The traditional role of liberal arts has been to transmit cultural heritage to undergraduate students. This function should be changed to involve the development of understandings that leave students free to make informed and uncoerced individual judgments in a world that deals with constantly increasing bodies of knowledge. The old concept of liberal arts has been made inadequate by the tempo and extent of technological and social change in the US, and the rapid growth of college enrollments by students of higher intellectual quality. Today, institutions of higher education must not only cope with more young people but with a more diverse student body. Modern undergraduate students are searching for generous human relationships, educational relevance, and are trying to make articulate in contemporary terms the very values that have been most cherished in the history of liberal education. Close observation reveals that the attitudes of these students reflect the forces at work in the larger US society. The small activist group is important, because it is composed of students who are among the highest in academic achievement and ability who also influence the tone of their institutions. The college or university that neglects this group in its curriculum and in its instructional effort invites both trouble and a kind of functional extinction.
The Liberal Arts: A Modern Concept?

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For those of us intimately enmeshed in the affairs of academia, it comes as a mild but authentic wrench to realize that the liberal arts are not subjects in the curriculum. Rather, they are personal qualities—the attributes of men that enlarge their capacity for uncoerced choice. The liberal arts, in short, are the liberating arts, the skills and understandings becoming to free men and essential to their freedom.

Beginning in the Renaissance and flowering most fully in the nineteenth century, the liberal arts became the aim and center of higher education primarily on the basis of two then valid assumptions. First, it was assumed that the goal of the educational experience was the shaping of character, the development of the prince or, at the very least, the gentleman. Elitist in conception, advanced educational opportunity was reserved for the few whose advantaged backgrounds prepared them for roles of authority and leadership and equipped them for the special studies suitable to their station. Second, it was assumed that the world was stable, that yesterday's experience was predictive of tomorrow's, and that exposure to the finest historical models of manhood provided the surest base for the free but responsible life of those specially destined for high position. The languages, the literatures, and the history of Greek and Roman antiquity thus became the successors to the medieval trivium and quadrivium as the source of the artes liberales, the arts by which men of privilege could achieve the widest degree of uncoerced choice, because the record of Greece and Rome most vividly reflected the images of human life that defined
nobility, wisdom, and freedom. In the nineteenth century, the British Civil Service could be founded on this classical conception of a liberal education on the ground that it produced men of judgment who stood fast in the face of crises and who could readily learn the technical specifics necessary for a wide range of important jobs. Far more important than technical knowledge was the man—a man liberated from the compulsions of immediacy and meanness by his inclusion in a viable tradition and his cultivated emulation of the best known models of human conduct. And it worked remarkably well.

But during the nineteenth century, new winds began to blow. The growth of political democracy stimulated a democratizing trend in society generally, leading steadily to a broadening of the base of educational opportunity. Elitist assumptions about higher education, especially in the United States, began to break down; and the industrial revolution, giving birth to a host of new occupations and professions along with its new products, created a demand for expanded types of training at the same time that it gave an impetus to social mobility by letting at least an occasional mechanic, for example, dream realistically about becoming an engineer. Specialized knowledge became a force to conjure with, and the classical tradition of the liberal arts lost some of its persuasiveness and force.

In our own time, these patterns of change have acquired a complexity and a rate of occurrence that have never before been even approximated. In 1922, not so long ago as we ordinarily count the years, a distinguished chemist, discussing new understandings of the energies locked within atoms, could conclude his remarks on such new metals as radium and uranium by writing, "The atom is as much beyond our reach as the moon. We cannot rob its vault of the treasure." A scant 45 years later, all of us are keenly aware that the moon is no longer a symbol of the unattainable; and news from the Chinese mainland italicizes our troubled knowledge that the atomic vault can now be plundered almost at will.
In the past 25 years, we have not only turned the energy of the atom into a potentially genocidal weapon, begun with high success the exploration of space, and stepped over the threshold of industrial automation. We have also been brought face to face with a variety of entirely novel social probabilities. The accessibility of inexpensive oral contraceptives implies a marked and rapid revision of our codes of sexual conduct and the ideological and psychological bases on which they have found their credibility. The impact on marriage as an institution is not easy to predict. Our technology of communication and transportation, largely a product of the past quarter-century, has tied the nations of the world into a system of interdependence that properly makes events in once exotic places like Cambodia or the Congo matters of great concern in New York and Dallas; and mountains, deserts, and oceans have become essentially irrelevant as guarantees of a state's security, autonomy, or importance. The rejection of colonialism has been timed in general to the rejection by Negroes in the United States of second-class citizenship, and the long hegemony of Caucasian dominance in both domestic and international spheres is under a threat which, in many quarters, entails special agonies and nervewracking complexities. If the industrial application of computers and servomechanisms means freedom from undignified toil and opens new vistas of comfortable leisure, it also raises the troubling question of where men are to find new and viable sources of pride and self-esteem when the ancient Western ethic of work loses its vitality.

