A case study was made of comprehensive efforts to get young people to identify with the core ideals of the parental generation through youth organizations in Israel, where over 90% of the adolescents report an active involvement in one or more of three nationwide programs: youth movements, sponsored by political parties and the Scouts, the "Gadna" youth corps, sponsored jointly by the schools and the Ministry of Defense—a sort of high school R.O.T.C. with premilitary as well as national service goals, and beyond-school programs providing group work, skill training, education, and recreational services in community centers and in school buildings after hours. Large samples of youths and youth leaders were interviewed. Among the variables studies were recruitment, programming, resignation, leadership, and attitudes toward national service. Special attention was given to efforts to reach the poor and immigrants. It was found that the overwhelming mood of Israeli youth is not alienation but identification with their country's past, its complex present, and its need for development. The organizations designed to reinforce these attitudes rely more on cooperation than on adult direction. Their peer-group oriented programs, emphasizing individual self-development and national service, provide adolescents with opportunities to acquire status. (Included are historical details and discussion of the implications for nation building and for youth culture management.) (Author/JS)
Final Report

Project No. 5-0375
Contract No. OE 4-10-010

INFLUENCING THE YOUTH CULTURE

A Study of Youth Organizations in Israel

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University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

In collaboration with

Michael Chen
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and Szold Institute of Behavioral Sciences

February 1, 1969

The research reported herein was performed pursuant to a contract with the Office of Education, U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Contractors undertaking such projects under Government sponsorship are encouraged to express freely their professional judgement in the conduct of the project. Points of view or opinions stated do not, therefore, necessarily represent official Office of Education position or policy.

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Organizational Sponsorship

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Henrietta Szold Institute for
Research in the Behavioral Sciences,
Jerusalem, Israel
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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Acknowledgements

Behind every completed social research effort is a study of voluntaristic enthusiasm of many persons. There were thousands who completed questionnaires, hundreds who responded to interviews and dozens who offered administrative and intellectual stimulation to enable the research to proceed.

Data collection required cross-national collaboration of many persons. The United States Office of Education financed the study through a basic research contract. In a world where government sponsorship often leads to close government surveillance, the U. S. Government pattern for sponsoring basic research stands out as a model of free inquiry. It provides opportunities for research without prejudice. Proposals are not accepted or rejected by some anonymous civil servant, no matter how well intentioned. They are reviewed by a panel of citizens, many of them scholars in the field involved. Approval follows, in most cases, these expert recommendations. Persons outside of the scientific community may be insufficiently aware of the freedom which investigators have in the conduct of research within this policy.

The Inter-University Research Program in Institution Building, with funds from the Ford Foundation, invited the Study Director to undertake a cross-national survey of the planning process to institutionalize a youth corps in a few countries where such programs have recently been organized. The Gadna Youth Corps of
Israel offers a suitable laboratory for this purpose. Its staff and programs have been a model for adaptation in many countries of Africa, Asia and South America with help from the Israeli International Cooperation Division. Most of the field work for this comparative survey remains to be done, but the association with fellow scholars of the Inter-University Research Program served to suggest a number of useful analytic guidelines, which are reported in Chapter VIII: Institution Building: The Gadna

The Giora Josephthal Fund of Israel made a grant to the Assistant Director to examine the data collected in the city of Holon for its implication for Israeli youth program policy. A detailed analysis of certain educational concomitants of the data were made by Professor Michael Chen in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Included was a factor analysis of most quantitative and dichotomous variables used in the area sample of the city of Holon, near Tel Aviv.¹

The Szold Institute of Behavioral Science in Jerusalem provided administrative services for the field work in Israel. Its two directors, Professor Moshe Smilanski and his successor, Dr. Chanan Rappaport accorded this study the same kind of concern as to projects directly sponsored by their own staff.

Messrs. Joseph Meyouhas and Aryeh Kreisler of the Youth and Sports Department of the Ministry of Education and Culture helped to open many doors. They were always ready to share ideas and offer advice, administrative clearances, and other essential services. They read some chapters of the manuscript, particularly the one dealing with Beyond School problems, and made some important suggestions for its improvement. The Deputy Ministry of Education, the Hon. Aharon Yadlin M. K., gave the study his encouragement. Mrs. Shoshanah Segal of the Holon Youth Department and the energetic mayor of that satellite city of Tel Aviv, the Hon. Pinhas Eylon, did much to facilitate our use of that area for making an intensive study of youth programs.

The investigators had equally satisfactory experiences with the process of getting clearance from Israel Government sources of information that might be relevant. The administrative relationship of the Gadna Youth Corps with the Israel Defense Forces (Zahal) had as its consequence that some of the required data had to be obtained through official channels. When data were requested, they were usually furnished. And what was perhaps even more important, it was rare to find anyone who thought that his official role would make it necessary for him to defend the current policy. In matters related to youth work, Israeli officials, within the Defense Forces or the Ministry of Education generally were quite free in discussing their own point of view.

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Three former commanders of the Gadna Youth Corps, Colonel Akiba Azmon, Colonel Zvi Ben-Ari and his successor Colonel Moshe Zohar took a strong interest in the study. We were "adopted" by the Gadna without in return being asked to show filial obedience. The research staff was left free to search out relevant information from any available source.

Colonel Mordechai Bar-On, Chief Education Officer and the Liaison Dept. of the Ministry of Defense under the direction of Colonel Nachman Karni, with the support of Moshe Gilboa and Aaron Canaan helped to resolve many issues. They were always available to discuss some of the theoretical, as well as analytical, problems that emerged during the data gathering process. Mr. Yehuda Kavish of the Jewish Agency Youth Dept. called our attention to a number of relevant activities of this body.

The collection and refinement of the raw data in the field would not have been possible without the dedicated efforts of Miss Dalith Ormian, Mrs. Hannah Weiner, and Mrs. Simcha Landau along with the late Mrs. Mellita Roth.

The writing of the report and the refinement of the statistical analysis was done largely at the University of Pittsburgh with the administrative support of Dean William H. McCullough of the Graduate School of Social Work and his Administrative Assistant, Mrs. Elizabeth Mazura. Mrs. Norma Feinberg served as Research Assistant. She was highly imaginative in working out technical details and did much to maintain the morale of the project staff. She did most of the data programming for computer
analysis, and with Dr. Helen Jean Moore, read the entire manuscript to suggest editorial improvements.

The writers also owe an intellectual debt to those who critically reviewed a part, or all of the manuscript and who were always ready to discuss some of the fundamental questions involved in youth culture management. They were Menachem Horovitz and Gideon Levitas. Mrs. Katherine Falk was a most stimulating co-worker, while making a thorough bibliographic survey. Professor Robert Mason of the School of Education at the University always found time to discuss with its junior author many of the questions of this study. Certain sociological issues were clarified in discussion with Professors Menachem Amir, Chaim Adler, Israel Katz and Moshe Lissak of the Hebrew University, Gavrush Nechushtan of Kibbutz Yezreel and Martin Eaton of Kibbutz Yavne.

The most critical test of our findings came in conversation with young Americans and Israelis, who are concretely confronting a moral issue of great magnitude: National service, how and for what ends? Many ideas were suggested by and tested in interviews with adolescents who were considering the question: Shall I volunteer for public service? To them, this book is dedicated.
Summary

Planned programs to influence the youth culture exist in all modern nations. This book is a case study of a comprehensive effort to get young people to identify with the core ideals of the parental generation through youth organizations. They supplement, through planned leisure-time pursuits, the socializations efforts of the schools and the family. The locale is Israel, where over 90% of the adolescents report an active involvement in one or more of three nation-wide programs:

1. Youth movements sponsored by political parties or by the Scouts
2. The Gadna Youth Corps, sponsored jointly by school authorities and the Ministry of Defense
3. Beyond School programs, providing group work, skill training education, and recreational services in community centers and in school buildings after school hours.

The continuity and survival of a social system depends on the capacities of each generation to meet challenges. Role training to assume these responsibilities is highly developed in the Israeli youth programs. It is co-educational, peer-group oriented, with considerable emphasis on individual self-development and on national service. Outside threats combine with utopian social, national and ethical ideals to provide a framework within which a large segment of the youth population are being motivated to spend part of their leisure time in organized groups which combine fun-seeking, learning and national service preparation.

The role of ideology as a national resource is discussed, as well as the achievement crisis which occurs whenever a
revolutionary change program succeeds, its leaders take power, and they want to maintain the same innovative thrust in the oncoming generations.

No revolution is permanent. The Zionist ideology and action program for drastic change through "territorial therapy" of one generation of refugees cannot be transmitted to their native born children, once many of the objectives of the parental social movement have been achieved. The youth programs, therefore, face the complex task of motivating young people to accept the status quo, while finding a new basis for public concern without which no planned social system can maintain a high level of morale and cohesion.

The youth organizations rely more on a cooptative control strategy than on a directive strategy. There is much emphasis on voluntaristic participation, including the programs designed to prepare youngsters for both developmental and military forms of national service.

This study includes historical details, as well as an analysis of the planning process. Israel relies on planned control points rather than central comprehensive planning. There is no single source of power over the youth programs. Each political, religious or politically disinterested adult-making agency is free to compete for the loyalty and concern of the next generation.

Recruitment, programming and resignation of members, as well as the role of peer group leaders and adults are analyzed. Special attention is devoted to efforts to reach the poor and new immigrants.
The youth organizations try hard to interest children of population segments who have difficulty in meeting the requirements for achievement in a modernizing society. Class and ethnic group integration are a problem in Israel, which are consciously faced. This study examines the outcome of these efforts on the basis of extensive survey data of several large samples of the adolescent population and of the leadership personnel of the three major youth organizations.

The overwhelming mood of the youth of Israel is not alienation but identification with their country’s past, its complex present and its uncertain future. There is criticism of the status quo, but it rarely takes the form of organized protest. Most young people seem to be coopted by the existing adult-making agencies to work within the system. There is a minority of idealists who assign a high priority to national service requirement, even at the price of inconvenience or neglect of more personal and family requirements. They have an influence on the majority who are primarily occupied with meeting their self-centered requirements. These more realistic segments will support national service requirements on a routine basis during normal periods and with more enthusiasm during periods of emergency. The detached segments of the youth population, who are organizationally - and often ideologically - disinterested, also were studied in detail. While lower class youth are over-represented in this group, the youth organizations reach out to them, integrate them and provide them with channels for upward mobility.
The impossibility of replicating a youth culture in a laboratory for precise and controlled comparative study creates some special methodological problems. But this fact does not preclude the formulation of generalizations. While no single illustration can prove a theory, a case study can provide insights for the analysis of other complex social systems that are in some respects similar. Theories analyzed include the following:

Acceptance of the theory that the future is determined by the younger, rather than the older, generation facilitates the maintenance of a vital youth culture.

Informal education programs can supplement the schools and can have an impact on the youth culture, if they provide for a wide range of programs and modes of adolescent participation.

Military and developmental public service priorities, when combined, can attract non-militaristic and innovative elites to the defense establishment.

The existence of leadership roles in the youth culture facilitates the learning by adolescents of adult rights and duties.

Organized cooptation of peer groups enables adult-making agencies to influence the youth culture with only occasional resistance to the generational transmission of esteemed social values.
Planning and Nation Building
Cooptation

Countless generations of loving, untrained, and sometimes downright inadequate parents have kept the human race going. They have children and they influence them. This is never a haphazard process. Each family and local community follow cultural prescriptions to socialize the on-coming generation to become committed to ideals cherished by their elders. They present key issues of living as challenges and hope to elicit an approvable response. In modern nations this challenge-response process is planned with deliberation by adult-making institutions. Included among them is the school and some form of national service. This book discusses yet another organized socialization network: Extra-curricular, voluntary and peer-group oriented youth programs. They are controlled by adults, but are often led by young persons. The organizations are specifically designed to coopt rather than to coerce young people to espouse ideals the society hopes to perpetuate.

Much of the education of public service ideals is accomplished in peer group programs in which young people participate with some degree of autonomy. Many of the organized activities are based on the fact that youths are biologically able to perform adult roles. And they want social acceptance of this fact. They can indulge in satisfying emotional and intellectual preferences with fewer restraints than adults, who are weighed down by family responsibility, who have a status to protect, and whose enthusiasm is often dampened by the caution reflecting experience. The power potential of youth groupings explains the great temptations for adult-making institutions to influence young people. Well established interest groups compete in providing commitment education through youth branches.
In the United States, there are Scouts and the Four-H Clubs. Russia has its Komsomol, and Israel has its pioneer youth movements. These organizations, though they differ in many ways, have a common concern: They aim, in part, to challenge adolescents to give a high priority to the performance of public service roles. This includes the performance of acts of good citizenship, the discussion of social issues and consideration of the idea that, in an emergency, they should volunteer for difficult and dangerous assignments. They offer an organizational framework for young people to play approved adult-like roles, to acquire self-confidence and to undergo a rite of passage into a more mature status. The program includes work and adventure, indoctrination and self-expression, study and instruction which the sponsoring adult-making agency views as relevant preparation for becoming a reliable person.

To a greater or lesser extent, these organizations employ cooptation rather than coercion as the preferred process for exercising influence. Adolescents want to establish their identity. Most youth programs attempt to satisfy this objective, by delegating to participants a good deal of influence and power to make choices, provided they are ready to operate within general policies of the sponsoring agency.

Modern societies, unlike their traditional antecedents, are self-consciously concerned with planning their future. They avow the theory that the Great Society is not built by great men -- neither by kings nor by generals. It relies greatly on an idealistic

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1 The distinction between cooptation and other modes of social control was first presented by Philip Selznik, TVA and The Grass Roots: A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organizations, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1949: 13-15.
elite, who can inspire support from less public service oriented "realists." National development has never been just a matter of the availability of manpower and national resources. Development also depends on planned and carefully built social organizations. Some of the poorest countries - as those in South America - are rich in natural resources. Some of the least endowed areas of the world, like Switzerland, Israel and Japan, have gone a long way to compensate for their lack in natural wealth with a high rate of human resource development.

The State of Israel, where a sense of social commitment is highly developed, will serve as our case study of youth organizations and their role in the youth culture. Our study addresses itself to questions such as: In what way can coopted youth organizations transmit cherished social goals from one generation to another? Young people cannot be treated as if they were mere targets for educational inputs of skills on how to fix a car or plant corn. As future citizens, their ideological orientation will be decisive for how the country will be governed. Men are not machines who can be "used" by an impersonal state for very long without becoming very inefficient. Each new generation must become committed anew to accept public service responsibilities. One way to do it is to trust young people and coopt them by providing them with real issues and influence while encouraging them to take responsibility for socially valued tasks.

Public Service

Public service is a normative concept that defies neat operational definition. It implies social commitment and sacrifice. It can be defined as a readiness to assign a high priority to the
accomplishment of ideal-oriented objectives, even at the expense of competing personal convenience or preference. Public Service involves the acting out of good citizenship roles that make social norms operational. Nations and individuals vary in the degree to which public purposes are allowed to influence the determination of personal and family preferences.

The prevalence of honoring public priorities of a country, however defined, can balance discrepancies in population size, natural wealth and military hardware. It is measured less by what people say than by what they will do in circumstances when they can make a choice between actions that would be of private benefit and others which would serve public goals, to their personal detriment or inconvenience. The range is from relatively detached persons, who identify little, if at all, with public purposes to the idealists with the highest degree of commitment to assign priority to the accomplishment of social objectives. The rewards for what they do are internalized, often non-material and spiritual. There is a high degree of voluntarism in their role. From this they may gain much public esteem, and at times they exercise power in the name of the cause which they serve.

The most dramatic instances of public service involve the risk of life for a cause. Lesser degrees of sacrifice involve the readiness to face imprisonment, forego a chance to hold a "safe"
job or to engage in political activity for an unpopular cause, as John F. Kennedy documented well in Profiles in Courage. And there are "dollar a year" men, who give up remunerative and important positions to take complex government assignments. Other indices of public service orientedness are charitable donations and conservation of natural resources.

There was little reliance on public service incentives in the larger premodern states, with such notable exceptions as the Greek city states, the churches and other religious institutions. Governments did most of their business by relying on a system of material rewards and punishments. Princes depended heavily on the services of mercenaries or they resorted to coercion, serfdom and slavery to recruit the men needed to do their bidding. Modern states, especially democracies, rely to a greater extent on voluntaristic efforts to accomplish national objectives. They require the services of public spirited minorities: people committed to give a high priority to serving their community on the basis of self-motivation, far beyond any material rewards than can be offered. Appeals for such commitments are commonplace. Educational programs to nurture them require more planful social action.

Dedication Intensities

Citizens can be divided roughly into three dedication intensity categories, idealists, realists and the detached, on the basis of their operational priority for public service ideals. One of the objectives of youth culture management is to encourage idealistic

priorities and to counteract detachment.

Citizens differ greatly in their readiness to become concerned with public rather than private purposes. Some will voluntarily vote for an increase of their own taxes to build better schools. Others will oppose such a policy to have more personal spending power. Public service idealism is a major motivational ingredient among missionaries, persons who join Catholic orders, peace-corps volunteers and rebels of all types (nationalists, conscientious objectors or journalists refusing to disclose a source of information) who prefer jail to violating their principles. But ideological commitment is always re-enforced by other motives. Even when men risk their lives, as in the war against Hitler and for democracy, soldiers interviewed at the front in a study of combat motivation mentioned "group solidarity," ending the task and "self-preservation" more frequently than "idealism," "duty" and "self-respect."¹

Public service attitudes can be expressed in many social roles. In nursing, social work, teaching, civil service and many other professions, personal preferences are expected to be subdued in favor of public priorities. The importance of public service expectations increase during a period of social crisis. In a war, a

revolution, a depression, or a natural calamity, there are strong demands for higher public priorities in the expenditures of resources, personal and social. The Chinese word for crisis is Wei-Chi, a philosophical combination of two characters, one meaning danger and the other opportunity. This combination of alternatives is the essence of the crisis situation. There are several alternate public policies, each with probable consequences believed to have great meaning for the future of the entire society. Some of the most dramatic crises are military. There are people who will volunteer to defend their country; more will serve if drafted; and there are some who will do all in their power to evade service.

At all times, the number of idealists is limited. They do not usually control the political process but social policies tend to be influenced by them far beyond their numerical strength. Their potential for being influential is a function of their capacity to sustain a high level of civic enthusiasm during a state of crisis, while keeping resources needed for personal needs at a minimum.

The idealistic elite have to rely for support on the much larger (and therefore politically important) realistic segment of the community. Particularly during sustained crisis, idealists are
not sufficient to meet manpower requirements. Realists balance public needs with a strong emphasis on their personal needs. Publicity of the Peace Corps, for instance, takes a realistic approach. It emphasizes as much, if not more, what the Peace Corps can do for its volunteer in the process of recruitment of personnel.

Idealism

"There is nothing that the developing countries need to much as people with trained hands who can pass along their skill to others."¹

"After a cyclone, Roger Hard, a bricklayer in Pakistan along with 7 Pakistani volunteers rebuilt 171 homes and two schools. What's more: his planning and instruction of Pakistani in bricklaying (when it was again possible to get bricks) led to the rebuilding of Kumire into the model community it is today."

Realism

"The Peace Corps is the working man's Rhodes Scholarship, - it gives a person an opportunity to live and work in culture different from any he has known."¹

"Hard left Pakistan soon thereafter ... this work had also given him administrative experience he expects to use in a new career. Today he is studying labor relations at Portland (Oregon) State College."

"The Peace Corps does not guarantee any improvement in future earning power, but service does open new opportunities. Many colleges award academic credit for Peace Corps experience and more than 1000 scholarships are available to former volunteers."

"Private industry is also becoming increasingly interested in former Corpsmen. I.B.M. President Thomas J. Watson says that volunteers who complete their service are particularly employable. They have demonstrated the ability to do tough jobs under difficult circumstances, and there are never enough people of this kind available."

Realists conform to the generalization of Gabriel Almond that "Americans prefer to combine idealistic explanations with pragmatic justification. It must be good for an abstract selfless cause but also be 'good business' . . . Americans would appear to be happiest when they can cloak action motivated by self-interest with an aura of New Testament unselfishness ..."\(^1\) In the words of the ancient Hebrew proverb, the text of an Israeli popular song:

If I am not myself, who will be?
If I am only for myself, what am I?
And if not now -- when?\(^2\)

Realists and idealists differ from the more detached segments of a population who are disinterested in public priorities. In many of the newly emerging countries the detached represent a majority of the citizenship. Identification with national objectives is weak. The emery of most people is concentrated on personal, family, local and tribal needs. During a crisis, this condition changes only slightly. The detached feel they have little reason for identification with the larger social order. Many of them are poor, culturally disadvantaged, emotionally ill or feel discriminated against. Emergency measures like rationing or licensing will be viewed as irrelevant to their needs.


Even in the world’s richest country, a Presidential Commission in 1964 reported that many young people have good reasons for non-identification with national security needs. One-third of all young men in the nation turning 18 would be found unqualified if they were to be examined for induction into the armed forces. Of them, about one-half would be rejected for medical reasons. The remainder would fail through inability to qualify on academic achievement and mental tests.¹

Usually there is a tendency to keep this disaffected or detached segment to a minimum. Those in power or the opposition wishing to replace them exhort young people to be **idealistic**, that is, to place high priority on public purposes, even at the price of personal inconvenience and sacrifice. And if not idealistic, they expect young people to show realism in balancing social and self needs.

Voluntarism

A key element in public service is voluntarism. It can be defined as the degree to which a task is performed in response to normative or idealistic power,² rather than remunerative or coercive power. Volunteers often achieve an elite status by virtue of their readiness to sacrifice for public purposes. This differentiates from more established elites, whose power is derived from wealth, the accident


of birth into a prestigious family or control over military resources. Idealistic elites represent an important avenue for social mobility. Even young people can gain considerable influence by virtue of their identification with an idealistic cause that enjoys public esteem and by their willingness to sacrifice for the actualization of these ideals. Removal of mines from a battle field is forced labor if enemy civilians are required to do it. It is idealism of the highest order when done by soldiers who volunteered to perform this public service. Voluntarism can give social prestige to otherwise menial, difficult or dangerous jobs.¹

The actual tasks performed by volunteers are often the same as those performed by some non-voluntaristic employee. What differs is the social meaning attached to what is done. When a job is regarded as a public service, those who perform it can more easily demand and receive social support to insure their success. This access to social support is why so much youth work is on a non-profit basis. This voluntaristic element endows the programs with symbolic meaning for the survival of cherished social values.

Young people are primarily consumers of other peoples' attention in their home and school. They can be producers of attention for other people when they serve as volunteers. In this role they are often allowed to perform services the adult society values, but would not pay for. Volunteering opens up new opportunity

structures that enable youths to practice adult roles and begin to be recognized for them. It is hard to criticize, discipline or to fire a volunteer. As a result, the frequency competitive rules under which men work are modified. A volunteer youth leader who conducts a swimming class will get help from other citizens who think that his job is also theirs. Since he asks little for himself, he can demand that others help out with donated labor, rent-free quarters or whatever else is needed. The commercial swimming school cannot count on such support. Its owner will have to be licensed and pay taxes.

Planning

National development requires planning, the determination and enforcement of public priorities. Detailed planning is usually done only for selected control points of the social system, as in the allocation of budgets or rationing. Many plans are implemented voluntarily. Under emergency conditions, planning will become more comprehensive. In war, it becomes nearly total. In peace time, for instance, manpower tends to be planned only on the basis of making broad determinations of how much labor should be allocated to one or the other segments of the economy. In war, many citizens will work on jobs that are assigned nationally. They are drafted to serve in the army or to perform specific civilian tasks.

Our generation has witnessed the attainment of independence of nearly all areas of the world. Some of them, formerly ruled by colonial powers, barely emerged from the iron age. They expected to become transformed quickly into twentieth century nations once their flag was raised at the United Nations. Unfortunately, they lacked the manpower to work planfully for national development. The component tribes, races and religious groups had been unified on a purely negative basis - hatred of the former rulers.
Once this unifying scapegoat disappeared there was no new idea to replace it. In the pursuit of tribal interests, or to support the dreams of empire of their dictators, millions have been killed in civil wars. Others were forced to become refugees. Many of these new nations have experienced a drop in their standard of living.

This type of achievement crisis was particularly pronounced in Indonesia, Egypt, the Congo and in Nigeria. In repeated revolutions, some of the most idealistic and well educated persons were forced into inconsequential posts, had to flee or were murdered. The nations concerned are now having difficulty in motivating young people in sufficient number to work hard for positive developmental objectives.

In Israel, whose youth organizations we shall study, the achievement crisis has been of more modest dimension. Conflicting interest groups have learned to co-exist. Unity is not only encouraged by the existence of military threat from the outside; it is nurtured by the existence of a Zionist ideology, which is widely shared by the Jewish population. It provides a normative basis for positive planning. Major national planning issues are being debated openly. Planning for nation-building involves other than technical criteria. It involves the implementation of controversial public service values into actions which often call for a downgrading of private priorities.

**Competing Priorities**

The core values that support planning for socio-economic development are never perfectly integrated. There always are
multiple criteria, public and private, by which the desirability of an action can be judged. This fact gives rise to an often unmentioned variable of the planning process: its competing priorities. There always are values opposed to those upon which a plan is predicated. They introduce an inefficiency factor, which must be taken into account, unless those responsible for a plan have the will and the capacity to ignore all competing cultural values and to silence those who support them. For instance, the objective of educating young people has to be achieved in traditional families in the face of a prevailing belief that girls, the future mothers of the society, will be corrupted if exposed to too much education. Sometimes this means that girls are kept out of school altogether. Other parents will at least impose restriction on participation in peer group programs away from home.

The issue of competing priorities is highlighted in the confrontation of military and developmental priorities in the national planning process. All nations maintain military establishments for reasons of prestige, as well as security, internal or external. In some the priority assigned to the purchase of complex military hardware and the training of necessary experts is so high, that major developmental projects are shelved. Children die of minor infections for the lack of penicillin pills, costing pennies, while their government maintains million dollar fleets of supersonic planes, flown by pilots who could have become physicians.

No implication is intended that all military expenditures can be dispensed with. Some countries might not survive without military
deterrent forces against internal or external opposition. But if optimum social-economic development is the goal of a national plan, military priorities represent an inefficiency factor.

Military activities do not exclude the possibility of having a developmental "pay-off," but their essence is negative - the prevention of conquest by an enemy or the enhancement of internal security. Military activities receive greater publicity. Countries have not yet learned to have an independence parade honoring those who create products of their farms and factories. Instead, military men are rewarded more medals, though their work can affect a nation's development capability only indirectly.

Public service can be rendered through both military channels and developmental programs. Under a military system, planning priorities are set and enforced by command from above. Developmental programs generally allow for more citizen participation in the priority determination process. Another fundamental distinction is that planning for non-military development tends to be less comprehensive. It is often restricted to control points through an allocation budgeting or a licensing system. The distinction between the two types is highlighted by the following conceptual model:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functional Variable</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Developmental</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goals</td>
<td>Destructive or the prevention of destruction</td>
<td>Creative - addition to existing resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risks</td>
<td>Life, limb, health and property</td>
<td>Comfort, convenience and limitation on self-centered pursuits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Limited to period of a military service</td>
<td>Less limited - can require lifetime dedication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skills</td>
<td>Military emphasis with only incidental carry-over to civilian life</td>
<td>Production oriented, with carry-over to military capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>Priorities determined publicly and affecting all aspects of living</td>
<td>Public determination of priority usually limited to control points of the system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision Making</td>
<td>By command; very limited public participation</td>
<td>Considerable public participation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A high rate of development can occur even with a sizeable inefficiency factor. The planning process can never be fully rationalized so that all alternate cultural deterrents will be ignored. Planning involves more than the determination and public enforcement of technically relevant priorities. Allowance must be made for the fact that there are cherished cultural values which enjoy support even though they require actions which are technically irrelevant or contrary to a plan and its implementation.

In Israel, where a high proportion of the national income is devoted to defense, there also is a strong emphasis on economic development. Technical planning requirements are often modified.
by competing cultural priorities. The Co-existence of these functions in the youth culture will be examined in detail.

Search for a Moral Equivalent to War

Readiness to give public service seems to be related to the degree of crisis in a society. When the frontiers are developmental, idealists and realists are not easily distinguishable. When there is enough income to pay them, both pay their taxes. Both work to meet self-needs, while doing something to fulfill public requirements.

The distinction between idealists and realists becomes most evident during an emergency, especially a war, when individuals must make fateful choices between what they can expect from the nation and what they must be prepared to give.

In the hope of counteracting the reduction of public service readiness during peace, a moral equivalent to war strategy was first advocated by Professor William James. Before World War I, he urged in a now classic essay that youth be conscripted for peaceful, rather than military, purposes. They would be assigned to hardship tasks of social significance in a war against poverty and a natural calamity to get the childishness knocked out of them and to come back to society with healthier sympathies and soberer ideas.

They would have paid their blood tax, done their own part in the immemorial human warfare against nature, they would tread the earth more proudly, the women would value them more highly, they would be better fathers and teachers of the following generation.¹

There are those who hold that lasting peace is probably unobtainable and that it might not be in the best interest of society. They would dismiss James' proposal as utopian. So far, these critics seem to have been correct. Many nations maintain a continuous atmosphere of war hysteria to keep up "unity." But there are seedlings in military establishments throughout the world for peaceful uses. Hugh Hanning reports them particularly well developed in Israel where "the need for military readiness is matched by a comparable need to mobilize the nation against a harsh and unrewarding physical environment. To this need they have responded by building on tradition and modernizing the concept of the soldier-farmer."

The existence of real or imagined military threat in so much of the world has constrained the few voices who would shift priorities in national service from being primarily military to becoming more development oriented. Without war threat it may well be more difficult to get large numbers of people to volunteer for public service tasks that have peaceful rather than military objectives. In the dedication of a physician to his patients or incorruptibility of a public servant, there is less drama than in the downing of an enemy plane. But unless man succeeds in finding a way to guide public service enthusiasm towards developmental and peaceful goals, war and war threat will continue to be used widely to promote nationalist fervor.


Commitment Education

Young people everywhere must learn to see their world in five dimensions: Length, width, height, time and purpose. The first four dimensions are well defined. Not so the fifth dimension: the purposes which men strive and for which objects are used. An adolescent can use a stop watch to time himself to the length of a hundreth of a second in the hundred-meter dash. But there is no single standard for deciding why he should run so fast. To keep physically fit? To win glory for his team? To gain personal fame? Would he be better off if he were to use his time studying accounting and competing in the job market?

What for is a question that applies to every activity of individuals and of societies. Answers are never simple. But they are essential for personal and social stability. Existence without personal goals is demoralizing - even pathological. Social life without fundamental consensus yields anarchy and anomie. Agreement on basic values is particularly difficult to arrive at in a modern society, in which there is a rapid rate of change. New ideas compete with traditional values. Confusion about the purposive dimension of living is common.

One of the characteristics of traditional societies is that parents feel secure in their beliefs. There is not much ambivalence about indoctrinating their offspring. Modern parents are generally less sure of themselves. They have problems in transmitting a well-defined philosophy of life to their children for they have experienced
our modern era as Winston Churchill describes in his biography:

"I wonder often whether any other generation
has seen such outstanding revolutions of data
and values as those through which we have lived.
Scarcely anything material or established which
I was brought up to believe was permanent and
vital, has lasted. Everything I was sure or
taught to be sure was impossible, has happened."¹

Education not only involves knowledge and skills, it includes
indoctrination of young people to embrace the nation building
beliefs, hopes and values that sustain the planning process. Commit-
ment education answers the question: "What for?" It occurs
not only in schools, but in churches and synagogues. It can never
be divorced too much from the real world. When doctrinaire pres-
sure to serve unrealistic causes is applied to young people by well
entrenched power figures, senility and death will force them in time
to yield to succession by the youth whom they once controlled.
Stalin, for instance, like other meglo-maniacs before him chose
priorities that were symptoms of a paranoid personality and often
defeated national planning objectives. His successors redefined
him from being a national savior to a criminal psychopath.

The inevitability of generational succession is an ever-present
social reality no matter what power of persuasion, control or terror
is employed to retard its social change impact. Stalin's own
daughter left Russia to campaign for civil liberty at home. And
still younger Soviet citizens have sought martyrdom by publishing

¹ Winston S. Churchill, My Early Life: A Roving Commission
what they believed, but knew to be, officially frowned upon. In commenting upon the current evidence of rebelliousness of Soviet youths, Edward Crankshaw, a British Kremlinologist, notes:

"For decades anyone who dared speak up in the Soviet Union, even privately among friends, would find himself taken away in the middle of the night, imprisoned, interrogated, sent to forced labor, if not shot. Why, then, has the sequestration of a few young writers so profoundly shocked a society so long accustomed to terror? The answer is that the young genuinely believed that the spirit of the highest authority had changed, and that all that was necessary to make the Soviet Union a fit place for honest men and women was a show of the boldness and determination they found lacking in their elders." ¹

**Ideology as a National Resource**

Idealism makes men willing to plant trees that will benefit only the next generation. It will support a heavy program of saving and taxation to raise capital for development. It will induce a significant minority to sacrifice for commonly shared values in more substantial ways—economic as well as personal. Ideas are weapons, is what Max Lerner proposes in a seminal book² which examines the impact on ideologies that become internalized by people.

There is a tendency to exaggerate the significance of material possessions for social change and national development. This bias has been re-enforced by the valid observations that the actions of men are influenced by economic considerations. How men are related ¹

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²Max Lerner, Ideas Are Weapons, New York, Viking Press, 1940.
to the means of production no doubt affects their lives, but this Marxian theory must not blind anyone to the fact that individuals and groups also act with economic irrationality. Without commitment education, even generous economic incentives may be insufficient for rapid nation-building. Remunerative incentives are a very limited basis for development, as is indicated by Lybia, Iraq and Ghana. While these countries are relatively richly endowed with natural resources, their population includes as yet few who are also highly responsive to strong idealism for nation-building. In contrast, Israel and Japan, while poor in natural wealth, have populations that include strong minorities of idealists who give high priority to public needs, even at the cost of some personal inconvenience and loss. Their challenge by adversity after World War II was great. But so was the response of their nation-building elites. These countries lead the world in a rapid rate of development. ¹ Many other variables, like investment and technical aid, affect development. But commitment is a concrete socio-economic resource.

The basis for normative or patriotic consensus is eroding in many countries which are experiencing rapid social change. Emigrants or their parents moved from a farm to a village; from village to a city. Or they migrated to a new country. They question the "old" ways without having alternate standards to replace them.

Young people grow up without being able to accept the traditional values held by their grandparents, values about which many of their parents already had doubts. For instance, honesty is seen as a "good policy," but men who get ahead without honesty can become leaders of the community. Patriotism may be extolled verbally, but only a minority of parents want their children to enter national service. In each county there are many men uncertain if any public issue is worth sacrificing for. They are primarily addressing themselves to family, neighborhood, and tribal concerns.

The requirement of missionary service of Mormon Youths, Quaker Work Camps, Russia's Komsomol, Ethiopia's University Service, Germany's "Wiedergutmachung" (Reconstruction) Labor Projects and Israel's Gadna Youth Corps are all applications of the theory that public service is good both for society and for the person. Premature resignation is not merely a matter of cancelling a membership. It involves a loss of status, inherent in such concepts of being a "deserter" to the common ideals. Comprehensive commitment is expected of members in these elite youth organizations. They aim at more than member-self development. They have as their objective the moral revitalization and/or political influence on the larger society.¹ Members are expected to identify largely or totally with

the movement, at the expense of other peer group loyalties. What is required is a partial moratorium from self-centered pursuits. As a Director of Training of the Peace Corps points out, "Public service is different from the pattern of careerism, that begins in early high school for many U.S. youths. They learn to plan every move of work, study or pleasure, within the context of building a 'record', curricular and extra-curricular."

Conclusion

The relative success of a plan for nation-building is not only a function of its technical perfection. It also is dependent on its inefficiency factor. No planned social change can ignore the existence of competing priorities. Culture is not rational. Every plan has to take account of alternate interests and deterrent social forces. Their containment to a realistic minimum is the challenge that differentiates nations which do well from those which do poorly in planning and implementing an actual program.

This generation is witnessing the emergence of new nations at an unprecedented scale. The local populations have attained sovereignty in most areas in the world. But after their flag is raised and the new national anthem has stirred the citizenry, they wake up the next morning to face the challenge: Nationhood for what?

In India, the Congo, Nigeria and Indonesia independence was followed by sectional and tribal struggles. In Egypt and Ghana, the end of colonial rule led to efforts to restore ancient empires.

Many resources were allocated to meet competing military priorities. Others were destroyed in civil riots between competing power cliques. Military and prestige expenditures compete with developmental investments in the national budgets of all new nations.

This book will proceed from an assumption that the pace of planned nation-building or of development is never simply a function of natural resources. Their scarcity can be more than compensated for by planning with a low inefficiency factor. This is possible because competing priorities are kept down to a reasonable degree by an elite with a strong public service commitment, an active minority who are ready to give high priority to the satisfaction of agreed upon public needs even at the inconvenience of alternate and more person oriented priorities.

Such an elite is neither hereditary nor a function of privilege. It is self-selected and voluntaristic. It is unlikely to emerge without deliberately planned programs, like youth organizations, for the utilization of national service volunteers. Volunteers must be trusted with responsibility and held to standards of performance. Their impact on the country is a function of the intensity of their commitment, their number and the balance between what allocations are made by these elite to military and developmental needs. These two utilities are not mutually exclusive. But when high value is placed on military gains, many of the society's resources and its most gifted and dedicated officials are less available for the implementation of developmental requirements.  

In a modern society, the recruitment of idealistic elite is not left to chance. It is facilitated by adult making institutions, which include commitment education among their functions. These adult making institutions include the school, the army and youth organizations. The latter, unlike the school or the army, rely largely on voluntaristic recruitment. Their programs are directed by adults, but day-to-day operations are also influenced much by youthful leaders and by their members.

The theory that a dedicated minority of idealists can help inspire other more realistic segments of the population to work together to achieve public purposes is a specific instance of a more general sociological proposition: what social groups want to have happen, can happen, if their desire is matched with a plan to bring about the change. This theory has also been described as the self-fulfillment theory.¹

This book will deal with informal educational programs designed to challenge a proportion of the country's youth to volunteer for public service and to motivate much of the remainder to contribute to public purposes within the limits of their more personal and family requirements. The report will also deal with what is being done organizationally to reduce to a minimum the proportion of detached youths, who will feel no identification with these nation-building priorities. It will examine the balance of military and developmental objectives in the commitment education program of a country with a serious and chronic security problem, as well as a core ideology that places much value on social-economic development.

II

YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS
Adult-Making and the Youth Culture

Education for public service is part of the function of an inter-related network of social institutions. They include the Family, School, Religion and in many lands, a National Service. They have the purpose of adult-making, of socializing the young. Each of the mentioned institutions is adult directed, with a plan to influence the youth culture and values to which it becomes committed.

Youth culture is the web of normative directives of a society to its young members - its rules, customs, fashions and fads. These norms tend to be somewhat different for the young than their parents, particularly in rapidly changing societies. Adolescents who can take a tranquilizer before an examination or a "pill" before a date and who will hear their President psycho-analyzed by a television commentator face life-problems with which the parents had no experience. Innovation has always been the privilege of youth as well as its destiny. Even in less rapidly changing cultures young people must learn to take adult roles under circumstances that are different from those their parents experienced. They must separate from their homes to form their own families of procreation. They must enter the world of work, learn to make decisions and to take risks. This process of generational transition is universal, but it has taken added significance in modern times. Its young people grow up in a world the adult-making institutions often fail to take account of the rapid pace of social change.

Commitment education for conformity to adult expectations begins in the family, as does every aspect of social identity.
This is where the young begin to learn answers to the questions "Who am I?", "What am I?" and "What for?" The national language is acquired and emotional links are developed with a historic sense of community. Attitudes of readiness for patriotic and communal service are most likely to flourish if supported by the family. But the means for their expression require a larger social framework than the kinship group.

Commitment education is continued and reenforced in the public school. But such indoctrination is not the school's primary function. Its curriculum tends to be focused on pragmatic subjects, the learning skills and the acquisition of knowledge. Most of the time is devoted to "how to do it" courses. Much less time is given to history and civics which properly taught, acquaint students with nation-building issues that confront their body politic.

The school rarely has a strong ideological impact, especially in democratic states, where different political parties compete for power. In such countries controversial political and moral issues that young people must confront are often deliberately avoided in the curriculum. Such omissions also occur in totalitarian states where teachers fear to discuss them openly. Schools and universities more often become the seedbed of change on the basis of clandestine study and discussion outside the official curriculum.

Voluntary youth organizations are under no such constraints for neutrality. They can be frankly partisan. And they often are. They do not try to appeal to everybody. Some espouse a particular political or economic philosophy such as "Free Enterprise", socialism, anarchism or some form of nationalist revival.
There are also more middle class and establishment-oriented organizations like the Scouts, group work programs, extra-curricular activities and recreation services. These stress more neutral civic virtues. They avoid major public controversies, very much as the public schools do. This similarity may help to explain why they are sometimes closely related administratively to the schools.

**School and Youth Organizations**

The first step taken in modern societies to contain the youth culture was universal compulsory education. Youth organizations followed. There are few activities of such youth programs which could not also be sponsored by a school. Both can conduct sports activities, discussions and hikes. They can sponsor clubs, help develop leadership and organize the idealistic elite for public service programs. When two institutions co-exist, the question naturally arises: "Why are there several organizational alternatives for accomplishing the same objective?"

The answer may be related to the different prerequisites for participation in each of these institutions. Schools cannot go far in coopting peer groups. They cannot yield much power to the students. Their primary task is technical, the counteraction of illiteracy and ignorance. Teachers and principals, being in full charge, organize what they regard as optimum conditions for the acquisition of skills. Students are evaluated by how much they know. Fierce competition is generally encouraged.

In contrast, peer groups follow a set of different rules. Courtship, intra-mural sports, debating, the enjoyment of music or other "fun" activities are the object of interaction. There are no comprehensive examinations or grades. High value is placed
on emotionally laden experiences like comradeship, participation and loyalty to shared ideals. Schools are therefore often supplemented planfully by a separate informal education network. The latter does not have the built-in limitations of schools for counteracting peer group influences.

This is why two frameworks, the school and the youth organizations, can/do co-exist. They serve different functions. Youth leaders unlike teachers do not have to demonstrate their skill on the basis of competitive accomplishments of their charges. Success involves such variables as "Who participated", "How often" and with "What meaning to the formation of social identity of the adolescents."

Of the two institutions, the school is the more firmly rooted in most parts of the world. This is where the young study skills and "safe" ideas. In totalitarian, and even in many democratic countries, there are nationally planned educational systems. But youth-serving institutions speak less often with a single voice. Certainly in multi-party states, with democratic governments, there is no central source of power, even when government and semi-public bodies support many of the youth programs. In school systems, uniformity is often imposed by such devices as nationwide text books, accompanied by teachers manuals and work-books, performance testing and final examinations. Young people cannot resign from school without considerable opposition from adult figures. They can leave a youth organization with much less and sometimes no loss of status. Such organizational flexibility facilitates the involvement of young people. To be a pupil in good standing, a student is evaluated by adults by how well he acquires specified occupational skills,
technical knowledge and develops school-approved attitudes. In youth organizations the "curriculum" is much less formal. Young people can take part in programming and policy making. In a wood-working class in a vocational high school, the teacher prescribes what is being done. In a wood-working group in a youth center, the activity is defined as a hobby. Training in personal hygiene occurs in both schools and youth movements, as do discussions of recent history, ethics and philosophy. But in a voluntary youth organization unconventional ideas, such as the use of LSD, sexual freedom or political change can be discussed with less bureaucratic clearance.

In youth organizations, there also is less competitiveness than in schools. Voluntary youth programs can appeal to youngsters who get poor grades in school. Leadership, humor, athletic skills and sex appeal can give them a basis for peer group status which they cannot get in school on the basis of their marginal knowledge and skill. Their youth program performance will be rated by a different set of criteria. In such circumstances, new youth culture patterns can be innovated and tested. Fashions, fads and protests can be tolerated.

Formal youth organizations were rare in ancient or medieval times. Nor do they exist in contemporary traditional or what S. N. Eisenstadt calls "non-kinship or universalistic" societies.¹ In these pre-development cultures, adolescence is a brief interlude between childhood and adolescence. There is not too much role

uncertainty, though romantic observers have been apt to exaggerate the bucolic simplicity of these so called "simple" societies. However, identity is taught early and unequivocally. Adult responsibilities are expected early, especially in the area of work. Marriages can take place after puberty and full employment often begins before it. Levels of aspiration of young people are realistic, not far removed from what could be achieved with moderate effort. Each person is born with an established status. Semi-slavery, indentured service and corporal punishment -- even abuse have at times been quite acceptable as means of controlling the next generation.¹

In the more modern social systems there is an increasing number of organizational mechanisms to postpone adult status. Youths are sent to college, in part to "find themselves," not just to train for specific adult roles. The status and role transition from childhood to adulthood is slow, resulting in many role uncertainties. Adolescents are expected to postpone marriage for several years after puberty. The state grants voting status years after young people think they are qualified for it. Except in times of dire emergency like war are youths made to think that they have a real part to play in the on-going social system. Quite often schools serve as institutions for the prolongation of "nobodyness." Controversial questions have to be handled gingerly. Many modern adults are ill-at-ease about or totally opposed to the public discussion of moral, sexual, religious and political controversies. In some circles, such questions are barely thought to be appropriate for adult consideration.

The public school tends to reflect this lack of normative consensus.

Ninety youth organizations were reported in the 1950's in France, 141 in the Netherlands and 115 in the German Federal Republic.\(^1\) Hundreds of these youth serving agencies exist in the United States at national, state and local levels, under both governmental and voluntary sponsorship.\(^2\)

1. European Seminar on New Methods of Working with Youth Groups, United Nations, Marjaniemi, Helsinki, Finland, August 1955: 15-20, Geneva 1956: 15. For more up-to-date data on Germany, see Federal Ministry For Family and Youth Affairs, International Youth Meetings, Germany, Koln, Europa Union Verlag, 1968.


About one boy in every four, aged 11-13, is a Boy Scout; one in 10 belongs to a farm organization like the 4-H Club. Forty-one per cent of a national sample reported themselves as not belonging to any club and 5 per cent were not members of any athletic team. One-fourth of the pre-adolescent sample were not members of any organized group, but only 3 per cent indicated that they had neither gang, clique or best-friend associations. See Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, A Study of Boys Becoming Adolescents, Ann Arbor, Michigan, The University of Michigan, and Boy Scouts of America, 1960: 6-10.

Among girls 11 to 13, only about one-third reported not belonging to a club or organized group. University of Michigan, Research Center, Adolescent Girls: A Nation-Wide Study of Girls Between Eleven and Eighteen Years of Age, Ann Arbor, Michigan, n.d.: 157-161. The unaffiliated girls, as in the comparative study of boys, came from primarily low status and rural families and from very high status families.

Because of the great variations in the way records are kept, it is doubtful that these reports document much more than that these organizations reach large number of youngsters, including pre-adolescents.
The diversity of organized youth groups in these multi-party states stands in contrast with what exists in highly controlled societies. In newly emerging nations the expansion of both schools and youth organizations are among the many signs of modernization, but most of the youth organizations are sponsored by the same government that also runs the school. This is true of the Ghana Workers Brigade or the National Volunteer Service programs of the Governments of Kenya, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, the Phillipines and Thailand. In the more authoritarian lands there is not only a single organizational framework; young people are bluntly discouraged from becoming interested in political action generated by peer groups. Spontaneous youth leadership is suppressed. In the extreme case, when Hitler assumed power in Germany, all of the country's youth organizations were either dissolved or "gleichgeschaltet" (integrated). In the single party countries, like Poland and the U.S.S.R., only one major youth organization is allowed, but there are many less formal "circles" especially in the universities. Participation in the state sponsored youth organization is a virtual "must" for youths planning a political, educational, or a public-service career. It smooths the path to upward social mobility, to higher education, and to other career advantages. There always are exceptions to this controlling tendency, but at least in theory, youth organizations in single-party countries are seen as

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instruments of central control. They do not stress what youth organizations can do for young people. They ask what young people do for the party. In the name of "national interest," young people are expected to work under adult direction to support the political and/or religious principles of those in charge of the government.  

Peer groups - formal or temporary - differ from all these adult-making institutions because much of the initiative and power is in the hands of youths. Young members can compete with the better entrenched adult authority figures, such as parents, school and government officials. Friendship groups, cliques and gangs which stress sociability but have no clearly defined programs, provide youth-controlled environments for learning new social roles. Youth culture innovations emerge in such settings and are expressed in a variety of group activities, including sports, dancing, dating, music, hiking, adventure, "hanging out," crime or political protest. There are no long-range planning and no hierarchy of formal leaders. At times, peer groups adopt an action program like a hike, a dance, a delinquent rumble, a sit-down strike against racial discrimination, or a campaign in support of a particular political figure. But they rarely develop a stable organizational structure.

The spontaneity and voluntarism of peer group associations give them a basis for being very influential on the youth culture and on individual youngsters. Old patterns are tested; new ways of dealing with life problems are likely to emerge. Adult-making institutions are, therefore, tempted to sponsor youth groups.

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Many parents, favoring such indirectly controlled programs, will encourage their children to join them.

Unlike the schools, youth organizations are elective. This is their most distinctive feature. They are age and sometimes sex-limited. Children can choose to belong or resign, be active or nominal in their participation. Some have ideological selection criteria. Others are more activity centered or stress the learning of skills and hobbies. Overall policies, even when determined by adults, reflect more youth power than that in other social role-training programs. Training for approved adult role behavior is an incidental rather than an explicit objective. Youth leaders can serve as volunteers, without professional qualifications. Unlike teachers, social workers and army officers, they need not be adults. Their actions are less often predicated on the expectation of making this work their career.

The schools are too formal to be informal as well. But youth work, both inside and outside school auspices, is also becoming professionalized. In the USA, fewer ministers run church clubs. The job is turned over to an Educational Director. Group Work and Recreation leadership are graduate level training programs. The importance of amateur citizens in the youth services is declining.

An expansion of youth programs, personnel, buildings and equipment can be expected, regardless of the organizational development that will be employed. The management of youth culture is a "growth industry." This can be observed universally, in the more developed as well as the less developed countries, where leisure is thought of not only as a luxury but also as a "problem."
There has been little systematic study of this emerging network to influence the youth culture. Our book aims to make a contribution to identifying what some of the issues are and in providing selected data to facilitate their examination.

Control Strategies

Patterned relationships between young people and the adult-making agencies vary considerably. In families, traditional parents tend to object to manifestation of the emerging youth culture, which conflict with the parental way of life. Somewhat more permissive traditionalists will consider each youth culture innovation on its merits. Parents decide unilaterally which fads they will tolerate or disapprove. In more modern families, a feed-back process exists between parents and their children. Though the parents retain veto power, they will delegate much power to their children to engage in innovative fads as long as this delegated authority is exercised within limits set by the parents. When the latter lose control over their children, a revolutionary family situation is created.

