This study was undertaken to examine the education of Arab youth in Israel, with special consideration of the following factors: (1) the social and psychological background of the Arab minority, (2) the aims of Jewish authorities regarding the education of Arab children in Israel, (3) the structure of Arab education in Israel, and (4) the degree of success of such education in relation to its aims. High school students, their parents, working youth, young adults, and teachers were interviewed by Arab interviewers using an open-closed type of questionnaire. In addition, an analysis of the official curricula in history, literature, language, religious studies, and citizenship was carried out. Major findings were (1) that secondary education has not moderated the antagonistic attitudes of Israeli Arabs toward Israel, though it has reduced their social distance from Jews, and (2) that among the factors contributing to the lack of educational success are official Israeli educational aims that prevent Arab participation and identification, and problems related to the role, recruitment, and status of teachers. (Tables of the findings are included.)
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U.S.A.

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Project Title: SOME PROBLEMS OF EDUCATING A NATIONAL MINORITY
(A Study of Israeli Education for Arabs)

Principal Investigator - Prof. S. N. Eisenstadt
Co-Principal Investigator - Dr. Y. Peres

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In collaboration with:
Nira Yuval-Davis, B.A.
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INTRODUCTION

Israel has the reputation of being a "sociological laboratory"; a small-scale society with large-scale problems. Many of these problems have been explored by social scientists, e.g. the absorption of immigrants, the emergence of original forms of cooperative settlements, the establishment of professions and scientific institutions.¹)

There is, however, one central problem facing Israeli society and particularly the Israeli educator on which the researchers have so far maintained an almost complete silence. We refer to the problem of education of the Arab minority in Israel. The reservation relating to research in this field is not accidental; this is one of the most sensitive points within the fabric of the Israeli social structure. The reluctance to inquire into this area results from various political anxieties based on the close connection between anything touching the Israeli Arabs and the Israeli-Arab conflict.

Our object in this research was to show by what means and with what degree of success the State of Israel is coping with the problem of educating the children of the Arab minority in Israel. On a closer examination of the matter we found it necessary to divide up the central problem into a number of secondary ones:

a) The social-psychological background of the Arab minority;
b) The aims of the Israeli authorities with regard to the education of Israeli Arab children;
c) The structure of Arab education in Israel;
d) The degree of success of such education, in relation to its initial aims.

From the outset we have felt that the exploration of the socio-psychological background is essential for the understanding of the
process by which Arab-Israeli youth is educated. Therefore, a large portion of research resources have been devoted to the study of Israeli Arabs' national identity and their attitudes towards Israel. In retrospect we realize that the importance attached to these aspects was not exaggerated. The aims, means and outcomes of Israeli education for young Arab citizens, are intelligible in the light of this background.

Chapters 2 and 3 ("on the national identity of the Israeli Arab" and "modernization and nationalism among Israeli Arabs") attempt to pinpoint the main factors moulding Israeli Arab identity. In Chapter 2 we stress the internal conflicts and difficulties of the Israeli Arab who is caught between two opposing forces - the State of Israel on the one hand and the Arab states on the other. An attempt has been made to analyze the mechanisms by means of which Israeli Arabs succeed in maintaining a normal life, both as individuals and as a group, in spite of being subjected to conflicting pressures. In Chapter 3 the links between the nature and intensity of national identity of the Israeli Arab and his integration into the process of modernization taking place in the Middle East, was explored. The confrontation with a relatively modern people (the Jews) lends a particular nuance to the modernization process of the Israeli Arab. Thus, clarification and analysis of the general background common to all members of the Arab minority in Israel preceded examination of specific educational issues.

After presenting (in Ch. 4) a very brief description of the Israeli-Arab school system we turn to a detailed examination of the aims set by Israeli (Jewish!) policy-makers for the instruction and indoctrination of Arab high-school students; and of the ways by which these aims are translated into didactic directions. For this purpose we undertook a comparative analysis of curricula in Jewish and Arab
secondary schools in Israel, with further reference to the equivalent curriculum of Jordanian secondary schools. It was now possible to embark upon an analysis of the educational process itself and examine the extent to which the Israeli Education Authorities succeeded in establishing their aims with regard to education towards values. This is discussed in Chapter 5. We investigated this question by comparing the responses of subjects who had received various degrees of Israeli education (secondary school pupils versus subjects without secondary education, and also students of different classes in secondary schools). The general trends discovered among the entire sample should be explained by the social situation of the Arab minority as indicated above, but the differences between various subgroups in the sample might be attributed, at least partly, to some specific educational factors; like the gap between students' private values and the official curriculum, or the degree of faith in the teachers' sincerity.

The research was confronted at all its stages by two main methodological problems:

a) How is it possible to maintain scientific objectivity while investigating an issue in which the researchers themselves are directly involved?

b) How can one persuade Arab subjects to have confidence in the investigators?

Chapter 1 (Methodology) is a description of the methods employed to deal with these problems.

The principal research assistants at various stages of the project were: Zippora Levi, Mahmoud Habib'alla, Yisrael Katz, Avishai Erlich, Muhammad Yunis and Gad Freudenthal. Mr. Katz participated in the preparation of chapter 3, and Mr. Erlich is a co-author of chapter 4.
We wish to express our thanks to all those who assisted us in carrying out this project: to Mr. Sammy Marai, of the Hebrew University's Department of Education, for his help and consultation; to Dr. Rivkah Bar-Yosef, of the Department of Sociology, for her instructive comments; to the interviewers who spared no efforts to ensure the success of the research; to our local coordinators, who made our stay in the Arab villages a pleasant one; and finally, to our respondents who - in periods of great tension - gave us their cooperation and their trust.

Chapter 1 - Methodology.

The problem of gaining the subjects' confidence and thus ensuring the validity of the data, constituted the principal challenge to the research project concerned with two peoples who are mutually hostile and suspicious. This problem, likely to confront a neutral investigator, became acute where the initiators of the research were themselves Jewish Israelis and the subjects - Arabs.

Other researchers who have tried to introduce sociological (as opposed to anthropological) methods into a Middle Eastern milieu, have already discovered how foreign is the research process to Arab culture. Scientific curiosity, the "will to know", are not considered as justifications for the posing of questions by a stranger. If this is so in peacetime, how much more so will it be in the periods of tension preceding and following war when the intelligence services of the parties involved, and of external powers with particular interests in the situation, are busily collecting information which is not infrequently used to the detriment of those from whom it was collected.
This atmosphere of uncertainty and suspicion can be illustrated by an incident in which an unexpected and unusual invitation (by an Arab woman to two strangers) to eat at her house was subsequently explained by our hostess as follows: "At first I thought you belonged to the Israeli Intelligence until my brother (our field worker) told me who you were and then I felt I ought to invite you to make up for my bad thoughts."

The reader may, of course, feel that conditions like these (of fear and suspicion) impede the carrying out of a scientific research project. On the other hand, we felt that if we were to limit our research work to those historic circumstances in which there were no severe social tension which might render people inhibited or insincere, we would be cutting ourselves off from broad and important sectors of human reality.

The Team.

The initiators and directors of the research were, as stated, Jews. However it was felt that a mixed team was essential both to illuminate the research problem from different angles, as well as to achieve objectivity and balance in analysis. To build up the necessary connections we carried out some highly detailed interviews with a representative sample of Arab students at the Hebrew University. On the basis of these interviews we selected the first Arabs to be coopted on to the mixed team. The Arab students were able to form a sort of "psychological bridge" between the researchers and the subjects, belonging, as they did, to the Hebrew-speaking academic community of the University in Jerusalem and to the Arab village simultaneously.

Life in the mixed team was not always idyllic. The Arab researchers regarded the situation of Israeli Arabs first of all as a problem
requiring a solution, or - as they put it - as a wrong demanding correction, as a result of which they would question the practical benefit of the research project to the Arab community.

We are not yet sure that we have succeeded in furnishing an adequate reply to this query, but as a result of cooperation in the project, the entire team learned to satisfy itself with a more limited aim: to bring to light some of the mental and social processes included within the term "Jewish-Arab relations" and make them widely known. Such a revelation is not, of course, sufficient to bring about a solution, but is however a vital prerequisite of it.

Another point which worried some of the Arab members of the team was that of their public image among their fellow Arabs while they were cooperating closely with Jews. Some stopped working on the grounds that they were not prepared to be regarded as "Quislings", however clear their conscience. Others made efforts to be seen in our company only in Jewish surroundings.

In order to strengthen their confidence that they were not causing any damage to their respondents the interviewer did not note subjects' names on the questionnaires and even among team members the identity of subjects was kept strictly secret. However, despite difficulties and tensions, covert and open, an atmosphere of cooperation and loyalty to the joint project evolved during the work. Professional discussions were generally conducted not according to "national fronts", and friendship was not confined to working relationships alone.

Pilot Study and the Identity of the Interviewer.

One of the problems which bothered us was, which interviewer would evoke the more valid reactions, a Jew or an Arab?
Previous researches have shown that the national identity of an interviewer influences the answers of the interviewee, particularly in questions dealing with intercommunity relationships and questions which bring up the "national problem". Whittaker found that the interviewer's race influenced research results, the reactions of Negro interviewees varying according to whether the interviewer was Negro or white. There was a tendency towards the expression of more strongly racialist views where there was a Negro interviewer. Irwin Katz in his research on Negroes found:

a) That the personality of the interviewer has a certain influence but that the basic content of the replies remains unchanged.

b) There is a greater tendency to identify with a Negro interviewer than with a white interviewer.

We, too, anticipate this type of difference in reactions to Jewish and Arab interviewers. In order to examine the effectiveness of the research instruments, a pilot study was carried out in summer 1966. In this pilot study 104 Arab high-school students were interviewed by a mixed team of Arab and Jewish interviewers. The results partially confirmed our assumption: not in the case of every question did the type of answer vary with Jewish or Arab interviewers. Significant differences were found only among some of the questions which probed directly into the identification with Arab nationalism or the relationship to the Jews, and required a clear-cut choice between the two. We can demonstrate these results with the help of one or two distributions.
A. An item where the type of answer given to Arab and Jewish interviewers did not differ:

"How would you react to the following sentence: The Arab world should fight or by means of economic and political pressures, without the use of force?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>Jew</th>
<th>Arab</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disagree, because even such pressures are</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mean of force</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with reservations</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree, because when necessary, one needs to use force</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B. Questions where there was a highly significant difference in the type of answer given to a Jewish or Arab researcher:

1. **Do you often remember that you are an Arab?**

   **Table 2**
   
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>Jew</th>
<th>Arab</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Often</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rarely</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost never</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   \[ X^2 = 12.207; \quad P < .01 \]

2. **Attitude to the war.**

   How would you react to the following sentence: **The Arab world must fight to restore its honour.**

   **Table 3**
   
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>Jew</th>
<th>Arab</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree to a certain extent</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refused to answer</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   \[ X^2 = 15.950; \quad P < .01. \]
We have no criterion to decide which are the "genuine" answers. One could perhaps say that the positions taken up vis-a-vis a Jewish interviewer typify behavior in a situation of Jewish domination whereas those adopted vis-a-vis an Arab interviewer conform to behavior in a situation of Arab dominance.

Another possibility would be to say that a significant agreement between the two types of interviewer supports the validity of the replies, whereas in the case of a marked discrepancy one can say very little; perhaps only that the position of the average subject is situated somewhere between the averages of the two distributions.

In the light of these reflections we thought that we would continue with the parallel interviews, with Jewish and Arab interviewers, but the outbreak of war changed the situation radically. After the war there was less willingness to cooperate with the Jews and the percentage of vague answers such as: "I'm not a politician", "I don't know", increased. We therefore decided to use Arab interviewers only.

**Instruments of Research.**

The type of information in which we are interested is best obtained through interviews, based on questionnaires.

**The Questionnaire.**

Subjects were interviewed with the aid of an open-closed type of questionnaire. This method enables the subject to express his opinion fully after which he sums up his reply in such a way that it can be allotted to one of several prepared categories. In certain cases the interviewer guided the subject towards his final summary. We can demonstrate this by the following typical conversation:
The question: "Do you agree to your son marrying a Jewess?"
1. Fully agree. 2. Agree. 3. Agree, but prefer him to marry an Arab girl. 4. Against. 5. Strongly against.

Interviewer: (Asks the question without reading out the alternative responses.)

Subject: These days children do what they like.

Interviewer: That's right, but if your son nevertheless asked your advice?

Subject: I would say: In times like these it's not desirable.

Interviewer: Would you say that you are strongly against it or just that you would prefer him to marry an Arab girl?

Subject: In peacetime it would be different; today, when our brethren are fighting (the Jews), it's out of question.

Interviewer: (Marks answer No. 5).

Categories were prepared according to the results of pre-tests which were carried out initially among Arab University students and later in 8 Arab settlements in Israel. The pre-test in the Arab villages was held in the summer of 1966, and we used it in the report comparing responses of subjects before and after the June 1967 war.

Coordinators.

One of the ways of obtaining the cooperation and trust of our subjects was by employing coordinators. The coordinator, a person of some standing, at least in his neighborhood, introduced the interviewer to the subject and recommended him as "a good Arab". In this way some initial credit was gained which permitted the researcher to start the interview with the maximum confidence possible in the circumstances.
Sampling was done in two stages: firstly of localities, and secondly of subjects. Research localities were stratified according to the following categories:

b. Type of settlement (rural v. urban).
c. Region (center v. north).
d. Size of settlement (large village, small village).

The localities in the final list were: Taibe, Nazareth, Abelin, Rama, Sachnin, Ja't, Majdal Krum, 'Araba.

Since education was our most important independent variable we selected individuals to be interviewed (within each locality) according to educational background. Consequently the following groups of respondents were interviewed:

Table 4
Distribution of the sample according to educational background, and age groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Number of Interviewees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. High-school students</td>
<td>age: 14-18, 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Parents (of High-school students)</td>
<td>age: 35-70, 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Working youth</td>
<td>age: 14-18, 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Young adults</td>
<td>age: 20-35, 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total: 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Teachers*</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Teachers were interviewed with the aid of a different questionnaire and are not included in the calculations unless otherwise indicated.
This grouping permitted us to make two important comparisons:

a. comparing the attitudes of the older generation educated during the British mandate (or even earlier) with the attitudes of the younger generation raised under Israeli regime (groups 1;2 or groups 2;3);

b. comparing youngsters with relatively high formal education to their colleagues with low formal education (groups 1;3).

Group 4 (young adults) was used mainly to close the age gap between the various groups and thus to increase the representativeness of the sample.

The teachers sub-sample was referred to only in Ch. 5, in which the outcome of Israeli education of Arab youth is discussed.

In summary then, the principal methodological problems occupying our attention were:

a. Achieving and maintaining scientific objectivity while investigating a conflict situation in which the researchers themselves were involved.

b. Gaining the subject's confidence.

c. Isolating our main independent variable, the type and degree of education, in the most appropriate method.

In order to solve these problems, however partially, the following steps have been taken:

a. A combined Jewish–Arab team of investigators was created.

b. Interviews were administered by Arab students.

c. Interviews were carried out anonymously.

d. Groups were sampled according to level and quality of education received.
Chapter 2 - Some Observations on the National Identity of the Israeli Arab and Its Background

Turning now to a substantive discussion of our findings, let us begin with a general account of the Israeli Arab's situation as a minority in a Jewish state and simultaneously a part of the majority in the region. A feeling of uncertainty and marginality is thus one of the "Leitmotifs" in the identity of the Israeli Arab, or in the phrasing of one of our respondents: "I sometimes think that we are neither real Arabs nor real Israelis because in the Arab countries they call us traitors and in Israel - spies".