Above all, this familiar but deeply revolutionary catalogue must be capped with some brief attention to the thoughtways that both underlie and are a consequence of our booming technology and its social reverberations. There is not yet a widely accepted single name for these intellectual processes, but they are concerned primarily with the design and management of large-scale systems. They permeate econometrics.
and modern control theory, are the basis of the programming and use of big computers, pervade management science and the field of operations research, and enter into the strategic as well as the technological issues connected with weapons systems. Whatever their assets—and they are obviously manifold—these systems-oriented approaches to contemporary problems begin not with a concern for persons, but with a search for predictability, reliability, and efficiency. Such a quest leads, as a by-product at least, to a low premium on the individual human being; and to the extent that it is in some sense successful, it subtly alters our ways of thinking about ourselves, our fellows, and the human condition. Nudged by the very real contributions of the systems scientists and computer engineers, we tend a little more to evaluate men as systemic units. Sheer efficiency becomes the touchstone of personal judgment, and if men fall below some minimally acceptable standard of efficiency, the central question becomes one of whether it is more economic to repair them (often psychiatrically) or to replace them. Thus, the revolution of our time has far more in common with the revolution's associated with the ideas of Galileo and Darwin than with those associated with changes in the manufacture and distribution of artifacts; ours is a revolution in man's image of himself, in the very way that we conceive ourselves and our relationships to each other.

Educationally, the implications here are clear. Because our society is in process of radical transformation at an unprecedented rate, the past is no longer a sufficient guide to the future. For this reason, the traditional function of the undergraduate college—the transmitting of the cultural heritage to young people destined for some form of social leadership—is simply inadequate. It is not that the great human legacy has lost its value. Indeed, now as never before, one can make a strong case for the importance of our connections with the past and for the humanizing merits of developing an informed sense among students of membership in the long, proud pageant of man. But when yesterday no longer forecasts the nature of
tomorrow, when the experience of sons is so startlingly different from the experience of fathers, then the enterprise of education must find new sources of vitality, relevance, and the liberating effects associated with the liberal arts.

In the curriculum, this state of affairs demands not only a presentation of our cultural inheritance and of what is now known. It makes necessary a winnowing of our inherited knowledge in the light of the uncertainties of the future and the urgent problems of the present. Our traditions, in short, must be subject to responsible and intensive criticism. And if teaching is to be effective, it must embrace not only scholarly thoroughness and clarity, but also a demonstration of responsible criticism. One can argue that if scholarship itself is to be more than antiquarianism, a methodolagical exercise, or a harnessing of intellect to technology, then it must prove its value as a basis for this kind of critical and functionally humane perspective on the sources of our culture. Teaching students "to think" has long been an academic piety; it is now a necessity that must be faced and met in the most hardheaded fashion if colleges and universities are to remain the great agents of civilization that they have historically been. Readymade answers are not available, but it seems only the blunt truth that institutions which fail to address themselves systematically to this problem are simply irresponsible.

The crucial nature of this point may be illustrated by an episode from recent history. In 1962, the then President John F. Kennedy was struggling with the question of whether to stop the atmospheric testing of atomic bombs. On his one hand, he had a set of advisers, all eminent and creative physicists, chemists, and biologists, who were urging the cessation of tests on the ground that fallout would cause genetic mutations, producing untold numbers of monstrously deformed children over untold numbers of as yet unborn generations. On his other hand, the President had another set of advisers, equally well qualified, who argued that these predictions of genetic
casualties were greatly overdrawn and that, in any case, the risk of radioactivity-induced damage to the germ plasm was as nothing when compared to the risk of America's losing its supremacy as an atomically equipped military power. On the lonely shoulders of Mr. Kennedy sat the responsibility for decision. And yet, as James Reston reminded all of us that March in a column in the New York Times, that responsibility ultimately rested on every citizen of the United States. Whatever the President's action, it was up to us, the next time we went to the polls, to validate it or to reject it. A failure on our part to do so would be a failure of the democratic tradition and the faith that wisdom finally resides in a nation's people. The liberal arts, in contemporary terms, means the development of understandings that leave men free, even in the face of issues like this one, of domination by experts, able to make informed and uncoerced judgments about the decisions of their leaders, whatever the complexity involved.

