A study of American-Chinese relations in the period 1944-1966, this unit for high school students focuses on a number of problems which American policy-makers have had to confront in this period. These problems include the liquidation of Japanese power, the Communist-Nationalist schisms and the rise of the Communists to power, the Korean War, the Quemoy-Matsu crisis, and the question of recognition. The student is asked what the proper goals of foreign policy are, and at the conclusion of the unit he should be able to make some valid generalizations about the dilemmas inherent both in the shaping and executing of policy. (Author)
UNITED STATES ACTIONS TOWARD CHINA SINCE WORLD WAR II: EVOLUTION OF A POLICY?

Teacher and Student Manuals

(Public Domain Edition)

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Amherst, Massachusetts
UNITED STATES ACTIONS TOWARD CHINA SINCE WORLD WAR II:
EVOLUTION OF A POLICY?

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This material
has been produced by the
Committee on the Study of History,
Amherst, Massachusetts under contract with the
This unit is designed to encourage students to ask fundamental questions about the nature and methods of foreign policy and to explore and evaluate the policy-making processes of the United States government. On the basis of its use they should be able to attempt more informal generalization about the objectives of American policy and the means used to attain these objectives.

The unit uses the development of United States policy toward China during the past twenty years as a case study in the making of foreign policy. China was selected as the specific area of study for three main reasons. First, many people think that the present conflict between the United States and China constitutes the major threat to world peace and that the future of mankind depends on how that conflict is resolved. Second, the major foreign policy issue today, Vietnam, is intricately related to our policy toward China. Third, students should understand the background of policies which they may later influence and which may have a direct and important effect on their lives.

It is important to remember that most foreign policy decisions are made not on the basis of what is actually happening in another country but rather on the basis of what one country thinks is happening in another country. In a situation where information is readily exchanged between two countries, what is happening and what is considered to be happening are much the same thing. This situation does not exist between the United States and China, and information is often unobtainable, inaccurate, or outdated. A great discrepancy can, therefore, exist between what the actual situation in China and our estimate of that situation.

During the course of the unit, a number of general questions should be explored: What is the relationship between theory and practice in foreign policy? What are the major objectives of American foreign policy? Do those objectives remain constant or do they change with time and circumstances? Why has the United States acted as it has toward China? Has American policy been based on a long range plan, expediency, or a combination of both? In what directions do past and present actions lead the United States?

The Introduction presents material concerning the goals the methods of foreign policy and factors which influence the choice of possible alternatives. Section I introduces the case study of China, providing background information before examining American actions in China during World War II. Section II centers on the attempt by the United States to mediate the Communist-Nationalist conflict and the question of whether the United States could have prevented China from coming under Communist domination. Section III deals with the first two major encounters between Communist China and the United States. Korea and the Quemoy-Matsu crises. Section IV raises questions as to present American policy toward China.
A reminder at this point. The teacher should feel free to use or disregard any suggestions made by the authors. Only the individual teacher can tell what will or will not work in his own classes.

INTRODUCTION

This section provides the theoretical bases for the rest of the unit and should be referred to frequently as the class progresses through the unit.

Since the materials in the Introduction are quite abstract and may not of themselves interest any except the very brightest students, it might be wise to give the following assignment before distributing the student manuals: Ask the students to write an essay in class on what they think are the central objectives of American foreign policy today and what methods they think the United States uses to achieve these objectives. After the essays have been completed, the unit can be distributed and the Introduction assigned to be read as homework. The students could be asked to think about the ideas raised in the Introduction in relation to the essays they have just completed.

At the beginning of Part A several foreign policy goals are mentioned. This list is by no means exclusive. If the class has written essays on American policy objectives, they may compare what they have come up with and add to or reclassify the goals, possibly agreeing on a list of goals for future reference.

The first selection, which presents Lerche and Said’s idea that all policies are status quo or revisionist, may provoke a lengthy discussion. Do all policies fit neatly into these two categories? Are there exceptions; if so, what are they? How do the positions of the United States and China today relate to this theory? Britain, France, the Soviet Union, South Africa, Cuba, India and others might also be discussed here. Why might a nation change from revisionist to status quo or from status quo to revisionist?

The excerpts by Walt Rostow (A, #2) and by Richard Goodwin (A, #3) give two views on the question of long range planning. Which of the goals mentioned by the students in their essays are long range and which are short range? Rostow suggests that the problem lies not in choosing between the two but in how to combine them. The students may wish to suggest ways of combining the goals they have mentioned.

Part B concentrates on two major factors which may influence policy making: public opinion and moral considerations. The selection from Kennan (B, #1) suggests that if public opinion causes us to make national mistakes, the United States should recognize this fact and do something about changing the situation, although still operating within a democratic framework. Does the government need to enlighten the public
concerning foreign policy? How could it go about this? To what extent does public opinion influence foreign policy decisions today? What are the dangers of both too much and too little influence by the public? How can the government determine which course to follow in foreign affairs when public opinion is split on an issue?

The last two selections (B, #2 and 3) present arguments for and against allowing morality to influence policy making. Possibly it would be best to begin this section with an attempt to define morality and to determine whether it is absolute or relative. What kinds of moral questions might be involved in foreign policy? Does the United States consider only national interest in choosing its policy alternatives? Is morality a part of our national interest?

Students may want to bring up other, probably short range, factors which may influence policy making in connection with the final statements in Part B. It would be helpful for the class to define the term "expediency" and to give a number of examples.

The amount of time spent on this section will doubtless vary greatly according to the ability of the class. Since the remainder of the unit is so closely related, it is essential that the questions raised in the Introduction be explored carefully. Should some students find parts of the Introduction difficult to grasp, frequent reference to their own essays might be helpful as well as summarization of the major points of the more difficult selections in their own words.

A final comment: Since Vietnam is so constantly in the news and on their minds, the students will naturally gravitate toward discussing the issues and strategies involved. Some discussion of Vietnam may be allowed at this point, but it is probably better saved until the end of the unit, when the students should have a far better notion of the Vietnamese problem as seen in the context of United States policy towards China.
SECTION I
WORLD WAR II

This section provides a background against which to study United States relations with China during the past twenty years. The first portion supplies a summary of American policy prior to and during the early years of the war, plus a brief history of the Nationalist-Communist conflict during this same period. Students who are interested in learning more about this period should be referred to the list of suggested readings at the end of the student manual.

Some questions might be asked concerning this portion of Section I. What policy objectives appear to emerge from American policy toward China before the war? Do these objectives support the idea that the United States was a status quo nation at that time? What methods were used to effect American policy? Did the methods reflect the influence of public opinion, morality, or other factors?

Part A presents evaluations of the comparative strength and effectiveness of the Nationalists and the Communists as prepared by Foreign Service officers. Although the Communists were nominally a part of the United Front government of China in 1944, these evaluations emphasize the separation that in fact existed.

The first two selections note the pro-Russian and Marxist tendencies of the Chinese Communists, while the third suggests that their attitude toward the United States might be favorable. How would the idea of pro-Russian sympathies have affected American policy makers at that time when the USSR was our ally. What does the comment as to the Marxist direction of the Chinese Communists suggest about their attitude toward the Nationalists and possibly toward the United States? Students should be directed to watch for further evidence concerning the assumptions in the third selection.

The next two selections (#4 and #5) comment on Communist strength. Several interesting points are made about why the people in Communist areas were especially eager to oppose the Japanese. Are there other explanations for their strength which were not noted here? Students may wish to discuss communist ideology briefly in relation to the Chinese situation. Can comparison be made with U.S.S.R. domestic and foreign policies?

The evaluation of Nationalist strength (#6) gives a number of reasons for the decline of Kuomintang power. This document should be compared with #4 concerning the questions of corruption and popular support.

The final selection in Part A (#7) gives the Foreign Service recommendations for dealing with the Nationalist-Communist problem. The suggestions here should be kept in mind for discussion along with the actions taken in Part B.
Part B centers on the policy and actions taken by United States representatives in China near the end of World War II. The first two selections present statements of American aims and policies in 1944. Were these policies related to long range goals concerning China, or were they intended mainly to hasten the end of the war with Japan? In light of the previous Foreign Service recommendations and reports, why did the United States particularly want to support the Nationalist government? Was a moral issue involved in American support of the Nationalists? We were, after all, the ally of the official Chinese government. Would it be morally right to support an antagonistic faction within their territory?

The third selection outlines General Hurley's efforts to mediate the Chinese dispute. Why was this attempt at mediation a failure? Why did Hurley want the Nationalists to accept the Communist proposals? How does this attempt compare with the recommendations made by the Foreign Service? Does this description of Communist reaction bear out the evaluation of Communist attitude toward the United States expressed in an earlier Foreign Service dispatch (A, #3)?

The last selection in this section raises the question of whether the United States should have given separate aid to the Communists when the Nationalists had blocked mediation. Hurley was clearly following his instructions in recommending that no aid be given to the Communists. Was this a wise choice, or should policy makers have assumed that the United States might have to deal with a Communist Chinese government later and, on that assumption, have given at least token aid? Would it have been worth taking the risk of giving aid with the hope that such action might make the Communists more favorably disposed toward the United States at a later date? Would the United States have given aid to the Communists had they had controlled the Chinese government at that time? Did the United States have any moral obligation to support the Nationalists under such circumstances? What position might the American public have taken? And a final question: Can a revisionist nation ever cooperate with a status quo nation over a long period of time?
SECTION II

THE WAR ENDS: MEDIATION AND ITS AFTERMATH

This section discusses the events surrounding the rise of the Communists to power in China and American attempts to prevent this from happening. An introductory portion describes the role of the Soviet Union in the closing events of World War II. How did American actions toward the Soviet Union at this time relate to American policy toward China?

Part A focuses on the Marshall mission, the final attempt on the part of the United States to mediate the Communist-Nationalist dispute. In the first selection Acheson outlines the three alternatives which he felt were available to the United States at the end of the war. Are there other possible alternatives which he does not mention? Acheson went on to describe American evacuation of Japanese troops from China. How would this affect the situation in China.

The next two selections (#2 and 3) present varying estimates of the prospects for the success of Marshall mission. Marshall was relatively optimistic about forming a coalition government, while military advisor Wedemeyer was distinctly pessimistic. Students should probably list the stated reasons for these positions in order to relate them to subsequent American actions.

After Marshall had succeeded in getting both sides to sign several agreements, the Soviet Union changed the entire situation by withdrawing from Manchuria with results as described in the fourth selection. The next selection (#5) outlines American aid to the Nationalists at this time. Had American policy makers taken into consideration the possibility of a Soviet withdrawal from Manchuria when deciding on a policy of mediation? Had they considered this possibility more carefully, what changes might they have suggested in American policy? How could the United States have prepared for such an eventuality? Was mediation the action of a status quo or a revisionist nation?

The last two selections (#6 and #7) comment on the effect of the American embargo on arms to the Nationalists. Did Marshall raise a moral question when, as a mediator, he decided the United States could not supply arms to one side? Is a possible conflict in moral obligations involved here? Would the Communists trust us if we did not have an arms embargo? Did the embargo convince them of our good faith? Did the arms embargo contribute significantly to the Nationalist defeat? Were other factors of greater importance? Were Wedemeyer's earlier misgivings (#3) about the Marshall mission borne out in its failure?

Part B presents the final attempt by the United States to help the Nationalist government hold China, largely through economic aid. Although military advisors were provided, there was no direct American military intervention during this period. The first two selections are policy statements by Truman. What changes had taken place in American policy since Hurley was given his instructions during the war
(I, B, #2)? Do these changes reflect differences in long range or short range goals? Or have the goals remained the same, while the methods have changed?

The last two selections in this part (#3 and #4) describe the aid program, both direct economic aid and indirect military aid, and question the exact amount of aid actually received by the Nationalists.