It is difficult to conduct a frank conversation with an Israeli Arab without sooner or later coming up against this feeling of being faced with an insoluble dilemma. How can the Israeli Arab find his place when his life space is rent by total conflict and, at the same time, maintain his position in society and the integrity of his personality?

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the psychological processes resulting from the unique position of the Israeli Arab, and to show how these processes guide his behavior, thus producing a feedback on the actual framework of Israeli society in general and on Jewish-Arab relationships in particular.

The central concept upon which we shall try to focus our hypotheses is that of identity.

Like other concepts in psychological and sociological theory, the concept of "identity" was developed following analyses of situations in which identity - as it is understood today - was a problem.
Erikson's analysis of the process of adolescence, Goffman's essay on "handicaps" and social "stigmas" of various kinds, and the work of Lewin and Erikson on minority groups, are examples of research on identity in cases where the wholeness and unity of the "I" are subjected to conflicting pressures.

In spite of the very frequent use made of the word "identity", it would be difficult to say that there existed one accepted, unequivocal definition of it. We propose here to follow Miller who regarded identity as the network or perceptions and attitudes which a man has towards himself. Miller sees a parallel between identity and the term "self" as defined by Murphy: "the self is the individual as known to the individual". Identity, therefore, according to his approach, is part of the zone of consciousness in the life space of the individual, though in order to explain the structure of identity and its dynamics, we shall also employ concepts dealing with subconscious mechanisms.

One of the primary areas in the structure of identity is the network of ties between the individual and various ethnic groups (i.e. national, cultural or religious groups, etc.). Miller described this area as "ethnic sub-identity". It should be stressed that reference is being made here not only to groups of which the individual is a member, but also to groups to which he relates, and secondly, that the ethnic sub-identity is affected not only by positive ties with various groups, but also by negative ones. In other words, the question "who am I?" is answered not only by the quality of the groups to which I am
positively attracted, but also by the quality of groups which arouse in me feelings of antipathy or disdain.

In speaking of national or communal identity, we do not claim that every single member of a group possesses this same identity. The number of nuances of identity would probably approach the number of the group members. Nevertheless, it seems to us that certain motifs deriving from the structure of the group and its position within its surroundings will appear in one form or another in the identity of most of its members.

At first sight, one could apply everything that has been said about the identity of other minorities, to the Israeli Arabs; however, one must bear in mind certain special conditions which leave their impress on the identity of the Israeli Arab and render it distinctive.

(a) The Arabs of Israel are a relatively "new" minority. Up to 1948 they felt themselves to be a majority in the country (even though they were never a ruling majority).

(b) This minority is linked by origin, language, customs and consciousness with an overwhelming majority - namely, the Arabs in countries by which Israel is surrounded and with which she exists in a state of conflict and hostility.

(c) The Arabs of Israel are a minority cut off from its political and cultural elite. This minority consists of a village population which had been accustomed to the leadership of towns like Jaffa, Haifa, Nablus and Beirut. The 1948 war emptied some of these towns and severed the connection with the rest.

The unique historical conditions in which the Israeli Arab minority found itself led to a situation in which the formation of the
ethnic identity of the minority individual became a problem of balance between conflicting forces. On the one hand, Palestinian Arabs were, and still remain, emotionally, a part of the Arab world. This sense of belonging underwent a process of intensification as a result of the rise of the Pan-Arab Nationalist Movement, and of the fact that this movement transformed the Israel-Arab conflict and the "Rights of the Palestine Arabs" into one of the main planks in its platform. While bearing in mind these forces of positive valence towards the Arab world, one should not overlook two countervailing forces:

a) The publicized anxiety of Arab states for the Palestine refugees was not accompanied by any serious attempt to absorb and rehabilitate them.

b) In the few cases where Israeli-Arabs met citizens of Arab states (e.g. during periods of study abroad) they were treated with coldness and reserve.

In the course of time, on the other hand, the process of adaptation to the conditions of minority existence in Israel developed. This adaptation is based on two main factors:

1. Being in the main a rural population, Israeli Arabs have a close, almost mystical relationship with their land. Possession of land in rural societies has always symbolized authority and security. A man who acquired wealth reinvested it in land, and similarly, the sale of land symbolized impoverishment and loss of status.

   Even families who left agricultural work were still influenced by rural tradition; the more educated among them could give a more sophisticated expression to their love of soil and countryside.
This individual (or familial) bond between Israeli Arabs and their land was frequently transformed into a collective bond. Holding on to the land which is a "national Arab possession" was redefined as being not only an expression of personal attachment but also an indication of devotion to a national aim.

In Arab Israeli literature of the last 20 years, agricultural symbols are frequently given national connotation. Love for a girl, for the village, and the homeland, are perceived by the Israeli-Arab poet as a single indivisible emotion.

The 1948 war is described in this literature as the shattering of a pastoral idyll (conceived in romantic and nostalgic images) and severance from a familiar and beloved landscape. Those who remained behind must now watch over the inheritance for those who were scattered. In this way those Israeli Arabs who did not take refuge with the majority of their brethren in Arab countries found a legitimation of their minority status in a Jewish country.

When a nationalist movement was founded among the Israeli Arabs in 1963 (to be eventually banned by the authorities), the name "El Ard" - "the Soil" - was found to be the most natural expression of national aspirations.

This double link, personal and national, with the soil, provides acceptable explanation of the replies received to the question as to whether subjects were planning to emigrate. Only 9-10% of all subjects expressed such a desire, whereas 90% claimed that their intention was to remain in Israel. A small proportion of this 90% explained their stand with a specifically national reason: "Leaving the country is treachery to the Arab cause", and the large majority referred explanations of the type: "This is my homeland", "This is the land of my
fathers", which combine both personal and national elements.

2. A second factor (apart from the bond with the soil) which facilitated the adaptation to Israeli life was the social contact with Jews, which was an inevitable consequence of two groups living together for 20 years in a small country. In the economic sphere the number of Arabs working for Jewish employers\textsuperscript{11} rose, and the standard of living and habits of consumption of the two peoples drew closer. In the cultural sphere, the Hebrew language and a considerable part of Hebrew literature became familiar to the younger Arab intellectuals. In political life, enduring ties were formed between most of the local, traditional leadership and the various Israeli parties.

However, these processes of adaptation took place against a background of heavy pressure exerted by the Jewish majority on the Arab minority. Such pressure expressed itself mainly in the following ways:

a) The existence of a military government in most areas of Arab settlement in Israel, a government which maintained close supervision and reacted with sanctions of varying degrees of severity, (e.g. house arrest, banishment, expropriation, arrest) to all manifestations of revolt or attempts to maintain effective connection with the anti-Israel Arab world.

b) Suspicion and repulsion on the part of a considerable portion of the Jewish population.

This, then, was the background for the development of the two main motifs in the Israeli Arab’s identity, the\textit{national-Arab} motif, and the\textit{Israeli} motif.

The picture becomes more complicated as a result of the involvement of the Israeli Arabs in the on-going process of modernization
among Afro-Asian peoples in general and the Middle East in particular. In the case of the Israeli Arab, modernization is connected with a closer contact with Jews, who represent for him the most approximate model of modern man. On the other hand, modernization increases the importance and need for nationalism - a development which tends to remove the Israeli Arab from the Jews.*

The tension between the two main foci of identity (Israeli and pan-Arab) appears at first sight to be insoluble. The fact that Israel's Arabs have lived with this conflict for many years leads the researcher to look for the mechanisms which enable the two foci to co-exist and to retain for the Israeli Arab the ability to function more or less normally on the psychological and social levels. It would appear that the main mechanism at work here is compartmentalization of the identity to the point of far-reaching separation between the ideological-collective plane, on the one hand, and the individual-pragmatic plane on the other. We can define the first plane as dealing mainly with higher values and as evaluating reality from the point of view of the potential benefits it may afford to the Arab public as a whole. On this plane, pan-Arab nationalism holds almost unbounded sway. The second plane deals with the norms of day-by-day behavior and its criterion of evaluation is mainly the good of the individual. On this plane the Jewish-Israeli influence is marked.

A few examples will make the extent of separation between the two planes clear:

* This dilemma of modernization and nationalism is crucial in examining Arab education in Israel. A detailed discussion can be found in Ch. 3.
1. The accusation that disproportionate emphasis is laid on Jewish culture (as against the paucity of Arab studies) in government schools for Arab children, is very widespread among the Arab public. This criticism, however, has not created any tendency to boycott the government schools, to set up in their place private schools, or even to fight for suitable changes in the curriculum, a fight which could be conducted within the law. There is even a tendency to accept a certain amount of Hebrew studies to the extent that this helps them to get on in daily life. For example, 58% of subjects claimed (in reply to a suitable question) that the hours devoted to teaching Hebrew should be left as they are, 32% even felt that they should be increased; only 2% stated that Hebrew studies should be cancelled altogether.

2. In spite of the strong feelings of hostility aroused by the Military Government and the expropriation of lands in Arab villages, no signs of civilian revolt were revealed. To the extent that an intensive, political struggle was maintained against the Military Government, it was maintained chiefly by Jews rather than Arabs. It is interesting to note that Arab voters gave no great support to those political forces which opposed the prolongation of military government, as may be seen from Table 5 which gives the distribution of Arab votes in the Knesset elections of 1949, 1955 and 1961.
Table 5

Distribution of Arab votes in Knesset elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party stand on Military Government</th>
<th>Party Lists</th>
<th>1st Knesset</th>
<th>3rd Knesset</th>
<th>5th Knesset</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consistently against</td>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mapam (Left-wing socialists)</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternately for and against</td>
<td>Liberals (center)</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Achdut Ha'avoda (socialist)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Herut (right wing)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistently for</td>
<td>Mapai and associated Arab lists (moderate socialists)</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religious parties</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other lists</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 100% 100% 100%

These examples indicate the lack of a tendency, on the part of the Israeli Arab, to translate his general outlook to the language of concrete action.

The division into two spheres - ideological and daily life - was, in fact, encouraged by the two sources of influence which affected the Israeli Arabs: Propaganda from the surrounding states continually stressed the pan-Arab ideology and the central, albeit passive task of Israeli Arabs within the framework of this ideology (that they would one day be redeemed or liberated by the joint action of the Arab states). Only in very few instances did these propaganda communications face the Israeli Arabs with actual aims demanding action.
The Israeli authorities, on the other hand, demanded a punctilious regard for the law, abstention from resistance, and cooperation in various municipal enterprises (creating educational institutions, water supply, etc.), and made no attempt to guide their Arab citizens towards a deeper identification with the State and its aims. This trend showed itself first and foremost in the exemption of Arabs from military service, though in certain cases it was even stated more specifically that in view of the Jewish and Zionist nature of the state, and of the tension between it and its neighbors, it was useless to hope for complete identification from the Israeli Arabs.

An additional factor which helped balance the contradictions in the Israeli Arab identity was social control within the minority group itself. This control tended to restrain the tendency to irritate the authorities by extremism in word or deed where such behavior might endanger the standing of the entire Arab minority or sub-groups within it (the region, the village, or the wider family group "Hamullah"). By contrast, within the framework of this same control, sanctions were applied against "anti-Arab" behavior, such as participating in Israeli propaganda broadcast to Arab countries, giving information to the security services, expressing open criticism of Arab states, and so on. It can be said, therefore, that this internal social control restricts the maneuvering space of the individual Arab, since the most extreme stands permitted are: being pro-Arab without being anti-Israel, and being pro-Israel without being anti-Arab. To phrase it otherwise - this social control prevents both the practical application of nationalism and the full, ideological legitimation of the existing situation.

Erroneous interpretations have been placed upon this unique form of a compartmentalized identity and the types of behavior deriving
Attempts have been made to describe the behavior of the Israeli Arab when in the presence of Jews as a mask, while the nationalistic stands presented during informal meetings express, so to speak, his "real" identity. Another approach would be to define those situations in which the Arab tends to express extreme nationalistic ideas (informal meetings with friends in a private house) as "ritual" situations intended to lower the tension and to guarantee keeping faith with sacred symbols, whereas the "real" identity is that which finds its expression in actual behavior in daily life. It seems to us that attempts to define one of the foci of the Israeli Arab identity as "genuine" and the other as false (or as ritualist behavior) are rather arbitrary. The identity of the Israeli Arab is compounded of several predispositions. The actual social situation decides which of the various factors will come to the fore at any given moment. To give an example: an Arab employee of an Israeli public institution, will behave loyally and express the views of that institution in public, whereas among his intimate friends he might express totally different views.

Another way of separating the spheres is political indifference: the subject "takes no interest" in political questions and takes up no specific stand where they are concerned: "Leave that to the politicians..." or "a politician has to speak, the plain man is entitled to keep quiet..." are fairly frequent cliches. It is interesting to note that "apathetic" subjects of this kind often reveal a great familiarity with details of political developments; i.e. the refusal to take a stand is not a result of ignorance.

A third mechanism is one which Goffman calls "role distance". That is to say, the subject plays his part and while doing so "signals"
to the audience that he is not too involved in the role. This category includes all kinds of double-entendres, humour of the self-mocking type, and in certain cases exaggeratedly pro-Israel remarks, to the extent that they convey to the initiate that these are not the real views of the speaker.

As we have attempted to show earlier, the identity of the Israeli Arab is a delicate balance between conflicting elements. The ability not to decide, or to keep to the slogan "pro-Israel but not anti-Arab", or "pro-Arab but not anti-Israel" is dependent on the postponement of total confrontation between Israel and the Arabs, since such confrontation transforms the path between the camps into a narrow thread, which even an experienced acrobat like the Israeli Arab would not succeed in treading.

It seems to us that this is the chief reason for the fact that most of the Israeli Arabs up to 1967 opposed, or at least had grave reservations about a military solution of the Israeli-Arab conflict and emphasized political solutions. 17)

The Effects of the June '67 War on the Israeli Arab's Identity.

Thus far we attempted to analyze the nature of the Israeli Arab's national identity as it developed prior to the total confrontation of June 1967. The war brought about a far reaching transition of the entire political and social situation of the Israeli Arab. Consequently his identity underwent deep changes, and till now has not reached a new equilibrium. We shall try to describe these developments utilizing impressionistic observations and informant reports on the one hand and systematic comparisons between responses obtained in our 1966 pilot study and responses (to the same questionnaire items) obtained in the 1967 main study on the other hand. (See Ch. 1 on methodology).
When the period of tension preceding the 6-Day war began, discomfort among the Israeli Arabs mounted. The feeling of an impending day of doom sharpened. Small groups appeared at both ends of the spectrum declaring that the hour of decision had really come: from one side there were letters of solidarity, donations of blood and money towards the war effort, and mobilization for emergency services (such as helping to bring in the harvest); the other end of the scale showed isolated instances of rebellion (flying enemy flags on a few houses, making provocative remarks to Jewish acquaintances, and so forth). But the vast majority of the Arab population stayed shut in its villages, wrapped in a mantle of absolute silence, as though it had decided that "it was too early to decide". As long as it was possible to postpone self-commitment, the tendency was to do just this.

It was not easy to find out what Israel's Arab citizens thought in the confused days before the war; at all events, if one can rely on their ability to recollect this after the war was over, the great majority thought that the Arabs would gain the day.

Table 6

"When the war broke out, who did you think would win?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Arabs</th>
<th>No-one</th>
<th>decisive victory</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>67%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When hostilities ended, many of Israel's Arabs experienced an upset in the structure of balances in their identity. The Jewish public in Israel, which had within so short a period passed through the fear of annihilation and the joy of victory, were seen by the Arabs after the war as more remote and hostile, and less tolerant.
There is no denying that the achievement of the Israeli Army during the war aroused respect, and, in certain cases, even a tendency to identify with the strong and the victor, but the main reactions were fear and hatred, as can be seen in Table 7, which sums up the replies to the question: "How, in your view, did the war influence the attitude of the Arabs to the State of Israel?"