Similar variations in patterned behavior can be observed at the organizational level. Those responsible for youth culture management operate on the basis of a variety of models or combination of types. Each characterizes a way for adults to relate themselves to youth culture manifestations:

1. Lowest on the scale of peer group power is a negative strategy. It opposes most separatist youth culture manifestations as dangerous, if not anti-social.
2. Next on the scale is the directive strategy. It accepts the development of a youth culture as inevitable. But it relies on close adult supervision of peer group activities to encourage socially acceptable behavior and to compartmentalize or anesthetize dissident practices. Directiveness is made tempting by the fact that all youth organizations are temporary social systems. Members change frequently as one cohort gets older and a younger one takes its place. Only the adult leaders and organizers remain active for a longer period and thus provide for organizational continuity. In any temporary social system, those who are organizing it can easily control potentially competitive peer groups. Unless they encourage it, little or no feedback from the young people need to be tolerated.

3. A more positive acceptance of an autonomous youth culture is implied when a cooptation strategy is used. Peer groups are incorporated by an established adult power elite into an organizational framework which the adults have established. The incorporated youths surrender their autonomy in return for delegated posts of secondary leadership and the right to participate in policy formation, within a general framework acceptable to the adult power group. Youth culture innovations are rarely rejected unilaterally without prior consultation with the young people.

Cooptation differs from cooperation, where a coalition of equally powerful groups work together to accomplish a common objective. Neither group surrenders their autonomy.

4. And finally there is the revolutionary strategy. The youth culture tries to displace the existing establishment. Revolutionary youth groups aim to wrest power from the adult-making agencies. This can be done in a variety of ways, such as overthrowing the government or by abandoning parental ways in favor of new institutions, which co-exist with those they intend to replace. The latter path was chosen by the contemporary Zionist Kibbutz movements and the utopian communal societies in the United States during the nineteenth century. Theirs' was not a revolution by violence, but be setting up alternate social systems by hard work.¹

The differences among the four strategies are crudely symbolized by different expressions used in English to characterize adolescents.

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<tr>
<th>Adult Strategy for Youth Culture Management</th>
<th>Terminology to Characterize Adolescents</th>
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<td>Negative</td>
<td>Being &quot;a nothing&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Directive</td>
<td>&quot;Teen-ager&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cooptative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
<td>Being &quot;a somebody&quot;</td>
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**The Negative Approach**

Power or tradition oriented adult-making agencies tend to give a high priority to objectives of preventing alienation, deviancy and delinquency. This is the principal concern for relating to the emerging youth culture of their society. The popular press will often applaud a "firm" local ordinance that attempts to discourage disapproved youth culture manifestations. They may forbid beards, short skirts, smoking or beer drinking in school, not to mention drug taking and sexual acting-out. Negativistically inclined youth culture control agents may become obsessed with even minor fads and other innocuous youth culture innovations. Some school principals devote their talents to administrative measures to outlaw such symptoms of deviancy as sneakers for boys or slacks for girls. Negativism towards youth culture fads is prevalent among

a not uncommon species of high school principal, enforcing their rules with vigilance not used when the issues are educational.

The negative strategy towards youth culture innovations is complicated by the inconsistency of this policy. Outside of school, sneakers and slacks are acceptable forms of clothing. When young people are warned against indulgences - smoking, alcohol and sex - they are being asked to forego experiences that are meaningful, if not highly valued, by their own parents. In institutions where the negative strategy is particularly strongly pushed, certain orphanages, reformatories and many residential schools, the outward acceptance by adolescents of what adults demand of them is accompanied by a secret and very deviant youth culture.

The negativistic approach to the youth culture becomes particularly contradictory in change-oriented societies. How can one expect young people to develop initiative while withholding from them the choice making which is associated with the possession of adult physical, intellectual and emotional capacities? Young people cannot be expected to take up school "student government" with enthusiasm if there is only "play government" without decision making power. One cannot root-out smoking when parents consume several packs a day. Nor is this particular problem made easier by the fact that mass media spend billions to counteract medical evidence about the dangers of cancer with seduction to "let go."

No generation can entirely conform. Few parents will bring the kind of pressures on their children to exercise as much control as is theoretically possible. Many accept an adolescent moratorium on deviancy. The Hutterites, for instance, postpone baptism until
after adolescence to give young people a chance to try out forbidden experiences without the serious indictment of mortal sin.¹

Conservatives everywhere tend to idealize the compliant youth culture. But their objective is unrealistic in any rapidly changing society. Everywhere today young people must face a world their parents barely understand. Adult-makers are unsuccessful even in highly controlled one-party states in nurturing a passive youth culture. In spite of their well-oiled social control apparatus, they have not succeeded in imposing a truly negativistic approach to youth culture innovations. Young people, including the children of Russian leaders, are attracted by such "deviant" goals as American jazz. A significant minority imbibe alcohol irrespective of adult disapproval. Many prefer materialistic rewards to Komsomol esteem. And those with intellectual and idealistic aspiration find fascination in many of the ideas their government views as subversive.

The Directive Approach

Few American adult-making agencies espouse a purely negativistic strategy toward youth culture management. Church groups will sponsor a dance; schools will hold a debate on drug use. The progressive high school principal or church youth leader will avoid moralizing with young people about their dress and manner. In all modern societies, adult-making institutions are under pressure to encourage young people to think about change. Many a high school has a Youth Council to adopt a code of behavior, which will then be enforced administratively. But the organization protects itself by investing the principal with the power of veto over Youth Council decisions.

The directive approach requires that adults take note of youth culture innovations and accept some of them like a new dance or fashion of dress which they regard as innocuous or socially acceptable. But directly oriented youth leaders will strongly oppose those changes that they think "go too far" such as the dance that is too wild or the abolition of rules on boy-girl meetings without adult monitoring.

The brakes on youth power are generally strong when there is a directive strategy. The feedback system has a one way bias. Innovative ideas from the young people quickly run into a wall of pre-established expectations. For instance, the school has a formal curriculum. How far can students be allowed to modify it? The church has sacred ideals, pre-ordained by charismatic men in the distant past. Such ideals are not subject to change, except through very gradual generational re-interpretation. The school or church can sponsor a "way out" dance, but attire will have to be much more modest than if the dance were held outside official sponsorship. There, a higher degree of youthful initiative is usually tolerated. A controversial subject will be discussed more cautiously in a public school than in a political forum.

The Co-optative Approach

Co-optation involves the incorporation of an already existing institution for the attainment of new functions. In co-optation there is more of a two-way feedback process. In return for accommodation to the goals of the controlling institution, the coopted program is given a chance to influence what occurs. The process is well illustrated by the educational system of Kibbutzim,
Israel's villages, where "peers exercise informal, semiformal and formal control." Teachers and youth workers use a variety of devices to influence adolescents, including appeal to reason, threat of deprivation, shame and by giving orders. But most of the techniques employed by these youth workers do not include the exercise of their formal authority. Instead, they manipulate "the situation so that the responsibility for insuring conformity devolves on the group or the individual." If, for example, a difficulty or a problem arises and the teacher feels it ought to be met, he calls a meeting of the class, poses the problem, and asks them to suggest a solution. Hence, though it is the teacher who usually initiates the process, it is the group which imposes the sanction so that instead of exercising authority himself, he delegates it to the group.\textsuperscript{2}

This cooptative arrangement is often used in modern societies when an adult group wishes to challenge young people to carry out highly approved objectives if the young are to develop a sense of self-confidence and commitment. This is true in every club, sports group and other extra-curricular activity, where the goal is to nurture spontaneity and leadership. There must be a readiness to accord young people a fair amount of status and influence. Young people often select their own leaders, help to determine programs and negotiate with adults. Through cooptation, the youth culture can sanction the trying-out of many a fad and fashion.

\textsuperscript{1}Melford E. Spiro, \textit{Children of the Kibbutz}, N. Y. Schocken Paperback, 1965: 308
\textsuperscript{2}312-313
Young people are being challenged to perform adult-like roles established as well as innovative ones. But room is left for adults to exercise influence on the younger generation, to prevent the widening of the generational gap.

The Revolutionary Approach

Peer groups generally sanction conformist as well as some deviant behavior. Much of the deviance is transitory, such as the violation of school rules, sex before marriage and the withholding of information from adults about events in which young people are involved. Innovations may be designated as revolutionary if they involve acts with social, and not only personal significance. Revolutionary ideas are justified by an ideology devoted to changing the social system. Their expression can be, but need not necessarily be violent. Nor is all violent change revolutionary. The Zionist pioneer youth of Europe, which will be discussed later, began as non-violent but revolutionary youth movements. The Kibbutz settlements which they established were revolutionary in their challenge to the established order. Their power was and still rests primarily on their spiritual appeal to utopian socialist values, within a framework of national renaissance. By labor, not coercion,
they sought and achieved a major break between the social order in which they had grown up, and the new Jewish state which they were determined to build.

Rioting youth are common, but violent revolutionary youth programs are rare. They tend to have a short existence.\(^1\)

The Wandervögel of Germany were swallowed up by World War I when their ideals for a purer and less bourgeois Fatherland gave way to unqualified acceptance of their country's demand for military service in defense of their Kaiser. Youth movements also will suffer if their programs succeed. Their leaders then are tempted to perpetuate themselves in office. Young leaders must grow older. As they mature, marry and have to think of making a secure living, they can continue to remain active only by turning their political agitation into a career. Like labor leaders and leaders of other social movements oriented toward "revolutionary change," they assume more and more control over what had been a spontaneous and a revolutionary social movement in order to stay in power. The revolution becomes professionalized.

Transitory youth movements emerge periodically which frighten the adult-making agencies because they advocate radical change. In the United States there are youth groups who take a firm line on civil rights, advocate LSD or espouse active opposition to the Vietnam War. In underdeveloped countries like Indonesia, such groups burn the embassy of an unfriendly country or organize a demonstration against the government. This power-potential reinforces the efforts of governments to sponsor youth groups responsive

to a more cooptative or directive strategy. This is seen as an "antidote" to the revolutionary potential inherent in more autonomous peer groups, who want to replace the old order or wish to try out a disapproved experience.

**Youth Culture Management**

The negative, directive, cooptative and revolutionary models are logical abstractions. They are analytic concepts that facilitate the comparison of different universal organizational arrangements. Youth culture management rarely relies exclusively on a single control strategy. In the United States a few policy makers advocate a negativistic strategy. They would discourage youth groups and restore the predominance of school authorities and of the family over the emerging youth culture. Many more favor a directive approach. Youth groups are officially encouraged to play a directed role in the adolescent world. In contrasting these institutional alternatives, James Coleman described the first one as highly impractical:

One strategy.... is to bring the adolescents back into the home; to reduce the pervasiveness of the adolescents' society and to return to a state in which each boy and girl responds principally to parents' demands.

Coleman expresses more support for the directive alternative:

The other possible strategy is just the reverse of this: to take adolescent society as given, and then use it to further the ends of adolescent education. Rather than bringing the father back to play with his son, this strategy would recognize that society has changed, and attempt to improve those institutions designed to educate the adolescent toward adulthood.1

Israel, as will be shown, relies heavily on a third pattern, the strategy of peer group cooptation. There is a two-way feedback system between the adult-making institutions and the youth groups. In return for the power to give guidance, public institutions provide financial support, pay youth leaders and sponsor informal educational programs. But they rely heavily on initiative and leadership of the young by peer group leaders. Even when adult authorities exercise more direct influence, as is the case in the Youth Corps, it often is exercised with sufficient passivity to leave young people some degree of freedom to innovate peer group patterns. Anti-adult and anti-school attitudes are treated with considerable tolerance, as long as they do not become an imminent danger to the established order. Should this occur, the police are called in. Such "innovations" would be defined as delinquent and suppressed as they are elsewhere in the world.

Many professionally oriented youth workers would settle for a largely negativistic or directive policy for the control of youths. They view their jobs as being primarily concerned with the prevention of deviance or the teaching of a well defined code of behavior sanctioned by their church, the Scouts or a technical club.¹

This "no trouble" outlook fails to take note of the fact that modern countries are dependent for their future on a minority of innovative activists - people ready to try out new adaptations in the light of major social changes. Without such leaders, no democratic nation can implement plans for change. Innovators are needed who are willing to take risks. There is a need for altruistic persons to serve as public officials or as volunteers in organizations. They must be ready to give a relatively high priority to the achievement of public purposes, even at the inconvenience - if not detriment - of competing personal and family preferences. In times of crisis or war, the readiness of citizens to show such a public-service orientation through military service will be a variable crucial in determining survival.

Conclusion

The world of the young includes a highly diversified range of associations, which are less formal than the school and which help in socializing young people into adults. Youth organizations co-exist with friendship cliques, local gangs and the many ties of affection, or distrust between the generations.

Youth organizations supplement other adult-making institutions in their effort to influence the on-coming generation. They are part of, but not equivalent to the youth culture. They are linked to other social institutions. Adults can try to influence them by a variety of strategies, such as negativism, directiveness, cooptation and revolution.
In singling out youth organizations for special study, one must keep in view their special functions. They are only one of several adult-making agencies which aim to influence the future citizens and leaders of the social system, but they are the most elective and voluntaristic. These qualities enable them to be more selective and exclusive than the school, the army or the family. Youth organizations can cater to special groups and particularized interests. They can become concerned with controversial issues. They are open to youngsters who do poorly in school. Unlike the army, the school and the family, in which young people are automatically relegated to low status by reason of their age and dependency, adolescents have preferred status in youth organizations. Only they have full status. There is much scope for the development of leadership talents, the testing of innovations and the development of new social roles. In consequence, youth organizations play a special role in the youth culture.

In a planned society, youth organizations are being given much attention. In the emerging countries of Africa and Asia, they sometimes are monitored by a high-level civil service official or a cabinet minister. In one-party states, the official organizations try to maintain a monopoly. In multi-party states, youth organizations can be sponsored by many different adult pressure groups. This is what has happened in Israel where youth organizations are highly developed and diversified. The sponsoring adult-making agencies, the leadership and the membership have been studied to identify some of the variables that affect man's capacity for youth culture management.
COOPTATIVE PLANNING
A Natural Laboratory

Complex social events are often analyzed in terms of their leading dramatic personalities. When this is done, the fact is easily overlooked that there is more to the Vietnam War than the views of Ho Chin Min and President Johnson. Nor can events in the Middle East be properly understood by focusing on what Abdul Nasser, Moshe Dayan, and General DeGaulle are willing to say for publication. Without wishing to suggest or to imply that personality variables are irrelevant to social change, this case study is based on the theory that complex social change can be planned organizationally over a long period of time by selective attention to limited institutional variables - control points, while leaving other features of the social system outside the jurisdiction of the planning process.

The Zionist idea is as old as the Psalms. It was first conceived in antiquity by men who had to leave their home and yearned to return there. It did not survive because of the impact of any one individual. It became an inherent part of the Jewish religion and culture. Yearning was turned into reality when men organized to implement it. Israel as a state, represents an unusual case of successful social planning, much of it voluntary, within a network of competing ideological and political forces. The planning process always was limited by developments outside the control of Zionist institutions. Israel also illustrates the probably inherent limits of the planning process -- the effort to use events of the past and present to influence the future for the purpose of achieving a concretely formulated objective.
No plan is self-enforcing. It has to be implemented, often in competition with alternate models. This process can be studied in depth by focusing on a limited institutional sector. Our study is focused on youth culture management through organizations, each with a program for influencing the process of generational transition. In choosing organizational variables for special analysis, no implication is intended that they are necessarily the most important or even the most effective by means of which one generation can influence another. The family and the public school may well have greater impact on what the future of a social system will be. But youth organizations provide a planful way by means by which a government or political parties can try to influence large segments of a population.

In Israel, there are three major adult-directed youth programs to influence adolescents: Youth movements, the Gadna Youth Corps and Beyond School activities. Youth movements preceded statehood and did much to help it come into being. Gadna and Beyond School activities also serve socialization functions. Sports clubs, social clubs and the National Service further contribute to the goal of planful youth culture guidance to perpetuate its core ideology and public service objectives.

Israel is a self-contained society, small enough to permit intensive observations of the way social planning is related to implementation. Planning alternatives are often discussed openly in the press and in the parliament before they are resolved. Public priorities for nation building are balanced with openly acknowledged vested partisan interests.

Citizens of many new countries are impatient about reaching a modern level of living. Their leaders aim to shortcut the slow
evolutionary process of the more developed lands. They think in terms of a series of five and six year plans to leap into the twentieth century. Israel stands out among the new nations because it has come close to achieving some of its planned-for cultural, spiritual and material goals.

It is also an unusually troubled land. Military priorities compete severely with socio-economic development objectives. Alone among the members of the United Nations, Israel's very right to exist is openly challenged by its neighbors. Its young people are growing up to face, personally and concretely, the threat of physical extermination, which in less immediate terms faces the entire world: The technology by which man can reach out to a material utopia, can also be employed to plan for total destruction of a society.

The challenge of evolving a normal social life in the face of such a threat confronts Israel with greater immediacy than other new countries. It is being met. Economic and social development proceeds in spite of the country's precarious geo-political location. But as an emerging nation, Israel had farther to travel than most. Palestine, the "Promised Land" of the Bible, had degenerated much after hundreds of years of neglect. Its population subsisted in the abject poverty that still characterizes so much of the Middle East.

What the country lacks in natural resources has in part been compensated for by a high rate of investment of human talent. Included is a sizeable cadre of idealists voluntarily ready to give a high priority to public requirements, even at the price of neglect of many personal and family requirements. Youths and youth
organizations play a major social role in the emerging social system.

The utility of analyzing Israel's experience with coopting youth power is heightened by the fact that this is one of the major components of the country's foreign aid program. African leaders have often been invited to Israel even before their land achieved independence. Many left, impressed by the programs for educating adolescents, to espouse public service values and requested help in evolving similar programs. During 1959 and 1964, the Government of Israel sent 101 instructors overseas and trained 452 students in Israel in programs to encourage pioneer youth movements and national service organizations in 49 countries, from the Cameroon to Singapore. Additional thousands of youth leaders were trained in their own countries in courses conducted for them by Israeli instructors, in English, French, Spanish and Persian.¹ The curriculum stresses group leadership, scouting, discussion group techniques and methods of organizing work camps.

These mutual aid programs deal with such questions as:

How can new countries train an idealistic elite who will give high priority to public priorities? Can men as well as women take part in public service programs? Can there be governmental financing of youth organizations without imposing an unacceptable degree of central control? More generally, can the cooptative practices of Israel be adapted to the needs of tradition-oriented countries where most people are illiterate, with little experience in self-government, and with only an incipient tradition to serve as a common bond for voluntary public services? Can public support for national service be maintained when no military threat exists and when the only enemy is man's capacity to plan effectively for matching his aspirations to his capabilities?

At the beginning there was planning ....

No one had to build France, Albania or Ghana. They have always been, although they achieved their present national status by differently tortuous routes. Only Israel, in contrast, began as a mere idea. Its impact is summed up in Theodor Herzl's law of social change:

"If you will it, it is no fairy tale."¹

In sociological terms this is known as the self-fulfillment theorem:² when men regard something as possible, their belief generates social action designed to realize their social objectives. Nationhood was attained in Israel by a social movement called Zionism, which was able to mobilize manpower and economic resources to solve a worldwide problem - the pariah status of Jews in many lands and their frequent persecution.

¹ Theodor Herzl, Alt-Neuland, Haifa, Israel, Haifa Publishing Company, 1960, Dedication page. Translated from the German original published in 1902.
Planning for the return of Jews to Israel can be said to have begun in the year 70 of our era, when the Romans destroyed Jerusalem and put an end to Jewish sovereignty. The chief control point of the planning process was the Jewish religion. One of the Jewish religious leaders, Jochanan Ben Zaccal, was able to obtain Roman assent to assemble surviving scholars at the village of Javne. It is here that the Jewish holy scriptures were finally codified. A daily routine of prayers was prescribed. "Return to Zion" became one of the recurrent themes of their content. At least six times a day, morning, afternoon, and evening, and after every meal orthodox Jews include a plea to God that Jerusalem be rebuilt and the Jews be returned to their ancient patrimony.

The vitality of this religious re-enforcement of Zionism was not dimmed by the passing of many centuries and the settlement of Jews all over the world. In each country, synagogues were built facing in the direction of Jerusalem. In death, many Jews are buried with a small sack of soil from the Holy Land. There was a never-ending migration of small numbers of Jews to Palestine.

Political support for the idea that a Jewish state be re-established in Palestine began to appear early in the 19th century. There were Christian statesmen like Napoleon and Jean Henri Dunant, founder of the Red Cross, Sir Laurance Olipant, Colonel Henry Churchill, and Anthony Ashley Cooper. As outsiders they could not stir the Jewish masses, as did the call for a return to Zion by such Jewish leaders
as Leon Pinsker, Moses Hess and Rabbi Zvi Hirsch Kalischer. They advocated Zionism for many different reasons, including religion, socialism and the urgency for finding territorial solution of Jewish homelessness.

Beginning with Napoleon's rule in France, many anti-Jewish laws in western Europe had been formally repealed. Jews streamed out of the ghettos to greet the dawn of a new era of enlightenment. Acculturation and assimilation proceeded at a fast pace. But anti-Semitism did not disappear. Violent persecutions persisted, especially in Eastern Europe. Even in France, the slogan "Death to the Jews" became respectable a century after Napoleon had emancipated them. Millions of European Jews reacted by giving up hope of ever becoming full fledged citizens in lands of their birth. The majority migrated to America, Australia and other overseas settlement areas. Only a trickle of thousands went to their ancestral home in Palestine.

It was in reaction to disillusionment with universalism that Theodor Herzl, a young Vienese newspaper correspondent and playwright wrote a book entitled Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State.) Eighteen months after it appeared, in 1897, the First World Zionist Congress convened in Basle, Switzerland. It adopted a plan for a Jewish home in Palestine that was to be more than refuge. It was to be a better

---

world, where social justice would replace man's exploitation of men. Not only Jews, but the resident Arab population were to benefit and live together in peace. Fifty years later the United Nations voted, by a large majority, to partition Palestine in an Arab and a Jewish state. The few thousand Jews in 1897 had grown by 1947 to a population of 650,000. It was not large, but sufficient to set up a viable government and to defend its territory.

This transition from blueprint to fulfillment was facilitated by a good deal of closely coordinated technical planning. For instance, the Jewish National Fund was set up in 1901 to purchase land, to reclaim swamps, and to plant forests. A social-economic planning agency, the Palestine Office of the Jewish Agency was organized in 1908, but it never had a monopoly over development. Many specified projects were organized autonomously, in industrial development, the building of new communities and the encouragement of immigration. The Hebrew language as a medium of communication was adopted to replace the many languages that the immigrants brought with them.

The idea of control point planning by making public priority decisions for selected and clearly limited objectives was accepted widely, but the power of decision making was never fully centralized. Different political and religious groups within a range as far apart as Marxist utopianism and religiously traditionalist fanatics maintained independent initiative. They could work together cooperatively on such matters as land settlement, economic development and defense on the basis of a unified core-ideology, especially when faced by external opposition from powerful nationalist stirrings among the Arab people of the area. Any major setback could have been fatal to the emerging nation. Its program clashed with the Pan-Arab movement. Israel and most Arab states achieved sovereignty at about the same time. But among the many Arab factions there was no recognized central force or leader who could or would negotiate an accommodation between the two national movements, each with persuasive claims to the same area.

The Core Ideology

Public service volunteering seems to be a function of the acceptance of a core ideology, common beliefs shared by diverse segments of the population. Israel is a unified, yet divided, country. Communists and nationalists, orthodox and atheistic Jews have fought side by side during each of Israel's three wars since 1948. Groups associated with all these parties lease land from the Jewish National Fund and help absorb immigrants from abroad. But in most public matters, alternate policies are advocated by these groups reflecting fundamental ideological differences¹ to sustain more than a dozen major parties and factions within parties. Many sponsor

For illustration of one area of divergency, see Eliezer Goldman, Religious Issues in Israel's Political Life, Jerusalem, Jerusalem Post Press, 1964.
their own youth movements, competing with others for the mind and soul of the on-coming generation. Loyalty to the state does not require loyalty to the government in power. It requires acceptance of a core ideology which is regarded as being "above politics." There might never have been a State of Israel had the situation been otherwise.

Publicity-wise, national defense has overshadowed news about Israel in recent years. Thrice within the last twenty years, Israel's civilian militia has faced the combined forces of neighboring Arab countries. But national defense, which is the principal basis of consensus in many countries is, in Israel, closely tied to the pursuit of non-military developmental values. The Israel Defense Forces, Zahal, devote some of their scarce manpower to health services, vocational training, the establishment of new settlements, communications, and the development of natural resources. Israel's capacity to mobilize is not merely a function of the essentially negative goal of defense against attack. It also incorporates the core ideology and thus is able to call for support on the basis of emotionally powerful developmental objectives and utopian aspirations. If the Israel experience is of any general significance, it lies in the fact that its noteworthy results are being obtained in spite of considerable divergency in planning priorities. Implementation did not follow the theory of many under-developed nations, and some more developed
ones, that a high rate of development can occur only when there is governmental coercion to support a unified national plan. Israelis have gone beyond the threshold for a modern standard of living without the totalitarian planning theories of what Bertram Gross calls "the typical century skipper" – whether a Stalin, a Mao, a Cardenas, a Nyerere, or a Nasser:

"Like Moses, he will die or be deposed long before his people can end their wandering in the wilderness.

Israel has been a dramatic exception. In 1948 it was a poverty-ridden land of sand and rock, swamped by enormous immigration and threatened with imminent destruction. Since then, while remaining in the 'powder keg' of the Middle East, it has been transformed into an industrial, technology oriented society. Living standards have reached Western European levels. Hundreds of Israelis offer technical assistance to other countries." ¹

The determination of priorities to achieve public objectives is done by coalitions of ideologically competitive small groups, each concerned with the attainment of somewhat different sets of specific program objectives. Within a network of a core ideology it has been possible to sustain many common activities. But there also were and are some vitriolic controversies. Alongside with common action there is a good deal of "muddling through."

¹ Bertram Gross, in Preface to Israel, High Pressure Planning Benjamin Akzin and Yehezkel Dror, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1966: vii
Religious Israelis explain their survival in the face of adversity as the expression of divine intervention. Others take a more secular view. Israel, they would assert, documents what can be achieved when a country includes an active group of citizens who share common ideals and who know that the consequence of disunity might be extermination by outside hostile forces. Much of the national and regional planning is done on the basis of civilian objectives, to build a better country rather than to meet an outside threat.

Nationalism can be more than ethnocentricism, the primary concern with one's own group and its welfare. In its undiluted form it has been unfashionable in circles, who object to jingoistic self-centeredness in all nations of the world and who recognize that the welfare of their own group is closely related to regional and world wide requirements. Zionism is a nationalist social movement but in its history, ethnocentric considerations were usually combined with universalist objectives. Zionism advocates a territorial solution for persecuted Jews of many lands. This includes Jewish cultural renaissance, the ingathering of exiles, national defense, national resource development and the optimization of individual opportunities. Social cohesion in Israel is not merely a reaction to outside threat. It is a social movement which advocates core values, such as the following:
## PARADIGM OF ISRAEL'S CORE IDEOLOGY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Service Objective</th>
<th>Areas of Agreement</th>
<th>Areas of Major Controversy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. Jewish Renaissance</strong>&lt;br&gt;An unbroken cultural chain links modern Jewry with the ancient Hebrews and the land of Israel</td>
<td>The Bible is Israel's common heritage; its language is once more the common means of discourse. Festivals and memorials are national holidays. Israel should be a spiritual center for Jews everywhere.</td>
<td>Many differences exist about the meaning of the Bible. Religious groups want a theocratic state. This is opposed by the country's more secular majority, who vary in their outlook on traditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II. Ingathering of Exiles</strong>&lt;br&gt;Unrestricted immigration brings Jews from everywhere in the world irrespective of their capacity to support themselves.</td>
<td>About two-thirds of the heavy absorption cost must be paid out of Israel's national income. The remainder comes from overseas contributions.</td>
<td>There is disagreement on the extent of incentives and social welfare services and opposition to giving newcomers more generous help to find housing and schooling than is given to old settlers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>III. National Defense</strong>&lt;br&gt;All citizens male and female, young and old, must be prepared to fight for their country.</td>
<td>In the event of an attack, Israel would have to do battle in the territory of its hostile neighbors. The country is too small for a more defensive strategy.</td>
<td>There are many proposed strategies on how much occupied territory be kept and there is opposition to military exemptions of some women and rabbinical students from very orthodox families.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IV. National Resources Development</strong>&lt;br&gt;Israel is poor in natural resources. It cannot support its population on a modern standard of living, absorb immigrants, and maintain an expensive army without optimum exploitation of its resources.</td>
<td>No man should think only of making a living for personal enjoyment. The Government has the right to enforce a general development plan. Economic activity should be related to the national needs.</td>
<td>There is little agreement on best means of socio-economic planning. Socialism has many adherents, but even among them there is much diversity about the role of private and cooperative enterprise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>V. Individualism</strong>&lt;br&gt;Opportunity is to be for self-fulfillment and maximum freedom of choice for every person within limits set by the needs of others.</td>
<td>Agreement exists on a very abstract level that each man must be free to pursue his happiness and that of his family.</td>
<td>There are questions on the limits of individualism. Each of Israel's cultural and ethnic groups has some different prescription for the &quot;good life.&quot;</td>
</tr>
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The first law passed by the parliament after independence was the Law of Return. Any Jew, irrespective of his philosophy, was authorized thereby to come to Israel, and acquire immediate citizenship. It is doubtful if Israelis would have taken up arms and exerted pressure to oust the British Mandatory regime, if the latter had not decided to prohibit Jewish immigration and land settlement. Israel was established as much for the welfare of persons who had not "yet arrived" as for the citizens already residing there. Israel is far from being a Utopia, but officials point with pride to the fact that Arab as well as Jewish children now grow up without trachoma, as did so many of their parents.

General support is also given to the ideal of cultural renaissance. There is an active campaign for the eradication of illiteracy among Jewish as well as Arab citizens. Agnostics have worked with orthodox rabbis in restoring and adapting the language of the Bible into a modern tongue. It is now used for science as well as prayer.

There is also considerable consensus on the encouragement of the arts, music and literature. More books and newspapers are published and read per capita in Israel than in any country of the world. There are the public parks, the cultural centers, the new industries, and the universities.

Many occupations that had been uncommon among Jews in the countries of their dispersion are now being practiced by their children who came to Palestine. The culture hero of pre-war Zionism was the agricultural pioneer, reared in a European middle-class home, who in Palestine worked in a quarry or acquired expertise in the growing of fruit trees on formerly barren terraces. A good case can be made for the popular quip that in Israel, Jews became "good soldiers and farmers but poor businessmen and bankers."
Pioneer Manpower

The chief instruments of Israel's renaissance were the so-called Halutzim - settlers oriented to public service. Most of them came as young volunteers, predominantly from areas where Jews were insecure. From among tens of thousands of Jews who experienced this external threat, the Halutzim were a self-selected elite dedicated to a mission rather than to make a mere living. An excess of 100,000 came from Eastern Europe, especially from Poland. A much smaller number of Halutzim came from western countries, where the integration of Jews in the general public life was quite advanced. Between 1931 and 1952, just over 3,000 immigrated from the United States, Canada, England, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand, establishing 25 collective villages.

The majority wanted to build a socialist society. Socialism, without dictatorship has deep roots in Israel. There is much genuine experimentation with alternate ways to apply its principles to the real world. Many of the pioneering oriented immigrants shared

1 Precise statistics about Halutzim are not available. The attributes of being a Halutz are not clearly defined. Also during much of the pre-statehood period, the encouragement of immigration was decentralized. S. N. Eisenstadt (Israeli Society, op. cit: 11) cites an estimate of 152 to 157,000 immigrants between 1904 and 1931 and 265,000 from 1932 through the end of 1944. Pioneering oriented workers were in a minority, but their social cohesion gave the disproportionate influence in the organization of the country's emerging institutions.

2 Yaacov Morris, Pioneers from the West, Jerusalem, Youth and Hechalutz Department, World Zionist Organization, 1953.

Communist leaders do not allow dissemination and free discussion of information about the socialist experiments of Israel. The findings would raise too many questions about what happened to socialist dreams for a utopia. In Russia, Labor Zionists have been imprisoned and executed for "counter-revolutionary" ideas.
the humanistic values of the revolutionary groups in Russia, as well as the more Western European lands. Jews were active in radical political movements in all of these countries. Some rose to positions of influence. But many of these socialist European radicals were also responsive to the nationalist and religious prejudices of their own masses, who define Jews as strangers. Even today, when few Jews remain in Eastern Europe and even fewer are politically active, anti-Semitic appeals crop up periodically in the struggle for power of different communist factions. Some of the most idealistic Jewish socialists, therefore, migrated to Israel to try building a utopian working class society near the river Jordan rather than be second class participants in the socialist endeavors of the lands of their birth. For religious Halutzim, there was an added sacred inspiration. Re-establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine would be the fulfillment of the prophetic visions in the Old Testament. For a hundred generations Jews included in their daily prayers the vow: "If I forget thee Jerusalem, may my right hand wither." (Psalm 137)

For all Halutzim, irrespective of their political philosophy, the old home-land was to be more than a refuge for Jews. It was to become a more perfect society. There would be no capitalist exploitation. Men would live from the fruits of their own labor, particularly labor of the soil. Jews with diverse religious orientations and ethnic backgrounds were to live together in peace, in harmony with resident non-Jewish, mostly Arab population. Being a Halutz was like joining the Peace Corps for life, but without even minimum pay.

The Halutzim planfully set about to create Israel's basic institutions. For many years there was no harbor in Palestine where sea going ships could tie to a dock. Immigrants had to be

transferred off shore to small boats or be carried to shore on the backs of Arab stevedores. They were coming to a land of historic ruins, swamps and deserts. Before World War II, Zionist literature dealt almost exclusively with these developmental challenges. Mutual aid, scientific agriculture, democracy and social justice were key values. Through cooperatives, the children of capitalist merchants set up modern consumer services, transportation, and banking institutions. Under the guidance of experts in development, the Halutzim laid out hundreds of new settlements. Walter Clay Lowdermilk, a chief of the U. S. Soil Conservation Service, who devoted some of his retirement years to providing consultative services in Palestine described their developmental doctrine as follows:

"Thou shalt inherit the holy earth as a faithful steward, conserving its resources and productivity from generation to generation. Thou shalt safeguard thy fields from soil erosion, thy living waters from drying up, thy forests from desolation, and protect thy hills from over grazing by herds, that thy descendants may have abundance forever. If any fail in this stewardship of the land, their fruitful fields shall become sterile, stony ground or wasting gullies, and thy descendants shall decrease and live in poverty or perish from the face of the earth." 1

The Halutzim did not build the state by themselves. They always were a numerically small elite, who helped to sustain a larger social system that was able to absorb larger numbers of plain refugees. These immigrants came primarily because they could not continue to live safely in the lands of their birth.

1Walter Clay Lowdermilk, Palestine, Land of Promise, N. Y.
The Halutz provided an uncommon type of manpower: a well motivated, generally well educated person who was willing to engage in "blue collar" labor and view it as having as much dignity and status as "white collar" work. He was bound by no contract. Each year there would be drop-outs, who felt that they had sacrificed enough, whose health was impaired, or who found themselves in disagreement with members of their group. The number who remained Halutzim for life was only a fraction of those who originally volunteered to join this unique development corps.

It was organized in small groups, often from the same part of Europe. There were no officers or generals, only members. Within each group, decisions were by majority vote. Their impact on the country was far out of proportion to their number. They worked while others just hoped. They represented a major capital and developmental asset, not to mention their spiritual influence.

Adversity As An Incentive

As suggested previously a crisis can be defined as a social situation when danger co-exists with opportunity. In the last three decades the Zionist settlers were confronted with a series of polarized alternatives: perish or fight. No compromise that would have permitted the Jewish community to survive could be negotiated. As George Simmel, Lewis Coser and many others have pointed out, "Outside conflict increases internal group cohesion." 1

These harsh realities occurred in Palestine after World War II, under the shock of awareness that the world had stood by with no more than token objection to the highly organized Nazi campaign to exterminate all persons of Jewish ancestry. The pitiful remnants, discovered half-living in Dachau and Auschwitz, highlighted

the enormity of the catastrophe which had befallen the Jewish people.

Most Israelis had lost all but an occasional kinfolk. Thousands of Jewish communities in Europe were wiped out. The centers of recruitment of pioneers by Zionist youth movements no longer existed. Only where the Germans failed to achieve total control, as in Russia, did Jews survive in large numbers. They fought as partisans and were prominent in the Russian army. But when the war ended, Zionism remained illegal in Russia as it had been before World War II.¹

Half a million Jews fought in the Soviet armed forces. A high proportion of these were officers, including 50 generals, and hundreds of colonels. One hundred and twenty-one Jews received the coveted Russian version of the American Congressional Medal of Honor, the decoration called "Hero of the Soviet Union." After the war, however, Jews were not allowed to migrate to Palestine. Many prominent Jewish leaders were arrested. Some were executed in a new wave of Stalinist anti-semitism.

In England, the British Labor party, when out of power, had been pro-Zionist. But after winning the election in 1945, its leaders decided to enforce a prior government policy in 1939 halting nearly all Jewish immigration and land purchases. Arab nationalism had gained much in self-confidence and power during World War II. The Arabs regard the Jews as alien intruders, without rights to statehood. Sentimentalism regarding the tragedy of the Jews seemed hardly a sufficient reason to antagonize so powerful a geopolitical force.

Peace in Europe permitted the stationing of over 100,000

British troops in Palestine. Their purpose was once and for all to convince the Jewish population that there would be no alternative to acceptance of Britain's decision to freeze the status of the Jewish National Home. The full powers of the British Army and Navy were mobilized to halt the unauthorized immigration of Jews who were being smuggled in superannuated boats and across land borders by volunteers of several countries. This policy was enforced ruthlessly even against the survivors of German death camps whom some of these same British soldiers in Europe had helped liberate. The ship, *Exodus*, for instance, was intercepted by the British navy and forced to return to Germany, its decks packed with refugees.

The British policy lacked nothing in resoluteness. Nor was it unreasonable in terms of the way British officials defined their long range strategic interests in the Middle East. But it left the Jewish community without a reasonable prospect for growth and development. Its very existence seemed in danger. Units of the Trans-Jordan Arab Legion, officered and equipped by the British, were stationed inside Palestine, while Jewish self-defense units were disarmed. The alliance of Arab nationalism and British power left no alternate policy except surrender and ultimate evacuation of Jews from Palestine. The surviving relatives of those who had perished in Europe were driven to desperation. They decided to rebel. Unlike their lost relatives in Europe, in Palestine the Jews had a territorial base. Most of its young people were experienced in self-defense. Tens of thousands had fought with the British against Germany, others had been trained clandestinely.
Halutzim who had come to Palestine to build, planned secretly to fight. New farm settlements doubling as military strong-points were set up over night in forbidden zones. Ships filled with refugees sailed the Mediterranean, forcing the British navy to attempt their interception. Bridges were blown up to delay British troops rushing to intercept those who reached the beaches. Military force was employed in carefully selected guerilla action.

Israelis did not struggle alone. Help came from some dissident British officials. Thousands of Jews from all over the world came as reenforcements and there was active support among many non-Jews everywhere. Much of this response was sympathy for the universalistic ideals of the Zionist movement, its concern with the rehabilitation of refugees, the re-birth of an old-new country and the Halutz ideology that men can build a better world if they are willing to do it for themselves.

By 1947, The British Government decided to give up its Mandate over Palestine rather than continue the expensive and very unpopular war against the Jews. And in 1949 when the Israel flag was hoisted at the United Nations, admission was supported by the most unlikely political coalition. It was led by the United States and the Soviet Union, where Zionism continued to be outlawed. The Vatican was unsympathetic; yet most nations with Catholic populations voted for Israel.

United Nations membership did not end the threat to Israel's physical survival. The Arab States refused to recognize her right to exist. A period of two decades of guerilla warfare followed, interspersed with major military confrontation in 1956 and 1967.
Each could have resulted in the destruction of State and most of its citizens. The Jewish community, however, was able to mobilize enough force to prevent this. Indeed, each major battle left the Jewish state in a better strategic position.

Almost every contemporary family in Israel is conscious of personal recollections and involvement in these events. Not all settlers came as volunteers. But all had to live under hardship conditions. Most of them had to learn new occupations, form new social relationships and experience the transition from immigrant to citizen. "Israel has proven itself the most successful intruded state of modern times" commented Cyrus Sulzberger in a dispatch about the country's twentieth anniversary as a sovereign state: "There have been other intruded states - from ancient Carthage of the Phoenician traders to New Zealand, Haiti or, indeed the U.S.A. None had such a flamboyant inception."¹

This is how many Arabs experience what Israelis would prepare to characterize as a "return home" fulfillment of biblical prophecy.

Fear not, for I am with thee; I will bring thy seed from the East and gather thee from the West. I will say to the North, give up; and to the South, keep not back. Bring my sons, from far, and my daughters from the ends of the Earth. (Isaiah 43: 5-6)

Secular Jews view the event more as vindication of the Zionist theory of how to solve the problem of Jewish homelessness. Many could see themselves as having had historic foresight. In Palestine a fraction, perhaps 10% of the more than six million men, women and babies, who in Europe died helplessly, stood their ground to create

a territorial entity, where Jewish children can grow up to acquire self-respect. There is pride in the country's cultural and social welfare achievements. The mood is much more sober with respect to its military successes. Even the Six Day War, which freed the population from a grave military threat, is widely viewed in the perspective of its human cost, 830 dead and 3000 wounded. To the outsider this will appear to be a small price to pay for survival. But these casualties are "higher than the proportionate total of United States casualties in the Korean and Vietnam Wars put together. And this was all in six days, not fifteen years."\(^1\)

**Conclusion**

National planning is becoming a feature in many modern countries. In Israel, it preceded statehood. It could not then rely of coercion. Cooptation of diverse interest groups was the predominant pattern. Much of the planning involved voluntary cooperation among an idealistic elite of Halutzim, who by virtue of their willingness to work hard and in a disciplined way were able to dominate the emerging social system. Key elements in the implementation process were young people, members of youth movements, most of whom were recruited in Europe. They emigrated to Palestine as volunteers, who were part of a Halutz peace corps, which expects

life-time service rather than a short-term commitment. They embraced many different utopian and socialist ideas. Often they clashed with those of others, equally dedicated. But there was enough of a core ideology around which a sense of national purpose could develop. Unity was also re-enforced by outside opposition to Zionism by Arab and British forces. Military priorities often overshadowed the nation-building objectives of the Zionist movement, but few Israelis hate their enemies. National unity depends far more on common developmental objectives. Utopian ideals retain much of their appeal though they are viewed with a realism that comes from daily practical confrontation.

Zionism succeeded on the basis of a voluntaristic control point planning process that included a high inefficiency component due to competing priorities. It would appear that successful implementation is not dependent on total coordination. Men cannot predict the future well enough, nor assess all relevant details, to anticipate complex social events with the precision of an architect at his drawing board. The Israeli experience suggests that planned national development can occur in spite of the existence of many competing priorities in the planning process.

The young people of Israel are continuing to show much readiness to assume responsible roles for the realization of the parental core values of planful nation-building. There is agreement that Israel's primary mission continues to be the nurturing of a promised land where men can live a decent life, within a framework of——
Jewish traditions, universalistic ethical values and with a modern standard of living. In the words of an English non-Jewish scholar, reviewing the confrontation of political forces in the Middle East: "Zionism was from the beginning a movement of Jewish self-criticism. The salt is still there and the consequence is no diminution of self-criticism, especially among the younger generation."

Every nation would like to arouse such concern for public service and for nation-building among its youths. The relative success of the Israeli society in achieving this objective makes it all the more instructive to study some of the organizational arrangements within which this phenomenon occurs.

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IV

Generational Transmission
Territorial Therapy

When the Twentieth Century began, two Jews, who were to leave their footprints in world history, labored side by side in Vienna, Theodor Herzl and Sigmund Freud. Both founded world wide social movements. Each, in his own way, wanted to bring about a better world. Sigmund Freud explored, among other things, the psychodynamics of hatred, while Herzl addressed himself to its politics. Their theories, while not mutually exclusive, called for radically different methods to reduce the incidence of human hatred.

Freud showed that individuals who wanted help in overcoming pathological emotions could be helped by individual therapy, a permissive relationship between a gifted human healer and the sufferers of fear and anger. Freud became the founder of the worldwide psycho-analytic movement of practitioners of this form of therapy. But the Nazis who destroyed Freud's world, and many of his relatives, wanted no help. Only Herzl's territorial solution could save Freud's life. In his old age he was whisked out of Vienna just before he could be arrested to be forced to join other Viennese Jews in scrubbing the streets on their knees. Psychotherapy could not cure German and Austrian anti-Semites of their corrosive hatred.

Freud's fate gives irrefutable testimony to the limits of his own theory in the solution of inter-group problems. By taking refuge he resorted to a form of milieu therapy: stress reduction by a change from a political jurisdiction where a group problem appears to be insoluble to a new and more supportive environment where the problem can disappear.

Inter-group relations specialists have sometimes been over-impressed by the potentialities of psychological approaches to the
management of group conflict. Without much supportive evidence, they cherish the hope that racial, ethnic or caste hatred are subject to resolution through more personal contact and by means of "brotherhood" appeals for understanding. This theory tends to short-change the power variable. Ethnic minority groups lacking a territorial base are often exploited by the majority. This is a social fact applicable to many. It can be changed if the social system is modified through political power that can be generated most strongly in an area under the political control of the disadvantaged ethnic group.

Contemporary Black Power advocates use this theoretical approach in staking their claim to America. The urban slums are their territorial base. Within it they can organize a more general strategy to right the wrongs of many generations. Through the ballot and their numerical weight, Black "ghetto" inhabitants can demand, rather than request, justice. For Negroes, as for other American ethnic groups, neighborhood power has achieved gains that are more concrete than those previously negotiated by "inter-group" techniques and goodwill gestures.

Territorial therapy is no panacea. Political force cannot solve all human problems, especially those at the social and psychological level. This becomes all the more apparent once the original political objective is achieved. New goals are then needed to answer

1 Marcus Garvey, the first proponent of "Negro Zionism" electrified Blacks emotionally to the possibility of a territorial solution to their outcaste status. He was a Jamaican who appealed to fellow Blacks after World War I with a call to strike out against their bondage by moving to Africa, where they could be part of the majority rather than an outcaste minority. The emotional upsurge made him the leader of the largest Negro mass movement in American history. He was the first to stress racial pride, Negro history and blackness as sources of ego-identification rather than ego-rejection. His "Negro-Zionist" emphasis on the territorial roots of power continues to be reflected in the contemporary civil rights struggle.
the question: Power for what ends?

The Achievement Crisis

The limits of political solutions become particularly apparent after a social movement has been successful. This clears the deck for concern for problems that may always have existed, but which were given a low priority when there was an intense struggle to achieve a unified purpose. The fervor of such a movement, be it for freedom or to remove discriminatory laws, cannot remain unchanged after the objective is attained. Liberated people often turn against each other, in a fierce struggle for ascendancy. The change in outlook may not always take such extreme form as the shift from radicalism to the status-quo preference of the leaders of Russia under Stalin. But any revolutionary change has to be followed by a change in focus.

Achievement of a hard-to-reach goal is the occasion for great celebration. But when the festivities are over, problems previously played down take on a higher priority. Native born Israelis, who now defend their country's borders, never were in need of territorial therapy. They cannot feel the awe of their parents and grandparents who were reared in a European ghetto tradition and who suffered the consequences of organized anti-semitism.

The present generation has different priorities. They are concerned with what kind of state is desired. They want to change some of the institutions their elders created. This outlook is directly traceable to the success of the previous generation in meeting so many of its objectives. While struggling for statehood, this political objective was invested with an idealistic halo that involved the deliberate exclusion of certain realities, such as the fact that statehood alone will not bring peace or prosperity.
Halutzim, feeling the breath of history on their brow, often denied themselves goals of a more personal nature. They accepted long separations from their families. Few could think of starting a savings account to take care of their old age. Many gave up opportunities for professional education.

But when victory was won, they could begin to think of themselves and their family. Kibbutz wives who felt too constrained by group demands now felt free to press their husband to move to a city in order to set up their own household. Departure could no longer be interpreted as "running away" from common danger. Political opponents, who had collaborated to face a common danger felt freer to battle each other. Workers could strike more freely and place fringe benefits above competing demands for efficiency at lower cost.

These problems were not new, but they had been suppressed. The attainment of independence, however, placed them higher on people's priority scales. The resulting achievement crisis condition reflected the fact that during the long period of emergency, the ideological certainty which had united a whole generation was displaced by uncertainty and conflict about what priority is to be given to new goals. Utopian hopes about the glories of the new freedom could be entertained easily so long as achievement was not in sight. After independence they were deflated by the less rosy realities of the post-achievement period. Some of the immigrants whom Jews had struggled hard to bring into the country had no concern with Zionist ideals. Crime rates rose, requiring an expansion of the prison system.¹

Thousands of volunteer soldiers who had rushed to Israel from America, Europe and South Africa returned home. They could not adjust to the complexities of making their life in Israel. Competition for jobs was keen - at times even underhanded. White lies - and some outright falsehoods - were broadcast to assure a job for friend and deny it to someone better qualified. Charismatic qualities ascribed to leaders became tarnished, when the leaders shifted roles. Instead of being heroes in opposition to British rulers they had to assume government responsibilities in which they had to say "no" to many demands that were being made. Many were made in the name of very partisan rather than public interest.

Young Israelis are growing up to see Israel without embellishment. They talk less about Halutz pioneering and more about red-tape in the bureaucracy of the Labor-Federation. Revered national leaders of the independence are described as "old men," who should have retired long ago to make room for new blood. Bus cooperatives are seen as a monopoly, more concerned with profits for their members than service to the public. Indeed the uninformed reader of the Israeli press might easily be misled by the large volume of published complaints and vigorous controversy to conclude that the country is in grave danger. There are many serious problems, indicating that the achievement of one generation cannot yield a Utopia. It allows the next one to concentrate its attention on new issues.

The non-recognition of Israeli sovereignty by neighboring Arab states perpetuates some sense of crisis. There is a high probability that the country's left to right coalition government
would break up, if the Arab states were to agree to permanent peace. This would make it unnecessary for Israel to live in a state of military readiness. But Israelis now feel secure enough to be able to sustain many major controversies even on matters that once were regarded as almost "sacred." The Zionist movement is being attacked as outdated, both organizationally and ideologically. There is much dissatisfaction with the present political parties, with the state of efficiency of many bureaucracies and with the country's sparse economic resources.

No generation which achieved one epic objective can expect to transmit its own emotions and fervor to its children. Many people find it easy to make public service oriented choices in an emergency situation. If personal and national priorities conflict, they choose the former. But after the emergency is passed, their priorities begin to shift. Herein lies a dilemma for recently emerged countries. Nation-building does not end with independence. This memorable event only allows the nation to begin. The enthusiasm that can unify a people when combatting an outside enemy is not automatically transmitted to the developmental challenges which face the post-independence generation who must deal with less dramatic challenges of going to work for 44 hours a week every week of the year for wages always a bit lower than desired.
From Idealism to Realism

In the United States it has become quite respectable for a public servant to announce his resignation in order to return to private business, in order to recoup his personal financial stability. Public service is highly regarded, but it is accepted as limited in duration. The principle of rotation is incorporated in most posts which call for voluntary sacrifice and national service.

This was less true in the Zionist movement. Before it achieved sovereignty, all important settlement, military, and civic functions were performed by volunteers. There was a chronic shortage of pioneer personnel. People for whom pay and organizational status were secondary considerations, were hard to replace.

