One of the most influential factors leading to the strengthening of the states' role in higher education is the coordinating agency which acts in liaison between both the state and national capitols and the universities. The states continue to experiment with 3 types of coordinating systems: the voluntary council consisting of public college and university presidents and board members; the single governing-coordinating board for all state supported institutions of higher learning; and (most prevalent) a board, composed of citizens who do not directly administer any public institution, that is superimposed over the governing boards of individual institutions or systems. The movement toward creation of coordinating boards of citizen members having substantial powers has been accelerated because (1) the agencies are exercising greater political leadership in formulating and advocating policies for developing and expanding higher education (2) more and more federal grant programs are being oriented toward states rather than institutions (3) private institutions are becoming more involved in public policy making and coordination for all colleges and universities. Despite the attendant risks to the coordinating agency or individual members, the agency must seek a position of political leadership in order to promote the long range interests of higher education. An annotated bibliography is included. (JS)
Today, higher education institutions cooperate more closely with each other and with government than at any previous time in American history.

Probably the most significant advances in cooperation and coordination are coming about through ties created by the state and national capitols. Over the years, the state capitol provided more initiative and exercised more control in promoting higher education than the national government. Although that condition appears to be subject to radical change in the near future, the results are unlikely to make national education dominant. Several factors, such as increased awareness by the states of their responsibilities, the new philosophy of creative federalism, and the activities of state governors and other officers in improving state administration, make that outcome less imminent than some educational and political leaders believe.

The State Coordinating Agency

One of the most influential factors leading to the strengthening of the states’ role in higher education is the coordinating agency which acts in liaison between both the state and national capitols and the higher education institutions.
Coordinating agencies for public higher education have been so generally adopted by the states that a historical discussion seems out of place. Ten years ago knowledge about them was little and understanding of their functions even less. Now, the great majority of states maintain some agency which attempts to make more rational the complexities of college and university development. Both collegiate administrators and governmental authorities have accommodated themselves to this nascent agency which promises to gain increasing significance as it matures. Logan Wilson, president of the American Council on Education, provides in a recent paper the reasons why coordination is here to stay:

Our past assumption has been that the separated aims and activities of existing colleges and universities would somehow add up to the best educational interests of the nation. In my judgment, this is no longer a valid assumption. Higher education has become too complicated, too costly, and too important in the national welfare for its basic decisions to be made haphazardly.¹

To achieve Mr. Wilson's "best educational interests," the fifty states continue to experiment with three different types of coordinating systems. First, serving fewer and fewer states, is the voluntary council consisting of public college and university presidents and board members; secondly, maintained by a static number of states, is the single governing-coordinating board for all state supported institutions of higher education; and finally, an increasing number of states have super-imposed a coordinating board over the governing boards of individual institutions or systems of colleges and universities. The latter agency commonly referred to as "The Higher Board" (or some similar appellation) varies widely in its composition and powers.

The trend is for coordinating boards to be composed either of a majority or a totality of citizen members who do not directly administer or govern any public institution. State legislatures and governors have delegated increasing power to such boards over state-wide planning, budgets, educational and research programs, and other matters pertaining to the expansion of the total state higher educational complex. Thus, the trend toward a majority of public members seemingly encourages an increase in power. Conversely, the policy-making branches of state government show reluctance to extend significant power to boards composed primarily of institutional presidents and governing board members.
The Trends Toward Coordination

The general movement toward creation of coordinating bodies of citizen members with substantial powers has been accelerated by three other trends now better identified and better understood than previously.2

Simply stated they are:

1. The coordinating agencies are exercising more and more political leadership in formulating and advocating policies for development and expansion of higher education.
2. More and more federal grant programs for higher education are being state-oriented rather than institution-oriented.
3. The non-public colleges and universities are becoming more and more involved in public policy-making and coordination for all colleges and universities.

Each tendency, in mutual re-enforcement, promises to continue indefinitely. The order of listing the trends indicates their priority of importance, and although the future often makes fools of social scientists who predict historical events, in my opinion these trends portend significant consequences to patterns of coordination and cooperation in higher education. The reasons are revealed as we examine each of them in some detail.

The Political Leadership Role of Coordinating Agencies

While both collegiate administrators and state government policy makers find acceptable most coordinating agency activities, their conception of the political role of the agency remains unclear. Yet that role may now be the most important of all those played by coordinating agencies since it makes possible a new and different kind of positive leadership. Russell Cooper in a recent book on college administration states:

Unfortunately, the kind of amateurish leadership that sufficed reasonably well fifty years ago is not adequate for modern institutions, with their multimillion-dollar budgets, their hundreds of fiercely independent faculty members, and their critical place in American society.3

A Scheme of Balanced Tensions

The coordinating process is a political one, involving powerful social agencies, such as colleges and universities, with their historic
intellectual independence and autonomy on the one side, and the central public policy-formulating authorities of the governor and legislature on the other.

The coordinating agency, situated between these two powerful political forces, seeks to identify with both in order to achieve satisfactory solutions to developmental and financing problems of higher education. The agency role may appear to be strictly one of arbitration or of mediation, but it extends much further. Today, its principal legal duty is long-range planning for improving educational quality and for expanding programs and facilities. The responsible exercise of that power necessarily takes from both the universities and the state authorities a valued traditional function; this, in turn, provides the coordinating agency the means to political leadership.

The necessity for state-wide planning is now generally accepted by all concerned, and, recognizing their own limitations, legislatures assign to coordinating agencies the task of recommending public policy for higher education. Ultimately, however, legislators must act on agency recommendations. While they are relieved not to have the responsibility for determining priorities among contending colleges and universities for additional funds and facilities, at the same time they may be resentful of the agency's objective planning proficiency which discourages purely political decisions in such matters as location of new campuses and allocation of funds to institutions.