**Table 7**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The influence of the war on the Arab attitude to Israel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hatred</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the other hand, the actual influence of the Arab world increased in the situation created after the war, since with part of it (the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) direct contact was now possible. In the first stages of this contact between the two populations, the Israeli Arabs appeared in the role of guides by virtue of their long acquaintance with the Jews. This situation was further strengthened by the state of shock experienced by the population these areas as a result of the crushing victory and also because of the behavior of the Israeli Army, which was not compatible with official Arab propaganda. However, this situation changed rapidly: The fact that a long-standing and well-to-do leadership accustomed to authority, existed in the towns of the West Bank made for a quick reversal of roles, as a result of which the West Bank leadership exerted its influence on the Israeli Arabs. A kind of competition arose to see who adhered most faithfully to nationalistic Arab values, each side endeavoring not to lag behind the other.
This combination of pressures led to a strengthening of the Arabic element and a weakening of the Israeli element in the identity of our subjects. In the summer of 1966 we gave our interviewees a series of self-definitions (Israeli, Arab, Palestinian, Muslim-Christian, Arab-Israeli) and suggested that they classify these definitions in such a way that the most accurate description of themselves be designated grade 1, and so on. In 1967 we went through the same procedure. In Table 8 we show the distribution of grades of "Israeli" and "Arab" for the two years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Israeli 1966</th>
<th>Israeli 1967</th>
<th>Arab 1966</th>
<th>Arab 1967</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First grade</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second grade</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third grade</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth grade</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth grade</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We see from the foregoing that the self-description "Israeli" lost much ground and at the same time the tendency to describe oneself as an Arab rose somewhat.

In order to obtain a clearer picture of the alteration in self-description resulting from the war, we shall compare the order in which
they appeared in both 1967 and 1966. (We arranged these self-descriptions according to the medians of their grade distribution).

Order of definitions in 1966:

Order of definitions in 1967:

The following question may serve as an additional indicator of the same trend: "Where would you feel most at home, in Israel or in one of the Arab countries?"

| Table 9 |
|------------------|------------------|
| Feeling more at home in Israel or in an Arab country: before and after the June war |
| 1966 | 1967 |
| More at home in Israel | 57% | 31% |
| No difference | 14% | 12% |
| More at home in an Arab country | 28% | 57% |
| N | 92 | 188 |

The growth of nationalist consciousness among Israeli Arabs is noticeable not only in the changing self-definition and present feelings of affinity, but also as regards their future perspective. Whereas before the war the great majority of subjects claimed to see their future as Israeli Arabs within the framework of the State of Israel (even though insisting on completely equal rights as citizens), after the war this majority decreased and a sizeable minority appeared which defined its future aims in terms of breaking away from the State of
Israel and possibly even in its destruction. These conclusions are based on replies to the question: "What would you like the future of the Israeli Arabs to be?", which was asked both before and after the war.

Table 10

"What would you like the future of the Israeli Arabs to be?"

Distribution of replies in 1966:

1. They will become part of the Jewish public 6%
2. A separate but equal people within the State of Israel 81%
3. They will be in a separate state of their own 13%

N 104

Distribution of replies in 1967:

1. They will become part of the Jewish public
2. A separate but equal people within the State of Israel 53%
3. They will be in a separate state of their own 17%
4. An Arab State will be set up over the entire territory of Palestine 19%

N 191

These results parallel the altered stand of subjects in relation to the justification for an additional Israeli-Arab war. The question put to the subjects on this topic was completely straightforward:
Table 11

"Must the Arabs go to war with Israel?" (In 1967 we phrased the question as follows: "Must the Arabs wage another war against Israel?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1967</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Yes (unqualified)</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Yes, if Israel does not take the just rights of the Arabs into consideration</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. No (unqualified)</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These findings may provoke second thoughts among all those who hold the (generally untested) belief that an impressive show of force will always lessen the will to fight on the part of the loser; in the short run at least, our research seems to us to support a diametrically opposite conclusion. The influence of the dissonance between the results of the fighting and the heroic self-image which all peoples (not excluding the Arabs) like to have of themselves, might well overcome any rational consideration of the cost of war, or, in other words, an urge to reduce this dissonance at any price is liable to be created.

Without detracting from the gravity of the foregoing from the point of view of the Israeli society, one may also consider the possibility of an additional interpretation of the changed future image of Israel's Arabs. We must remember that the internal storm revealed in our research appears against a background of quiet and loyal behavior. Israeli Arabs did not take part in any of the strikes which affected the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; they continue to be an integral part of the economic life of the State, as producers and consumers; their interest in developing their villages in partnership with Jewish
institutions and individuals continues. In order to resolve the contradiction between their continued existence as a national minority and the strengthening of nationalist consciousness, some additional mechanism is apparently required, apart from compartmentalization and other mechanisms mentioned above. We shall call this additional mechanism: "messianic expectation". For the purposes of this discussion we shall define messianism as the belief in total redemption from without: by the agency of powers over which the faithful have no influence. (We find, for example, passive messianism of this type in the three great monotheistic religions, unlike the messianism of millenarian sects which presupposes intensive activity as a means of bringing the Messiah). Redemption may come at any moment, but even if it is slow in coming, one must not despair, and therefore even those who believe in the "cataclysm" do not consider this eventuality when planning their private lives, investing their money, building a house, acquiring a profession, or educating their children as though they no longer had any such expectations ....

Not only may a messianic urge of this type co-exist with a way of life based on radically different principles but it may, even, reinforce it in a rather paradoxical way. It is easier to become accustomed to the demands of a Jewish majority if one believes that these demands are temporary, since the fact of belonging to the State of Israel is only a temporary necessity. The feeling of impermanence which today characterizes the lives of a considerable minority of Israel's Arabs can thus be regarded as exercising a stabilizing function.
Although the belief in impermanence is rather widespread, one cannot deduce from this that the attitude to "redemption" by the Arab world is solely positive. Empirically, it is important to stress that the 38% opposing war in 1966 remained stable in 1967, the strengthening of the belligerent tendency coming from among the undecided, i.e. there was a tendency towards polarization among the Arab public on this issue. As often happens, the social conflict also cuts across the individual's private life. Israeli Arabs are not in the position of "having nothing to lose". Economic and social ties with the Jews on the one hand, and the lands of the refugees which for years have been worked by local Arab farmers, on the other, are examples of assets which an Arab victory would liquidate. The attitude to redemption, therefore, remains ambivalent; it is not easily relinquished, and similarly, its advent is not hastened ....

Conclusion.

In this chapter the concept of identity was used as the main tool in an analysis of the social-psychological characteristics of the Israeli Arab. We have shown how the political conflict between two peoples affects those marginal individuals who must live as Israelis and Arabs simultaneously. We have tried to show that the two foci - the Israeli and the Arab - are integral parts of the Israeli Arab identity, without the one being a cover for the other.

The Arab defeat in the 1967 June war did not bring about, as one might perhaps have expected, complete reconciliation with minority status in Israel, nor even a strengthening of the opposition to war, whose terrible price had been so clearly shown; the combination of direct influence from the Arab world together with the effect of the
tendency to reduce the dissonance, led to the strengthening of Arab consciousness and even aroused a kind of "messianic vision" of salvation from minority existence through the intervention of the Arab world. Analysis of the psychological functions of this vision show that its practical effects might be the opposite of what is immediately apparent. Instead of impeding the adaptation of the Arab minority, such messianic expectations might well facilitate it. The transitory appearance of their status renders possible their coming to terms with a situation which, if it were perceived as permanent, would be wholly unacceptable.

There are two conceptions prevailing among different sectors of the Jewish majority concerning the function of the Israeli Arab in the Middle Eastern conflict. More liberal circles perceive him as a potential bridge to peace, while more nationalistic circles emphasize the possibility of his intensifying the conflict.

As opposed to these conceptions, our analysis attempts to show that the Israeli Arab is a basically passive element in the struggle. The identity of the Israeli Arab is the result of an extremely delicate balance of counterposing forces, each of them stronger than he and effectually beyond his control.

We have indicated the nature of the mechanisms by which the Israeli Arab struggles for survival within the contradiction.
Chapter 3 - Modernization and Nationalism in the Identity of the Israeli Arab.

As has been mentioned before, modernization is an important dimension in the national identity of Afro-Asian peoples in general, and the Israeli Arab in particular. The perception and evaluation of new modern modes of thought and behavior is especially relevant to a study of Arab education, since education is one of the main paths to a modern style of living. In this chapter an attempt will be made to explore the relations between the attitudes towards modernization and various facets of Arab nationalism.

The impulse towards modernization and national independence are two of the key factors moulding the identity of nations of the "third world" of which the Arabs are an integral part. As a part of the Arab world, Israeli Arabs are also subject to these influences. A number of researchers already indicated the association between the process of modernization and the growth of various modern ideologies, such as a nationalism and socialism. The rapid spread of these ideologies and the fanatical adherence which they win in most of the developing countries point to the fact that they arise in response to needs which are created concomitantly with modernization.

We wish to deal here specifically with one dilemma connected with modernization which seems to us of central importance in the case of the Israeli Arab. Nations who are not the first to undergo the process of modernization (i.e. all nations except those of Western Europe and to a certain extent U.S.A.) are faced with the danger that their specific identity, linked up in one way or another with traditional culture, may become blurred, and they themselves come to resemble the older-established nations, to the extent of being assimilated by them.
This danger is not actualised in the majority of cases, as a result of the operation of various psychological and social mechanisms. The first and most important of these mechanisms is the formation of a nationalist ideology characterized by strong antagonism towards those very nations which represent the model of a modern society and as such the actual danger to the crystallization of the new identity.

One may expect, therefore, that the relationship between "teachers" and "pupils" in modernization will be ambivalent from inception, and that the attitude of the "pupils" will become progressively more antagonistic as the process of modernization impinges on their traditional symbols. (This process could also be analysed in reverse: a modern movement with an active nationalist ideology is well equipped to discard traditional identity symbols because its external antagonism represents a "functional alternative" to them).^22^)

A complementary mechanism is the tendency to present modernization as a process which although being concerned with the acquisition of norms and techniques from without is still selective and eclectic, thus making possible a relative freedom to select according to the specific features of the receiving society.

In this way unique combinations of borrowed elements appear, as in the case of Yugoslavian communism, the Zionist labor movement, and Arab socialism.

To what extent can these general reflections be applied to the reality of the Israel Arab? How, and to what degree, do modernization and a nationalist ideology blend in his case?
Where the Israeli Arab is concerned, the dilemma between safeguarding national integrity and participating in the process of modernization is particularly severe. The Jewish majority or, more precisely, the European element within it, represents the most concrete model of a modern society and modern men. The necessity of accepting the blessings of modernization from the political adversary could, perhaps, be the element which singles out the basic conditions of modernization among Israeli Arabs.

The influence of the Jews on the breakup of the traditional framework and the growth of modern elements in the Israeli Arab society has many facets. In part it is conscious and beneficent (the inclusion of Arabs in social legislation, development projects in Arab villages) and in part—a byproduct of the interaction between the two peoples—the direct aims of which are completely different. Paradoxically enough, the confiscation of some agricultural lands from Arab villages (justified mainly by the need to absorb Jewish immigration) led to the increased participation of Arab labor in agriculture, building and industry in the Jewish sector, so that many young Arabs were drawn closer to the life of modern Jewish society.

In the political sphere, the need of Israel’s political parties for the support of Arab voters led to the incorporation of the latter in various areas of public life (the Knesset, municipal government, press, and so on). And finally, competition among Israeli producers led to the spreading of new consumption patterns among Arab citizens.
Zionist leadership was, in effect, conscious of the function performed by Jews as the cause of, or at least a catalyst of the modernization process in Arab society. In fact, the image of Jews as carriers of progress to Palestine and its inhabitants was one of the constant themes in the whole Zionist ideology. Like most of the great ideologies of the 20th century, Zionism approached the concept of progress with distinct optimism, seeing in it a factor to restrain, if not cancel out Arab nationalism25. This optimism seems to have sprung from two assumptions:

a. Jewish-Arab opposition derives chiefly from the cultural difference between the two peoples. Therefore it can be checked by decreasing these differences, i.e. by inducing modernization among the Arabs.

b. Since modernization involves raising the standard of living of most of the Arabs, these latter will finally be favorably disposed towards the people which speeded up their progress.

These two assumptions led to the idea, mainly in the ranks of the Zionist left wing, that the political struggle between Jews and Arabs was, in fact, a class struggle, in which Zionism was opposed only by the ruling classes, who were afraid of losing their privileges as a result of the diffusion of progressive social norms.

In the light of everything that has happened since then, and bearing in mind our above analysis, it is easy to point to the naiveté of these optimistic viewpoints. It is harder to isolate the grain of truth which they contain and to fit them into a balanced theory. Modernization does, actually, increase the resemblance between Jews and the younger generation of Arabs. For the majority of the younger Arab intellectuals, for example,
the Hebrew language was the gateway to both classical and modern European literature, as well as to current schools of political and economic thought.

The increased resemblance, then, created a common language and a basis for a cultural and professional rapprochement. While the relations between Jews and traditional Arabs are restricted to a mixture of polite gestures and economic and political interests, young Arab intellectuals are quite likely to say "some of my best friends are Jews".

As a result of the severance from traditional identity symbols there is an increased need for a new identification which would be sufficiently universalistic to provide a basis for the joint experience and interest of Arabs from different traditional frameworks and, at the same time, sufficiently particularistic to guard against attempt at assimilation into the Jewish majority, which are inevitably doomed to failure.

The nationalist ideology satisfied both these needs. We find, then, that modernization draws Arabs and Jews together on the personal and professional level, and at one and the same time repels them on the political and ideological level.

Jews are an important modernizing agent for the Israeli Arabs, but they are by no means the only one. Various communication media (press, radio, TV, two-way tourism, etc.) create contact - though less close - with three additional sources of influence:

a. The West (mainly U.S.A., Britain, and France),

b. The Arab world (mainly Egypt),

In spite of the influence of the accepted Arab ideologies as regards the imperialist nature of the West, it still wields considerable influence on the Israeli Arab, particularly in the spheres of technology and consumer production. Israel, and to some extent Lebanon, are intermediaries in this case.

The image of the U.S.S.R. as the model of a modern society has been strengthened by the following factors:

a. Her "clean" - i.e. non-colonialist - past. The U.S.S.R. has never ruled over any Arab country.

b. Her declared pro-Arab and anti-Israel stand over the past few years.

c. Her revolutionary ideology.

The concept "revolution" is understood by the Israeli Arab not only in its socio-economic sense, but also in its politico-national sense: a revolution against the Jewish-Zionist government.

The existence of alternative sources of modern influence are strongly stressed in the Israeli Arab outlook. The tendency on the part of the Jews to take the credit for every sign of progress to be found in the Arab minority (more education, raised standard of living, lower incidence of disease, etc.) is regarded by the Israeli Arab as distorted and insulting. They point out that these processes are taking place in a world which is uniformly modernizing, and therefore the comparison of the Israeli Arab's present condition with that of ten or twenty years ago has only a very limited validity. This progress should be compared with that of other Israeli citizens (i.e. that of the Jews) or with the progress of the inhabitants of Arab states.27)
This stress on the importance of alternative sources of influence and offering other criteria by which to measure and evaluate the modernization process in the recent past seem to be mechanisms by which the Israeli Arab attempts - successfully - to get round a feeling of gratitude to the Jews, a feeling which appears so natural and inevitable to Zionist ideology.

Among Israeli Arabs, modernization, under its various names (such as progress, development, etc.) turned into an extremely popular slogan in spite of the need to adopt the principal values and ideas from without, in many cases through Jewish mediation.