After independence Israel became a land of great opportunity for upward mobility. The Jewish population expanded by the astonishing multiple of four during the two decades between 1948 and 1968. The number of children aged ten to seventeen, who are eligible in schools or youth programs increased about seven-fold. The supply of Halutzim and other idealist oriented public service was not equal to this great demand for leadership talent.

The heavy logistic demand for public servants occurred on top of a qualitatively serious manpower loss. Somewhat over 4000 soldiers and 2000 civilians were killed in the War of Independence. The loss of Jewish population over fifteen years of age was nearly two per cent. Many of them died when they volunteered for dangerous assignments. Halutzim who had made their reputations planting new varieties

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of fruit trees and spraying them against disease were called upon to become diplomats. Social workers became mayors of new towns, to receive immigrants, and underground military leaders became managers of new industries. Few of the present heads of the vast industrial and commercial enterprises of the Israel Labor Federation had any formal education in the field of his specialty.

The growing size and complexity of the country has shifted priorities from ideological to technical prerequisites. The recognition of this shift has led to suggestions that future managers be better trained. In the government this policy is being applied more and more widely. Even political appointees are often sent to school to gain technical competency. As professional competency is emphasized, ideological and party affiliations are given lesser priorities.

Israel, like all nations after the attainment of independence, experienced a "let-down" in civic morale. In the year before the Six-Day War in June 1967, the country experienced a severe recession. Unemployment reached a high level. Israelis were confronting the question: what will be the public service equation of the next generation? What will be the balance of their concern for their community's welfare as against their desire to advance themselves and their immediate families especially for tasks that are arduous and carry special risks? How can public enthusiasm be maintained when the balance of national priorities is shifting from the primitive issue of "Survival or Extinction"/the less dramatic setting

Aharon Becker, remarks to the Histadruth Central Committee, on September 13, 1967, as reported by Sraya Shapiro, "Search for Bright Young Men," Jerusalem Post, January 18, 1968: 5
of guaranteed and secure borders and of the attainment of developmental goals.

Sacrifices are still demanded, but more on an allocated basis. Youths can work out a realistic balance between the needs of self and those of national service. Emergencies are planned for. Service in the active army and the civilian reserve is no longer voluntary. It is required by law. Voluntarism is still utilized, but only for the staffing of some of the hardship and glamour posts. Volunteers have to meet the appropriate qualifications determined by a comprehensive testing procedure. This routinization has divested public service of much of the emotional intensity that characterized it before Israel became a state.

Only a dozen of the hundreds of new towns and villages established since 1948 were settled by volunteer pioneers who selected themselves for this task. Most new settlements are inhabited by immigrants who are assigned to go there by the Jewish Agency which financed their journey.¹ They were induced to accept a pioneering assignment in return for free living accommodations and a chance to become economically independent. Problems that exist are thought to be solvable without a radical reorganization of the status quo. No new symphony, but only variations on a theme already composed, seems to be required.

The Halutz idealist is thinning out in the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency. Quite a few have aged into career officials with a bureaucratic orientation towards their jobs.

¹See, for instance, Alex Weingrod, Reluctant Pioneers: Village Development in Israel, N. Y., Cornell University Press, 1966.
There is a shortage of personnel who are willing to make their career in the merchant marine. The Histadruth Central Federation of Labor has become a cumbersome political machine, with entrenched functionaries who are showing some of the universal attributes of the "organization man." In the public school system, teachers with formal qualifications will generally advance even without charismatic quality. What Max Weber has called the bureaucratization of charisma is increasingly in evidence.

Crucial pioneer tasks are still filled quite often by volunteers, but their desire to serve is not always a sufficient basis for insuring their proper performance. Not all Nahal pioneer members are volunteers. Only a minority have the intent to settle in a Kibbutz. More and more youth leaders have to be hired for pay. Hardship posts in development towns often remain unfilled for long periods. The hospital in Beersheba cannot maintain all of its departments for lack of properly qualified physicians. Israeli policy makers, still much under the influence of their pioneer tradition, are ambivalent about supplementing idealistic incentives with realistic material benefits. But more merit oriented organizations like the army and the Ministry of Labor have learned to do this. Its career personnel get fringe benefits in the form of low cost housing, tax reductions and civilian education to keep them in the service.

It has been traditional among Jews to resolve conflicting views of ancient rabbis with the Talmudic concept of Teikuh, meaning "The Messiah will answer all such questions." But this theological resolution will not satisfy modern day Israelis. When they let their hair down, they openly air many dissatisfactions.
Pioneering Now Requires Realistic Incentives*

Ministry of Labour
Employment and Absorption Department
Unit for Settlement and Development Areas

"He who wishes to act wisely —
should turn to the South"
(Talmud, Baba Batra, 25)

Because the South of the country is Israel's development region, the gateway to Asia and Africa, containing a concentration of the country's natural wealth;

Because the development of the Negev is Israel's greatest challenge; because for people with trades and professions and for young couples there are plentiful opportunities to build their future in the developing settlements of the Negev;

Because the towns of the Negev need skilled and professional people and young people who consider it a worthwhile task to be partners in the opening up of the vast areas of the Negev.

for Eilat
- doctors
- tinsmiths
- welders
- smelter workers
- operators of heavy equipment
- electricians
- waiters
- cooks
- hospital attendants

for Mitzpe Ramon
- tractor drivers
- drivers
- accountants
- auto mechanics
- technical supervisors
- mechanics
- young workers: (male/female)
- electricians
- construction workers
- electricians
- waiters
- cooks
- hospital attendants

for Arad
- tinsmiths
- production technicians
- mechanical engineers
- electrical engineers
- knitting workers
- young workers: (male/female)
- electricians
- skilled construction workers
- accountants
- tinsmiths
- drivers
- salesmen
- students
- electricians
- waiters
- cooks
- hospital attendants

The Negev has a network of improved roads which affords easy connection between its cities and the more densely populated areas. Elementary and secondary schools of good level are available.

Persons wishing to make their home in the towns of the Negev are assured of housing at reasonable terms. It's well worth your while to investigate employment opportunities and living conditions in Eilat, Mitzpe Ramon and Arad.

Contact the Unit for Settlement and Development Areas, employment service, 14 Rehov Arlosorov, Ramat Gan. After you have registered your personal data you will be invited for an interview regarding the process of your absorption.

SEE US AND WE WILL LOOK AFTER YOU!

* Copy of an Israeli Government advertisement in the press, Jerusalem Post, February 22, 1968:3
Some react to the discrepancies between their aspirations and their achievement in terms of an *ad hominem* explanation, typified by a story that is making its rounds in a variety of versions:

The Prime Minister, Minister of Finance, and Minister of Social Welfare were flying to a conference in Europe when their plane fell into the ocean. "Who was saved?"

"The State of Israel!"

When viewed in a larger context, Israel's sobering mood has something in common with similar sociological trends in the United States, the Soviet Russia and other modern nations. In spite of the high degree of accomplishment of the parental generation, young people everywhere are turning away from ideology and slogans. Even in the United States, which has reached a level of prosperity unknown in human history, many young people are dissatisfied and some are alienated. They see the problems of their parents chose to ignore.

All these facts support the theory that the achievements of one generation cannot provide satisfactions to another. Different circumstances prevail in large part because of what the parental generation accomplished. Every successful social revolution or major planned change has to confront this issue. Will the fervor of their children diminish? In the words of one American Chalutz:

"Me, I can say I participated in creating the Jewish state, a homeland for the Jews. That's what we did, I mean those who came to fight or to take part in the Kibbutz movement before the war. The guy who came after all of that can't say as much. I'll also say that my kids won't get out of this what I've gotten out of it." ¹

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¹ Harold R. Isaacs, *American Jews in Israel*, op cit: 84
But for the continued opposition of Arab states to peace, the achievement crisis of Israel would probably be more intense than it was once described by Foreign Minister Abba Edban:

"Pursuit is movement, pursuit is dynamism. Attainment on the other hand is conservative and static. Many Israelis and many Jews looking back to the heroic struggle of the past three decades, now ask themselves the burning question: What happened to our dream? It abandoned us. And in the vacuum now there sound no strong voices speaking in mutual unification of one hope and will."

He went on to indicate that his country must somehow recapture its "morning feeling." Among the tasks still to be faced are the following:

How to unite economic freedom with economic justice?

How to revere tradition within the exercise of free intellect and free conscience?

How to draw the youth of Israel and of the Jewish dispersion together?

How, within an organized and increasingly industrialized society, to preserve the special serenities and solid virtues of rural and agricultural life?

How to build a society which, while fostering its own heritage, will in some modest measure be a portent for all mankind?

Neo-Zionism

Contemporary adolescents still have reasons to feel important. They saved their country in the Six-Day War of June 1967, while many of their elders listened to the battle news in safe shelters. The struggle for secure and recognized borders has displaced territorial therapy as one of the core ideology elements around which national unity can be sought.

Socialism continues to be a vital force in the country. But the problem of modifying socialist theories on the basis of practical experience needs attention. The General Labor Federation is in need of revitalization.

There are also many opportunities for innovation. In Israel new institutions still can be built without too many limitations by traditional practices. "Experimentation" remains as a highly valued quality -- be it in the army, education, social welfare, water supply control or the administration of custom duties.

Israel, as a territorial solution and as a location for social rehabilitation, has not lost these functions, though the urgency is reduced. More than twenty years after Hitler committed suicide with Eva Braun, Jews are still persecuted in several countries. Nazi-type cartoons have appeared in Russia. Jews are the only national minority prevented from maintaining their own cultural institutions. The few remaining Jews in Arab lands are harassed. Many feel out-of-place in South Africa, with its apartheid policy.

Unfinished business is big business in Israel. When immigrants arrive, they need housing, vocational training, health care and education. Some of them need help to make the transition from a primitive way of life into the twentieth century with its contradictory values. Thousands of teachers, social workers, doctors, employers, foremen and youth leaders participate in this task of social welfare rehabilitation. And their number is insufficient to meet existing needs. Young people are, therefore, not without opportunities for creativity.
Idealism As An Export

The idea that people need to identify with development oriented public services has universalist implications. Every year thousands of young men and women come to Israel to do volunteer work, mostly in the communal farms (Kibbutzim). The Government, the labor movement and the Kibbutzim are subsidizing this program of Sheruth Le'umi - the Hebrew for public service. Israel has become a Mecca of people trying to find themselves.

The supply of volunteers sometimes exceeds the country's organizational capability to make full use of them. Some are beatniks. But many more make a pilgrimage in search of self-fulfillment. Approximately 1200 of the many thousands who hurried to Israel when its existence was threatened during the summer of 1967 have made arrangements to stay permanently. They helped gather the harvest, recover military equipment from the desert or repair damaged settlements. A Jewish agency report indicates that about half of them were members of the Zionist youth movement in countries of their origin and declare they would have come to Israel in any case, and only came earlier because of the war.¹ But others have more universalist ideals.

These neo-Zionists "dislike, even resent" being told they must come to Israel because the future of the Jews elsewhere is uncertain. They want to show independence and are impatient with the country's complex bureaucracy. Few of them seem to have any interest in existing political parties.

Why do they come? One clue comes from a report of the Masada excavation. Volunteers came from 28 countries when Yigal Yadin

¹Jerusalem Post, January 9, 1968: 1.
was ready to wrest the secrets of Herod's desert fortress through archaeological study. This is where Jews had made their last stand before the Romans ended their national sovereignty in the year 73 of our era.

Most of the volunteers had to perform the tedious manual labor of excavating by hand and small tools. They had to pay their own fares to and from Israel: they had to stay for at least two weeks. They were told in advance that living would be rough - in tents, with ten beds to a tent. This was no soft vacation junket. But there were more than enough applicants from all over the world to run twenty-three fortnightly shifts during two winter sessions, with an average of 300 participants. They ranged from priests to vagabonds, professors to butlers.

One official from London was allowed to come with his sixteen year old son, though the boy was under-age for acceptance. The father explained: "My object in bringing (him) is partly education, but mainly that he may be shown by example to give of his time and labor without financial regard, for the joy of a worthwhile venture alongside young people from other nations."

There is some doubt that unskilled work done by volunteers is less expensive than the hiring of paid local labor. Not all of the volunteers are pioneer material. Some are young adults who enjoy Bohemian living, who will shirk work and who are lost souls, in need of help rather than capable of giving much of it. But the process of volunteering does help as a self-selection mechanism to recruit the kind of young men and women whom Israel hopes to attract as permanent settlers. By reserving certain tasks with inherently

1Yigal Yadin, Masada: Herod's Fortress and the Zealot's Last Stand, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966: 262
idealistic meanings for volunteers, officials create opportunities for local or overseas personnel to feel part of the historic enterprise of nation-building. Some will remain; others will go home, but will return later.

The organization of work camps, volunteers and youth services also has become one of Israel's principal foreign aid programs to the emerging countries of Africa, Asia and South America. The pioneering accomplishments of Israel are inspiring leaders of these nations with the hope of replication. Did not Palestine become transformed from a destitute waste to one of the world's most progressive countries, and was this progress not achieved within a period of decades, rather than centuries?

Here and there Israeli mutual aid provides military training, but the overwhelming volume is devoted to developmental rather than military objectives. Leopold Laufer, who studied Israel's mutual aid programs, found that this new nation symbolizes to many the attainability of cherished hope for rapid development

"Israel's cooperation program is not without its flaws, failures and continuing problems. In many important respects the problems are similar to those that other donor countries face. Yet by virtue of its almost charismatic appeal, Israel, the symbol, has largely remained untouched by these difficulties. The traveller in Africa or Latin America is repeatedly struck by contrasting reactions on the part of his hosts: mention the United States and it brings to the fore uneasiness, suspicion, a plea for more capital, a question about U. S. intervention in the Dominican Republic or the war in Vietnam; mention Israel and it evokes a cordial smile, questions about the Kibbutz, Israel's accomplishments in a specific sphere or declarations of how much better things would be if only the Israeli spirit were present."

The Foreign Aid program also serves to re-enforce the prestige

1 Leo Laufer, Israel and the Developing Countries, N. Y., Twentieth Century Fund, 1967: 213-214
of pioneering inside Israel, at a time when it is losing some of its charisma. It embodies the powerful spiritual message that what is being accomplished need not be viewed as an unique case of nationalistic rebirth. Theodor Herzl envisioned such a universalization long before Israel became a state. In 1902, in his novel describing the Zionist movement as a universalist utopian effort, he had the hero of the novel exclaim:

"Now that I have seen the restoration of the Jews, I should like to pave the way for the restoration of the Negroes -- that is why I am working to open up Africa." 1

The Israeli foreign aid effort, of which the development of youth programs is a major part, adds a strain to Israel's large foreign exchange deficit. Only by postponing some very urgent domestic measures can the needed dollars and skilled manpower be allocated. The Governor of the Bank of Israel reported in 1965 that there were 2,000 students from underdeveloped countries in Israel for training. The number of Israeli experts abroad is at a rate of more than twice that of citizens from the much more developed European Community states. 2

The decision to do this involves a variety of factors. Certainly, Israel's Foreign Aid Program has helped to break down the wall of diplomatic isolation from newly emerging countries, which Arab states tried to erect. Foreign aid jobs have enabled

1 Theodor Herzl, Alt-Neuland: 129-130

many Israelis to see the world beyond their confining borders. Many of these foreign aid experts return later with renewed enthusiasm to their youth work in Israel. The recipient countries often pay a large part of the aid cost in their own country. One of the distinctive attributes of Israel's foreign aid program is the emphasis on pioneering attitudes in the selection of personnel. The majority are young. As Leopold Laufer reports: they have earned an image at home and abroad for speed, pragmatic improvisation and social idealism. They identify with their host country as if it were their own. In the words of one of them:

We worked with the local people and wore the same work clothes they did. We treated them as we treat our workers in Israel. We let them come into our hut, which no Englishman would do ... work schedules aren't a holy matter. If necessary, one works at night ...¹

Cross National Comparison: Utility and Limits

In a world where so many countries devote a disturbingly high proportion of their national incomes to support a military establishment, Israel's experience with cooptatively planned change stands out because a high rate of development has been achieved in spite of the necessity to maintain a large army. Can there be generational transmission of the enthusiasm, fervor and voluntarism which inspired the generation who succeeded in bringing about a major change? Can national morale be maintained when the military emergency begins to lessen or disappear? These are universal problems of long-range national planning.

Something can be learned about these questions from cross-national comparison though no two historic circumstances are ever identical. In the United States, as in Israel, the idea of a

¹ Leopold Laufer, Israel and the Developing Countries, 56-57
### Schematic Comparisons of Selected Institutional Variables in Israel and in The United States Relevant to the Question: Shall There Be A National Service?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-Comparable Planning Variable</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Israel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Size of Program</strong></td>
<td>Large Population over 200 millions</td>
<td>Small Population about 2-1/2 millions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Support for Comprehensive National Service</strong></td>
<td>Opposition to be expected</td>
<td>Strong support. National Service is not a controversial political issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Supportive Economic Resources</strong></td>
<td>Very large per capita National Product</td>
<td>Much more limited per capita National Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defense Necessity</strong></td>
<td>Borders are not fortified. No hostile neighbors overseas, defense of the United States has been maintained by other means than Comprehensive National Service.</td>
<td>Surrounded by hostile neighbors. Israel relies primarily on Comprehensive National Service for its defense.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eligibility</strong></td>
<td>All citizens, irrespective of race or creed who favor a strong U.S.A.</td>
<td>Only Jewish and Druze Arab Citizens. Other Arabs are exempted to spare them potential battle with Arabs across the border.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opportunity Structure for Young People</strong></td>
<td>Large and diversified</td>
<td>Small and more limited mobility</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
universal military service to recruit a civilian militia in time of war has become traditional. But American programs to recruit young people for developmental tasks, the Peace Corps and Vista domestic service are of very recent origin. Their expansion into a universal national service to employ the approximately three million eight hundred thousand youths who come of age each year would be a mammoth undertaking. In urging some degree of expansion to cover more of the youth population, Labor Secretary Willard Wirtz told the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service: "I think that life will have more point to it if every boy and girls has in his or her life a chance to spend two years doing something for some reason other that what is called 'breadwinning' -- that is, for some reason better than money and on a pure service basis."2

This is indeed what Israel expects from all of its young citizens. There is a universal national service. It has many consequences for the total social system, but they are not necessarily the same as those which would emerge if the same idea were to be implemented in the United States.

There is much variance between the continent spanning United States of America and postage-stamp size Israel. For instance, compulsory education in Israel ends with the eighth grade. The government is committed to extend the period for two more years,


but at present cannot afford it. Post-elementary education is not free. Israel has a long road ahead to equal the educational attainment of the United States at the high school and university levels.¹ (See attached chart)

In spite of major differences, other than those mentioned, between conditions in Israel and in the United States, there are in both countries common administrative considerations in planning for a comprehensive national service, such as the following:

1. The need to challenge the on-coming generation and to develop affinity for public service. A high ideological value is placed on voluntarism but only a minority of the population will actually respond to a call for purely voluntary national service.

2. The need for opportunities for young people to discover themselves, their capacities and skills. Many of them feel they are growing up under achievement crisis conditions. The parental generation attained a high degree of success in some areas of life; their children must identify new challenges to give meaning to their lives.

3. The presence of a sizeable segment of the population who grow up in poverty. It includes many insufficiently educated youths, especially from culturally deprived ethnic groups. Under ordinary circumstances, they enter adult life without meaningful experience in the performance of social roles that have status in the youth culture or in the adult society.

4. The need to integrate the deprived and to motivate some of them to take part in public service programs.

Conclusion

The mission of creating a cohesive citizenry out of Israel's polyglot population is facilitated by a network of public service, welfare and educational programs. Prominent among them, as will be shown, are youth organizations. They serve many functions, such as creative use of

EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT LEVELS
UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL

FINISHED EIGHTH GRADE
FINISHED NINTH GRADE
FINISHED HIGH SCHOOL
ENTRY INTO COLLEGE OR TEACHER'S SEMINARY
GRADUATION FROM A COLLEGE OR TEACHER'S SEMINARY

(COHORT PROJECTION OF THE 1960's)

UNITED STATES
ISRAEL

PERCENT
0 20 40 60 80 100
leisure time, utilization, skill and leadership training, along with the nurturance of nation-building enthusiasm. Sponsorship is by a variety of agencies including political parties, school authorities, the army and some private groups. But there is no central control. The possibilities and limitations of nationwide planning for youth services can, therefore, be studied easily in such a diversified laboratory.

When Israel became a sovereign nation, there was an achievement crisis. It involved a shift from idealism to realism, a change in priorities among many of the country's pioneer elite. Halutzim left collective settlement to pursue more individually and family centered careers. When there were conflicts between personal and public priorities, the former often were in ascendancy. Crucial posts were filled on the basis of personal and party loyalties, sometimes with little regard for technical merit. Many vital developmental programs like the new harbor at Asdod were delayed by jurisdictional conflict and strikes to impose featherbedding practices. What Max Weber called the bureaucratization of charisma occurred.

The severity of the achievement crisis was mitigated by the continuation of external conflict. The Arab neighbors of Israel view its destruction as a necessity. Relationships are based only on a cease-fire agreement. It is often broken, as such "no peace, but no war" arrangements are always likely to be.

There has, however, been a dramatic change in the nature of the country's mood. The revolutionary fervor of their parents cannot be felt by the younger generation in the same way.
Young people born in Israel do not experience anti-semitism. They do not have to make the transition from being a refugee to being a citizen of a new land, learn a new language and work in a new occupation. The emerging youth culture cannot remain what it was before independence.

Like children everywhere, they are concerned with their personal development and with having fun. Daily conversations are filled with the excitement of the next soccer game or who is courting whom. And they get angry at bus schedules, frustrated by school assignments. They want many things somebody thinks they should not have. As in all developing countries, aspirations for personal achievement are high, but there is little room at the top. Opportunities for higher education for important jobs and for comfortable jobs are very limited. Young people must work many years to finance an apartment. Many have more than one job. One paycheck is usually too little to be the basis for supporting a family at a middle class standard.

In one sense, this is what the parents struggled to give their children, a chance to grow up normally. But the country's political leaders and educators are also concerned with perpetuating the ideals which brought them from all parts of the world. There is much unfinished business in Israel, to transform the country's promises into a more stable state of fulfillment. The remainder of this book will deal with the organizational arrangements that have emerged to influence the country's youth culture through peer group programs guided by adults. As will be shown in subsequent chapters, they retain much of the organizational structure of the pre-independence struggle. But the day-to-day programs reflect,
in part, the fact that Israel is no longer a vision but an accomplished fact. The country's youths are confronting new problems, as does every generation in an era where the pace of social and economic change is being hastened by a very high rate of technological innovation.
V

The Research Setting
Organizational Mapping

The principles of planned youth culture management were analyzed by relating three elements:

1. Major youth organizations;
2. Leaders who staff their programs;
3. Members who participate in them.

Selected variables were selected for more intensive study.

In social system research, as in planning, it is a good strategy to survey the total network of related institutions but to concentrate detailed attention on key variables or control points of the larger system. Computers can handle intricate multi-variate analysis of quantified data. But the statistical output must also be related qualitatively to the total complex of cultural, social-economic political and psychological factors.

The research began with a survey of nation-wide organizations and government ministries concerned with youth problems. Descriptive reports, census data and available research studies were reviewed. Key policy makers were interviewed by the American Study Director or by his Israeli collaborator. Interviews with key informants helped in the formulation of questions which were pre-tested before being included in one of our several schedules. Large scale data collection and analysis was focused on three national youth programs; the youth movements, the Gadna Youth Corps and the Beyond School program. There also was a considerable amount of participant observation. The research staff was invited to visit many organizations, sometimes to give lectures or to be available.
for consultation. These requests provided access to important sources of data.

Two different methods of sampling were necessary. Leaders and policy makers were selected on the basis of their accessibility and their readiness to be interviewed from lists of leaders furnished by each organization. Information from adolescents was obtained on an area sampling basis. Efforts were made to reach all youths in the sample, including those not active in any youth program.

Every modern society tries to influence the next generation through organizations. Youth program participation in Israel is almost as common as school attendance. Over ninety per cent of all Israeli youngsters reported themselves as having participated in one or several of the three major youth organizations selected for study. The proportion was 95% among the adolescent tenth grade cohort in Holon, a city which has an above average participation rate. But youth programs are elective.

The surveys were largely concerned with determining the presence or absence of reported membership. Less data could be selected to measure the meaning of participation for each respondent. Some members become deeply involved in a youth program while for others participation is nominal or is restricted to one specific project. Youngsters experience the membership personally rather than organizationally. For many, it is more than a matter of going on hikes, engaging in sports and in discussions. In contrast, many of the adult policy makers and leaders thought of their work in more jurisdictional terms. They discuss them administratively as youth movements,
the Gadna Youth Corps, the Beyond School programs, sports clubs, street clubs or the National Service of the Israel Defense Force. Each plan specific activities in terms of the ideological and administrative expectations of the sponsoring adult-making agency. Many of these programs, as shown in the attached schematic outline sponsor the same activity. There is some overlap also in their organizational objectives. But there is no single administrative unit which could aspire to exercise over-all control over the youth culture or furnish the data needed for this study.

All of these programs offer leadership roles to very young persons but there is much variation in how much initiative can be exercised by them. There is directiveness in all programs, but the cooperation - the incorporation of competing and conflicting youthful elements in leadership and in policy formation - is more variable.

1. Youth Movements

The Youth Movements will soon celebrate their fiftieth anniversaries. That is a long time for age limited organizations, that must recruit each year from a new group of eligibles. They are highly esteemed. They reach about three quarters of the adolescents at some time of their lives. But only a dedicated minority will still be associated as they reach adulthood. Youth organizations remain in the forefront as organizations recruiting for public service, especially in Kibbutzim, but there is also much talk about their being outdated. Structurally the youth movements have changed little, nor have their official ideologies changed much in spite of major changes in circumstances of their operation.

The Youth Movements had their origins in Europe, where program leaders recruited Halutzim and facilitated emigration to Palestine. They still have some overseas branches, but they now rely on nurturance
from Israel to flourish. All of the ten movements, with the exception of the Scouts (Zophim), are sponsored by political parties. But they are quite similar structurally. Each is composed of small groups of age-mates, federated regionally and nationally.

Each youth movement began as a "radical," if not revolutionary program to build a new social order. With the success of Zionism, they have now become "establishment" oriented, with the exception of a handful of members of a Communist youth group which failed to take part in our survey. Ex-members of the other youth movements are prominent in the government. Overall policy on "principles" is formulated by adults, who prefer to exercise their influence indirectly. Youth initiative in day-to-day operations remains relatively high. There is a good deal of reliance on voluntary and amateur leadership. Paid coordinators are employed increasingly for central posts that cannot be manned by volunteers.

At one time the youth movements had a near monopoly over organized peer groups. They still reach more members than any other youth organization but participation is short lived for all but an idealist elite. Early adolescence is an age when many satisfactions are derived from group activities. But they tend to decline generally during the later puberty years when there is an increasing tendency for boy-girl pairing and the desire for courtship oriented activities competes increasingly with programs for a larger group. Even among the long-term members, a decline of ideological impact is reported by many of the leaders who were interviewed.

2. The Gadna Youth Corps

Gadna had originated as a para-military volunteer corps prior
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Youth Organizations</th>
<th>Gadna Youth Corps</th>
<th>Beyond School Programs</th>
<th>Sports Clubs</th>
<th>Street Worker Programs</th>
<th>Zahal National Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hiking and touring</td>
<td>Often</td>
<td>Often</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Rare</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Often</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports and games</td>
<td>Non-competitive</td>
<td>Non-competitive</td>
<td>Non-competitive</td>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td>Non-competitive</td>
<td>Non-competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussions</td>
<td>Often</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Often</td>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td>Often</td>
<td>Often</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts and Crafts</td>
<td>Rare</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Often</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Singing</td>
<td>Often</td>
<td>Often</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Rare</td>
<td>Often</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching of vocational skills</td>
<td>Rare</td>
<td>Rare</td>
<td>Often</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Rare</td>
<td>Often</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-military conditioning</td>
<td>Incidental</td>
<td>Major goal</td>
<td>Often</td>
<td>Incidental</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Major goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-educational groups</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Professional or Non-professional</td>
<td>Professional or Non-professional</td>
<td>Often Professional</td>
<td>No Professional</td>
<td>Mostly Professional</td>
<td>Highly selected and trained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Work with problem youngsters</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Rare</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Almost None</td>
<td>Often</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Service</td>
<td>High Priority</td>
<td>High Priority</td>
<td>Minor emphasis</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>High Priority</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
to the country's struggle for independence, as a cooperative program of the high schools and the then underground Haganah army. This organizational structure has been retained, but minimal participation is now compulsory in the weekly or monthly drills, hikes and endurance training of certain post-primary schools. There also are voluntary out-of-school Gadna clubs devoted to sharp-shooting, airplane model building, sea scouting and/or an orchestra. A selected elite is invited to vacation courses in leadership.

There is very limited youth culture initiative in Gadna. The organizers are career officers or Ministry of Education officials. They supervise a well organized curriculum taught by full time youth leaders. Eighty-two per cent were former youth movement leaders. A large minority are women. Students are taught to accept discipline, but are expected to exercise a good deal of peer group control in place of externally enforced commands. The program is non-political. About sixty per cent of youths between fourteen and seventeen years of age are enrolled.

3. The Beyond School Programs:

There are many local cultural enrichment and recreational programs subsidized and/or coordinated through the Ministry of Education. They include a range of amateur sports, dancing, supervised recreation, hiking, hobby and art classes, films and other informal educational offerings. There are also extended day school programs and after-school clubs in school buildings. They reach in excess of half the adolescent population. Known by many administrative labels, they will be designated in this book as Beyond School programs. They have to be taken into account in any
assessment of organizational efforts to influence the youth culture.

There is no central control although different Bureaus of the Ministry of Education and Culture along with local youth departments are planning and financing them. Those located in grade schools are officially designated as Supplementary Education (Hinuh Mashlim). In high schools the Social Education (Hinuh Havrati) Department of the Ministry of Education is responsible for encouraging their expansion through a subsidy program. In separate buildings one will find Neighborhood Centers (Moadonim) programs, Technical Clubs and community-wide Youth Centers (Batei Noar). There are also detached youth work programs. Municipalities furnish leaders to guide self-generated social clubs and induce them to locate in one of the youth centers. Leaders are more often career officials than in any of the other organizations. About two-thirds are male. Few are under 20. The program is more professionalized than the Gadna or the Youth Movements.

For several decades now, the adult-making institutions in Israel have sponsored three nation-wide youth programs, each designed to supplement the efforts of the family and school system in specializing for adolescents. As will be documented in more detail later, none of them employ a negative strategy. They do not openly oppose youth culture manifestations as dangerous or anti-social. Nor are any of the contemporary programs revolutionary in their objective.

The Gadna Youth Corps and the National Service are inherently directive in their outlook. Their military structure gives the leaders a great deal of formal control in deciding organizational objectives. But within this control structure, young people are
given many opportunities to volunteer and to serve on a cooptative rather than on a command basis.

Those working with Youth Movements and the Beyond School programs rely in part on cooptation, since young people are recruited for key leadership and policy-making posts. There is a positive acceptance of some youth culture innovations. There is a regard for the need for autonomy on the part of young people in deciding on the use of their leisure time.

Additional youth activities are provided by sports clubs and local social clubs. The national service of the Israel Defense Forces also provides an organized framework for adolescents. These programs were studied, but not included in our analysis. Sports clubs have a specific athletic mission. They are not aiming to exercise a general youth culture influence. Local social clubs are not sponsored by an adult-making agency. They form spontaneously by youths in neighborhoods and are largely devoted to companionship and social dancing. The Army's national service makes a determined effort to have an impact on the youth culture. But it drafts youth at 18, beyond the age range of the population samples available for our study.

Our research attention was restricted to the three nation-wide youth programs which have a well formulated strategy for influencing the pre-army service youth culture. They also have a strategy for recruitment and training of youth leaders to educate, indoctrinate and to provide models of conduct. But in order to get a more complete picture of the total network of leisure time programs, it will be necessary to sketch the outlines of the organized youth programs that were excluded from our analysis. (See chart on next page.)
### SCHEMATIC OUTLINE OF ADULT CONTROL OF ADOLESCENT YOUTH PROGRAMS IN ISRAEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Adult-making Institution attempting to exercise control.</th>
<th>Control Strategy</th>
<th>Degree of initiative by youths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cliqués or Gangs*</td>
<td>Parents; also social workers and probation officers if clique or gang is engaged in anti-social activities.</td>
<td>None or cooperatorially influenced.</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Movements</td>
<td>Political parties; the Youth Department of the Ministry of Education and the Youth Department of the Jewish Agency provide some subsidies.</td>
<td>Cooptative</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beyond School programs, municipal and rural youth centers</td>
<td>Local schools, local Departments of Recreation and political parties. Some centers are also sponsored by voluntary organizations and youth movements.</td>
<td>Cooptative</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports Clubs*</td>
<td>Political parties, municipalities plus earning of clubs from national lottery and sale of tickets to spectators.</td>
<td>Directive but voluntary</td>
<td>Small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gadna Youth Corps</td>
<td>Gadna Departments of the Ministry of Education and of the Ministry of Defense</td>
<td>Directive and Cooptative</td>
<td>Small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Service*</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
<td>Largely directive; cooperatorially controlled Nahal Units</td>
<td>Small</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Not included in our field survey.*
Sports Clubs

Soccer is the king of organized sports in Israel. It is likely to be played whenever boys can be gathered together in a neighborhood lot. Most localities have a local team. They play to crowds of spectators and engage in regional, as well as national tournaments. Two hours of physical training instructions a week are required in most schools above the third grade, including gymnastics, soccer games, other sports and walking trips. Swimming lessons in school are compulsory in the sixth grade. Hikes, non-competitive basketball, swimming, track and field sports are also part of the program of Youth Organizations and the Gadna Youth Corps.

Sports is an activity in which adolescents generally outshine everybody else. It is viewed as fun; less often as an object for single-minded devotion. The stress in Israel is less on training a few outstanding athletes than on widespread participation. In the 1968 Olympics in Mexico, as well as the 1964 Olympics in Tokyo, not a single Israeli athlete won a medal. "None showed that vitally important 'push', that supreme Olympic effort, that breeds best performers and brings about the upsets."¹

Most sports clubs are sponsored by a political party. Each party contributes funds and provides adult sponsorship but it is rare for political criteria to be employed in the selection of players although the party gains prestige from its club. Many localities make contributions from tax revenues.² Members also pay small fees.

². In Jerusalem for instance, the municipality provided a subsidy of 15,000 pounds for the 1967-68 fiscal year. Hapoel, the Mapai Labor Party sports club, received 45% of this sum; 25% went to the Betar, the nationalist party club. The Religious Party Club, Elitsur received 12% and 13% went to ASA, a non-partisan student sports class club, supported by the Liberal Party. These allocations were made in accordance to the number of registered members.
The Ministry of Education contributes to the improvement of facilities. Funds are also raised through a national lottery.

Physical education teachers as well as amateur sports leaders are trained at a specialized school, the Orde Wingate Center. It has excellent facilities located on the seashore between Tel Aviv and Natanya. It conducts a two-year sports teacher training program for grade and high schools. There also are brief courses about specific sports for leaders of amateur clubs.

Sports clubs are less co-educational than are the other youth programs. The sex ratio of our sample of tenth grade level youths in Holon was four males for every female. Sports seemed to attract ex-youth movement members much more than those who were still activists in the tenth grade. Since many of the games take place on Saturdays, there is a competition for time with youth movements, which also use that day for many of their programs. Nevertheless thirty-five per cent of the active members in the left Socialist Hashomer Hatzair youth movements in Holon also reported being members of a sports club.

About one in ten adolescents in our area sample of Holon is a sports enthusiast. While seventeen per cent said they belonged to a sports club, only two out of five or seven per cent of the total group rated sports as their "most preferred leisure activity." On this basis they were designated as sports enthusiasts. In addition, there were three per cent who were unaffiliated sports enthusiasts. These youths also designated sports as their most favored type of recreation, but did not report themselves as belonging to a club.

1 For details about the nature of this Holon sample, see page 5-24
In sports clubs, as in all autonomous peer group programs, good students from European families predominate. About one-half of the sports club members were enrolled in an academic high school; nearly two-thirds had fathers born in Europe. But sports clubs did reach youths who fail to do well in school. Achievement in sports is not dependent on intellectual capability. Nineteen per cent of those who received failure scores in the eighth grade screening examination reported being a sports club member. Of the youth movement members who were not in a sports club, about 60% were good students, in contrast to only 45% of the youth movement members who also were active in a sports club.

Sports clubs have a high attraction for those who thought of themselves as physically fit. Only three per cent of the sports enthusiasts (those who were sports club members and who rated this activity first among leisure-time activities) thought they would be deferred from the army for health reasons. This proportion needs to be contrasted with 13% of those who were youth movement activists but not sports club members. Of those who belonged to no organized youth program, 49% thought they would be deferred from the Army for health reasons.

Sports clubs are activity centered. They do not advocate pioneering type tasks. Sports enthusiasts, those who rate sports above all other recreational programs, reflect this fact. Less than three per cent thought they would join a kibbutz, as against 14% of the mildly interested sports club members, whose first preference for recreation was an activity other than sports.
Local Social Clubs

All young people belong to informal cliques. Membership tends to be spontaneous and local, reflecting friendship patterns among age mates of a school or in a neighborhood. Most youngsters belong to one or more of these groupings. Some acquire enough identity to adopt a name and to sponsor scheduled programs, especially dances or hikes. Many others retain more fluidity. While these cliques are an important part of any youth culture, they were outside the range of our field study, which dealt with programs to intervene organizationally in guiding adolescent leisure time activities.

Many a school class, especially in middle class neighborhoods, will begin to be divided socially as they near the end of grammar school into two major strata: youth movement members and social club, (Havuroth Noar) participants. The latter place a higher priority on clothes, keeping up with movie stars and other popular culture activities. They are exclusive for youth in a particular area or school. Its members rarely pay dues. They just belong. Lipstick among girls, smoking by young students and social dancing are acceptable. They meet in each other's homes, on the beach, the street or in neighborhood cafes, especially on Friday and Saturday night.

In later adolescence, local social groups gain more adherants than the youth movements. They explore the world that unfolds to their curious minds with all its facets, including jazz, as well as concerts, literature and pornographic weeklies. The cliques will also do some "things" their elders would disapprove. Their programs are fun, social and courtship oriented. Much of the time members just sit and gossip. They may →
serve additional functions-helping to bring food to lonely aged persons or the pursuit of delinquent activities. The difference between the local clubs and youth movement activists is not absolute. It is a matter of degree. Yochanan Peres found that two thirds of the youngsters oriented towards popular culture thought "elegant dress helps in making a good impression," an attitude shared by only 44% of the Youth Movement members.¹

Cliques are highly resistant to adult control or cooptation. A street club program began to take shape to reach deviant cliques while our survey was in process. Social workers were employed in the Tel Aviv area to seek out and to befriend individuals and groups among the under-privileged, who often engage in disapproved, if not illegal, activities. The street worker's main objective is to coopt these potentially dangerous cliques so as to control their violations of socially acceptable values. The street club worker does not wait for an invitation. He searches out a group which he thinks is in need of socialization. He befriends them, often by first "hanging around" in slum cafes where shadowy figures meet to gossip, to do business or to plan anti-social acts. Few of the lower class social club members are enrolled in any other adult-controlled youth program. They are primarily detached from the social system and its reward structure.

Over the months, the good street worker becomes accepted as a valued outsider. He will give advice, intervene in family matters, assist in obtaining employment, help in court cases, and apply his know-how about military service problems.\(^1\) He has many opportunities to be present in situations which could easily deteriorate into a major fight or a criminal act. He knows when a car is stolen or a local girl is slept with. He will not turn youngsters over to the police but try to use the peer-group to exercise social controls.

This generally detached segment of the youth population represents only a few per cent of the total youth population, but they are important beyond their numerical strength. They are a heavy burden to law enforcement agencies, which try to work with them on a preventive basis, to the extent their manpower permits.\(^2\) Many of these youths will enter the army at age 18. Some will adjust while others have to be discharged for lack of social responsibility.

The National Service

When youths reach the age of 18, boys are expected to report for 36 months service and girls for 24 months. Men remain on reserve duty until the age of 49. Women are generally discharged when they marry, or before, if not needed. Every citizen -- and if has a motor vehicle, his car, is subject to call without prior notice.

There are malingerers, draft evaders and an occasional deserter.

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No statistics are available, but a reading of the Israeli press shows that enforcement of the national service requirement occurs without much legal coercion. Many more cases of tax evasion and serious traffic violation are reported than failure to meet national service requirements.

The National Service was excluded from our study. It is relevant, however, as the last organizational effort to influence adolescents. Military service is a nearly universal experience, where the impact of the youth organizations, the school and other adult-making organizations are put to a test. But it is not the only test. Life beyond the army provides other challenges to national service equally and more relevant to what the youth programs want to achieve.

Girls first train in separate units, but are then assigned to such duties as drivers, typists, cooks, nurses, administrators, social workers, youth leaders and teachers. They serve with men, except during actual combat. Their work is usually commanded by the unit (and male) officers, but women officers in each area are responsible for the personal needs of girls. When parachutists come back to the camp from a training jump, girl soldiers are likely to have a snack ready for them.

The availability of woman power in the military not only releases men for direct combat units, but also humanizes the army. While interviews with women soldiers indicate that some think they are inadequately utilized, many also responded: "I would not have wanted to miss this experience for anything."
Girls from very traditional homes can be on their own, to make their decisions. They often return home more self-confident and grown-up as they were when entering the service. Quite a few meet their future husband in the army. It is here that adolescence gives way to adult status at home and in the community.

Zahal, the Israel Defense Army, is not a distant bureaucracy. It is an institution affecting virtually every Jewish family. It is the people's own militia, generally above politics and patronage. Class privileges mean much less than in many other Israeli institutions, even those under the direction of socialist organizations and the Histadruth trade union. Officers are expected to lead, rather than tell others to go ahead. The "batboy" and the officers' washroom are unthinkable. Even more than in the United States Defense Forces, the power to command is kept clearly separate from social privileges.

Most Israeli institutions are responsive to "protektia," the expectation that office holders in performing their job give some weight to party politics, religious outlook, kinship and friendship. "Who you know" competes with "what you know" when it comes to speeding up the process of getting a driver's license or the determination of promotion of personnel in government and industry. Such a policy of considering personal criteria is vigorously suppressed in the army. A strong merit orientation is enforced. Able young people from under-privileged groups without "contacts" will generally get their chance. Over protected middle class youngsters of lesser ability learn to confront themselves realistically.
National service also provides young Israelis with a sudden introduction to the harsh realities of existence. There is little of the romanticization of military experience which the Israeli has earned abroad because of its fighting capability. Quite a few officers do not conform to the ideal model of the task-oriented charismatic leader. There is red tape, boredom, neglect and other bureaucratic complications. Above all, there is the risk of injury and death. The young Israeli learns to balance his pride in being part of an organization that can defend him and his loved ones against the cost. Casualties in their small country are not reported by the numbers. They are known by name. Each loss is felt keenly.

The army has a double set of models. There are the usual military heroes, who risk all in battle. But the Halutz, who measures his achievement by what is developed positively, shares some of the limelight. Zahal does much more than defend the borders. It provides transportation and communication in border areas. Its volunteer Nahal pioneer corps develops new settlements. A vast network of Vocational and Academic educational services are maintained, especially for immigrants. Efforts are made to have everybody leave the National Service in good physical condition and enriched by social and vocational experiences that can be of value to him in meeting adult responsibilities.

For many under-privileged youths, military services serve as a framework for last chance "make-up" education. The program is extra-curricular in the sense that no one will be court-martialed
for failure to take advantage of it.

Special classes are organized for these educationally handicapped throughout their two years of service, but the most intensive course comes near the end of military service. The Army Education Corps found that soldiers are then more motivated than they are at the beginning of their national service. But if few refuse to take part in it before discharge from the army, the under-educated are sent to a full time school in accordance with Order Number 37,0102 of the General Staff:¹

1. Every soldier who has not previously finished an elementary education must go through his basic studies during his national service, sit for a final examination and receive a graduation certificate.

2. A soldier who has finished his elementary education abroad must attend a course to round off his Jewish and civic education.

3. The basic-studies course aims at elevating the cultural level of the soldier, deepening his attachment to the State's national values, and laying the foundations for future training and further education.

4. Soldiers whose Hebrew has been graded by the Army authorities as 0-5 (out of a maximum of 10) must study the language before they can attend the basic studies course.

5. Basic studies comprise: Bible, geography and history of

Israel national renaissance and independence, mathematics, general geography and history and civics.

Boys and girls from disadvantaged segments of the population tend to enter the army deficient in good work habits, neatness and motivation to succeed with educational tasks. Towards the end of their service, they begin to worry about their future. What will I do when I get discharged? Some of these culturally deprived soldiers also had a success experience because of their physical courage or social skills. Not all of them "make it." But hundreds each year graduate from Camp Marcus School\(^1\) in Haifa rescued from the social-educational stigma of not having met grade school standards.

The army reaches a good many, but not all of those for whom national service could serve as an integrative experience. As one high official explained, "Fighting is our primary mission. Welfare is a luxury. I wish we could afford more of it."

The army will not draft severely delinquent, socially maladjusted and psychologically disabled youngsters. But when the military budget permits, several hundred of such socially marginal youngsters are accepted for rehabilitative purposes. They are given special attention and conditioning under quite unmilitary permissive circumstances. Run-aways are not normally court-martialled. They are more often brought back to camp by their own officers who function more like social workers than commanders.

\(^1\)Named after Colonel "Mickey" Marcus, a West Point graduate who served as Israel's first field Commander-in-Chief during the Independence.
About one third of these special recruits end up doing well in the service. Another third complete their period of service, but are marginal. About one third cannot adjust and are discharged.

In advocating a somewhat similar program of alternative military and developmental services for the United States, the former Director of the Peace Corps, Sargent Shriver, and the Director of America's "War on Poverty" characterized Israel's example in the following concise, if somewhat over-simplified, description:

"Israel has found that its program of universal national service which brings all young Israelis together for training and for either military duty or work in pioneer farm settlements, is the most effective factor it has for national integration and education. Young men and women, literate and illiterate, from fortunate families and from the most demoralized backgrounds, come together for common service to their country. And they come out of this service more productive, better educated and healthier citizens."¹

Leadership Mapping

Youth organizations are strongly influenced by those who lead them. At policy-making levels, dozens of officials were contacted and interviewed with respect to both current and past trends. This descriptive information was supplemented by a questionnaire survey of 2,201 youth leaders who were carried on the roster of various or who was enrolled in a youth leader training course. Israeli youth programs/ This conglomerate group of officials included many of those responsible for their programs. Recently employed youth workers or those disinterested in their work are probably over-represented among the non-respondents.

Different subunits varied much in the proportion of being reached. Only a few were missed among the Army Gadna Youth Corps leaders, mostly persons who were ill or on vacation on the days when our staff met with them. Many permanent cadres, who did not think they were expected to take part in the questionnaire survey, also failed to participate. Our coverage was much more restricted in other leadership sub-categories. Respondents could not often be assembled in one place for group administration of the questionnaire. Our data comes from those interested in replying.

There is no reliable list of youth leaders that could be used for sampling purposes. No one knows how many persons work in this profession, though their number exceeds 10,000. In part this is because the definition of youth leaders (Madrih in Hebrew) covers many types of youth work. The following categories were included:

**Youth Work Administrators**

Officials who administer a program or teach youth leaders without direct responsibility for any adolescent groups. Most of these administrators once served in direct leadership posts. They tend to be full-time personnel.

**Paid Youth Leaders**

Most of the direct youth leaders included in our sample receive some form of compensation for their work. It may be a part or full-time salary. More often there is a more modest compensation for expenses and maintenance from the adult sponsoring agency, a Kibbutz, the army or the youth movement central headquarters. Some leaders are teachers who earn extra pay by serving as extra-curricular youth workers.
Volunteer Youth Leaders

About 17% of the youth leaders in our sample served without any form of compensation. Their actual proportion is probably greater. Volunteer leaders are not easily contacted because they must be active for a long time before they are likely to appear on a national roster of the type used in this study. Most of them were under 18 years of age.

Additional information about the volunteer and very young leadership reservoir was gathered from a sample of 722 leadership trainees enrolled in the 1965 summer courses of the Gadna Youth Corps. Most of them had completed the first year of high school. All those in attendance, except for a handful who were ill or refused to take part completed a questionnaire which was administered to groups.

Membership Mapping

In addition to policy makers and youth leaders, the research team questioned several samples of adolescents about how they think and feel, with special reference to their involvement in leisure time programs. Previously collected data from two already completed surveys of students were recoded for re-analysis for the purposes of our inquiry of how the "customers" of youth programs think. Most questionnaires were group administered in school classes and special programs, supplemented by a mail contact.

The interviews were at two different age levels, in the last year of public school (age 13-15) and during later adolescence,
at the tenth grade level. Most of these informants were 16 years old, although the range was from 15 to 18. Students do not progress through the educational system at a uniform pace, especially in an immigrant country where many young people lose a few years of schooling when making the transition of studying in a new language.

A total of four samples was utilized:

1. **The Sekker Sample**: A nation-wide 25 per cent sample of eighth graders in 1963 were questioned about their youth program participation. Most of them (87%) were between thirteen and fourteen years old. The data were collected as part of a study to relate school performance to each youngster's socio-economic background, his future and vocational plans. Each student's responses were related to scores on his Sekker comprehensive examination, which is given each year on a nation-wide basis to determine access to high school programs. The examination includes items on vocabulary, reading comprehension, arithmetic, geometry, bible and two I. Q. tests. Evaluations of each student are also solicited from teachers.

2. **The Holon Area Sample**: All tenth grade level adolescents in that metropolitan satellite city of Tel Aviv were asked in 1965 to complete a questionnaire about their current schooling, their work, future plans and their youth program involvement. Included in this sample of 1,040 youngsters were 250 who also were previously interviewed in the 1963 nation-wide Sekker Comprehensive Examination sample. This provides our study with a panel of youth, permitting

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1Seven per cent accelerated - under thirteen, five per cent were fifteen and one per cent was sixteen years old or older.
comparisons of their 1963 and 1965 responses.

The choice of the city of Holon had a number of advantages. It has a diversified network of youth programs, coordinated by an above average Youth Department Director, who was willing to cooperate in the study. Holon is fairly representative of Israel's urban population.\footnote{With 67,250 inhabitants it was small enough to be encompassed within the limited resources available for this part of the study. But it was big enough to have a 1963 graduating class of 1,040 eighth graders whom we then tried to locate in 1965. Limited demographic data about each student was available from the 1963 Sekker study. A field team of college students relocated 879 of these same subjects during 1965. They were then questioned about their youth program participation, their vocational plans and their attitudes about many personal as well as social questions.}

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3. The Leisure-time Survey data of a nation-wide sample of 2,045 high school age students in 1963 were made available to the study staff. Youth program participation of these older adolescents had been studied within the context of their leisure-time activities, employment, and school attendance. These data provided a means of checking the national representativeness of the Holon Area sample findings.
4. The Welfare Department Sample: The 1963 national Sekker survey as well as the 1965 Holon area study focused on youngsters graduating from Israel's regular elementary schools. This enumeration procedure makes it probable that many school drop-outs were missed. About five per cent are given permission to leave school; another roughly five per cent leave illegally; and perhaps another five per cent are in parochial or special education classes. These youngsters were under-represented in our samples. The few studies which have been made of these population segments agree that they have two characteristics: the children come from poor families and are poor students.