Ours, then, is a new task in the changing tradition of the liberal arts. It is nothing less than to make an entire citizenry, not merely an elite, capable of participating freely in the direction and determination of its own destiny. To accomplish it, we must deal effectively and imaginatively not only with a vastly enlarged and constantly enlarging sphere of knowledge, but with huge numbers of people.

So far as numbers are concerned, we have certainly made a dramatic beginning. We all know that there are currently about 5.5 million students roaming our halls of higher learning. In 1940, the comparable figure approximated 1.5 million. In that year, the percentage of college-age youth actually enrolled was 14. In the mid-1960s, that percentage comes close to 48. By 1975, we can anticipate total student enrollments of roughly nine million or something in excess of 60 per cent of youngsters between the ages of 17 and 21. The problems of housing such rapidly increasing numbers, providing parking spaces for their cars, and recruiting faculty
members to meet their classes are much too close to require under-scoring.

Two points, however, may not be quite so apparent. A little surprisingly, the leaping increments in college attendance have also produced an increase in over-all quality. In part, this upgrading in student competence may be attributed to the improved instruction in elementary and secondary schools, particularly in the last decade. It is easy to demonstrate that today's freshmen come to college with both a wider range of information and a superior mastery of mathematics, English, and modern foreign languages than was true, on the average, of their parents a scant generation ago. More importantly, rising enrollments have meant rising opportunities for the most able youngsters. A generation ago, only about half of the brightest high school graduates—those in the top 15 per cent of the population in measured intelligence—continued their formal education. In 1965, over two-thirds of the students in that bracket of ability went on to college. If we take high school achievement as our index, we note that in 1940 appreciably less than half of the youngsters ranking in the upper 50 per cent of their high school graduating classes went on to college; today that figure has passed the 70 per cent mark. In short, as our colleges and universities have absorbed more students, they have also absorbed more talented ones at a higher level of pre-college training. So far then, the burgeoning of numbers has meant an accompanying growth in intellectual quality.

Nevertheless, the second point to be made here remains crucial. Increases in absolute numbers of students and in proportions of college-age youth in the growing population inevitably mean increases in the diversity of college student bodies. Not only must our institutions cope educatively with more youngsters, but with more kinds of youngsters. This inexorable fact of growing diversity raises the question of whether we mean it when we give voice to certain of our humane aspirations and to some of our national goals. An example, important both for its
source and for the way in which it echoes widely shared sentiments, comes from the platform of the Democratic party in 1964:

Our task is to make the national purpose serve the human purpose: that every person shall have the opportunity to become all that he or she is capable of becoming.

We believe that knowledge is essential to individual freedom and to the conduct of a free society. We believe that education is the surest and most profitable investment a nation can make.

Regardless of family financial status, therefore, education should be open to every boy or girl in America up to the highest level which he or she is able to master.

Regardless of political preferences, there are few among us who would dissent from such an aim. Yet it poses questions as fraught with poignancy as with technical difficulties: What are the highest levels of education which various groups within our population are able to master? How can we tell? And what are our resources for appropriate action?

Up to now, we have been able to avoid these worrisome queries while cherishing our ambitions. It has been a long time since we quarreled with each other about whether elementary education should be universal. There is still room for doubts about secondary education, but we have reached a high degree of agreement by supporting an increasing diversity in high school programs as well as by appealing to such collateral matters as keeping youngsters of high school age out of the labor market and off the street, etc. We are now coming rapidly to the moment of decision when we must find some way, at once rational and humane, to balance the standards of higher education with the huge spectrum of abilities over which American youth is distributed. Conceivably, we could solve (as seems probable) the financial problems
of college attendance only to find ourselves developing exclusionary policies of
admission on the grounds of some straightforward concept of stupidity. Given the
still unresolved issues bound up with the nature of intelligence, and given the
ambiguous character of academic grades, we are liable to some disquieting uncer-
tainties and some distressing feelings of guilt if we move too rapidly toward a
total control of enrollments on such a basis. Like the Queries of the Quakers, this
matter may be one less to be settled than to be thought about vigorously and
seriously. Unhappily, there is little evidence that many of our colleges and
universities are facing up to this close-at-hand difficulty in any systematic fashion.

