State actions related to the formulation of educational policy are treated from four distinct points of view. Tom Wiley, University of New Mexico, describes pressures upon the school system in New Mexico by the U.S. Office of Education, the State legislature, the governor’s office, and teacher associations. Michael Manley, assistant to the Democratic floor leader of the California legislature, discusses specific legislation enacted by the California Assembly in areas of school finance (including support for special services, children’s centers, and kindergartens), increasing local authority to develop local curricula, and a standardized statewide testing program. Joseph H. McGimsey, Syracuse University, outlines and evaluates the main features of Planning-Programing-Budgeting Systems. Laurence Iannoccone, Harvard University, projects a basic shift in the governance of education, with authority through funding becoming less centralized in the Federal government and more actively expressed through political interest groups active at the State and local levels. (JK)
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on

STATE POLITICS OF EDUCATION:
POLICY FORMULATION - PAST
PRESENT AND FUTURE

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State Politics and Educational Policy:  
A View From the Profession  

by  
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Educational control factors in New Mexico are undergoing a metamorphosis. The syndrome leading to these changes is not uncommon to other states; however, I shall limit my remarks, principally to what I have observed in my home state.

Strong pressures are exerting themselves upon the State Board of Education, the official body entrusted with establishing educational policy. Policies relate to controls, and the prime question is: Who shall control education?

These pressures converge from at least four directions: 1) Washington, 2) The Legislature, 3) The Governor's Office, and 4) Teacher Organizations.

INFLUENCE FROM WASHINGTON. - State Departments of Education have been strengthened by the U.S. Office of Education, as was promised by Mr. Keppel several years ago. Sufficient funds have been poured into the various departments, that they could maintain a large operation with no state appropriation. How has this new strength expressed itself? Primarily in activities sponsored by federal money and directives. Departments are strongly Washington-oriented, to the degree that to an extent, they are becoming regional offices of the USOE, as they administer the recipes in the big "cookbook" from that office. Heavy federal subsidies for specific purposes have made this situation inevitable.

About half the operating budget is derived from federal funds, and all or part of the salaries of two-thirds of the staff is paid from these funds. It is axiomatic that emphasis is given to those services into which these revenues are fed. This, of course, has always been true, although upon a much smaller scale. For example, supervision of the Smith-Hughes related courses was always much more concentrated than for subjects that were not federally garnished.

PRESSURES FROM THE LEGISLATURE. - On the other hand, strong inducements are being exerted by legislative leaders to give more "police" power to the SDE, but with command decisions regarding maintenance of standards being made behind the scenes by the legislature. Partnership relations between the SDE and local districts are discouraged, rather the "partnership" is between the Legislature and the SDE, - the senior partner being the legislature. The legislature also appears to be attempting to use a "captive" SDE to counteract the power exerted by the Governor. For several years, the legislative interim committees have been slopping over into the executive field. This factor appears to be stronger when the legislative majority is of the opposite party from that adhered to
by the governor, although it is not entirely absent when the governor is of 
the dominant party. The structure providing for an interim Legislative 
Finance Committee, encourages "investigations" of administrative activities. 
Education has consumed a heavy percentage of this committee's time and interest. 

POWER FROM THE GOVERNOR'S OFFICE. - In New Mexico a large percentage of 
operating funds originates at the state level. The Governor exerts direct 
authority over budget making through the Chief of the School Finance Division, 
an official who serves at the pleasure of the Governor, and who has full legal 
control of budgetary procedure and line item amounts. Each year he conducts 
hearings in every school administrative unit, wherein budgets for the coming 
year are analyzed, adjusted, and approved by him. Historically, this official 
has had great influence with the legislature in fiscal matters. His office 
has been influenced, in turn, by the big taxpayer groups of the state. The 
stance of this office is usually contrariwise to that of the NMEA, where 
educational financing is concerned. A hardline, pruencial, money-saving 
attitude is customary. The SDE is often squeezed out of a strong policy-
making role in state finance policy-making. To say the least, the relative 
positions of these three agencies can be represented by a triangle with 
the SDE located at the least significant vertex. 

Ancillary agencies, such as the New Mexico School Boards Association 
and the New Mexico Congress of Parents and Teachers, have wielded influence 
on the side of one or the other of the three major organizations. 

