This report on a job creation program for poor people deals with the organizations within which jobs were created, the responses of the organizations to the jobs, and the techniques which seemed useful in working with the organizations. Major sections include: (1) Employment, Unemployment and New Careers, (2) Organizational Barriers, (3) The Forms of Resistance, and (4) Program Strategies. The program supported the assumption that poverty is not inherent in the human condition; the impulse to pass something better on to one's children is a major social force. The concept of new careers is a method of harvesting this energy. (JK)
Working With Organizations To Develop "New Careers" Programs

by

Robert Pruger and Harry Smith
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Working With Organizations
To Develop
"New Careers" Programs

by

Robert Pruger and Harry Specht
CONTRA COSTA COUNCIL OF COMMUNITY SERVICES

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This report on a job creation program* deals with some of the problems encountered in the development of new jobs for poor people, and some of the ways the problems were solved. Our particular interest in this paper is in the organizations within which the jobs were created, in how the organizations responded to the jobs, and the techniques which seemed useful in working with these organizations.

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Robert Pruger was born in New York City, January 10, 1933. He received his B.A. (cum laude) degree in 1955 from the City College of New York and his M.S.W. degree in 1957 from the University of Pennsylvania, School of Social Work. He is a Phi Beta Kappa.

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Before accepting the position of Assistant Executive Director of the Contra Costa Council of Community Services in 1964, Dr. Specht had been Director of the Community Organization Program of Mobilization for Youth in New York City. Prior to that position he had been Director of the Research Project for the National Jewish Welfare Board Study of Young Adults at the Florence Heller Graduate School at Brandeis. His work also included that of Executive Director of the Mt. Vernon Hebrew Camps, Inc. in Mt. Vernon, New York; Program Director for the Mt. Vernon YM-YWHA; and Instructor at Adelphi, Hunter College and Yeshiva School of Social Work.

Dr. Specht joined the faculty of San Francisco State College as an Associate Professor of Social Welfare in September, 1966.
The elimination of poverty has been one of our nobler societal ambitions, but to do so has always been more of an ideologically stimulating notion than a serious program objective. And, of course, many would doubt that the situation has changed, in spite of our enormous wealth, the burgeoning variety of anti-poverty programs, and the most favorable political and social climate in our history.

Between the skeptics and the believers, however, there is an implicit and easily missed, but nonetheless fundamental, point of agreement, viz., that the elimination of poverty in the United States is today only a question of the means or technology by which it will be achieved. And, conversely, it is not a serious question of morality (i.e., Should it be done?), nor of capacity (i.e., Can we afford to do it?), nor even of economic structure (i.e., Can an economic system that requires men to be competitively acquisitive avoid creating a large, permanent pool of the losers of that competition?). At least insofar as the mainstream of American thought goes each of these once nagging and hotly debated latter questions seems to have been quietly, but affirmatively and permanently, decided; attempts to rekindle the debate are felt to be argumentative and tiresome.

Most recently, respected economic analysts of various ideological persuasions have put forth a number of proposals through which massive poverty in the United States could be made to disappear into history. And all of these means can be considered conservative, at least in the
sense that they require no major reconstructions of our economic order. Indeed, the arguments advanced rest not on humanitarian or moral grounds so much as they do on the requirements of our modern capitalist society. To wit, one of the weakest links in our present economy is the continuing threat of economic breakdown arising out of the inability to create ever greater levels of buying power to absorb our ever-increasing industrial output. The existence of 30 to 40 million poor testifies to this failure and, if allowed to persist, it can threaten the viability of capitalism. Within the limitations of the market economy, then, means need to be found through which the poor can be enabled to generate the share of buying power which our economy requires of them. To paraphrase a familiar remark, the implicit and strangely directed request to the poor really is, "Ask not what capitalism can do for you; ask rather what you can do for capitalism".

It is not surprising, then, that the elimination of poverty has become one of the practical, increasingly routine concerns of government. And even beyond merely accepting the inevitability of a solution to this historic problem at least one noted economist, with almost casual confidence, concludes that the solution may well come within the lifetime of those Americans already approaching middle age, if not those already well into it:

It is idle to predict when Harlem will be reconstructed and Appalachia reborn, since so much depends on the turn of events in the international arena. Yet it seems to me that the general dimensions of the problem make it possible to envisage the substantial alleviation...perhaps even the virtual elimination...of massive poverty within the limits of capitalism three or four decades hence, or possibly even sooner. (1)
The optimism in the above, it is presumed here, derives more from an appreciation of both economic changes which have made poverty obsolete and the material wealth available to finance suitable programs, than it does from any abundance of wisdom to guide the selection of methods through which change will occur. Considerations of ethics and compassion, for example, require that methods be found that will work as quickly as possible, even if they are abrasive; political considerations require methods that can win and sustain as much consensus as possible, even if they slow the pace of visible progress. And these are by no means all of the interests that collide over this question and make wisdom a resource not likely to be in oversupply.