In any event, diversity of background, ability, and drive is almost sure to
be the hallmark of most American student bodies in the very near future if such
is not already the case. The breadth of these differences makes it highly im-
probable that a homogeneous curriculum, traditional methods of teaching, or the
customary allotments of time in either credit-hours or terms will serve equally
well the diverse elements within institutional enrollments. De facto equality of
educational opportunity demands attention to the varying rates at which diverse
students learn, their frequently quite different styles of learning, and their
divergent motivations and personal orientations. We already know that the lecture,
the conventional preference among modes of college instruction, is an inefficient
and expensive means of promoting learning per unit cost. In the light of the
numbers and diversity of students with which we must contend now and in the years
ahead, we are doomed to produce far less than optimum learning, just as we are doomed
to provide far less than truly equal opportunities for large segments of our college-
going youth, if we continue our now modal patterns of teaching and of organizing the
learning experiences that define our curricula.

So far, we have considered two major factors that have put in extremis older
conceptions of the liberal arts and how they may be facilitated by the college
experience: One is the revolutionary tempo and extent of technological and social change; the other is the staggering increase in the numbers of persons for whom extended and meaningful educational opportunities are crucial in a society in such radical transformation as our own. But the increase in the number of students to be served is probably less significant than the alteration in the demands, the expectancies, and the temper of students now coming to our campuses. Protests and demonstrations at a variety of institutions are the most public and dramatic symptom of this component in the drastically modified Zeitgeist of academia, but their meaning is not given by either their intensity or their immediate causes. Student riots are hardly novelties—witness the heated cannon balls rolled down the corridors at Hobart in 1811, the "bell and shooting" by which Georgia students celebrated Christmas Eve in 1824, or the more recent panty raids of the 1950s. The novelty in the modern student temper lies essentially in a tripartite emphasis on more generous human relationships, on social criticism, and on educational relevance. And the greatest of these is relevance.

When one strips away the irresponsible hotheadedness, the disposition to adolescent hijinks, and a tendency simply to run with the crowd—all of which are certainly present—one finds\(^4\) an impressive reflection in student attitudes of the forces at work in our larger society. Predominant themes include the subtle processes of dehumanization, symbolized by the IBM card; a distrust of the world which youth has inherited from its elders, the emblems of which are atomic weaponry and such military involvements as those in Viet Nam and Santo Domingo; and the disarticulation of the intellectual life from the direct application of human ideals like love and justice in the community, a concern represented by students' leaving their classrooms to join the Peace Corps or to participate in the civil rights movement. While the proportion of actual activists among undergraduates is undoubtedly low, this group is important in two ways. By and large, these students are among the highest in both academic ability and academic achievement on their campuses; and they heavily influence the
tone of their institutions even where demonstrations and protest meetings are few or nonexistent. The college or university that is inattentive, in its curriculum and in its instructional effort, to this element invites both trouble and a kind of functional extinction.

Nor are the issues substantively very different if the student mood in a particular place is one of apathy. Apathy, after all, can be a form of passive resistance, and a lack of commitment to college may imply a lack of anything that seems worthy of commitment. Standards of worthiness may properly vary markedly between students and faculty, and student standards are by no means necessarily the most appropriate ones. Nevertheless, a condition necessary for the business of education to proceed effectively is an institutional ambience in which such differences can be openly and fairly considered and in which undergraduate views are accorded genuine respect.

The reasons for such respect are many, but a central one is that the current generation is struggling to make articulate in modern terms the very values that have been most cherished in the history of liberal education. Concern about one's fellows, caring about the state of the world, and a strongly interiorized sense of love and justice have long animated the educational adventure; and whatever their shortcomings, their immaturities, or their impatience with very authentic complexities, today's youngsters are searching---and asking for help in their quest---for ways to develop just such qualities. Theirs is not a request for surrogate parenthood. See, for example, their scathing strictures on the doctrine of in loco parentis. Rather, they are searching for the forms of personal development that extend the domain of uncoerced choice; and when they criticize the contemporary college for contributing too little to the definition and cultivation of the liberal arts in this central and humane sense, they are only saying, however stridently, that our institutions of higher education have responded too sluggishly and with too little imagination to the changing context of scientific and social innovation. They are
only saying that, in the whirlwind of our era, our colleges, with too few notable exceptions, have become overly involved in off-campus change and have neglected the need to reinterpret the liberal arts in ways congruent to the age.