The inference that our survey data fails to include a representative sample of the deprived and socially inadequate segment of the population is confirmed by internal analysis of our own findings. Ninety-four per cent of the good students in the 1963 Sekker study were located for a follow-up interview in 1965, as compared with only 74% of the poor students. Eighty-eight per cent of the high social-economic scale students were re-enumerated,¹ but only 74% of those of the lowest socio-economic scale point.

This under-enumeration led to the decision to make a special survey of children of Welfare Department clients. Supplementary data about these largely low-class youngsters was collected in a

¹The differential under-enumeration of poor youngsters and marginal students was even more pronounced with respect to certain questionnaire items. Only 65% of our 1965 respondents of low socio-economic status responded to the question "In which unit would you prefer to do your army service?," as compared with 82% of the highest socio-economic scale group.
survey of 514 adolescents from the files of the Department of Welfare in Holon.

Arab youths were excluded from this study. While Israel is a bi-national state, there are almost no integrated adolescent youth groups. Youth organizations play a very minor role in Arab youth culture. Their social system is still predominantly traditional. The patriarchal family is in conflict with overt expressions of peer group power that would be generated by youth programs. Organizational efforts to influence the beliefs, expectations and voluntary activities of the next generation through youth organizations and extra-curricular programs are well developed only among the Jews. In 1968 the Gadna Youth Corps was extended to incorporate boys of the Arab speaking Druze minority, who supported the Jews during the Independence War. Druze males serve in the Israeli army, but even this group has no extensive youth programs. Girls are kept close to home until marriage. There is ambivalence about co-education in the schools.

**Participation Index**

Israeli youth program planners and educators tend to assume that like school attendance, youth organization affiliation is presumed to be socially desirable. This view is justified by references to such facts that affiliated youths more often do well in school and express more idealistic preferences than those of non-joiners. This assumption was confirmed as were a number of other variables such as sex and school attendance.

The meaning of organizational affiliation for each youngster
was not elicited directly. But in order to test if this variable might be related to the impact of youth organizations on behavior, respondents were divided into the following four categories:

1. Non-joiners
2. Passive participants
3. Volunteer (non-youth movement) participants
4. Youth movement activists

Only six per cent of the Holon sample reported no youth program membership. They were the non-joiners. Three quarters of them were also poor students. They had failure scores in the eighth grade Sekker examination given two years before our survey was conducted. Many of the non-joiners came from families where the father had no education. Only two per cent of youngsters growing up in such a family were youth movement activists. Over two thirds of the non-joiners were girls. This reflects several cultural variables, especially the fact that Afro-Asian families are often unwilling to allow their daughters the same freedom as boys in joining organized peer groups.

About half of the young people were identified as passive participants. They were enrolled in the semi-compulsory activities of Gadna, those conducted in secondary schools, or they reported belonging to a Beyond School program conducted in their school buildings. They were designated as relatively passive since involvement did not require the youths to show much autonomy. They just had to "fall in line" with what was offered in their school. Also included among the passive participants were the ex-youth movement members,
YOUTH ORGANIZATION PARTICIPATION OF HOLON ADOLESCENTS IN 1965 - BY SEX

(6%) NON JOINERS

(50%) PASSIVE PARTICIPANTS

(30%) VOLUNTEER PARTICIPANTS

(14%) YOUTH MOVEMENT ACTIVISTS

48 FEMALE N = 420
52 MALE N = 459
who had resigned. (See chart "Youth Organization Participation of Holon Adolescents in 1965 - By Sex.")

The passive participants were more often girls than boys. Relatively few expressed pioneering preferences in response to our attitude questions. Only six per cent of these so-called passive participants - the same proportion as among those never reporting any youth program participation - expressed a preference for settling in a Kibbutz, Development Town or rural community. (See chart "Preference of Holon Adolescents for Settling in a Kibbutz, Development Town or Rural Community.")

Thirty per cent of the sample can be designated as volunteer (non youth movement) participants. They reached out to enroll in a voluntary Gadna Youth program or a Community Centered Beyond School activity. They had to be sufficiently interested in these peer group programs to join an activity that was not located in their school. But they were not members of a youth movement at the time our survey was made, when they were in the tenth grade.

The volunteer participants ranged between the non-joiners and the youth movement activists on nearly all variables, except that the girls they included were very much under-represented. Few girls were interested in joining voluntary Gadna programs, many of which were devoted to target shooting and airplane model building. One in ten volunteer participants expressed a preference for settling in a Kibbutz, Development Town or rural community.

Fourteen per cent of the Holon area sample were active members in youth movements. One third of these also were volunteer activists in
PREFERENCE OF HOLON ADOLESCENTS FOR SETTLING IN A KIBBUTZ, DEVELOPMENT TOWN OR RURAL COMMUNITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non Joiners</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passive Participants</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beyond School Program Activists</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gadna Activists</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active in Youth Movements</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Movements Plus Other Programs</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 49  
N = 436  
N = 142  
N = 92  
N = 83  
N = 44
the Gadna Youth Corps and/or in a community centered Beyond School program. However, in our survey, they were counted only once, as youth movement members. This was done on the assumption that youth movement membership tends to the most differentiating type of voluntary association because it requires the greatest amount of ideological commitment.

Girls were slightly more numerous than boys in this activist category with a ratio of 53 to 47. Academically able students were also over-represented. The youth movement members ranked high in their expression of pioneering preferences. Twenty-eight per cent said they would like to live in a Kibbutz, a development town or in a rural community. The percentage was even higher (32%) among the very active youths, those currently taking part in a youth movement and in a voluntary Gadna or community Beyond School program club.

The evidence is consistent with the theory that organizational affiliations tend to increase the likelihood that a youngster will grow up to assign a priority to public service needs. Idealism, as evident in readiness to be of service in a concrete national program, can be organizationally encouraged. Peer group interactions are utilized planfully and indirectly for the accomplishment of socially approved goals. Whether or not this theory works cannot be proven but there is no doubt that idealistic attitudes are more common among youngsters who prefer to spend their leisure time socially, with friends, a club or a youth movement. (See chart on "Leisure Time Preferences of Holon Adolescents by Their Frequency for Expressing Idealistic Attitude Choices.")

Joining a youth group is not a random probability. Students in
LEISURE TIMES PREFERENCES OF HOLON ADOLESCENTS
BY THEIR FREQUENCY FOR EXPRESSING IDEALISTIC ATTITUDE CHOICES

- MISCELLANEOUS LEISURE PREFERENCES OR NO ANSWERS
  - 54%

- READ FOR PLEASURE
  - 33%
  - 22%

- BE WITH FRIENDS
  - 11%
  - 34%
  - 19%

- GO TO CLUB OR YOUTH MOVEMENT
  - 12%
  - 14%
  - 32%

NO IDEALISTIC PREFERENCES
N=202

SOME IDEALISTIC PREFERENCES
N=522

MANY IDEALISTIC PREFERENCES
N=153
technical courses, or who are enrolled in a work-study plan, were organizationally more active than their age mates who are working without studying. But in each category, about one-third were enrolled in a voluntary program of the Gadna Youth Corps and/or in a community centered Beyond School program. The academically oriented and brightest students were most active organizationally. They were especially over-represented in youth movements. As shown in the attached chart of participation rates, only a negligible proportion of high school students reported themselves to be non-joiners, persons not active in any of the three programs, while one in five was active in a youth movement.

Conclusion

A youth culture is a web of inter-related institutions, folkways and mores. The concern of this study was with what can be learned by examining the organizational affiliations of young people. Their folkways and mores were observed only incidentally. Our's is a macro-study rather than a micro-analysis of how adult making agencies can plan to influence the thinking of their off-spring.

It was not our intention to generalize about Israel, but to study the problems of youth culture management through adult-controlled organizations. Our staff succeeded in reaching the core of the country's growing population, even if some of the smaller sub-elements were inadequately represented. For instance, the demographic findings could be checked against Israel census data. The distribution of the samples by age, sex, immigrant status, etc. was very close,
YOUTH ORGANIZATION PARTICIPATION OF HO LON ADOLESCENTS IN 1965 BY SCHOOL ATTENDANCE

- **Technical Course or Work Study**
  - N=108
  - Non Joiners: 18
  - Passive Participants: 45
  - Volunteer Participants: 33
  - Youth Movement Activists: 4

- **In High School**
  - N=564
  - Non Joiners: 2
  - Passive Participants: 46
  - Volunteer Participants: 32
  - Youth Movement Activists: 20

Note: N represents the number of participants.
supporting the inference that the study population was representative with the above noted exceptions.

There is no equally reassuring method for validating the attitude responses. Questionnaire responses represent what people are willing to say when asked such personal questions like, "How do you get along with your parents?" or "Where do you hope to live?" A youth who answers "In a Kibbutz" at age 14 may think quite differently when he is 16 or when he enters the army and must decide on whether he wishes to volunteer for a Nahal assignment. Not all Kibbutz members are responding to idealism. There are other incentives for considering this way of life, the inability to decide on a career, the desire to try out something unfamiliar but safe, or the hope that one will be taken care of in a Kibbutz. Attitude responses often differ from what people will actually do when the opportunity arises for them to act in accordance with their expressed opinion.

The weight of our evidence lies in the relative consistency of the data. The different samples provided response rates very similar in direction and in the attitudes expressed. It is reasonable to assume that our respondents opened their thoughts and feelings to allow the investigators to explore meaningfully the questions they had come to answer.

Few of the policy makers interviewed questioned the theory that adults should help young people to organize their leisure time. There are an increasing number of commercial recreation centers, that can be frequented without being affiliated in any group. There are movie
houses, concerts and Israeli leads the world in per capita attendance. There are also many swimming pools, beaches, state parks, discotheques and other popular recreation facilities. All of them cater to young people. They are viewed as being supplementary to the adults-sponsored group programs. But the structure of the major youth programs is much what it was before independence.

Any consideration of social planning variables needs to take account of the fact that social research of system and institutional variables occurs in a live laboratory which will not stand still. The country has changed much since then, as have the circumstances under which young people grow up. The issue "how can a stable social structure adapt itself to new functions?" can therefore be studied well in this dynamic laboratory. During the period of data analysis, Israel confronted a military crisis that began with the closing of the Tiran Straits by Egyptian troops and the ejection of United Nations peace-making forces. When it ended after the Six-Day War, the entire strategic position of Israel was transformed. The impact of this victory on Israel's thinking was overwhelming. Efforts were made to take this change into account in the interpretation of our findings.

The research process also affects the social system under study. For instance, the attention given by some Israeli officials to youth services seemed often influenced by the fact that their programs had been selected for special study. Interviews with policy makers went beyond the furnishing of information. Some were followed by a change in priorities by the officials for reviewing minor and some major
organizational questions. It is probable that the conduct of the study helped to hasten the initiation of planned changes that had already been under contemplation. Such change had not been its purpose. But the vitality of concern of many Israeli leaders for improving the impact of their programs provided a receptive milieu for this study. It opened many doors and made people willing to talk candidly about many of the questions which they were considering.
VI

Pioneering
Peer Group Screening

All over Israel one can find assemblies of small groups of boys and girls without adults. In Jerusalem's Valley of the Cross, especially on Tuesday and Friday evenings and on Saturdays, the landscape is dotted with a dozen clusters of youths. They are members of youth movements that aim to inspire today's adolescent to become tomorrow's pioneer. Group activities are under guidance of a volunteer youth leader only a few years older than the members of his group.

Irrespective of their party affiliation, the different youth movements differ little in organizational structure. Now, as decades ago, youngsters can join as early as ten years of age. The groups become co-educational after members reach the age of thirteen. Relationships will be informal among equals, superiors and subordinates. Many of the organizers are unpaid or working for a subsistence salary. They are expected to rely on charisma, rather than authority, to make their influence felt.

In spite of ideological divergencies that range from theocratic to Marxian socialism, there also is much similarity in programming. Each meeting takes about two hours. Going and coming together in small cliques or boy-girls pairs adds personal meaning to the group activity. Many meetings start with group singing, followed by in-door or outdoor games. There usually is a group discussion about a political, moral, religious or cultural topic, such as "How can we make peace with the Arabs?" or "Should one always tell the truth?"
A youth leader or group member begins with making a presentation, followed by discussion. There is much emphasis on membership participation. No authority figure can command order. A common word is Sheket (let's have quiet). Members, as well as the youth leader, will be heard to make this demand repeatedly, when the group spirit gets high and begins to interfere with the program in process.

In addition to the discussion centered meetings, there are traditional scouting activities -- patrolling, woodcraft, hiking and picnics. Special programs are prepared to celebrate holidays or historical events. The religious youth movements emphasize memorial and fast days, while those of the labor parties take note of May 1, the international Labor Day. All movements join in marking the Jewish festivals, especially Chanukah, Purim and Independence Day.

Vacations take on special significance. This is when groups leave home to visit archeological, historic sites and tour unpopulated or border regions. These journeys are usually full of adventure. Youngsters sleep under the open sky, live under primitive conditions and face many a test of endurance, resourcefulness and courage. They hear tales about the lives of the early Halutzim, the pioneers who developed Israel and, when need be, defended it under great odds. Members learn to care for themselves, help each other and test their limits of independence, without any parental or teacher presence. Management of each unit is characterized by a high degree of autonomy. Committees are elected which decide on
budgets and expenditures, allocate jobs, enforce discipline and organize cultural and recreational programs.

Members who are ten and eleven years old go only for overnight. In the 14-15 year groups, trips can extend to five or six days. The older youths, 16-17, often serve as leaders. Having longer holidays, they may go as a group for several weeks as volunteer workers in a Kibbutz communal farm. They try out collective living, with the view of settling in a Kibbutz after their army service.

The abundance of personal reports and diaries about these hikes and work experiences in youth movement periodicals document that they have much emotional meaning for the members. They are on their own and can feel grown up. The young people relive the saga of Masada, where Israel made its last stand in Roman days. They visit the cave where the Dead Sea scrolls were found. They bathe in the Sea of Galilee or admire how trees have grown in a hillside reforestation project.

A Public Service Movement

Youth movements were the principal organizational instrument of the Zionist resurgence. Small local groups, most of them in Europe, but federated on a world-wide basis, recruited young people to rebuild a national home for the Jews in Palestine. At first, many of the members would be attracted by social activities rather than by ideology. They would discuss Jewish problems, study of Jewish history and the learning of Hebrew and of the geography of Palestine. Those who became committed would join in making plans
for emigration. Such plans included prior vocational training, especially in agriculture and in the building trades. Each local or regional group would then send a few members to Palestine to prepare the groundwork for the rest to follow. Unlike the schools, the Gadna Youth Corps and the Beyond School programs, the youth movements have a very loose organizational structure. They own few buildings, have few permanent employees and their appropriations are always tight and pieced together from many sources. Much more than any other youth program, they rely on what the members and the leaders contribute. In an age of bureaucracy, with high overhead costs, they are very informal. The resultant casualness can make for inefficiency, but it also allows individual members and units to innovate without much opposition. There are no forms to fill out in triplicate before a group-hike can be arranged. No central office approval is needed to accept a new leader or to arrange for discussion of a controversial issue.

It is one of the ironies of history that the Zionist youth movements' informality and voluntarism were first modeled after Germany's Wandervögel.¹ This pre-World War I movement aimed to bring about a moral revival of the Vaterland by personal example. Members shunned politics. They did not demonstrate in the streets.

They were idealistic romanticists without an action program for the larger society. They encouraged the formation of bands of young boys ("warriors") who would attach themselves to a charismatic leading hero in a deep emotional relationship. They hiked in the mountains, sang songs and vowed around campfires to forego the bourgeois superficialities of their parents to live a pure, simple and nationally devoted existence. The state was to be less of an extension of kinship and tribal groups and more the creation of the **Maennerbund** (Fraternity of Men). World War I swallowed up this youth movement as it did much else in Europe. Many of its members died in Flanders and Verdun. The Zionist youth movement adopted the Wandervogel emphasis on youth culture autonomy. They organized small groups with local roots organized around a charismatic peer group leader and federated in a large organization. But from the very start they were strongly universalist and socialist in their ideals. Few of the Wandervogel had a universalist outlook. Many espoused a teutonic nationalism that preceded Nazism, including a hatred of all strangers. While a few Jews tried to gain acceptance in this movement, the majority preferred to set up separate Jewish and more humanistic youth movements. The **Wandervogel** had no plans for social-economic development. There were romanticists, while the Zionist youth movements demand more than an emotional attachment. Work was expected. Zionist youths were to devote themselves concretely to the revitalization of the Jewish community in their hometowns.
The most dedicated later were to make a personal commitment to build a better world with their own hands in the land of Israel.

The Development-Defense Corps Concept

There were no plans for an army when the first few Zionist congresses convened. Not with guns, but with ploughs did the \textit{Halutzim} hope to redeem Zion. The Jewish National Fund, the Jewish Agency and the Jewish Colonization Association had no budgets for purchase of arms or even for police protection. The first Jewish watchman's cooperative had to purchase arms and equipment from their own earnings, savings brought from abroad, and occasional gifts from sympathizers. In a novel describing the not yet established \textit{Old-New-Land}, Herzl described a utopian "New Society," with a capitalist system without exploitation, a welfare state without poverty, and many social reforms in such diverse fields as penology and education. He anticipated the transformation of military conscription into a peaceful nation building force:

"All the members of our New Society, whether men or women, must devote two years of their life to public service. As a rule they are the years from eighteen to twenty ... This two-year service provides us with an inexhaustible reserve of lower-grade personnel for all those institutions and public works which have been declared generally useful by the New Society. The upper echelons are staffed by paid personnel."

"I see," said Friedrich: "Your army consists of both regular soldiers and volunteers." "I accept the analogy," David replied. "But it is no more
than an analogy - We have no standing army. ... We are satisfied with making and keeping our youth physically fit."\(^1\)

In retrospect, this was a most naive approach. The early settlers had to learn painfully that this theory would not work. They hired neighboring Arabs to guard their property, but this practice led to repeated extortionist demands. In Palestine, as elsewhere in rural areas under Ottoman rule, trespass, anarchy and robbery were the order of the day. "They were indeed a regular source of livelihood for many desert tribes all over Arabia. Among them, one was not fully accepted as a grown man of the tribe until one had been responsible for some act of banditry."\(^2\) Herzl's plan was too utopian in its hope that Zionist could devote themselves exclusively to developmental tasks of building a nation.

The necessity for combining defense and development led to an organizational pattern which still characterizes the pioneering youth groups since it was first improvised by the Hashomer, or watchman's society, in 1907. A group of eight Halutzim decided to organize a self-defense cooperative, selling its services to Jewish villagers. After several years the society succeeded in gaining acceptance for the principle that all local defense be


\(^2\)Eliyahu Golomb, The History of Jewish Self-Defense in Palestine 1878-1921, Tel Aviv, Lion the Printer, the Zionist Library, Vol. 4:11.
entrusted to Jews. By that time it had become clear that Arab watchmen could not be relied upon, all the more in view of the growth in Arab national consciousness. The defense-development units have changed in name and size since they were first organized but their operating procedures have changed little:

Hashomer: Before World War I
Palmah: During period of British Mandate
Nahal: Since independence

These Military-Development units have always relied primarily on youth movements to recruit their members. They established the country's communal farms (Kibbutzim) and cooperative villages (Moshavei Shitufim). Each follows the principle that men are most effective when they defend their own home. Militarily exposed areas, instead of being left a no-man's land of trenches, are settled by families, who create all the institutions required for normal living and who are prepared to defend them, when attacked. They are defending not an abstract location, but their home, often between breakfast with their children and putting them to bed with a story at night.

The defense-development strategy of the Hashomer and the Palmah are being continued in the present Israeli Defense Force by the very much enlarged Nahal corps. It is a volunteer


unit without counterpart in other modern armies. The kernel of a Nahal group is self-selected. Boys and girls, usually from one youth movement, request induction into the national service as a unit. Assignments will be discussed by the group. Except for specialized military training given to some members, the entire group will serve together to explore their compatibility as a nucleus for establishing a new settlement. Along with rudimentary military skills, girls will study agricultural, land settlement and home-making skills. Boys will be trained as parachutists, tank corps specialists or in other military along with agricultural and other work skills. With group agreement, individuals not previously part of a Nahal group can be assigned to it in the hope of integrating new members. Aside from guard duty, Nahal units will do construction, land clearance and engage in agricultural production.

Socially, each Nahal unit is a close knit Hevrah, or primary group. They combine national service with life goal planning. While living in an exposed, dangerous and often uncomfortable location, they experiment with the practical details of communal living to see who is ready to satisfy his personal needs in a unit of pioneers who share common ideals.

Officers and enlisted men live in the same quarters. Except in combat, orders are not issued from above. Policies for internal management are sanctioned by the group. Nahal experience offers members of youth movements a chance for reality testing of their capacity to plan together, with the ultimate goal of organizing a
new settlement or of joining one already established. Members
must be able to adjust to group pressures, accept them and
find them satisfying.

After the Six Day War of 1967, Nahal settled the Kfar Etzion
compound, an area of Jewish residences over-run by the Arab Legion
in 1948. It sponsored an urban cooperative of religious youths,
who were ready to move into an urban slum near the Western (Wailing)
Wall in what had been the Jewish section of the old city of
Jerusalem, before its occupation by Jordanian troops in 1948.
Nahal is preparing land for settlement in the Golan Heights and
in selected areas of Judea and Samaria which had been owned
by Jews before 1948 when much of the West bank of Palestine was
occupied by Jordanian forces. Nahal is also establishing a
fishing village on the coast of the Sinai desert. It is readying
desert land in the Negev for permanent settlement.

The close tie-up of military and developmental public
service objectives can be best surmised from a report of a
Nahal outpost during its first few days.

The 28-year old lieutenant in charge, received us in the
room he shares with three others. He was just planning the
guard and patrol roster for that night. B., from Yotvata,
is a Tel Aviv-born native. He is a reservist who followed the
call of his Kibbutz movement to command at Nahal Golan.
"As far as the sexes go we are a well-adjusted unit. Now wait a minute, don't misunderstand me. What I mean is that both sexes are adequately represented; half and half. They are youngsters from Haifa and its suburbs and some from the villages. They will stay at Nahal Golan for less than a year -- and will then be replaced by a second unit while they, richer by the experience, will rejoin another permanent settlement they were intended to reinforce in the first place.

While we are here, we will start implementing our assigned agricultural blueprints: 'Hummus' (chickpeas), which are raised much in Israel; 2,000 dunams of unirrigated grain crops; 75 dunams of irrigated vegetables; poultry; cotton; and a beef-cattle herd. No milkers."

Michal -- from Kfar Ata ("I am just as old as the state!") was a typical sample of the several scores of boys and girls at Nahal Golan. Yes, she liked it, she said fiddling with her straight black hair. Michal is pretty, cooks and doesn't mind cooking. She was in a hurry. She had to finish cleaning her rifle, before inspection.

"Everybody is terribly polite about my food and if they don't like it they at least don't say so," she says. "No, there were no 'couples' here yet," she said. "But we are all terribly good friends, really." She said it was thrilling to be "an actual pioneer." There was nothing she would have liked to do more, though she admitted that not all of the girls who do not like it so much are a very small minority -- most of us would have volunteered for this kind of thing anyway." Michal wants to study when she gets out of the army but doesn't know what. She matriculated recently, as did, incidentally, every single member of this unit. All are graduates of secondary schools.

Reuven, 19½ wants to study economics. He does not know yet how he is going to bridge this with his equally strong desire to join a settlement nucleus. But the decision will have to wait anyway until he finishes his army service. When he came here on Thursday, his first assignment was to set up the flag pole. "We had a bit of a parade afterwards and some of the veterans from the Jordan Valley came up to greet us. The Syrians are just behind the gorge east of the settlement. The cease-fire line runs along the bottom of the wadi." ¹

¹Adapted from Ze'ev Schul, "All Quiet on Syrian Front as Nahal Unit Moves Unto Land," Jerusalem Post, January 5, 1968, Weekend Magazine: 8
The bulk of the young people who volunteer for a Nahal assignment are attracted by a mixture of motives. The opportunity to perform a nationally recognized task is joined with a chance to live in a group of self-selected young men and women, who get acquainted in a youth movement and who are testing out their capacity to organize a community. For some, this preference is associated with prior ideological commitment to join a Kibbutz after the end of their army service. For many more, this choice reflects uncertainty over what to do with themselves. For others, it is a means to be in an atmosphere which is more creative and less constrained than the more structured combat services.

In the choice of Nahal, as in all options of public service, idealistic incentives re-enforce prosaic inducements. No large-scale and viable programs are likely to survive without a mixture of idealistic and realistic incentives. Indeed, fanatic idealists, who are intolerant of the human preference for meeting personal and family needs, are likely to create problems. No human institution which needs to attract large numbers and which has to change its composition each year can restrict itself to the limited supply of single minded and purist idealists.

The relative prestige of Nahal has declined within the youth culture. Developmental projects, such as the months of back-breaking work to prepare the mine-infested Golan heights for extensive cattle
grazing cannot compete in glamor with the capability of the air-
force to decide Israel's fate within 90 minutes of actual combat.
It was commanded by a forty-one year old Kibbutz born officer,
who chose flying in preference to Kibbutz living when his time
came to select a pioneering career.\[1\] About one in four of the
youth movement activists in the Holon area sample expressed the
preference of joining the airforce or paratroop corps.

Development is \textbf{Nahal}:'s primary mission. But this is not a
unit for pacifist - which are a rare phenomenon in Israel. Military
training and discipline are at high level, for each unit is self-
selected on the basis of ideological and social cohesiveness.
When there is no battle, they do not "waste time". They fight the
battle for production - against low income. They symbolize the
idea of civic action - the use of military force for peaceful pur-
poses. Even in war, much of the group goes into serving the country's
security objectives through productive and constructive work.

For some years now, the tactical need for \textbf{Nahal} settlers has
exceeded the supply of youth movement volunteers. The \textbf{Nahal} command
is now accepting individual draftees who select this option, though
not previously active in a youth movement. Some units have been asked

\[1\] Moshe Ben Shaul, editor, "Mordechai Hod," in Generals
of Israel, Tel Aviv, Hadar Publishing House, 1968: 133-141.
to absorb youngsters from the slums who were not youth movement members to help in rehabilitating them. Fifteen percent of the tenth grade level youths in Holon who thought they would like such service, in preference to any other, had resigned from a youth movement or never had been a member.

Ideology in Transition

Public service is no longer a youth movement specialization. It has become routine and compulsory. After young men complete their three year required tour of national service and women give two years of their life to a nation-building task, they have reason to feel that a shift in their personal priorities is justified. They want to start their professional education, begin a civilian career, enter marriage - in short, they want to live for themselves rather than serve as instruments for a cause. The majority of the native born Israelis are realistic rather than idealistic in their general mood. They tend to be less collectivist in orientation than their elders, except during a period of emergency.1

Before statehood was attained, the Halutz pioneer was often the only available manpower source for meeting urgent public requirements. There were many with a lifetime of dedication who, as volunteers, built the hundreds of new rural settlements and towns. Volunteer manpower was a critical factor in what was done or failed to get accomplished. Manpower planning has become more predictable since statehood. Leadership personnel are now recruited by offering them career incentives to fill such roles as army officer, industrial manager or civil servant.

The ten pioneering youth movements who still operate in Israel much as they did before statehood, have lost their near monopoly for pioneering. They now are able to recruit members from a native born generation who face a different challenge, of being good citizens of a state already well established. The law requires of them a period of national service. Youth movements appeal that members render this service through the army's Nahal option and to use this experience for considering the idea of life-time settlement in a Kibbutz. But this public service option is now just one of many ways by which a young Israeli can plan his life to fulfill both his personal and his public priorities.

There also has been a decided reduction in partisanship. When the youth movements were founded, there were many competing ideological models on how to combine humanitarian values for a productive life, socialist principles for a non-exploitative existence and aspirations for Jewish cultural renaissance with the needs of every human being for self-fulfillment, in marriage and by rearing a family. Many of the doctrinal differences that could be entertained during the experimental decades have mellowed by practical experience.

It is hard to interest young people in carrying on the feud between the late Vladimir Jabotinsky and Chaim Weizman, which broke in the 1930's over the issue of tactics of cooperation with the British Mandatory authorities. Few care today Why Mr. Tabenkin of the Achduth Avodah (Unity of Labor Parties) split with Ben Gurion many decades ago. The realities of Israeli politics, especially
the existence of a stable coalition government since the inception of statehood, favor a tolerant co-existence of the different youth movements.

All of them are becoming more professionalized by hiring paid youth leaders. Technical expectations for skill in group work begin to compete with ideological commitment in determining who gets hired. In rural areas there often is only one active movement. In small towns, only a few of the larger movements tend to be represented.

Few youth leaders are willing to make adherence to the "party line", a criterion for membership. Most youth leaders preferred to retain a member who was active even if he did not conform in his ideology. This "organization above all" attitude was most pronounced among the more purist youth movements, both religious and socialist. For them ideology was still rated as a criterion for membership. But even in these movements expulsion or threat of expulsion was advocated only by a minority of the leaders.

All youth movements are concerned with their common problems of planning and management. The youth leaders, who try to recruit new members from among the on-coming generation meet to discuss such common concerns as how to prepare group meetings, turn out a movement newspaper, plan for hikes and train volunteer youth leaders. In the larger cities there is a city-wide coordinator for youth movements ready to assist all of them in programming. Training schools have emerged, offering a common curriculum. Only a few lectures are given separately to discuss the particular problems
of each movement and its political or religious doctrine.

There also has been a change in the meaning of joining a youth movement. Halutzim in Europe were rebelling against readiness of their parents to live in a Ghetto, to endure anti-semitism, to strive for a middle class occupation and to pray, rather than work for the re-establishment of a Jewish home in Palestine. Their native born children in Israel are not challenging the social system when they are recruited into the same youth movement structure. They are conforming to it by joining a program closely identified with the "establishment." Youth movement members are rarely found among the spontaneous crowds that assemble from time to time to protest a government policy. There had been fist fights in the 1930's between the nationalist Betar and some of the socialist youth movements. Such fights have not happened for many years. None of the contemporary youth movements are belligerently missionary or oppositionist. Certainly, they are opposed to illegal or revolutionary tactics, which once were espoused because the target was an unfriendly British Mandatory regime.

The majority of all youth movement members belong to nominally socialist groups (67%). But to conclude that the majority of the country's youths are led by persons with Marxist views would be erroneous. None of the movements advocate full nationalization of existing private enterprise. Israel's brand of socialism has
more kinship with the Owenites and Hutterites of North America\textsuperscript{1} than with the state socialism of Yugoslavia or Russia. Zionist socialism is viewed as counter-revolutionary in Russia. Its emphasis is on genuine collective living in small groups, each of which is independent of the State as well as the party. Zionists strongly oppose dictatorship. The members make their own policies and have legal title to their property. Their common life is an expression of spiritual values.

Israel has remained politically stable, in spite of a massive absorption of immigrants. Elections since 1948 have led to only minor shifts in party strength. What has changed is the militancy of ideological controversies.\textsuperscript{2} All movements are searching for a new ideological basis for pioneering, in view of disinterestedness in many of the issues that divided the parental generation.

When dramatic changes occur, the different sectors of the social system are never affected in the same way. Independence transformed Israel overnight. The Six-Day War in 1967 greatly changed further its geo-political condition. Israel's political parties have changed little to reflect these epic post-achievement conditions. Their youth organizations continue to stress pre-independence rural pioneering ideals.


There is structural stability in the face of major social change. But twenty years after independence the State has quite different and a much more diversified set of public service priorities. The nation now needs young doctors really more urgently than pioneer farmers. Not enough physicians are ready to live in the desert towns of Beersheba and Arad. Good public officials are in short supply in development towns. Cooperatives need business managers who select staff more on merit and less on "pull." A linguist index of the change in ideological priorities is the Hebrew word for Zionism: Ziyonuth. The parental generation proudly identify with it. Some of their native born children use this "sacred" term to connote "outdated sentimentalität." The Kibbutz member, who had been the undisputed culture hero, is the occasional butt of cynic jokes -- as someone who takes himself too seriously, is too self-satisfied and too provincial.

Youths now disaffected with status quo tend to be unaffiliated with or to resign from the youth movements. The rebel of the contemporary generation may associate himself with informal groups such as a "salon dance" clique (Hug Saloni) or he may become active in a group like the "League Against Religious Coercion."

1The absence of synchronization in social changes was first noted by William F. Ogburn in Social Change, N. Y. Viking Press, 1922. It has been refined and broadened since, by Ogburn and other writers. The first formulation concentrated on differences in rates of technological and normative patterns. The differences in rate of change noted here are between the youth movement ideology and administrative or governmental policies.

There are small cliques of orthodox "activists" who demonstrate with stones against violations of the Sabbath by their fellow citizens. And many - indeed most - Israeli youths are too busy with their own needs to be politically active.

A painful question is now confronting the pioneer youth movements: should we continue to emphasize Kibbutz life as our goal? This is an ideal that demands too much priority for group needs to appeal to most of our "best" young people who are ready to volunteer for other forms of public service. There are numerous occupations of national significance which cannot be pursued well within a Kibbutz framework.

The next decade is likely to see a change in the program and the political orientation of the youth movements. Several socialist parties have merged into a unified electric Labor Party. The remaining political parties are in search of new foci of identification. The youth movements do not now address themselves to many of the problems which really concern young people. In the universities non-partisan candidates have been elected to head the Student Organization rather than candidates associated with the existing parties or youth movements.

The world, as defined by members of one generation in order to deal with the issues that confronted them, cannot look the same to their children. They are growing up under the very much changed conditions which their parents struggled to bring about.
Kibbutz Viability

Verbal expression of intent to settle in a Kibbutz at 16 can involve a variety of attitudes, ranging from "I don't know what I want to be" to a romantic desire to identify with a pioneering elite which embodies universalist values that transcend Zionism. Few will take issue with the conclusion of Georges Friedman. "The Kibbutz movement, in spite of its limitations and difficulties, is the biggest and most successful "utopian" revolutionary experiment that has been attempted."¹ For every person who joins a Kibbutz, several try it out. This has always been the case. Most of the youth movement activists will ultimately choose a different career, often based on technical study at a university. The communal way of life provides a good deal of security, but it also calls for a willingness to conform to group expectations in many areas of life planning.

The country's national service ideology still helps to recruit new members, but the days are gone when enough people are prepared for a lifetime of pioneering in development areas, where there are many economic and cultural disadvantages, without compensatory allowances. Tax concessions therefore are made. High schools are free for the children in border regions or newly developed towns. But there also are psychic and prestige gains, which accrue to those who live in accordance with Kibbutz ideals which are admired by many more than those who practice them. To be a "Haver Kibbutz" (member) remains a role of distinction. Of the 120 representatives of the parliament elected in 1965, 12% were members of Kibbutzim, though

¹Georges Friedman, The End of the Jewish People? op. cit. 1968:86
these settlements contain only 3.7% of the population. Nowhere else in the world can one find villages of farmers and blue-collar workers, who also include among their ranks a goodly number of philosophers, scholars, writers, artists and otherwise creative human beings. Kibbutz children are over represented among the youth selected for pilot training or as army officers. They also head the casualty lists.

Kibbutz living has lost some of its priority in the country’s core ideology, but this form of social organization still has ideological attractiveness. No statistics are available about the current post-army career selection process of youth movement graduates. One clue comes from Yochanan Peres' study of 600 youngsters in the outskirts of Tel Aviv. Of the youth movement members, 76% in his sample said they wanted to live in a Kibbutz for while. But only seventeen percent attached no condition to their verbal preference. Forty-three percent said they would join, but didn't know for how long. Sixteen percent said they would be interested in Kibbutz life for the period of army service in a Nahal unit.¹

For every Kibbutz-born youth, who at the eighth grade level in 1963 was thinking of leaving to live in a city, four city children expressed a preference of making their lives in a Kibbutz. In both the Holon sample and the sample of Gadna Youth Corps leadership trainees, nine out of every hundred respondents chose Kibbutz life as what they hoped to do in the future.

The kibbutz ideal has its greatest holding power for children born there. The great majority of the graduating class in Kibbutz schools at age 14 said they intend to remain. This was true of 82 per cent of the bright youngsters and 73 per cent of those who were not doing well in school. City youths who are bright, especially those from European families also were over-represented among those expressing a Kibbutz preference. Such a verbal expression during adolescence certainly does not mean that all, or even most of them will actually make this a choice when they get older. Only a minority of all youth movement members will make their life in a Kibbutz. The size of this proportion is one of the best kept secrets in Israel. Whatever the ratio may be, for different youth movements, the attitudes expressed by contemporary adolescents suggest that Kibbutzim are still able to recruit among the country's on-coming generation.\(^1\) The country's Kibbutz population increased from 47,408 in November 1947 to 77,999 in 1961.\(^2\) The population continues to expand slightly, reaching 80,600 in 1967.\(^3\)

This modest increase is in part due to immigration from overseas. The Kibbutzim attract idealistical young people from all over the world, non-Jews as well as Jews. Many come to try this


way of life. A proportion remain, enthusiastic about living in small self-governed units, where the pursuit of self-needs can be balanced with group efforts to achieve public purposes. They were responsible for 30% of Israel's total agricultural production. There also were 180 Kibbutz owned manufacturing and industrial plants. Most of them are small. Together they employed 7000 workers.¹

The 232 Kibbutzim continue to play a major role in the country. Idealism remains a major asset. This is not to imply that they are composed of only dedicated men and women. But there are many of them and they tend to control each village. Twenty-two per cent of the non-commissioned and commissioned officers in the draft army are Kibbutz children, although they constitute only four per cent of the age group population taken into the services. The proportion of Kibbutz children is even higher in combat units. They volunteer six times more frequently than do other youths for special risks units, such as the Parachute Corps, the Air Force and submarine units.²

Somewhat like large law firms or corporations in the United States, Kibbutzim can be flexible about releasing members for public service. Men without independent resources are inclined to be careful. They cannot readily take the risk of a political career. They need a steady income. A Kibbutz member, when given leave for a national assignment, remains a member in full standing. He and his family retain their home. The Kibbutz allows them to keep enough

¹ ibid: 28
from their salary to defray the extra living expenses in town. No Kibbutz member needs to allow economic considerations to affect the way he functions in a public-service post. When his mission is completed, he can and usually does return to an important post at home.

Conclusion

Youth movements furnished many of Israel's pioneers. They provided small cadres of self-selected idealists, who did the heavy work required to develop the institutional framework for the absorption of large masses of immigrants on a public-service rather than a remunerative or coercive basis. Their origin was in Europe. Rejection of the ghetto, anti-semitism and disillusionment with the betrayal of socialist values by European nationalists were incentives to the recruitment of youth movements. Their positive identification with the Jewish renaissance was also a source of attraction.

The youth movements have, however, been affected greatly by the social forces that had to be confronted in Palestine. Developmental priorities increasingly had to yield to military considerations, with the resultant creation of the concept of the farmer-soldier. He settled land and turned it into an economically productive enterprise, while also fortifying the area for defense purposes.

Military establishments are inherently wasteful. The Israeli Defense Forces are no exception to this rule. But to keep this inefficiency factor to a minimum, even some of the army combat units
devote occasional resources to economically productive purposes. They build roads and improve communication. They have released men and women in uniform to serve as youth leaders and teachers. No senior career officer can expect to spend his life being a soldier. He is expected to acquire a skill with civilian utility, since for all but a few technical specialists, retirement in the forties is expected.

The country's capacity to raise a large army during an emergency, while maintaining a high state of defense readiness during more normal periods is a function of the merger of military with developmental functions. Nahal is only the most explicit example of this jointure of pioneering with defense.\(^1\) It has some counterparts in the comprehensive military reserve, in which civilians are periodically called up for military service.

The high priority given in Israel to developmental rather than militaristic values may well be related to the continued vitality of the youth movements. They recruit young people for the Kibbutzim who view themselves as guardians of the utopian and universalistic ideals that have always balanced the more nationalistic trends in the Zionist movement.

It is in these communal farms that many young immigrants first experience as temporary residents the culture shock of adjusting to a new environment. Many Kibbutzim conduct special educational programs for problem children. They were among the

first to confront the emotionally painful challenge of being hospitable to German youths who want to come to Israel to demonstrate their feeling of remorse about the outrages of their parental generation against the Jews of Europe.

The diverse public needs of a rapidly developing urbanizing country seem to be less and less consistent with the single-minded stress of most youth movements on the virtues of Kibbutz life with its agricultural base. Israel needs many other kinds of dedicated public servants. Some youth movement groups have reacted to this fact by organizing short-term volunteer projects of community organization in a development town like Dimona. These programs have received much publicity but they have attracted not enough real support to do more than illustrate the difficulties and utilities of an urban counterpart to Kibbutz living. Some Israeli leaders think that this will have to be developed, if socialist living is to retain vitality.

The youth movements and their rural emphasis retain an important but almost static influence in an expanding population. Only a minority of youth movement members end up living in a Kibbutz. Some Israeli observers interpret this fact as a symptom of impending decline. This assessment is not accepted by the government, quasi-public agencies and the labor parties. They take heart from the fact that even in their present status of limited influence, the youth movements have a youth culture influence beyond their numbers. They still attract and retain the loyalty of a creative minority. Their members serve as backbone of many Israeli pioneering ventures. They also do much to attract and inspire volunteers coming to Israel from the free countries of the Western World.
CHAPTER VII

YOUTH MOVEMENTS
Recruitment

Public service volunteers are generally recruited from among adults and when needed. In the American Vista and Peace Corps programs, only mature persons are encouraged to apply. They are then screened in terms of well identified specifications. Selection is by Government administrators, on the basis of tests, interviews and performance during a training period. Lower class persons with marginal achievement records, are not often wanted.

In Israel screening for public service begins in the pre-adolescent period, in the youth movements. All class levels of the population are approached, although they are not reached in equal proportions. The major purpose is advocacy of the idea that the country still needs pioneers. But their day-to-day programs are closely related to the process of fun-seeking, self-searching and maturation which dominates the thinking of this age group.

Youth movements initiate novices in a solemn ceremony. Young members promise to uphold the movement's principles often before they understand them. Youngsters are organized as small groups of 10-25 age mates. The program includes the kind of lectures, discussions and observational experiences which convert the members to acceptance of the movement's objectives. Most Israeli youngsters join one or the other of the movements for a period averaging 26 months. A 1963 headcount survey of the Youth Department of the Ministry of Education showed that about one-third of the
11-17 year old Jewish youth were currently members of youth movements.¹ Seventy per cent of eighth grade students who were surveyed in 1963 when registering for the nationwide comprehensive examination, reported themselves as having been active in a youth movement at one time.

The impact of youth movements is further enhanced by the fact that three of them operate labor branches for employed youths. Ideologically, each movement would prefer to integrate working youth with those who are in high school. But there are differences in program priorities, in outlook and in social status. Working youths like all youngsters, like to play, hike and discuss, but they must also be concerned with wages and working conditions.

Youth leaders of such groups therefore devote much of their effort to labor union activities with much less energy being given to conventional youth movement programs, to discussions, to week-end institutes, dances, hikes and to national service. The 1963 census of youth movements enumerated 57,055 Working Youth as members. Nearly all of them were over the age of fourteen.

¹Michael Chen and Dalith Ormian, Some Findings of the Youth Movements Survey, Jerusalem, Youth Department, Ministry of Education and Culture, mimeographed (in Hebrew) 1965; the same proportion was estimated to be enrolled in 1959 by Hillel Barzel The Youth Movement. Its History Among the Nations and in Israel, Jerusalem, Youth Department of the Jewish Agency (in Hebrew), 1963: 81.
Census of Jewish Working Youth Movement Members in Israel, 1963

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Affiliation</th>
<th>Percent of Total Membership (N = 57,055)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mapai &amp; Achduth-Avoda (Socialists)</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herut (Nationalist)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Religious Party</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Youth movements are a highly probable life experience for Israeli youngsters, but most of them drift away. For all but a minority, the association is of short duration. Somewhat more than half (38% of the 70%) had already resigned when the eighth grade survey was made. Membership turnover of high school students was also large, but at a slightly lesser rate. As many as 84% reported to have been in a youth movement in the 1963 leisure time study. Nearly half of them indicated that they had resigned by the time the survey was made, when the youngsters were in the first or third year of high school. In the Holon area sample of the tenth grade level students, 75% of the respondents reported having joined a youth movement at one time. But four out of five had dropped out at the tenth grade level when our survey was made.

The Activists, as those still members at the tenth grade level will be designated were a minority of sixteen per cent. They tend to be a closely knit in-group, self-chosen from a much larger number of ex-members. Most of these activists are busy young people, who attend high school and who strive for good grades. They tend to get along well with their parents and report fewer conflicts with
school or army demand than do non-members of youth groups. They generally come from homes where their continued membership is either approved or tolerated. They are a residue of enthusiasts, who share a common sense of purpose and a common self-searching. It is from them that an even smaller self-selected group remain after army service to form a Kibbutz. The weeding out process is gradual. Many of those who resign retain a loyalty to the ideals of their movement and a generalized commitment to good citizenship which makes them receptive to national service priorities.

All of the youth movements except for the nominally non-political Scouts, subscribe to a partisan blueprint of how the country should be run. Three represent a socialist orientation; two have a traditional-religious outlook; and three are identified with middle-class "Free-Enterprise" parties. There is also a very small Communist movement.

Peer Group Autonomy

The tradition persists that the movements have autonomy from adult agencies which sponsor them. While adults and the children have different incentives for supporting youth movements, their respective priorities are not mutually exclusive. Adults have reason to favor opportunities for young people to develop self-confidence and autonomy. Often with ambivalence, parents will let their teen-age boys and girls go on a three day hike in the Negev desert, without adult chaperons. The adventure is not without risk, but occurs in a socially protected setting, a group of self-selected idealistic youths.
The balance of autonomy and parental influence can be illustrated by the response of youth leaders to the question of how they would deal with parents requesting that a hike be cancelled because of the threat of bad weather. Comply? Nearly two thirds of all the leaders thought they would. It is apparent that adults have an influence, but they do not fully control the youth programs. (See attached chart)

Programs differed significantly in their members' preferences for autonomy. The religious youths were the most parent-oriented. Tradition tends to re-enforce obedience to parents. The most autonomous programs were those of the labor parties. Among the more purist socialist only a few, three out of ten, would humor parental objections to a scheduled hike.

In all of the youth movements adolescents have more self-determination than in other adult-making institutions. Children can choose to belong or to resign, or be active or passive. This gives them a self-chosen identity as a "Haver" (member), rather than as the child of their parents or a student of the local school. There is much room for exercising initiative in planning programs, organizing a hike or in raising funds. Programs are not run by teachers, but by peers, not much older than the members. Youth movements provide youngsters with an opportunity to search for new social ties, outside the immediate family and neighborhood.
### Leader Response to Parental Request to Cancel an Over Night Hike

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Youth Program</th>
<th>Refused</th>
<th>Canceled</th>
<th>No Reply</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious Bnei Akiba</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>81</td>
<td></td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beyond School Programs</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>74</td>
<td></td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scouts</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gadna Youth Corps</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
<td>410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Party Youths</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
<td>577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Youths</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- REFUSED
- CANCELED
- NO REPLY
What Membership Entails

Fun and socialibility rank high as initial incentives for getting youngsters to join. As initiates become aware of the fact that youth movements demand a commitment to certain ideals and oppose many innovations of the popular culture including social dancing, night clubs and "hanging out", there is a lessening of interest and resignation. The weeding-out is progressive since expectations for a personal commitment also become more intensive. Four successive states of involvement can be distinguished:

1. Active participation in a group (Hevrah)
2. Becoming a Youth Leader (Hadera) starting at age 14-16
3. Nahal pioneering or service in another volunteer army unit at age 18
4. Kibbutz membership after discharge from military service

1. Participation: The initial requirement of a youth movement is active participation in the program and in the social life of a local subgroup, called Hevra in Hebrew. Members are expected to balance their awakening interest in the other sex, their worship of the local soccer team and their love for the cinema with concern for philosophical, ethical and political issues. Before and after Israel and Germany decided to establish diplomatic relations, the moral and practical aspects were heatedly discussed by twelve to fourteen year old youth movement members all over the land. The ethical issues of boy-girl relationships, of selfishness, cooperative living, or of meaningful co-existence with the Arab neighbors are live concerns at an age when in much of the world such matters would be viewed as being inappropriate for group discussion among children.
2. Leadership (Hadraha): The active member, unless he lacks the necessary qualifications, is expected to become a youth leader as he reaches high school and 14 and 15 years of age. Junior leaders begin by helping to recruit new members by age 16. They devote six to twelve hours a week to this task. In the survey of youth leaders (based on national rosters), nearly one in ten were between the ages of 14-16. Forty per cent of all enumerated youth leaders were less than 20 years of age. Only 17 per cent were over 25 years of age. (See Chart "Proportion of Youth Leaders Under 20 Years Old.") Youth movement leaders were on the average younger than those of other extra-curricular youth programs. The age difference between leaders and followers was particularly small among the Scouts and religious youth movements. About half of their leaders were less than three years older than the group being led.\(^1\) Completely voluntaristic youth movement leadership is on the decline. In part, this development is a consequence of the achievement of statehood. Before 1948, youth movement leadership was a principal public service role for older adolescents. Israelis are now subject to the draft at this age. By the time they are released from service around age 21, many feel somewhat out of touch with the youth culture. They have to give priority to becoming breadwinners, husbands or wives. Most of them think they have done their share of public service.

\(^1\)Young leaders were under-represented in our sample. They can serve as volunteers for a year or two before their name will appear on the central roster of their movement used in the study to identify who should be interviewed.
PROPORTION OF YOUTH LEADERS UNDER 20 YEARS OLD

- Army: 14.1111%
- Education: 85%
- Gadna: 90%
- Municipal: 94%
- Rural: 68%
- Urban: 43%
- Youth Aliyah: 42%
- Beyond School Programs: 64%
- Gadna: 88%
The manpower problem has led to the recruitment of a new type of leader, one who works for a salary. For some this task may become a job, like any other job performed for the pay received. But for most of the job holders, this is still more of a calling than a profession. Paid leaders generally earn less than the pay scale in other jobs they could fill. Youth leaders are not unionized as are all other workers in Israel, including teachers. There has never been a strike of youth leaders.

3. Nahal Pioneering Service: As previously mentioned, youth movements prefer that members volunteer in the army Nahal Pioneer Corps, which maintains separate units for each youth movement and recruits them as a group rather than on an individual basis. Of the active youth movement members slightly more than half said they would choose Nahal service. Even among the adolescents who had never joined a youth movement or had resigned from one, 15% expressed a preference for Nahal.

4. Pioneering Occupation: Nahal units operate on the theory that members will explore the idea of establishing a communal village or of settlement in a newly established development town after completing military duty. Religious youth movements also expect their members to keep on learning about Jewish traditions through special courses (Shiurim) or study at an advanced religious seminary (Yeshivah). They urge members to settle in a religious Kibbutz, a religious small-holder village or an urban neighborhood controlled by persons concerned with a revitalization of religious traditions.
Pioneering career preference are most often expressed by youth movement activists but they also occur in the non-members population. About one-tenth of the Holon youth expressed preferences at age 16 for joining a Kibbutz collective village. For the youth movement activists such preferences were three times higher, 28-30%.

