyze the independence movements and the class structure of the two continents, and to take into account climate, demography, and many other factors. We will limit ourselves here to the general observation that European cultural penetration remained shallow in most of Africa. It usually did not extend beyond the coastal zones and the urban centers, and it modified in depth the way of life of perhaps no more than 5 to 10 per cent of the indigenous population. And only in South Africa is the trend toward continued Westernization clear. Elsewhere, European cultural influence, which was never very strong to begin with, probably has tended to recede somewhat since independence. Traditional religions frequently remain viable in spite of the spread of Islam and Christianity. Most African languages hold their ground quite well against French and English, and some like Swahili, Lingala, Hausa, and Wolof continue to spread. African family structures, although rapidly changing, remain notably un-European, even in the cities. African states are increasingly turning away from political institutions modeled on European forms with which they entered their independence. In short, there is very little prospect of Angola ever becoming a second Brazil, or Gabon a second Quebec, or Nigeria another United States. Few Americans show any inclination to become Black Europeans. Moreover, there is every indication that most African cultures (with the possible exception of the few remaining hunters such as the Bushmen and the Pygmies) are fully viable under modern urban conditions. Far from having shown themselves inadaptable, African cultures have shown remarkable vitality, flexibility, and capacity to adjust creatively to new conditions.

At a first glance, the downtown sections of Nairobi, Dakar, or Kinshasa (formerly Leopoldville) look very European or American. The life-style of African professionals, managers, civil servants, and intellectuals seems, and
indeed is, quite Westernized. But the urban elite represents only a small (though powerful) minority of the population. Most African states have a thinly spread and fragile superstructure of alien institutions inherited from colonialism at the top and a broad indigenous substratum at the bottom. Thus, subsistence economy exists side by side with the money sector; a Western, bureaucratic type of central government coexists with traditional local authorities; modern schools and Koranic schools function in parallel fashion.

The political institutions and the administration of African states are probably least well adapted to local conditions. Politically, the newly independent states are successor states to the colonial territories, a fact which contributes both to the stability and instability of African states. Their boundaries, administrative machinery, civil service, armed forces, constitutions, parliaments, and judicial systems are still heavily European in character and function. The new bureaucratic ruling class of university educated civil servants have inherited the high salaries and prerequisites of their colonial predecessors. In the political as well as in the economic sphere, then, the continuities between colonialism and independence continue to overshadow the discontinuities, at least in a number of states like Senegal, Ivory Coast, Kenya, and Malawi.

This lingering foreign legacy is in most cases what holds African states together in their present form. Were it not for the administrative structure inherited from colonialism, it is likely that the heterogeneous and artificial territories created during the Scramble for Africa would disintegrate and reconstitute themselves on different lines. This threat of disintegration and separatism makes it essential for African governments to hold to the inviolability of their artificial frontiers and to create the illusion of unity in their arbitrary association of nationalities or ethnic groups.

Europe has, in effect, imposed its political institutions on Africa and prevented the development of a viable alternative. In a number of states, independence and "Africanization" have meant little more than a change in the pigmentation of the ruling class. In some cases, the new ruling class has even adopted the European outlook to the extent of openly expressing
their concern for maintaining "European standards" and for proving their worth by emulating the behavior of their former masters.

There is another side, however, to the political and economic legacy of colonialism. To the extent that the central polity is alien to African societies, it is often ill-adapted to local conditions and lacks legitimacy and effectiveness. Sometimes a strong charismatic leader and a political party which have gained legitimacy during the independence struggle may provide a certain measure of democracy and rule by consent; but, more commonly, African governments are either too weak and too poor to penetrate effectively down to the grass roots, or they have to govern by force much in the same way as did the old colonial regimes. The Westminster model is no more suitable to Africa than, for example, the Chinese mandarin system would be to the United States. Pressures toward more democratic, representative, and indigenous forms of government contribute to the instability of many African regimes today. In the economic sphere, the persisting foreign control of banking, commerce, and industry; the continuing privileged position of Asian and European minorities; and the highly unequal distribution of income between the Western-educated African minority and the mass of peasants and workers also constitute ferments for social change.

In the Americas, a century or more elapsed between political emancipation and social revolution. In many countries, the social revolution has yet to come. In Africa, on the other hand, the political and social revolutions are being compressed into a shorter time span. The pace of change is much faster. Nkrumah, Nyerere, and Sékou Touré combine the historical roles of Bolivar and Castro. Some African countries, such as Algeria, Guinea, Mali, Ghana, and Tanzania launched into social revolution at the same time as they achieved political emancipation. Others, such as Rwanda and Zanzibar did so within a few weeks or months of independence.

The southern third of the African continent still remains under white settler or colonial control. Some nominally independent states such as Lesotho, Botswana, and Malawi are in fact reduced to the status of economic clients of the Republic of South Africa. And, further north, such countries as Morocco, Liberia, and Ethiopia are still ruled by traditional elites.
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with modernized trappings. However, these conservative regimes do not seem to have much of a future in their present form. Africa is on the verge of a period of acute, indeed, revolutionary change. The very continuities between the colonial and the independence periods help create the ferment of change.

Having tried to indicate some of the general parameters of change in Africa, let us turn more concretely to some important trends, problems, and dilemmas of change in more specific aspects of social life.

DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES

Population censuses during the colonial period were generally taken in connection with poll-tax collection, using inexpensive, makeshift and unreliable methods. In most cases, the population was underestimated by margins of 10 to 20 per cent. For many countries, no decent census was taken until the 1960's, and thus we lack good longitudinal data (that is, data taken over time). What we do know, however, indicates that African demography has many characteristics in common with other developing countries. Africa is clearly in the "second phase" of the demographic cycle—that is, its population is increasing at a rate of 2.0 to 3.0 per cent a year. Probably until the first two decades of this century, Africa was still in the first phase of the cycle: the birth rate was high, but so was the death rate; and growth was fairly slow, perhaps around 1 per cent per annum. Now, the death rate, while still about twice that of developed countries, has declined to around twenty per thousand; the birth rate is somewhere in the upper forties, or close to twice that of Western Europe, Australia, Japan, or North America.

With increasing urbanization and other social factors, the birth rate may soon begin to decline in Africa in much the same way as it has elsewhere. However, due to the fact that the population is still 80 to 90 per cent rural, this decline is as yet barely perceptible. The total population of the continent which is now close to 300 million will almost certainly exceed half a billion by the turn of the century.

The immediate future calls for considerable pessimism. In the long run, the rate of population growth will most probably decline but so slowly as
to give little respite in the present population explosion. At best, the demographic gallop will slow down to a canter. Nor does the relatively low population density of Africa compared to Asia or Europe call for any optimism. In terms of existing natural resources and technology, much of Africa is already overpopulated, overgrazed, eroded, and incapable of providing its existing population with an adequate diet. Without radical technological change, increasing food scarcity can be expected to occur in the foreseeable future. Population control should thus be an essential ingredient of any development program if population growth is not to outstrip or, at best, wipe out economic growth.

Other demographic changes are evident in African countries. As hygiene improves, life expectancy increases, and the population becomes older. The urban population becomes more stable (that is, resides in cities longer than before), its age pyramid becomes more normal, and its sex ratio becomes more equal. In short, the urban population tends more to resemble the rural population in terms of age and sex composition. Cities become less temporary places of employment (and unemployment) for adult males of working age, and more permanent places of residence for family units.

In its basic demography, therefore, Africa behaves much like other parts of the world with the similar ecological, technological, and economic characteristics. Being less urbanized and less developed than Latin America or Asia, however, Africa may be expected to lag demographically one or two decades behind the rest of the Third World. The rate of urbanization itself, however, is faster in Africa, because the baseline is so low. Also, a rapid rate of urbanization is characteristic of early phases of industrial development.

RELIGIOUS CHANGE

By far the most important religion of Africa is Islam. Probably around 40 per cent of the continent's population is Muslim, and something like one-third of the world's Muslims live in Africa. Nor is African Islam confined to the north; there are about as many Black African Muslims in the Sudan Belt as there are Arab and Berber Muslims north of the Sahara. Christianity, which, except in Ethiopia, was the religion of the colonial powers, comes in a poor
second with probably about half as many adherents as Islam. Finally, perhaps some 40 per cent of Africans, the so-called "pagans," practice indigenous ethnic religions. Both Islam and Christianity continue to gain converts at the expense of the traditionalists, but Islam seems to be gaining ground considerably faster than Christianity in the areas where the two world religions are in direct competition. The southward thrust of Islam appears as strong as ever.

These crude facts tell us practically nothing about the extremely complex processes of change which took place in the religious sphere. The interplay between Islam, Christianity, and the various indigenous faiths has been one of the principal and one of the most interesting aspects of social change in Africa. Indigenous religions vary enormously in beliefs and rituals, though a great many share certain elements such as sacrificial rites, a cult of ancestors, and the concept of a supreme creator ruling over a hierarchy of lesser gods and of humans. African religions range from pantheism to polytheism; and some are as monotheistic as, for example, Catholicism. Many of them are still thriving concerns, notably the traditional beliefs of some of the larger ethnic groups, such as the Yoruba (Nigeria), and quite a few African religions probably surpass both Islam and Christianity in theological, philosophical, and cosmological sophistication. There is no relationship between the complexity of a people's religion and the level of technological development. This helps explain why material culture may readily be accepted from the outside while traditional religion frequently remains vital or may be only superficially affected.

Political power is, of course, related to the spread of religions and has been an important factor in the diffusion of both Islam and Christianity. Even when conversion was not imposed by force, the material advantages and social prestige accruing to those who adopted the religion of the dominant group were powerful incentives for at least nominal conversion. By and large, Islam has had several tactical advantages over Christianity. In the Sudanic belt and North Africa it is now regarded as an indigenous religion, a status which Christianity has attained only in Ethiopia.

During the colonial regime, the basic egalitarian ideology of Islam was translated into practice to a greater extent than was the case with
Christianity. With few exceptions, Christian missionaries were an integral part of the colonial system and practiced racial discrimination much as did lay settlers. While Christianity frequently attracted misfits, deviants, malcontents, and low-status persons, Islam generally endeavored, and frequently succeeded, to convert populations from the top down, beginning with the king and nobility. Furthermore, in traditional monarchies, Islam provided a powerful legitimizing force for the existing political order; whereas, Christian missionaries had long abandoned the theory of divine right of kings and tended, in fact, to undermine the status quo. Christian doctrines were thus regarded by many ruling classes as subversive, while Islam easily became the official religion of traditional kingdoms.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Islam made few attempts at reforming the entire way of life of its converts and tolerated or even favored widespread pre-Islamic African customs such as polygyny and bridewealth payments, which Christianity sought to eradicate. In short, Islam was often more tolerant and less presumptuous than Christianity.

Much of whatever acceptance Christianity achieved is attributable to the fact that the European missions preserved a virtual monopoly of Western education for Africans until independence. Colonial governments provided few state schools for Africans, and lay private schools were even scarcer. As soon as Africans realized the value of Western education, the demand for it increased rapidly; and conversion to Christianity was typically the price to be paid for a modern type of schooling leading to wage employment. Eventually the missions contributed to the demise of colonialism through the spread of Western education, in that almost all leaders of African independence are products of mission schools. Though a great many rebelled against the colonial form of Christianity, the fact remains that Christianity, more than Islam, was one of the main agencies of political and educational change in sub-Saharan Africa. Christianity was both an adjunct of colonialism and one of the principal agents of its undoing.

There is much more to religious change in Africa than the spread of Islam and Christianity. As a consequence of contact with the West there developed in various parts of Africa a great number of syncretistic and
messianic movements, which adopted some elements of Christianity and combined them more or less liberally with indigenous beliefs and rituals. Some sects remained fairly orthodox and simply sought to substitute African for European leadership in the church. Others were quite unorthodox and simply seized on prophetic and Messianic ideas from the scriptures to herald the arrival of an African savior who would overthrow white rule. Most of the movements were clearly the political as well as the religious expression of frustrated and oppressed peoples in search of a better life. Some of these sects became quite subversive against the colonial regimes and were the precursors of later independence movements. In the post-independence era the political significance of messianism has continued. As late as 1964, for example, the Lumpa sect of Zambia under prophetess Alice Lenshina created a serious threat to the newly independent government. Sociologically, these syncretistic movements offer fascinating examples of dramatic responses to rapid social change.

EDUCATIONAL CHANGE

In the broad sense of the socialization of youth for adult roles, education, of course, has always existed in traditional and Islamized African societies. In many cases, long before the colonial era, educational functions were assumed by specialized, extra-familial agencies. Koranic schools in Islamic areas and initiation schools in many non-Islamic societies functioned as formal educational institutions quite distinct from informal family socialization. The same was true of the long apprenticeships served prior to acceptance into skilled craft occupations such as those of musician or blacksmith.

Africans quickly realized, however, that a Western type of education, including literacy in a European tongue, was essential for success in the modernizing sectors of the economies which were beginning to take shape during colonialism. With the rapid Africanization of technical and administrative personnel since independence, the premium on Western education is even greater today than it was during the colonial period when the Europeans imposed rigid ceilings on the occupational mobility of
Africans. Modern educational skills are a prerequisite to modern technical societies. Increasingly even such relatively unskilled tasks as driving an automobile or assembly-line production require literacy. Most African governments therefore invest relatively high proportions of their budgets (as much as half) in the development of human resources.

Literacy rates are now climbing to between 25 and 50 per cent of the school age population in some areas like southern Nigeria, southern Ghana, Algeria, Tunisia, and the Republic of South Africa; but rates of 5 to 20 per cent are still typical of most of the continent. It is probably still true that in most African countries at least half of the children never go to school at all; over 90 per cent never complete primary school; well under one per cent ever complete high school; and less than one child in a thousand graduates from universities or technical colleges. Throughout Africa the better post-primary education is heavily concentrated in a few urban centers and is often beyond the reach of the rural masses.

Such a highly pyramidal system of education combined with a low degree of economic development produces a vicious circle of stagnation. A low level of modern skills makes for low labor productivity, high birth rates, administrative inefficiency, and other ills associated with the countries which, in nearly all cases, can only euphemistically be called "developing." Most developed agricultural economies cannot absorb and effectively utilize large numbers of highly educated persons. Thus, some countries, such as India, are beginning to experience the tragic paradox of having both a very low educational average and a growing class of "unemployable" university graduates who emigrate to the greener pastures of Europe and America. Few African countries have enough university graduates to fill top positions; but some like Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, and Ivory Coast are already starting to experience a "brain drain" and a loss of trained talent.

The pyramidal education system has other consequences. One of the most obvious is that it contributes to the rise of an increasingly elitist ruling class of technicians, professionals, and civil servants who come to form a kind of mandarinate, or what has aptly been called a "meritocracy." These problems of elitism are compounded by the fact that African school curricula...
at all levels are still heavily foreign in character in spite of superficial attempts at "Africanization." The French and English languages hold a complete, or nearly complete, monopoly as media of instruction in universities and secondary schools in the former Belgian, French, and British colonies. In some countries the importance of European languages in primary schools has increased rather than decreased since independence. Likewise, the subject matter taught in the schools still reflects almost entirely the needs and traditions of European rather than African countries. African children still learn more European history in high school than African history.

The educational tasks faced by African governments are formidable. Nothing short of a profound revolution in both the quantity and the type of education will accomplish the progressive aims of some governments. The curricula must be thoroughly revised in line with policy objectives, and rapid expansion of facilities must take place simultaneously at all levels of education. A crash program of university expansion can be effective only if the lower schools that feed into the universities are also expanded; the opposite approach, a gradual upgrading and broadening of the school system from the bottom up, implies a steady expansion in the number of qualified teachers, and it would take some twenty years before it would produce top level scientists and technicians. To succeed, African states must try to do everything at once with extremely limited financial resources. Without education there can be no development, and without development there is little money for education. Short of foreign aid on a much more massive scale than is currently available, escape from the vicious circle can only be painfully slow.

FAMILY, MARRIAGE AND KINSHIP

Most traditional African kinship systems share certain characteristics which differentiate them sharply from Western systems. Almost all African societies have extended, polygynous, virilocal family groups, in contrast to the European family which tends to be nuclear, monogamous, and neolocal. Traditionally and ideally, the large family group sharing common residence consists of a man, his wife or wives, his unmarried daughters and granddaughters,
his sons and grandsons and their wives, and his brothers with their wives, sons, and unmarried daughters. Upon marriage, a girl goes to live with her in-laws. In practice, even in rural districts, there are a great many departures from this ideal residence group; but the local family sharing a house or compound is almost invariably much larger than a nuclear family of a man, his wife, and his unmarried children. Polygyny is at once the rule in theory and the exception in practice. For demographic and economic reasons, seldom more than 10 per cent of the men in any society have more than one wife.

Another nearly universal feature of traditional African marriage is that it involves the payment of bridewealth (usually in livestock) by the groom's family to the bride's family. Sometimes misconstrued as a "purchase" of women, the bridewealth has, in fact, a number of functions most of which are not economic in character. The bridewealth usually constitutes a legal guarantee for the validity and stability of the marriage, a warranty for the good behavior and good faith of the parties, and a juridical claim by the husband not so much on the wife herself as on her present and future offspring.

In Western types of kinship systems, all lines of descent are of equal (though often minimal) sociological significance. Except for the patrilineal inheritance of surnames, Westerners do not distinguish between categories of cousins, grandparents, and uncles and aunts. This is known as a bilateral system of descent, one of the consequences of which is that Western societies cannot be neatly divided into mutually exclusive kinship groups. Almost all African societies, by contrast, have unilineal descent; that is, an individual has only one relevant line of descent. In the vast majority of cases the patrilineal line is the significant one, but some societies of West Africa (for instance, the Congo and Zambia) are matrilineal; and a few have double descent kinship systems.

This, then, is the broad matrix of traditional African systems of kinship and marriage. Until recently, many sociologists assumed that the Western type of family was the only one suited to urbanized and industrialized societies, and, hence, that non-Western kinship systems would break down and come to resemble Western systems. In fact, the changes that took place in Africa,
Japan, India, and other non-Western countries are much more complex than this simple model would suggest.

In the urban areas polygyny is indeed declining, if only for economic reasons. Polygyny which is an asset in agricultural societies where women do a great deal of the productive work becomes a liability in an urban environment where the productive process is male-oriented. But polygyny is not replaced by the missionary ideal of monogamy. The urban poor, often unable to pay the bridewealth and to find a spouse in a city where there are two or more men for every woman, resort to prostitution or more or less unstable cohabitation. The rich can afford divorce and serial monogamy. Common law unions and illegitimacy, which are not the norm in Europe nor in traditional Africa, have become frequent in large African urban centers, especially in the south.

With urbanization, the kinship ties and obligations which are so important in most African societies are beginning to recede to a more secondary position. The extended family, however, still remains the ideal norm, and while large traditional families frequently cannot be housed together in town, living groups continue to be typically larger than nuclear families. Large family compounds are not uncommon, especially in the more traditional cities of West Africa; and kinship obligations (such as the extension of hospitality, of mutual aid, of financial help to meet educational costs, and the like) continue in force. Urban life does not generally entail the breakup of family ties, not even of the extended family. In fact, studies in urban Europe and North America have shown that in the working class, in some immigrant communities, and in many upper-class circles, extended family ties have been of great importance. The real situation is radically different from the expectations of some sociologists, who seem to have been generalized the behavior of the highly mobile middle-class population of American suburbia to all urbanites.

Traditional kin groups, especially patrilineages, show no indication of disappearing, though the range of their social functions may sometimes become more restricted. In any case, urban Africans are not turning to a system of double descent. If anything, under Western influence and urbanization, matrilineal systems have tended toward patrilinearity.
Bridewealth, in spite of concerted attacks by a number of missionaries and some of their converts, is so central to indigenous marriage systems that it frequently retains its vitality as a social institution. Here too, rather than disappearing, bridewealth often undergoes changes in form and function. Thus, cash is substituted for payments traditionally made in cattle. And instead of being collected from a wide circle of patrilineal kinsmen, it is earned by the groom through wage employment in town or even occasionally by the prospective bride herself in order to hasten her marriage.

ECONOMIC CHANGE

The central economic fact about Africa is poverty. In terms of such criteria as Gross National Product, per capita income, percentage of the population who are wage-earners, share of world trade, labor productivity, and percentage of GNP attributable to secondary and tertiary industry, Africa is indeed grossly underdeveloped, more so than most of Latin America and Asia. This is not to say, however, that Africa is the most destitute continent of the Third World in terms of subsistence. There is probably less overpopulation and chronic food scarcity in most of Africa than in such Asian countries as India, China, and Pakistan. In large parts of central and East Africa which have not yet been converted into cash-crop economies, there is still a diversified subsistence agriculture which provides the rural population with a reasonably adequate diet. Paradoxically, the dietary situation is sometimes worse in the more developed economies of West and southern Africa which are based on cash crops, mining, or manufacturing. For example, the vast inequalities in the distribution of wealth, high costs of living, the tax structure, and other factors make the relative "prosperity" of the Republic of South Africa illusory for the urban African proletariat. There is probably more malnutrition in Johannesburg, Africa's richest and most developed city, than among the Pygmy hunters of the Congo rainforest.

In the "modern" sense, however, Africa clearly stands out as the most underdeveloped of the continents. In most African countries, less than one-tenth of the adult population is literate, lives in towns, or works for
wages. The vast bulk of Africans are either pastoralists or subsistence peasants. In certain more developed regions, mining and cash crops have raised productivity. Such is the case for the Copperbelt of Zambia and the Katanga part of the Congo with copper mining; or Ghana, Ivory Coast, and parts of Nigeria and Uganda with coffee, cocoa, cotton, groundnuts, and other cash crops. Especially privileged countries like Kenya have a well-diversified agriculture. The only truly developed economy with a broad industrial base in the whole of Africa is that of the Republic of South Africa. But this development has been achieved through the ruthless exploitation of Black Africans, not only within the Republic, but also in Rhodesia, Zambia, Mozambique, South-West Africa, Malawi, Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland. The last four in particular have become utterly dependent reservoirs of cheap labor for South African mines and industries.

The underdevelopment of African economies is only one of the important elements of the situation. The other is the very special and exploitative nature of such development as did take place as a result of contact with Europe. For four centuries, significant portions of Africa were literally bled of their human resources. After the slaving period was over, Africa was transformed by the European colonial powers into a source of cheap raw materials for the economies of Europe, and secondarily, into a market for manufactured products. In a certain sense, the colonial powers did develop Africa: they opened roads and railways, introduced currencies, built cities and mines, and planted cash crops. (More precisely, they supervised the African labor which actually accomplished these tasks.) This, of course, was development in the economic sense of increasing GNP and capital formation; but it was also exploitation of the most systematic and ruthless sort.

All colonial economies, by means of taxation and land alienation, compelled the local population to work for low wages in order to produce cheap raw materials. These materials, in turn, were to be traded, on terms dictated in part by monopolistic boards and cartels, directly and solely with the mother country. The alleged "free-trade" capitalism of Europe
was transformed in Africa into a protectionistic and monopolistic form of mercantilism almost entirely for the benefit of the colonial powers. Colonial economies reduced African countries to a state of helpless and unilateral dependence on the exploiting countries. All trade and labor contracts were on terms unfavorable to Africans. The whole continent was carved up into zones of economic exploitation by individual whites or, on a much larger scale, by monopolistic trading, mining, and transport companies which received charters from their respective European governments. Subsistence farmers were often transformed into a floating mass of urban sub-proletarians and rural serfs.

This process of "development" was most advanced in South Africa, Algeria, Rhodesia, the Belgian Congo, and Kenya, and least advanced in countries like Chad, Niger, Somalia, Upper Volta, and Gabon which had little in the way of exploitable resources to offer. The Congo was exceptional in that it was initially, by treaty, a "free-trade" area. As the price for recognizing King Leopold's annexation of the Congo, the other European powers in the late nineteenth century made the Congo into an open field for exploitation. A few countries like Uganda and Ghana, where cash crops were cultivated in small holdings by indigenous farmers, did benefit somewhat from this kind of development, but these are the exceptional cases.

The irony of colonial "development" is that even Europe did not really benefit from this plundering of a continent. A few individual settlers and private concerns profited enormously, of course, but the African booty had but a slight effect on the colonial countries at large. Portugal, itself an underdeveloped country, remained poor in spite of its vast empire (which turned out to be an albatross around its neck). The postwar growth of French, Dutch, and Belgian prosperity continued unabated after the liquidation of their empires. Even Britain's economic sluggishness is largely unrelated to the loss of colonies. For European governments most African colonies were liabilities rather than assets. Being poor, Africa had little to offer except a few scarce minerals and some luxury tropical foods. As a market for manufactured products Africa was, and still is, relatively insignificant. Since the 1930's Africa's share in world trade has been no more than
Major Themes in Social Change

5 per cent; and, if anything, that percentage had tended to decline recently. Industrial nations find synthetic substitutes for tropical products such as cotton and sisal and even manage to produce food more cheaply than "developing" countries.

The great paradox of economic change in Africa during the colonial era is that, on balance, colonial development has meant widespread impoverishment of the indigenous population. This process, which in many ways still continues, has been referred to by many authors, including Dalton and Rivkin in this volume, as "growth without development." This signifies the simple expansion of investments, GNP, and per capita income without a concurrent spreading of this wealth on the emergence of a wider, efficiently integrated, economic system involving and benefiting the masses of the people. One need only survey the eroded "Native Reserves" of South Africa, or the ramshackle shantytowns and bidonvilles of West and central Africa, or the mining compounds of Johannesburg, or the growing dustbowls of North Africa, or the scarred forest of the Congo Basin and the Guinea belt, to realize how much change has taken place.

The economic dilemmas of Africa appear at the moment to be almost insoluble. Many African countries lack significant mineral resources. Agricultural yields can almost always be increased, but not without enormous capital and human investment. Cash crops lead to highly unstable and precarious economies subject to world price fluctuations. Investment in secondary industries is costly and is hampered by the debility of the consumer market, by low labor productivity, and by other factors. Emancipation from expatriate control is essential for long-range, balanced growth; but growth is impossible without capital, and capital comes in large part from conservative Western countries. Modern skills are scarce, and so is money to develop them. Subsistence agriculture is becoming increasingly deficient with unchecked population growth, and in the urban areas the narrow industrial base makes for high unemployment. Fewer and fewer people can live on the land, but many displaced farmers cannot find jobs in towns. Of the main factors of production—capital, land, and labor—Africa has an abundance of labor but unskilled labor is increasingly redundant and unproductive.
In fact, African countries have to import expatriate labor at enormously high prices while the overwhelming majority of the indigenous population contributes little to the Gross National Product.

In short, much of Africa seems to be in a position where it cannot return to traditional subsistence economies. Irreversible processes of modernization and monetization make such a solution unthinkable. At the same time, it lacks the technical and capital resources to reach the "take-off point" of self-sustaining growth. Behind the rhetoric of African Socialism hides the stark reality of continued economic dependence and stagnation.

SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

Proponents of African Socialism sometimes state that traditional African societies are egalitarian and that modern African countries do not have social classes or class conflicts. They conclude that the Marxian model is therefore not appropriate to African conditions. It is certainly true that, by and large, property, especially ownership of the means of production, is not the most significant criterion of class in Africa. But to deny the existence of social classes and of class conflicts does violence to the facts. Interestingly, African Socialism, the official ideology of the new African ruling classes, has often become the status quo ideology of a bureaucratic mandarinate.

Precolonial African ethnic societies varied greatly in the extent to which they were stratified. Some groups, especially hunters and pastoralists (for example, the Bushmen, Pygmies, Nuer, and Masai), but also some agriculturalists (for example, the Ibo), were quite democratic and egalitarian, at least as far as adult men were concerned. Many of these societies were stratified into age-classes or age-sets, but all adult men of a given age group had much the same duties and privileges. Some prestige differences existed based on individual qualities such as bravery in war; but these societies had no marked differences in status, in life style, in wealth, or in power between identifiable social groups. Age stratification was a way of differentiating functions and obligations according to strength and experience without creating invidious distinctions between social classes.
Aside from age and sex inequalities, at least a couple of hundred traditional African groups could be described as classless in the sense that they have no inheritance of differential power, status, and wealth within well-defined social groups.

At the other end of the spectrum, however, one finds a great many highly stratified pre-colonial ethnic societies. These are usually the largest politically centralized groups. Included in this category would be most of North Africa (except some desert nomads); the great empires of the Sudan belt; the Hausa-Fulani emirates of Nigeria; the kingdoms of the Guinean belt (Ashanti, Yoruba, Bini, Dahomey); the Amharic empire of Ethiopia; the kingdoms of the Great Lakes region such as Rwanda, Burundi, Buganda, Ankole, and others; and the traditional monarchies of the Bakongo, Bakuba, Baluba, Balunda, and Barotse in the sub-equatorial savanna. Many of them were states based on conquest, where military expansion probably accelerated the process of stratification.

These societies were generally divided into fairly rigidly defined groups which are best described as estates (in the medieval European sense) rather than classes. At the bottom, there were often domestic slaves who were acquired by war or by purchase, but who were typically assimilated as free men within one or two generations and who could sometimes rise to high political office. Next in the hierarchy was the mass of commoners—that is, the peasants who paid the taxes and did most of the productive work. Distinct from the peasants, though sometimes of lower status, were smaller groups of specialized artisans, such as blacksmiths, weavers, potters, leather-workers, musicians, praise-singers, and so on, who typically constituted hereditary castes, or guilds similar to those of medieval Europe. Priests and scholars also had a distinct and higher status than commoners in Islamized societies. At the top was a nobility, often only partially hereditary, which was itself frequently divided into several specialized segments. One or several of the noble families constituted the royal clan within which the king was chosen according to a wide variety of methods, strict primogeniture being the exception rather than the rule.

These societies had many characteristics in common with the Anciens Regimes of medieval and Renaissance Europe. In between the two extremes of
estate societies and egalitarian ones come a number of groups which were in
the process of becoming more stratified, but which had not yet reached the
level of complexity of the great kingdoms. The Swazi, Zulu, and Ndebele of
southern Africa, for example, developed the notion of a royal clan and, hence,
an aristocracy; but no sharply distinct life styles emerged between nobles
and commoners.

Traditional status distinctions began to break down during the colonial
era. The colonial powers outlawed slavery (though it frequently lingered on
through the institution of clientage); they unwittingly undermined the authority
of the traditional aristocracies through which they tried to rule; they deposed
sovereigns and, hence, frequently destroyed the legitimacy of the kingship
which was often religious as well as political.

The colonial powers did much more than disrupt traditional status systems.
They also created a new one, namely the colonial system itself--an extremely
rigid hierarchy based on "race" and culture. Whites, Africans, and, in Eastern
and southern Africa, Asians, came to constitute racial castes with distinct
duties and privileges, separate juridical status, widely different living
standards and styles, and either customary or legal segregation in residential
areas, schools, means of transport, hospitals, hotels, and churches. The
French and Portuguese were less racist than the British, Belgians, and Germans;
but in practice there was little difference between colonial powers in the
relative status of Africans and Europeans. All colonial societies were in
fact rigid caste or quasi-caste systems, considerably more stratified and
ascriptive than any of the traditional systems or, for that matter, than
contemporary European societies.

Within the African population, the colonial powers sowed the seeds of
a new status system based largely on the acquisition of modern skills through
the school system. Thus the Europeans not only undermined the old societies,
and imposed themselves as a new ruling class; they also initiated a new
process of status differentiation within the African population itself. In
short, they created the embryo of the stratification systems of independent
states. As many of the mission-educated children were of commoner status,
the new educated elite showed little overlap with the traditional elite where
such an elite existed. The new elite tended to develop anti-traditional attitudes and claimed high status by virtue of such skills as literacy and formal education in French, Portuguese, or English.

The dynamics of class formation since independence, though extremely complex, are reducible to the following basic elements: an acceleration of the breakdown of traditional elites; the elimination of the racial structure imposed by the colonial regime; and a restructuring of African societies into a new system of social classes which cut across ethnic groups.

Some traditional systems were overthrown by violent revolution soon after the colonial powers withdrew. The two bloodiest examples were the anti-Natusi revolution in Rwanda and the anti-Arab revolution in Zanzibar. In Uganda, the Kabaka of Buganda was also overthrown by force and the other monarchies abolished; in Nigeria, the Sardauna of Sokoto was assassinated. In most cases, however, the displacement of traditional elites by the Western-educated elite was somewhat more gradual. Chiefs were often kept as figureheads and as ritual functionaries; they were even "kicked upstairs" into Houses of Chiefs patterned after the House of Lords; but they were generally stripped of all effective power, a process which had started under colonialism. With the recent demise of the Mwami of Burundi, there are no ruling monarchs left in Central Africa. The two remaining significant regions in Africa where traditional aristocracies still play a leading political role are Ethiopia and Northern Nigeria.

The second aspect of change is status systems, the overthrow of the colonially structured racial castes, is still far from completed. The Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia maintain a rigid color bar in every aspect of social life, but both countries are facing revolutionary change. Portugal still retains its Overseas Provinces, but it is fighting a losing guerrilla war against African freedom fighters in Guinea, Angola, and Mozambique. The nominally independent Americo-Liberian settler regime of Liberia still maintains its minority domination. Even in some countries under African majority rule, the remnants of the colonial caste structure are still very strong. In Kenya, for example, the Europeans, Asians, and Africans still constitute mutually exclusive social groups with only token formal interaction at the top. The distribution of power in Kenya has been altered
in favor of the Africans, but Asians and Europeans still retain strongly privileged positions in the economic and occupational spheres; and, aside from some land redistribution, the bulk of the country's wealth is as much in alien hands as during the colonial era.

Expatriate Europeans in Africa still enjoy a highly privileged economic status and are able to maintain much of their exclusive social position through economic barriers. The rigid pattern of racial segregation in public or semi-public facilities which was typical at least of Belgian, British, and German colonialism has been largely eliminated in the independent countries; and some African governments are attempting gradually to abolish the economic privileges of their expatriate minorities. The most serious current problems are faced by East African countries that have a sizable Asian as well as European population; the future problems of the reconstruction of Rhodesia and South Africa along non-racial lines will also be quite formidable.

What is happening to the class structure of the indigenous African population? Because of their precolonial and their colonial experience, African societies are very unlike those of Europe, America, or Asia in respect to their stratification systems. Certain social classes which played prominent roles elsewhere are conspicuous by their absence or insignificance in Africa, or at least in Tropical Africa.

Apart from the areas of extensive white settlement (South Africa, Algeria, Rhodesia, and Kenya), a sizable class of large landowners did not develop in Africa. Even the traditional aristocracies were not for the most part landowners. The reason for this lies in the nature of African land-tenure systems. The European notions of individual freehold tenure and of land as a freely marketable and alienable commodity do not exist in most traditional African systems. In almost all African societies land was neither bought nor sold; occupation of land conferred certain users rights, but not ownership in the Western sense. Furthermore, claims over land were often vested in groups such as lineages, or even in an entire ethnic group through the nominal "ownership" of the king. Periodic land redistribution according to need sometimes took place.
Agrarian conflicts—which are typical of countries with plantation labor—debt peonage, share-cropping, and other forms of exploitation of landless peasants have not been uncommon. The colonial regimes generally preserved systems of communal tenure in the Native Reserves, and, even in the few places where cash crops were cultivated by individual African farmers (as was the case in Uganda and Ghana), no large land estates developed. Small owners organized in marketing cooperatives remained the dominant pattern of agricultural production.

Just as modern Africa has no indigenous landed aristocracy, it also lacks a bourgeoisie, or middle class, in the Marxian sense of industrial entrepreneurs and owners of capital. During the colonial era capital ownership remained almost exclusively in European (and secondarily, Asian) hands. In West Africa, there was a traditional merchant class; and petty entrepreneurship (much of it conducted by women) flourishes in Nigeria, Ghana, Ivory Coast, and Senegal. Graft has made some capital accumulation possible in highly corrupt regimes such as the former Nkrumah government in Ghana. In North Africa, the indigenous mercantile bourgeoisie is relatively well established, especially in Egypt and Morocco. Elsewhere, however, indigenous entrepreneurship is largely confined to petty retail trading, and the native bourgeoisie is still embryonic and insignificant. In short, then, Africa lacks, to all intents and purposes, indigenous property-holding classes with a stake in the economic status quo. There is a rapidly growing ruling class, but the basis of its status and power is now economic.

Schematically, the emerging stratification system of most African countries is based on two criteria: urban versus rural residence and formal education. At the bottom of the prestige and economic ladder are the masses of rural dwellers—the farmers and pastoralists with only traditional skills. They still constitute 80 to 90 per cent of the population of most countries. In contrast to the rural dwellers, are the urbanites who stratify themselves roughly into a still weak but growing proletariat of mine-workers, factory operatives, and domestic servants; a smaller middle-class of clerks, salesmen, artisans, small merchants, technicians, and semi-professionals;
and at the apex, a tiny, educated ruling class consisting mostly of civil servants, army officers, and top-ranking politicians with an admixture of academics, independent professionals, and managers. How far one has gone in the elitist and alien educational system is the principal determinant of one's position. The proletariat has received little or no formal education; the middle class is typically literate, knows some French or English, and has gone at least through primary and often through some secondary or vocational schooling; the upper crust completed at least high school, frequently has a university degree, and has fluent command of a European language.

Naturally, this analysis could be refined. Where commercial crops are important, for example, in Ghana, cash-crop farmers have risen as a class above subsistence peasants, thereby complicating the rural stratification system. Finer distinctions are made within the middle-class between, say, an uneducated petty tradesman and a practical nurse. The elite is by no means a monolithic, undifferentiated group. Nor is the elite quite the same in all countries. In one state, the ruling group may consist of relatively uncouth and corrupt political parvenus; in another, of idealistic and puritanical young army officers; in a third, of urbane intellectuals who became bureaucrats.

In the present transitional phase, professional success and elite status are still to a large extent the results of individual achievements of persons of above average abilities who frequently are only one or at most two generations away from rural illiteracy. During the last ten or fifteen years, when this new bureaucratic mandarinate was being educated, access to the elite was wide-open to talented, ambitious, and aggressive persons who had the luck to be within reach of good mission schools. At present, there is still little relationship between family membership and modern social status, except in the coastal regions of West Africa. Wide status differences between members of the same family are still quite common. However, there are many indications that the ruling class is rapidly becoming closed and self-perpetuating through the monopoly of European language and culture, and through the inheritance, not so much of wealth, as of privileged access to elite secondary
schools and universities. Increasingly, the roster of senior civil servants in some states consists of the old boys from African Etons and Oxfords. This is, of course, more true of such conservative states as Senegal, Ivory Coast, or Kenya, than of more radical states like Tanzania or Guinea.

In Africa, however, perhaps even more than in Europe, revolutionary and socialist ideologies and rhetoric have often gone together with the arrogance and elitism which characterizes the rising class of technocratic intellectuals. Modern mandarins of the Third World have taken to quoting Castro, Mao Tse-tung, or Nkrumah instead of Confucius. Nevertheless, they are a fundamentally conservative class, enjoying salaries of at least fifty times the per capita averages in their countries. They are, notwithstanding their rhetoric, the successor elite to the colonial administrators. And in the present state of economic stagnation of Africa they are virtually the sole beneficiaries of independence. They are isolated from the masses not only by their salaried affluence but also by their foreign education, their use of French or English as lingua francas, their acquired Europeanized tastes, and their participation in the international jet set of diplomacy, U.N. agencies, and globetrotting experts. It does not take much acumen to see the potential internal conflicts in such a situation—conflicts which may have been responsible for many of the recent military takeovers in Africa.

This sweeping survey of social change in Africa has, of necessity, been sketchy. It is no easy task to generalize about the nearly forty independent states, a handful of dependent territories, and hundreds of traditional cultures which, except for their colonial past and contemporary underdevelopment, have little more in common than do Eskimos and Greeks. It is hoped, however, that the broad scope of the essay will not only serve to emphasize the continuity of social change in Africa by attempting to draw on the more detailed material of preceding essays in this volume, but also to introduce some of the central themes which will be elaborated in the contributions to follow. Some of the generalizations presented here may be contested by scholars who have had experience in different parts of the continent. We all become, more or less, prisoners of where we have done our field work.
The note of controversy and involvement in this essay, however, is deliberate. I hope that some of my pessimistic conclusions and predictions will be invalidated. I also hope that my opinions will raise some controversy, because discussion is the salt of intellectual life.
PERSONALITY AND CHANGE

Robert LeVine

THE IDEA OF AN AFRICAN PERSONALITY

Is there an African personality? Can the population of an entire continent like Africa be said to have a personality? Not with any accuracy, given the size of Africa and its ethnic and ecological diversity. How is it, then, that Western and African writers alike persistently speak of "the African personality" and "the African mind"? The assumption that Africans are psychologically homogeneous is due in part to conditions surrounding the social perception of Africans by outsiders and indigenous intellectuals. One of these conditions is ignorance; African history and cultural diversity are less well documented and understood than those of Europe and Asia, and ignorance favors the presumption of homogeneity. Anyone who knows Europe but not Africa would consider a "European personality," lumping together Sicilians and Swedes, Poles and Portuguese, an absurdity, but might readily accept the idea of a distinctive "African personality." Another condition is racial visibility; the distinctive skin color, hair form, and facial features of Africans are their most immediately recognizable characteristics. Homogeneity on visible attributes favors the presumption of behavioral homogeneity, especially to a naïve observer. The same naïve observer who might be sceptical about an "Asian personality" because he has heard of India and China and knows that there are brown people in one and yellow people in the other and that they dress and live differently, would more easily accept that all Africans, being "black," have a single personality. Finally, there is the known history of colonialism, under which Africans
all over the continent were subordinated to European rulers, producing a superficially common framework for Africans to perceive themselves and be perceived by others as essentially similar. Thus from the popular European or American viewpoint, Africans are Black colonials, from a continent south of Europe, whom one cannot distinguish from one another on any known historical, cultural, or behavioral basis; why not believe they are psychologically homogeneous?

But the concept of an African personality has persisted not simply because of ignorance and the intellectual laziness involved in judging people on the most superficial aspects of race and history, but because there have been those who had a stake in perpetuating the idea. There were and are those white writers who, seeking to justify European domination in Africa or slavery and the racial caste system in the Americas, have found it convenient to posit an "African mind" or some similar concept to which they could attribute various kinds of mental inferiority. Then there are the journalists, film-makers, pornographers, and even some serious novelists who have found profit and popularity in using the undifferentiated African as a fantasy figure of uncontrolled hedonism, malevolent savagery and superstition, and orgiastic sexuality in order to provide entertainment for the bearers of a puritanical culture. This stereotype has a long history in Europe; it is probably as old as the familiar anti-Semitic stereotype, perhaps even older, but has suffered less debunking by intellectuals and so remains current in more literate segments of society.

There are also those African political leaders and writers who, in their urgent drive to construct an ideology for opposing European domination and promoting Pan-African unity, have accepted the psychological homogeneity of Africans while insisting on equality or superiority to Europeans. In some cases they have even accepted the content of European stereotypes but reversed the values from negative to positive; in other cases they generalize their own local cultural background to the whole continent or even to all Negroes everywhere. At the same time, however, the term "African Personality" as popularized by Kwame Nkrumah is used by African intellectuals more in the sense of "spirit," "tradition," or "philosophy" than in reference to the
mental characteristics of persons, and more as a call for a unified defense of African distinctiveness than as a statement of what actually exists. Hence "African mind" or "personality," as most frequently encountered in print, tends to be a stereotyped image designed to either derogate and dehumanize or to defend Africans, rather than an attempt at understanding them.

So pervasive is the influence of partisan stereotype on discussions of the psychology of Africans that it is perpetuated by some academic treatises which purport to be scientific or scholarly. The most notorious of these in the racist tradition is *The African Mind in Health and Disease* by J. M. Carothers, a British psychiatrist, published in 1953 by the World Health Organization. Another example is *The Personality of the Urban African in South Africa* by J. C. de Ridder, a South African psychologist, published in London in 1961, this book reports biased impressions disguised as objective data; these "data" happen to confirm the popular white stereotypes of Africans as immature, violent, and undisciplined. The defensive literature has its representative in *The Mind of Africa* by W. E. Abraham, a Ghanaian professor of philosophy and Fellow of All Souls' College, Oxford. Although not distorted by pseudo-scientific methodology like the volumes of Carothers and de Ridder, this book does little more to shed light on the subject of its title: "African culture" is vaguely characterized as "essentialist," "rationalist," and "communalist"; and these labels are apparently intended to provide a philosophical basis for a rambling and unscholarly review of African history and current problems. The works cited illustrate that in publications on this controversial topic the academic credentials of the author are no guarantee of an objectivity which reflects the expected standards of science or scholarship.

There have, however, been some systematic works on the psychology of Africans which are objective and scientific; Doob and LeVine have attempted in review articles to sort the wheat from the chaff and to give emphasis to the more meritorious studies in this new and slowly developing field. But any of these studies that have general significance for understanding Africans, no matter how objectively conducted and reported, are highly susceptible to misinterpretation, to being viewed as efforts to support
one or another kind of stereotyped image of Africans. And they are indeed used by ideological partisans outside behavioral science circles to support their own political positions and prejudices. There is no easy way of eliminating this misinterpretation and abuse in an area where issues like racism and ethnic relations are involved, apart from growing recognition of the scientific study of man as a legitimate and socially constructive type of activity. We are now beginning to see how the study of culture and personality in places like Japan, Latin America, the United States, and Scandinavia can contribute to a deeper understanding of individual adaptation and maladaptation to changing social and cultural environments; Africa has much to contribute to, and benefit from, this kind of international enterprise. One benefit will be a more complex and realistic view of African populations and their similarities and differences on the psychological dimensions underlying contemporary social behavior.

In this paper I shall ask the reader to divert his attention from the possible political implications of our subject and to consider it from the stance of a neutral scientific observer. For purposes of this discussion I shall assume what I know to be untrue: that the question of psychological differences between Africans and others can be explored without inhibition and in some depth and still be received as an honest attempt at objective description reflecting no hidden desire to defame or defend.

ENVIRONMENT, PERSONALITY, AND PERSONALITY PROFILES

In psychology, the term "personality" refers to consistencies in the behavior of a human individual, consistencies that cannot be attributed to temporary states of his organism or temporary conditions in his environment, but which endure over substantial periods of his life, making him to some degree predictable. Psychologists differ as to whether these consistencies are organized into a unified whole for each individual or are simply numerous independent traits. They do agree, however, that in its most fundamental sense personality is characteristic of individuals rather than groups or other collective entities. Personality characteristics vary widely among individuals in a given population, just as do physical characteristics such as height and
weight. Like height and weight, personality characteristics (as measured by standard tests) tend to show a normal bell-shaped distribution in which the majority of individuals are clustered toward the middle of the range near its average, with relatively few at both extremes. These distributions are not identical across all human populations; they differ in central tendency as well as other ways. Just as the average heights of two populations may differ considerably (although many individuals in one are identical to those in the other), so too may personality. Thus, though personality refers to consistencies of individuals, the individuals of a given population tend to show, when statistically aggregated, some central tendencies among themselves as well as average differences between themselves and some other populations. It is my assumption and that of most personality psychologists that these average differences are caused primarily by differences in the social and cultural environments in which individuals of different populations grow up. According to this theory, if environmental conditions are similar in two populations, the distribution of personality characteristics should be also similar.

From this perspective, the question of an African personality takes us back to two prior questions: 1) Are there environmental differences among African populations of a quality and quantity to lead us to expect average differences in personality distributions? 2) How does environmental variation among African populations compare in magnitude with environmental differences between Africa and other parts of the world? In other words, are African societies and cultures, regardless of their differences from one another, distinguishable as a group from societies and cultures elsewhere?

The available evidence indicates that African societies and cultures are as a group distinctive. This is not to deny the major variations along lines of economy (hunting and gathering, pastoral, agricultural, presence or absence of markets, degree of occupational specialization); kinship (patrilineal, matrilineal, non-unilineal); social and political stratification; community structure (urban, clustered village, dispersed settlement); religion; and aesthetic tradition. Some of these points of difference among African communities will be considered, as they relate to personality, later in
this essay. There are, regardless, strong central tendencies of economy, social structure, and culture among African populations and these are somewhat distinctive in a comparison of regions of the world. The relative homogeneity and distinctiveness of African socio-cultural environments has been considered above in the essays by Cohen and by Dalton. The analysis by Sawyer and LeVine of Murdock's cross-cultural data sketches the directions of the distinctively African social and cultural profile that is emerging as independent data are refined and analyzed.

From these analyses it can be said that, within the economy, agriculture is overwhelmingly dominant over hunting and gathering and animal husbandry; but it is an agriculture in which male members of the community are less frequently involved than in any cultural region of the world. The association of animal husbandry, however, with men, even where it is not a dominant subsistence activity, is strikingly evident and exceeds that of other world regions. In family and kinship institutions, Africa leads the world in the incidence of polygynous societies, and the associated mother-child household is so widespread that Africa has the lowest frequency on two other household variables that are quite common in other regions. Patrilineality, patrilocality, and brideprice prevail among African societies as they do almost nowhere else in the world. Bilateral descent has its lowest incidence in Africa. Indigenous slavery and hereditary succession to local office are considerably more frequent in Africa than in other regions. Although lacking figures, I would nevertheless argue that aspects of indigenous religion such as ancestor cults and witchcraft and sorcery beliefs have similar high frequencies.

Other cultural characteristics could be added, but this sampling of facts indicates that there is substantial homogeneity in socio-economic institutions in sub-Saharan Africa. Basic characteristics like agriculture, polygyny, and patrilocality are shared by at least four out of five societies in the Murdock sample; others, like patrilineality, brideprice, and hereditary succession to local office are present in about three out of four societies of the sample. Together with what social anthropologists know less formally about Africa, this suggests a common context of experience for Africans.
growing up in diverse parts of the continent. The second implication of the data concerns the distinctiveness of these socio-economic characteristics. None of them is uniquely African, for they are all found elsewhere as well; it is the particular combinations of traits that may be distinctively African. There is not simply agriculture, but agriculture in which women supply a large proportion of the labor; not just polygyny, but polygyny in which each wife and her children have a physically separate residential unit; not only patrilineality, but patrilocality as well. The traits in themselves are not uniquely African, but the profile of traits appears to be. In other words, it is not the customs that are distinctive but the patterns or constellations of cultural characteristics. This suggests that the common context of experience shared by so many Africans is not widely shared by populations outside of Africa, even though many of the specific customs are. Those inclined to generalization in the grand style might say that there is something that could be called "the African experience" which, though allowing for many exceptions, derives from a common core of environmental patterns shaping individual development in Africa.

Do these shared and distinctive environmental patterns produce similarly shared and distinctive personality distributions among the populations of Africa? The data to answer this question do not exist and are so far from being obtained that we are limited to discussing what form they might take if we had them. Speculating from a personality-trait perspective, I would argue that there will be no distinctively African personality traits, but possibly profiles of traits, like the cultural profiles discussed above, that are more frequent in Africa than elsewhere. In other words, even if there is one or more profile of traits that distinguishes African populations from populations elsewhere in the world, these profiles will not characterize all or even a majority of Africans, but just a larger proportion of Africans than non-Africans. In general, we can expect more variation at the level of individuals than at the level of societies. First, there are hundreds of millions of individuals and only hundreds of societies; and second, within the population of each society, there is a great deal of inter-individual variation in personality
that is due not to patterns of economy, social structure and culture, but to genetic factors and idiosyncratic developmental events. Thus "the African personality" cannot be more than a matter of statistical tendency and is likely to show less uniformity across African populations than do patterns of culture.

From a different perspective, that of a conception of personality as a structure rather than cluster of traits, a somewhat different picture would emerge. In this view, personality is a system with interdependent parts, and the focus is less on the parts in themselves than on their organization, their relations to one another, and their contributions toward the functioning of the system. Psychologists espousing this view believe that the trait approach mistakenly isolates discrete traits for measurement without reference to the over-all system in which they operate, concentrating on the individual bricks in a house rather than on the design that determines their place and functions. A structural approach would therefore attempt to identify characteristic patterns in which the major aspects of personality were related to one another. In the psychoanalytic view, for example, personality is seen as made up of a drive organization, a reality organization, and an organization of moral constraints; and it is their relative strengths and degrees of development and their characteristic ways of interacting that constitute the individual's enduring patterns of reaction to events in his environment and in his physical organism. If we assume that environmental adaptation is a major goal for a functioning personality structure, and that environmental forces help create a structure that will be adaptive, then it seems likely that a population having faced common adaptive problems for many generations would tend to share structural solutions to them. Thus, environmental similarities at the level of a population or a continent would tend to produce similarities in personality structure, just as they would tend to produce similarities in profiles of personality traits.

But here is where a psychoanalytic view of personality structure diverges more radically from the trait approach, for in the former view not all parts of the functioning personality are equally affected by the environment and its pressures. The personality is thought of as having a
surface, in close contact with the social and cultural environment, which consists of stabilized compromises between the individual's drives and the environmental demands (that is, the demands of reality and the moral order); these compromises make up his character structure. Those parts of personality that are deeper (that is, less accessible to consciousness and thus farther from the surface at which social interaction takes place) have been less affected by environmental demands and therefore do not reflect the society and culture to the degree that the character structure does. In these terms, the question of whether there is a distinctively African personality can be answered only in terms of a particular level of personality structure: at the bottom, there are similar forces and structures in all functioning human adults, and at the top, or social surface, each individual has his own peculiar character structure that sets him off from his fellows; it is in the intermediate levels that we can observe the effects of social experience in homogenizing individual adaptations to a more or less common environment.

In these intermediate levels of personality structure, the degree to which we see population-wide or continent-wide commonalities depends partly on the level of abstraction of our concepts rather than on what is really there. It is possible, for example, to conceptualize the fear of witches in its concrete cultural context so that it is seen as specific to a single cultural group. Or it may be considered as an instance of a general category of witch-fear so that it is seen as characteristic of many African and non-African societies. Or it can be viewed in terms of projection of hostility so that it is applicable to all populations in some measure but in varying degrees and varying contexts. This arbitrariness cannot be dispelled until comparable data on the functions for the individual are available on enough populations in Africa and elsewhere that scientific agreement can develop on structural similarities and differences. Until then, characterizations of personality at the level of population, region, or continent must reflect the observer's range of experience and knowledge, the level of abstraction at which he chooses to operate, his ability to detect (accurately or mistakenly) psychological
similarities in diverse contexts, and his guesses as to whether behavioral similarities represent similarities in personality structure and function.

**UNIFORMITIES IN AFRICAN BEHAVIOR**

Despite the scepticism of the foregoing section, I shall attempt here to describe patterns of personality in Africa in terms of those characteristics that I see as broadly shared across the continent and those that distinguish one African population from another. Description of the uniformities will be based on my personal experience and observations in East and West Africa and on my reading of the ethnographic literature; the variations between groups will include those that have been demonstrated in systematic psychological comparisons.

Several qualifications are necessary concerning my outline of widespread African personality patterns: First, it is limited in scope to the agricultural societies of sub-Saharan Africa and does not apply to primarily pastoral or hunting groups, to the modernized elites of the cities, or to North Africa and the eastern Horn. Second, it is limited to the more observable, social personality characteristics; it is description at the level of the social surface of personality structure rather than in the underlying dynamics. The dynamics may show through, particularly toward the end of the outline, but I do not attempt depth interpretations. In fact, some of the tendencies dealt with are social expectations and might seem better described as properties of roles than of persons. I concede this to the point of using the term "behavior" rather than "personality"; but I would contend that, in order for large numbers of persons to internalize these role demands and social expectations, their personality structures must already be compatible. The reader may reach his own decision on this issue. I make no effort to portray personality as a functioning system of coordinated structures because this would be even more speculative than such portraits usually are; thus my account appears to be that of trait psychology, with the door left open to future structural analyses. Finally, it must be emphasized that this is a personal account in which I have allowed myself to generalize rather freely while hoping to remain objective. The point of view is that
of the Western culture shared by this writer and his intended readership, and contrasts between Western and African behavior and attitudes are explicit or implicit throughout.

The following are seven characteristics I believe to be widespread among the populations of sub-Saharan Africa:

Social Distance Between Persons Differing in Age and Sex

African social life involves institutionalized restrictions on social contact between age and sex groups. The arrangements of social activities in space and time tend to separate males from females and older from younger generations. Interaction between the sexes and generations tends to be highly prescribed by custom and, from a Western view, to be relatively formal and unspontaneous. What is most striking about these social-distance patterns to a Western observer is that they apply to interpersonal relations within the family, which we are used to thinking of as a unit of relaxed informality. Relations between husbands and wives, parents and their children (especially adult children) and junior siblings and co-wives are regulated in accordance with institutionalized restrictions, segregation patterns, and customary prescriptions. The evidence for this is vast and can be discussed in terms of avoidance, segregated activities, and formality of interaction.

The most institutionalized avoidance patterns have been documented by anthropologists; for example, the in-law avoidances of East Africa, which may mean that a man and his mother-in-law must never meet or see one another, or (as among the Zulu) that a young wife must carefully avoid mention of potentially sexual or aggressive topics in the presence of her senior-in-laws. In western Kenya and other parts of East Africa, there is generational avoidance, in which young men and those whom they call "fathers," must avoid a wider range of personal contacts, from physical touching to discussing sexual topics or even jointly hearing them discussed. Relations between these generations tend to be stiff and restrained, with the younger generation especially inhibited in the presence of their elders. In the Western Sudan, avoidance of the eldest son is especially common and takes a variety of institutionalized forms. Sometimes the eldest son of the
father must be raised apart from the latter and must make efforts to avoid being seen by him; in other groups avoidance between father and eldest son only becomes a social necessity when the son reaches maturity. Among the Hausa, the eldest child (of either sex) of each wife must be raised apart and must avoid social contact with both parents; the avoidance is sometimes applied to the second child as well. Here, too, name avoidance is practiced. Thus, a Hausa man or a woman may not speak the names of persons standing in a certain relationship to themselves, and will not use those names in conversation even when referring to someone entirely unrelated who happens to have the same name (and this is common) as the person with whom an avoidance relation exists. For example, a parent would not speak the name of a first-born child, and may not use the names of his own parents if he himself is a first child. A woman will not speak her husband's name and very likely will not use the names of his senior brothers (real of classificatory). This practice accounts in part for the very widespread use of nicknames among the Hausa.

These customs, and others like them, have meanings in their respective local contexts which anthropologists have taken pains to elucidate in terms of potentials for conflict that would be disruptive to the social structure if not regulated by avoidance. What is significant here, however, is that the members of these African societies are reported to experience the avoidance patterns as being concordant with their own desires and fears, and that these institutionalized avoidances are but the most dramatic aspects of a much more general tendency.

The tendency for persons and group distinguished by sex and age (or generation) to avoid one another is often concealed by segregated residential and other social arrangements that provide external barriers to their contact so that no individual initiative or exertion is necessary to maintain social distance. Houses and settlements and the explicit customs concerning their use constitute structural arrangements for eating, sleeping, sexual activity, work, and recreation in which contact between the sexes and certain age groups is effectively minimized. Different age-sex categories are assigned their particular spaces for carrying out their activities, and they
develop different activity schedules that limit interaction across social distance boundaries. The most massive forms of age-segregation, for example, the age-villages of the Nyakyusa (Tanzania) and the young warrior's settlements (manyatta) of the Masai (Kenya and Tanzania), have perhaps received the most attention; but more subtle forms of age and sex segregation are pervasive in African societies. For example, houses are often laid out to provide husbands with space where they can eat and sleep separately from their wives and children; sexual contact between husband and wife is often confined to a brief segment of the night. Married women usually have their own distinctive routines and activity spaces that tend to unite groups of them and to separate them from other adults in the domestic group and neighborhood. The following description by an Acholi (Uganda) woman of life in her home community is typical:

At meal time all the children eat with the mother, sitting on the kitchen floor, while the father eats alone. It is common in the villages to find a group of two or three families eating together, each woman having cooked two separate dishes, one for the men and one for the women and children. If there are a large number of children, one separate dish can be served to the children only. The two or three men, heads of the different families, will sit together near a fire outside or inside a house. It is impossible in this brief summary to do justice to the rich variation in arrangements of this sort described by ethnographers of Africa. Suffice it to say that such arrangements share the characteristic of creating barriers to interaction between categories of persons whom Westerners feel belong together, particularly when they are members of the same family, and that Africans find this a satisfactory and desirable order of things. In fact, when men and women and young and old do participate jointly in a public event, they are likely to go and return separately and to cluster by age-sex groups at the event, thus spontaneously maintaining social distance (even between husbands and wives, parents and adult children) when the customary barriers are temporarily lowered.

Despite the limits set by avoidance and segregation customs, the sexes and generations do come into contact in African families and communities. When they do, their interaction is often highly institutionalized. There are explicitly prescribed greetings, conversational topics, role obligations,
and safeguards against intrusions on privacy. Deviation from these prescribed norms is regarded as punishable if publicly revealed. To a Western observer, behavior among family members and other kinsmen appears formalized allowing little leeway for voluntary idiosyncratic variation or what sociologists call "re-negotiation of role contracts." There is a degree of social prescription and proscription in African families and other primary groups that we are accustomed to only in organizational or bureaucratic settings. Furthermore, the adherence to institutionalized norms of behavior acts as a barrier to what Westerners regard as intimacy, that is, the sharing of innermost thoughts and feelings, the giving and taking of emotional support, the private regression to childish means of expressing affection, the experience of temporary union (loss of ego boundaries) with another person. It seems that intimacy in this sense, and the individualized relationships that accompany it, are of less importance to Africans than other goals of interpersonal relations described below. So the relative formality of behavior, like the customs of avoidance and segregation, maintains social and emotional distance between persons.

Some Westerners would see this prescriptive aspect of interpersonal behavior as meaning that Africans are "slaves of custom," but this overlooks the fact that Africans regard their greater formality as perfectly "natural" and "normal"; they do not experience their social boundaries as uncomfortable, isolating, or destructive to their individuality. It is because they do experience as natural and comfortable types of role demands which we would experience so differently, that the maintenance of social distance in African societies must be regarded as a psychological characteristic of the participating populations as well as a structural characteristic of their social systems.

Age and Sex Hierarchy

Turning to the content of prescribed interpersonal behavior among Africans differentiated by age and sex, no aspect is more in evidence than the giving and receiving of deference, respect, and precedence. Variations in rank, status, and power at every level tend to be given public emphasis, and each society has its distinctive hierarchy of social positions. Taken as
a whole, African status hierarchies vary widely in differentiation, depth, distribution of decision-making functions, and ritual elaboration. But for all of them, in most aspects of social life, men are ranked higher than women, married persons are ranked higher than those who are socially immature, and men with adult children are ranked higher than their juniors. A great deal of social interaction is accounted for by the deference and respect paid to men by women, to adults by children, and to elders by youths. The display of deference does not always signify the dominance of one person over another—indeed, sometimes the person deferring is quite autonomous—but it is nonetheless regarded as an indispensable feature of proper behavior. Deference is expressed in respectful terms of address, in appropriate greetings and blessings, in submissive gestures like bowing or prostration, in receiving a gift with two hands instead of one, etc. The elaborate deference displayed daily in an ordinary Yoruba (Nigeria) compound might find its nearest Western counterpart in a European royal court; and while the Yoruba are extreme among Africans in the flamboyance of the gestures used, they are not extreme in other aspects of their deference. Respect entails not only deferential behavior but also various kinds of restraint and avoidance. The latter was described above; perhaps the most widespread form of restraint is refraining from disagreeing with a status superior to his face. Thus one rarely sees open arguments across the most important age and sex boundaries, and when they occur they are regarded as serious if not downright scandalous.

It is in the distribution of leisure and other conspicuous advantages that the African age-sex hierarchies contrast most sharply with Western values. This can be seen clearly in a contemporary African home that has Western-type chairs but not enough to go around. An honored guest is always given precedence in seating, but immediately thereafter come the senior men of the house or neighborhood. Women and children are regarded as marginal to a gathering of men and would yield a place of honor to someone higher in the age-sex hierarchy. A similar situation obtains for the distribution of meat, which is a rare delicacy for most Africans. The senior men are served first, women are allowed to have what is left over, and
children may receive none. The frequent exclusion of children from meat-eating occurs even among relatively affluent urban families, and in Western Nigeria we found that one of the most typical childhood memories of punishment reported by adolescent pupils was being beaten for sneaking meat out of the cooking pot. From the other side of the continent, Kenya, comes this recollection by a man from the Idakho area of the Luhyo people:

I once helped myself to shihango, the roasted meat that is kept for emergency cases, without the permission of my mother. When she came home and discovered that the hidden treasure had been removed and eaten, she did not wait to report me to my father. She gave me a thorough beating then and there, threatening to cut off my hands, these being the limbs I had used for stealing.10

The basic principle is: in any public or semi-public situation, those of higher rank must be served or relieved of burdens by those lower in the hierarchy, and the former must be granted precedence in the use of consumption of any valued good. Thus, wives must carry heavy loads for the husband while he walks unencumbered; thus, children are constantly sent to fetch and carry and convey messages around the home and community. The same principle holds among senior and junior siblings and co-wives and other kin, and has been applied to bureaucratic relationships such as those between schoolteacher and pupil and high and low ranking civil servant. Thus, the allocation of work, and especially menial, burdensome, or servile tasks reflects the distribution of status: the higher one's status, the less work visibly performed and the greater the tendency to delegate tasks to inferiors. Giving orders and discussing whether or not they have been carried out, like deference and respect behavior, account for much of the content of social interactions between unequal persons in African societies.

**Emphasis on Material Transaction in Interpersonal Relations**

In considering the content of socially prescribed interpersonal behavior, we have seen that much of African behavior is hierarchically ordered, and that this order involves the giving and receiving of deference, respect, commands, and tribute between persons occupying unequal social positions. There is another dimension of content, however, that Africans emphasize when describing relationships of equality or inequality, namely, obligations to give material goods—food, gifts, financial help, property, and babies.
Relationships are frequently characterized by Africans primarily in terms of the type of material transaction involved: who gives what to whom and under what conditions. Even premarital sexual liaisons and courtship are discussed in these terms.

In contrast with the Western attitude (genuine or hypocritical) that the emotional component in interpersonal relations is more important than any transfer of material good involved (the latter being thought of as something incidental), Africans are frankly and directly concerned with the material transfer itself as indicative of the quality of the relationship. This is best illustrated with respect to food and feeding. Volumes could be written on the social and cultural meanings of food and feeding in African societies. Family relationships are often described in terms of feeding or providing food. Visitors are accepted, honored, or rejected in terms of feeding or providing food. Visitors are accepted, honored, or rejected in terms of the food and drink provided for them; and they in turn show their friendliness and trust by accepting food and drink. Husbands reject their wives and neighbors and express suspicious hostility by refusing food when offered, behavior which invariably creates alarm and tension. The sharing of food at an ordinary meal or a sacrifice to the spirits creates important bonds between persons. As Audrey Richards pointed out many years ago, African chiefs feed their followers in time of famine, thus serving as a reserve food supply for the group, and local political leaders build their following through providing food for them.11

Beyond the realistic realm, food and feeding are a prominent feature of belief and imagination. When interpersonal suspicion mounts within the family or neighborhood, people fear that their enemies will poison their food. Ancestor spirits are often viewed as hungry or greedy, wanting to be fed through sacrifice. Witches are thought to eat the hearts of their victims (who may live on after the encounter, but will sicken and eventually die); and persons may become witches by swallowing certain substances extruded or vomited from the bodies of practicing witches. Most medicine and sympathetic magic is based on this idea that through ingestion of substances thought to be endowed with certain qualities a person will
assume these qualities himself. Thus, a would-be warrior will eat the heart of a lion, and thereby become courageous. An expectant mother will such the milky sap from plant stems in order to induce lactation. In Islamic areas, Koranic, or sacred verses are written on a wooden slate, and the ink, washed from the slate is administered as a medicine. In many domains of behavior that do not involve actual feeding (for example, economics, sexuality, political succession) linguistic idioms, metaphors, and imagery derived from eating are widely used. It sometimes seems to an outside observer that the process of eating and being fed are central to the symbolic interpretation of social reality in African populations.

Food is just one (although a basic) example of the concern for material transfer in interpersonal relations; among kinsmen, land, cattle, and (increasingly) money are importantly involved, and in more transient relationships small gifts play a significant role. Something of the flavor of the material emphasis that can affect brother-sister relations is conveyed by the Acholi woman quoted above:

If a boy sees his sister misbehaving in any way, he is authorized by his parents to give her a good beating. The sisters are very important to the brothers, whose future can largely depend on them. A brother whose sister has good manners and is married is sure to have a wife himself. The money paid to his father as his sister's brideprice is the money he will use for his own marriage. Since he cannot marry until his sister is married, it is his real concern to see that she is well-behaved enough to be married early.

It is not possible to describe in any further detail the parts these material goods play in African social life, but several points must be emphasized: a) A certain amount of material giving is obligatory in a relationship, particularly kin relationships, and is not dependent on how the individual feels about or even how well he knows the other person. b) Persons are evaluated partly in terms of how much and how freely they give to others; those who give more than the obligatory minimum may be liked more as generous persons or may become special friends or leaders of others. c) Failure to meet the material obligations of role relationships cannot be compensated by a friendly attitude or emotional warmth and support; since the relationships are conceptualized in terms of material transactions, attitudes and feelings are concomitants but not substitutes. d) Relationships
that have goals of obtaining valued resources generate competition, particularly when the resources are limited, the scope of obligations wide, and the rules for allocating resources somewhat ambiguous. Potential recipients or heirs are naturally competitive with one another, and Africans grow up in an interpersonal climate in which such competition is ubiquitous, although held in check by a variety of social controls. In novel institutional settings, Africans are sensitive to the material rewards offered and are ready not only to demand their promised share but also to compete with one another for preferment. Thus, the obligatory giving and taking of resources as a major theme in social interaction has as its concomitant the non-obligatory, but inevitable, competitive striving for resources.

In the husband-wife relationship, babies are thought of as material goals for both spouses: a husband "gives his wife children" and she bears children "for him." It would be hard to exaggerate the personal importance of fertility to individuals of both sexes or the fear they have of being sterile. Giving and bearing children are absolutely obligatory no matter what the emotional quality of the husband-wife relationship. Children are often thought of as being like wealth, although non-economic. If the wife is barren, the husband takes another; and the first woman may eventually run away to try her luck with someone else. If the husband proves sterile or neglects her sexually, the wife most frequently leaves him for another; although sometimes, if he allows her to be impregnated secretly, she may stay. Africans generally like to have as many children as possible, so long as there is enough time between them to allow each one to thrive. Continued child-bearing to menopause is regarded as a sine qua non of the marriage, and no amount of conjugal love and understanding can make up for its absence. Occasionally, a couple will stay together without children; but their attachment, however strong, is subjected to the constant stress of personal frustration and anxiety about not having children, and they lose the esteem of others. After the wife who has borne children reaches
menopause the spouses may have little to do with one another, as she is preoccupied with her grown and growing children, he with his younger wives. Finally, if co-wives differ in their fertility, competition turns quickly into jealousy and suspicion; for there is no resource more valued among women than children, and their distribution is as invidiously calculated as is the division of land among men.

Functional Diffuseness of Authority Relations

Sociologists have described traditional societies as having "functionally diffuse" role relationships. By this they mean that, whereas in a specialized and bureaucratic society like ours, social behavior between persons becomes limited to the specific function that brings them together (buyer-seller, employer-employee), in the traditional societies relationships are less narrowly defined by a single functional context. We have legislators, judges, and administrators in our government; but Africans have chiefs whose roles often include all three functions and are not even limited to "government" in our narrow sense of the term. This functional diffuseness may indeed be common to a wide variety of societies, but I want here to call attention to its characteristically African forms and the expectations that Africans bring to authority relationships. (I do not use the word "traditional" because it seems to me that diffuse authority is at least as common in introduced as in indigenous institutional settings in Africa.)

In Africa, when someone is in a position of authority there are characteristic demands and expectations he makes of others and has made upon him. He expects that his followers will obey his commands not only concerning the function that may have originally brought them together, but for any other purpose he deems significant. They must, for example, help maintain and enhance his social status by providing him with the conspicuous leisure appropriate to someone of high rank. In other words, they must perform menial tasks for him and serve him so that he can appear unencumbered in public and can offer a degree of hospitality that is beyond his private means. The school can serve as a striking example here, although parallel illustration could be drawn from other institutional spheres. In schools
all over English-speaking Africa, primary and secondary school pupils are pressed into service by the teachers as domestic servants in their houses and seasonal laborers in their fields and gardens. This may strike a Westerner as exploitation, but African parents do not complain except when the practice extends to using the female students sexually; then there is a public outcry and the teacher is dismissed. African parents who have had little schooling themselves often send their children to an educated kinsman, usually a schoolteacher, knowing that the boy or girl will be used as a house servant or in any other way the teacher wants, but with the hope that the teacher will help the child with his schooling.

