The processes of revolutionary change, particularly the dynamics of the egalitarian ideal, have affected the campus in 2 central ways. The first is the erosive effect of equality on the traditional status of higher education as centers for cultivating the abilities of an intellectual and social elite. Educators are faced with the difficulty of maintaining the vision of excellence in a mass educational system and maintaining standards of excellence when they can no longer be included in the criteria of admission. The second effect of egalitarianism is the use of the campus as a major lever for social change by ethnic minorities. Campus unrest continues to sharpen the conflicts between faculty and trustees, and political pressures are likely to increase the power of trustees. As academic senates are brought into more direct and intense conflict with trustees and administrators, tactics used by both sides will sharpen the adversary character of their relationship. New procedural and substantive issues will create new tensions in the senate's relationships with external organizations. The senate is likely to respond by endorsing collective negotiation. And, if the academic union is involved in an issue, the senate may also find itself contending for the role of bargaining agent. There is also the problem of the ineffectiveness of the faculty in reaching agreement on any issue. Adversary relationships characterized by confrontation and bargaining, and backed by force, will likely increase within the university. (JS)
LIVINGSTON, JOHN C.

THE ACADEMIC SENATE UNDER FIRE

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE
OFFICE OF EDUCATION

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROM THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIGINATING IT. POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONS STATED DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT OFFICIAL OFFICE OF EDUCATION POSITION OR POLICY.
Academic senates are irretrievably caught up in the processes of revolutionary change in America. The causes, the general character, and the probable outcome of these revolutionary forces are beyond the scope of my present purpose and my insight. But, more specifically, it can I think, be said that the central challenge to academic senates is rooted in the dynamics of the egalitarian ideal. The struggle to define and realize equality has entered a new phase in which this "greatest of all doctrines and the hardest to understand," as Mark Van Doren described it, has affected the campus in two central ways.

The first is the erosive effect of equality on the traditional status of higher education as centers for the cultivation of the abilities of an intellectual and social elite. Clark Kerr described the problem from the traditional perspective in The Uses of the University. "There is," he said, "the urgent issue of how to preserve a margin for excellence in a populist setting when more and more of the money is being spent on behalf of all of the people. The great university is of necessity elitist, the elite of merit. It operates in an environment dedicated to an egalitarian philosophy. How may the contribution of the elite be made clear to the egalitarians, and how may an aristocracy of intellect justify itself to a democracy of all men? It was equality of opportunity, not equality per se, that animated the founding fathers and the progress of the American system, but the forces of populist equality have never been silent . . ." But surely the ideal of equality, as Van Doren implied, is more difficult to understand than this account allows. From another perspective, "populist" pressures on education reflect, however vaguely and imperfectly, the perception that "equality of opportunity" is an empty ideal which serves mainly to conceal and rationalize actual inequalities of real opportunity. Moreover, while the intellectual Darwinism implicit in the ideal of an "elite of merit" is clearly under attack, it is by no means clear that it has lovelier or more humane consequences than other elitist concepts or that our problem is to find ways to induce the egalitarians to accept it. From an egalitarian perspective the problem is not how to persuade the mean and jealous masses to support their intellectual superiors, but the more difficult problem of how to maintain the vision of excellence in a mass educational system. Similarly, the problem for faculty is increasingly the more difficult one of how standards of excellence are to be maintained when it is no longer possible simply to dodge the issue by building these standards into the criteria for admission. More specifically, for faculty in elitist institutions the problem is how, or whether, to justify patterns of expenditure which are inversely related to the past opportunities of students. In public systems, especially, the question is whether the masses should continue to provide greater financial support for institutions which educate the children of the wealthy than for institutions which educate their own children or the children of the disadvantaged. Even the magic and slippery formula of equal opportunity fails to justify this common
inequity, an inequity which is being clearly exposed by the demands of ethnic minorities though it seems odd that its exposure should have had to wait on those demands.

Whatever valuation we are to put on the egalitarian pressures to expand educational opportunity, they exist and they force new roles on faculty and academic senates and create new tensions between senates and other parties. Elitism (intellectual and social and economic) is firmly built into the structure of higher education. (Even in the private sector, in an oligopolistic corporate economy corporate donations to elitist private colleges represent a form of compulsory "tax" support by consumers). In the public educational sector, faculty who teach in the more "populist" institutions resent the second-class status to which they are assigned by the elitist implications of resource allocation.