Among the children of Afro-Asian families, expressions of preference for Kibbutz life were only slightly more common among youth movement members than among those without prior involvement in a youth movement. This was much less true of children of European families. Four out of five of the European youths who expressed a readiness for Kibbutz life also were youth movement members.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Father's Birth Place</th>
<th>Youth Movement Status of Kibbutz Oriented Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afro-Asian Countries (N = 92)</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe (N = 230)</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More than a quarter of all members in the 1963 nationwide Sekker sample joined while enrolled in the fourth and fifth grades. They were between 9 and 11 years of age, too young for concern
about an ideological program. They responded instead to social and peer group influences. Youth leaders were in wide agreement that the choice of movement depends less on ideology and more on parental preference. Proximity of meeting place, peer group composition and the personality of the group leaders were also mentioned as major variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade Level</th>
<th>Per Cent Joining Youth Movement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not members</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three out of four in Holon sample had resigned when they reached the tenth grade. Some youths are simply too busy. Others fail to find the friends they want or want to try out different leisure time activities. The average stay was found to be 26 months in one study, with 21% of all new members resigning within a year or less.¹

A resignation rate of nearly 75% at around the age of 16 worries youth movement, policy makers. It probably rises to above 90% by the time youths reach the age of 18 to pursue more self-directed leisure time activities. At that time membership entails more than willingness to spend a few hours a week with

¹Micha Chen and Dalith Ormian, Some Findings of the Movement Survey, 1963, op. cit.
congenial and ideologically sympathetic peers. It requires a career commitment. Resignations are also affected by poor leadership. Youth movements are often administered spasmodically. They may lack in monetary resources. Some youths find their group simply boring. Not all of the 16-17 year old volunteer leaders can discuss with interest a topic like "Social Life of Animals." This is a subject youth leaders of the Hashomer Hatzair are supposed to take up with ten year old members to get them to accept the idea that cooperation is a natural trait. These and similar topics have long ceased to arouse much interest in a country which has changed much more rapidly than the youth movement programs.

The majority of Israel's youths prefer other formal group associations in adolescence which require less conformity and allow for more casual participation. At the tenth grade level, youth in Holon reported themselves to be active almost five times as often in a Beyond School program or the Gadna Youth Corps than in a Youth Movement.

Some of the most intelligent and dedicated youths of Israel who resign from a youth movement, do so because they prefer to make more individually oriented decisions about their future. They may continue to admire their youth movement, its ideals and comradeship, but they object to its orthodoxy in ideology and their preference for a commitment to life in a collective agricultural settlement. University study and professional careers can be pursued in a Kibbutz only in exceptional cases, after such a career choice has been discussed by the group.
No Kibbutz could be composed of only white collar workers and poets. Group involvement in career choice may be necessary for long-range economic planning, but it goes beyond what most young people are willing to accept. Four times as many youth movement activists expressed strong preferences for spending their leisure in peer group associations (44%) than those who resign or who never joined a youth movement (11%). (See chart "First Preference for Spending Leisure Time") But the Kibbutz idea is not always rejected by those who resign. In the Holon area sample one fifth of the 61 tenth grade level youths who said they wanted to join a Kibbutz were no longer members of a youth movement.

Those who never joined a youth movement or who resigned from one are not social isolates. They were often active in informal groups without adult guidance or in solitary activities. Fifteen per cent think that they have a high peer group status as indicated by a "Yes" answer to the statement: "My friends consider my opinions," a proportion similar to those giving this response among youth movement activists. The "Not now or never active" group seem to have less need for an ideologically oriented organization to help them schedule their leisure time. They expressed a relatively high first preference for reading and movie attendance. They were more likely to choose the twist than folk-dancing, popular songs than group singing.
FIRST PREFERENCE FOR SPENDING LEISURE TIME

HOLON ADOLESCENTS 1965 in %

- ALL OTHER CHOICES
- GO TO THE MOVIE
- READ FOR PLEASURE
- IN THE YOUTH MOVEMENT OR ORGANIZED GROUPS

NOT NOW OR NEVER IN YOUTH MOVEMENT MEMBERS

N = 670

N = 127
Short-term exposure to a youth movement is not reflected in the attitudes expresses. Youths who never joined were quite similar in their preference for public services to those who had belonged to a youth movement but resigned before the age of 16. (See Table on "National Service Attitudes of Tenth Graders by Youth Movement Activists, Holon, 1965") Many of the active members were ready to have a Nahal army assignment or live in a Kibbutz. Those who never joined a youth movement and the ex-members were much less public service oriented. But in all categories, there was a minority who expressed a preference for idealistic career choices. Only a negligible proportion of all youngsters thought the army demanded too much of them. Even among non-youth movement members, over one-third wanted to volunteer in a high risk army unit, with glamour status - the airforce or the para-troop corps.

The ex-members and those who never belonged tend to conform to/conceptual model of the realist. As realists, they will sacrifice a little, and sacrifice more during a period of national emergency, but within what they view as reasonable and pragmatic limits. They are less inclined than idealists to express pioneering choices in an attitude survey.

1 See Chapter I, pp 5-11
National Service Attitudes of 10th Graders  
by Youth Movement Activists  
Holon 1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question and Answer</th>
<th>Active Members (N=127)</th>
<th>Ex-Members (N=470)</th>
<th>Never a Member (N=200)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Where would you like to live permanently?&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In a rural settlement, Kibbutz or development town.</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Army demands too much of me. (yes)</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;In which unit would you prefer to serve your army training?&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nahal</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airforce or Paratroopers</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Resignations are the other side of the selective equation reflecting the progressively idealistic commitment that membership requires. Those who remain include many who sustain a high level of enthusiasm and voluntarism for public service, while keeping resources needed for personal needs close to a minimum. They are a minority of no more than one out of seven. It will diminish further as the group gets older. But they have an influence on the total youth culture that goes much beyond their numerical weight. They can count on support of many of those who left, often with some nostalgia and regret.
Partisanship

Youth services are rarely discussed in terms of their activities. One can play soccer in a Sports Club or a Youth Movement. Ethical problems will be discussed in a Beyond School program as well as in a Gadna youth leadership training session. Israelis prefer to categorize youth programs in terms of the adult institution which sponsors them - political parties, the schools, parent groups or the Army. This organizational classification scheme has descriptive utility. It focuses on a clear variable: the organization which pays the bills and controls programming. It serves to pose organizational questions such as: How does each of the adult-making agencies intend to influence the country's youth culture?

The youth movements advocate a political point of view, in contrast to the Gadna or the Beyond School programs which are more universalistic and non-partisan in their recruitment. They expect youths to be participants in an activity rather than become proponents of a cause. They espouse general patriotic virtues which call for no commitment beyond the obligation to be a solid citizen, who will obey the law, serve his country in an emergency and learn something about his country's many problems. Policy is made by appointed civil service officials.

Before Israel became a state, several of the ten movements competed actively - sometimes aggressively - with each other. They did not want to attract all comers. And they expected members to embrace the official ideology. This political exclusiveness has been modified considerably the last twenty years. The group
work aspects of the youth movements differ much less than the political parties who sponsor them.

The Official Programs

Three youth movements, the Scouts (Zophim), Noar Oved Velomed and B'\textit{nai Akiva} place a great deal of emphasis on such group work goals as peer group identification, self-confidence, encouragement and skill acquisition by each member. They play down ideology. They want to attract as many youngsters as possible. (See attached table "Survey of Youth Movements")

They have relatively universalistic programs and enroll about 75-80\% of all the youngsters in youth movements. They make special effort to reach out to unorganized segments of the youth population, including those in immigrant housing projects and communities. This active recruitment program is facilitated by hiring youth leaders in relatively large numbers. While volunteer leaders would be preferred, their supply does not meet the requirements of an expansion-oriented program.

The Scouts (Zophim) are non-partisan and predominantly middle-class. Their first group in Israel dates back to 1919. The Scouts emphasize general civic virtues, within a pioneering tradition. Their program can be summed as follows:

To educate on the basis of Scout values and the Scout pledge; to develop the social feelings and the individual character, to accustom its members to order, exactness, discipline, observation work and outdoor life; to strengthen love for Israel, to develop respect for tradition and to train its members for Zionist pioneering. (Kibbutz membership)
Survey of Youth Movements Members
(In Per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name and Party of Youth Movement</th>
<th>Eighth Grade National Sample in 1963 (N=4,151)</th>
<th>Tenth Grade Level Area Sample in Holon in 1965 (N=127)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socialist Movements</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noar Oved (Mapai - Moderate)</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hashomer Hatzair (Mapam - Left)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machanot Olim (Achduth Avodah-a Center)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religious Movements</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B'na' Akiva (National Religious Party)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ezra (Aguda - Ultra-religious Party)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Free Enterprise Movements</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macabi Hatsair (General Zionist)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betar (Herut-Nationalist Party)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noar Zioni (Progressive Party)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Political Movement</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zophim (Scouts)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Ex-members are excluded in this tabulation.
The Scout movement gets much of its support from local educational authorities. They also could, on occasion, use school buildings. Between 1956 and 1964, when political youth movements were banned from recruiting in the schools, the Scouts were the only program which could be active in the general trend public schools. Since 1964 the Ministry of Education has shifted its policy to allow leaders of other youth movements to talk to classes in school about their point of view. Parent committees function in many localities. They help in keeping the scouts going and some of them assist youth leaders in the conduct of overnight hikes.

Quite similar in program, but more partisan in sponsorship is Israel's largest youth movement, the moderate socialist Noar Oved Velomed. It is backed up by the largest Kibbutz Federation and the country's most powerful political force, the Mapai Labor Party. For many decades Noar Oved Velomed has enjoyed the support of leading members of the Government, who represent Mapai.

Like the social-democratic parties of Europe, Mapai is politically pragmatic. Its youth movement, though socialist

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1 In the Public Schools with a religious orientation the Scouts never did enjoy this favorite position. In theory, no youth movement was supposed to recruit in the schools, but in actuality many principals gave encouragement to youth leaders of the traditional B'nei Akiba movement because it has a program in harmony with their own orientation.

2 Early in 1968, the Mapai Labor Party merged with two other parties, Rafi and Achudth Avodah. The latter has its own youth movement, the Machnoth Olim. What will happen to it and Noar Oved Velomed has not been determined. Their unification may be more difficult than the merger of the adult political parties. The Machnoth Olim are more puritan and selective, making more demands for commitment of its members to a social utopia oriented pioneer tradition than is true of the Noar Oved Velomed movement.
in theory, subdues ideology when necessary to reach a political segment of the population. While the program advocates pioneering, especially through Kibbutz membership, members need not accept this as a life goal in order to remain active. Noar Oved members rank lower on the idealism score than those of more orthodox and ideologically pure socialist youth movements. (Hashomer Hatzair and Machnoth Olim). Political pragmatism is particularly evident in the Mapai policy of working with the children of Afro-Asian immigrants whose parents are less often supportive of socialist ideals. Few of the newcomers are interested in abstract political theory. They want housing, jobs and social benefits.

Though the party is secular in theory, its youth movement tries to recruit also among the more orthodox segments of the population. Religious youth leaders are hired for this purpose. This is part of a general strategy of political "ecumenism." The Mapai has acquiesced in the continuation of the Mandatory Regime's practice of regulating of marriages and divorces by religious courts. There also is no public transportation on the Sabbath in most of the country. This is in spite of the fact that this policy offends many liberal sentiments. But without such "Real-Politik" concessions to the religious parties, the Mapai leaders think they cannot remain in power.

B'nei Akiva and Ezra have different normative priorities. They wish to stem the drift towards secularism. Socialist ideas are recognized as having economic utility, but they are not an essential part of the basic doctrine. Each of these religious
youth organizations is affiliated with Kibbutzim sponsored by their respective political parties. B'nei Akiva, the larger of the religious movements, is generally conciliatory and progressive in its outlook. Recruitment in the general population is restricted to orthodox children. This policy limits the volume of potential recruits but also insures the cohesiveness of each movement. Many of the members of both movements are children whose parents were in the same program when they were young.

The two youth organizations differ in their degree of acceptance of secular ideas. For instance, army service by girls is more positively advocated by B'nei Akiva than by local branches of Ezra. Both of the religious organizations could agree on the following platform:

The education of a generation of Jews faithful and devoted to the Torah, the Jewish people and their holy land. Each movement favors the personal realization of the ideals of "religion and labor," which find their highest expression in the pioneering settlements. They include Kibbutzim, religiously inclined family farm villages and urban suburbs restricted to orthodox Jews.

Ezra is theocratically inclined. Its leaders tend to follow closely the political stands of its adult sponsors, the Agudath Yisrael, a party favoring strict conformity in all state and non-government functions with the orthodox religious rituals. They believe themselves to be a vanguard upon whose religious fervor will depend the survival of orthodox Judaism, as it was practiced in Europe's ghettos. Ezra does not disassociate itself from the mainstream of Israeli public
life, as do a number of more orthodox Jewish sects. It has co-
educational programs. But most of the leaders favor ejection
of a member who disagrees with their movement's principles.
(See "Very Religious" Group on the chart "Recommended Action
For Handling A Member With A Deviant Ideology")

Cooperation with national institutions is always on condition that religious
youths are given special recognition.

The two smaller "left-of-center" socialist movements,
the Hashomer Hatzair and the Machnотh Olim, also prefer to
be selective rather than try to recruit youths who are skeptical
about the movements' partisan orientation. Both of these programs
favor greater expansion of the socialist sector of the country's
total economy than the larger and moderately socialist Noar Oved
Velomed. All of the adult socialist parties entered a political
alignment in 1968. But their youth movements remained separate,
although they all avow the core values stressed in the literature
of the most purist - the Hashomer Hatzair.

It aims to educate its members to fulfill the
pioneering mission of Jewish youth in order to
create a nation of workers living in an egalitarian society in Israel. The movement wants to
perpetuate a national value and to develop a
Zionist and Socialist consciousness as preparation
for the Kibbutz way of life. It wants to educate
and reinforce the qualities of individuals and to
train them for personal realization of these aims
in a life devoted to the community.

1 Chart is based on answer to the question: "What
should be a leader's attitude towards a youth with an outlook
different from certain basic principles of his organizations?"

1. Expel him from the program.
2. Put the issue up to the group.
3. Explain to him he would have to be expelled
if he continued to hold his point of view.
4. Try to persuade him to change his mind, but
do nothing else.
## RECOMMENDED HANDLING OF MEMBER WITH A DEVIANT IDEOLOGY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Expulsion</th>
<th>Retention</th>
<th>Group Decision</th>
<th>No Reply</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BEYOND SCHOOL PROGRAMS</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LABOR PARTY YOUTHS</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GADNA YOUTH CORPS</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCOUTS</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIALIST YOUTHS</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELIGIOUS YOUTHS</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VERY RELIGIOUS YOUTHS</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend:
- □ EXPULSION
- □ RETENTION
- ◊ GROUP DECISION
- □ NO REPLY
Sixty-three per cent of the active members of the Hashomer Hatzair and Machnoth Olim groups in Holon said at age 16 they would like to live later in a Kibbutz or a development community. This proportion is more than twice as high as the incidence of such pioneering intentions expressed by the more moderately socialist Noar Oved Velomed (24.5%) and four times as high as that of members of all other youth movements (15%).

This purist socialist attitude favorable to Kibbutz life is confirmed by the small proportion of members who scored zero on a scale of idealistic attitudes. Only six per cent of the Hashomer Hatzair members made no idealistic responses to our attitude questionnaire. There were more than three times as many low-scoring youths who were, or had been, members of the Noar Oved Velomed. Six times as many (37%) scored zero on the idealism scale among those never active in a youth movement. (See chart "Idealistic Choices of Past and Present Members of Selected Youth Movements")

The left socialist groups were the most autonomous from parental influence. They exceeded all others in their expressed willingness to schedule a hike against parental opposition. They also exceeded leaders in other youth movements in being tolerant in personal matters. Very few (4%) were willing to deprive a youth on a desert hike of water if, contrary to instructions, he drank all of his own supply of water at the beginning.

The remaining three very small youth movements can be classified as "Free-Enterprise" in the sense that they are ideologically non-socialist. Included are the sports oriented
IDEALISTIC ATTITUDE CHOICES OF PAST AND PRESENT MEMBERS OF SELECTED YOUTH MOVEMENTS

Many Idealistic Preference
N = 153

Some Idealistic Preferences
N = 522

No Idealistic Preferences
N = 202

Never Members or No Answer
N = 271

Scouts
N = 141

Religious Bnei Akiba
N = 52

Labor Noar Oved
N = 281

Socialist Hashomer Hatzair
N = 118

16% 44%
37% 6%
50%
Maccabi Hatzair, the nationalistic Betar and the Noar Zioni movement of the Liberal Party. Their programs are hard to differentiate from those of the Scouts.

The most separatist of these small movements is the Betar. Before Israel became a state it had a dissident nationalist platform. Betar members were ready earlier than the majority of the pre-independence Zionist movement to oppose by means of military retaliation British restrictions of Jewish settlement. They were uncompromising opposition to the 1947 United Nations plan for the partition of Palestine between Arabs and Jews. But just before the June 1967 War, the leader of the Betar's sponsoring party joined the coalition government as a Minister without Portfolio.

Betar avoids taking strong stands on social or religious issues. It stresses such symbols as:

One national flag, one national anthem, a united educational system, discipline and glory. It idealizes the characteristics of the "New Jew" who stands proudly upright and shows civic courage. It advocates pioneering for every difficult, especially military, task but does not advocate Kibbutz life.

Before statehood these movements represented a distinct political alternative to the socialist parties. Today the socialists are themselves more pragmatic and free enterprise oriented. Their youth movements are less doctrinaire.

Absent from this survey of youth movements is the youth branch of the two Communist parties. Communist political activity is legal in Israel, but is regarded with great suspicion by the authorities and all other parties. Fewer than 100 Jewish
youths, together with somewhat larger numbers of Arabs, are estimated to be affiliated with this movement. When the field work for this study began, the Party youth secretary offered to cooperate. But just then the Party broke up into two small splinter factions. Questionnaires filled out by nine of its youth leaders were not turned over to the study staff.

The membership patterns of Israel's ten youth movements are consistent with the theory which might be called the inverse relationship of size and impact. Reformist social movements, as they grow in size, tend to become less particularistic in their demands and more universalistic. The impact of any elite is probably more a function of its dedication than of its size.

Post-Revolutionary Conservatism

Many youth movement activists like to think of themselves as revolutionary and change-oriented. But, in fact, their acceptance of adult-making institutions, especially their parents, exceeded that of all other organized young people. They are radical in tradition, but system-maintenance oriented in actuality. Joining a youth movement often was a non-conformist act for their parents. Today except for some youngsters from non-European families, the act of joining a youth movement is eminently respectable. If anything, non-membership is a form of deviance, since over 70% join at some time of their life.

Conservatism is the fate of every successful reform movement. Revolutionary ideas, when transmitted by parents to their children, become prescriptions for conformity. Few parents wish their children to alter again what was created with so much effort.

The readiness for conformity on part of all segments of the youth population is also apparent in the responses of young people to the question comparing their own religious outlook to that of

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1Proportion of Tenth Grade level Holon Youths by Youth Program affiliation reporting parents "who do not understand the problems of young people." (N=805)

| Youth Movement Activists (ex-members excluded) | 17% |
| Gadna Youth Corps Voluntary Program Activists   | 30% |
| Non-School Related Extra-Curricular Program Activists | 29% |
| All other youths                               | 28% |
their parents. The great majority of the young people followed parental footsteps in the area of religion. (See attached chart).

The contemporary youth leadership are not often found among those who support minority factions within their respective parties. Some youth leaders reacted defensively when confronted with this evidence. They wish it were otherwise, for they sentimentalize dissent. Youth leaders are probably selected in part for their readiness to conform with the "establishment" by opposing certain youth culture innovations. Such "conservatism" is evident at least with respect to the current controversy regarding the propriety of social dancing. When the youth movements began, "bourgeois" ballroom dances such as the waltz were frowned upon. The movements adopted folk-dancing as their distinguishing mark. Most contemporary youth movement leaders continue to oppose social dancing, along with many other youth culture innovations.

The non-political youth organizations, such as the Gadna Youth Corps and the urban Beyond School program, have no similar ideological past to uphold. Even though many of their leaders once belonged to youth movements, their more eclectic current orientation is reflected in greater readiness to approve of social dancing.

Popular dancing was also frowned upon in Russia for a long time, denounced as "hooliganism" and, at times, punished as an offense against the state. But in Israel, a multiparty democracy, such post-revolutionary conservatism must compete in the market place on almost equal terms with new youth culture fads. Its youth movements are certainly not the reservoirs of rebellion which they were when their parents joined them a generation ago.
COMPARISON OF RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION OF HOLON ADOLESCENTS AND THEIR PARENTS
(IN PERCENT) N = 812

SIMILAR TO PARENTS
- ORTHODOX
- TRADITIONAL
- NON-OBSERVANT

DIFFERENT FROM PARENTS
- MORE TRADITIONAL OR ORTHODOX THAN PARENTS
- LESS ORTHODOX OR TRADITIONAL THAN PARENTS
Middle-Class Orientedness

Youth movements seem to have the highest rate attractiveness for the well-established and the intellectually gifted segment of the population. Residents of spacious apartment, children of European-born settlers, and high achievers in school were over-represented. Only 18% of the youth movement activists at age 16 had received failure scores two years earlier in the nation-wide eighth grade Sekker examination. This proportion of less than one-fifth must be compared to the one-third failure score among those who had resigned from a youth movement. Among those who never belonged to any youth program, 76% had received failure scores. (See attached chart on "Youth Organization Participation of Holon Adolescents in 1965 - By Eighth Grade Examination Scores in 1963").

This middle class selectivity of youth movements may be related to their requirement that members submit to peer group enforced discipline and be concerned with idealistic values. Members must be willing to put up with primitive conditions while being on a hike or working on a National Service project.

The middle-class concentration of youth movement membership also confirms their post-revolutionary conservative character. When a revolution succeeds, the "underdogs" become "top dogs."¹ Their children are now advantaged. This class-related selectivity must not be mistaken

YOUTH ORGANIZATION PARTICIPATION OF HOLON ADOLESCENTS IN 1965 - BY EIGHTH GRADE EXAMINATION SCORES IN 1963

- NON JOINERS: 6% (6/76)
- PASSIVE PARTICIPANTS: 50% (38/76)
  - Ex Youth Movement, Compulsory Gadna & Beyond In-Building School Programs
  - Volunteer Participants: 30% (23/76)
  - Never in Youth Movement, but Voluntary Gadna Club or Community Centered Beyond School Program (14%)
- VOLUNTEER PARTICIPANTS: 14% (10/76)
- YOUTH MOVEMENT ACTIVISTS: 34% (26/76)

Failure: 34 (34/76)
Marginal: 31 (31/76)
Passing: 35 (35/76)
for exclusiveness. It is ideologically distressing to the youth movements that they are not more successful in attracting lower class children. Sociologically this finding is not surprising.  

Children from disadvantaged population segments are statistically under-represented, but they are far from absent.

One third of all youth movement members live in poverty as indicated by the fact that they live under crowded conditions of more than 2½ persons per room.

Nearly half (46%) of all youth movement members were academically marginal. They were below the 67th percentile in their eighth grade qualifying examination that often is a prerequisite for admission to an academic high school.

About one quarter (26%) of all youth movement members had fathers born in Afro-Asian countries.

Nearly 60% of children who are never in a youth movement live under such crowded conditions.

About 60% of all children who never were in a youth movement made such low scores.

About 57% of all children who never were in youth movements came from Afro-Asian homes.

The youth movements are trying to recruit more members of lower-class origin. They want to facilitate the integration of ethnic groups. But such objectives must overcome the divisive impact of social and class criteria as the basis for peer group formation. The participation rate of children who are culturally educationally disadvantaged is much lower than their proportion in the population. The political sophistication necessary for embracing any ideology, including socialism, is much more commonly found among middle class than lower class

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1Our findings are similar to those of August B. Hollingshead and David P. Ausubel who found that in the United States participation in formal and informal youth programs is often related to socio-economic status and school achievement. See August B. Hollingshead, Elmstown's Youth: The Impact of Social Classes on Adolescents, New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1949; David Paul Ausubel, The Theory and Problems of Adolescent Development, New York, Grune and Stratton, 1954.
elements. There is a cultural gap between Europeans and persons recently immigrated from the under-developed countries of Asia and Africa. The gap cannot be closed in half a generation, no matter what efforts may be made, though youth movements are making such efforts.

Conclusion

A large proportion of Israeli youth are exposed to the Zionist and predominantly socialist pioneering traditions through youth movement membership. Coverage is extensive, including at least 70 percent of the total population. It is higher for the middle class youngsters who do well in school and less for those from poorer segments of the population who do not achieve well in school. The exposure begins during pre-adolescence, at an age before young people are ready to weigh the alternate political or religious programs which are advocated by the country's ten youth movements.

Recruitment relies heavily on natural peer group associations in schools and neighborhoods. The pre-adolescent proclivity for socializing with age-mates is utilized by youth movement leaders to coopt individuals and groups to join "the movement." Many of those who resign also respond to peer group, rather than ideological, factors.

Ideology plays an increasingly significant part in screening the membership at older age levels. The elite who volunteer to become youth leaders, who join a Nahal unit of the army and who finally join a Kibbutz are self-selected by many variables. The larger youth movements maintain their size in part by accepting readiness for participation as the primary criterion of membership. The movements which stress
ideological cohesion remain relatively small but proportionately influential on those youth who are retained.

Adult-making agencies that sponsor each of the youth movements leave much of the initiative for local programming to the young leaders. There is room for upward mobility from being a child to becoming a youth movement member and leader, who will soon be ready to take on even more responsible roles in the country's defense establishment. In each program, young people learn to make choices on their own. They are free to join or to leave, to be active or less active or to select one youth movement in preference to another. They enforce their own discipline and do much of the program planning for themselves and for others. They can practice these adult-type roles before they become adults. Through this cooptation process, youth movements have an impact not only on their active members, they influence others who admire these values. This includes a much larger segment of the total youth culture. Adults who sponsor these movements can be assured that the next generation is exposed to the idea that young people are responsible for their country's future.

Planning for the youth movements is quite decentralized. This leaves much initiative to each local unit, but some supportive services are provided by the sponsoring political or religious group, plus the Government and the semi-public Jewish Agency.

The youth movements have shifted from being revolutionary to becoming establishment-oriented. They retain much of the same structure and objectives that served to make them key instruments of nation-building before Israel became a state. Their ideological principles, which link each of the youth movements with their sponsoring political
or religious party have changed little. But the partisan identification of young people with these programs is being overshadowed by the changing conditions under which they are confronting life, in contrast to those that were experienced by the parental generation.

One of the consequences of drafting all youths at age 18 is a perpetual shortage of older volunteer youth leaders. The movements that wish to exercise an influence throughout the country, especially among the new immigrants and the poor, have to hire more and more paid youth leaders. Paid personnel now staff the central planning and organizing jobs of nearly all youth movements. This emerging professionalization provides a degree of stability, which is counteracted by the view that such jobs are transitional and temporary for most of those who take them. More than other programs, the youth movements circulate their leadership elite. Each year there is room for the services of new people, closer in age to the members than those who are being replaced. This circulation of elites is often paid for with organizational instability. A program will lose much of its impact when a good leader is replaced by one less competent. But there always is room for new talent who are willing to serve the movement and who have the requisite leadership skills. The generational gap between the youth movements and the peer group culture is never allowed to become too large.

The youth movements are confronting an achievement crisis that is in store for all successful revolutionary movements: What can be the basis for our continuity? Socialist living cannot be transferred from rural kibbutzim to urban areas. Only a few new rural settlements are needed and much of this pioneering is now done by the Nahal army units. The goal of the small nationalist Betar movement for a
"Greater Israel" has emerged as a realistic alternative since the Six-Day War, but it is fraught with difficulty since it would involve the risk of Jews becoming outnumbered by Arabs within a generation.¹

On this and other contemporary issues, there can be division of opinion in each of the youth movements about what policy should be pursued. The youth movements are old social structures, but their historical differences have lost much of the contemporary meaning. Their sponsoring political parties are forming new alliances, but so far, these mergers have not yet resulted in mergers of youth programs. Each of the youth movements is now in search of functions with enough contemporary vitality to retain or increase beyond their past impact on the youth of the country.

¹Ailon Shiloh, Population Problems and Programs in Israel, University of Pittsburgh. A paper read at the Middle East Studies Association, Austin, Texas, November, 1968.
VIII

Institution Building: The Gadna
Planning and Implementation

How does a youth corps develop? There are many such organizations around the world - in Russia, in Jamaica and in Ghana. Each reflects the application of a strategy by adults to influence the emerging youth culture through an adult organization. In modern societies, innovations are less and less introduced haphazardly. They are planned. New administrative relationships and personal interactions are organized on the basis of a design to accomplish specific purposes.

The Gadna Youth Corps organized in 1939 will be reviewed from this point of view, as a case study in institution building: The planful establishment of a new organizational arrangement to serve purposes which are thought to require more and different resources than those which can be allocated by already existing administrative units. This chapter presents a brief historical review of how Gadna developed, to provide a basis for suggesting explanatory hypotheses about the way this new organization is linked to others in the country's extensive network of youth services. In the next chapter, the contemporary operations of Gadna will be analyzed.

Little is known about the general principles of planful institution building - the restructuring of an organization or a more diffuse social action pattern on the basis of a model. It must begin with estimates of how the new program can operate and its probable impact on existing network of available services. These estimates must then be translated operationally. Such market
research is almost standard when a new commercial product is introduced. It is less often done when public service modifications are being considered. Almost unheard of is the idea of a planful trial of alternate organizational arrangements. In Israel the multiple network of youth programs approximates such a natural experiment which began when Gadna emerged to supplement the programs of youth organizations.

How New Institutions Develop

When a new function is planned, there usually are several alternatives. It can be assigned to a new agency, specializing in the nurturance of a new service and the establishment of supportive linkages with already existing and related institutions. Or an added function can be taken on by an existing agency. A rotary club can sponsor a service project of tutoring children in a slum area to become "more related" to the key issues of the time. A small church-related school can expand to become a general university. But some new function cannot be integrated by an existing body without jeopardy to those that are already being performed. This is how Gadna became a separate program.

It began in 1939 when Jewish adolescents seemed needed for defense for lack of a supply of adult manpower insufficient to meet a triple threat to the community's survival: By Nazi Germany, the British police in Palestine and the Arab guerilla forces.

Before World War II was over, 33,000 adult Jews enrolled as volunteers from a community of only 465,000. This total included children and the aged. The volunteers served under British command to assist in such varied campaigns as the ejection of Vichy French forces from Syria, the defeat of Nazi supported nationalists in Iraq and the battle against the Germans in Greece and in the desert in Egypt and Lybia. Jewish battalions helped to liberate Italy. They remained at the end of the war against Germany as part of the occupation forces until the British removed them to put an end to Jewish activities to help the surviving refugees reach Palestine.

While Jews were allied with the British in the battle against the Nazis, they were in opposition at home. In 1939, after repeated failures to get Jews and Arabs to negotiate a bi-national agreement, the British Government decided to grant the principal Arab political demand: Termination of the League of Nations mandate to facilitate establishment of a Jewish national home. The British hoped to rectify what some of its leaders had come to regard as a serious political mistake, the Balfour Declaration in 1917 committing British support of the Zionist movement. Independence was promised to Palestine after a ten year transition period. Except for a final quota of 75,000 persons, the British would subject further Jewish immigration to Arab agreement. Purchase of additional land by Jews was immediately forbidden in 95% of the country.
A majority of the League of Nations, which had originally mandated Palestine to Britain for the express purpose of implementing the Balfour declaration, disapproved of the new British policy. But the League had no power to enforce this judgement. If the British policy was to be stymied, the Jews would have to do it on their own. And it had to be done by passive resistance along with selectively applied force, even while a large proportion of the young men and several thousand women were away from Palestine, in the joint allied effort to defeat Germany. Under circumstances such as these, adolescents were badly needed for para-military purposes.

Even later, when the Jewish soldiers fighting against Germany had returned home, there was an acute manpower shortage. After the United Nations had voted in 1947 that Palestine be divided into an Arab and a Jewish state, the British Government refused to assist in implementing the decision. Empire troops, which at times exceeded 100,000 were often employed to stop Jewish military efforts to defend themselves against Arab guerilla warfare. The Jewish army had to function clandestinely. The underground Hagana could maintain a full time force of no more than 400 men who performed mostly general staff, planning and training functions. It could count on support from a small Palmah striking force, most of whom worked as farmers in Kibbutzim. It included 2,100 men and women plus 1,000 in the active reserve. They were backed by 32,000 in the Hagana civilian reserve. Other adults could be called up in case of need, but they had no military training. Adolescent manpower could make a difference in such an emergency.

The small clandestine Jewish force had to protect settlements against Arab guerilla actions in a civil war without a solid front. Jews and Arabs in Palestine lived in close proximity. Help was also needed to smuggle Jewish immigrants into the country above and beyond the British quota and to establish new Jewish settlements on land purchased for this purpose.

No existing organization could take-on the task of training adolescents for participation in these activities without many risks. There was a Jewish settlement police force but it was commanded by British officers and it was not allowed to train reserve forces. The clandestine Hagana could not muster-in adolescents without exposing them and their recruiters to punishment in case of discovery.¹ This led to the decision to establish a "physical education" program (Hagam) to serve as a legal cover for what was proscribed activity, a youth corps in the high schools.²

Through their high school affiliation Hagana agents could reach all qualified students as a group. Para-military training could begin during gymnasium periods and on school hikes. Sticks took the place

¹Munya M. Mardor, Strictly Illegal, London, Robert Hale, Ltd. 1957 Efraim Dekel, Shai: The Exploits of Hagana Intelligence, N. Y. Thomas Yoseloff: 1959

²For youths who were working and who were not enrolled in a high school, a different administrative arrangement was needed. It was called Gadna, the Hebrew initials of the term, Youth Corps. Its name ultimately was to be applied to the school related to units as well.
of guns and whistles simulated bullets. Youngsters learned about military discipline, self-defense, leadership, the geography of the country, and night orientation. Those with proper capabilities were then allowed to graduate into the secret Palmah shock troops of the Hagana.

A Marriage of Convenience: Education with Para-Military Service

Before 1939, the Hagana (Jewish self-defense force) occasionally recruited a few youngsters as runners, to put up posters and to perform other non-combat tasks. Those selected were generally associated with youth movements. Older members were invited to undergo pre-military conditioning under the guise of scouting. The curriculum included physical training, group living, capacity to live off the country in isolated places, desert warfare, the use of small arms, ju-jitsu and the experience of moving throughout the country at night.

This clandestine organizational arrangement was inefficient. Each boy and girl had to be recruited separately. A different administrative umbrella was needed to recruit and train larger numbers of youths more openly without opposition of the British authorities or the risk of protest from parents who did not want their adolescent children to be part of an underground army. This is how an administrative merger of school and youth corps came into being.

The program was first known as Hagam, an abbreviation in Hebrew of "Expanded Physical Education." It was administered within the
framework of high schools. While there were British inspectors who had to approve this curriculum idea, as all other general policies, Hagam could be justified as an application of the British public school emphasis on physical fitness and the ideals of the ancient Greeks who are reported to have stressed the utility of combining intellect and sports. ¹

In its origin and subsequent development, the Gadna also parallels the Boy Scout Movement. Both began as a para-military force. Both were later transformed with official sponsorship into a permanent peace-time "character-building" agency. Both avow such non-partisan objectives as "endurance, resourcefulness, self-control, defense of honor and trustfulness."² But unlike the Boy Scout Movement in Europe and America, Gadna includes boys and girls within the same organization. This co-educational policy was consistent with the ideology and the practice of youth movements, which stress the spirit of equality and comradeship of all members. Girls were not expected to equal boys in the rigor of the exercises, but they were needed to meet the severe manpower shortage. Many enjoyed this opportunity in Hagam to play a new role, hitherto not generally open to women. Their presence also added much to the morale of the units.

For working youths and those not enrolled in a high school,


administrative arrangement other than Hagam was needed. The 
clandestine Hagana, therefore, assigned a few men who could be 
spared to recruit adolescents into what they began to designate 
as Gadna, the Hebrew initials of the term Youth Corps. At first, 
this was a very small enterprise. Its name ultimately was to be 
applied to the school related to Hagam units as well. 

The Gadna and Hagam never focused exclusively on military 
training. Few of its officers were professional soldiers. Many 
had an interest in education. Nearly all of them were graduates 
of youth movements. There were many students and Halutzim who 
had come to Palestine trained in developmental skills. They 
viewed military activities as an unfortunate but necessary devia-
tion from pioneering. They, therefore, combined para-military 
exercises with exposure to hard work. 

Many city children had no prior experience with either. 
They were, therefore, taken on hikes where they learned to ford 
streams, survive in the desert on berries and snakes, and move 
at night without fear of "spirits." The emphasis was on acquisi-
tion of self-confidence derived from a knowledge that as part of 
an elite corps they could endure hardship and would be ready to 
help their country, as workers in time of peace, and as fighters 
if the need arose. 

A Prestigious Institution

Youth corps all over the world are organized by adult-making 
institutions (parents, school and the state) for two purposes which 
differ drastically in their consequences. A youth corps can function
as an elite selector or can serve a welfare function. Participation can serve as a rite of passage from childhood to adulthood.

An elite youth corps is quite different from a welfare-oriented program such as the United States Civilian Conservation Corps, or the current United States Youth Corps. Both are designed for impoverished youngsters. They provide social services for the marginal. They are virtually without members from the more influential segments of the population.

In Israel, as in the Boy Scouts or the present American Peace Corps, the elitist theory predominates. Middle class elements set the tone from the very beginning. The Hagam trainees in high schools outnumbered the few who were recruited outside of schools through Gadna. The status of a new institution within the total network of related agencies was very much influenced by the high status of those involved in its initial development.

Organizational Linkages

The Youth Corps began as a legal cover for an illegal program. It developed gradually into a permanent administrative organization that combined educational with military requirements and was linked closely to two major adult-making institutions: The schools and the army. Their cooperative relationships were symbolized by the linkage of the chief architects of this program: Dr. Arthur Biram, a school principal in Haifa, and General Yaakov Dori, one of his many illustrious students. They developed a bi-focal organizational pattern which still persists today.
Both Arthur Biram and Yaakov Dori spanned in their lifetime the era of Jewish history when the idea of Jewish statehood became transformed from improbable romanticism into a political reality. Biram had started out as a reform rabbi in Berlin by graduating from the "Hochschule für-Jüdische Wissenschaft" College of (Jewish Studies). But this calling did not suit him for long. He decided to study classics, especially Greek and Latin, and obtained a degree from a secular university. This qualified him for a teaching post in one of Berlin's high schools. But in 1914 at the age of 36 he left a promising career in German Civil Service to settle in Palestine and to become headmaster at the Reali High School in Haifa. He was a man in search of himself, whose sense of identity was a mirror of the conflicts of his generation of early Zionist leaders.

Jacob Dori (Dostrovsky) was one of Biram's first students. He had been born in Haifa of Russian parents. After graduation Dori joined the Hagana to become the Haifa Commander of this Jewish underground army. For many years he was one of its few full time military experts. He had a strong interest in education. After his retirement as Chief of Staff, he became the President of the Technion in Haifa, Israel's Center for high technical studies. He served in this second career until his retirement in 1965.

The outbreak of World War I interrupted the relationship between Biram, the school principal, and Dori, his soldier-student. Both were Zionists, devoted to the same cause, but they served
different armies. Biram decided to return to his German fatherland to do military service. He reappeared in Palestine in 1916 as a German officer in the Turkish Army. Young Dori joined the Jewish Legion in Egypt. He re-entered Palestine in the service of the British Army, which conquered the country from the Turks.

When students had to be recruited for clandestine service, Dori and Biram could work together. Neither liked the politically partisan spirit of most youth movements. Some students, far from being old enough to understand the complexities of politics, would barely talk to fellow students enrolled in a competing youth movement. Biram actually banned them from operating in his high school. Nor did he relish the idea that the underground Hagana might directly recruit students in his school. He wanted educators to retain exclusive administrative responsibility for all students, including their military preparation. He was first and foremost an educator, but with a classical Greek regard for the importance of fitness and defense.

Dori had a similar outlook. He thought the Army should have an educational aspect. He did not mind if his officers were appointed to the faculty when directing a voluntary and clandestine military program. They could then turn to school authorities to enforce discipline.

This cooperative arrangement was more than a reflection of good personal relations between two administrators. Joint programming was made easy because this arrangement supported certain core values of both institutions.
1. Defense conditioning should be conducted under a non-partisan umbrella, within which youngsters from youth movements of different parties and those not affiliated could participate together.

2. Teachers and students should be united in support of the cause of independence. They should be on the same side of this issue. This helped develop a spirit of comradeship which affected the total milieu of a school.

3. Educationally oriented leaders could counteract an excessively militaristic spirit, which might develop more easily if military training were to be conducted outside the school system.

When World War II broke out, Expanded Physical Education became a "course" in most Jewish high schools. Few youths refused to participate. Training officers of the underground army could function as high school faculty members, thus reducing their isolation, helping to broaden their perspectives and their social prestige.

The schools provided office space and other services. In some cases they also gave financial aid, since the clandestine training officers did not have a regular source of income.

**Gadna Survives Success**

When the Independence War was joined, Hagam - Gadna trained youths were among those who fought, died, and helped with the country's independence on the field of battle. In Jerusalem, under siege for many months, manpower became so short that Gadna units were assigned to battle stations.¹ But after establishment

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of a Jewish State, necessity for a clandestine youth corps disappeared. Not even during the Six-Day War in June 1967, did the Gadna Youth Corps have to be mobilized for military tasks. The fighting was done by the regular reserve, which yielded a force of more than 300,000,¹ although through the school and the Gadna youths were organized in many localities to help in distributing mail, newspaper and milk for aiding such civilian defense activities as filling sandbags. Approximately 14,000 Gadnaists worked temporarily in ordinance factories, the air-craft industry, in making camouflage nets, in hospitals and as farm helpers in border villages.²

When an institution attains its goals, why should it continue? The certainty which united those who worked together tends to be displaced by uncertainty about what priority to give to new objectives, if indeed such new goals can be agreed upon.

The idea of Gadna's dissolution was entertained in 1948, but rejected. The issue of its future was resolved at the highest level by Prime Minister David Ben Gurion. Independence had brought sovereignty, but not peace. Neither the High Command of the Israel Defense Force nor the political leaders of the country wanted to disband the Gadna. Successful organizations generally tend to exert pressure for their continuity. In this instance, what had begun as

¹This estimate, quoted by Leo Heiman without revealing its source appears plausible, although it represents between 13 and 14 per cent of the entire Jewish population. Even the major powers which scraped the bottom of their manpower barrel in World War II, seldom approached a ten per cent mobilization rate. Leo Heiman, "Can Israel Build Defense Industries?" The American Zionist Vol. LVIII 1967, No. 4:21.

a military emergency program became a permanent organization in which para-military objectives were supplemented by social welfare, educational and developmental goals.

In Israel, as elsewhere, serious outside threats have had a tendency to unify divergent streams in the nationalist movements. In politics and religion, Israelis disagree in many ways. But there is overwhelming consensus that the shaping of youthful minds is too important to be entrusted to any single program. The Gadna Youth Corps was designed as a survival oriented non-political youth program in an otherwise zealously partisan community.¹

Though under government sponsorship, the Gadna has remained non-political. Unlike the Hitler Youth of Germany, China's Red Pioneers, Russia's Komsomol and the youth corps in several newly emerging countries, Gadna has never been used to stage "spontaneous" protests and riots. Its leaders neither have the power nor seem to aspire to control their participants. Disciplinary infractions, and there are few, are turned over by the Gadna Commander to the school principal. There is no legislation to make Gadna compulsory and permanent. Each school can decide on whether or not to have a Gadna program. Few principals refuse. Gadna offers them an enrichment and physical education program without cost. All instructors are paid by the Army or the Ministry of Education.

¹ Its ideological particularism was even more pronounced before statehood than today. Many schools were under the auspices of a political party. Each youth movement strongly advocated its own general, socialist or religious prescription for a better world. But a high measure of unity could be obtained around one issue: Survival.
The Rehabilitation Mission

Gadna has shifted its program priorities a number of times since statehood. First, the organization was mobilized and expanded to help meet a new "emergency," mass immigration. After the Independence War pre-military activities could be somewhat reduced in favor of developmental challenges. Before independence, Israel had been a predominantly European community. In 1968, over seventy per cent of the children in primary grades had parents born in the under-developed countries of Asia and Africa. The biblical prophecy of Jews being gathered from the four corners of the earth came true. The entire Jewish community of Yemen made their way to Aden, to be flown by air to Israel. From every other Arab country, Jews came by plane or ship, often after having to leave behind all their belongings. Europe's displaced persons camps were emptied of their Jews. From the Americas and South Africa, as well as the democracies of Europe, came smaller groups to cast their fate with the new nation. Israel's Jewish population doubled in thirty months and quadrupled by 1968.

An influx so large and fast taxed the country's resources to the limit. During the first few years, strict rationing had to be introduced. Many immigrants had to be housed in tents and asbestos huts. There were shortages of teachers, social workers and other public servants to help integrate the newcomers. The Ministries of Education and Social Welfare did what they could. But their manpower and budget were sufficient only to meet the most urgent needs. Gadna was given a new mandate to give "social first aid" to help decrease the gap in educational and welfare services.
This emergency national service mission was launched with eleven people, two rooms and a bicycle. It was soon given more funds and manpower, released in large from the Defense Ministry budget. With it the Youth Corps established over 200 youth centers in immigrant towns and slum sections. They offered recreation and supplemental education. In a few locations Gadna also helped in hospitals and creches, in fire fighting and in the building of new roads. Several youth villages provided shelters for poorly housed adolescents. Many had been living with their families in hurriedly put up tent cities. Some of them lacked the rudiments of knowledge about twentieth century living. They had to learn the use of flush toilets, and tooth brushes and the care of their new clothing. Nearly all needed instruction in Hebrew. Gadna also organized summer camps, where thousands of youngsters from poor homes were given a chance to spend a few weeks, under healthy conditions. They received good food, medical care and free clothing, along with a chance to mix with Israeli children from more established sections of the population. Trips were organized to different parts of the country to acquaint youngsters with the new land to which they had come.

The challenge of helping new immigrants attracted some adolescent volunteers from the more settled families of the country. Helping to integrate the refugees was a new cause, with powerful youth culture appeal. For some of the immigrant youths, Gadna had glamour. What could be more inviting to a recent immigrant, living
in a leaky tent, than to be taken to an Israeli Army Camp? There
his rags were exchanged for an army uniform. He ceased being a
poor refugee. He became part of a prestigious organization.

The education-welfare emphasis was reflected in the outlook
of Colonel Akiba Azmon, the first commander of the Gadna after
independence. His military career began in the Engineering Corps.
He came to the Prime Minister's attention during the war with a
plan to employ border village housing for defense purposes. Living
quarters were built so that they could be used as fortified posi-
tions. He was a charismatic pioneer personality, with direct access
to David Ben Gurion, the Prime Minister, who also was the Defense
Minister. Akiba Azmon sometimes used this power to circumvent
normal military channels. He was no organization man. He was the
kind of person who would smile and thumb his nose in response to
a salute when entering a room of junior officers, to whom he was
to lecture.

When Azmon was appointed as Gadna Commander, he decided on
a program with just enough military drill to make youngsters feel
part of a military unit - which has prestige value. Most of their
attention was devoted to the welfare and character development
aspects of the program. He recruited a staff of educators and
youth movement enthusiasts rather than persons who had a military
orientation.

An "elite" image is projected by the symbolic recognition given
to Gadna by the Prime Minister and many leading persons. Gadna is
highly visible in ceremonial celebrations. Its units, without arms,
participate in the Independence Day Parade. As many as 17,000 Gadna members have taken part in the international four-day Passover March to Jerusalem from the coast along with youth movement units, foreign visitors, U. S. Marines and Golden Age Club members.

Gadna entertains the participants with mass gymnastics, singing and acrobatic spectacles in an open-air auditorium, located on the hills outside Jerusalem. Gadna also sponsors other mass hikes, track and swimming meets. Each involves large numbers of youths, usually entire school classes. They are conducted to give the students a sense of participating in a national program of considerable visibility. There is only limited emphasis of individual competition. Most prizes are given for group performance.

The significance of this civilian transformation of what was supposedly a para-military youth corps is heightened if one keeps in mind that the Israeli government had no money for "extras" in 1952. Instruments for the Gadna Orchestra had to be imported. There was severe austerity including food rationing. Some army officers raised their eyebrows: "Is it army business to maintain a music education program?" they asked, "when funds are also badly needed for strictly military purposes?" There also were staff recruitment problems. Well qualified youth leaders were in short supply. Among recruits with qualifications for Gadna leadership, most of them preferred a truly military assignment to being a youth leader.
These substantive issues about budgetary and manpower priorities were complicated by organizational "politics." Some staff officers envied the personal prestige of the Gadna Commander in the Prime Minister's office. Azmon acted more like a civilian in uniform, than a soldier. The integration of immigrants rather than para-military training seemed to be his priority concern. In 1954 he was asked to leave his post, immediately after David Ben Gurion first resigned from the Government. With his protector out of power, the army's High Command preferred a Gadna Commander with more military orientation. Most staff officers, whom Azmon had brought into Gadna, gradually left as the Youth Corps shifted policies reasserting to a degree the priority of its para-military objectives.

Stabilization

In the 1960's the need for Gadna's recreation, informal education and welfare programs began to decline. Attendance of voluntary Gadna programs dropped markedly in many towns and villages. The Ministry of Education was rapidly expanding, more varied and hobby oriented leisure time activities. Gadna had to use army personnel who were draftees and were changed each year while the school and youth movements could employ youth leaders for longer periods. By 1968, all had been liquidated except for a few youth clubs in Druse Arab villages in response to Druse demands for fuller integration in the Israel military establishments.¹

¹ Gideon Weigert, "Young Druse to Gadna: Want to Join Nahal as well," Jerusalem Post Magazine, July 19, 1968: 19
The phasing-out of most of Gadna's welfare program did not affect its para-military and national service programs. They have become stabilized, encompassing an increasing proportion of the country's adolescent population. Officials estimate that their program reaches 60% of the country's adolescent population. This participation rate is likely to increase soon, since the government is extending compulsory education through the tenth year and most secondary schools have a Gadna program.

Gadna is today the largest youth program of Israel. It has more members than at any time in its over 25 years of history. It enjoys financial and logistic support from two administrative units, the Ministries of Defense and Education. For the army, it is a non-defense activity; for the schools, it falls into the "non-school" category. This gives the program a diffuseness which allows for highly flexible content. The Ministry of Education pays for Gadna instructors in academic high schools and full time vocational schools. The army furnishes leaders to agricultural, Kibbutz and other rural schools, to part-time vocational training programs, and to welfare institutions, including those for juvenile delinquents.

The Army Gadna is headed by a Colonel, who did not have prior experience in the Youth Corps. The post is not a step towards a power position. It usually is the last military assignment for a man reaching his early forties, the conventional "retirement" age for command officers. The first commander during our survey period, after completing his tour of duty, entered the Foreign Service as a military attache. The present
commander plans to retire from the army to enter the field of education.

Day-by-day programming is by a more permanent career cadre of education oriented officers. They enter the Gadna Corps as young officers and remain to train and supervise successive cadres of draftees who are assigned each year by the army to direct youth corps programs in vocational schools, youth centers, apprenticeship classes, agricultural settlements, welfare and reformatory institutions.