The situation in the schools is an extreme one because children are in no position to press their own demands upon the teacher, but when adults are the subordinates, their willingness to serve in menial capacities is based on great hopes and expectations which they make known to the leaders. From the Western observer's point of view, the very willingness to become a lackey to a leader and do his bidding might seem demeaning to an adult man, but Africans do not see it that way; and one must try to take the follower's point of view to understand it. When a young African becomes the employee, assistant, supervisee, political or religious supporter, or even student (in higher education) of someone in a relatively high position, he often does so with hopes and expectations that are of great personal significance to him. First, he tends to exaggerate the power, wealth, and skill of his leader, in extreme cases believing him to have boundless power including magical means of escaping death. Second, he tends to have conscious fantasies that this great leader will use his power to raise his devoted follower from obscurity and make him into a great man too. He may actually propose this to the leader, while asking for help to support his self-improvement efforts in education or business. Third, more realistically, he expects the leader to be generous with food and drink when his followers spontaneously visit and to give them financial aid to meet urgent family obligations and pay debts. Every African of relatively great wealth is besieged by potential devoted followers seeking financial assistance and hospitality; a man with political aspirations must satisfy as many as he
possibly can, straining his resources to the utmost. Finally, the subordinate will go to his leader for advice, guidance, and the use of influence, prevailing upon the leader to settle family quarrels, provide contacts and letters of recommendation, and give counsel on a variety of personal matters. In the hope that his relationship with someone of eminence will eventually lead him to prosperity and even greatness, the young man is eager to prove himself the dedicated servant, obediently carrying out his master's commands even when they involve menial and burdensome tasks. In his personal contacts with the leader he will temporarily fall into an attitude of exaggerated respect and admiration, naive hopefulness, and dependence upon the leader for advice, support, and protection. Hence the leader's diffuse and apparently limitless control over the labor of his subordinates has as its counterpart their diffuse and grandiose expectations of him as their patron. Rarely can he gratify their most ambitious expectations, but he can keep their hope alive through generosity and hospitality; if he did not do so, his followers might disappear, in search of a more rewarding patron.

The Tendency to Blame and Fear Others When Under Stress

Despite the placid and cheerful surface of interpersonal relations in most African communities, there are strong disruptive forces that must be held in check and socially regulated to maintain an orderly existence. These disruptive forces have their visible starting points in the personal disasters and interpersonal friction of African life, or more correctly, in the typical reactions of Africans to such difficulties. When disaster befalls an African family (for example, the death of its patriarch, sterility, insanity, a series of infant deaths, a crop failure) the most common reaction of the persons involved is to see it as resulting from the malevolent design of an enemy, often someone who is a competitor in a struggle for inherited property, job advancement, or educational achievement. Having decided that the misfortune is caused by someone else, through poisoning or a variety of magical practices, the afflicted family takes steps to protect itself from the enemy's continued malevolence and possibly to strike back through public or private means.
From a psychological point of view, there are two particularly notable characteristics of this reaction to personal difficulty or disaster: the suspension of empirical criteria for interpreting natural events in favor of the attribution to unseen forces acting at a distance, and the choice of other humans in the immediate interpersonal environment as the causal agents rather than the self (as in a guilt reaction), malevolent gods or spirits (which do exist in some African belief systems but are less frequently blamed), or impersonal natural or cosmological forces. However one interprets this pattern psychologically, these distinctive features must be accounted for. Rather than attempt such an analysis here, however, I want to point out the relations of this stress relation to social relationships as we have discussed them so far.

The emphasis on material transaction in social relations has been described, and the competition generated by it has been mentioned. There are many primary group relationships in African societies that engender competition for scarce resources: co-wives competing for the favor of their husband and the property he can allocate to them and their children; brothers and cousins struggling for the patrimonial inheritance (especially land); neighbors quarreling over boundaries and damage to crops caused by each other's children or animals; peers in a variety of bureaucratic settings striving to become the favorite of their superiors. Intense feelings of jealousy and hatred accompany these forms of competition. It is the task of those in authority to settle competitive disputes in a legitimate way that is recognized as just, so that the jealousy and hatred do not give rise to violence and conspiracy. To this end Africans spend a vast amount of time in meditation, adjudication, and litigation, not only in the courts but in judicial proceedings organized within extended families, lineages, compounds, and villages. But personal grudges do not necessarily end when the case is publicly settled, and even when disputants accept the impartial judgment of the elders or court. The stress of a sudden misfortune induces a regression from that mature acceptance to the deep seated motives aroused by the competitive situation in the first place. When this regression takes place, the individual feels personally threatened by the hostility he attributes to
his competitor. One sees this at funerals and public trials where suspicions of witchcraft and sorcery are first publicly voiced in the emotional atmosphere of the occasion.

The beliefs concerning witchcraft and sorcery so prevalent in African societies offer the threatened individual a definitive interpretation of his stressful situation that is compatible with his own personal motives. And these beliefs offer as well the feeling that there is something he can do about it—through a public witch trial, retaliatory sorcery, or emigration and subsequent avoidance of the designated enemy. In the past these recourses to action appear to have functioned to keep interpersonal hostility within well-defined bounds; but in contemporary Africa witchcraft and sorcery are increasingly associated with disruptions of community life. What I want to emphasize here is that the personal reaction to stress involved in utilization of the witchcraft-sorcery complex is one that is widely characteristic of African populations, is generated in the context of interpersonal competition for resources, is precipitated by serious or sudden misfortune, and takes both normal and pathological forms. Only the normal form has been described. In its pathological varieties, common to many parts of Africa, the reaction involves delusions of persecution (sometimes accompanied by hallucinations), and violence directed at persons in the immediate environment, sometimes with homicidal result. Although this is clearly a psychotic reaction and not to be confused with the typical reaction to stress described above, it shares with the latter the tendency to attribute malevolence to other persons and to move from fear to retaliation.

The Relative Absence of Separation Anxiety and Related Affects

We now turn from patterns of interpersonal behavior to affects, or emotional states, which are difficult to compare across cultures—especially with objectivity—but cannot be omitted from an attempt to assess patterns of personality. There are many possible contrasts in affects and their customary expression between Africans and Westerners; but I shall discuss one that I believe to be central for an understanding of social relationships. The Western desire for intimacy in social relationships, and its relative absence among Africans, has already been mentioned. Another aspect concerns
separation and the anxiety that Westerners have about leaving or losing loved persons in their environment. We are accustomed to making strenuous efforts to avoid separation from our most intimate loved ones, often engaging in tearful departures and reunions, and making the assumption that separation in physical residence, as when a child leaves home, has a final quality about it like a death and must be similarly mourned until the original emotional investment is irrevocably withdrawn or attenuated. These tendencies are widespread in Western populations and are exalted in a variety of cultural forms ranging from sentimental literature and films to humanitarian ideologies with their concern about those who are rejected and abandoned. Some of these cultural forms and practices involve such an exaggerated image of unconditional and everlasting love that they draw out attention to their primary function for the individual—the complete denial of hostility within the self and the transformation of the hostility that is surely there into an excessive concern about the well-being of others. It is in the affect of pity that the unconscious hostility shows through most clearly; in fact "pity" has become a bad word in our culture because of this; but pity as an affect remains. Pathological separation anxiety as Anna Freud describes it for children with school phobias, for example, is due to the child's need to be constantly reassured that his unconscious hostile wishes did not magically kill his mother; the same mechanism operates for neurotic mothers who get up innumerable times during the night to see if their children are all right. Much of our normal and culturally valued affectionate concern for others, particularly the most exaggerated sentimentality in our cultures, is reinforced by this tendency to convert hostility into its opposite. A related phenomenon is seen in relationships of a sadomasochistic nature in which two persons are bound together, so to speak, by the suffering that one inflicts on the other; both seem to need the emotional transaction, cannot give it up, and have come to think of the hostility as a necessary component of their love. Separation anxiety, sentimentality, pity, and sadomasochistic attachments are all ways which our culture with its idealized concept of love, has of managing the unacceptable hostility necessarily involved in intimate relationships.
Many of these patterns of behavior seem to be absent among Africans: They appear to find physical separation from loved ones less upsetting emotionally and do not regard it as being final. Sentimental attachments, and their residues in longing, weeping, and nostalgia are not conspicuous in African communities; and the more sentimental outpourings of the Western mass media, if understood, have little appeal there. The reactions of Africans to the pet-keeping practices of Britons and Americans living in Africa is usually one of astonishment and amusement at the personalized concern and affection for animals. In caring for infants, the aged, and seriously disabled persons, there is a noticeable absence of the anxious concern and pity characteristic of Westerners, and none of the thinly veiled disgust that sometimes accompanies pity. Africans are not immediately drawn into an attentive and solicitously caretaking attitude by the sight of a weak, enfeebled, or helpless person or creature. Their casualness, relative to our attitude, often causes puzzlement and irritation in Westerners, who see this as an incomprehensible lack of humanitarianism.

In public, African mothers rarely lavish on their infants the kind of verbal and physical affection that we think of as "instinctively maternal" behavior; and they are capable of carrying on conversations or tasks like trading while nursing their infants. The pattern of mother-child relations within the privacy of a family compound, however, has yet to be researched systematically.

Finally, Africans do not bring to social relationships the need to torment or be tormented that we see in sadomasochistic attachments in our society, and their interpersonal life seems unusually free of these profoundly ambivalent motives. In this connection it might be mentioned that deliberate mortification of the flesh, as in the specialized asceticism of the West and India, is virtually absent in sub-Saharan Africa (with the possible exception of Islamic West Africa). Africans usually cannot understand what moral virtue there can be in extreme forms of self-denial and self-punishment.

To explain these differences in affective reactions and relationships between Africans and Westerners would take a great deal of psychological
investigation; indeed even testing the validity of my assertions about manifest behavior would be a big project. But we can try to understand them in relation to earlier observations on patterns of interpersonal behavior. For example, the social distance and formality of primary group relationships helps us understand the relative absence of separation anxiety; since the relationships are not as intimate as their Western counterparts in the first place, it is not surprising that they are more easily given up temporarily, and the greater social distance of daily interaction makes the loss of contact in actual separations seem less discontinuous, less final, more tolerable. Furthermore, the material obligations that are emphasized in role relationship can be fulfilled at a distance, with only occasional reunions, in a way that is difficult (even in intensive correspondence) if intimate emotional transactions are the goals. In other words, Africans can more easily keep up their primary social relationships at a distance than can Westerners, a point to which we shall return in the concluding section. At this juncture I want to stress that less separation anxiety must be understood in terms of the goals and means of interaction among Africans, which differ from those of Westerners.

As for pity, sentimentality, and sadomasochism, we must consider the way Africans handle their hostility. Social anthropologists have found that Africans all over the continent have a keen awareness of the hostility generated in social life and especially in its jealous competition. Unlike Westerners, they do not deny—at least to themselves—the potential for hatred in even the closest of relationships, given failure to meet material obligations or the development of an irresolvable competitive dispute. In fact, a number of African belief systems contain the idea that unexpressed grudges cause disease and social disruption and that it is healthier to release the hostility than keep it pent up (which does not mean that the advice is always followed, but it does indicate public recognition of the problem). Without the need to deny and repress hostility toward others, there is no need to transform it into the anxious and excessive concern for their welfare, as we do in pity and sentimentality, or into the pretense that
hostility is love, as in sadomasochistic attachments. Altogether, it would seem that for Africans the control of hostility tends to be managed through the institutional structure of their society; whereas, for Westerners it is more frequently (though of course not entirely) managed through the structure of their personalities and particularly through the regulation of consciousness about hostile impulses in the self.

This is a rather glib formulation but to go beyond it would take us too far from the main course of this brief outline. It must suffice to note here that a more adequate formulation would have to deal with the representation of self for African individuals, the perceptual boundaries between self and environment, and the mechanisms of social and personal control.

Concreteness of Thought

A variety of pieces of evidence suggests that, as a whole, Africans in their indigenous cultures were more inclined to think and conceptualize in concrete rather than abstract terms. This does not imply that complex thought processes were not involved, but that concrete objects and actions were used to communicate metaphorically, rather than general qualities disembodied from their most familiar or striking context. Anyone who has asked an African elder to explain a difficult proverb has encountered this rich metaphorical wisdom in its full concreteness. Generalities have been captured, but are not discussed in general terms; the foreign inquirer unfamiliar with the concrete local context of behavior is likely to have a difficult time understanding the explanation of a proverb. Likewise, unschooled Africans, particularly children and youths who have not acquired a reservoir of generalizable experience on which to draw, often have a hard time understanding disembodied abstractions and switching over to thinking in abstract terms of solving abstract problems.

The tendency to think in concrete terms is at the root of two characteristics previously discussed. The tendency to define relationships in terms of material expectations and material obligations involves primary attention to the objects given and taken and the actions of giving and taking rather than to dispositional qualities of the persons and their mental traits; secondly, there is little interest in the idiosyncratic
patterns of thought and feeling characteristic of oneself and others, patterns for which one needs abstract verbal labels before one can even notice them. In other words, the emphasis on material transactions and the avoidance of introspection in social relationships constitute a reflection in the domain of interpersonal cognition of the more general inclination toward concreteness of thought.

The tendency to blame and fear others under stress is another reflection of this general mode of thinking in the sense that it concretizes the causes of misfortune as familiar humans in the immediate environment. Africanders are rarely satisfied with believing that disease, death, and disaster strike randomly in a community or are the results of forces beyond human understanding; they do not accept that degree of ambiguity. Instead they insist that agents of disaster be identified with certainty as particular neighbors or kinsmen. Frequently, the neighbor or kinsman turns out to be a competitor in a dispute over material resources of obligatory transactions, another concrete element involved.

VARIATIONS IN AFRICAN BEHAVIOR

Having allowed myself to generalize in these seven points about characteristics I see as common to most Africans, I would emphasize again that Africa's populations are not psychologically homogeneous. My characterization is limited to the agricultural majority of sub-Saharan Africa, exempting the pastoral populations and the modernized urban elite. These groups are, however, significant minorities; and they do manifest personality differences from the others. The psychological differences of the elite, who derive mainly from the agricultural populations, seem to be due largely to the influence of education, which has powerful effects on cognitive development and values. Also, overseas experience and the adoption of a Western middle-class life-style have significant effects on the way their children are raised. This group is of course increasing in number and plays a leading role in African national societies. As for the pastoralists, the recent evidence of Edgerton indicates that they too,
are psychologically different from the agricultural majority. Edgerton's study is important because it included, in a total sample of more than five hundred persons, members of both agricultural and pastoral segments of four East African ethnic groups (Pokot, Kamba, Hehe, Sebei), so that the effects of cultural background could be distinguished from those of subsistence economy. Psychological test data available so far indicate that the pastoralists express their hostility more directly than the agriculturalists, are less preoccupied with witchcraft and sorcery, and place a higher value on personal independence. Pending further evidence, it seems reasonable to forecast that the African pastoralists will exhibit a personality profile distinct from that of the settled agricultural populations and related to the particular environmental conditions for individual development created by their distinctive way of life.

The agricultural societies of Africa, similar though they be in many respects, also offer a range of environmental conditions for individual development and can be expected to show a corresponding range of central tendencies in personality distributions. There is some evidence for this type of variation, although relatively little relevant research has been done to date. I have experienced some sharp differences between the two agricultural groups I have worked with: the Gusii of Kenya and the Yoruba of Nigeria. There are many social and cultural differences between the two, but none perhaps as overwhelming as the density of their settlements. The Gusii family lives on its own piece of land, separated from other families and with no community clustering; the Yoruba live in large towns and compact villages. I found urban Yoruba children and adults much more personally gregarious than Gusii children and adults, and it was a deep-seated sociability that expressed itself in many domains of their lives. Perhaps most dramatically, two- and three-year-old Gusii children tended to run away crying when I approached the first time; whereas, their Yoruba counterparts, who had no more experience with white foreigners, would cheerfully run up to greet me. I find it hard to believe that this behavioral difference is unrelated to the residential conditions of life in the two groups. In a more systematic comparison of three agricultural
societies of Nigeria, the Ibo, Hausa and Yoruba, I predicted differences in personality distributions on the basis of variations in the precolonial status mobility systems. The predicted differences in achievement motivation and obedience, and social compliance values, were found in samples of secondary-school students, but it was not possible to conclude with certainty that the precolonial status systems caused the psychological differences. We need more studies on this subject, but at the moment I would venture the prediction that strong differences in personality traits like gregariousness or sociability, achievement motivation, authoritarianism, and mistrust of other people will be found among African agricultural societies and that they will correlate with differences in size and density of settlements, social mobility patterns, the democratic or authoritarian nature of decision-making, and other aspects of social structure.

ADAPTATION TO SOCIAL CHANGE

One could relate the foregoing discussion of uniformities and variations in African personality patterns to many aspects of change in Africa, but I shall limit myself to illustrating how a few of the uniformities might be affecting personal response and adjustment to institutional change.

Personal Adjustment to Mobility

As discussed above, the formality of primary-group relationships and the relative absence of separation anxiety make physical separation of husband and wife, parents and children, less painful and disruptive to the individual than in our culture; and the emphasis on material obligation makes it possible to maintain role relationships during prolonged absences. For example, so long as the husband provides his wife with a place to live (a home), a social group to live with (his family), a livelihood (a piece of land or some capital for trading), and a pregnancy every two and a half years, his prolonged absence for economic or educational reasons is regarded as quite tolerable. This kind of relationship has allowed individuals to respond to economic incentives by moving themselves—in labor migration, for overseas education and vocational training, and when transferred to a better job—with a minimum of personal disruption.
African families do not have to be residentially intact in order to remain socially and psychologically real for their members; nor do the obligations of marriage and kinship diminish with prolonged absence. This was demonstrated by Evans-Pritchard in his description of forms of marriage among the Nuer of the Southern Sudan. It is true throughout much of contemporary Africa and provides an elasticity in relationships that is highly adaptive under modern economic conditions. Since there is never any pretense that the obligations of kinship are based on emotional intimacy or residential proximity, kinship groups are able not only to remain intact even when their members are dispersed, but also to play a central role in the redistribution of economic resources. No matter how far away an individual has moved from his natal home, he is obliged to provide regular aid to his wives, children, and aging parents; to contribute, when asked, to the school fees and other important expenses of a number of more distant relatives; and to provide hospitality for an indefinite period for kinsmen who come to visit him or who have migrated to his place. A mature man will also be called upon to return home occasionally for meetings at which major group decisions regarding internal disputes and collective property are reached. In rural homes and in the cities, the unemployed, the disabled, and the elderly are taken in by their kinsmen, whether or not they are well acquainted. These unfortunates may not have a great deal of attention paid to them, but, in societies that have few public welfare facilities, they are cared for.

Thus the social distance, formality, and material obligation of African relationships operate at present to help preserve indigenous kinship organization in the face of increased mobility, to redistribute income from participants in the modern economy to their less fortunate kinsmen, and to provide care for the needy. None of these goals could be achieved if Africans made their obligations as contingent on intimacy and proximity as we do or allowed them to atrophy in prolonged separation.

The short-run adaptiveness of these behavioral patterns at the group or societal level is unquestionable, but what of the individuals involved? The advantages to them are obvious: they can count on their kinsmen for care, protection and emergency relief even in a strange city and even when they have had no prior contact or acquaintance with the available kinsman.
As the kin disperse, so does the spatial range of one's potential relations. Africans do take advantage of this potentiality, and it eases their adjustment in urban areas and in new settlements at home and abroad. The dangers of maladjustment and breakdown in personality functioning increase greatly when African individuals move outside the network of kin and ethnic affiliations where care and protection cannot be guaranteed. Such has been the case of some students in America. But there are disadvantages too, experienced primarily by the wealthier and more successful Africans who find themselves on the giving rather than the receiving end in the network of kinship obligations. They are constantly called upon to help close and distant relatives, including many they barely know. Those wealthy Africans who are comparatively unschooled and have not lived abroad take their donatory position for granted and even exploit it for political ends; but those who have become Westernized in their conception of social roles tend to resent not only the immense drain on their resources, but also the intrusions on their privacy and limitless demands on their hospitality. These latter individuals sometimes see themselves as victims of an outdated system that coerces their participation and makes it more difficult for them to provide as adequately for their own children and immediate families as can their individualistic Western counterparts.

The relatively young man who has studied abroad on a scholarship often finds himself in a very difficult position when he returns home to discover that his newly acquired social status far overreaches his financial resources. His scale of obligations to his kinsmen and within his community has increased commensurate to his increased stature, but his income (very likely as a government school teacher) has not. He may also find it impossible to meet local expectations as regards the manifest standard of living and life-style assumed appropriate to a man of his social position.

Response to Economic Incentives

The indigenous emphasis on material transaction in role relations, and the competition stemming from it, provided a psycho-social basis for African response to novel economic incentives introduced from the West. Although early colonial officials found it necessary to establish a compulsory tax to
pull Africans into the labor market, such artificial devices have not been necessary in most areas for many years. Since Africans have seen the material advantages resulting from employment and the education which fitted one for employment, they have been actively seeking jobs, clamoring for schools, and making sacrifices to obtain higher education. Some of the strength of this response, as compared with "traditional" peoples in other parts of the world, is competitive; men want to do better than one another, and each wants his own children to do better than the others. This competition is sometimes fraught with jealousy, suspicion, and hostile intrigues, but it has promoted among Africans a receptivity to innovations that have a demonstrable economic advantage and a high degree of readiness to participate in new economic institutions. In my opinion, this deep-seated competitiveness as an aspect of individual personality has some roots in the polygynous family, where the intense striving of the co-wives for equivalent or preferential treatment of themselves and their children provides an early model of jealous competition.

**Personal Adjustment to Intergenerational Differences in Acculturation**

Another adaptive outcome of the pattern of interpersonal relations described above is the remarkable absence of serious conflicts between conservative and modernizing segments of families and small communities. Americans accustomed to the clash of generations in immigrant families and anthropologists acquainted with the schisms of American Indian communities along conservative and progressive lines, cannot help but note the ease with which Africans manage this potentially troublesome problem. To understand this intergenerational accommodation properly we must refer to the competitive materialism just discussed. Since Westernization almost always gives an individual an economic advantage over his less Westernized brethren, it also gains him their respect and dependence; and from this position they are not likely to question his values. More specifically, however, there is the material aspect of role obligations and the relative unimportance of sharing thoughts and feelings. So long as the Westernized individual responds to the customary demands of his kinsmen described above, and provides financial assistance, gifts, and contributions where
they are expected, he will be favorably regarded, even if he has forsaken the home community, its way of life, and its beliefs and practices. Neither his parents nor the others in his home village or town will expect him to share their values, opinions, or life-styles, and they may not even discuss the differences between them except insofar as they affect material obligations. The greater social distance between the generations in Africa allows culturally differing parents and children to make their peace on the ground of formal obligation without invading each other's cultural domain. Hence we find a cultural relativism among Africans that is impossible when closely related persons expect to be "of the same mind."

Reactions to Increasing Scarcity of Resources

Institutional and demographic change in Africa has not been completely unstressful by any means. Though unevenly spread across the continent, there is overcrowding of land in some rural areas, unemployment and overcrowding in the growing cities, and fierce economic and political competition in urban life. Responses to these stresses have varied, as they would anywhere; but the tendency to blame and fear others has been strongly in evidence, particularly where there is competition for scarce resources--land, jobs, occupational and educational advancement, political office, revenue for community improvement. When the resources are scarce enough that an equitable distribution is impossible, or when there is no institutionalized mechanism for distribution, competition has given rise to conflict, which has taken the forms described above, as well as other forms in political behavior. One of the most striking developments has been the apparent increase in witchcraft and sorcery accusations in many parts of the continent, particularly in some of the most overcrowded rural areas of East Africa and South African cities. These are areas in which Western education and Christian missions, with their antagonism to magical beliefs, have been most active; but they are also areas of the most stressful competition, in which people have fallen back more frequently on the underlying tendency to see malevolent designs in their neighbors.
The brief discussion of adaptation to change has attempted to convey illustratively the functions in contemporary settings of some of the indigenous behavioral characteristics of Africans. I shall end by warning the reader that adaptation is relative to the time-span over which one observes it; thus in a cost-benefit analysis of the behavioral characteristics discussed, those that look highly adaptive now might prove disastrous in the long run, and those that look maladaptive now might prove their worth in time.

NOTES

1. The population of Africa consists of more than a quarter of a billion persons divided along linguistic and cultural lines into at least a thousand ethnic societies spread over the second largest land mass in the world, with ways of life ranging from those of isolated pastoral nomads and hunters of the deserts to those of villagers and urbanites in the complex kingdom states of West and Central Africa.


6. The findings here have been confirmed independently in a worldwide sample of 863 societies by H. Berry ("Regional and Worldwide Variations in Culture," Ethnology, VII [April, 1968], 207-217) who states, "Seven dichotomized traits pertaining to marriage and the family are shown in Table 4. Among the six regions, Africa is in the extreme position of having the highest or else the lowest incidence of five of these traits," (p. 211); he concludes, "Africa thus appears to be differentiated from the rest of the world with respect to the prevalence of certain cultural traits..." (p. 215).


THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE
OFFICE OF EDUCATION

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INTRODUCTORY ESSAYS

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Many scholars argue that African economic growth and political development are slowed down by the absence of a sizable African educated elite. Allegedly, the number of local, skilled technicians is limited; supervisory and managerial functions remain in the hands of expatriate personnel. At the same time, however, it has been observed that African nations are suffering to some extent, from the same "brain drain" which plagues the Middle East and the Far East. Highly trained African individuals are often found in Europe or even in the United States. In 1967, a group of French experts in international assistance published a manifesto to complain about the misallocation of the funds devoted to educational development in Africa and to deplore the fact that there were more Dahomean doctors in metropolitan France than in Dahomey itself.

Given the low level of international cooperation and aid made available to the Third World to help with educational development, it is quite important to assess relationships between educational progress in an African country and the processes of elite formation. The examination of such a relationship should enable us to have more accurate expectations about the returns from educational investments.

Although educational functions have always been provided under the umbrella of traditional society, the growth of modern school systems in Africa has been a by-product of colonial experiences. A step toward a better understanding of the processes of elite formation, requires, therefore, an examination of the convergences and divergences in the educational policies of the main colonial powers: France, Great Britain, and Belgium.
THE FRENCH EXPERIENCE

It is frequently argued that the French colonial experience has been consistently assimilationist and that the goals of colonial administrators and educators were to mold African populations into "Black Frenchmen" with a system of norms and values identical to those of the Metropolitan French people themselves.

The historical reality is somewhat different. Initially, the French colonial administration had few resources, both in men and in material, and was furthermore obliged to fight tooth and nail with a National Assembly in Paris fearful to engage the country in colonial adventures. The major part of educational expenditures could be derived only from local resources, and such a limitation shaped both the extent and the form of colonial educational enterprises. There were a small number of missionaries and professional schoolteachers, but the majority of the teaching force was provided by Senegalese ex-soldiers who had received a basic training in the Army. Communications between territories were sporadic and difficult and each governor was given a large leeway to define the curriculum that he deemed best to fit the needs of his territory. If the pursuit of assimilationist objectives and the emergence of a class of "Black Frenchmen" required uniformity in programs and curriculum, these conditions were far from fulfilled during the early days of the colonial period.

Even more important than this diversity in the classroom, were the divisive theoretical questions argued by laymen and specialists alike; the issues concerned the optimal goals of educational development in the African territories. At one end of the political spectrum certain French leaders held a highly pragmatic view of colonial adventures: for them, the only socially acceptable purpose for establishing an empire was to find additional markets for the industrial products of French manufacturers and to obtain easy and cheap access to raw materials. Those who held this view of French interest in the colonies contended that the spread of formal schooling among Africans should remain as limited as possible, mainly because of its cost, but also because "the more you educate individuals in this situation, the more they hate you."
Leaders at the other end of the political continuum, agreed among themselves that colonization implied the diffusion of educational experiences, but they disagreed as to the extent and the form of this diffusion. Certain educators advocated the need to give a basic education to the largest possible number of Africans. Others, recognizing the merits of the particular efforts undertaken by General Faidherbe in Senegal in the 1860's, claimed that education should be a privilege granted exclusively to the children of local chiefs and elites. Thus, the first conception emphasized the merits of a quantitatively massive but necessarily qualitatively limited, educational development; whereas the second approach stressed the values of an elitist system.

The first conception shaped the majority of educational endeavors undertaken before the Second World War. Local territories increasingly became integrated into two political and administrative frameworks: French West Africa (l'Afrique Occidentale Francaise) and French Equatorial Africa (l'Afrique Equatoriale Francaise), with a resulting uniformity in the organization of local school systems. It was decided, however, that school enrollments should be determined by the pace of economic and social development of each colony and in all cases would remain less than that of Metropolitan France itself. Accordingly, there were marked contrasts in the size of these enrollments along territorial lines. These contrasts reflect interaction between two distinctive sets of forces.

On one hand, French colonial authorities were eager to promote a certain division of labor among the territorial components of each of the two federations. For example, the economic growth of Ivory Coast was supposed to rest upon the development of large-scale agricultural activities. This particular country, then, needed the services of an unskilled labor force; and local school enrollments consequently were kept at as low a level as possible. At the same time, French authorities were inclined to consider that the inhabitants of other countries, such as Senegal or Dahomey, should constitute the backbone of the semiskilled and unskilled administrative labor force needed to run the empire. In addition to the efficiencies of differentiating between the colonies in this way, it was
also thought that if Ivory Coast, for instance, were to be partly administered by Dahomeans or Senegalese these territories might be prevented from forming a united front against the demands of French administrators.

On the other hand, Africans did not attach a uniform importance to the rewards resulting from formal schooling. In Dahomey, former slaves, returned from Brazil, had been exposed to European organizations and were able to perceive the potential gains derived from academic experiences. In Senegal, too, the individuals who were most intensely subjected to French influences did participate in public services and obtained a preferential treatment from colonial authorities. But in other territories the advantages which accrued to the educated were less apparent, and thus individuals had fewer incentives to acquire academic experiences.

Not only were there limitations in the output of African educational systems, but there were also limitations in their curriculums. The major purpose underlying these curriculums was to prepare a limited number of students for the specific occupational "slots" open to them. Rural schools had gardens which were to be cultivated by students and which were to comprise the industrial crops that authorities were eager to introduce on a large scale. Regulations specified both the acreage to be cultivated by each institution and the yields to be obtained. Thus, the idea was to use schools as places for agricultural experimentation and as relays for the spread of modern agricultural techniques. Alternatively, urban students learned specific industrial and clerical skills: they were trained to become railroad engineers, general mechanics, nurses, primary schoolteachers, and secretaries or accountants. The largest part of the graduates of urban schools were to be recruited by the public administration, and it was assumed that the private sector of the economy had to provide its own workers with "on-the-job-training" programs.

In summary, French colonial administration was eager to maintain a strict balance between educational and economic developments. Variations in the needs of the labor market were supposed to condition variations in school enrollments rather than the reverse. Officials were concerned not to create a mass of "urbanized and educated unemployed individuals" and thus to have to
cope with the political unrest that could be provoked by this situation. There were few attempts to build bridges between African and Metropolitan educational structures; the assumption was that the function of schools was to mediate an adjustment of local populations to their own environment rather than to the norms and practices of the Metropolitan French society. In general, African students were not admitted into French universities, and the diplomas delivered to African students had an exclusively local value. The only exception to this particularistic conception of schooling concerns language. French was taught from the very first year of primary school; the stress placed upon French did not seem, however, to result from the belief that this language was more appropriate than local vernaculars but rather from the observation that vernaculars were too numerous to be taught in an efficient manner.

The Second World War obliged French colonial authorities to change their educational policies. First, they obtained cooperation from African leaders by promising to give a more equalitarian treatment to local populations. Secondly, it became apparent that industrialization of African countries required colonial subjects to be more mobile and more skilled. Thus, political demands were congruent with the requirements of economic change.

African educational institutions became organized on the Metropolitan model. Lycees—the equivalents of American high schools—were opened in a variety of territories and provided their students with an education analogous to that obtained in Metropolitan France itself. A large number of African students were sent to France in order to accelerate their adjustment to the norms and values of a modern society, and school enrollments were increased in all colonies. Given the formation of political pressure groups in Africa itself, colonial authorities were most eager to assimilate individuals rather than existing political and social structures. The multiplication of "Black Frenchmen" was supposed to counterbalance the effects of centrifugal forces exerted by political agitation. The fear of such forces accounts for the reversals in the educational efforts undertaken in several of the colonies. Up to 1950,
Ivory Coast was perceived as the "black sheep" of the colonial territories because it was plagued by political unrest. But an agreement was concluded between the most important local leader, Houphouet-Boigny, and the French Minister for Overseas Affairs: Ivory Coast was to become the showcase of the new colonial approach. Though they had previously lagged far behind those of other territories, school enrollments for that particular country increased rapidly and a large number of scholarships were given to Ivoiriens for studying in Metropolitan primary, secondary, and postsecondary schools.

To sum up this period, the increasingly assimilationist tendencies of French policies can be explained by the threatening growth of nationalist movements. Assimilationist measures demanded greater uniformities a) in the school enrollments observable in France and in Africa and b) in the organization and the curriculums of African and Metropolitan institutions. In short, these policies required the linkages between schools and society to be similar in Africa to those of Metropolitan France.

THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE

Two important factors have contributed to educational developments in the African areas colonized by Great Britain. First, contacts were initiated early and educational developments accordingly have more historical depth than those of the regions under French authority. By 1850 British authorities already had a strong control over large segments of Ghana, Gambia, and Sierra Leone. As a result, schools there started functioning quite early. (As early as 1644 there was an educational institution in Elmina (Ghana), and a second school was opened in 1722 in that area by the Danes.) Thus, the number of generations exposed to a European form of schooling tends to be larger in the parts of West Africa initially controlled by Great Britain.

Secondly, British colonial enterprises have been dominated by private initiatives. As a result, religious missions have been quite influential in the expansion and the organization of educational facilities. Initially, the curriculum of the schools was based on the model of institutions serving the poorest segments of European societies: teachers taught reading,
writing, a little arithmetic, with a heavy emphasis on religious instruction. Rapidly, however, an increase in the number of missions was accompanied by a differentiation both in the type of clientele attending schools and in the type of materials presented to students. On the one hand, Wesleyans were eager to establish institutions in the cities of the coastal area. They taught in English, stressed the academic aspect of the curriculum, and recruited most of their students from the mulatto segments of the population and from the growing class of merchants. On the other hand, the Basel missions tended to concentrate their efforts in the hinterland. They taught vernaculars and emphasized instruction in agricultural techniques.

Soon enough, British authorities were obliged to face the same kind of dilemma experienced by their French counterparts. Their decision to subsidize the efforts undertaken by missionaries made it important to determine guidelines and criteria likely to promote an optimal diffusion of schooling. The first type of dilemma pertained to principles of recruitment. In 1842 the governor of the Gold Coast (Ghana) deemed it advisable to open schools with higher standards for the sons of chiefs, the underlying idea being that curriculum should vary with the social characteristics of the student population. The second type of dilemma pertained to the objectives of educational development. Should formal schooling accelerate the diffusion of modern norms and values by removing students from their home environment and placing them in boarding schools, or should education facilitate a better adjustment of children to their traditional milieu?

A report published in 1867 by the Education Committee of the Privy Council to the Colonial Office gives some indication about the objectives and the ideal organization of schools as perceived at that time by British authorities. Four types of institutions were to be created. Elementary schools would provide children with basic skills and would lead on to two specialized kinds of institutions: schools for boys would be self-supporting institutions devoted to the teaching of trades, agriculture, and gardening; whereas schools for girls would train their
students in the practical skills of housewifery; the series of normal schools would insure a proper recruitment of teachers. Thus, the report was suggesting that a bookish type of education exerted a negative influence and was emphasizing the significance of the relation between education and economic development. In short, schools were supposed to have a strong vocational orientation and were to lead to the formation of a "settled and thriving" peasantry. African populations, however, did not necessarily respond enthusiastically to such proposals; they were convinced, with some reason, that participation in educational structures implied above all the opportunity to enter the most highly rewarded positions within the exchange sector of the economy.

Implementation of governmental recommendations, however, was made impossible by the very structure of educational institutions. After all, the extension of missionary schools was subordinate to the primary aim of proselytization; and missions were accordingly obliged to provide their students with the kind of training they demanded. The training most desired by these students reflected the existing occupational structure more than any perceptions of problematic future developments.

Development of educational facilities was relatively rapid. For example, by the late 1860's there was a total of 135 schools in Ghana, the majority of which were operated by Basel Missions, with a total number of 12,000 students registered. The expansion of these facilities obliged colonial authorities to adopt more flexible views about the optimal organization of any school system, and the conditions under which individual institutions could be eligible for receiving grants-in-aid were rather loosely defined. The dominant feature of educational developments in the British colonies in the nineteenth century is the large amount of autonomy enjoyed by schools, and hence the large amount of variance in the quality and the content of the teaching that they provided. The Wesleyans, for example, remained in favor of giving their students a highly academic form of training without detaching them from their milieu. The Basel missions, conversely, provided their students with an initial three-year program of instruction in vernaculars with a strong emphasis on agricultural and industrial techniques.
Older students were gathered in boarding schools where they received a more advanced form of training in vocational skills.

The expansion of schools and the corollary growth in the number of graduates led to the formation of a nationalist elite opposed to an "Africanization" of the school system; that is, this elite opposed to the introduction of quantitative and qualitative restrictions in educational development. They advocated African institutions organized after British models and the opening of secondary schools to any student. In the Gold Coast (Ghana) the first of these schools began to operate in 1876, was obliged to close its doors in 1889, but finally resumed its activities because of the pressures exerted by highly educated Africans.

These pressures toward both an increase in the number of educational facilities and an improvement of their curriculum become more manifest as one moves closer to the independence period. Indeed, Africans perceived the development of the labor market and were eager to obtain access to the expanding numbers of clerical positions of the modern sector of the economy. By 1950, there was a total of almost 3,000 schools of all sorts in Ghana with a total enrollment of about 280,000, the majority of which were students in private institutions.

Yet quarrels about the optimal form of education to be given to African students remained as urgent and divisive as in the previous period. Certain high civil servants were aware of the dangers accompanying a too-rapid expansion of vocational schools and argued that to train artisans without guaranteeing them a profitable placement in the occupational hierarchy was politically dangerous. Yet, the Phelps-Stokes report published in the early 1920's still stressed the view that educational institutions should aim at facilitating the adaptation of African students to their environment. Thus, the report recommended a) the use of vernaculars as vehicles for teaching practical subjects; b) a stress on vocational, agricultural, and technical training at the expense of more traditional subjects; c) an expansion of the educational facilities offered to girls; and d) a tighter control by colonial authorities over private institutions. Such proposals were not entirely welcomed by
Africans who continued to think that any Africanization of the curriculum would limit their chances for geographic and social mobility. Local elites resisted therefore, any attempt to introduce new vocational techniques into the curriculums of the existing schools and continued to exert pressures in order to obtain a larger number of secondary schools with programs analogous to those of their counterparts in England.

To sum up, British colonial experience in education presents many similarities to educational development in French colonies. The main difference between the policies practiced by these two powers concerns the relative importance accorded to public and private institutions. An increase in the share of private institutions leads to the quality of educational facilities varying within wider limits and to the number of such institutions to depending more markedly upon the demands and pressures exerted by local populations. It is often tempting to debate the relative merits of the French and the British methods of colonization; but we can see that it is difficult to derive any definitive conclusions from such debates.

THE BELGIAN COLONIAL EXPERIENCE

Of the three major colonial powers, the Belgians have been the most pragmatic in their educational policies. Their efforts were directed at the provision of literacy in the vernaculars for a large proportion of the population, combined with a minimal development of postprimary schools except for a few with technical and vocational emphasis.

Like the British, the Belgians placed educational facilities under the authority of private missions, mainly Roman Catholic. In 1951, 515,000 students were attending private schools subsidized by the government. Of these, 400,000 were enrolled in institutions whose organization and curriculums were not controlled by government authorities; and only 7,000 individuals were studying in public facilities.

Like the French, Belgian authorities opted for linking educational development with economic growth. In 1951, 30,000 individuals were enrolled in postprimary institutions, and it was impossible to gain access to universities from these schools. It was only a few years prior to independence
that Belgian authorities decided to establish bridges between postprimary educational facilities and universities. Their inability to perceive the pressing nature of African demands along these lines resulted from their initial decision to open the Congo to a massive white immigration; therefore, they preferred to reserve the most rewarding positions of the occupational structure to European expatriates and hence to bar Africans from skilled and managerial professions.

Belgian perceptions of educational development also implied a tight control over both the curriculum and the organization of schools; and this constitutes another similarity to the French colonial system. Yet Belgian authorities differed from their French counterparts in the amount of political control they imposed upon the graduates of their school systems. Immigration to towns was allowed only for these Africans who had been trained for "urban" occupations and were able to prove that they could be employed.

COMPARISON OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF COLONIAL POLICIES

Although French and British colonial authorities at various points in history considered the feasibility of providing the offspring of African aristocracies with a special education, or at least of giving them a preferential access into the school system, formal education has still uniformly contributed to the upset of traditional structures. African chiefs or kings initially perceived Westernization as a threat imposed upon existing social order. Since individual positions were traditionally defined according to ascriptive criteria (such as familial affiliation, sex, seniority, social background), any move toward the introduction of criteria based on achievement (such as academic success) was thought to minimize the legitimacy of the existing authority structure. Accordingly, the first children who were sent to European schools were the sons of slaves, of junior lineages, and of marginal categories of local societies. It was believed that the exposure of such individuals to new ideas and norms would not influence the functioning of traditional political, social, and economic institutions.
Acceptable in the context of a short term analysis, this view was wrong in the long term. Europeans were eager not only to export to African societies their own cultural norms and values but also to recruit in Africa the semi-specialized labor force that was needed to insure even a minimal amount of economic, political, and social development. Obviously, the first subgroups to enter educational institutions were also the first to participate in the profits of new economic enterprises. As a consequence, initial steps toward educational development resulted in the emergence of a dual African social hierarchy: traditional chiefs maintained a part of their traditional prestige and wealth, but their position became increasingly threatened by the advantages gained by the minority of educated Africans. Rapidly, larger numbers of individuals began to perceive the rewards associated with formal schooling. They were tempted to abandon agricultural activities and to move toward urban centers where they could escape the formal control of traditional authorities and would have more opportunities to earn stable and high incomes. Educational developments, then, in Africa have been uniformly accompanied by a decline in the significance of traditional institutions and an increased mobility toward urban centers.

Educational developments have been uniformly associated with an increased demand for white-collar occupations. Many observers of the African scene have noted the predilection of African individuals for clerical positions but have argued that this predilection reflects a cultural distaste for manual work and a questionable attraction for non-productive types of employment. On the contrary, occupational aspirations of African students along these lines appear to have been quite realistic. There is no doubt that in a colonial environment the most powerful and economically influential European actor was the District Officer. One can easily understand why African students were eager to enter occupations as similar as possible to this model. Indeed, European entrepreneurs themselves were often subjected to the authority of the District Officer and could not launch any profitable activity without his approval. Also, in more general terms, it has been demonstrated that attraction toward white-collar jobs is
Education and Elite Formation

Universally greater than toward manual occupations. Income, prestige, opportunities for promotion, and stability of employment are perceived to be more rewarding in the clerical occupations. Why should Africans be less shrewd observers of the economic scene than Europeans themselves? As long as the economic structure of African countries remains dominated by tertiary activities (that is, activities which provide services rather than produce goods) and more specifically by public employment, administrative jobs will be the most attractive. Regardless of their training and of their actual branch of activity, African individuals remain oriented toward public employment, which provides them with a sense of security which is particularly appealing in the context of underdeveloped economies.

In all colonial countries, European powers have come into conflict with local populations on this very issue. Colonial authorities were unwilling to facilitate the access of African students to higher administrative and clerical positions and maintained a truncated educational hierarchy for as long as possible. In addition, they were aware that demands for administrative and clerical occupations were developing more rapidly than the labor market itself and were, accordingly, afraid of the dangers of overurbanization with its growing mass of educated, unemployed males prone to indulge in political agitation. To stress the value of a vocationally specific training, however, in an underdeveloped economy remains a questionable proposition. An underdeveloped economy is characterized by a loose division of labor and by wide variations over time in the needs for manpower in the various sectors of economic activity. It may be wiser, therefore, to provide students with a general basic training that would facilitate their adaptation to a variety of professional situations rather than to limit their education to the acquisition of specific and hence unadaptable skills. Further, to think that training agriculturalists or artisans may change the occupational structure of a particular country is to underestimate the influence of economic incentives. As long as agricultural and artisanal activities are less rewarding than white-collar occupations, the most enterprising individuals will do their best to enter the latter type of
employment and will not hesitate to abandon the jobs for which they have been trained. In the Africa of yesterday, as in the Africa of today, many planners were anxious to see Africans sacrifice their expectations concerning a real and promising present in favor of a problematic future. Yet education cannot significantly change the system of differential rewards attached to various types of economic activities. The demand for education is determined by this system rather than the contrary.

In brief, all educational developments in Africa have been accompanied by a build-up of tensions resulting from the desire of African peoples to obtain a large number of academic institutions and from the tendency of colonial powers to provide them with a limited number of specific vocational schools.

All colonial educational systems tend to be alike in another way in the sense that they have duplicated certain crucial aspects of the educational structures of the colonizing power. Thus, French colonial schools presented the same centralized organizations and the resulting rigidity as the Metropolitan educational system itself. Educational philosophy stressed the significance of equality. Norms, examinations, and course sequences were uniform; and after the 1920's French officials in Paris could take some pride in the fact that they knew what African students would learn on a particular hour of a particular day of a given year. Equality meant also that teachers would be subjected to the same kind of training and would present a uniform level of skills. Lastly, equality meant that formal schooling was tuition free and that students would be recruited on the basis of their merits.

Similarly, it can be argued that Belgian colonial schools have enabled religious missions to play a role in Africa identical to their role in Belgium itself. In both cases, cognitive and ethical learning have remained undifferentiated.

And, in British territories as in Great Britain, education was perceived as a consumer good to be determined by the conditions of the market. Such a system stressed the significance of individual initiatives and of freedom. Education was a privilege to be privately acquired rather than a right guaranteed by the central government. This obliged schools
to charge their students tuition. But the British system was also accompanied by greater variations in the quality of the teaching force and of the curriculum, and it limited the quantitative and qualitative control exerted by governmental authorities. Correspondingly, educational developments were more likely to reflect variations in the demand for schooling and hence variations in the resource of local populations, than variations in ideal models proposed by planners and administrators.

**THE POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD**

Everywhere in Africa nationalist leaders had long protested against the limitations of educational development and against the discrimination exerted against local students in an effort to oblige colonial authorities to change their stands on such issues. Upon assuming office in the newly independent states, these leaders were themselves obliged to maintain to their initial platforms. As a result, the present period is uniformly characterized by a dramatic increase both in the number of schools and of enrollments in these schools. This increase has taken place at all levels and includes universities as well as primary institutions.

Recent political developments have been associated with drastic changes both in the organization of school systems and in their curriculum. These changes reflect the dilemmas faced by African governments. On the one hand, the modernization of a country is evaluated according to universalist criteria. This leads to the proposition that elites should receive a universal form of training and should be interchangeable. On the other hand, political development requires a mobilization of the energies of individual citizens and a corresponding emphasis upon the virtues of Africanization (that is, the progressive expansion of specifically African participation in all spheres of modern political, social, and economic life). African leaders are accordingly torn by two conflicting forces. They want their students to be able to enter European or American institutions of higher education but they also have the desire to see these students acquire respect and admiration for African traditions. Indeed processes of nation-building involves competition with other nations according to a uniform set of
rules and it also includes emergence of particularistic feelings and nationalistic orientations.

Certain African nations have stressed the first alternative. They underscore the necessity of having as many graduates as possible and of assuring that these graduates are as comparable as possible to their European counterparts. Ivory Coast is probably the most typical example of this category, and it tends to adopt the same educational reforms as France itself. This tendency is, of course, reinforced by the fact that increases in the output of secondary institutions require the services of a specialized teaching force, derived mainly from former colonial powers, which is usually unwilling to innovate, either in terms of curriculum or in terms of teaching method.

At the other end of the continuum, other African countries have realized that variations in levels of school enrollments and of economic development should be associated with variations in the curriculum and the length of each cycle of studies. Accordingly, they are willing to recognize the fact that the profile of African schools should deviate from that of highly industrialized nations. There are differences, however, in the way this policy is implemented. Some countries may argue that educational costs weigh heavily on their gross national product and that the vast bulk of students should enter occupational life as early as possible. Other countries recognize the fact that underdeveloped economies are characterized by erratic shifts in the composition of their labor force as well as by a low level of rationality. These countries, thus, tend to believe that students should receive a general training for as long a period as possible and should not be oriented toward specific skills before the very late stages of their academic career. Furthermore, they are willing to recognize the costs of an early orientation, both to the individual and to the society at large.

THE SELECTIVITY OF SCHOOL POPULATIONS

In our consideration of the development of educated elites, it is not enough to evaluate the number and the relative proportions of individuals processed by school systems. The examination of the recruitment system, or
"selectivity," is at least as critical in the sense that it gives us some ideas about elite origins, the degree to which they perpetuate themselves, and the ways in which they may prevent the upward mobility of other segments of the population.

Selectivity by Sex

There is no doubt that even today male children obtain a disproportionate share of enrollments. Exposure to European norms and practices has always been selective along sex lines and African populations have seen by themselves that educational achievement tends to be most rewarding for European males. The effects of this perception have been reinforced by the pre-eminent nature of the status traditionally allocated to African males. Both factors have contributed to minimize the impact of formal schooling on local women. In fact, it is quite clear that female school enrollments do not begin to increase until the percentage of educated males reaches a certain critical threshold. In primary schools in Ivory Coast, for example, there is a relatively close association between overall enrollments and changes in the sex ratio (see Figure). In other words, the higher the school enrollments for a given region, the more even are the proportions of male and female children attending primary institutions. Deviations from this model may reflect the incidence of specific cultural patterns and hence variations in the significance of the economic and social roles allocated to women. They may also result from variations in the importance of urbanization. Bongouanou, for example, has an unexpectedly higher proportion of females given its level of enrollment, probably because of the high degree of economic and social autonomy of its female population. (Note the position of Bongouanou with respect to the "general" trend as represented by the area enclosed by the ellipse in the Figure.) Similarly, Abidjan, the capital city of Ivory Coast, fails to fit the general pattern because of the relative importance of economic opportunities that it offers to its female residents.

There is a marked contrast not only in the size of male and female educated populations but also in the type of studies that are undertaken by the two groups. In Ivory Coast and in Ghana, girls are likely to have
a shorter academic career than their male counterparts; but they are proportionately more numerous both in academic programs and in institutions devoted to the training of skills deemed to be feminine attributes, such as nursing, home economics, and social work.

Selectivity by Age

An initial caveat must be entered before discussing the evidence available on this subject. Within a context of rapid social change, African individuals have a very loose sense of their exact age. Furthermore, they are willing to adopt instrumental views concerning this problem. More specifically, they are aware that age may constitute a legal obstacle on the road of their academic aspirations and have no hesitations to report an inaccurate birth date whenever it helps them to remain enrolled in the school of their choice.4

Given the limitations on the amount of evidence available, scholars have come out with conflicting propositions regarding selectivity by age. Using a particular intelligence test (the Cattell test) on Congolese students, N. Zydius has observed that the variance in the results to this test was explained more by the length of the academic experience than by age.5 In examining a population of students attending the second year of postprimary schooling in Ivory Coast in 1959, I have noted that success both in academic examinations and in psychological tests varies as a negative function of the age of the subjects examined. In other words, the younger students tend to perform better than the older students. These results have been indirectly confirmed by similar observations made in 1963, which indicated that younger students were more likely than older ones to enter, or remain in, the prestigious and rewarding lycees.6 At the same time (but without giving empirical evidences) other scholars have argued that the system of examination practiced by the Ivory Coast school system favors "old timers" and enables them to acquire the type of rote knowledge demanded in academic examinations.

Regardless of these conflicting observations, it may be that correlation between age and academic success primarily reflects variations in the importance of the advantages deemed to accompany precocity. In other words,
ENROLLMENT RATES AND SEX RATIO OF STUDENT POPULATIONS IN THE IVORY COAST

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the measures of age may reflect psychological phenomena rather than an objective chronological quality. Furthermore, the influence of this factor has to be understood in terms of variations in the dates at which children begin their educational experience and variations in their ability to pass the differing sorts of examinations imposed upon them. Such variations may reflect distinctions between the types of environment from which such children are derived.

Selectivity by Ethnic Group

Ethnicity is included in two distinctive dimensions of educational selectivity and performance. First, each ethnic culture comprises sets of norms and values which have a varying degree of compatibility with the demands of modernization and of formal schooling. Other things being equal, students derived from ethnic groups emphasizing individual mobility and competition may be expected to have high educational aspirations and to be academically successful. In contrast, for example, it can be argued that in matrilineal societies, where socialization functions are divided between fathers and maternal uncles and where child-rearing techniques are primarily focused upon a lessening of the centrifugal forces exerted on familial groups, there will be a low level of school attendance and great difficulties in stimulating the academic interest of children.

At the same time, however, ethnicity has usually entailed a geographic location for a particular people which may in turn affect the relative exposure of a people to modernizing forces. A comparison between the representation of various ethnic groups in the secondary schools of Ghana and Ivory Coast shows the chance to enter such institutions declines as one moves away from the coastal areas toward the hinterland and as one gets further away from the places where Europeans have been concentrated. In Ivory Coast, selectivity ratios vary between 1.6 for southern regions and 0.6 for the north; in Ghana, the corresponding figures are 1.4 and 0.2 (where 1.0 is the "standard" value).
Selectivity by Urban-Rural Origin

Given the above observation, we can expect that the urban populations most exposed to the rewards and norms of a European society will be more likely to enter educational institutions than individuals originating from a rural background. African urbanization is highly correlated with industrialization and economic changes, and comparisons between Ghana and Ivory Coast show such expectations to be correct. The intensity of this form of selectivity, however, is lower in Ivory Coast than in Ghana, and such a difference may tentatively be attributed to contrasts in the organization of the urban centers and educational systems of the two countries. Ivory Coast has a primate distribution of urban centers; correspondingly, both urbanized populations and schools are overwhelmingly concentrated in the capital city of Abidjan. Access to such schools depends upon a national examination and urban competitors are swamped by the mass of rural candidates. In contrast, Ghanaian urban populations and schools are more evenly distributed throughout the country. As a result, the size of each educational "market" is more limited and this gives a systematic advantage to urban candidates. In short, we are suggesting here that the importance of urban-rural differentials in the patterns of recruitment to postprimary institutions varies with the number and size of educational markets. A decline in the number of such markets combined with an increase in their size probably favors the most numerous subsegments of the population, and in the instance of the Ivory Coast, candidates of a rural origin. Thus differences in the nature of the colonial model of localization of urban centers and educational institutions are accompanied by differences in the significance of residential forms of selectivity.

Selectivity by Family Occupation

Participation in a cash economy enables individuals to perceive the rewards associated with formal schooling. Increases in the regularity of income and in the amount of cash resources facilitate the payment of educational costs. Increases also limit the consequences of the losses in
resources resulting from participation in educational structures. One can expect, therefore, that an individual whose family is still engaged in subsistence activity will have fewer chances to enter a postprimary institution than an individual with both parents engaged in the modern sector of the economy. In Ivory Coast, the sons of professional higher technical and administrative personnel are twenty-five times more numerous in secondary schools than they are in the population at large. In Ghana, the corresponding ratio averages fourteen. At the other end of the continuum, sons of Ivory Coast farmers are not entitled to equal educational facilities and those in school represent only 0.8 of their proportion in the entire population. In Ghana, the corresponding percentage is approximately the same, with a value of 0.8. It remains important, however, to differentiate between various types of farmers. In Ivory Coast, the children of cash-crop farmers in postprimary schools are far more numerous than the children of persons still exclusively engaged in subsistence activities.

These observations should not mean that chances to participate in educational structures increase regularly with level of exposure of the parental generation to modernizing forces. In fact, the socio-occupational category most under-represented in the school system is that of semiskilled and unskilled manual workers. This particular class of persons is more exposed to modernizing forces than are farmers and rural populations; yet their participation in the modern sector of the economy is not associated with proportional rewards, and their marginality prevents them from entertaining high aspirations with regard to modernity. Thus, the distribution of enrollments by socio-economic category tends to indicate that modernization of means and modernization of ends are not necessarily similarly distributed.

**Selectivity by Family Educational Characteristics**

Of all the forms of selectivity analyzed here, the level of parental education is the most influential. The higher this level, the higher the aspirations that parents have with regard to the academic career of their children and the tighter is the control that they can exert upon the relevant behavior of their offspring. Obviously, level of maternal education is an even better predictor of whether a person can enter a postprimary institution
and of how far this person will go in this type of study. The number of educated female adults is very limited in Africa, and the presence of a literate woman in a household is therefore an unequivocal index of the level of modernization of this particular group.

**Interaction Between Forms of Selectivity**

At the present time, ethnic affiliations remain important determinants of the position occupied by individuals in the overall structure of the society to which they belong, and there is a relatively limited amount of social differentiation within each ethnic group. Given these remarks, it has been observed that socio-economic differentiation operates most clearly within ethnic groups whose enrollments are minimal. In such a case, students are likely to be derived from atypical social categories. Conversely, as the level of enrollments of a particular ethnic group increases, parents of the student population have an educational and occupational profile which ceases to differ from that of the bulk of the population.  

**CHANGES IN THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ELITE SELECTIVITY**

The above observations tend to indicate that selectivity in the recruitment patterns of educational institutions reflects two distinctive sets of forces.

First, there are variations in the demand for education. Certain ethnic groups and social categories of the population are not involved enough in the processes of modernization to perceive the importance of education as a mechanism influencing individual placement in the occupational structure. Some of these groups still have a low level of mobility, are still oriented toward traditional gratifications, and prefer their children to remain subjected to the forces underlying traditional networks of interaction. Certain peoples also occupy marginal positions in the political structure of their country and may feel that they will remain deprived in all cases of the legitimate rewards accompanying formal schooling.

Secondly, there are variations in the level of adjustment of various social categories to the demands of an educational system. Given the fact
that teaching methods remain influenced by European models, certain subgroups of the entire population are more exposed than others to the cognitive style prevailing among highly industrialized nations. They have an easier access to written material, are exposed to a greater amount of vocabulary and images, and therefore have more chances to give the kind of answers expected from them in formal examinations.

Forms of interaction between these two forces seem difficult to evaluate. Indeed, students having attended primary institutions in large urban centers have perhaps a higher average level of aspirations than those with a basic training acquired in rural areas. Yet, variance of aspirations is probably greater among rural school populations, and rural students with a high aspirational level are probably in a position to obtain more attention from their teachers than are their urban counterparts. Among students engaged in the second year of postprimary studies in Ivory Coast, it has been noted that those having attended rural schools had better academic results than those whose primary education was acquired in the public schools of Abidjan. Similarly, the former subgroup showed better results in psychological tests.

Such contrasts may account for the fact that students derived from underprivileged ethnic or socio-economic backgrounds seem to get more than their fair share as one gets closer to the upper rungs of the educational hierarchy. There probably is a closer match between the aspirations and the skills of such students than between those of urban privileged students. Furthermore, the terms of the over-all selectivity are probably such that rural students really belong to the cream of the educated population. In other words, given the fact that their exposure to European cognitive style favors urban candidates, rural students who make their way through the system may be particularly talented.

Thus far, our analysis of selectivity has been static and we must, therefore, turn our attention toward a dynamic examination of this factor. In this context, one can hypothesize that the level at which selectivity operates most severely varies with a) the overall level of school enrollments of the country investigated and b) with the age of its school system and its
level of economic development. Among countries with a new educational system which is limited in size, it is probable that individuals are differentiated in terms of whether or not they attend school. In other words, selectivity operates at the level of entrance to educational institutions. As schools grow in number and as economic development becomes more manifest, the most crucial cleavage concerns the length and type of studies undertaken. Selectivity enables observers to predict what subgroup has the best chances to undertake academic rather than vocational studies, or to follow a long rather than short cycle of instruction.

In general, levels of selectivity are also affected by cultural factors. For example, I have observed that there are more significant differences between the social and ethnic characteristics of Ivory Coast academic students taking and not taking Latin than between the ethnic and social background of these students considered as a whole and that of their counterparts engaged in vocational or agricultural studies. This selectivity takes place in spite of the fact that the distinction between classic and modern academic studies has no implication for the future career of the individuals involved, whereas the entire population of the lycees have more chances to enter a university than persons undertaking other types of studies. In this case, Ivoriens seem to have borrowed an obsolescent French model. Although functional until quite recently in Metropolitan France, distinctions between modern and classical studies have now ceased to be associated with distinctive rewards. Ivory Coast has nevertheless assumed the old French attitudes toward classical studies, and those Ivory Coast students engaged in such studies tend to represent the educated elite—that is, they are from monogamous Christian families with both parents educated and engaged in the modern sector of the economy.

Comparisons between Ghana and Ivory Coast also suggest that educational development may be associated with a tightening of the various forms of selectivity. Offhand, one would anticipate that a decline in the scarcity of educational facilities should lead to a corresponding decline in the severity of selectivity. Yet, a decline in the scarcity of educational institutions may also result from a differential increase in
the demand for education. Economic and social development implies accentuated social differentiation—that is, accentuated contrasts in the means and the ends of the distinctive social groups of each country investigated. The problem remains to determine whether these contrasts affect the field of education.

The influence of such contrasts may depend, first, on the nature of social perceptions pertaining to education. Formal schooling may be viewed as a consumer good or as a private or collective investment. Until quite recently, many French-speaking African nations stressed the collective investment aspect of their educational enterprises and gave to their students free room and board, clothes, and educational materials. Such a policy could not but limit the severity of selectivity, insofar as student recruitment would rest exclusively upon academic merit. These measures have been progressively abandoned, and one can anticipate that educational institutions will in the future be recruiting their students from narrower segments of the population. In contrast, many English-speaking countries started with the opposite assumption and considered that formal schooling was a consumer good, the distribution of which was to be conditioned by the laws of the market. Such an assumption could not but strengthen the severity of the various forms of selectivity. Yet recently, an increasing number of measures have been taken in order to alleviate the financial burdens of African parents. Such measures should lead to a decline in the significance of favored or neglected minorities in the origin of students. In brief, differences between French and English-speaking countries along these lines should decrease.

Secondly, contrasts are influenced by the nature of the association between ethnic and occupational affiliations. Persistence of marked inequalities in the level of participation of distinctive ethnic groups in the modern sector of the economy and in political structures may increase differences in the perceived reward system of academic experiences. So far, certain ethnic groups have complained that they are discriminated against in terms of educational opportunities. Governments are not always able to cope properly with this type of complaint. Indeed, the opening of new educational equipment may ultimately produce the greatest profit for
peoples with an already high exposure to educational experiences. The introduction of ethnic "quotas" tends to reintroduce particularistic considerations which are at variance with the universalistic nature of educational objectives. The absence of rational solutions in this respect may nevertheless lead to the creation of a "vicious circle" and to the strengthening of interethnic antagonisms, with certain peoples being deprived of the "plums" accompanying the processes of modernization.

Thirdly, contrasts are influenced by the tightening of a social class system. So far, socio-economic selectivity in Africa has remained relatively limited. Given the fact that the Ivory Coast and Ghana farmers do not get their fair share of educational opportunities, they still represent more than 60 percent of the entire school population, and this suggests that the system is more open than we usually think. This fluidity may very well decline, and African countries may drift toward the kind of situation experienced by European countries where lower classes consider educational activities to be made by, and for, middle and upper classes. In such a situation, participation in educational institutions is determined by the prevailing characteristics of the social structure, but in turn hardly affects such characteristics.

THE FUNCTIONS AND PROCESS OF EDUCATION

In the previous sections, we have analyzed the "inputs" of schools and selectivity patterns in recruitment. We must now turn our attention to the activities of these educational institutions and to their functions as agencies of socialization. Variations in these functions may affect the volume and the quality of the elites produced.

The Recruitment of Teachers

For a long time, teaching jobs were considered by Africans to occupy the top of the occupational hierarchy. At that time, opportunities were scarce and teaching enabled talented individuals to enjoy the rewards of a "modern" activity without facing the corresponding costs in terms of personal adjustment. Indeed, subservience of teachers to the colonial system was minimal, and teachers enjoyed a large amount of independence;
but educational and economic developments have changed this situation. First, there has been an increase in the number of teachers. Secondly, with economic development other rewarding positions have opened up to Africans, and there has been a consistent decline in the prestige attached to the teaching profession. Thirdly, a lessening of the prestige of teachers also results from the need for an increased manpower in this field and the corresponding decline in the requirements for access to this particular profession.

As a result, teachers with the highest seniority tend to leave the profession in order to enter more rewarding positions. Many members of the political personnel are recruited from this particular category. Senior teachers also tend to be concentrated in the best schools (often the ones closest to the centers of European influence). Differences in the quality of the teaching force among regions or between rural and urban areas could very well contribute to maximize differences in the level of academic achievement of the corresponding segments of the population.

**The Location of Schools**

Changes in the organization of the teaching force have been paralleled by changes in the stereotypes pertaining to the optimal location of educational institutions. As in colonial times, the present policy alternatives are to place schools either near centers where elites are concentrated or in the proximity of the various occupational markets. Now, as before, the second alternative seems to be out of touch with reality. As long as educational experiences facilitate access to white-collar occupations, the creation of schools in the hinterland will not necessarily induce more individuals to undertake agricultural careers.

On the other hand, the location of secondary schools in centers of European influence raises two significant questions. First, it raises the problem of the utility of boarding institutions. I have noted that in Ivory Coast the academic achievement of boarders tends to be superior to that of day-students. It also raises the problem of the consequences attached to the composition of the school population. That the academic achievement of individual Ivory Coast students attending the second year of
their postprimary studies varied with the ethnic and social composition of their class has also been noted. The greater the proportion of Europeans in the class, the better would be the performance of the Africans enrolled in such classes. Similarly, the academic performances of the sons of farmers were better when the majority of their classmates were derived from modern environments, than when they belonged to classes with a limited number of students from a modern origin.

Finally, it should be stressed that changes in the orientations of religious missions have been accompanied by changes in their locations. Initially, many Catholic missions, particularly those in French-speaking Africa, were anxious to participate in the training of potential elites. As such, they tended to concentrate their educational institutions in areas where demand for education was already high. Recently, many missions have become eager to participate more in the spread of education into regions where school enrollment levels are low and where, more specifically, educated women are scarce. In brief, missions have realized the consequences attached to disparities in the educational level of distinctive subsegments of the society.

Africanization of the Curriculum

African nationalist leaders opposed the introduction of African materials in the curriculum at an early stage, but they have now modified their stand. During the colonial period few rewards were to be gained from the learning of particularistic skills and values. After independence, however, this view changes. It was argued that to learn African culture and history would heighten individual commitment toward nationalist ideals. There has been, accordingly, an Africanization of the curriculum; and students are increasingly exposed to local materials in the field of history, geography, natural sciences, and modern languages.

Interestingly enough, however, no effort has been undertaken to promote an Africanization of teaching methods. Yet, it is increasingly clear that cognitive styles are culture-bound and that learning processes vary along ethnic lines. For example, I have suggested elsewhere that the role performed by memorization in French and African schools cannot have
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the same implications, since African cultures by definition have strong oral or mnemonic orientations. Similarly, performances of African subjects on psychological tests involving the use of colors are not alike when words for these colors are present and absent in local vocabularies. At a more general level, it has also been argued that cultural attitudes toward authority and expertise determine the extent to which learning processes involve the use of experimentation. The neglect of strategies likely to maximize intercultural communications and to recognize cultural variations in teacher-student relations cannot but limit the formation of "universalist" elites in Africa.

Schools as Agencies of Socialization

In Africa, as everywhere else in the world, it is often believed that schools may perform a significant role with regard to the political socialization of the oncoming generation. It is accordingly believed that the influence eventually exerted by educational institutions may be more powerful than that exerted by familial environments. Evidence available so far, however, invites us to remain cautious in this respect. In Ivory Coast, attitudes of students toward occupational opportunities remain as much determined by their ethnic background as by the level of studies undertaken. In fact, interethnic contrasts along those lines remain sizable when one analyzes the vocational aspirations of male individuals having undergone ten years of formal schooling. Such evidence, though limited, does not lead us to believe that formal education is associated with the emergence of uniform, modern sets of norms and values. As suggested earlier, views on education may be strictly instrumental; and the student may acquire additional education, hence additional resources, in order to restore culturally specific ends. In brief, under certain circumstances, formal schooling, far from eroding the ethnic particularisms of local elites, reinforces such cleavages.
THE INFLUENCE OF SCHOOLS ON SOCIAL CLASS AND ELITE FORMATION

Thus far, we have analyzed recruitment patterns of educational institutions; we have also considered the processes by which such institutions perform their socialization functions. We must now turn our attention to an examination of the impact of educational developments on existing African social structures.

First, as noted earlier, access to educational facilities remains somewhat fluid. Yet, it is quite obvious that education is increasingly an important determinant of the placement of individuals in residential and occupational slots, and that educational achievement constitutes a force pushing toward the formation of social classes and elites. Given this situation, it is not difficult to understand why the demand for education keeps increasing in all areas of Africa.

Secondly, variations in academic achievement are associated with variations in level and type of vocational aspirations. With the expansion of the occupational structure, most talented students are increasingly attracted toward technical careers where there are a large number of openings, and where rewards are substantial. Conversely, agricultural jobs and professions such as primary school teaching seem most likely to recruit their new members from groups who have been less successful or have not been able to complete a full cycle of postprimary studies.

An analysis of vocational aspirations of students over time suggests that this particular population is highly sensitive to the fluctuations of the labor market. Thus, as suggested earlier, teaching careers lost their attractive power as soon as it became obvious that new opportunities would be open to young Africans. Similarly, the professions of politics and of law, so popular in the years immediately preceding independence, ceased to be in high demand when it became obvious that new regimes would minimize the significance of public and private litigations and that the political personnel was young enough to prevent a high amount of turnover.
An analysis of vocational expectations yields similar results. When asked what they would do if obliged to enter the labor market without completing their current academic cycle of studies, African individuals were perfectly able to recognize that teaching and clerical jobs are the best opportunities available to them.

Students are uniformly attracted by public employment. The long history of exploitation by private concerns explains this choice and it is also true that, up to recently, the Administration was the only employer able to provide its wage-earners with guarantees concerning stability of employment and hence of income. There are certain signs, however, that the situation is changing. The large-scale concerns which still dominate the economic scene of many African countries are particularly anxious to avoid accusations of "neo-colonialism." As a result, they are eager to hire African individuals with a high level of skill and to promote their personnel to supervisory positions. Further, they are also reluctant to dismiss personnel without being absolutely sure of winning their case should it come before local courts. Accordingly, the relative stigma attached to participation in the private sector of the economy is slowly disappearing. Though still limited in number, a growing minority of the more advanced students are inclined to consider positions offered by private firms, and some of their predecessors are starting to move from public to private employers. In all parts of Africa, colonial experiences explain why educated elites have been attracted to administrative careers. The problem remains to determine whether such an attraction favors or impedes further economic development. Planners are likely to argue that the growth of European economies resulted from the emergence of a class of private entrepreneurs and that the disinterest of young African students toward entrepreneurial activities necessarily prevents their countries from "taking off" in economic terms. Yet, we are not sure about the uniformities of patterns of economic development throughout time. Nor are we sure about the social characteristics of successful and unsuccessful entrepreneurs in European countries of the nineteenth century.

Lastly, and most important, variations in educational achievement are
associated with variations in residential choices. The more advanced a student, the more prone he is to live in a large urban center, where the best economic opportunities are concentrated and where his initial exposure to modernizing forces is systematically reinforced. As a result, differences in the social composition of urban and rural populations become more pronounced, and such differences, in turn, are likely to induce contrasts in the relative chances for further development of urban centers and of their hinterland. In short, the gap between urban and rural elites keeps growing, and it may in the long term threaten the economic and political balance of entire African countries.

To sum up this array of observations, African students seem to take advantage of their educational achievement to obtain the best share of the existing economic and social opportunities, rather than to change the economic organization of their country. This is not exceptional. Innovators are rarely recruited from the segments of the population having an immediate access to the largest number of most appealing rewards; indeed, innovators are usually derived from strata which are relatively deprived.

Yet, relative deprivation is going to characterize an increasing number of students. There is indeed a growing gap between educational aspirations and the number of educational facilities. There is also a growing gap between the growth rates of educational institutions and of economic resources. As a result, there is a decline in the payoff of academic achievement. A decade ago, ten years of formal schooling mediated an automatic access to the most rewarding positions of the modern sector of the economy. Today, the rewards derived from ten years of education are far more limited in number and significance. Furthermore, their acquisition is not automatic. There is a marked increase in the number of educated, unemployed individuals. African governments are faced with the same dilemma as their colonial predecessors. Should they limit educational outputs and adjust them to the growth rate of local economies? Should they limit urban migrations and oblige a certain number of young people to remain engaged in farming activities? What should be the nature of reinforcement used to achieve this goal? Is it better to use negative
sanctions and to punish individuals who migrate without permission or to reward persons willing to stay on the land? Lastly, certain experts recommend an acceleration in educational development so that academic achievement may cease to be a decisive factor in the placement of individuals in occupational and social structures.

