Until the 1960's, the writing of Russian history in America was greatly concerned with intellectual history. However, once more sources became available in the mid-1950's, other approaches and techniques were applied. Similar trends were perceptible among Soviet historians. Although Western and Soviet historical inquiry has been hampered by the restrictions of the Soviet regime, they have both adhered remarkably well to the canons of scholarship. (GK)
New Developments in the Writing of Russian History*

The attention historians have given to events on the soil of present-day Russia is at least as old as Herodotus, but the writing of Russian history as an enterprise based on the critical use of sources was not firmly established in Russia until the publication of the works of S. M. Soloviev (1820-1879). Nor was it established in Western Europe until the post-World War II period with the appearance of the historical syntheses of such men as Paul Miliukov, Charles Seignobos, and Louis Eisenmann in France, Karl Stählin in Germany, and B. H. Sumner in England, some of whom also produced substantial monographs. The United States had a few doughty pioneers, but it was only after World War II that the students of Michael Karpovich (Harvard University), George Vernadsky (Yale University), G. T. Robinson and Philip E. Mosely (Columbia University), and Robert J. Kern (University of California, Berkeley) appeared in such numbers as to transform the writing of Russian history on this continent.

The 1950's and early 1960's were accordingly a period when much new monographic work was published, along with several new textbooks on Russian history. Many of these books dealt with the history of ideas, mainly with nineteenth- and early twentieth-century topics, and most often with figures and movements that have been interpreted as forerunners of the Revolution of 1917 or that were active in 1905 and 1917. There were reasons for this. Access to Soviet archives was denied, and few sources were easily

*My apologies go to the sociologists and political scientists whom I have included and the many historians, some productive of important innovations, whom I have left out.

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obtainable except for the writings of the radical thinkers of the last century of tsarism—many of them originally published in Western Europe or America, others available in Soviet publications. Probably additional factors leading to such a choice of topics were the widespread feeling that options other than Bolshevism were open for Russia in 1917 and the desire to see that non-Bolsheviks received their just historical desserts. Some of the scholars, moreover—partly because of the lack of documentary materials mentioned—were much interested in intellectual history and influenced their students in that direction.

The resumption of Soviet tourism in the mid-1950's and the inauguration of educational exchanges with the USSR gave many American scholars and students the opportunity to use Soviet libraries and archives. At the same time the death of Stalin and the progress of de-Stalinization under Khru-
shchev perhaps helped to give rise to a belief that the Soviet regime might in some respects allow pre-Stalin ideas and institutions to reassert themselves and that under such circumstances topics other than political ideas might be more significant. The post-1960 generation of Russian historians in this country seems thus to have moved in the direction of institutional history based on at least some use of Soviet archival materials. George Yaney's forthcoming study of tsarist administrative history is an example. Another might be found in the session on "The Reform of Russian Institutions in the 1860's" at the 1968 meeting of the American Historical Association, in which all three authors of papers (as well as the commentator, Peter Czap, Jr.) had done research in the USSR: Thomas Hegarty on "The New University Statute," Charles Ruud on "The New Censorship Law," and Richard Wort-

The opportunity of the newer generation to use Soviet archives and thus to draw on a sizable body of hitherto unknown data coincides with an increasing interest, throughout the historical profession in this country, in the results that quantification can yield. This, of course, is a development that has been largely produced by work in what is now called the behavioral sciences. Walter Pintner, for example, is analyzing information about 3,000 civil servants of the mid-nineteenth century and adding data on 2,000 more from the beginning of the century; he is applying quantitative methods to what he hopes will be a successful venture in collective biography. In a study of Russian education, a Harvard doctoral candidate, Max J. Okenfuss, has been attempting to assemble information concerning actual schools, teachers, and tutors in the period of Peter the Great; he hopes to move in the direc-

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tion of programming for computer use biographical data for eighteenth-century persons from various social strata. George Fischer, who has made sociology his new base, has just published a study partly based on computer use of data concerning the careers of high Soviet officials.