The second central way in which the egalitarian tide has affected the campuses is, of course, the way in which the struggle of ethnic minorities for racial equality has used the campus as a major lever of social change. Demands, like those for greatly expanded minority group enrollment and for minority group "self-government" in the development of ethnic studies programs, put traditional academic standards and usages to new and severe tests. So also, of course, do the verbal violence, the disorder, the threats and intimidation and occasional violence that accompany this struggle.

In ways that I hope to clarify, the pressure of these new problems on the campus seems to me likely to increase the tension among faculty organizations, to create new problems in the relationship of academic senates to the external organizations, to intensify the adversary character of relations between academic senates and trustees and administrators, and generally to accelerate a trend toward collective bargaining. My analysis draws heavily on the experience of California because I am most familiar with developments there. Its general relevance, therefore, depends in some measure on the accuracy of our Chancellor's comment that "things tend to happen first" there. (This, of course, is only a methodological hypothesis; I do not wish to be understood as hoping the rest of the country will follow our example.)

Unrest on the campus promises to continue to sharpen the conflicts between faculty and trustees. As the recent Educational Testing Service survey of some 5000 trustees confirmed, the "typical" trustee is the model representative of the Establishment: white, Protestant, middle-aged, wealthy, "successful" and, most important, inclined to take a managerial view of his institution. He believes that trustees should select a strong executive and that the old saw that authority must be coextensive with responsibility provides an obvious and authoritarian answer to the question of campus government. The faculty role in decision-making, he believes, should be limited to "academic" matters, narrowly defined (half of the 5000 respondents did not believe faculty should have power to appoint an academic dean or grant faculty leaves; 53 per cent thought faculty should sign loyalty oaths).

In tranquil and "normal" times these trustee attitudes constituted no great barrier to the development of shared authority on the campus. What trustees did not know or were willing to overlook did not irritate them, and they were often preoccupied with enjoying the prestige of reigning over, without ruling, their institutions and debating the adequacy of the "fenestration" in schematic drawings for new buildings. Where they were unwilling to delegate authority to faculty and administrators, they often deferred to them in fact and rubber-stamped policies and proposals which originated on the campus. More recently, they have intervened in areas delegated to academic senates (the appointment of Eldridge Cleaver at Berkeley) and have issued
directives or initiated policy changes unilaterally in areas previously reserved to local campus administrators and faculty (the firing of George Murray and the opening of the campus at San Francisco State).

Trustees are likely to move in the direction of assuming greater power and control under pressure from donors or potential donors, from the public, from parents, from alumni and, especially in public institutions or systems, from politicians. Political pressure may be direct or indirect. Direct pressure may take the form of punitive legislation, often accepted by trustees as desirable or politically necessary. Retaliatory laws may be directed against students, faculty, or administrators; almost invariably they will enjoin or mandate behavior and establish penalties with the effect of removing from the campus areas of discretion that have traditionally involved consultative processes and shared authority. Several bills, for example, have been introduced into the California legislature which would make it illegal for a college president to delegate any of his authority to or share it with faculty bodies; one bill in the current session would establish an independent commission, appointed by the governor, with power to investigate, hear, and establish penalties for all violations of campus order; the Governor's own legislation would mandate severe penalties for faculty or students found guilty of disrupting normal campus processes.