Relative deprivation resulting from discrepancies between educational and economic developments is likely to affect intergenerational relationships. First, there have been drastic changes in the amount and form of selectivity underlying access to certain types of studies or certain types of occupations. For example, senior teachers in Africa are necessarily appalled by the conditions underlying the recruitment of their junior colleagues. As the prestige and the economic status of their profession decreases, they are particularly frustrated to see a corresponding decline in the qualities of the incoming teachers. Conversely, certain occupations, the access to which was initially easy, have raised their prerequisites, and present students feel frustrated to see that people who occupy top positions do not have as high an educational achievement as they themselves have. Such frustrations are likely to be exacerbated by the severity of familial obligations imposed upon upwardly mobile individuals. Indeed, the more successful an individual, the more dependents he must support. To sum up this point, discrepancies in the economic and educational growth are associated with marked variations in the rate of upward mobility experienced by various generations and in the amount of familial obligations to which they must conform.

Discrepancies between educational and economic developments are also likely to affect relationships between sexes. First, orientations of educated males and females toward familial social and economic organizations are highly distinctive. Educated men tend to perceive their female counterparts as threats to the existing social order and, at least temporarily, the life of the educated women is often a lonely one. In addition, any tightening in the labor market tends to be associated with an increase in the limitations imposed upon active women. As a result, there is a growing ambivalence in the attitudes that African individuals
adopt toward female education. On the one hand, many people are willing to recognize that disparities between male and female educational levels limit chances for further economic development, since there will be few of the needed innovations in the field of child-rearing practices. On the other hand, educated women are discriminated against both in occupational and matrimonial terms.

CONCLUSION: EDUCATION AND ELITE FORMATION

One of the most striking characteristics of African educational developments is the continuity of the tensions and strains to which they give birth. The problems of determining whether elites should be universalist or particularist, of deciding whether educational developments should proceed economic growth or vice versa, and of controlling the occupational and geographic mobility of educated individuals have been discussed since the very early days of colonization. This continuity is both reassuring and frightening. It suggests that colonial educators were not necessarily the horrible "monsters" that we imagine them to be. It suggests also that we have not made that much progress on the road toward economic, educational, and social rationality since the turn of the century.

Thus far, the role played by formal schooling in the processes of elite formation has been positive. It has facilitated a greater mobility among the various segments of African societies and has stimulated a certain reorganization of occupational and social structures. The universalistic values underlying formal schooling have changed the criteria used for defining individual placement in such structures. Achievement becomes more important than ascription in this respect and stimulates individual creativity.

Yet, the role performed by formal education may also introduce dysfunctions. First, we have noted that there is a growing gap in the orientations and the values of rural and urban elites. Secondly, we have seen that the spread of formal education has tended to favor the emergence of an elite strongly oriented toward positions within the public sector of
the economy—a situation which could prevent an indispensable diversity in the economic and political orientations of the leaders. Thirdly, discrepancies in the growth rates of educational and economic institutions lead to tensions between ethnic and age groups, as well as between sexes. Indeed, development always implies social differentiation and hence accentuated tensions between those components of the nation-state most likely to compete for access to the additional commodities brought forth by social change. Lastly, the question remains of determining the conditions under which the circulation of elites may slow down or may impede further development.

All these difficulties are nevertheless not specific to the African scene. They characterize all nations with a fast rate of social change and are visible throughout the Third World. An examination of the processes of elite formation in Africa should be the first step toward a more systematic cross-cultural analysis. It is only after having completed such comparisons that we shall be able to have more realistic expectations about the returns to be expected from educational investments.

NOTES


2. For a review of this theme see Clignet and Foster, "Colonial Education in Africa"; and P. Foster, Education and Social Change in Ghana (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).

3. For a review of this theme see Foster, Education in Ghana, pp. 151-52; and N. Zydias, "Le travail; conditions aptitudes formations Effets sociaux de l'urbanisation a Stanleyville," Aspects sociaux de l'Urbanisation et industrialisation en Afrique au Sud du Sahara (UNESCO: Paris), 1956.

5. N. Zydias, "Le travail."


and totally unused to the settled agricultural and urban economy of the Romans. Moreover, the strong proselytizing nature of the Islamic religion produced a conscious hostility to the survival of the Christian churches, which in Europe at this time were important in preserving the idea of city life until it reflorew again with the revival of trade in the medieval period. The nomadic pastoral economy of the Arabs, however, led to the introduction of the camel into North and Saharan Africa between the seventh and eighth centuries. When peaceful conditions began to return to North Africa in the ninth century, this development was to prove very important in linking North Africa commercially with the West African Sudan. In this way the growth of urban centers of both North and West Africa was indirectly stimulated.

The West African Sudan and Forest Belts

Urban development in the West African Sudan was linked both with state-formation in the area and with the needs of international commerce. Much of this commerce was with Mediterranean Europe and was conducted through the major ports of North Africa. The most important article of commerce was gold. Mauny suggests, in fact, that the Sudan was one of the principal providers of gold to the European world throughout the Middle Ages, until the discovery of America. Apart from gold, other important items of the trade included slaves, ivory, ebony, horses, hides, and skins—especially the famed "moroccan" leather derived from the Sokoto area of Northern Nigeria. In exchange came salt from the Saharan desert, a wide range of European manufactured articles (including glass beads from the principal glassmakers of Venice and textiles of various kinds), silver and copper, as well as cowries from the Indian ocean.

This extensive international trade across the desert encouraged the growth of an equally extensive intraregional trade within the Sudan itself, and between it and the forest areas to the south. The North African explorer, Leo Africanus, for instance, writing toward the end of the medieval period, emphasized the trade in textile and leather goods from Hausaland to Timbuktu and Gao. Together, these trading activities encouraged the rise of numerous cities in the area. In general, one can distinguish two broad
was tremendous. Like the colonial economies of modern Africa, agricultural production for export was central to the economic activities of Roman Africa. Up to the end of the first century A.D. the emphasis was on the production of wheat for export to Rome. From then until the termination of the Roman hegemony in this area in A.D. 430, olive oil and wine were also important export commodities.

The needs of this trade encouraged the development of new urban centers in North Africa or reinforced and revitalized those deriving from the earlier Carthaginian period. By the end of the Roman period, for example, Carthage was said to have a population of over 100,000. Most of the other towns were small (populations generally between 5,000 and 10,000) and scattered unevenly throughout the area. Along the southeastern coast of present-day Tunisia, and in Tripolitania, important port cities served the Roman trading galleys. However, there were few cities in the interior. The undulating countryside which opens to the sea near Sousse also had several large centers such as Thelepte (Feriana) and Sufetula (Sbeitla). Other areas of major urban concentrations include the lower Medjerda Valley, the coastal region of Algeria, the region around Carthage, the Numidian Plateau, and areas along routes to the desert interior.

Details of the characteristics of these Roman cities need not concern us here. Suffice it to say that they were in many respects similar to their prototypes on the European continent. The important point to stress is that these cities, during both the Carthaginian and the Roman periods had engaged in trade across the Sahara Desert with peoples of the Sudanic belt in West Africa. The barbarian invasions in A.D. 429 which put an end to the Roman control of large parts of the ancient world seriously disrupted trade relations in Africa and led to a waning of city life everywhere in the former Roman empire. The succeeding four centuries of instability and confusion in Europe are usually referred to as the Dark Ages.

In North Africa, the barbarians (Vandals) were in turn conquered by Byzantium, but in the seventh century the whole coast of North Africa was swept over by the Arabs, expanding from their base on the Arabian Peninsula. The Arabs were essentially a nomadic people, nurtured in the desert of Arabia.
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zones of city development. There was a northern zone at the edge of the desert where the cities served the important functions of terminal markets of trade with North Africa and provisioning stations for caravans about to cross the desert. Such cities included, from west to east, Tekrur, Audaghost, Walata, Kumbi, Timbuktu, Lirekka, Gao, Takedda, Tadmekket, Agades and Bilma. The southern zone of cities developed in connection with the interregional trade with the forest areas from where most of the gold, slaves, and ivory were derived. They included again from west to east such cities as Silla, Bamako, Segou, Jenne, Ouagadougou, Fadan-Garma, Gaya, Kukia, Kano, Kukawa, Jega, and Katsina.

Farther south during the same period, towns and cities emerged in the kingdoms which were developing in the forest belt (notably Ashanti, Ewe, Yoruba and Benin). The Yoruba concentration was probably the most important of these city systems and can be used to illustrate their general characteristics. The relation of forest cities with those of the Sudan region is not clear, although the evidence seems to suggest some early contacts between the two areas. Yoruba towns, however, clearly seemed to have evolved as bases for "colonial" expansion by the Yoruba—that is, their intrusion into territory already occupied, but by societies less organized and practicing a less advanced economy than that of the Yoruba. The Yoruba are regarded as having migrated into their present location from the northeastern parts of the continent some time between the seventh and the tenth centuries A.D.. According to a Nigerian historian, S. O. Biobaku, this movement occurred in a series of waves. The earliest of these led to the founding of Ile-Ife, which is regarded even today as the cultural hearth of the Yoruba. A later wave led to the founding of Old Oyo, which for a long time exercised political and military dominance over a large part of Yorubaland. From these two centers, minor waves went out to found other cities. Notable amongst these immigrant communities were Ketu, Owu, Save and Illa. Other urban centers emerged later, like Ijebu-Ode, Ondo, Owo, Ede, Oshogbo, Ogbomosho, Shaki and Iseyin. In the nineteenth century came social upheavals, following on the active involvement of Yorubaland in the trans-Atlantic slave trade. This was a time of the destruction of numerous small towns and the emergence of large centers such
as Ibadan and Abeokuta from the concentrations of the displaced population.

Basically, Yoruba towns were administrative centers; and over the centuries they had evolved an elaborate power structure and a hierarchical system of administration, both at the level of the city and of the kingdom. Nonetheless, they soon exhibited economic patterns significantly different from those of the countryside; trade and craft production became their lifeblood. They maintained extensive trade relations both among themselves and with other areas. Indeed, by the early eighteenth century, John Barbot commented that

good fine cloths are made and sold by the natives to foreigners, who have a good rent for them at the Gold Coast, especially the Hollanders, who carry thence great quantities, which they turn to good account.9

The East African Coast

The early development of cities in West Africa was paralleled on the East African coast. Here, records suggest trading contacts with the Mediterranean dating from the Greek period. The Periplus (pilotbook) of the Erythraean Sea written by a Greek of Alexandria about A.D. 60 suggests that ships from the Red Sea areas met those from India and together they carried on trade with cities on the East African coast. The number of these cities, however, seemed to have increased with the Arab expansion under Islam in the seventh century A.D. The social upheaval in Arabia led to waves of refugees seeking out the East African coast not simply for trade but, more importantly, for settlement. Even the trading cities encountered by the Arabs on the coast were transformed into Islamized communities. Thus, from early times, these cities consisted of highly mixed communities of indigenous Bantu-speaking Africans, Yemenite Arabs, Persians, and even some Malay. Gradually these peoples evolved into the Swahili people of today.

The major cities of the East African coast included Mogadishu, Brava, Lamu, Malindi, Mombasa, Zanzibar, Kilwa, and Sofala. At first, their trade was in ivory, rhinoceros horn, tortoise shell, and a little palm oil. Later, from the tenth century, iron ore and gold became important. The Arab geographer, Edrisi, in A.D. 1154, reported that the inhabitants of this area depend entirely on the iron trade for their livelihood, and that a great
number of iron mines were found in the mountains inland from Sofala. He also emphasized that it was from this iron ore that India produced the famous wootz steel which she sold throughout the medieval world--the steel from which the swordsmiths of Damascus made their sought after blades. The gold working continued until the Portuguese period. Indeed, mining experts estimated the yield of gold from this area prior to the Portuguese contact at anywhere between fifteen and seventy-five million pounds sterling, which would account in considerable measure for the fabulous wealth of medieval Indian rulers.

Most of the cities of the East African coast developed as independent city-states. There are early references to a certain Ali ibn Hasan who is said to be the founder of a dynasty which ruled these trading cities until the coming of the Portuguese. Evidence, however, seems to suggest the minimum of administrative centralization. A number of the cities, in fact, developed into strong, autonomous states and enjoyed marked economic prosperity. Kilwa on the Tanzanian coast, for example, founded in A.D. 975, held the distinction of being the only African state south of the Mediterranean to strike its own independent coinage during the medieval period.

Central and Southern Africa

The fourth major area of urban development is central and southern Africa. Urbanization here derives almost exclusively from the European colonization of the area. Beginning with the founding of Cape Town by Jan van Riebeck in 1652, European-type urban centers spread first eastward along the coast and later inland with gold mining and railway development toward the Zambezi River and beyond. From their very beginning these cities were greatly influenced by economic and social development in Europe. At first, their economic orientation was toward the export of primary products of agriculture, animal husbandry, and mining. But gradually, industrial development, largely for home consumption, came to dominate and transform their economy. In particular, the earlier mining areas matured into major industrial districts. Thus, apart from the coastal ports and cities, the main centers of urbanization in southern Africa are found in the gold mining
areas of Witwatersrand, with Johannesburg as the major city; the Great Dyke region of Rhodesia with Salisbury and Bulawayo as major cities; and the copper mining areas of Katanga, in Congo-Kinshasa, and of Zambia (the Copperbelt).

In all these urban centers, contrary to the tradition of relatively unrestricted interaction of peoples in other cities of Africa, the European settlers introduced in varying degrees the practice of racial separatism. By denying the local people and others of non-European origin full citizenship and equality before the law, the European minority not only subverted the economic aspirations of the vast majority of the populace but encouraged the development of shanty towns or bidonvilles around all their cities. These ghettos housed the Africans who were denied most of the benefits of urban life but were required to provide labor to keep the mills of the urban European economic and social life turning.

The European impact on the recent history of urbanization in Africa is, however, not limited to the central and southern parts of the continent. Especially since the nineteenth century, European penetration of the continent has significantly affected the nature and pattern of urban development everywhere. In no other aspect of urban life is this more pronounced than in the economic. The economy of traditional African cities was exposed to far-reaching transformations and this, in turn, influenced and changed the physical and social conditions in the cities. To assess this impact, it is necessary first to provide a brief summary of the characteristics of the traditional urban economy in Africa, and then to indicate the many ways in which it was transformed in the century of European domination.

PRE-EUROPEAN URBAN ECONOMIES IN AFRICA

Although trade was the lifeblood of the pre-European African cities, craft production was perhaps equally important. The basic unit of craft production was the master craftsman who was assisted by one or more journeymen and one or more apprentices. In general, most production units were small, seldom comprising more than ten individuals. But there were numerous instances where several production units could be housed under the
same roof, giving the appearance of a modern factory. This was particularly true of the weaving, dyeing, and smithing industries.

The master craftsman was someone who had completed a full apprenticeship in the production of a particular commodity or service. An apprenticeship was based very often on ascription; that is, the apprenticeship was fulfilled simply by the fact of being a member of a lineage or family group which had been known in the city to be skilled in the particular craft. The importance of lineage membership in recruitment to apprenticeship varied widely from craft to craft. In general, apprenticeship began as soon as a boy was old enough to help with any stage in the production process. It continued until adult life. When he had mastered the art, there was no formal test or examination indicating that a certain widely accepted standard of competence had been attained. There may be a ceremony to mark the occasion, but this would very likely be part of the broader ceremony associated with reaching the age of puberty. For most accomplished apprentices, the immediate prospect was that of becoming a journeyman either to one's own father or to a relative. This period lasted until the youth earned enough to buy the equipment and raw materials necessary to set up on his own as master craftsman. At that stage, he also had to decide whether to remain in his own town or migrate to another area to seek out new customers and clientele.

The production process was basically manual, though in a few cases it involved the use of animals. There was little dependence on inanimate sources of power such as wind, water, coal, or electricity. This fact, it has been suggested, was a major reason for the small size of the production unit. When, therefore, a basic change occurred involving the use of the imported steam engine as a source of power for production, it ushered in the beginnings of an industrial revolution and subsequently a phenomenal transformation of the character of cities.

Because of their small size, traditional craft industries usually occupied very little space. As a result, traditional African cities showed only moderate differentiation into functional zones. Thus, particular quarters in a city might have been well known for the production of particular
goods, or a particular street might have been distinguished by the concentration along its length of numerous craftsmen in the same line of production. Such a street was often called by the name of the dominant craft. Thus, in Fez (Morocco) there is the smith's row and in Ibadan (Nigeria) there is "agbede adodo" or the foundry quarter.¹⁴

The need to regulate the activities and protect the interest of producers in a particular craft industry made the institution of guilds a basic feature of the urban economy of most traditional African cities. The functions of the guild included not only setting and maintaining an agreed price level, insuring a certain standard of workmanship, and providing welfare services for their members, but also participating as a corporate unit in the political or religious life of the urban community.¹⁵ Especially in terms of their corporate role, guild associations seem to vary in terms of the importance attached to them. Thus, in some cities, the guild of wholesale and retail traders was regarded as more important than that of blacksmiths and the blacksmiths' guild more important than that of weavers and leatherworkers, and so on. Guild associations seldom had connections beyond their particular city. There were instances, however, where in a kingdom the titled heads of guilds in the capital city had responsibility for guilds in other towns of the kingdom. M. G. Smith has noted, for instance, that in the Zaria Emirate (Nigeria) craftheads of the capital city were required to tour the kingdom at the tax season to collect the allotted tax of their particular crafts from the local heads.¹⁶ Nadel, reporting on the Nupe area (Nigeria), pointed out that it was to the crafthead of the capital city that the ruler of the kingdom gave bulk orders for craft products such as farm tools, war equipment, metalware, leather goods, and clothing.¹⁷ The crafthead, in turn, allocated the orders among the available workers, and sometimes among the towns. In North Africa, there was also the mohtasseh, or head of all the guilds in a city, who was usually appointed by the Sultan.

Craft goods can be classed into two broad groups: artistic and utility goods. The former were goods produced for the aristocracy and religious cults and included such items as brass, bronze, and silver wares;
carvings; fancy leather works; and carpets. The utility goods were intended for use by the general populace. They included agricultural implements, locks and keys, cloth, pottery, shoes, and various wooden utensils. Since the rate of production was necessarily slow, supply factors—in particular the amount of labor available—set a constraint on the level of production. Labor availability, in turn, was conditioned by the low level of productivity in agriculture in that large numbers of hands were required on the farms to provide the surplus foodstuffs necessary to support the relatively few non-agricultural producers in the cities. In a period of poor transportation development, when movement depended on human porterage, or the use of donkeys or camels, or of dug-out canoes, the extent to which the agricultural surplus could be augmented by import from distant areas was greatly restricted.

Thus, it is easy to see why, as a result of a relatively undeveloped production and transportation technology, the number and the size of traditional African cities were kept very low. One of the major consequences of the increased European penetration of the continent during the last century was the introduction of advanced technologies of production and transportation. Their impact was a mixed blessing, but they provided the basis for the tremendous physical, social, and economic transformations going on in most African cities today.

THE IMPACT OF INDUSTRIAL EUROPE ON AFRICAN CITIES

The Industrial Revolution in Europe was characterized by factory-based, mass production of producer and consumer goods, as well as by the invention of means of land transportation which were faster and more capacious than anything the world had known before. These transportation facilities were particularly important in distributing the mass-produced goods from the factories of Europe—virtually "to the utmost ends of the world." Indeed, it was only after 1884, when active construction of railways in Africa was initiated, that European penetration had any serious impact on the economy of most African cities. The railways flooded the cities of Africa with a wide variety of cheap, mass-produced, manufactured goods from Europe, thereby setting in motion far-reaching changes in the nature of the local economy.
Of these changes, three deserve further elaboration: the undermining of traditional crafts industries; the adaptation of traditional craft organization to modern production processes; and the reappraisal of the locational advantage of individual cities with respect to the new pattern of trade.

The Undermining of Traditional Craft Industries

The availability of cheaper manufactured substitutes for local craft products quickly resulted in a fall in the demand for the latter. Especially with respect to utility goods, such as textiles, shoes, and metal wares, the manufactured substitutes had a better finish, greater attractiveness, and could be more easily obtained, usually from stock and in any desired quantity.

More than this, the European impact seriously undermined the social importance and control that attached to craft organization and production. Miner, writing about Timbuktu, pointed out that "the craft organization of pre-French days was supported by supernatural sanctions, physical force, popular consensus, and the right to select apprentices". It was believed, for instance, that if anyone but an apprentice shoemaker tried to sew leather slippers, the needle would turn against him and prick his finger. If a person who was not from a family of masons tried to build a house, he would topple from the wall to his death; besides, no house-owner would have his house repaired by a mason who was not from a builder's family because the owner would not want his house to collapse. Moreover, society permitted the use of physical force against those who infringed upon guild prerogatives.

The liberalizing attitudes of colonial administrations everywhere in Africa weakened the economic cohesiveness of craft organizations. Indeed, in Morocco the French passed a law in 1917 which transferred the powers of titled-head (mohtasseeh) of all guilds in a city to the municipal authorities. The greater social and economic rewards associated with European-type education and employment also impaired recruitment to apprenticeship, even from within the ranks of craft families. The loss of consumers meant that even master craftsmen had to seek new sources of income either by closing down
their workshops and reverting to agricultural pursuits or by converting to more modern production processes, even if on a small scale. During the last one hundred years the picture everywhere was that of a startling decline in the number of traditional, urban craftsmen. Figures are not easy to come by, but the situation in Morocco (Table 1) for the eleven year period from 1947 to 1958 is perhaps typical of the trend in most traditional African cities.

Although this trend toward a decline in numbers of craftsmen is likely to continue with regard to the utility crafts, the artistic crafts seem to have found a new lease of life, especially with growing tourist demands and a widening employment for as many people as possible. Governments in most African countries are today attempting to rehabilitate the craft industries, not only in cities and towns but also in rural areas. In particular, attempts are being made to organize the craftsmen into cooperatives and to offer them credit facilities for joint purchase of expensive modern equipment. Some countries have, in fact, made elaborate arrangements to stimulate greater craft production. Thus, Morocco as early as 1918 established an Office for Indigenous Industries and Crafts. In 1919, it introduced an official stamp guaranteeing the quality and origin of Moroccan carpets. Since the Second World War, it has also set up a Directorate of Handicrafts with agents to carry out inspections of craft production and to provide occupational training for artisans through special schools and apprenticeship workshops. The result has been a growing increase in the market value of craft products (Table 2) as well as in the amount exported.

The Adaptation of Traditional Craft Organization to Modern Production Processes

Urban craftsmen with a more flexible turn of mind, instead of deserting craft production completely, have turned to producing goods of more modern significance. In Ibadan, for instance, Callaway reports cases of blacksmitheries which have been transformed into semimodern foundries producing such items as photographers' stands, barber chairs, iron bedsteads, iron chair frames, and a wide variety of farm tools. In some cases, the blacksmith may become a tinsmith, using imported corrugated sheet iron to make such items as cooking utensils, buckets, metal boxes for school books, metal trunks, and sieves.
### TABLE 1

CHANGES IN NUMBERS OF URBAN CRAFTSMEN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trade</th>
<th>1947</th>
<th>1958-59</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Master Craftsmen</td>
<td>Workmen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Textiles</td>
<td>44,341</td>
<td>19,311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Leather</td>
<td>14,724</td>
<td>10,454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Building &amp; Ceramics</td>
<td>17,006</td>
<td>6,982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Metals</td>
<td>5,250</td>
<td>1,814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Wood</td>
<td>4,419</td>
<td>2,810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Vegetable product</td>
<td>6,254</td>
<td>769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Miscellaneous</td>
<td>9,443</td>
<td>2,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>104,437</strong></td>
<td><strong>44,534</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trade</th>
<th>1958-59</th>
<th>1947</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Master Craftsmen</td>
<td>Workmen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Textiles</td>
<td>20,405</td>
<td>11,223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Leather</td>
<td>10,203</td>
<td>5,988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Building &amp; Ceramics</td>
<td>6,785</td>
<td>4,857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Metals</td>
<td>4,654</td>
<td>1,882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Wood</td>
<td>4,449</td>
<td>2,167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Vegetable product</td>
<td>6,254</td>
<td>769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Miscellaneous</td>
<td>1,818</td>
<td>4,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Miscellaneous</td>
<td>11,655</td>
<td>13,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>66,223</strong></td>
<td><strong>44,209</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 2
MOROCCO: MARKET VALUE OF HANDICRAFT PRODUCTS, 1957-59
(in millions of francs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trade</th>
<th>1957</th>
<th>1958</th>
<th>1959</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leatherwork</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basket-making</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper goods</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpets</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More commonly, new production processes such as photography, printing, automobile repair, furniture-making, tailoring, baking, sign-making and shoemaking, have taken on some aspects of traditional craft organizations, especially the master-apprentice relation and the guild system. This has involved a number of departures from tradition, however, including the recruitment of apprentices without regard to their lineage or ethnic origin; the precise definition of the period of apprenticeship; the commutation to a fee of part of the services due from an apprentice to a master; as well as the less direct political involvement sought for the guild. Moreover, some degree of formal education is increasingly becoming characteristic of apprenticeship, though not a necessary qualification for apprenticeship, in these small-scale industries.

Governments in African countries are trying to aid these small-scale producers with technical, organizational, and financial assistance. Partly because of their low capital-labor ratio, these small-scale industries are seen as possible means of reducing urban unemployment as well as creating a reservoir of semiskilled industrial labor. It is somewhat doubtful, however, that these small-scale industrial activities have the capacity for development into larger scale enterprises. But given the need to disseminate technical skills widely and rapidly and to provide, however crudely, much needed goods and services, the role of craftsmen in both the urban and the national economy has been highly significant.
Re-appraisal of the Locational Advantage of Individual Cities with Respect to the New Pattern of Trade

The transportation network which colonial administrations in the various African countries established between 1885 and 1930 imposed new patterns of locational importance on traditional African cities. The main elements in the new networks were the railways running inland and their terminal ports, reflecting the export orientation of the colonial economies. Roads were significant at first only as feeders to the railways and did not seriously come into their own as major economic trade routes until after the Second World War. Indeed, until then, the development of roads in competition to the railway was resisted everywhere.

The structure of this new transportation network paid little attention to location of cities and towns but rather sought out areas rich in potential resources for export. A number of interior cities with limited export potential found themselves poorly integrated into the new economic-spatial order. In contrast, small towns or villages which were located at important nodal points within the new network suddenly blossomed and grew rapidly. The port cities in particular experienced phenomenal growth. In a number of cases, completely new towns were laid out and developed by the colonial administration at strategic points within the network.

These developments strongly affected the economy of traditional African cities. Yet this impact varied significantly between the artisans and the traders, the men and the women, the young and the old. The artisans, for instance, felt the effect more than the traders. Because of the social matrix within which their precolonial organization was established, it was not easy for an artisan to move away from his town if the economic health of that town was no longer sound. Not so the trader. He was familiar with the vagaries and shifts of trade and was prepared to travel wherever the trade repaid his effort. This willingness to move to new places in response to the opening up of new opportunities was more noticeable in men than in women and more apparent in the young than in the old. The result was a dual picture in most African countries: one of stagnating, formerly important,
traditional cities, and the other of ebullient, fast-growing, new colonial urban centers. 21

A TYPOLOGY OF AFRICAN URBAN PATTERNS

From our discussion of urban history and traditional occupations, it is possible to distinguish a four-fold pattern in contemporary African cities based on the type of organization and the character of economic and social life. These four types include a) the traditional city, b) the "rejuvenated" traditional city, c) the colonial city, and d) the European city.

The traditional city today is one where traditional economic, social, and spatial organization still predominate. It is a city which in general has failed to integrate effectively into the new spatial economy and transportation network. In consequence, its economy is stagnant, and it suffers a high rate of migration of its youthful and more energetic population. This loss weakens the traditional guild organization and denies the cities of the aggressive and imaginative leadership which could pull them out of their depression. Social life, although close and intimate and reflecting traditional usages and stratification, shows a certain degree of instability resulting from the general uncertainty of economic fortunes and the awareness that the possibility of emigration either to the rural areas or to other cities is always imminent. The demographic pattern of traditional cities shows a higher proportion of aged people and children, sometimes also of women. Ethnic heterogeneity is not very pronounced. Many houses or rooms in houses are vacant, while others are in various stages of disrepair. Urban utilities are poorly developed and, where they exist, are inadequately utilized. Examples of such cities include Timbuktu, Katsina, Oyo, and Iseyin.

The "rejuvenated" traditional city is usually located on the modern transportation network within a rich agricultural region or close to a mining site. Its population is highly heterogeneous, and it shows a division into three basic areal units: the indigenous town (the birni of the Hausa of Nigeria or the medina of the Arabs of North Africa), the immigrant quarters, and the European "reservation" area. The reservation was the typical form
of European settlement outside but adjacent to a traditional African city. In the case of the British particularly, the colonial policy was that of "differentiation"; this emphasized ethnic exclusiveness and found expression in a form of residential segregation. The French too, in spite of a professed policy of "assimilation," strenuously maintained the "reservation area" form of residential segregation. In Morocco, for instance, Marshal Lyautey, the French administrator-general, decreed in 1918 that Europeans should live in a quarter of each town separate from the of the indigenes (the medina). In recent years, with the attainment of independence in most African countries, the racial exclusiveness of the reservations has been broken down and many Africans in the civil service and in the higher income classes reside here along with Europeans.

The urbanization process within a "rejuvenated" city, such as Kano or Ibadan in Nigeria, shows somewhat contradictory trends. The indigenous town suffers a gradual decline or de-urbanization due to a negative selection whereby its more successful members migrate to higher income residential districts, usually in the immigrant parts of the city, and/or migrate away from the city altogether. The immigrant part of the city is itself highly differentiated physically on the basis of income, and socially on the basis of ethnicity, in a manner discussed more fully below. Thus, while there are residential districts in the indigenous area which are veritable shanty-towns, there are also districts of very high quality housing where members of the professional, business, and administrative classes live. An equally interesting feature of the "rejuvenated" traditional city is the existence of two major commercial centers in the town, one traditional comprising a central market or bazaar, the other more recent and modern and very reminiscent of the European or American central business district.

The colonial city was essentially a new creation of the colonial administration, but intended for a principally African population. It served primarily as a nodal point within the colonial spatial economy which was largely oriented to export. Its population is almost wholly immigrant and the task of generating a civic spirit out of such disparate elements has always been a difficult one. More usually, as an adjustment mechanism to the
strangeness and uncertainties of their new urban existence, the immigrants formed themselves into various mutual-aid voluntary associations. The basis of membership of such association is very often ethnic. Members of an association help one another in securing employment, engaging in various trades, performing social functions, or discharging civic obligations. Because of the importance of these voluntary associations, the colonial town, even though not strikingly differentiated physically, shows a variegated pattern in its social and cultural configuration.

The colonial city is found in Africa mainly within the tropics and is distinguished by the symmetry of its layout. This has been necessitated by the need to facilitate both the rental and the registration of land to the immigrant population and to provide urban services such as electricity, water supply, and sewage disposal to individual houses. The city is also remarkable for its wide, straight streets, controlled traffic flow, and clear, functional specialization of areas usually revealing a central business district in the center of the town and various industrial districts at the periphery. The most developed of the colonial cities are port cities such as Lagos, Port Harcourt, Accra, Abidjan, and Dakar. Where these new cities are also capitals of their respective countries, they have shown the fastest rate of growth of any cities in the continent. Other colonial cities include various mining centers, route junctions, and administrative headquarters.

The European town, like the "rejuvenated" traditional city, is characterized by distinct racial enclaves but gives the appearance of being more European than African due to the larger number of permanent white settlers. In the center is the European city itself surrounded by enclaves of Asians and "Coloureds" and by the bidonvilles of the African laborers. Usually in such towns emphasis is given to discouraging the Africans from attempting to become permanent urban residents. The provision of accommodation is often such that a man, but not his family, can be housed. At work, the African is legally precluded from acquiring skills beyond a certain level to insure that occupational mobility does not tempt him to commit himself to an urban existence. In the extreme example represented by the cities of South Africa, (Johannesburg, Pretoria, Cape Town) even simple physical
mobility by Africans within the city requires the carrying of passes. An artificial economic color bar operates which makes a large proportion of the European workers parasites on the economy. Their wages are bolstered up at a level out of proportion to their marginal contribution, and various government subsidies support the generally high standard of living.

POPULATION PATTERNS IN URBAN AFRICA

The last hundred years have witnessed not only a wide variation in the urbanization process but also a remarkable increase in the urban population of Africa. The increase in the urban population could be examined under three headings: a) growth in the number of cities and towns; b) growth in the proportion of the total population that live in urban centers; c) growth in the proportion of the urban population that live in large cities.

A crucial point in the discussion of urban population is the operational definition of an "urban center." For different countries this definition varies with respect to the smallest unit to which the term is applied. Some adopt a population minimum of 2,000; some 5,000; some 10,000; and still others 20,000. In studies on urbanization, however, it is usual to adopt the figure of 20,000. For Africa, as a whole, it is not easy to collect statistics on the increase in the number of such centers over time. What is clear, however, is that the number has increased tremendously since 1850. Breese suggests that in 1960 the number stood at 405, of which 62 had 100,000 inhabitants or more. (Figure II)

With regard to the proportion of the total population living in urban centers (localities with 20,000 people and above), Davis and Hertz pointed out that as of 1950, this represented only 9 per cent of the total population of Africa compared to 13 per cent in Asia, 24 per cent in Latin America and 42 per cent in North America. Compared to the preceding period of relatively little urban growth, the period since 1950, however, has been characterized by tremendous increases in the proportion of people in centers of 20,000 and above. It has not been possible to produce a continental estimate, but data from a number of countries typify the general trend.
In Ghana, for instance, the proportion of the population living in urban centers rose from 7.2 per cent (1950) to 11.6 per cent (1960); in Congo-Kinshasa from 2.2 (1946) to 9.1 (1959); in Kenya from 3.8 (1948) to 5.9 (1962); and in Zambia from 11.3 (1950) to 16.8 (1960). (Figure III)

The trend toward population concentration in a few very large cities has also been a widespread phenomenon, although again statistical documentation is woefully deficient. A simple measure of this phenomenon is the population living in cities of 100,000 and more inhabitants expressed as percentage of the total urban population as here defined. The general situation is perhaps typified by Ghana, Congo-Kinshasa, and Kenya. In Ghana, the proportion living in cities of 100,000 or more rose from 46 per cent (1948) to 67 per cent (1960); in Congo-Kinshasa from 48 per cent (1946) to 65 per cent (1959); and in Kenya from 58 per cent (1948) to 88 per cent (1962). If we measure growth of the urban population by reference only to cities of 100,000 or more inhabitants, for the period 1850 to 1950, Africa, as mentioned above, has had the fastest annual rate of growth (3.9 per cent) in the world. Indeed, during the first half of this century (1900-50), cities of 100,000 and more inhabitants have increased three and a half times as fast as has the total population of Africa. At this rate, out of the current population increase of seven million per year in Africa, at least one and one-half million persons are being added to the big cities.

An indication of the rapidity of growth of the larger cities is provided in Table 3. As of 1960, according to these data, three cities in Africa--Cairo, Alexandria, and Johannesburg--have passed the one million mark. Six others each had over half a million inhabitants, and the remaining eleven had over a quarter of a million. What is equally striking is the fact that most of the cities in the list more than tripled their population over the twenty year period. Today, there are indications that three other cities on the list, namely, Casablanca, Algiers, and Lagos, have also passed the one million mark; and most of the remaining have grown even more rapidly than before.
### TABLE 3

**GROWTH OF MAJOR AFRICAN CITIES, 1940-60**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1960</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cairo</td>
<td>1,307,000</td>
<td>2,100,000</td>
<td>3,348,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>682,000</td>
<td>925,000</td>
<td>1,516,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johannesburg</td>
<td>286,000</td>
<td>880,000</td>
<td>1,111,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casablanca</td>
<td>268,000</td>
<td>551,000</td>
<td>965,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algiers</td>
<td>252,000</td>
<td>315,000</td>
<td>883,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casablanca</td>
<td>268,000</td>
<td>551,000</td>
<td>965,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algiers</td>
<td>252,000</td>
<td>315,000</td>
<td>883,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Town</td>
<td>187,000</td>
<td>594,000</td>
<td>745,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td>220,000</td>
<td>365,000</td>
<td>680,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durban</td>
<td>115,000</td>
<td>496,000</td>
<td>659,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibadan</td>
<td>387,000</td>
<td>435,000</td>
<td>600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>230,000</td>
<td>449,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>444,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pretoria</td>
<td>257,000</td>
<td>245,000</td>
<td>422,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leopoldville</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>208,000</td>
<td>402,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Kinshasa)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oran</td>
<td>195,000</td>
<td>260,000</td>
<td>390,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accra</td>
<td>73,000</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>388,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dakar</td>
<td>165,000</td>
<td>230,000</td>
<td>374,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>240,000</td>
<td>312,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Elizabeth</td>
<td>125,000</td>
<td>148,000</td>
<td>274,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salisbury</td>
<td>51,000</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>270,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>112,000</td>
<td>267,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE II: MAJOR CONTEMPORARY URBAN CENTERS
(100,000 inhabitants and over)
Growth in the cities of Africa has been due both to a fairly high rate of natural increase and to immigration. Compared to the rural areas, the birth rates in African cities tend to be lower, but so too is the death rate. Table 4, showing the vital statistics for a few sample countries, well illustrates this point. The fertility rate appears to be higher in rural areas compared to urban areas, though this generalization is not always confirmed by the crude birth rates. This difference in fertility rates is due to the tendency in urban areas for late marriages and for a limitation on the size of family by the wealthier classes. It is, of course, the lower death rates in urban areas that are crucial and the reasons for this are not difficult to find. High mortality levels in most African countries are due to infectious, parasitic, and respiratory diseases. These causes of death have been greatly reduced by inexpensive medical techniques developed or adopted in recent decades. Moreover, in African countries, public health facilities (such as hospitals, doctors, modern water supply) are much better in urban than in rural areas. There is, of course, no pretense that urban living conditions are always healthy or that they reduce mortality risks; but despite slums and despite malnutrition, it would be very surprising if mortality was higher in the urban areas than in the rural areas. The infant mortality

**TABLE 4**

**CRUDE BIRTH AND DEATH RATES FOR URBAN AND RURAL AREAS OF SELECTED AFRICAN COUNTRIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Urban rates (per '000)</th>
<th>Rural Rate (per '000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Birth</td>
<td>Death</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo-Kinshasa</td>
<td>1955-57</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>1955</td>
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<td>Mali</td>
<td>1957</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1960-61</td>
<td>44</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dahomey</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>26</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

rate, in general, tends to be very high everywhere in Africa, but again it is relatively lower in urban areas.

Migration, however, is more important than natural increase in determining the demographic characteristics of African cities. Especially in the last three decades the volume of migration from rural to urban areas in most countries has been phenomenal. The pattern reveals an unparalleled volume of migration to newer coastal port cities as well as to mining and industrial centers and a net loss from old, traditional centers. Everywhere, the major elements of the initial phase of migration flows are males in the age group between fifteen and fifty-nine. As the urban economy becomes more mature and diversified and the urban social organization more stabilized, a tendency towards equalization between the sexes becomes more noticeable. For example, the population of Kinshasa (formerly Leopoldville) increased more than ten-fold between 1926 and 1955, that is, from 23,000 to 290,000. During this period, the masculinity ratio (the number of males per 100 females for the adult population) decreased from 360 in 1926-29 to 230 in 1930-34, to 190 in 1935-39 and 140-44, and 180 in 1945-49, but rose back to 190 in 1950-55.25

The age and sex structure of most African cities thus reveals a tendency for a) a lower proportion of children of age group zero to fourteen, compared to the position in the rural area; b) a higher proportion of adults, with more males than females; and c) a lower proportion of the aged. These characteristics are largely explained by the structure of employment in African cities. As long as a city's growth by immigration continues and available jobs are primarily suitable for men, not only the masculinity ratio but also the proportion of adult male and female to the total population may remain high. Moreover, if it were possible to measure the average length of stay per immigrant and to classify immigrants as "temporary" or "permanent," the masculinity ratios might be very high for the former but perhaps more nearly balanced for the latter. Nonetheless, in a dysfunctional sector, or in the traditional city, the reverse situation is often found with generally higher proportions of women, children, and the aged in the population.
THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF AFRICAN CITIES

The socio-economic patterns of contemporary urban populations in Africa illustrate a gradual breakdown of traditional forms of social organization and an emergence of new forms relevant to the modern needs of city dwellers. The extended family system with its network of kinship relations becomes less important in the city as a reference for social action. Although an acknowledgment of kinship relations persists and remains relevant on specific occasions such as birth and funeral ceremonies, their overall significance is more diffuse and family obligations are less clear-cut. In some cities, the decreasing cohesiveness of the extended family is physically perceptible in the break-up of traditional compound houses and their replacement by smaller structures housing a single nuclear family or multiple of often non-related nuclear families. In general, the urban residential unit is thus much smaller than the rural household. A study by the International Labor Office, for example, indicated that while the average urban household consists of four to six persons, the average in the rural areas is nine to twelve. A household is not always equivalent to a family, but it is often a very close approximation.

In place of the extended family, voluntary associations provide the newcomer to the city with a means of adjusting to his new circumstances, of finding employment, and sometimes of protecting his interest at his place of work. Initially, a newcomer may belong to a single voluntary organization comprising people from his village area, clan, or ethnic group. Through this association, he is able to maintain links with his rural origin. In a number of interesting examples, this ethnic association introduces him directly into a craft or trade for which his people already operate a virtual monopoly. Thus, in Morocco, the Ammelu people (from Tafraout in the Anti-Atlas) owned most of the grocery stores in the cities along the coast as far north as Tangier. The management of a store was rotated among the male members of the families so that in this way no individual was away from home for too long and family relationships as well as the traditional social structure
were maintained. Similar examples can be multiplied from other parts of the continent. In modern Lagos (Nigeria), for instance, most of the butchers come from the town of Iwo about 120 miles inland.

With longer residence in the city, acquisition of greater skills and upward mobility socially and economically, the city-dweller becomes affiliated to an increasing number of voluntary associations to meet his specific needs or preferences. Thus, he may join occupational associations or trade unions, religious associations, literary societies, recreation clubs, or political parties. This widening of interests indicates a greater commitment to urban existence, though not necessarily a complete and permanent break with his rural relations.

In contemporary African cities there are few instances of rigid class or caste differentiation. Virtually everywhere in the continent, with a few significant exceptions in North Africa and southern Africa, the egalitarian or communal basis of traditional land tenure has prevented the rise of a strong class of landed aristocracy. Moreover, the breakdown of the occupational guild system has reduced some of the tenuous social barriers of the past. Although African cities show little evidence of class consciousness, there is increasing evidence of stratification by levels of consumption. However, social mobility is largely unrestricted, and arrival at a certain social stratum may be demonstrated conspicuously by such status symbols as cars, housing, and clothing.

Rapid changes in the economic conditions of cities underlie this pattern of social mobility. In the colonial days the economic organization in most African cities showed an overbearing domination by European interests. The commercial firms that bought the export produce or controlled the mines were, without exception, European-owned. In most cases, the same firms dominated the import trade and wholesale and/or retail branches were to be found in all major cities of the country. The managers and senior officials of these firms were also European. Africans were normally restricted to the intermediate levels in trade, industry, and administration and more often were restricted to providing only unskilled labor. In some parts of the continent, notably East Africa, the intermediate levels
were, in fact, effectively monopolized by Asians. Except in North and West Africa, entry into the professions, notably law, medicine, and engineering, were seldom open to Africans.

With independence, much of this has changed. Europeans are being almost entirely displaced from administration. In commerce and industry, although European interest is still dominant in terms of capital, there is strong pressure everywhere to Africanize the management. The governments of these new African states have been aiding their nationals through loans, manpower training schemes, or restrictive work-laws (against foreigners) to take over an increasing proportion of the economic activities of the country. In many cases, the governments directly participate in economic activities through statutory corporations and development boards. Scholarship schemes of various types have been launched to produce the professional and high-level manpower needed for the rapid development of both the public and private sectors of the economy.

This emphasis on manpower training has meant accelerated educational development at all levels. Some governments have gone so far as to make primary education free and compulsory. Within a decade the younger people have attained a high degree of literacy. The type of education, however, is still largely in the liberal arts, following the humanistic, European tradition and paying little or no attention to vocational training in many cases. The result has been a widespread disaffection by young people in the rural areas and a massive influx of young people with an elementary school education to the cities in search of employment opportunities which often do not exist.

Callaway, however, reports that in Nigeria, after an initial phase of disillusionment, a good number of these young immigrants become apprentices, learning either the traditional or modern craft skills. He estimates that in most years some two million elementary school graduates have been so engaged. On completing their apprenticeship some of these are absorbed in the growing manufacturing sector of the urban economy; a good number move out to small urban centers or rural areas to set up on their own; while...
others remain inadequately employed as journeymen hoping for some fortunate break in the employment market.

In spite of this trend, cities in Africa are increasingly becoming major reservoirs of the unemployed and the unemployables. The rural poor, poorly educated and with few marketable skills, still turn to the city in the hope of survival. It is partly for this reason that African cities are conspicuous areas of income inequality. The contrast in the income of the urban indigent, the recent migrant, or the displaced craftsman and that of the newer generation of businessmen and professional people who have capitalized on risk-taking and on manipulating private property for gains, is unparalleled in most Western countries.

SOCIO-POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF URBANIZATION IN AFRICA

The major problems of urbanization in Africa stem from two causes: the rapid rate of growth of the urban population and the failure of employment opportunities to keep up with this growth.

The rate of urbanization is, of course, uneven between African countries as well as within countries. As has been emphasized above, urbanization is greatest in large, coastal, port cities and lower in smaller centers or centers poorly situated in relation to the major flow of modern economic activities. With particular regard to the coastal metropolitan areas, four types of problems are highly dependent on the rate of population growth. These are: a) the provision of adequate housing and removal and/or prevention of slum development; b) the provision of adequate public utilities to all parts of the metropolis; c) the organization of an effective and efficient intracity transportation system; d) the establishment of a competent and forward-looking urban administration.

Each of these problems has been foreshadowed in previous comments. The presence of traditional sectors and bidonvilles in most African cities emphasises the serious problems of housing shortage, chronic overcrowding, insubstantial nature of housing structures and the low level of repair. The situation, in fact, is progressively worsened by the continuing immigration into the city and the overuse of the existing housing supply.
It is estimated that to keep pace with the demand for urban housing up to 1975, and assuming a thirty-year period of replacement, African countries would have to produce some 130,000 units of dwellings each year. Part of the problem is in interesting the private sector in providing this much-needed housing for the low-income group. Almost invariably this type of development is left for the governments to undertake. Since governments in the new African states have pressing infrastructural investment obligations to attend to, they have been very niggardly in dealing with the problems of urban housing. Moreover, in spite of the advice of international experts, most African countries have come to realize that there is, in reality, nothing like a low-cost housing scheme for the low-income group of city dwellers. The rent or mortgage payments on even the cheapest of publicly constructed houses have proved far beyond the means of most African workers. Governmental initiative in this direction has, in fact, lined the pockets of the higher income groups who buy these government-built houses and then rent them out for fantastic profits.

The provision of adequate public utilities presents a different set of problems since this is squarely a responsibility of the government. The basic issue is in the allocation of scarce capital resources between social overhead investments and directly productive activities. Moreover, social overhead investments tend to be of a large, lumpy character and often are technically indivisible. In consequence, except where loans by international bodies such as the World Bank are proffered, most governments at present find such commitments unattractive. As a result, in most cities public utilities such as water supply, central sewage disposal systems, medical services, and electricity are grossly inadequate and suffer from frequent breakdowns or shortages. The undependability of these services tends to discourage foreign investment and helps to perpetuate the phenomenon of urban unemployment. The presence in most cities of a large proportion of people who cannot be taxed heavily enough to produce sufficient revenue for installing and maintaining basic services lies at root of the problem of inadequate living facilities in these cities.
Intracity transportation presents special difficulties also, partly because of the poverty of the majority of the urban residents and partly because of the ecological pattern of development of most African cities. Especially in the rejuvenated traditional cities in western and northern Africa and in the European cities in eastern, central, and southern Africa, the typical ecological pattern has the bidonvilles or medina of the poorer people displaced at one end of the city, far away from the major centers of work. This is unlike the typical pattern in most European and American cities where the low-income classes are close to the city center and their place of work. The result is that for the low-income classes in most African cities the daily journey to work is a seriously tiring effort. Coordinated urban transport services are poorly developed in most cities, and where they exist they are beyond the means of most workers. A good number of the latter thus have to spend many hours each day trekking to and from work. Others find it cheaper to invest in bicycles. The confused and heterogeneous pattern of traffic during rush hours invariably leads to such traffic congestion that it has to be seen to be believed.

Fundamental to the resolution of all these problems is efficient urban management and administration. For the older African cities, part of the problem here is the incapacity of traditional governmental institutions to cope with the complex problems of the modern city. For the new colonial cities, the problem is to generate an ethos of responsible civic leadership among such a heterogenous population. In either case, an inadequate financial base and a shortage of qualified and trained personnel tend to thwart even the best of managements. This does not mean that various African governments have not been attempting to modernize urban administrative institutions; the real problem is that so far their efforts have not led to any significant up-grading of the character of urban social and economic life.

Perhaps there is little that can be done in this respect until the second major cause of the problems--the failure of employment opportunities to keep up with the growth of the city population--has been effectively
tackled. Until after the Second World War, the urban economy in most African countries, except in areas of relatively dense European settlement, was largely centered on trading, administration, and in a few notable instances, mining. Since then, the remarkable rush of people to the cities and the independence of most of the countries from colonial status have turned attention increasingly toward manufacturing industries as a means of solving the unemployment situation in the cities. The postwar period, in fact, has seen a remarkable increase in manufacturing employment in the cities, but the impact of this increase on the general unemployment situation has been relatively slight. Two reasons account for this: the locational tendencies in the manufacturing industry and the available choice of technology in most developing countries.

Recent developments in the manufacturing industries have encouraged tendencies favoring concentration in a few locations, notably port-cities. Such concentrations are known to result in external economies which enhance the profitability of the individual enterprise, as well as that of the complex. Moreover, in many African countries even though manufacturing activity is not physically bound to a given location, a number of considerations often severely restrict the range of locational alternatives to a few port-cities and regional centers. These include the availability of skilled labor; of basic facilities such as power, transportation, and industrial water; ready access to the procurement of machinery, equipment, spare parts, and intermediate goods, as well as to repair and maintenance services; and the proximity of markets for the manufactured products. The result has been that industrialization in most African countries to date has led to a high concentration of employment opportunities into a few cities while at the same time weakening the capacity of other cities to provide poles of counter attraction.

What makes the situation more serious is the fact that modern manufacturing technology tends on the whole to be more capital-intensive than labor-intensive. This means that the degree to which the overall employment problem can be resolved by even these increases in the number of manufacturing enterprises is greatly limited. Nonetheless, it has been suggested that in
the production of certain commodities there may be a number of technological alternatives from which African countries may want to choose. For example, in many areas of engineering activity--building, construction, earthmoving--it is possible to substitute in considerable measure labor for machinery. Such substitution is also feasible in certain branches of manufacturing.

Be that as it may, an equally important aspect of the unemployment situation in most urban areas in Africa is that the vast majority of the labor force lacks specialization. This is due both to the low level of development of technical skills and the high degree of occupational instability. The latter situation is particularly common in those countries of eastern and southern Africa where, until recently, Africans were discouraged from making a permanent commitment to urban existence. The recent emphasis on education in most African countries represents an initial step toward dealing with this problem. But, as has been pointed out, there is a great need for orienting this education to the specific technological needs of the age.

Despite the many problems posed, there is no doubt that urbanization in Africa has been a force for rapid economic and social development. It has been instrumental in introducing many Africans to a money economy and to new consumption patterns. These have served as major influences in motivating increased economic exertions and rising aspirations. Urbanization has also been the means of introducing and diffusing new technical skills and expertise as well as new economic and social institutions. It has provided the opportunity for Africans to grapple with novel problems of modern organization and to gain increased confidence in their ability to deal with new and complex situations. Indeed, it is to this organizational ability deriving from the urban situation to which most African states owe the early beginnings of the concerted nationalist protest against colonialism and the subsequent vigor with which it was carried through to independence.
It is not surprising that the prospect for Africa is one of a continuing rapid increase in the rate of urbanization. Homer Hoyt estimates that at the current rate of growth, the proportion of Africans living in cities of over 100,000 would increase from 8 per cent in 1960 to 16 per cent in 1975, and 25 per cent in year 2000. In terms of actual numbers, this would mean an increase from roughly 20 million people living in these cities in 1960 to 48 million in 1975, and 129 million in the year 2000. Hoyt’s estimates were based on the assumption that world population will increase at the median rate of 2.5 per cent per annum predicted by the United Nations, and that there will be an increasing degree of industrialization throughout the world.

Such a phenomenal increase in the urban population of Africa would compound most of the problems outlined above; these projections underline the urgency with which the urban problems call for solutions. One expedient that has often been suggested is to dam the tide of migration into the cities. Even if this could be undertaken, such a solution would at best serve only as a palliative. For the urban problem is only one side of a coin, with the rural problem on the other side; essentially both problems revolve on the issue of how to modernize traditional economies, agricultural and non-agricultural, rapidly and effectively enough to accelerate increases in per capita productivity and output. Of the two types of locale, urban and rural, the urban offers a greater potential for resolving the problems. Consequently, it can be said that the degree and rapidity with which African countries effectively deal with their urban problems will in large measure determine how soon these countries are able to achieve a sustained rate of economic growth.

NOTES


5. Rhoads Murphy, "The Decline of North Africa since the Roman Occupation: Climatic or Human?" *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, XLI (June, 1951), 116-32.


One of the most striking developments accompanying social change in traditional societies throughout the world has been an explosion in the breadth, intensity, and impact of communications. In most African societies of one hundred years ago a man's horizons were restricted by the nature of the communications and transport channels available to him. Without written or mechanical means of effectively recording and storing information he was forced to depend upon the memory of his elders to transmit the knowledge of past generations. His physical mobility was usually limited to the distance a man could travel by foot. His material possessions and the scope of his technological knowledge reflected the narrow range of his contacts and the great restrictions imposed by distance on the diffusion of innovative ideas and objects. And perhaps most important, his level of expectation, his dreams, and his actions were largely confined to a set of available alternatives which were limited by his experience and shaped by the history and immediate environment of his ethnic community. Some were able to extend their horizons through participation in trade or political administration or through "universal" religions such as Islam, but most lived their entire lives within small ethnically defined bubbles which bounded an entire existence.

The forces of change which have been operating in Africa in the past century are not entirely new. Ethnic bubbles have been punctured and expanded periodically throughout African history both through the stimulus of external contacts and through indigenously generated innovation. But the introduction of the technologically advanced communications and transport systems of the industrialized West ignited a series of radical adjustments and re-evaluations.
which was unparalleled in its impact on the individual and his society. The automobile and the railway, modern shipping and air transport, the newspaper, the telegraph, the telephone, postal facilities, radio and television—the whole array of media and other channels for the movement of goods, people, and ideas that characterizes modern society—were primary generators of the forces of change which have been shaping Africa for the past hundred years and are still molding the social, economic, political, and psychological makeup of African societies today.

The subject of this essay is the development of circulation systems in Africa and their relevance to contemporary problems of social change and to the creation and consolidation of nation-states. The term circulation is used to encompass both communication and transportation systems, that is, any facility or structure which involves the movement of people, goods, or messages from place to place. After a brief examination of the circulation systems in precolonial Africa, the essay will turn to an historical and geographic analysis of the phases in the growth of modern circulation systems and their current patterns of development. Finally, an attempt at evaluating the interrelations between circulation, information flow, and nation-building will be offered, not as a final statement on the subject, but as a useful preface to some of the most exciting and important processes operating within the modern world.

**CIRCULATION SYSTEMS IN TRADITIONAL SOCIETIES**

Circulation in traditional African societies was firmly emmeshed within a socio-political matrix. Ethnic society, with a number of important exceptions, was characterized by small-scale units, ethnically circumscribed and inwardly focused. Communications were almost entirely immediate and oral. Rarely did there exist distinct circulatory organizations or professional communicators, for the flow of information was usually guided by social attributes, such as clan membership or position within a social hierarchy.
The environment, especially the existence of physical barriers and the simple friction of distance, restricted both the extent and the intensity of communications so that the effective "world view" of a particular group was relatively narrow and usually confined to the group itself and its immediate neighbors. In the jargon of modern communications theorists, the "extending media"—those channels which facilitate the spread of information over space and time—were weakly developed. In discussing the question of societal scale and its relation to social change, the Wilsons noted that in traditional African societies ancestors are believed to have power over men, but it is the immediate ancestors who are feared. Similarly, logical and conventional pressure are exerted only within a small group. A man is not influenced by the arguments of those living at a distance or those long dead. He fears the scorn and enjoys the admiration only of neighbors and contemporaries.¹

But it would be wrong to view ethnic Africa as being composed entirely of an airtight mosaic of tiny cells in virtual isolation from one another. Several forces acted to promote intersocietal linkages and create larger scale circulatory systems. At the most basic level, there was the pattern of societal overlapping whereby large numbers of ethnic groups came to interact in a complex network of both direct and indirect linkages. Group A, for example, might have direct contacts with group B but not with group C. But groups B and C could have direct contacts with one another as well as with several other more distant groups. This pattern was frequently extended, primarily through sociolinguistic and economic ties, to involve large clusters of societies very much like a "friendship network" of an individual includes not only his immediate friends but his friends' friends and perhaps their friends as well. Thus, although two given societies may not even be aware of one another's existence, both may form part of a chain of interaction which can act as a channel for the diffusion of information, goods, and even people. Much of the widespread similarity in certain cultural features over large sections of Africa (for example, folk tales among Bantu-speaking peoples) is attributable in large part to the intricate web of societal overlapping.
There were other forces which worked to expand the boundaries of community interaction beyond the mosaic of small-scale ethnic compartments and to create distinct channels for information flow between different ethnic groups. Long distance trade, for example, was perhaps the most important influence in the establishment of routes and focal centers similar in function to those in modern communication and transport networks. It permitted the infusion of external influences while at the same time stimulating the diffusion of information outward from ethnic Africa.

The oldest and probably most important trading system was that which spanned the Sahara to connect North Africa and the Mediterranean with the Western and Central Sudan. Trade in turn extended southward from the Sudan into the forested zone fringing the Guinea Coast. Not only was the historical significance of the Sudan belt closely associated with this expansion of scale due to trade, but so also was the relative amount of reliable information about West Africa available to areas outside the continent. West Africa was never as "dark" to the Islamic world as it was to Western Europe during the early centuries of contact.

Long distance trade was also important along the east coast of Africa, which, from at least the beginning of the Christian era, formed part of a vast trading system in the Indian Ocean Basin. Its impact on peoples of the interior is considered to have been rather limited until the last half of the nineteenth century, although a number of non-coastal ethnic groups such as the Kamba, Nyamwezi, and Yao, actively participated in this trade well prior to this time. Indeed, further historical and archaeological research may reveal that a more extensive interaction existed between the coast and the interior than has hitherto been known. In addition to that of the East African coast, there were a number of smaller scale trading systems in other sections of Africa, particularly in the Congo and Zambezi Basins and in the Great Lakes region of East-Central Africa.

Urbanization was another factor stimulating greater interethnic circulation. The growth of large towns in Africa was related to the elaboration of long distance trade and to the establishment of centralized political organization, as is clearly seen in Professor Mabogunje's essay
Communications and Change

in this volume. Although some traditional African cities were "homogeneous" in the sense that their populations consisted almost entirely of the same ethnic group, most did contain representatives from other societies; and some became major centers for contact and interaction between a wide variety of peoples. In the market city of Kano (Nigeria) probably over 20 per cent of the population were non-Hausa speaking at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Indeed, the Hausa people are themselves a conglomeration of many ethnic communities.

The history of urbanization and African state formation are discussed in greater detail in this volume in the essays by Akin Mabogunje and Jeffrey Holden respectively. The role of Islam in expanding the connectivity and world view of large sections of traditional Africa is analyzed by Ibrahim Abu-Lughod in another essay. What must be stressed here is that well before the colonial era there existed a superstructure of circulatory routes and nodes which did extend communications beyond the ethnic bubbles of traditional Africa. As will be shown in the next section, this superstructure as well as more localized patterns of communications, both affected, and were affected, by the technologically superior and wider reaching systems of circulation superimposed upon them during the colonial period.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN CIRCULATORY SYSTEMS

The growth of modern systems of communications and transport in Africa can conveniently be examined as a series of phases which have affected the continent at varying times and with varying impact. Although the phases to be discussed are derived from the work of geographers dealing generally with the growth of transport networks in underdeveloped countries, each phase is also closely associated with significant developments in the spheres of economic, social, and political organization and behavior. Furthermore, taken together they provide a revealing perspective on the origins and structure of contemporary patterns of communications and transport and on the relevance of these patterns to the problems of nation-building and social change.
The First Phase: Growth of Trading Ports

In the growth of modern circulation systems, the first phase reflects the nature of early European contact and pre-European patterns of long-distance trade and urbanization. It is characterized by the existence of a large number of scattered trading centers along the coast which acted as interfaces between Europe and Africa. This phase is most clearly identifiable in West Africa where, between about 1500 and 1900, a string of trading ports were established, usually consisting of a European trading station and an indigenous settlement. The trade itself was nearly always carried out by African intermediaries who provided the important link with the interior. The port itself had a limited immediate hinterland and had only weak connections via local fishing craft and trading vessels with other ports along the coast.

These coastal ports served much the same function as the interior trading centers of the Sudan belt. Timbucktu, Gao, Kano and Katsina, to name but a few, were themselves "ports," trading goods from the West African forest and savanna for those of North Africa and the Mediterranean. But, to extend the analogy, the ocean-going ship eventually proved more efficient than the "ship of the desert", and trade was re-channeled southward with the intensification of early European contacts. This shift was one of the outstanding geographical changes in West African history. It was stimulated by indigenous developments in the forest zone, was made more compelling to Europe with the growth of the slave trade, and was finally solidified by colonial empire-building. After centuries of leadership, the Sudan became a backwater with respect to the forces of change generated by the colonial contact, and the coastal peoples moved into the vanguard.

The older West African coastal ports included St. Louis at the mouth of the Senegal River; Sekondi, Cape Coast, Winneba, Elmina, and Accra along the "Gold Coast"; Whydah in Dahomey; Lagos, Badagry, Bonny, and Calabar in Nigeria; and Luanda and Benguela in Angola. Several of these were to act as the major steppingstones for colonial penetration.

In contrast to the situation in coastal West Africa, the ports of the East African coast had formed part of a complex trading system in the
Indian Ocean Basin for over a thousand years before the first Portuguese contacts. Nevertheless, there were some basic similarities: a long string of trading stations dotted the coast from Mogadishu in Somalia on the north, through Lamu, Malindi, and Mombasa in Kenya, Bagamoyo, Zanzibar and Kilwa in Tanzania, to Mozambique and Sofala in the south. Each had its own limited hinterland and depended upon African middlemen to tap the ivory, gold, copper, and slaves of the interior. The coastal trade was controlled by Arabs, not Europeans, but as in West Africa nearly every port was an amalgam of indigenous settlement and trading station.

Many ports developed along the coast of southern Africa; at first, these were primarily revictualing and refueling stations for ships sailing around the Cape of Good Hope and only later the bases for the extension of political control and European settlement into the interior. Trade with the local population was never as important as it was in East and West Africa.

**Second Phase: Penetration and Port Concentration**

Routes were eventually constructed from the coastal ports into the interior. This led to the growth of those ports which succeeded in capturing the largest hinterlands and to the establishment of the channels through which the influences of colonialism spread from the coast. This same pattern of penetration and concentration is identifiable in the early history of the precolonial trading systems, but it was dominated in the modern context by the construction of railways during the early decades of the colonial period. Railway lines were often paralleled by telecommunication links and roads; and in some areas, notably in the Congo Basin, the railways were supplemented by river transport as well.

These penetration lines rapidly became the major axes of interaction between traditional Africa and European influences, and their ocean termini developed into many of the great urban political centers of contemporary Africa (see Table). It is difficult to overestimate the importance of this phase in the growth of modern circulation systems, for the links and the major nodes along them became strongly entrenched and attracted further attention in the form of financial investment, infrastructural development, the growth of industry and cash-crop agriculture, European and other
non-African settlement, and general "visibility" to the rest of the world. New urban centers were created where none existed before (for instance, Nairobi, Port Harcourt, Salisbury, Dakar), while favorably situated older centers grew at the expense of their less fortunate neighbors (for example, Mombasa vs. Lamu and Malindi; Lagos vs. Badagry; Dar es Salaam vs. Bagamoyo and Zanzibar; and Kano. Ibadan, and Kumasi vs. most of the interior West African centers). By 1930, a year considered by some scholars to mark the end of the African railway era, the broad framework of modern circulation systems had become firmly established.

### MAJOR PENETRATION LINES

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Coastal Terminus</th>
<th>Interior Focus</th>
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<tr>
<td>Dakar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conakry</td>
<td>Guinea Highlands</td>
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<td>Abidjan</td>
<td>Ouagadougou (Upper Volta) and Ivory Coast interior</td>
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<td>Accra/Tema</td>
<td>Southern Ghana (Kumasi)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>Nigerian Interior (Ibadan, Kano)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Port Harcourt</td>
<td>Nigerian Interior (Enugu coalfields, Jos Plateau)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Matadi-Kinshasa</td>
<td>Congo basin, especially Katanga</td>
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<td>Lobito</td>
<td>Katanga and Copperbelt</td>
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<td>South Africa, (Johannesburg and the Rand)</td>
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<td>Nairobi and the Kenya Highlands, Uganda and the Lake Victoria basin</td>
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<td>Addis Ababa and the Ethiopian Highlands</td>
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<tr>
<td>Port Sudan</td>
<td>Gezira and the Sudan interior, including Khartoum</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The routes of the early penetration lines were guided by military and strategic objectives at first; later, by the desire to reach valuable mineral deposits and productive agricultural areas. Wherever they reached, they introduced revolutionary means of communication and facilitated a wider circulation of goods, people, and ideas than had ever been experienced in traditional Africa. Subsistence farmers and petty traders began to turn to commercial agriculture, industrial employment, and urban life. In many
cases the individual's world expanded to encompass the London cocoa market and French food; many became involved in two World Wars and ultimately in the drive to join the world community of nations on an equal basis. The intensity of these changes was associated in both space and time with the development of communications and transport facilities in the large, urban centers which acted as the primary focal points of social, economic, and political transformation. The more isolated rural areas, in contrast, remained relatively unaffected.

Since each colonial power was concerned with carving out its own distinct set of territorial units, very few of the penetration lines crossed what today are international boundaries. The result was a group of compartmentalized colonies and protectorates, each with its own circulatory system and often each in closer contact with Europe than with its immediate neighbors. Only since independence has it become possible to telephone between many adjacent French-speaking and English-speaking territories in West Africa without first contacting Paris or London. And even in 1967, the visiting head-of-state from the Central African Republic flew first Paris in order to reach Kampala in Uganda (a distance not much greater than that between New York and Chicago).

This fragmentation of Africa into relatively large unconnected compartments had its roots in the competitive struggle for African colonies. It became solidified, however, in the early patterns established in the development of transport and communications systems. The forces of change were contained within different "bubbles"; and the colonial boundaries, so often criticized for their artificiality and ignorance of traditional cultural patterns, assumed a new significance in delimiting areas within which the processes of modernization were directed, coordinated, and interrelated. Ethnic groups were sometimes split by colonial boundaries, and often, despite traditional similarities, the two segments followed different routes with respect to social change. Yoruba in Nigeria and in Dahomey, for example, even those living within a few miles of one another, began to learn different second languages, pay taxes to different authorities, and even supplement their diets with different kinds of food. Moreover, the degree of divergence
tended to increase as social change progressed. It is no wonder that the colonial boundaries have come to be considered, at least on the surface, as inviolable by most of the newly independent states. Just as ethnic boundaries in traditional Africa circumscribed distinct circulation systems within which the movement of goods, people, and information was channeled and articulated, so colonial boundaries, both inter- and intraterritorial, recompartmentalized Africa with respect to the forces of modernization and change. Except for some minor readjustments and a few changes in function (for example, when an interterritorial border becomes intraterritorial with the federation of two areas, as in Cameroon), not one of the international boundaries established in the colonial period has been modified since independence.

Third Phase: Consolidation and Interconnection

In interpreting the significance of penetration lines and port concentration, this discussion has already telescoped itself into the next phases of communications and transport growth. The third phase involves the development of feeder lines to, and interconnections between, the major nodes of the urban-administrative system and, as with the second phase, is characterized by concentration at key locations within the evolving transport and communications network. Generally, the processes of growth and decline sparked by the initial penetration into pre-existing urban and trading patterns becomes accentuated as certain cities extend their economic, social, and political hinterlands.

This phase involves an areal and societal expansion of modern circulation from the initial axes of penetration. The continuing dominance of the initial penetration axes in Africa, however, is revealed in the weak interconnections between the state-based circulation systems as well as in the poor development of internal networks (still characteristic of circulation in Africa). The common pattern in most African countries is that of a single dominant transport and communications corridor (occasionally two) tapping the most productive parts of the country and functioning primarily to siphon off resources for an external market. Internal connectivity, except for perhaps a skeletal telecommunications and road
network, was greatly neglected in comparison. Large areas of the country and probably most of the population, therefore, were only minimally affected by communications and transport growth. Some of the most pressing problems of national unity in Africa today are derived from the circulation patterns established during the colonial period. Whereas the former colonial powers sought maximum security and an assured outflow of raw materials to the world market, the leaders of independent Africa seek instead the expansion of internal markets and the greatest possible interaction and integration between all sectors of the population. It will take many years before the circulation systems inherited at independence are restructured to accommodate the new functions demanded of them by African countries today.

Fourth Phase: Integration of Circulation Systems

Although road transport and the mass media are of great importance in the third phase, they become overwhelmingly dominant in the movement of people, goods, and messages, in the fourth phase. In addition, air transport emerges as an important means of interurban linkage; and certain centers, which are the major nodes in their respective national circulatory systems, become even more closely tied together by a range of modern transport and communications media.

This fourth phase is difficult to evaluate in Africa. The developments usually associated with it—developments which are still being elaborated upon in even the most economically advanced countries—are generally based upon an already tightly woven circulation system, something which does not yet exist in any African country except the Republic of South Africa. Although railways are still being built, it appears unlikely that Africa will ever attain the level of rail density existing in Europe or North America—if only because transportation technology has changed radically since the period of railway expansion in Europe and the United States. And the number of paved roads, telecommunications, and postal and mass-media facilities required to create and maintain integrated circulation systems involving the masses of the population, even on a national basis, is staggering.
Nevertheless, some of the features of this phase are recognizable in contemporary Africa. Probably the most prominent is the growth of high priority linkages between the dominant urban centers. In Africa, these linkages appear more "streamlined" than elsewhere, in that there are relatively few feeders and connecting links with the rest of the system. This probably reflects the weak development of phase three and the consequent limitation on the areal extent of modern communications and transport networks. High priority linkages in Africa are associated with wide, heavily traveled highways with adequate lodging and refreshment facilities; major railway lines carrying the primary import and export products of the country in addition to passengers; and the most advanced communications facilities, such as direct-dialing telephone systems (for example, Lagos-Ibadan, Kampala-Jinja, Arusha-Moshi) and radio-television services. In a way, this parallels the process of geographical concentration which occurs in the previous two phases, but instead of ports and interior nodes, the emphasis here is on whole corridors of interaction which are the most important routeways of circulation on the continent.

High priority linkages in tropical Africa are still in their early stages of development, but might include the following: Dakar-Thies (Senegal); Tema-Accra-Kumasi (Ghana); Lagos-Ibadan, Port Harcourt-Enugu, Kano-Kaduna (Nigeria); Douala-Yaounde (Cameroon); Lusaka-Copperbelt (Zambia); Salisbury-Bulawayo (Southern Rhodesia); Nairobi-Nakuru-Kisumu (Kenya); and Kampala-Jinja-Tororo (Uganda). In the future, some of these linkages are likely to become extended or interconnected with further modernization of transport and communications. At the present, however, they are confined to the core areas of their respective countries—a further reflection of the pronounced territorial fragmentation which has characterized the growth of modern circulation systems in Africa.

CONTEMPORARY COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORT SYSTEMS IN AFRICA

The growth of modern circulation systems in Africa created a new compartmentalization based upon the framework of colonial boundaries and the geographically uneven development of transport and communications...
facilities. The traditional ethnic mosaic was not erased, however, but reacted much as it always had to new influences. In some cases, it was completely transformed; in others, it molded the new influences to its own design. This interplay between traditional and modern circulation systems came to shape the nature and pattern of social change.

An accurate evaluation of circulation in contemporary Africa would therefore have to consider both the old and the new. This, however, is an immense task unsuited to a general survey of this type. Consequently, only some broad patterns will be identified here with the over-all emphasis on modern forms of communications and transport.