INFLUENCE OF TEACHER ORGANIZATIONS. - Traditionally a rivalry has existed 
between the New Mexico Education Association and the SDE. Now, greater 
influence is exerted by the Association because of the accelerated militancy 
of teachers. Indeed, the NMEA, if it could find its potential strength, 
might dominate the scene, but ultra-conservatism vs. ultra-activism splits 
this organization's power. The SDE, under a board largely made up of 
conservatives, is opposed to the militant thrust of teachers. This makes 
for covert antagonism between the SDE and the NMEA. In spite of the 
division within the ranks, legislative leaders appear to fear the teacher-
groups. This is shown by their irritability toward teacher militancy and 
also by their attempts during the recent campaign to appease the teachers. 

The new exertion of power is baffling to politicians. Traditionally, 
they have not feared teacher reaction at the polls. New they are carefully 
watching for new developments, although during the 1968 campaigns -- primary 
and general election -- no decided unity of the teacher-vote was discernible. 
Nevertheless, teachers in action no longer bear any resemblance to Ichabod 
Crane, although to a degree they have amazed, and even confused themselves 
by their own militant activities. 

SOME OBSERVATIONS. - Now and then a concerted effort on the part of the 
various educational agencies has occurred - such as suggested by Iannaccone's 
syndical, but they have drifted back, in each instance, to a fragmented 
approach. The system is now comparable with that of Michigan. (Nicholas 
A. Masters, et. al., State Politics and the Public Schools) Largely, the 
SDE has been influential in areas of curriculum and teacher-certification 
standards, but not in the fiscal area. More often than not, unity of thrust
or fragmentation has been related to the personalities of the men holding positions in the NMEA and the SDE, as well as the School Finance Division. Rivalry has depended to a great extent, upon the attitude of these men to each other upon a personal basis. Each organization has a built-in prestige factor that has been evident through the notice which it receives from the legislature but its prestige factor also involves the men at the "helm". Attempts are constantly underway to divide their collective potential power.

Republican v. Democratic rivalry is present in Santa Fe, but many disagreements are on the issue of conservatism v. liberalism in both parties. Upon this latter basic difference in philosophy it appears that many more contests will be waged, both groups testifying that education is important -- with the conservatives arguing that if the "fat" were cut from the program much less money would be needed, while the liberals are contending that more money is necessary and that austerity describes the present situation.

At this point in time it appears that the legislature may yield to a demand for higher support of education. Public opinion seems to have been temporarily won by the "school supporters," who have argued for more funds in order to do a better job. An incident leading to this conclusion occurred in December 1968, when the electors of the Albuquerque School District voted heavily in favor of a 43 per cent income-tax surtax to be used for education. Last spring, pressure to do something about the financial situation had been exerted upon the Governor through a five-day strike of the Albuquerque teachers, and several other exhibitions of teacher unrest throughout the state. A task force named by the Governor to study the situation, recommended a special legislative session, which he called. The legislature provided local option for a 50 per cent maximum income-tax surtax. This was the first opportunity that the legislature had ever given for local option where public school operating funds were involved. The underlying reason, of course was to relieve the pressure upon the legislature, but the action constituted a needed reform.

Countering the optimistic trend as indicated by this exhibition of public support is a growing concern caused by the constant increase in taxes at the Federal, state and local levels. It is impossible to predict with assurance whether the importance of education or the revolt against climbing taxes will govern legislative action during the session now in progress.

In conclusion, it must be said that at times the several major agencies representing education at the state level have appeared to be more interested in receiving the credit for legislative accomplishments than in getting the job done. This attitude for the past few years, has failed in bringing about achievements to which any of them could point with a high degree of pride. Such a condition may cause closer cooperation in future legislative confrontations. However, it appears that the legislature is strongly committed to do the major research and make the command decisions in determining educational needs and support, using professional people in an exalted "choreboy" role, a role that the SDE has already been forced to take where federal decisions for use of funds are concerned.
The Teachers' Association, as it strengthens its militant stance, may play a more important role in politics and thereby, in influencing legislation at the state level. It follows that this new found power, if combined with that of other states could strongly influence federal legislation. The extent to which the public will support the demands of teachers, depends upon the degree to which it correlates these demands with better education. The answer to this question remains to be unveiled.
State Politics and Educational Policy:
A View From the Legislatures

by

Michael A. Manley
Assistant to Democratic Floor Leader
California State Assembly

When Dean Bowles first contacted me with regard to participating in this panel on the subject of legislative influences on educational policy making I was very reluctant to appear. Everyone, I thought at the time, in the education fraternity believes he is an expert on this subject, and his thesis generally is simple: there is entirely too much politics in education, and entirely too little education in politics. What could I possibly say that might dispell the popular notion that politicians dabble in education only when it suits their political purposes?