After describing the Cold War context of American actions in China, Part C poses the question: Could the United States have stopped the Communists in China? In the introductory portion a number of American policies are mentioned. Students should relate these policies to previously discussed goals of United States policy and to the question of planning vs. expediency.

The first three selections give two different points of view on the decisive effect of lack of military aid on the Nationalist battle for the critical North China area. Badger (#1 and #2) thought that this was a decisive factor in losing the area and thus China, while Barr (#3) thought the lack of aid was not critical in that particular case and that little could have been done to save China short of unlimited economic and military aid. Can we evaluate these statements without outside evidence? Do they just represent differences of opinion between military men or do they have other significance? Barr's testimony also brings out other reasons for the breakdown of morale among Nationalist troops, a factor which may have been decisive in their defeat.

Secretary of Defense Marshall (#4) described some reasons why aid to China did not operate in the same manner as did aid to Greece. Do these reasons seem valid? Was the question of difference in cultural background as crucial as Marshall made it out to be? Would the relative size of the two countries have had an effect?

MacArthur's testimony (#5) presents his assessment of the seriousness of losing China to the Communists, while in the last selection Senator Hickenlooper attempted to blame that loss on faulty policy on the part of the United States Government. MacArthur suggested that our error was in allowing the Communists to rise to power, but Hickenlooper states that we "pushed the Nationalist government over the cliff." Do these comments represent two sides of the same coin? Or are they talking about two different things?

At the conclusion of this section a number of policy questions arise. What kind of planning was involved in China policy after the war? Were our actions typical of a status quo policy? Did they succeed in maintaining the status quo? Did the United States allow moral considerations or public opinion to have too much influence? Would a more realistic appraisal of the situation have led the United States to a better relationship with the Communists when they did come to power? Did the
United States cling too long to an outworn, ineffective Nationalist government? Or should the United States have exerted every possible effort to shore up that government, including direct military intervention such as the United States involvement in Vietnam, possibly even using nuclear weapons? Would this type of policy have been consistent with stated American goals? What role was played by lack of cooperation on the part of the Nationalists? Was mediation a realistic step when all other United States actions made it clear that we favored the Nationalists? What other steps could the United States have taken to ensure that the Communists didn't gain control of China? Is it possible that the United States was really powerless to do anything further at that time to get what it wanted in China?

SECTION III

KOREA AND ITS AFTERMATH

This section focuses on United States policy during the first two major encounters with Communist China: the Korean War and the Quemoy-Matsu crises. A brief description at the beginning of the section indicates what American policy toward China was at the beginning of the Korean War. Was this policy consistent with the ideas expressed prior to the Communist accession to power?

Part A discusses the circumstances surrounding the decision to invade North Korea, a decision which brought China directly into the Korean conflict. The first three selections deal with the actual decision making process: Truman's discussions with MacArthur and with the National Security Council, and his public justification of the decision. One of MacArthur's major arguments for an invasion of North Korea was that China and the U.S.S.R. would not intervene. Truman stated that the purpose of the invasion was the unification of Korea. The excerpt from Panikkar's book (#4) which described the Chinese decision to send troops into North Korea, showed that MacArthur was wrong in his estimate of Chinese policy. Was the decision to invade representative of a status quo policy? Did the United States become overconfident because of easy victories and overstep itself? Was this action the result of a long range plan? What would the reaction of the United States be to a Communist invasion of Mexico or Canada?

In Part B the Truman-MacArthur controversy is explored. The essential question concerned the degree of caution necessary in conducting the war. The first two selections present MacArthur's proposals for conducting the war and his estimate of the risks involved. The statements by Truman (#3), Bradley (#4), and Vandenberg (#5) present the Administration's defense of its position. Selections #6 and #7 illustrate the human cost of the war, and the last two selections present both MacArthur's and Truman's final evaluations of their own and of each other's actions.
A number of questions should arise in considering this controversy. Should civilian or military authority be supreme in such a conflict? How reliable was MacArthur's judgment in the light of his earlier suggestions about the non-intervention of China (A, #1)? Were MacArthur's proposals essentially revisionist or status quo? What would be the moral implications of a direct attack on Communist China by the United States? Would the use of Nationalist forces really have made as much difference as MacArthur suggests? Did Truman show any evidence of "loss of nerve" as MacArthur notes? Did Chinese intervention have any beneficial effects on United States policy?

Part C presents the methods Eisenhower used to end the Korean War. Eisenhower stated his willingness to use atomic weapons, if necessary, and he let the Communists know his position (#1). Was this decisive in ending the war, or might there have been other factors not mentioned by Eisenhower which were influential? Did we have a moral obligation not to use atomic weapons? Was this decision part of a long range plan? Eisenhower's position in this case should be remembered for reference in the next part.

Part D focuses on the second major China-United States confrontation, the two Quemoy-Matsu crises. The United States became involved in these crises partly because of the decision made during the Korean War to send the Seventh Fleet to protect Formosa. The major question concerned how far this protection extended.

The first two selections present Eisenhower's account of how the crises developed and how the United States reacted. The last selection presents two evaluations of American handling of these events, one unfavorable and one favorable. Were Eisenhower's actions in line with previous foreign policy objectives or did he take unjustifiable risks? Were American actions status quo and part of a long range plan or did they result merely from expediency? Again the moral question concerning use of nuclear weapons arises. What comparisons can be made between Eisenhower's actions concerning Korea and his actions here? Could the use of convoys have inadvertently involved the United States in a major war? Was it chance or planning that kept the war from starting? Can some useful lessons for handling future crises be drawn from a study of these confrontations?

SECTION IV

THE PRESENT—and FUTURE—PROBLEM

The concluding section treats the question of whether the United States should increase its contacts with the Chinese Communists. The first four selections are statements by the last three presidents concerning United States policy toward China. What changes are reflected in these three statements?
The next four selections (#5-#8) present extended discussions of the two opposing positions on the question as to the desirability of greater contacts with China. It would be helpful for students to extract a list of the major arguments from each statement and then to compare these two lists side by side. The arguments could then be discussed in terms of United States goals, previous policy methods, planning, and morality.

The last two selections in the unit are excerpts from a public opinion poll. What effects might public opinion, at least as measured in this particular poll, have on the policies toward China suggested by President Johnson? Barnett? Judd?

To conclude the unit the students could be asked to discuss or to write a paper on a variety of topics:

1. Ask students to imagine that they controlled American foreign policy from 1944 to 1966. What would they have done that American policy makers did do and what would they have done differently? What do they advise for the future?

2. Ask students to discuss what they think should be the objectives of American foreign policy today and what methods they feel should be used to attain these objectives.

3. Ask students to show the relationship between the United States policy toward China and the present situation in Vietnam. How are American actions in Vietnam related to the ideas discussed in the Introduction?
STUDENT'S MANUAL

UNITED STATES ACTIONS TOWARD CHINA SINCE WORLD WAR II:
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This material has been produced by the Committee on the Study of History, Amherst, Massachusetts under contract with the U.S. Office of Education as Cooperative Research Project #H-168.
NOTE TO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN EDITION

This unit was prepared by the Committee on the Study of History, Amherst College, under contract with the United States Office of Education. It is one of a number of units prepared by the Amherst Project, and was designed to be used either in series with other units from the Project or independently, in conjunction with other materials. While the units were geared initially for college-preparatory students at the high school level, experiments with them by the Amherst Project suggest the adaptability of many of them, either wholly or in part, for a considerable range of age and ability levels, as well as in a number of different kinds of courses.

The units have been used experimentally in selected schools throughout the country, in a wide range of teaching/learning situations. The results of those experiments will be incorporated in the Final Report of the Project on Cooperative Research grant H-168, which will be distributed through ERIC.

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This unit was initially prepared in the summer of 1966
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INTRODUCTION

Today the United States and China are engaged in a bitter rivalry which threatens world peace and which may possibly lead to full-scale war. As future citizens of one of the countries involved and perhaps as potential front line soldiers, it is important for you to gain some insights into the background of this rivalry and into its implications for the future.

What goals are involved in one nation's relations with other nations? What means are used in attempting to reach these goals? How did the United States arrive at its present relationship with China? Were these steps planned, or were they taken under pressure of unforeseen circumstances, or has it been a bit of both? In examining past and present relations with China can we discover anything which might guide us in the future?

This unit, which focuses on United States actions toward China during the past twenty years, is an attempt to explore these and other related questions.

A. Foreign Policy and Policy Makers

Nations deal with other nations for a variety of reasons, almost all involving self-interest. For example, a nation may wish to avoid conflict, to expand its political or economic system, to strengthen its economy by obtaining materials which it lacks, or to gain greater influence in world affairs.
In order to attain these goals, nations may use many methods and must consider various factors in deciding which ones to select.

1. Political scientists Charles O. Lerch and Abdul A. Said hold that all foreign policies fit into two categories, status quo or revisionist.¹

   [The selection contains definitions of the terms status quo and revisionism and briefly explains the military implications of the two positions.]

2. The value of long range planning in foreign policy is explained by Walt W. Rostow, who served in this field during the Kennedy Administration:²

   [Rostow contends that planners must keep long range objectives in mind when involved in short-run solutions to immediate problems.]

3. A different position on the wisdom of long range planning is taken by Richard Goodwin:³

   [The argument states that speculation on the ultimate outcome of present policies is a futile exercise for the statesman. He should decide as little as possible in dangerous situations and take few risks.]

B. Factors Influencing Policy-Making

1. One factor which must be considered by policy makers in a democratic country is public opinion. In his book American Diplomacy George Kennan, a well-known ex-diplomat, discussed this problem. In one section


Kennan mentioned actions which he thought the United States should have taken in order to end World War I without sending troops. In countering the point that the government could not have followed this course because of public opinion, Kennan replied: 4

[Kennan admits that the democratic system imposes limitations on policy makers. He advocates facing the problem of public opinion in order to allow democracy to continue as a viable form.]

2. An interesting question is whether or not moral considerations should influence policy makers when choosing among alternatives. Lerche and Said discuss one point of view: 5

[The selection deals with the conflict between the practices of personal morality and the requirements of nationalist codes of ethics.]

3. Another point of view on the moral question is expressed by Howard Trivers: 6

[The article states that survival in itself is not the aim of mankind; nationalist ethics are therefore not justified when they conflict with personal morality.]

In addition to the factors mentioned above, many others also influence the choice of a foreign policy alternative. Frequently these factors depend upon the immediate situation, and the expedient alternative

4George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1951), 73.


is selected. Sometimes the expedient choice may happen to fit into a long range policy. At other times it may not. When a choice rests solely on grounds of expediency, it is difficult to predict what may be its future consequences.

Keeping in mind the problems of foreign policy-making in general, we now shift our attention to the specific case of United States actions toward China.
Before the beginning of the Nineteenth Century China had few contacts with Western nations. These contacts increased during the nineteenth century. The ruling dynasty, which had been very strong in past centuries, had become weak. Also the West was more technically advanced than China and possessed superior weapons. The Westerners were therefore, able to force the Chinese to grant them many special privileges.

As the European powers began to move into China, the United States went along and participated in the rich China trade. The Americans did not treat the Chinese quite as roughly as did other foreigners and didn't take direct control of Chinese territory as was done by several European nations. Still, the United States demanded and obtained many concessions from the Chinese.

At the beginning of the twentieth century the Chinese overthrew the old dynasty. Central authority disintegrated and a period of lawlessness followed.

In the 1920’s the famous Chinese patriot, Sun Yat-sen, organized a revolutionary party whose aims were to unify China and to give the Chinese people a better life. Before Sun could lead his followers to victory, he died unexpectedly in 1925. A young military commander, Chiang Kai-shek, took Sun's place.

The Chinese Communist party had been organized in 1921. Up until the time of Sun’s death and shortly thereafter, the Communists had been part of the Kuomintang or Nationalist party. The Communists controlled many rural areas and became a threat to the power of Chiang. In 1927,
when Chiang's forces were in the process of unifying China, he suddenly turned on the Communists and killed many thousands.