Indirect political pressures are exerted by public pronouncements by politicians on the state of the campuses, by threats to withhold funds from budgets, and by the power of appointment to the boards where this is vested in political agencies. Political pressures, whether direct or indirect, are backed by "public opinion" as reflected in correspondence to public officials and in letters to the editor in newspapers. Whatever its form, the dominant theme of public and political pressure is likely to be the familiar, nearsighted, and misleading clamor for "law and order." Here as elsewhere, California leads the way in disclosing the vicious and contradictory consequences of this approach. The Governor who occupies an ex officio seat on the boards of both the University and State Colleges and also appoints their members, was recently reported in the press as saying that the "basic issue ... is simple, not e. but simple. It is that the basic educational process cannot go forward under threats of force." This is in a speech in which he reiterated his belief that campuses should be kept open "at the point of bayonet" if necessary! In addition to the obvious inconsistency in this approach, there is a dual blindness here: one eye is blind to the fact that the campuses have inherited the historic fruit of American racism and the bitterness of the unfulfilled promise of democratic politics; the other is blind to the terribly fragile character of the educational process. This blindness permits the governor to use the sensitivity of faculty and administrators to these realities against them. These attitudes dominate the political climate in California and even "liberal" legislators have informed faculty leaders that the academic community is politically isolated and cannot expect support from any political quarter. Insofar as these attitudes are reflected, through pressure or natural inclination, in the attitudes of trustees their relationship with faculty will take on increasingly a power-oriented, adversary character in which forms of communication other than pressure and threat will become increasingly difficult.

Adversary attitudes toward governing boards and a disposition to embrace collective bargaining will also be promoted among junior college and state college faculties by the difficulty they encounter in redressing their second - or third - class status. They are likely to be increasingly frustrated by the fact that the social and political elites are heavily representative of the elitist educational institutions, and by the fact that members of their own governing boards also occupy second-class status in comparison to the boards of more prestigious institutions and,
partly for that reason, are reluctant and politically powerless to press the claims of their institutions as vigorously as the spokesmen for their more affluent neighbors. Collective negotiation, backed by effective sanctions, may come to be viewed as the only effective means of forcing trustees to act more aggressively and putting muscle in their demands.

In these circumstances, administrators are put under extreme pressure to take a harder line in order to forestall more punitive action by trustees or politicians and to preclude their own dismissal and replacement by a more rigid and authoritarian appointee. The direction of the pressure is the abrogation of consultative processes on the campus and the assumption by the administrator of the oligarchic power of the executive in the business or military model. The failure of administrators to yield to the pressures puts their jobs in jeopardy, and few administrators indeed are able to imagine that the continuity of their own tenure is not necessarily a condition of the salvation of their institutions. But their dilemma is real: failure to dissociate themselves from faculty positions and faculty influence is calculated to give further currency to the charge that, in the words of a California state legislator, "it has become obvious that many of our present campus administrators are totally unfitted by training, by temperament and in some cases by personal ideology to deal with" force and violence on the campus. Moreover, the effort to escape between the horns of this dilemma by reversing Teddy Roosevelt's dictum and speaking toughly while carrying a very small stick is likely only to further alienate both faculty and trustees or politicians. In the foreseeable future, therefore, the prospect is for increased tension between faculty and governing boards, with administrators caught hopelessly in the middle.

As academic senates are brought into more intense and direct conflict with trustees and administrators, strategies on both sides tend to sharpen the adversary character of their relationships. The ordinary tendency of faculties to exaggerate the "establishment" views of trustees by putting them all in the same bag is intensified, and trustees are systematically dehumanized and depersonalized by the increased popularity of the view that they can be known by their corporate or other establishment connections. On the other side, trustees increasingly play the game of "we represent the public interest and the senate represents no one." Thus, when the academic senate challenges administrative or trustee positions, its representative character is questioned or it is claimed to be a captive of one of the more militant external organizations; when it fails to support the more militant organizations, it is acclaimed as "representative" of the "silent majority" of faculty for whom the trustees or administrators allegedly speak.