On reflecting later over the current state of the public mind on this issue, however, I decided to make the bold defense of legislative policy making in the educational field. The State of California over the past two years has been the scene of more political meddling in education -- most of it for plainly political and publicity purposes by persons in the nation. But much constructive legislative interest and action has occurred behind the scenes and the front pages of the tabloids. I hope today to tell part of that story. I believe in the long run it is by far the most significant for the betterment of education in this State.

It is almost traditional for American state legislatures to be remiss in their duties to education. They argue loudly against federal aid and for states' rights while appropriating paltry sums for the support of the schools. But as true as this may be of other states, it is not the case in California.

The California Legislature today is truly and fervently interested in quality education, and the record proves it.

The post-war record of the Legislature in school finance was not very good. As a matter of fact, there was no record to speak of. The substantial increases in the State School Fund in 1946 and 1952 were the results of popular initiative, not voluntary state legislation.
The first really large addition to the School Fund was the result of Assembly Bill 145 by then Speaker and now Minority Leader Jess Unruh in 1964, and that was an increase of some 120 million dollars at that time. It is even more today because of the growth in enrollment.

In 1967 the largest school finance bill in state history was signed into law, again authored by Unruh.

That legislation provided nearly 200 million dollars in increased school aid annually. That amount set a record, as I said, but it was appropriate in a year in which record high levels were reached with the budget and the tax bill. The passage of Assembly Bill 272 was a major victory for the schools if only because it was the largest school aid proposal before the Legislature that year.

And, I would remind you, it was a bill authored by the leading Democrat in the State and signed into law by a popular new Republican Governor. That proves either that educational finance is not a partisan issue, or that the schools are very successful lobbyists. I suspect the truth is somewhere in-between.

In addition to the non-categorical type of state aid, AB 272 also made a very substantial change in the Basic Reading program which was adopted by the California Legislature in 1965.

Until then state aid for employing Specialist Reading Teachers had been on a straight proportion of the tax base. It meant that Los Angeles was required to put up about sixty-five cents on the dollar whereas an impoverished district might have to come up with as little as ten cents.

Our experience with the original fifty-fifty matching, however, showed us that the only districts taking advantage of the program were the poor ones financially, not necessarily the ghetto districts, most in need of additional expert teachers. Thus, the program now calls for full state funding for this unique program. And I think it is a unique program.

Nowhere in this country, to my knowledge, is there a system which focuses on the fundamental part of the regular school program and underwrites it completely with state funds. It indicates the importance attached to reading by the California Legislature, and the confidence the Legislature has in top-flight teachers to do the job with adequate backing.

And another major improvement in the 1967 bill was a fifty percent increase in state support for Children's Centers -- a critical need in Los Angeles where working mothers must often travel many miles to work and back again. We provided for new centers as well as funds to reduce the fees low-income parents have to pay.

A further word on kindergarten probably should be included here. The new law mandated kindergarten, and waiting lists are now a thing of
the past. In addition, there is a major effort in the bill to get away from double sessions of sixty or seventy children, taught by one teacher.

Perhaps of greatest long-range importance is a small, eight-line section of AB 272 which is a declaration of fiscal independence for school boards.

Starting in 1971, the fixed tax ceilings which have restricted school districts for decades will be eliminated. The State's school boards will have the power to set their own tax rates just as do city councils and boards of supervisors.

School boards, virtually alone among the legislative bodies in this State, must now wait for a vote of the people before determining the amount of money that can be spent. If there is voter resentment over taxes -- any kind of taxes -- it manifests itself in the defeat of school taxes.

I have always regarded this as a curious, if not downright tragic, reversal of our traditional structure of values. There is no more acrimonious political issue than that of taxation. Yet, when voter resentment builds, it is not the politicians who take the heat; it is the children.