The Communists retreated into the mountainous southern interior and established the Juikin Republic under Mao Tse-Tung. In 1931 Chiang's forces again attacked the Communists and finally succeeded in dislodging the Red Army in 1934. The survivors then made the 6,000 mile Long March, surmounting incredible hardships, to the north of China and established a new base of operations in Yenan.

While Chiang was occupied in his attempts to defeat the Communists, Japan conquered the Chinese province of Manchuria and threatened all of China. After the Communists became entrenched in the north, they suggested forming a united front with the Nationalists to resist the Japanese aggression. The idea drew much support from non-Communists, and demonstrations in its favor were held all over China. In 1936 some soldiers kidnapped Chiang and did not release him until he had signed an agreement which provided for cooperation with the Communists.

During the summer of 1937 Japan began its invasion of the rest of China. Although the Chinese armies could not defeat their better armed and equipped opponents, they did impress the world with their brave resistance. Rather than surrender they retreated slowly into China's vast interior.

During the first years of the struggle the United States launched strong protests to the Japanese government. By 1940 the United States began sending large amounts of supplies to the Chinese and even some
military personnel to train Chinese soldiers. In 1941 the American government made its position even clearer by cutting off vital oil supplies to the Japanese and by freezing all Japanese government funds deposited in United States banks. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, made the United States and China open allies.

United States actions toward China after this point are seen against the background of the gigantic military effort against the Japanese. From the first, the assumption was that the war should be fought by sea and in the air and that it might eventually involve in invasion of the Japanese mainland. The United States, however, did not plan to attempt to engage the large mass of the Japanese army which was fighting in China.

Soon controversy arose between the United States and China centering on the relationship between Chiang-Kai-shek and the American general, Joseph Stilwell, who had been appointed to train and lead a modern and efficient Chinese army. In his attempt to carry out this mission, Stilwell constantly clashed with Chiang. According to Stilwell, Chiang refused to cooperate. According to Chiang, Stilwell had no respect for either his position or his problems. Early in 1944 President Roosevelt attempted to get Chiang to give Stilwell complete control of the Chinese armies. When Chiang refused, Roosevelt recalled Stilwell and sent General Wedemeyer in his place. At the same time he appointed General Patrick Hurley as ambassador to China and assigned him the task of looking after American interests.

While the Chiang-Stilwell controversy was going on, the Nationalist-Communist conflict was again becoming intense. Since 1940 the United
Front had been only an empty phrase, as each group was working independently against the Japanese, in general maintaining an uneasy, armed truce between themselves which was occasionally broken when one group would openly attack the other.

A. The Communist and Nationalist Positions in 1944

During the war the United States had certain sources of information concerning conditions in China. One of these sources was the professional Foreign Service officers stationed in China. Following are excerpts from some of their reports.

1. On June 24, 1943, a Foreign Service officer, John Paton Davies, sent a report on the Communists to the State Department:1

Although we have no accurate information on the subject, it is suspected that the political leaders of the [Communist] Party retain their pro-Russian orientation and that they are, notwithstanding the dissolution of the Comintern, likely to be susceptible to Moscow direction.

2. A second officer, John S. Service, sent another report on the same subject on August 3, 1944.2

The Chinese Communist Party claims that it is Marxist. By this the Communists mean that their ideology, their philosophical approach, and their dialectical method are based on Marxist materialism. Marxism thus becomes to them chiefly an attitude and approach to problems. It is a long-term view of political

1Department of State, United States Relations with China with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949 (Publication 3573, General Printing Office, Washington, 1949), 564.

2Ibid., 565.
and economic development to which all short-term considerations of temporary advantage or premature power are ruthlessly subordinated.

3. On September 28, 1944, Service expressed his opinion as to how the Communists felt toward the United States:

[The statement explains the pro-American stand of the Chinese Communists; desire for military protection, economic assistance and support for Chinese unity are mentioned.]

4. On October 9, 1944, Service reported on the efforts the Communists were making in their struggle against the Japanese invaders:

Reports of two American officers, several correspondents, and twenty-odd foreign travelers regarding conditions in the areas of North China under Communist control are in striking agreement. This unanimity, based on actual observation, is significant. It forces us to accept certain facts, and to draw from those facts an important conclusion.

The Japanese are being actively opposed—in spite of the constant warfare and cruel retaliation this imposes on the population. . . . There is complete solidarity of Army and people.

This total mobilization is based upon and has been made possible by what amounts to an economic, political and social revolution. This revolution has been moderate and democratic. It has improved the economic condition of the peasants by rent and interest reduction, tax reform and good government. . . . The common people, for the first time, have been given something to fight for.

The Japanese are being fought now not merely because they are foreign invaders but because they deny this revolution. The people will continue to fight any government which limits or deprives them of these newly won gains. . . .

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4 United States Relations with China, 565.
5. On November 7, 1944, Davies commented on Communist strength:5

The Communists have survived ten years of civil war and seven years of Japanese offensives. They have survived not only more sustained enemy pressure than the Chinese Central Government forces have been subjected to, but also a severe blockade imposed by Chiang.

They have survived and they have grown. Communist growth since 1937 has been almost geometric in progression. From control of some 100,000 square kilometers with a population of one million and a half they have expanded to about 850,000 square kilometers with a population of approximately 90 million. And they will continue to grow.

6. Service discussed the strength of the Kuomintang or Nationalist party in a report dated June 20, 1944:6

The position of the Kuomintang and the Generalissimo is weaker than it has been for the past ten years.

China faces economic collapse. This is causing disintegration of the army and the government's administrative apparatus.

1. Morale is low and discouragement widespread. There is a general feeling of hopelessness.

2. The authority of the Central Government is weakening in the areas away from the larger cities. Government mandates and measures of control cannot be enforced and remain ineffective. It is becoming difficult for the Government to collect enough food for its huge army and bureaucracy.

3. The governmental and military structure is being permeated and demoralized, from top to bottom by corruption, unprecedented in scale and openness.

4. The intellectual and salaried classes, who have suffered the most heavily from inflation, are in danger of liquidation.

On the economic front the Kuomintang is unwilling to take any effective steps to check inflation which would injure the landlord-capitalist class. It is directly responsible

5 Ibid., 566-567.

6 Ibid., 567-569.
for the increase of official corruption which is one of the main obstacles to any rational attempt to ameliorate the financial situation. It does nothing to stop large-scale profiteering, hoarding and speculation—all of which are carried on by people either powerful in the Party or with intimate political connections. . . .

In view of the above it becomes pertinent to ask why the Kuomintang has lost its power of leadership; why it neither wishes actively to wage war against Japan itself nor to cooperate whole-heartedly with the American Army in China; and why it has ceased to be capable of unifying the country.

The answer to all these questions is to be found in the present composition and nature of the Party. Politically, a classical and definitive American description becomes ever more true; the Kuomintang is a conglomeration of conservative political cliques interested primarily in the preservation of their own power against all outsiders and in jockeying for position among themselves. Economically, the Kuomintang rests on the narrow base of the rural-gentry-landlords and militarists, the higher ranks of the government bureaucracy, and merchant bankers having intimate connections with the government bureaucrats. . . .

7. After surveying the situation a member of the American mission to China submitted a report to the United States government outlining what he considered to be the correct solution to the dilemma posed by China: 7

The initial step which we propose for consideration, predicated upon the assumption of the existence of the military necessity, is that the President inform Chiang Kai-shek in definite terms that we are required by military necessity to cooperate with and supply the Communists and other suitable groups who can aid in this war against the Japanese. . . .

Chiang kai-shek might also be told, if it is regarded as advisable, at the time of making this statement to him, that while our endeavor to persuade the various groups of

7 Ibid., 89-91.
the desirability of unification has failed and it is not possible for us to delay measures for the most effective prosecution of the war any longer, we regard it as obviously desirable that our military aid to all groups be based upon coordination of military command and upon unity, that we are prepared, where it is feasible, and when requested, to lend our good offices to this end, . . . although we believe the proposals should come from Chiang Kai-shek. . . .

The fact of our aid to the Communists and other forces would shortly become known throughout China, however, even if not made public. It is our belief that profound and desirable political effects in China would result from this. A tremendous internal pressure for unity exists in China, based upon compromise with the Communists and an opportunity for self-expression on the part of the now repressed liberal groups. . . . The statement has been made to a responsible American. . . . that if Chiang Kai-shek were told, not asked, regarding United States aid to Communists and guerrillas, this would do more to make Chiang Kai-shek come to terms with them than any other course of action. . . .

B. United States Attitude and Actions

This, then, was the situation which confronted Ambassador Hurley when he came to China in late 1944. What was he expected to do, and what did he actually accomplish?

1. At the time Hurley went to China, Sumner Welles was serving as Assistant Secretary of State. An excerpt from a book Welles published in 1950 throws light on what Roosevelt was trying to accomplish in sending Hurley to China: 8

[The selection explains that Roosevelt feared civil war in China.]

2. Another source of information on American aims in China is the set of instructions handed to Hurley shortly after his arrival in China: 9

8Sumner Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped History (Harper and Bros., New York, 1950), 152.

9United States Relations with China, 71.
(1) To prevent the collapse of the National Government,
(2) to sustain Chiang Kai-shek as President of the Republic
and Generalissimo of the Armies, (3) to harmonize relations
between the Generalissimo and the American Commander, (4) to
promote production of war supplies in China and prevent economic
collapse, and (5) to unify all the military forces in China
for the purpose of defeating Japan.

3. Following his instructions, Hurley attempted to mediate the dispute
between the Nationalists and the Communists. The following account of
his efforts is drawn from a State Department report prepared in 1949
from official documents in the State Department files, to explain why
the Communists were able to take control of China:

Following discussions with Chinese Government and Chinese
Communist representatives in Chungking, General Hurley on
November 7, 1944, flew to Yenan for a two-day conference with
Mao Tse-tung, the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee
of the Chinese Communist Party. The Communist leaders were
impressed by the fact that General Hurley had taken the
initiative in making this flight and cordial relations were
established at once. As a result of these discussions there
was evolved at Yenan a five-point draft, entitled "Agreement
Between the National Government of China, the Kuomintang of
China and the Communist Party of China," which was signed by
Mao Tse-tung as Chairman of the Central Executive Committee
of the Chinese Communist Party on November 10, 1944, and
by General Hurley as a witness. . . .

General Hurley felt that this Five-Point Draft Agree-
ment, which he promptly submitted to the National Government,
offered a practical plan for settlement with the Communists.
National Government leaders, however, said that the Communist
plan was not acceptable. The National Government submitted
as counterproposal a Three-Point Agreement. . . .

This proposal was handed to General Chou En-lai, the
Communist representative in Chungking, on November 22 and
was taken by him to Yenan early in December. Following his
arrival in Yenan, General Chou wrote General Hurley a letter,
which the latter reported as follows:

We find it impossible to see any fundamental common
basis in these new proposals. . . . We . . . completely
desire to continue to discuss with you and General Wedemeyer
the concrete problems of our future military cooperation
and to continue the closest contact with the United States
Army Observers Section in Yenan. Chairman Mao Tse-tung

Ibid., 74-81.
has especially asked me to express his deep thanks and appreciation for your sympathy and energetic efforts on behalf of unity in China...

Ambassador Hurley told him [Chiang] very frankly that the only instrument heretofore with which he could have worked with the Communists was the five-point agreement; that if he had revised that agreement at the time it was offered, the Communists would probably have accepted reasonable revision; and that it was still the only document in which there was a signed agreement by the Communists to submit control of their armed forces to the National Government...