What is in competition here, however, is not only different kinds of programs to eliminate poverty, but also, the definitions of the problem to which the programs are logically relevant. If, for example, poverty is seen simply as the absence of money, then an ans that puts money, consistently and in adequate amounts, in the hands of the poor would be appropriate, and many such proposals are being advanced. However, poverty, particularly intergenerational poverty, is often seen as a self-defeating, self-perpetuating way of life that is the sum of adaptations made to the long-term need to negotiate an harassing environment that is built around the absence of money. With this view, ways have to be found which provide both money and a new way of life. Designs to eliminate poverty through various job creating mechanisms all derive from the latter understanding of the problem.
EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT AND NEW CAREERS

The social definition of who may be unemployed without having to suffer the social stigma and psychological havoc of unemployment already extends to several large segments of our population (i.e., children, all persons over 65 and many below that age already on a retired status, undergraduate and graduate students, mothers, the physically and mentally disabled, institutionalized persons). There seems to be little likelihood, however, that the number of such groups will be significantly enlarged within the foreseeable future. In the next decade or two the average retirement age may drop a few years and the average age at which people seek employment may rise somewhat, but it is also true that well into the future the mental and economic well-being of the vast majority of our able-bodied population will continue to rest on its capacity to find and engage in profitable employment.

From this perspective it is quite clear that any mix of planned interventions to eliminate massive poverty that does not include a program of massive employment is inadequate. The task of pulling hundreds of thousands, and even millions of people out of poverty through employment, however, is complicated by the limited applicability of previously tried job-creating mechanisms. Training programs, for example, reach few of the poor and result in profitable employment for fewer still. Public works projects, for another example, require far fewer unskilled laborers today than they did when this mechanism was used to alleviate the massive poverty of thirty years ago. Industrial expansion
generally results in fewer, rather than more, unskilled positions, while those that remain are the most likely to be machined out of existence. And even if all of the above were not true, a questionable logic and complacent, sapless morality would still underpin these attempts to eliminate poverty by rewarding or emphasizing the areas of least talent amongst the poor by creating make-work tasks which have no value to either worker or community.

Our irreversible technical drive, then, has created a volatile combination of effects: progressively higher levels of production and a progressively lesser dependence on raw human labor to sustain economic growth. The poor can be expected to resent their poverty and strain against the forces threatening to institutionalize their marginality. This, inevitably, shows up in violent public events and ugly headlines. Our economic abundance and social turmoil, however, have also provided the material and political thrust that just may force the recognition that the achievement of broad welfare objectives would not only eliminate the moral shortcomings of capitalism, but would be good business as well. To both of these conditions the concept of new careers for the poor (2) is potently, if not crucially, relevant.

This concept emphasizes the recruitment of vast numbers of the poor to perform tasks and carry functions which are usually allotted exclusively to highly trained professionals and technicians, as well as other useful activities heretofore performed unsatisfactorily or not at all. It is markedly different from other designs for massive job creation in that the content of the jobs derives not from the poverty population's assumed lack of talent (e.g., manual labor on a public works project), but rather from those socially useful skills and capacities many have acquired by virtue of having lived in poverty. In this sense, what other job creating programs have had to treat as an obstacle to em-
ployment becomes a qualification for employment. The concept is further distinguished by its requirement that the positions created be part of a "career", so that the worker has a chance to take more responsibility as he demonstrates his skill, rather than jobs which are (dead)ends in themselves.

In this way the new careers concept raises the need and provides a means "to revitalize many of the structures and institutions central to society (as) the alternative to relegating large numbers of citizens to a spectator class... a permanent, stable, 'non-working' class, whose children and grandchildren will also be unable to perform meaningful functions in our society." (3) By this view the new careers concept, more than providing a much needed device to put money into the hands of large numbers of the poor, also moves the poor into a new social position, i.e., from socially suspect service receivers to socially useful service givers. And, where the program is actually accepted, the transfer would be a permanent one because the powerful forces now pushing people into poverty would have the direction of their thrust reversed.

These elaborate hopes for social reconstruction through broad application of the new careers concept, however, excite the parallel certainty that such applications will be resisted. While there may be few today who believe in "relegating large numbers of citizens to a spectator class", the "need to revitalize many of the structures and institutions central to society" remains an ideological point far more acclaimed in the general than honored in the specific, and least honored by those whose privileges depend on current institutional arrangements.

There is more than logical neatness in the above; the reality of these ideas is demonstrated in the accumulated experiences of many projects across the country that are currently dis-
covering the obstacles that stand in the way of establishing new careers for the poor. In the following discussion an attempt is made to specify some of these obstacles, explain them in terms of existing social theory, and describe strategies through which they can be addressed, even when there is little reason to expect that they can be completely resolved.
Organizational Barriers

Even if we expect an inevitable resistance to attempts at broad social and institutional reform, there is still, at least at first glance, fair reason to wonder if such resistance must also attend the development of new careers for the poor. As a strategy to eliminate poverty, for example, it is certainly less controversial than is the strategy of organizing the poor for political power, or vesting power in their organized representatives.

More to the point, the most likely employers of new careerists (public school districts, medical care facilities, public recreation organizations, police and probation departments, and other social service agencies), are the ones most often accused of having poor communication with the low-income community and who suffer most from personnel shortages. These same agencies would seem most likely to benefit from and thus would welcome the notion of putting their problem-creating clients to work reducing their client-creating problems. This argument would be persuasive if the basis of the resistance to new careers rested on rational and objective grounds. Were that the case, the only problems that would arise in the development of new careers programs could be wholly explained in terms of the individual peculiarities of each program (e.g., the hostility of an agency supervisor, the tactlessness of a program administrator, the undisciplined behavior of a new careerist, the rigidity of a particular organization, etc.). The point advanced here, however, is that while rational arguments and unique situational factors can and do cause resistance to
the development of new careers for the poor, resistance, even in the absence of such factors, is inevitable. And it is inevitable because it is rooted not in objective assessments of the program nor in the quirks of organizational behavior, but in the virtually irresistible forces that influence organizational behavior.