Administrative and trustee efforts to use the academic senate against the more militant external organizations are resisted by the senate as a tactic of divide and conquer. The senate resists by seeking to strengthen its ties with the external organizations while keeping an official neutrality with regard to the issues that divide them. At the same time, all of the organizations move toward greater support of some form of collective negotiation. The academic senate itself feels less sanguine about the possibilities of reasoned argument as a means to influence the administration and the board (with good reason, of course, where trustee or administrative reaction to campus turmoil takes the form of showing the faculty and students who is boss); it feels a greater obligation to conciliate or to surmount the rivalries of external organizations; it sees its own organizational power threatened by the aspirations of the external groups to bargaining status. It is likely, for all those reasons, to endorse the method of collective negotiations, loosely defined, and to propose that it serve as negotiating agent.
The impact of egalitarianism, both in broadening educational opportunity and in focussing the demands of ethnic minorities on the campus, poses new problems for academic senates and creates new tensions in their relationships with external organizations. Academic senates will be sorely tested by the necessity to deal with a variety of new and difficult issues, both substantive and procedural. How ought the problem of force and violence on the campus be dealt with? How should the institution respond to such demands as that for "self-government" by ethnic minorities in the development of ethnic study curriculums? Under what conditions is amnesty justified for students found guilty of violating campus rules? How should faculty react to the question of the right of faculty and students to strike? Should faculty react to public pressures and attacks by using a public relations approach to improving their "image" or by trying to persuade the public to modify its assumptions and attitudes? While generalizations about faculty attitudes need to be recognized as describing only broad tendencies, it seems probable that disagreements over these issues will intensify traditional faculty cleavages. The defense of elitism will be undertaken mainly by faculty in the professional and graduate areas, attacked by liberal arts faculty with a primary orientation toward the undergraduate curriculum. Liberal arts faculty will include most of those who take what might be described as "tolerant" attitudes toward student protest and responsive attitudes toward minority group demands; the "law and order" approach finds more adherents in the applied and vocational areas. The cleavage runs generally along the same lines with respect to whether faculty response to adverse public attitudes should be "image"-centered or problem-centered. When these schisms are added to long-standing faculty cleavages, it becomes even more difficult for academic senates to act decisively and effectively or, indeed, to act at all.

These same issues threaten to sharpen the conflicts among external faculty organizations and to bring their latent differences into the open. The more militant organizations are not simply more aggressive in pressing for faculty interests; they tend also to put themselves more firmly and publicly on the side of egalitarianism. The more cautious organizations become at the same time more openly conservative in their attitudes toward issues raised by egalitarianism. The result is that what had been mainly a disagreement over tactics takes on also the character of ideological warfare. The academic senate's task of accommodating the rival postures and working out an effective faculty position becomes immensely more difficult.

In some situations, for which California may be a prophetic model, the academic senate may be forced into the position of defending militant faculty groups. In campuses disrupted by the confrontation tactics of black and brown and revolutionary white students there appears to be an increasing tendency on the part of the trustees, some administrators and politicians to refuse to acknowledge that the problems on the campus are fundamentally social and political and to construct a conspiracy theory to explain them. Reluctant openly to challenge or accuse ethnic minorities, these forces tend to focus on "a small group of subversive faculty" as the root of the problem. In these circumstances the Academic Senate may be compelled to defend the rights of colleagues under attack. If the militant faculty are organized in an AFT chapter or another group, one of whose objectives is collective bargaining, the senate may find itself in a trap.

So long as an academic union is too weak to threaten to be successful it may be welcomed by an academic senate as a source of pressure to move the senate into a more dynamic and aggressive posture and as a potential threat to administrators and trustees that prompts them to look more kindly on a strong senate. But if the union gets strong enough to strike or seriously to threaten to strike, the senate is put in a difficult position. It is likely to support most of the strike demands, yet
yet the legitimacy and future of its own organizational position is seriously
challenged. It may be called upon to defend the right of union members to strike
and to take vigorous counter measures against punitive dismissals of striking
faculty without endorsing the strike itself, a clear enough posture in principle
but one which in practice will have the effect of strengthening the union's
demand for bargaining rights for its own members. In these conditions the senate
is likely to find itself pushed into a position of endorsing collective bargaining
and itself contending for the role of bargaining agent.