4. After these attempts at mediation failed, the issue arose as to whether or not the United States should respond to Communists requests for direct American aid. This report of Hurley's reactions is included in the State Department report mentioned above:

The Ambassador recommended that "all such requests, no matter how reasonable they may seem to be, be universally refused until or unless they receive the sanction of the National Government and of the American Government." It was his "steadfast position that all armed warlords, armed partisans and the armed forces of the Chinese Communists must without exception submit to the control of the National Government before China can in fact have a unified military force or unified government." The Ambassador followed this policy in connection with a request from General Chu Teh in January 1945 that the United States Army lend the Communist forces 20 million dollars in United States currency for use in procuring the defection of officers and men of the Chinese puppet government together with their arms and for use in encouraging sabotage and demolition work by puppet troops behind the Japanese lines.

"While financial assistance of the type requested by General Chu might in the end prove to be more economical than importing a similar quantity of arms and ammunition from the United States for use against Japan, I am of the firm opinion that such help would be identical to supplying arms to the Communist armed Party and would, therefore, be a dangerous precedent. The established policy of the United States to prevent the collapse of the National Government and to sustain Chiang Kai-shek as president of the Government and Generalissimo of the Armies would be defeated by acceptance of the Communist Party's plan or by granting the lend-lease and monetary assistance requested by General Chu Teh."

Ibid., 86-87.
SECTION II
THE WAR ENDS: MEDIATION AND ITS AFTERMATH

By the beginning of 1945 it was clear that Germany and Italy would soon be defeated and that eventually Japan would be forced to surrender. Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin met at Yalta to prepare for these events. Roosevelt intended to convince the Russians not to declare war upon Japan after the defeat of Germany, feeling this to be of extreme importance in order to speed the defeat of Japan, thus saving hundreds of thousands of American lives.

The President achieved this objective. The Russians agreed to declare war on Japan two or three months after the German surrender, but the Russians demanded and obtained a secret treaty which contained a very important provision concerning China. The treaty stated that the Soviet Union should have a special status in the Chinese province of Manchuria, controlling two major ports and two major railroads. In turn Stalin pledged support for Chiang.

At the beginning of May the meeting of Russian and American troops marked the end of the war in Germany. Early in August, 1945, the United States dropped atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Before the Japanese could surrender, the Soviet Union poured troops into Manchuria to liberate that province. Consequently Russia controlled that region when hostilities ended a few days later.

A. United States Actions, 1945-1947

The role which the Soviet Union would play in the postwar world was the major question facing American policy makers in 1945. For four
years the U.S.S.R. had coordinated its wartime efforts with the Allies. Everyone hoped that this cooperation would extend into the post-war years and that a better and more peaceful world would follow the terrible suffering caused by World War II. It was against this background that the American government set about trying to solve China's problems.

An interesting history of this era emerges from the pages of the Congressional Record, for in 1951 the Senate held extensive hearings on the military situation in the Far East, which inquired into the rise of the Communists to power in China. At this time many of the principal figures involved testified at length.

1. Secretary of State Dean Acheson outlined the three alternatives which he believed were open to the United States in its relations with China at the close of World War II:¹

One choice was to pull out of China and say, "We have defeated the Japanese. The Chinese from now on must paddle their own canoe, and we have to wash our hands of it." That was an impossible choice to take because with the presence of 1,235,000 armed Japanese troops in China, exclusive of Manchuria, and of another 1,700,000 Japanese civilians--Government officials, economic people, clerks, and businessmen, one thing or another--there was a Japanese force and a Japanese influence so great in China that by throwing its weight to either side in this civil war it could have taken over the administration of the country, and Japan in defeat would have found itself in actual control of China, a result which we could not, of course, help to bring about.

The second choice was that the United States Government might have put into China unlimited resources and all the necessary military power to try and defeat the Communists, remove the Japanese and remove the Russians from Manchuria.

¹U.S. Congress, Senate Joint Committee on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, Hearings on the Military Situation in the Far East, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1842, 1847.
That was a task so great and so repugnant to the American people that the Government could not undertake it, and it was one which was not in accord with American interests.

The third choice, and the one which was chosen, was to give important assistance of all sorts to the Chinese Government and to assist in every way in the preservation of peace in China and the working out of the agreements . . .

So the marines had to go in there, hold coal, which was the heart of the industrial life in China, hold the seaports so that they would not be captured by Communists, and then receive the Japanese as they were marched to the railheads and down their railroads, and put them on ships and take them back to Japan.

At the same time our Armed Forces airlifted Chinese armies, whole armies, from south China into the areas to be evacuated and which were being evacuated by the Japanese. Now that was a tremendous undertaking most skillfully carried out, and it was that undertaking which permitted the Chinese Government to really get back into areas of China which it would have had the utmost difficulty in even getting into without that colossal effort.

By the end of 1946 we had removed 3,000,000 Japanese, just a few thousand under 3,000,000, from China to Japan--one of the great mass movements of people. . . .

2. When the evacuation was completed, President Truman sent General George Marshall, at that time serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to China to negotiate a settlement between the Nationalists and the Communists. In 1951, Marshall, who was then Secretary of Defense under Truman, testified before the Senate Committee concerning the situation which he found in China upon his arrival late in 1945: 2

You were confronted with a force on one side of about 3 million, a military power, and a force on the other side of something between a million and a million and a half, of which about 400,000 were pretty well-trained troops in the way of organization.

2Ibid., 396, 638.
Those were in the field against each other, and to set up a political agreement in the midst of that, of course, presented an extraordinarily difficult proposition.

I myself did not enter into the political phase of the matter. My job was first to create an armistice so there would be no active fighting during the period of the meetings, the political meetings, and later. I was to act as an adviser in the integration and demobilization of the military forces, Communist and Government.

It looked like it had a fair chance of success because the Communists were very anxious to go through with it, because I think quite evidently, they felt that their discipline and their strength, particularly with the people of the lower classes, the peasantry, was so much better than that of the National Government that they could gain the control politically.

And the hope in the matter so far as I saw it was that other parties—the Young China Party, Democratic League and so on, I think there were about four—and the nonparty group could coalesce. And it looked as though there would be enough drawn from those groups, together with what existed in the way of an independent group, which was a very small group, to hold the balance of power between the two alongside of the evident factor to me and to my associates that the Kuomintang Government was utterly incapable of suppressing the Communists by military means.

3. When Marshall arrived in China, the top American military officer on the scene was General Albert Wedemeyer. In response to Senatorial questioning Wedemeyer related his reactions to the Marshall Mission:

Senator CAIN. General Wedemeyer, during which month in 1946, if you recall, did you discuss with General Marshall his mission, which, in part, looked toward the amalgamating of the Nationalist and Communist armies in China?

General WEDEMEYER. It wasn't in 1946, sir; it was in December of 1945, when he arrived, the day he arrived to assume his responsibilities as special envoy of the President.

3Tbid., 396, 638.
Senator CAIN. And during this visit, sir, you expressed to General Marshall as being your opinion that mission was not subject to accomplishment, that it was like mixing oil and water; and it was your view that could not be done. Is that correct, sir?

General WEDEMEYER. In substance; yes, sir.... The Chinese Communists had an army. The Nationalist Government had an army, and in my judgment they would neither give up their military force because that was the source of their strength, and I tried to convey to my friend, a man with whom I had served and for whom I had the greatest respect, General Marshall, my innermost thoughts in expressing to him my concern that it was impossible for him to bring about this coalition....

Yes, sir; I think we were creating a very difficult situation for anyone to put those men in with the Nationalists, because they would sow these seeds of dissension and mistrust and try to undermine confidence in the Government. They were trained to do it....

4. Under Marshall’s guidance the Communists and the Nationalists signed agreements to call an armistice, to form a coalition government, and to merge the two armies. But almost immediately disputes broke out over occupying Manchuria after the Russian withdrawal. The following account of the situation was presented in a State Department report entitled

United States Relations with China:4

On February 10, General Marshall again, but without success, proposed that field teams be sent to Manchuria, pointing out the need of such teams both in stopping possible conflicts and in establishing a basis for the demobilization of the armies under the plan for military reorganization and integration. While the Chinese Communist Party acquiesced in this proposal, the National Government remained adamant in spite of a deterioration of the situation in Manchuria. At this stage the National

4United States Relations with China, 147-150.
Government seemed determined to incur no restraints on its freedom of actions in Manchuria and appeared bent on a policy of complete military occupation of the area and elimination of the Chinese Communist forces if they were encountered, even though it did not have the military capability of achieving these objectives.

It was not until March 11, the day of General Marshall's departure for Washington, that the Generalissimo finally agreed to the entry of Executive Headquarters field teams into Manchuria, but with numerous conditions stipulated. . . . This directive was not, however, sufficiently broad to enable the teams to bring about a cessation of the fighting, which meanwhile was developing into a dangerous situation for the National Government forces.

In addition to this difficulty, there was a justified complaint by the Chinese Communists that the National Government commander at Canton had violated the terms of the cessation of hostilities order by refusing to recognize the authority of the Executive Headquarters in his area of command. . . .

The extended delay in the sending of teams to Manchuria, caused first by the National Government's refusal to give its approval for such action and later by the inability of the two Chinese representatives to agree on a suitable directive for the teams, had already resulted in a serious situation. . . .

When the Russian troops did withdraw toward the north, the National Government found itself with extended lines of communication and limited railroad rolling stock. . . . The Chinese Communist forces were moving both into areas from which Russian troops were withdrawing and into the hinterland between the lines of communication where there had been no occupation forces. The movement of National Government troops into and within Manchuria for the purpose of restoring Chinese sovereignty had been provided for in the cease fire agreement. The entry of the Chinese Government forces had, however, been seriously impeded by the Russian refusal to permit their use of Dairen as the port of entry and their continued advance subsequent to their entry had been blocked by the delay in the Russian withdrawal. This delay also had the effect of giving the Chinese Communists time to build up their forces in Manchuria. . . .

This situation made a solution of the political impasse immeasurably more difficult, as it created considerable misgivings among the Chinese with regard to the relationship of the Chinese Communists to the Soviet Union. . . . The situation in Manchuria, however, presented them with a plausible excuse for resisting any limitation of Kuomintang governmental authority.
under such circumstances. Chinese Communist resentment and suspicions, in turn, were aroused by the obvious intention of the National Government to assume complete military and political control in Manchuria through new administrative appointees for Manchurian posts from among the most anti-Communist elements in the Kuomintang. . . . Subsequent to their withdrawal from Mukden, for example, the Russian military authorities refused to approve the National Government's use of the rail line north toward Changchun for the transportation of Chinese troops, alleging that it was prohibited by the terms of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of August 1945. . . .

On March 31 the Chinese Communists protested the further transportation of Chinese Government armies into Manchuria by American vessels . . . It was pointed out to General Chou En-lai that . . . the movement of National Government armies into Manchuria had been authorized by the cessation of hostilities order of January 10.

On April 15, 1946, the day after the withdrawal of Russian troops from Changchun, the Chinese Communist forces attacked the city, and occupied it on April 18 . . .

At the time of General Marshall's return to China on April 18, the impasse was complete, except that the Chinese Communists were willing to submit the future military dispositions and local political reorganization to negotiations if the fighting were terminated. The National Government declined such compromises, on the grounds that the cessation of hostilities order clearly gave National Government troops the right to proceed anywhere in Manchuria necessary to establish sovereignty. . . .

At the beginning of May the Generalissimo finally came to the point of proposing the same conditions for a settlement of the Manchurian problems that the Chinese Communists had actually proposed about six weeks earlier, before the Communists had captured Changchun. . . .

The successful Chinese Communist commanders in the Changchun region, however, had been strengthened by their acquisition of Japanese military equipment and stores, including medium artillery and tanks, while the National Government's military position grew weaker as its forces advanced, owing to the great distances over which its troops had to move in proceeding northward. The Chinese Communists therefore did not accept the Government's terms and General Chou En-lai urged General Marshall to withdraw shipping support from the National Government armies in order to force the hand of the Generalissimo. The Generalissimo's advisers were urging a policy of force which they were not capable of carrying out, even with American logistical support and the presence of United States Marines
in the North China ports of Tsingtao and Tientsin and up the railway line toward the port of Chinhuangdao, from which the coal essential for the industries of the lower Yangtze Valley area was shipped south.