One such force, well noted in the social science literature, initiates and feeds "the familiar process of displacement of goals where 'an instrumental value becomes a terminal value'". (4) In simpler terms, within organizations there is a subtle, but unceasing pressure for the way a job gets done to become more important than the objective itself. This process..."hardening of the categories"...completes itself in the frequent situation in which the organizational objective seems to be little more than to conform to its own established ways of working for their own sake. The "rules in time become symbolic in cast, rather than strictly utilitarian"; (5) the means are sanctified, they become the moral or "right" thing to do, and the real purposes of the organization are substantially forgotten. No organization ever has existed, nor ever will, that does not manifest some of this feature of organizational life. A prime example of this is the way in which public welfare personnel are bogged down with enormous and unnecessary machinery for establishing eligibility to an extent that eligible clients are intimidated and discouraged when they apply for benefits.

The new careerist, born and raised in a style quite different from the organization's middle-class professional personnel, implicitly, if not explicitly, challenges the organization's morally buttressed way of operating. His view of what needs to be done, of how it should be done, and, in fact, what he does do, is suspect precisely because it is different. Even the fact that the organization may employ the new careerist at least in part because value is seen in
that difference does not necessarily reduce reverberations within the organization when that difference is actually put to use. More than one social agency, for example, has invited new careerists to "tell us what the community wants", only to experience agitated dismay and disbelief when that voice was raised. A major vulnerability of new careers programs can be found here because organizations seek to avoid such reverberations and will move to eliminate them.

But the new careerist need not be different to be unsettling to the organization; ironically, the same result occurs when he is perceived as being similar. This is especially true when the similarity is held to be with the organization's already established corps of professional service-giving personnel and is perceived as such by them. Public health nurses, for example, have objected to the use of new careerists as home health visitors on the grounds that this is a professional nursing responsibility. An organized group of public welfare workers objected to the use of new careerists as eligibility workers on similar grounds.

An explanation of this objection can be found in the powerful way in which organizational behavior and the training of helping professionals re-enforce each other. Complex organizations, on the one hand, must satisfy both their own demands for clarity and public demands for efficiency. Doing so requires that the professional staff group, even if numerically large and ideologically diverse, must be induced or "trained" to respond to situations in wholly predictable ways. Too important to be left to chance and too complex to be left entirely to conscious planning, the resulting conformity is an inevitable by-product of each organization's formal and informal punishment and reward structure. Organizations, in other words, may initially employ persons because they are competent physicians, social workers, psychologists, engineers, etc.; before too much time has passed; however,
they must also learn to become competent bureaucrats and "organization men". They behave as the organization wants them to, even though the behavior is sometimes nonsensical and does not meet the client's needs.

The helping professions, on the other hand, whether traditionally or primarily based in organizations (e.g., teaching, social work) or not (e.g., general medical practice, law), must be permitted to become involved in significant areas of a client's life, even if those interventions frequently have no positive, and sometimes even profoundly negative, effects. The social, moral and, in the case of some professions even written, license to do so rests heavily on the well-policed requirement that professional practitioners respond to the problems brought to them in predictable and approved ways. Developing this reliability of response or "professional discipline" is a major function of professional education and is a specific, continuous concern of all professional associations. And in the case of organizations, the forces that insure organizational discipline complement the pressures inducing professional reliability.

Thus, the professionals in organizations are limited in their repertoire of responses by some combination of the above-mentioned forces and are incapable of a sustained resistance to them. It is not surprising that the professional accommodates to these forces, particularly as advantages for him are discovered in it. Not only does he tend to define his behavior as complete and correct, but further elevates its significance by insisting that only he, by virtue of his long training and demonstrated reliability, has the necessary skill. Because much of his professional, if not personal, self-image rests on his perception of his dearly bought competence, competitors arriving on the scene through nontraditional routes must almost certainly be felt to be impudent upstarts, if not conscious
usurpers. And this is true whether or not the presence of the newcomers makes sense on other grounds to which many professionals may be sympathetic.

The new careerist concept requires the re-examination of traditional organizational and professional task allocations. Experimentation with new divisions of labor is already underway as many new careerists have assumed tasks that have long stood near the center of the professional's sphere of activity. In various pilot programs, for example, sub-professionals have been interviewing clients, taking social histories, participating at staff meetings, counselling parents and children, speaking to and stimulating the development of community groups, tutoring students, and making a broad variety of service decisions, all of which were virtually unheard of only a short time ago.

While it may not have been the universal experience, in many instances the above assignments have been made only over the direct or indirect objections of the established service personnel. More often than not these objections, even when not focused enough to completely disallow the employment of new careerists, have been potent factors in seriously restricting the scope and duration of experimentation. Police new careerists, for example, have been assigned to work only with closed cases, (i.e., cases in which no other organizational personnel had an active interest). A school new careers program was accepted only after the school administrator was assured that the new careerists would not see themselves as counsellors, but would restrict themselves to a strict implementation of a counsellor's directions.

Still another force that creates barriers to the adoption of new careers programs can be found in the nature of what could be called the "organizational" or "professional imagination".
It is a world view that operates with particular potency in organizations whose product is human services; and, in varying degrees it characterizes all of the likely employers of new careerists.

In its pure and advertised form, it is a view that has much to recommend it: it permits those who are to be helped to spurn the help offered without any weakening of the professional desire to help; it returns disciplined understanding for impulsive rancor; it demands hard, long work hours without regard for the amount of remuneration or the conditions under which that hard and long labor occurs. Indeed, it embodies the finest in civilized behavior, holding nothing in the human experience foreign to it...save one. That one is the notion that the helped...the clients...could or should be the helpers except in certain prescribed, professionally approved ways.