However, the victory of the ideas of progress in the identity of the Israeli Arab and the demographic, economic and social facts in terms of which it is put into practice, have not cancelled out the great attraction of the traditional way of life with all its customs and institutions, even for the younger generation. The village and the "hamulla" (wider family group) still represent a stable and secure social background, to which Arabs working in the Jewish sector can return in times of failure, political crisis, or unemployment.

Patriarchal authority over land property, on the one hand, and over women (i.e. potential brides), on the other, represents a considerable measure of real power, which the young Arab cannot ignore.

Apart from these concrete factors there is also an element of nostalgia for the peaceful life of the village, which becomes idealized vis-a-vis a background of the strain of adaptation to modern life.

In this clash between forces of modernization and forces of conservatism, one can find, in our view, the explanation of a number of typical phenomena:
a. A consciousness of the value and the advantages of modern customs is not always translated into personal conduct. There are many Arabs, for instance, who have ideological objections to the custom of "Mohar" ("Bride-price"), "turning the bride into merchandise for sale to the highest bidder", yet they themselves will demand Mohar for their sisters or daughters, in order to acquire the means to take a wife or to marry their sons.

b. Different institutional spheres manifest varying degrees of receptivity towards modernization. There is, for instance, greater readiness to accept change in the economic than in the political sphere, the family sphere being the last to accept such change.

The conflict between conservative and progressive forces which exists both in the personality of most Arabs and within Israeli Arab society, is a further factor influencing the attitude of Arab minority members towards the Jews.

It frequently happens that the tensions between different generations at different stages of the modernization process, are projected onto the Jews. The young Arab who stops wearing traditional costume and no longer observes his religious norms, is sometimes called "Jew" by the older generation. Put otherwise, the Jews are blamed for pushing the young people away from ancestral ways. On the other hand, radical circles put the entire blame for the still potent influence of the remnants of traditional society, (e.g. the prevailing influence of untutored "Mukhtars" with family connections in the political sphere, etc.), on to the Israeli authorities.
Clearly the Israel Government (like any modern power governing a
traditional society) is partly responsible for the creation of these
tensions, but, on the other hand, it is also clear that the fact of
their existence derives from the modernization process itself and not
from the Jewish presence.

This state of affairs is somewhat reminiscent of the history of
events in many colonial and ex-colonial countries. "Imperialism" is
blamed for all the difficulties of modernization, for economic back-
wardness and the persistence of tribal divisions, on the one hand, and
for a certain degree of anomia stemming from the gradual deterioration
of traditional structures, on the other hand.

To sum up, we have attempted to show how modernization and national-
ism are interwoven and, in most cases, accelerate each other. National-
ism is the main legitimation making possible the breakup with tradition,
while modernization in its early stages creates the spiritual and
psychological needs which demand the absorption of a nationalist ideo-
logy.

The Data.

In the second part of the chapter, we will attempt to answer the
following questions, through a presentation of the empirical data
obtained during our research:

a. What in principle is the stand of Israeli Arabs on the
question of change and modernization?

b. Is receptivity to change general or selective (greater in
some areas and less in others)?
c. How do subjects react towards Jews as a cause of modernization? (To what extent are they ready to learn from the Jewish way of life in spite of the political conflict?).

d. What is the extent of perceived progress of the Israeli Arab as compared with the perceived progress of the West Bank population, which was, until recently, under Arab government?

e. Finally, we shall test the influence of certain demographic factors (age, education, religious observance, type of residential area) upon the perception of the modernization process and the attitude towards it.

We shall begin, then, by testing the attitude towards modernization in general. It has become clear from numerous conversations with communal influentials and leaders of public opinion, that the basic idea of progress and the development of a traditional society into a modern one, has turned into a general principle to which practically no-one in the Arab society of today is opposed. This appears clearly in Table 12 which is based on the question: "Is it desirable that the Arabs should learn from progressive nations and change their own way of life?". Answers were grouped according to spheres:

1. The technical-industrial sphere;
2. The political sphere;
3. The educational sphere;
4. The family sphere.
Table 12

"The Arabs must learn from progressive nations in relation to..."
(In Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tech. &amp; Industr. Sphere</th>
<th>Political Sphere</th>
<th>Educational Sphere</th>
<th>Family Sphere</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>387</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We can see from the above Table that there are almost no subjects who dismiss the idea of change out of hand. This support for the idea of progress was expressed in a number of ways: "It's natural", we were told by one subject. Another stressed: "Everyone must learn... all Arabs must know precisely and understand what is going on around them". "There's a lot to be learnt from others" admitted a third subject, and gave us more details - "building schools and factories, and in agriculture. We have to learn agricultural methods. We have to build more schools and have free education".

However, beyond the general tendency to support the idea of change, we find differences in the degree of receptivity to modernization in various spheres. As might be expected, the techno-economic sphere is the most receptive to change. There follow the political and educational spheres, and last - the family sphere. It is interesting to note that even in this sensitive area there is a strong tendency to modernize. It is, of course, possible that part of the strength of the progressive ideology derives from the general, theoretical nature of the question. If the subjects had been asked to react
to a concrete change affecting certain strongly-held values or interests, it is quite likely that conservative tendencies would have come out more strongly. However, in spite of these qualifications, it is important to regard the process of modernization among Israel's Arabs as a process which, by its very nature, enjoys the unqualified support of all strata of the public (differences between categories of subjects - pupils, parents, working youth, etc. - were minimal and not systematic).

We turn now to the role of the Jew as the agent of modernization. On this point two general questions were asked:

a. "Have the Arabs anything to learn from the Jews?"
b. "Have the Arabs learnt anything good from the Jews?" (What?).

The answers to these questions, which are given in Tables 13 and 14, combine the dimension of nationalism with attitude to modernization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Have the Arabs anything to learn from the Jews?</th>
<th>Have the Arabs learnt anything good from the Jews?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-----------------------------------------------
Table 14

The beneficial things which the Arabs have learnt from the Jews (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Science, technology, industry</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce, business</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern agriculture</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern personal characteristics: industriousness, initiative, thrift</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family and education: restriction of birthrate, rights for women, correct education for children</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs and tradition, food and clothing</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 278

Table 13 demonstrates that there is almost universal recognition among Israeli Arabs regarding the necessity of learning from the Jews. It is, indeed, a little less widespread than the consciousness of the necessity to learn from progressive peoples in general, but it is clear that the Jews are seen as playing a central role in the modernization of the Arabs. On this point the question arises as to whether Jewish influence is regarded as positive in all spheres. Table 14 provides the answer to this query.
As one would expect, there is an unequivocally positive attitude towards acquiring modern norms from the Jews in technological spheres. The fact that the Israeli Arab population is largely rural explains the central position of modern agriculture among the various spheres. In the spheres of family and education, customs and tradition, there is far less enthusiasm for change. It is interesting to note the largely positive attitude towards the acquisition of the Hebrew language, which has become, for many Arabs, an important tool in the absorption of modern culture.

The need to learn from the other nation is perceived by our subjects as a two-directional need. Just as the large majority admit that the Arabs have something to learn from the Jews, so there is a large majority which claims that the Jews should learn from the Arabs. However, there is a decisive difference in the type of subject upon which there is something to be learnt from the Arabs. Table 15 shows that Arabs can serve as an example to the Jews mainly in social relations (hospitality, tolerance) and in their personal characteristics (pride, honour, honesty). In other words, in those spheres the superiority of a modern over a traditional society is less acknowledged. It is interesting that traditional family relationships, which are still a powerful traditional focus in the Arab society, are not quoted as an example from which the Jews should learn. It is possible that this absence derives from a certain ambivalence towards the traditional family which is caused by the process of modernization.
Table 15
What should the Jews learn from the Arabs? (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>They have nothing to learn from the Arabs</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal characteristics (pride, honour, honesty)</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social relationships (hospitality, friendliness, generosity)</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations with other peoples (tolerance, non-discrimination)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family (honour for parents, modesty)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs and tradition (foodstuffs, styles of building, etc.)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>464</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Let us turn now to a comparison between the perceived progress of Israeli Arabs and that of their fellows in the West Bank. This comparison is made once again according to spheres (economic, socio-political, educational, and family).

In Tables 16-18 we summarize the results of the following question: "During the past 20 years who made more progress, Israeli Arabs or West Bank Arabs, in the sphere of ...?"
Table 16
"During the past 20 years who made more economic progress?" (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israeli Arabs</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both the same</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank Arabs</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 427

Table 17
"During the past 20 years who made more progress in the socio-political sphere?" (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israeli Arabs</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both the same</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank Arabs</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 411

Table 18
"During the past 20 years who made more progress in the educational and family sphere?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israeli Arabs</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both the same</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank Arabs</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 412
The results obtained are quite surprising. They completely contradict Israeli propaganda which tends to stress the relative progress of Israeli Arabs as compared with the population of Arab countries, and are furthermore not in accordance with statistical data, which are published intermittently by Israeli sources and neutral sources (and even Jordanian sources). These data prove that according to the accepted criteria for economic progress (per capita income, the supply of services such as water and electricity, ownership of consumer goods, etc.) the Israeli Arabs have progressed far more than residents of the West Bank.28)

The question is, what causes this wide gap in the perception of such hard facts? It would seem that whereas statistical data relate to the average or the frequent, personal impressions are based more on actual observation. The high standard of living exhibited by the upper class in the West Bank, particularly in villas, private cars etc., was perceived as an example of the opportunities open to an Arab in an Arab country. The reference to the people at the top distracted attention from other strata, particularly as most of the poorer classes in the West Bank live in small villages, far from main roads and out of tourists' sight.

It is interesting to note that Israeli Arabs regard themselves more advanced in the political sphere than West Bank Arabs (Table 17), despite the fact that the latter were already incorporated in an independent Arab state. Subjects explained that it was just the need to fight for their rights against the Jewish majority which helped to develop their political consciousness.
Another cause of the contradiction between the statistical data and the subjects' perception can be found, of course, in the nationalistic ideology. And we did, in fact, find a series of correlations between various dimensions of this ideology and the opinion that the West Bank Arabs have progressed more than the Israeli Arabs:

a. A correlation of .30 between the opinion that West Bank Arabs have progressed more and the social distance from Jews.

b. A correlation of .33 between the opinion that Israeli Arabs have progressed more and the admission of the State of Israel's right to exist.

c. A correlation of .31 between the opinion that the West Bank Arabs have progressed more and the tendency to recall frequently the Arab origin (a tendency which we have called "centrality of Arab identity").

These findings exemplify in the political sphere the well-known generalization that perception is influenced by the needs and aspirations of the perceiver.

Towards the conclusion of this chapter we should discuss the impact of various demographic factors upon the attitude to the modernization process.

The religious dimension seems to be of particular importance. Religion and modernization represent two contrasting sets of values, and it is hardly surprising, therefore that alongside the almost universal recognition of the positivity of modernization there is only a small percentage of Arab citizens who describe themselves as religious.
Table 19 brings out clearly to what extent secularism has spread among Israeli Arabs, viz., the small percentage describing themselves as religious. Religious observance declines in particular in those sectors exposed to modernization: young people (there is a positive correlation between degree of religious observance and age), the educated class (a positive correlation of 0.27 between degree of education and degree of secularism), town dwellers and Christians.

Let us go into more detail regarding these sectors:

1) **Young people** - less subject to the authority of tradition, they are dynamic and more suggestible, their identity not yet crystallized, so that their acceptance of modernization is relatively easy.

2) **The educated class** - education broadens the outlook and exposes the subject to different types of culture and foreign sources of influence.
3) Town dwellers - The urban way of life is more likely to absorb changes in general and the type of innovations brought about by modernization in particular (e.g. technological improvement, social differentiation etc.).

4) Christians - they are more progressive, have relatively high professional status, and improved education. Apparently they are likelier to accept the European world, which shares their religion, as a reference group, than the Muslims.

To sum up, we have tried in this chapter to test the way in which Israeli Arabs react to the almost universal phenomenon of modernization. We discovered that the aspiration to progress and its recognition as a positive feature have become common among the Arab population. As with many developing peoples, the aspiration to progress among Israeli Arabs has taken on a nationalist coloration. The recognition of the necessity for modernization, and anti-Jewish nationalism (directed against the main source of modernization) appear at first sight to be two contradictory trends: modernization draws Jews and Arabs closer together and provides them with a broad common denominator, whereas nationalism aspires to segregate Arabs from Jews and to increase the social distance between them.

From the data we have collected it follows that the association between modernization and nationalism prevails over the logical contradictions between them: nationalism fills some of the psychological needs arising in the wake of modernization, and the latter provides tools for the achievement of nationalist aims.
Chapter 4 - Education For Israeli Arab Youth, the System and its Goals.

After analysing some of the principal factors pertinent to the formation of Israeli Arabs' political outlook and ethnic identity, let us address ourselves more directly to the issue of education. What was the policy of Israeli authorities with regard to educating Arab youth? How was this policy realized in the structure of the school system and in the content of the official curriculum for highschools?

In the present chapter we shall try to approach an answer to these questions by providing a description of the educational system, and a systematic comparative content analysis of official curricula. One might, of course, wonder how effective these policies are. This problem however will be deferred to the next chapter.

One of the principal arguments in the sociology of education concerns the extent to which planned and institutionalized education moulds the character and values of the pupil, as compared with the random influence of the environment.

In normal circumstances, it is difficult to isolate the educational factor from all the others. A rare opportunity for research is provided when the formal educational program follows lines which clash with the influence of the social environment. Such a contrast can be found in slum neighborhood schools, where there is a deviating local sub-culture, or in schools run by occupying forces where the population is hostile, or - finally - schools run by the educational authorities of a majority for pupils belonging to a minority group.

We must ask ourselves to what extent such an education can meet the counter-pressures of the surroundings. Kurt Lewin's views on this
issue were pessimistic. After World War II he warned against the Allies' pretensions of "re-educating" the Germans. Education, he claimed, cannot succeed unless it is part of its social setting and is run by people who have the complete confidence of the students.29)

In the specific case which we intend to discuss - the education of children of the Arab minority in Israel - the contrasts between the school's aims and the values of the pupil's society were quite significant.

Apart from the political opposition between Jews and Arabs there are also differences of language, religion and, in particular, in the degree of modernization.

The Central Problems Facing the Planners of Arab Education in Israel.

The Jewish majority was faced with a number of problems in planning the educational program for Israeli Arab children:

a. The degree of independence of Arab education: With the creation of the State some called for complete integration of Arab pupils into a single State educational network. Two seemingly contradictory justifications may account for this demand. From the national-Jewish point of view, an integrated system would help to enforce the language and culture of the majority, whereas from the liberal point of view it would guarantee equal education for all. As against these views, a number of considerations were raised on behalf of a separate educational system for Arabs. Firstly, there was a certain inertia at work: a separate network had existed in Mandate days. Secondly, the existence of a school which uses Arabic as its language of instruction might be regarded as a more liberal arrangement, respecting not only the rights of the minority member as an individual, but also the
rights of his ethnic group as a whole. Thirdly, the separation of the Arab children permitted the establishment of a Jewish educational system which is unequivocally oriented to Zionism and includes many religious elements. Finally there was also an administrative consideration: in view of the ecological separation between Jews and Arabs, the separate school system (at least for the younger children) was a natural consequence of the existing situation.

b. The amount of education granted to Arab pupils: When the average education of the minority lags behind that of the majority, the question generally arises, whether it is desirable from the majority point of view to equalize educational levels, or at least, bringing them closer together. Raising the educational standard of the minority may lose the majority its monopoly on elite positions and/or create within the minority a class of frustrated intelligentsia leaning towards a radical ideology. The image of the young Arab intellectual, with European habits and far-reaching personal and political aspirations, constitutes a more severe threat than that of a traditional Arab who "has no interest in politics". These considerations, however, were written off by the liberal conscience which regarded equal education for all as an imperative. Possibly, there developed also a certain "missionary" urge to bring "enlightenment" to the "backward Arab village", and finally, a partly conscious eye on international public opinion which from time to time wanted to know what Israel was doing for her Arab citizens.

c. The values to be imparted: This problem is perhaps the most serious of all. It is necessary to find a balance between universal values, such as democracy, human rights, industriousness, honesty,
discipline, etc., and specifically national values. Secondly, it is necessary to link national Arab values (which, for the past few decades, have been formed in the image of anti-Zionism!) and those Jewish and Zionist values which leave their impress on Israel's social, cultural and political life.