General policy and budgeting of the Youth Corps are supervised by a civilian "Department of Youth and Nahal" of the Ministry of Defense, in line with the overall Israeli policy of civilian control over military affairs.

The Ministry of Education branch is headed by the Director of Sports and Physical Education. He hires civilian youth corps instructors who are paid by the Ministry. They are assigned administratively to function as Gadna teachers in local schools. Their program supplements what is being taught in physical education classes, which are staffed by teachers, who have to complete a university or teachers college curriculum. Gadna instructors who perform much of the same tasks can be hired with lower academic credentials. This overlapping in function was organizationally reflected by a recent shift of the Gadna Director in the Ministry of Education to be a subordinate to the Director of Physical Education. In previous years, the two posts had enjoyed equal organizational status.
As shown in the attached organization chart, neither the Defense Ministry or Ministry of Education controls the program. Funds must be allocated each year by both Ministries from a tight budget. These allocations occur in spite of the fact that the army has military units that are understaffed. The Ministry of Education is unable as yet to provide free high school level education for all. But it finances Gadna Youth Corps teachers in most academic and vocational schools.

The Gadna Youth Corps, much like the Reserve Officers Training Corps in the United States, forges a link between the country's armed forces and its schools. In the view of many army officers, Gadna is uneconomic if judged by purely military criteria. Gadna trainees may not be outperforming non-members with equivalent qualifications. Adolescents are certainly no longer needed for military service, but strategists want to maintain Gadna as a conditioning program. It is a convenient organizational framework for reaching youngsters of all social classes. The most publicized Gadna activities are not those involving para-military training, like target practice. The Gadna orchestra, which plays on many state occasions and gives excellent concerts both at home and abroad, the Bible Quiz and Gadna's many work projects are emphasized, as if to symbolize the symbolic liaison which Israel's civilian militia wishes to maintain with the civilian sector. Gadna wants to be identified with both the military and the development accomplishments of Zionism. Pioneering, along with defense, are key organizational values.
GADNA ORGANIZATION CHART

Defense Ministry
GADNA COMMANDER
(Tel Aviv)

REGIONAL OFFICES
SOUTH
CENTRAL
NORTH
Supervision of officers and enlisted youth leaders

PROGRAMS in Agricultural settlements, Youth Aliyah Institutions, vocational training centers, welfare and reformatory institutions, apprenticeship training courses

Gadna Clubs
Sharpshooting Air Clubs
Marine Clubs
Slum recreation clubs

Military Training Bases, Nirit, Beer Ora, Sde Boker Djelil, others.

LIAISON OFFICE of Defense Ministry
for Budgeting relations with civilian groups and local government

Education Ministry
DIRECTOR OF PHYSICAL EDUCATION & GADNA (Jerusalem)

REGIONAL OFFICES
SOUTH
CENTRAL
NORTH
Supervision of Gadna Teachers in Local Schools

PROGRAMS in Academic High Schools, Vocational High Schools, Evening High Schools

Municipal sharp-shooting ranges.

EXTERNAL NON-SCHOOL PROGRAMS
Overnight hikes, forestation, harvesting help, archaeological expeditions, other national service volunteer work, youth leadership courses (domestic and foreign) Bible quiz, Independence Day Parade, 4-day march to Jerusalem, Gadna youth orchestra, theatre groups.

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Cooperative relations
Command relations
Replanning

When Gadna - Hagam was set up in 1939, no existing agency could offer illegal para-military training without endangering its other functions. What emerged was a new institution, closely linked to both the school and the clandestine Hagana army. Gadna still functions cooperatively as a program run by two separate and different bureaucracies. Its structure has changed little, although much else has changed. Gadna is now a legal youth corps. It is less needed militarily.

Social planning cannot be a one-time activity. It must be continuous so that changes in social functions can be reflected in the organization's structure and its goals.

The unequivocal support of Gadna by most school and army officials has given way to the consideration of new policy issues. For instance, Should pre-military training receive quite as much priority in 1969 as seemed justifiable in 1939? Israel can today maintain a military deterrent force without reliance on adolescent manpower. Why should the process of training for national security begin at age 14 when only four years later, all Israeli citizens are subject to military conscription? There also have been discussions of the question whether Gadna should be made an elective subject in high schools for those vitally interested. Other issues up for consideration involve the qualification of youth leaders. Is it feasible to attract young officers who want to leave the army to enter the field of education?
These and other questions illustrate the fact that in any planned program there is a need for periodic re-assessment. When such a re-assessment is made, planners must confront conditions different from those that pertained originally. Before a program is set up many more options tend to exist than afterwards, when a stable organizational structure has been in operation. It can be altered, it can grow or decline. It can even be abolished, but all of these alternatives first have to answer the question: Is the change better than the condition it is designed to replace?

These policy considerations provide the background of an on-going re-assessment of Gadna by its administrative leadership. New programs, such as first aid clubs, are being set up to fit the desire of many young Israelis (especially girls) to acquire technical skills that have personal as well as public utility. Gadna has become a comprehensive internal tourism enterprise, offering young people a chance to see their country under circumstances that also offer tests of endurance and the opportunity for peer-group companionship. It facilitates volunteering by adolescents for adult-like roles, whenever such help is needed.

Conclusion

Gadna originated during Israel’s struggle for independence as a seemingly temporary program of clandestine para-military training. It became a permanent institution after the country’s independence, though this event outdated its original functions. The Youth Corps has become part of the "establishment." No one is seriously considering its abolition.
Over the nearly three decades of its existence, Gadna has maintained a stable organizational structure. But this has not meant a freezing of its functions, which have shifted repeatedly, in response to different public priorities. Without abandoning its para-military training objectives, an educational and social welfare dimension was added. This organizational flexibility may also be related to the fact that Gadna regularly rotates its top leadership.

Gadna does not compete but supports and uses other youth serving institutions, especially the schools and the youth movements. Most Gadna instructors have had experience in youth movements. They provide high schools with a nationally planned supplementary education program. Their instructional services are rendered without charge to the local tax payers. This budgetary fact is particularly important in immigrant quarters and rural areas, where the local educational authorities lack resources and manpower to provide them enough leaders to organize hikes or to maintain an orchestra. Efforts are made to enroll youngsters from disadvantaged families and those not enrolled in secondary schools. Gadna confers prestige on those who participate in its program. But the tone is set by youths who are achievement oriented.

Gadna is compulsory for all those enrolled in a post-primary school with a Gadna instructor. In addition there are voluntary programs with an elite appeal. The curriculum includes physical toughening, volunteering for developmental pioneering, and visits to historic sites, natural wonders and other points of interest.
The Youth Corps espouses only very general civil and patriotic objectives consistent with the country's core ideology, such as defense readiness, ingathering of the exiles, and Jewish cultural renaissance. Its leaders are selected on a merit basis. Gadna avoids many of the divisive controversies, such as religion versus secularism, socialism versus free enterprise and others. This ideological neutrality is re-enforced through Gadna's linkage with two of the country's other major non-political institutions - the army and the school system.

Chester Barnard once observed: "An organization must dis-integrate if it cannot accomplish its purpose. It also destroys itself by accomplishing its purpose." This contingency has been avoided by adding new functions. Gadna devotes a proportion of its resources to sponsoring developmental rather than military activities. This combination of para-military training with education and recreation gives the program a high degree of public acceptability in conformity to the predisposition in Israeli society that the civilian sector gain ascendancy, when there is a close working relationship between civilian and military authorities. Gadna's history represents an instructive case study of the capabilities and limitation of operating a non-partisan governmental youth program in a democratic political system. It is within the framework of this generalization, that its contemporary functions be examined in detail in the next chapter.

1Chester Barnard, Functions of the Executive, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1950: 29

IX

Gadna Today
Program

Gadna is a youth corps specializing in para-military training within a context of Israel's civic action tradition. Sixty per cent of the country's adolescents are enrolled. Any weekday, groups of boys and girls can be seen drilling in school yards or assembling in suburban firing ranges to practice sharp-shooting. Youngsters come together to hear lectures and to discuss issues of military strategy. This part of Gadna is compulsory for all students registered in a post-primary school which have a Gadna unit.

What gives Gadna most of its lustre and favorable public image are its elective programs. They include a variety of local after-school Gadna clubs. Its members build airplane models, seat-scout, target shoot, and hold discussions. Each year Gadna sponsors an International Bible Quiz. Dramatic groups are sponsored in several parts of the country, as well as soccer teams that play in an amateur league.

Gadna exposes young people to the idea of national service labor. In the 11th grade, entire school classes spend a week or two in Gadna sponsored re-forestation projects, farming, harvesting or archaeological digging. Participation is voluntary, but it is rare for any youngster to remain home. Working youths, who attend evening schools or apprenticeship classes only one day a week, go for shorter periods of time, since in order to go on these trips, their employers must release them from work.
These field trips provide opportunities to youths for testing their capacity to work. They learn to respect the people who live in border areas and who bring up families within reach of a rifle bullet. Unfriendly soldiers on the other side could—and sometimes do—fire without notice. Each Gadna unit posts guard every night. Physically and emotionally they experience what it means to have borders without peace. In the words of one military reporter:

The Gadna provides useful training in marching, outdoor camping, sharpshooting, night reconnaissance, first aid and communications. More important, Gadna inspires a sense of comradeship which makes the participants ripe for the next stage when they are inducted into the Israel armed forces.1

The descendants of those who were slaughtered in pogroms throughout their long history want to have children who will never face extermination for lack of ability to defend themselves.

The range of the physical conditioning is indicated by the following annual events:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Participants in 1967</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Kinnereth Lake (Lake Tiberias) mass swim</td>
<td>9000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The desert hike in the Negev</td>
<td>6200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Jerusalem hike</td>
<td>6000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Spring track meet</td>
<td>4000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Galilee hike</td>
<td>3600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Lake Kinnereth (Lake Tiberias) hike</td>
<td>3400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The picnic hike</td>
<td>3260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Mount Tabor hike</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Mount Gilboa hike</td>
<td>2700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samarian area hike</td>
<td>2200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashkelon beach and antiquity park hike</td>
<td>1900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tel Katzir track meet2</td>
<td>1732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hehadar track meet</td>
<td>1700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinai Desert track meet</td>
<td>1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frontier hike</td>
<td>512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hefer beach swim</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1Leo Heiman, "Israeli Infantry," *Infantry Magazine*, May-June 1964: 44-45

2A village that had been exposed to frequent Syrian shelling for nineteen years until Israeli occupation of their Maginot line type gun positions during the June War.
Event (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Participants in 1967</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eilat bay crossing</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yona swim meet</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public bicycle track</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nakruth swim meet</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bat Yam swim meet</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Many Israeli adolescents have been to Mount Herzl with its two memorials: *Yad Vashem*, with its speechless message of how six million Jews were exterminated under Hitler and the National Cemetery, where many who helped to found the Jewish State were buried. Survival remains a very personal issue. All youths at eighteen must face it. Few will shirk their turn in taking the risks in military service.

**Gadna** advocates universalist as well as Jewish renaissance values, along with training and military and civic skills. This combination is the essence of Zionist core ideology, which is also incorporated in other of the country's public service organizations, such as the **Nahal** pioneer corps and the agricultural **Kibbutzim**.

**Universalist Values:** Honor, unaffectedness, self-control striving for faultlessness, comradeship and forebearance.

**Jewish Renaissance Values:** Knowledge of Jewish History, the Bible and historic sites throughout the country.

**Military Attitudes:** Patriotism, discipline and obedience, fieldcraft (scouting), Mishmat-Hamayim (water discipline for desert living), punctuality, secrecy and capacity to live normally near the borders, even if danger lurks there.

**Civic Skills:** Love of work, protection of property, getting along with people of all walks of life and capacity to accept physical hardships graciously.
The Youth Corps gives special attention to youngsters with leadership ability. Over one thousand are invited each year to participate in summer camps conducted under army auspices. Military vehicles transport school children to the sites where the leadership training courses are held. While in attendance, the youngsters wear army uniforms. Their mail goes through military channels. Nevertheless, civilian values in character building are emphasized. If this were otherwise, there might be considerable opposition to the Gadna program.

Much of the discipline in the field is enforced by the peer group, as is the practice in the more autonomous youth movements. The Gadna instructor tries to limit himself to directing paramilitary exercises. He is helped by assistants (Makim), who are members of the class and who have attended a course to train for such leadership during previous summers and other vacation periods.

The curriculum includes group living under hardship conditions, physical toughening, survival skills, pre-military training akin to army basic training, calisthenics and group games and lectures about patriotic subjects. The aim is to build up the leadership skills of each boy or girl who participates. Upon completion of the course, the trainees are employed as assistant leaders in their schools' Gadna classes.

The Gadna program is mirrored well in the content of the agency's monthly journal, "In the Gadna Camp." It has a full staff of youthful reporters, photographers and graphic artists and has a circulation of over 10,000 copies. Its articles deal
with military subjects which appeal to young people, scientific topics, new items on youth culture and organizational announcements.

The December 1967 issue, for instance, included the following stories:

**Military**

Aryeh Katz, a tourist guide. Since 1930, he served in six armies. He began as a British village artillery policeman. Later he also served in the clandestine Haganah, the Jewish Brigade during World War II (under British auspices) and the Independence War. He also was called to serve in the Sinai Campaign of 1956 and the Six-Day War in 1967.

The new and the old Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces

Article about the Egyptian prisoners of war and their life while awaiting repatriation

**Scientific and Cultural**

Feature story about astronomy

The Gadna orchestra's trip to 11 countries in Europe, the United States and South America, under the baton of Comedian Danny Kaye and conductor Shalom Ronelli Riklis

Contributed stories and poems by youngsters

Music, theater and movie reviews

Visit to a historic site in East Jerusalem by the Director of Ministry of Religion

Local history: The Jewish pharmacy in the old city of Jerusalem before independence

A story about Israel's foreign aid program: Youth leadership training course No. 7 for emerging nations with students from 10 countries

**Youth Culture News**

The Olympic Stadium in Mexico City

Biography of the late James Dean, US baseball player and movie star

Stamp collector's corner

Crossword puzzle

Cartoons and jokes
Organizational News

The Sinai Desert hike

Letters to the Editor, including member complaints

Sharpshooting club news

Membership

Gadna, like the youth movements, tends to have the greatest impact on youth in academic secondary schools. But the Youth Corps reaches 61% of the adolescents which the youth movements cannot attract.

Gadna Youth Corps Membership of Adolescents in Holon Who Were Never Enrolled In A Youth Movement (N=194, 10th Grade Age Levels)

| Activists in one of the Gadna Voluntary Clubs | 18% |
| In a compulsory Gadna School sponsored program only | 43% |
| Not a member of Gadna | 39% |
| **TOTAL** | **100%** |

The children of poverty in Israel are not excluded, but they are under represented in all youth programs. Among the marginal segments of the population, adolescents are often expected to go to work early or, in the case of girls, to help out at home. Others are too undisciplined to feel comfortable in any organized program, where peer group discipline plays an important part. Only 36% of the youths in our area sample of Holon, who were Welfare Department clients, or whose families were on its rolls, reported themselves to be Gadna participants. This numerical

1 The Welfare Department sample included a large number of non-respondents. 47% could not be located. The percentages reported are based on the number who answered each question, about half of the total sample.
impact is less than that of the youth movements which reached 46% of the same Welfare Department sample.

The Welfare Department youths were grossly under-represented in Gadna. The existence of several organizations, each with the aim of instilling national service values does provide a somewhat better coverage than if only one of them were to be functioning. Forty per cent of the 54% of the Welfare Department sample, who "never were in youth movements" reported themselves in Gadna. But while only about 10% in the general sample of adolescents in Holon reported "never having been in Gadna or a youth movement," the proportion of non-involvement was more than twice as great (24%) for the Welfare Department youths who were in a secondary school. The non-involvement ratio of school drop-outs was even greater. Fifty-five per cent of those who at age 16 had not gone beyond elementary schooling or failed to complete it were never enrolled in either Gadna or the youth movements. Both of these programs require youths to accept a great deal of organizational discipline, yet one can also read this finding in reverse. Forty-five per cent of these very hard-to-reach youths reported to have been enrolled in Gadna, a youth movement or both.

The Gadna Youth Corps also had difficulty in reaching orthodox youths. Some of the religious schools, though state financed, refuse to allocate time for Gadna training in their curricula. They give a higher priority to the study of religious subjects. Sixty-one per cent of those never enrolled in the religious B'nei Akiva Youth Movement in Holon, were not in Gadna.
The proportion of non-participants was even higher for girls. Among orthodox families, the belief is widespread that women should be educated exclusively for feminine roles, such as housewives, teachers and nurses. They should stay close to parental control until marriage. Extremely orthodox elements are even unsympathetic to the idea that boys engaged in religious studies do military service. They certainly object to attendance at a Gadna camp where boys and girls mix with no more than the routine controls, maintained in any co-educational setting.

Gadna leaders try to overcome this resistance in orthodox circles by co-optation, through the establishment of an administratively separate religious section. Its Director and all of its youth leaders are orthodox Jews. A special Gadna training center for orthodox youngsters has been established. The usual camp program is supplemented by regular religious services and daily "Shiurim" (Study Groups). No data are available on how much impact this procedure has had on reducing the resistance of Orthodox educators to Gadna, but the officer responsible believes he is "making progress."

There also is an under-representation of orthodox religious youths among the youth-leader trainees. Only 10% of the 1965 sample of 721 Gadna trainees said they were orthodox. Most of them were boys. An additional three per cent, whose parents were not orthodox or traditional, said they were more observant religiously than their parents. This proportion is a measure of how far Gadna has succeeded in reaching the traditional elements of Israel who represent a much larger proportion of
the society. Their under-representation also shows how far Gadna has to go before it is to have a uniform impact on the total population.

Among the activists, the participants who join voluntary after-school programs, girls represent only 13% of the membership. (See Chart on "Sex of Youth Program Activists, Holon 1965.")

Few of the adolescent girls are interested in sharpshooting. A higher ratio of participation by girls is anticipated when Gadna implements a new plan to offer first aid and nursing education through the voluntary clubs. But there are quite a few women Gadna leaders, about 40% of the army instructors and 22% of the Ministry of Gadna Education teachers. Gadna duty is one of the non-combat roles for which women are eligible. The co-educational make-up of Gadna prepares women for such supportive roles and re-enforces the idea that national defense affects everybody. As future mothers, girls should know what will be required of their husbands and sons. Their presence also keeps the program from becoming a male sub-culture, where soldiers' slang might replace ordinary language or where the courtesies of normal social life would be down-graded. While women can claim exemption from military service for religious reasons, the majority take their defense-related responsibilities seriously. There are few "Amazons," however, who care to invest a great deal of their time in a para-military program.

Even with the exceptions noted Gadna reaches a somewhat wider population of adolescents than other programs at an age when youth movements decline in influence. Its impact is high
SEX OF YOUTH PROGRAM ACTIVISTS, HOLON 1965

Youth Movement
N = 127

Gadna Youth Corps
N = 148

Beyond School Activities
N = 203
numerically, but low in meaning, just the opposite of youth movement involvement among older adolescents. Few of those interviewed identified Gadna as a major focus of their interest. For most, it is just an added school course. Gadna is not a program with which students identify deeply. It is not a center of social life or peer group inter-action. Its activities are often perceived as fun and of educational significance, but they are not essential. There can be, and is, disinterest in Gadna. About 40% of the adolescents do not now participate.

In contrast to the American Job Corps, Neighborhood Youth Corps and Peace Corps, which tend to have a socially stratified membership, Gadna tries to reach the educationally disadvantaged. In non-academic post primary programs Gadna instructors conduct programs in evening schools, apprenticeship courses, and institutions for neglected children. They also teach in vocational training courses for socially marginal youths, who are not in school nor in a job. Gadna does not exclude youngsters with minor physical handicaps. There also is a unit in the country's reformatory at Tel Mond.

**Militarism and Education**

Most armies train men to think of battle. They pay less attention to the requirements of peace, the hoped for aftermath of war. The fatalist idea so well expressed by the Prophet Isaya, "Let us eat and drink because tomorrow we must die," competes with the values of civilization-building. Peace as a key objective of national policy is commonly stressed in the Israel defense forces. Gadna programs counteract rather than incite hatred of the enemy. Military roles are stressed as being necessary, but not as primary.
Israel's militia has no militaristic traditions. There is no Prussian type of military elite.\textsuperscript{1} Civilians control national policy. There is discipline in battle or on maneuvers, but officers are taught to lead by persuasion and to rely on cooptation for their power to command. More is expected of Israeli soldiers than obedience. They must think. Developmental technical skills are often utilized. Military habits are a poor preparation for life in a modern society and its demands for productivity. As Hebrew University Professor Ernest Simon points out, "In some armies, one of the preconditions of training for discipline is to get the soldier to accept meaninglessness, he must learn to wait passively until an order is received.\textsuperscript{2}"

After the first thrill of wearing a uniform or holding a gun wears off, adolescent fantasies about the possible glories of military life tend to be corrected by the reality of carrying a heavy pack in the hot sun. It is all too often chastened further by personal confrontation of injury or death of a comrade, or of an enemy soldier. One of the best selling books of the Six-Day War is a compilation of \textit{Fighters Conversations} about the horrible realities of war and the moral dilemmas of soldiers brought up on

\textsuperscript{1}Moshe Ben Shaul, Editor, \textit{Generals of Israel}, Tel Aviv, Hadar Publishing Company, Ltd., 1968.

\textsuperscript{2}Ernest Simon, "Uber Militarische Erziehung", in Erich Fromm, Hans Herzfeld and Kurt P. Grossman, Editors, \textit{The Search for Peace. Festgabe Fur Professor Dr. Adolf Leschnitzer}, Heidelberg, Germany, Verlag Lambert Schneider, 1961: 431. The high morale and effectiveness of the Israel military forces may well be related to its reliance on civilian initiatives.
the idea, "thou shalt not kill."\(^1\)

An educational orientation to youth work can be inferred from the choices made by the Gadna leaders for organizing a discussion program. From a list of twelve topics, including one that was military, the army Gadna leaders made first choices that were similar to those of political youth movement leaders. They gave top priority to the topics, "Should one always tell the truth even if it causes harm?" and "Wildcat Strikes: Their causes and how to prevent them." The military topic included in the listing ranked third. (See attached chart)

Gadna leaders who serve as draftees, on assignment by the Ministry of Defense, give a somewhat higher priority to the educational objectives of Gadna than do those hired as civilian instructors through the Ministry of Education. This inference is further confirmed from their ranking of the three "most important" youth work occupations from a list of six occupations. (See attached table) Army Gadna leaders ranked teaching in a frontier area above being an army officer, in contrast to the ranking of Gadna instructors who were hired as civilians (after army service) by the Ministry of Education. The differences are small, but consistent. But in both groups there are many leaders

\(^1\)Fighters Conversation, a compilation of comments of Kibbutz youths about their personal feelings in the Six-Day War, privately printed by a committee of Kibbutz members, 1968 (In Hebrew - Si-ah L'homeem).
FIRST CHOICE OF YOUTH LEADERS FROM A LIST OF TOPICS FOR INCLUSION IN A DISCUSSION PROGRAM

- **FIRST CHOICE TOPIC**
  - EIGHT OTHER TOPICS
  - HOW TO FIND A PROFESSION
  - EMERGENCE OF THE MILITARY IN ISRAEL, FROM SELF DEFENSE TO PRESENT TIME
  - WILDCAT STRIKES, THEIR CAUSES AND HOW TO PREVENT THEM
  - SHOULD ONE ALWAYS TELL THE TRUTH?

**ARMY GADNA**
- FIRST CHOICE TOPIC: 13
- EIGHT OTHER TOPICS: 4
- HOW TO FIND A PROFESSION: 11
- EMERGENCE OF THE MILITARY IN ISRAEL, FROM SELF DEFENSE TO PRESENT TIME: 25
- WILDCAT STRIKES, THEIR CAUSES AND HOW TO PREVENT THEM: 47

**EDUCATION MINISTRY GADNA**
- FIRST CHOICE TOPIC: 21
- EIGHT OTHER TOPICS: 5
- HOW TO FIND A PROFESSION: 17
- EMERGENCE OF THE MILITARY IN ISRAEL, FROM SELF DEFENSE TO PRESENT TIME: 14
- WILDCAT STRIKES, THEIR CAUSES AND HOW TO PREVENT THEM: 43

**NOAR OVED VELOMED**
- FIRST CHOICE TOPIC: 20
- EIGHT OTHER TOPICS: 3
- HOW TO FIND A PROFESSION: 10
- EMERGENCE OF THE MILITARY IN ISRAEL, FROM SELF DEFENSE TO PRESENT TIME: 20
- WILDCAT STRIKES, THEIR CAUSES AND HOW TO PREVENT THEM: 47

**N = 410**

**N = 536**
who place priority on pioneering and developmental objectives. The Youth Leadership courses, work programs, the Youth Orchestras, the International Bible Quiz, and Gadna's International aid program to emerging countries are more often mentioned as representing the Gadna "spirit" than is the core program of drilling and sharp-shooting.

While Gadna originated as a para-military unit, pioneering values share the limelight with military heroism. The idea of dignity of physical labor is given a good deal of stress. There is a general agreement that no one in Israel should grow up to think that he (or she) "is too good" for hard work. Only a few youths in our Holon sample wanted to make careers in the army -- a proportion equal to those who are thinking of choosing social work. Certainly there were few Spartan youngsters among our sample of 703 Gadna leadership trainees. This is evident by their education oriented responses to two of the forced-choice questions: "Which quality is most necessary for a leader to be successful in his task?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quality</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Courage</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Fitness</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding of child's personality</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talent of speaking and discussing</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Chart on page 9-14, "First Choice by Youth Leaders From a List of Youth Work Occupations" is based on replies to the following question: "Before you is a list of occupations. Please rank the three which you think are most important."

Noar Oved Velomed is Israel's largest Youth Movement, sponsored by the Mapai Labor Party which holds both the portfolios of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Education in the coalition government.
Public Service Orientedness

Young people seem to be more willing to favor an extension of Gadna Youth Corps activities than those who are responsible for making its policies. The majority of youths who are enrolled think that basic Gadna training should be made more compulsory. Only about one in ten think the program should be made entirely voluntary. Activists, who are enrolled in voluntary Gadna programs, do not differ markedly in these attitudes from those whose involvement is restricted to compulsory programs required because they are part of the regular curriculum of many schools. As might be expected, youths who had never been in Gadna were much less interested in it. Many of these non-participants were girls who did not attend school or who were in a religious school where Gadna programs are often rejected by the school authorities. But in general, as shown below, Gadna enjoys considerable youth culture support:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ATTITUDE TOWARDS EXTENSION OF GADNA YOUTH CORPS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HOLON TENTH GRADE LEVEL ADOLESCENTS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Never Participated (N-199)</th>
<th>In required activities only (N-407)</th>
<th>Volunteer activities (N-198)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Youth corps activities should be extended and be made compulsory&quot;</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The present situation should be continued and No answer&quot;</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Gadna Participation should be made voluntary&quot;</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This high degree of youth culture acceptance may be related to the fact that Gadna requires only participation -- not an ideological commitment. This is confirmed by the analysis of the responses to the questions which attempt to differentiate between the more and less idealistic youths. Gadna members did not differ from the total adolescent group in their readiness to join a Kibbutz or in their choice of idealistic responses to attitude questions. Those who were activists (and who joined in voluntary Gadna programs) were more idealistic than those whose participation was restricted to required activities. But neither reached the level of commitment of activists in youth movement.

Non-Partisanship

A governmentally-controlled youth corps can become a propaganda agency to support the existing power elite. This is what happened to the Ghana Workers Brigade under the leadership of Nkrumah. Certainly this is the case of the Komsomol and the Red Guards in China. The Gadna has shown no signs of turning into such a coercive youth-culture control agency. Gadna personnel are recruited on the basis of technical qualifications, including intelligence and interest in education. Lecturers are expected to avoid issues outside the area of national consensus, the widely-shared core-culture values, especially defense conditioning and Jewish renaissance. There is explicit prohibition against political action on the part of the Gadna staff. As shown in the table, "Youth Movement Membership of Gadna Leaders," they belonged to youth movements of varying political orientation:
### YOUTH MOVEMENT MEMBERSHIP OF GADNA LEADERS

*(In Per Cent)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Youth Movement Membership</th>
<th>Army Section of Gadna (N=410)</th>
<th>Education Section of Gadna</th>
<th>Adolescent Youth Leader Trainees (N=679)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Noar Oved, Yelomed (Center (Labor Party))</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td><strong>35%</strong></td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scouts (non-Partisan)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bnei Akiba (National Religious Party)</td>
<td>21<strong>X</strong></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hashomer Hatzair (Left-Socialist)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heitar (Nationalist Opposition Groups)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Youth Movements</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None or No Answer</td>
<td><strong>22</strong></td>
<td>10</td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**X** The over-representation of B’nei Akiba leaders (National Religious Party) in the Army Gadna reflects a deliberate policy. Religious schools have refused to take part in the Youth Corps program unless the instructors are also religious. The Army therefore recruits youngsters acceptable to such schools in large numbers. It even set up a special administrative sub-unit to service these schools, including a separate Gadna Camp.

**XX** The over-representation of Noar Oved Velomed (Labor Party) youths among the Ministry of Education is more difficult to explain. It may reflect the fact that this movement includes many youngsters who did not quite complete the minimum educational requirements for teaching jobs. Also, there may be an element of political influence, since the Ministry of Education has been headed for many years by a member of the Mapai Labor Party.
More Gadna leaders expressed a critical view of Gadna than about the other youth programs in which some of them had been members. The model Gadna youth leader would not seem to be a pliant "organization man." Relatively few rated Gadna as having been a very important influence in their life. (See table below.) More were critical of Gadna than of the other youth programs. (See attached chart "Gadna Leaders Expressing Critical Views About a Youth Program in Which They Had Been a Member." ) At the same time, Gadna leaders were less inclined to designate their own Youth Corps experience as "Very Important." They seem to include a high proportion of personnel, who balance their service with objectivity about the program's limited impact on them and their peers.

PER CENT OF GADNA LEADERS DESIGNATING AS "VERY IMPORTANT" A YOUTH PROGRAM IN WHICH THEY HAD BEEN A MEMBER WHEN YOUNGER. 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Youth Program</th>
<th>Army Section of Gadna</th>
<th>Education Section of Gadna</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gadna (N=348)</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Movement (N=342)</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beyond School Activities (N=107)</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 This table as well as the chart that follows are based on responses to the following type questions, identical in wording, except for the name of the youth program:

"What is your evaluation of Gadna (Youth movements, Beyond School) activities and experiences and their impact on you when you were a member?"

1) Never participated 4) So so
2) Very important 5) Unimportant
3) Important 6) Negative influence

X Coded as "Critical View" in preparing the attached chart "Gadna Leaders Expressing Critical Views About A Youth Program in Which They Had Been a Member."
GADNA LEADERS EXPRESSING CRITICAL VIEWS ABOUT A YOUTH PROGRAM IN WHICH THEY HAD BEEN A MEMBER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Proportion Participating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GADNA</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YOUTH MOVEMENT</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEYOND SCHOOL PROGRAMS</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IN PERCENT

ARMY SECTION

EDUCATION SECTION
Manpower Planning

The military and civilian Gadna leaders conduct identical programs. An assessment of the organizational capabilities of the two branches for doing the same job reveals a number of differences in the respective qualifications of the leaders, their concern for education and their public service perspectives.

Both the Army and Ministry of Education suffer from a high rate of personnel turnover. During their normal tour of duty, Army Gadna leaders are available for little more than a year before their discharge. They tend to be young, with 44% being under 20 years of age and only 1% over 25 years of age. Nearly all of them are single. They are predominantly civilian in outlook. Twenty-five per cent want to be youth workers or teachers. Only one of the youth leaders in our sample wanted to have a military career.

In the Israel Defense Forces, Gadna leaders are selected and assigned from the total manpower reservoir of the country. Selection is on the basis of high personal qualifications and leadership skills. Since such persons are also needed in every branch of the army, many male Gadna leaders tend to be youth with minor health defects disqualifying them for combat duty. Gadna duty is recognized as being important. It provides leaders with an opportunity to gain experiences in working with youths. But most male Gadna leaders would have preferred a combat assignment which has more prestige in the army as well as the youth culture. The attitude tends to be different among girls. For them, Gadna leadership is a choice assignment among the non-combat duties now open to women.
The Army Gadna leaders generally are from middle class and well established families. Ninety per cent of their fathers finished an elementary school, more than twice the proportion of the fathers of Ministry of Education Gadna leaders. One in five Army leaders came from a family who had immigrated from North Africa or an Asian country. This was true of about twice the number of Gadna leaders hired by the Ministry of Education. Fewer of the Ministry of Education Gadna leaders came from the prestigious collective farms (Kibbutzim) than was true of Army Youth Corps leaders. The Army leaders also ranked high in their ideological readiness for Kibbutz life. More than twice as many planned to live in such a settlement (14%) than the Education Ministry leaders (6%).

The Army leaders also had higher vocational aspirations. Nearly twice as many Army leaders (29%) as Ministry of Education instructors (16%) hoped to enter the professions. Over half (55%) of the military Gadna personnel completed a high school or teacher's seminary and passed the matriculation examination, qualifying them for admission to a university. Only a minority of the Ministry of Education Gadna personnel had reached a similar educational level.

The Ministry of Education policies have, in the past, defined Gadna leadership posts as jobs requiring less education than is needed for academic teaching. Gadna teachers in secondary schools, unlike the physical education instructors, require no certification. Gadna salaries are lower than those
for certified teachers. Few of the Gadna instructors completed the minimum training to teach any other high school subject.

In the Ministry of Education, Gadna teaching has low organizational status. Gadna leaders must have military experience as non-commissioned officers. None were under 20 years of age. Sixty-two per cent were between 20 and 24 years, and over a third - (38%) - were over 25 years old. Only 4% had been educated beyond the high school level. They are not in line for promotion to school administrative posts. Such jobs, are, therefore, most likely to appeal to academically poorly prepared persons who want to teach but who cannot meet the requirements. Some are studying at a university to correct their deficiency in training. They see Gadna teaching as a part-time, temporary job to finance their studies. Those who are not studying and who do not intend to qualify for better jobs are more likely to see Gadna as a career, as the best job they can get.

Consideration is being given to upgrade the requirements for Gadna teaching in the Ministry of Education. If this were to occur, it might affect the impact of the programs in the school. But it would cost more money. It would also reduce the upward mobility function of the Ministry of Education Gadna jobs now open to people without credentials for being a regular teacher.

Even now, only a few of the leaders are of lower class origin. While ten per cent of the Army leaders had fathers who did not finish elementary school, this index of lower class
origin applied to 21% of those hired by the Ministry of Education.

Of the adolescent Youth Leadership trainees - a voluntary program for youngsters beginning at age 14-15 - only four per cent were from the clearly lower class segment of the youth population who are already working at that age or who did not report themselves to be in any school. Over half, 57% were attending an academic high school or teacher seminary. Only six per cent of the trainees came from the approximately 50% of Israel's disadvantaged families, with a father who never attended school or had not completed the eighth grade.

This proportion of lower class trainees is regarded as "woefully inadequate" by those identified with Gadna's objectives in social rehabilitation. But for those who are in leadership jobs and trainee courses, Gadna represents an opportunity structure for upward mobility.

Conclusion

Gadna is a youth corps which specializes in para-military training within a context of Israel's pioneering tradition. Its leaders are full time employees, most of them with a youth movement background. In Gadna hikes and work programs there is some degree of overlap with what the youth movements are doing, except that the Youth Corps is non-partisan and demands no intensive commitment from the participants. Adolescent volunteers are utilized as assistant leaders, but they enjoy less of the
peer group autonomy that tends to exist in youth movements. The Gadna program is planned directly by its leaders, but in the enforcement of discipline, peer group solidarity is primarily relied upon. Leaders co-opt rather than command obedience. Only rarely does any youngster have to be sent home from the Gadna for failure to behave within a range of what is acceptable.

By the late 1960's the Gadna Youth Corps had become firmly institutionalized. Its pre-military conditioning and public service experiences have become a part of the educational preparation of a majority of Israeli adolescents. The program is closely linked to high schools as well as the curriculum of part-time courses for adolescents. Within each school, the principal has final administrative power over the program. Only field exercises and outside school Gadna programs are under army auspices.

Few of those who participate in the program view it as having extraordinary significance for their personal development. They accept it as a necessary activity. It is just a specialized program of a few hours a month, plus a way of seeing interesting parts of the country and a way to offer occasional public service. It can be a source of fun and novelty, physical challenge and sight-seeing, but it is not an activity that gives rise to strong emotional identification.

In spite of military sponsorship, the use of uniforms, rifle practice, and use of army installations, the Youth Corps is no militarist lobby. Equally strong expression is given to developmental
values and the idea of self-discipline. Ministry of Education Gadna teachers were slightly more identified with their military functions, but few leaders want to have an army career. Gadna teaching tends to be a temporary job for most of them.

The majority of the leaders and members tend to be more realistic than idealistic in their outlook. They transmit the attitude that defense be taken seriously, but that it be no more than one of many roles citizens may have to be able to perform. Military education is seen as a specialized preparation for life in embattled Israel. Most of the youth leaders wish to keep the program this way. The majority oppose the idea that Gadna take more of the student's time. But they also oppose that it take less time, or become entirely elective. It is rare to find anyone who romanticizes Gadna as a cause around which young people should rally. It is a program to give concrete expression to certain pioneering values and the idea of self-discipline. In this, Gadna has something in common with Outward Bound schools.

1A loose network of programs to help young men (and women) to discover their own abilities. There are five schools in the U.S.A. The students undergo the physical toughening training similar to that required of soldiers in Basic Training. Outward Bound combines the idea of teaching survival skills and rescue techniques with exposure to the idea that man must be able to work hard and confront the forces of nature. Students live primitively in the mountains, on the ocean or in the desert.
Gadna would like to, but cannot now reach many of the lower-class youngsters for whom participation would be an opportunity for better integration in the dominant youth culture. But a proportion are reached. They are primarily those who attend high school and part-time vocational training programs.

In contrast to the American Youth Corps, the Ghana Workers Brigade, or the Kenya Youth Service, the Gadna carries no lower-class stigma. It has youth culture prestige. Members can identify with the Israel Defense Forces, whose uniforms they are allowed to wear. They can discover that physical labor is dignified, not degrading. They become acquainted with middle-class youngsters some of whom are willing to get their hands dirty in the cause of non-military development—help to build a new village, harvest the crops or build a border road.¹

But Gadna is no "big cause" that makes the heart beat faster. It plays a circumscribed part in the strategy of Israeli adult-making agencies to influence the on-going generation to identify with the future of their country.

Professionalized Youth Work

There is a third major organizational framework for youth programming, the Beyond School programs. This designation was selected to call attention to one of their distinguishing characteristics. They are administered through local schools and a Municipal Department of Youth and Sports. Informal education and recreation are primary rather than ancillary objectives.

The programs are not known by any single label. There is only limited planning at the national level. Of the participants, nothing is required other than an interest in a program and a readiness to attend it regularly. It offers enrichment, without requiring a commitment.

The Beyond School programmers are inclined to stress "What can be done for our participants" rather than "What can young people do for the organization?" Many activities offer services which the school cannot yet afford to give part of its regular course offerings. Youth movements or the Gadna sometimes sponsor an amateur skit, which the group decides to put on. But in a drama club of a Beyond School program, the coach is likely to be a drama specialist. He will be interested in the theatre. He is not concerned with infusing a patriotic or political attitude. His first priority is to help youngsters acquire professional understanding of the art.

This "the customer is always right" attribute differs from the organizational expectations of the Gadna Youth Corps and the political youth movements. The latter are more oriented to public service. Military or national goals are given priority over personal needs.
This is not to suggest that the public service element is absent. No youthful peer group program in Israel can remain immune to idealistic values. There is a "Youth to Youth" helping program. It is not based on a political or patriotic ideology. It springs from the more simple and fundamental belief in mutual aid - that young people help those less fortunate through tutoring or visiting of the sick.

Beyond School programs are largely a post-independence development and have grown much in the last decade. Many are conducted in school buildings after school hours. Informal and voluntary youth services can be organized in such facilities with little extra overhead or administrative cost. It is largely a matter of budgeting for overtime pay for some officials, for extra janitorial services, and for the employment of youth leaders. The extension of services by educational agencies to develop leisure-time programs fits the general proclivity of all organizations to expand their jurisdiction.

Other programs take place in neighborhood and community centers, catering to both youths and adults. They are non-political and have much in common with those conducted in community centers in the United States. The Ministry of Education does much to encourage the scheduling of group work and recreational and other extra-curricular activities, especially in development towns, new communities and urban slums in cooperation with local youths and sports departments. There are also a few independent non-profit agencies, like the YMHA and YMCA in Jerusalem and Beth Rothschild in Haifa. But there is no single national administrative structure.
Beyond School activities are consumer oriented. Youngsters can select a few or many activities. Reduction of activity or dropping out is not viewed as letting down a cause. Each activity - be it a sports team or a radio hobby class - stands on its own capacity to keep youngsters interested. Youth leaders are hired primarily on the basis of technical qualifications, such as a skill in radio work, carpentry, sports, or group work. Nearly one half of them thought of youth work as a career. They were planning to remain a paid youth leader for many years, a proportion very much higher than in either the youth movements of Gadna. (See chart "Youth Leader Intentions to Work For Many Years").

Beyond School programs vary considerably. They are not centrally directed as are the Gadna Youth Corps or the youth movements. Nation-wide patterns exist, in good part because of fiscal subsidies from the Ministry of Education and Culture to local authorities. They serve as an incentive to organize such programs as the following:

1. Grade School - After School Clubs (Batei Talmid).

Tutors are hired in some, but not all schools in the afternoon, to supervise youngsters who wish to remain to complete their homework. The tutors also conduct enrichment programs, hikes, rhythmic dances, or drama groups; they sponsor visits to cinema, theaters and concerts, and supervise athletic programs. Nearly one in five of the youngsters in our nation-wide 1963 survey of eighth graders reported
YOUTH LEADER INTENTIONS TO WORK FOR MANY YEARS

- Army: 100%
- Education: 80%
- Municipal Urban: 60%
- Rural Youth Aliyah: 40%
- Noar Oved: 20%
- Bnei Akiva: 10%
- Hashomer Hatzair: 1%
- Scouts: 14%

Beyond School Programs

Gadna

Youth Movements
himself as participating in such an Beyond School program. In
1967-1968, the same proportion was reported to be participating.
Direction is by teachers who work on an overtime basis or part-
time teachers hired especially for this program.

2. High School Social Education (Hinuh Hevrati).

Hobby classes, music current events, sports and other
voluntary activities are conducted in many high schools under
this administrative label. The school sponsors attendance at
theater performances and concerts with the cost of the tickets
subsidized by the Ministry of Education. Internship experiences
for high school seniors in local government offices are occasion-
ally arranged to give practical experience in civic affairs.
Social education programs are a local responsibility. They are
encouraged by a small subsidy fund from the Ministry of Education
of about 300,000 Israeli pounds a year. Local matching funds are
probably ten times as large. The programs are more intensive in
academic than in vocational high schools. The curriculum of the
latter tends to be crowded by technical requirements. Direction
is by part-time specialists or teachers working for extra pay after
their regular hours.

Academic high schools and a few vocational schools have also
organized social work services. Some students give tutorial help
to others who need it. Elderly persons who would otherwise be
left alone may be visited. Students also collect clothing, toys,
and other necessities for persons in need.
School administrators provide administrative encouragement and supervision, but most of the initiative for particular activities of the Youth to Youth programs comes from the students. Some of the leaders are ex-members of youth movements.

3. Community Center Programs: School-centered programs have a ready made "consumer market" among the pupils who are enrolled. They cannot organize school drop-outs or youths from different schools with similar interests. Schools also have physical limitations as the focus of peer group organization. If they are left open at night they have to be cleaned for the arrival of students the next morning. Few school buildings have the proper equipment for hobby programs. More and more extra-curricular, informal education and recreational services are therefore organized in special buildings. Four principal types can be distinguished: Neighborhood Centers (Moadonim), Youth Centers (Batei Noar), Social Clubs (Havuroth Noar), and Technical Clubs.

Neighborhood centers are maintained by voluntary organizations, local governmental units, public housing authorities and the Children's Fund sponsored by the Ministry of Religion. Some are housed in a wooden hut. Often they function with part-time paid youth leaders. Overhead costs are kept low. In the late afternoon the facility is often reserved for youngsters under the age of 14. In the evening, the premises remain open for the older groups. This double programming sometimes leads to conflict and gives rise to demands for more spacious community centers. There has been rashes of arson in such
centers reflecting tensions in areas between different groups in the neighborhood.

Youth Centers (Batei Noar). Community-wide programs of recreation, sports, hobby and informal educational activities can be more conveniently housed in permanent quarters. There were 56 such youth centers Batei Noar in 1965, each with a full-time director and a diversified part-time staff of specialists. The Youth Centers are open to anyone willing to come and, therefore, tend to draw their clients from the entire community. Their number is expanding rapidly in response to a high priority which the Ministry of Education and Culture gives their development. Educational programs have bee organized to train the necessary staff. Salaries are offered to induce a career rather than a transitional job outlook.

Another community program are the Social Clubs (Havuroth Noar). Many youngsters leave youth movements to form informal cliques. The pattern of having a group identity is so pronounced in the Israeli youth culture that many of these friendship circles prefer to function like a club. In the larger cities, the municipality hires youth leaders to approach some of the spontaneous clubs to meet in a Youth Center instead of the street or the beach. Space is furnished free of charge. The only condition is the group's acceptance of a youth leader paid by the Center.
This cooptation program is designed to bring under adult influence more of the peer groups of the lower middle class. In a few cities group workers in slum districts are seeking out social clubs and trying to gain confidence of the members. The worker meets them in the streets and cafe houses and uses group work methods to prevent them from becoming the nucleus of dangerously anti-social gangs.\(^1\)

Included among the community centers are technical clubs. They were introduced under the leadership of Colonel David Wortman in the late 1950's. He had served as a liaison officer for the British Army in Soviet Russia during World War II. There he was impressed with a centrally planned program for encouraging youngsters to pursue technical hobbies.

Participation in these programs, though voluntary, requires a readiness on the part of the youngsters to attend regularly. The curriculum is carefully organized to teach youths about electricity, metal work, the building of model boats, the telephone, radio and other arts and crafts. It is planned for a three-year period with increasing levels of difficulty. Equipment, models, blueprints and other teaching aids are carefully designed for each level of skill. About 5,000 youngsters were enrolled in 25 clubs.

in 1967, most of them located in urban areas. About 25% of the participants are girls. Youngsters work in teams of 12 to 15 under the direction of a technically competent instructor. He need not be an educator. He can be an electrician who enjoys teaching.

Financing is provided from modest private contributions plus grants-in-aid from local authorities. The Ministries of Labor and Education and the National Labor Federation also give subsidies. A central office, directed by a volunteer Board of Directors, helps in establishing new programs. Its Executive provides program consultation, helps locate teachers and sells mass produced hobby equipment at cost. It prepares training manuals and sponsors nation-wide competition among the various clubs.

The Beyond School network of youth services in Israel is even more diversified than suggested by the brief description of its major components. At the lower end of the age range are Mesiboth, meetings arranged by third and fourth graders in some schools. They hold occasional meetings in their homes or organize a class party. Particularly in middle-class areas, these spontaneous groups need little help from teachers and only supportive aid from parents.

The Department of Information of the Prime Minister's office sponsors selected activities for older youths in the large cities. University students are organized and have a national federation of local chapters. Each chapter functions somewhat like a student labor union, negotiating for lower fees, easier examinations,
better employment prospects. The local chapters also publish a university newspaper. They alone, among the youth programs, are autonomous from adults. The university authorities exercise no direct influence.

Taken together, the Beyond School programs in the streets, in community centers and in school buildings are Israel's most rapidly growing network of youth services. They can be viewed as a supplementary education program. Most youngsters start school before eight o'clock in the morning and some get home as early as twelve o'clock noon, especially in the lower grades. Even high school finishes at two o'clock. Quite a few children then come to a home without parents: 30% of the married Jewish women age 18-54 are working.¹

The Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Religion, the Prime Minister's office and the Ministry of Labor and Welfare provide some of the leadership and fiscal subsidies. Each agency aims to influence the emerging youth culture by organizing programs which can command the enthusiasm of young people. Except for the more voluntaristic Youth to Youth activities, the Havuroth Noar cliques and the younger age Mesiboth, a directive strategy is employed. It assumes that experts rather than youth leaders do most of the planning of leisure-time programs on the basis of technical and professional proficiency.

Participation Patterns

The diversity of program content, fiscal sponsorship and location is considerable. No simple analytic scheme can adequately guide the analysis of how youngsters participate in Beyond School programs. For purposes of estimating their relationship to the different adult-making institutions which aim to influence the youth culture, the following classification scheme was adopted.

1. Elementary School activists. 14% of the Holon area tenth grade sample reported no other Beyond School program participation. They were not enrolled in a community center or High School program but conducted in their elementary school. Nearly all of them liked other youth programs. Only 4% reported never to have been in a youth movement, a sports club of the Gadna youth corps.

2. High School activists. They accounted for 25% of the Holon sample population since high school is elective and attendance is limited to academically qualified students. This category tends to include a high proportion of good students and youths from middle class homes. They tend to try out many organized peer group programs. Only one per cent had never enrolled in another youth program.

3. Community-centered activists. Twenty-three per cent attended programs in special buildings, where there is no restrictions to participation on the basis of school attendance. Thirty-five per cent came from families of Arro-Asian origin as against 23% of the high school activists. Membership rolls in the community-centered programs are not inflated by pro-forma participation of those mostly middle class youths, who passively "fall in"
with school peers by enrolling in a conveniently located and well staffed leisure time program.

Community-centered programs reach farther down the social scale than the school-centered programs. More than twice as many members in community centers were thinking of a technical career than were the youths in high school-centered programs; 37% of those enrolled in community centers were ambitious to enter professions or wanted to do youth work, in contrast to over half of the youths in high school Beyond School programs.

4. The non-joiners. Those not in any Beyond School program, were 38% of the Holon sample. As shown on the attached chart (Father's Birthplace of Participants of Extra-curricular Education Programs in Holon), this category included the largest proportion of children of Afro-Asian parentage. The non-joiners in Beyond School programs also were otherwise disinterested in organized social activities. Only three per cent reported themselves participating in one of the major youth programs, the Gadna or the youth movements.

The non-joiners also were somewhat more often school drop-outs than the joiners. Fifteen per cent did not answer the question about their current school enrollment, a proportion more than twice as high as the entire sample. One in five of the non-joiners were "working-not studying," as against only 15% in the sample as a whole. But it should be noted that half of the non-joiners were attending a high school of an academic or technical nature. Being disinterested in Beyond School programs was not restricted to marginal students.
or school drop-outs. It was just more likely to occur among those who were under-achieving in formal schooling.

Growth Potential

The Beyond School programs are the most flexible of the three major youth frameworks. Participation is possible without an ideological commitment, as in a youth movement. Youngsters can be active in a community center without being in a school which is now necessary to be enrolled in the Gadna. Expansion of Beyond School programs, especially in slum sections and immigrant areas, is possible by providing whatever may be of most interest to the youngsters, be it sports, informal games or hobbies.