AB 272 proposes that we end this modern version of the children's crusade. This law will make school boards responsible for both the kinds of programs they approve and the amounts of money they spend. They will have to assess the cost of education in terms of two things: the proven educational necessity for a budget item and the ability of local citizens to provide the revenue.

I should add that there is now a strong movement in the Legislature -- which this year is Republican-controlled for the first time in a decade -- to repeal this provision of the law and return to the system of requiring tax ceilings for school districts to be voted upon by the electorate. The State Senate has already passed a repealer bill. Of course, no one has proposed the logical concommitant of this: requiring a popular vote on the tax limits of cities and counties and other special districts. It seems to me in this area that some peoples' sense of values is strangely twisted. The local mosquito abatement district may raise its property tax rate at will, but a school district -- in whose hands the future of the nation lies -- may not.

Should this repealer effort fail, this new tax setting responsibility will contribute mightily to establishing that system of priorities in education that we have talked about for years but done little or nothing about. To be sure, the abstract criteria are well known now: the programs we must have, those we should have, and those we can, if reluctantly, do without. This new freedom for school boards is a two-edged sword.

If the sword is to cut the right way, voter education will be more important than ever. Faced with the prospect of rising property taxes, the voters will find penny-wise but pound-foolish school board candidates
extremely attractive. It will be up to school administrators and teachers to make their own continuing assessment of the costs and benefits of school programs and to be ready to argue their case at election time. They must be ready to oppose an idea that is currently extremely popular -- the idea that parsimony equals responsibility.

Lest I leave the mistaken belief that the California Legislature is concerned only with the immense problems of financing the schools, let me hasten to add that the elected body has been extremely active in the curriculum and evaluation field over the past four years.

After two false starts, last year the Legislature adopted a bill which streamlined the State's multi-volume Education Code by eliminating a number of fossilized required courses (such as "manners and morals", the "evils of drink", etc.) and gave local school boards broad authority -- within state guidelines -- to develop local curricula which suit the community. Of course, the basic courses are still required, but school boards no longer have to measure the "quality" of their educational program by the number of clock-hours that Johnny occupies a seat in a classroom.

This bill, the "George Miller, Jr. Education Act of 1968", named after its late author, was not developed principally by the Legislature as many of the recent innovations in California education have been, but was drafted by a prestigious group of educators. Although it was described as the "magna charta" of education by its advocates, I am unwilling to give the bill that label without talking about a new law passed in 1968 as the "quid pro quo" for obtaining passage of the curriculum modification.

That legislation, authored by Assemblyman Leroy Greene of Sacramento, provided for the first time in California a basis for performing that most necessary function which is so dreaded by educators: evaluation of the product. Mr. Greene's bill established a statewide uniform testing program through which students in grades four through eight will be tested in the basic subject each year on a standardized test. The results of this testing will then be made available to the State and to the Legislature in an effort to see exactly what all that new state money I talked about earlier is producing.

This bill was, quite naturally, opposed by the school establishment in Sacramento, but because it was in the legislative give-and-take the obvious "price" for passage of the new curriculum bill, it was adopted. No matter how you personally feel about standardized, statewide testing, I think it is obvious to any observer of the California Legislature that its members are extremely serious in their desire to obtain some reasonably good measurement of what the schools are doing. Whether this bill does the job remains to be seen, but I think it is clear that if educators continue to fail to come up with acceptable achievement measurements for California school children, legislators will.

I could talk about numerous other areas of educational program with which the California Legislature has been concerned for many years, but
time is short. Let me close by quoting H. G. Wells, who once said that "human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe." My experience with the California Legislature in recent years indicates the lawmakers recognize their responsibility to lead in history's great race with catastrophe.
I. Claims for PPBS

"PPBS produces alternative goals for state programs and shows alternative means for achieving those goals, so that state policy-makers can allocate funds with full knowledge of expected accomplishments."

"Midway through the decade of the 1960's a revolutionary approach to administrative planning was accorded recognition by a Presidential pronouncement introducing program budgeting into the entire federal structure."

II. What is Planning, Programming, Budgeting Systems?

A. PPB is an approach for organizing information to improve decisions having to do with the allocation of resources.

B. In brief, this is done by:

1. An explicit delineation of objectives in quantitative terms.

2. A systematic comparison of the benefits and costs of alternative objectives and alternative methods for their accomplishment.