The map below represents the major circulation regions in Africa—areas in which the growth of modern systems of communications and transport have displayed some degree of uniformity and articulation. These regions are the contemporary geographical equivalents of the historical phases discussed in the previous section. Just as each phase represented a broad uniformity of events over time, each circulation region is the expression of shared characteristics of circulatory structure, flow, and development through space. Regional boundaries are not simply coincident with political boundaries, but represent major discontinuities in the circulatory patterns of Africa. Because of the central role of circulation in human behavior, these regions provide a more meaningful areal division of Africa than the often vague and inconsistent regions described in other types of literature.

South African Region

The South African region has by far the most highly developed and tightly interconnected network of communications and transport in Africa. It encompasses virtually all of the Republic of South Africa (RSA) plus Lesotho, Swaziland, most of South-West Africa, southeastern Botswana and southern Mozambique. The focal center of the entire region lies in the gold-rich and heavily industrialized Witwatersrand area, centering on the metropolis of Johannesburg. Other important centers include the large ports of Capetown, Durban, and Lourenço Marques (Mozambique). Interurban linkage is high, although significant "holes" in the transport network exist,
particularly in the now independent Lesotho and in most of the Bantu "reserves" of RSA. The circulation of people in the form of labor is particularly well developed, with the economy of the entire region heavily dependent upon the manpower supplied by Lesotho, Swaziland, and Botswana, not to mention the African population within the Republic.

Zambezi Region

The Zambezi region also has a relatively well-developed transport network, which is connected to the South African region by rail through Mozambique (to Lourenco Marques) and Botswana, and to RSA directly by road, air, and a variety of communications media. The major port of this region is Beira (Mozambique), which until recently served as the primary outlet for the productive central spine of Southern Rhodesia, stretching roughly from Salisbury to Bulawayo, and for the rich Zambian Copperbelt. The latter, however, has begun to re-orient its traffic to Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) and Lobito (Angola) since the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Rhodesia, just as Rhodesia in turn has looked increasingly toward the South African region particularly after the attempts to blockade the port of Beira by Great Britain and other powers. Both of these shifts are symbolized by plans for railway construction, one to connect the Zambian railway system with the central line in Tanzania and another to link the Southern Rhodesian and South African networks directly, thereby cutting across the major transport gaps which hitherto served to define the boundaries of the Zambezi circulation region.

It must be emphasized that the boundaries of all circulation regions are temporary ones reflecting the structure, direction, and flow of circulation at a given time and are subject to change with new developments in transportation and communications. The changes mentioned above, for example, seem to signal the disintegration of the Zambezi region, an event touched upon by the New York Times in reviewing the economy of Africa in 1966. It observed that, during this year, Zambia was transformed in terms of its regional orientation from the northernmost part of southern Africa to the southernmost part of eastern Africa.
**Congo Basin**

The Congo Basin is unique among sub-Saharan African circulation regions in having an extensive system of navigable waterways extending through the heart of the region and providing an inexpensive means of transport. Despite its apparent physical unity, however, the Congo Basin is highly fragmented due not only to the falls and rapids along the rivers which impede continuous navigability, but more importantly to the division of the region during the colonial period into separate Belgian, French, and Portuguese administrations. Furthermore, the colonial policies which operated internally, especially in the former Belgian Congo, did not foster effective interaction among the various peoples in the area, thus hampering the growth of communal identity beyond the existing ethnic compartments. In fact, Congo-Kinshasa is today still struggling with powerful centrifugal forces which seem, in terms of circulatory orientation, to be pulling the state in different directions: the northeast toward East Africa, the south toward the Zambezi region, and the west toward former French Equatorial Africa and West Africa as a whole. This diffuse orientation, however, along with the great size and wealth of the Congo, may eventually enable it—despite an extended period of internal instability—to act as a hub for supranational integration in the future. The current activities of Congo-Kinshasa with respect to unification movements in West, Central, and East Africa may signal the start of this process.

The Congo Basin circulation region covers all of Congo-Kinshasa, the areas of Congo-Brazzaville and the Central African Republic served by the Congo River, and nearly all of Angola. Its most productive area is Katanga, with other mining and agricultural areas scattered throughout the basin. Its major ports are Matadi, the main outlet for Congo-Kinshasa, and Lobito (Angola) which also serves Katanga. Interurban linkage is weak, and there is much redundancy in the transport network. Brazzaville and Kinshasa, for example, although facing each other across the Congo River, both have major international airports and are at terminal points of railways and roads running to separate ports in their respective countries (Pointe Noire and Matadi). And despite the shorter distance to Lobito, Katanga copper was
forced during the colonial period to follow the "national" route by rail and river to Matadi. Political boundaries, therefore, have often prevented natural features from acting as integrative forces within the Congo Basin.

**East Africa**

East Africa, comprising all of Uganda and Tanzania and nearly all of Kenya, plus Rwanda and Burundi, forms a compact circulation region with a relatively well integrated rail and road network serving most of the densely populated and productive areas. With the exception of South Africa, it has achieved a level of economic integration and coordinated communications and transport unsurpassed in any other circulation region. Throughout most of the colonial period, East Africa (except for Rwanda and Burundi) was under British administration and by independence had developed several interterritorial institutions dealing with nearly all forms of circulation in the three territories. The transport network remains rather skeletal and communications are strongly affected by international boundaries, but the region has progressed further toward regional cooperation than any of comparable size in Africa. Building upon this pre-independence unity, East Africa has recently been expanding its sphere of influence in an effort, still in its very early stages, to draw together a "greater" East African area extending from Zambia in the south, to Somalia, Ethiopia, and the Sudan in the north, and westward into Rwanda, Burundi, and possibly Congo-Kinshasa and the Central African Republic, all of which have expressed interest in the newly formed East African Economic Community.

The premier port in East Africa is Mombasa, serving the fertile Kenya Highlands (with Nairobi, the focal point of circulation in the region, as its major node) and the rich farming country surrounding Lake Victoria (especially southern Uganda, where Kampala is the major center). Mombasa also serves some areas of Tanzania, but most of Tanzania is oriented toward Dar es Salaam, the capital and main seaport. The only significant international labor migration within the region is between Rwanda/Burundi, and Uganda; but communications, transport, and trade between Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda is greater than that between any other three Tropical African states.
When viewed as a whole, West Africa has barely progressed beyond the phase of penetration and port concentration. The largest city in every West African state bordering the sea (taking the total population of Lagos to include its immediate suburbs), is a port at the origin of a major penetration line. Moreover, with one minor exception (Togo-Dahomey), none of these cities is connected with any of the others by rail, and only a few are linked by paved roads. Although it seems contradictory, the only characteristic which unifies this region is its fragmentation. Political fragmentation is greater than in any other region, and the degree of redundancy in the circulation system approaches the absurd. One need only glance at a railway map of West Africa to view the evidence: Togo and Dahomey, thin slivers of territory, each with its own north-south railway, flanked by but not connected with additional north-south lines in Ghana and Nigeria; Senegal and Guinea with railway lines curving inland to serve areas which could better be served through Gambia and Sierra Leone (or Liberia) respectively. One could almost sketch the political boundaries of West Africa by using the railway map alone.

Only recently has air transport and telecommunications begun to reduce this fragmentation by promoting interaction across international boundaries. But even today it is impossible to speak realistically of a West African network of circulation. At best, there are national circulation networks which occasionally, as between Senegal and Mali or Ivory Coast and Upper Volta, cross territorial boundaries—yet even these are not extensive and are poorly integrated. It would appear from a map that the transport network in Nigeria is relatively dense. It must be remembered, however, that the population of Nigeria alone is greater than the total population of any one of the other circulation regions discussed and that the already weak circulation of people, goods, and information within Nigeria has been weakened further by the civil war which has engulfed the country since May, 1967.

At a very broad, speculative level, one can perhaps identify at least potential subregional circulation networks. The first would radiate from
Nigeria and its two major ports, Lagos and Port Harcourt. It would include Nigeria, Dahomey, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. The second would revolve around Ghana and Ivory Coast, with Upper Volta, Togo, and possibly parts of Mali and other adjacent states at the periphery, overlapping to some extent the other subregions. Its major focal points are Accra-Tema (Ghana) and Abidjan (Ivory Coast). A third subregion would focus on Dakar and would include the states in and around the Senegal River Basin: Senegal, Mauretania, Gambia, Guinea, Mali, probably Sierra Leone, and possibly Liberia. This is the least populated and least developed of the three, but has great mineral wealth and has shown some signs in recent years of increased interterritorial cooperation.

Although there has been some talk of a West African economic community and some earlier attempts at political federation, it seems quite clear at present that the existing circulation patterns are inadequate even for effective national integration, much less some form of supranational organization. There are unifying forces: Islam, the Niger River, and most important, widespread recognition of the great economic disadvantages of fragmentation. The barriers to communication and transport, however, are so great that there is probably less chance of economic or political unity being achieved in West Africa than in any of the other circulation regions on the continent. But it must be remembered that this is a region of ninety to one hundred million people. The achievement of political unity in Nigeria alone would be as significant in terms of population numbers and ethnic diversity as federation in East Africa or the Congo Basin.

**Nile Basin and Maghrib**

The remaining two circulation regions, one in the Nile Basin and the other in the Maghrib or northwest Africa, will not be discussed here, although their relevance to sub-Saharan Africa cannot be neglected. In particular, there is some rationale for detaching Ethiopia from the Nile region and including it within East Africa. Ethiopia, however, has perhaps the most inadequate circulation system of any African country given its large population size (estimated at over twenty million). More likely, it should be included with those large areas which lie outside any major regional circulatory system.
COMMUNICATIONS THEORY AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION: A PERSPECTIVE

In this essay, communications and transport have been considered together as the major components of circulation systems. The primary focus has been on the growth of new channels for the movement of goods, people, and ideas and the general impact of these developments on traditional circulation systems and contemporary patterns of communications and transport at the continental level. The essay now turns to a more abstract and theoretical examination of circulation in Africa, particularly with respect to the problems of social change and nation-building.

Concepts of Communications Theory

In modern social science theory the term "circulation" is seldom used, while the term "communications" is broadened in scope to include many of the features of circulation systems. But at the same time the emphasis is shifted from structure to process, from pattern to behavior, and from the movement of goods, people, and ideas to the movement of ideas alone. Within this more behavioral approach, the mass media are distinguished from interpersonal communication; the first is highly organized, professionalized, and objectively oriented; the second is informal and even in the most developed countries, dependent on personal contact. Each of these two levels interact as part of the over-all communications system, and the degree to which there is "feedback" between them—the degree to which the formal institutions of mass media and the informal, society-based processes of interpersonal communications are effectively integrated—is considered a key measure of modernization. Feedback, to use an African figure of speech, represents a "two-way, all-weather road" which promotes interdependence and mutual interests between local village life and the controlling powers of the central government.

Communications, in this sense, has assumed an important role in social science research. This development has been stimulated by the extension of the mathematically-framed theoretical formulations of such relatively new
and closely interrelated fields as cybernetics, information theory, and systems analysis into the social sciences in the desire to provide new and more powerful interdisciplinary perspectives on problems of focal interest. Communications research, in short, has emerged as a common ground for cooperation and exchange of ideas between political scientists, sociologists, geographers, and psychologists as well as mathematicians, biologists, and representatives from virtually the full spectrum of academic disciplines.

One of the problems which has received increasing attention in recent years from communication theorists within the social sciences has been political development, particularly the growth of integrated political communities. The literature on political development in Africa suggests the great potential of a communications approach to the subject of the consolidation of nation-states. Modern forms of communication are largely responsible for sparking the processes of change associated with modernization; and many have observed that the success of nation-building in Africa today will depend to an equally large extent on the establishment, acceptance, and maintenance of integrated communications systems incorporating these new forms.

Before examining further the relevance of communications research to nation-building in Africa, some mention must be made of the new terminology which has accompanied its application in the social sciences. Some brief observations and definitions are offered only to supply a very basic working vocabulary for the short discussion which follows. Of particular conceptual importance are the terms "transaction" and "information." A transaction may be defined as an exchange between units which always involves the communication of information and may represent a transfer of peoples, goods, or services. The flow of transaction thus covers much of what is meant by "circulation," although the stress is on the exchange of messages and ideas whether or not this requires, or is associated with, actual physical movements of people or goods. The term "transaction" thus, has a more behavioral connotation than does "circulation" as used in this essay. Meier describes a transaction in the network of human relations as discrete interaction over space, an adjustment to recent events and new opportunities, and a joint experience which accommodates the participants to the changing socio-economic system.
The term "information," likewise, is used in communications theory in a highly specialized way. It can be defined as "amount of order" and refers to that which is not random or uncontrollable and which can therefore convey meaning. It is not simply "news" or "data"—an analysis by Huntley and Brinkley carries information, but so does a purposive wink of the eye. Information is also associated with the capacity to select from a set of alternatives, for it involves knowledge of the physical and human environment and thus the potential for controlling or regulating this environment.

The exchange and preservation of information within a community of people, be it a small-scale ethnic group or a modern nation, provides the integrative glue which enables the community to survive as a cohesive, organized unit. In order to comprehend more fully the problems of nation-building in Africa, therefore, it is essential to examine the structure, content, and flow of information through time and space; for it is this dynamic exchange between component parts of a system that creates the bonds of mutual awareness and interdependence which promote integrative behavior.

**Communications and National Political Integration**

James Coleman has succinctly summarized the relationship between communications and nation-building as follows:

The problem of integration and the building of consensus in Africa's new territorial political systems is largely a problem of developing patterns of communication which transcend, rather than coincide with, prevailing discontinuities and communal divisions.8 Nation-building as defined by Clifford Geertz in Professor Zolberg's essay in this volume, becomes in turn, the aggregation of independently defined, specifically outlined traditional primordial groups into larger, more diffuse units, whose implicit frame of reference is not the local scene but the 'nation'—in the sense of the whole society encompassed by the new civil state.

Most African states are attempting to construct cohesive national communities from an amalgam of smaller scale societies found within the territorial boundaries inherited from the colonial period—an interesting reversal of the Western experience in which, rather than the boundaries defining the nation, national consolidation defined the boundaries. Many of the societies are still bound within traditional communications systems which
control the exchange and preservation of information by its adherents and have only tenuous links with the national transactional network. In other cases, new patterns of information flow have emerged which have solidified human interaction on a transethnic or regional basis, but not on a scale commensurate with the accepted view of the nation by the political leaders of the state.

For perhaps the bulk of the population in most African states, old channels of communication have been radically weakened but nothing sufficiently binding has been substituted for them. The people are fully aware of the national idea, yet they remain ambivalent in the absence of adequately intensive channels of information flow involving them in the emerging national society. But the success of nation-building rests largely on the degree to which effective transactional channels, both mass media and interpersonal, can be established to connect the transitional group (located in status terms, between the more isolated traditional societies, and the educated elites) to the national communications system.

These observations may seem confusing as it was asserted earlier in this essay that the growth of modern circulation systems resulted in a recompartmentalization of Africa into what are today national circulation systems based on the framework of colonial boundaries. The integration of political communities, however, is a multitiered process in which the salient relationships have a different significance at each level of hierarchy. The generalization about national circulatory systems is relevant to supranational integration. The units involved here are states which, during their existence as overseas possessions, evolved a certain degree of identity within their borders but failed to develop sufficient levels of interconnectivity and interdependence to sustain political federation after independence. The component parts were—and essentially still are—too inwardly focused to link together as part of an integrated larger scale organization.

At the national level, however, the next stage down the hierarchy, the pattern is basically the same although the units involved differ. Referring back to Coleman's observation, the central problem in nation-building is to
create and solidify communications systems which extend beyond subnational communities. In all cases, the challenge is not to destroy completely the next lower order of system, but to develop new ones in which information can be systematically exchanged and preserved; in which the flow of transactions reflects the requirements and social structure of a modern achievement-oriented society; and in which efficient feedback is maintained between the higher order mass media and informal opinion leaders at the local level.

Communications and Modern Ethnicity

The communications problems created at the national level, however, have been made more prominent for two main reasons. First, the nation is still the dominant organizational unit in world politics, the depository of sovereignty and, by definition the primary controller of the functions of its internal political system. Secondly, whereas the barriers between states are largely by-products of modern communications, administration, and political behavior, the pronounced discontinuities within a national state are often further intensified by ethnic identities and loyalties.

Ethnic boundaries continue to present formidable barriers to national integration not only because of the persistence of traditional communications systems, but also due to the way in which traditional ethnicity was transformed during the colonial period. Colonial contact, as previously mentioned, worked effectively to expand the scale of contacts for the African individual. At the local level, he came to interact with a larger population than ever before. This increase in scale, however, was powerfully shaped both by the cultural characteristics of the individual and, particularly in former British colonies where some form of indirect rule was practiced, by the administrative policy of the colonial power.

In cases where ethnicity was reinforced by language similarity, the boundaries of ethnic identity were often redefined to include all people who spoke mutually understandable languages. Where community allegiance was formerly extremely localized—perhaps mainly to the clan or lineage—it soon came to encompass a larger unit, often called the "tribe." People such as the Ewe in West Africa and the Kikuyu in East Africa became effectively consolidated as an ethnic unit primarily during the colonial period. Prior
to this time, they rarely acted together as a unit. (For a further discussion of the concept of "tribe", see the essay by Cohen in this volume).

Changing boundaries of ethnicity was not a new phenomenon for traditional African society. Groups were appearing and disappearing, mixing, blending, and breaking off in response to both internal and external stimuli throughout African history. During the colonial period, just as in the past, African traditional society often readjusted itself in reaction to forces of change. When increased size appeared to be an effective measure of influence within the colonial context, many African societies undertook scale-expanding developments in communication to consolidate into larger ethnic groupings.

The Baluhya of Kenya, for example, are considered today as a single ethnic group of over one million members. But prior to 1900, the people who eventually composed the Baluhya constituted many smaller communities which, although having some cultural and linguistic affinities, were essentially dissimilar in much of their social, economic, and political life. Some were largely pastoral, others almost entirely agricultural. Even physically there were great differences and intercommunity warfare was not uncommon. Many of these divisions persist today, but there is no doubt that in the period since 1900, a Baluhya identity emerged which had never existed before.

Similar extensions of ethnic identity (within the restrictions of broad cultural similarities) took place throughout Africa. Moreover, many of these changes were stimulated and/or solidified by the superimposed structure of colonial administration, especially when efforts were made to draw internal boundaries which reflected ethnic patterns as perceived by the colonial government. The most immediate effect in these cases was the strengthening of broad ethnic identities without the concurrent context of interethnic communications development. The roots of what is called "tribalism" in Africa today probably lie more in this coincidence between the superimposed boundaries of modern communications and administrative subsystems and those of transformed community identity than in any set of traditional ethnic differences existing before colonialism.
The new patterns of ethnicity are particularly troublesome with respect to the articulation between the nationally organized sector of the communications system and the local opinion leaders who more directly reflect the feelings of the population mass. Ethnic interests in most African countries dominate the flow of information not only on local issues, where they are perhaps most relevant, but also on issues of national importance and in the national mass media as well. What feedback does exist between the two levels of the communications system is very often fragmented into frequently antagonistic ethnic subdivisions.

Communications and Urban Concentration

Another factor which has affected the consolidation of nation-states in Africa is the concentration of development within small areas, particularly in the major urban centers. This phenomenon was discussed earlier with respect to the growth of modern circulation systems and can be illustrated further with examples from nearly every African country. The city of Nairobi, for instance, contains only 4 per cent of the total population of Kenya, yet has at least half of its total urban population, postal traffic, radio and television sets, newspaper circulation, and telephones. About 17 per cent of the African labor force is employed in Nairobi, but more significantly they receive almost 30 per cent of all African wages in Kenya. Nairobi is the headquarters for over one-third of the registered political organizations and the origin or destination for a disproportionate share of railway, road, air, and telephone traffic in the country. If just a handful of other urban areas are added to Nairobi, they would together account for nearly all the transactions within the more modernized sector of the national communications system.9

The situation in most other African countries is not radically different from that in Kenya. Not only is there inadequate articulation between the national mass media and local communications from the societal perspective, there is also insufficient interaction between the elite and the masses from the geographical point of view. Although interurban linkages may be relatively well developed, rural-urban interaction is usually very weak, unstructured, and inefficient. This is an extremely important problem, for national
political integration must depend on the urban system to act as a transmitter in the flow of communications between all segments of the national society: the elite and the mass, the traditional and the modern, the local and the national. This will not be possible in most African countries until more effective means for disseminating information from these focal centers are established. The continued accretion of development in a few small areas, without the accompaniment of "spread-effects" to the rest of the population, can only work against the long term aims of nation-building.

CONCLUSION: THE CHALLENGE OF COMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH

A concern with communications has become a point of convergence for the several disciplines which have an interest in the process of nation-building and social change in Africa. But this communications approach to national consolidation is still in its initial stages. Its great potential, however, is already evident, and there is little doubt that in the near future many of the generalizations suggested in this essay will be supported, or refuted, by more empirical evidence and quantitative data than are currently available.

The following statement by Professor Lucian Pye, one of the leading proponents of communications research, supplies a stimulating challenge to all social scientists interested in the patterns and processes of change which characterize contemporary Africa:

Communications is the web of human society. The structure of a communication system with its more or less well-defined channels is in a sense the skeleton of the social body which envelops it. The content of communications is of course the very substance of human intercourse. The flow of communications determines the direction and the pace of dynamic social development. Hence it is possible to analyze all social processes in the terms of structure, content, and flow of communications.
NOTES


3. It is recommended that a reader unfamiliar with these place-names and those which follow refer to a map or atlas. Two good and relatively inexpensive atlases are Phillips' *Modern College Atlas* (London: George Philip and Son, 1966 edition) and the *Oxford Regional Economic Atlas of Africa* compiled by P. E. Adee (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965).

4. The broad outlines of these circulation regions are based on a map of transport regions in Africa included in *Africa: Maps and Statistics*, published by the Africa Institute in the Republic of South Africa, Pretoria, IV (April, 1963) p. 55.


6. A further elaboration of this discussion, as well as a list of suggested references for further reading, can be found in Edward W. Soja, "Communications and Territorial Integration in East Africa: An Introduction to Transaction Flow Analysis," *East Lakes Geographer* (forthcoming, 1968).


IV

CONSOLIDATION OF NATION-STATES

16 AFRICAN CONCEPTS OF NATIONHOOD
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AFRICAN CONCEPTS OF NATIONHOOD

John Paden

In the European context, the term "nationalism" usually refers to those movements, feelings, and ideologies which demand that the basic political boundaries and identities of a people be contained within the framework of a sovereign state. The notion of "sovereignty" which has emerged in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries reflects an international system wherein states are accorded complete autonomy on internal matters, legal equality and inviolability within the external (or international) context, and some precise delimitation of territoriality.

A sovereign state may or may not be based on a single national identity. If it is, we refer to it as a "nation-state." A sovereign state which comprises several "nationalities" may be referred to as a "multinational" state. The idea of "nation" refers to a people, or volk, who regard themselves as sharing common values and goals, as sharing a common history and a common future, and as somehow being distinguishable in various ways from other peoples. Within the European context, the characteristics which have been used most frequently to distinguish different peoples have included the following: language, culture, proximity (or territorial identification), religion, political system, and economic interdependence. While none of these characteristics are necessarily essential to the consolidation of a nation-state, some combination of these factors is usually present.

The concept of a people sharing common values and a common identity clearly relates the issue of nationality (and nationalism) to the issue of "ethnicity." Ethnicity may be regarded as communal (as opposed to
associational) loyalty or identity, and is usually accompanied by the claim of "kinship" or "common origin" (real or assumed). The notion of ethnicity, however, does not necessarily require political independence, sovereignty, or territoriality. Ethnic groups, such as the Bakongo (Congo-Kinshasa) or Tswana (Botswana), which have petitioned for separate political status may be said to express "ethnic nationalism." The distinction between ethnic group and nationality group, as van den Berghe points out in his essay, is partly a matter of preference. In general usage, however, an ethnic group often refers to a smaller scale unit than a nationality group. Ethnic groups also emphasize "kinship," a notion which may be transmuted in various ways in the concept of "nationality".

Nationalism need not preclude certain types of subnational loyalty, either in the nation-state context or in those cases of the multinational state where a sufficient commonality of interest reinforces the legitimacy of the national state (rather than the component nationalities) as the seat of sovereignty. Peoples usually have multiple identities or loyalties, each relative to different needs or situations. Thus, for example, within Germany, the Bavarians and Prussians (peoples associated with specific geographical regions, religions, and cultures) are significant subnational identity groups; but only if these peoples had demanded secession from the "nation-state" of Germany would we regard them as nationalisms in the fullest sense.

A conceptual category which relates the notion of nationality to that of sovereignty is the notion of "irredentism." This would occur if an international (or sovereign-state) boundary divided a people or nation and the members of this nation were dissatisfied or frustrated enough to actively demand "reunion." An irredentist movement usually originates with a minority group resident in a state neighboring their "homeland" state. Examples would include the Turks in Cyprus, the Ewe in Ghana, or the French in Alsace-Lorraine between 1870 and 1914.

In trying to explain how national identity emerges, a major branch of theory concentrates on definition by reference to the external context; a "we" group, for instance, is distinguished from a "they" group which is
usually in relative proximity. Thus, to a certain extent, Polish nationalism emerged as a response to the existence of Russians along an eastern border and Germans along a western border. Since nationality is ultimately a matter of social definition rather than objective definition, the selfascriptive identity process and the external-ascriptive process are always interrelated. The question as to what constitutes a "German," "Polish," or "Russian," will vary with the time context, the spatial context and with a variety of subjective perceptions. This process is clearly illustrated when members of these European groups migrated to America where new (usually more general) categories of national identities were ascribed to them.

Another major process in the emergence of national identity is the extension of loyalties from smaller to larger scale units. Thus, the city-states of the Italian peninsula began to coalesce in the late nineteenth century into what finally emerged as "Italy." In cases where multinational empires have broken up, as with the Hapsburg Empire in Europe and the Turkish Ottoman Empire after World War I, and with the various colonial empires after World War II, the resultant components may regroup themselves into units smaller than the original empire, but larger than the individual components. Thus Yugoslavia was formed after World War I from several peoples, such as the Croats, Serbs, Macedonians, Slovenes, and Montenegrins.

In summary, the necessary elements in nationalism would seem to include the following: demand for political independence (sovereignty), reinforcement of external boundary differentiation, and an internal commonality of interest and ascriptive identity. Usually there is some attempt at intellectual, or ideological, justification of these elements.

THE SCOPE OF AFRICAN NATIONALISM

Three stages of nationalism accompanied the emergence of African states from colonial rule. These included the early proto-nationalistic phenomena, the drive to independence, and the postindependence efforts at nation building. This latter process will be discussed in the essay by Zolberg.
Proto-nationalism

The idea of African proto-nationalism has been developed in recent years as a category for discussing phenomena related to demands for political autonomy (as opposed to sovereignty) in the period prior to the organization of African nationalist movements. In most African states this generally occurred in the time period from 1900 to 1935. The distinguishing feature of this phenomenon would be the active rejection of the legitimacy and effectuation of alien rule. Three major manifestations of proto-nationalism have been resistance movements, rebellions, and individual protests.

Resistance movements usually occurred at the time of colonial conquest. Thus, the Fulani battle at Burmi (Northern Nigeria) in 1903 was a clear effort to resist alien (British) rule. Likewise, the Ashanti wars of 1899, or the Islamic wars of Samory Touré were in a similar category.

Rebellions, or revolts, usually occurred shortly after the occupation of an area. They constitute early attempts to throw off alien rule once such rule had been established. Examples would include the Maji Maji Rebellion (Tanzania) against the rule of the Germans and the Zulu Rebellion (South Africa) against the Afrikaners in 1906.

Individual protest movements have taken a variety of forms. Frequently they involved leaders from the African Christian churches such as John Chilembwe of Malawi, who, in Nat Turner style, was willing to "strike a blow and die." Other protestors were leaders of nascent labor unions (as in the Copperbelt) or of ethnic voluntary associations (such as Harry Thuku of Kenya) who were willing to go to jail for petitioning against heavy taxation, poor work conditions, and land alienation. Nationalist literature of a later period has accorded these men both a real and a symbolic role in the independence movements.

The Independence Movements

African nationalism can be clearly identified in the period 1945 to 1960. Beginning in the late thirties, urban organizations began to emerge, often drawing on the new Western-educated professional and skilled classes. These organizations raised the issue of increasing African participation
in the civil service, administration, government, and the modern economic sector. An example of such an organization would be the Lagos Youth Movement (Nigeria), founded in 1934, which later became the springboard for nationalist leaders such as Nnamdi Azikiwe.

During World War II the African colonies provided manpower and staging bases for the Allies, especially in the North African campaigns against Italy and Germany. In return for this assistance, major reforms had been promised to the Africans by France and Britain. But as a result of the war the myth of European infallibility was broken; and the universalistic concepts of freedom, democracy, and justice, which had been part of the rhetoric of the Allied confrontation with fascism, were interpreted by the educated class of Africans as applicable within the African context.

With regard to this question of principles and values, Professor Hodgkin comments on the political vocabulary of early African nationalists.

The theoretical weapons with which African nationalists make their revolutions have been largely borrowed from the armouries of the metropolitan countries. Much of the political thinking of contemporary African leaders is bound to be derivative. They are themselves the products of European schools and universities. They are asserting claims of a kind that have already been asserted by Europeans, around which a European sacred literature has been built up. And they have to state their case in a language that will be intelligible to their European rulers. Three strains of western thought stand out: 1. the Christian idea of human brotherhood and the specifically Protestant conception of an "Elect"; 2. the traditional democratic belief in the "right to choose our own governors"; 3. the Socialist (not necessarily Marxian) conception of a society in which economic exploitation, poverty and unemployment are abolished.

Within a brief postwar period of approximately fifteen years, African political parties were formed, self-government was demanded, and independence was won in most African states. The speed of change does not mean that the task was easy. In almost every case, the colonial power offered major resistance of some sort. It is a tribute to the organizational skill, and often charismatic inspiration, of the pre-independence African nationalists that they were able to mobilize enough support to enforce their demands and to do so, in nearly all cases, without resort to violence.
Nationalism and Supranationalism

The territorial units within which the nationalist movements developed were, for the most part, the colonial units. During the pre-independence nationalist period, however, a matter of considerable debate among nationalist leaders was the question of the most appropriate boundaries for future nation-states in Africa. In a few cases, it was suggested that units smaller than the existing colonial units, consisting primarily of ethnic nationalities, be the basis of nationhood in Africa. In most cases, however, the idea of using ethnic nationalities as a basis for future nationhood was rejected by the elites in favor of political groupings which were larger than the existing colonial units. The arbitrary nature of the inherited colonial boundaries mitigated against the acceptability of these boundaries to nationalist leaders who were intent on promoting a new order of things. But the subjective, acquired identities of the peoples comprising the former colonies as well as objective factors such as the intra-colonial structure of communications systems tended to reinforce the originally arbitrary boundaries, and the viability of the former colonial boundaries has been stronger than had been anticipated. As Professor Zolberg points out in his essay, in the immediate postcolonial "nation-building" period the major source of national unity in almost every case turned out to be the legacy of the nationalist party of the independence movement.

Yet certain pre-independence concepts of nationalism extended beyond the superimposed framework of colonial boundaries associated with the inherited national state systems. It may be that when the birth pains of the new African states have lessened, the reservoir of ideas generated in the pre-independence period will regain importance in the future of African nationalism.

In this essay, we will identify six categories of nationalism which posit emergent communities larger than the existing, or inherited, states of Africa. It is recognized that there exist categories of nationalism proposing political communities, either larger or smaller than the existing states, which are based on various types of traditional or existing loyalties.
most important of these would be ethnic nationalisms (in the case of large groups of people such as the Fulani or Hausa or Ibo) or religious nationalisms (which would include religious denominations, both Christian, as in Ethiopia, and Islamic, as in Mauritania, Morocco, or the Somali Republic). We will be examining here, however, only the large scale territorially or ideologically based political nationalisms.2

The six "suprastate" identity groups which will be considered in this essay reflect the range of thought of African leaders during the pre-independence period. They may ultimately be regarded as the unique dimension of African nationalism, for African nationalism has been concerned primarily with the appropriateness of alternative criteria of "external differentiation." Many of the examples cited in this essay will be drawn from French-speaking Africa; counterpart examples do exist in English-speaking Africa, but francophone Africa is perhaps less well known to American students, and it more than adequately illustrates the range of African concepts regarding nationalism. The six categories to be discussed include: Eur-Africanism, Marxism-socialism, negritude, Pan-Africanism, Third-Worldism, and African regionalism.

THE IDEA OF A EUROPEAN-AFRICAN COMMUNITY

Under the Fourth French Republic (1946-58) France governed its colonies and territories through an organization called the French Union, which was made up of Metropolitan France (including Algeria and Corsica), the Overseas Departments, the Overseas Territories, and the Associated Territories. But in 1958, with the inception of the Fifth French Republic, the French Union was replaced by a new governmental system called the French Community. The French Community was designed to provide for the continuing political and economic association of the African member-states with Metropolitan France and the remaining Overseas Departments and Territories.

Prior to 1958, many African deputies to the French National Assembly found ideological, as well as political and economic, justification for the continuing relationship with France through the proposed multinational French Community. In July, 1957, Houphouet-Boigny, of Ivory Coast, outlined
this position. He is quoted below at length (with underlines added), to illustrate the major elements of this argument.

"I think I have the right to consider myself the authentic spokesman of millions of African men and women who have chosen, in preference to the type of independence just acquired by the neighboring state of Ghana, a Franco-African community founded on liberty, equality, and fraternity.

"In considering where the real interests of the colored peoples of the French territories in Africa lie, we do not begin with a blank slate. The relations which prevail between Frenchmen of the mother country and Frenchmen of Africa already exist in an historical complex of events lived in common, in which good and bad memories mingle...As a preliminary, we must remove the aura which the concept of independence holds in our imaginations. Why do we not demand independence? To answer this question, I can only ask another: \textbf{What is independence?} Industrial and technical revolutions are making peoples more and more dependent on one another... What countries are self-sufficient? Not even the United States. Indeed, the countries of Europe in the Coal and Steel Community, in Euratom and in the Common Market are prepared to relinquish a part of their sovereignty, that is to say, a part of their national independence. Why, if not to bring about, by association and mutual aid, a more fully elaborated form of civilization which is more advantageous for their peoples and which transcends a nationalism that is too cramped, too dogmatic and by now out of date?

"We know what France asks of us—-to share in her institutions and to share in them as equals. The right of citizenship has been granted without restriction to all the inhabitants of the French Union, and all the electors, whatever their origin, are gathered in a single college... Territorial assemblies are endowed with broad deliberative powers allowing them to adopt autonomous laws distinct from legislation which applies to the mother country. They have an executive responsible to them, to whom is entrusted the direction of territorial affairs with the exception of foreign relations, defense and security, which remain in the hands of the central power. It is in some degree self-government, but it maintains essential links with the Republic, and is not without analogy to the federal structure of the United States of America. What makes it certainly unique however, among various relationships that have existed in modern times between a mother country and its dependencies, is the participation of overseas populations in the central government of the Republic... We feel at home in it /the French Union/. We participate in family discussions. Nothing is hidden from us—neither hopes nor dangers. How could we better preserve the interests of the Negro people who for so many years have put their confidence in us again and again? It is this awareness of a comprehensive
inter-dependence of mutual interests which has permitted the creation of a Franco-African community based on equality. It is expressed by autonomy in the management of local affairs and intimate association in the management of the general interests of the Republic.

"The presence of the French in Africa is the result of military conquests or of peaceful penetration which go back to the end of the last century. France has suppressed slavery wherever it existed and has put an end to the quarrels which set different ethnic groups against one another; it has given its education to the African masses and its culture to an elite; . . . In French ranks, in turn, we have poured our blood on the battle fields for the defense of liberty, and we have won a place in the history of France and of the Free World. We do not want to abandon this recent heritage by going back to our origins.

"In a world where interdependence has become the supreme rule, outbreaks of fanaticism and nationalism accomplish nothing and run the risk of merely increasing misery.

"It is important that the Franco-African community--egalitarian, humane, and fraternal--appear to all nations not only as an example to be emulated but also as an element of international stability on which a sure future can be built.

"In our view, that community is an act of faith in this future, also an act of human solidarity. It enables us to bring our stone to the world edifice without losing either our national identity or the French citizenship which we have earned an' acquired worthily."3

In short, Houphouet-Boigny suggested that the purposes of a Franco-African community would be to insure the economic and social interests of the black peoples of Africa, and to further a civilization drawn from the best of both African and French culture. He deplored nationalism as a means to these ends and was prepared to relinquish elements of sovereignty in favor of an interdependence which would be in the "true" interests of both France and Africa. The African, according to Houphouet-Boigny, has found himself at a unique stage in history--one in which the notion of "nation-state" was losing its significance. Hence the African nationalists should bypass the "nation-state epoch" in the interests of more rational groupings of peoples. The objections which were raised against this Eur-African concept generally focused on the need to establish a national identity prior to merging of identity into more extended forms of association.
During the Fifth Republic referendum in 1958, French African colonies were given the option of becoming member states in the French Community (Communauté) as individual units or as a federal unit. None favored the federal alternative. In each case, except Guinea (which opted for complete independence), the territorial assemblies became legislative assemblies and the executive councils became national governments. Article 86 of the Fifth Republic Constitution allowed member states to opt for complete independence at a later date (which all eventually did). Thus, initially greater autonomy and identity were accorded to each unit within the French Community. The actual division of powers in the Community, however, was not markedly different from that of the former French Union. The African legislatures were still precluded from full control over foreign policy and defense, economic and financial policy, general organization of external and common transport and telecommunications, higher education, and justice. Furthermore, the "overseas" states of the Community did not have treaty-making powers. Ironically, the remaining ("residual") powers in the African states were made to look like sovereignty itself.

In its essentials, the Community was a federal scheme in which one of the federating units (France) predominated, but in which the federal authority did not extend to the local affairs of the federating units, each of which considered itself to be a "republic." The President of the Community was the President of the French Republic (Charles de Gaulle), the Executive Council consisted of thirteen prime ministers, and the Senate was composed of 284 delegates elected by the respective assemblies (Metropolitan France had 186 of these delegates).

Today the French Community has been modified beyond recognition. This process of transformation began in December, 1959, when the Mali Federation (consisting of Senegal and Mali) inquired whether it could opt for complete independence and still remain in the Community. Nevertheless the rationale for a commonwealth type of community (that is, primarily an economic and cultural association rather than a strong political association) continues to be essentially that which was outlined earlier by Houphouet-Boigny. Such a conception of "nation" and "multination" is still implicit in much of the economic planning in French-speaking Africa.
THE IDEA OF A MARXIST-SOCIALIST COMMUNITY

The idea of the solidarity of working-class elements in all sovereign states had long been a prime tenet both in European socialism and Soviet Communism. Partly because of the "working-class" status of most farmers and laborers in the African context, and partly because of the wartime alliances between the French Communist Party (CPF) and other resistance elements in France (including de Gaulle), the immediate postwar period was one of considerable rapport between the CPF and many French-speaking African leaders.

In July, 1948, however, French Communist leader Raymond Barbe sent a letter to the various African Communist Study Groups warning them against ideological nationalism, and urging that they stress instead the idea of class struggle. The African reaction to this policy position was largely negative. The major break in relations, however, occurred in 1950, when the Trans-National West African Party, Rassemblement Democratique Africain (RDA) severed its connections with the French Communist Party.

At about this same time in North Africa, a similar break was beginning to occur, largely as a result of French Communist support for the French government position against the nationalists in Algeria. In 1954, the Algerian National Movement had taken control of the labor unions and had warned the workers against divided loyalties. Aimé Césaire, a leading West Indian black nationalist (and poet) summarized this disenchantment in his 1956 letter of resignation to Maurice Thorez, Secretary General of the French Communist Party:

The colonial question cannot be treated as a subsidiary part of some more important global matter, as a part over which others can patch up compromises . . . . Here it is clear that I am alluding to the French Communist Party vote on Algeria, the vote by which the Party granted the Guy Mollet-Lacoste government full powers for its North African policy. In any case, it is patently established that our nationalism, the struggle of coloured peoples against racism, is much more complex, indeed, it is of totally different nature than the struggle of the French workers against French capitalism . . . . I think I have said enough to make it plain that it is neither Marxism nor Communism I repudiate; the use certain people have made of Marxism and Communism is what I
condemn. What I want is that Marxism and Communism be harnessed into the service of coloured peoples, and not coloured peoples into the service of Marxism. . . . There will never be any African communism because the French Communist Party conceives its duties towards colonial peoples in terms of a tutorship to be exercised, and because the French communists' very anti-colonialism yet bears the stigmata of the colonialism they are combatting.  

Conversely it became clear to French communists that some types of nationalist leaders in Africa might be opposed to "international proletarian" interests. Stalin had anticipated this confrontation:

The revolutionary nature of the national movement does not necessarily imply the existence of proletarian elements in the movement, the existence of a revolutionary basis for the movement.  

The case of the Tunisian labor movement bore out this suspicion, for the General Union of Tunisian Labor (UGTT) became associated with the conservative Neo-Destour Party. Subsequently the Tunisian labor movement was denied affiliation in the communist-led World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU).

The estrangement between African labor movements and European communists continued to the point where eventually most of the African unions disaffiliated from the WFTU. Under the leadership of Sekou Touré of Guinea, most of the French-speaking West African unions regrouped into the General Union of Labor in Black Africa (UGTAN).

Yet the values and identities of Marxism-socialism continued to serve as a potential basis of community and political grouping. Much of the vocabulary of nationalist protest, especially that directed against colonial political and economic systems, continued to be phrased in Marxist-socialist terms. This terminology frequently lost much of its precise meaning and was increasingly adapted to African problems and conditions. Thus, for example, when the leader of the conservative opposition party in Ghana, J. B. Danquah, claimed to be a "socialist liberal" it was apparent that the concept of socialism was being used more in a symbolic sense than as a basis for any particular political community.

In retrospect, there seem to have been three categories of persons in Africa during the pre-independence period who identified themselves as Marxist-socialist: a) a small assortment of "neo-Stalinists," who faded
in importance after 1956; b) a variety of former communist trade unionists (CGT), who had renounced ties with European communism but still espoused a revolutionary class struggle in Africa; c) an increasing number of African leaders who counted Marx as one of their spiritual fathers but aligned themselves with an emergent notion of "Afro-socialism." These three groups will be considered in more detail below.

Neo-Stalinism

Brief mention must be made of Soviet theories of African nationhood current in the early postwar period. Stalin had laid the framework by writing:

A nation is an historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture. . . . The nation is not a racial or tribal, but an historically constituted community of people.  

Within French-speaking Africa, there was probably only one group which approximated a neo-Stalinist position regarding African "nationhood": the African Party of Independence (PAI). This group was formed in Dakar in 1956 after the institution of the Loi Cadre. The PAI espoused "scientific socialism" and sought to enlist the support of the urban proletariat of Dakar and Saint Louis. Its leadership included students, teachers, chemists, dentists, and other white-collar workers. The Secretary-General of the PAI, Majhemout Diop, was a Dakar bookseller who had spent several years in Eastern Europe as a member of the Secretariat of the International Union of Students. His writings tried to reconcile Marxism-Leninism to the African situation. The result might be interpreted as a sort of neo-Stalinism, at least on the question of nationalities. A major work by Diop in 1958 summarized this position on "The National Question":

In Black Africa there does not exist a single nation, but several are certainly in formation. . . . The non-existence, however, of nations, or of a single Black African Nation, does not mitigate our claims for freedom . . . . In the world today, there exist multi-national states, including the most powerful of states such as the Soviet Union. There are several types of nations. The Socialist nations are the consequence of socialist revolutions, while bourgeois nations appear with capitalism and die with it.
Just as Marxists are not for the negation of the nation, they are against all national political egoism, which tends to overestimate the interests of one nation to the detriment of others. To the nationalism of the bourgeoisie we propose international proletarianism. . . . Proletarian nations have their right to freedom. Lenin has said "Complete equality of nations and the union of workers of all nations is the national program assigned to the workers of Marxism." Stalin has written: "The countries of the Soviet consider that each nation, large or small has particular qualities or specific characteristics not found in other nations. It is these particularities of each nation which constitute the culture of the world . . . no nation is more important than another." 7

With regard to the equality of nations, and the definition of nationhood, Diop is quite clear, yet at no point does he focus his analysis on the characteristics of the nation or nations in Africa. Speaking only in general terms regarding "the future of nations," Diop offers a dialectic of historical development:

Marxism affirms that the disparity between nations will only be overcome after a long period. All during this period, nations will be born and develop themselves, others will fuse. Yet still it is necessary that nations first be bourgeois and then be transformed into socialist nations. 8

The rejoinder to this notion of nationhood and dialectic of history was expressed most forcefully by Aimé Césaire:

We are offered solidarities with the people of France; with the French proletariat, and, via communism, with all the world's proletariats. I don't make light of these solidarities, I don't deny them. But I don't want to see them blown up into metaphysics. There are no allies thrust upon us by place, by the moment, by the nature of things. But if our alliance with the French proletariat bars us from contracting any other, if it tends to make us forget or retreat from other necessary and natural, rightful and fertile alliances, if communism pillages our most vivifying friendships, wastes the bond that weds us to West Indian islands, the tie that makes us Africa's child, then I say that communism has served us ill in having us swap a living brotherhood for what looks to have the features of the coldest of all chill abstractions. . . . 9

The plea for Africanization of ideology came to characterize most of the remaining African Marxists. Yet even this group was divided over the issue of class formation and class struggle in African society.
Class-Struggle Afro-Marxists

The position of "Afro-Marxists" incorporated fierce nationalism and Pan-Africanism with an insistence on Marxist tools of class-analysis. It is illustrated by trade unionists such as Diallo Seydou. Implicit concepts of the nation in much of this writing focus on a unified Africa consisting of peasants and workers, and led by a vanguard of "workers" and "intellectuals." This group of nationalist thinkers was increasingly undermined by the political elites of the new African states, who regarded class struggle theory as a threat to stability.

African Socialism

African socialism was a strong influence on nationalist thought in both the colonial and postcolonial periods. It may be illustrated from the writings of President Senghor of Senegal. Senghor was especially concerned with what he considered to be the alienation of modern Africa from its source of values. In interpreting Marx, Senghor regarded him primarily as a sociologist of alienation. But economic alienation was closely related, for Senghor, to spiritual and cultural alienation. Thus, writing in 1959:

"Socialism means return to original sources... Can we integrate Negro African cultural values, especially religious values, into socialism? Yes..."

"The Atheism of Marx can be considered as a reaction of Christian origin against the historical deviations of Christianity. It impaired the essence of religion all the less because the idea of alienation is of religious origin. We find the equivalent of this in Mohammedanism..."

"Negro African philosophy, like socialist philosophy, is existentialist and humanistic, but it integrates spiritual values."

In a sense Senghor re-echoed the romantic chords of Rousseauian protest against the industrial disruption of "the natural harmony" of men and things, the moral disruption, the alienation from meaning and roots--alienations which characterize a society in the transitional process of modernization. The values to be restored would form the basis of political community.
Senghor specifically challenged the "class-struggle" Marxists on a number of points. He was insistent that the moral community was not to be found either in the division of society into classes or in the totalitarian state system of the communist countries.

First, the class struggle is more complex than Marx thought. Second, Marx was wrong on peasant theory. He was also wrong on theory of capitalist concentration. He was wrong on periodic economic crises in capitalist countries. Furthermore, in the Communist countries, the "dictatorship of the proletariat," contrary to the teachings of Marx, has made the state an omnipotent, soulless monster, has stifled the natural freedoms of the human being, and has dried up the sources of art, without which life is not worth living.11

To Senghor, the "state" should be a moral agent whose purpose and function is to overcome all forms of alienation. Cultural and spiritual matters are included in these functions. The purpose of the state is to promote or restore the moral autonomy of people. Just as the proletariat of the nineteenth century "were estranged from humanity, the colonized people of the twentieth century, coloured peoples, are even more estranged, and similarly alienated."12 The peoples with which Senghor was most concerned were those of Black Africa, whom he regarded as a potential nation which could be brought into being through the actions of the state. "The state is the expression of the nation: it is primarily a means of realizing the nation."13 This process of cultural reassertion was at the heart of Senghor's nationalism. Senghor would both make a nation out of African peoples and find a nation in Negro values. "We must assure a cultural base for the future Nation, by defining essential characteristics of traditional Negro African Civilization which, blending with European and French contributions, will undergo a renaissance."14

NEGRITUDE AND NATIONHOOD

Senghor based his notion of African nationhood on the assumption that there is a commonality of values characteristic of traditional Black Africa. This conceptual category of nationalism with its racial parameter was known as "negritude" (la négritude). Within this category, three distinct varieties seem to emerge which are relevant to our discussion of nationalism:
a) the general espousal of Black African values and personalities; b) the assertion that black skin color is in itself a positive thing; and c) the assertion that black people everywhere share a common soul (or subconscious).

**Black African Values**

In the first instance, negritude was a political and cultural assertion by Africans in Paris that assimilation into French culture was absurd and that Negro-African values could make a positive contribution to universal civilization and at the same time provide a means of personal identification for the intellectuals involved. The black populations of the French West Indies (for example, Guadeloupe and Martinique) also participated in this reaction against French assimilation. In fact, it was to a West Indian, Aimé Césaire, whose poem, *Cahier d'un Retour au Pays Natale* (written in 1939) set the scene for the postwar literary movement of negritude as outlined by Professor Cartey in his essay. This literary movement included a number of writers and poets who were also nationalists, including Rabemanjara of Madagascar; Senghor, and Birago and David Diop of Senegal; Roumain of Haiti; Tirolien and Paul Niger of Guadeloupe; and Leon Dalmas of Guiana. Their rejection of assimilation was based on the disillusioning experiences of Black people in Metropolitan France.

Later, certain English-speaking intellectuals joined at least peripherally in the movement. The American writer, James Baldwin, who attended the First Congress of Black Writers and Artists held at the Sorbonne (Paris) in 1956, summarized the mood and consensus of the assembly as follows:

... it became clear as the debates wore on, that there was something which all black men held in common, something which cut across opposing points of view, and placed in the same context their widely dissimilar experience. What they held in common was their precarious, their unutterably painful relation to the white world. What they held in common was the necessity to remake the world in their own image, to impose this image on the world, and no longer be controlled by the vision of the world... What, in sum, black men held in common was their ache to come into the world as men. And this ache united people who might otherwise have been divided as to what a man should be. 15

By the time of the Second Congress of Black Writers and Artists (Rome) in 1959, the emphasis had shifted from a simple rejection of white culture,
to the issue of the "responsibilities" of Black intellectuals in aiding the "rediscovery" of African culture.

Black Skin Color

The second conception of negritude as a basis for group identity had little to do with cultural values or the notion of a return to the "homeland." It is concerned with the dignity of black skin coloring. It asserts that "Black is beautiful," without trying to justify an elaborate set of common cultural values. This type of assertion tends to emerge only in a biracial context and has been less characteristic of French-speaking Africa than in Brazil, for instance. In fact, negritude as defined by skin color, became a form of Brazilian subnationalism. It was initiated in Latin American literary circles as a reaction against the claims of "mulattoism"--that is, the assertion that it was good to be neither black nor white, but brown. (It will be noted that other Afro-American movements in Brazil incorporate the cultural-values argument. Thus, religious sects called Candombles Sangoes formed a Federation of African sects which sends members to Nigeria to be initiated into Yoruba religious associations.)

Black Soul

The third variety of negritude related to group identity would assert that Black people throughout the world share a subconscious experience which distinguishes them from other men. This is more than a rejection of oppression, or a reassertion of African cultural values, or a pride in black skin coloring. It was a view of culture not as a product of environment, or a learned set of behavior traits, but as a genetic inheritance, less on a level of conscious thought and behavior than on a subconscious level. Senghor has elaborated this view in combination with the two other classes of negritude mentioned above. Thus (underlines added):

We could assimilate mathematics or the French language, but we could not strip off our black skins nor root out our black souls. And so we set out on a fervent quest for the Holy Grail: our Collective Soul. And we came upon it . . . Negritude is the whole complex of civilized values--cultural, economic, social and political--which characterize the black peoples. . . . All these values are essentially informed by intuitive reason. . . . This sentient reason . . . expresses itself emotionally through self-surrender, coalescence of subject and object;
through myths, by which I mean the archetypal images of the collective soul; above all through primordial rhythms, synchronised with those of the Cosmos... In other words, the sense of communion, the gift of myth-making, the gift of rhythm, such are the essential elements of Negritude, which you will find indelibly stamped on all the work and activities of black men.16

Senghor has on occasion attempted to demonstrate that the writings of Black Americans, such as Richard Wright, manifest not only the force vitale of the African but even the specific forms of expression. He argues that "collective soul" is transmitted by heredity and that the cultural manifestations of Black soul are transmitted in like manner. Thus:

As certain biologists point out, the psychological mutations brought about by education are incorporated in genes, and are then transmitted by heredity. Hence the major role played by culture.17

Although the scientific basis of this assertion is questioned by modern geneticists, in a way, Senghor's argument rests less on whether temperament can be transmitted by chromosomes, than on the notion of archetypal patterns of existence. Thus it is asserted that peoples and civilizations have developed archetypal patterns of personality which are distinctive and which characterize the modal sector of their populations. It should be noted, however, that Senghor draws heavily on the writings of the French Catholic priest, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, and espouses the principle that "all things converge", that is, that eventually European, African, and other archetypes will contribute to the emergence of a new "phenomenon of man" in the global context.

Cultural and Historical Assertions of Negritude

French-speaking African scholars within the mainstream of ideological negritude reacted against several aspects of Western scholarship on Africa--especially those aspects which focused on the differences between African societies, rather than on the similarities. The intellectual elite of negritude sought an historical and cultural basis for Black African unity. One of the foremost African scholars along this line has been Professor Cheikh Anta Diop. In 1956, Diop wrote:

When we have created... a sovereign, continental and multinational state, we shall have to, whatever one may say, endow it with an ideological, cultural superstructure which will be one of its essential
ramparts of security. That means that such a state will have to be, as a whole aware of its past, which presumes the elaboration of a general history of the Continent, embracing the particular histories of particular nationalities.\textsuperscript{18}

Diop has attempted to synthesize such African commonality in his own research. His major work, translated as \textit{The Cultural Unity of Negro Africa},\textsuperscript{19} compares African and "Aryan" civilization. He suggests that the world is divided into two cultural groupings: Aryans, including Semites and Asians; and meridional peoples ("meridionaux"), including Black Africans. Negro African culture is traced from its original linkage with civilization in Egypt. Diop's concept of "the nation" envisages a multinational, federal Africa. The exact basis for nationality, however, is not clearly delineated.

A second theme in the cultural nationalism of negritude has been the unity of Negro-African philosophy and religion. At the Second Congress of Black Scholars and Writers (1959) one resolution stated:

\begin{quote}
It is highly desirable that the modern African philosopher should preserve the unitary vision of cosmic reality which characterizes the wisdom of traditional Africa. . . /The Commission/ urges that the African philosopher should learn from the traditions, tales, myths, and proverbs of his people, so as to draw from them the laws of a true African wisdom complementary to the other forms of human wisdom, and to bring out the specific categories of African thought.\textsuperscript{20}
\end{quote}

The Congress also outlined what it considered to be the essence of all Black African religious systems:

\begin{quote}
[1] . . . a fundamental faith in a transcendental Force from which man draws his origin, upon which he depends and towards which he is drawn.

[2] . . . the sense of a vital solidarity ("solidarité"), a French word which seems to us the least removed from the Fulah neddaku, the Pambara maya, the Madagascan fihavana, and others, and which comprises a series of moral and social virtues, such as Ancestor worship, the veneration of Elders, hospitality, the spirit of tolerance, etc. . . .

[3] . . . the vital union between spiritual and practical life.\textsuperscript{21}
\end{quote}

A German writer, Janheinz Jahn, attempted to draw together the various academic studies of African religion, and, by focusing on similarities, to demonstrate the existence of a Black African religious philosophy which emerged from the fundamental elements in various African traditional religions.\textsuperscript{22} While generally criticized by Western scholars, his effort
elicited support from many of the disciples and spokesmen of negritude. According to one African reviewer of Jahn's work:

More important than to the Africanist and anthropologist is this book to the young African nationalist. For the last fifteen years or so we have been talking a lot about the African personality, without being very sure what we mean by it. At the basis of it was a rejection of the increasing tendency to assimilate European culture--whatever they might be. . . . Now here Mr. Jahn in his book *Muntu* offers a solution: a new-African culture which is inspired by the common elements in our traditions. . . . The experts will tear it to pieces, but it will remain an important pioneering work.23

A more sober consideration of some of the theoretical aspects of comparative African values, world systems, and societal organization is found in the work of Louis-Vincent Thomas of Dakar.24 The major difficulty for an African intellectual of the negritude persuasion, however, remains the difficulty of differentiating the loyalties and identities of ethnic communities, national communities, and racial communities.

The "Diaspora" and Negritude

Since one tenet of negritude is the commonality of all black persons, the question of the relationship of Black Africans to black people in the New World is of considerable importance to the negritude concept of nationhood. Two apparently mutually exclusive positions seem to have characterized African nationalist thought on this issue: a) some form of Black Zionism, or espousal of return to the motherland, Africa; or b) a "spiritual" nationalism, comparable perhaps to certain conceptions of Judaism,25 which do not espouse a return to a homeland. In a sense, this is the issue of irredentism, that is, of scattered minorities living outside the homeland. Continuing the analogy, those Black Africans who were forcibly removed from their homeland and resettled throughout various parts of the world have come to be known in some literature as the "African Diaspora."

The African Diaspora, especially into the Americas, has played an important role in the various negritude concepts of nationhood. Aspects of Afro-American attitudes toward Africa are explored in James Turner's essay in this volume. The challenge of negritude to Afro-Americans was considerable; yet as late as 1962, American Professor E. Franklin Frazier could still
write, "the question of integration and assimilation of the American Negro has not been considered or raised by American Negroes but by African intellectuals." 26

Certain proponents of Black Zionism, such as Marcus Garvey27 and later (temporarily) Malcolm X, have advocated some type of return to Africa. The countervailing position has been a recognition that the Afro-American is a synthesis of both Africa and the West. American novelist Richard Wright wrote in 1956:

My position is a split one. I'm black. I'm a man of the West. . . I see and understand the West; but I also see and understand the non or anti-Western point of view. . . This double vision of mine stems from my being a product of Western civilization. Being a Negro living in a White Christian society, I've never been allowed to blend in a natural and healthy manner with culture and civilizations of the West. . . I'm not non-Western. I'm no enemy of the West. Neither am I an Easterner. When I look out upon these vast stretches of this earth inhabited by brown, black and yellow men. . . my reactions and attitudes are those of the West. I see both worlds from another and third point of view.28

The process and elaboration of "synthesis" by Afro-American intellectuals (who, until recently included only a relatively few Black Americans self-consciously regarding themselves as products both of Africa and of the West) has taken a variety of forms. One early spokesman for the "synthesis" point of view was W. E. B. du Bois. (It is of historical interest, however, to note that both Wright and du Bois eventually chose to take up permanent residence in Africa, more specifically in Ghana where they lived out their days.) According to du Bois in 1903:

The history of the American Negro is the history of this strife, this longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self. In this merging he wishes neither of the older selves to be lost. He would not Africanize America, for America has too much to teach the world and Africa. He would not bleach his Negro soul in a flood of white Americanism, for he knows that Negro blood has a message for the world.29

Negritude and Nationhood

There have been a variety of intellectual positions taken on the issue of the "community" implications of negritude. The relevance of negritude to African nationalism and/or theories of nationhood has been
considerable. The assertion of Negro-African values and culture was intended by some writers to provide a basis for a "Black-Africanism," with potential political implications. The assertion that Negroes throughout the world are tied by a common collective subconscious may provide a basis for either a "spiritual" or "political" nationalism (the latter, particularly, in the form of irredentism) which is transcontinental in scope. The notion of "Diaspora" then becomes especially relevant.

The racial criteria of nationhood has been in direct confrontation with concepts of Pan-Africanism which look for a geographical/cultural basis for solidarity between Black Africans and North African Arabs and Berbers. (It should be noted, however, that the assertion "black skin color is good," is compatible with a variety of other nationalisms and need not in itself be suggested as a basis for political nationhood.)

The sharpest criticisms of race as a basis for nationhood have come from Black African nationalists themselves, many of them Muslims. Mamadou Dia, while Deputy Premier of Senegal, may have reflected the Islamic point of view when he wrote, "We must discard racist theories that claim to base the national vocation on the race or the people."30

Within Senegal, which is 85 per cent Muslim, there has been considerable criticism by young Muslim intellectuals writing in Arabic of Senghor's notion of negritude. An alternative transnational concept for such writers has been Pan-Africanism.

**PAN-AFRICANISM AND NATIONHOOD**

Pan-Africanism seeks a continental rather than a specifically racial basis for unity. Perhaps the outstanding spokesman for Pan-Africanism was Kwame Nkrumah when he was President of Ghana. In a sense, Nkrumah accepted Senghor's notion of subconscious archetypes, but asserted that the African continent contained three major civilizations which, he argued, should synthesize identities into a new, distinctively African, "consciencism." These three civilizations were "traditional Africa, Islamic Africa, and Euro-Christian Africa." According to Nkrumah:
"African society has one segment which comprises our traditional way of life; it has a second segment which is filled by the presence of the Islamic tradition in Africa; it has a final segment which represents the infiltration of the Christian tradition and culture of Western Europe into Africa, using colonialism and neo-colonialism as its primary vehicles. . . . These different segments are animated by competing ideologies. But since society implies a certain dynamic unity, there needs to emerge an ideology which, genuinely catering for the needs of all, will take the place of the competing ideologies . . ." 

"Such a philosophical statement will be born out of the crisis of the African conscience confronted with the three strands of present African society. Such a philosophical statement I propose to name philosophical consciencism, for it will give the theoretical basis for an ideology whose aim shall be to contain the African experience of Islamic and Euro-Christian presence as well as the experience of the traditional African society." 

The translation of ideas of African civilizations and geography into ideas of African nationhood seems to have taken two major forms: a) assertion that nationhood is a "collective vocation," that is, a working together of peoples with common purposes; and b) assertion that the continent of Africa, because of her internal historical development, has in some usually undefined way endowed her inhabitants with a personality which is African, rather than Black. 

Pan-Africanism as a Collective Vocation 

The first conceptualization is summarized by Mamadou Dia of Senegal (underlines added):

One might define the nation as a collective vocation, depending on a common scale of values, common institutions, and finally, common aims. . . . Increasingly numerous are the examples of historically and ethnically heterogeneous groups that share a collective national vocation. It is to be hoped that this process may become general, thus settling certain frightful dramas and making new nations centers of humanism by the diversity of the human elements assembled. . . . As a vocation the nation cannot be a rigid framework for activities: it is a stimulus. Its frontiers cannot be those of dwarf states that try to atomize it. . . . The nation as a collective vocation within African dimensions necessarily groups diverse countries and peoples. Hence the stupidity of certain border disputes that seem to excite African or Arab leaders who lack neither culture nor political realism. . . . They act as if it were a question of fixing a definite form to the vast movement that will continue to seek an equilibrium not yet attained. . . . The Venetian and Florentine national vocations although clearly expressed, were no
less happily merged in a wider and more authentically national collective vocation—the Italian vocations.32

Dia has both asserted a criterion for nationhood, and given examples of "national vocations." He makes this concept even more explicit in his recurrent rejection of racialism (underlines added):

Nationalism in this sense is something quite different from a theory founded on racial or religious ideology. Nationalism with a racial or religious basis is an irrational construction depending not so much on a national conscience as on the collective folly of the crowd, on the destructive force of exasperated instincts. . . . This is why those African nations destined to play any historic role whatsoever will neither be Negro, Berber, or Arab nations, nor Christian, Moslem, or animist nations . . . but . . . if they are to be anything at all—a synthesis, or let us say a civilization.33

Dia cites examples of multiracial national vocations which include the Soviet Union, India, and "the forthcoming confederation of Independent States of the Franco-African Community."34

Dia is explicit in his rejection of certain types of suprastate nationalism, particularly international proletarianism (underlines added):

On the other hand, one cannot refuse the various national vocations the right to exist, on the pretext of unification or supra-nationality. . . . Western socialists who urge colonized people to abandon national vocation in favor of socialism—without, however, renouncing their own nationalism—have to be shown the firm desire for nationhood . . . Nothing is less certain than the contention that class is a higher of integration than nation.35

The idea of "collective vocation" is not dissimilar to the notion of "manifest destiny" which gave impetus to nineteenth-century American consolidation of nationhood within a geographical context which could not claim racial, historical, or even religious homogeneity. It is a future-oriented nationalism, rather than a past-oriented concept.

Pan-Africanism as Cultural Synthesis

The second concept of Pan-Africanism would attempt to establish a sense of history and mystique which characterizes the continent as a whole. It may be either more or less inclusive than the notion of "collective vocation."

Pan-Africanism began its historic life "not in the 'homeland' but in diaspora,"36 as did the literary aspects of negritude. Until recently,
Pan-Africanism was largely a phenomenon of English-speaking areas, just as negritude was largely a phenomenon of French-speaking areas. The First Pan-African Congress, held in London in 1900, was sponsored by H. Sylvester Williams (Trinidad) and W. E. B. Du Bois (United States). Although the Second Congress was held in Paris (1919) with the cooperation of Blaise Diagne (Senegal), it was dominated by Du Bois. The Third Congress (1921) was held in both London and Brussels, and the Fourth (1923), in London and Lisbon. The Fifth Congress (1927) was the last to be led by Du Bois.

The Sixth Congress (1945) was entirely different in character and representation. Convened by English-speaking West Indian George Padmore in Manchester, England, it included young English-speaking Africans who were not satisfied with the slow pace of colonial "reform." These included many who were to be in the forefront of African nationalist movements: Kwame Nkrumah, J. Annan, E. A. Ayikumi, Edwin J. dePlan, Dr. Kuranky Taylor, Joe Appiah, and Dr. J. X. de Graft Johnson (all from the Gold Coast/Ghana); Chief H. O. Davies, Magnus Williams, Chief S. L. Akintola (all from Nigeria); plus Jomo Kenyatta, (Kenya), Wallace Johnson (Sierra Leone), Dr. Raphael Armatoe (Togo), and Peter Abrahams (South Africa). A major issue at that time, as mentioned in Professor Mazrui's essay, was whether to use physical force in the anticolonial struggle.

These post-war nationalists did not base their appeal for self-determination on concepts of negritude. Of the eight independent African states which met in Accra in 1958 for the First Conference of Independent African States, only Ghana and Liberia represented Black Africa; five states were Arab. Yet, according to Colin Legum, "the Accra Conference immediately proved the validity of one of the concepts of Pan-Africanism: a bond of color did exist between former colonial peoples."37

"Color," however, is to be distinguished from "negritude"; color in this context refers to non-white, rather than specifically black. As if to demonstrate this non-racial concept of African continental solidarity, President Nkrumah of Ghana married an Arab woman from Egypt.

Although there was no mention at the First Conference of Independent African States of the formation of a "United States of Africa," the All-African
Peoples' Organization, which also met in Accra in 1958, did draft a resolution calling for an eventual "commonwealth of free African States." It will be noted that African leaders from the French colonies did not participate in these early discussions.

To summarize, the basic goal of Pan-Africanism has in most cases been continental solidarity or nationhood, with the prospect of a nation stretching from the Cape to Cairo, and from Dakar to Mogadishu.

THE THIRD WORLD (TIER-MONDE)

The premise of African interracial continental solidarity is perhaps only one step removed from a bond between African states and other new nations in the former colonial empire zones. Because these new nations were not part of the Western or the communist blocs, they are often referred to as the "Third World" (TIER-MONDE). The common shared experiences include a legacy of colonialism, relative poverty, and "skin color." Basing his ideas on the economic reasoning of Gunnar Myrdal, Dia speaks of the "Proletarian Nations" that is, those Asian and African countries with per capita incomes of about $100 per year. These nations constitute not only a third block in world politics, but are characterized by involvement in the "anticolonialist revolution." This is part of their "collective vocation."

The Bandung Conference (1955) was the point in time when these common interests were first apparent to the various nationalist leaders (although it will be noted that the only African state attending was Ethiopia; the Gold Coast sent observers). Certain African political exiles during the colonial period, however, had found haven in Cairo. Cairo too was much involved in the Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement, the first conference having been held there in December, 1957. Colin Legum interprets the basis for Third World solidarity:

Although blacks identified themselves emotionally with their skins, they were always intellectually willing and able to identify themselves with peoples of other colours who were in the same boat as themselves—victims of white superiority, of colonialism, of imperialism, and of discrimination. Black regeneration was one
aspect of the struggle for emancipation; the wider struggle against colonialism and injustice demanded wider alliances.\textsuperscript{41}

After African nationalists had intensified their drive to independence, however, the wider alliance or identity with other poor states began to fade into what C\'esaire earlier described as "fleshless universalism." Poor states were seen to be economic competitors in agricultural production and for import capital. The problem which demanded the full energies of the African leaders was that of national integration within their inherited state boundaries. Even the notion of Pan-Africanism began to appear grandiose as a starting point. The French-speaking African states therefore began to turn their attention to the more near at hand possibilities of suprastate regionalism.

**THE IDEA OF SUPRASTATE REGIONALISM**

Some of the most important attempts at suprastate regionalism have occurred in French-speaking Africa. During most of the colonial period (1904-1958) there existed a formal federation of states in French West Africa. Loyalty toward such a suprastate organization may be distinguished from loyalties to other political groupings. Three early sets of experiences influenced postwar political thinking on this type of regional association: a) the creation of trans-territorial political parties; b) the creation and dissolution of the Mali Federation; and c) the attempt at a Ghana-Guinea-Mali Federation ("Union of African States").

**Suprastate Regional Parties**

Apart from the founding in Senegal of a branch of the French Socialist Party (SFIO) in the late 1930's, most of the French West African African parties were formed after the war. Of these, two were regional in scope: the Rassemblement Democratique Africaine (RDA) and the Independants d'Outre Mer (IOM).

After the initial referendum defeat of the French Fourth Republic Constitution in May, 1946, several African leaders called for a "united front of all worker, cultural and religious movements in Black Africa to fight 'revival of colonialism.'"\textsuperscript{42} A conference was called at Bamako (Mali)
in October, 1946, and over eight hundred delegates from all parts of French Africa attended. Houphouet-Boigny announced that the purpose of the RDA, which was set up at the conference, was "the union of Africans and their alliance with French democrats." (Lamine Gueye and Yacine Diallo had failed to attend the conference and other socialist leaders had withdrawn.) In the 1946 elections, the RDA gained six deputies to the French National Assembly, five senators, and seven councilors of the French Union. The association of the RDA with the French Communist Party and their eventual split has been mentioned above.

The electoral reforms of 1951 extended the franchise in French West Africa to a conservative rural element which set back the more radical parties such as RDA. Yet by 1956, Houphouet-Boigny had reoriented himself to less radical policies and joined the Mollet Government in Paris as a Cabinet Minister. The RDA at that time held nine National Assembly seats in Paris.

The IOM was not a political party in the strict sense, but rather a grouping of African parliamentarians which was formed in late 1947. Membership in IOM was not incompatible with membership in territorial parties, but it included elements which were not represented in the RDA or SFIO. The IOM congress in 1953 at Bobo-Dioulasso (Upper Volta) advocated a federal republic for French-speaking West Africa. Shortly thereafter, Senghor proposed dividing French West Africa into two parts: one centered at Dakar (Senegal) and the other at Abidjan (Ivory Coast), but each with a premier and local parliament.

By the first half of 1956, leaders from the IOM, RDA, and SFIO were all stressing the need for regional unity. Labor leaders such as Bakary Djibo were appealing to Senghor and Houphouet-Boigny to follow labor's attempt at unification. The IOM was succeeded early in 1957 by the Convention Africaine and this, in turn (1958), by the Parti du Regroupement Africaine (PRA) which united all of the non-RDA parties (with the exception of the parties in Mauritania). The reconciliation of the socialist party (SFIO) and IOM had occurred earlier when the socialists broke their ties with the French parent party. During this period, both the PRA and the RDA were advocating some form of federal government for French West Africa.
When the 1958 referendum occurred, most of the West African parliamentarians supported the concept, in one form or another, of regional community.

Thus, under the Fourth French Republic, a number of trans-territorial or suprastate political relationships were developed. French-speaking West Africa was considered to be a likely candidate for a federal structure which would link up the eight component states. The actual pattern as it evolved, however, provided for independence on an individual state basis, with the exception of Senegal and Mali, and a continuing association with Metropolitan France through the French Community.

The Experience of the Mali Federation

The Mali Federation was conceived on January 17, 1959. Forty-four representatives from the states of Senegal, Dahomey, Sudan (Mali), and Upper Volta met at Dakar to regroup into a "Mali Federation." The conference resulted in a Constitution with sixty-two Articles, which stipulated Dakar as the capital, French as the official language, and the four participating states as the member states. There was to be a federal president who would choose two cabinet ministers from each member state. A federal legislative assembly was to be elected for five years which would consist of twelve delegates from each of the four member states. For various reasons, however, Dahomey and Upper Volta withdrew from the arrangement. On March 25, 1959, the Mali Federation, consisting of Senegal and Sudan (Mali), was established within the French Community, and a new party, Parti de la Federation Africaine (PFA), was set up to accommodate the merger.