5. In connection with American aid to the Nationalists, Marshall later said:

[T]here was a movement of [Nationalists] troops into Manchuria, which was carried out by our Navy, and they were landed there; and supplies were gotten for them there.

I personally arranged to have all our subartic clothing brought down; had the officer go with it until it was all shipped, headed for the Manchurian coast.

We also transported ammunition I think directly from Okinawa to the Manchurian coast as a base of supply for those forces because they were going in with very inadequate clothing into the winter of early 1946.

6. After the problems encountered in Manchuria, Marshall ordered an embargo to be placed on arms shipments to the Nationalists. During the Senate hearings Secretary of State Acheson was questioned on this topic:

Senator LONG. I wish you would clear up in my mind the embargo that you said at one time existed, especially on the Chinese Nationalists. Would you tell me when that embargo took place, the reason for it, and when it was lifted?

Secretary ACHESON. That was imposed in August 1946 and was lifted in May 1947.

Senator LONG. And what was the purpose of it?

Secretary ACHESON. That was imposed at the request of General Marshall . . . [who] took the position that it would be quite inconsistent to be acting as the chairman of a group which was attempting to stop hostilities and at the same time be furnishing arms to one side when they started hostilities;

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5Hearings on the Military Situation in the Far East, 697.
6Ibid., 2263, 1888.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, if they were on a diminishing supply of ammunition and equipment, which was being used up all the time and they could not replenish it, and their opponents, the Communists, were on an increasing supply of ammunition and equipment, which they could replenish, and did apparently replenish, is it going beyond reason to say that the Chinese Nationalists under those circumstances would eventually have to succumb?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, if those two facts were true, it would tend in the direction you say.

I don't know anything to show that they were true.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I think there is a great deal of existing cumulative evidence that would indicate that there are strong arguments along that line.

7. General Wedemeyer also testified on this subject:7

Senator LONG. Now, it seems to me that the only way we could have exerted pressure upon the Communist regime in China would have been simultaneously with this, by sending word to Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai that "unless you people recognize the supremacy of the government of the Republic we are going to supply Chiang Kai-shek with such aid as he needs, with no restrictions," but all the pressure, so far as I can see, seems to be applied upon the government of the Republic and not upon the Chinese Communists. . . .

General WEDEMEYER. Well, sir, in the first instance, we had no diplomatic connections with the Communist Government.

Senator BREWSTER. Were the shortages of ammunition one of the very critical problems for the National Government?

General WEDEMEYER. They were, sir; but I never would fail to emphasize, in making a statement, or a reply, that it is the moral rather than the material aid that is important to an army the spirit of the army.

General Marshall remained in China until early 1947. When the Communists announced they had lost all confidence in him, he returned to the United States and subsequently became Secretary of State. The United States made no further efforts to mediate the dispute.

7Ibid., 2441, 2434.
B. United States Actions After Mediation

Although the attempt at mediation had failed, the United States continued to be involved in mainland China until the Communists actually came to power.

1. In 1946 President Truman had made the following statement about United States policy in regard to China:8

   China is a sovereign nation. We recognize that fact and we recognize the National Government of China. We continue to hope that the Government will find a peaceful solution. We are pledged not to interfere in the internal affairs of China. Our position is clear. While avoiding involvement in their civil strife, we will persevere with our policy of helping the Chinese people to bring about peace and economic recovery in their country. . . .

2. President Truman further clarified the American policy towards China in a letter he sent to Chiang Kai-shek in 1948:9

   Your attention may have been called to my public statement on March 11, 1948, in which I stated that the United States maintained friendly relations with the Chinese Government and was trying to assist the recognized Government of China maintain peace. I also stated that I did not desire Communists in the Chinese Government. Secretary Marshall stated publicly on March 10, 1948, that the Communists were now in open rebellion against the Chinese Government and that the inclusion of the Communists in the Government was a matter for the Chinese Government to decide, not for the United States Government to dictate. I believe that these statements and the action of my Government in extending assistance to the Chinese Government under the China Aid Act of 1948 have made the position of the United States Government clear.

8Ibid., 694.
9Ibid., 899.
3. In 1948 Secretary of State Marshall proposed an aid program for the Nationalists. The following year Marshall resigned as Secretary of State to become Secretary of Defense, and Dean Acheson took over the State Department. Acheson described the aid program:10

Now, the program of aid which General Marshall presented was a program of $570 million in economic assistance over a 15-month period. He pointed out that the experience gained in the program would throw light on the possibilities of future programs. . . .

It was not recommended that we should have military advisers in combat areas.

It was not recommended that we should take measures of military aid which would lead to United States military intervention in China, or direct involvement in the civil war. . . .

There was already a United States military advisory group in China that had been established in 1946, and in 1947 the commanding officer of this group had been authorized to give advice on a confidential basis to the Generalissimo, advice of a strategic nature . . .

Therefore, we did not take responsibility for the strategic direction of the war, nor did we recommend that American officers should be with troops in combat areas.

This recommendation was considered by the Eightieth Congress. It reduced, split the appropriations and recommended $338,000,000 for economic aid and $125,000,000 as a special grant to be used at the discretion of the Chinese Government.

The debate indicates that the Chinese Government would probably use this 125 for military aid. In the course of the legislative history the House put in a provision authorizing military advice . . . that is, having officers with troops in combat areas and strategic advice. That was stricken out by the Senate, and in speaking about it Senator Vandenberg said:

"As in the case of Greece and Turkey, your committee recognizes that military aid is necessary in order to make economic aid effective. It proposes to make military supplies available at China's option. Your committee believes that as a matter of elementary prudence

10Ibid., 1854-1855.
that this process must be completely clear of any implication that we are underwriting the military campaign of the Nationalist Government."

I said that the bill authorized $338,000,000 for economic aid. However, when it came to the appropriation process, Congress only appropriated $275,000,000 for economic aid and $125,000,000 for military aid. So a total was actually made available by the Congress of $400,000,000 as against $570,000,000 requested.

4. General Barr, the top American military advisor to China in 1947, also testified on the subject of aid to China:

Senator SMITH. General, before I begin questioning you, I want to call attention to something in the white paper, a statement by the President of the United States, entitled "Statement by President Truman on United States Policy toward China, December 18, 1946"

"According to the latest figures reported, lend-lease assistance to China up to VJ-day totaled approximately $870 million."

And then, here is the important part:

"From VJ-day to the end of February, shortly after General Marshall's arrival, the total was approximately $600 million--mostly in transportation costs. Thereafter, the program was reduced to the fulfillment of outstanding commitments, much of which was later suspended."

And then, later, on page 692, the President's statement goes on to say:

"Aircraft all nondemilitarized combat material, and fixed installations outside of China were excluded. Thus, no weapons which could be used in fighting a civil war were made available through this agreement."

That, of course, was prior to the time that you were there?

General BARR. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. And I just would be interested to know, after you were there, what change was ther in that situation? . . .

Ibid., 2989.
General BARR. From the time that General Marshall came out of China after his mission over there, when all military aid was cut off, no aid was received in China other than one shipment of ammunition, and later on what came from the $125 million, and provided by Congress in 1948.

Now, most of this stuff that is referred to there, I believe, is the equipment, and so forth, that went to the BOSEY organization, which was not to the military.

Senator SMITH. But it did not have to do with the military aid. The reason I am raising this question is that it has been said so frequently by different persons in and out of the administration, that since the Japanese war we have given China some $2 billion worth of equipment of one kind or another, and I never could figure out how that $2 billion could ever have been figured.

**C. Could the United States Have Stopped the Communists in China?**

The Chinese Communist rise to power should be viewed in the broader context of the post war world, and United States actions toward China during this time were closely related to actions taken elsewhere.

After the close of hostilities Americans wanted to put war behind them, and the United States promptly demobilized. At the time of Japanese surrender the Armed Forces contained over eleven million men. Within a year only one million remained under arms.

The post war world brought new problems. The Russians refused to leave Eastern Europe or to hold free elections in the territory they had previously liberated from the Germans. Instead, they established Communist governments in these nations. The Russians also blocked many proposals in the United Nations. For example, they vetoed a United
States proposal for the creation of a world agency to supervise the pooling of information about atomic energy and to insure its use for peaceful purposes.

In 1946 Winston Churchill coined the phrase "Cold War" to describe the conditions existing between the Soviet Union and the Western powers. When it appeared that Communist guerrillas might take over Greece in 1947, President Truman sent economic aid and military supplies to the Greek government as well as civilian and military advisors. In the Truman Doctrine he proclaimed his intention "to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." In 1947 the United States undertook the Marshall Plan, a massive aid program for Europe, one of whose main purposes was to strengthen the ability of the region to resist Communism. During 1948 the Berlin Blockade furnished the major Cold War encounter. The Allies had agreed upon joint British, American, and Russian occupation of Berlin, although the city was surrounded by territory occupied by the Russians. When the Russians refused to allow the Allies access to the city, the Western nations staged a massive airlift to supply the city.

In considering the world situation in the years from 1946 to 1949, one major factor should be remembered. The Western nations possessed a very important asset the Russians did not; it was the sole possessor of nuclear weapons.

During these same years the Communists took over China. At the end of 1946 the N. lists had 3,000,000 soldiers who were opposed by 600,000 regular communist troops and 400,000 guerrillas. By the end
of 1949 the Communists controlled the entire Chinese mainland, and the Nationalists had fled to Formosa (Taiwan), an island off the mainland.

The United States obviously did not want China to fall under Communist domination. What, if anything, could we have done to prevent this? In 1951 the Senate hearings on the military situation in the Far East sought an answer to this question.

1. Senators Connally and Bridges questioned Admiral Badger, United States military advisor to China:12

Senator CONNALLY. Do you think we could have saved China if we had given them more aid?

Admiral BADGER. That is a pretty broad question.

Chairman CONNALLY. It is---very broad.

Admiral BADGER. But I think we lost our great gamble, a great gamble, with an element of possible success in the specific implementation of that act. We had gone through that area of North China and we had had several things that were very favorable occurring and evident in that part of China.

In the first place, the armies were led at that time by a general named Fu Tso-yi. He was a man who we knew, by close acquaintance and by inspecting his armies, was a very popular and effective leader.

He had under handicaps stopped the Communists for a considerable period of time at the Great Wall. . . .

This is a personal letter to Mr. Forrestal:

"The following day at General Fu's invitation I inspected the better part of three of his armies. . . . These armies were very impressive in their appearance, actions, and spirit. Their loyalty to General Fu was unmistakably of the highest degree. General Fu told me during this tour that he had a total of 11 armies, 4 of which were well equipped, 3 of which were fairly to poorly equipped, and 4 of which were unequipped. He

12 Ibid., 2745-2747, 2763.
stated that he could do little more than to keep the Communists out of the area with his equipped armies; . . . he stated that if he could obtain equipment for the four additional trained armies he would then be able to set up an offensive. . . ."

I asked General Fu Tso-yi if he had made his requirements known to Nanking, and he said, "Yes," that he had. But I said, "Are they specific and listed?" And he wasn't sure but said that he would make up such a list.

When he made it up that list came to me, came to the Army advisory group in Nanking and to the Ambassador. As a result of that a recommendation was sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff specifically listing this equipment . . .

Chairman CONNALLY. They approved it?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, yes. Then nothing happened. . . .

To make a long story short, nothing happened. Questions as to even the prices, what it was going to cost those people, were not forthcoming, and remembering that that was approved by the Joint Chiefs, had the authority of the act of Congress and had the approval of the President, a period of 5 months went by before we could actually get any action.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Action where?