3. Considering the implications of the "programs" over an adequate time horizon.

C. It attempts:

1. To make the decision-making process explicit.

2. To assure the decision-maker that he has a choice of comparable alternatives.

3. To express the ingredients for decision in concrete quantifiable terms.

4. To build in a time dimension that tries to see today's decisions in terms of their longer term consequences.

5. To take account of all costs and benefits inherent in decisions.
III. Thus PPBS improves upon traditional planning and budgeting techniques in the allocation of resources.

A. It requires the program builder to specifically spell out goals and objectives.

B. It focuses on outputs as well as inputs.

C. It adds a sufficient time dimension.

IV. But policy is developed within a political system: a political system allocates

A. resources - economic resource to which PPB addresses itself

B. values - liberal-conservative, segregation/integration, etc.

C. power - control of the system (control of rewards and sanctions)

V. The following typology is a framework within which PPBS and its usefulness as a decision tool can be analyzed.

**PPBS AND ITS RELEVANCE FOR POLICY FORMULATION**

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<td>GRUENCE</td>
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<td>PERSUASION</td>
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<td>BARGAINING</td>
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A. Rational search for solution that satisfies shared criteria of participants.

B. Persuasion - specific objectives may differ but agreement can be reached on goals at some level by the participants.

C. Bargaining - goal difference is fixed but trade-offs can be made to arrive at a solution.

D. Conflict Resolution - goal difference cannot be accommodated; there are winners and losers among the participants.

VI. Limitations of PPBS within the political process.

A. For PPB to work, objectives must be set. No output or activity can be evaluated unless it is related to some objective (or objective function) and a criterion is established.

1. Goals and objectives may be very difficult to find. Outputs of political systems are decisions of a group. Thus individuals may support a piece of legislation even though

   (a) their motivation differs

   (b) their information may be different
2. Measurable objectives or quantifiable outputs may thus be difficult to identify.

B. Given the existence of goals where are they to be found?

1. No single mechanism for setting goals exists; legal separation of powers; different interest groups.
2. Statements of objectives may be vague or ambiguous: "to meet staffing requirements of the struggle for freedom".
3. Statements of intermediate objectives pose the problem of linking a "program" to some output.
4. Multiple objectives without statements of relative priority render PPBS helpless.
   "to help feed children" or "to use our agricultural surpluses".
5. Objectives, when stated as objective function are not commensurable thus, not comparable.

C. Given that objectives exist and can be found how does one measure the benefits and costs of the alternative "packages": problems of extant methods:

1. Rate of return vs. benefit/cost ratio as a ranking function.
2. Social time preference (opportunity cost) of capital as a measure of the price of money.
3. Specifying difference between risk and uncertainty.
4. Treatment of "externalities".
5. The use of "shadow pricing".
6. Longer amortization periods or higher salvage values.

VII. Conclusion, PPBS represents an improvement over traditional budgeting to the extent that it requires participants in the political decision-making process to focus on outputs and outcomes of programs (not just inputs) and to the degree that participants are willing and able to specify objectives in quantitative terms.

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The typology is based upon an address by B. Dean Bowles to the National Development Institute in PPBS, the Ohio State University, October 21 to November 1, 1968, J. H. McGivney, Director.
I intend to talk about what I see coming in the governance of education. I say "governance" rather than "politics" because I am convinced we are on the threshold of nothing less than a constitutional revision of the present structure. What is underway is a public rejection of our traditional system for governing education K through 12 and at the University too -- on the eve of a revolution in the governing and politics of education.

Following Crane Brinton, let me add, revolutions are first made in the minds of men. It is highly significant that one is no longer required to apologize for talking about the politics of education. Not long ago, it was necessary to explain at length that politics and education, especially in its policy-making, were neither strange bedfellows, nor far apart in fact in America. Neither is it necessary to point out that the once held myth of separation between education and politics is no longer seriously believed by much of the public, especially after experiencing a U.F.T. led march on Albany last spring and a political strike this fall. The political myth of educationists which declares education separate from politics has undergone change, is in eclipse.

Let me remind you that the political myth of education has not only been the private belief system of educationists about the governance of their world; it has generally been accepted by the American public too. That is to say, the profession successfully "sold" its views concerning educational governance. Hence, a change in the political myths of educational governance entails a larger revision of thought than merely the professional educator's world view.