The subsequent dissolution of the Mali Federation in the summer of 1960 was probably caused by several factors. Senegal preferred a loose federation, reflecting perhaps the fact that most of the wealth was in that region, while Sudan (Mali), with its larger population, wanted a unitary state. Also, Senegal had closer links with France (25,000 Frenchmen actually lived in the city of Dakar), while Sudan had strong Islamic linkages; also it was closer to Guinea than to Senegal in its political propensities.

From the dissolution of the Mali Federation came a greater realization of nature and problems of nationhood. The concepts of nationhood held by the nationalists during the brief experience of federation are most
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instructive in retrospect. Thus, Senghor remarked to the PFA constituent assembly:

We have made a good start in Mali by uniting populations whose natural characteristics—climate, soil and blood, language and customs, art and literature—are similar. Senegal and the Sudan constitute, moreover, a rather homogeneous and relatively rich economic ensemble... and yet, in the interest of Black Africa and France, our aim must be to unite, within the Mali Federation, all the states of the old A.O.F. This reconstruction on new bases, of the old French West African Federation is in the political interest of the Africans... This is clearly in line with our concept of "nation." The Upper Volta and Niger are grassland, prairie countries, like Senegal and the Sudan. The fact that the Ivory Coast and Dahomey are mostly forest offers an additional reason for not separating them from the other countries. They are complementary to the others.43

Senghor further elaborates his notion of Black African unity with regard to English-speaking African states:

Nor do we intend to forget our African neighbors who speak English. But let us be frank: they should not ask us to leave the Community while they remain in the Commonwealth. Horizontal inter-African solidarity will gradually be established, by beginning at the beginning with economic and cultural relations.44

The failure of the Mali Federation had noticeable effects on African regionalist thinking. Certain "conservative" nationalists felt disillusioned with "political" unification and began to focus on economic cooperation. Others, more "radical," turned to ideological groupings. The ex post facto evaluation by Malian leaders of the causes of failure of the Federation is of interest. According to Mamadou Dia:

In our fight against Balkanization, we failed to consider the pre-colonial fact that is territorialism. Our mistake has been our failure to pay sufficient attention in our analyses to this phenomenon, a fruit of colonialism and a socio-political fact that a theory of unity cannot abolish. We allowed ourselves to be lured by the mirage of the most intellectually satisfying construction... The Senegalese masses adopted the Mali mystique only because they were attached to their leaders... Senegalese territorialism was still alive, all the more so because the Sudanese presence in Dakar was too indiscreetly manifest to let the people forget it... The rupture of the Federation was welcomed with relief by the masses... The Sudanese were no less territorialists... They thought Sudanese and reacted above all as Sudanese. With a slant less Malian than Sudanese they studied problems related to defense, justice, education and the Africanization of cadres.
On the question of "federalism," Dia continued:

Marx, who was scientific, readily yielded to the rigor of facts and did not hesitate, whenever it became necessary, to revise his position on a given political problem of his time. First, an anti-federalist--for reasons that half-baked Marxists today pick up and transpose *mutatis mutandis*--he quickly qualified his opinion and admitted the Federal solution along with the right of self-determination. Why should others not be allowed, by the force of events, to change from an acceptance of federalism to the rejection of federalism, at least temporarily.46

Partly as a result of this misadventure in territorial federalism, a new type of regionalism appeared in West Africa; this might be termed "ideological regrouping."

The Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union

The Ghana-Guinea-Mali union, entitled "The Union of African States" (UAS), was announced by communiqué on December 24, 1960. It was probably conceived as a reaction to the Brazzaville "bloc," led by Senegal and Ivory Coast. Furthermore, the Republic of Mali needed a route to the sea and was perhaps reacting to the recent failure of the Mali Federation. The UAS Charter provided an embryonic confederal framework. While sovereignty was to reside in each of the member states, the heads of state were to consult quarterly, diplomatic representation was to be coordinated, and permanent ideological and economic committees were set up; the supreme executive organ was to be the Conference of Heads of States.

One point of focus in this essay has been the identification of the ideological justifications for various types of nationalisms and concepts of nationhood. In the case of the UAS there was to a marked extent a similarity of political ideas on means and ends of the state. This "means-and-ends" criterion is not dissimilar to Dia's "collective vocation," or common goals.

President Sékou Touré of Guinea has summarized this concept (underlines added):

If the laws of development lead to the regrouping of societies, and in consequence to the enlargement of existing entities and their transformation into multi-national entities, it is still necessary that each element should find itself in identical conditions, should have similar means available, and should use these means to the same ends.47
President Keita of Mali has elaborated on the prerequisite of ideological sympathy to the regrouping of African states (underlines added):

We are convinced that the states of Africa will never be independent, in the full sense of the word, if they remain small states, more or less opposed to one another, each having its own policy, each taking no account of the policy of the other. Our Constitution, therefore, provides for a total or partial abandonment of sovereignty in favor of a grouping of African states, but such an abandonment of sovereignty demands an identity of views with our fellow states. One cannot build a complete whole without contradictions. Certain common viewpoints on international policy and on economic policy are absolutely necessary, together with an understanding of the contradictions contained in economic planning, and the necessity for each state to consider its economy within the framework of one large African economy, if it is to constitute an entity with the other states. For this reason we recognize that this abandonment of sovereignty necessitates an identity of views with our partners, both in foreign and domestic policy. The Republic of Mali has decided to cooperate in all fields with all the African states, whatever may be their political, economic, or social set-up. This means, however, that we envisage a political organization in cooperation with the other African States only in so far as they have identity of views with us in the field of international policy, and also in the field of internal economic policy. But this does not preclude us from cooperation with all the African States, whatever their alignment in international policy, and whatever may be their political or economic system.43

In summary, even though there has been a long history of regionalism and regionalist thought in French-speaking West Africa, the difficulties of establishing suprastate political communities have been considerable. (Perhaps the most successful example of African regionalism in practice has been the more recent phenomenon of the Entente consisting of Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Niger, and Upper Volta.) In the immediate postcolonial period, criteria for regional unity or multinational community formation included economic interdependence, congruence of political values, and personal rapport between political elites.

NATIONHOOD AND POLITICAL COMMUNITY

The six categories of potential suprastate political communities outlined in this essay may be grouped into those with relatively "static" boundaries, and those with changing, or "mutable" boundaries.
Consolidation of Nation-States

Concepts of Static Community Boundaries

The boundary line between Black Africa and North Africa, although to some extent indistinct (See Professor Abu-Lughod's essay for a discussion of this point), tends to be defined by the historic location of peoples along the Sudanic belt. A number of national states straddling this "line" are faced with the problems of biracialism. Such states include Mauritania in the west and the Republic of Sudan in the east, both with "light" majorities (Arab/Berber) and a "black" minority. The central Sudanic states such as Chad reverse these racial proportions. In most cases, there has been an attempt to build a nationalism and to develop concepts of nationhood which do not depend on racial classifications. (Islam has influenced this non-racial thought.) African nationalists who have espoused political union of Black Africa, however, (with or without diaspora) would presumably seek a political redistricting along racial boundaries.

The most static and most inclusive boundary line, of course, is the geographical definition of the continent of Africa. Pan-Africanism has subsequently sought to find or develop cultural homogeneity within these continental boundaries.

Concepts of Mutable Community Boundaries

The idea of a Franco-African community is essentially an ideological concept, based on notions of French citizenship, culture, and political interests. Basic acceptance of a defined value system is necessary to such a community of like-minded states. Racial distinctiveness, however, tends to underlie such concepts, and hence the concept of an European-African community may be partly in the static category.

The concept of international proletarianism is probably ideological at core, since class membership is usually a matter of ideological perception. These perceptions will change, both over time and space, as is evident in the difference between the class struggle Afro-Marxists, and the African socialists.
Even the idea of a Third Worldism is essentially an ideological concept. The selection of experiences which are felt to provide a commonality between states are related to perceptions of colonialism, relative deprivation, and non-Western value systems.

In the immediate postcolonial period, the temporary alignment of African states into a Casablanca group and a Monrovia group was primarily ideological. Both groups consciously rejected racial boundaries. Thus, the locational identity of the "radical" group (Casablanca) was in a non-black area (Morocco), while the chairman of the "conservative" group (Monrovia) of associated labor organizations (African Trade Union Confederation) was an Arab. It is of further significance that when these two organizations dissolved in about 1963, they jointly established a Pan-African organization (The Organization of African Unity) which has emerged as the dominant supranational grouping in contemporary Africa. The headquarters for this organization are located in Addis Ababa, an area which symbolically links non-black peoples with Black Africa.

The Future of African Nationalism

The loyalties, values, and identities of the different types of African nationalism and concepts of nationhood will continue to demand the attention of African leadership. The three major levels of nationalism will probably turn out to be subnational ethnic loyalties, sovereign state nationalism, and some combination of regionalism and Pan-Africanism. The accommodation of such multiple loyalties in the future will require the reevaluation of many of the issues which were raised first in the pre-independence and early postcolonial period.

The political units which achieved independence were not predestined to emerge in any particular form or number. In certain areas, (for example, Nigeria) relatively autonomous units were fused into a larger federation. In other areas (for example, French West Africa), a federation was broken down into component parts. The decisions which determined these results were to some extent based on European and African concepts of nationalism and nationhood. Future reorientations and reorganizations will likely be informed by these same sources.
NOTES


6. Ibid., p. 5.


9. Césaire, "Letter to Thorez."


11. Ibid., p. 17.

12. Ibid., p. 3.

13. Ibid., p. 12.


17. Ibid., p. 5.


21. Ibid.


33. Ibid., pp. 9-10.
34. Ibid., p. 9.
35. Ibid., p. 7.
37. Ibid., p. 42.
40. Ibid.
41. Legum, Pan-Africanism, pp. 40-41.
43. Senghor, African Socialism, p. 5.
44. Ibid., p. 46.
46. Ibid., p. 143.
49. For sample of such concepts of nationhood in Mauritania, see Alfred G. Gerteiny, "The Political Thought of a Modern Muslim African Statesman: Moktar Ould Daddah" (paper presented to the International Congress of Africanists, Dakar, 1967).
For the purposes of clarity, large-scale political changes such as the ones which have occurred in recent decades in Asia and Africa can be sorted into several components: 1) changes in the size of the political community, which may entail segmentation of larger units into smaller ones (as in the Middle East) or amalgamation of smaller ones into larger territorial units (as in most of Tropical Africa); 2) changes, which may be called evolution, in the fundamental ideas, or culture, governing behavior related to politics; 3) variations in development; that is, the degree to which these cultural changes are in fact institutionalized, or transformed into norms, structures, and roles. These aspects of change are not bound to any particular historical period and can be used to discuss the transformation of the Roman Empire into feudal Europe as easily as the transformation of contemporary societies in Africa into new states.

The concept of modernization is historically much more specific and involves changes in many spheres of social action besides the political. Within the political sphere itself, usually as the result of cultural diffusion and the emergence of new elites which are the bearers of new ideas, modernization entails the appearance of a new culture of politics which stresses certain institutional arrangements for government and a specific range of relationships between the rulers and the governed within a nation.

One of the major problems in the literature dealing with the processes of modernization, development, and nation-building has been the tendency to extrapolate from specific research to high levels of generalization which then appear to reveal patterns of the past, the present, and the future.
The study of how a specific traditional system is being transformed into a relatively modern one in a particular place at a particular time is taken to be a paradigm of how the traditional system is being transformed into the modern system. Yet, we know on the basis of common sense observation that political development, modernization, and nation-building, are very different processes, and that the combination of circumstances may vary greatly. In one case, national communities may be carved out of a more universal system, perhaps based on religion, with differentiation in status characterized by a sharp disjunction between urban elites, who control the land, and peasant masses, under the leadership of a component of this urban elite, but linked by an ideology such as religious reformism. In another case national communities may emerge from situations where many small societies devoid of sharp status differentiation are being amalgamated into arbitrarily defined larger units under the leadership of a group of recently educated men who are drawn more or less evenly from the societies that constitute the country, and who act according to the precepts of a pragmatic, secularist ideology.

The analysis of nation-building in a particular part of the world therefore requires us to pay attention first to the available building materials, and then to the characteristics of the architects, contractors, and their crew, as well as to the blueprints they are utilizing. It then becomes possible to discuss what sorts of obstacles the nation-builders are likely to encounter in pursuing their goals and to evaluate their chances of success.

NATION-BUILDING IN SOCIETAL PERSPECTIVE

The starting point for political analysis must therefore be a consideration of the societies which serve as the environment for African political systems. Usually, political scientists who speak of political systems have in mind, at least implicitly, the context of an identifiable concrete society, be it contemporary Great Britain, or a small tribe of northern Togo. It is more difficult, however, to take as a given the existence of a "society" which encompasses all the individuals living within the
territorial confines of any contemporary African country. A century ago, or less, there existed on the African continent, within the area encompassed today by any single country, a fairly large number of societies varying in size, in social structure, and in culture, each with a corresponding political system. These societies ranged from relatively undifferentiated ones in which political and kinship structures were almost inseparable to highly differentiated ones, usually referred to as "states." These societies did not exist in isolation from one another, but constantly interacted as regional systems.

About a century ago, however, certain of the European states, hitherto only peripherally involved on the African continent, extended the boundaries of their own political communities to include some of the societies of the African continent. The creation of new political boundaries did not, of course, result automatically in the creation of new societies within these territories. At least initially the various societies caught within the colonial administrative nets retained their identities. Although the new colonial units provided a territorial mold within which social, economic, political, and cultural changes occurred, we are becoming increasingly aware that these processes, although related, did not necessarily change at the same rate; and that the rates of change varied not only between countries, but also between regions of the same country. If we construe the original African societies as sets of values, and norms, and structures, it is evident that they survived to a significant extent everywhere up to the time of independence, even where their existence was not legally recognized, as in the most extreme cases of direct rule. Furthermore, the new set of values, norms, and structures which constituted an incipient national center did not necessarily grow at the expense of the older African societies. For example, although many individuals left the rural areas for the new towns, they did not necessarily leave one society altogether to enter into a new one; instead, the behavior of a given individual continues to be governed by norms from the social, ethnic, and economic systems which define his multiple roles and which may mix to define a particular role.

Because the new national centers in Africa had not developed at the time of independence, we cannot characterize an African country today as a single
society, with a relatively integrated system of values, norms, and structures. Since the new African states do however, encompass in a single territory two sets of values, norms, and structures--the "new" and the modified "traditional," the latter often subdivided into distinct subtypes--it is useful to think of these sets as forming a particular type of unintegrated society which can be called "syncretic." Thus, when compared to other Third World clusters, the African states in general are characterized by extremely weak national centers with a periphery of societies which have until recently been self-contained. Also typical are levels of economic and social development close to the lowest limits of international statistical indexes of development. Comparative data for 1965 and 1966 rank Africa as the lowest of four Third World areas (Africa, East Asia, Latin America, Near East/South Asia) in total GNP, annual growth of GNP, electric power per capita, life expectancy, physicians per capita, literacy, and percentage of pupils in the population. Africa was tied with one other area for bottom place in several other indicators, and ranked relatively high only in acres of agricultural land available per capita.²

The extreme weakness of national centers in African states suggests that those responsible for nation-building can apply only very limited political leverage to bring about the transformation of the society required by their commitment to nation-building. They must first create the tools of change--political institutions. But the process of state-building is itself conditioned by the societal environment; and it would be expected, therefore, that the builders will experience many setbacks. The initial edifice of a government may be fragile. If such is the case, it might also be expected that some African countries might not be able to hold together as political units. If they do endure, their political life will be characterized by irregular events and a high incidence of conflict. A consideration of the creation of political institutions and of political conflict will therefore enable us to grasp two complementary aspects of African political processes. Another problem faced by the nation-builders in their attempt to transform African societies is that of integrating their constituent units, usually referred to as "tribes" or "ethnic groups." An examination of this process will give us a sense of what nation-building in emergent Africa might be like.
THE CREATION OF POLITICAL ORDER

Political architects who engage in nation-building need blueprints. It is therefore not surprising that the period of African independence witnessed the proliferation of more or less explicit and systematic statements of political means and goals, usually called "ideologies." Since the architects also shared similar circumstances, it is not surprising to find that despite the apparent diversity of ideological orientation, there appeared many persistent and similar themes related to nation-building; there has been a great deal of ideological borrowing from the experiences, or the assumed experiences, of older nations. Beyond this, there has been adaptation and invention by African statesmen to define more precisely what the nation means in the African context.

The first important dimension of the nation is territory, and Africans have usually accepted without question the territorial boundaries which they inherited from the colonial period. Other foundations of national identity which have derived from the historical experiences of older nations are more problematic. With very few exceptions, as in Tanzania, African countries do not have a single dominant language; French or English may be used in elite circles, but these languages remain unknown to a substantial proportion of the population. Ethnicity as a unifying principle is too restrictive, since on the whole the ethnic unit is smaller than the nation-building unit. Religion is also often related to smaller units, except where Islam is dominant or in the few cases where Christianity has become truly indigenous and widespread. The ideology of Africanness, whether in the French-speaking tradition of négritude or in the English-speaking version of "African personality," was very serviceable during the period of nationalist struggle, but less serviceable at the time of independence. Although the concept facilitated the development of unity within the African continent, it could not serve to distinguish Africans of one country from those of another country.

Hence, in the absence of broadly based unifying principles, African leaders came to identify as a major foundation for nationhood the experience
loyalty to the political movement which came closest to representing the country during the period of decolonization. The most obvious cases were those in which a single political organization had been able to transform itself from a preindependence nationalist movement into a dominant political party, as in Ghana, Tanzania, Guinea, and elsewhere. In such countries, the party was the widest, best-known membership group which had political meaning for the inhabitants of the country. The national community thus came to be defined in partisan political terms. Support for the party and its ideas was therefore a way of entering into a sort of social contract, of participating in a nascent national community. As a community, the party was not exclusive. Membership, on the whole, tended to be vaguely defined and required primarily non-involvement in any other political organization which opposed the party. The ideological paradigm might go as follows: the people are one, as demonstrated by the existence of a single party; acting through the party, which directs the state, the people build the nation. The party is the basis of the legitimacy of all other institutions; ultimately it is the people, it is the nation. Therefore, it must be one. Political opposition is to be resisted because by its very existence it denies the unity of the nation.

Not all African countries, of course, came to independence with a dominant party which could claim to speak for the nation in the above sense. In the less-developed French-speaking African countries, as well as in Sierra Leone and Kenya, for example, mass organizations never developed, and political participation remained very limited until after independence. In most of these cases, however, the African rulers who were in office at the time of independence were able to create at least the semblance of a one-party state. Their justification for doing so was very much in line with the reasoning outlined above. The major exceptions to the one-party trend were Nigeria, Congo-Kinshasa, and Uganda. In these states strong regional differentiations, based in part upon the continued existence of relatively large-scale traditional political units, made dominance by a single organization impossible. Significantly, in these exceptional cases, no explicit blueprint of nation-building seemed to emerge. Federal arrangements, embedded in the constitution established at the time of independence
and as a condition of independence in Nigeria and in Uganda, could have been used as the starting point for a nation-building blueprint. This was not the case mainly because other institutional prerequisites of federalism, including appropriate leadership groups, did not exist. From the very beginning, insurmountable problems were apparent in these countries. In Congo-Kinshasa one political group did internalize a "mass-party" ideology similar to that discussed above, but the circumstances of decolonization and a series of acute crises at the time of independence resulted in the destruction of the party.

The prevalence of the single-party ideology is confirmed by the later experiences of many of the countries which did not initially reflect that ideology. There are now indications that African military leaders have internalized an ideology of nation-building very similar to that of the one-party rulers. Hence, in the long run, the one-party ideology is not to be analyzed in terms of the existence of a dominant party, but rather in terms of the existence of an administrative framework directed by an oligarchy, whether civilian or military, which views itself as indispensable to the building of the nation. Mass parties have tended to decline in the postindependence period, and the importance of bureaucracies has increased. There is a general consensus in Africa today that nation-building presumes the existence of a state. The emergent ideology is one which attributes overwhelming importance to state-building. Although economic and social development remain important goals, they tend to be viewed as means of fostering a stronger state, rather than as goals in themselves.

THE INSTRUMENTS OF NATION-BUILDING

Within the general framework discussed above there were significant variations in the degree of institutionalization of national centers in different African countries around the time of independence. To continue our metaphor, there were variations in the effectiveness of the instruments available for the pursuit of nation-building. The first of these variations relates to the characteristics of the ruling groups. Absolute size and
cohesion of a ruling group may be difficult to estimate; but it is not difficult
to recognize variations, for example, in a country such as Ghana which had a
sizeable body of experienced politicians and administrators who were fairly
well educated and had been involved in the running of public policy for the
better part of a decade before independence, as against a country such as
Congo-Kinshasa where the training of elites began only shortly before the
rapid acceleration of decolonization and where the process of institutional-
izing political participation of Africans occurred within a period of two or
three years and was not completed by the time of independence. These
differences between African administrative elites were not due exclusively
to differences in the political policies of the colonial powers. There
were also general economic and geopolitical factors which facilitated or
hindered the development of a personnel infrastructure. A policy variable
in this respect, however, was the extent to which secondary education
was developed, rather than primary or higher education.

But even the most apparent variations in political arrangements at the
time of independence, such as differences between mass-party states,
"no-party" states, and multi-party federal states, tended to be exaggerated
by observers because insufficient attention was paid to the extent to which
these arrangements were in fact institutionalized. An examination of
political parties, the best studied and documented feature of the African
political scene, reveals a wide gap between the organizational model from
which the leaders derived their inspiration and their capacity to implement
such models. The very use of the word "party" to characterize such structures
may involve a dangerous reification. African "parties" which have adopted
a Leninist model, for example, seldom function in the way in which European
"vanguard" organizations have functioned to establish control over various
sectors of the society. Rather than controlling society, African parties
tend to reflect social structure and to merge with it.

These comments may be extended to include constitutional arrangements
which, in the absence of legitimation derived from norms and institutions
indigenous to the society, seldom had reality beyond their existence as the
written word. Constitutional arrangements therefore, could easily be
modified from year to year, or maintained as part of a ritualistic adherence to accepted practice, but ignored in relation to the realities of the political process. In most African countries, there was some sort of "civil service"; but this is so rarely governed by bureaucratic norms that it is perhaps better to speak of "government employees," a term which does not imply the notion of administrative neutrality associated with "civil service." Likewise, "trade unions" are bodies which seldom exhibit the expected organizational characteristics. They often consist of aggregates of employed and unemployed townsmen intermittently mobilized for a temporary purpose, such as a street demonstration or a strike. Finally, African armies, which have come to play an increasingly important political role, exhibit to only a limited degree the discipline and hierarchical organization we normally associate with military institutions. Instead, they often consist of an assemblage of armed men with very limited skills who may or may not obey their officers. The officers themselves are less a cohesive group than a fluid coalition of factions.

Given this view of African society, we should expect to find that the operations of even the most modern institutions in Africa are not always institutionalized and often are governed by values and norms that stem from both the "new" and the "residual" sets. The societal environment shared by all new African states thus imposes severe initial limits upon the range within which significant variations in regime can develop. Here we face a paradox: although the widespread image of African society and politics is one of very great change, it can be argued that very little is changing. This paradox involves an analytical distinction between levels of the political system. While there may be rapid change of "authorities," leadership elites, and even regimes; there is very little change at the normative level, that is, in the relation of political institutions to the society. The processes involved in such developmental changes cannot occur independently of the characteristics of the society itself. Hence, the creation of political order through the organization of modern political institutions at the time of independence tended on the whole to be unsuccessful. We shall consider below some of the political consequences of the failures.
African countries which contain unintegrated ethnic communities and which are characterized by a low degree of institutionalization of political structures related to the national center may actually break into smaller components. A few, indeed, have been on the verge of doing so since they became independent. The fact that most do persist as territorial states cannot be attributed exclusively to the operations of internal factors, such as a sense of community and the ability of authorities to enforce cohesion. Persistence may also reflect an inertia with regard to the instruments of government inherited from the colonial period. It may also reflect the absence of effective external challenges and the protection provided by a contemporary international system which, more often than not, guarantees the existence of even the weakest of sovereign states.

Yet those states which hold together in spite of disintegrative forces are likely to experience a high incidence of internal political conflict. Although the occurrence of conflict may be random in time and space, it is not random in structure. The societal constraints which define patterns of integration and limit the extent of institutionalization also shape conflict into discernible patterns. An examination of these patterns complements our understanding of the processes of institutionalization. In the following discussion one aspect of the expression of political conflict will be considered in some detail: the coup d'etat. It will be suggested that in Tropical Africa, the coup d'état has become part of the normal political process, while revolutions are likely to fail; and civil wars will seldom occur.

The coup can be viewed as a normal pattern in African politics on statistical grounds, in that it has become the modal form of governmental change. More significantly, however, coup behavior is the normal consequence of direct confrontations between incumbent governments and opposition elements, in situations where the military force at the disposal of the government is very limited. This condition is widespread in African countries; yet it tends to prevent actual civil war because a government
usually falls before extensive mobilization of support by both sides can occur. Governments may even prefer to withdraw peacefully rather than fight. Coups determine who will rule, at least temporarily, but do not in themselves affect the structure of the political system. The scope of the conflict is usually limited in relation to the society as a whole; it may be accompanied by brutality, but it seldom entails more strategic forms of violence. The occurrence of coups appears to be random in relation to most of the classificatory variables applicable to African states, such as indexes of social and economic modernization, type of regime or ideological orientation of the incumbents or of their opponents. Yet coups arise from similar processes and are remarkably similar in their course.

The legitimacy of the new African regimes was probably highest at the time when nationalist leaders first assumed responsibility for the central executive in their respective countries, usually a few years before independence. At that time the new leaders were still viewed as champions of the oppressed; and they could rely on the techniques of machine politics, institutionalized in the form of broadly-based coalitions with one or more governmental parties. The expansion of the bureaucracy during the period of welfare state colonialism absorbed many job claimants. A few bridges, roads, hospitals, and schools were being built by the departing colonial power, and the general pace of development appeared to be high. At the same time, the coercive apparatus, which usually remained under the control of expatriate officials until the last moment, was a neutral instrument of control in the hands of the colonial government. In most new states these psychologically advantageous circumstances were carried over into the immediate, postindependence period, but in country after country this political capital was rapidly frittered away by the new regimes in meeting contingencies.

Although the circumstances varied, these contingencies were associated with three general processes. First, there was a growing gap between the ideological aspirations of the leaders and their capacity to implement the policies these aspirations entailed. Hence, governments with a very limited capability tended to overextend their resources. Secondly, most regimes were faced with the consequences of the rapid extension of political
participation. When, as a result of the introduction of universal suffrage, political entrepreneurs attempted to mobilize individuals with the least exposure to modern political institutions, primordial sentiments became manifest and interethnic cleavages were often exacerbated. The result was an escalation of the demands made by ethnic groups to the center. Thirdly, all African countries have experienced an inflationary spiral of demands formulated by modern sector personnel. This group includes civilian employees of government, who overlap with the bulk of the membership of labor unions in many countries; the second- and third-generation elites, who find that the highest positions in various institutional spheres have been filled by relatively young men and that the period of rapid expansion is over; and members of the uniformed services (army, gendarmerie, and police).

The demands made upon the central government during the postindependence period thus increase without a concomitant increase in government capability, and indeed often with a net decrease in capability as the result of structural factors. Under the impact of these processes, the center's weakness is unmercifully exposed. As Talcott Parsons has indicated, such situations are analogous to a run on a bank. He has suggested that the system's response can be twofold:

First, an increasingly stringent scale of priorities of what can and cannot be done will be set up; second, increasingly severe negative sanctions for non-compliance with collective decisions will be imposed.5

But the greater reliance on force as a technique of government, as has occurred in most of postindependence Africa, tends to have results opposite to those intended. First, governments which rely on coercion tend to become less adept at discriminating between danger signals and may tend to approach even the smallest disturbance by expending a great deal of force. But since the capital of force is small, it becomes dispersed, and the government's vulnerability to more serious threats is increased.6 Secondly, the relative legitimacy of political institutions undergoes a sort of deflation; the value of any organization capable of wielding force, whether in an institutional form, such as the army and the police, or through the manipulation of bodies of men by means of civil disobedience, riots, and strikes, is increased. Thirdly, the use of force by the government to
overcome deteriorating legitimacy paradoxically undermines the legitimacy of the rulers in the eyes of those to whom the implementation of force must be entrusted; that is, the army. Fourthly, attempts to resolve this problem by building up countervailing institutions (such as a presidential guard or a gendarmery to offset the army) often exacerbate the situation by engendering dissatisfaction among those services whose relative status has been lowered. Finally, potential opponents who are deprived of opportunities to express demands through institutionalized political channels must resort to force to make their demands felt. But since the government's coercive capability is a limited resource, its credibility is lessened over time in the eyes of potential challengers.

The atmosphere within which a coup is likely to occur can be created by almost any type of conflict situation, originating almost anywhere in the social structure, within the ruling group or outside of it; but not every kind of confrontation is equally likely to lead to the government's downfall. A government has to be threatened physically, which means that the challengers must be able to deploy force in the capital city. Hence, successful coups usually involve two bodies of manpower: labor unions (or more properly, aggregates of employed and unemployed townsmen) and members of uniformed services. These groups are related asymmetrically: the unions cannot bring about the downfall of a government without the active support or at least the acquiescence of the army and the police, while the uniformed services can carry out a successful coup without securing outside alliances. In the final analysis, then, the role of the uniformed services is determinative, regardless of its size or degree of professionalism. There were successful interventions by the Togo army of 250 men in 1963 and by the Central African Republic's army of 600 men in 1966, each of which was the smallest military establishment on the African continent at the time of its coup.7

Military interventions have been escalated to straightforward takeovers from strike-mutinies, in which armies acted like any other grievance organization, and from referee actions, in which the army intervened after conflict had been initiated by others. Several of these takeovers occurred
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after earlier referee actions failed to bring about the desired change. In other cases a referee action was transformed into a takeover when civilian politicians failed to meet the army's expectations. All coups have been facilitated by the demonstration-effect, or contagion, of a successful military intervention in a neighboring country. But even the establishment of military regimes does not seem to lessen the probability of future civilian or military coups, since African armies share the structural characteristics of other institutions. The solidarity of their leadership, the control they have over their own organization, and the degree of leverage they can exert over the society are not likely to be much greater than that which they replaced in the overthrown government.

Those structural features of African societies which insure the frequency of coups also insure that more strategic forms of internal conflict such as revolutions and civil wars will be rare. Since existing national centers are weak, they will not be able to withstand attempts to modify the political community, as in regional secession movements. At most, the antagonists will become involved in a protracted but low key struggle, in which bloodshed may increase significantly, but without clear-cut evidence of changes in the capabilities of either side unless external powers intervene. Revolutions are unlikely to occur because on the one hand governments fall too easily, and on the other hand, alternative elites do not have the degree of ideological and organizational solidarity required to effect structural changes. The exceptions are those few countries which, deviating significantly from the African societal structure discussed above, approximate the plural society model (such as Rwanda and Zanzibar). The cases which best approximate recognizable revolutionary situations are Congo-Brazzaville following the coup of mid-1963 and the several rebellions in Congo-Kinshasa which began in 1964. Both of these cases contained some of the elements of the "second-revolution," the truly new beginning, prophesied by Frantz Fanon. One took an urban form; the other, especially in the Kwilu region, took a rural form. But after four years the Brazzaville regime (initially responsive to an anti-Western urban youth movement) seems to have settled down into the usual party-state mold; the Kwilu uprising
in the western Congo was for the most part contained by military action before the end of 1964, having been unable to establish links with Congolese dissidents in the east.

Growing tensions and the recurrent availability of desperate leaders may contribute to the emergence of similar movements elsewhere. These movements may generate relatively large-scale sporadic violence. Yet it is unlikely that such movements will be able to translate their revolutionary aspirations into the institutionalization of a new regime and of new social structures. Since the new African states do not have a strong center, they cannot be turned inside out; attempts to do so only bring about slight shifts in the relative positions of various groups, while the society as a whole remains very much as it was before. If revolutionaries gain control of a government, they will encounter the same constraints upon their attempts to mobilize as did the first wave of radical-minded leaders. Recurrent unsuccessful attempts to change the African world may well give rise to a vendetta morality and to full-scale withdrawal movements.10

THE PROCESSES OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION

Nation-building involves not only the creation of political institutions capable of maintaining peace and order and of pursuing policies which foster social and economic development, but also the transformation of the syncretic societies of contemporary African countries into national societies. Nation-building thus involves what has come to be called "national integration." National integration entails

the aggregation of independently defined, specifically outlined traditional primordial groups into larger, more diffuse units, whose implicit frame of reference is not the local scene but the "nation"—in the sense of the whole society encompassed by the new civil state.11

The most problematic aspect of national integration in Tropical Africa has been, and remains, "tribalism." But "tribalism" is a very inadequate concept with reference to a very complex reality. Africans cannot be assigned to mutually exclusive classificatory units of similar character called "tribes" or "ethnic groups." Increasingly, it is recognized that while an ethnic group or tribe usually suggests a closed, ascriptive group based
on a descent from a common ancestor, such a group is in practice defined by the theory its members hold of themselves. The identity to which they refer involves not only the fact of descent, but many other elements such as exploitation of the soil, history, religion, and spatial organization; and everywhere these groupings have been modified over centuries by social changes. The concept of ethnicity constitutes a moving rather than a static pattern of identities; interaction between the old and the new does not occur once and for all when "tradition" encounters "modernity," but continues in a process of change.

The interaction of the old and the new to constitute patterns of incipient national integration can be illustrated by comparing two cases from West Africa: Ivory Coast and Mali. The two countries are contiguous; they shared the same colonial experience for over half a century and were administered as provinces of a common larger unit; their dominant political organizations were, for a period of almost fifteen years after World War II, subunits of a larger, interterritorial party, the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (R.D.A.); and many members of their first-generation elites shared a common secondary socialization through education and occupation and had established close ties of personal friendship. The two countries went through exactly the same steps of constitutional development from 1945 to 1960 and became independent at the same time, with the same formal institutions. Yet, approaching the end of the first decade of independence, their paths appear to be diverging toward what may eventually become opposite poles in a continuum of African patterns of national integration.

An approximation of the significant features of their respective societal landscapes can be achieved with the aid of an old-fashioned construct, the ethnographic or culture circle. Ivory Coast can be divided into four of these, none of which accounts for more than one-third of the population; furthermore, none of the four constitutes any sort of cultural core with a center in the Ivory Coast itself; and there was in the past relatively little interaction among these circles toward the middle. The self-image of Ivory Coast, internalized by Africans from the perceptions of European explorers and administrators, is one of very great fragmentation.
Little in their experience challenges this view.

The Mali pattern is very different. A single core of related peoples, which Mali shares with Guinea, contains more than half of the population; a second accounts for about one-fifth; and the remainder is divided among three other culture circles. The largest group is not merely an ethnographic construct but is a unity defined with reference to the historical tradition of the Empire of Mali. This provides important links between the Mali population and peripheral groups with whom they have lived in close relationship, ranging from mutual conquest and coexistence within a large-scale state to symbiotic economic life. There have been conflicts, but a sense of "belonging to Mali" has persisted, reinforced by nearly universal adherence to Islam. The most distinctive pattern of traditional culture in Mali was the existence of a network of trading towns which served as the foci of regional culture. These towns were ethnically heterogeneous; a town's immigrant population was amalgamated into a core urban culture through a process which involved a shift from an ethnic to a residential identity. Hence, traditional Mali consisted of a shifting coalition of regional political communities with urban and rural components.

Recent social changes have reinforced these contrasts. In Ivory Coast, which underwent fairly rapid economic transformation after World War II the major effect of cash-crop agriculture was to reinforce fairly sharp divisions between those different parts of the country which coincided with the distinct culture circles. There developed poorer and richer ethnic groups, a pattern which reinforced earlier differentiation. At the same time, there was large-scale migration of certain economic groups from one part of the country to another, thus creating a sudden confrontation between immigrants in the new towns. The tendency has been for these immigrant groups to create urban voluntary associations based on ethnic links, thus fostering the transformation of the country into a society of ethnic segments with a rural and an urban component. Concurrently, these social and economic changes contributed toward an increasing rate of transactional integration at the national level. 15
Mali has not undergone the same experience. The country remained an economic backwater, and the colonial system invested very little in the development of an economic and social infrastructure. Much of the population is still involved in the traditional market economy, and there are fewer opportunities for the sort of sudden ethnic confrontation that is typical of the new Ivory Coast towns. Hence, there is less interference with integrative patterns typical of the older Malian urban culture.

Political leaders in both countries started with the same model of mass-party organization, inspired by the continental European left. In attempting to institutionalize these organizations, however, they have necessarily adapted them in a manner congruent with pre-existing societal patterns. In Ivory Coast, the movement which eventually became the dominant political party was erected on the basis of a vast ethnic coalition founded on the network of ethnic associations in the capital city, themselves linked with the rural areas and towns of the hinterland. Much of the postwar political history of the Ivory Coast can be understood in terms of a process of fragmentation and recombination of this coalition; opponents have necessarily defined their own organizations in ethnic terms as well. The ethnic criterion is prominent in all representative institutions, in a manner familiar to students of urban political machines in the United States. The dominant party's success can be attributed to its ability to hold the ethnic coalition together. This is accomplished by distributing benefits to second-tier leaders in the form of offices and general economic rewards, while maintaining a relatively high level of prosperity for the country as a whole. This prosperity was the result, initially, of the accident of high prices for tropical commodities during and immediately after the Korean War. The maintenance of these prices afterward was assured by a deliberately pro-French policy on the part of Ivoirien leadership.

In Mali, during the equivalent postwar period, a significantly different process developed. From 1945 to 1959, there were two poles of political organization, neither of which could be clearly identified as an ethnic coalition. They resembled the heterogeneous bipolar factions often
observed in Malian towns. The primacy of one of these groups toward the end of the period can be attributed to a variety of factors, including a more forceful ideological appeal, greater concern with organizational detail, occasional assistance from the interterritorial parent organization in Ivory Coast, and, less tangibly, the fact that its attitude was congruent with the historical coalition which prevailed in the area. Although there were variations in regional support for one or the other of these two national coalitions at various times, neither of them could be identified as an ethnic coalition as were their counterparts in Ivory Coast. The only clearly ethnic parties in Mali were peripheral ones, involving groups which were traditionally at the edge of the central political arena, such as the Dogon. The growth of the one-party state tended to take on the appearance of a confederacy of urban-dominated regions represented by ambassadors at the center. In the absence of an economic boom, the party organization's distributive capacity was limited to rewarding its followers with political and administrative offices.

Around the time of independence, Mali and Ivory Coast shared the characteristic approach to nation-building discussed above. This involved, at the ideological level, a commitment to "oneness," and at the institutional level, a reliance on the administrative and coercive apparatus inherited from the colonial government sustained by the dominant party. But the relationship between these instruments was weighted in favor of the party in Mali and in favor of the administrative apparatus in Ivory Coast. If one considers the party alone, it appeared that the center was exerting much more leverage on the national society in Mali than in Ivory Coast. But if party and administrative instruments are considered together in each country, as structures by means of which the national center is attempting to transform society, then the situation may well be reversed. At the present time, the Malian party seldom effectively reaches beyond the country's administrative centers. Its cadre is composed primarily of government employees (including school-teachers), often the only literate adults in an area, for whom party activity is a supplementary obligation in the same sense that participation in civic affairs is an obligation for corporation executives in the United States. The party's main contribution
is the performance of administrative tasks such as the relaying of information concerning governmental decisions. In Ivory Coast, the party cadre includes mainly "old militants" whose orientation is almost exclusively local; hence, the party is not a major instrument used by the center to effect change, but rather an instrument used to elicit local support. The national center has invested heavily in the national administrative apparatus. The bureaucratic ranks were filled initially by highly skilled French administrators whom France was willing to maintain and Ivory Coast was willing to retain; but increasingly these men are being replaced by well-trained Ivoiriens. The country's resources enable the government to create specialized administrative structures to carry out development programs, thus freeing the general administrations, patterned after the continental prefectural system, for the performance of political tasks.

In the final analysis, however, a focus on institutions alone would mask the emergence of profound differences of purpose and of ultimate orientation which are related to the societal patterns discussed above. The constraints imposed upon the leadership by the availability of means, and the choices they have made within the range available to them, are determined to a large degree by the societal environment. In Ivory Coast, where development is progressing at a remarkable rate, one senses that the leadership is betting on the long-run beneficial effects of transactional integration. The one-party state serves to hold political conflict in abeyance, almost in a Gaullist sense, while the consequences of these modernizing processes become more firmly established. The network of ethnic associations referred to earlier remains the basis for political management while the population is being assimilated into a new Franco-African culture which derives little or no inspiration from the past. In Mali, non-political factors cannot be relied upon to bring about the integrative transformation. The Malian party-state stresses a territorial federalism combining the major regions, all connected by Islam and the area's historical traditions. Reinterpreted to fit a Marxist-Leninist linguistic mold, this party-state is not merely a temporary arrangement, but rather the contemporary avatar of an older polity which defines the very order of society itself.
Whether the processes that are discernible in these two countries and elsewhere in Africa will result in the kind of societal wholeness that we can call "integration" cannot be seriously foretold. Although Ivory Coast and Mali have already moved farther along the difficult path to national integration than many countries, the institutional patterns sketched above are still extremely precarious. At the time of writing, both countries belong to that dwindling group of African states which have not experienced a coup d'etat. It would be foolish to attribute this apparent stability to structural factors which distinguish these two countries from their neighbors. There have been near misses in both cases, and the failure of attempted coups can be accounted for only in terms of circumstantial events.

CONCLUSIONS

In this essay, I have made no attempt to rank-order the African states with regard to degree of success in nation-building. This might be done by developing a new typology of African states based not on similarities and differences among formal political institutions, but rather on similarities and differences in social structures more generally. From this point of view, it is clear that a small number of countries, such as Ivory Coast and Ghana, for example, stand out from the rest and are on the verge of reaching a threshold of societal development which may be labeled "incipient modernity." These states are exceptional in the contemporary African scene and are likely to become even more exceptional as the effects of incipient modernization become infused into every sphere of social life, including the political. At the other extreme, there is a fairly large group of countries, such as the Central African Republic or Upper Volta, which are among the least developed countries in the entire world. Unfortunately, they are likely to remain at their present level for a long time; it has become evident that wherever there was some potential for relatively rapid modernization, this potential was brought out during the colonial period. In between are countries with some potential for modernization but with a complex of problems which has so far prevented this
potential from developing. It is not necessary to view politics as merely epiphenomenal to suggest that the general characteristics of the social structure, and especially the nature of primordial solidarities and the overall degree of modernization, impose limits within which variations of regime can occur.

The approach followed here, which might be called "comparative macro-analysis," stresses the identification of broad structural patterns obtained inductively but inspired by general theoretical considerations. In its present form, this method cannot achieve a very high degree of empirical precision or theoretical elegance. But it is, on the whole, suitable for the task at hand, which is to explore a world that is essentially unknown, not only to us, but also to those who live within it. In that sense, it is very much like an early map; it does not constitute a sure guide, but it does identify salient features of the terrain which can be used for orientation.

NOTES

1. For the concepts "environment" and "political system" as used here, see the works of David Easton, and especially A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965).


3. Some of the ideas discussed in this section have been elaborated in the author's Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).


6. This proposition is related to David Apter's suggestion that there is "an inverse relationship between information and coercion in a system" in The Politics of Modernization Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965, p. 40.


10. See, for example, E. J. Hobsbawn, Primitive Rebels (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1965).


15. "Transactional integration" refers to the process discussed by Karl W. Deutsch in various works; see in particular "Social Mobilization and Political Development," reprinted in Comparative Politics, ed. by Eckstein and Apter, pp. 582-603.
From experts on African questions, Deliver us, O Lord!  

African politics is a graveyard of typologies and predictions. The compressed temporal space of African independence encompasses two distinctive phases, marked by sharply contrasting approaches to understanding. The era of nationalist triumph, culminating in 1960, was ushered in with confidence, optimism, and euphoria, an attitude shared by African statesmen and "experts on African questions." In the wake of the accumulating frustrations of an independence which often fell short of the towering expectations, a dramatic shift in style and tone has occurred. In the language of observers "political decay" replaced "political development"; "charismatic heroes" became "charming rouges"; the warning by René Dumont that "Africa is off to a false start" became the savage pessimism of Albert Meister's question "can Africa take off?" The African poet who wrote the epigram cited above might well repeat his lament today, nearly two decades later. Is not today's analysis operating in as cramped a perspective as that of the yesterday of independence? Are we freezing the swing of the pendulum of political development in mid-arc by projecting over a broad time canvas conclusions drawn from an exceedingly narrow segment of African history, the handful of years since independence? Perhaps we can escape the constraints of cross-sectional analysis by viewing the development of political systems in a time-series framework. The unit of analysis is the contemporary territorial state; therefore, the base point is necessarily the colonial state. For analytical purposes, we
Consolidation of Nation-States

may characterize political systems at any given state in terms of the key sources and vehicles of power. Our central assumption is that the contours of the system at any given stage limit the number of possible outcomes at the succeeding stage. This, of course, assumes that alterations in the environment are only partial, and that no apocalyptic transformations of the context of African political systems occur. But let us stress the modesty of our aspiration. We seek only a conceptual device for illuminating the process and direction of change, for understanding where we now stand in the politics of independence, and for offering a framework for reasoned speculation (not prediction) concerning the range of conceivable alternative patterns of development in the immediate future.

The analytical stages we would suggest are four: 1) the colonial system; 2) the nationalist political system arising as a substitute for the colonial system becoming in some cases a virtual anti-state; 3) the independence political formula; and 4) the second-phase post-independence regime, already upon us in the majority of independent African states. We propose to sketch a paradigm of the political system at each stage, to examine the transition from each stage to the next, and to consider the range of observed variation in outcome.

Our universe is composed of the thirty-nine African states which were independent as of January, 1968. South Africa, however, as a state based upon a racial caste system and ruled by white oligarchy, presents such special circumstances that most of the generalizations we suggest do not really apply. Two other special cases worth noting in passing are Liberia and Ethiopia, examples of historic African states which avoided prolonged colonial subjugation.

THE COLONIAL POLITICAL SYSTEM

The colonial political system was, at its zenith, a nearly perfect model of a bureaucratic regime. After the initial period of putting down resistance from those African kingdoms having the military and political
capacity to oppose European penetration, and the subsequent suppression of widespread rebellions which arose in both stateless and centralized societies when the first consequences of colonial overrule became apparent, the elite corps of colonial administrators constituted a mandarinate whose authority was virtually unrestricted.8

There were, it is true, different emphases in the theoretical dogma which arose as prescriptive rationalization of the administrative practice emerging in the first decades of colonial practice. But the basic requirements were everywhere the same: to impose colonial order, to generate sufficient local revenue to make colonial administration self-supporting and to assure the security of the missionaries (except in Muslim areas) and trading companies who sought to follow the flag (or even precede it) into the hinterland. After colonial hegemony was established, some kind of accommodation was necessary with traditional elites in most areas. The personnel and means available to the colonial state were initially very small; for example, in the first decade of colonial rule in the Congo, when King Leopold's authority was being established, there were never more than 120 Europeans in the army of conquest. Delavignette gives a vivid description of the role of sixty French administrators in Niger in the interwar period, governing one million people in an area half the size of France.9 All colonizers had to find a formula by which a small expatriate elite could meet the goals of the colonial state.

The colonial mandarinate created a state in which political power was exercised by a central bureaucracy of Europeans in the territorial capital, with a field corps of district officers who enjoyed wide latitude in maintenance of order within their areas. A residual area of local power and influence often remained with the African intermediaries, especially where they were the legitimate heirs of established centralized systems, such as in the Buganda kingdom in Uganda, the Hausa-Fulani Emirates of Northern Nigeria, Barotseland in Zambia (ex-Northern Rhodesia), the Bayaka region in southwestern Congo, or the Wadai sultanate in northern Chad. But the African chiefs, legitimate or imposed, had a restricted orbit of influence and had very little impact on decision-making at the territorial level. At the top the colonial state was susceptible to pressures from expatriate interest
groups, such as settlers, corporations, or missions. But even in dealing with these groups, the colonial bureaucracy enjoyed a substantial degree of freedom of maneuver. The respective metropolitan governments set only broad guidelines to direct the colonial decision-making elite. In the case of former British territories, colonial governors were, until World War II, fairly immune from London directives if they did not demand Exchequer subsidies and if they could prevent any crisis situation from inviting public attention. In the French case, despite the façade of centralization, colonial legislation was delegated to the Ministry of Colonies; in practice effective control was in the hands of the territorial governors, and the two governors-general in Dakar and Brazzaville. In Belgium, only in the rare case of a strong minister of colonies was much real authority exercised from Brussels. In short, to a remarkable degree, the heart of the colonial state was its local European bureaucracy, which had very few effective constraints on its operation, either from above or below. This was the structure of power to which nationalist movements responded, and which provided the grid within which social change occurred at an accelerating pace.

In the years following World War II, nationalist movements arose in antithesis to the colonial system. The colonial mandarinate came to recognize—slowly—that its hegemony could not be perpetual. The metropolitan powers, caught up in the environment of cold war competition for the Third World, began to participate more actively in colonial administration, laying down policies which provided opportunities for African organization. The social changes which came in the wake of colonial penetration—emergence of important urban centers, development of a modern educational system, diffusion of the cash economy—produced an elite capable of organizing an effective challenge to the colonial system.

THE NATIONALIST POLITICAL SECTOR

The character of the nationalist response was shaped to an important degree by the nature of the transitional mechanisms. For the most part, in former British, French, and Belgian territories, these were determined by
the constitutional norms of the metropole. The withdrawing power, if it had to go, was determined to do so with honor. Colonial self-respect required that a political sector be introduced to parallel the bureaucratic mechanisms which had run the colonial state. Thus, the colonial administrators assumed that the African personnel to succeed to power would emerge from the electoral procedures which had been enshrined as the model of good government at home. So it was that the British evolved a sequence for devolution of power which entailed gradual conversion of legislative councils, which before World War II had been advisory bodies with little if any African membership, into elected parliaments. Colonial department heads were gradually replaced with African ministers who were ultimately responsible to the legislature. In the French case, African political participation was made available on a limited scale in the French National Assembly. In 1956, provision was made for fully-elected territorial assemblies with ministers responsible to them. In the former Belgian Congo, when the sudden decision was made for immediate independence in 1960, a faithful replica of the Belgian constitution was produced and the full apparatus of the Belgian parliamentary state erected in less than six months.

The definition of legitimacy in terms of the arithmetic of parliamentary democracy had important consequences. To win control of the state, African nationalists had to begin by seizing the political sector. The vehicle for achieving this goal was the political party, organized for electoral competition. The party, however, did not control the colonial bureaucracy; in fact it usually penetrated rural areas by aggregating the manifold grievances focused upon the European administration. Two interacting, partially competing power systems developed—the colonial bureaucracy, which managed the formal, authoritative institutions of government, and the nationalist parties, which derived their force from their ability to organize the people for elections and mobilize them for other specific manifestations of opposition, such as boycotts, demonstrations and strikes.

Under the mandate to permit African political organization, the first response of the colonial administration was frequently to encourage the formation of parties subject to their manipulation. The French were particularly prone to this policy; in the words of one pro-French writer:
"The administration had no choice. The elections since they were mandatory, had to be rigged."10

Administrative parties were launched by the administrations in Morocco, Algeria, Chad, Ivory Coast, and elsewhere, especially in the late 1940's. The Belgian administration banked heavily on the fate of its creature in the Congo, the Parti National du Progrès.

But the colonial bureaucracy was not really equipped to compete with the growing nationalist forces in a political arena where its particular skills and resources were not relevant. The metropolitan government placed growing pressure on the colonial administration to respect its rules of decolonization; for example, the 1951 elections in former French Africa were cynically rigged, whereas the 1956 elections, except in Algeria, were relatively honest. Also, the mandarinate faced the growing ability of nationalist parties to organize rural areas. For example, the Belgian administration in the Congo had been in a position to exercise a decisive influence in many parts of the countryside as late as the end of 1959. However, in the May, 1960, national elections to designate the successors to the colonial regime, the administration party won a meager 15 out of 137 seats.

In this stage of development there emerged two main types of parties, "mass" and "patron", and two types of party systems, single and competitive. Mass parties were characterized by the aspiration to penetrate every village, hostility toward traditional authority structures, an aggressive style of total opposition to the colonial administration, a radical, Marxist-Populist flavor to its ideological rhetoric, and an organizational framework modeled on European parties of the left.11 Patron parties were inclined to build a national alliance founded upon existing local authority structures, they were less belligerent in style and more moderate in program pronouncement. Where the mass-party model was approximated, there was a strong tendency toward the voluntary or forced absorption of all competing groups. The more ideological character of these movements, and the tendency to identify the party with the nation, implied that no legitimate political activity could occur outside the party. As former President Kwame Nkrumah declared of his party, the "CPP is Ghana." Under these circumstances no one could stand outside the party. However, where the patron-party style predominated, or
Development of Political Systems

where mass movements had become identified with ethnic nationalism, the alien control over the electoral process frequently permitted the emergence of a competitive party system. The classic examples of the mass single-party outcome in the terminal colonial period are Guinea, Mali, Tunisia, Ivory Coast, and Tanganyika. Competitive parties developed in Uganda, Sudan, Lesotho, Congo-Kinshasa, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. It should be noted that where competition did occur, it tended to follow religious (Uganda and Sudan) or ethnic (Congo and Nigeria) cleavages.

There were, however, occasions when the nature of the colonial system was such that it was not prepared to organize constitutionally its own demise. There were two key factors which obstructed the devolution of power upon the African. One was the presence of a large and potent settler population, which saw transposition of the electoral rules of the metropole as a direct threat to its survival. The other was the existence of a vision of empire which precluded separation of the overseas territory. The cases in point are Algeria, the Portuguese territories, Rhodesia, and, for a time, Kenya. The same processes of social change produced a nationalist elite, but it became evident that the path of access to power through electoral processes was not going to be possible—in Algeria and Rhodesia because the settler element controlled the legal processes, in the Portuguese possessions because both elections and decolonization were beyond the pale of Lusitanian political practice. A guerrilla army rather than a political party was required by the situation. This in turn implied utterly different organizational skills, and dictated different techniques of relating the movement to the population. The most effective revolutionary movements, in the phase of organizing resistance to the colonial system, were those of Algeria and Portuguese Guinea. 

In Kenya, the Mau Mau revolt at a time when settler sway seemed unshakable was highly instrumental in eventually committing the metropolitan government and colonial administration to the enforcement of an orthodox, constitutional electoral devolution of power to the African majority.

Whether by guerrilla war or constitutional politics, a common occurrence was the coalescence within the territorial state of nationalist political forces. This led to an escalation of demands upon the system, above all for a foreshortening of the independence timetable. The very fact that this
political force was outside the inner sanctum of colonial power, the bureaucracy, yet was increasingly an authoritative spokesman for the population, created impossible dilemmas for the colonizer. Margery Perham, her hand on the pulse of colonial policy formulation in Britain, states the problem succinctly:

... power cannot be held in suspense. Once it was known that it would be transferred, the position of the colonial government could become so weak, and that of its still irresponsible successors so strong, that the interim period of uncertainty could become intolerable, if not dangerous.14

Thus, the alternative power system developing through political parties secured its control over the newly established institutions of the political sector before much effort was made to decolonize the bureaucratic sector. The mandarinate had established criteria for entry which greatly restricted African access in view of the very limited opportunities for secondary and higher education until the 1950's. A political career had no prerequisites; politicians did not need diplomas. But after World War II a university degree was essential for entrance to the senior cadres of public service. The figures on this are eloquent. In 1939, in Nigeria, there were only 23 Nigerians in the senior service; in 1947, the number was still only 182.15 In Ghana, Africans composed only 13.8 per cent of the senior service in 1949, and still only 38.2 per cent in 1954.16 In Kenya, the public service was only opened to Africans in 1955. At the end of 1960, of 1600 professional-level functionaries, only 42 were Africans. In Tanganyika, the first African entered the senior service in 1951. In 1958, of the 4000 top posts, only five were held by Africans.17 In Morocco in 1955, the French held two-thirds of all civil service jobs; there were no less than 40,000 French civil servants.18 In Ivory Coast in 1956, not a single African held a decision-making position in the senior administration.19 In the Congo (Kinshasa), at the moment of independence in 1960, of the 4,642 top slots, only three were filled by Africans.20

A crucial aspect of this phase of political development was the nature of the mass-elite relationships, which experienced a major metamorphosis after independence. The accumulated privileges of the exercise of power tended to be concentrated within the expatriate group. In many territories,
the European minority received more than half the national income. The nationalist counter-elite did not bear the onus of actual exercise of governmental power. Whether the struggle was electoral or armed, the nationalist leadership had an absolute need for the support of the countryside. Numbers were critical; whether the tactic was appealing directly to villagers, or stitching together a series of alliances with local or regional influentials, notables, and chiefs, the keys to the political kingdom were in the ballot box. Rewards for support came through promissory notes for the future. In most cases no mortgage payments needed to be met until independence arrived. Both the continuing needs of party organization and the focused requirements of electoral campaigns compelled a sustained effort at building linkages between elite and mass.

THE INDEPENDENCE POLITICAL FORMULA

Independence symbolized the assumption of full authority by the nationalist political counterpart to the colonial bureaucratic system. It represented a fundamental transformation of relationships, and it had the ineluctable consequence of a swift liquidation of the expatriate mandarinate. The rules of the political game were redefined. Power for the triumphant nationalist elite now derived from its control of the state, rather than from access to potential backing from the countryside. Prestigious positions in the bureaucratic hierarchy was a key reward for the elite faithful; swift Africanization was also dictated by the desire to assume full control of the state machinery, and was reinforced by the sheer logic of nationalism. In the aftermath of independence, nationalist ideology was given further elaboration in the form of African socialism which gave impetus both to the role of the state and the urgency of Africanization.

This third phase in the development of African political systems may be labeled the independence political formula. The dominant political forms were political parties, which moved swiftly to consolidate control by imposing restrictions on opposing groups and by inducing voluntary fusion into the ruling group. The salient political form appeared to be a single-party system. The application of the categories of "mass party" and dominant
"patron party" to specific countries is bound to raise objections and endless debate on given cases, as few real parties fully match the abstract paradigms. However, useful indications can be given on orders of magnitude by a rough classification. The analysis in Table 1 shows that of the thirty-eight independent African states (excluding South Africa), at the moment of independence, nine were led by reasonable approximations of a mass single party. In eighteen other cases, there was a dominant patron party. 23 Nine instances of competitive party systems survived the terminal colonial electoral processes (including three, Nigeria, Congo-Kinshasa, and Uganda where no party achieved an electoral majority). Two states (Ethiopia and Libya) had traditional no-party systems, and Algeria achieved independence behind the revolutionary military Front de Libération Nationale (FLN).

SECOND-PHASE POST-INDEPENDENCE REGIME

The assumption by the nationalist parties of the reins of government set the stage for transition to another stage. Africanization of the bureaucracy and the exercise of power through formal institutions of government led to a tendency toward partial fusion of party and state.24 The nationalist elite, impaled upon the boundless promises of the drive for independence, faced enormous difficulties in maintaining the relationships with the countryside which developed in the terminal colonial period. There were agonizing limitations imposed by the uncertainties of export prices, the high cost of the administrative infrastructure of the state, and the dependence on the developed world for both markets and finance. The central concern shifted silently from organization to control. Political personnel who had devoted years to the hardship of agitational politics had been absorbed into the machinery of government. Africanization and independence had offered substantial satisfactions to the incumbent generation of leadership; out of power were the growing numbers of new post-independence university and secondary school graduates, the urban workers, and the rural peasantry. The nationalist elite and functionaries benefiting from Africanization had become a political-administrative middle class; new lines of social division and conflict began to become evident.
The range of possible outcomes was limited by the nature of the independence political formula and the new context of change within which the dominant power-holders operated. The mass parties faced a particularly acute dilemma, as their whole style of operation was totally altered by success in gaining power. The essential skill developed by the mass party had been solidarity-making; the role of governance compelled them to adopt at least partly an administrative-technocratic orientation. The arteries of communication hardened; the shrivelling party structure became simply a transmission mechanism for directives and official exhortation. The excitement of political rallies promising life more abundant was supplanted by exhortations for harder work. The most dramatic demonstration of the total erosion of a once potent party, with mass support in at least a substantial part of the country, was the complete evaporation of the Convention People's Party in Ghana with the overthrow of Nkrumah in February, 1966. The CPP had become nothing more than the projection of the political personality of Nkrumah. The elimination of one man caused the party to vanish with hardly a trace.

The mass party, as it stood in the independence political formula, was an unstable form. The change in its role generated a strong tendency toward atrophy of its mass character; the mass party eroded into an oligarchic machine or, in the extreme case illustrated by the final days of the Nkrumah regime, simply into an agent of personal rule. Only two of the mass-party regimes, Tunisia and Tanzania, appear to have been able to maintain their momentum; an examination of these cases may shed light on the mechanisms available to revitalize mass parties.

THE CASE OF TUNISIA AND TANZANIA

In the case of Tanzania, one may point to a specific political mechanism which has provided the dominant party, TANU, with a renewed vitality. One of the most interesting political innovations of the contemporary world is the one-party electoral system devised to preserve both democracy and a single-party framework in Tanzania. The system was constructed on the premise that some form of competitive mechanism had to be built into the party itself to replace competition from outside. It was devised after a special
TABLE 1
AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM TYPES: THE INDEPENDENCE PERIODS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Phase 3 Independence Political Formula</th>
<th>Phase 4 Second-Phase, Post-independence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Key: MP: Mass party</td>
<td>Key: P/S: Party State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DPP: Dominant patron party</td>
<td>RMP: Renewed mass party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CP: Competitive party</td>
<td>MR: Military regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RLM: Revolutionary liberation movement</td>
<td>CP: Competitive party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NP: No-party traditional</td>
<td>NP: No-party traditional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>RLM</td>
<td>MR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>P/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroun</td>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>P/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Rep.</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>MR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>P/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo-Brazzaville</td>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>P/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo-Kinshasa</td>
<td>CP</td>
<td>MR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahomey</td>
<td>CP</td>
<td>MR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>NP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>P/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>CP</td>
<td>CP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>MR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>MR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>P/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>P/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>CP</td>
<td>P/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>P/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>NP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>P/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>P/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>P/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>P/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>NP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>P/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>CP</td>
<td>MR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>CP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>CP</td>
<td>P/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>CP</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 1 (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Phase 3</th>
<th>Phase 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>RMP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>MR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>RMP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>CP</td>
<td>P/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAR</td>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>MR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>MR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>P/S</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Totals:
- MP = 9
- DPP = 18
- CP = 9
- RIM = 1
- NP = 2
- P/S = 19
- RMP = 2
- MR = 12
- CP = 3
- NP = 3

Commentary:

Readers should exercise proper caution in interpreting Table 1. The categories are not susceptible to rigorous definition, and therefore are rather imprecise at the margins. The totals, however, give a useful indication of the over-all distribution of system types. The basepoint for Phase 3 is the time of achievement of independence, while the Phase 4 classifications are made on the basis of the situation at the beginning of 1968. Therefore, the time interval varies substantially in some cases. (For example, Lesotho and Botswana became independent only in 1966, while the UAR regained its sovereignty in 1922.) South Africa, as a racial caste system, obviously is a very special case; and some may prefer to exclude it from the tabulations.
presidential commission carefully examined ways and means of building a
democratic one-party state.28 The crux of the procedure was to offer a
contest between two candidates in the 107 single-member districts into which
mainland Tanzania was divided. A petition with twenty-five signatures was
sufficient to enter the race. The TANU district executive committees then
selected two candidates, with the TANU Central Committee having an opportunity
to screen the nominations. The campaign took place under rather stringent
restrictions. Candidates spoke at formal gatherings organized by the party;
they were not permitted to hold their own campaign meetings. Use of Swahili
was obligatory; discussion of race, ethnic group, or religion was prohibited.
Wide areas of government policy were also out of bounds, including matters
such as the Development Plan, the role of Tanzania's Asian community, non-
alignment, and East African cooperation.

Despite these limitations, there can be no doubt that the September,
1965, elections, the first to be conducted under these rules, had a thera-
peutic effect for the regime. A dramatic demonstration of both the impact
of the elections, and the need for them, was the high turnover of parlia-
montary seats; less than one fourth of the incumbents won re-election. Two
ministers and six junior ministers were defeated at the polls. The govern-
ment did not interfere to assure the re-election of its top personnel, and
the evidence from these carefully studied elections is that the populace did
find them a meaningful opportunity for political participation.29 The turnover
rate is all the more remarkable when one recalls that the parliamentary
salary is, for many deputies, far greater than that of alternative forms of
employment. Politicians have a high personal stake in their political
careers. The content of the campaign speeches was dominated by local issues,
partly because most other issues were proscribed. In a number of consti-
tuencies, there is evidence that the visual political symbols by which
candidates were identified to the many illiterate voters (a house or a hoe,
assigned by lot) had some effect on the results. But the 1965 elections remain
a crucial moment of renewal and rebirth for the mass-party system in Tanzania.
They compelled the elite to rebuild a link with the countryside; the turn-
over demonstrated how badly these had been eroded.
The 1965 elections are not the sole explanation of the relative success of TANU in sustaining itself. The nature of the leadership from President Julius Nyerere is of central importance as well. The recognition by Nyerere of the necessity to build into his system constraints on the party in order to maintain its vitality is suggestive of a political style very different from that of Nkrumah. In many other ways, Nyerere demonstrated a concern for preserving an open society and active rural support. However, it is important not to exaggerate the distinctions we are suggesting between party systems containing renewal mechanisms, and oligarchic machines; Tanzania and TANU fall some distance short of the mass-party model, while other systems endowed with leaders of broad political vision, such as Zambia or Senegal, are not entirely dissimilar from Tanzania.

Tunisia has found rather different mechanisms for maintaining the momentum of the mass-party, the Destour Socialist Party. Elections per se have not played a major part in this instance. The processes of revitalization in Tunisia are more subtle and elusive, yet the contrast between the Destour Socialist Party, after more than a decade of independence, and most African ruling parties is dramatic.

Part of the answer lies simply in the greater historic depth of Habib Bourguiba's Destour party. The movement was already well established in the 1930's, unlike sub-Saharan parties. Its internal structures were constructed in the perspective of a long-range struggle, rather than in the context of the swift achievement of the primary goal of independence. The party developed a whole family of ancillary organizations, such as UGET (students), UGTT (workers), UNFT (women), and UTICA (traders). These have enjoyed a degree of autonomy; but there has been continuing political conflict between the ancillary organizations and the party on the boundaries of legitimate dissent. The creative tension thus sustained is one of the sources of regeneration. The homogeneity of society and culture in Tunisia has assured that tensions are not translated into ethnic or religious confrontations and escalated beyond the point which the system can manage them.

Since independence, the Destour Socialist Party has been able to transform successive challenges into revitalizing impulses. A classic example of the transformation of challenge into renewal was the process of commitment
of Tunisia to planning and socialism. In 1956, Bourguiba engineered the removal of trade union leader Ben Salah because his economic doctrines were judged too radical for the regime. Five years later, Ben Salah was dramatically returned to grace as Minister of Planning. The mounting pressures from a younger generation of militant intellectuals for a redirection of Tunisia's economy was converted into new strength as Bourguiba adopted the program of a potential opposition force.

The renewal process in Tunisia partly occurs through the cooptation of individuals. A careful analysis of the career lines of top Tunisian leaders would find many who first became visible as articulate critics of what they felt to be the inadequate forward momentum of the regime. The ablest protagonists were disarmed by the offer of responsibility within the system and of some scope for converting their bill of indictment into the Destour Socialist policy.

As in the Tanzanian case, the style and character of the leadership from the top, especially from Bourguiba himself, is a significant dimension. A cyclical pattern is discernible; periods of stagnation in the late 1950's, and again in the middle 1960's, were visible. But each time the regime has been able to generate a renewed sense of momentum, and from this, a refurbished legitimacy. Challenge has been met with a political response, and not simply increased application of coercion.

PARTIES, ELECTIONS, AND MILITARY TAKE-OVER

For mass-party states which failed to find a formula for renewal, and for patron-party states generally, the initial outcome was an oligarchic party state. The metamorphosis was less spectacular in the latter case, as the contrast is less marked between the patron party and the oligarchic party state. But the same forces operated; the sources of power were now in the capital, and a network of rural allies was less vital.

Competitive party systems have proved very difficult to sustain. The tensions generated by a genuinely open electoral contest, when the outcome threatens the existing distribution of power among ethnic groups or regions, can be enormous. Elections of this nature, since 1960, have been
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held in Sierra Leone, Burundi, Congo-Kinshasa, Nigeria, Somalia, and Sudan. Only in Somalia were the results fully accepted; a remarkably deviant case, Somalia has had three peaceful, constitutional changes of government since independence. In Sierra Leone elections in 1967 that were free enough for the opposition party to win led immediately to an army coup. In Burundi, open elections were held in 1965; the results led to a sharp shift away from Watusi hegemony over the numerically superior Bahutu. A series of coups ensued which eliminated the Bahutu threat and restored Watusi overrule under army auspices.

In Nigeria, the national general elections in 1964 became a massive confrontation between regional parties. So high were the stakes believed to be by the participants that all felt it necessary to rely heavily on intimidation and coercion.32 The poisonous atmosphere of distrust which these elections left behind was a mortal blow to the competitive party system in Nigeria. The coup de grace came the following year when regional elections in the Western Region were conducted under even more deplorable conditions. Not long after, in January, 1966, a group of army officers assassinated the leader of the government party and ended the independence political formula.

In Congo-Kinshasa, the national elections held in 1965 were rendered almost meaningless by the entirely ephemeral character of the political groups contesting them. A new coalition movement knitted together by then Prime Minister Moise Tshombe fell apart shortly after winning an apparent electoral triumph. Voters were totally unable to discern any relationship between their voting choice and subsequent political outcomes. In this instance, the sheer anarchy of a Parliament with no control over political conflict made the results so capricious and unpredictable that a military coup occurred in November, 1965, to forestall a genuine risk of breakdown at the center. Thus the very nature of competitive parties, and the strong tendency for them to reflect communal or ethnic divisions, meant that an open fight tended to pit community against community. A competitive party system as an independence political formula was also, in general, unstable and tended toward either a fusion of parties into an oligarchic party state, or a military coup.
The fate of the single case to date of a revolutionary movement achieving power merits notice, although one cannot properly draw inferences from a single outcome. In Algeria, during the epic eight-year armed struggle for independence, the insurgent movement appeared to grow from weakness to strength. The revolutionary core was very small when violent action was unleashed on November first, 1954, but by 1956 it was able to hold at bay a French army approaching 500,000. The potent sense of nationalist identity borne of common hardships, the transcendent character of the struggle, and inspiring vision of the future seemed to most observers the guarantee of a regime of exceptional dynamism. A peasantry which had endured the trauma of the Algerian revolution could not fail to have the élan and the commitment to transformation which would create a new Algeria. But the outcome was to be utterly different. The first symptom visible to the world was the appearance of direct factional conflict between two armed groups for control of the government at the moment of independence. Six weeks passed before the Ben Bella group consolidated its control over Algiers. Subsequently, a whole array of competing groups became evident. The commanders of the six wilayas (military districts) appeared to regard their areas as personal fiefs. The external armies which had been based in Tunisia and Morocco had factional interests to promote. Traces of Kabyle-Arab tension surfaced. The imprisoned leaders differed sharply from those who had supervised the government in exile. The Algerian revolution drifted into an incoherence which culminated in a military coup in June, 1965.

Thus, as the African independence political formula moved into a post-independence phase, new rules governing access to power produced a limited range of outcomes. The most frequent were the erosion of mass or patron parties into either an oligarchic party state or a military regime. The competitive party formula exhibited a strong tendency to move toward one of the same two outcomes. Other possibilities were the preservation of a mass-party regime through the evolution of mechanisms for political renewal (in Tunisia and Tanzania) and, in rare instances, through the maintenance or emergence of a competitive party system (Somalia and Kenya). The range of possible outcomes arising from a military system will be discussed below. We have already considered the nature of renewed mass parties; we turn now to
a consideration of the character of the oligarchic party state and the military regime.