Admiral BADGER. Action toward the shipment or knowledge of what was going to come, and you can't build a house, you can't fight a campaign unless you know what is coming and when it is coming, and therefore all the planning, the whole thing was stopped.

In the meantime the Communists started coming down against Fu Tso-yi and were knocking him back about December, November 31.

Chairman CONNALLY. There is no such time.

Adimiral BADGER. I beg your pardon. I mean November 30. I received word that a ship was entering, was about to go into Tientsin and it had about 10 percent of this shipment that we had recommended on board. I said, "Well, that's pretty bad. It's too bad that it isn't the full business, but maybe it will still have a morale effect," knowing as I did that these generals under Fu Tsu-yi and his troops were hanging on in the fighting and fighting hard, hanging on in the promise of this American aid.
That ship went in at Tientsin on the night of the 29th of November as I remember, and on the 30th I received this dispatch sent to me because of the fact that I had communications, but also to Nanking, and it was from General Fu Tso-yi reporting the deficiencies of these machine guns.

The result was that General Fu Tso-yi, who had his back to the wall at that time at Tientsin and Peiping in effect had his generals say, "Is this what we have been waiting for?" and they collapsed within 2 days.

Senator BRIDGES. Now you said earlier, Admiral, that we could not save China if we lost North China. I understood you to say something to that effect, that North China was critical in the whole China picture. When you speak of North China, could that have been saved by this operation of General Fu Tso-yi if he had had adequate equipment?

Admiral BADGER. The statement was made in one of the official dispatches that it had better than a 50-50 chance of success.

Senator BRIDGES. When they saw what they were getting and the ineffectiveness of it, that was rather a determining factor in the breakdown of the morale, was it not?

Admiral BADGER. It was the straw that broke the camel's back, in my opinion.

2. At another point in his testimony Badger commented on American aid in general.13

We went along those lines doing the best we could, and I feel sure we did the best we could as a Nation and as people. I have never heard a Chinese in all my life criticize us for lack of generosity.

But we expected too much of them. They never had had a central government; they never had had any national public works program; they never had had any national planners. They couldn't requisition stuff; they didn't have the facilities. Therefore, we met and they met, and we didn't get the results that we hoped to get.

13 Ibid., 2751-2753.
I think that my simple example will disclose that not as a criticism. We just didn't appreciate the fact that we sent planes to China without ground crews; they didn't have technicians. We sent trucks out there that needed spare parts; they didn't have any repair crews. . . .

3. After Admiral Badger finished testifying, General Barr came in for some very intensive questioning: 14

General BARR. Certainly, if there had been unlimited numbers of troops, and unlimited amounts of equipment and ammunition, and they had the will to fight, the results would have been different. But with the troops that were on the battlefield, and other troops that could have been put on the battlefield there was no battle lost but what a tremendous amount of ammunition and equipment was not lost with it; and the Chinese would never destroy equipment. . . .

Senator SMITH. Well, do you not agree with the suggestion made by Admiral Badger that had Gen. Fu Tso-yi had this equipment that the Joints Chiefs approved of . . . he might have maintained an effective offensive there in north China?

General BARR. No, sir. . . . I don't think that Gen. Fu Tso-yi would have had a chance in the world. . . . In other words, he had an enemy on the right, an enemy on the left, and an enemy to the front and rear.

Senator SMITH. Then you are in disagreement--

General BARR. I do not agree with Admiral Badger that was the straw that broke the camel's back. . . .

Senator SMITH. Now, was General Wedemeyer in China on his other special mission at the time you were them in an advisory capacity?

General BARR. No; he had left there some several months before I arrived.

Senator SMITH. Well, . . . I felt he was much more optimistic about what might have been done with the Nationalist Chinese than you appear to have been.

General BARR. Had we had unlimited amounts of equipment and unlimited ammunitions, sir, and broader advisory directive, we certainly could have done more. . . .

14Ibid., 2986-2987, 2983, 3000, 2968.
Had we given unlimited aid to China and had we given unlimited advice to China, the situation would have probably been different.

Senator STENNIS. Did you want to control the pay [of the Chinese soldiers] yourself?

General BARR. No, sir. I could not control the pay, but I was perfectly willing to have officers—

Senator STENNIS. I mean, through your command you wanted to control the payroll?

General BARR. No. I could not control the pay. I wanted the Chinese though to use my recommendations as to how they would pay them, so that the division commander could not divide the money into two bags and put half in his pocket and pay the soldiers the other half when, as a matter of fact, it all belonged to the troops.

Senator STENNIS. So that condition was something that you did find there; and you found it was an actual fact, that it was going on, and it was impossible to cope with it.

General BARR. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, you stated that the Chinese division and army commanders in some cases were very careless about the rights of their men to receive their pay and their equipment and food. Was that widespread or just confined to certain armies?

General BARR. No, it was widespread. It was less prevalent in Fu Tso-yi's than anywhere else but he could not observe his people all the way down.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did you ever discuss that question with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek?

General BARR. Many times.

Chairman RUSSELL. Why could he not correct it?

General BARR. Because he did not have the intestinal fortitude to slap his old faithfuls down and say to them, "By God, I said to do it—now do it!"

Chairman RUSSELL. What do you mean by "old faithfuls"?

General BARR. People who had been his loyal friends over a period of many, many years and who occupied high positions in his government and in his army.
Senator WILEY. Now, you were in China about a year. Assuming that the statement is correct that there has been a break in the morale of the nationalist troops, what is your explanation of that?

General BARR. It was brought about in the defense forces, principally the army, due to the fact that they were not properly paid, were not properly clothed, fed, nor were their dependents cared for or taken care of in any way.

The leadership was atrocious, so far as the individual soldier was concerned. No one accepted responsibility for him. If he got breakfast in the morning, it was purely on his own.

Senator WILEY. Did you report that condition to the General Staff or to the people here in this country?

General BARR. I did, yes, sir; and to the Generalissimo many times.

Senator WILEY. I understand. Now, then, once our Government knew that, what steps did they take, if anything, to try to remedy that situation?

General BARR. The Government itself took no steps. They closely observed the actions I took to try to remedy the situation.

4. Secretary of Defense Marshall also testified on the effectiveness of American aid:15

Senator LONG. There is some argument that possibly at the time we undertook that bold policy in Greece, that we should have pursued the same course in China.

Secretary MARSHALL. What we did in Greece, was not done by compulsion; it was not done, we will say, assertively; but it was done by continual efforts along diplomatic lines, by the Ambassador, and it was done . . . to make particularly the economic recovery of Greece possible. . . .

Senator LONG. By and large, one of the main differences of the result in the Greek policy and the Chinese policy, I take it then, would be the difference of cooperation between the two Governments and the difference of understanding between the people who were trying to work it out, and in Greece you had occidental people who seemed to understand our

15Ibid., 663.
way of doing things better, and in China we had great difficulty in working out an understanding on how to try to meet the situation. I take it?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes; we were dealing with a China of several thousand years of, we will say, culture or methods or procedures, good, bad and indifferent, and with a fixative which was very hard to overcome. . . .

5. Another witness whose opinion interested the senators was General Douglas MacArthur, who was serving as Commander of Allied occupation forces in Japan during the period in question:16

Senator WILEY. When you were in Japan, were you cognizant of the internal affairs that were going on in Russia, China—the fight between the Commies and the Nationalists?

General MACARTHUR. Naturally. . . .

Senator WILEY. Did you have any idea at that time how the situation in China might have been solved, instead of running into the mess that we are in now?

General MACARTHUR. It is my own personal opinion that the greatest political mistake we made in a hundred years in the Pacific was in allowing the Communists to grow in power in China.

I think, at one stroke, we undid everything, starting from John Hay, through Taft, Leonard Wood, Woodrow Wilson, Henry Stimson, and all those great architects of our Pacific policy.

I believe it was fundamental, and I believe we will pay for it, for a century. . . .

6. An exchange between Senator Hickenlooper and Secretary of State Acheson brought out another point of view:17

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, Mr. Secretary, don't all the events that have happened since the close of the war show

16Ibid., 32.
17Ibid., 2145.
that American policy, foreign policy, directed toward China was to push the Nationalist Government over the cliff and not make it look like we had done it?

Secretary ACHESON. Absolutely, completely no. There is no vestige of truth in that accusation.
When fighting ended in China, two governments were firmly established, the Nationalist Republic of China on Formosa and the Communist Chinese People's Republic on the mainland. The United States was faced with the problem of deciding which it should recognize as the official government of China. Seizure of American property and imprisonment of some American citizens by the Communists combined with American hostility toward Communism made it relatively easy for the State Department to decide not to recognize the Chinese People's Republic.

The Western Allies did not follow the American example. The British recognized the Communist regime in December, 1949, partly because of a desire to safeguard the port city of Hong Kong which lies on the Chinese mainland.

Early in 1950 the Chinese Communist government, claiming to represent the Chinese people, demanded that the United Nations award it China's seat in the Security Council and in the General Assembly. Largely because of pressure from the United States, the United Nations refused the request.

In June, 1950 world attention turned from China to neighboring Korea, a peninsula to the south of Manchuria which had been freed from Japanese domination at the end of World War II. The United States and the Soviet Union had divided this small nation between them into two occupation zones, agreeing to prepare their respective areas for elections for a united government. Instead, the Soviet Union established a Korean Communist government in the north, while a government was elected...
in South Korea. Both Russian and American troops were withdrawn from Korea in 1949.

The world was dismayed to hear reports that troops from North Korea were streaming down into South Korea. To allow the invasion of South Korea would be a clear violation of the containment policy, adopted officially by the United States in 1947 which provided that this nation would do everything possible to contain Communism within its existing borders.

The United States went to the United Nations, which adopted a resolution recommending that member nations send troops to repel the aggressors and help establish peace. Several nations provided troops and equipment, but the United States furnished the bulk of necessary manpower and supplies. To limit further aggression, President Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to the Formosa Strait to protect the Nationalist stronghold. The fleet is still there today.

A. The Early Korean War

After the United Nations entered the war, the North Korean forces were pushed out of South Korea more quickly than expected. Should the United Nations forces then invade North Korea?

1. The decision rested with President Truman. Before making it he met at Wake Island with the United Nations Commander in Korea, General Douglas MacArthur. From a transcript of their meeting:

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1Richard H. Rovere and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The General and the President and the Future of American Foreign Policy (Farrar, Straus, and Young, New York, 1951), 258.
[In answer to the President's question about probably Chinese or Soviet interference MacArthur described the air and land strength of these two forces, and concluded that interference was unlikely.]

2. The President took up the question of taking the offensive in Korea with his closest advisors on the National Security Council. Truman reported its recommendation in his Memoirs:

[The selection describes the military policy to be implemented by General MacArthur in the Korean conflict. The National Security Council recommends the occupation of North Korea if China and the Soviet force do not enter; if they do enter, MacArthur is to extend his land operations only to the 38th parallel.]

3. Truman explained his decision in a speech delivered in San Francisco on October 17:

[Truman states that the United States' objectives in Korea were to establish a "unified, independent, and democratic" government and that troops would stay in Korea, under United Nations auspices for only as long as it was necessary to accomplish this.]

4. While the decision was being made to invade North Korea, important events were taking place in Peking. K. M. Pannikkar, who was then serving as Indian Ambassador to Communist China, described these events in his book, In Two Chinas:

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3Ibid., 369.

[The account describes the interview between Pannikkar and the Chinese Director of the Asian Affairs of the Foreign Ministry and contains the reflections of the Indian Ambassador on subsequent events. Pannikkar explains that he conveyed the Chinese intention to intervene in case the American forces crossed the 38th parallel; subsequent decisions by the United Nations and the United States reveal that the U. S. effectively "elected for war."]