The professional urge to maintain a clear line of demarcation between those who need to receive and those who are competent to give can, of course, be persuasively defended as a necessary condition for the application of professional or scientific knowledge to human problems; it is certainly more than a mere organizationally tidy arrangement. What is germane to this discussion of organizational barriers to programs of new careers for the poor, however, is the fact that no matter how valid the established division of labor or allocation of roles within our system of human services is, it also represents an intractable, problematic system of privilege.

This system of privilege can be understood as the award to some, and not to others, of the right to decide most questions about the allocation of service: Who shall be served? In what style and under what conditions shall the service be offered? When and why should the ser-
vice be restricted or cut off? What shall the content of the service be? Who or what is responsible for the failure to achieve service objectives? etc.

The professional managers and practitioners who are the inheritors of this system have long claimed that offering service was a privilege, though it is doubtful that there has been a conscious and full appreciation of the scope of that privilege. In any case, attempts to blur the lines between the helper and helped, the privileged and the nonprivileged, can be expected to meet excited resistance. The new careers concept, as it successfully shifts large numbers of the poor from service receivers to service givers, certainly tempts, and in places already has evoked, this response.

The final source of difficulty to be identified here originates in the "mutual invisibility" or "structured ignorance" that shapes the relationship between the service organization and the community it serves. The three paragraphs following this and explain the process of that relationship as it is relevant to these concepts:

1. It is virtually, if not absolutely, impossible for a service organization and the community it serves to have complete information about each other. There are, for example, vast differences between the frustrations of service giving and the frustrations of service-receiving. The pervasive problems of organizations are staff turnover, hard-to-reach or overly demanding clients, vague service objectives, dull and endless staff meetings, intraorganizational ideological conflicts, and the general overwork experienced eight hours of every working day. These problems bear little similarity to the problems of clients... being without a job, inadequate housing, punitive or hard-to-reach services, dirty streets,
abusive officials, slick merchants, sick children and a relentless, pervasive hopelessness experienced every waking moment. Obviously, one's location in the service system will determine which set of problems one will know more intimately. It is equally obvious, but more often overlooked, that this reality also determines what one will know only superficially, even to the point of total ignorance.

2. Conflicts develop that lead the service organization and the community to perceive their ignorance of the other to be complete and equitable basis for action. These conflicts arise because each must regularly make decisions about the other, whether or not each has the information to support a rational decision. Inevitable, the need to defend the decisions results in the decision-makers, even if no one else, becoming self-convinced of the validity of their action. Thus, a generation of settlement houses, committed to community service, enthusiastically gave themselves to the task of developing elaborate leisure time programs in communities whose dominant reality was unemployment and under-employment. The decision to generate such services was invariably based on a sincerely held organizational perception, by no means questioned here, of "the needs of the community".

3. The perceptual blindness that treats biased decisions as fair ones and incomplete knowledge as total information rapidly establishes an addiction to such perceptions, even to the point that suppliers of new or fuller infor-
Information are perceived as irritants or threats to be expelled or otherwise resisted. In both subtle and obvious ways, then, the service organization and the community move to defend their ideas about the other. The police new careerist, for example, though the police department expects him to (and he does in fact) behave quite differently from the patrolman, is highly suspect in his own community. And if, because of this now more intimate knowledge about the police department, he too quickly offers his neighbors a more balanced interpretation of its activities, the community's suspicions of him are powerfully confirmed. Community protests, organized by new careerists, which are directed at service organizations, for another example, could supply new information about the community to these organizations. Not surprisingly, the number of organizations encouraging or welcoming such communications is exceedingly small.

In the light of the above, a source of organizational resistance to new careers programs becomes clear. Though his manner is not nearly as dramatic as that of the placard-carrying picket line marcher, and even when it is wholly absent from his conscious purpose, the new careerist literally cannot help but increase the visibility of the community in the service organization that employs him. On that basis alone he can expect to meet resistance. That this increased visibility frequently is experienced as a criticism of the organization and its ways, or as an unwanted pressure pushing it to admit that a problem exists, only further excites the organization's self-protective, self-insulating mechanisms.
The following summarizes what has been stated thus far. In addition to possessing the will and the material "wealth" to eliminate poverty, means are required to achieve that objective efficiently and secure it permanently. At least as regards the able-bodied poor, the concept of new careers is one such means. The implementation of new careers programs, however, will not occur easily. An analysis of the various ways organizations behave reveals the inevitably unsettling effect new careerists can and do have on their organizational and professional sponsors. Among other reasons, the new careerist is problematic because (1) he induces organizations to re-examine their sanctified definitions of means and ends, (2) he is perceived to be in competition with already established organizational personnel, (3) he implicitly challenges the self-sentimentalized right of professionals to decide what is best for the community of clients, and (4) he encumbers the organization's ability to ignore the community as it makes decisions that affect the community.
OVERCOMING
ORGANIZATIONAL BARRIERS

The preceding discussion might easily lead to the conclusion that the concept of new careers is programatically inoperable. Such a conclusion is even more justified when the obstacles described above are properly understood to be only a suggestive, rather than an exhaustive, inventory of such obstacles.