THE OLIGARCHIC PARTY

The key political resources for the elite of the oligarchic party-state were the security apparatus of the state, offices of government commanding allocation of funds or other goods and, in certain cases (especially former French territories such as Senegal, Ivory Coast, and Gabon), significant external support. The ability to serve as spokesman for a large or strategically located regional group was another valuable asset. Zolberg has suggested the analogy that the oligarchic party state is comparable to the American urban machine. Although it is not genuinely democratic, he argues, "it tends to avoid senseless cruelty." Zolberg continues:

By shunning serious commitment to a very demanding ideology, the machine maintains solidarity among its members by appealing to their self-interest while allowing for the play of factions and for recurrent reconciliation. It can easily provide for the formal and informal representation of a multitude of relatively modern and not-so-modern groups in the society, including those based on explicit economic or political interests.35

A useful example of the oligarchic machine was the Binza caucus group which dominated Congo politics from 1961 to 1964. The membership of the network suggests the types of political resources which were aggregated into effective power. Key members are shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2

BINZA GROUP CAUCUS, 1961-64, CONGO-KINSHASA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Region of Origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Justin Bomboko</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>central Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victor Mendaka</td>
<td>Director of the Sureté (special branch)</td>
<td>northeast Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Mobutu</td>
<td>Commander, Armée Nationale Congolaise</td>
<td>northern Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albert Ndele</td>
<td>Director of National Bank</td>
<td>lower Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damien Kandolo</td>
<td>Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Interior</td>
<td>east-central Congo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This shadowy caucus brought together leaders situated at strategic positions. Bomboko, Nendaka, and Mobutu had been politicians prior to independence, while Ndele and Kandolo were more administrative-technocratic in background. Each had at least a modest regional clientele. It was to some extent an invisible political machine, not a party; indeed, subsequent efforts of the group to form a political party failed.

A pervasive aspect of the oligarchic party state is the importance of personal ties. Politics is a highly complex matrix of interacting patron-client networks. Personal ties can be based upon kinship, common ethnic origin, membership in the same religious brotherhood, or, among members of the elite, shared educational or professional experiences. If a service is required from government, a commoner will make an effort to introduce his demand through a network to which he is attached. If there is none available, it is very likely that anticipating failure, the individual will abandon his request. Patron-client networks involve a set of mutual obligations; the client is expected to support his patron, and be governed by his political wishes. In return, the client is entitled to distributive benefits, to favored access to employment, or lodgings, or emergency financial support. The vintage politician is a man who succeeds in weaving together a large set of subnetworks. The need for access to substantial resources is axiomatic; the reward system is fundamental to the patron-client net. Rewards are not always material. In Senegal, for example, the most extensive patron-client nets are built around the Muslim brotherhoods; the marabout, or holy man leading an order, is able to distribute supernatural rewards through his exceptional piety and presumed ability to fathom and manipulate occult forces.

In the absence of non-governmental institutional structures, the oligarchic party state exhibits great fluidity as alliances of patron-client nets form and dissolve. Costs and benefits of coalitions are under continuous recalculation; this results in frequent shifts. The patron-client nets are critical in the political communication process. Mass media play a relatively small role in most African states; political information passes through the patron-client net by word of mouth. This diffusion process involves a heavy dose of selective perception as knowledge of a political
event is diffracted in passing through the patron-client prism.

System mutations arising out of the oligarchic party state appear to move primarily to a military regime. There is as yet no instance of a mass movement arising in antithesis to an oligarchic party state. The administration is unlikely to permit the formation of such a movement, and an open electoral framework for a movement of radical opposition is highly improbable. A large part of the potential leadership of such movements is absorbed into oligarchic coalition politics. The nearest approximation to a revolutionary opposition seeking to mobilize on a mass scale was the Congo rebellion of 1964-65. It proved subject to fragmentation; in choosing the path of violence the initiating elite found itself unable to direct or control the forces unleashed.37

MILITARY RULE

The military coup as a form of political change was almost totally unanticipated at the hour of African independence, although in retrospect it is not difficult to see why armies are able to seize power from oligarchic party machines with little opposition. Initially, the military was restrained in the majority of cases by the presence of expatriate officers at top levels. Not until Africanization of the major command posts had occurred in 1952 in the United Arab Republic; the former Wafd oligarchic party-state had completely lost its momentum and legitimacy. Sudan followed in 1958, although six years later the army relinquished power. Altogether, twelve states have experienced successful military coups. The coup is generally triggered by some particular impasse in the affairs of the oligarchic party-state. A recurrent underlying cause is simply that the consumption requirements of the patron-client network coalition outstrip the available resources of the state.

It is important to note that the regimes installed by the military are by no means wholly staffed by the army. The more general pattern is for a large percentage of the positions to be held by members of the political-administrative elite who had controlled the previous government. What has altered is the visible basis of power and legitimacy. All political actors recognize that the army is ultimately the basis of the
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regime, and that any direct challenge to its authority will simply be dealt with by military means. This is a significant change in the ground rules, but the change often merely sets a new framework for the continuation of previous patterns of network interaction.

Military regimes are unlikely to enjoy indefinite power; one of the more important open questions about African politics is the range of alternatives possible after military rule. Experience to date suggests the following possibilities: 1) a return of power to the previous dominant political groups, as in Sudan in 1964; 2) a coup by younger officers, or a different army faction, as in Dahomey in 1967; 3) an effort to politicize and invest the regime with non-military symbols, as in the UAR and Congo-Kinshasa. Only the last of these outcomes constitutes a real innovation. It merits further consideration.

In both UAR and Congo, the military elite has tried to construct from the top a political movement capable of offering a means for political organization of the countryside and support for the regime. In the UAR, the movement has been through several incarnations; its latest designation being the Arab Socialist Union. The initial undefined nationalism of the Nasser regime has been replaced by a relatively specific set of ideological commitments. In both UAR and Congo the military antecedents of the government have been de-emphasized. Congo President Mobutu quietly replaced his uniform with a Tanzania-style tunic and a leopard-skin cap. All previous political parties were dissolved, and the regime launched its own party: the Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (MPR). The MPR was constituted on a basis entirely different from earlier Congo parties; rather than being founded upon the regional clientele of local political notables, it was imposed from the top. In adopting the radical vocabulary of earlier mass parties elsewhere, it clothed itself in a populist garb. Regional party leaders were appointed from the center, and operated primarily on the basis of resources made available from the center. Officials were forbidden to work in their home territories where they might have an opportunity to develop a personal following. The MPR and the Arab Socialist Union faced a similar dilemma. The burden of generating support for a regime in a context which lacked the capability to meet the expectations of the countryside was
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a major constraint upon effectiveness and legitimacy. No doubt military regimes elsewhere will be tempted to try changing their spots as a means of increasing longevity.

CONCLUSIONS

In the immediate future, then, African political systems seem likely to be predominately of the oligarchic party state, military regime, or regime-imposed party types. (Table 3) But African economies are unlikely to expand rapidly enough to provide adequate resource lubrication for any of the existing systems to enjoy stable development. There are many constraints upon the range of political outcomes which have not been given adequate attention in this essay. Increasing numbers of university graduates will appear on the scene, and those who do not find satisfying outlets are likely to place high ideological demands on the system. The spread of political consciousness in many states is likely to intensify ethnic nationalism. If a large and self-conscious ethnic group believes itself excluded from the distribution of power and rewards, it is likely to contemplate the option of secession, as Biafra has attempted in the Nigerian context. Active separatist movements which have resorted to armed revolt have appeared since independence, in addition to Nigeria, in Congo-Kinshasa, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Chad.

Yet unrelieved pessimism regarding the development of African political systems would be as misplaced as the unbridled optimism of ten years ago. Within the limited range of available alternatives, the majority of African states have maintained a standard of government which is quite creditable. There is no African equivalent of Tonton Macoute in Haiti, nor are African military regimes really comparable to the rapacious nineteenth-century Latin American dictatorships. Although authoritarian practices are widespread, use of coercion remains in most cases quite limited. African states have neither the coercive capacity nor the apparent intention of moving in the direction of totalitarian models, such as Hitler's Germany or Stalin's Russia. African political development may well reach maturity to the extent that fundamental contextual problems can be resolved.
TABLE 3

TIME SEQUENCE OF AFRICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 1: Colonial Period</th>
<th>Phase 2: Nationalist Period</th>
<th>Phase 3: Post-independence Period</th>
<th>Phase 4: Second-phase Postindependence</th>
<th>Phase 5: Future Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonial bureaucratic state</td>
<td>Nationalist anti-state</td>
<td>Mass single-party → Renewed mass party</td>
<td>Patron single party → Oligarchic party state</td>
<td>Party-state Restoration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Competitive parties → Military regime</td>
<td>Reshuffled Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Revolutionary liberation movement</td>
<td>Imposed single party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NOTES


7. Liberia (or its coastal settlements) was under the nominal tutelage of the American Colonization Society from 1822-47, and Ethiopia was briefly under Italian rule from 1936-41.


11. Important questions have been raised by Zolberg and others on the accuracy of the "mass" party model; but it is retained here as a useful ideal type, especially for the terminal colonial period, even if extant parties probably fell further short of the model than was generally acknowledged at the time. See Aristide R. Zolberg, Creating Political Order (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).


23. Three special cases arise out of the attachment of small units with already established parties to larger territories with single parties: Tanzania (Zanzibar), Somalia (British Somaliland), and Cameroon (West Cameroun).

24. The emergence of the "party state" is set forth as the central trend in postcolonial West Africa by Zolberg, Creating Political Order. See also Henry Bienen, "One Party Systems in Africa," Princeton University Mimeographed, 1968.

25. The dichotomy between "administrators and "solidarity-makers" is developed with particular skill by Herbert Fieth, in The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: 1962). See also S. N. Eisenstadt, "Breakdowns of Modernization," Economic Development and Cultural Change, XII (July, 1964) pp. 345-67. The "mass" character of competitive parties in an opposition role, such as the APC in Sierra Leone, was better maintained.
26. Henry Bretton in *The Rise and Fall of Kwame Nkrumah* (New York: Praeger, 1966), argues that the Nkrumah regime always was an illustration of personal rule rather than of a mass party.

27. TANU operates only in mainland Tanzania (formerly Tanganyika). These remarks do not apply to Zanzibar, where the dominant Afro-Shirazi party has not sought any means of revitalization.


29. A team of researchers covered every aspect of the elections and reported very favorable findings; see Lionel Cliffe, ed., *One Party Democracy* (Nairobi: 1965).


32. A fictionalized version of these elections and post-independence politics in Nigeria generally, conveys admirably the flavor of the situation; see Chinua Achebe, *A Man of the People* (London: Heinemann, 1965).

33. This thesis in its most memorable formulation was advanced by Frantz Fanon, especially in *Les Damnés de la Terre* (Paris: F. Maspero, 1961), and *L'An V de la Revolution Algerienne* (Paris: F. Maspero, 1960).


36. The extant literature on micro-politics in Africa lends abundant support for these generalizations; indeed, the interaction of networks is more readily visible at this level. For a penetrating and suggestive analysis of this phenomenon at the local level in India, see R.G. Bailey, *Politics and Social Change: Orissa in 1959* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963).

Generally speaking, the colonial territories in Africa have come to independence with dual economies—that is, economies with a traditional and a modern sector. Most of the new states have relatively small modern sectors in which production is for the market and the exchange of goods is achieved through the use of currency. Most also have large subsistence sectors in which production is primarily for home consumption, and such exchange of surplus goods as occurs is largely unplanned and frequently carried on through barter, with only limited use of currency. The two sectors converge or intersect at various points, such as the withdrawal of labor by the modern sector from the subsistence sector and the remittance of cash wages by migratory labor in the modern sector to their families in the subsistence sector; but by and large the economic circuits and links between the two sectors are circumscribed and limited. Thus, every African state is confronted with the need for developing new economic structures, that is, for extending the market sector or monetizing the subsistence sector. What is required is the development of economic structures involved with the conscious production of goods for the market, to be distributed through established marketing channels, with payment in currency or through credits extended by recognized banking institutions.

Most of the modern economic structures in Africa have been overwhelmingly concerned with primary production of agricultural and mineral products for the export market. There has been a tendency throughout the colonial period and
into the first decade of independence for African countries to emphasize production for the export market almost to the total exclusion of rational cash-crop agriculture and industrial production for the domestic market. This tendency is understandable. Since the advent of the European presence in Africa the export market has accounted for and still accounts for the largest part of Africa's vitally needed foreign exchange, which, in turn, is used for financing imports and also, more recently, for financing national development plans and the growth of the domestic private sector. The tendency has, however, resulted increasingly in the unnecessary use of foreign exchange to finance the import of foodstuffs to feed growing urban areas and of consumer goods of a type which would logically provide the starting point and impetus for internal industrialization.

Thus, notwithstanding the growth of economic activity directed toward the export market, the rationalization and modernization of complementary economic activity to produce cash crops and consumer goods for the expanding domestic market has tended to lag. What is required is the extension of the market-sector structure of African economies to accommodate production of cash goods for the domestic market as well as for the export market in combinations appropriate to the circumstances of the various African countries. Similarly, private foreign investment needs to be thought of not only as a source of financing modern production for the African export market (for example, exploitation and plantation agriculture) but also as a source of financing for the development of production for the domestic market.

Frequently too, African production has been of a single-crop or two-crop variety. Many African states have been, and remain, dependent on the production of a single agricultural commodity for 60 per cent or more of their foreign exchange earnings, (for example, the dependence of Ghana on cocoa, Senegal and Gambia on peanuts, Dahomey on palm kernels and palm kernel oil, Sudan on cotton, Ethiopia on coffee, and Somalia on bananas). In several instances African countries have been similarly dependent on the production of a single mineral for 75 per cent or more of their foreign exchange earnings (for example, the dependence of Zambia on copper and Libya on petroleum). In only a few instances have African economic structures been
based on multiple crops or on a combination of agricultural and mineral output (for example, Nigeria and Congo-Kinshasa).

In some instances semi-processed and processed production of primary agricultural and forest products has been gaining in importance in the export earnings of African countries, as in the extraction and refining of peanut, palm, and palm kernel oil; the washing, grading, and packaging of coffee; and the processing of hardwoods and the manufacturing of plywood. There has also been an increase in some African countries (for example, Nigeria and Gabon) in the refining of crude oil with a corresponding increase in export earnings or import savings. There has been mounting pressure to expand the processing of crude ores within African countries in order to increase the value of exports: plans are now under way to provide more refining capacity for copper in Zambia; and in a few countries, such as Guinea, the processing of bauxite into the intermediate product of alumina, has been introduced. Industrial production has generally played a very small part in African export earnings, with the exception of the Republic of South Africa and, to a lesser degree, Rhodesia, which has been a key industrial supplier to Malawi and Zambia; but in a growing number of cases, industrial production for the domestic market has been expanding to include commodities such as processed and canned foods, textiles and clothing, cigarettes, soft drinks and beer, light household utensils and pottery, and building goods.

There is thus a widespread need in African countries to diversify production by enlarging the range of primary products produced, by increasing the degree of processing of these commodities, and by introducing industrial production on an increasing scale to serve both growing internal and, in the long run, external markets. The Yaounde Convention, which, through May 31, 1969, governs the association of eighteen African states with the European Common Market, provides for a special productivity and diversification fund of $230 million to help African states in their development to meet these needs.

In addition to these basic structural changes involved in African economy-building, the new states are confronted with major philosophical
decisions as to the type of economy they want to build. Should it be an economy with a larger or smaller state-controlled sector? Should it be an economy which encourages private investment, local and foreign, and seeks to develop a significant private sector? Should it be an economy which encourages independent voluntary institutions and permits them to share in economic decision-making, such as trade-unions, agricultural cooperatives, chambers of commerce, and smallholder farmers' groups?

The new states have tended to assign a major role in economy-building to the government and to minimize the role of private entrepreneurs and independent institutions. Part of this trend is an inevitable consequence of the shortage of capital in the hands of private individuals and, in some areas, of the lack of experience and cultural tradition conducive to economic activity involving production for the market. In part it has grown out of the psychological compulsion of the new African states to "catch up" with the world's modern affluent states, and in part out of the need to allocate scarce resources carefully.

In addition, an ideological preference for an economic objective frequently called "economic independence" has emerged, and has a preference for an approach to economy-building which has been called "African Socialism." These terms are defined in a variety of ways and have been employed to describe such sharply contrasting situations as the heavily state-dominated economies of Guinea and Mali, and more recently Tanzania, on the one hand, and such relatively open economies as Senegal and Kenya, on the other. Frequently what is implied by both terms is a desire to reduce or even minimize the predominant role of the former colonial power in the trade, investment, and aid patterns of the recently independent African states. The reduction of that influence is often attempted through the introduction of new trading, investment, and aid patterns, which include relations with states other than the former metropoles. Similarly, there has been a corresponding increase in the participation and control of the state over the country's economy. Sometimes too, as in Guinea and Mali, egalitarian concepts of developing (or "preserving") classless societies have been associated with the terms "economic independence" and "African Socialism"; and
sometimes, as in Tanzania, concepts of "communalism" with respect to ownership and organization of production have been read into the meaning of the two terms; quite often, perhaps most often, as in Senegal, Tunisia, and several other states, the concept of a more equitable and even distribution of income and wealth in society has been implied in the use of the two terms.

Finally, as Crawford Young observed in his essay, state-dominated economies with large public sectors have been associated with oligarchic or authoritarian one-party states. It would seem contradictory to seek to centralize and control all political power and at the same time encourage and sanction the development of independent economic power outside the control of the single, comprehensive political party. The dominant party inevitably feels the need to avoid competitive or conflicting poles of power; and it feels the need to control economic units or groups, such as trade unions, cooperatives and trade associations, which, although they may be economically motivated, dispose of significant political power. At any rate, this has been the trend. The evolution of Ghanaian one-party authoritarianism before the military coup of February, 1966, was accompanied by just such an evolution of government combined with party control of the country's economic structure. There are many examples of comparable situations.

In only a limited number of cases have African countries sought to develop large private sectors which have substantial local as well as foreign investment and participation. Nigeria prior to the 1966 coup was perhaps the outstanding example (with the exception of South Africa) of an African country with an important and growing private sector involving an increasing number of indigenous as well as overseas investors and personnel. In lesser and varying degrees the oligarchic party states of Ivory Coast and Kenya have also had growing private sectors, attributable in large part, however, to foreign private investment. It would be difficult to predict what would happen in these countries if and when significant numbers of indigenous investors and personnel become involved in the economy and develop
vested interests in the growing private sectors. Will the restrictive political format of the oligarchic party state be flexible enough to accommodate the development of independent and non-party controlled foci of economic and political power? Or will the state cum party control over economic activity expand the economy with a corresponding growth of the state sector but at the expense of the private sector? In other words, sooner or later, at some critical juncture, the oligarchic party state structures in attempting to nurture the growth of large private sectors will inevitably be confronted with a major dilemma. Should they extend their authority over the private sectors, and in so doing transform them into public or quasi-public sectors? Or should they refrain from extending state authority over the private sectors, thus diluting their monopoly of political and economic power, but possibly preparing the way for their transformation into states with multiple and plural sources of political and economic power, such as frequently obtains in Western state systems.

AFRICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH SINCE INDEPENDENCE:
OVER-ALL TRENDS AND PERFORMANCE

During the first half of the "Decade of Development"--1960-1965--the average rate of growth of per capita real Gross Domestic Product in Africa was among the lowest in the world, 1.4 per cent per annum. This compares with the average rate of growth in per capita real GDP for the same period for all underdeveloped countries of 2.3 per cent per annum. It also compares unfavorably with the average rate of growth of per capita GDP in Africa of 2 per cent per annum for the period 1955-60, and of 1.8 per cent per annum for the period 1950-55. Thus, Africa in its first decade of independence has been experiencing a decline in the average rate of growth of real per capita GDP. There has also been a decline in the average rate of growth of annual GDP, from 3.9 per cent in 1950-55 and 4.2 per cent in 1955-60 to 3.6 per cent in 1960-65. There has been only a modest increase in the average rate of growth of population from 2.1 per cent in the periods 1950-55 and 1955-60, to 2.2 per cent in the period 1960-65.1

An average annual per capita growth rate of 1.4 per cent does not allow for more than a modest increase in consumption levels on a continent where
most countries have an average annual per capita income of $100 or less (some with an average annual per capita income of as low as $40 to $50). Furthermore, it must be noted that an average such as Africa's 1960-65 average annual per capita growth rate of 1.4 per cent conceals extremes. In fact, a large number of African countries have been stagnating at dead center, hardly keeping pace with their estimated 2.2 per cent average annual rate of growth of population and even experiencing a decline in average annual per capita income. This is not revealed by the continental average which also includes the relatively high growth rates of the handful of more promising countries. See the following Table which sets out the average annual per capita income (GNP) of all the independent African states as of 1965. The table also reveals the sharp contrast between the economies of all of the independent African states outside of South Africa (thirty-eight in number), on the one hand, and South Africa, on the other. It explains why South Africa is increasingly grouped with countries with developed economies.

The foregoing brief outline of the economic growth status of African countries during the first half of the "Decade of Development"--the initial decade of African independence--reveals the almost awesome magnitude of the economic development task confronting all of the recently independent African states (as well as the older states of Ethiopia and Liberia). It also reveals worrisome trends of stagnating and declining average annual growth rates of overall GDP and per capita income. This is true despite the frequently proclaimed national objective of economic development and near universal adoption of economic development plans for achieving this objective throughout independent Africa.

Although rudimentary economic development plans existed in African countries prior to independence (for example, in Congo-Kinshasa and Nigeria), with independence they took on a new importance and mystique. Ghana, which achieved independence early in 1957, set the trend in development planning. Plans became the hallmark of post-independence economic status and activity in one new African state after another. Unfortunately, as the foregoing growth trends show, the early experience with development planning has not been particularly successful. Few, if any, African countries have been able
## INDEPENDENT AFRICA

### POPULATION AND GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA, 1965

(in U.S. Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ranking (By Population size)</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population (Est. mid 1965)</th>
<th>GNP per Capita (Est. end 1965)</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Tanzania</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>1,070,000</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>1,050,000</td>
<td>150</td>
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<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Congo (Brazzaville)</td>
<td>840,000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>838,000</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>559,000</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>463,000</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>330,000</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
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</table>
to come within striking distance of achieving the goals and targets of their plans. There are many reasons for this apparently poor performance. Some plans, frequently prepared with outside assistance, have been totally lacking in realism with respect to their assumptions, scope, and goals, (for example, the development plans of Morocco, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sierra Leone). Others were equally unrealistic in being far beyond the capability of the country to execute (for example, Ghana, Guinea, and Mali). Still others, not necessarily lacking elements of the foregoing weaknesses, fell prey to internal political instability and violence (Nigeria, Sudan, and other states which have experienced military coups d'état since 1963). There were many other reasons for the disappointing performance, such as limitations on availability of foreign aid and foreign private investment and on foreign exchange earnings in trade. The scarcity of foreign exchange was partly due to the level of African exports and partly due to the adverse movement of terms of trade against producers of certain primary products.

THE PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

For a long time experts have been debating how much and what kind of economic development planning is appropriate for African countries in their present circumstances. Some strongly recommend what has frequently been termed comprehensive planning. This approach seeks to plan for the total economy, the private as well as the public sector--to establish not only planning objectives and goals but also quantitative targets, frequently including production targets. Another school of experts, who are in effect "anti-planning" planners would restrict African planning to the identification of a handful of priority projects in the public sector. In between those two extremes there are planners who would seek somehow to impart a sense of order and priority to the use of resources, particularly in the public sector.

Notwithstanding the controversy among the planners, there can be little question that the formulation of a correlated and realistic series of development goals, priorities, policies, and approaches is urgently required.
There can, for example, be little argument about the need for officials to make a systematic assessment of their country's situation in order to evolve a set of reasonable development goals that are within their country's capacity to achieve. There can also be little dispute about the need to develop reasonable guidelines for the type of technology, institutions, and manpower availabilities each of the new states should seek to develop in its circumstances and in light of its decisions concerning its development goals and policies.

Independent African states frequently have adopted development plans which have not served their principal needs. Many plans have been too elaborate and often irrelevant to the realities of the African states in question; plans have been ill-conceived and, although avoiding the pitfalls of the folie de grandeur school of planning, have been little more than "shopping lists" for external aid.

Among the most difficult planning problems confronting the African states has been that of identification and selection of development priorities and thus decisions regarding allocation of resources. First, there has been the problem of determining priorities among the three major sectors: the productive sector (agriculture and industry); the infrastructural sector, or "economic overhead" (transportation, telecommunications, power, etc.); and the social welfare sector, or "social overhead" (education, health, social amenities, etc.). Within these major sectors, the problem is that of determining priorities between subsectors (for example, between agriculture and industry within the productive sector). During the period under consideration most African countries have tended to give investment priority to the non-productive sectors; that is, investment goes into economic and social overhead. There has been considerable investment in "bricks and mortar," public buildings, transportation, and urban improvements. There has also been considerable investment in education and welfare projects. Finally, there has been a widespread tendency within the productive sector to favor investment in industry over agriculture, with results often leading to uneconomic industrial enterprises and stagnating or declining agricultural output. The latter pattern has frequently resulted in increasing imports of food and a declining share in world trade.
Although there may not be anything intrinsically wrong with investment priorities and allocations of the foregoing type, the overallocation of resources to non-productive sectors accounts in significant part for the limited, stagnating, or declining growth rates in many African countries. Frequently the timing for such investment has been premature; often the scope and magnitude of such investment have outstripped need or capacity to maintain it; generally it has led to unbalanced investment patterns without adequate concentration on generating productive resources either for further investment or for defraying the costs of social services on a continuing basis.5

Closely related to the problems associated with investment priorities and resource allocation is performance with respect to the crucial problem of mobilization of domestic resources for development. As the foregoing discussion implies, failure to select appropriate priorities and over-allocation of resources to non-productive sectors have resulted in modest growth rates and limited generation of new domestic resources for further investment in development. It has also limited private savings and limited the possibilities for domestic private investment in profitable economic undertakings. Failure to expand the growth rate significantly has also limited the possibility for increasing the size of the wage-earning labor force, the income of self-employed persons, and the income of agricultural small-holders. Thus, expansion of the domestic tax base has been correspondingly limited, and import revenues have also tended to be limited as the result of restricted or falling domestic demand and/or restricted availability of foreign exchange with which to meet domestic demand.

The inability to increase significantly the internal mobilization of resources has often coincided with a growth in ordinary budget costs, that is, in "recurrent public expenditure" as opposed to "development expenditure." There have been several causes for this; among these are the costs of achieving and exercising sovereignty, the insistent pressure by the populations of African countries on their political leaders to redeem their pre-independence
campaign pledges, such as "more education, more health facilities, more sound amenities, better wages, and more and better fringe benefits." In addition, recurrent budgets may be used to support prestige and politically-motivated expenditure on such things as state-operated airlines, television networks, public stadiums and conference halls, public buildings, and military establishments.

Expenditure on military establishments has been of growing importance in many African countries. This has not only affected economic development priorities and absorbed growing amounts of recurrent expenditure in largely non-productive areas, but has also become a political factor reflected in the large number of military coups and resultant military governments in African states. In the same way that maintenance of a costly foreign service is considered indispensable in today's world, so too, is the maintenance of a modern military force. Unquestionably, self-defense is the inherent right of every state. During the colonial period in Africa, the colonial power by definition had a monopoly of force and generally did little or nothing about developing indigenous armed forces until independence was imminent. Frequently, new states have had to develop military forces from scratch.

Some countries, such as Gambia, Sierra Leone, Niger, and Tunisia, have done this with considerable restraint, developing modest forces to maintain internal law and order, control smuggling, help collect import and export duties, and prevent illegal immigration. Many, however, have raised armed forces as a prestige symbol, a source of national pride and identity, and a potential source of power in inter-African affairs. In these countries there has been an attempt to develop not only light infantry forces, but tank and artillery battalions and even small navies and air forces. In Somalia, Ethiopia, Congo-Kinshasa, Morocco, and Algeria, for example, a growing part of the recurrent budgetary expenditure (to say nothing of development or "capital" budget expenditure) goes for military purposes—perhaps as much as 35 per cent in the case of the first two, and probably not much less in the other cases. Military and para-military expenditure was an important factor in the economic and financial difficulties which brought pre-coup Ghana to the "brink of bankruptcy" in 1964-66.
There have also been non-productive expenditures in the productive sectors. In many instances, economic development has been equated with the size of the factory chimney. Poor investments have been made in plants which are too large by any standards for foreseeable needs; or too automated in the given circumstances of capital scarcity and large-scale unemployment or under-employment; or inappropriate in terms of technology, the availability of skilled staff or the supply of raw materials. The desire to have the outward trappings of economic development has thus been an important factor limiting the discretion and circumscribing the freedom of action of the political leaders of the new states in their economy-building policies.

In summary, over-all economic growth trends and performance since 1960 have been modest to poor, with the partial exception of a handful of the more promising economies of such countries as Nigeria (pre-civil war), Ivory Coast, Kenya, and Tunisia. The growth trends over an even larger period have not been encouraging, and experience with planned growth has left a legacy of major development problems.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN AFRICA

International trade is normally the principal source of foreign exchange income for most underdeveloped countries. Private foreign investment and public foreign aid are the other main sources. External capital inflow has generally financed on an average less than 20 per cent of gross investment of underdeveloped countries. The financing of such development in Africa, however, has been considerably higher, averaging about 30 per cent—among the highest in the world. Hence the role of external capital inflows is a crucial one for African economic development and must remain a principal consideration in African development planning.

Some countries with known or promising mineral resources attract unusually large investment of private foreign funds (for example oil exploration and exploitation in Libya and Nigeria and iron ore exploitation in Liberia and Mauritania). Under a variety of special circumstances, many other countries receive unusually large amounts of foreign aid from multilateral or bilateral sources. The eighteen African Associate Members
of the European Economic Community, for example, received some $500 million during the first five-year funding of the European Development Fund and are scheduled to receive another $730 million during the current five-year funding period (that is, $1,230 million between 1957 and 1969, including the two-year carry-over period between the expiration of the Overseas Territories Implementing Convention under the Treaty of Rome of 1957 and the ratification of the Yaounde Convention of Association of 1964).

The contribution of international trade, however, cannot be neglected. Given the present situation, it is likely to remain of central importance for African economic development for a long time to come. For most African countries the export sector serves as the "engine of growth." According to a World Bank report,

Despite the uncertain price outlook over the medium term, it is likely that the African continent will continue to expand its export-type output. The relative lack of alternative investment opportunities in a number of countries, an ample labor supply and the availability of natural resources for exports . . . , make such an outcome probable.

During the period 1960-65 there seems to have been a close relationship between economic growth rates and the expansion of trade of African countries. Areas which have achieved more rapid growth have also had fairly high rates of increase in exports and imports. Conversely, many African countries which have been lagging in the growth of GDP have also been lagging in the growth of their external trade.

Although exports of underdeveloped countries to developed countries increased from $27 billion to $42 billion during the period 1959-1966, they did not keep pace with the growth of exports of developed countries among themselves and with the expansion of world trade generally. Thus the share of underdeveloped countries in world trade during the same period fell from 27 per cent to 23 per cent.

For ten selected African countries for which comprehensive data are available, accounting for 38 per cent of African GDP, exports in the period 1960-65 increased 4.9 per cent compared to an average of 7.3 per cent for forty selected underdeveloped countries (including the ten African countries) during the same period.
In African countries generally during the 1960-65 period, imports rose faster than the relatively slow growth of GDP. For the same ten selected African countries, imports during the period rose at an annual average rate of 6.1 per cent—significantly in excess of the 1.7 per cent average annual GDP growth rate and also at a rate in excess of their 4.9 per cent average annual export growth rate. During the same period, the average price level of primary commodities, which form the bulk of African exports, did not change. In contrast, however, there was a rising trend in the average prices of manufactures—a significant part of African imports. Hence, the net result of these trends in the terms of trade was thus detrimental to the economies of most African countries.

In light of the rate of increase in imports, as compared to the growth rate of GDP and exports, and the adverse movement of the terms of trade, it is not surprising that many African countries have had increasing difficulty in mobilizing domestic resources for development. Compare the following figures for the ten selected African countries and the group of forty selected underdeveloped countries respectively (each figure represents a percentage of GNP averaged for the period 1950-65): gross investment rate—14.2 to 17.5; savings rate—9.7 to 14.4; current accounts deficit—4.5 to 3.1. Thus, the ten African countries lagged behind the average for the forty underdeveloped countries in the important gross investment and savings rates categories, while running a larger current account deficit.

In sum, there seems to have been a close relationship in African countries during the 1960-65 period not only between a low growth rate and lagging external trade, but also between a low growth rate with comparatively low rates of gross investment and savings and a comparatively high rate of growth in current account deficit.

A significant portion of Africa's current account deficit was offset during the period 1960-65 by favorable official and private capital flows. For example, in 1965, the most recent year for which comprehensive statistics are available, the current account deficit of about $1.695 billion was offset by a combined official and private capital flow of just over $2 billion.
The importance of external capital flows has therefore been made more crucial as a result of the relatively poor performance of most African countries in achieving over-all economic growth and in maintaining, let alone expanding, their share of world trade.

INTERNATIONAL AID AND CURRENCY RELATIONS

The flow of private foreign investment to the underdeveloped countries, particularly to those with per capita annual incomes of $250 or less (that is, most African countries), declined sharply during 1966. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development reported a decrease of $600 million in the flow of private foreign investment to underdeveloped countries from its fifteen members (the principal capital-exporting countries of the world).15

The flow to all underdeveloped countries of official capital assistance in the form of disbursements rose slightly in 1966. But in doing so, the declining trend of such assistance generally, and to Africa particularly, was obscured. The trend is also obscured by the time lag in disbursements of foreign trade within African countries, thus creating a full "pipeline" which is still feeding in outside capital. There has also been an increase in official aid flows from the smaller DAC aid-givers, such as Austria, Canada, Denmark, Japan, and Sweden, which has augmented the general flow to underdeveloped countries. Despite expanding national incomes in developed countries, however, official aid to underdeveloped countries, including African states, reached a plateau in 1962. In fact, insofar as Africa is concerned, the largest aid-giver, France, reduced its absolute level of aid. This is mainly the result of its reduction of aid to North Africa; its aid to Africa south of the Sahara has remained fixed at roughly $275 million annually. The other three principal Western aid-givers to Africa--the United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany--have also reduced the relative level of their aid to Africa in relation to the growth in their national income. In absolute terms, however, the level of aid to Africa was maintained or was increased slightly in the period 1960-66. This was due in part to the pipeline lag, and in part to factors such as the growth in aid of some of the smaller DAC
aid-givers, the maintenance of roughly the same level of aid by the four principal aid-givers (without regard to the growth of national income) and a growth in multilateral aid from the Overseas Development Fund of the EEC and the World Bank Group (the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Development Association).

Taking into account, however, rising prices and the practice of giving aid which is "tied" to the donor country (that is, restricting the use of aid to financing imports of goods and services from the specific aid-providing country), there has probably been no increase, and perhaps there has even been a decline, in the level of effective aid to African countries in the last few years.16 In the years immediately ahead, given the trend of declining authorizations and/or commitments of new aid from France and the United States, among others, to Africa, as distinct from the flow of aid already in the pipeline, official aid from the principal bilateral Western aid-givers is likely to decline somewhat.

Eurafrican trade, investment, and aid are the most distinctive and important aspects of Tropical Africa's economic presence in world affairs. Almost without exception, the new states continue to deal with their former colonial rulers as the principal source of trade, investment, and aid. Most have retained their membership in the currency zones to which they were linked before independence.

Various African countries have tried to diversify their external economic relations and, in particular, to develop new trading partners and new sources of external aid. Nigeria, Congo-Kinshasa, Tunisia, and Kenya have been developing new economic ties with the United States. Others, such as Guinea and Mali, have developed new economic relationships with the Soviet bloc and Communist China. A fair number of countries in the area have also developed expanding economic relationships with Israel and Japan. By and large, however, the Eurafrican ties remain paramount and have been consolidated for the eighteen African states which are associate members of the European Economic Community (EEC). Under the original Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957, and the more recent Yaounde Convention of Association of 1964, these states have developed a series of preferential trade, aid, and investment relations with the six European countries of the EEC.17
Only Mali and Guinea have terminated their membership in the French franc zone. As a result, lacking gold and hard currency reserves to back their respective national currencies, both have found themselves with inconvertible and deteriorating currencies which are increasingly unacceptable both in international trade and as a means of exchange internally. This loss of value and confidence in the Malian and Guinean currencies has resulted in severe shortages of imported goods (capital and consumer) extensive smuggling of exports through neighboring countries for hard currency or consumer goods, losses of foreign exchange and public revenue, growing internal inflation, mounting budgetary deficits, falling agricultural and cattle production, and other attendant economic and financial ills. In 1967, after some five years in the monetary wilderness, Mali prepared to re-enter the franc zone via the West African Monetary Union, pursuant to the terms of two sets of economic and financial accords with France. As qualifying steps for re-entry—presumably during 1968—Mali adopted an austerity budget, underwent a 50 per cent devaluation in the value of the Malian franc, and initiated a reorganization of the twenty-odd public enterprises whose annual losses have been a major continuing drain on its recurrent budget. Only Guinea now remains completely outside the French franc zone.

The three ex-Belgian colonies, Congo-Kinshasa, Rwanda, and Burundi, all severed their formal ties with the Belgian franc. All three, but particularly the Congo, have experienced a continuing depreciation in the value of their currency. The Congolese franc has been devalued three times since independence, most recently in 1967 by the overwhelming rate of 240 per cent. Many of the Congo's financial and economic ills have been closely related to the declining value and confidence in its currency as an acceptable medium of exchange, and all have been related to the more basic political problems of the area.

In these three instances—Mali, Guinea and Congo-Kinshasa—the dual nature of their economies has tended to act as a buffer to the more direct and acute impact that deteriorating and inconvertible currencies usually produce in more developed countries. Their large subsistence sectors have been less directly affected by the decline in imports and the fall in international and domestic trade than their market sectors. The former were able to turn inwards
to subsistence production of food and other basic necessities and to barter transactions and were more readily able to do without consumer and other goods which can be acquired only with money. Thus, although subjected to stresses and some outbreaks of violence as a result of consumer shortages and curtailment of illegal trading and currency transactions, the subsistence sectors of the three countries have been able to absorb and blunt the sharp edge of much economic discontent. By way of contrast, in the somewhat more sophisticated economy of Ghana, which severed connections with the sterling zone during the Nkrumah regime, the subsistence sector was somewhat less able to perform the buffer role to the same degree. This lesser capacity, in combination with other political and economic factors, contributed to the military coup d'etat and overthrow of the Nkrumah government in February, 1966. It is pertinent to note that in 1967 the military regime found it necessary to devalue the deteriorating Ghanaian currency by some 30 per cent.

Liberia, which has no colonial history, uses the United States dollar as a medium of foreign exchange and is thus the only African member of the dollar area. Ethiopia's currency is independent and backed by Ethiopian reserves of gold and hard currencies. Both Liberia and Ethiopia have important trade and aid ties with the United States. There are also United States investments in Liberian rubber plantations and iron ore-mines.

One more special currency area in Africa should be briefly noted. It is the South African rand area. With the independence of Botswana and Lesotho in 1966 and the independence of Swaziland in 1968, the South African rand, which is the currency in the four independent countries, must now be viewed as a separate monetary zone. The monetary relationship of the four countries is reinforced by a customs union, trade patterns, transportation links, labor migration, and the many other interlocking economic ties of the three small "enclave" countries with the Republic of South Africa. Official aid to, and private investment in, the three new states from South Africa are also likely to reinforce the economic and financial links of the four countries.
To summarize, in the international context, Africa is not a major area for trade or investment. With a few exceptions, it does not loom large in terms of the total trade and investments of the European powers. The Belgian trade and investment relationship with Congo-Kinshasa is an exception. As for France, only its dealings with Ivory Coast, Senegal, and Gabon have any particular significance. Only South Africa, despite its racial policies, is of major importance to the United Kingdom for trade and investment. Rhodesia, which is in a state of "rebellion" against the U.K., Zambia, and Nigeria are economically of significance to the United Kingdom, but trade relations with these countries are not of the order of magnitude of those with South Africa. To the United States and the Soviet Union, Africa is an area of minor economic significance. South Africa is the principal trading partner and area of American investment in Africa, despite official U.S. acceptance of the United Nations boycott of selected exports to South Africa.

In the foreign aid field, Africa has been the principal recipient of French foreign aid and an important recipient of British foreign aid. The Development Fund of the European Economic Community, to which the six European members contribute, has, as we have noted, also been a major source of external aid. Of the many geographic areas which have been recipients of United States aid, Africa has received the smallest amount. Likewise, Africa has received only limited aid from the Soviet Union. In individual cases the United States has provided important quantities of aid--to Nigeria for its first post-independence economic development plan, to Guinea in order to counter ties to the Soviet bloc, and to Congo-Kinshasa as a consequence of the continuing crisis in that country. Similarly, the Soviet Union has provided significant quantities of aid to such countries as Guinea, pre-coup Ghana, and Somalia; Communist China has also committed aid to Algeria, Tanzania, Guinea, Congo-Brazzaville, and Mali.

The economic importance of Africa internationally can be expected to increase in time. Trading and investment opportunities have been opening up in more countries and are likely to grow. In view of the widespread political instability and internal economic difficulties of the area, however, a dramatic change in Africa's economic importance is not likely to occur in the near future.
PROBLEMS OF AFRICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Most countries of Africa have achieved "international sovereignty." They are members of the U. N. and have diplomatic relations with other states. But in most cases, the task of state-building—that is, of constructing stable governmental structures—remains to be accomplished. During the colonial period, government structures were primarily designed to maintain law and order; to provide the minimal services required by the bulk of the population to function at a subsistence level, and by the small European colonial populations to function at a modern level; and to accommodate limited economic activity, generally related to the export sector. In only a few instances were governmental structures adapted to carrying on nation-building programs, launching sustained and correlated programs of economic development, developing and maintaining the economic and social infrastructure required for expanding economic activity, providing the promised enlarged programs of social services, conducting foreign relations, maintaining military forces and discharging the countless other functions which nation-states in the twentieth-century world are now called upon to perform. The lack of defined and organized levels of government and established channels of communication between the center, intermediate regional, and local levels has frequently frustrated the operations of one new government after another.

Second only to the fundamental problem of state-building in Africa is the problem of nation-building. The new states have come to independence with little or no sense of national identity. All are confronted with the problem of welding together populations divided by ethnic, cultural, religious, and regional differences. In almost every instance, the new states have to create national loyalties which transcend, but at the same time are compatible with, traditional and local loyalties to tribe, religion, and region. In cases such as the unification of the former British Southern Cameroons and the French-speaking Republic of Cameroun, and the union of former British Somaliland with the U.N. Trust Territory of Italian
Somaliland, the problem of heterogeneous populations has been complicated by the vastly different cultural, linguistic, juridical, political, and economic heritages from the colonial period.19

In the larger African countries the problem of fusing together the disparate population is complicated by vast distance and limited transportation and communication links. In countries like Ethiopia and Mali, the problem tends to be aggravated by natural barriers such as mountains and deserts; in others, such as Gambia and Malawi, by their odd geographic configurations; and in still others, such as Chad and the Central African Republic, by their isolated, landlocked locations.

In many African countries the political systems have been unable to cope effectively with the problems of state-building and nation-building, and there has been widespread political instability. This is evident from the twenty military coups d'état which have occurred since January, 1963. For the most part, the military governments, although they have to some degree provided a measure of law and order, have not yet shown much more aptitude than the civil governments for inducing meaningful participation by their people in political and economic development programs. The resulting context for development has been anything but favorable in such countries as Dahomey and Upper Volta.

A third problem common to, and implicit in, state-building and nation-building is the problem of institution-building. Although many factors have been singled out by one observer or another as crucial to development, the cumulative African experience in the first decade of the African independence era suggests that whereas these several factors may be of varying importance, no one, or combination, of them has sufficed to sustain an integrated program of African political and economic development in the absence of an appropriate institutional structure. The African states have not been lacking in the political skills and organizations so often associated with the requirements of national political development (such as political parties, charismatic leadership, national political symbols, and so on); yet, there has been little or no development of accepted (legitimate) state structures or political systems and even less growth of political stability.
ECONOMIC INSTITUTION-BUILDING

At the economic level Africa has appeared to have many of the factors necessary for its development. Country after country has adopted a national development plan, and some have had several plans since their independence. Many have begun to develop and exploit more effectively their resource base. Those countries fortunate enough to come to independence with substantial reserves or with access to significant external aid have stepped up their rate of investment. Several of the new states regardless have increased their rate of investment in particularly favored sectors. Some African states have made efforts to reorient the monetary, investment, trade, and/or aid patterns of their economies away from those which existed during the colonial era and toward the Communist bloc, or toward non-colonial Western powers and other developed countries. African countries, thus, have not been lacking in the presence of important economic factors often associated with the requirements for economic development; yet there has been little institutionalization of growth, and more often than not, even where growth has taken place, little real development.

Economic institutions to build modern economies in Africa have been lacking, even more than state and political institutions. Very few African states had developed, until recently under the pressure of outside stimuli, economic institutions which consciously sought to induce greater production of a wider variety of commodities and products for more than the subsistence needs of the producing unit, the family. Traditionally there has been little or no impetus for market production or for an exchange economy.

Almost everywhere in Africa there is an absence of the institutions required to formulate plans and, equally important, to execute them. Most governments lack essential knowledge about the physical features of their countries and do not have the facilities and personnel needed to acquire and develop the necessary information and data. Statistical services and research bodies are needed for economic planning or programming, as are services such as geological and topographical units to map and explore
the resource base and test the soils, and meteorological and hydrological services to record rainfall and locate surface and sub-surface water. Crucial institutions for transferring data to producers and potential producers are needed--agricultural extension services, industrial advisory services, manpower training institutions; crucial institutions for carrying out the physical elements of development projects are also needed--public works departments, soil conservation services, and reforestation units; crucial institutions for mobilizing internal resources, savings institutions, commercial banks, development banks, home-loan and mortgage institutions, domestic money markets, and stock and bond markets are needed; and crucial marketing institutions--commodity markets, trading centers, and storage and grading centers are needed. The list is almost endless. The gap between what exists and what is needed is tremendous. The capacity to develop the institutions is limited. Traditional subsistence society did not provide the incentive or create the need for the type of individuals and institutions that economy-building now requires. There is now a desperate race in Africa to throw up institutions and create the skilled and semi-skilled personnel that is required to span the gulf between subsistence and market production.20

Intimately related to institution-building as a precondition for economy-building in Africa is the associated problem of technological modernization. Africa presents the striking incongruities of the most modern, automated equipment and the most primitive and backward technology at one and the same time. Hence, side by side, one finds the machine-drawn plow and the crude digging stick, the dial telephone and the talking drum, the modern hospital and the medicine man, the jet airplane and the human beast-of-burden.

Africa lacks a hierarchy of technology. It lacks a technology developed in response to its contemporary needs and purposes. It lacks the supporting institutions for adapting imported technology, for rationalizing and developing the imported technology, and for training staff to use and maintain the imported technology. Thus, often, on a continent with surplus or underutilized manpower, one finds no particular philosophy or system of labor-intensive investment and production. At the same time, on a continent with scarce capital resources, one finds no particular philosophy or approach to capital-intensive investment and production.21
A final problem to be taken into account, one which is intimately related to modernizing a country's technology, is manpower development. In the same way that technological development must take place within the framework of a country's national development plan and within the constraints imposed by an absence of basic institutions, so too must it relate to the state of skilled, trained, and experienced manpower in the country. The new states are lacking or are seriously deficient in the skilled manpower necessary for establishing and sustaining a modern economy. Manpower development in turn presupposes appropriate training institutions and national planning goals to accord priorities and establish targets.

Manpower planning in African countries, which are just embarking upon programs of economic development, is in its infancy. There are few guidelines (and even less hard data) on manpower requirements and availabilities. It is necessary to make the best estimates of current needs and availabilities, then to make projections based on national planning objectives, taking into account the country's institutional capacity for training. Thus, manpower planning has a direct bearing on size, volume, and content of a country's educational effort. It also has a direct bearing on the establishment of realistic development objectives or goals for all of the sectors of a country's economy. It does no good to establish goals for the expansion of agricultural output if the facilities for training extension workers, agricultural technicians, and marketing specialists to help achieve the goals cannot conceivably keep pace with the manpower requirements for attaining the expected rate of increase.

There is, therefore, a direct need to phase manpower development planning to institution-building, to development goals, and to a country's technological modernization program. African states are confronted with multiple interrelated major problems which require simultaneous solution if the net result is to be development. All too often one or another of the problems has been faced, perhaps successfully, while the larger development situation has not improved and may actually have deteriorated.

Also, African states generally tend to be overextended in terms of social welfare standards or practices leftover from the colonial period,
which they find extremely difficult, if not impossible, to discard. French-speaking African states, for example, have inherited costly programs of allocations familiales (family allowances); the French developed this program to meet the population problem of metropolitan France after World War I and subsequently extended it to Africa, although population growth in the African colonies was hardly a crucial problem.

Even more universal, however, than the inherited social welfare practices are the universally distorted wage and salary structures bequeathed to most African countries. Developed to meet the needs of the colonial period—that is, to attract Europeans to staff the public services and the private sectors--a structure of premium wage-rates with generous fringe benefits was developed for the expatriate serving in Africa. At the same time, regardless of the level of productivity of the African employee, the salary and the wage structure for manual, unskilled, and semiskilled African labor tended to be depressed. In short, the ceiling was highly inflated and the floor was very low indeed; there was no graduated ladder of salaries and wages.

With independence, frequently without regard to skills and experience, Africans have tended to move into the senior positions in government and the private sector vacated by departing Europeans, but at the inflated expatriate salary and fringe-benefit scale. And because the floor was so low, pressures to increase salaries and wages, to retain existing social welfare practices and fringe benefits, and to add new ones, have been extremely strong. Instead of closing the wage gap by lowering the ceiling and developing an intermediate ladder, the tendency often has been to raise not only the floor but also the ceiling. Hence, wage inflation has become a common phenomenon, affecting the cost of both public services and industrial production. The potential for developing the primary symbol of progress, a growing industrial sector which would be competitive with industry elsewhere in the world, is being badly hindered by the perpetuation of these legacies from the colonial period. Thus, African countries are confronted with major problems of rationalizing and adapting inherited welfare practices and wage and salary structures to the needs and capabilities of their economies.
THE OUTLOOK FOR AFRICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The outlook for the development of modern economic systems and the prospects for accelerating the rate of economic growth in Africa over the next several decades are most uncertain. The development of productive economic structures and suitable growth rates are both dependent on an involved complex of internal and international factors.

Internally, as we have seen, the development nexus--political stability and a sound economic structure--is the crucial factor. The need to build an appropriate constitutional and political structure to house a productive economy is basic; so too is the corollary need to develop a modern, dynamic, and productive economic system to sustain the political and constitutional structure. Although conceptually separable, in Africa today the achievement of political stability and a modern economic structure must proceed hand in hand. The premium is on sound political and economic performance to face and then cope with the basic economy-building and development problems already discussed.

Internationally, the problems of the volume, value, and terms of trade, the flow of official economic assistance, the volume and quality of foreign private investment, the state of the world economy, and, more generally, the patterns of world affairs, are the basic factors which will affect African economic development. They will interact and influence favorably or adversely the internal state of affairs and the domestic efforts of all African countries. What then are reasonable economic growth goals for African countries to seek over the next several decades?

Slogans such as "catching up" and "closing the gap," which are now part of the African development vocabulary should be recognized as propaganda goals which divert energy and resources from more meaningful development efforts. African countries with per capita incomes of $50, $75, and $100 per year--even those with per capita incomes of $250 per year--are not going to be able to "close the gap," let alone "catch up" with the developed economies with per capita incomes ranging from $1,000 to $3,000 per year.
The improbability of "closing the gap" is most sharply illustrated by a single comparison. The United States alone, growing by between 5 and 6 per cent a year, adds over $40 billion to an annual GNP which is now over $730 billion, thereby acquiring each year, as an extra, about as much as the entire GNP of Africa. Stated in other terms, the "poverty line" in the United States is now set at a family income of $3,000 or less, or roughly 15 to 30 times what might be estimated to be the family income of an average African family. Rates of growth even higher than that of the United States in developed economies with annual per capita GNP's of $2,000, $1,500, and $1,000 also vividly highlight the improbability of African countries "catching up" with developed economies in the foreseeable future.

What is possible, however, is a significant and steady growth in the absolute per capita incomes of African countries so that the standard of living can be improved for the existing generation and certainly for the next generation. Much can be done to improve the diet, clothing, housing, education, and immediate material requirements of individual Africans by the steady improvement in the growth rate; and much could be done to generate resources so that these improvements are sustained for future generations. This does not mean catching up, nor does it preclude the possibility that the existing gap between developed and underdeveloped economies in per capita income will not grow greater. Nonetheless, absolute improvement in the standards of living of Africans and the increasing participation of more and more Africans in productive modern economic efforts would not only be worthwhile goals in and of themselves but would also serve in an important way to enhance the nation-building programs of African countries.

What then are the prospects for Africa in the world economy over the next several decades?

The prospects are difficult to assess in light of the trends already discussed. Assuming improved internal performance in growth rates and export availabilities, it seems likely that African countries generally will expand the volume and value of their participation in world trade. It is not clear, however, that they will be able to hold or increase their relative share of world trade without various types of international assistance to improve their access to and income from world markets.
Of the many schemes now actively under study or consideration, it seems clear that Africa will need a combination of most and perhaps all of them, if it is to hold its own and go beyond this minimal goal and augment its share of world trade. Many African countries for the balance of the 1960's and most of the 1970's are likely to remain producers and exporters of primary products—agricultural and mineral. This is particularly true of most of the former French territories and a good many of the former British territories, for example, Gambia, Sierra Leone, and Malawi, as well as countries such as Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, and Ethiopia. These countries will need help in the form of access for their primary products to developed markets. This would include some combination of tariff preference of the type the eighteen African Associated states of the European Common Market now receive, commodity stabilization arrangements of the type now in effect for coffee and not yet in effect for cocoa, price supports of the type France has made available (and now on a reduced scale, the EEC) to Senegal and Niger for groundnuts and groundnut oil, reduction of those excise and other internal taxes which discourage the consumption of coffee and tropical products in developed countries (as in West Germany), and compensatory financing of the type proposed in a recent World Bank Staff Study for UNCTAD.

By the mid-1970's some of the more developed African economies may also have need of preferential entry and tariffs for their semi-processed, processed, and manufactured goods, of the type now afforded by the EEC to the eighteen African Associated States and of the type being sought by underdeveloped countries generally under various proposals agreed at the Algiers Conference of 1967 and put forward at the second United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in New Delhi in February, 1968.

All African states will have need of more public assistance and private overseas investment. This implies a reversal in the current trend of declining flow of official bilateral assistance and private overseas investment to Africa and/or a marked increase in multilateral assistance to Africa. Recently the World Bank reaffirmed earlier staff studies indicating that underdeveloped countries "could use effectively $3-4 billion
more per year in external capital during the next five years than they are now receiving."24 African countries obviously could use a fair share of any such increase, to say nothing of the need to halt the present trend of declining external capital flows to Africa.

The needs are quite clear; the prospects for meeting them, however, are far less clear. What is clear with regard to meeting the needs is that African prospects will be considerably enhanced if the factors within African control are handled in a satisfactory manner and the domestic development nexus is satisfactorily established. The external factors are likely to be more responsive and interact more favorably under these conditions.

On the international level, the relevant factors are likely to show some improvement, partly as a result of the efforts of the African states in the international arena, partly as a consequence of the efforts of developed states to aid the development of African states and to improve their trade and economic relations with African states, and partly as the outcome of the efforts of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and other international organizations, the efforts of producing and consuming states with respect to compensatory financing, commodity stabilization, and the efforts of the world community generally to augment world trade.

NOTES

1. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, World Bank and IDA Annual Report 1966/67 (Washington, D.C., 1967), p. 26. Sources other than the one used as a basis for the foregoing computations place the average rate of growth of African population at levels as high as 2.5 to 3 per cent. Obviously, if the average rate of population growth exceeded the 2.2 per cent used here, then the average rate of growth of per capita GDP would be correspondingly lower.


4. It should be noted, however, that Ethiopia's first five-year development plan dates from 1955.

5. For a full discussion of development priorities, resource allocation, and the relationship of industry and agriculture in the productive sector, see the author's paper, "The Role and Scope of Industrialization in Development" in Industrialization in Developing Countries, ed. by Ronald Robinson (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 54-66.


10. IBRD, Annual Report, p. 27. If exports of certain African countries not included in the selected ten for which comprehensive data are available are included, such as petroleum from Algeria and copper from Zambia, the African average for exports would be increased. On the other hand, if exports of other countries not included in the selected ten are included, such as those of landlocked countries--Mali, Niger, Upper Volta, Chad, Central African Republic, Rwanda, Burundi, etc.--the African average for exports would be decreased.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.


One of the significant developments in Africa during the last century has been the introduction of new legal systems, with the consequent modification of the force of customary law for controlling society and regulating human relationships. With the introduction of new legal systems, procedures and institutions have been established by which old law can be changed and new law created.

Perhaps we can achieve a clearer picture of these momentous developments by viewing African law in its historical context. Three aspects should be stressed: customary law, foreign law, and the new national legal systems. Customary law is a concept with many shades of meaning, but it is used here as a general category embracing all types of traditional law. Law as a method of resolving disputes was not unknown in the precolonial period; and, indeed, many writers have commented on the litigious nature of traditional societies. Although customary law has been modified in content, in procedures, and in methods of enforcement, it continues to control many aspects of African life. In rural areas, in particular, customary law still has considerable potency in regulating property, descent, and marriage. For purposes of this chapter, customary law is extended to include Islamic law, Hindu law, and the ancient law of Ethiopia as expressed, say, in the Fetha Negast ("Legislation of the Kings").

A second aspect of African legal development has been the introduction, or reception, of foreign legal systems, comprising a corpus of interrelated concepts and following established systematic procedures for litigating
disputes. The new, colonially-induced legal systems and the old, traditional systems have some points in common, but they are not the same. Among the newer ideas is the belief that law can be created by a positive act of government—normally the legislative branch. At the close of the Middle Ages, this idea had a considerable impact on the growth and modification of law in the Western world, and it now has a modern parallel in the development of law in Africa.

A third aspect of jurisprudential development has been the growth of a more unified national legal system, embracing all categories of people and all types of law. As systems of national law develop, it becomes possible to carry on interrelated activities over extensive areas. An obvious example is found in the economic field (commercial transactions, contracts, and sales, for instance). In a similar fashion, the application of national standards of criminal justice and criminal procedure make it possible to establish the conditions of peaceful life over extensive areas. The varieties of law become integrated through a common system of courts. It is this newer national legal system which is now in the process of development. One may still refer to legal pluralism as a characteristic of African law; but the multiplicity of laws are now being integrated into an interrelated system, particularly at the national level. Part of this law is traditional, or modified traditional, part has been received, and part has been developed or "made."

On a still broader scale, the new nations of Africa have been confronted with the problem of establishing legal relations with each other and with the rest of the world. Here the field of public international law provides many of the categories, concepts, and procedures which are being followed in Africa.

Law has many meanings, and in considering the nature of law in Africa one is immediately faced with the problem of developing categories and definitions. In fact, it is not easy to define Western-type law, for the definition of law, Dean Roscoe Pound has said, "has been the battle-ground of jurisprudence."1 It is even more difficult to develop a pluralistic and transcultural definition of law, one which encompasses the various types of African customary law, the law found in Western legal systems, and the law
as expressed in the newer unified state systems. Western law makes certain assumptions about the nature of the society to be regulated, as does African law; both perform a similar function, albeit using different procedures and different conceptual frameworks.

Law serves as a unifying regulator within a community, and with the development of a legal system the various segments of law can be related to one another. In Western terms, some aspects of the law are of local application only, perhaps the result of a referendum or the verdict of a jury. Other aspects have a wider applicability, such as a tax law which extends to state or nation. Still other aspects, such as procedural rights found in the expression "due process," are of a more transcendent nature, embracing cultures and civilizations. In Africa, much of the traditional law is of a local nature, based on the family or community. The newer law is based on broader, more comprehensive standards and tends to form a more or less coherent body of rules which create the basis of order in a community.

Paul Bohannan has defined law in terms of "double institutionalization," a definition which can be applied both to traditional African law and to Western legal systems. He writes that customs are norms or rules . . . about the ways in which people must behave if social institutions are to perform their tasks if society is to endure. . .

and that law is a body of binding obligations which has been reinstitutionalized within the legal institution so that society can continue to function in an orderly manner on the basis of rules so maintained.

Reciprocity is the basis of custom; law rests on the process of double institutionalization. Law, he says, is never a mere reflection of custom; it is always out of phase with society, specifically because of the duality of the statement and restatement of rights. . . . Thus, it is the very nature of law, and its capacity to "do something about" the primary social institutions, that creates the lack of phase. . . . It is the fertile dilemma of law that it must always be out of step with society, but that people must always (because they work better with fewer contradictions, if for no other reason) attempt to reduce the lack of phase. 2
Law, then, is an institution which regulates relations within society; it prevents certain types of harmful activity; it supports a certain type of order by the process of "double institutionalization;" it recognizes an "ought" element which "is culturally determined and may change from society to society and from era to era." Certain aspects of legal institutions are not shared with other institutions of society. Legal institutions "must have some regularized way to interfere in the malfunctioning (and, perhaps, the functioning as well) of the nonlegal institutions in order to disengage the trouble-case." They are concerned with two kinds of rules: procedural laws, which govern the activities of the legal institution, and rules of a substantive nature, which are "substitutes or modifications or restatements of the rules of the nonlegal institution that has been invaded."^3

With the introduction of new systems of law in Africa, a certain confusion, or lack of phase, may arise because different standards can be applied to similar cases. Thus, the growth of law, or of legal systems, has been accompanied by growing conflicts of law, with attempts being made to harmonize the various systems, and by the use of law for new purposes, including the legitimation of a national government.

AFRICAN TRADITIONAL LAW

It is not possible in this essay to treat in any detail the various types of African customary law. In most cases, customary law was unrecorded until recently, and it is difficult to reconstruct it in its earlier forms. The Kupers have made the following comment on African traditional law:

The legal systems of "traditional" African societies are extremely diverse. In some there are no units or offices that coincide with the Western concept of a judiciary. In others, only the religious aspect of power is institutionalized, and it provides the main sanction for public activities. Yet in others there are elaborately conceptualized and verbally defined distinctions, a separation of legal from other institutions. ^4

African law may be described in such a manner as to show the existence of a system, but the nature of the system revealed may in fact be determined by the categories selected for analysis. As Allott and Cotran have remarked, many apparent differences between African legal systems...
are created by or aggravated by the different legal training and background of those who write about or administer them, and by differences in legal terminology. It has often been remarked that when a French lawyer writes about customary law, he naturally attempts to fit it into French legal categories and the English lawyer into English categories.  

Recent writings on traditional African law include discussions of ordeals, moots, feuds, criteria of "reasonableness," compensation to "restore the equilibrium," negotiations outside the court system, witchcraft, and self-help.

An understanding of some of the main characteristics of African law may be useful in providing background for sections of this essay which are concerned with the interrelationships of customary law and received law. One makes generalizations on African law with some diffidence, for customary law tends to be parochial and particular rather than general and uniform. Nevertheless, there seems to be a basic difference between African law and Western law on the concept of abstract, individual rights which arise from, and are inherent in, the legal system. In Western law a person has rights that are created by the legal system and are enforceable through the legal system; but it is not at all clear that African societies conceive of rights within a legal system or, indeed, of rights in any abstract sense. The evidence suggests otherwise; and a more appropriate summation (as suggested by Professor Ronald Cohen) would seem to be that African societies conceive of law not in terms of abstract rights but in terms of concrete role relations with other people, particularly members of the family, which can be transferred. It might be said, then, that customary law is an amalgam of specific relationships, not a system of abstract rights. To a large degree, therefore, African customary law is governed by status relationships.

This fundamental difference between Western and African law poses the issue of comparability—is it permissible to use Western legal concepts in describing the African legal process? Different views on this subject are expressed in the approaches to African law followed by Paul Bohannan and Max Gluckman. In his work on the Tiv (Nigeria), Professor Bohannan states that he has tried not to explain or translate the Tiv system of jural control in terms of the Western legal system, which, he says, "would do violence to
the Tiv ideas and folk systems.7 As an example he cites the Tiv use of the word jir as a key legal concept, a notion possibly covered by the English word "counteraction."

Tiv see their tribunals, both courts and "moots," with a single set of concepts. The two have different internal structuring, but in the long run both are jir and the purpose of both is to "repair the tar," to make the community run smoothly and peacefully. The elders of the moot also repair the tar ceremonially. Tiv see the ceremony and the jir as two aspects of the single task of repairing the tar: what we might call the government aspect and the religious aspect of social welfare.8

Professor Bohannan illustrates the difference between European and Tiv ideas about law in his interpretation of the establishment of colonial legal structures, that is, the Native Authority tribunals.

The European folk system sees the Native Authority tribunal basically as a court which, within established limits, applies "native law and custom." Tiv, in their folk system, see the same organization as a jir which arbitrates disputes brought before it. "Native law and custom" as a "corpus" of "law" which can be "sure," is simply not a Tiv idea. Neither is it a Tiv idea that a "court" may have "authority" to carry out its "decisions." Rather, Tiv believe that a right answer exists to all disputes; they take disputes before the jir in order to discover that answer, and the principals to the dispute must concur in it when it is discovered.9

A different approach to the study of traditional law has been followed by Professor Gluckman. Using procedures and concepts which are essentially Western, he finds similarities in the legal approach of the West and that followed by the Barotse or Lozi of Zambia. On the whole, he finds that the Lozi judicial process corresponds with, more than it differs from, the judicial process in Western society. Lozi judges draw on the same sources of law as Western judges--the regularities of the environment, of the animal kingdom, of human beings; and customs, legislation, precedent, equity, the laws of nature and of nations, public policy, morality. They assess evidence in the same way. They manipulate the different types of legal rule which can be applied to a particular situation, and the ambiguity of the concepts which make up the legal rules, in a similar attempt to achieve justice according to their lights... The dominant factors which produce important differences are the comparatively egalitarian and undifferentiated nature of social relations, the absence of pleadings and counsel and complex procedure, and the unwritten state of the law.10
Professor Gluckman finds that the Lozi courts use concepts familiar to Western law, including the reasonable man—"the man on the Clapham omnibus," as one judge expressed it.

The standards of right behavior against which the behavior of the parties is assessed to see if they have acted rightly or wrongly are those of "the reasonable and customary man." This exists as a distinct concept in the Lozi language, though it is not always explicitly stated by the judges.11

These different approaches illustrate some of the difficulties of understanding African law in Western legal terms. Concepts are, to an extent, a method of classifying material, and material can usually be classified in different ways. Professor Bohannan cites the Tiv concept of "debt" (injo) which is used as a major category for classification.

Many torts have debt aspects; most contracts have debt aspects. Tiv "classify" on the notion of debt, as it were, not on the notion of "tort" and "contract." It is not for us to say that Tiv do not understand tort or contract; neither is it for Tiv to say that the English do not understand debt.12

A legal concept that has created considerable misunderstanding in Africa is the Western idea of ownership, particularly the ownership of real property. Traditional African societies had notions of control over land, particularly where land was in short supply, but the Western concept of freehold and leasehold are not necessarily applicable, nor is the ambiguous concept of "communal" ownership. In the parts of Africa where shifting agriculture was practiced the peasant cultivator would move from one area to another as the land wore out. In such a situation, the concept of permanent possession or ownership over a precisely delimited piece of land would be clearly inappropriate. With regard to the practice of shifting agriculture, it would be nearer the mark to refer to a corpus of ambulatory relationships that are applicable regardless of what land is considered or where it is located. The relationships remain constant as the peasants move from one area to the other, but the object of control is continually changing. The situation is similar, say, to soldiers on the march who bivouac at a different place every night. The relationship of the soldiers to each other and to a camp remains constant, but the site of the camp changes.
Another major difference between African and Western law includes legal procedures. The procedures of the Western court system are highly regularized and depend for their successful operation on a trained profession of judges and lawyers who are bound by a common professional tradition. The distinctive features of the system include judicial precedents, jury trial, prerogative writs (including habeas corpus), a hierarchy of courts, and independence of judges. An African scholar describing Western legal procedure, writes that

The basis of the system is that every court is absolutely bound by the decisions of all courts superior to itself, but the highest court of the land holds itself bound by its own previous decisions.13

Gluckman has noted in African courts "the absence of pleadings and counsel and complex procedure, and the unwritten state of law." The jury system, for instance, was not an aspect of traditional African law, and from the date of its introduction in West Africa more than a century ago the system has been criticized as "inappropriate." In Sierra Leone, for instance, it was alleged that

an Akoo jury will never convict an Akoo, and that they will never acquit a white man or a Timmanee, and that the verdict of an Akoo is generally agreed upon out of court before the trial comes on.14

A modern commentator, with a similarly low opinion of the jury, has stated that

To entrust the defendant's liberty to a jury on these terms is not democracy; ... it is the despotism of small, nameless, untrained, ephemeral groups, responsible to no one and not even giving reasons for their opinion.15

Prior to European influence, the customary laws of Africa were normally unwritten, and hence there was no written body of case law to serve as precedents in future cases. There were, however, two exceptions to this statement. One exception is Islamic law, which has prevailed in North Africa for centuries and has penetrated southward with various degrees of saturation. In some parts of English-speaking Africa, Islamic law and customary law were treated as largely identical. These areas include Ghana, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Nyasaland (Malawi). In other areas Islamic law was regarded as a third system, alongside received law and indigenous law. These included Somaliland, Kenya, Zanzibar (now part of Tanzania), and Zambia. Between these two
categories fall Gambia and Tanganyika (now part of Tanzania). The second exception is Ethiopia, where the Fetha Negast, a compilation of canon and civil law dating from about the thirteenth century, was for some three hundred years the only legal code in Ethiopia.

WESTERN INFLUENCE IN AFRICAN LAW

During the historical period following the establishment of European rule in Africa, the laws of Africa were greatly changed, partly by the introduction of new legal systems and partly by the establishment of methods for making new law and modifying the old law. The English legal system, including common law and equity, was introduced into Africa, as were systems of codified civil law of continental Europe (French, Belgian, Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch). The new legal systems included a hierarchy of courts which not only provided new methods for adjudicating disputes but also helped to adjust the law to changing times. Legislatures and bureaucracies, which could create positive law in the form of legislation, orders, and regulations, were also established. Constitutional law, creating the structure of government, is also included in this category, but will not be dealt with in this essay.

The pattern of induced legal changes was not identical in the various colonies. Nor have the new nations of Africa followed the same course in promoting further legal change. Nevertheless, one can identify the pattern of change. New systems of law, based on commonly held legal assumptions, are being created in the various African countries. Part of that process has included the increased international interaction on legal development. No one need be surprised to find West African lawyers, trained in the English Inns of Court, serving as judges in East Africa, or to find American lawyers teaching law in Ethiopia, or Australian lawyers teaching law in Tanzania. Such developments have been possible because of the similarity of concepts, processes, and methods of legal reasoning found in Western legal systems--despite their differences in detail. They have also been possible because of the similarity of legal issues found in modern society, again despite the differences in detail in resolving them.
The trend toward the development of unified national legal systems in Africa has been uneven, and nowhere has this goal been reached. The complete unification of law would, in fact, presuppose considerable internal adjustments in those nations composed of mixed societies. The unification of marriage laws, for instance, would be a step of momentous significance in a country where both monogamy and polygamy are practiced and where these practices are sanctioned by ethnic tradition or by religion. A similar momentous change would be the unification of land law on, for example, a leasehold or freehold basis. On the other hand, the unification of commercial law might be accomplished relatively easily and would meet with little resistance from traditional groups. We should note however, that changes of law by legislation may not indicate a real change in legal practice. The abstract standard and the concrete fact may be far apart; law and society may by "out of phase."

The change that has taken place in the law of Africa has taken place gradually, and is illustrated by the lengthy and complex introduction of the English common law into Africa. The system of common law was alien to Africa. It developed in England from feudal law, and after a long process it was so modified that it could be applied to a highly industrialized society, with considerable emphasis placed on rights, procedures, and "constitutionalism." The transfer of common law principles to a territory outside England was not without precedent. Several of the states of the American Union had adopted English common law. For instance, the Constitution of the State of Illinois, enacted in 1818, provided that

the common law of England, so far as the same is applicable and of a general nature, and all statutes or acts of the British Parliament made in aid of and to supply the defects of the common law, prior to the fourth year of James the First, . . . and which are of a general nature and not local to that kingdom, shall be the rule of decision, and shall be considered as of full force until repealed by legislative authority.

In a similar fashion, an ordinance of 1876 relating to the Gold Coast (now Ghana) provided that

The common law, the doctrines of equity, and the statutes of general application which were in force in England at the date when the colony obtained a local legislature, that is to say, on the 24th day of July, 1874, shall be in force within the jurisdiction of the court.
In commenting on the transfer of the common law to Africa, Lord Denning has made the following comment:

Just as with an oak, so with the English common law. You cannot transplant it to the African continent and expect it to retain the tough character which it has in England. It will flourish indeed but it needs careful tending. So with the common law. It has many principles of manifest justice and good sense which can be applied with advantage to peoples of every race and colour all the world over; but it has also many refinements, subtleties and technicalities which are not suited to other folk. These offshoots must be cut away. In these far off lands the people must have a law which they understand and which they will respect. The common law cannot fulfill this role except with considerable qualifications. The task of making these qualifications is entrusted to the judges of these lands. It is a great task.19

The English common law was introduced into Africa on an eclectic basis. All aspects of the law were not included; it did not apply to everyone, even those living within the same "jurisdiction"; and the vast bulk of the peoples continued to live under customary law, in whole or in part. But customary law was in turn modified indirectly by the new legal system, with its different concepts and procedures, and by the procedures followed by the new courts.