The system of Israeli education for Arabs can be viewed as a series of compromises between the extreme solutions of the above mentioned dilemmas.

The Development of Arab Education in Israel

Jewish and Arab education were already separate in the days of the British Mandate, with regard to structure, supervision, teacher training, etc. This separation has, to a certain extent, been maintained by the State of Israel. Arab children study in separate schools in which the principal language of instruction is Arabic. Most of the teachers and some of the headmasters are Arabs. The supervision of Arab education comes under a special department of the Israeli Ministry of Education not connected with the regional supervisory centers but directly subject to the Director-General of the office. The Head and the top level staff in this Department are Jews, while most of the regular supervisors are Arabs.

Both the relative and the absolute scope of Arab education in Israel has risen continuously since the creation of the State. Schools are built in more and more villages, and an increasing proportion of the village populations requires them. This growth is well illustrated by the following data:
Table 20

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Boys</th>
<th>Girls</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% of pupils in the 5-14 age group of Israel's Arab population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956/7</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>26,659</td>
<td>78% 32% 46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960/1</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>33,739</td>
<td>64% 36% 54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965/6</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>49,349</td>
<td>64% 36% 58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966/7</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>52,820</td>
<td>65% 35% 59%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite this striking growth, it should be noted that the percentage of non-attenders at school, particularly among girls, is still markedly higher than the parallel figure for the Jewish population, or even among the Oriental part of the Jewish population whose original educational level was similar to that of the Arabs. The percentage of failures in the matriculation examination is very high among Arab candidates in spite of the selection carried out in the transition from Primary to Secondary school (more stringent than among Jewish students). In 1965 matriculation failures among Arab candidates was 70%31) and this was considered to be a good result as compared, for instance, with 1962 when the failure rate was 90%.32)

The flight of most educated Arabs in 1948 necessitated the employment of unqualified teachers, most of whom had not even completed secondary school. Only in 1956 was an Arab Teachers' College opened, and this is still far from being able to meet the demand. A similar situation obtains regarding buildings and textbooks, which are not the direct responsibility of the Ministry. In the Jewish sector, the local authorities construct the school buildings, and private publishers
supply text books. In many Arab villages there is no local authority capable of undertaking the school building. Similarly, the small size of the Arab population prevented any profitable private publication of textbooks. During the last few years the Ministry's activity in these spheres has increased. Generous loans have been made to local authorities for improvements and construction of buildings, and a considerable number of textbooks have been translated and published by the Ministry of Education. At the same time, there are still many school buildings unworthy of the name, and textbooks for secondary schools have not been issued in adequate quantities. Furthermore, many of the translated books are unsuited to the school population for which they are intended.

The quantitative and qualitative development of Israel's Arab educational network bears witness to the fact that the decision of the authorities regarding the need to raise the standard of education among the Arab population was, fundamentally, a positive one. The marked and continuing backwardness of the Arab sector, compared with even the weakest parts of the Jewish sector derives in part from factors which do not depend on the educational planners (the necessity of teaching another language – Hebrew –, the lack of a municipal framework, the small scope which limits the profitable publication of textbooks), but one cannot ignore the influence of barely articulated considerations which have held up the development of Arab education and placed it relatively low down in the list of priorities.

Teaching of Values

In the sphere of educating in values, the stated aim of the educational authorities was to achieve a synthesis of the central values of the Jewish majority culture, and those held by the minority.
In order to examine more profoundly this aim in conception and execution we shall turn to a detailed content analysis of the curriculum of the Arab Secondary School in Israel and compare it to the cognate Jewish and Jordanian curricula.\textsuperscript{33)}

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ISRAELI ARAB, JEWISH, AND JORDANIAN SECONDARY SCHOOL CURRICULA

In order to emphasize the central dimension of the following analysis two potential problems confronting every attempt to instill national values, should be articulated:

\textbf{a. The problem of exaggeration or slipping into nationalism.}

The less serious revelations of this problem are a non-critical glorifying of the nation in the past and at the present, which, at the same time, ignores the rights and achievements of other nations. In its severest form this educational approach can spread hatred and contempt for other nations to the point of assenting to their expulsion or destruction.

\textbf{b. The problem of "disengagement".}

This pitfall involves a weakening of the authentic elements in the national culture as well as a loosening of the emotional ties between the student, his people and his country. This dilemma is particularly pertinent in new states which lack a tradition of self-government.

In a country where a majority - living side by side with a minority - determines the social setup and form of government, this problem has an added dimension. The educational planner must bear in mind his responsibility for the peace and
progress of the state as a whole and for the legitimate needs of each group.

The education given to the minority national group must equip it to live and prosper in a society whose cultural pattern is determined largely by the majority, and simultaneously with the means to develop its own national and cultural identity.

The conflict and tensions existing between these aims make it difficult to conceive of an educational system in which they could all be fully realized. Nevertheless, it seems to us that these are the yardsticks by which national education should be judged.

There can be few cases where an educational authority is faced with a problem as complicated as that of planning a curriculum for the Arab minority in Israel. In this particular case it is necessary to bridge not only differences, but also antagonism.

To achieve a critical evaluation of the above curriculum, we have used comparative methods. We first compare the curriculum designed for the Arab minority\textsuperscript{34}) with that drawn up by the same authority for the Jewish majority,\textsuperscript{35}) and then proceed to compare it with a curriculum drawn up by an Arab government (Jordan) for Arab pupils.\textsuperscript{36})

Analytically, we have a triangle in which a common quality links every two apices:

1. Two Israeli curricula;
2. Two curricula designed for Arab youth;
3. Two curricula designed for the children of the dominant (majority) group.
The comparison between the two Israeli curricula drawn up by the same Ministry and consequently employing common concepts, is simpler and more valid than the other two comparisons, and we have, therefore, devoted most of our space to it. The Jordanian curriculum served as an additional yardstick enabling us to distinguish between dissimilarities deriving from the differential trends of the planners for the children of the majority and the minority groups, and those stemming from differences between Jewish and Arab cultures.

To a certain extent the problematic nature of Arab education in Israel was known to the curriculum planners at the outset, as can be seen in the question posed by one of them, Mr. Y.L. Benor, as follows:37

"How can we encourage loyalty to Israel among Israeli Arabs without demanding a negation of Arab aspirations on the one hand, and without permitting the development of hostile Arab nationalism on the other?" This sentence provides a valid criterion for evaluating the curriculum: To what extent does it help the young Israeli of Arab origin to see his path clearly and to mould his own identity in a way which maintains a reasonable balance between his Arab nationalism and his loyalty to the State in which he lives? After suggesting criteria for evaluation (based, as stated, on the attitude of one of the planners) we shall set out the facts. Only after the facts have been summed up will we give our own evaluation, thus enabling the reader to form his own impression, whether or not he agrees with our interpretation.

Method.

Comparative education has developed extensively in recent years and has almost become a doctrine in its own right.38 One of the
main impulses behind this development is the scientific-technological competition between the Great Powers, where training of scientific manpower plays an important part. It is for this reason that researchers concentrated mainly on comparing educational methods and achievements in the field of the natural sciences, and relatively neglected the investigation of the teaching of humanities. An additional reason for the little attention paid to the latter is the peculiar difficulty of comparative analysis in this field. Whereas in the natural sciences one has to compare different means aimed at achieving the same (or very closely related) ends, where humanistic subjects are concerned, one has to compare both the means and the ends.

We decided to compare curricula intended for secondary and not primary schools - in spite of the fact that only a minority of Arab students reach secondary school - because the level of secondary education makes it possible to deal with social historical and political problems in a more mature and articulated way.

In line with our main objective, namely, a comparison of the goals of the educational authorities in the field of instilling values, we have selected four subjects, in the teaching of which values are particularly relevant: history, literature, religion and citizenship. In each of these subjects we made the following comparisons;

a. The declared aims of teaching the subject; i.e. what contribution is it expected to make to the personality of the student and to society's needs.

b. The number of hours devoted to the subject as a whole, and to its sub-topics (e.g. number of hours spent on modern literature and ancient literature in Jewish and Arab schools).
c. In certain instances we also touched on the content which the planners would like the students to acquire. On this point we met with considerable difficulties: Firstly, curricula are not always sufficiently detailed, and secondly, in order to undertake an adequate analysis of the material studied in the various subjects one would need a wide professional knowledge. The reader is advised, therefore, to approach somewhat cautiously those sections dealing with the actual subject matter taught.

HISTORY

Aims:

The aims of the Jewish and Arab curricula in Israel are formulated on similar lines. This may, perhaps, stem from the fact that the planners of the Arab curriculum had the Jewish curriculum before them and worked to the same pattern, making any adjustments they found necessary.

We will quote the paragraphs from the two curricula in the following order: first the paragraph in the Jewish curriculum, followed by the equivalent paragraph in the Arab curriculum (the italics are ours). All quotations from curricula are based on the sources given in footnotes 34, 35 and 36.

1. For Jewish students:

To teach students to regard the culture of mankind as the result of the combined efforts of the Jewish people and the nations of the world throughout the generations; to evaluate correctly our share and that of other nations in creating this culture; to strengthen the recognition of human cooperation and to develop the will for common action for peace and goodwill among nations. ((35) p. 35).
For Arab students:

To teach the students to regard the culture of mankind as the result of the combined efforts of the nations of the world throughout the generations; to evaluate correctly the part played by the Jewish and Arab nations and by other nations, in creating this culture; to strengthen the recognition of human cooperation, and to develop the will for common action for peace and goodwill among nations. (34)p.102

2. For Jewish students:

To implant a Jewish national consciousness in the students; to strengthen their appreciation of a common Jewish destiny; to insert in their hearts a love of the Jewish people both in its own country and throughout the world, and to strengthen their spiritual links with the nation as a whole.

For Arab students:

No parallel paragraph.

3. For Jewish students:

To instil recognition in the student of the importance of the State of Israel as the means of ensuring the physical and historical existence of the Jewish people; to develop his sense of personal responsibility for the consolidation and development of the State; to implant the desire and the readiness to serve the State in all ways.

For Arab students:

To instil a recognition in the student of the importance of the State of Israel for the Jewish people throughout the ages; to implant a feeling of the common fate of the two peoples, Jewish and Arabic, in
the past and the present, in order to develop his sense of personal responsibility for the consolidation and development of the State; to implant the desire and the readiness to serve the State in all ways.

4. **For Jewish students:**
   Character formation through appreciation of the lives of outstanding representatives of our people and of the peoples of the world.

   **For Arab students:**
   Character formation through appreciation of the lives of outstanding men, and in particular Jews and Arabs.

5. **For Jewish students:**
   A training in independent and critical thinking habits particularly in dealing with social issues.

   **For Arab students:**
   The paragraph is identical.

**Evaluation of differences.**

1) The Arab curriculum lays special stress on the contribution of both nations, Jewish and Arab, in the development of world culture, whereas the Jewish curriculum emphasizes only the part played by the Jewish people, the contribution of the Arabs being included among that of "the nations of the world".

2) The paragraph on the inculcation of Jewish national consciousness has no parallel in the Arab curriculum.

3) The aim of the third paragraph is the instilling of Israeli patriotism. In the case of both ethnic groups the planner seeks to base the sentiment of patriotism on an understanding of the importance
of the State for the existence of the Jewish people. This is a logical argument as far as the Jewish student is concerned, but what about the Arab student? Here the planner relies on the "sense of the common fate of the two peoples, Arab and Jewish in the past and the present", i.e. the Arab student is expected to serve the State not because the latter is important to him and fulfills his needs, but because it is important to the Jewish people with whom the Arab nation is "linked by a common destiny". Even those who are prepared to ignore the highly problematic nature of the claim of "the common destiny in the past and present" of the two nations will certainly be astonished at the tortuous and indirect logic through which it is hoped to educate the children of the minority group towards Israeli patriotism.

4) Here, too, there is a marked discrepancy. Whereas the Arabs are required to take an example from the great men of Israel, the great figures of the Arab world are not deemed worthy of special mention in the Jewish curriculum, but are relegated to the group containing world heroes.

Comparison of the Number of Hours devoted to Jewish and Arabic History in Israel's Jewish and Arabic Secondary Schools

While "the definition of aims" guides the teacher qualitatively and gives general expression to the planner's values, the time allotted to the various topics in fact determines their relative importance for the planner and is a definite instruction to the teacher what to emphasize and what to pass over rapidly. It is of interest, therefore, to compare the time allotted in the curriculum to Jewish history, Arabic history and world history, in both types of school.
Table 21

Hours devoted to studying Jewish, Arab and general history in Jewish and Arab secondary schools in Israel as a percentage of total hours spent on history

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Trend of Humanities</th>
<th>Trend of Science</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arab Sec. School</td>
<td>Jewish Sec. School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish History</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>38.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic History</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World History</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>59.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total hours of history in each faculty:</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Evaluation of differences

The conclusion derived from this table is consistent with the goals which we found to be set for history teaching: In the Arab secondary education there is great emphasis on Jewish history.

A more detailed presentation of this general conclusion can be made by comparing the number of hours allotted in the two curricula to a study of the student's own ethnic group (i.e. Jews about Jews, and Arabs about Arabs), and the time allotted to the study of the other group's history (i.e. Jews about Arabs, and Arabs about Jews).

1. Study of their own group

Nearly 40% of the total time spent on history in the Jewish secondary school is devoted to Jewish history. In the Arab secondary school, on the other hand, of the total time spent on history, only about 20% is devoted to their own history.
2. **Studying the other group**

According to the curriculum, the Arab schools devote some 20% of their history time to the teaching of Jewish history, while the Jewish schools spend less than 2% of their total history time on Arabic history.

If we bring the Jordanian curriculum into this comparison, we find that they place even greater emphasis on studying their own people: about 50% of their history lessons are devoted to Arabic and Jordanian history.

In the Jordanian school, the study of Jewish history is concentrated on one period only, that of Zionism, and is in a sharply hostile vein.

To sum up, the similarity between the Israeli-Jewish and the Jordanian curricula lies in the strong emphasis laid on national history, and the glorification of national tradition. There is, however, a difference: the Jordanian curriculum is more extremely nationalistic in tone and shows strong antagonism towards Judaism. The Jewish curriculum, on the other hand, tends to ignore the Arabs and their history.

What the Israeli-Arab and the Jordanian curriculum do have in common is their subject matter, i.e. they deal with the history of the same people. The dissimilarities, however, are considerable: on one side is the nationalistic curriculum of a dominant majority, and on the other the curriculum of a subjected minority, which curtails the history of its own people while emphasizing that of the other.
LITERATURE AND LANGUAGE

It is difficult to compare the literature and language teaching programs of two peoples because of the differences in the content and in the relative importance of various periods and key motifs in the respective cultures. It is particularly hard to determine whether certain differences between curricula stem from the material to be taught, or from the educational goals of the planners.