Some immediate encouragement, however, can be taken from the fact that new careers demonstration programs are in fact currently active in several places around the nation, and with apparently good, though not unmixed, results. (6) If the preceding discussion of organizational barriers at least partially explains why these programs have developed neither easily nor smoothly, a discussion of some of the organizational factors that limit the impact of those barriers might serve as a partial explanation of why these programs have managed to develop at all.

Organizations are, of course, extremely complex mechanisms, and it should not be surprising that they generate and contain contradictory pressures. But more than that, they simply are not all cut from the same cloth. While on a highly abstract level of description it is possible to describe the characteristics common to all bureaucracies, closer examination of any specific organization will reveal those characteristics that distinguish it. Among these differences, several can be found that make an organization reasonably congenial to the development of new careers programs. Whether or not such an environment actually crystallizes, however, may well rest on how clearly these differences are recognized and addressed by program planners.
One such difference is that organizations vary in the degree to which their staff is differentiated and specialized. Stated as a principle, the greater the organizational differentiation, the greater are the chances of success. Where, in other words, an organization houses a variety of occupational specialties, fewer potent obstacles to new careers programs are likely to arise. And if in addition, there is also a tradition for the employment of sub-professional personnel in service positions (in contrast to positions of physical maintenance, such as janitor or elevator operator), the likelihood of resistance diminishes.

Thus, hospitals, employing not only a great variety of professional personnel (e.g., doctors, nurses, social workers, pharmacists, occupational and vocational therapists, psychologists, researchers), but a variety of sub-professional personnel as well (e.g., nurses' aides, social service aides, orderlies, ambulance drivers, laboratory assistants), would probably absorb new careerists far more easily than would police departments. These latter organizations historically have housed a more limited variety of occupational specialties and, beyond the relatively recent advent of meter maids and traffic aides, they have no clear orientation to the employment of sub-professional personnel. Indeed, even where police departments have established human relations units, staff for these units are generally recruited from within police ranks rather than from any one of the externally located human relations professions.

Internal differentiation is not entirely specified in occupational terms; it is also reflected in the number of levels of authority in the staff structure. Here, however, there seems to be no clear rule to guide program planners. A police new careerist program, for example, developed when a chief of police of a small department adopted the program above the objec-
tions or disinterest of many of his subordinates. A school new careerist program, on the other hand, was organizationally incorporated when the enthusiasm and pressure of subordinate personnel outlasted the ambivalence of the administrator of a very large school system.

Organizations also differ in the degree of their responsiveness to the communities they serve. This is true whether this responsiveness is maintained by organized public pressure (e.g., as such pressure is increasingly directed at the public schools) or is in response to the fact that the organization's clients supply a significant portion of the organization's budget through direct fees of various kinds (e.g., hospitals serving fee-paying patients). In any case, the principle suggested here is that the greater the degree of relatedness to the community from which clients are and new careerists would be drawn, the greater the potential opportunity to win organizational acceptance of new careers programs.

The principle is particularly potent when organizations perceive their degree of relatedness to the community as inadequate and consciously seek to improve that relationship. Thus, a county health department, while unenthusiastic about a program for which federal funds were available finally did seek such funds because they felt it important to use some of the money to employ low-income persons as "community health aides" in order to develop a better relationship with low-income organizations.

In addition to guiding the choice of organizational sponsors for new careers programs, this same principle is also relevant to the practical problem of selecting the most appropriate location for new careerists within any particular organization. Many police departments, for example, have a narcotics division, a vice squad, and a patrolman's division. The work of the first two of these is generally related to specific acts of wrongdoing. The presence of nar-
cotics or vice squad officers in the community is legitimated or justified by these acts, thus reducing the need for such personnel or units to be concerned with general community relationships. Patrolmen, on the other hand, move in the community as a matter of routine, whether or not law breaking has occurred. Their generalized crime prevention, criminal apprehension and ordinance enforcement functions...the fact that they cannot withdraw from the community...disposes them to a more likely concern for good community relationships.

The expectations of the community are relevant to the selection of the new careerist's location within the organization. Few communities, for example, achieve broad consensus on a concern for how well police respect the civil liberties of known adult criminal offenders; all communities, on the other hand, are much more sensitive to the treatment of its children at the hands of the police, whether or not those children have violated any law. While other considerations may recommend another choice, from the above there would seem to be clear reason to expect more success when police new careerists are located in a juvenile aid bureau, rather than one of the criminal apprehension units.

Organizations may also be classified by their ideological commitments. And without further explanation or example it is obvious that an orientation to social services or rehabilitation may produce less strain between agency and community when introducing the concept of new careers than would a social control or punishment ideology.

Less obvious, however, may be the fact that unique situational factors can seriously qualify the above, even though the ideological commitment of a total organization remains fixed. A knowledge of these situational factors would seem to be the kind of field intelligence relevant to the needs of planners of new careers.
programs. A particular public school, for example, while historically connected to a social service tradition, could prove to be a poor placement for new careerists if the teaching staff is hostile to the program. A particular law enforcement agency, on the other hand, while unalterably rooted in a social control ideology, may provide an acceptable, if not a permanent, placement if its chief officer is an exceptionally flexible administrator, or if he is concerned about his organization's public image, or if he sees political advantages in sponsorship of the program.

From all that has been said thus far it should not be surprising that the most common initial response of organizations actually considering the employment of new careerists has been an ambivalent one. This occurs, of course, because the potential service, social and political advantages are seen to parallel the equally potential service and social disadvantages. The advantages are generally felt as expectations of more cooperative clients, a friendlier immediate community, and public congratulation for bold innovativeness from the larger community; the disadvantages are generally felt as forebodings of additional service breakdowns, a militantly aroused and critical clientele, and public embarrassment before the larger community.