The common law system was extended gradually over time, in some cases by including people within the jurisdiction of the new courts who were otherwise "outside" the law, and by increasing the number and kind of offenses. An early example of the extension of the system to include people not within the settled areas is found in the West African Offences Act, 1871, which provided that

the inhabitants of certain territories in Africa adjoining the settlements of Sierra Leone, Gambia, Gold Coast, Lagos, and adjacent protectorates not being within the jurisdiction of any civilized government, and crimes and outrages having been and being likely... to be committed within such territory against British subjects and persons resident within any of the said settlements, it was requisite to provide for the trial and punishment of such crimes and such outrages. Crimes or offences committed within twenty miles of the boundaries of the settlements or by persons not subjects of any civilised power against British subjects or persons resident within the settlements shall be cognizable in the superior courts exercising criminal jurisdiction within any of the said settlements and shall be tried, prosecuted, and punished in the same manner as if the crime or offence had been committed within such settlements.20
The introduction of English common law was normally accompanied by two types of reservations, called respectively the "residual clause" and the "repugnancy clause," each of which has played its part in developing, modifying, preserving, transforming, and expanding the laws of Africa. The two clauses were expressed in various forms, but the purpose was the same—-to provide a degree of flexibility in the application of the common law. In the British Settlements Act, 1843, the residual clause provided that such laws and courts should be established "as may be necessary for the peace, order and good government" of the territories concerned. In Sierra Leone, the Courts Ordinance provided that where no rule was applicable to a matter in controversy, "the court shall be governed by the principles of justice, equity, and good conscience." An explanation for the inclusion of a residual clause was given by Justice Brandford Griffith in the Nigerian case of Cole v. Cole (1898).

These words show that the legislature was well aware that it could not lay down specific rules as to where native law and custom was to apply and where it was not to apply. It was aware that cases must arise for which it could not possibly provide, accordingly it framed the section in very general terms, expressly specifying one particular class of transaction in which natives should not take advantage of native law and custom, and finally giving the court large discretionary powers.

The repugnancy clause was also expressed in various ways. A Gambian ordinance provided that no person should be deprived of any law or custom existing in Gambia, "such law or custom not being repugnant to natural justice, equity, and good conscience." Judges in the Cape Coast (in Ghana) were to observe "such of the local customs . . . as may be compatible with the principles of the law of England." Other expressions included "not repugnant to Christianity or to natural justice," or "natural justice and morality," or "natural justice and humanity." The French used the expression "costumes compatibles avec la civilisation occidentale." In Belgian and Portuguese territories, "indigenous laws which were prejudicial to the order publique" were denied recognition.

Several cases illustrate the use of the repugnancy clause. In Gwao bin Kilimo v. Kisunda bin Ifuti (1938), Mange, a government clerk, was convicted for converting another's money to his own use. The respondent brought an action against Mange for the return of the money. In executing the judgment
given in his favor, the respondent attached property belonging to Gwao, Mange's father. According to the evidence presented, it was the practice of the Wanyaturu, in certain cases, for a father to pay compensation voluntarily for cattle stolen by his son or he could be compelled to do so. The issue was thus posed: was customary law applicable in this case, in which event Gwao's property could perhaps be taken in execution of the judgment against his son; and if applicable, was the custom "repugnant to natural justice, equity, and good conscience"? The judge thought it was not right to take away a man's property in order to compensate a party injured at the hands of the man's son. "It is against our general ideas of justice," he said, "that a man should suffer or be punished directly either in person or in property for some wrong which he has not done himself."

Thus, one of the understood principles of customary law, the legal responsibility of kinship groups for individual behavior, had been overruled.

In another case, the procedures followed in deposing a chief were declared void because they did not follow "principles of natural justice." These were here interpreted to mean "rules of procedure so fundamental in any system of law that their observance is obligatory on every court of law." The plaintiff, who had held the title of chief for some ten years, "was 'drummed out' of the Iwarefa body by his fellow Iwarefa chiefs in a way which amounted to taking matters into their own hands."25

The repugnancy clause was also used by the court to defeat stale claims. In the case of Ado v. Wusu, the defendant claimed that he and his family had been undisturbed in occupation of land for nearly 200 years without paying tribute. The plaintiff claimed, however, that his ancestor had permitted the defendant's ancestor to settle on the land now in dispute and that it was now his land. The plaintiff won the case in the lower court, but the decision was reversed on appeal. The court reasoned:

We accept the finding and entirely agree that in accordance with strict native law and custom the plaintiff remains the owner. But there is a long series of decisions in which it has been laid down that the courts will now allow the strict native law and custom to be invoked in such cases as this when the effect is, in equity, unjust.26

The same rule against stale claims has been developed in Kenya, but according to one commentator it has not found acceptance with the people.
In so far as customary land law is concerned, the rule or observation by the Kenya Court of Review that to allow stale claims for possession is repugnant to justice, equity and good conscience, is not regarded by the law consumers as part of their customary law. As a result litigation after litigation concerning the same problem occurs. In this one may be led to believe that these judicial pronouncements intended to reform a rule of customary law tenure have no effect among the people they are intended to guide. Here the judicial rule is not working.27

The fact that a court finds a particular practice "repugnant" does not necessarily modify the custom or even make it illegal. In the words of Lord Atkin, the court can reject a customary law but it "cannot itself transform barbarous custom into a milder one."28 W. C. E. Daniels has said that the declaration that a custom is repugnant does not imply that it is illegal. In fact the practice can still go on publicly, after a judge's decision in a particular case. What it does imply is that the High Court will not allow itself to be made the instrument to observe, or enforce the observance of, a customary law which is repugnant.29

An analagous question is whether the court should apply native law and custom even though it is not repugnant. In the nineteenth century case of Cole v. Cole, the issue was raised whether the succession to the property of a Christian native, who was married by Christian rites outside the colony, was governed by the Marriage Ordinance of Nigeria, the English law of succession, or native customary law. The judge held that the case was governed by the English law of succession.

When the court has before it a matter which is purely native, or where all the circumstances to be taken into account are connected with native life, habit, or custom, then undoubtedly native law and custom should apply. . . . Does this mean that the court is bound to observe native customs or to allow native customs to apply in every case of a native where the custom is not repugnant to natural justice, etc., . . . nor incompatible with any local Ordinance? I think not.30

**CRIMINAL LAW**

The Western system of criminal law is highly rationalized and specific, the product of a particular type of political organization. When we think of criminal law we tend to think in terms of Western criminal law. Criminal law makes certain assumptions about the kind of behavior which must be suppressed and the agency responsible for suppressing it. Certain offenses are "crimes"
and subject to prosecution by the "state"; other offenses are "torts" and subject to "civil action." This distinction—a fine one at times—between a crime and a tort has been developed historically, the product of much controversy, litigation, and the application of moral standards. A further fine distinction has developed between the abstract state and a concrete person with abstract rights. In modern times, criminal law is always written, an exception to the common law practice of "finding law" by referring to past cases; and the process for bringing criminal prosecutions is highly proceduralized. So the question can be raised, is it possible for something called "criminal law" to exist in a society not organized in the form of a "state"? The answer, of course, depends on how one defines the relevant categories of criminal law. There are some analogies between African and Western criminal law, but the "fit" is not always precise.

The argument has been advanced that in many African societies all wrongs are penal, or again that wrongs treated in Western law as crimes, such as murder and theft, are treated in some African societies as matters for private redress. There is no one standard to follow. Eugene Cotran, who has examined traditional law in many African societies, has concluded "that most African societies do make a distinction between crimes and civil wrongs." He quotes Professor Schapera, who wrote (in Tswana Law and Custom) that Tswana law (of contemporary Botswana), in practice if not in theory, "is divided by the people themselves into two main classes. These may quite conveniently be termed 'civil law' and 'criminal law' respectively although their categories are by no means identical with those of European systems of law." He also draws on Haydon, who wrote (in Law and Justice in Buganda) that in ancient Buganda it is probable that certain crimes such as treason against the Kabaka, witchcraft, incest, sexual perversions, adultery with the royal wives or chief's wife, theft and cowardice in war were classed as crimes against the State and were punished with death or at the least mutilation. Other offences were dealt with as torts and were settled by the payment of compensation to the injured party.

Although there is evidence that such a distinction exists, Cotran says, it is more difficult to put forward a general definition of what are regarded as crimes for all African societies. Different societies may have different bases for distinguishing between crimes and torts:
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(1) trial may be in different courts adopting different types of procedure, e.g., criminal offences before the chief or counsellors, and civil before clan or family elders; (2) sanctions may be different, e.g., capital punishment, banishment, social ostracism and public ridicule, mutilation and flogging for crimes; reconciliation, restitution and compensation for civil wrongs; (3) crimes are wrongs contrary to the basic beliefs of the community, whilst civil wrongs are directed against the individual.32

In modern times, far-reaching changes have been made in the field of criminal law. The procedures and substance of the Western law have largely replaced customary law with regard to criminal matters. The introduction of criminal law is another example of how written codes may be more easily transferred between systems that abstract principles of law based on precedent. For instance, the present Criminal Code of Ghana was based on an Ordinance of 1892, which in turn was based on a criminal code drafted in 1877 for Jamaica. Although the code was not adopted in Jamaica, it eventually became law for St. Lucia, British Honduras, St. Vincent, Grenada, and the Gold Coast (Ghana). The Nigerian Criminal Code Ordinance of 1916 was modeled on the Criminal Code Act of Queensland (Australia), 1899, which in turn was based on the draft of the English Criminal Code of 1879 and on the penal codes of Italy and of the State of New York. The Penal Code Law of Northern Nigeria, adopted in 1959, is based on the Sudan Penal Code, which in turn was adopted from the Indian Penal Code. The latter has been described as "the criminal law of England freed from all technicalities and superfluities systematically arranged and modified in some few particulars . . . . to suit the circumstances of British India."33

ISLAMIC LAW AND ETHIOPIAN LAW

Islamic law in Africa is of major significance in the inland Sudanic belt, stretching from Senegal to the Republic of Sudan. J. N. D. Anderson has remarked that Islam has penetrated, or is still penetrating, many parts of the continent, and the influence of Islamic law has been widely spread, superficially at least, through Muslim merchants and members of the religious orders. As a result the indigenous customary law has been leavened, in certain areas, by Islamic principles and precedents—to a degree which differs widely, of course, from place to place. In
certain areas, moreover, it has been virtually displaced by the law of Islam, particularly where a native ruler has attempted to impose this law upon his people. But nowhere in tropical Africa has the imposition been complete, for traces of the customary law survive even in the most rigidly Muslim areas.\(^{34}\)

Professor Anderson has raised the question of whether an authoritative law, which is regarded as firmly based on divine revelation, can so adapt itself--or be adapted--as to enable it to resolve the typical conflicts of an industrial society. His answer is affirmative, based on the fact that Islamic law has changed not only in Africa but in other Muslim countries as well. In criminal and commercial law, in the law of evidence and procedure, and in large parts of the civil codes, "Islamic law has been quietly put on one side."

There has been less change in the sphere of Islamic family law and succession. Matters dealing with divorce, inheritance, adoption, and marriage are still largely guided by the tenets of Maliki law, the predominant Islamic legal school in West and North Africa. In such cases, there is often a National Shari'a Court of Appeals to adjudicate such civil disputes on the highest level. In only one African state with an important Muslim minority (Ivory Coast) has national legislation curtailed the Islamic practice of legally allowing four wives.

The process by which Islamic law, particularly Islamic criminal law, has come to be modified in the modern period, is summarized by Professor Anderson:

> Muslim countries have contrived to effect reforms in what purports (at least) to be still Islamic law by a variety of ingenious devices. One is a procedural device, by which parts of the Islamic law are simply precluded from judicial enforcement (or even recognition). Another, which has been given the widest possible application, consists in an eclectic selection of principles for which some support can be found among the heterogeneous Muslim authorities of the past, and the promulgation of these principles in the form of statute law. Yet another, which has received less acknowledgment, represents a reinterpretation of the ancient texts in a manner more acceptable to contemporary opinion. And each of these is at times reinforced by statutory regulations which are represented as augmenting, rather than contradicting, the sacred law.\(^{35}\)

Turning to the other major body of traditional codified law in Africa, Ethiopian law, a similar process of revision is evident. Indeed, one of the
most singular developments in African law has been the adoption by Ethiopia of six basic codes which now constitute the body of law in that country. The adoption of these codes provides Ethiopia with one of the most modern legal systems in Africa. The six new codes are the Penal Code of 1957 (amending the Penal Code of 1930); the Civil Code, the Maritime Code, and the Commercial Code, all of 1960; the Criminal Procedure Code of 1961; and the Civil Procedure Code of 1965.

The new codes supplanted the body of traditional law, which had not been unified or codified. According to one observer,

The principal origins of law were the Fetha Negast, for the Coptic-Christian populations of the ancient provinces; the Moslem law, for the populations of Harrar and the coastal areas of the Red Sea; and the customary law, for the other regions of the country which are considered more "African" in the popular sense.36

The preamble of the 1930 Penal Code pointed out that

the principles of the modern European Codes used as models are still often very close to those which are found expressed in the Fetha Negast.

"Whether common sources had been transmitted by way of Rome, as in Europe, or by Alexandria, as in Ethiopia, on many points the Roman-Occidental conception, reflected in the Ethiopian tradition, joined together and easily allowed the modernization of the work on this ground."37

THE GROWTH OF AFRICAN STATUTE LAW

We have noted earlier the significance for African law of the introduction of new institutions capable of creating law: that is, the legislature and the bureaucracy. Both types of institutions have initiated extensive legal changes. The introduction of new machinery for making law is reminiscent of the development of the legislative function of Parliament in the sixteenth century. Thomas Smith, writing in 1583, gave his impressions of this development, where, in his words, the Crown in Parliament "can make and unmake law, can change rights and possessions of private men, legitimate bastards, establish religions, condemn or absolve (by its attainders, etc.) whomsoever the Prince will."38 Legislation has been used for many purposes, including the modification of traditional law. Slavery has been abolished by statute; trial by ordeal became an offense against the Criminal Code.
At the local level in Africa new assemblies made it possible to adopt customary law to modern needs. In Ghana, for instance, the power of chiefs to abolish inequitable custom is regulated by the Chieftancy Act (1961): "if the law is uncertain or it is considered desirable that it should be modified, or assimilated by the common law, the Council is empowered to make representations to the House of Chiefs having jurisdiction over the area." The Chiefs can also "draft a declaration of what in their opinion is the customary law relating to any subject in its area or any part thereof." 39

Legislatures have also been used to modify "received law." An example of this is found in the idea proposed in Ghana of incorporated private partnerships. The Final Report on Company Law in Ghana (the Gower Report) stated:

The principal weakness of the present type of partnership as an organisation for African business is that the firm has no separate existence and that the partnership is automatically dissolved on the death or retirement of any partner. Under this Bill, a distinction is drawn between the partnership relationship and the firm. The former is dissolved on the death or retirement of any partner. But the firm (the business itself) on registration of the partnership becomes a separate legal entity capable of permanent survival and its life is not destroyed by a change in the constitution of the partnership. 40

In Tanzania, to give another example, freehold tenure has been abolished and freehold has been converted to ninety-nine years held by the government. Legislation has given boards and commissions extensive control over land held under customary law. An act relating to rights of occupancy makes far-reaching changes in the rules relating to ownership and holding interests in the land. Where the law is unclear or open-ended, as it is in many places, it is an administrator or an administrative tribunal which is charged with the duty of giving it coherent meaning and not a court. 41

The Range Development and Management Act of 1964 had the effect of enclosing land against pastoralists. It is designed to create a legal framework for the conversion and development of range areas--specifically so for the Masai district. . . . The Minister, after consultation with a commission, may make rules prohibiting and restricting entry into the area, providing that certain categories of persons must have residence certificates to be able to reside in the area, and empowering the Commission to issue
permits of entry and erect road barriers to control entry into the area.\footnote{42}

All these rules, orders, and measures are taken on the basis that customary law still applies to the land in the range development area, but clearly their effect will often be to alter or make redundant some of these rules, and this alteration is being done by an administrative body which has no standing in the traditional society and which is not under any obligation to investigate the existence or content of customary rules governing the same matters before acting.\footnote{43}

There is a highly abstract character to some of these legislative enactments, and it may be another example where statute law and the living law are "out of phase."

\section*{Integration and Interrelation of Legal Systems}

The trend in modern Africa is clearly toward the integration of law within a unified national legal system. This is the goal, however slow or fast the pace or by whatever the approach. The integration of law has been considered part of the process of nation-building, and in some states, such as Tanzania and Ethiopia, has been promoted as a device for increasing national unity. The complexity of national integration as a background for legal integration is summarized by Professor Robert B. Seidman:

This, then, was the matrix for the law of English-speaking Africa at independence: a dichotomous society, sharply split between the subsistence economy with its associated culture and law and the commercial-industrial private, Westernized sector; a pluralistic legal order; demands upon the legal orders that implied fundamentally irreconcilable jural postulates—status, contract, and plan; and a governing elite for whom law was more frequently a restriction to be avoided than a tool for the rational application of state power.\footnote{44}

The place of customary law in the process of national integration is highly controversial. On the one hand it may exacerbate ethnic societal differences, but on the other hand it may be necessary to placate the various ethnic groups. From the viewpoint of modern planning Professor A. Arthur Schiller writes that customary law is generally dismissed as of minor importance by the lawyer immersed in the legal problems of economic development, characterized as antiquarian by the policy-maker, and surrendered to the anthropologist, who normally attempts to reconstitute the pristine, primitive law untainted by contact with Western ways and modern life.\footnote{45}
Professor Seidman, for instance, whose interests are in legal planning, gives grudging recognition to the place of customary law:

Perhaps the only valid generalization that can be made about customary law in Africa is that, in all its diversity, it has been reasonably apt to answer the problems thrown up by the subsistence economy and the existing level of technology.46

The unification of African customary law is being brought about through various devices, such as the "restatement projects" and codification, or, as in Ethiopia, by a series of codes which have replaced the older law. A parallel trend is found in the development of unified national court systems, with the courts having jurisdiction over all types of cases, regardless of the nature of the litigants or the type of law involved.

If customary law is brought into the legal system and thus becomes part of the "law of the land," it is necessary that the law be raised to a level of abstraction where useful principles can be deduced from the case to be applied to subsequent cases. Professor L. T. Fallers, who has studied customary Soga law (Uganda), has described some of the problems involved in relating the Soga system to the national legal system:

The legal reality for the vast majority of village-dwelling Africans is the traditional ethnic group, . . . and the relevant boundaries between bodies of law are not the familiar political frontiers shown on most maps but rather the many times more numerous boundaries between traditional tribes and kingdoms which appear on the maps of anthropologists.47

This customary law is still important, according to Fallers, because "it continues to order relations among members of the community." He would like to see customary law remain vigorous and made flexible, incorporated in the national legal system and equipped with tools for further evolution, rather than "sweeping it away in a burst of legislative enthusiasm."

In Busoga, the two systems of law, traditional and modern, are interrelated and may be used to reinforce each other. Marriage, for example, may be contracted under the national Marriage Ordinance, but a large majority of the Soga continue to contract customary marriages as well, through the payment of bridewealth. Professor Fallers has found, however, that the local courts have failed to develop generalized principles and precedents as guides to future cases, and that they tend not to translate norms into more
abstract principles. He writes that

the clear statement and communication of a precedent-setting decision
in response to a new problem requires, if such decisions are not to be
random departures from tradition, much more explicit formulation of what
what is being done.

At present, judges have not made such formulations. An observer must examine
the whole body of testimony to get the full implications of a decision. What
is required, according to Fallers, is a corps of judges and clerks who are
trained in court procedure but also "in somewhat more analytical modes of
reasoning."

The writer found judges unwilling or unable to discuss abstract rules
of law, generally responding to questions by saying that a rule could
not be stated in the absence of all the facts of the case.48

An early effort toward simplifying and unifying customary law was
promoted by the late Hans Cory, the former Government Sociologist of
Tanganyika, who, in a series of barazas (conferences), sounded out chiefs
in various parts of the country on the rules which were followed in settling
local disputes. Cory hoped to secure a measure of agreement on the appropriate
customary rules to be followed in various types of cases and thus to build
up a body of doctrine that would assist judges in their deliberations. At
the same time, it was thought that an understanding of the content of the
law would make it less necessary for the judges to rely on the advice of
elders and assessors who themselves might have a personal or family interest
in the outcome of the case.

A later and more far-reaching development is the Restatement of African
Law project, sponsored by London University, under the direction of Professor
A. N. Allott. The sponsors of the project have argued that there is a need
for a restatement, or rearrangement, of African law, inasmuch as the territorial
legal systems in the former British territories "are an uneasy and uncertain
amalgamation of rules derived from the law of England, and rules elaborated
on the spot by legislation and interpretation."49

The Restatement of African Law project involves customary law as well
as general law, so there is concern that legal "harmonisation or even
integration with the customary and other personal laws would be promoted or
achieved."50 The project favors restatement over codification or "piecemeal
judicial interpretation." Those administering and changing the law should know precisely what elements are being integrated and harmonized.

Within the African context, the restatement of law has been taking place through court decisions, where descriptions of customary law are often made in legal English. According to Allott,

The judge is naturally tempted to accommodate African conceptions in English categories. Thus the institution of family property may be described by an English or English-trained judge in terms of joint tenancy, or corporations, or trustee-beneficiaries, or of agency—all conceptions of the English law which have to be adapted or stretched to fit the African institution.

The reverse may also take place, where legal terms are stretched to fit another legal system.

Whenever a native court, or an African speaking an African language, has tried to apply the concepts or rules of English law to a legal situation before it or him, it is possible that such reverse restatement may take place, and the English law will be "africanised" in consequence.51

The restatement of African law follows certain general guidelines, which include the following: a) inconsistencies and doubts in existing law should be removed; b) local divergencies should be resolved, or at least noted and compared; c) the applicable law should be stated in as precise language as possible; d) restatements of one kind of law must employ a uniform terminology; e) the restatements must have as much authority as scientific scholarship can give; f) there must be arrangements for periodic revision to conform to new interpretations and the changing society in which the law operates.52

In theory, at any rate, the unification of law has gone further in Tanzania than in any other African state. Professor Schiller has commented on this development:

The restatement of the customary law in Tanzania was from the start a first step towards the unification of the law. Nyerere called for a unified code as a vital element in the building of a nation state. Government officials met with tribal representatives chosen by district councils in order to ascertain the rules applicable in the fields of family law and succession throughout the Bantu patrilineal tribes of the country. They prepared uniform statements of the law and submitted these draft pronouncements to local authorities. Although in many instances the rules proposed varied considerably from the local
Consolidation of Nation-States

Consolidation of Nation-States

practice, these declarations were accepted by the district councils and were promulgated as rules of law binding upon the courts. Hence, unification of the customary law of most of the Bantu peoples of Tanzania has been accomplished, at least in the printed notices issued as supplements to the official gazette.

UNIFICATION OF AFRICAN LAW THROUGH COURTS

African law has also been unified through the development of a national system of courts. When foreign legal systems were introduced into Africa there was a tendency to create specific courts having jurisdiction over specific peoples or laws. Local courts, for the most part, applied customary law and had jurisdiction over Africans. The newly created courts, if not the law, were a foreign import and provided a new form into which the old law would have to fit. Whether the new local courts were in fact "native courts" depended in part on the perspective from which they were viewed. Writing in 1957, Professor Bohannan said:

There are today two folk systems operative in Tivland. There is that scheme of looking at social institutions which characterizes the tribal Africans and which includes their views not merely of "indigenous institutions" but also of European inspired and dominated institutions. There is also the scheme of looking at things which characterizes a colonial administration and is shared more or less fully by other local Europeans; it includes views not merely of governmental and mission institutions, but also of other African institutions into which the Europeans do not enter directly. The two systems are seldom congruous.

Therefore it is not surprising that administrative officers and other Europeans living in Tivland refer to those bodies officially termed "Grade-D courts" as "native courts," while the Tiv refer to them as "government courts".

With the passage of time and the increased mobility of the people, it has been necessary to develop a legal system with greater flexibility. The present trend points toward a unified legal system, with the courts having jurisdiction over all types of persons and cases. The rationalization for this development was made in 1951 in the Korsah Report on Native Courts in the Gold Coast, which stated:

As any modern secular state develops, if it is to keep free of communal or racial strife, there comes a time when special courts for particular classes of inhabitants must give way to general courts for all manner
of men. We think the time has come now in this country, and we therefore recommend that local courts should have authority ...

Concomitant with the development of a common court system is the attempt to introduce, in the English-speaking countries, English procedures and rules of evidence. The result is that customary procedure is being assimilated by the English court system. In Ghana, customary law has been assimilated with the common law, to be applied where applicable; but it would not be applied where the "proper law" of a transaction was a non-customary law. A law case, in other words, might contain elements of customary law, common law, and legislation, and it would be heard by courts in a single system of courts rather than by courts created for the type of law they are to administer.

In Uganda the unification of courts is well advanced. According to Sawyer,

Magistrates' courts of all grades are now empowered to apply one body of law with many components--local statutes, the received English law and customary law--each component applied presumably in an appropriate case.

The concepts of "membership of a customary community," Sawyer writes, has in some places, replaced the term "native" or "African," but this concept of community, in turn, raises new legal problems, such as the type of acts which make one a member of the community, and the question of acceptance or rejection by the community.

In Tanzania, where extensive integration of law courts has taken place, the Magistrates Courts Act of 1963 established a single hierarchy of courts, consisting of Primary courts, District courts, Resident Magistrates' courts, and the High Court. The Primary courts were given general civil jurisdiction over causes of action governed by customary or Islamic law, and certain other matters in respect of which jurisdiction was specifically conferred by statute. Original jurisdiction over marriage, guardianship and inheritance under customary law, and certain types of immovable property was confined exclusively to Primary courts.

Although the jurisdiction of the Primary courts is concerned mainly with matters controlled by customary law, "it is not limited to these and . . . it is not defined by reference to the race of the parties."
The development and systemization of African law has not been completed and its further development will require additional effort by all segments of the new African states. The training of judges, lawyers, and legislators with proper expertise, the explanation of the law to the people, and the enrichment of ideas concerning rights, legitimacy, and due process are items of concern. Research is also necessary in developing a unified and interrelated legal system and in learning how the law affects the life of the people. One of the most important areas of research in the development of African law is that relating to the conflict of law, or, in lay language, the interrelationship of legal systems, when more than one system of law is involved in a case. This problem has been stated by G. F. A. Sawyerr:

Due to the constant intercourse between peoples subject to these various laws, it is inevitable that from time to time cases coming before the courts will raise issues which, because of the identity of the parties or the nature or form of a transaction, have contacts with more than one of these systems of law. In such circumstances a court may be called upon to select the particular system by the rules of which to decide the issues.58

Internal conflict of law may occur, in Professor Allott’s words, when a judge is required to choose between two or more systems of law which are not territorially distinct, i.e., which apply concurrently and without spatial separation within a single territorial jurisdiction. There is thus an overlap between one system and another, which cannot be removed merely by drawing a boundary on the ground.59

Conflict may occur between general law and customary law, between different systems of customary law, between customary law and Islamic law, between schools of Islamic law, and between different national systems of law.

Another area of research relates to the impact of legal change on the people. Is the new law accepted, or do the litigants resolve their disputes outside the legal system? There is the possibility that legal change will be little more than an exercise in conceptualization and that legislation or even judgments will not represent the actual living law. In the words of L. L. Kato:

Law reform is the process whereby the "desired free law" may take the form of "formal law" like a statute or a precedent. It is the incorporation of the practices and desires of the law consumers into
a legally recognized category. . . . The problem of law reform involves a re-examination of the working of the concept of justice, i.e., the justice of an individual rule or decision as well as the justice of the legal system as a whole.60

Professor Schiller has sounded a word of caution in the dangers of separating law from its popular base:

If future judgments are rendered by magistrates who are strangers to the community, and if they are based upon principles dictated by the central government and at odds with well-established and recognized rules of the local customary law, there is good reason to expect less resorting to the state judiciary. For these decisions would have little or no weight in enhancing one's position in the give and take leading towards settlement. A diminution in the use of the courts means an increase in the number of traditional arbitral hearings. The nullification of the judicial process on the part of a substantial element of the rural population is a serious danger. It is a giant step back on the road to tribalism.61

The problems of African legal development are considerable. These include the conceptual framework of the law itself. In addition, the creation of legal institutions and the training or re-training of personnel are formidable tasks. It is of significance that much of the recent political instability of African states has not affected the embryonic legal systems. The future of African legal systems rests more directly with the processes of adapting law, whether customary or Western, to the needs of national states which are ever bending under the winds of change.

NOTES


8. Bohannan, Justice and Judgment Among the Tiv, p. 213.


18. Gold Coast Supreme Court Ordinance, No. 4 of 1876; quoted by Daniels The Common Law in West Africa, p. 121.


24. (1938) 1 T.L.R. (R), 403.


30. (1898) 1 N.L.R. 15 at p. 21.


32. Ibid., p. 15.


35. Ibid., p. 96.


43. *Ibid.*, p. 188.


AFRICA AND THE MODERN WORLD

21 AFRICAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
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The world in which African states emerged after World War II seemed one of almost symmetrical alignments and allegiances. To the north of Africa lay Europe, the chilly home of imperial powers. In the southern tip of Africa itself lay the Union of South Africa, the most institutionalized case of racism in the world. In other words, both the north and the south symbolized for African nationalism targets of opposition and foci of political antagonism. Acute imperialism flowed from the north, and acute racism flourished in the south.

By contrast, to the east lay the continent of Asia and the comradeship of the Indians, the Chinese, and other fellow sufferers of the colored world. To the west of Africa lay the Americas. Latin America later came to be included in the comradeship of the Third World and to be regarded as an area which shared the indignity of indigence. North America consisted of Canada, the most liberal influence in the British Commonwealth, and the United States, with a tradition of anti-imperialism and with the liberal credo which was carried by the American Negroes into the heart of early Pan-Africanism.

We may therefore say that for the African nationalist both the Asian East and the American West carried the warmth of friendly allegiance against colonialism; while the European North and the Afrikaner South symbolized the cold forces of colonialism and racism. With the attainment of independence in Africa this political symmetry was disturbed by a new alignment of forces and new patterns of friendship and enmity. But before discussing these changes we should examine more carefully the golden age of symmetrical African alignments—when north-south was a meridian of
antagonism and east-west a connecting line of alliance.

THE ETHICS AND THE TACTICS

To discuss patterns of development in history is to indulge in generalizations. As one such generalization, we might say that African nationalism borrowed ideas from the Americas and from Europe and strategies and tactics from Asia. Wilsonian notions of self-determination, liberal ideals of individualism and the concept of one man, one vote were part of the package of philosophical norms which Africa inherited from the Western world. But strategies and tactics such as Gandhian passive resistance, Nehru's policy of non-alignment, and Mao Tse-tung's modes of revolutionary opposition were all part of the heritage which Africa received from the Orient. To some extent this differential legacy from the Orient and the Occident has elements of historical irony. After all, the Orient is supposed to be a wellspring of universal values and religious systems. Most of the major religions of the world have come from the Asian continent and its perimeter. The Occident, on the other hand, is supposed to be the home of techniques and skills, of industrial strategy and mechanical methods. Even the miracle of Japan's rapid industrialization and Westernization was described by the Japanese themselves as a case of adopting "Western techniques" while retaining "Japanese spirit." Time and again, in other words, Asia has been regarded as the fountain-head of spiritual values, while Europe has been regarded as the great source of practical techniques. Yet here was African nationalism borrowing techniques of social protest from contemporary Oriental experience, while adopting some of the political values of the Western world.

Among the important African borrowings from Asia during the colonial period was the Gandhian concept of passive resistance. Gandhism had been operative in India for more than a decade before the technique really captured the imagination of African nationalists. In West Africa the Gandhian torch was taken up by Kwame Nkrumah, the leader of nationalism in the Gold Coast. By June, 1949, Nkrumah launched the strategy of "Positive Action," designed to harrass the British authorities into granting one
concession after another to the nationalist movement. Nkrumah viewed positive action as legitimate political agitation, newspaper and educational campaigns, and, as a last resort, the constitutional application of strikes, boycotts and non-co-operation based on the principle of absolute non-violence, as used by Gandhi in India.¹

Later, Nkruma was to say: "We salute Mahatma Gandhi and we remember, in tribute to him, that it was in South Africa that his method of non-violence and non-co-operation was first practised."²

In retrospect, it is clear that many early African nationalists were convinced that Gandhism would always be successful. At the 1958 All-Africa People's Conference, however, one of the major debating points became the issue of whether violence was or could be a legitimate instrument of the African nationalist. The Algerians—then struggling against the French—put up a spirited case in the defense of armed insurrection, but Black Africa was divided in its opinion. The chairman of that conference in 1958 was Tom Mboya of Kenya. By 1963, Mboya would observe cautiously in his autobiography that "even those African leaders who accept Gandhi's philosophy find that there are limitations in its use in Africa."³ By the time the Organization of African Unity came into being in May, 1963, Africa could actually think in terms of establishing a liberation committee to aid insurrectionist movements in the remaining colonies on the continent. Far from being against the use of force, the Organization of African Unity actually encouraged insurrection in the Portuguese territories, and later in Southern Rhodesia after Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence.

But what had happened to the Gandhism which had once animated and inspired many African nationalists? There were a number of reasons for the greater militancy assumed by independent African states. One important factor in the shift in African mood was the action taken by India against the Portuguese colony of Goa on the Indian subcontinent. This was the first instance of a former colony taking direct military action to eject an imperial power from a neighboring territory. China had contributed
indirectly in Indo-China to the humiliation of the French at Dien Bien Phou, but China had never been colonialized in the same sense as India and Africa. The victory of the Vietnamese at Dien Bien Phou was substantially a victory of the Vietnamese themselves—much as Algerian independence came ultimately through the efforts of the Algerians themselves. India's military action against the Portuguese regime in Goa was, thus, in a class by itself. Accomplished with ease and confidence, it was a display of Asiatic power against the imperial arrogance of a European country. It was the first case of a former colony successfully intimidating one of the oldest empires of the era of European expansionism.

The impact of this event on Africa was greatly accentuated by the fact that Portugal's remaining empire was now in Africa itself. Tom Mboya was soon saying in Kenya that he was "strongly in favor" of India's action over Goa. And on the West coast of Africa the man who had once been described as the "Ghandi of Ghana," Kwame Nkrumah, was now declaring, "I am most happy about India's annexation of Goa which I consider long overdue."4

This then was the paradox of India's ideological impact on African nationalism. The country which had once inspired African nationalists to a non-violent approach to liberation had now set the precedent of a military confrontation with a colonial power.

DIPLOMACY AND REBELLION

In addition to the techniques of passive resistance, India contributed to African nationalism the concept of non-alignment, which served as the basis of African diplomacy on attainment of independence. In a sense, the doctrines of non-violence and non-alignment are closely related, and were developed sequentially in the Indian context. One school of African thought had adopted Gandhi's concept of passive resistance, and almost all African countries borrowed Nehru's doctrine of non-alignment. As Uganda's President, Milton Obote, put it in his tribute to Nehru on his death: "Nehru will be remembered as the founder of non-alignment...the new nations of the world owe him a debt of gratitude in this respect."5
Independence is a time when a newly created state has to seek direction for its diplomacy. The experience of conducting international relations as a sovereign state is entirely new. The idea of a foreign policy is also relatively new for such a state. The concept of non-alignment was therefore a useful guide line for the newly decolonized states of Africa. Non-alignment was essentially a policy of pragmatic non-committal. By eschewing commitment to alliances in the early postindependence period, and by rejecting the notion of automatic alignment in the cold war, the non-aligned countries gave themselves time to think. Non-alignment as a policy was well-suited to a period of experimentation. It enabled the new states to try out relations with countries both in the Western bloc and in the Eastern bloc, to seek direct knowledge and direct contact with a diversity of other countries, and to find out for themselves what the rest of the world was like. Commitments to one bloc on attainment of independence would have limited the experience of diplomatic relations, particularly with the Eastern bloc. The opening of embassies is expensive, and had not the policy of non-alignment required contact with both sides, it could seem wasteful to establish embassies among Eastern countries if the small power were already committed to the West. This sort of reasoning was clearly manifest in a number of new states, including several in French-speaking Africa.

Non-alignment on the pattern formulated by Nehru set the stage for a period of diplomatic maturation. It allowed new states a period of trial and error in a diversity of relationships. Of course, there was always the risk of having one's fingers burned. It has been suggested that India's own faith in Chinese good intentions, stemming in part from the policy of non-alignment, resulted in India's unreadiness to meet the Chinese invasion in 1962. If this interpretation were true, it could still be argued that burning one's fingers as a result of direct trial and error is part of the process of growing up in the world of diplomacy.

India is not the only Asian country to have contributed strategies and techniques to African nationalism. Communist China, as a model, has also had an impact on several of the new African states. It might be said that whereas India bequeathed non-violence as a method of changing
imperial relationships, China bequeathed revolutionary violence as a method of social transformation. Admiration for China in this regard within Africa goes back at least to the Mau Mau insurrection in Kenya. One of the leaders of the Mau Mau movement was even called "General China." The Chinese established relationships with people like Felix Moumie, the rebel leader of Cameroon, and with Abdulrahman Babu, a leading radical of revolutionary Zanzibar. The Simba rebels of the Congo seemed to have established a special revolutionary comradeship with the Chinese communists.

Because of their identification with opposition political forces in many African states, the Chinese are becoming more circumspect in their involvement in Africa. But the result might merely be more subtle ways of extending Chinese support to African revolutionaries, as the Chinese will probably continue to "offer themselves as the allies of oppositionists, rebels, and power-seekers." To use the words of Colin Legum, "In this field they have virtually no competition--neither the West nor the Russians will openly support movements against the status quo."\(^6\)

These are some of the ways in which the Orient has provided a source of oppositionist techniques for African statesmen and African radicals. These techniques came from the East but we have said, too, that some of the animating values of contemporary African politics came from the West. It is to the latter phenomenon that we now turn.

DIPLOMACY AND IDEOLOGY

We have described Europe as one of the targets of the African nationalistic offensive. This was inevitable since it was from Europe that imperialism had come to Africa. But Senegal's Mamadou Dia grasped an essential paradox when he described Europe as "mother of nationalism and, by a strange destiny, mother of colonialism."\(^7\)

This was an exaggeration on both counts, but there is some truth in the suggestion. Liberal democratic notions such as those of individual freedom and universal suffrage, as well as socialist and Marxist concepts such as those of class struggle and economic exploitation, all found their way to the African continent where they were Africanized to some extent.
before they were adopted by African radicals.

In addition to Europe, the United States also contributed some of the political norms of contemporary African politics. The role of American education for Africans is one important link in this regard. As a Nigerian student dramatically put it in the 1940’s, "The first skirmishes in the struggle for political freedom of the 21,000,000 people of Nigeria are being fought in the colleges of the U.S."8

This too, is a romantic exaggeration. But it is substantially true that Africans who were educated in the United States have tended to be more single-minded in their nationalism than Africans educated in, say, Great Britain. Perhaps it was not accidental that the radical leadership in Ghana passed from the British-educated elite to Nkrumah, who was primarily American educated. Nor was it entirely a coincidence that the father of modern Nigerian nationalism was Nnamdi Azikiwe, also a product of American education.9

Another source of Western values for African statesmen was the United Nations itself. It is true that the United Nations is by intention a world body and its values ought not to be related to any single cluster of states, but in reality the United Nations Charter was greatly influenced by European values.10

The U.N. Charter contributed some of the values and scale of the rhetoric which came to characterize African nationalism. Indeed, the U.N. Charter developed into the ultimate documentary confirmation of the legitimacy of African aspirations, although it is probably safe to say that very few African nationalists had in fact read the Charter. Those who had were less interested in the specific procedures for assuring world peace than in the reaffirmation of "faith in fundamental rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small."11 In spite of this limited or selected grasp of what the U.N. Charter was all about, the Charter became a kind of documentary expression of natural law and a global bill of rights. Demands for liberation by both Asian and African nationalist movements came to be based increasingly on the principles of human rights "as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations . . . and of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and
dall nations."12

The United Nations became a liberating factor in practice as well as
in principle. Yet, in this process it exhibited two paradoxical capacities:
that of a collective "imperialist" with trusteeship responsibilities of
its own and that of the grand critic of imperialism at large. Indeed, as
early as 1953, exasperated voices were already complaining that "perhaps
the term 'self determination' should be dropped, now that the United
Nations is called upon to do the determining."13

PAN-AFRICANISM AND RACIAL SOVEREIGNTY

After independence the theme of liberation remained important in
African diplomatic activity, both in the United Nations and in other areas
of debate and action. The Organization of African Unity devised methods
of giving moral, and sometimes material, support to insurrectionists in
the remaining colonies of Africa. African states were often strongly united
in a mood of denunciation on issues such as that of Rhodesia after the
1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence. Unity in action, however, was
less common than unity in mood. When the African states passed a resolution
to break off diplomatic relations with Britain over the Rhodesia issue,
over thirty states fulfilled that resolution. Even the support for freedom
fighters from the Portuguese territories has at times been a subject of
disagreement between African states within the Organization of African Unity.
Notwithstanding these divergent policy preferences, the fact remains that
the newly independent African countries have found a major unifying political
conviction to be the shared commitment to the liberation of the rest of
the continent.

Anti-colonialism, however, is second to opposition to white racism
as a unifying and unanimously supported cause in Africa. While there is
a pervasive feeling that foreign rule is morally reprehensible, there are,
in fact, a number of cases where African countries do not react strongly
to the phenomenon of foreign rule as such. For example, there is very
little African antipathy against Chinese imperialism in Tibet. And even
within Africa there has often been acceptance of the need for colonial rule as a transition to independence. In 1958 the bulk of French-speaking African countries voted in the referendum arranged by de Gaulle for a continuation of French-colonial rule. The 1958 de Gaulle referendum was a striking case of colonialism by consent. Even on the issue of Rhodesia many African countries are demanding the end of the illegal independence and the restoration of British control over the country. The issue here is racism, not colonialism. Even if Ian Smith had legally formed the Government of an independent country, the majority of African states would still demand that this independence be terminated and British colonialism restored. Why? Simply because with Smith in control the principle of racial sovereignty is violated in Rhodesia. The legitimate sovereignty of Africans is being violated by the racist rule of a white minority. This is regarded as a greater breach of African aspiration than is traditional British control from London. Here then is a case in which African anti-racism is a stronger motivation than African anticolonialism.

At present much of the sentiment of Pan-Africanism is focused on these twin areas of antiracism and anticolonialism. The idea of Pan-Africanism as a quest for continental integration has considerably subsided since the early days of Nkrumah's militancy. Regional organizations such as the East African Community or the Organization of States on the Senegal River are very much a part of interstate relations in Africa; but the idea of a continent-wide unification movement has receded into the limbo of obscure romanticism since Nkrumah's fall from power in 1966. Today the issues of antiracism and anticolonialism stir deep responses in Africa and constitute the two major bonds of empathy among Africans.

Finally, there is a widespread feeling that African political problems ought to be solved by African effort and exertion. This feeling lies behind the strong disapproval of the use of mercenaries in African civil wars like that of Nigeria or, earlier, of the Congo. To employ mercenaries in a war of Africans against Africans is regarded as a violation of racial sovereignty. It is also a violation of the principle of Pax Africana, a principle which dedicates itself to the ideal of creating a state of affairs in which the peace of Africa would be maintained and
CASTRO. The moral was not lost to the non-aligned in Africa. If an African voice was going to be marginal in influencing big events, it had better be marginal outside the blocs altogether. The experience of little Cuba was a warning against allowing oneself to be used in a global nuclear strategy by one of the big powers. The crisis of confidence among the non-aligned which China's behavior had created was resolved by the new sense of fearful vindication which emerged from the Cuban confrontation.

Indeed, even while the Cuban crisis was on, African states participated in the search for a solution. Ghana and the United Arab Republic submitted a joint draft-resolution to the Security Council on October 24, 1962, urging the parties in the dispute to refrain from further aggravating the situation while the search for a modus vivendi was in progress.17 The Union of African and Malagasy States (the old UAM) submitted a set of proposals on the immediate steps to be taken to reduce the danger of war. It was clear that the survival of humanity was an issue which concerned all states, and Africa asserted her right to have a say in a matter so grave.18 Africa's freedom from military entanglement with either of the big powers did not appear to be a diplomatic handicap at such a moment.

Yet, much as the Cuban crisis strengthened the case for non-alignment, it indirectly also weakened the impact of non-alignment on world affairs. The Cuban confrontation was the great turning point in Soviet-American relations. The intense ideological competitiveness between the two countries was replaced by a more sober relationship. The Soviet Union was humbled over Cuba. This by itself had a major impact on the Third World. But at least as important was the use to which John F. Kennedy put his triumph. He did not gloat over Krushchev's capitulation. On the contrary, he congratulated him on his statesmanship.19 Before long the "hot line" between Washington and Moscow was established. The Soviet-American détente was born.

This détente helped to reduce what little status Africa had had as a "crisis area." The Soviet-American scramble to buy the ideological souls of Africans began to lose its momentum. Cuba had strengthened the case for non-alignment, but it had also helped to reduce its rewards. The Clay Report on U.S. foreign aid was presented to Kennedy soon after the Cuban
helped to rescue non-alignment from its own crisis of confidence following China's invasion of India at about the same time. How were these crises inter-related?

According to at least one view at that time, a basic assumption of non-alignment was that it was possible for a country without an alliance to be left alone militarily by both blocs. All that was needed, therefore, to invalidate non-alignment was an invasion of a non-aligned country by a member of one of the blocs. Mao Tse-tung fulfilled this condition when he attacked neutralist India. In other words, Mao apparently succeeded where John Foster Dulles had failed—the sanctity of non-alignment was destroyed, at least temporarily. The Times of London had a curt editorial to celebrate the explosion of the myth of neutralism. On November 11, 1962, the New York Times even managed to collect quotations from Africans allegedly disillusioned with non-alignment. On the night of December 3, 1962, a professor from the London School of Economics commented over the BBC upon "the end of the neutralist myth." This interpretation of the significance of the Chinese invasion of India was fairly representative of Western opinion.

The New York Times might have been right in its reference to a mood of disenchantment in the ranks of the African non-aligned. There might indeed have been a moment of agonizing doubt as to the meaningfulness of the diplomatic stance they had so far fondly cherished. But among the implications of the Cuban crisis—when the worst was over and people could reflect afresh—was a vindication of non-alignment. The humiliation of Cuba in the fall of 1962 arose from permitting a foreign nuclear base on Cuban soil—a contravention of one of the basic tenets of Afro-Asian neutralism. In a letter to U Thant on October 27, 1962, Fidel Castro said that his country flatly rejected "the presumption of the United States to determine what actions we are entitled to take within our country, what kind of arms we consider appropriate for our defense, what relations we are to have with the U.S.S.R., and what international policy steps we are entitled to take." Yet Castro's ally, Nikita Khrushchev, capitulated to Kennedy's demands with little pretense at consultations with
Castro. The moral was not lost to the non-aligned in Africa. If an African voice was going to be marginal in influencing big events, it had better be marginal outside the blocs altogether. The experience of little Cuba was a warning against allowing oneself to be used in a global nuclear strategy by one of the big powers. The crisis of confidence among the non-aligned which China's behavior had created was resolved by the new sense of fearful vindication which emerged from the Cuban confrontation.

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confrontation. For as long as non-alignment had been regarded as dangerously near to communism, Africa had a chance of being regarded as "critical." The year 1962 was, in fact, the peak year of American aid to Africa. But in the fiscal year 1963 the economic assistance program for Africa began to drop back. From 12.5 per cent of the AID figure, Africa's share dropped to 10.4 per cent in 1963 and then to 8.8 per cent in 1964.20 Although there was an overall global reduction of American foreign aid, this reduction might itself have been influenced by the change in the tempo of the cold war following the Soviet-American détente. With that change Africa was reduced even further in status as a "security risk" for the United States.21

It was not only the Western hemisphere which was changing the globe. Transformative influences were also coming from the East. In 1923, writing on his death bed, Lenin had linked three countries together and assessed the impact of their populations. Lenin said:

In the last analysis the outcome of the struggle will be determined by the fact that Russia, India, China, etc., account for the overwhelming population of the globe. And it is precisely that majority that, during the past few years, has been drawn into the struggle for emancipation with extraordinary rapidity.22

Lenin saw in this fact an assurance for the complete victory of socialism. For a while in the 1950's it did seem that Russia, India, and China, the three most populous countries in the world, intended to remain on sufficiently friendly terms to exert a shared influence on the rest of the world. Alternative possibilities began to be discernible. If China and Russia remained together communism would retain a powerful alliance. If India and China remained together something approaching "Pan-Asianism" would continue to exert a shared influence on diplomatic events in the world, and could constitute a collective leadership of the colored peoples of Asia and Africa.

Yet for a while it was India rather than China which was the effective leader of the new states. One factor which helped India to retain this leadership for a decade was the general diplomatic isolation of Communist China, including her exclusion from the United Nations. But by the time Nehru died, non-alignment in the old sense had already been rendered
impossible by Communist China. The two most populous members of the old community of Afro-Asian states had each played a crucial role in the history of non-alignment—one, India, had virtually invented it; the other, China, had virtually destroyed it.

But, as we have indicated, it was not the Chinese invasion of India that killed non-alignment; at most what the Chinese invasion imperiled was India's non-alignment. Even if that invasion had eliminated non-alignment from the rest of eastern and southern Asia as well, it could conceivably still have left Africa and the Middle East as the last and defiantly enduring bastions of non-alignment in the world.

What killed non-alignment in the old sense was not China's conflict with India, but China's dispute with the Soviet Union. The old non-alignment that Nehru had bequeathed to Afro-Asians had been based on the assumption of a bipolarized cold war. Its whole conceptual framework postulated a dichotomy between "East and West"—and sometimes between "communism" and "capitalism." China's dispute with Russia suddenly rendered such dichotomies too simple. Reluctantly, but with increasing tempo, African states saw themselves having to cope not only with archaic contests between Russians and Westerners, but also with competition and hostility between the Russians and the Chinese.

CONCLUSION: GROWTH AND COMPLEXITY

The birth of African diplomacy and its evolution to the present time is a process whose pattern so far can be only roughly discerned. Much of the dust of history will have to settle down before the full picture of Africa's diplomatic growth in the first decade of independence can be adequately comprehended. Nevertheless, we have attempted to trace in this essay some of the main outlines of that growth and some of the patterns which suggest themselves for analysis. Inevitably there are a number of over-simplifications in this analysis, but excessive fear of generalizations can stifle perception and inhibit discernment of the broader movements of history.
We have tried to demonstrate that the Orient was one of the great sources of techniques and tactics for African protest movements, and that the Occident has been a major source of some of the political values which animated African political and diplomatic behavior in the closing stages of colonial rule and the opening days of African sovereignty. India bequeathed to Africa some elements of Gandhian passive resistance, and later she bequeathed to Africa the whole doctrine of non-alignment as a basis for small-power diplomacy. From the Western world and the United Nations came some of the ideas and the rhetoric of the liberal ethos, ranging from principles of universal suffrage to the whole conception of self-determination as a basis for individual freedom.

But changes have occurred in the world of African political behavior since independence. Some of the old ideas of Pan-Africanism as a movement for broader integration have declined in importance, while the older commitments to antiracism and anticolonialism have persisted right down to Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence and beyond.

The doctrine of non-alignment has itself responded to the fluctuations of political meteorology on the world scene. Pre-eminent among those who effected this change, and with it the international role of the new African states, were two individuals--John F. Kennedy and Mao Tse-tung. We have attempted to demonstrate that Kennedy's contribution to the emergence of a Soviet-American détente reinforced the effects of Mao Tse-tung's alienation from Russia. The world neatly divided between communists and anti-communists receded into the background of history. In some respects the Soviet Union had become closer to the United States than to Communist China, and the context of foreign relations for the non-aligned states became more complex than ever. President de Gaulle of France contributed his own share toward this complexity as he appeared to transform France into a European non-aligned power. It might even be said that the triumvirate of Kennedy, de Gaulle, and Mao Tse-tung wrote the epitaph to bipolarity as a basis of alignment in the world. No longer could the West or the East be considered "blocs" in any real sense.

In like manner, the old symmetry of African affiliation and orientation, had sustained a disintegrative shock. It could no longer be said convincingly
that to the north lay the enemy imperialism; to the south among the Afrikaners, the enemy racism; to the east, the source of techniques of resistance; and to the west, the fountain of political values. The universe of Africa's political behavior was now rescued from this symmetrical simplicity.

But complexity is always the companion to growth and maturation. As the pattern of African diplomatic affiliation and diplomatic behavior have become more complex, so has the depth of African maturity in international politics. The old behavior of people suffering under foreign rule must now give way to the conduct of sovereign peoples engaged in foreign relations.

NOTES


5. Uganda Argus (Kampala), May 29, 1964.

6. Colin Legum has also observed, "the Chinese are liberal in their payments to individuals selected by them as useful allies...large sums have been paid to individual politicians in Zanzibar." See Colin Legum, "Peking's Strategic Priorities," Africa Report, X (January, 1963), 21. More recently, there have been indications or allegations about Chinese financial support for some of the domestic opponents of the Kenyatta regime in Kenya.


9. For some of the reasons which contributed to the greater radicalism of American-educated Africans as compared with British-educated ones, see my essay "Borrowed Theory and Original Practice in African Politics," in

10. In this case the term "European" includes the Soviet Union as well as the New World, as cultural extensions of European civilization.

11. This quotation is taken from the opening lines of "Re-Affirmation of the United Nations Charter."


13. See, for example, Clyde Eagleton, "Excesses of Self-Determination," Foreign Affairs, XXXI (July, 1953), pp. 592-604. This point is also discussed more fully in my article, "The United Nations and Some African Political Attitudes," International Organization, XVIII (Summer, 1964).

14. These ideas are discussed more extensively in my book, Towards a Pax-Africana.


CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN LITERATURE
Wilfred Cartey

The literature of a region—of a people—charts the vibrations of that region and captures the rhythms of that people. In contemporary African literature, as writers attempt to apprehend the total reality of their vast continent, the vibrations are multiple, the rhythms plentiful. The literature draws its creative sap from the earth of Africa, its variations from the diverse rhythms of the African peoples. Vibrations spool backwards echoing the mythic, the folkloric, the traditional; rhythms resound, probing immediate social and political circumstances. Times coalesce, traditions and myths are actualized, historicity and contemporaneity shade together. Man and his circumstance correspond, motifs interlock, themes criss-cross. This commingling of forms and of circumstances gives a totally social dimension to the literature.

On the larger structural level, two converse yet complementary movements give continuity and duration to African literature; a movement away from the traditional and a symbolic return to it. The movement away, the falling apart of things, the dissonant vibrations, may result from an inherent weakness in the structure of the traditional; or it may result from the collision of well-organized indigenous social structures with a foreign culture, the corollary to intense racial and social conflicts, colonialism, and apartheid. The symbolic return is the validation of tradition by some African writers, the questioning of tradition by others.
AUTOBIOGRAPHY

The autobiographical novel, one of the dominant forms in recent African literature, recounts the author's growth, especially his emotional development and increasing awareness of his social circumstances. In this type of novel the motifs of mother and earth bind together to form a single symbol. This symbol recurs as a dominant motif throughout. Many writers of the autobiographical statement turn to childhood to recall the bliss and easy circumstances of life as in *L'enfant noir* (*The Dark Child*), by Camara Laye, and *Kossoh Town Boy* by Robert Cole. *L'enfant noir* becomes a nostalgic recreation of life cushioned from the thrust of historical or political upheavals. When life is troubled and chaotic writers invoke quiet moments cushioned by mother from the full force of adverse social conditions. Movement away from the mother—"thrusting her aside"—is movement away from Africa.

James Ngugi in *Weep Not Child*, Ezekiel Mphalele in *Down Second Avenue*, Peter Abrahams in *Tell Freedom*, and Cheikh Hamidou Kane in *Ambiguous Adventure* focus their attention on the political surroundings and, using a selective process different from that of Camara Laye and Robert Cole, present the stresses of growth and the harsh encounters with colonial administration and apartheid. The plot of these novels delineates the protagonist's growth from childhood to manhood and his ever-increasing awareness through education of his circumstance. But any education, any growth of awareness, demands its proper sacrifice. Such is its nature: to create a contrast so startling that the past must be abandoned in favor of the future it promises, or the reality it so starkly reveals.

This new awareness often leads them into struggle or active conflict, embitterment, loss of hope, and finally escape. Confusion and perplexity often assail them, and with the possible exception of Robert Cole in *Kossoh Town Boy*, they all suffer loneliness. And so in spite of love of the land, in spite of nostalgia, in spite of Africa, Mother Africa, many move away—some inevitably through the process of growth and across the cycle of initiation into life, others because they are compelled by growing alienation and disaffection from the realities which surround them.
THE CONFRONTATION OF BLACK AND WHITE

A falling away from the kind of unity and certainty portrayed in the world of The Dark Child is inevitable. The movement away from one's spiritual heritage, the breakup of old beliefs, may result from the natural and gradual growth of boy into man or it may be brought about by the thrust on the individual of external forces. Colonialism is perhaps one of the most powerful of these external forces, and the concomitant conflict between individuals, generations, and a confrontation between groups becomes the moving force in these novels.

The plots of novels such as Une vie de boy and La vieux negre et la medaille, by Fernand Oyono, Le pauvre Christ de Bomba, by Mongo Beti, The River Between, by James Ngugi, Batouala, by Rene Maran, and Things Fall Apart, by Chinua Achebe, treat the theme of colonialism and the clash of cultures. In the course of colonial imposition many indigenous social structures were shattered, family groupings destroyed, and individuals plunged into disillusionment and despair. It is the reverberations of this breakup, this destruction, this increasing disillusionment, which resound in these novels.

The naive black, the resisting black, the black middleman, the newly arrived white, the white missionary, and the white administrator who has discovered his power are all types which appear in this group of novels; and their interaction provides the character conflict. The initial deceptions and subsequent development of knowledge are the moving impulses. The movement away from a source is an unavoidable consequence of the clash of two worlds in which all the heroes seem to move from a certainty of effort and position to uncertain striving and disillusionment.

In these novels we follow the African through his awakening to the meaning of the white man's presence. Inability to comprehend, and thus to sympathize, is perhaps the most significant cause of tension and conflict in any human relationship. The novelistic statement reveals a nearly complete void of penetration and understanding existing between
Africans and Europeans, blacks and whites. Like the African, the white man too misrepresented and naively misinterpreted the characteristics of those he encountered. Throughout the novels, the white man regards the black man as subhuman, at best as a child, a simpleton worthy of tolerance and condescension. There is neither sympathetic penetration into the African's psychological reactions to the white imposition nor is there comprehension of his defensive gestures.

Given mutual misconceptions and fears, conflict and struggle between the two races could not be avoided. The application of force by the white colonizer to produce desired actions is the material of this group of novels. The physical destruction of life and property by the white man is paralleled by the psychological destruction of the African and his mode of being. Presentation of the clash inherent in the various exploitative situations gives structure to the novels, all of which have a deep sense of the pathetic and a tragic inevitability about them.

ALIENATION

The movement away from the spiritual heritage of a people leads to disintegration of traditional patterns, and when things fall apart the rhythms of life are broken and disillusionment ensues. The works in English dealing with alienation are almost all South African: *Blame Me on History*, by Bloke Modisane, *A Walk in the Night* and *And a Threefold Cord*, by Alex LaGuma, *The Quartet*, by Richard Rive, and *The Living and the Dead*, by Ezekiel Mphalele. The realism is not shot through with historical analysis, but rather becomes a contemporary representation of immediate social situations wherein the writer is often actor, moving through the total environment of his art.

The system of apartheid and the resultant overwhelming alienation of the black man is the essential subject of these South African novels. As the writers daub their canvases in stark colors, they depict the dual realities of the all-pervading, all-controlling outer society--the dominant white ruling minority--which chokes and strangles the inner society--a black, Coloured, Indian minority. It is the play of the former on the latter and the total reactions of the latter which constitute the essential elements
of these works. The outer society and its social institutions have a corrupting historical legacy to which all of the writers attribute the alienation of their protagonists. Writers postulate that by a converse application of justice, violence sanctioned by all the institutions of South Africa becomes "given."

It is not surprising that the outer society exploits and seems, at times, to enslave the inner society. Economic control is insured by a brutal system of migratory labor with all its consequent disruptive forces and suffering. In this literature, which is primarily located in an urban complex, migrant workers, effectively controlled by pass and influx laws, are brutalized, even as they carry the work-burden of the society. It is this system of economic exploitation that supports the white population and simultaneously enfeebles and threatens the ultimate survival of the blacks.

Enfeeblement and destruction, however, may also result from imprisonment or from the brutality of the police, who appear throughout these works. The police who are the executors of the legally unjust social system are a constant motif in all of this literature and are drawn by all of the authors with unsympathetic slashes of the pen. Curfews and raids, pre-emptory jailings and beatings, their cold, truculent calculations and the use of weapons make the police agents of the outer society, the hunters of the inner society, whose members are sought out and destroyed like animals. Thus the police seem to control every gesture, every action, almost every thought process of many of the characters.

Even those whites who are not represented as having fears of being haunted by blacks, even those "liberal" whites who "know" the blacks—when not unsympathetically portrayed—are ironically presented. Few truly liberal whites appear in these works and when they do appear, an all-pervasive stereotyping of one group by another is operative. Everyone is suspect and true feelings are not easily perceived. The reality of the South African social order is presented in all its diversification: its unsavory outer material aspects, its corrosive and cramping emotional stresses, its atmosphere of abandonment and decay, all of which induce an immense
alienation and compel a desire to flee. The inner society feels that the outer seeks its total absorption, seeks to suck from it its very marrow and matter.

The inner group, however, remains and perseveres in spite of the hostility of the outer group; it continues to survive in spite of the decay and abandonment in which it lives. All the authors present, as a given of the inner group, a total sense of the material and physical horror brought on by an ever-present, inimical exterior, omnipresent also in its hostile advances. Thus it is that all elements of nature, of society, of man, seem to be enemies of the smaller group. We are given, then, a total, realistic interpenetration of cause and effect and all of its extensions. Realism is of two kinds: the immediate presentation of the lives of the characters—and often of the authors themselves—and a realistic material presentation of the outward circumstances controlling these lives. The outward features are ugly, the lives often creatural. The presentation is a baroque compilation of unwholesome elements—a continuous repetition of degrading incidents—to the point where the canvas becomes an exposition of horror. We note the apparent hostility, even of nature, to the lives of this group, the poverty and decay in many of the living quarters, and the shabby communal gathering places of the lower classes of society.

In all of these works an insistent feeling of alienation enshrouds the various types and characters. The outer group—the white world—is a point of reference, always controlling and goading reactions which ultimately end in alienation from self, and group, or in the ultimate alienation in death.

THE POLITICAL KINGDOM

Many characters in the novels which attempt to apprehend the urban political realities of contemporary Africa experience a state of anxiety as they search for a course of action and a way of relating to this reality. In the cities, where values are shifting and codes of behavior are amorphously evolving, protagonists are unable to cope with the newness of this African circumstance. In novels such as *No Longer at Ease* and *A Man of the People*, by Chinua Achebe, *A Night of Their Own* and *A Wreath for Udomo*, by Peter Abrahams,
Jagua Nana and People of the City, by Cyprian Ekwensi, and Les bouts de bois de Dieux, by Sembene Ousmane, the portrayal of the social and political dilemmas becomes a shifting, all-pervasive background. The resolution of problems, economic or moral, which beset the characters of these novels, becomes the action; and characters who are coincident to the convoluted social circumstances often become convoluted and twisted.

Many characters attempt to comprehend the immediate reality of heterogeneous societies by exploring current problems and searching for moral solutions in a transitional world. We receive the political and social emanations of this transitional world caught in upheavals and cataclysms which bring with them violence and moral decay. On the political level, the exploration of historical dynamics becomes the novelistic presentation of the inner workings of political parties—a searching for political kingdoms.

In their search for approaches to the political kingdom, many characters are imbued with the poetry of action. The situation which confronts those who search for the political kingdom may advocate its own justification and, by creating its own ethic, give validity to all action. At times, therefore, the argument of means and ends disappears in that of causal situation and resultant action. In the quest for political freedom, to act is to hope and to exist; but to act is often to be alone. Many of the protagonists in these novels feel the weight of aloneness when called upon to arrive at decisions leading to involvement. The immediacy of the situation gives larger significance to the analyses of action, to the discussions of methods of approach, to the realization of political goals. Planning is necessary to offset the newness of a political situation which might produce an inherently destructive power struggle.

Thus the novelists debate the expediency of action and often discuss the process of political development. The novels, though they pose political questions, are not structured around a series of polemical dialogues. Rather, the questions give direction to the actions of the characters. The novelists, pushing the characters through immediate problematical political action, continually confront them with choices:
how does a leader act in order to consolidate gains which will lead to the realization of political ideals?

In this search for the political kingdom most of the novelists seem to suggest that each and every ally is acceptable, that all sectors of the population may be mobilized to achieve political ideals. These novels are constantly involved in the dialectic of action, between choice of action and effect, decision and result. The characters are often caught in an historical moment, socially and politically indeterminant, which can be decided through action. Through all the novels we are presented with a sense of historical causation and social determinism which dictate the progress of the novel and the formation of its characters. Pre-independence action, of necessity more destructive and violent, is distinguished from post-independence decisions, by nature more constructively problematic.

But the characters are not simply social or political refractions; rather they are people caught in the violent flux of social forces which sweep through Africa today. The outward social and political circumstances are not simply contributing factors--they become controlling forces in the lives of the main characters. The political scene is not simply a political scene--it pulses with life. The urban scene is not simply urban--it, too has a will and a way of its own.

The political climate within these novels, the game of practical politics, is cynically delineated. There is little idealism in this portrayal; it is starkly presented with greed, corruption, and violence prevailing. Participation in politics exposes one to danger and often brings with it a brutal end. And so the political scene is surfeited with corruption and bribery, is heavy with threat and violence, and reels under the debilitating effects of opportunism. In the urban political reality corruption has become a way of life, all pervasive, all encompassing, and totally acceptable.

It is clear, therefore, that the political and social realities in which action is to be carried out are completely subversive to ideals and actions stemming from poetry. Inevitably dreams are lost and goals are obliterated by the overpowering presence of formless ferment in heterogenous transitional societies. Some of the characters in the novels resist bribery
and refuse to sink into corruption, persisting in their search for the political kingdom. Disillusionment or heroic death often awaits them, even as disillusionment and violent death confront those overwhelmed by the force of politics and the city. At times the pull of tradition and the peace of rural circumstances are romantically presented by the novelists as a point of rest—a hiatus before the final disillusionment. But tradition becomes nostalgic and the movement back to it, illusory. And so many of those who have moved away return, bent on resolving the problems and the dilemmas that both drove them away and brought them back. Often their search condemns them, and their deliberations ostracize them.

THE POETS OF NEGRITUDE

The loss consequent on colonialism and the alienation deriving from the movement away from rural traditions to urban political realities, are in one way or another reflected in the thesis of the negritude poets: Léopold Sédar Senghor, Aimé Césaire, Léon Damas, Bernard Dadie, David Diop, Tchicaya U Tam'si. To return symbolically to the source, to abnegate the loss, the alienation, the confusion, will be the prime intention and motive of the negritude poets as they search through their single selves for a communal, African authenticity. Thus, things remembered—that is, things lost—the entry into infancy—that is, something past—will link them, even as they seek a rebirth, to the beginnings of things. And since the child is, in African ontology, ever akin to and close to the ancestor, to recall the ancestors will be but a short step away from the plunge into those elements which lie at the beginning—at birth. Infancy and ancestry, recalling and reidentifying, exile and return, are themes which will color the works of the negritude poets.

Negritude becomes a ceremony ritualizing the earth of Africa and the life of its peoples. Its poets, grasping the external world, revitalize life through the cogency of pure memory, through the power of the poetic word. Negritude for the poet is not superficial, exterior, facile, and shallow: it is a descent into the heart of a matter. What was tense or dammed up, flows; what lay dormant or shrouded in past times, becomes present
and dynamic. The belief in the primacy of life, in its enduring quality, leads the poet of negritude to offer his poetic power to the service of all mankind.

In the search for the poetic absolute, time and space for the negritude poet must be uninterrupted and continually flowing. It is the desire of all poets to seek the absolute in the midst of chaos. To find the quality of endurance of a person, a people, is to show the quality that abides in all things, to show that all things are in a state of constant becoming, that time flows, detoured, yet never interrupted. To accept the duration of all things is to capture the essence of all things. In attempting to capture the essence of their people, these poets release a rhythmic flow, delving deep into their furthest beginnings, into the nearer past, the immediate present, and the future of tomorrows unwinding to an infinity. Time, space, and memory flow together to the rhythms of the elements or to the rhythms of life. Timelessness becomes a constant motif, symbolizing the duration of a race, of a people. Entry into the extensions of space, into the center of time, is at the heart of the poetry of negritude.

The poets of negritude ascribe force and curative strength to rivers and waters, accepting the rhythmic pulsations of all elements, each force concatenating to another force and forming an essential unity. They accept the unbroken convergencies of all things and give a total sense of the organic and inorganic. A restorative power, a cleansing and abiding vision, invoke their poetry. And so the poet hymns with rhythmic cadences the purity, eternal motion, and power of waters. Man is united to the elements, transformed by them, invigorated by them; from the earth-mother, he receives life.

Negritude for the poet explores only essences, seeks only essentials, but essence and rhythms move together, bringing with them spontaneous abandon and freedom, the power to dance all things, thereby performing a ceremony to life. Such ceremony is no mere happening; it becomes charged with a deeper significance, with presentiment which produces illusions and contorts ideas. Drugged nights, years of exile—exile from self, exile from childhood and natural instincts, exile from homeland, exile from race. All become too long, too arduous, and are converted by the negritude poet into a point of symbolic return.
At the heart of the poetry of negritude is return from exile, rejection of Europe, reclamation of the oppressed peoples of the world, and the acceptance of and identification with those who still live close to the earth. Thus, negritude opens out, redeeming not only those who live close to the soil of Africa, but all people who work the land. Negritude seems to postulate that man is not sufficient unto himself, that he receives regenerative force from without. Thus, do the poets of negritude appeal to forces outside of themselves for strength and for inspiration.

THE NATURE OF MAN

Some writers, however, question the relationship of man to forces outside himself, doubt the primacy of return to tradition, and wonder at the relationship of man to the pull of the earth. Can single man, still linked to the sources of the fountain and tied to his guardian angel, extricate himself even when the bells of exile ring softly and the time for worship has begun? Man is an ontological being set in a qualitatively historic and mythic time, controlled by worship and belief, family and ancestry, sacrifice and meditation. Man is linked to all the forces of the earth, affecting and being affected by them, seeking for his own mask and his own destiny, and often his own tragic fulfillment. The question that will be reiterated in the plays of Wole Soyinka and John Pepper Clark and in the novels of Amos Tutuola, is whether man can be at one and the same time linked to the earth-mother and be not controlled by her.

The final optimism which we discern in Soyinka is nowhere present in the plays of John Pepper Clark. In Soyinka, man, through some act of defiance, interrupts the cycle of unending history and brings to an end an inherited and tragic destiny. Clark holds out no such optimistic end to the tragic pull of man's inheritance, sees no solution through action to the destructive force of the curse which may have befallen a man, a race. Therefore, Clark's vision of history is based on the uninterrupted continuity of man's tragic destiny. His treatment of phenomena, too, differs in one basic way from that of Soyinka. In Clark, man's tragic destiny is not only presaged by phenomena, but is totally reflected in phenomena's various manifestations.
In the kaleidoscopic world of Amos Tutuola's novels, all realms flow together, all varying manifestations of reality merge and coalesce. Yoruba myth, customs, and manners synchronize with Western artifacts bringing about a concretization of concepts and a tautness of imagery. All details are foreground, all illuminated by the author's total experience. There is no inherent clash of cultures, for all cultures are his domain and from all of them he derives his material. This material is transmuted through the author's imagination and the fusion gives to reality a sense of otherness and to myth, a veracity.

Much in Tutuola is mythic and folkloric; but much springs from ordinary, everyday lived reality. Only after being fortified by juju and prepared by sacrifice, do his heroes cross over into an imaginary realm contiguous to their own real world to pursue their searches and go on to their wanderings. Indeed, Tutuola's novels are the ultimate expression of return to acceptance of tradition in all its varying manifestations. All things flow together, movement away leads to movement back, return follows exile, a new day follows the agony of night.

The literature of a people should be consonant with the rhythms of the life of that people; the literature for the vast continent of Africa should reflect the throbbing complexities of that continent and its thrusting hopes. Many problems beset the African writer. In what language should he write? In that of those who imposed their ways upon him—or should he use his own vernacular? For instance, what reality must he apprehend and to whom should his writing be directed? Can he, by the use of African imagery, capture the local psychology through known symbols and images and give it a definition distinctively African?