By myths, following McIver's Web of Government, I mean the value impregnated beliefs that men hold, that they live by or for.

Every society is held together by a myth system that determines and sustains its activities. So viewed, all social relations, the very texture of human society, are myth-born and myth-sustained, and government is the organization of men under authority. Their ever changing myths are sovereign over the governors and the governed. If the proposition that education and politics are separate is no longer believed, then we are experiencing the demise of the traditional political myth of educational governance in America.
One great function of myth, regardless of objective truth, is to turn valuations into propositions about the nature of things. These propositions range from cosmogonies to norms regulating relations in families or between principals and teachers or school-community relations. The forms and kinds of myths are endless but at the core of every myth structure lies the particular myth of authority. The central myth in the maintenance of any social system, is the myth of authority.

If there is a single proposition which may be said to be central to the entire authority myth of educational governance in all its aspects, it is that which declares that laymen control ends and professionals determine means in education. This is analogous to the distinction between policy and rules, policy-making and administration, and between the public will and professional expertise. This view presents school administrators as professional experts who operate with the welfare of children uppermost in their minds in making expert judgments (decisions) about education.

D. W. Brogan's introduction to Bertrand De Jouvenal's book On Power says,

It is a dangerous and idle dream to think that the state can become ruled by philosophers turned kings or scientists turned commissars. For if philosophers become kings or scientists commissars, they become politicians, and the powers given to the state are powers given to men who are rulers of states, men subject to all the limitations and temptations of their dangerous craft.

The only slightly less dangerous and idle dream that education can be ruled by experts, educationists, apolitically and in the best interest of others, dominated the professional training and writing and beliefs of educationists from the turn of this century until now.

This view ignores some things; for example, it ignores the fact that:

1. Education, schooling, in America is the major process of upward mobility.
2. The profession itself is a major ladder system in the mobility process for a couple of million verbal people.
3. Positions in that ladder--series of ladders--are hard won and tenaciously held. Many or most of them by poor boys who made "good".

But I am not here to footnote the obvious that those who profit from a given myth of authority are not likely to proclaim or even see the extent to which the belief system they uphold benefits them especially. I am interested in pointing out that it is precisely
people like ourselves -- those who in various ways have profited from the system -- who are likely to be among the last to awaken to the fact that the old authority myth is no longer vital. Any myth of authority is holistic; tends to form a kind of Gestalt; may be viewed as a seamless web; so that changes in one major element of that myth must affect all of it. Therefore, the drastic change in the recognition that public politics and education are inextricably intertwined implies a whole series of correlative changes in the authority myth governing education. Specifically, the rupture of any one link in the hierarchical chain of authority governing education cannot take place without breaking or, at least, seriously endangering the survival of all the others. And, as stated earlier, revolutions are first made in the minds of men.

The politics of education is frequently quite separated from the rest of our politics. This has tended to keep the politics of party more separate from the politics of education than it is in most public policy areas.

The politics of education has been a kind of parlor politics, essentially a low-pressure type, although one may find many exceptions in any year. In addition, the development of systems of educational associations, state and local, have provided a semi-formal national organizational network with a common ideology. These associations function partly to provide a cushion between diverse interests and the agencies of educational policy-making, and partly to provide agencies for accommodating interests and for building consensus on educational issues before these must be acted on by school boards or state legislatures. The New York State Educational Conference Board has so operated at the state level for many years; so did C.T.A. in California until the early sixties. The pattern should be recognizable in most of your states, but it is changing.

The greater the diversity of the publics actively involved in the politics of any governmental area or level, the less probable will be the continuance of the pattern of low-pressure politics.

The greater the stress, such participation of diverse publics places upon semi-formal groupings, the less they can achieve consensus.

Conflicts unresolved in the extra-legal social networks around governmental arenas require resolution in formal governmental arenas, that is, in school boards and legislatures. Similarly, conflicts wide in scope and of great significance to the society, are less likely to be resolved in extra-legal associations or in governmental agencies having delegated powers.

The longer they remain unresolved the more likely they are to end up in the central agencies of government, those which are the source of the delegated powers.