This characterization of students brings us to the observation of a paradox in the modern university. Seedbeds of change for virtually all of the rest of society, universities are themselves highly resistant to change. That is, they are highly resistant to any modifications in their educational functions. This situation defines still another barrier to the reconstitution of the liberal arts on bases that are at once vital and contemporary. To understand it, we must understand something about the nature of college faculties and the roles of college professors.

Oddly enough, the catalogue of professorial tasks is not a small one. Over time, the college instructor has been called upon to extend the frontiers of human knowledge, to resynthesize and reinterpret knowledge, to impart significant information and ideas to young people, to provide a good example of conduct for youth and to indoctrinate the young in the moral (and sometimes the religious) traditions of their culture, to furnish personal counsel to students, to play a part in the determination of policy and in the management of his department and occasionally in his institution, to render various forms of intellectually based public service, to represent the professional concerns of his special discipline to his institution and to the public at large, and many more. Obviously, these functions have never been equally weighted, and some of them have waxed over history while others have waned. The point, however, is that a professor plays many roles and occupies a deceptively complex niche in the hall of the professions.

An analysis of recent trends in the activities of faculty members gives rise to the strong hypothesis that those tasks which bring professors and students into closest relationship have been progressively less rewarded and therefore weaker,
whereas those which separate professors from students have been progressively more
rewarded and therefore more definitive of the actual work of faculties. The result
has been a degree of alienation between students and their mentors and the perceived
irrelevance in their educational experience of which so many undergraduates complain.

For example, as the extent of religious control over colleges and universities
declined, there was a concomitant decline in the character-building objective once
so vital in American higher education. With secularization a dominant motif in the
larger society, the professorial functions of moral indoctrination and personal counsel-
ing fell away for sheer want of support in the culture at large. In a specialized
and secularized way, they have been taken over by specialists in student personnel work
and the clinical professions, oriented much more toward the resolving of such human
problems as emotional upset, troubled interpersonal relations, difficulties in the
planning of careers, or actual mental illness than toward the development of
character. Under this sort of division of labor, emphases in the curriculum and in
instructional patterns on the significance of subject matter for characterological
growth or decisions about one’s conduct have also fallen away. In consequence,
classrooms have been cleared of a certain stuffiness and an atmosphere of frequent
preachment; but there has also been a lessened sense of faculty responsibility for
students as persons, and a compelling justification has at least been put ready to
hand for a lessened interest in the personal concerns of undergraduates as developing
human beings. These tendencies have been reinforced, of course, by the sheer force
of hugely increased numbers.

On the other hand, three quite different trends have increasingly moved
professors into a predominantly scholarly role in which their primary audience is
their disciplinary colleagues rather than their students or the official personnel of
their institutions. One is the establishment of the PhD as the faculty union card.
A German import, the degree originally stood witness to advanced scholarship in
primarily the natural sciences. Very rapidly, however, it became the hallmark of respectability in all departments of knowledge, and its special stress on research attainments somehow generalized to become also the basic qualification for teaching, too. This development is understandable in the light of the second trend, an essentially simultaneous increase in the centrality of research and publication as the criteria of professional success and the routes to promotions and salary increments. In 1958, Caplow and McGee demonstrated that research and publication were very often the only bases on which employment in a college or university was granted or withheld and quite frequently the only grounds for decisions about a professor's advancement. There is no evidence to suggest any significant change in this pattern. Indeed, a recent study finds old practices still entrenched and that the almost willy-nilly emphasis on research and publication actually stands in the way of improving undergraduate teaching. With respect to both the quickly developed vitality of the PhD and the greatly increased emphasis on research, the rise of science in Western culture through the last half of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries was no doubt crucial.

The rise of science also was highly relevant to our third trend, the growth of professional associations. Rare is the professor who does not belong to at least one of the societies into which his discipline is organized or who does not look forward to its published journals, its annual meetings, its special services to members, and the contributions of its committees. His identity pivots in large part on his acceptance by the Modern Language Association or the American Chemical Society and on the status he commands among his fellow members. As a result, he is subject to a conflict of loyalties between his discipline, represented by its society, which determines in high degree his reputation and his self-concept, and his institution, which pays his salary and gives him a place in which to work. This situation has been enormously elaborated as the professional societies, responding to the growth of knowledge, have undergone various forms of mitosis to make room for new
specialties, concerned with increasingly narrower and more intensive brands of investigation and scholarship. Inevitably, a divisive influence has been exercised, reshaping the faculty member's image of himself and the perceived role he plays in the public eye. No longer is he the sage, reflective, and broadly cultivated man whose wise judgments can properly be sought over a wide range of issues; rather, he is known by the distinctiveness of that highly fractional part of his discipline in which he has developed superior expertise.