Aims:

In the literature and language teaching programs, unlike the history program, there is not even a faint resemblance between the manifest aims. The following are the original formulations:

The Jewish curriculum

a. "To impart to the student a love of the ideals, outlook and experience of the nation at its various periods of development, and an awareness of the unbroken historical link between the nation, its country and its culture. Special attention should be paid to the struggles and achievements of our own, as well as of recent generations in the sphere of national revival and cultural and social renewal. ((35) p. 25).

b. To develop good literary taste and an appreciation of great masterpieces.

c. To expose the students to the cultural treasures of mankind as an expression of universal human values, and also, as far as possible to works which express the creative genius of different nations.

d. To bring the students into direct contact with the controversial problems and trends of thought of the world at various periods of its history, and with the Jewish people's way of life throughout its history.
To develop the student's ability to express himself correctly, clearly, logically and accurately, both orally and in writing.

To help him acquire an organic understanding of the rules and forms of language and its growth, and the ability to distinguish various literary styles.

To equip the student with a fund of those idiomatic expressions which mirror the uniqueness of our outlook, of our relationship with the world and with ourselves, and which create a common form of expression among individuals and generations.

The Arab curriculum

a. Correct reading and an understanding of the written and spoken language. (34) p. 1).

b. The clear, precise and logical expression of ideas and feelings, orally and in writing.

c. The ability to understand and appreciate good literature.

d. To open for the student a gateway to a knowledge of literature past and present.

Comparison

1) In contrast to the detailed aims of the Jewish curriculum, those of the Arab curriculum are meagre and insignificant.

2) In contrast to the national emphasis of the Jewish curriculum both in literature and language (paras a. and g.), the Arab curriculum lacks such guidance and even a mention of the Arab nation.

3) Moreover, even in the teaching aims of world literature in the Jewish curriculum, the national trend is linked up with a recognition
of the main problems and trends of thought in world literature (para. d.). In the Arab curriculum, the author contents himself with the casual remark: "to understand literature and 'the good in it' (lit.)" (para. c.).

This comparison may be supplemented by citing the aims of teaching Hebrew language and literature in Arab schools:

a. To give the Arab student a basic, comprehensive knowledge of the Hebrew language, an understanding of all reading material, a functional command of the language, both written and oral, for practical and cultural needs. ((34) p. 17).

b. To open the gateway for the Arab student to Jewish culture and its values, past and present; to facilitate his understanding of the cultural and social life of the Jewish community in Israel.

Against the background of these aims ("open the gateway to Jewish culture"), the tendency to ignore Arab national values in the teaching program of Arabic literature and language is even more marked.

Our comparison of teaching aims would certainly be incomplete were it not to include the goals set for the teaching of Arabic literature and language in the Jordanian secondary schools.

1. To develop pride in belonging to the Arab peoples, and in Arab heroes, past and present ((36) p. 39).

2. To crystallize the concept of the great Arab homeland, and inculcate this idea into the consciousness of the students by studying the beat of Arab literary tradition.

3. To educate the students towards the lofty characteristics and ideals of the Arabs, e.g. aiding one's fellow man, heroism, courage.
strong opposition to oppression and cruelty, hospitality, kindness, tolerance, etc.

4. To widen the student's views on life and increase preparedness for it.

The goals show an even more nationalistic approach than those of the Jewish school. Almost no attention is paid to universal, human values, and even when they are, in fact mentioned (para. 3) they are presented as uniquely Arab values.

To sum up, if we were to place the aims of the various curricula on a nationalist-neutral continuum, the order would be: Jordanian, Jewish, Israeli-Arab.

We shall compare the number of hours devoted to Hebrew literature and language in the Jewish and Arab secondary schools with the time allotted to Arabic literature and language in the Arab secondary schools.

The Jewish school curriculum is composed of two main sections: 1. Literature, and 2. Language. The teaching program for Arab literature and language in Arab schools, on the other hand, is divided into the following four sections: 1. Grammar and rhetoric; 2. Literary history; 3. Poetry, and 4. Composition.

In order to make these two curricula comparable, we bracketed together paras. 1 and 4 under the heading language, and paras. 2 and 3 under the heading literature.

The curriculum for Hebrew literature and language in Arab schools is also divided into four sections: 1. Bible, Mishna and Aggada;
2. Belles-Lettres; 3. Theory of language; 4. Composition. In this case paras. 3 and 4 were defined as language, and para. 2 as literature.

For a number of reasons, the hours devoted to the study of religious texts - 256 hours of Bible, Mishna and Aggada plus 30 hours of Koran - in the Arab schools, have been omitted here and will be dealt with in the following chapter.

Table 22

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Trend of Humanities</th>
<th>Trend of Science</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jewish School</td>
<td>Arab School</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td>Hebrew, Arabic</td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literature</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>608</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Evaluating the Differences

From Table 22 we learn that the total number of hours devoted to Arab literature and language in Arab schools is greater than the parallel total for Hebrew language and literature in Jewish schools. In other words, the emphasis in the Arab secondary school is more on literature and language than in the Jewish secondary school. This trend is especially noticeable in the program of the Science Faculty of the Arab secondary school, where the hours spent on literature and language (both Hebrew and Arabic) are not fewer than in the Faculty of Humanities. There is very great emphasis on teaching Hebrew literature to Arab students, so much so that the number of hours spent on this
subject in the Science Faculty of Arab schools approaches the time devoted to it in the Science Faculty of the Jewish secondary school.

The study of literature in the Israeli–Arab secondary school is divided into three sub-topics, namely: history of literature, poetry, world literature.

It has already been noted that comparison between the contents in two different subject matters to be taught (i.e. Hebrew and Arabic literature) are rather shaky. In the following paragraphs we nevertheless shall try to emphasize some differences between the ways of teaching literature recommended in the two curricula.

History of Literature

This topic exists only in the Israeli Arab curriculum. Within its framework the following is taught: the development of the customary forms of Arab literature (the description, the story, the letter, the speech, etc.), the history of literary criticism, the historical background of Arab literary classics, and the biographies of their authors.

This is the traditional method of teaching Arab literature which is still used in some Arab countries. The question here arises: Is it desirable that in Israel, too, literature should continue to be taught in this way?

The section of goals and principles in the 1964 literature curriculum for Jewish secondary schools states: "Neither historical continuity, nor literary history has been the main criterion of those who prepared this curriculum; but it is rather the literary values and the worth of its ideas which determine the inclusion of a
particular work. The teacher in his classroom, therefore, should use only the literary work itself in elucidation and development through study. The uniqueness and nature of literary works should be studied and should occupy a central place in the lesson.

Historical, sociological, psychological and linguistic aspects of a literary composition are indeed important in themselves but one should be wary of overstressing any one of them without relating it to the artistic value of the composition as a whole. In conclusion, in the teaching of literature, everything should originate from the work itself, and should return to it. Any substitute - however good - for the literary composition, is essentially invalid."

It is amazing that these clear statements apparently had no influence at all on the Arab program planners, who have tried, in other cases, to make their program compatible with the Jewish one.

It is interesting to compare the study of Arab language and literature in Jordan and Israel. The structure of lessons in Jordan resembles that of the Israeli-Arab program (poetry, history of literature, grammar, literary style, composition) but in addition they have selected texts to read. In other words, the Jordanian curriculum is in a stage of transition between the study of literary history alone and the more modern method of studying literature itself. The Israeli-Arab program retains the traditional pattern.

**Classical and Modern Poetry**

The curriculum for Israeli-Arab schools makes an overall division of Arab literature into four periods:
1. Early Arabic literature (Gahilia and Islamic)
2. Abbasic literature
3. The period of the decline (1258-1798)
4. Modern literature: (a) The Revival, (1798-1908)  
   (b) Modern, (1900 onward).

The modern literature is studied only in the ninth and tenth grades; in grades eleven and twelve only classical prose and poetry are studied. Most of the modern works studied were written in the classical style and rhythm, which is, however, atypical of most contemporary literature.

The subject matters of the poems are generally as follows: pastoral poems, meditation, love, and humanistic poems. The majority of the modern poets studied also wrote national patriotic poems, or poems of struggle, and there is no sign of these in the curriculum. Neither is there a single work by an Israeli Arab poet or by Palestinian poets, despite the fact that several of them have received considerable public notice (e.g. Ibrahim Tukan, Haroun Hashem Rashid). The omission of Palestinian poetry is total, in spite of the fact that apart from anti-Israeli themes it also includes moderate or politically neutral poems and stories.42)

In the Jordanian curriculum, on the other hand, there is a greater emphasis on modern poetry and nationalistic themes.

World Literature

Up to now we have dealt with the teaching of national literature. Let us now consider the place of world literature in the curriculum. The Jewish curriculum recommends 80 hours of world literature, for
the Humanities Trend, the teacher selects works from among the follow-
ing authors: Racine, Moliere, Goethe, Schiller, Balzac, Flaubert,
Tolstoy, Chekhov, Dostoevsky, Merimee, de Maupassant, Babel, Kafka,
Camus, Hemingway.

In language and literature program for Israeli-Arab schools, not
one of the above authors is recommended. World literature suggested
includes: Fables of Ancient Egypt, China, India, Persia and Greece.
The teacher is advised also to select excerpts from modern Western
literary culture. Oddly enough, a small number of Western master-
pieces ("Don Quixote", Edgar Allen Poe's "The Raven", Goethe's
"Erlkönig", Shakespeare's Sonnets, and Greek tragedies), are studied
within the framework of Hebrew literature, a phenomenon for which we
have found no logical explanation.

However, the general trend remains unchanged: while the program
of world literature studied in the Jewish school has a strong leaning
towards European culture (especially Western European - one of the
sources from which every modern culture springs), the main emphasis
in the Arab curriculum is on ancient Oriental culture.

One cannot help to ask if an important educational opportunity
has not been lost here? Opening the doorway to Western culture seems
to be one of the solid contributions which a Jewish-Israeli inspired
education could make to the Arab student. The student would not be
asked to accept the culture of his opponent but would widen his
horizons and acquire values and modes of thought which could be a
spiritual basis common to him and to his Jewish fellow-citizens.
RELIGIOUS STUDIES

Only in the Jordanian curriculum do religious studies appear as a separate subject. In both the Israeli curricula they are scattered among various other subjects. Since both the Jewish and the Islamic religion have a share in shaping the national identities of Jews and Arabs respectively, we consider it essential to discuss their place in the curricula. Studies of a religious nature appear in the Jewish curriculum under the headings Bible and The Oral Tradition (Mishna, Aggada, Gemara). In defining the study goals for these subjects the planner emphasizes their importance in the development of a national consciousness and as a basis for national unity, along with the ethical, artistic and linguistic values inherent in them.\(^43\)

There is no such guidance, however, given for the study of the Koran, which is studied as a part of Arabic literature and defined as a "supreme example of literary Arabic" essential for learning and understanding Arabic literature. In the Israeli-Arab curriculum the Koran is included in "the history of literature", and the Bible comes under "Hebrew literature". In the Jordanian curriculum the study of the Koran is included in the study of religion.

In trying to make a quantitative comparison of religious studies recommended in various curricula, we are faced, as mentioned above, with certain difficulties: in some subjects, the number of hours to be taught is laid down; in others, the number of chapters to be studied is specified. To create a common basis for comparison, we have estimated all quantitative directions in terms of hours.
### Table 23

A Comparison of Religious Studies in Israeli-Arab, Israeli-Jewish and Jordanian Schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Study hrs.</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Study hrs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jewish Religious Studies</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Arab Religious Studies</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bible</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>Koran</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oral trad.</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>No Muslim religious studies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>Koran and texts: (Estimate: 3 hrs. per week are set aside for religious studies. We assume 1 hr. per week to equal 30 hrs. a year).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Evaluating the differences

Given the difficulties involved in comparison and the possibility of slight error in our estimates of time allocation, two general conclusions emerge:

a. A fairly wide knowledge of Jewish religious texts is required of Israeli-Arab students. On the other hand there is no attempt to give the Jewish students any systematic knowledge of texts of other religions than their own.
b. Muslim high-school students in Israel do not receive Muslim religious study on an adequate scale. They are required to spend seven or eight times as long on Jewish holy scriptures as on their own religious writings. For Christian students (who constitute a considerable proportion of Israel's Arab students) there are no special religious studies; they are exempt from studying the Koran without any substitute being offered.

There is no consensus among educators about the proper place religion should occupy in national culture and education, but, whatever one's opinion on this point, it is very difficult to find a plausible justification for a state of affairs in which unusual stress is laid on religious values for Jewish students, coupled with the impoverished state of religious studies for non-Jewish students.

**CITIZENSHIP**

By contrast with the lessons in citizenship in the Jewish secondary school, no goals are outlined for the citizenship teaching program for the Arab secondary school. Since the same text books are recommended for both schools, the aims of the Jewish curriculum may be assumed to apply for Arab schools as well. These aims are:

1. An explanation of the emergence of human society, and of its present-day structure. ([p. 73](#)).

2. Developing critical and unprejudiced modes of thought.

3. Explaining the principles of democracy, the Israeli system of government, and the rights of the citizens, with the aim of encouraging a desire to serve the State.
4. Widening the knowledge of the status of the Jewish people in Israel and in the Diaspora, and encouraging the desire to participate in the solution of their problems.

5. Imparting of an understanding of Israel's particular situation and projects, and the desire to help in realization of her vision.

Thus far the goals. The time devoted to citizenship in the Jewish secondary school is two hours per week in the last year of studies. The time allotted in the Arab school is one hour per week in the eleventh grade. Since the curriculum does not specify the time to be spent on each topic, we will compare below the topics studied within the citizenship framework, in Jewish and Arab schools.

A comparison of subjects of study in citizenship lessons.

The paragraphs dealing with the definition of a modern state and its machinery and with the government of Israel and its economical and political system, are similar in both teaching programs. Also similar is the question of religion (the Jewish curriculum dealing more with Jewish religious institutions). A special chapter in the Arab curriculum is devoted to the achievements of Druze and Arabs in Israel, the main emphasis here being on attainments in education, and standards of living. The program does not touch on any of the problematic aspects of the life of a minority in Israel.

In addition to these parallel paragraphs, two long chapters (about half of the total material) in the Jewish curriculum, deal with demography and the social, economic and cultural structure of the Jewish people in the Diaspora, as well as the problem of anti-Semitism and the absorption of immigrants. Neither of these chapters is included in the Arab curriculum.
An evaluation of the differences

The study of citizenship presents, perhaps, the most difficult and direct challenge in education of minority children. How is this challenge met by the program planner?

A. A 50% cut in the number of hours. The problematic nature of the subject for the children of minorities, instead of bringing about an attempt to deepen the study has produced a time cut.

B. Presentation of a rose-colored and one-sided picture of the status of the Arab minority in Israel. The citizenship program deals little with topics peculiar to the Arab minority, despite the fact that this is one of the main issues in Israeli public life. But even such attention as this is predominantly directed to Arab and Druze achievements in Israel. One should certainly not ignore the value and importance of the developments in agriculture, education, health, and social welfare among the non-Jewish minorities in Israel. It seems clear, however, that no objective observer would agree that the social and political reality of these minorities is composed solely of achievements.

Obviously, difficult and occasionally tragic contrasts between the Arab minority and the Jewish majority come to the student's knowledge. The question is whether a one-sided presentation like this can counterbalance the influences of home and street, and whether this is the way to gain the student's trust and to equip him to cope with his difficulties.
Conclusions of the Comparative Analysis

We began our discussion by consideration of the twin dangers facing planners in education towards national values: exaggerated nationalism, on the one hand, and a cosmopolitan blurring on the other. We have shown that Israel's educational planners were alive to the difficulties of maintaining a balance between these two poles. In the light of the material here presented we can now ask, to what extent the planners succeeded in achieving such balance.

Exaggeration

The Israeli-Jewish curriculum does, indeed, avoid spreading hatred and encouraging aggression, but it is not free of the type of indoctrination which tends to glorify Israeli society and culture and detract from others.\textsuperscript{46}

The Jordanian curriculum, which was only briefly considered, is immersed in nationalism to the extent that it denies for others the right to exist.