The need to resolve this dilemma yields the final principle to be identified here, viz., that organizations are most likely to resolve their ambivalence about hiring new careerists in a positive direction when, assuming the absence of outside pressure, they become convinced of their capacity to control the behavior of these new workers. Such assurance can be based on chance circumstance, such as the timely availability of a trusted organizational servant who can assume the daily supervisory responsibility for the new careerists. Such assurance can also be based on the existence of that
tion of the power structure of some organizations...the service unit that has no power, cannot aspire to power and to which the new careerists thus may be safely assigned. The small social work unit in a large, medically dominated public health department or the human relations oriented juvenile bureau in a municipal police department are examples.

In summary of this section, then, it has been established that organizations differ from each other in many ways. Awareness of these differences and skillful exploitation of them by program planners can do much to neutralize the negative impact of the barriers arising out of bureaucratic structure discussed in the preceding section of this paper. Among these organizational differences are the varying degrees of: 1) internal differentiation; 2) community relatedness; 3) commitment to community service ideologies; and 4) the capacity to control the behavior of new careerists.
THE FORMS OF RESISTANCE

Conceptual statements such as those previously listed have an important place, but a limited one, in the planning and implementation of new careers program. Their not inconsiderable and often overlooked value is that they can help planners understand the sources of programmatic stress and to anticipate it, thus reducing the likelihood of wasteful, impulsive and naive responses to it. They cannot be used, however, to foretell the specific forms the stress will take, nor the sudden, substantive or silly, and often maddening situations out of which it will arise.

It is one thing, in other words, for a program planner to gird himself against a school system's broad resistance to his carefully contrived overtures to accept some new careerists; it is quite another thing for the same planner to specifically prepare himself to face the school administrator, who, while confessing great enthusiasm for the program, reports that he, "regrettably", must rule it out because in his schools' one or two hundred rooms and back-rooms he can find no space to house the two or three new careerists being offered. Even where an immense logic and awesome social forces commend the concept of new careers, the fate of specific new careers program may still depend on how specifically that planner has anticipated that school administrator.

The conceptual insights, then, that can inform the planning of program strategy are not nearly so useful in planning program tactics. Here the planner is much more left to his own
devices and artistry as he tries to predict the who, what, when, and where of the barriers that, only in the most general way, he knows he will come upon.

In the absence of useful abstract knowledge, advocates of program-to-be have had to gather much of the necessary intelligence from the reported experiences of programs-that-have-been. However, because such reportage is generally characterized by incomplete descriptions, unsubstantial analyses, and vague definitions of terms, it too has only limited uses. Thus, abstract knowledge is often overlooked because it seems irrelevant, but concrete knowledge is often misused because its irrelevance is missed. The skill required to plan new careers programs is the skill to use both kinds of knowledge with a full appreciation of the limits of each.

If taken within the cautions suggested above, a listing of the forms of resistance already encountered in the brief history of new careers programs may be useful. The list, of course, is not complete; nor is it suggested that it was the intent of the organizations to be resistive. From the planners point of view, however, the intent is irrelevant.

1. Organizations rarely perceive their resources as adequate. Therefore, real or imagined shortages of resources are a tempting, and always available and organizationally acceptable explanation of the refusal to adopt a new careers program. Thus, one program planner prepared for his first interview with the superintendent of a public school system by clarifying in his own mind the contribution new careerists could make to that system; the bulk of the interview, however, was devoted to a discussion of the system's inadequate supply of supervisory personnel, preoccupation with other problems, and insufficient
budget. Not only was the planner obviously unable to address these conditions with any confidence, but only substantially handicapped any possibility of a serious discussion of the agenda he had prepared.

2. It is extremely difficult to recommend a new careers program to a service organization without specific mention of the service problems to which the new careerists are said to be a solution. Thus, organizations can rather easily undercut such programs simply by denying the existence of the problems they were designed to address. The principal of an elementary school in a low-income Negro neighborhood, for example, frequently complained about the lack of cooperation the school received from parents. He saw no need for new careerists, however, out of his firm belief that the school's relationship to the community was a good one.

The two forms of organizational resistance specified above are most likely to arise before the decision is made to adopt or refuse a new careers program. The decision to adopt the program, however, is not necessarily accompanied by a commitment to see it succeed. Indeed, the subtler and more complex forms of resistance may emerge only after the decision is made to place low-income persons in service positions:

3. It seems reasonable (and even desirable) for organizations that agree to employ new careerists to expect a strong voice in selecting them. But that voice can be used to establish qualifications that vitiate much of the value new careerists can bring. A police department, for example, that in-
tended to use new careerists with youthful offenders, initially insisted that it would hire no low-income person who himself had ever "run with a gang". Unwed mothers would not be employed because of their obvious "lack of moral turpitude". Civil rights activists were equally unsuitable. Many other organizations have insisted that new careerists have a high school diploma, even though their primary assignment was to build organizational bridges to a community in which such academic awards were relatively rare.

4. Program planners have had as much problem in softening organizational enthusiasm as they have had in overcoming organizational disinterest. Excesses of both can be understood as forms of resistance. An extreme of noninvolvement is exemplified by one agency that agreed to accept a group of new careerists, and then seriously announced its intention to farm them out to another organization that served a similar group of clients. On the other hand, exaggerated expectations of the new careerists led one school district to propose placing each of its five new employees in a separate school, even though each school had several hundred students and the program itself was undertaken solely as a demonstration of what observable differences new careerists could make.