The record of faculty senates in dealing with questions like these leaves something
to be desired, and even the most ardent supporter of faculty self-government must
entertain doubts about their ability to survive the current crisis. For their
survival requires that they be able to reach viable agreements on how to deal with
these issues which can produce sufficient faculty support to enable the faculty
collectively to contend successfully against outside pressures. It is not only a
matter of the complexity and difficulty of the issues, though heaven knows they
are complex and difficult enough. There is also the problem of the constitutional
ineffectiveness of faculty in reaching agreement on any issue. However much we
proclaim the supremacy of reasoned dialogue on the campus and however insistently
we assume that the dialogue in which faculty are trained is a means by which
reasoning men reach reasoned agreements, anyone with even a minimum of experience
with faculty meetings knows better. What other group can so easily embroil itself
in parliamentary impasses from which it is sometimes not even clear that adjourn-
ment can be effected? Who does not suspect that faculty resistance to student
membership on senates is partially motivated by a reticence to allow students to
observe what goes on? The problem is ordinarily not that faculty are too "politi-
cal" in the sense of playing games of strategy with one another; it is, rather, that
they are not political enough in the sense of skill in the arts of reaching agree-
ment. The typical skills of faculty are, after all, not the skills of the Platonic
dialogue; they are, instead, the skills by use of which a seemingly coherent
reality is made to reveal its contradictions and inconsistencies. Faculty tend to
be experts at making distinctions, not reaching agreement; posing problems, not
offering solutions. Politically their skills are divisive (although it is true
that, in Jefferson's phrase, "integrity of views" furnishes a bond of "mutual
esteem"); in this sense, faculty politics is a contradiction in terms. I do not
mean to exaggerate this faculty attribute (faculty still, do, perhaps more than any
other group, give allegiance to the ideal of reasoned dialogue as a means to deci-
sion), or to depreciate its value. I mean only to say that it complicates the
faculty's task in the current crisis and perhaps makes it more likely that faculty
senates will work out their responses to new and difficult problems primarily
within the framework of the adversary relationships with other parties.

My analysis and my conclusions are not optimistic, and I do not pretend to have any
pat or easy answers to the power struggle that seems increasingly to catch us all
up and lead us to make choices of the lesser evil. Nor do I find comfort in the
sophistry that the lesser evil is some kind of good, for the very essence of our
predicament is that we no longer are able to judge or act on some conception of
a good or goods that would bring purpose and direction to our activities. We seem
destined, in short, to move increasingly toward relationships of an adversary type,
characterized by confrontation and bargaining, backed by force, by threat and
intimidation. I agree with a colleague of mine that "when the people of the col-
leges and universities abandon reason for force in an effort to effect changes,
then, at that time, the purpose ceases to be improvement of the quality of the
institution; and the issues, for which that sacrifice of reason was made, become
empty." Bargaining is not thoughtful inquiry, and the two are not brought
noticeably closer together by the reflection, however accurate, that bargaining rather
than inquiry and dialogue are the common way of settling differences in the "real
world" of American economic and public life. Indeed, that characteristic of the
"real world" lies somewhere near the center of things that are responsible for the
crisis on the campus.

Even apart from such personal valuations of the bargaining process, it is doubtful
that the organization of effective faculty bargaining strength can realistically be
expected to modify the negative and destructive public and political attitudes that
appear to me to be at the heart of our problem. Effective faculty organization for
bargaining, indeed, seems more likely to intensify those public attitudes and to
disarm faculty efforts to change them.

Still, it is difficult to imagine in the present context how the trend might be re-
versed. And collective bargaining has, as it has always had, this to recommend it:
it is preferable to warfare (even though, to borrow Clausewitz' analogy, it is
"warfare by other means"). There is, perhaps, some hope in the willingness of
academic senates to take on the bargaining role. There are dangers here as well:
the possibility that a senate will come increasingly to take on the characteristics
of another external organization as it organizes itself for effective bargaining, and
the more serious problem of reconciling its bargaining role with its professional
claims to self-government. But, on the other side, an academic senate seems to pose
the best chance for defining collective negotiations in flexible ways and for keeping
alive the idea that bargaining is a second-best alternative to which, unfortunately,
events have forced us.

Although in principle a clear distinction can be drawn between decision based on the
process of discussion, debate and reasoned argument on the one hand and decision
based on accommodation, compromise, power and pressure on the other, in practice one
process blends into the other. (The distinction in principle is clearly put in
Joseph Tussman's distinction between "solving" and "getting"). The decision of an
academic senate, therefore, to embrace collective bargaining and to enter itself in
the contest to select a bargaining agent need not be regarded by faculty or by other
interested parties as anything more than a conclusion that exclusive reliance on the
cogency of their reasons and arguments has proved ineffective and that the protection
of the vital interests of their profession requires additional means to power. If
the movement to collective bargaining is so regarded, it may not be irreversible in
happier circumstances, and the process of negotiation may itself retain more of the
flavor of reasoned discussion--consequences that, from my value structure at least,
are devoutly to be desired.