B. After Chinese Entry

The Korean situation changed suddenly and dramatically. Approximately a million Chinese soldiers poured into Korea, sending the United Nations soldiers running for their lives. For a time most high government and military leaders, including President Truman and General MacArthur, thought it would be necessary to evacuate United Nations forces from Korea. The Chinese did succeed in clearing United Nations forces from North Korea and even captured the South Korean capital of Seoul. Then MacArthur launched a counter offensive which drove the Chinese and North Koreans back to the 38th parallel, the border between North and South Korea. Here the war settled into a bloody stalemate.

A surprised America learned on April 11, 1951, that President Truman had recalled General MacArthur. The recall was triggered by a letter written by MacArthur to Republican Representative Joseph Martin, which Martin made public. In the letter MacArthur criticized the Administration for not taking stronger measures against the Chinese. Truman considered this a constitute insubordination.

On his return, MacArthur made speeches all over the nation, including one before a joint session of Congress. The publicity he received was extensive. It was impossible to read a newspaper or listen
to a newscast without hearing or seeing MacArthur's name. Many people took stands for or against his views. The following selections center on the Truman-MacArthur controversy.

1. MacArthur outlined his proposals for conducting the Korean War in his speech before a joint session of Congress:

   While no man in his right mind would advocate sending our ground forces into continental China—and such was never given a thought—the new situation did urgently demand a drastic revision of strategic planning if our political aim was to defeat this new enemy as we had defeated the old.

   Apart from the military need as I saw it to neutralize sanctuary protection given to the enemy north of the Yalu, I felt that military necessity in the conduct of the war made necessary:

   First, the intensification of our economic blockade against China.

   Second, the imposition of a naval blockage against the China coast.

   Third, removal of restrictions on air reconnaissance of China's coastal areas and of Manchuria.

   Fourth, removal of restrictions on the forces of the Republic of China on Formosa with logistical support to contribute to their effective operation against the Chinese mainland.

2. The Senate hearings on the military situation in the Far East were actually begun to inquire into the Truman-MacArthur controversy.

   General MacArthur testified at length, expanding upon his ideas about the Korean War:

   General MACARTHUR. As to their use [of Nationalist Chinese troops], Senator, there is no question that such a decision should be left to their commander. The possibility of a huge amphibious force landing all that crowd on the mainland might not be feasible. They could be used in

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5Hearings on the Military Situation in the Far East, 3614-3615.

6Ibid., 24, 25, 80.
Various ways. They could infiltrate into Indochina. They could go in small forays and come back or they could go to the mainland just exactly as they came to Formosa, in their own junks and so on. . . .

The Chinese are peculiar in their own methods. They have their own ideas. They know their terrain. They know their potentialities.

That is a subject that should be left up to the commander in chief of the Chinese forces. I would not attempt to speculate how those troops should be used, but this I do know: They should be used.

Even as a threat they would have relieved the pressure on my command. It would have been a 100-percent different picture if they had not been held in leash. . . .

Had I been permitted to use my air, when those Chinese forces came in there, I haven't the faintest doubt we would have thrown them back.

That opinion is shared not only by every air officer I have commented to, but to General Stratemeyer, and General O'Donnell. . . .

I don't believe that the Soviet has sufficiently associated itself with the war in Korea to believe that the defeat of Red China to the extent of her being forced to evacuate Korea would necessarily produce great prejudice to the Soviet cause in other parts of the world.

Everything that is involved in international relationships, Senator, amount to a gamble, risk. You have to take risks. . . .

What I faced in the Pacific wasn't something that was speculative in the future. It's right now. What are you going to do to stop the slaughter in Korea? . . . Does your global plan for defense of this United States against war consist of permitting war indefinitely to go on in the Pacific? . . .

It is there. There is no sophistry of talk when you see thousands of battle casualties every month; you can't talk those off that there is no war. There is a savage war there.

If you are not going to bring the war to a decisive conclusion, what does the preparedness mean? . . .
3. Writing in his Memoirs President Truman had this to say about MacArthur's position: 7

[Truman claims that MacArthur must have known that the bombing of China would have caused massive retaliation.]

4. During the hearings General Bradley, speaking for the Administration, expanded upon the themes raised by Truman: 8

The strategic alternative, enlargement of the war in Korea to include Red China, would probably delight the Kremlin more than anything else we could do. It would necessarily tie down additional forces, especially our seapower and our airpower, while the Soviet Union would not be obliged to put a single man into the conflict. . . .

Red China is not the powerful nation seeking to dominate the world. Frankly, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this strategy would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy. . . . We also know that there is a treaty between the Soviets and the Chinese Communists.

But even if the treaty did not exist, China is the Soviet Union's largest and most important satellite. Russian self-interest in the Far East and the necessity of maintaining prestige in the Communist sphere make it difficult to see how the Soviet Union could ignore a direct attack upon the Chinese mainland.

5. General Vandenberg also testified for the Administration, and his subject was victory: 9

I often used to hear . . . this theory, and I am an advocate . . . that there are two ways of going about establishing peace in the world.

One, in which you completely bring to the knees a nation so that its power of resistance is gone for many years, and

7 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, II, 415-416.
8 Hearings on the Military Situation in the Far East, 731-732.
9 Ibid., 1416-1417.
that shifts the balance of power.

There is another complete victory that is a combination of a military victory and the diplomatic victory, whereby there is again a balance of power in the world in which the people that we are interested in and believe have the right idea, have that balance without completely knocking out, emasculating, ruining, killing off all of your enemies.

With that explanation, I would agree with the statement that there is nothing that is a substitute for victory.

6. What was the human cost of the Korean War? MacArthur commented on the cost to Korea:

The war in Korea has already almost destroyed that nation of 20,000,000 people.

I have never seen such devastation.

I have seen, I guess, as much blood and disaster as any living man, and it just curdled my stomach, the last time I was there. After I looked at that wreckage and those thousands of women and children and everything, I vomited.

7. Following are the American casualties of the war:

[The chart gives statistics on the dead, wounded, missing and captured military personnel in the Korean conflict.]

8. In his memoirs MacArthur discussed Korea and President Truman:

[MacArthur criticizes Truman for ignorance and lack of nerve in the Korean situation; he would have preferred an offensive approach.]

10 Ibid., 82.


9. In retrospect Truman summarized what he thought happened in Korea and what his Administration accomplished:\textsuperscript{13} 

[The statement claims that the U. S. achieved its objective in preventing the Chinese take-over of South Korea; general war was averted in this effort. Truman states that in contrast to MacArthur he could not risk such a war.]

C. Armistice

Dwight Eisenhower was elected President in 1952, assuming office in 1953. One of the most urgent tasks facing him was to find a way of ending the Korean War.

1. In his memoirs Eisenhower described how he viewed the Korean conflict and what he did about it:\textsuperscript{14} 

[The selection describes various plans for settling the Korean conflict which Eisenhower considered and rejected. Among these are acceptance of the status quo, the waging of a conventional ground war, and the use of atomic weapons. Despite reluctance to resort to atomic power, Eisenhower describes "discreetly" suggesting this possibility at the Panmunjom peace talks.]

2. Shortly afterwards the Communists signed an armistice ending the fighting. The new division between North and South Korea was the battle line on the day the armistice was signed, almost the same as the border which had divided the two sections of Korea before the war began. Eisenhower described his feelings immediately after the signing of the armistice:\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{13}Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, II, 464, 416.


\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., 191
[The selection recalls the sense of satisfaction the author enjoyed at the outcome of the Korean conflict; the emotion was tinged however with a "haunting doubt" that real peace must await the settlement of the conflict between the Free World and Communism.]

D. Aftermath: Quemoy and Matsu

When the Nationalists fled to Formosa late in 1949, they also maintained control of the several small islands lying in the Formosa Strait. In 1949 the Communists could do little about either these islands or Formosa because they possessed no navy. During the Korean War Truman sent the Seventh Fleet into the Strait to protect the Nationalists. Was this protection by the United States only for Formosa, or did it also extend to the small islands?

The following map shows the location of these islands:16

[The map locates Formosa, the Chinese mainland, islands in the area, and the Seventh Fleet.]

Chiang wanted to retain the offshore islands as possible future steppingstones for invasion of the mainland and as present bases for guerrilla raids. Considerations of morale also influenced Chiang's position. The American Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, thought that these islands were not essential for the defense of Formosa and considered that they could not be held without United States assistance.

In 1954, after several Communist-Nationalist skirmishes in the Straits, the Communists began to show an interest in the offshore islands.

16 Ibid., 460.
In September they began shelling Quemoy and Matsu, which were within range of artillery installations on the mainland. The situation developed into a full fledged crisis.

1. In his memoirs Eisenhower described the situation:

   [Eisenhower recalls his stated determination to protect Formosa from the threat of Red Chinese air attacks. He reports having asked Chiang to remove civilians from Quemoy and Matsu; Chiang refused. Chou then announced his willingness to negotiate rather than fight over Formosa. Shortly afterward Molotov told Dulles that Russia considered the problem of the off-shore islands a matter of Chinese domestic concern. Chou then reiterated his hope for a peaceful solution.]

2. During 1958 the offshore islands again came in for every intensive shelling from the mainland. In the second volume of his memoirs Eisenhower discussed this new crisis:

   [The excerpt discusses the problems and strategy of U. S. intervention. The U. S. had to face the possibility of using atomic weapons, and the necessity of victory in any conflict here in order to save face. The strategy was to "keep the Communists guessing" about the U. S. intent to defend any particular island. The seventh fleet was ordered to patrol the area; after symbolic shelling, the Red Chinese "seemed to lose interest" in Quemoy and Matsu.]

3. In 1960 During a nationally televised debate between Richard Nixon and John F. Kennedy, the presidential candidates discussed the offshore island crisis:

   [Kennedy stated in the debate that although we should "protect our commitments" we should not draw the line at two strategically indefensible islands which are inessential to the defense of Formosa. Nixon disagreed, contending that the islands are in "the area of freedom" and should be defended.

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17 Ibid., 466-467, 469, 476, 480-482.


19 The New York Times, October 18, 1960, 11
SECTION IV

THE PRESENT--AND FUTURE--PROBLEM

Today the central question concerning relations between the United States and China is whether or not this nation should increase its contacts with Communist China. Some people think the United States should recognize Communist China, accept its admission to the United Nations, and establish trade relations. Others think the United States should maintain its present policy of refusing to deal with the Communist Chinese regime and attempting to keep it isolated from other nations. This concluding section will explore these alternative positions.

1. President Eisenhower had strong views concerning China. In the following excerpt from his memoirs he recounted a conversation which he held with Chairman Khrushchev of the Soviet Union:\(^1\)

   [Eisenhower states that he told Khrushchev he saw little purpose in their discussing Red China since that nation had put itself "beyond the pale so far as the United States was concerned" principally through refusal to return U. S. citizens and by economic and military intervention and aggression in Southeast Asia.]

2. Eisenhower also reported a discussion on the subject with Marshal Tito, President of Communist Yugoslavia:\(^2\)

   [Tito explains that despite animosity between the peoples of Red China and Yugoslavia, he has supported the entree of Red China into the U.N. as logical in view of the vast population controlled by that government.]

3. President Kennedy, too, had to deal with the problem posed by China. Former Presidential Assistant Arthur Schlesinger reported that


\(^2\)Ibid., 583-584.
in a conversation with the United States representative to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, Kennedy said:

[The selection quotes Kennedy's advice to Stevenson to delay the admission of Red China to the U.N., despite the logic of the step, until both Stevenson and Kennedy had been in office longer, and the election year had passed.]

4. During a nationally televised address in July, 1966, President Johnson commented on United States policy toward Communist China in the course of discussing the war in Vietnam:

[Johnson states that peace in mainland China is essential for peace in Southeast Asia. He describes the Chinese people as isolated from the outside world through the design of their leaders and sees the "free flow of ideas and people and goods" as the way to achieve peace. He cites the rejection of his proposed exchange programs but vows to continue his efforts.]