Taken together, these three tendencies---the rise of the PhD, the centrality of research and publication, and the growth of professional societies---have determined conditions under which a professor's identity, reputation, rank, and salary are much more dependent on what he does in his study or his laboratory than in his classroom. Indeed, students can be a real distraction from the productive functions according to which success is defined. Again, the effect has been to enlarge, sometimes subtly and sometimes blatantly, the degree of alienation between faculty and student body.

Finally, the demand for expert brainpower, particularly since World War II but as a necessity in a highly technologized society, has given a new impetus to the public service functions of the professoriate. If philosophers have not yet become kings, faculty members have certainly come into their own. Opportunities to serve government agencies and industrial organizations in consultative capacities are available with considerable and growing frequency, and posts to be filled in business or government during leaves of absence or sabbatical years are not uncommon. Performing these functions is not only Pleasantly lucrative; it makes possible contributions to society of genuine importance, and potentially at least, it brings the perspectives of academic life and the immediacies of the outside world into a closer and more harmonious relationship. But because it is not easy to involve students in meaningful ways in such enterprises, the enlargement of the public service function has tended to deepen the rift between multiply occupied professors and the youngsters.
who come to them in search of a relevant education. The problem, of course, is one of how to make more accessible to youth the experience of men who have learned to move with relative ease between the ivory tower, with its long view of the human condition, and the world of practical affairs, with its realistic hurly-burly and harshly direct responsibilities.

From this analysis, it appears that the task of our time is that of democratizing the liberal arts—of cultivating the personal qualities that extend the range of a man's uncoerced choices not merely in an elite, but in a whole nation. To do anything less is to abrogate our dream of a self-determined society of responsibly participant citizens. Needing specialists, needing technicians, and faced with the extreme diversity of talents and abilities in our population, we cannot afford to be lured away from the conviction that the first requirement of a good society is free persons. To be a free person, one must have a sense of kinship with a community and with the continuities in the human narrative while still retaining the ability to criticize one's social matrix and one's traditions. One must be able to vote on the basis of information and principle, to relate oneself in intimate ways to other persons, to find joy and self-fulfillment in leisure, and to share zestfully in the risks and opportunities of our distinctive age. The achievement of such objectives entails more education for both more people and for more kinds of people, and that education must be of a liberating sort.

The regeneration of the liberal arts as we have discussed them here requires our coming to grips with the rate at which knowledge is currently expanding and with the pace of social change, with the increased numbers and diversity of our student bodies, with the often disruptive but basically sound demands of contemporary students, and—with the peculiar role-conflicts of our faculties, who often are strongly drawn into enterprises where commitments to education are not infrequently a burden and a distraction. Of these problems, probably the most central is that of
the cleavage of interests between students and their professors. The primary factor at work here is a reward system that puts a low premium on educative involvements with youth, on any serious investment in improved instruction, and on such matters as curricular innovation or the reorganization of institutional structures in ways calculated to serve more meaningfully the principles of the liberal arts. On the other hand, the reward system puts a very high premium on research and publication, on various forms of public service, and on a professor's involvement in his professional societies. So long as that reward system operates, it is unlikely that major developments favorable to the liberal arts will be brought about. One of the chores of contemporary leadership is that of identifying and of inventing ways to reinforce novel efforts to cultivate the liberal arts among students and to encourage a more active and creative concern with the specifically educational objectives of our colleges.
Footnotes

This paper is adapted from an address to the Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges, meeting in Washington, D.C., on 16 November, 1966.

1 In compressing a long and complex history here, I have done a violence to its details that demands apology. For present purposes, however, this general sketch is sufficiently accurate, and the contrast between the nineteenth century and our own unprecedentedly hurly-burly epoch is, I think, appropriately drawn.

2 In much of this paper, I lean heavily on my chapter, entitled "To Disenthrall Ourselves," in O. Milton and E. J. Shoben, Jr. (Eds.) Learning and the Professors, to be published by the American Council on Education in the spring of 1967.