As was already indicated, the disadvantaged among Israel's youths are touched by youth movements and by Gadna, but activism is much lower than that of adolescents whose families have attained middle class status. This discrepancy is least true for the Beyond School programs. This was demonstrated by a special survey made of a sample of adolescents whose families are known to the Ministry of Social Welfare because they receive some of its services due to such factors as unemployment, absence of a wage earner, presence of a mentally defective child, or severely ill person or a delinquent. The welfare roll youngsters were less involved than the general population, but the difference was least pronounced for the Beyond School programs. While 62% of the general Holon area sample reported they participated in them, so did 45% of the welfare sample youngsters.
Coverage of the population is lowest at younger age groups. In the nation-wide survey of eighth graders, most of them fourteen years old, only 44% reported themselves to have been active in a Beyond School program at some time.\(^1\)

The majority of the Beyond School programs also reported involvement in other organized group activities. But a noteworthy 11% minority took part in no other organized youth program. This group included three-fifths of those who reported no participation in Gadna or in youth movements. Disadvantaged youngsters were over-represented in this group. Sixty per cent were doing very poorly in school. They had/standard scores (below 67) in the eighth grade examination. Fifty-seven per cent came from a family where the father had been born in Africa or Asia. Youngsters active exclusively in Beyond School programs located in elementary schools included a much higher proportion from crowded homes (62%) than those active in a youth movement (33%). The Beyond School programs, therefore, reach a key target category: The majority of the otherwise unorganized.

The Beyond School programs exceed the Gadna Youth Corps and the youth movements in attracting lower class youths on a voluntary basis. (See Chart on "Father's Country of Origin of Youth Program Activists, Holon 1953") The children of recent immigrants, who do not learn Hebrew at home, those from Afro-Asian families and those who under-achieve in school are more active voluntarily in the .

\(^1\) Fewer programs are open to youths just completing grade school than to those of high school age. Also between 1963 and 1965, when the Holon area survey was made and 62% were found to be enrolled, Beyond School programs were expanded.
FATHER'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN OF
YOUTH PROGRAM ACTIVISTS, HOLON 1965

Youth Movement
N = 127

Gadna Youth Corps
N = 148

Beyond School Activities
N = 203

- Asia, Africa
- Europe, America
- South Africa
- Israel

Percent
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
highly adult controlled Beyond School programs than in the more autonomous youth movements. (See table on "Comparison of Youth Programs For Their Capacity to Attract Disadvantaged Youths In Holon, Tenth Graders, 1965")

Comparison of Youth Programs for their Capacity to Attract Disadvantaged Youths, Holon Tenth Graders, 1965 In Per Cent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Community Centered Programs (N=142)</th>
<th>Volunteer Youth, Corps¹ Activities (N=125)</th>
<th>Still Active in Youth Movements² (N=127)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Hebrew spoken in home</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father Born in Afro-Asian Land</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failed 8th Grade Comprehensive Examination (Sekker)</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The latter require less conformity but make heavy demands upon their members for idealistic commitments. Youth movement leaders are predominantly of the volunteer type. They do not seem to be able to reach out to the under-privileged as much as the more professional, and more often, full-time paid youth workers. This is in spite of the ideological expectation of socialist youth that they reach the working classes.

¹ Not currently active in a Youth Movement; some of them were also in a Beyond School program.

² Some were also active in a Beyond School program or the Gadna.
Impact Data

Skeptics of education through autonomous peer groups theorize that there will be an over-emphasis on peer-group loyalties. This would lead to the development of excessive cliques, based on social or ideological considerations, at a time when young people should explore their world with an open mind.

This danger does not seem to materialize. There is a great deal of multiple participation. No single youth program is meeting all the needs of young people for structured leisure time. The percentage of the Holon tenth-grade adolescents, who had joined at least one major program at some time, was 95%. But half of those belonged to all three, a youth movement, the Gadna and one or more Beyond School programs. Membership in one was correlated with participation in all the others, although youngsters were not necessarily active in all of them at the same time. The different adult-managed programs are not competitive. This is not to suggest that they could be expanded indefinitely. The amount of leisure time is limited.

The readiness for multiple participation was as great among the political as among the non-political groups. Two-thirds of the youth active in the radical socialist Hashomer Hatzair and Dror youth movements also reported to be in one or more Beyond School programs. Members of the less socialist Noar Oved Velomed movement were even more active. Only one in four reported no participation in extra-curricular programs. Youngsters who had never been in a youth movement had a non-participation rate that was nearly twice as great (48%). Youth movement members are not anti-establishment as Micha Chen concludes on the basis of a more extensive analysis.
of these data: Youth movements "even when they advocate a radical ideology do not lead to a reduction of social contacts." ¹

**Beyond School Program Participation of Tenth Grade Holon Youths by Youth Movement Affiliation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Beyond School School Participation</th>
<th>Socialist Hashomer Hatzair &amp; Dror Activists<em>N=53</em></th>
<th>Labor Party Noar Oved Velomed Activists<em>N=53</em></th>
<th>Never a Member in any Youth Movement<em>N=200</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None reported</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Elementary School Programs</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In High School Programs</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Community Programs</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Active member only. Ex-members of these youth movements who had resigned when our survey was made were excluded.

¹Micha Chen, *Educational Concomitants of Adolescent Participation in Israeli Youth Organizations*, University of Pittsburgh, A dissertation submitted to the Graduate School of Education in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, 1967: 123
Like all other organized youth services, the Beyond School programs were somewhat more successful in reaching those who felt positively identified with their country and aware of what could be needed to enable it to survive. This is apparent from the analysis of preferences expressed by youngsters about where they would like to live permanently. Only 8% of the uninvolved as against 14% of those active in a community-centered program said they wanted to live in a Kibbutz, a development town or a rural community. (See Table on "Where Holon Beyond School Program Participants Hope to Live Permanently.") The uninvolved also were over-represented among those who expected to be exempt

WHERE HOLON BEYOND SCHOOL PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS HOPE TO LIVE PERMANENTLY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Where I want to Live Permanently</th>
<th>Never Participated (N=335)</th>
<th>Elementary School Sponsored (N=121)</th>
<th>High School Sponsored (N=219)</th>
<th>Community Centered Programs (N=203)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In Holon (N=362)</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In a Kibbutz or Development Area (N=95)</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other choices (N=421)</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
from military service for religious or health reasons. Fewer expected to volunteer in the Nahal Pioneer Corps, the Air Force, or the parachute corps. One-third of the entirely uninvolved answered their questionnaire without a single idealistic reply, a proportion twice as high as youths enrolled in community centered, Beyond School programs.

The youth programs share with other adult-making institutions the objective of encouraging a patriotic identification. The Israeli society seems to succeed considerably in reaching this objective. Few youths expressed cynicism about the Israeli goal of being an open society. Only 15 of 878 respondents thought there is ethnic discrimination. Around election time, much is said by some opposition parties about the allegedly discriminatory policies of the government towards new immigrants and against Jews of Afro-Asian origin, who occupy few leadership posts. Their ranks include a high proportion of persons with a low income and little education. But only a minority of children viewed this reality as a barrier to upward mobility. In answering the question, "Who can advance and succeed in the State of Israel?", very few checked as their reply: Being an "European" (Ashkenazi), or being an "old-timer." (Vatik).¹

1

1 people with luck
professionals
children of the "Vatikim"
educated people
members of wealthy families

--- hard workers
people who have "pull"
members of the Ashkenazi Community

--- strong willed people
A larger group of all Israeli youths, nearly 12%, thought that advancement is related to economic and social advantages. They checked "Having pull" (Protektia) or "Coming from a wealthy family," as the most important reason for success in Israel. Uninvolved youths, those never enrolled in any Beyond School program, were over-represented among those who explained success in terms of having "Pull."

But the largest proportion of all respondents thought the Israeli social system is an open opportunity structure. Over half (53%) checked "Education," "Having a profession" or "Being an industrious worker" as their primary explanation of social mobility. Another 18% checked being "strong willed." (See footnote, p. 20)

Israel does not now have a revolutionary climate. The "establishment" is strongly oriented towards welfare. Much is being done by the government, the Histadruth Labor Federation and the Jewish Agency to integrate newcomers. Some will criticize that the pace is too slow. Many think the programs could be more effective. But most of the young people now growing up are willing to be identified with publicly sponsored enrichment programs. Even the under-privileged include a fair proportion who attend Community Centers and other Beyond School programs during their leisure time. Except for a small proportion who keep the police busy, Israeli youths are not roaming the streets without identification with the larger social system. They are not "dropping out."
Conclusion

Schools have carefully defined and crowded curricula. The three "R's" (reading, writing and arithmetic) are stressed plus cultural subjects. Hobbies, personal interests, sports and other "luxury" topics cannot find much room within the regular course requirements. The Beyond School programs try to provide for some of these special interests. They cater to hobbies, the arts and the mind, from soccer teams to running an amateur radio station. Many are administered by school officials. Full-time leaders are recruited, trained and certified nationally. Beyond School programs represent the most highly professionalized segment of the network of Israeli youth organizations. Some of the planning is done by the Ministry of Education officials, but there is no co-ordinated program or central control of policy. There is room for local innovation.

Neither Gadna nor the youth movements are primarily concerned with education. Both have service oriented missions. The personal needs and interests of the members are of secondary importance. Beyond School programs are more consumer oriented. They are publicly organized to provide enrichment education.

The Beyond School programs reach over three fifths of their target population in middle adolescence and somewhat less than half of those during the earlier years. The highest probability of participants is among those who are also in a youth movement. Members of these relatively autonomous peer group programs find no conflict in taking part in the much more adult directed Beyond School activities.
Eleven per cent of the participants in the Beyond School program were working or studying in a vocational, commercial, nursing or part-time post-primary school. One fourth were born in an Afro-Asian country. They are relatively successful in attracting the children of the under-privileged "other Israel" (newcomers). But they fall short, though less than other youth programs, in being able to attract all of the children of the poor, the uneducated and the immigrants from Afro-Asian lands.

They place priority on youth centered education rather than public service. But the pervasive interest in idealistic causes among a minority of Israeli youths also finds expression in the Beyond School services network, even without explicit organizational encouragement.

The Beyond School programs have a strong potential for organizational expansion. They are less costly than schools. Financing comes from local authorities, the central Government as well as voluntary groups. There is still a shortage of high school and technical education programs at the post-primary level. Leisure time programs fill this void, to some extent. The programs can utilize part-time sports leaders, teachers, musicians, dance teachers, artisans and other hobby specialists. They also are more able to offer a career possibility to professional youth leaders than the other peer-group agencies. This gives them an organizational capacity for long range planning and the resources for implementation of such plans.
XI

THE HARD-TO-REACH
The Welfare Challenge

In Israel, the territorial therapy theory was applied on a large scale. After the establishment of the state, 1,290,000 refugees came, who could not continue to live decently in the lands of their birth. Many more arrived earlier and helped found the state.

Before World War II the manpower influx was primarily development oriented. Many of the immigrants came after a period of Hasbarath, technical study in nation-building skills and/or with investment capital. Skilled adults, persons with capital, unattached adolescents or members of Chalutz-oriented youth movements were favored by the immigration policy of both the British Government and the Jewish Agency.

A high proportion of them were strongly identified with Zionist and Socialist ideals. They generally suffered from only one social handicap: they were Jews in an environment where this status led to discrimination and worse. They felt outcast socially, but not necessarily personally disadvantaged. Indeed, among the pre-World War settlers in Israel was included a disproportionate number of highly gifted and technically skilled persons. Pre-independence Israel was oversupplied with physicians, writers, poets, engineers, lawyers and other professionals.

This positive manpower selection policy had to be modified during World War II. All of Europe's Jews faced death. Migration could no longer be planful. Any Jew who could find a way to reach

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1Report of the Jewish Agency To The 70th Zionist Congress, Jerusalem, June 1968.
Palestine, even without permission of the British Government, was welcomed by the Jewish community. Selective immigration ended completely after Israel attained statehood. Total Jewish communities were evacuated from Arab countries. Many of them had lived there under primitive conditions; some showed the scars of having lived in a low-caste status for many generations. No one was excluded from the right to "return to Zion." The poor, the blind, and the sick generally were sent out first. Many youths came too late to fit well into the country's educational system. The result: The illiteracy rate of Jewish persons over 14 years of age doubled from 6% in 1948 to 12% in 1961. Even in 1963 when educational conditions had made great strides, 43% of the boys and 50% of the girls scored very low on their eighth grade qualifying examination. About 10 per cent of the youths cannot meet eighth grade minimum standards when examined for entry into the army. Most of them are culturally deprived. Only 2 out of 5 have a low level intelligence to help explain their academic deficit. Delinquency and crime had been minor problems during the pre-World War II era. But in 1966 there were 10,588 children in need of probation services.¹

A large proportion of these immigrants have struck personal and economic roots. But for a variety of reasons, one in ten families in Israel is in need of welfare assistance. Most of them live in slums. The majority are from families of Afro-Asian origin. Over 70% of Israel's Jewish children in the 1970's will be from non-western families who were reared in a traditional

¹Statement in the Knesseth (parliament) by Welfare Minister Yosef Burg, February 7, 1968.
culture and can give, at best, very limited guidance to the children in finding their way in a rapidly modernizing country.

Israelis openly discuss the question: will our land become a Levantine state controlled by the power of those not yet ready to live in a modern state? Or will the "other Israel" be acculturated to the twentieth century traditions of the early settlers? Can our land continue to have the highest volume of book publishing and newspaper readership in the world? Or will our nearly quarter million\(^1\) illiterate voters gain more influence?

Israel is experiencing the limitations of the Zionist theory that territorial therapy can cure the ills of persecuted Jews. Migration from a politically unstable or even untenable situation to a land where Jews can live by right rather than sufferance does make a difference. Not many of the welfare clients in Israel would like to return to their country of origin. But there are those who brought or newly acquired problems that made them into clients in need of education, medical, casework and other types of personal intervention.

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\(^1\) Ministry of Education and Culture. Israel, School Comes to Adults, Jerusalem, Israel, Government Printer 1965: 10. (A report prepared for the World Congress of Ministers of Education on the Eradication of Illiteracy in Teheran). At the start of the adult campaign there were 226,000 illiterates, Arabs and Jews. All are entitled to vote.

These statistics do not include the Arab population of the areas administered by Israel since the Six-Day War.
The Uninvolved

Among Israel's institutions to facilitate absorption of the immigrants are the youth programs. They are a control point for planned intervention to transform "Israel the refuge" into a viable nation. They reach over ninety per cent of their target population, but there is a disinterested population segment. About five per cent of the tenth graders in Holon reported no participation in any of them. In a country with several well-organized peer group programs, non-participation cannot be casual or accidental. It reflects a deliberate policy on the part of the youngster and/or his parents. Repeated invitations for joining must be resisted. This population segment will be referred to as the uninvolved or hard to reach.

Not all of them are poor and disadvantaged. Some are chronically ill, mentally retarded, unusually introverted or isolated in homes where parents actively oppose participation of their children in an organized extra-curricular program.

But the majority of these organizationally non-involved adolescents are the children of poor and uneducated parents. Non-organized youths are over-represented among the approximately 12% who drop out of school before the eighth grade in a country where education is compulsory and highly valued. Only 22% of the non-joiners in youth programs were in an academic high school. Very few were bent on achieving much academically. Many did not know what they were going to do in the future, work or go to school.
The lower class relatedness of organizational non-involvement in youth organizations is also confirmed when non-involvement is defined in more social-psychological terms. The adolescents in our Holon area sample, who described themselves as social isolates, were much more deprived and socially marginal than those who thought that they were "ordinary members" of their peer groups, not to speak of those who designated themselves as leaders when replying to the question: "What is your status among your friends?"

As shown in the attached table, the social isolates, a mere 3% of the tenth grade level adolescents, came predominantly from families of lower socio-economic standing.

They were substandard in school achievement and had low vocational aspirations. A fairly high proportion were organizationally uninvolved in youth movements, but more of them did relate themselves to the more professionally directed Beyond School programs.

Social stratification is universal. Classes and castes develop often on the basis of century-long generational transmission of privileges or disadvantages. Not so in Israel. Its status system was recently "imported." Its class disparities are not "home-made" and are ideologically inconsistent with both the Zionist and Socialists' theories. But they exist, nevertheless.

The uneveness of this heritage is colossal. Most immigrants from Europe had schooling and marketable skills; those from Asia and Africa often had neither. This discrepancy has consequences that are transmitted to the next generation. Boys whose fathers came from an under-developed country had three times more failure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Leaders (N=124)</th>
<th>Ordinary Members (N=655)</th>
<th>Social Isolates (N=21)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio-Economic Status</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crowded living quarters (Four or more persons per room)</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father born in Afro-Asian country</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low socio-economic scale</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father had only elementary school or less education</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aspiration Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plans to work now full or part time</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not think he can achieve his goal</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Achievement Index</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Sekker Score (67 or Less)</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All friends are of the same sex</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Youth Program Participation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never belonged to a youth movement</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never in a Beyond School program</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Service Orientation Index</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thinks he will not serve in army for religious or health reasons</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
scores in eighth grade and only about one third the proportion of passing scores of those who were born into families from developed countries. For girls from Afro-Asian families the differences were even more pronounced in contrast to families from developed countries. Their girls tend to outperform boys academically.

The cumulative impact of the existing differences in environmental supports for education stand out glaringly when Israeli youths are drafted into the army. One finds in Israel many of the gross variations reported in the United States armed forces\(^1\) between ethnic groups in the proportion of their children who can meet requirements for officers training, or who serve in technical units.

**FORMAL EDUCATION OF MALE SOLDIERS IN ISRAEL, 1960-61**

**BY AREA OF ORIGIN OF FATHERS**\(^2\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highest Level of Education</th>
<th>Afro-Asian Country</th>
<th>Occidental Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seven years or less</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed Primary Grades</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial Secondary School Attendance</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed High School (12 years or more)</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---


(2) Adapted from Mordechai Bar-On, Educational Processes in Israel Defense Forces, Tel Aviv, Israel, 1966: 14. The percentages in the original source do not add up to 100%. 
If these ethnic and cultural differences were to be perpetuated for a generation, Israel might well become a land divided against itself, like so many countries where a privileged few command power over a disadvantaged many. One can today find instances of political agitation in Israel in which those with status are accused of being responsible for the inequalities that immigrants have brought with them. But in all public services, the youth organizations included, there is much concern with the bridging of East and West. The merger of Europeans with Afro-Asian people, many with dark skins, is one of the most challenging aspects of the Zionist effort. Special school programs exist for the disadvantaged. Youth programs play a key role in this strategy for reaching the children of those who are poverty stricken. There is widespread satisfaction in the fact that inter-marriage between these two components of Israel is rising.¹

The Lower Classes are Less Organization Minded

No youth program excludes the lower classes. All make an effort, and all succeed to a degree, in reaching "the hard-to-reach." But as shown in the chart of "Non-participation in Youth*

¹The exogamy index which measures inter-marriage rose from .19 to .30 between 1955 and 1965. This means that three out of ten marriages in 1965 involved a union of children of a Euro-American with an Afro-Asian family. See Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel, Table C/12 "Persons Marrying, By Bride's and Groom's Continent of Birth," Jerusalem, No. 18, 1967: 61. Brides and Grooms born in Israel were classified on the basis of the ethnic derivation of their parents.
NON-PARTICIPATION IN YOUTH PROGRAMS
ADOLESCENTS IN HOLON, 1965
(IN PERCENT)

WELFARE POPULATION

- NOT IN BEYOND SCHOOL ACTIVITIES: 45%
- NOT IN YOUTH MOVEMENT: 53%
- NOT IN GADNA YOUTH CORPS: 60%
- NOT IN SPORTS CLUBS: 83%

TOTAL POPULATION

- NOT IN BEYOND SCHOOL ACTIVITIES: 32%
- NOT IN YOUTH MOVEMENT: 24%
- NOT IN GADNA YOUTH CORPS: 25%
- NOT IN SPORTS CLUBS: 76%

PROPORTION WHO ARE:
WORKING, LOOKING FOR WORK, OR NOT STUDYING

WELFARE POPULATION

- WORKING, LOOKING FOR WORK, OR NOT STUDYING: 30%

TOTAL POPULATION

- WORKING, LOOKING FOR WORK, OR NOT STUDYING: 15%
Programs" the children from the less advantaged segment of the community were over-represented. The highest intensity of coverage is in the Beyond School programs which reach more of the welfare population than all of the others.

School drop-out youth, even more than those who attend only evening classes, constitute a special challenge. Five per cent of the working youths in our sample who were not studying, were active members of youth movements. In contrast, of those enrolled in a high school, 21% were active members. Similarly, children whose fathers never attended school were more often non-joiners and much less often youth movement activists than those whose fathers had some education. (See Chart, "Youth Organization Participation of Holon Adolescents in 1965 By Fathers Education." In all societies, there is a tendency for class differences to be transmitted from generation to generation. The youth services of Israel represent one of several attempts to counteract this tendency.

Non-participants in the country's extensive network of youth services is related to a variety of other indices of under-achievement and low status. A disproportionate number (69%) of the totally uninvolved are girls. Even if the reluctance of traditionalist parents to let adolescent girls participate in peer group programs is taken into account, the conclusion is plausible that lower class youths suffer from insufficiencies in communication skills, lack of self-confidence, under-achievement in education or the necessity of helping at home. These conclusions can be inferred from the following data.
YOUTH ORGANIZATION

PARTICIPATION OF ADOLESCENTS IN 1965 BY FATHER'S EDUCATION

- **Non Joiners**
  - No School: 20
  - Elementary School: 53
  - Some High School: 47
  - Higher Education: 46
  - N = 20

- **Volunteer Participants**
  - No School: 14
  - Elementary School: 51
  - Some High School: 31
  - Higher Education: 39
  - N = 347

- **Passive Participants**
  - No School: 2
  - Elementary School: 7
  - Some High School: 17
  - Higher Education: 11
  - N = 368

- **Youth Movement Activists**
  - No School: 2
  - Elementary School: 7
  - Some High School: 17
  - Higher Education: 11
  - N = 89
Achievement-Related Characteristics of Tenth Grade Adolescents and Their Relationship to Youth Organization Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Uninvolved ** (N=49)</th>
<th>Only in Beyond School Program (N=141)</th>
<th>Only in Youth Movement (N=83)</th>
<th>Active in All Three Programs (N=44)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eighth Grade Failure Score Below 69 Percentile*</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth Grade Success Score, 80 Percentile or Above*</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Amiability Index</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youths Much Older Than Their Class (18 years or Older)</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Scores of the nationwide Sekker examination, administered in the eighth grade.

**Belonged to none of the major youth programs, but five reported membership in a sports club.

Few will doubt the prediction that those untouched by the youth program will later be among those who will be socially and economically disadvantaged. It is one of a web of inter-related symptoms of being unable to achieve in terms of prevailing social expectations. No amount of voluntaristic organizational effort can reach all adolescents, especially those of lower class origin whose families are not well integrated in the on-going social system. Quite a few are active, nevertheless, if one considers the fact that many of the children of families in Welfare Department sample cannot take part in organized peer groups because they are chronically or mentally ill, retarded.
or otherwise severely handicapped. The "hard-to-reach" population who are not in school rank highest in the proportion who are unorganized (57%). Those in school are being reached in larger numbers by the organized youth programs; 75% were in a youth movement and in the Gadna Youth Corps. Sixty-three per cent reported having been active in a Beyond School Program and 17% were in a sports club. Even among those not in school, 43% are in some youth program and a noteworthy minority, 25% of those responding to our questionnaire reported having been in both Gadna and the Youth movements.

Youth Program Participation of Holon Adolescents Known To The Department of Welfare. By School Attendance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Youth Organization Participation</th>
<th>Not In School</th>
<th>In School</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In No Programs (N=58)</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Beyond School Programs Only (N=41)</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Movements Only** (N=63)</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gadna Only** (N=34)</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Both Youth Movements and Gadna* (N=53)</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*There were 265 non-respondents to this question in the total of 514 adolescents in our sample of families known to the welfare department in Holon.

** Some are also enrolled in Beyond School Programs

Mass frustration is likely to arise when the channels of upward mobility are blocked by regulations or by customs which are regarded as inequitable. The Israeli Government does much to avoid such reactions, and even to resorting to discrimination-in-reverse. Being in the highest 20% of those taking the examination, a score of 80 (Norm A) is usually required to qualify for High School scholarship aid on the basis of the nation-wide Sekker eighth-grade screening test. Children with parents from Islamic countries, however, will be accepted if their score is 70. The importance of the policy is indicated by the fact that in 1961 two thirds of the children of Afro-Asian families who reached high school did so through preferential treatment because of the existence of a "Norm B" entry route.

Even with this added help, among those finishing the fourth year of high school in 1964 only 13% were of Afro-Asian origin, although they represented 40% of the relevant age group. At the university level, only about 5% of all students came from these "new Israel" families from the emerging countries. The "Norm B" can open up a channel of educational mobility. But it is not able to equalize the underlying inequality in cultural conditioning and parental support between the children of the European and Afro-Asian origin. Preferential examination scoring to permit entrance

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1 Joseph W. Eaton and Neil Gilbert. "Racial Discrimination and Diagnostic Differentiation" National Association of Social Workers, Proceedings of Workshop on Race Relations, August 1967, publication pending. This study deals with this strategy in some detail.
into high schools does not guarantee graduation. Those who qualified on the basis of "Norm A" were more than 3½ times more likely to graduate than those who had been admitted on a "Norm B" basis.¹

### Follow-Up Study of Eighth Graders Who Passed The 1957 Sekker Screening Test ²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Norm A (Scores of 80 or more)</th>
<th>Norm B (Score 70-79)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per cent entering an academic high school</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per cent completing high school of those who entered</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per cent earning matriculation certificate of those who entered</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The class lines in Israel are fluid. Social integration is more than just a slogan. Young people who grow up in disadvantage families are not excluded from youth programs. But their children appear to be less responsive to the country's pioneering values. Few of the uninvolved made idealistic choices in their attitude questions. This is evident if comparisons are made of the idealism scores of activists in each of the youth programs.

¹The Jerusalem Post, September 29, 1968: 6 reports that the armed forces adopted a special program for soldiers from Afro-Asian families to facilitate their attendance "special preparatory courses" to enter a university after completing their period of national service. In 1968, this scheme was extended to cover also young persons from slum areas, immigrant settlements and development towns. However, the scheme is restricted to students who come close to meeting the stringent requirements for university admission.

²Aryeh Rubinstein. "Norm B Trebles the Chance of High School for Deprived Child," Jerusalem Post, December 9, 1965: 5. No actual frequencies were given in the report cited.
Respondents Making Zero Idealistic Statements
In the Holon Adolescent Survey, 1965
(In Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Total (N=49)</th>
<th>Beyond School (N=142)</th>
<th>Youth Movement (N=125)</th>
<th>All Three Programs (N=127)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Centered Beyond School programs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary Gadna activity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth movement activists</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The differences are relative, not absolute. Even among the organizationally uninvolved, 17% wanted to join the national service oriented Nahal Pioneer Corps and 5% expressed the hope of joining a Kibbutz as shown below:

Idealistic Attitudes of Holon Adolescents and Their Relationship to Youth Organization Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Totally Uninvolved*</th>
<th>Only in Beyond School Program</th>
<th>Only in Youth Movement</th>
<th>Active in All Three Programs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Idealism Score</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hope to join Kibbutz</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expects Army Deferment</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wants Air Force or Parachute Service</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>18%*</td>
<td>37%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wants Nahal Pioneer Service</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>56%*</td>
<td>36%*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The organizationally uninvolved were not only more detached ideologically, but they also felt less self-confident. Nearly one in five of the unorganized declined to make a self-estimate of peer status, as against less than three per cent of those who were enrolled in Beyond School programs and even fewer among the youth movement members. Only ten per cent of those who answered thought that leadership had status among their friends and that their opinion was being respected. This finding must be contrasted with leadership of youth movements prefer that activists volunteer for Nahal service rather than any other branch.
self-estimated by 17% of those youths who enrolled in a community
centered Beyond School program, 29% who joined a youth movement
before the age of 11 or 34% who lived in a Kibbutz.

Manpower Priorities

In many public service fields, the most difficult cases are
assigned to the least qualified. In the field of education, the most
highly trained teachers are hired by universities, where there also
are the most motivated students. Rural schools, where children often
lack motivation for serious study, are likely to have an untrained
teacher. In psychiatry, the most qualified physicians tend to enter
private practice. The sickest and poorest patients have to go to
a public mental hospital or a prison. Top-flight professionals
are not likely to be available to them there.

No such simple inverse relationship of the level of qualification
and difficulty of the job is to be found in Israel youth work.
Leaders with a career commitment, who work for full time wages,
were highly likely to be working with groups in which Afro-Asian
youths represent over 80% of the membership (See chart "Who Gets
the Career Youth Leader"). Full time and more career minded leaders
are not necessarily technically superior in their impact on youths
than are the less career oriented youth leaders who may be working
temporarily on assignments made by a Kibbutz or their political
party. But if one assumed that the allocation of personnel with
a long range career objective reflects deliberate organizational
priorities, the tendency of Israeli programs to assign the most
professional of their youth leaders to the "hard-to-reach" suggests
WHO GETS THE CAREER YOUTH LEADERS?

PERCENTAGE OF AFRO-ASIAN YOUTH IN GROUPS

- LESS THAN 10%
- 10 - 79%
- OVER 80%

CAREER COMMITMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>MANY YRS.</th>
<th>FEW YRS.</th>
<th>ONLY SHORT TIME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N=493</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=593</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=538</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the degree to which youth programs are thought to be important in the country's strategy for reaching the difficult segments of the population.

The most active among the youth movements in the endeavors to reach the "hard-to-reach" is the Noar Oved Velomed movement of middle class Labor Party. With financial help from the Labor Federation and the Mapai Party, over 200 full-time youth workers are employed. Nearly one third (31%) were seven or more years older than their members. This cadre of paid leaders represents definite evidence of emerging professionalization. Fifteen percent had not even been members of the movement when they were young.

There is a preference for hiring paid leaders who have completed high school, but many of the jobs have to be filled with those who did not. Special efforts are made to select those with a capacity to relate meaningfully to lower-class youngsters. But the volunteers still tend to be better educated than the paid professionals. On the other hand, volunteers usually can invest only a limited amount of their energy in youth work. Some are unable to reach out to youths with a cultural background, different from their own. Also over three fifths of the unpaid volunteers and Kibbutz leaders were unsupervised. Full-time, part-time and army youth leaders, who were most often working with youngsters whose parents came from the under-developed countries, were given more on supervision and administrative support than their youth leaders.
The very intensively staffed and somewhat better supervised street club worker programs also address themselves to this "hard-to-reach" segment of the population. Patterned on the programs and using methods developed in the United States, these programs go beyond efforts to contain social and delinquent actions. As much as possible, youngsters are encouraged to become an integral part in a youth service. In a small scale experiment in a suburban slum near Tel Aviv, a youth leader seminar was conducted for adolescents from disadvantaged families. A young instructor assigned by the Ministry of Education was able to attract 25 teenagers who had dropped out of school. He could hold out the prospect of employment as indigenous youth worker in the Municipal Youth Department after trainees completing their studies. This incentive proved strong enough to "change their attitude to their surroundings." 

Conclusion

Territorial therapy can provide a geographic framework for resolving intergroup problems, but it will not make people equal in capacity, opportunity or class mobility. In Israel, immigration saved many Jews from persecution elsewhere, but residential change no alone is a panacea. Many economic and psychological problems will stay with them. There is in Israel a group of very hard-to-reach


families, who require the bulk of the public welfare services. Their children are under-represented in the peer group programs, which are intended to provide enrichment experience and which do attract most middle class children. Such under-representation could lead to an inter-generational transmission of disadvantage.

In any study of a social program, one way of evaluating its impact of the target is to examine its limits. Youth organizations want to serve the total population. The educationally marginal and the children of recent immigrants are not excluded. The question of how underprivileged young people will mature and what they will do with their lives and for their country are actually given priority. The disadvantaged are more likely to have/full-time and trained youth leader, who is administratively supervised, than is the average Israeli youngster. Nevertheless, the children of the lower classes are under-represented in all programs.

Two alternate explanations are plausible. The participation gap suggests that insufficient effort is being expended for special programs and services to counteract the disadvantages with which children from lower class families participate in the emerging youth culture. Many theoretically promising youth programs in Israel are only experimental, for limited numbers, rather than country-wide. National income is always limited. Every welfare or youth program has to compete with other public priorities.
But even if youth work efforts were to be increased many times, it is highly likely that significant differences between advantaged and less advantaged children would remain. In a free society, parents exercise considerable authority over how their children are to be brought up. Their outlook and values will be transmitted, at least in part. Youth program participation is much more likely among parents born in Europe, where patriarchal traditions are modified by child-centeredness than among the children of Afro-Asian families. In many such families, a youngster's interest in youth programs will be opposed at home.

Organizational devices and social mobility oriented welfare planning do not reach all of those who might benefit from them. Indeed, one of the consequences of being socially disadvantaged is that lack of self-confidence, parental support and other assets make it difficult to become involved in the socially approved youth culture agencies. Special efforts and preferential attention probably contribute to the opening up of opportunities for youth culture involvement to those are brought up in disadvantaged families. They and other adult-making programs cannot be expected to wipe out, as rapidly as social planners might wish, cumulative differences in culturally transmitted skills for life in a competitive and achievement-oriented modern society.
Social planning for the abolition of marginality and poverty must proceed from the fact that many people are positively identified with the perpetuation of cultural differences. They have an investment in cultural continuity as a basis of their ethnic identity even if this means the encouragement of values that handicap their capacity to compete equitably in school, in youth organizations or in the job market. The point is dramatically illustrated by the findings of an ex-post facto experiment of American school children. Dr. Morris Gross found marked differences in school readiness when comparing the children of two well matched groups of native born Jewish middle class ethnic sub-groups in Brooklyn.¹ All data were collected by the same interviewer. In all the homes English was the mother language. None of the children had major handicaps. They lived in the same neighborhood. The mothers were native born. Their families were tradition conscious, in that they preferred to incur the financial burden of sending their children to a private religious school, although a quality public school was also located in the area. In spite of these many similarities, the children, whose ancestral roots had been in Europe (Ashkenazim) out-performed the descendants of Jewish families of Syrian origin (Sefardim) on a variety of tests. The battery included Stanford-Binet, a non-verbal reasoning test and others. The differences, while not large, were consistent. As John R. Seeley points out: "What is clearly implied in these findings is both the virtually invisible

persistence of cultural traditions ("ethnic differences") for very long periods even under ostensibly like social conditions, and the depth to which such differences reach, right into something so profound in the ontogenetic process as "measured intelligence" or readiness for school - which comes close to readiness for eventual "successful" participation in the society."

In Israel where Sefardim are more often slum dwellers, new immigrants, poor and uneducated than Ashkenazim, a "cumulative deficit hypothesis" is often offered to account for differences between these ethnic sub-groups. As in the USA, their children do not participate in schools and youth programs in the same way. But since in the US study, the Jews of Syrian origin were no more deprived than those whose grandparents lived in a European ghetto, the theory is highly tenable that even after these ethnic sub-groups achieve similar social class levels in Israel, some residual differences may remain for a few generations. A society can open the doors to its members to take equal advantage of available means of participation. But in their choice of what is "the good life", human beings will build on their cultural heritage when making choices in priority among cultural prescriptions of what is to be transmitted to the next generation.

2John R. Seeley in Morris Gross, ibid: 4
XII

LEADERSHIP
Peer Group Leaders

There are no legal pre-requisites for being a parent. A license is needed to get married, but none is necessary to have children or to exercise parental rights. Being a youth leader is in the same category. Anyone so inclined can be a youth leader. He only need be acknowledged by a group. Leadership is a social role without a standardizeable set of behavior patterns. Expectations vary with each group and the circumstances in which they operate. But what leaders think and do has important consequences for the groups to which they are related. Youth leaders mirror the culture of which they are a part and which they, in turn, influence.

Role uncertainty is common among adolescents. It is not surprising that nearly three quarters of the youths in the Holon area sample characterized themselves as ordinary members of peer groups. In describing their own social status, they checked "my friends like me and are considerate of me, but I am not particularly important" or "I am an ordinary member of the group and am no different from the others." Very few designated themselves as social isolates by checking: "I don't like groups of people" or "I stay away from groups of people and from friends." But one in seven (14%) thought they had leadership standing among their friends.

These self-defined leaders often had their confidence re-enforced by social status. Sixty-one percent were male.

Most of them had friends of both sexes. They ranked above average in socio-economic status, aspiration level, school achievement, participation in organized youth programs and national-service readiness. Self-designated leaders were more active organizationally than those who viewed themselves as ordinary members. The Gadna Youth leadership training courses enrolled a relatively high proportion of self defined leaders (24%), when compared to the general prevalence of such peer group leaders in the Holon area sample.

**Replies of Israeli Adolescents to the Question:**
"What is your status among your friends?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Holon Sample (N=877)</th>
<th>Gadna Youth Leader Trainees (N=722)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leaders*</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary member</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Few social ties</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Youths answering, "I have an important status among my friends and they consider my opinions."

The differences between leaders and ordinary members were moderate but consistent. But both were very dissimilar to those few who had characterized themselves as social isolates. Of the latter, only 5% lived in spacious homes, one third of the proportion in the population as a whole. None wanted to live in a kibbutz. On all other indices, the social isolates were highly disadvantaged. (See chart on next page.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Leaders (N=124)</th>
<th>Ordinary Members (N=655)</th>
<th>Social Isolates (N=21)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio-Economic Status</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spacious living quarters (less than two persons per room)</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>father born in Europe</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high socio-economic scale</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aspiration Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plans to continue studies after 10th grade.</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plans to attend a university</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>definitely thinks he can achieve his goals.</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Achievement Indices</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high sekker score (80 or more)</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Youth Program Participation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>participation in four organized programs at some time in his life.</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>active youth movement member at 10th grade level</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>active in a voluntary gadna program</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Service Orientation Indices</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plans to live in a kibbutz</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chose national service as the most important youth movement activity from many alternate choices.</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The advantaged and well endowed are over-represented among the self-defined leaders. But one out of four did poorly in school, never belonged to a Beyond School program and came from an Afro-Asian family.

Role Expectations

There are well institutionalized roles for achieving formal leadership status, within ready reach of young people. They are usually selected by adults from a pool of eligible adolescents. As leaders they serve many functions, including those of teacher, friend, disciplinarian role model and social worker. In each case there are personal variations in style within patterns of organizational preferences for what is expected.

In the youth movements, leaders are expected to serve as an ideological and moral example rather than to enforce their will by outright command. Command roles are more acceptable in the Gadna Youth Corps. In the Beyond School program, being an educator is paramount. The focus is on serving the needs of the group and on the teaching of skills rather than on leading a peer group. Technical standard vary considerably. The Gadna Youth Corps requires military experience. Beyond School programs hire on a skill basis in carpentry for a technical club leader or in music for the director of a choir.

Charismatic persons are preferred when they can be found - to fit the role model of being a Madrih, the Hebrew word for youth worker. He should be able to guide rather than command.
The Madrih is expected to act more like an older brother or sister, than like an authority figure. He must be able to attract new members by virtue of his personality and retain the loyalty of those who are already active. He should be capable of understanding psychological issues so that members will be ready to discuss personal problems with him.1

Youth leaders vary in readiness to let the group decide controversial issues. In the socialist Hashomer Hatzair youth movement a large proportion favored a group division about how to handle a hiker who has violated the discipline of water rationing. This is an important lesson in Israel where young people are expected to learn how to live in the desert. Even among Gadna leaders, who direct a paramilitary program there were as many as among the voluntaristic Scouts who were willing to have the group decide how discipline should be enforced. (See Table below)

**Youth Leaders Answers to Question:**
"Should a Youngster be Left Thirsty if he Prematurely Drank All of Water Ration?", By Youth Organization

*(In Percent)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Youth Organization</th>
<th>Leave the decision to the group.</th>
<th>Yes-Leave member thirsty to teach him lesson.</th>
<th>Other Decisions.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gadna Army Leaders</td>
<td>N=410</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gadna Ministry of Education Leaders</td>
<td>N=410</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beyond School Program Leaders</td>
<td>N=569</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hashomer Hatzair Socialists</td>
<td>N=74</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B'nei Akiba religious youth movement</td>
<td>N=196</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scouts</td>
<td>N=114</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noar Oved Velomed</td>
<td>N=536</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Nundi Israeli, The Madrih: The Israeli Youth Leader, Roles Training and Social Functions, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh, Graduate School of Social Work, mimeographed report prepared for this study, June 1965: 7-18
The role expectations of a Madrih appear in clear contrast if a comparison is made between youth leaders and teachers. Both are expected to influence young people. But while teaching is a profession, youth leadership is a calling. Madrihim can be volunteers. They can start work without passing a course of training, nor do they need a certificate. Teachers must complete formally designated training programs before they are eligible to do their work, except under emergency conditions. The volunteer Madrih can rise to the top of his program on the basis of experience and his ideological identification with his movement's objectives. Even when youth leaders are paid, they regard the job most often as a transitional one. Teaching is thought to be a lifetime occupation.

Perhaps most distinctive of all is the nature of enforcement authority of youth leaders and teachers. Teachers are appointed authority figures, whose powers are re-enforced by the administrative hierarchy of the school system. Youth leaders, by contrast, are expected to rely for their power primarily on persuasion and charisma.

There is over-lapping in this dichotomy. Progressive schools demand that their teachers act like youth leaders. Even in the Gadna there are leaders, many of them women, who act more like youth movement leaders than as army officers.
Comparison of Teachers and Youth Leaders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirements</th>
<th>Teacher</th>
<th>Youth Leader</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Requirements for Practice</td>
<td>State Board Certification.</td>
<td>Volunteer or hired on basis of each agency's standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Requirements</td>
<td>Formal, technical</td>
<td>Ideological, Informal, highly variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Requirements</td>
<td>Open to adults only.</td>
<td>Open to youths and young adults</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source of Authority</td>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>Charismatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement Techniques</td>
<td>Voluntary compliance or legal</td>
<td>Voluntary compliance or threat of expulsion, no legal powers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>coercion under school law.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay</td>
<td>According to professional standards.</td>
<td>Work often is voluntary. If paid, a reimbursement often is nominal, barely enough to meet expenses.¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Career Possibilities</td>
<td>Lifetime career</td>
<td>Transitional career</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹This is not true of professionals employed as technical specialists or administrators. They earn pay at professional salary scales.
While youth workers of different programs function within a variety of administrative settings, their respective organizational expectations are filtered through a common prism: Youth movement experience. Only a minority, even fewer than the general population report no experience in youth movements.

**Percentage of Youth Leaders Not Reporting Prior Youth Movement Participation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Never Member</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Youth Movements (N=1060)</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gadna Squad Leaders Makim (N=721)</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gadna Teachers-Ministry Education</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gadna Leaders - Army</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beyond School Program (N=596)</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Volunteering**

Youth movements were established by self-selected volunteers. Each in turn recruited younger members, also volunteers, who were ready to lead peer groups. University students and young adults, at the threshold of starting their own families, form the core. They rely on youths in the sixteen to eighteen-year-old age range. And whenever possible, they recruit still younger boys and girls as leadership trainees. This pyramidical structure now, as before, remains the model of the youth movements. Training begins in the year or the summer before responsibility for a group is assigned. Anyone who wants to try is likely to be welcome, unless his personal conduct or belief system is at variance with the principle of the
Youth movement leadership serves a double function. The hoped-for outcome is a more enthusiastic member and someone who can inspire younger peers. Leadership is an esteemed role, the exercise of which will provide much personal challenge to someone finishing the eighth grade or in the first year of high school. Organizational stability and a degree of predictability are provided by a small number of full time organizers. They generally serve for a few years. Their support, often at no more than a subsistence level, is underwritten by a political party, a Kibbutz movement and contributions from interested older persons, many of them youth movement members.

Youth movement leadership offers opportunity to a minority of activists and enthusiasts to identify with an esteemed social role.¹ The choice requires a personal assessment of priorities on the part of each youngster. Organizational leadership requires ten to twenty hours a week, time which must be found from the routine of school work and family obligation. On many a Tuesday or Friday evening, the leader has to prepare a program for presentation to younger members. On Saturday morning, he often must attend a training session.

In the youth movements, more than priorities regarding the utilization of leisure time is involved. An increasingly firm commitment regarding one's personal conduct is expected. The majority of youths in Israel, as elsewhere, wish to test out

alternatives, including being part of a self-selected social clique. No youth movement leader could openly attend a modern party, like the one described below, without criticism by his organization.

"A total of 25 kids were in a room, boys mostly on one side. Songs played on a record player could be split into three categories: American new pop, like the Rolling Stones, Old Pop, like Elvis Presley and French singers and folkish pop. Although I was told there were three couples among the 25 who were present, this was not apparent. They did nothing but dance all evening."

Persistent interest in such "salon-group" activities would result in expulsion. The most puritan are the Socialist Hashomer Hatzair. Twenty-one percent of their leaders would ask a member to leave if he belonged to a popular dance club. The Scouts would request resignation 17% of the time; and 14% in the religious B'nei Akiva. The Noar Oved Velomed, the country's largest youth movement, is more ready to accept popular culture. Only 7.5% of its leaders would eject a member, but none of them said they would encourage membership in a dance club.

Volunteer leaders are a screened residual of the much larger group who at one time were youth movement members. They view themselves as elite and they are so regarded by many people, including some of their friends who left the youth movements with ambivalence. But the majority of the country's youths seek out

---

1From a personal communication from an American teenager, who belonged to a youth movement at age 14 and revisited his Israeli friends two years later.
other channels for achievement. They want different social role experiences, with more emphasis on popular culture, commercial recreation and participation in social cliques. Also among the non-leaders are some youth movement loyalists who are too shy or who are so interested in their school work, in hobbies or in sports to have no time for carrying organizational responsibilities.

Volunteers are an answer to any program which must operate on a tight budget. But they have their price. Volunteers tend to be independent. To dismiss them is hard. Their readiness to serve free of charge usually means that they have convictions about what they are doing. This makes them unrewarding targets for bureaucratic controls. Two thirds of the volunteer youth leaders and those assigned to such a function by their Kibbutz reported themselves to be without supervision. (See chart, "Absence of Supervision of Youth Leaders by Recruitment Channels"). The resulting casualness in function makes it difficult to enforce good technical standards. Many resignations from youth movements were explained by our respondents by boredom and lack of effective leadership. But the youth movements would also lose an important attribute if they adopted the controlled, more professional and better supervised staff pattern of the Beyond School and Gadna programs.

In both programs instructors are appointed and paid, either by the Ministry of Education or the Army. But volunteers are used as Gadna squad leaders after completing a training course. Many of them rely on youth movement patterns of group leadership which has an impact on Gadna, in spite of the latter's para-military function. Observation of squads in the field show a consistent picture of a preference for discipline by cooptation rather than command. Youth movement activists were over-represented among those selected for the Gadna leadership training course.
ABSENCE OF SUPERVISION OF YOUTH LEADERS BY RECRUITMENT CHANNEL

- Proportion Unsupervised

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recruitment Channel</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Unsupervised Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unpaid Volunteer</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kibbutz Member</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenses Only</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Personnel</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part Time Job</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full Time Job</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cooptative Conformity

No youth organization can tolerate leaders who oppose its expectations. Program materials are prescribed and basic materials are prepared on a country-wide basis. Many basic policies set down centrally can be changed only after much deliberation at the national level. But youth leaders have a less precise curriculum than teachers. In schools, teachers can be assessed by how well their students perform in nationally administered final examinations. But in youth organizations, styles of leadership can and do vary considerably. The sense of humor, the capacity to sing, intellectual interests and the many other qualities that make up the social character of each person are at least as relevant as technical skill. Many youth leaders exercise a good deal of operational autonomy. This flexibility is re-enforced by the power of leaders to resign without much, if any, loss of status. Organizational discipline from above is, therefore, maintained largely by means of cooptation.

The process can best be described by the concept of cooptative conformity. If there is little organized anti-adult rebellion in Israel, it may have much to do with this way of relating youth programs to the youth culture. It guarantees organizational continuity and predictability, without preventing changes from being introduced by those actually performing youth leadership roles. There is room for innovation, variation and non-compliance with headquarter expectations even in the paid leadership post of the Gadna and the Beyond School programs.
Israel is a country where the art of compromise and coalition is highly developed. Government relies a good deal on cooptation of diverse interest groups. Many immigrants come from countries where fear and the negative threat of anti-Semitic persecution are not an incentive. They respond to incentives of personal utopian and Jewish self-fulfillment, and those who come are free to leave. In such a setting, a national Youth Kommissar would be unthinkable. This flexibility is further facilitated by the high turnover of youth leaders. Most volunteers work part-time. Two thirds of them work for fewer than ten hours a week. Especially in the youth movements a volunteer leader rarely does the kind of career planning which turns so many professionals into organization-men, who think first and foremost of how to please their supervisors and fellow employees, and less and less about their constituency.

Even less common is the rebellious leader who wants to ignore program guidelines, reject official training programs and introduce radical changes. The youth programs are sufficiently well controlled to make it difficult for a youngster to achieve a leadership post, without showing a readiness to accept a cooptative relationship to his "movement." Many fanatics were reported to have been among the youth leaders in pre-Independence days. They defied parents and other authority figures to enter a clandestine program. Such persons are not now welcome in any of the larger youth organizations.
Youth leaders in charge of a local program can innovate, provided they do not support highly controversial causes or run so "tight" a shop for their subordinates that suggestions or innovations from lower echelons are squelched.

The most bureaucratic outlook was observed among career youth workers. They held such posts as community center director, training school teacher or the civil service of the Government, the Jewish Agency, or in a municipal Youth Department. As career officials, they were under pressure to maintain stable and long range personal relationships throughout the "establishment" in order to get their work done. They have their annual fights for a budget. They want to earn an occasional promotion. But the very nature of youth work keeps even those professionalized structures from becoming too rigid. The consumers of services are adolescents who can react to dissatisfactions by resigning. Career youth workers also are dependent for help on volunteers and many temporary leaders, who think of their work as transitional. This fact accounts for a good deal of careless preparation and under-investment on the part of some youth workers. But it also helps to keep the whole field fluid, relatively informal and resistant to centralized control.

Informal Training

A social role as flexible as youth leadership cannot have well-defined qualifications and still utilize untrained volunteers within one and the same organizational framework. Formal study, other than on-the-job instruction, is not now a requirement. But there is an increasingly disposition to view role-training as useful.

The most informal training programs are those of youth movements.
In most larger localities members of high school age begin to serve as leaders on an apprenticeship basis. "They learn, or teach each other, such skills as folk dancing, camping, scouting, games, singing, story telling, giving lectures (or what they call leading a discussion), crafts and the like."\(^1\) The Scouts have regular Saturday morning sessions. In the Socialist youth movement, all first year high school students are exposed to the course. In the Nationalist Betar, training is limited to those who pass tests at the end of elementary school. All movements conduct week-end vacation and summer courses. Nearly anyone attending a high school can participate in the training sessions and then test out his capabilities in practice as a Madrih.

Most of the in-service training is done by non-professionals, older leaders who once went through such a course when they were 13-15 years of age. This is supplemented by special lectures by the local head leader or members of the national Executive. It is also customary for V.I.P's - the Prime Minister, members of parliament, professors and other famous personalities to lecture to such groups. Their presence helps symbolize the status which youth movements wish to ascribe to their leaders.

Training must be brief -- a matter of days or weeks. Volunteer leaders do not have much time. Each movement publishes a journal,

for which members can write program material on such varied topics as Jewish and Israeli history, the movement's ideology, Kibbutz life, important personalities, Jewish holidays, literature, ethics, nature study and administrative information concerning the collection of membership fees, group diaries and reports. These and other techniques are designed to enable the young Madrih to attract and hold a group of younger members.