5. Early in 1966 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on American policy towards China and invited many experts on China to testify. Part of the prepared statement of one such expert, A. Doak Barnett of Columbia University, is presented here:

I would like, right at the start, to state my own belief that there is a need for basic changes in the overall U.S. posture toward Communist China. For almost 17 years we have pursued a policy that might best be characterized as one aimed at containment and isolation of Communist China.


5U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on U.S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., 4-8.
In my view, the element of containment—using this term in a very broad sense to include both military and nonmilitary measures to block threats posed by China to its neighbors—has been an essential part of our policy and has been, in some respects at least, fairly successful. Our power has played an important and necessary role in creating a counterbalance to Communist China's power in Asia, and we have contributed significantly to the task of gradually building stable non-Communist societies in areas that lie in China's shadow. But the U.S. attempt to isolate Communist China has been, in my opinion, unwise and, in a fundamental sense, unsuccessful, and it cannot, I believe, provide a basis for a sound, long-term policy that aims not only at containing and restraining Chinese power but also at reducing tensions, exerting a moderating influence on Peking, broadening the areas of non-Communist agreement on issues relating to China, and slowly involving Communist China in more normal patterns of international intercourse.

I strongly believe, therefore, that the time has come—even though the United States is now engaged in a bitter struggle in Vietnam—for our country to alter its posture toward Communist China and adopt a policy of containment but not isolation, a policy that would aim on the one hand at checking military or subversive threats and pressures emanating from Peking, but at the same time would aim at maximum contacts with and maximum involvement of the Chinese Communists in the international community.

Such a policy would involve continued commitments to help non-Communist regimes combat Communist subversion and insurrection, as in Vietnam, and continued pledges to defend areas on China's periphery, including Taiwan. But it would involve changes in many other aspects of our policies.

While continuing to fulfill our pledge to defend Taiwan against attack, we should clearly and explicitly acknowledge the Chinese Communist regime as the de facto Government of the China mainland and state our desire to extend de jure recognition and exchange diplomatic representatives with Peking if and when it indicates that it would be prepared to reciprocate.

We should press in every way we can to encourage nonofficial contacts. We should, instead of embargoeing all trade with the China mainland, restrict only trade in strategic items and encourage American businessmen to explore other opportunities for trade contacts. And within the United Nations we should work for the acceptance of some formula which would provide seats for both Communist China and Nationalist China. In taking these steps we will have to do so in full recognition of the fact that Peking's initial reaction is almost certain to be
negative and even hostile and that any changes in our posture will create some new problems. But we should take them, nevertheless, because initiatives on our part are clearly required if we are to work, however slowly, toward the long-term goal of a more stable, less explosive situation in Asia and to explore the possibilities of trying to moderate Peking's policies.

The biggest question about the future arises from the fact that Communist China is on the verge of an historic transition period in which virtually the entire top leadership will pass from the scene in a relatively brief period of time. To date the unity as well as longevity of the Chinese Communist leaders has been remarkable, but what has been an asset to the regime in the past is now becoming a liability, as the leaders steadily age and resist bringing younger men into the top inner circle.

When Mao and other top leaders die, therefore, I would expect China to enter a period in which there could be a great deal more fluidity and uncertainty about both leaders and policies than in recent years. It would be reasonable to expect, I think, that the outcome of the competition between leaders and policies that is likely to occur, and the resulting balance between what one might call radicals and moderates will be definitely influenced by the perceptions that the new leaders have of the international environment as it affects China. While it may not be possible for outsiders to exert very much influence on the outcome, our hope, certainly, should be that the balance will in time shift in favor of technical bureaucrats promoting relatively moderate policies.

6. Many people think our policies toward China should be influenced by the recent chill in relations between the U.S.S.R. and China. Some also consider it important to determine if China is motivated mainly by Communism or by old fashioned national interest. In response to a question by Senator Williams, Professor Barnett touched upon these issues.6

I believe that certain issues which the Chinese looked on, above all, as national interest issues, rather than ideological issues, were at the root of the dispute. I think, to simplify, that there were at least three developments in that period in Soviet policy, or three aspects of Soviet policy,

6 Ibid., 32-33.
three issues relating to Soviet policy, that were terribly important from the Chinese point of view and help to explain why they ended up where they did in their position in relation to the Soviets.

One of these was the failure of the Soviets to give the Chinese Communists as much support as they had hoped in the off-shore islands crisis of 1958, in regard to Taiwan—and Taiwan from Peking's point of view is an important issue. It is regarded as Chinese territory by them, and territory that should be recovered.

A second was the neutral position assumed by the Russians regarding the India border issue in 1959. At the time the Chinese Communists said this was the first time that a Socialist state has not backed up another Socialist state on this kind of an issue.

And the third was the complicated field of nuclear relations between the two countries. As you probably recall in 1957, late 1957, an agreement was signed between Moscow and Peking in which the Soviets promised support in the nuclear weapons field—although there never had been data as to the precise nature of this agreement—and then in 1949 the Soviet Union broke this treaty, dissolved this agreement.

And the Chinese involved—

The CHAIRMAN. 1949 or 1959?

Mr. BARNETT. 1959, excuse me, 1959.

7. Some witnesses at the hearings took a different stand from Barnett. One witness who disagreed with Barnett on many points was Walter Judd, a former Congressman, who had previously been a medical missionary to China. 7

Communist governments and their fronts are waging war against free peoples worldwide. At the moment the hot-test spot, and the test case for us, is Vietnam—as at other times the test case has been Japan, Greece, Berlin, Korea, Quemoy, Lebanon, Cuba.

7Ibid., 437-440.
But the issue is not Vietnam; it is how are disputes settled--by resolution through civilized means, or by armed force?

The state is not Vietnam; it is Asia--and ourselves and the world.

The problem is not Vietnam; it is aggressive Communist expansionism--this time from North Vietnam, backed up by the Soviet Union and Communist China.

Mr. Chairman, no great expansionist movement has ever stopped until it was checked. Our choice--with Red China just as it was with Japan and Hitler--is not between checking and not checking. The choice is whether to check early, while we can, and with allies--or try to check the aggression later when it is stronger, closer, and we have fewer and weaker friends and allies.

From what I have seen in the press, most of the changes in American policy toward Communist China proposed by various witnesses before this committee appear to be based on certain assumptions which do not seem to me to be justified:

1. That the Communist regime now in control of China mainland is here to stay.

But the same was said of Hitler, of Khrushchev, of Sukarno, of Nkrumah. People are not so sure now that Castro will last forever. Despots generally appear invincible--"until the last 5 minutes."

2. That the United States is stubbornly keeping Red China isolated and therefore we are responsible for its hostility and belligerence. The reverse is the truth; it is Red China's hostility and belligerence in its international attitudes and actions, that are responsible for its isolation.

Mr. Chairman, I come from Minnesota and Maury Wills is not one of our chief heroes up there. When he is on first base, do we say, "Well, he is tough. Let's give him second base, and maybe that will please him so, and make him so grateful that he won't try to get to third base"?

No, we try to keep him on first base. In essence that is what our policy under four administrations has been--to keep Red China on first base. How do you accomplish that? We must not do anything to strengthen Red China. Secondly, we must do all we properly can to strengthen the countries around China that are resisting its expansion...
Mr. Chairman, I don't believe the American people will ever accept the assumption that any tyranny is here to stay, or that we will accept as permanent the subjugation of any people, no matter how powerful the despots may look at the moment.

The cause of Red China's hostility is not its isolation, but the Communist doctrine of the necessity for use of armed force to achieve world revolution. To remove China's isolation now would prove that the doctrine is correct and should be adhered to by them even more tenaciously.

3. That there is a better hope of getting Red China to change its attitudes and activities by giving in to it on matters like diplomatic recognition, trade, and admission to the United Nations than by resolute continuance of the policy of containment as long as Red China refuses to act like a responsible member of civilized society.

4. That changing our policy vis-a-vis Red China just might start an evolutionary process there.

But, of course, it might just as easily reduce the chances of such an evolutionary process. Everybody desires and hopes for "evolution" in Red China. The debate should be over what measures are most likely to produce it.

For example (a) giving Red China greater prestige, influence, entree; that is, making it stronger? Or keeping it as weak and isolated as possible?

(b) Concessions from its intended victims--like the United States? Or pressures from its present victims--the Chinese within Red China, those on Taiwan and in southeast Asia, Muslims in Indonesia and Malaysia, et cetera?

(c) Proving that Red China's truculence and stubborn defiance of the world succeeds? Or showing that it will fail?

(d) Taking the mountain--United Nations--to Mao? Or patiently and nonbelligerently insisting that Mao come to the mountain of better international conduct if he wants the benefits to Red China of membership in the international community?

What has caused the reported mellowing and evolution inside Yugoslavia, Rumania, the Soviet Union? Influences from without? Or their failures within? . . .
Let us look now at the changes in policy toward Red China suggested by some. They are mostly three: official diplomatic recognition by the United States, expansion of trade relations, and admission of Communist China to the United Nations. What would be the probable results of such changes, the gains, and the losses?

Almost no one, so far as I have seen, goes further than to express the vague hope that some time after these steps, perhaps after Mao dies or in another generation or two, Red China may "mellow, moderate, mature, evolve." But there is no evidence on which to base the hoped for changes . . .

In contrast, there is no uncertainty as to the losses that would result from the suggested weakening of American policy.

Here are some:

1. It would pull a rug out from under our loyal allies on Taiwan. The Chinese are a realistic, even fatalistic, people. With no hope for reunion in freedom with their brethren on the China mainland, they would have little or no choice but to prepare for the inevitable.

Americans who advocate admitting Red China and then add glibly, "Of course we would support the defense of Taiwan," may be salving their own consciences but I think no Asians will be deceived.

8. In the course of questioning Judd commented on the relationship between the Soviet and Chinese Communists:

Dr. JUDD. May I make one more comment?

Senator CASE. If the chairman will allow it.

Dr. JUDD. It is on the same question as the chairman asked: Is Mao Tse-tung under control of Moscow? These men are controlled more from within than from without. They are disciples. Chou En-lai once said that progress comes out of conflict. This struggle is a purification of dogma that is going on, as they regard it.

8Ibid.
But in the showdown they will be together.

De Gaulle is using language against us that we don't like, and we against him. But in a showdown he and we will be on the same side; we belong to the same civilization. In a showdown, all the Communists will be on the same side because they belong to the same "civilization," if you want to call it that, the same dogma.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Judd, you mentioned the similarity of Communism to Christianity regarding the way it started. This leaves the impression that you view it as a religious war. But there have developed considerable differences among Christians, haven't there? They are not all agreed upon a proper doctrine.

Dr. JUDD. That is right. I said the Communists are following the course that the early Christians did.

The CHAIRMAN. Then these differences may be a little deeper than you think, aren't they?

Dr. JUDD. They are deep, they are profound. This is a real quarrel; it is no fake. But it is a quarrel about methods and timing and tactics. It is not a quarrel about objectives. If I have two doctors and their only difference is on which is the quickest and surest way to dispose of me, I am interested in that disagreement, but I don't get too much comfort out of it. It doesn't allow me to relax.

9. Since public opinion may play a part in decision making, it is important to discover what the American public thinks about increasing contacts with Communist China.

To discover the attitudes of the public, researchers asked a representative cross section of Americans the question printed below. The response follows the question.⁹

The question deals with attitudes toward considering the Communist government as representing the Chinese people; 34% of those asked favored this approach.

10. The same researchers wondered how the public might respond to certain policies should they be recommended by the President. They therefore asked a number of questions and received what some people might find to be surprising answers: 10

The poll reveals that the public favors strongly the exchange of visitors and official talks with Red China, if these moves were suggested by the President. Support for the exchange of ambassadors is less enthusiastic. The selling of wheat meets less approval and admission to the U.N. gets the least support.

10 Ibid., 97-101.


*Available in paperback edition.