African writing cannot but be social, for the writer is caught in the vibration of the region and the rhythms of its peoples. In many parts of Africa, the rhythms are broken. A region may be caught in internecine conflict; the continent is still searching for its own pattern of development, striving toward its own future fulfillment. In all of these affairs, it is not only incumbent on the writer, but indeed demanded of him, to explore circumstances, to offer prognoses, to bring about the consonance of African man and his circumstance.
At the heart of the poetry of negritude is return from exile, rejection of Europe, reclamation of the oppressed peoples of the world, and the acceptance of and identification with those who still live close to the earth. Thus, negritude opens out, redeeming not only those who live close to the soil of Africa, but all people who work the land. Negritude seems to postulate that man is not sufficient unto himself, that he receives regenerative force from without. Thus, do the poets of negritude appeal to forces outside of themselves for strength and for inspiration.

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Interaction between engineering and the natural sciences on one hand, and the social sciences on the other, is necessary for human progress in all societies but is perhaps most urgently needed in the developing countries, where an accelerated pace of change is required. Throughout the world ecological patterns and the distribution of natural resources pay no attention to international boundaries. In Africa, however, the division between the have- and have-not states is more pronounced than it is in either America or Europe. This places a premium on ecological engineering as one means of correcting the imbalance in resources, both between and within countries, and of insuring more efficient utilization of existing resource potential.

WATER TECHNOLOGY

Water supply is the critical factor that determines habitability or limits human activity in most of Africa. Water, however, is in short supply in at least 75 per cent of Africa south of the Sahara. The importance of water supply may be emphasized by the enumeration of six major categories of use. a) Domestic use by man and his animals: this is a rather limited usage, and husbandry is usually the main occupation of people who live in dry countries. b) Irrigation: it is estimated that from 4,000 to 13,000 gallons per day per acre are needed for various crops, and in many areas this must come entirely from irrigation. c) Industry: industrial development draws heavily on water supply, but it can readily pollute that supply. d) Fisheries: inland fisheries are normally on lakes and rivers, but
reservoirs or dams offer additional opportunity. e) Transport: the
topography of Africa does not allow easy water transportation despite an
extensive network of lakes and rivers because of discontinuities at waterfalls
and rapids. f) Hydro-electric power: the same vertical irregularities that
are a detriment in water transport offer exceedingly favorable opportunities
at many locations in Africa for hydro-electric power, particularly in the
Congo Basin.

There are important local variations and climatic cycles, but the
greatest changes in availability of water are due to man's intervention in
natural conditions. Destruction of vegetation increases runoff, reduces
penetration of rainfall through the soil, and results in the disappearance of
streams and springs during the long dry season. The tapping of underground
water by sinking wells for domestic supply of villages is a positive human
endeavor provided it is coupled with means assuring adequate replacement by
checking runoff. It has been found, for example, that the use of water from
affluent streams, wells, and boreholes in the drainage basin of Lake Naivasha
in Kenya has resulted in a general lowering of the groundwater table (that
is, level of water in the soil) in that area and to the over-all lowering of
the lake itself. Runoff can be checked, however, by the construction of large
dams which affect the local population and areas many miles from the site, and
catchment projects on small streams, collecting from drainage basins of a few
hundred acres. A notable American project, the Tennessee Valley Authority, is
looked to by many as a prototype for the efficient use and control of water
resources. Experience gained directly at the TVA has supplied basic principles,
applicable on large and small scales, dealing not only with water supply
directly, but with waste treatment and disposal as well.

The drainage pattern in Africa is dominated by a series of large river
systems, each of which cover hundreds of thousands of square miles. Almost
invariably, therefore, the larger African rivers (the Nile, Congo, Niger,
Zambezi) are international waterways. Furthermore, since their watersheds
also span political boundaries efficient water resource development, even on
most of the smaller streams and tributaries, is a venture which requires
international cooperation. A dam on the Niger River, for example, will involve not only the country in which it is located; it will have an impact on all areas downstream from it and its functioning will be closely related to activities in areas further upstream. Occasionally, a dam may be constructed in one country by, and primarily for, another, as in the case of the Jebel Aulia Dam on the White Nile, built by the United Arab Republic in the Republic of Sudan.

The Nile Basin provides several examples of how scientific and technological research may become subordinated to national politics and how the activities of one government may greatly alter conditions in another country. A long stretch of the White Nile passes through the Sudd, a vast swampy area between Juba and Malakal in Sudan. During its slow and tortuous passage through this extremely flat region, an estimated 50 per cent of the Nile's water is lost by evaporation. In an attempt to cut this evaporation loss, a 300 mile long canal has been proposed to carry half the river's flow from Jonglei (north of Juba) around the Sudd to rejoin the main river south of Malakal. Coupled with this proposal is the plan to store water in Lake Albert so that the major flow of the White Nile at Khartoum would occur when the flow of the Blue Nile, which joins it at that point, is at its lowest. Although the major benefit would accrue to the United Arab Republic, the Jonglei Canal would be built in Sudan, and the Lake Albert Reservoir would be on the border of Uganda and Congo-Kinshasa. Further complicating the matter is the fact that Lake Albert contains chemical salts which are largely removed by natural activity as the water flows through the Sudd. The Jonglei Canal would greatly reduce this effect possibly with a detrimental effect on agriculture in Egypt.

Another problem involving the Nile system as a waterway relates to the increasing growth of water hyacinth in the White Nile south of Khartoum. Development has been undertaken for spraying equipment and for a sawing system to enable spray boats to penetrate the solid mats of plants that block the river during high water. But White Nile water is used to irrigate extensive cotton-raising projects and the chemical (2, 4-D) sprayed on the water...
hyacinth is believed to have a damaging effect on the cotton. A detailed study of stage and dose factors in the chemically caused damage to cotton has been initiated.

Over-all, the technological problems and studies concerned with water supply in Africa are increasingly trying to relate conservation of this natural resource with control of runoff, evaporation, and transpiration of plants (estimated to be three or four times that of evaporation in swampy areas). Work is being done on the problems of artificial rain making, waste treatment, and optimum utilization of water for irrigation, fish-farming, transportation, and generation of electrical power.

**FOOD PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY**

Increased production is another important factor in the development of African states. And here, again, there is a great need to expand research on man's influence on his physical environment. Clearing a forest to cultivate a garden, or the burning of many square miles of savanna to provide improved pasture, may so upset the balance of nature as to change the natural vegetation and climate. Africans have long recognized that too frequent tilling of the soil causes deterioration, and they have attempted to counter this by a system of shifting cultivation (sometimes called rotational bush fallow). In some areas of Africa the population lives permanently in the same place and cultivates surrounding plots in rotation; in others, the whole village site is changed every few years. When there are significant increases in population, however, the shifting agricultural system frequently breaks down, and substitutes should be found. But what are the optimum pattern of rotation and the necessary crop-to-fallow ratio? Studies are being made to establish systems of fixed cultivation using rotation of crops, mixed cropping, green manuring, composting and fertilizers, in the effort to solve these problems.

Rotation of crops is a procedure whereby the subplots of a garden plot are planted with different individual crops in sequential order. Mixed cropping is a plan of growing two or more crop plants on the same ground at the same time, generally a leguminous crop and a grain crop. The African farmer
usually plants the crops in relation to their growing periods and can thus distribute the labor of harvesting. Research conducted at numerous places in Africa, however, indicates that the system of mixed cropping is applicable only where low yield is acceptable. Work at the Moor Plantations' Research Station at Ibadan in Nigeria indicates that in the southern part of Nigeria two crops can be grown per year by using green manures (a crop such as beans or clover plowed under while still green) to revitalize the soil and thus improve the crop-to-fallow ratio from 1:7 to 1:2 (that is, one year of cropping to two of fallow per subplot). Other studies are more cautious regarding the benefits of green manuring in the humid tropics. Composting has not yielded general success, as the usual African farmer seldom takes the necessary pains to water frequently and turn the composting materials; furthermore, water may be in short supply. In Kampala (Uganda), however, refuse has been composted in a manure which is used by the banana growers in the area. In some areas regeneration of the soil is accomplished quickly by planting elephant grass. Studies in Rhodesia showed that after breaking the natural veld (grassland) and applying nitrogen fertilizer, cultivators could plant elephant grass which would grow to a height of ten feet or more and could be cut for a two to three year supply of silage. The land may then be grazed for a year or two, and then plowed and cultivated to yield two or three heavy arable crops, mostly maize, before repeating the rotation. Thus instead of ranching beef animals on the natural veld at the rate of one animal per thirteen acres, the same land with a little irrigated pasture will graze one animal per three acres averaged through the rotation, and will yield feed for other purposes.\(^2\)

Research on African crop plants themselves will have more far-reaching significance than studies of local cultivating techniques. Most research has been done on the cultivated plants whose products are exported; cotton, tobacco, and rubber are notable examples. Continuing work on the problems of improving the food supply of the continent will relate to producing strains which maximize desirable characteristics when the plants are grown in a wide range of conditions and to studying optimum climate and soil conditions for each plant, the nutrition of plants as concerns growth and reproduction, and
resistance of plants to disease and depredations from birds. Such research has been and continues to be applied to such crops as the sorghums, the millets, maize, rice, wheat, pulses, groundnuts (peanuts), sesame, oil palm, palm fruits, soybeans, cassava, ordinary potatoes, yams, coffee, tea, cocoa, fruits, sugar, ginger, and cloves.

Rice provides the main diet for most people in Sierra Leone and was a large import until 1935 when it became an export commodity as a result of the development of swamp-grown rice in the Scarfies area. The Republic of Sudan has been importing up to a thousand tons of rice per year but has started experimenting with the raising of various strains from India.

Important problems relate to the supply of meat. The Food and Agricultural Organizations of the United Nations reported in 1950 that the continent of Africa with 23 per cent of the world's land surface and only 8 per cent of the human population had 26 per cent of the goats, 15 per cent of the sheep, and 11 per cent of the cattle. Meat supplies are often short, however, and improvement of stock has been hindered by social and religious traditions in which social status is determined by the size of flocks and herds and marriage customs involving the transfer of domestic animals. It is not uncommon for Africans to suffer from protein deficiencies in their diet while maintaining more animals than their land can support.

Current research in the production of protein may well be significant in many African areas. Dr. Harold B. Gotaas, an internationally-known sanitary and environmental engineer of Northwestern University, has developed proposals to grow and harvest algae on ponds of sewage to provide high-protein feed for fowl and livestock. He states that, at best, an acre of high-protein crops will yield less than a ton of protein, whereas an acre of sewage in a moderate climate would yield twenty tons of protein. It is further estimated that depending on the land, algae is 100 to 300 times more efficient in producing protein for beef cattle than grazing.
TRANSPORTATION TECHNOLOGY

Increased quantity, quality, and efficiency of food production are of no avail without adequate internal transportation. The relatively weak and unintegrated development of transport in Africa is one of the continent's most pressing problems. One part of an African country occasionally imports from foreign sources the same commodity that is going to waste in another part of the country. Most of the coastal and capital cities have more effective and more economic links with other African, European, or Asian centers than with interior areas of their own country.

The following table, based on statistics compiled in 1960, offers some striking comparisons between various African countries and some of the more developed areas of the world.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Miles of railway per thousand square miles of territory</th>
<th>Miles of railway per ten thousand population</th>
<th>Number of motor vehicles per ten thousand population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>87.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>113.5</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. S. A.</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>676</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data derived from Wilfred Owen, Strategy for Mobility, pp. 216-17

Many of the social, economic, and political implications of inadequate transport in Africa have been explored above in the essay by Professor Soja. It is important to note here, however, that from the standpoint of research in transport engineering and planning, a "systems approach" must be maintained. In other words, efforts must be made to view transportation as part of a larger network of relationship between people and their cultural and physical environment. According to Wilfred Owen, a leading transport economist:

"For every case in which transport has produced notable social and economic impacts, there seems to be another in which the effect of
transport on levels of living has been limited. Sometimes high standards of mobility have been achieved at the expense of higher standards of living. For transport affords unparalleled opportunity to make mistakes, including errors of location, technology, design, timing, or the mistake of investing in transport at all.

"A good case can be made, however, that appropriate transport facilities are the key to development. For without transport, supply and demand are restricted by the high cost of moving, and by ignorance of whether goods can be sold and for how much. Improvement in living conditions is dependent on the ability of people to communicate and on their capacity to trade."  \(^3\)

**TECHNICAL TRAINING AND RESEARCH FACILITIES**

Having discussed water supply, food production, and transportation, it is appropriate to be reminded that all branches of science and engineering are making important contributions in African countries and throughout the world. Undergraduate and graduate collegiate studies in African universities are being expanded as fast as they can be supported. Various programs funded by African and/or foreign nations are bringing research talent together to work on the problems of water supply, food production, transportation, topography, cartography, geology, meteorology, bioclimatology, public health, and aspects of industrialization and technological development. The faculties, increasing in number and competence, are distributing their research activities among matters of immediate relevance to the local scene and wider professional concerns, with an interest in being represented in the international journals and the main stream of academic thought.

In 1962 when Sudan was planning to spend approximately one hundred million dollars of its own funds to attract private investments, it requested assistance from the United Nations Special Fund for an Industrial Research Institute and a Food Processing Research Center. The Fund's managing director retained the services of the Stanford Research Institute (U.S.A.) to assist in the evaluation of the projects and their potential impact on the industrial development of Sudan. Considerations with regard to the proposed Industrial Research Institute related to the feasibility of establishing a center that could insure a supply of technically trained
personnel which could study indigenous problems and provide technical assistance to government and industry. Regarding the Food Processing Research Center, SRI suggested a central food-processing training and demonstration center near Khartoum with more remote stations limited to simpler packaging, grading, and processing until more local competence could be developed. They also suggested air transport for certain perishable, high-priced commodities and agricultural transfer to nonperishable crops in areas with inadequate transport. Lockheed Aircraft International recently conducted an extensive two and one-half year transportation study in a major African developing country using systems analysis techniques. Included in this research was a physical road survey of the country with the purpose of developing a master plan for growth of the country's transportation systems; a study of soil and drainage conditions so as to subdivide the country into homogeneous areas as concerns costs of road construction, road maintenance, and vehicle operation; and the training of local nationals in the techniques used in the study.

In 1967, a group of thirty-four engineering educators and other specialists from nine African and four other nations met in Kumasi (Ghana) to discuss the special characteristics of engineering education in Africa and their consequences in the educational system. Specifically, a staff was chosen to collect and disseminate information related to curricula, postgraduate programs, and engineering materials for use in secondary schools: technical reports on topics such as rainfall, soils, tropical woods, and small industry were located as was information on common research activities, exchange of students and faculty, and sharing of opportunities offered by visiting lecturers and expert consultants. The Kumasi Conference agreed to urge all engineering and science personnel to participate as advisers in their governments' economic, social, and educational planning, especially in science and technology at the pre-university level, and to serve as advisers in relevant technical aspects of public projects. As concerns research, strong encouragement was given to cooperative research programs with organizations outside the university and between universities, including non-African institutions, to the ends that available local capability be
addressed to problems of local and regional importance and that recruitment of foreign specialists be implemented. Plans are in force for convening this conference every two years.

Perhaps the image of "an iron fist in a velvet glove" may describe the desired interaction of technology and natural sciences with the social sciences in Africa's future development. Progress in improving material aspects of the living experience and the longevity of human beings will surely depend upon a hard core of research and application in engineering and science. But in an area with such a rich and enduring heritage of cultures, the "velvet glove" of understanding human institutions and patterns is clearly needed to schedule accommodation of people and projected changes.

NOTES


2. Ibid., pp. 271-73.

Mass communications in Africa are a reflection of increasing modernization as well as a powerful force behind the modernization process itself. Although mass media have been introduced into the continent on a large scale only in recent decades, they have come to play a vital role as avenues for the diffusion of modern ideas and aspirations and, concurrently, as agents for social change. Newspapers and radios—and increasingly television and movies—are becoming accepted components in the lives of large segments of the African population.

The mass media as we know them in America are all present in Africa, and rare is the contemporary African who has never heard a radio or at least seen a newspaper. But the development of communications networks is closely associated with over-all levels of development, and so it is not surprising that Africa, technologically the most underdeveloped of all continents, should be also underdeveloped with respect to the extent of mass communications. Awareness is not the same as participation. Only a small proportion of the total population actively participates in the mass media. But at the same time, this is the segment that is largely responsible for shaping the future of the new states. Many of Africa's problems are related to the discontinuities and breakdowns in the communications process between the governing elite and the masses, and most African leaders have recognized that improved mass communications can speed and ease the "terrible ascent to modernization," as President Nyerere of Tanzania has phrased it. Great attention has therefore been given to developing the mass media and to its role in nation-building.
Recognition of the role of mass communications, unfortunately, does not lead automatically to its rapid development. To serve almost 300 million people in over 40 countries, the existing mass media facilities in Africa are inadequate. Excluding the United Arab Republic, there are about 175 daily newspapers in Africa, with a circulation of 2.7 million copies; 98 radio stations broadcast to over 11.8 million radio receivers; 32 television stations transmit to 312,000 receiving sets (about the same number as in a medium-sized American city); about 525 weeklies and fortnightlies have a combined circulation of less than 4 million; about 5,000 indoor motion picture theaters have 1.3 million seats and an estimated weekly attendance of 317 million; and 3,800 local libraries contain almost 14.8 million books.¹

African media, with the exception of radio—the use of which has grown dramatically since independence—fall well below what UNESCO considers minimum standards for "adequate communications." UNESCO has suggested as an immediate target that a country should aim to provide for every 100 of its inhabitants at least the following facilities: ten copies of daily newspapers (Africa had 1.0 for every 100 inhabitants in 1965); five radio receivers (Africa had 4.3, in 1965); two cinema seats (Africa had 0.5, in 1965); and two television receivers (Africa had 0.1, in 1965). Moreover, not only are mass media facilities meager, but also the rate of development is unpromising. Based on growth rates in the 1950's, for example, Africa cannot expect to reach the UNESCO minimum of 10 copies of daily newspapers for each 100 persons, until the year of 2035.

THE PRESS IN AFRICA

There have been daily newspapers throughout Africa for most of the twentieth century, yet the press in Africa remains limited as a vehicle of communications. Of some 6,591 daily newspapers in the world during 1965-66, only 170 were in Africa.² The average daily production of all African papers (2.7 million copies in 1965) was about half the daily press run of the Daily Mirror in London. Moreover, in the years since independence, the total number of daily newspapers has probably declined.
The variety and quality of the daily press in Africa reflects the diversity of Africa itself. As with radio, dailies are unequally distributed and concentrated in the great coastal cities of the continent. The largest and most modern papers, about nineteen dailies, are found in the Republic of South Africa; Nigeria has had the liveliest and most diverse daily press in Tropical Africa with eighteen papers in 1965; and the United Arab Republic has ten dailies. There are vast expanses in the continental interior where daily newspapers are rarely, if ever, seen and several countries have no daily papers at all.

The press in Africa was established by Europeans and to a lesser extent by other non-African communities (such as the Asians in East Africa). Consequently the earliest papers served the immigrant communities, particularly the white settler communities in Southern and East Africa. Salisbury (Rhodesia) has had a newspaper (the Rhodesia Herald) since 1891; Kampala (Uganda) and Mombasa (Kenya) had newspapers before World War I; Nairobi (Kenya) has had the East African Standard since 1914. Dakar (Senegal), the administrative center of former French West Africa, has had a daily (Paris-Dakar, now Dakar-Matin) since 1935. The best newspaper on the continent is probably the Rand Daily Mail of Johannesburg, South Africa, a vigorous paper with a circulation of 114,000 which is often critical of the government. The best newspapers of West Africa, by technical standards, were financed by the Daily Mirror group of London but edited by Africans. These were dailies in Sierra Leone (Daily Mail), Ghana (Daily Graphic), and Nigeria, where the Daily Times with a circulation of 120,000 is the largest paper in Tropical Africa. The Mail and Graphic have since become government papers, but the Times remains privately owned.

The major obstacles which impede the development of African daily journalism include the following: high illiteracy and poverty which greatly restricts the potential sale and readership of any daily newspaper; lack of local capital to support newspaper enterprises, which means that most papers cannot maintain their own presses and must have their printing done on contract, often on obsolete equipment; high publication costs because the presses, linotypes, and newsprint must be imported from abroad; difficulties
of distribution due to inadequate roads and lack of transport facilities; continuing shortages of technical staff for maintenance of equipment, to say nothing of a lack of trained and experienced journalists, a major problem in itself.

Despite these problems, however, newspapers have been published—and published by Africans—for a long time. Former British West Africa (Nigeria, the Gold Coast, and Sierra Leone) had a long and honorable newspaper tradition dating from the early years of the nineteenth century. In Nigeria alone, over one hundred newspapers or periodicals were published by Africans during the colonial period (1900-1960). Nationalist political movements in Tropical Africa, especially in West Africa but elsewhere as well, were ignited and nurtured by the small political papers in English, French, and vernacular languages. Polemical, and usually lacking in hard news, these newsheets played an important and dynamic role in wresting political control from the colonial governments.

Since independence, as the nationalist leaders themselves moved into the government offices, these partisan papers (which were often subsidized by political parties) have given way to government-owned newspapers. Typical of this new genre of government-owned daily journalism are The Nationalist of Tanzania, Fraternité Matin of Ivory Coast, the Zambia Mail of Zambia, and the Morning Post of Nigeria.

In addition to the European papers (significantly reduced in number since independence), the party-subsidized press, and the new government papers, many African cities have a number of small independent or semi-independent journals which pursue a precarious and often ephermal existence. Also, mission and church-affiliated weekly, biweekly, and monthly publications are found in most countries, ranging from the sophisticated and authoritative Afrique Nouvelle of Dakar to small mimeographed sheets in the hinterland.

RADIO AND TELEVISION IN AFRICA

Radio broadcasting has made far greater progress than have the newspapers in expanding its audience. When radio was introduced into Tropical Africa in the early 1930's, it functioned mainly as a service to the European population.
Today there are 12 million radio sets in Africa. The greatest increase has occurred in the past ten years, and has been due in a large part to the low-power-drain receiver known as the "transistor." Light, portable, and relatively inexpensive, transistor radio sets are freed from the dependence on an electric power source which still impedes television expansion.

Throughout Africa, there is a widespread feeling that radio is the most efficient, least expensive, and most effective way to reach people—particularly those people who are illiterate in European languages or who are isolated in rural areas. The argument is often heard that Africa will not go through a "newspaper age" as did Europe and America; instead, it will proceed directly and fully into an electronic age of radio, television, and cinema long before newspapers and literacy are well established. In any case, there is little question that radio comes closest to being the most popular communication medium in Africa. The others—newspapers, television, cinema, magazines, and books—do not yet reach mass audiences and tend to be elite or specialized. (Although, in many circumstances, it may be more desirable to reach and influence the educated few rather than the general population.)

Television, the newest and most versatile of mass communications, burst over Africa like a skyrocket in the early 1960's. More recently, however, the expansion of television seems to be leveling off, if not actually decreasing. Unlike radio and the press, which were established by colonial rulers, television was initiated by the new independent governments. In some places, television broadcasting has been an expensive status symbol comparable to an airline or a presidential palace. Regular television service was established in Morocco and in the Western Region of Nigeria in the late 1950's, but the rest of the continent remained untouched until 1962. At that time, a number of the new nations hurriedly established transmitting facilities, often at great expense. By the end of 1965, 23 nations had television transmitting facilities, reaching an estimated 312,000 receivers. The United Arab Republic has another 422,006 sets. It should be stated that the government of the Republic of South Africa has not allowed the introduction of television into that country. The biggest increases in purchase of
television sets came in 1962-63. Since then, the total number of sets has risen only slightly. In 1965, Africa's total number of television receivers accounted for less than half of one per cent of all sets outside of the United States and Canada.

This slowdown in television growth is a reflection of the formidable obstacles to expanding the medium in Africa. Chief among these are the high initial price of sets, plus maintenance costs, and the need for electricity as a power source. Another is program production which is not only expensive but requires highly trained personnel. As a result, most African television systems rely heavily on "canned" programs produced in the United States, France, and Britain.

FOREIGN MEDIA CONTACT IN AFRICA

The United States, France, and Britain, plus the Soviet Union, and increasingly other Communist countries, also supply the continent with much of its news of the outside world. The new African nations, like most of the world, rely heavily on the five great world news agencies--Associated Press, Reuters, United Press International, Agence France-Presse, and TASS--not only to learn of international events but often for news from their own neighbors as well. The world agencies dominate the news flow in and out of most countries because of their world-wide facilities and trained personnel. In Africa, Reuters and AFP dominate the news agency business; as a result, the real news captials of Africa today are London and Paris. In 1965, Reuters was received in thirty-nine countries, AFP in thirty-three, UPI in nineteen, TASS in nineteen, and AP in fourteen. To supplement, and in part to counteract, the influence of the world news agencies, many of the new African nations have started their own national news agencies. By 1965, there were eighteen official and four semi-official news agencies operating out of African government offices.

No survey of mass communications in Africa would be adequate without stressing the roles played by both external or foreign mass media and media content produced abroad but carried in African media. Some of the media fare
is from commercial sources--television programs, motion pictures, newspapers and magazines--and some from foreign government sources, such as short-wave broadcasting of Voice of America and BBC, which may be regarded as political communication or propaganda.

Throughout francophonic Africa, French newspapers and magazines are widely read by the new elites. *Le Monde*, *France-Soir*, *Figaro*, and other Parisian dailies are on the newsstands of Rabat, Dakar, and Abidjan within twenty-four hours of publication. A broad range of British publications are air freighted into English-speaking areas. *Time* and *Newsweek* from the United States are also available throughout Africa. The educated African's reliance on foreign media is an indication that the new nations are being drawn into a world-wide system of mass communications, but it also reflects the nascent state of their own mass media facilities.

**NEEDS AND PROSPECTS**

What are the prospects for improving and expanding mass communications and broadening their audiences in Africa? (The typical "heavy" consumer of mass media is male, under 24, likely to be either a student, white-collar worker, or in a professional or managerial position, and living in an urban area.) The outlook is intimately associated with the general prospects for social, economic, and political development. Studies on the role of mass media in national development provide strong evidence that mass communications will expand along with the general processes of modernization. Along with more education, greater literacy, higher per capita income, and expanded urbanization and industrialization, will come more facilities for mass media and the audiences for them.

As previously noted, mass communications can be both an agent and an index of social change. Mass communications can help speed the process of social change by distributing essential information and involving the public in the tasks of nation-building and participation in the modern world. Mass media can help bridge the chasm that separates the modern elites in the cities from the traditional settlements in the rural areas.
Africa's prospects for meeting these media needs are directly related to the fact that the continued development of the media is still largely dependent on technological and financial help from outside the continent. There is a lack of local capital to invest in newspapers, radio stations, and other media. There is little prospect for a free press to develop economically independent of government. African governments, backed up by foreign media know-how and assistance, have had to fill the gap and provide the essential services. For example, the excellent government newspaper, Fraternité Matin of Abidjan, has been substantially supported by a French publishing firm. The pattern of foreign expertise combined with African government control is well established in broadcasting and is increasingly common in the printing media.

Although the economic and technical needs of the media are many, it is the training of journalists and mass communicators that has been given the highest priority in the years since independence. A 1962 UNESCO meeting of African information experts called training the indispensable first step in establishing new information media and services and developing existing media. Only a few African nations, such as Nigeria and Ghana, have anything like a cadre of trained and experienced African journalists. As Europeans have been withdrawing from African mass communications, there have been various kinds of training programs to fill the gap. Such outside organizations as UNESCO, International Press Institute, Ford Foundation, Thomson Foundation, International Organization of Journalists, International Federation of Journalists, and the African American Institute have initiated and supported various "crash" training programs.

But probably more significant in the long run are journalism education programs tied in with African universities or schools. A department of journalism at the University of Nigeria at Nsukka was established in 1961 along the lines of an American journalism school. Other important programs were started at the Accra Technical Institute in Ghana, and, at the pre-university level, in Zambia and Tanzania.

Technological developments in mass communications may affect dramatic changes in Africa just as the tiny transistor has already revolutionized
radio broadcasting. More AM and FM broadcasting, new offset or "cold type" newspaper printing techniques, and videotape recordings of television programs may all have great impact.

However, no mass communication innovation offers greater possibilities than the communications satellites. These developments offer the real prospect that Africa can have a continental communications system which will leapfrog a century of slow, costly telecommunications development. It may end the telecommunications dependence on Paris, London, and Brussels. Communications satellites, such as the Intelsat II, which was launched into a synchronous equatorial orbit over the Gulf of Guinea on March 22, 1967, will mean that news service reports, news photos, television programs, radio news programs, and even facsimilie newspapers can be easily communicated to inaccessible places all over the continent.

In the long run, journalism and mass communications will prosper as the Africans themselves prosper. As with other institutions and technology imported from the West, Africans will, in time, adapt the media of mass communications to their own needs and purposes.

NOTES


The term "Afro-American" is increasingly used with reference to Americans of African descent. A growing, and widespread, knowledge of Africa and a developing sense of pride in African origins has allowed Black Americans to recognize Africa as an ancestral homeland. In the past, however, Africa and race derived their importance for Black Americans mainly because they were symbolic of the slavery and oppression which black men endured in this country. Escape from this painful status resulted in a psychological rejection of both Africa and black skin color. Rupert Emerson and Martin Kilson summarize this symbolic role of Africa:

Africa, in one form or another, has always been a part of the reality of Americans of African descent. The relationship has often been tortuously ambivalent and confused, but given the segregated frame of Negro acculturation to American standards and the influence of white supremacist values, this was not surprising .... [Black people] have been shaped in their behavior and self-definition by the standards of the politically dominant white populations. ..."1

THE CHANGING IMAGE OF AFRICA

In the New World, as in Europe, Africa was reputed to be a land of savage black men, unbearably hot, infested with insects and wild animals, overrun with jungle, and with no culture above the very primitive. Stories of cannibalism were invented by white novelists, and the myth of Tarzan (the invincible white man who could protect paternalistically the simple-minded natives) persists to some extent in American life today. In short, the negative image of Africa became an argument for the "inferiority" of
black people, and this premise, in turn, justified the status of black people in the New World. Professor Silberman elaborates this phenomena:

"Against this debasing picture of 'the African' the Negro... had no defense; he had no way of knowing that the picture happened to be false. On the contrary, this 'evidence of the black man's inferiority,' as Isaacs puts it, 'was borne in upon him with all the weight and authority of the all-knowing, all-powerful, all-surrounding white world,' thereby confirming the sense of his own worthlessness that white attitude and actions had already established.

"In the interviews with a hundred and seven leading Negroes that formed the basis of The New World of Negro Americans, Isaacs found that 'in nearly every instance' the early discovery of the African background had been 'a prime element' in shaping the individual's knowledge of and attitude toward himself and his world--so much so that the subjects could recall the details, and the names of the texts with agonizing clarity forty, fifty and even sixty years later!

"In general, therefore, Africa served to alienate the Negro not just from America, but from the whole human race. In self-defense, he tried to dissociate himself from Africa.

"The key word was black. For a Negro to dissociate himself from Africa meant, after all, to dissociate himself from the African's color, hair, features--from the Negroidness that stared at him from the pictures in the public-school textbooks and that assaulted his senses from the movie screen. But in the last analysis, dissociation was impossible, the pervasive fact of color remained. And so the Negro's rejection of Africa was, at bottom, a rejection of himself."2

It was within this historical and social-psychological context that black nationalism emerged in the New World as an ideology. Its meaning and relevance to the social conditions of the Afro-American are derived directly from the legacy of the persisting stigma of race and ancestry. St. Clair Drake, a sociologist, explains that Negroes are "victims" of one persisting legacy of the slave trade--the derogation of "Negroidness." The idea that a dark skin indicates intellectual inferiority is rapidly passing, but at the esthetic level derogatory appraisal of thick lips, kinky hair and very dark skin is still prevalent. That many Negroes reject their own body image is evident from advertisements for skin lighteners in the major Negro publications... The ever-present knowledge that one's Negroid physiognomy is evaluated as "ugly" lowers self-esteem and, therefore, weakens self-confidence.3

The emergence of sovereign states in Africa, however, seems to have changed in varying degrees the self-image of increasing numbers of Afro-
Americans, as well as their vision of their place in the world. The contemporary recognition and respect being accorded Africa is allowing Afro-Americans to see Africa in a new light and to identify with their African past. Many Afro-Americans seem to realize that to deny black men a place in history was a means of keeping them down. They seek to construct a new understanding of the African past and to relate this history to Africa of the present. In so doing they hope to erase the stigma of race.

The denial of this past-present relationship has been central to Afro-American self-contempt. The effort to construct a new relationship with Africa is explained by Dr. John Davis, Professor of Political Science at the City University of New York and President of the American Society of African Culture, as the effort to bring to the American Negro . . . an understanding of the continuing value of our gifts and a pride in our origins, so that we may join other Americans who feel secure in the traditions of their past and their contributions . . . 4

BLACK IDENTITY AND AFRO-AMERICAN NATIONALISM

Harold Isaacs contends that the "African identity" is a strong prospect for a wider identity, because it offers a context for solidarity of black skin color, and provides the Afro-American with an equivalent of what other Americans could boast of or disavow: a homeland.

The possibility of a "wider identity" was raised at the American Negro Leadership Conference on September 29, 1964, in a speech by Chief S. O. Adebo, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the U. N.:

A great many of the things that happened to you here, which you thought happened to you because you were a minority people, happened to us in Nigeria . . . . I no longer think simply as a Nigerian; I no longer think simply as an African. I think more as a person of color. And the objective of all of us is to restore to the man of color, wherever he may be, whether in Nigeria, or in the United States, or in Moscow, or in Brazil, the dignity of a human being. That is why we are involved in the same struggle in Africa, here, and elsewhere.5
The issue of identity is inescapable, and pride in race must play a crucial part in the new identity. It no doubt will lead—as it already has done—to a considerable degree of racial self-consciousness, indeed, to some extent, race chauvinism. Black men and women are not struggling to become free simply in order to disappear. Contrary to the liberal argument that the race problem can be solved in this country only by total integration and complete assimilation and eventual miscegenation, there are Afro-Americans who do not want to disappear, and who seek to preserve specifically Afro-American values and cultural traits.

Such sentiments are expressed by a female student in Robert Penn Warren's book:

The auditorium had been packed—mostly Negroes, but with a scattering of white people. A young girl with pale skin, dressed like any coed anywhere, in clothes for a public occasion, is on the rostrum. She is . . . speaking with a peculiar vibrance in a strange irregular rhythm, out of some inner excitement, some furious, taut elan, saying, "—and I tell you I have discovered a great truth. I have discovered a great joy. I have discovered that I am black. I am black! You out there—oh, yes, you may have black faces, but your hearts are white, your minds are white, you have been white-washed!"

This sense of newly discovered identity is a conscious experience of "an increased unity of the physical and mental, moral and sensual selves, and a oneness in the way one experiences oneself and the way others experience us."7

Much of academic research, and analysis of the race relations situation during the past three decades, seems to accept the liberal assumption of historian Kenneth M. Stampp that "Negroes are, after all, only white men with black skins, nothing more, nothing less."8 But black men in America are not simply carbon duplicates of white men—to contend that they are is misleading. Differences in skin color, hair texture, and physical features are a fact. But the issue is not whether differences exist, but what they mean socially.

Identified as a Negro, treated as Negro, provided with Negro interests, forced, whether he wills or not, to live in Negro communities, to think, love, buy and breathe as a Negro, the Negro comes in time to see himself as a Negro . . . he comes in time, to invent himself . . . 9
The Afro-American subculture maintains a subterranean and private world of rituals, symbols, and motifs. Rupert Emerson and Martin Kilson in a discussion of black nationalism make the following observations:

The Black Muslims still represent, at the level of the Negro's subterranean world, a force of ultimate significance. This is found in its influence upon the new stage in the Negro's self-definition. This stage, moreover, has been reinforced by the rise of more rational black nationalist concepts than those represented by the Black Muslims, and all of them have been affected by the debut of African nationalism on the international scene. There are, however, many other groups of this sort, and they are likely to have a more sustained influence upon the Negro's new thrust for self-realization than the Black Muslims. Unlike the Black Muslims, these organizations are secular in orientation, intellectually capable of coping with the modern world; and they reject naive political goals.

According to St. Clair Drake, "increased identification of educated Negroes with some aspects of the Negro subculture and with the cultural renaissance taking place in Africa may become the norm." It is not unusual to find people in the larger urban ghettos who were previously wary about identifying themselves with Africa now proudly proclaiming their blackness and developing interest in African politics, art, and literature. Among the educated, and not so educated, discussions of "negritude" are becoming commonplace. Among many young people there is a certain reverence for the memory and image of such men as Patrice Lumumba (Congo-Kinshasa), Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana), and Jomo Kenyatta (Kenya), to name a few. These men are looked up to as Black heroes and idols, and as role models. It is interesting to note, in this regard, that the late Medgar Evers—slain NAACP civil rights field director for the state of Mississippi—had named one of his sons Kenyatta. Ordinary black men and women who a short time ago were using hair-straighteners and skin-bleaches are now wearing the new "Afro" and "natural" hair styles, as well as African-style clothing. Some are even taking African names and are learning to speak an African language.

Dr. Erik H. Erikson explains such social-psychological phenomena as the development of a consciousness of identity:

Identity here is one aspect of the struggle for ethnic survival; one person's or group's identity may be relative to another's; and identity awareness may have to do with matters of an inner eman-
cipation from a more dominant identity, such as the "compact majority."\textsuperscript{12}

Writer John O. Killen comments on the function and value of the new identity:

... one of the main tasks of Black consciousness is to affirm the beauty of our blackness, to see beauty in black skin and thick lips and broad nostrils and kinky hair; to rid our vocabulary of "good hair" and "high yaller" and our medicine cabinets of bleaching creams. To de-niggerize ourselves is a key task of Black consciousness.\textsuperscript{13}

The same mood is conveyed by another of the present generation of new writers, William Kgositsile:

Thus the Black artist who embarks upon a search for new standards and values for his salvation must, among other things, discard the tools presented to him by the social order which has proved to be the number one enemy to his sensibility and conscience ... if he is committed to his people \[he\] looks elsewhere for new standards and values, for new identification and allies.\textsuperscript{14}

The fundamental question raised by Black nationalism is whether integration is really desired or more specifically, whether Afro-Americans "should" want integration.

In the whole history of revolts and revolutions, "integration" has never been the main slogan of a revolution. The oppressed's fight is to free himself from his oppressor, not to integrate with him ... \textsuperscript{15}

Black nationalist ideology molds a new image of the dominant group. This is the other side of the coin and may be radical in its implication as black men redefine themselves and, of necessity, re-evaluate "the white man." Many Black intellectuals today seek to diminish the importance of being white--that is, today the idea that because of a certain color of skin one man, or group of men, is ordained to determine the lives of men of a darker skin color. The objective of this process is to wrest the black man's image from white control; its concrete meaning is that white men should no longer tell black men who they are and where they should want to go, and that black men must no longer be bound by white men's definitions. This is partly a response to the control of communications media by the dominant white group.
Historically, black men have reacted to white control of their image in a variety of ways. According to Bennett:

In the past, some Negroes attempted to define themselves by becoming counter-contrast conceptions, by becoming, in short, opposite Negroes, opposite, that is, to what white men said Negroes were.16

This process has been described by one sociologist as:

the backfire of the dynamics of American assimilation which gave rise to an increased sensitivity, on the part of Black people, in reacting to the institutionalized nature of bigotry . . . a subsequent development of a more positive regard for Black culture and community, and a determination to reconstitute the basic processes of U.S. life as they affect Black people.17

He further contends that "the most pervasive trend for today's young Black intellectuals is their vigor and degree of self-consciousness about being Black."

Growing militant ethnic assertion and racial consciousness of Afro-Americans is a two-fold process. On one level it is a psychological response to the social and political conditions of subordinate status and rising expectations, and on another level, a fervent quest for new social values and political orientation. The economic exploitation and social discrimination which defines persons of African descent as a social category gives many of its members an avid sense of race consciousness. The conversion of a social "category" into a cohesive social group has broader theoretical and empirical implications. One proposition would suggest that when an aggregate is categorically defined and uniformly treated it will eventually--on the basis of its externally defined commonness--transmute itself into a conscious group. Subsequent internal interaction will evolve a movement to define the boundaries of the group, and make demands for relations with other groups on new terms. This minority group formation process may precipitate a review of the core values of the dominant group, since some of these values are likely to be dysfunctional for the newly articulate minority. This may lead some minority group members to reject or call into question the legitimacy of the social system. I would suggest that this is precisely the development taking place among increasing numbers of Afro-Americans.
The following comments by Stokely Carmichael are illustrative of this point:

"Our concern for black power addresses itself directly to this problem, the necessity to reclaim our history and our identity from the cultural terrorism and depredation of self-justifying white guilt. "To do this we shall have to struggle for the right to create our own terms through which to define ourselves and our relations to the society and to have these recognized. This is the first necessity of a free people, and the first right that any oppressor must suspend."18

The current Black Power movement, which is fundamentally a form of Black nationalism is an ideological movement of social-psychological as well as political importance. Although the militancy of Black nationalism is an explicit response to a real situation, it is primarily a symbolic value assertion, and secondarily a political impetus or perspective. Black nationalism seeks to affirm and accentuate group and individual identity with Africa, as a central symbol in the configuration of a new "psychosocial identity." Lerone Bennett, social historian and a leading contemporary Black intellectual, talks of this fundamental change among Afro-Americans:

"In the most essential sense our people are engaged in two revolutions in America: a revolution in the streets and a revolution in the winding corridors of the mind.

"These two revolutions are proceeding at the same time on different levels, and they are complementary facets of the same reality: the historical explosion of a people in the sudden labor of self-discovery, self-determination and self-legitimization. In short it is a total struggle: for without the revolutionary range in images, symbols, and ideas, in sum the revolution of the word; the struggle for freedom and dignity can not fulfill itself. Black people have been told that they must love others at all cost, but I suggest we must come to a point of appreciating ourselves and loving ourselves, and understanding the great beauty that is us and the glory of our magnificent history and heritage. So that we can begin to re-knit together the separate parts of a people fractured by the burden of evil social and historical experiences into a whole and regenerating identity. For the Black race must be free of white-value domination and racial exploitation which have made us a race of culturally frustrated people."19

AFRO-AMERICAN IDENTITY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

One of the foremost advocates of a reclamation of Africa as a way of refurbishing the image of the black man was Marcus Garvey, whose efforts
spanned the first quarter of the twentieth century. The legacy of Garvey is not so much political as it is symbolic. Perhaps more than any other person of his time or before him, he was able to fire the hearts and minds of black people with his bold vision of the rise of Africa and the reality of Black Power. Garvey preached the gospel of a united Africa under the rule of black men, and in the process he developed a mass movement among Afro-Americans, particularly in the New York area. He made Africa the center of consciousness for Black Americans, and relation to it the major political question of his day. Bennett says Garvey’s achievement was based on two essential components: 1) "He went to the heart of the race problem by ripping away the shame and inferiority that were stunting the growth of black men;" and 2) "He focused attention on Africa when black nationalism was dormant."

Many Black leaders and intellectuals of the time were unalterably opposed to Garvey and his African scheme. His principal protagonist was W. E. B. Du Bois. Du Bois, however, was also concerned with the freeing of Africa from the strangle-hold of colonialism. He figured prominently in the early Pan-African movement as its spiritual and intellectual mentor and convener of the earliest Pan-African conferences. Garvey and Du Bois were not the only Afro-Americans with deep interest in Africa, nor were they the first to explore the significance of Africa for black men in America. Much of the work of Black creative writers during the Harlem Literary Renaissance, which developed almost parallel with the Garvey movement, centered on the question of the meanings of African heritage for their art. Notable examples are the sonnets of Claude McKay: "Africa," "Outcasts," "Enslaved"; "The Negro Speaks of Rivers" by Langston Hughes; "Georgia Dusk" by Jean Toomer; "Heritage" by Count Cullen; and "Stars of Ethiopia" by Lucian B. Watkins. Contemporary Black writers and intellectuals have formed the American Society of African Culture (AMSAC), counterpart to the Society of African Culture formed originally by French-speaking West Africans in Paris to assess their relationship to their African roots.

With regard to the historical origins of Afro-American consciousness, Richard B. Moore, historian and political analyst, contends that before
Garvey, Harlem had become Africa-conscious and to a considerable degree had related this consciousness to its own oppressed condition. He argues that Garvey seized the opportunity to "harness this upsurge against oppression and to direct the existing consciousness of Africa into a specific organized movement under his leadership." He does concede that "... the Garvey movement did heighten and spread the consciousness of African origin and identity among the various peoples of African descent on a wider scale than ever before." Together Du Bois and Garvey more than any others made Black Americans aware of and interested in their African origins. Du Bois was to say upon taking Ghanian citizenship in the postcolonial period:

My great-grandfather was carried away in chains from the Gulf of Guinea. I have returned that my dust shall mingle with the dust of my forefathers. There is not much left for me. But now, my life will flow on in the vigorous, young stream of Ghanaian life which lifts the African personality to its proper place among men. And I shall not have lived and worked in vain."

As early as 1787, the freed slaves of Newport, Rhode Island, formed the Free African Society to promote group cohesion and repatriation to Africa. African Societies were formed in other parts of the northeast section of the country, uniting members on the basis of their mutual African origin and previous condition of servitude, as well as the threat and violence of their environment which they experienced commonly.

In 1815, Paul Cuffee of Boston, a well-to-do entrepreneur, piloted himself and a boat load of other ex-slaves and their descendants to Sierra Leone in West Africa. Walker's Appeal to the Colored Citizens of the World, by David Walker, appeared in 1820 and was followed, slightly more than a decade later, by Henry Highland Garnet's "Address to the Slaves of the United States" and his Call to Rebellion in 1843. In 1852, Martin R. Delany, Harvard-educated physician, writer, editor, and theoretician, published his book, The Condition, Elevation, Emigration and Destiny of the Colored People of the United States Politically Considered, which was a statement of the doctrine which today is called "Black Zionism." Dr. Delany proposed an expedition to the "Eastern Coast of Africa" for the purpose of eventual settlement there. It is worthwhile to quote a few passages from this book...
because of the enduring relevance of the sentiments it conveys:

"Every people should be the originators of their own designs, the projector of their own schemes, and creators of the events that lead to their destiny--the consummation of their desires.

"We have native hearts and virtues, just as other nations; which in their pristine purity are noble, potent and worthy of example. We are a nation within a nation . . . .

"But we have been, by our oppressors, despoiled of our purity, and corrupted in our native characteristics, . . . leaving us in character, really a 'broken people.' Being distinguished by complexion, we are still singled out--although having merged in the habits and customs of our oppressors--as a distinct nation of people . . . ."23

It is interesting to note the essential parallel between this statement and the following comment of W. E. B. Du Bois, one of the most outstanding of the early Afro-American scholars and intellectuals. Dr. Hollis Lynch, a West Indian scholar who has done specialized research in Africa and the Americas on the subject of Pan-Negronationalism, contends that early Black nationalists were, compared to most of their peers, "well educated, economically well-off, and proud men of immense race price."24 Du Bois from the latter part of the nineteenth century thru the first half of the twentieth century was a major exponent of such feeling.

We are Americans, not only by birth and by citizenship, but by our political ideals, our language, our religion. Further than that, our Americanism does not go. At that point, we are Negroes, members of a vast historic race . . . . We are the first fruits of this new nation, the harbinger of that black tomorrow which is yet to soften the whiteness of the Teutonic today . . . . As such, it is our duty to conserve our physical powers, our intellectual endowments, our spiritual ideals; as a race, we must strive by race-organization, by race solidarity, by race unity to the realization of that broader humanity which freely recognizes differences in men, but sternly deprecates inequality in their opportunities of development.25

AFRICA AND THE AFRO-AMERICAN
IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE

The quest for new values thus leads the Black nationalist to the belief that self-definition and self-determination are one and the same, and his new self-perception must of necessity be predicated upon terms that are divergent from white Western values. An essential development of this
new identity is that the association of the "Black race" with Africa acquires a new meaning. Instead of being a source of shame, Africa becomes a source of pride and an important referent in this new orientation. This is an essential end of Black nationalism. The social-psychological function of this orientation is to permit open and unashamed identification with the continent, a kind of poetic sublimation of those associations in the minds of most Afro-Americans which constitute for them a source of conflict in their relationship with white Western culture: a process of self-avowal and self-recognition.

Neither Garvey nor Du Bois was the first to visualize a strong and independent West Africa, although they gave the idea new urgency and a tremendous impetus. Garvey's efforts had been preceded by Bishop Henry McNeal Turner, the Africa-oriented leader of the African Methodist Episcopal Church. Bishop Turner, the chief prophet of Black nationalism, urged his people to go back to Africa. Turner, like his contemporary, Edward Wilmot Blyden, traveled widely in Africa. He symbolized the early phase of Black nationalism in this country. According to Professor Redkey:

Among the various Negro responses to their American ordeal, the least known and understood is "black nationalism." It has embraced many forms... it has existed in one form or another among Afro-Americans since before the Civil War.26

With regard to the organizational aspects of Black nationalism, W. E. B. Du Bois describing his split with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in 1934 wrote in his autobiography:

I proposed that in economic lines, just in the lines of literature and religion, unified racial action should be planned and organized and carefully thought through. This plan would not establish a new segregation; it did not advocate segregation as the final solution of the race problem; exactly the contrary; but it did face the facts and faced them with thoughtfully mapped effort... What was true in 1910 was still true in 1940 and will be true in 1970.27

Commenting on this remark, Wallerstein suggests, "It is not fanciful to see here the intellectual roots of black power ideology."28 The conceptual parameters of Black Power ideology are still, to a certain extent, in the formative stages. Yet the thinking of Du Bois has been a foundation upon which much of this ideology will rest.
In recent times Malcolm X has been the single most influential personality and thinker in the growing Black Power movement and Pan-African orientation among Afro-Americans. After his split with Elijah Muhammad and the "Nation of Islam" he traveled widely in Africa, staying with African leaders. He envisioned a relationship with Africa that involved what he considered "an intellectual, cultural and psychological attachment to Africa, a sort of spiritual adjustment to the fact of African heritage." He claimed for Afro-Americans an identity of interest with Africa. He planned a world-wide unity of black men with Africa as the focus or frame of reference for political guidance. His was truly a dream of the Black Diaspora. Though he was assassinated while on the threshold of political maturity, his legacy has spawned a new epoch for the Black masses as well as the leadership class. The demand now is for economic development of legitimacy of Black creative expression. The mood of Afro-America is one of disenchantment with the present socio-economic system and a determination for a change in status. It urges neither integration nor accommodation with white society.

For many sensitive Afro-Americans the American dream is a facade, a cruel illusion that has created a nightmare of humiliation and oppression built upon broken hopes and unfulfilled promise. They are uncertain about their place in the larger white society and about where their loyalties should be. For some, their allegiance is to their people, to black people wherever they may be. Some Black militants and revolutionaries, like Stokely Carmichael and H. Rap Brown, talk of preparation for the role Afro-Americans must play in the coming Black liberation struggle in South Africa as well as Harlem. However, for others, a rapprochement with Africa is not without difficulty and ambivalence. As they begin to ask who they are and where they belong and where they should be going, they feel certain that their destiny cannot be realized in America—at least as it is presently constituted. But there is not, on the other hand, a credible or practical bond to the continent of their ancestors. Black writer Julian Mayfield, organizer of the AMSAC conference on "The Afro-American Writer and his Roots," comments on the dilemma of the black man in America:
He occupies... the position of the unwanted child who, having been brought for a visit, must remain for the rest of his life... He is indeed the man without a country.

Over the time and distance that separate Africa from her American descendants, real cultural differences have emerged. Richard Wright, the great Afro-American writer, eloquently relates the anguish of culture conflict in his attempts at resettlement in Africa. There are other problems. Perhaps more than other Americans, Afro-Americans have accepted the myths and distortions about Africa, and have internalized the false images and stereotypes of the "dark" continent. Many Afro-Americans are left with the feeling that they are victimized because of an inglorious past; consequently, many feel a deep sense of confusion, injustice, and bitterness at the fond attention given African students and diplomats, precisely because the same society has derogated the African past for so long. There are also semantic misunderstandings: when an African, for instance, proclaims that he is not a "Negro," Afro-Americans may interpret this behavior as a rejection of kinship and common identity.

Nonetheless, there is an increasing belief within all levels of the Black community that African and Afro-American will ultimately be drawn to each other by what James Baldwin designated as a "need to recreate the world in their own image." "What in sum they hold in common," he concludes, "is their ache to come into the world as men."

NOTES


28. Wallerstein, Ibid.


The purpose of this concluding essay will be to try to review the preceding essays from the viewpoint of interdisciplinary social science and to indicate similarities and dissimilarities in approach. The essay is divided into three main segments: a brief summary of the language of social science, at least as it has come to be used in African studies; a brief summary of the methodology of social science, especially techniques in use within the African context; and finally a review of the two major types of social science analysis in African studies (comparative and developmental) and a statement regarding priorities and problems of social science in Africa.

Social science refers to the systematic study of human phenomena, with particular reference to those aspects of experience which are observable. The observation may be of human conduct or behavior; it may be of human cognition, or sets of meaning attached to behavior; or it may be of human cathexis, or emotions which attach to both behavior and meanings. Such inquiry is "scientific" to the extent that it follows repeatable rules of observation, establishes a vocabulary capable of operational definition, and establishes frequency, probability, or sequential relations between units and events.

In a world of different cultures the necessity for a social science approach is two-fold: cross-cultural communication requires a common set of symbols and meanings (language), and the tendency toward ethnocentrism in the perception of other culture groups requires strict attention to the process of observation itself.
THE LANGUAGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE ANALYSIS

The Idea of Definition

A definition proposes the essential characteristics of a thing. Criteria for good definitions include common usage, precision, utility, and parsimony. Basically, however, definitions are arbitrary, and we try to persuade people of their utility and merits. There are several types of definitions including demonstrative, negative, paradigmatic, and operational. Operational definitions, for example, are those which include a set of rules by which we can potentially measure a variable or concept.

Concepts may also be arbitrary but are usually based on systems of definitions which are interrelated by the logic of their elements. Thus, concepts are essentially definitional. The concept of "elite," for example, might be described as follows: an elite is a segment of a social system which by reason of status or class is regarded as having influence or authority within the social system. In both the case of definitions and concepts, the necessity is to avoid tautology, in which subject qualifiers are essentially the same as predicate qualifiers (for example, to define middle class as bourgeoisie, is to use the French equivalent in translation).

Definitional Tools of Analysis

Major definitional tools of analysis include the concepts of variable, hypothesis, theory, model, system, and correlation. Each of the social sciences may use these concepts in a slightly different way. Certain usages, however, are most common. A variable is most commonly regarded as a characteristic of a unit within a universe (or context). This characteristic may take on different values for different units and hence is not "constant." For example, the age-level of an elite would constitute a variable.

An hypothesis makes an empirical statement about the value of a variable. For example, an hypothesis may make a statement about the specific age of an elite ("all political leaders in Africa are male and over twenty-one"). A theory is the process of relating sets of hypotheses. For example, we may theorize that if the average age of political elites is over sixty-five, political instability may result among the contenders for power. In this case,
there is an implied relationship between the two hypotheses. A model is a description of the relationship between a set of variables. A model may be an \textit{a priori} statement of correlation, and does not need to be a theory. Finally, a system is a set of units with relationships between them.

A correlation is a measure of co-varying change between two variables. Casual directionality is not implied, only interactiveness. A matrix of correlations is a table of all pair-wise relations of variables.

Finally, for the sake of analysis, variables are often regarded as either independent or dependent. Changes in the state of a dependent variable are explained by changes in one or more independent variables. Different kinds of technical analysis require different assumptions about the type of variables which can be used as independent or dependent. In ordinary usage, however, if a student were interested in the influence of religious elites on political integration, the data on elites would be considered independent variables, and the data on integration would be considered dependent variables.

\textbf{The Language of Units and Processes}

The basic idea of systems analysis is that within a universe, that is, a definable context, changes in one unit will cause predictable changes in another unit. For example, in the African context, if the international price of cocoa decreases, certain types of social tension within a country may increase. Or, as certain types of urbanization increase, certain types of traditionalism may decrease. Much of social science in Africa is concerned with discovering the implications of change and the types of things which are interrelated.

The units within the context being examined may be individuals, groups, cities, regions, or any other combination of humans with discernible boundaries. Within comparable units it is assumed that there are certain similar characteristics. Thus, national states may differ in size and complexity, but all share the common characteristics of international sovereignty. Political parties may differ in many ways, but all are organizations trying to assume and exercise governmental political power.
and authority. Units which call themselves political parties, but which really function as pressure groups would be excluded from a social science definition of "parties." Within the African context the initial problem is to examine the units of observation. These may be individuals--many of the psychological and historical studies focus on specific types of individuals--or they may be groups. Groups may be reference groups or membership groups, and membership groups, in turn, may be either of the communal or associational variety. A reference group is any set of individuals who have a role (patterned, or expected, interaction) relationship to one another. A membership group entails the additional notion of identity. If the basis of group identity is beyond the capacity of the individual to control, as in a kinship network, it is termed a communal, or ethnic group. If it is an identity which a person may withdraw from, as with membership in a church, labor organization, or political party, it is termed an associational group. Units which consist of well-established role relations may be termed institutions.

The types of interactions between units have been given a variety of names, such as conflict, coordination, and cooperation. Most of the specialized social sciences--such as political science, economics, linguistics, sociology, anthropology--examine particular processes which deal with certain specified functions within society. Linguistics may deal with communications functions, and economics with production and exchange functions. Disciplines such as geography and history, by contrast, cross-cut the functional subdivision of analysis by emphasizing the particular dimensions of spatial and temporal variation.

Within a systems analysis framework, processes are usually divided into three categories: input, conversion, and output. The inputs to a political system might be those claims of groups and individuals for certain types of state action; the conversion process might include channeling these claims through some decision-making institution; the outputs, in turn, might be some form of governmental action. It must be stressed again, however, that such conceptual definitions of process are somewhat arbitrary and are intended as aids to an intellectual grappling with real-world complexity.
The Language of Values

Much of social science is concerned with systems of meaning and emotion, both of which may be subsumed under the category of value analysis. Within social science there are two major usages of the term value: it may be regarded as a broad orientation toward ultimate goals, such as equality, or justice; or, it may be regarded as anything which is preferred. Depending on which of these usages of value is employed, the notion of norm is also used in one of two ways: as the means to the general values, or goals; or, as a modal set of preferences within a social unit. Apart from the discipline of sociology, there seems to be increasing use of "values" in the sense of "preferences." By extension, moral values would deal with preferences as to appropriate behavior between human beings.

The concept of belief, or belief system, refers to the assertion that something is true rather than false, whether it is preferred or not. Cohesiveness is necessary if a set of beliefs are combined into a belief system, although cohesiveness is not necessary to the notion of disbelief.

The concept of culture refers to the modal patterns of values, beliefs, and processes which characterize a particular social group. The concept of material culture would refer to those artifacts which derive their function from the broader patterns of latent ideology (as opposed to explicit or manifest ideology), which asserts certain propositions as both true and valued. Ideology, however, may also include proposals for a future course of action. It will be noted that to use culture as an independent, or explanatory, variable, with regard to a set of selected dependent variables which are part of the general culture, is to create a tautology. It is for this reason that the earlier concern of some social scientists for national culture studies must be examined with great caution.

One final concept might be included under the category of value analysis--the notion of symbols. A sign is an exact substitute for something else, whereas a symbol may refer to an array of meanings which go far beyond the original object. A symbol of ethnic identity may be circumcision, a symbol of generational identity may be length of hair, or the symbol of
an African political party may be a crowing rooster or palm tree. That people will fight and die for symbols is well known, but this fact points to the importance of getting beyond the outward manifestations of cross-cultural behavior into the range of meanings and emotions which are associated with such behavior.

The Language of Social Science

There is, therefore, an ongoing process within social science which tries to establish common usage of concepts dealing with systems, units, processes, and values which can be used to describe and analyze human experience. In this process there is a constant give and take on the matter of definitions and concepts, but the establishment of a truly international language of social science, which could be used appropriately by any social science discipline within any cultural or geographical context (including Africa), remains a hope for the future. One of the characteristics of such a language will be that it can be used to study either Africa or America. It is of historical interest to note, however, that much of the impetus for such a language has come from social scientists who are working in the non-Western world, and a significant number of these have been working in Africa.

THE METHODOLOGY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE OBSERVATION:
EXAMPLES FROM AFRICA

As mentioned earlier, the need for strict attention to the methodology or procedure of observation is partly the result of problems of ethnocentrism, whereby an individual scholar or observer may find that his perceptions are colored by his own cultural or personal experience. Within the African context, this problem exists whether the observer is a white American, a Black American, or an African from a different cultural unit than the one under observation.

One goal of social science, then, is objectivity with regard to cross-cultural phenomena. Yet certain sectors within the social science community are also cognizant of the intellectual arguments of phenomenology—that is, the belief that all reality is subjective. Rather than dismiss the possibility for inter-subjective communication and understanding, some scholars have
attempted to refine techniques such as participant observation where the observer himself experiences the phenomena under observation. In fact, within the African context, the methodology of participant observation has become, along with interviews, survey research, experimental tests, and documentary analysis, one of the major techniques of observation.

In all approaches to methodology, two problems exist: verification and validity. Verification refers to the processes by which the accuracy of the recorded observation may be checked, and validity refers to the processes by which variables are allocated to the appropriate conceptual categories. A major problem of both verification and validity is sampling, which will not be discussed here.

**Participant Observation**

Participant observation is based on the premise that first-hand observers of a situation may influence the situation itself; that is, that persons who observe are also noticed and may even effect the course of events. Techniques of participant observation try to assess the impact of an observer on a situation and try to establish procedures for reporting personal experiences.

Participant observation may entail different degrees of involvement. In the case of complete involvement, the observer is also a partisan. Participation, however, may also be partial, as in cases where the observer is obviously an "outsider" but is interacting in significant ways with the persons in the group under observation. Finally, participation may be passive, as in cases where the observer does not have a role in the unit under observation, but his mere presence may influence the actors involved. The technical and ethnical problems implicit in this approach will vary according to the type of participation.

The theoretical implications of participant observation are well elaborated in the work of Bruyn, and methodological aspects are discussed in the work of Becker. One of the best-known applications of participant observation is found in Whyte's *Street Corner Society*, but Africanist scholars, especially anthropologists such as Laura Bohannan and
Hortense Powdermaker\(^7\) have also contributed to the over-all understanding of participant observation methods and experience.

Drawing on the experience of the contributors to this volume, it is possible to illustrate the different types of participant observation. James Turner is a full participant in the Afro-American movements and perspectives of which he writes. Wilfred Cartey may be regarded as a partial participant in the realm of creative contemporary Black literature insofar as his role is primarily that of a critic rather than author. The field work of contributors such as Jack Berry and Ronald Cohen illustrate the notion of passive participation, in the classic sense of "outsiders" observing at close hand and over long periods selected aspects of particular social systems. It will be noted, however, that insofar as Berry has contributed to governmental discussions within Africa concerned with the directions of national language policy, he may be regarded as a partial participant, or, at times, a full participant.

In short, participant observation underscores the merits of first-hand observation, and tries to establish ways of accurately reporting such observations.

**Interview Data**

Interviews, in which the researcher talks in depth with a respondent either according to a fixed set of questions or in a more open-ended manner, are a primary means of gathering data. The techniques of interview may vary with each discipline and each problem. Oral data, which is essentially interview data, may be used to re-create major aspects of past histories of preliterate society. Historians such as Rowe and Holden have both used this technique in their work in Buganda (Uganda) and Futa Toro (Senegal), respectively. A useful description of oral data techniques is found in Vansina's description of his work in the Congo.\(^8\)

With regard to content, interviews may be open-ended, or more restricted. Of the latter, a focused interview attempts to elicit the feelings and interpretations of the respondent to a set of historical events which are known to both the interviewer and the respondent. There are special techniques to correct for errors in memory or other distortions.\(^9\)
Survey Research

Much of survey research is essentially a form of interview. However, instead of concentrating on individual depth interviews, teams of interviewers administer standardized questions which can be coded and, usually, machine processed. Much of survey research in Africa has dealt with attitudes and/or background characteristics. Census enumeration can be a form of survey research to the extent that it asks questions regarding background characteristics of a population. Attitudinal research may try to elicit responses to real or hypothetical questions. The major problems in survey research include maintenance of uniformity among the various members of the interview team, the problem of selecting a sample, and the possible exclusion of areas of information by the need to produce comparable (and/or machine readable) types of answers. The argument for survey research is its breadth of coverage.

Both Clignet and Mabogunje have used survey research techniques in Africa in their studies of Ghanaian/Ivoirien school children and Nigerian urban migrants respectively. Any research that deals with very large numbers of respondents will probably employ some techniques of survey research. To date in Africa there has been only limited use of this technique due to problems of financial resources and due to the problems of training large survey research teams. Even with regard to census survey research there are a few countries in Africa where a systematic census has not been undertaken. In other countries, such as Ghana, the census material is excellent.

Experimental Testing

Experimental tests may be designed to elicit reactions to certain specified stimuli. Usually this occurs in small group or individual studies. One example of such testing is the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) in which a respondent is given, in series, a set of pictures to which he responds. The use of these techniques is often limited to psychologists who can work intensively with small groups of persons. Student groups and hospital patients are frequent sources for an experimental sample.
Both Cohen and LeVine have used experimental testing in some of their work in Africa. LeVine's study of achievement motivation among school boys in Nigeria, and Cohen's work with school boys in Bornu both utilized experimental testing. The problems of cross-cultural interpretations of stimulus-response experiments is usually difficult if this technique is not combined with other observational methods. LeVine and Cohen spent considerable amounts of time engaged in participant observation prior to the experimental tests.

**Documentary and/or Content Analysis**

Content analysis refers to the processes by which written materials are systematically analyzed and classified. Documentary analysis is less concerned than content analysis with problems of sampling. A single document may be used as the basis of an urban history, as the Kano Chronicle has been in Nigeria until recently. Content analysis attempts to be more systematic insofar as the focus may be on patterns of communications rather than the subtleties of substantive matter. Quantitative content analysis may even engage in word counts or concept frequency counts. To date, most of the work in Africa has been in the area of documentary analysis.

The essays by Paden and Roland Young both reflect the use of documentary analysis. In the former, writings by African leaders are examined with regard to concepts of nationhood; in the latter, legal discussions and documents are examined with regard to precedents and concepts of jurisprudence. Other scholars have undertaken content analysis of African newspapers or parliamentary debates for indications of government policy. At the same time, historians are uncovering documents in Africa, (in European, North African, and vernacular languages) which, when carefully analyzed, may open new doors on the past.

**The Idea of Methodology**

In short, the purpose of methodology is to establish rules of evidence. This is done not only to establish the credibility of the claims to knowledge made by scholars but also to begin to establish the foundations upon which cross-cultural data analysis may be undertaken. By making explicit the
methodology of observation or procedures of data gathering, a scholar is in effect suggesting that any other scholar, who followed the same procedures, would come up with the same observations. Such potential for duplication of research is usually called replicability, and may be regarded as an essential premise of social science.

It is important to recognize that there is no essential difference in the methodological approaches of the various social science disciplines. The techniques of observation used in linguistics are much the same as those in sociology. The survey research of economics is essentially the same as that of geography. It is the interdisciplinary nature of social science methodology which contributes both to the unity of social science and to the permeability of disciplinary boundaries.

TYPES, PRIORITIES, AND PROBLEMS OF ANALYSIS: EXAMPLES FROM AFRICA

Types of Analysis

The two major types of analysis in social science may be described as comparative and developmental. Comparative analysis is concerned with analyzing the similarities and dissimilarities of units which are regarded as sharing certain common system properties. Such units may be nation-states, urban areas, ethnic societies, individuals, or any other set of units. Comparative analysis of such units is usually called cross-sectional, insofar as a functionally defined portion of such units may be isolated for comparative purposes. (Certain social scientists prefer the term synchronic in place of cross-sectional.) A comparative study of political parties in Africa, or even a typologizing of regimes, as is undertaken in the Crawford Young essay, would illustrate this approach. The comparative approach of both Cohen and Dalton, with reference to the characteristics of kinship patterns and economic patterns respectively, has not become common among anthropologists concerned with ethnic societies until quite recently. In contrast, the essay by Crowder does not compare a large number of units, but is essentially comparative in its assessment of the British and French colonial systems. In this sense, a system may well transcend the boundaries of a national state.
The idea of developmental analysis (also called longitudinal, time-series, or diachronic) is based on the assumption of change within a single unit over time. This is basically the historical approach. The single unit may be the international system itself, as is illustrated in Mazrui's description of the impact of Africa on international patterns of alignment and non-alignment. Or the single unit may be the national state, as is implicit in the time projections on economic and communications data in the essays by Rivkin and Hachten respectively. The boundaries of the unit itself may undergo change, as Abu-Lughod and Hammond suggest in their respective descriptions of the expansion of the Islamic community in Africa and the extension of the African community to the New World. The circulation systems described by Soja and the urban systems described by Mabogunje may be charted in terms of their change over time.

It will be clear from the above examples that an analysis may be both comparative and developmental. Crawford Young's suggestion that the various African regimes have gone through four distinct time phases is perhaps the clearest example of this combination. Another example was Rivkin's discussion of comparative rates of economic change.

The merits of developmental analysis ultimately focus on the possibility of projecting time-series data into the future and hence achieving some degree of predictability. The merits of comparative analysis rest in the ability to predict system characteristics in an unknown unit if it is similar to a known unit in other significant respects. For example, an urban center known to have a low average age level and a disproportionate percentage of male to female inhabitants may well predict certain other social characteristics, such as elements of social stability.

Priorities of Analysis

Whatever the hope of social science for an objective language and procedure of analysis, it is no longer disputed among social scientists that the initial selection of problems and/or units for analysis is a matter in which the values of the researcher may, and should, enter. It is only after the selection of issues or problems that an attempt toward objectivity is undertaken. Priorities of analysis are increasingly being suggested by the
African states themselves, or by the emergent university communities in Africa (including those at Ibadan, Makerere, Legon, and Dakar). While there is a clear distinction between social science and policy science, this does not mean that social science is oblivious to the needs of the day. The discussion by van den Berghe of problems of racism and economic exploitation, or the emphasis by Zolberg on the problems of nation-building, clearly indicate issues of major importance to African statesmen.

In the past, some of the priorities within social science have been determined by the traditional academic division of disciplines. This maintainence of rigid boundaries within social science disciplines seems at last to be dissolving. The work by Dalton on social and political factors in economic development, the effort of the Cordwell team to bridge the gap between architecture and urban design, the basically societal approach of Willett to the study of African art, and even the emergence of physical scientists such as Kliphardt who are dedicated to adapting technical developments to societal needs all seem to point to the necessity for even further interdisciplinary research. Whether such research is undertaken by individuals or by teams may become increasingly a matter of debate.

Problems of Social Science Analysis

The purpose of this essay has not been to suggest that social science holds all the answers regarding the African experience or even potentially holds these answers. Social science research at the moment is often inadequate by its own standards, and these standards themselves may even be visionary. In the effort to establish standards, however, it is important to recognize certain problems in social science, most of which are clearly illustrated in the African context.

The first problem is that of unit boundary comparability and change. Without comparable units--even the same unit may change beyond recognition over time--social science is impossible. It has been partly in response to this requirement that the unit of "tribe" is being used less frequently by scholars to refer to the full range of traditional societies in Africa. It has become clear that such societies may be fundamentally different types of units--for example, kinship groups, language groups, religious groups,
ecological groups—and that to mix them all together may violate the unit comparability requirement of social science.

The second problem is that of missing data. In many cases within the African context, it is not possible to obtain systematic information on a subject. Hence, a researcher must devise some way of dealing with missing data or must be willing to make qualitative judgments regarding the probable characteristics of such data. In all of the essays in this volume, the authors have continually stressed the difficulty of obtaining continent-wide data to sustain generalizations about Africa as a whole. When generalizations are made—and the demand for such generalization is one reason for undertaking this volume—it is important to recognize whether propositions are based on data, extrapolation, or judgment.

A third area of weakness in social science, especially within the African context, is the tendency to concentrate on behavioral analysis to the exclusion of value analysis. In certain respects behavioral analysis is less difficult to undertake, but the necessity for interpreting behavior within a cognitive and affective framework appropriate to the African context should not be forgotten.

Finally, there is often a tendency in social science to deal with the known rather than the unknown. This is the challenge which the African experience clearly presents to social science, as well as to the hundreds of societal systems in Africa that are trying to bridge the culture gaps between themselves. The greatest service social science could render Africa may well be to remain sensitive to the unique, the unknown, the emerging, the ambiguous, rather than to engage in the rigid application of techniques and problem orientations which may have proved useful or appropriate in the Western world.

NOTES


2. For a theoretical discussion of phenomenology and social science, see Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers I: The Problem of Social Reality, edited by


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