Another area marked by new departures is that of comparative history. In a bibliographical essay at the end of The Dynamics of Modernization (1966), C. E. Black remarks that "History has customarily been local, dynastic, and national in outlook, and its practitioners have only recently come to think in broader terms." To be sure, the writing of comparative or world history is much older than the present generation, but it is nonetheless true that a significant number of scholars trained as national historians have recently moved into broader arenas. Examples include C. E. Black's work in several books and articles, Barrington Moore in Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (1966), Zbigniew Brzezinski (and Samuel P. Huntington) in Political Power: USA/USSR (1964), and Theodore H. von Laue in Why Lenin? Why Stalin? (1964). Several Russian historians have extended their work into the East Central European and Balkan areas and East Europeanists have expanded theirs into Russia; others, such as Nicholas V. Riasanovsky in his recently completed book on Charles Fourier, and Richard Pipes in some of his recent work, have given renewed attention to Western Europe. Still others have ventured into fields to the East—for example, my study of the influence of Western thought in Russia and China.

Until recently most courses and texts in Russian history (even, to a certain extent, Michael T. Florinsky's masterful two-volume work) moved rather rapidly over the pre-Petrine period to stress the Empire and especially the nineteenth century. The increasing number of pre-Petrine specialists promises to lead in the direction of righting the balance. James H. Billington's studies of the Muscovite period led to his allotting ample space for that era in his cultural history of Russia, The Icon and the Axe (1966). So far few monographs have appeared, but a sizable number of translated and edited documents have prepared the way for them. Among these are new editions of foreign observers' works—Olearius, von Staden, Fletcher (three versions)—and compilations of materials on the judicial and social history of Muscovy and of the testaments of its princes. Edward L. Keenan has employed the methods of comparative and structural linguistics to reconstruct lost original sources in studying Muscovite relations with Tatar states in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

American work in several categories has its counterpart, to a degree, in the activities of Soviet historians. The scholars of the Soviet academies and universities have engaged in some attempts to use computers in sifting data
on nineteenth-century peasant problems, as described in *Voprosy istorii* (1965 and since). Massive documentary and monographic publications, especially concerning 1905 and 1917, have accompanied commemorations of anniversaries; a new twelve-volume Academy of Science’s history of the USSR and a new historical encyclopedia are in the process of appearing; an enormous Academy history of Russian art is almost complete. Of even more interest is the sizable number of high-quality, post-1956 monographs by Ia. S. Lur’e, A. A. Zimin, A. I. Klibanov, and others dealing with problems of the Muscovite period, and certain studies of the nineteenth century by P. A. Zaionchkovsky, I. D. Kovalchenko, and others. Such works make it clear that it was not Marxism in any version, but rather the state-imposed necessity to glorify Stalin and serve the policy line of the moment, that made most pre-1956 Soviet monographic publications in history so sterile and of such little interest to scholars. At the moment there are colder winds blowing in Soviet scholarship, which threaten the warming trend of a few years ago; but English, French, and to a lesser extent West German historians, as well as Americans, retain substantial opportunities to work in Soviet libraries and archives and to use the publications of their Soviet counterparts, if not always to meet and discuss problems with them face to face. These factors are likely to persist at least for the immediate future.

Western and Soviet historical scholarship have both suffered, of course, from the reign of Stalin and other aspects of the Soviet system, and it would be hazardous to argue that Western publications have been free of their authors’ perceptions of national policy imperatives or their political or other commitments. It may be thought remarkable, nevertheless, to what extent the writing of the history of Russia in America and Western Europe has kept to the canons of scholarship, difficult as they have always and everywhere been of implementation, and has escaped the intrusion of political or policy polemics that have bedeviled, for example, the field of modern Chinese history. When at least a few Soviet and Western historians were able to meet again after decades of separation, seldom were any unanswerable questions posed from either side; it was taken for granted that both groups had been following, as much as they could (even if that was for certain periods not very much at all), in the paths carved out by Thucydides, Augustine, Gibbon, Ranke, Soloviev, and Kliuchevsky. All of these men had to deal with pressures of various sorts, and they had their own strong opinions, but no one told them what they had to write. Theirs is the only kind of history that has ever been taken very seriously.

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