In the three large cities, the Jewish Agency has for years financed an office with a small library and a mimeograph machine. It is directed by mature youth leaders whose duty is to assist leaders in all of the youth movements in preparing their programs, irrespective of party ideology. Weekly seminars are held for senior leaders, while the majority also have other types of training. (See chart on "Intensity of Youth Leadership Training by Career Commitment.") 41% of those who intend to serve for many years have only had an in-service training course, 17% were untrained.

Leadership training is an important educational and maturation experience. Childhood begins to end. The youth can participate in a program where the assumption exists that he must care for others, younger than himself. He studies leadership in small local groups of his peers. On special occasions, he participates in a meeting with older leaders, who are finishing high school or have been released from the Army.

Formal Training

The tradition of voluntarism in youth work has been so strong that for many decades there was no professional training. Apprentice-
INTENSITY OF YOUTH LEADERSHIP TRAINING BY CAREER COMMITMENT

CAREER COMMITMENT

N=493

NONE OR VERY SHORT

IN-SERVICE

FORMAL COURSES

N=593

MANY YRS.

FEW YRS.

ONLY SHORT TIME

N=538

17

41

42

15

63

22

17

73

10
ship is now viewed less and less as sufficient preparation, especially for persons responsible for administrative and teaching roles. As youth programs have grown in size and in importance, officials concerned with the staffing of youth organizations wish to upgrade the level of technical skills and their own professional standing. Salaries are being raised. Minimum educational qualifications are introduced, along with formal training sequences for employees who administer youth centers, prepare budgets, deal with parents and supervise volunteer leaders. Professionalization is affecting the youth movements, but much less than the Gadna Youth Corps and the Beyond School programs.

Nundi Israeli's survey of the training programs in 1965 showed that all of them offer a diversified enrichment education. Illustrative is the curriculum of a 3½ month training program conducted by one of the Kibbutz movements for those of its young members, who are selected to "give a year" to youth leadership outside of the Kibbutz, upon completion of their service in the army. This extends their period of national service to beyond four years. The trainees live together during the course. The leadership assignment comes on top of three years of full time army service, required of all Israeli boys since the Six Day War. While this forces a postponement of other vocational plans, it is not without benefits for the leader. It broadens his knowledge base, his ideological sophistication, his social skills and his capacity to influence younger persons. The following material is included
in the course:

1. Israeli Society: Sessions on class and cultural groups and their development; Israeli youth; The school and programs of education; The Arabs in the state; The Israeli Army and national security; Immigration absorption and integration; Israel's system of government; Religious institutions and their rôle; The economy of Israel.

2. The Kibbutz: The Weltanshauung of the person living in a Kibbutz; The Kibbutz in the state; The Kibbutz as a goal for youth; Community life in the Kibbutz; on children rearing in the Kibbutz.

3. Youth Movement: The youth movement as meeting the needs of youth; The history of the youth movements in Israel; Institutionalization and the youth movement education for Kibbutz; Youth movements sexual education; Youth in high school.

4. Literature and Art: The crisis of man in modern society from a literary perspective; The literature and poetry of the younger generation; Buber and his teachings; Literature as an educational tool; The arts as an educational tool.

5. Programming: Training objectives; The movement camp; Operating the center; The younger groups; The role and image of the Madrill; Working in new immigrant areas; Talks with graduates of youth movements; Talks with children reared in Kibbutzim; Research.

6. Methods: Group dynamics; Methodology and didactics; Movement songs, culture, decoration and handcrafts.

Growing dissatisfaction with the absence of professional standards led to the appointment of a parliamentary commission, headed by Aharon Yadlin, a young member of parliament and a Kibbutz member, now the Deputy Minister of Education. He has an ideological commitment to youth movements as a means for inspiring young people. In a report issued in August 1962, this Commission

\[1\] Adapted from Nundi Israeli, Ibid, 74
recommended the adoption of a three-level civil service classification system. The certificates for each level would be issued by the Ministry of Education and Culture.\(^1\) The system would apply to all professional youth leaders hired for pay by youth movements, the Boyond School programs and the Gadna Department of the Ministry of Education.

1. **Beginner Level:** A youth leader who has graduated from a basic leadership training course or has the equivalent scholastic training and experience.

2. **Experienced Leader:** A beginner becomes an experienced youth leader after he had at least one year of experience. He must also advance academically from the minimum level of two years of high school and be recommended for promotion by the agency which employs him.

3. **Certified Leader:** A leader is certified when he has at least two years of working experience, has been asked to stay in his job, and has successfully completed his high school matriculation examinations or a special examination for advanced youth leaders. Certification can also be obtained by graduating from a special course organized for this purpose.

This classification system has been adopted in principle. Its objective is to recruit more youth leaders who are ready to make a career commitment to youth work. But this civil service reform does not resolve the dilemma expressed in the following question: How far can one go in formalizing an informal program, without transforming it into just another career program? Can youth movements retain their flexibility and peer group autonomy if technical criteria are adopted that would constitute a barrier to the recruitment of volunteer leaders? Are the youth programs at the threshold of bureaucratization -- with more directiveness

and less cooptation?

An Emerging Profession?

Reliance on volunteer leaders has become objectively difficult, ever since compulsory military service at age 18 was introduced. The army cooperates somewhat to reduce this leadership drain by releasing about 10% of all Nahal personnel to their respective youth movements to serve as full-time leaders. Their number is insufficient to meet the increasing demands for youth services. Youth leadership is in a transitional phase.

This led to efforts to attract career youth leaders. Schools and Institutes have been established to train them, often while being paid, by the Rutenberg Foundation in Haifa, the Jewish Agency, the Municipality of Tel Aviv, the larger youth movements, the Gadna, Youth Aliyah, and the Ministry of Education. Courses range from three months to two years. Their resources are limited and there is little specialization. They tend to be an improvised form of in-service training. There is usually a full-time administrator with a largely, part-time faculty. Teaching materials have to be borrowed and adapted. Few texts written for the training courses. Students are issued a certificate upon completion but credits cannot be applied to any university level program or even be transferred from one to the other certificate program, although there is much overlap in what is being taught. The courses tend to be at one of three levels:

Basic Training: Three months to one year full-time courses
for youth leaders. They are conducted by special institutes set up for this purpose by the Gadna in the army, the city of Tel Aviv (Machon L'Hadracha), the Labor Federation (Beth Berl), the Rutenberg Foundation in Haifa (Beth Rutenberg) and others. Candidates can be admitted without high school graduation. Indeed, at times they were admitted with as little as ten years of formal schooling. Upon graduation, they are certified as youth leaders, eligible for beginner-level responsibilities.

**Advanced Training:** These courses require a two-year period of study, part of which is devoted to field practice. Candidates are sometimes recruited without their having finished twelve years of high school, but admission standards are now approaching this minimum level, as the available number of applicants increases. Upon completion of such an advanced course, the candidates become professional youth leaders, eligible for higher pay and greater administrative responsibility than those who studied only a basic course.

**Post-Graduate Youth Work:** The School of Education at the University of Tel Aviv began in 1966 to provide training for ten youth workers a year, to serve as teachers and high level administrators. They are carefully screened from a large pool of applicants. Minimum requirement is the completion of a university education and a diploma course taken on a part-time extension basis.

**Career Problems:** All training programs tend to be classroom centered. There is almost no supervised field/ After six months...
of study in the youth leader seminar in Tel Aviv, nineteen to twenty-two year old men and women are often given difficult assignments to develop programs in isolated immigrant centers. Their administrative supervisors are not accessible for day-to-day consultation. Some of the young leaders simply cannot cope with difficulties on their first job. Personnel turnover is considerable. Only one-third of the student leaders in 1965 expected to work in the field for "many years," i.e., more than two years.

The leadership training programs, irrespective of their level, address themselves to a number of common manpower-planning issues. The diversity and size of organized peer group programs has grown so much as to create a serious shortage of qualified personnel. Being a youth leader requires availability during evenings, weekends and vacations. The work is still a transitional career for the majority of employed workers. There is a good deal of awareness of these facts, but there is no central authority which can plan to overcome these problems. Unlike the schools, youth programs are not centralized.

Career lines are just beginning to develop. In the past, youth leader seminars were largely composed of candidates with academic credentials insufficient to qualify them for teacher education. This had the effect of turning leadership courses into an opportunity for personable and socially skilled youths who failed to achieve academically. The courses are a second chance to enter a professional field, even though they have not completed high school. Steps have recently been taken by the
government to set up multi-professional leadership training courses, in conjunction with teaching and social work. Such courses could make it easier for the youth leaders to do additional academic work and acquire qualifications to enter closely related fields of work. Many of the qualified volunteer leaders are disinterested in full time youth leadership training. They prefer to prepare for entry into better established professional fields. But there is a definite relationship between work satisfaction and career commitment.

As shown in the chart on "Career Commitment and Work Satisfaction of Israel Youth Leaders" nearly half of those who report themselves as very satisfied with their vocation, plan to remain for "many years." About three in ten of the leaders reported themselves as not too satisfied with their work. But few of them (under 10%) want to remain active in this field for many years. It stands to reason that an occupation with only middle range status and modest economic rewards would have to rely considerably on other, largely psychic satisfaction in order to recruit and retain a cadre of committed leaders. Even among the students enrolled in formal training courses, not quite a third think they will stay in the field for more than a year or two! Less than half (43%) of those who are organizers are thinking of remaining in the field for "many years." There are such persons, but the supply is far from sufficient to give the field of youth leadership the emphasis on careerism found in many other occupations. As shown in the chart "Career Intentions of Youth Leaders by Level of Responsibility" there is much room for
CAREER INTENTION OF YOUTH LEADERS BY LEVEL OF RESPONSIBILITY

CAREER INTENTIONS

- DON'T KNOW YET
- TEMPORARY
- TRANSITIONAL (One-Two yrs.)
- MANY YEARS

LEVEL OF RESPONSIBILITY

ORGANIZERS

- N=272

STUDENTS IN FORMAL COURSES

- N=59

YOUTH LEADERS OF 3 GROUPS OR 100 MEMBERS

- N=423

OTHER YOUTH LEADERS

- N=911
upward mobility for youth leaders who are willing to stay in this field.

How Much Professionalization?

The transition of youth work from an avocation of volunteers or a transitional career is occurring most rapidly in the Beyond School programs. These programs are almost totally staffed by paid employees, selected largely on the basis of their technical proficiency. Steps in a career ladder have been identified. After an initial period as a direct group leader, workers can look forward to becoming program supervisors, teachers of untrained personnel and managers of youth centers. At a national level, he can look forward to an appointment as District Supervisor, local Program Director or to a headquarters post in Jerusalem. Differences among the three major youth programs in the degree of their preference for more professional personnel are shown in the attached chart on voluntarism comparing Beyond School programs, the Gadna Youth Corps and Youth Movements.

Few Gadna Youth Corps leaders, assigned to their role as soldiers, are career minded. Most of them view their job as transitional. Some feel that they are volunteers although they receive army pay. The job will yield to different occupations after army discharge. Even many of the Ministry of Education Gadna teachers take their post only while preparing themselves for what they regard as a more permanent career.

Personnel planning has to be done in terms of the following contradictory organizational realities. If there is too little professionalization, youth programs cannot maintain their present
PROPORTION OF VOLUNTEER YOUTH LEADERS

Unpaid Volunteers or Expenses Only

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Unpaid Volunteers or Expenses Only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Aliyah</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noar Oved</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bnei Akiva</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scouts</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hashomer Hatzair</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gadna
Beyond School
Youth Movements
impact on the youth culture, let alone increase numerically. If there is too much professionalization, the youth programs will become like school. A balance between formality and informality has to be maintained, between administrative leadership and freedom from bureaucratic control, between responsible adult guidance and opportunities for adolescents to be influential. The issue is dramatized by two generalizations:

1. Professionals have more staying power than volunteers. Professionals tend to move into the important posts in any organization where a large proportion of youth workers see their jobs as temporary.

2. As youth leaders get older they have increasing difficulty in interacting with young people as peers. Age leads to social distance. Many senior youth leaders wish to exercise more control and rely less on cooptation of peer groups.

The degree of professionalization is reflected by the age difference between leaders and members. In the puritan-socialist Hashomer Hatzair, where most leaders are volunteers, only 10% of the leaders were seven or more years older than their groups. Thirty-one per cent were older by the same number of years in the Noar Oved Velomed, the youth movement of the labor party that leads the government. This movement sends paid leaders into slums and development towns where not enough volunteers can be recruited. In the Youth Movements, the Model hero is and remains the volunteer leader. The proportion of personnel receiving pay is increasing, but many of them work for their bare subsistence. They see themselves giving a public service. They are not interested in a career in youth work. Their chief reward is recognition by their peers that The Movement is being served and that the country as a whole is benefitting.
Youth Work as an Opportunity Structure

There are under-achievers in every society. Their potentialities are not realized, often because of discrepancies between academic preparation and formal requirements for entry into a position. Many Kibbutz high schools, though of excellent quality, deliberately avoid preparing students for entry into a university. The parental generation wants their children to remain in a Kibbutz. University education for a profession, some of them fear, would tempt them to choose a professional career that could not be practiced effectively in a Kibbutz. There are bright immigrant children, who arrived in Israel too late to finish high school. In many an Afro-Asian family, upward mobility strivings of children are insufficiently re-enforced by parental encouragement for getting proper academic preparation.

It is for such under-achievers that youth work represents welcome opportunity structure for entry into a semi-professional field. In these posts, having Kibbutz experience is a functional asset. Youths of Afro-Asian families, even if they lack some of the desired formal education, have a communication advantage with children from this sub-culture. Afro-Asian adolescents are under-represented among the youth leaders, but active efforts are being made to recruit them. They represent about a third of the older youth leaders who are nearly always paid. (See Table, "Youth Leaders in Israel of Afro-Asian Origin.")
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Youth Program</th>
<th>Young Leaders</th>
<th>Older Leaders</th>
<th>Percent of all Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Under 20 (N=586)</td>
<td>20+ (N=1453)</td>
<td>(N=2039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noar Oved Velomed (N=536)</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other youth movements (N=524)</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beyond School Programs (N=569)</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Gadna Instructors (N=410)</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education Gadna Instructors</td>
<td>- 36%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Father born in North Africa, Iraq, Iran, Yemen, Aden or other Asian countries.

The under-representation of Afro-Asian youths is most pronounced among the Army Gadna leaders. They can be selected from a large manpower pool of draftees, including many highly qualified youth movement leaders. In contrast, the Beyond School programs and the Gadna Department of the Ministry of Education must hire youth workers in the open labor market, but can offer prospective employees not more than moderate pay and little chance for advancement. They draw largely on young people who may be socially quite skilled but are not academically qualified and are therefore likely to be attracted to these jobs for lack of alternative career routes.
Idealism

Youth leaders, more than teachers are free to speak out on controversial issues. On those ideological questions for which attitude responses were solicited, there were great variations within each category of leaders. This was true in the area of militarism versus developmental priorities, the virtue of economic efficiency, Kibbutz residence and what demands a state may legitimately make in order to get nationally important tasks performed.

Military versus Developmental Priorities: Youth leaders are less militaristic in their outlook than they perceive the public to be. Two thirds think that the public ranks the role of army commander as more important than other youth work occupations. In their own choices, youth leaders had more developmental oriented priorities. Forty-five per cent ranked teaching in the Negev frontier area above all other youth work alternatives. Social workers and army commanders were ranked about equal, but both were assessed to be more important than being a youth movement leader or youth center director. Gadna leadership was universally viewed to be the least important. Less than 1% of all leaders, including those employed by Gadna were willing to designate this role as the most important (see Chart, "Comparison by Youth Leaders of Own and Public Preference for "Most Important" of Six Youth Work Occupations")

Efficiency versus Labor Norms: Few youth leaders would oppose efficiency as an abstract goal. Economic development is an objective of the Zionist movement. The welfare of the citizenry and of immigrants yet to
COMPARISON BY YOUTH LEADERS OF OWN AND PUBLIC PREFERENCE FOR "MOST IMPORTANT" OF SIX YOUTH WORK OCCUPATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Youth Leader First Choice</th>
<th>Frequencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commander</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>1015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Worker</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Movement Leader</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Center Leader</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gadna Leader</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Youth Leader First Choice  N=1530
- Their Estimated Public's First Choice N=1496
come is dependent on how much is done to make optimum use of the country's resources. Yet a significant minority (from 18-45%) would recommend to reduce productivity to conform to group standards or to prevailing labor practices, as is evident from their responses to the following question:

"One of your friends is a very good worker; he is capable of producing more than the average. Some fellow workers resent this, especially since the management is demanding similar performance from them. What would you advise your friend to do?"

**Readiness to Slow Down Productivity in Response to Work Norms of Israeli Youth Organization Leaders**

**(In Percent)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Youth Organizations</th>
<th>Advice to Slow Down Productivity*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hashomer Hatzair and Dror Socialists</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scouts</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gadna - Education</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noar Oved</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Betar Youths</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gadna- Army</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious B'nei Akiba</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* N= is large in both categories. Total for both is 410.

The most radical of the socialist youth organizations, the Hashomer Hatzair and Dror were least compliant with group norms. More than any other category of youth leaders, they advocated to moral virtue of work to the best of one's ability. The less socialistically inclined were less imbued with efficiency values and were ready to accept work group policies to limit productivity.
Pioneering: In the socialist youth movements, more than the majority of the younger leaders say they plan to join a Kibbutz. The Gadna and the Beyond School activities do not stress pioneering. But preferences for living in a Kibbutz were expressed even by a significant minority among their leaders. (See Table, "Proportion of Youth Leaders Planning to Join a Kibbutz by Age and Youth Program.")

Proportion of Youth Leaders Planning to Join a Kibbutz by Age and Youth Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Youth Programs</th>
<th>Youth Leaders Under 20 (N=586)</th>
<th>Older Leaders Over 20 (N=1422)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hashomer Hatzair and Dror (N=150)</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noar Oved (N=574)</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Beyond School Program (N=222)</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scouts (N=144)</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B'nei Akiba (N=223)</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gadna Army (N=410)</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gadna Education</td>
<td>None under 20</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Beyond School Program (N=285)</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In reviewing the table, the following findings need to be noted:

The attitude favorable to Kibbutz joining declines with age. In all youth programs fewer leaders over the age of twenty were thinking of joining a Kibbutz than those under the age of adults twenty. As young they are close to making a decision about where they will actually live. Most of them have completed their army service. They are about ready for marriage, if not already married. Some already served in a Nahal unit and decided against Kibbutz living on the basis of having tried this way of life.

The ranking of different youth programs on the basis of their Kibbutz-orientedness remained the same, irrespective of age. The socialist puritan Hashomer Hatzair and Dror youth movements are clearly dominated by Kibbutz enthusiasts. The Noar Oved labor party youth movement and Scouts include many non-Kibbutz oriented leaders. There is an interesting difference in Kibbutz outlook between rural and urban Beyond School program employees. Those in rural areas include a high proportion of persons already living in a Kibbutz. In urban areas, the idea of Kibbutz life was rejected by practically all of the leaders over the age of 20.

The Gadna includes a minority of Kibbutz oriented youth leaders. This probably reflects the army's personnel selection policy. Youngsters are more likely to be chosen for a Gadna assignment by the Classification Officer if they have a youth movement background, though many other variables are also given weight.¹

¹ For instance, boys who have perfect health scores and the leadership qualities required for Gadna are usually given a combat assignment.
In general, youth movement leaders, especially those in the puritan socialist Hashomer Hatzair and Dror are most often favorably disposed to pioneering and to national development. This inference is re-enforced by the replies of youth leaders to the question: "What should the state do if people are needed in far away locations?"

A majority of Noar Oved leaders thought the state should be able to assign people as needed. A sizeable minority of all other youth leaders, including the Army Gadna leaders agreed with this position. The most pecuniary in outlook were the Ministry of Education Gadna instructors. Three-fourths of them thought the state should recruit the people by offering material and career incentives. (See the Chart "Youth Leader Answers: If the State Needs People in Far Away Places Proper Incentives Must be Offered to Motivate People to Go Voluntarily."

Conclusion

Youth organizations in Israel are the most elective part of the country's network of adult-making agencies concerned with the socialization of the child into an adult. Children cannot choose their parents. Nor have they much choice in who is to teach them in school. But adolescents can accept or reject their youth leaders. The connection between leader and the led is inherently voluntaristic. It, therefore, becomes a significant means for the expression of preferences about how a youngster wishes to fit into the prevailing youth culture.
YOUTH LEADER ANSWERS TO
"IF THE STATE NEEDS PEOPLE IN FAR AWAY PLACES
PROPER INCENTIVES MUST BE OFFERED TO
MOTIVATE PEOPLE TO GO VOLUNTARILY"

□ THE STATE SHOULD 'ASSIGN'
PEOPLE AS NEEDED

■ THE STATE SHOULD OFFER
PROPER INCENTIVES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N-410</th>
<th>N-569</th>
<th>N-536</th>
<th>N-524</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army GADNA</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education GADNA</td>
<td></td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beyond School</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noaroved</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Youth Movements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Personnel is an important variable that affects how an institution will function. Most of the leaders are amateurs. A few become trained volunteers and still fewer become professionals, since with increasing age, people can function less and less as peer-group leaders.

Amateurs cannot guarantee administrative continuity of an institution, especially in temporary social systems where members change frequently. But volunteers cannot be eliminated without risk of losing the program's spontaneity. Amateurs also provide a source of recruitment of candidates for professional training. For some, it is a transitional career to support themselves while enrolled in a university. Youth work also has much attraction for persons who lack the formal requirements to enter the better established professional fields such as teaching.

The staffing of youth leadership posts is illustrative of the control point planning strategy that predominates in Israel. No effort is made, in this multi-party state, to enforce nationwide standards for youth leadership. There are no governmental directives governing who can be a youth leader. The youth culture includes many diverse elements. If it is to be influenced organizationally, there must be room for many different youth programs and different youth leaders.

The Government takes responsibility for offering training programs and for providing career guidelines to those who will make their livelihood in this field. But there is dissatisfaction with the present training program and career incentives.
There is a shortage of good personnel. Youth leadership commands prestige as a volunteer activity but not as an occupation. The forces now at work to make the field more professional, may change this condition.

The co-existence of amateurs and professionals, volunteers and paid workers within the same field of work gives rise to certain issues of "strategy." What should be the division of labor among them and the professionals? Should policy-making power be allocated to volunteers who have no long range responsibility, but who have normative rather than remunerative interest in their job? Or should it be controlled by the professionals? These and many other unresolved issues confront those who now are responsible for the recruitment, training and hiring of youth leaders.

Youth leadership cannot be viewed only in terms of what leaders do for their members. It provides an opportunity for the leader to get an enrichment education. It yields dividends in the form of peer group recognition at an age, when in much of the modernizing world, adolescents are viewed by their social system as being too young to be "somebody." Leadership serves to coopt some of the most enterprising and active adolescents into social roles which give them status in their peer groups and in the adult world.
SUMMING UP
The Uniqueness Fallacy

The overwhelming mood of the youth is not alienation, but identification with their country's past, its complex present and uncertain future. There is criticism of the status quo, but it rarely takes the form of organized protest. Most young Israelis seem to have been co-opted by the existing adult-making agencies to work within the system. Many feel that the frustrations which citizens harbor towards their establishment can be dealt with from within.

Commitment to the nation takes many concrete forms. There is an elite of youths highly challenged by an ideology and ready to volunteer for difficult and dangerous public service tasks. Among a much larger segment of the youth culture there is a readiness to consider the challenge of pioneering values of the youth movements, but a more limited readiness to support developmental and military tasks through personal involvement beyond what is required by law. Most Israelis prefer an easy and well-paid job to one that is arduous. But during periods of crisis there is a widespread identification with nation building tasks.

Attitudes among the young towards public service commitment are analyzed in this book in relation to the fact that there are extensive youth organizations which nurture these values. There are programs planned by adult-making agencies to supplement the socialization efforts of the family, the school and the armed forces. No simple causal relationship can be inferred between these complex system variables. Their co-existence, however, does provide a good
laboratory for the study of how youth culture guidance programs can be organized within a democratic framework.

When viewing the social system of Israel and its many complexities, one can easily fall victim of the uniqueness fallacy: The belief that each social event is not comparable to any other because it is never exactly like another event. Social science would be illogical if this assumption were correct. Only artists, concerned with capturing the special nuances of a situation, would then have a legitimate place in the analysis of complex social events.

Social scientists derive insight by comparing elements in a complex system by means of concepts or ideal types. Complex variables, like youth culture differ in many details: No youth is exactly like those of any other country. But one can generalize about generational transmission processes in modernizing countries which are abstracted conceptually from how the young people view the values of their elders.

The impossibility of replicating a youth culture in a laboratory for precise and controlled comparative study creates some special methodological problems, but this fact does not preclude the formulation of meaningful theorems. While no single case can prove a theory, a case study can provide insight for the analysis of other complex situations that are in some respects similar. It is on such a basis that historians and social scientists have studied social movements, nationalism, social planning and nation-building. Within this methodological context, our case study of youth organizations in Israel was conceived.
Like all nations, Israel has its unique attributes. It was revived after a hiatus of 1900 years by a human group whom Arnold Toynbee unflatteringly designated as a "fossilized relic of a (Syriac) civilization that was extinct in any other shape."\(^1\)

This "fossil" gave birth to a utopian social movement, Zionism. Its ideology advocated a territorial solution to end the victimization of Jews by anti-semitism, social exclusion, economic harassment and the all too common mass killings. Hebrew became the common language of people from over 100 countries. Socialist ideas were subjected to trial-error experimentation. Zionism generally combined universalistic ideals with the hope for Jewish cultural renaissance.

This social movement attracted a sizeable manpower supply of pioneering-oriented youths to return to the land of their father's prayers. They confronted strong opposing forces but did ultimately succeed in transforming the aspirations of Zionism into reality.

The transmission of any set of pioneering values by a generation of successful revolutionaries to their more settled younger generation represents a complex technical problem. The challenges of the parents become "old" history to their children. All new nations confront similar issues of continuity. Patriotic sentiments that exhilarated the population before independence was achieved will not solve the problems that remain - poverty, disease and others.

This study of Israel's youth programs was made in part to formulate comparative inferences. This we shall do now, with the appropriate caution that no case study can confirm a generalization.

It can illustrate its plausibility and its utility for explaining past events and predicting future developments.

Youth Culture Acceptance

Acceptance of the theory that the future is determined by the younger rather than the older generation facilitates the maintenance of a vital youth culture.

Zionism began as a youth-oriented revolutionary social movement. One generation, rejecting the way they were brought up, went to a new country and evolved a social system quite different from any other previously known. Tradition, while not rejected in toto, ceased to be the infallible guide. Often it was only a point of departure for planned change or for giving ancient symbols to 20th Century practices.

Youth continues to be important in Israel. There are still as many unresolved problems. Aspirations for a high standard of living are being frustrated by high defense costs and a sparsity of natural resources. Such challenges will remain for many decades. Multiple ethnic groups need to be integrated. Only through young people can the long range objectives of the parental generation be attained.

When immigrants learn Hebrew as the public means of communication, only their children will speak it naturally. Parents can never free themselves of the psychic impact of having experienced anti-semitism abroad. But their children were the first to grow up without this ego-damaging experience. The parents achieved independence. Their children have to defend it. This is what was done repeatedly by the great majority of all young men and women. At age eighteen, the child is transformed into a citizen with the prestigious status of being among the forces which enable the people to live creatively in a land surrounded by actively hostile forces.

These realities are reflected in the policy of Israeli adult-making agencies in providing role learning occasions of social significance.
for adolescents. Youth is a time when men and women are viewed as being ready to assume social responsibility which the adults will value. This youth bias makes it reasonable for Israel's policy maker to encourage youth organizations. While they are sponsored by adults, they provide young people with many opportunities for the learning of adult roles, under guided conditions, without too much risk that alienation will turn the young against the core values of the adult establishment.

Diversified Programming

If organizations are to have an impact on the youth culture, they must provide a wide range of programs and modes of adolescent participation.

A youth culture is a composite of many patterned ways, each enjoying some adult sanction. In the Israeli network of youth programs, young people can gain recognition as peer-group leaders from both young and old. They can do this in many alternate frameworks, in the puritan socialist Hashomer Hatzair or in an orthodox religious group like Ezra. In the first organization, the goal of joining a Kibbutz will be held out as highly desirable. In Ezra, boys are expected to keep all religious rituals, but they can wear short trousers and shave their side-locks, to make some of their mothers wonder: "Where is this generation going?"

Youths also are free to shift their identification and resign from such organizations to explore new youth culture fads,
the world of movie stars, soccer stars and the latest social dances.

No person or organization could issue an order affecting all adolescents, not even in the para-military Gadna Youth Corps. There is no Komsomol Pravda which could assert that it is writing "authoritatively" about what young people think without open contradiction from many quarters. Youth organizations reach over ninety per cent of the country's adolescents by not trying to cast them into one mold. Influence is exercised more through cooptation than through direction.

There is a core ideology which is widely shared and believed. All of the youth programs are influenced by youth movement traditions, in part because so many of their leaders share this experience. But only a minority remain actively associated with a youth movement in later adolescence. At that age the majority of the youth affiliate loosely or intensively with informal cliques and social groups, as well as the Gadna Youth Corps and the Beyond School programs.

Many observers of the Israeli scene claim that the significance of youth movements has declined since the establishment of the State. We have no way of testing this hypothesis. There are no data about the social system significance of these movements before 1947. But there is no question that contemporary youth programs are very diversified.
The predominantly voluntaristic participation in organized youth programs is consistent with the fact that no young person can discover his interest, capabilities and limits without a degree of freedom. He must have to experience what it is to defy parental wishes, follow a course different from that recommended in his school, kiss his first girl, and seek friendships outside the circle of prior acquaintance. He needs to think about the goals of living on his own, no matter how adequately the parental generation think that the goal of "the good life" has been defined for him.

There need be many program alternatives if youth organizations wish to reach a high proportion of their target populations. In each program somewhat different minorities of activists remain and therefore can get personal meaning from their involvement. Men may be equal with respect to their right to life and to pursuit of happiness, but they differ much in their biological makeup, their intellectual potential, their social opportunity structure and their family sub-culture. Programs to influence the youth culture must make allowance for such differences.

Many a totalitarian country operates on a different theory for the guidance of the youth culture. The state exercises tight control over the school and the Army. Its organs also try to regulate the family and youth organizations. We lack data to compare such a negativistic and directive youth culture orientation to Israel's more cooptative pattern.
What is beyond question is that there is a significant idealistic minority of young people in Israel ready to give a high priority to public service tasks, even when they conflict with personal and family requirements. In a crisis, an "idealistic" minority can count on support from a much larger "realistic" segment of the youth population. For limited periods, and specific purposes, all but a few of Israel's youths are ready to identify with both developmental and military public service goals. The detached segment of the youth population, who are apathetic or anti-social, is small. They may get some of the headlines in the press and occupy much of the time of police and of welfare officials, but they do not represent a threat to public order or to national morale. The vitality of a youth culture is indicated not only by the extensiveness of the existing organizational apparatus, but also its diversity, including the frequencies with which young people resign from a program.

Peer Group Role Learning

The existence of leadership roles in the youth culture facilitate the learning by adolescents of adult rights and duties.

Adolescents anywhere, as they grow and mature, are confronted by adult role models, which are beyond their possibility of immediate attainment. They cannot become teachers or parents. Rarely can they find responsible jobs in the world of work. But they can become youth leaders. This role is attainable even during the latency period, after the age of thirteen and above.
They can volunteer as a Madrih in a youth movement or take a squad leader summer course in the Gadna. They can also take an expert role in a sports or skill group.

For those who aspire to leadership, the youth culture has patterned ways to achieve the status of being somebody among his peers, plus a degree of acceptance by the adult world. The existence of such channels for social mobility may serve to reduce the necessity for youths who wish to gain recognition to seek out socially deviant and anti-social groups.

**Socialization Through Cooptation**

*Organized cooptation of peer groups enables adult-making agencies to influence the youth culture with only occasional resistance to the generational transmission of esteemed social values.*

In weighing alternate strategies of adult intervention in the youth culture the following generalizations are suggested:

a. Adolescents need a sheltered environment -- a peer group culture -- where they can learn adult roles without having to compete with adults or meet adult standards. There must be a moratorium on being held to adult responsibilities. Trial and error must be tolerated with less severe sanctions that would be imposed on adults. They must be free to decide on the nature and intensity of their participation.

b. The school and the family have many short-comings for serving these functions. Power is closely held by adults in order
to insure that their institutional objectives are achieved. Also, adolescent participation is generally compulsory to allow for voluntaristic and autonomous trial and error experimentation.

c. When adult-making agencies try to direct informal peer groups, their effort to control is resisted by the adolescent sub-culture. Adult interference can be successful only by overcoming this basic barrier by coopting young people. The adult power group accords youths secondary leadership posts and the right to take part in policy formation, in return for acceptance of basic guidelines that meet adult expectations.

d. Adolescent status is increasingly influenced by merit, which Michael Young has defined as a function of "I.Q., plus effort."1 The school plays a major part in merit differentiation, providing the required knowledge and skill. For instance, Israeli children worry much about examinations, especially the Sekker screening test, administered on a nationwide basis in the eighth grade. It helps to stratify students educationally and occupationally. Admission to an academic high school is very difficult for those who score poorly on the Sekker.

In contrast, youth organizations have room for those who cannot reach the top of the educational merit scale. They represent a supplementary opportunity structure, where status can be attained on the basis of more diversified standards than at school. Participation in a youth organization is correlated positively with social

status, including academic merit. But no programs exclude youngsters who are academic under-achievers.

No Revolution Is Permanent

A revolutionary ideology and action program inspiring one generation cannot be transmitted to another, once many of the objectives of a social movement have been achieved.

Zionism is losing meaning for the children and grandchildren of the pioneers who settled Israel. The Hebrew equivalent, Zionuth, has come to connote the idea of misplaced sentimentality. The native born Sabras have no personal experience with Jewish homelessness. Of the young men and women who are now drafted into the Israel army, only a minority have experienced anti-semitism. Even fewer have lived in a Ghetto. More and more must learn second-hand about the alienation of Jews in the diaspora, which helped give rise to the Zionist utopian dream. Gas chambers, World War II and the uncertainties of life under the British Mandate are topics studied in a course on history.

Israel is no longer an experiment. It now faces new problems -- peace, cultural integration and materialism. The average Israeli is today very much concerned about having a nice apartment. He complains about his heavy taxes, levied in part to finance apartments for immigrants. Doctors have been known to go on strike for higher wages. Jewish agency officials, charged with encouraging the absorption of new immigrants, have been accused of careerism, more worried about working conditions than doing their job well.
There are still chronic "emergencies," a border skirmish here and there, an economic recession, or a new town failing to develop in accordance to plan. But national service needs are more often met by allocation and assignment than by voluntarism. Unlike their parents, adolescents can now concentrate on the more normal problems of human existence. The majority view national service within this context. Voluntarism continues to be a social force, but for most people, commitment to public service is time and space limited. The youth culture of today reflects those changes in a lessened ambivalence on the legitimacy of meeting self-service needs.

There can be no permanent revolution. A social movement which has succeeded in attaining its objective, like the proverbial sinner, can be saved only once. The fervor that might have inspired parents when they built a new way of life cannot be transmitted to the children. To fall in line with what is now traditional will not arouse comparable fervor.

Israel's youth movements suffer from ideological arteriosclerosis. Their ideology has changed little from the time the parental and grand-parental generation formulated their programs. Youth movements no longer enjoy their former semi-monopoly on pioneering. They continue now, as before, to recruit primarily from one form of national service -- Nahal service in the army followed by settlement in a Kibbutz.
As long as Israel's security remains in doubt and strategic areas remain to be settled, this ideology can have an appeal to a minority of youngsters. But the youth movements cannot offer a framework for peer group organizations for the country as a whole. They have been slow to embrace youth culture innovations in music, in the dance, in ideology and in leisure time pursuits. Those that are committed to Kibbutz living cannot mobilize young people to volunteer for the many other forms of national service now required to sustain the state. Youth movements cannot recruit doctors to serve in new town, sailors to man Israel's new merchant marine and administrators with the courage to violate agency traditions to get their work done.

Functional Change With Structural Stability

A well established organizational structure can be highly resistant to change, even when there are major shifts in the functions that are being served.

Youth movements came to Israel as extensions of political parties which sponsored them. Gadna was set up in response to the need to train adolescents for para-military service. Their structural arrangements persist to this day, in spite of the fact that conditions in the country have changed much since the achievement of statehood. In the youth movements, there is a continued preference for volunteer leaders, in spite of the fact that their number is insufficient to meet demands. Also their time
is very limited. There are competing demands to do well in high school. Most youth movements advocate Kibbutz living, in spite of the requirements of a modern country for many diversified settlements. There is similar evidence of structural rigidity in the Gadna Youth Corps, which survives in spite of the existence of a universal military service at age 18.

Large proportions of the population are exposed to both of these youth programs. But only a minority identify deeply with their organizational expectations. This low-key interest has given rise to proposals to modify the functions of these youth organizations. Efforts have been made to infuse the old structures with new and more relevant functions to acquire new meaning for the younger generation who are growing up as Israel enters its third decade of statehood.

The Multiplicity of Sanctions

Organizations can hold members by means of a variety of sanctions -- normative, remunerative and coercive.¹ Their potential for arousing public service enthusiasm is greatest when normative incentives are supplemented by remunerative and coercive ones.

The Gadna Youth Corps has patriotic (normative) appeal, but to insure minimal participation by all those enrolled in a school, the program is made compulsory. This coercive incentive is supplemented by remunerative and normative benefits. The Youth Corps gives members an opportunity for the perfection of leadership techniques, for hobbies, physical conditioning and recreation. It also has patriotic appeal.

¹ Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations, op. cit: 4-6
A remunerative element also helps to enroll members in the Beyond School programs. Few of them have a public service or normative aspect—all are voluntary. Activists in Beyond School programs are offered chances to learn a skill and/or have fun.

Only the youth movements rely primarily on normative sanctions. They place more emphasis on what the member can do for his movement than what the movement will do for him. And it is among these youth movement activists that attitudes favorable to public service and pioneering are most pronounced. However, the absence of coercion and the limited remunerative pay-off value of youth movement membership helps to explain why there is a high resignation rate, especially among realistically inclined segments of the youth culture.

**Achievement Crisis Containment**

Successful organizations tend to become vestigial unless new functions are adopted that deal with still unresolved problems.

When organizations attain a goal, the exhilaration with having reached it often yields to awareness that there are new problems. In designating this process as the achievement crisis, attention is called to the fact that resolution of one problem often makes it possible to become concerned with others which had been played down in the effort to give first priority to the original problem. The severity of the crisis is a function of how much prior planning was done to anticipate the confrontation of previously ignored latent difficulties.

Our generation has witnessed the attainment of independence of nearly all areas of the world. Some new states, formerly ruled
by colonial power, barely have emerged from the iron age. Sovereignty is not a guarantee of rapid closure of the gap between the capacity to aspire to modernization and the technical requirements to reach this objective. Many of the new nations experienced a drop in national income. There were different tribes, races and religious groups who were stimulated by their freedom from outside constraint to engage in internal conflict and war. Millions have been killed since the advent of freedom from colonialism in tribal or religious conflicts, or were forced to become refugees. This achievement crisis was particularly intense in such countries as Pakistan and India, in Indonesia, the Congo and Nigeria.

The crisis has been more circumscribed in Israel. This is reflected in the shifts of function of the youth movements and the Gadna Youth Corps. Independence reduced the military importance of Gadna. New organizational objectives were added, such as "first aid" to help in the absorption of young immigrants. These welfare and educational goals, along with the fact that para-military training can still be justified by Israel's embattled condition have served to preserve the Gadna.

The youth movements always placed more emphasis on developmental than military public service. Independence made it less necessary for young idealists to give top priority to defense. But only a small proportion of the country's older adolescents are now ready to identify with Kibbutz living. Their number has been sufficient
for a slow increase in the communal settlements where people live together in small cohesive groups to express their common ideological convictions - be they socialist, religious or both. But many of the urgent developmental challenges that now confront Israel involve professional, technical and civil service tasks which cannot be performed easily within a Kibbutz framework. The largest part of the youth population approach life planning more individualistically. They want to live in cities. They plan their life in terms of personal career, family and primarily self-centered objectives. The Army, industry and the Government have recognized these realities by supplementing public service appeals with material and career incentives. The youth movements do not as yet make allowance for these trends.

Control Point Planning

Adult-making agencies, including governments, can take leadership in planning peer group programs without imposing central controls.

All youth organizations depend in some degree on support from the government. In an emerging country the private sector of the economy lacks the resources to support major public programs. But in Israel, where a democratically elected coalition government has been in power for decades, the government restricts itself to exercising control point planning functions. Each youth program is free to use official help as its leaders see fit. Government units offer subsidies, organize leadership courses and publish program materials. But decision-making for how these resources are to be used is highly decentralized. Initiative can be taken at many levels.
Youth organizations, like all social structures, are resistant to formal change, but their multiplicity facilitates competition between programs. Youth movements, which once had a near monopoly on peer group organizations, now have to compete increasingly with less structured "salon" groups which are attracting more members because they include popular youth culture objectives in their program. The Gadna Youth Corps at one time operated an extensive groupwork program in immigrant settlements. It has now been disbanded. Within a para-military framework, it could only be ancillary. Beyond School programs under educational control have replaced them. They are sponsored by local authorities who are ready to give extra-curricular education a degree of priority on the available local manpower and resources. The existence in Israel of a variety of organizational frameworks provides each individual with alternate structured peer group programs. Young people are free to indicate approval or disapproval of a program by voting with their "feet," to enter or to leave it. Control points such as these keep small the hiatus that could develop if adult-sponsored youth programs were under more central and unified direction.

Social Change is System Related

Planning for change can proceed more quickly than implementation. Few specific problems can be "solved" quickly for they affect the total social system.

Among the frustrations that complicate planned social change is the inherent differential between the capacity for aspiration and the possibility for achievement. Israeli officials planned for the "in-gathering of exiles" to provide the benefits
of territorial therapy to as many Jews as possible. When immigration after 1948 reached massive proportions, doubling the population of Israel within thirty months, its resources were strained to the utmost. Included among the immigrants were many disadvantaged families including more than 100,000 illiterates. Some of them later learned how to read and write. But comprehensive education to adjust to life in a modern country could be given only to their children. Even among this new generation, many grew up with a limited capacity for "achievement" in terms of the expectation of a technological society.

There is no barrier to the participation of the poor. In contrast, youth organizations are an avenue of social mobility for some of the children of recent arrivals. Here they can learn to achieve in an expanding society where there always is need for new talent. But the youth programs have difficulty in reaching the children who do poorly in school, those of Afro-Asian families, recent immigrants and the poor. Such youngsters are less likely to acquire the communication skills that are necessary to fit comfortably into adult sponsored peer group programs in which there is an expectation of conformity to group discipline and the acceptance of a core ideology. Equally hard to reach are the children of tradition-oriented families, especially girls and youngsters of Afro-Asian derivation. The Israel experience would indicate that youth organizations which require a relatively high public service component will not flourish
in tradition-oriented sub-cultures. The patriarchal family structure, for instance, is built on an expectation that women stay close to home and that men devote themselves primarily to the needs of their own family. The idea of peer-group loyalty cannot have the same attraction for youths in such sub-cultures as among families whose traditions encourage formal associations of age mates.

The capacity to take advantage of existing opportunities is not randomly distributed in any culturally polyglot population. Indeed, if such an objective were to be pushed hard, the price in alienation might outweigh the potential gain. If children were to be taught that their parents have a completely outdated way of life, the authority of the family as an adult-making agency would be undermined.

Those who view Israel from without may see little of these limiting conditions to planned social change. They can be over-impressed by the country's pace of development to ignore the evidence of its limits. It would seem to appear that man's technical capacity for planned modernization is much greater than his capacity to absorb its consequences in the system and its institutional components.

Military and Development Priorities

Military and developmental public service objectives, when combined, can attract non-militaristic and innovative elites to the defense establishment.
Most armies are led by professionals who think largely in terms of non-productive tasks. They train for defense or attack to keep the country from being harmed. They are rarely concerned with adding resources to the national product. It is uncommon to find persons in the military establishment who are strongly development oriented.

Not so in Israel. The army is composed of "temporary" soldiers, who are drafted for a limited period. It is coordinated by small cadres of career officers who are expected to retire in their forties and pursue a second non-military career.

Except during periods of dire military threat, certain resources of the military establishment are devoted to land settlements, the improvement of communication, vocational training, teaching, foreign aid, manpower and industrial development which have a feedback to the civilian economy. Military leaders have opportunities to achieve public esteem on the basis of non-military accomplishments. Many of the higher staff officers were trained in agricultural schools, in Kibbutzim, and in academic pursuits. They identify with production oriented pioneer values.

The symbiotic combination of military and developmental objectives begins in youth organizations. The youth movements stress development of resources. Even when its members enter the military service, many serve in the development oriented Nahal pioneer corps. One of the bitter ironies of our era is the fact that these children of socialist utopians who went to their holy land to build a better world now start adulthood as soldiers.
Their original commitment of Zionism to developmental priorities and to cultural renaissance is constrained by the existence of a strong military threat to Israel's survival. The complex geopolitical circumstances which led to this paradox are incidental concern here. But they highlight the complexity of the issue of war and peace which the human family confronts in the atomic age.

On Being Somebody or Nobody

Major problems can serve to strengthen rather than weaken the identification of adolescents with the parental generation, provided their source is believed to be outside of the social system and there is a basis for optimism that the problems can be ameliorated.

The youth culture component of "anti-establishment" sentiments is very limited, in spite of the existence of many reasons why young Israelis can be dissatisfied with present conditions. For instance:

High school education is not free. Except in border regions and development towns, tuition must be paid by the parents on a sliding scale. Admission to academic programs is not open to all who wish to study. It is subject to stringent competitive standards.

Three years of army service is now required of nearly all males at age 18; two years for many of the girls. Casualty rates are in excess of those experienced by Americans during the Korean and the Vietnam Wars. Youths cannot begin their technical education until the age of 21, when many also wish to get married.
Work and study often must be combined. Housing, cars and other comforts are expensive. Rapid advancement in the world of work and career is rare.

Grumbling and criticism are common. No Israeli institution, policy or leader is immune from being questioned, in private and in public forums. Nor are those who criticize of one mind. But very few react to their frustrations by detachment or "dropping out." They seem to have accepted the dictum: "It may not be the best of worlds, but it is our's."

A good case can be made for the theory from our findings that the infrequency of alienation may be related to the existence of organized programs to relate adolescents to challenges confronting their society. Esteemed social roles are within reach of a large segment of the country's youth. The bright as well as the less bright, the old-timers and the newcomers, the rich and those who grew up in poverty can be somebody rather nobody during their late adolescent years.

Youth movements and organizations encourage adolescents to identify with the future of their society by a combination of fun activities, the learning of skills and the nurturance of national service attitudes. One does not have to be an exceptionally endowed person to be a Halutz or a youth leader. Ordinary young people can perform roles which have status in the larger social system. Adolescents, not quite ready to enter the adult world, can visit locations and help in tasks which make newspaper headlines. For a few days or weeks they can work on land reclamation, tree planting,
help harvest cotton or take part in establishing a new village
that will add to the sense of security of their country. Peers
and public figures will recognize these tasks as concrete contri-
butions to the national welfare. These opportunities for adoles-
cent participation in prestigious social roles are turning
Israel's embattled status from being a mere detriment into some-
thing of an asset.

Challenge and National Morale

Does outside conflict increase group cohesion? Can innovative
core values perform the same function?

Youth movements were a major organizational mechanism that
turned emotional yearning for a Jewish homeland into the reality
of the State of Israel. The core ideology includes no "hate your
enemy" dogma. It stresses constructive tasks, likely to benefit
the larger social system by improving the quality of life for all
citizens of the country, including the Arabs. Would there be more
inter-generational alienation if the country were less threatened?
Such a change could be expected if we are to accept the plausible
generalization of George Simmel as expanded by Lewis Coser that
outside conflict increases group cohesion.¹ They reason that when
the perception of outside threat declines, a society will lose much
of its cohesion.

¹Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, N. Y., The
Free Press, 1956: 104-110
Prospects for peace in the Middle East seem remote at this time. If the warnings from Arab capitals and from Moscow are to be taken at face value, the threat to Israel and its entire population is very real.

But what if peace were to come? Could the country's youth culture maintain its present level of identification with the ideals of the prior generation? Can adolescents grow up with a strong sense of identity when the only threats are those inherent in the human condition, such as sickness, poverty and anomie? Is war or the belief in its imminence a necessary pre-requisite for national morale?

There have been Arab nationalists who urge that the conflict with Israel be ended, on the assumption that without external threat the national morale of Israelis would decline. The population, so they reason, would then emigrate in larger numbers, while the Arabs in Israel with their high birth-rate, would increase in number and power. In time the balance would shift in their favor. They would come to dominate, without war, in contrast to the present strategy of belligerency, which re-enforces the social cohesion of the otherwise polyglot Jewish population.

The theory that peace can undermine social cohesion seems to enjoy some acceptance. In the United States, during the Joseph McCarthy era, efforts were made to silence liberals by appeals to the fear they would lead the country towards communism. Russia and China seem to feel it necessary to re-enforce their appeal for loyalty with the warning that it is required to combat
dark and hostile forces, like "imperialists", "cosmopolitans" and "revisionists." Priority in social planning is given to the negative goal of defeating the "enemy."

The question: "Can there be a moral equivalent to war?" is of importance for those who yearn for peace. No opportunity now exists to test it. There were lapses in national morale before Israel's military crisis in June 1967, when there was a recession. But even then the universalist and renaissance values that once inspired the parental and grand-parental generation enjoyed support in the youth culture. The war against ignorance, the battle against poverty and pursuit of an enriched cultural life were a basis of many "happenings" organized for young people. The integration of diverse ethnic groups retained high priority. Utopian socialist ideas remained meaningful for an activist minority. The fact that the youth stand for a core ideology, rather than just against an enemy, provides a basis of entertaining the theory that social cohesion and national morale can be sustained as much by challenges to create a better life than by appeals to defend against a real or mythical enemy.
Abstract

INFLUENCING THE YOUTH CULTURE

A Study of Youth Organizations in Israel

This is a case study of comprehensive efforts to get young people to identify with the core ideals of the parental generation through youth organizations. The locale is Israel, where over 90 per cent of the adolescents report an active involvement in one or more of three nationwide programs:

1. Youth movements, sponsored by political parties and the Scouts
2. The Gadna youth corps, sponsored jointly by the Schools and the Ministry of Defense - a sort of high school R.O.T.C. with pre-military as well as developmental national service goals
3. Beyond School programs providing group work, skill training, education and recreational services in community centers and in school buildings after school hours.

Large samples of youths and youth leaders were interviewed. Among the variables studied were recruitment, programming resignation, leadership and attitudes toward national service. Special attention was given to efforts made to reach the poor and immigrants. The youth organizations rely on peer group leadership.

The implications of this case study for nation building in general, and youth culture management are discussed in detail. The overwhelming mood of the youth of Israel is not alienation but identification with their country's past, its complex present, and its needs for development. The organizations designed to reinforce these attitudes rely more on cooptation than adult direction. They provide adolescents with opportunities to acquire status.