We have already seen the educational aspects of the unresolved long-term issues of church-state relations and racial equality increasingly referred to the most central agencies of governments. These were largely neglected by the schools and handled by the courts.
If, as one result of Nixon's election, the courts are reversed, it will be through the White House and Congress.

The combination of the traditional structure of educational governance and the increasing polarization of public opinion around educational issues, with a rise in public interest on educational matters, is almost bound to result in major changes in our system for governing education.

The closer that educational policy-making moves to the central agencies of government, the more blurred becomes the line of demarcation between educational politics and other forms of politics.

Let us deal with the conservative educationistswing begun long before the Nixon election with the Quie amendment effort and the successful passage of the Green Amendment. Now, the Nixon team will make its decisions. Let us assume the most extreme estimates of the Nixon administration's future behavior are correct: a complete surrender to the real cry, "ALL POWER TO THE STATES" even if the slogan is local control. Will this work against the predictions of change in educational governance and the centralization of policy in the hands of the major, central agencies and offices of State government: the Governor's office, and the legislative brokers of policy and power i.e., the majority leaders, the minority leaders and the chairmen of committees on rules, finance and education? Not at all!!

The states will not all respond the same way at the same time to the unresolved educational problems (of which we may be certain) and the federal black grants to the states (of which we must yet be less sure). But you can be reasonably sure that many states e.g., New York, California, Michigan such as I call "fragmented" or those near that stage in their development will not let additional resources from the feds be simply reallocated by the extra-legal interest groups which have traditionally determined much of state aid formulae and financing. On the other hand, in more states, this is exactly what will happen with the new input. Even in such cases, the new in-puts will most often demand a readjustment of the structure for educational policy-making in most states. With this we must anticipate a redistribution of power in education at many levels not only nearest the central agencies of state government.

The demise of "separateness," the cornerstone element of the educationist myth of authority at this time is understandable. It also tends to increase the chances that we will not retain the present system much longer. If we cannot retain the belief in separation of politics and education, we cannot continue believing in its correlates.

Specifically, the chain of command which views authority as sequentially flowing from the state to the local district, to the local board, to the superintendent, to the building principal, to the teacher, and over the pupil will be--and even now is--questioned, examined critically, and challenged.
If the educational myth of authority is shattered at the various points I suggest—and there is no small evidence that this is already underway—then a redistribution of power in the governance of education must follow.

We cannot hope to predict its eventual form in any detail. However, we can predict that such a redistribution will be embodied in greater detailed specification of the rights and obligations of each of the classes of participants in the educational enterprise: the public, top administration, middle management, teachers, and pupils.

Further, we can expect that such a redistribution will take place as a result of legislation at the state level (with a federal influence through grants in aid) probably with state legislative guidelines filled in by local district action.

Let me take a moment on the legislative process of educational policy development as it exists in most states. First, it must be realized that the research to date indicates a high degree of compartmentalization of the educational governance of K-12 schooling. Higher educational state policy and finance inhabits another universe. Similarly, the treaty arrangement described by the Masters et al. research between the city politicians and the legislative leaders tends to compartmentalize the city k-12 governance from the rest too. So in New York State the decentralization struggle for New York City found no place for the education committees of the legislature. So, too, when the question is asked, "where was the citadel agency of the education lobby when the battle was at its thickest?" the answer comes as in "the divisions of Ruben, there were great searchings of heart."

One development we can expect during the next decade is the breaking down of the walls of separation between the politics of K-12 and of higher education, of private school issues and of city school politics.

The legislative process described by J. Lieper Freeman's work as existing in a mutually dependent triad of legislative committees—executive agency and interest group is—as far as research has thus far revealed—generally led by the lobby rather than the executive agency.

At least for a time the traditional educational legislative triad's internal relationship, the old steady state of mutual interdependence with the organized interest group leadership will change. Specifically, the legislative member of the triad will, at least for a time, become the initiator of action. It may even result in a long range change with the executive agencies becoming the initiators of policy. This tends to be more characteristic of the twentieth century.

McIver points out that "established power is so tenacious of its prerogatives that rather than part with any of them, it will often by blind resistance invite the loss of them all." Those of us who now
occupy positions of influence in the present structure have considerable knowledge of where the bodies lie and how it could be changed. Were we to offer to put that to work to fundamentally alter it, we could possibly avoid the pain of abrupt and unnecessarily disruptive changes. We are unlikely to offer this.