Disengagement

In the light of the facts summarized above, it would not appear far-fetched to maintain that the Arab school curriculum in Israel has not achieved the balance between "Arab national aspirations" and "loyalty to the State", that its authors hoped, but has fallen victim to a tendency to blur Arab nationality and to educate towards self-disparagement vis-a-vis the Jewish majority.\textsuperscript{47} These tendencies are revealed, in the main, in two ways: (a) The tendency to formulate the study goals of various subjects without taking into account the national elements in the Arab student's identity. (b) The tendency to demand
of the Arab students a wide and profound knowledge of purely Jewish subjects (e.g. Jewish history, Bible) at the expense of his own culture. The latter is even more glaring when one takes into account the almost total absence of Arab language and culture in the education of the Jewish student.

The above comments are not intended to claim that the planners of this curriculum consciously intended to blur the national identity of the Arab student or to give him feelings of inferiority and self-disparagement. However, what is important here is not the intention of the planners, but the result of their program. The question arises what concrete results are likely to follow this curriculum in the Arab secondary school and to what extent these results will conform with the original intentions of the planners?

Allowing insufficient expression for national aspirations does not remove the fact of their existence. The Arab student who does not find answers to his problems within the school, may seek and find political leadership elsewhere.

Chapter 5 - On Results of the Education Given to Israel's Arab Youth.

Having dealt with the aims of the educational authorities regarding the instilling of values, let us turn to the question: To what extent in fact has the educational program succeeded in changing the pupils' political outlook in the direction desired by the planners? In order to reply empirically to this question, we shall have to divide it into two sub-questions:

a. To what extent has the educational program succeeded in improving the attitude towards Jews as individuals?
b. To what extent has the educational program succeeded in restraining the nationalist stand of the pupils and removing the anti-Israel elements of their national consciousness?

As a reply to these questions, we intend posing three comparisons in each case:

1. Between subjects educated under the Mandate and subjects educated in the Israeli educational network;
2. Between secondary school students and youth of the same age groups who have not continued their studies to secondary school level;
3. Between students of lower and more senior classes in Israeli secondary schools.

Findings

A. Social distance

Our first question was whether education had succeeded in improving the personal attitude of subjects towards Jews as individuals. We tested this with the aid of Bogardus' social distance scale which included the following items:

(a) Would you be prepared to make friends with Jews?
(b) Would you be prepared to live in a neighborhood where Jewish families live?
(c) Would you be prepared to live in the same house with a Jewish family?

In Table 24 we compare social distances in the various groups, and in Table 25 the social distance of pupils belonging to different grades.
From Tables 24, 25 two main conclusions may be drawn:

a) There is a consistent order among the items of social distance; neighborhood is felt to be more binding than friendship, and, of course close neighborhood is more significant than remote neighborhood. This finding underlines an important difference between social relations in Middle Eastern villages or small towns and in large metropolitan cities. While in the city, living in the same house means almost nothing and friends are carefully selected. In the village every acquaintance may
be called "friend" while one has quite close and binding relations with one's neighbor.

b) The social distance of the younger generation from Jews seems to be considerably smaller than the social distance of the older generation. Table 24 points to the gap between generations but fails to show any differences between high-school students and working youth. Table 25 does indicate that secondary education might have some positive impact on the willingness to be involved in personal relations with Jews. Students of the senior grade are somewhat more open to rapprochement than their junior colleagues.

The smaller social distance of the young and the educated Arabs from Jews appears to stem from their more modern style of life which make social contact and communication easier. However, as we shall see below, the closer personal proximity of the younger generation to the Jews does not bring with it more restrained political attitudes.

B. National attitudes and values

The second, and in our opinion, decisive question was in what direction Israeli education influenced the political values of the pupils and their attitude to Israel as a political entity. We tested these attitudes by the following items:

(a) "Where do you feel better - in Israel or in one of the Arab States?"
(b) "Has the State of Israel a right to exist?"
(c) "In your opinion has Arab evaluation of the State of Israel gone up since the war of June 1967?"
(d) "Are the Arabs bound to wage another war against Israel?"
Tables 26-32 summarize the replies to these questions, according to groups of subjects and secondary school grades.

**Table 26**

*Does the subject feel better in Israel or the Arab States? (By groups)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>In Israel</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>In one of the Arab States</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All respondents</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young adults</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working youth</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 27**

*Has the State of Israel a right to exist? (By groups)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes, with reservations</th>
<th>Refuses to answer</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All respondents</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young adults</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working youth</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 28
In your opinion, has Arab evaluation of the State of Israel gone up since the war of June 1967? (By groups)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>More highly</th>
<th>The same</th>
<th>Less highly</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All respondents</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young adults</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working youth</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 29
Are the Arabs bound to wage another war? (By groups)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes, if militarily possible</th>
<th>Yes, if Israel stays put</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All respondents</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young adults</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working youth</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 30
Has the State of Israel a right to exist? (By grades)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes, with reservations</th>
<th>Refuses to answer</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All respondents</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 9</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 10</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 11</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 31
Is Israel more or less highly appreciated since the June War? (By grades)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>More highly</th>
<th>The same</th>
<th>Less highly</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All respondents</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 9</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 10</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 11</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 32
Are the Arabs bound to wage another war? (By grades)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes, if militarily possible</th>
<th>Yes, if Israel stays put</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All respondents</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 9</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 10</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 11</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An examination of the above tables leads to a number of general conclusions (which are, in fact, common to all the tables!). Most of the differences in the degree of radicalism are inter-generation differences. The younger generation is far more radical in its nationalism than the generation of its parents. The difference in the educational framework through which the two generations passed (the older people being educated during the period of Mandate and the younger in the State of Israel) is almost certainly not responsible for all the differences of attitude, and possibly not even for the major part. There are a number of additional factors at work here:
1. **The age factor** - it is highly possible that youth itself determines the degree of radicalism. In a research conducted within a specific period of time we cannot distinguish between the influence of age and the influence of generation (i.e. the historical period in which a group of subjects underwent the process of socialization).

2. **The frame of reference** - the older generation was witness to the process of modernization of the Arab village, whereas the younger generation was born during the process. Consequently, the frames of reference of the two generations differ. The parents compare the present situation of the Arab village with the situation they remember from their youth, whereas their children regard the achievements of modernization as self-evident and compare their condition with that of neighboring Jewish settlements. The external resemblance to the Jews and a wide knowledge of the latter increases the tendency to see them as a reference group.

3. **Selection** - The Arabs who remained in Israel after the 1948 war, went through a selective process. All those who regarded life in a Jewish State as unbearable, left. The younger generation underwent no comparable selective process.

   We cannot, therefore, attribute the inter-generational differences solely to education, but it is plausible to say that the school has not succeeded in facing the complex of factors causing radicalism in the younger generation.

   We will look, now, into the differences between secondary school pupils and working youth of the same age group. These differences are far less clearcut, but if one could speak at all of a general trend it
would be that the pupils tend to be more radical than the working youth. Again, one must be cautious and bear in mind that apart from the educational and cultural factors, these two groups are differentiated by a status factor. The students are, generally speaking, from a higher social class. Nevertheless this datum lends weight to the view that Israeli education has not succeeded in uprooting anti-Israel elements from its students' political consciousness, or even in decreasing them.

We reach a similarly negative conclusion when we compare the attitudes of different grades within the secondary school. If the influence of the school were positive from the Israeli point of view, we would expect to find a less anti-Israel attitude among the higher grades who had been exposed to the school influence longer.

The lack of success of Israeli education to mould the national identity of Arab youth, seems to be one of our main findings. It is not easy to propose an adequate explanation of this phenomenon. Although we believe (as stated above) that the factors most influential on attitude formation are to be found outside the educational system, we shall confine ourselves here to factors internal to the educational framework; since these factors are more changeable through social and educational planning.

Let us see, now, to what extent additional findings particular to the educational system might further our understanding of the relationship between educational effort and its results.

C. The attitude towards the curriculum

A comparative analysis of the educational curricula of Jewish and Arab secondary schools showed that the Arab school program had a
markedly Jewish-Zionist orientation. We will repeat here only a few of the more striking findings: (For a detailed account see ch. 4)

- The purpose behind the teaching of a number of subjects (history, literature, religion) in the Jewish syllabus is the imparting of national values, whereas the Arab educational program is deprived of national aims.

- Arab pupils are required to study modern Hebrew literature of a nationalist-Zionist type (Bialik, Achad Ha'am etc.), where only classical Arab authors are studied.

- Moslem students in Israeli secondary schools have no Islamic religious studies worthy of the name, but are expected to spend an extensive amount of time on Jewish religious writings.

- Under the heading of citizenship, the achievements of Israel's minorities are stressed without any reference being made to their difficulties and problems.

In view of these conclusions, it is of interest to find out how the students and teachers involved relate to the curriculum. In this connection we asked the subjects: "What changes should, in your opinion, be introduced into the curriculum?" The distribution of the answers - in percentages - was as follows: 48)
Table 33

Desirable changes in the curriculum. (In percentages) *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change in Curriculum</th>
<th>Pupils</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. No changes necessary</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Arab subjects should be added</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Jewish subjects should be fewer</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Current topics should be added</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Universal subjects should be added</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Scientific subjects should be added</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Standard of studies should be raised</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Other answers</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N: 178 38

* Percentages do not add up to 100% since respondents could propose more than one change.

We see that the vast majority of both pupils and teachers are not satisfied with the existing state of affairs. The main changes demanded in the syllabus are: raising the standard and adding Arabic subjects. Contrary to what one would expect, there is no strong demand for a decrease in Jewish subjects. This conclusion receives added support from the replies to the question: "Do you think the Hebrew language should be taught in Arab schools in Israel?"
Table 34

Attitudes to the teaching of Hebrew

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pupils</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The study of Hebrew to be cancelled</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; decreased</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; left as it is now</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; increased</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 138 39

It appears that most of the respondents recognize the importance of Hebrew language and culture as a means of adjusting to the daily life of the State of Israel.

Trust in the teacher

In order to instil values, it is not sufficient for a teacher to articulate these values well in the classroom: he himself must believe in them, or at least convince his pupils that he believes in them. Obviously, the degree of internalization of such values (or, alternatively, the ability to present himself as a genuine supporter of these values) varies among teachers. However, this ability is also influenced by the structure of the role itself. To the extent that this structure permits the teacher complete identification with his role he is likely to arouse a tendency among his pupils to identify with the values he is imparting, whereas, if he fulfils his role (or part of it) with inner reservations, his influence on the pupils will almost certainly be shallow and limited. The Arab teacher in Israel is subject to a serious role conflict: the expectations of one set of complementary role-players (the supervisors) contradicts the demands of other
complementary role-players (parents, pupils). This clash is particularly striking in the sphere of values. In this sphere the supervisors try to turn the teacher into a medium of communication for the transfer of values from the authorities to the pupil almost without any adaptation on the teacher’s part. This tendency is expressed, for instance, in the supervisory methods employed wherever public issues are involved, such methods being much more stringent than those used for regular subjects of instruction.

A sample of teachers was queried on this topic as follows:

a. When a supervisor is not satisfied with the methods a teacher employs to teach a regular topic, how does he react?

b. When a supervisor is dissatisfied with the way in which a teacher explains a political issue, how does he react?

The breakdown of replies was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political sphere</th>
<th>Pedagogic sphere</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explains the mistake to the teacher</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complains to the headmaster</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applies to the authorities</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dismiss the teacher immediately</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We see from the above that supervision in the political sphere is much more stringent than in the pedagogic sphere, 45% of teachers
reporting severe sanctions (referral to the authorities, being fired) in the political sphere, and only 8% in the pedagogic sphere. The policy of teacher appointment is also considered by most of the teachers in our sample as being subject to the same trend; the political reliability of the teachers being more important than their professional ability.

Teachers were asked: "In your opinion, are the teachers appointed generally the people most suited to the job?"

**Table 36**

**Factors in the appointment of teachers**

1. Politically reliable people preferred to good teachers 20%
2. People with good connections 60%
3. A shortage of teachers, so anyone is taken on 6%
4. The most suitable people are appointed 14%

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>38</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Some 80% of the subjects believe that irrelevant factors (political reliability, personal connections) play a decisive role in appointments policy.

The methods used for the selection of teachers orientate the latter towards the expectations of the Ministry and the supervisors rather than towards those of the pupils. One must assume that a teacher liable to supervision and selection of this kind will be less well suited to act as a spiritual guide to his pupils, and the pupils will tend to suspect his integrity.
Pupils were asked: When your teachers expound on political and social problems, do you think they are giving their honest opinion?" Replies were as follows:

Table 37
Belief in the teacher regarding political questions (pupils)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Belief in the Teacher</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Yes, always</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Yes, mostly</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Yes, sometimes</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. No</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td><strong>150</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The pupils do not believe in the teacher's sincerity when he deals with political questions. We shall reach a similar conclusion on the basis of replies to our next question, which was posed to the teachers: "Do your pupils turn to you for explanations of political events?"

Table 38
Belief in the teacher regarding political questions (teachers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Belief in the Teacher</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Yes, at every opportunity</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Yes, but outside school</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. No</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td><strong>41</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Where the teacher is not trusted as a political guide or as a moulder of public opinion, the tendency to resort to alternative sources of information is, naturally, strong.
In this connection we asked the pupils: "When a secondary school student is interested in having an explanation of the political situation, to whom does he apply for such an explanation?"

Table 39
Sources of information for students on political questions

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Adult relations</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Friends or other boys</td>
<td>24.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Israeli sources</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Arab sources</td>
<td>35.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 176

In this list the teacher takes the last place.

We found that there exists no great faith in the teacher as a purveyor of values and political orientation. The question then arises, whether the lack of faith affects the status of the teacher in all other spheres. In order to test the rise and fall in status as seen by the teachers themselves, we asked them the following question: "Here is a scale (1-9): Assume that the head of the scale is the highest evaluation given to a man in the village and the bottom of the scale is the lowest":

a. Where does a teacher appear on this scale today?

b. Where did a teacher appear three years ago?

c. Where did a teacher appear before the creation of the State of Israel?

The teachers' replies were as follows:
Table 40

Status of the teacher in villages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Today</th>
<th>3 yrs. ago</th>
<th>pre-State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 42

These results indicate that teacher status is fairly high. (To make this result more convincing, it would have been desirable to compare these data with the teacher's status as perceived by other people. However, budgetary limitations did not permit this comparison). An examination of the fluctuations in status reveals a marked decline since the period of the Mandate, and a certain rise in recent years. It is very possible that the stringent political supervision exercised over the teachers bears partial responsibility for the decline in status as compared with Mandate days, but it seems that the change is mainly due to the relative decline in the teacher's salary and education. During Mandate times the teacher was one of the few literate people in the village, with a steady, and relatively high income. The rise in the average standard of life and education in the
village since the emergence of the State has caused a decline in the teacher's position. As one of our teacher-subjects explained: "A construction worker employed in the Jewish sector earns as much in a week as I do in a month." The period of economic recession through which Israel passed in 1965-6 and the specific employment problems of Arabs after the war, once more raised slightly the status of the teacher who earns a low but stable salary. Of particular interest, is the examination of the status of the teacher among the students. In order to do this we used two parallel questions: one was put to the teachers and tested the attitude of pupils as perceived by them, and the other was put directly to the pupils.

The teachers were asked: "Do your pupils see you as a personal example?"