5. Planners need guard against the tendency of organizations to define new careerists as temporary or otherwise less than full employees, even though this may be understandable where the programs are tried experimentally. Most
recently, for example, a city government about to launch a major effort to bring substantial numbers of low-income persons into significant positions in every city department had to fight the attempt to deny these workers the usual protection of civil service status. A particular public school, on the other hand, has successfully denied its new careerists a regular place at staff meetings. In several schools the right of new careerists to use the staff lounges has had to be negotiated.

6. Where organizations assign the new careerists to units or supervisors that have little access to the organizational policy making structure, the program is subtly, but powerfully, isolated. Examples of this have been suggested earlier and it need only be added that this particular form of resistance is among the more common ones and one of the most difficult to address.

7. At the heart of an almost endless and exasperating series of organizational complaints about new careerists is the organization's need to be continuously assured of the loyalty of the new workers. Such assurance is especially difficult to give, however, where the expression of "disloyalty" and dissatisfaction with things as they are is, almost by definition, a particular community response which the new careerist will make more visible and coherent. A school new careerist, for example, who was assigned to lead a small group of parents discussing their criticisms of the school was accused of being a trouble-maker when he, as assigned, reported on that discussion. Police new ca-
reerists, assigned to win a place of trust in the community, came under severe attack when they refused to serve a sub-rosa police intelligence function in that community.

8. The final form of resistance to be listed here is the least obvious and the most complex of those considered. Planners themselves might even disagree that it is properly identified as a manifestation of organizational resistance; indeed, many might unintentionally facilitate it.

The resistance can be found in the degree of initial specification of the new careerist's job tasks. The barrier arises when that specification is stated in either of the two possible extremes. If, at one extreme, the job tasks are made too specific, innovation around the new careerist role is disallowed and, more likely than not, the new careerist becomes permanently wedded to the least significant tasks. Moreover the participation of professional personnel in relating the functions of the new workers to their own is omitted and the opportunity for creating meaningful sub-professional functions is lost.

If, at the other extreme, organizational expectations are left wholly vague, other than the unstated demand that the new careerist create no new problems for anyone, the new careerist achieves organizational invisibility. The nebulous character of his job will also heighten the possibility of his becoming demoralized quickly. From that lo-
cation he can never win the internal support necessary to produce and sustain acceptable and significant innovation.

In summary of this section, the point has been made that while abstract knowledge alerts the planner to expect resistance to new careers programs, the growing body of reported program experiences offers useful clues about the specific forms the resistance will take. Identified here as forms of organizational resistance have been 1) defining resource shortages as deadends rather than as limitations to be overcome, 2) refusing to admit the existence of a problem, 3) establishing job qualifications for new careerists that weed out those with relevant backgrounds, 4) excessive organizational disinterest or expectations, 5) charging new careerists with full job responsibilities but denying full job rights, 6) isolating new careerists in the organization, 7) demanding loyalty in a manner that conditions disloyalty, and 8) too quickly or too slowly institutionalizing the new careerist role.
PROGRAM STRATEGIES

The design of this paper completes itself in a list of tactical steps to modify organizational resistance to new careers programs. It must be immediately pointed out, however, that nowhere have these or any other maneuvers enabled planners to implement their program intentions whole and uncompromised. Indeed, in the absence of a professional technology adequate to the task of purposefully redirecting the enormous weight of organizational inertia, it cannot be otherwise. (7)

Even if not insuring success, the tactics listed below have met several significant program needs. Most clearly, they have encumbered the organization's license to reject new careers projects outright. They also seem to have preserved the right of demonstration project personnel to continuously examine and comment on the organization's use and handling of new careerists. A certain amount of enervating, nonproductive upset that might otherwise have arisen has probably been avoided. And, finally, they may even have established those conditions that force an objective, albeit reluctant, organizational assessment of the service contribution of new careerists on which the public claim for tenure will have to be based.

The first set of tactics may be regarded as interpretational in that they suggest either the content, method or route through which new careers programs can be initially recommended. As content, for example, the case for new careers programs has been strengthened by articulating their relevance to important social values such as the promotion of financial inde-
dependence, service to one’s own community, the productive use of human resources, and the democratization of community institutions.

The use of new careerists as program interpreters has been an almost singularly successful method to command the attention of politically sensitive public and organizational officials. One careerist, for example, secured an appointment with a city councilman known to be opposed to a new careers project and, without argument or rancor, transformed him into a strong program booster. And professional persons, often steel-ed against and bored with the prechments of their fellow professionals, have been exceedingly easy audiences for new careerists to captivate, intentionally or not. The assignment of careerists to speak at conferences, program reviews and other public meetings is already a widely used interpretative method. The simple and somewhat surprising explanation of this success must be frankly stated. That is, many professionals experience a delighted shock when they see their low-income clients carry out a job with a degree of competence and ability which the professionals never suspected could be mustered.

While projects are almost universally initiated through direct discussions between project and organizational officials, professional associations may represent an alternate or complementary route into negotiations. These associations, one step removed from the organizational routine and one step closer to a pure concern for service, are more likely to be open to a substantive consideration of the concept of new careers. Where a primary professional identification is held with the professional association (e.g., medicine), the support of the local chapter obviously facilitates the organizational negotiations to come. Where the professional’s primary reference group is the organization that employs him (e.g., teachers are more influenced by the school in which they work than they are
by their collegial associations), prior consultation with the professional association is probably less valuable. Even here, however, the recent resurgence of activity by some professional groups (e.g., teaching, nursing) seems to have re-established the professional influence in setting organizational service and personnel standards.