Table 41

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The teacher as a personal example to his pupils</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Some of them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The question put to the pupils was: "Would you like to be like any one of your teachers when you grow up?"
Table 42

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Yes</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Yes, with reservations</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. No</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Perception of teachers and attitude of students fit in with each other: the pupils tend to regard their teachers as a personal example and an image with which to identify, despite the fact that they do not believe him to be sincere when discussing politics in class. It appears, therefore, that both teachers and pupils regard the official Zionist orientation of the schools, as a behavior pattern demanded by the authorities; the right of the teacher to teach and pupils to study being conditional on a good performance. The fact that the teachers take up a position which is not their own, does not detract from the personal esteem in which they are held by the village or by their pupils. Their behavior is seen as inevitable in the prevailing circumstances.

In effect, the teachers are here employing a combination of two mechanisms - compartmentalization\(^{50}\) on the one hand and role distance\(^{51}\) on the other. These mechanisms are typical of all Israeli Arabs in their struggle with the conflicting demands of Israel and the Arab states. The first mechanism is demonstrated in the way that speech and behavior differ when on and off duty. The second mechanism is seen in the way that even while carrying on his job, the teacher feels bound to give his pupils cues that what he is saying does not reflect his
real thoughts. For example, the claim that he is teaching this because "that's what's written in the book".

On the other hand, it is obvious that a situation is being created here which effectively prevents any internalization of Jewish national values by pupils of the Arab minority.

This last conclusion relates to another, much more general problem - what is the more important factor in the imparting of values, the evaluation and identification of the pupil with the personality of the teacher, or the affinity of the teacher for the values which he is trying to impart.

Many experts in the field of educational psychology regard the acceptance of values as a result of personal identification with the teacher. The findings presented above suggest that it is a belief in the sincerity of the teacher which is the basic condition. Without this kind of belief, not only will the attempt to impart values fail, but it may even produce directly contrary results.

CONCLUSION

When social problems seem to have become insoluble one frequently turns to education as a last resort. If this generation failed, is it not still possible, to achieve through educational planning, a success for the coming generation?

The belief that education is to prevail over all the other factors which mould social reality, is not very realistic. If education functions against most other social forces, it might moderate difficulties, but it can hardly be expected to resolve them.
In this study the capacity of an educational system - (which is initiated by one people for another) to resolve the conflict between these two peoples - was examined. Or, to put it in a more realistic perspective, we attempted to inquire whether education has succeeded in moderating hostility and enhancing mutual trust and understanding.

When we decided to investigate the nature of the education provided by the State of Israel for young Arabs, three very broad questions were in our mind:

a. What are the goals of this educational system?
b. What is its structure?
c. What are its final outcomes?

In order to contribute something to the solution of these questions a long and thorough groundwork was necessary.

First, we had to check our ability to inquire, analyze and report in a balanced and objective way on a subject in which we are personally involved.

Second, it was essential to acquire the trust and cooperation of our respondents; in a tense, suspicious and stormy period.

Third, a clarification of the socio-psychological background of Jewish-Arab relations was felt to be indispensable for the understanding of the educational process.

We considered the establishment of a mixed research team to be an effective way to deal with the problems of objectivity and confidence (on the part of the respondents). No research instrument was applied and no finding recorded without being examined by research workers belonging to both peoples. The field work was carried out by Arab research
workers (students at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem) who were assisted by local coordinators. These coordinators recommended the field workers to the subjects and served also as the researchers' hosts. The identifiable data were held strictly confidential so that subjects' interests were protected.

When we attempted to clarify the psycho-sociological background we discovered that virtually no scientific analysis of Jewish-Arab relations existed. Therefore we had to devote two chapters of the present report to the two main problems confronting Israeli Arabs in this generation: Their position in the struggle between Israel and her Arab neighbors, and their attitude towards the process of modernization and towards the social and spiritual changes attached to modernization.

In regard to the first issue we assumed that the Israeli Arab is a "marginal man" who has to maintain a minimal attachment to both reference groups (Israel and the Arab world), in order to survive. A careful analysis of the internal conflict between the orientations to these reference groups showed that it is a rather complex conflict: The attitudes towards Israel and towards the Arab world are both ambivalent. There are positive and negative valences towards each of them. The gravity and complexity of the conflict as well as the fact that a more or less normal social life developed in the Arab community call for an exploration of the mechanisms which enabled Israeli Arabs to "live with the conflict" and even to expand demographically and economically.

We suggested four such mechanisms:
(a) Compartmentalization; through which each of the different foci of identity acquires its own channel of expression.

(b) Role-distance; which enables the actor to perform a role and at the same time to dissociate himself from his own performance.

(c) Messianic expectations; which project the nationalistic yearnings to the remote future and thereby partially legitimize the acceptance of a minority status in the present.

(d) Social control; preventing the individual from breaking away from the delicate compromise between Israeli and pan-Arab influences which seems imperative to most Israeli Arabs.

These suggested mechanisms could maintain an equilibrium in the identity of the Israeli Arabs as long as they were relatively isolated from the wider Arab world, and as long as no total confrontation between Israel and her neighbors occurred. The June 1967 war changed both these conditions and thereby released dynamic forces which shook the very foundations of the Israeli Arab's split identity. Our data point to a general tendency to close the gap between the attitude towards Israel which prevails in the Arab world and the Israeli Arabs' attitude. This trend could be demonstrated by comparing the responses to similar questionnaires which were administered before and after the war. The tendency to adopt extreme anti-Israel attitudes is especially outspoken among the young and better educated.

When we investigated the second central issue, the attitude to modernization, we found in contrast to our own expectations, that the striving for modernization and social change is now a generally accepted attitude among all social groups. Even the older generation
whose way of life is more traditional is paying some lip service at least to these aspirations. Moreover, the general public realized that efficient modernization necessitates adaptation to other people's know-how and norms, and that the Jews are one of the peoples from whom Arabs can learn.

Not all areas of Arab social life are equally open to change. New norms are accepted first in the technological sphere then in politics while in the domain of kinship and family the traditional norms are preserved for a longer period of time.

The crystallization of attitudes towards Israel and towards modernization are not two isolated processes. These are really two facets of one broad ideological pattern and were found to be closely interconnected. The removal of traditional identity symbols produced a need for an alternative focus of identification which is supplied by nationalism. On the other hand, nationalism itself is needed in order to legitimize the silencing of local quarrels and the change of deep-rooted customs.

If the planners of Arab education in Israel were conscious of the above mentioned processes occurring in Israeli Arab society and within the personality of every Arab youngster, they could possibly direct them to more positive channels from the Israeli point of view. Two alternatives were (and to a certain extent still are) open to them:

a) To underline the universal and humanistic elements in the aims and means of modern education. In other words, to organize education around values which are common to all nationalities like science, economic development, civil rights and tolerance.
b) To instil and encourage the development of a new kind of Arab national identity, which would perceive Jews as equal partners rather than as enemies.

These alternatives are both difficult and risky because they are at odds with the cultural and political climate prevailing in Israel and her environment. However, they are, to a certain extent, viable, which means that they might possibly restrain nationalistic antagonism if not extinguish it.

But in fact a third way was chosen. Israeli Arab education was oriented towards national values, however these were values of a different nationality! The official curriculum demanded that Arab youth should learn first and foremost the principles of a national culture in which they were not allowed to participate!

We examined empirically the impact of Israeli secondary education by comparing the attitudes of respondents exposed to varying amounts of Israeli sponsored education. This examination revealed two phenomena:

a) Antagonistic attitudes towards Israel as a political entity were not moderated through Israeli secondary education. There seem to be indications that the net influence of Israeli education is negative in this sphere.

b) Attitudes and evaluation of Jews as individuals have not been affected negatively. It seems that social distance was even reduced through the impact of secondary education.
This second finding is particularly interesting if we bear in mind that in general for the entire sample a positive correlation exists between political antagonism and social distance from Jews. Apparently the influence of education prevails over the tendency of these two factors to co-vary.

One may infer from these findings that even in situations of conflict and tension there still remains some potential influence of the educational factor.

A fair evaluation of Arab education in Israel should take into account the special social and political difficulties confronting it, but should also examine whether the potential influence of education has been exploited with the requisite sagacity and courage, to serve mutual respect and understanding.

In attempting to explain what can be described as a lack of success of Arab education in Israel (there are some who would even call it a failure) we should emphasize two main factors:

(a) The educational aims as defined by the official curriculum prevented participation and identification and thus could never be internalized.

(b) The structure of the teacher's role, his status and his recruitment caused the lack of success of his educational work.
This study was conceived in the hope that investigators could objectively analyse phenomena in which they themselves were involved. In an attempt to validate this claim a mixed research team was established in order that the research instruments might thereby be exposed to critical evaluation by Arab and Jewish research workers. To the extent that we have achieved even a partial success in our aims we would hope to see these pages used as a basis for further and more far-reaching discussions of the difficulties and possibilities in education for Arab youth in Israel.
FOOTNOTES

1. E.g., Adar, L. and Adler H.: "Education in values at schools for immigrant children", Hebrew University's School of Education, Jerusalem, 1965. (Hebrew)
Herman, Simon N., The Attitudes of Israeli Youth to their Jewishness and to Jews Abroad. (Unpublished)

2. The next paragraph taken from D. Lerner's book can be a good illustration:

"In uneasy Syria, the interviewer was sometimes taken for a spy, (as one of the interviewers wrote); "I heard that after I had finished this interview rumors started to go around that I belong to the F.B.I. looking for communists. Others said I want to take their sons to Korea ... Although I had explained the matter and purpose of the interview, yet people were skeptical about it. And anytime the name of any big power or the name of their government used to be mentioned, you feel that they are not at ease and give short dry answers". Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, The Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1958, p.1.


4. Irwin Katz: "The influence of race of the experimenter and instructions upon the expression of hostility by Negro boys",


10. The authoress, Naj'ah Ka'war-Farah tells of the struggle of an old Arab who refuses to leave his land, and who clings to it as the olive trees hold on to the soil in which they grew, in spite of his wife's pleas to emigrate to one of the Arab countries where her children are living. See: Naj'ah Ka'war-Farah; "The Bitterness of the Two Alternatives" in: "Leman a-Rabiva" (To whom the Spring), Nazareth, 1963 (Arabic).
11. Paradoxically, the expropriation of lands in the Arab village increased the need of the villager for work in Jewish settlements, and therefore, indirectly, the intensity of contact and rate of adaptation.


13. State schools devote some 6 hours a week to teaching Hebrew, starting from Grade 4.


15. Social-psychologists often differentiate between public values and private values, the latter, for some reason, being accorded greater weight. For the same purpose, the psycho-dynamic school uses the distinction between internalized values - where someone acting against them would feel guilt - and externalized values - where he would only feel shame.


17. On one occasion, the Mayor of Nazareth explained the shrinking of Israeli Arabs from war pragmatically: "Israel's Arabs would be the chief victims of any war, since war means advance and withdrawal; when the Arab armies advanced they would kill the "co-operators with Israel", and when the Israeli advanced they would kill the "Fifth Column" which helped the enemy - who then would be left?"
Clearly there is no contradiction between these considerations and the psychological reasons summed up above.

18. This category was added to the 1967 research.

19. "The just rights" (which were not given in full in the final classification grading of replies were, in the interviews conducted before the war, mainly the return of the 1948 refugees, and in certain instances corrections of frontiers (a return to the 1947 partition frontiers) whereas, in the post-war interviews, claims which justified the war were defined in the main as the return of the territories captured in the June war.


21. The gravity of the dilemma depends, among other things, upon the extent of the contradiction between a traditional culture and modes of behavior and moral orientations connected with a modern society. Where the original culture has elements which facilitate the absorption of modern orientations, or elements which can, later on, blend organically into modern social and cultural life, the dilemma becomes less serious. See, e.g. Bellah, R.N.: Tokugawa Religion, The Free Press, Glencoe, 1957.

23. In his analysis of the influence exerted by colonial powers on native societies, Eisenstadt claims that any attempt to limit such influence to technical and economic spheres, while retaining traditional family, political and moral institutions, is doomed to failure from the outset. Sooner or later the modernization process breaks through into all sectors of society. See: Eisenstadt, S.N.: Modernization, Protest and Change, Prentice Hall, N.J. 1966, pp. 109-111.


25. This approach can be seen in its purest and simplest form in the political novel "Altneuland" by T. Herzl where the following words are put into the mouth of an Arab citizen of the "Jewish State": "The Jews have made us rich; why should we complain about them? They live with us like brothers and why should we not love them?" See: Herzl, T.: "Zionist Writings", vol. 3, pp. 165-172. "The Zionist Library", publ. M. Neumann, Tel-Aviv 1955 (Hebrew).

Similar attitudes are found in later Zionist writings too. See, among others, Ben-Gurion, D.: "In Battle", vol. 1, pp. 110-112 ("Evidence before the Royal Commission", 7th January, 1937), "Am-Oved", Tel-Aviv, 1957. (Hebrew)


27. See a detailed description of these claims in The Arabs in Israel, by a young lawyer, Sabry Gerais, Haifa, pub. Al Atiachad, 1966, p. 108. (Hebrew)
28. a) Census of population in occupied territories, carried out by the Central Bureau of Statistics for Army Headquarters. (Hebrew)
b) Economic investigation of the West Bank, under the auspices of the Bank of Israel. (Hebrew)
c) These versus Those, a comparative description of Israeli Arab villages and villages in Judea and Samaria, by Uri Standel, pub. "Merkaz Ha'Hasbarah" ("Information Centre") January 1968, Jerusalem. (Hebrew)


33. The curriculum is only one expression of the educational aims laid down by the Government. Other expressions are: the policy of selection and promotion of teachers, headmasters and supervisors, written directives issued from time to time, text book selection, etc.

34. Source: Curriculum for Arab Secondary Schools, The State of Israel, the Ministry of Education, the Department of Education for Arabs 1968. (Arabic)


39. In counting the hours at the Jewish secondary school we have borne in mind the main trends (science and humanities) but not the secondary trends (e.g. oriental studies) which include only a small percentage of students.

40. Arab students devote more or less the same number of hours to the history of their own people and to the history of the Jewish people.

41. This section is based on a new edition of the Program for Literature teaching which was published in 1962. This program does not include a list of aims, and we have therefore assumed that the aims in the earlier program are still valid. See: **Proposed Curriculum for Hebrew and World Literature in Secondary Schools**, Ministry of Education and Culture, Department for Secondary Education, Jerusalem 1962. (Hebrew)


43. In the aims of Bible teaching we find, for example: "To evoke a consciousness of the unique status of Israel among the nations", (para. 2).

45. The reader can find a picture slanted in the opposite direction in S. Jerais' book - "The Arabs in Israel", in which the author scoffs at achievements in these areas and tries to deny Israel's part in them. (See: S. Jerais - The Arabs in Israel, El Itihad Publications, 1966, pp. 108-168).

46. Some pedagogues have already criticized Israeli curricula on these grounds. See, for example, the comprehensive article by Z. Adar on "Official Curricula for Elementary Schools", Megamoth, 7, 1956/7; pp. 41-77, and also the comments of H. Adler and L. Adar in their monograph Education for values in schools for immigrant children, School of Education Publications, 1964. (Hebrew)

47. An amazingly extreme example, to the point of "complete identification" with the Jewish people and Zionism, can be found in the following poem, whose author, Sammy Mezijet, was a supervisor of the Ministry of Education in Israel. The poem was published in a Reader for the top classes of elementary schools (Sanabil Min Kul Al-Adab). The following is a free translation:
Israel
A light spread in the eastern skies;
Is it a comet guiding the fire worshippers?
Or Israel, whose light is shining?
Founded on the land of her forefathers,
Reviving the glory of ages past,
Leading a people from exile,
To build a land with courage and patience.
Her right hand calls for Peace
and a sword in her left awaits the aggressor.
Her deeds outshine those of bygone days
And her praises will be inscribed in the
scrolls of history.

48. As all subjects could put forward a number of changes, the percentages do not total 100%.

49. One could also define the answer to no. 6 as a demand for a rise in standard.

50. See chapter 2, "The National Identity of Israeli Arabs".