Going beyond professional associations, specific efforts to secure the intervention of elected or political figures have already met with at least a reasonable degree of success. The New Jersey Governor's Office, for example, has undertaken a review of the State's personnel system to identify civil service or other obstacles to the recruitment of low-income persons for civil service positions. The budget of the State of California has been augmented to include funds to hire consultants to guide the State in developing its own new careers program, thus committing it to such development. The Richmond (California) City Council has decided to revise its personnel system as a means both to create career opportunities for low-income persons and to bring all City departments closer to the poor by placing such persons in sub-professional and quasi-supervisory departmental positions.

The Richmond experience is particularly important in that it turned on a most stubborn obstacle to civil service reform. The City's legal counsel had advised against the adoption of the program on the grounds that reserving civil service positions for low-income persons was a violation of the City Charter. The Council, however, took the view that the legal sanctions surrounding civil service derived from the goals of that system. Once the Council had changed those goals, regulations to permit their accomplishment would have to be drafted. The favorable vote of the Council settled the issue to its confident satisfaction; the boldness of the
step, however, may still invite a court challenge. In any case, the immense vote gathering potential that lies in political support of broad new careers programs promises the continuing attention of public officials to such programs.

Another series of tactical maneuvers is manifested in the specific conditions for which planners have pressed in initial negotiations with potential organizational sponsors; the reverse side of this intelligence, of course, has been a specification of those conditions on which hard positions were not to be taken, so as to avoid as much purposeless conflict as possible. Among the points most deferable to the organization's wishes have been the details surrounding the supervision and training of new careerists, the composition and staffing of independent (i.e., citizens') program review committees, the final selection of the new careerists, and within certain limits, the designation of specific job tasks.

Relevant to each of these program features, however, certain conditions have been treated as much less subject to compromise. Among these have been the insistence that an independent program review committee be appointed (thus bringing the community into the program and, more specifically, reducing the probability of a facile dismissal or emasculation of it), that the organization provide the necessary on-the-job supervision (thus insuring the involvement of at least some of the organization's professional staff in the program and increasing its visibility within the organization), that clear, flexible job descriptions be prepared (thus inhibiting the unilateral reassignment of new careerists to meet the unanticipated demands of organization convenience), and that regular meetings be held between project and organizational staff (thus creating an arena for continuing discussion, particularly so that emerging
problems and hazards can be picked up and neutralized and the more extreme reactions to the program can be modified).

Almost in a class by itself, but so obvious that it could easily be overlooked, has been the provision of funds to organizations, purportedly to help them absorb the cost of supervising the new careerists. More probably these always modest sums have had the subtle effect of disallowing the organization to demur on the basis of an overburdened supervisory cadre.

Although necessary as a program strategy, it may be particularly difficult for the project personnel to provide sympathetic understanding and help to the employer. Ideologically (and organizationally), project staff will be most committed to improving the future of the new careerist and to institutional change which will benefit the low-income community. Understandably, project staff are likely to view organizational personnel as inflexible, uncooperative and defensive. It requires enormous maturity and objectivity for a professional who is committed to change to sit astride both his awareness of the urgent need for that change and his understanding of the problems of the employer.

However, quite apart from structural considerations, many employers will not understand the behavior of the low-income workers; they may not have the capacity to train the new workers and retrain their present staff; and they may not know how to deal with the new relationships with clients and community which the program may create. Quite apart from the administrative and financial supports offered, the change agent must find means to help employers deal with these problems. For example, they may appoint a professional member of the project staff to the sole responsibility of helping the employer deal with such problems; machinery for periodic administrative review can be arranged so as to encourage professional staff to take account of the problems of the employers; and other insti-
tutions can be used to help the employer, such as arranging for local university extension programs to organize in-service training programs.

The final point to be mentioned here is an elaboration of the strategic, rather than the substantive, uses of training. In other words, whatever relationship may exist between training and improved levels of job performance, training also serves other important program needs. The most significant of these is the fact that it provides a continuing structure through which new careerists, once past their initial shyness, eagerly enter into the dialogue over program problems, whether those problems are on the training agenda or not. The provision for on-going in-service training also has the helpful consequence of softening the organization's fears about drawing the untried and untested poor into its midst. (8)

Another aspect of training which should be considered as a device for dealing with organizational barriers has to do with the re-training of professionals. Reconsideration of the professional's function, and careful planning of his relationship to the sub-professional are required to mitigate the potential for professionals to experience anxiety and status-loss which is referred to above.
CONCLUSION

This paper has identified some of the obstacles and opportunities that await attempts to implement the concept of new careers. It has not, however, weighed the obstacles against the opportunities so as to be able to conclude with a confident prediction about the future viability of the concept.

A confident conclusion, nevertheless, resting on two assumptions suggested much earlier, can be offered. The first assumption is that poverty does not inhere in the human condition; and in this decade of the restless poor, their impulse to pass something better than their poverty onto their children has crystallized as a major, ineluctable social force. The second assumption is that the concept of new careers for the poor is one of the most potent harnesses available to turn that energy to productive use. The resistive capacity of organizational lassitude, we have gone to some length to indicate, may be well entrenched and automatically triggered, but it is simply not potent enough to block this modern urge for social justice. And where social practitioners do their work skillfully, it may not even cause serious delays.
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