The coordinating agency's policy strength is built on expert fact-finding and extensive studies by technicians and leading citizens. In a sense, recommendations by the coordinating board, in the public interest, bar legislators from achieving parochial interests. Of course, recommended policy must be approved by a legislative majority and if a sufficient number of powerful legislators should block recommendations, the coordinating board could lose the proposal and simultaneously become vulnerable to outright abolition or circumscription of its power.

In accepting the need for state-wide planning, university administrators and governing board members are not as apt as legislators to place confidence in a coordinating agency, and in fact often oppose its establishment. Nevertheless, once authorized and operating, a spirit of cooperation generally prevails between
institutions and the new agency. However, collegiate administrators sometimes resent long-range plans recommended to the governor and legislature by the agency, for the same reasons as do some legislators. The limited outlook of a university, in creating new branch campuses or professional schools or of trying to obtain more than an equitable share of state funds, may be contrary to effective master plan developments of higher education.

Thus, if recommended coordinating policy runs contrary to aspirations of a sufficient number of powerful university administrators, the coordinating board may find itself subject to open attacks in public forums and sub rosa by the governor and in the legislature. Its power could be reduced or eliminated if the seeds of destruction land on fertile soil.

Legislator and university administrator alike sincerely believe they promote the public welfare in pursuing their particular interests. As John Gardner has stated in his book on *Excellence*, "They may well recognize their leadership role with respect to their own special segment of the community, but be unaware of their responsibility to the larger community." If in practice, this unawareness is manifest in the pleadings of individual legislators or administrators, their objectives will be looked upon by peers and the public as "special interest" unworthy of adoption as against proposals of a coordinating agency which ostensibly has given thorough study to all state-wide interests in arriving at recommendations. (This is not to say that coordinating agencies never misjudge the public interest.)

The increase in political influence of the coordinating board results directly from the support of the governor, legislators, and college administrators, the great majority of whom work for the broad public interest. Hence, the forces which could destroy the coordinating agency by direct and indirect attack actually have given it the support and confidence necessary for success. This situation is a paradox when one considers that the coordinating agency has no built-in constituency, no tradition, little public awareness of its purpose and function, and operates on monies appropriated by the legislature. Yet, the coordinating agency must face tensions generated by universities and colleges through extensive constituent arousal means, such as alumni associations, grand openings of new campuses, dedication of new buildings, free
tickets to influential public officials for sporting events, dinners, and concerts, and a public relations staff dedicated year-around to molding a citizenry favorable to institutional aspirations. On the other side, too, tensions arise from legislative and executive branches whose local and state-wide political constituencies are organized for support and who have access to the effective communications media for reaching the public.

Thus, tension is the key to the new leadership. Tensions among elements in the coordination scheme do not entirely dissipate even in smoothly operating systems and, fortunately, can not. Indeed, the process is similar to the workings of a democratic society and may be described as a “system of balanced tensions” among diverse elements.

**Exercises of Powers**

State-wide, long-range planning is the principal legal power which allows the coordinating agency to gain a degree of political leadership in the “scheme of balanced tensions.” Priorities and determination of need for new programs, new buildings, and new campuses logically follow from a grand design which is subject to continuous reassessment and revision in order to reflect the dynamics of societal change. As master planning becomes a continuous process, the agency gains insight and sophistication in higher education policy-making and its consequences.

Within the prescribed policy perimeters of a master plan, the agency may properly exercise its short-run functions of budgeting and program approval without the capricious characteristic of expedient *ad hoc* planning. The more clearly defined the long-range objectives, the more rationally and easily made are decisions on immediate expansion plans of individual institutions or systems of institutions. Such planning also works to the advantage of the collegiate administrators and state officials in that both have a basis beyond aspiration and wishful thinking for making decisions.

Subordinate to, but part of, agency planning power is budget review. This power, too, is exercised with far more sophistication than previously. System-wide studies of unit costs and of building capacity and utilization often produce valuable information. In greater use today are formulas and sub-formulas which reflect the
differences among institutions in types of programs, level of students, and unit costs. Positive efforts to prevent "uniformity" and "leveling" are now more characteristic of some coordinating boards than, say, of some universities maintaining branch campuses under a central administration.

For implementation of master plans, several additional powers recently have been delegated to the agencies. Some of the most common are establishing minimum admission standards, approving non-academic construction projects, setting minimum tuition and fees, and discontinuing programs.

Compromise vs. Public Interest

The success and longevity of the coordinating agency are largely determined by its attitude toward maintaining high-level dialogue and the "system of balanced tensions." Two different modes of coordination now prevail among the thirty-eight to forty states which have one of the three types of agencies previously mentioned. Both modes result less from powers granted or assumed by the agency than from its composition. They stem from the conception of leadership held by the board or council and its staff. The modes are not as clearly delineated in practice as they are described here, although agencies can be identified which closely approach one mode or the other.

Coordinating Agency as a Broker

One mode is that of the coordinating agency which looks upon itself only as a mediator or arbitrator among the conflicting forces at work on higher education, and thereby assumes the role of a broker in the political market. This role of balancing power and accommodating interests in higher education has been carefully described by Clark Kerr as it relates to the position of president in a multi-versity. The chief strength of this method is the resulting policy which avoids the frustrating of powerful interests and thus avoids outright opposition. Many group interests may be partially satisfied in order to achieve harmony, but no influential group is completely disaffected.

The deleterious outcome of market-place policy-making is succinctly stated in a recent publication on American politics entitled The Consent of the Governed by Professors Livingston and Thompson. The authors state:
Present political realities tend to reflect a situation in which public policies express only bargains hammered out on the anvil of compromise . . . and they enable us to respond with half measures, at best, to pressing public problems.\(^6\)

Three interrelated weaknesses can be associated with the brokerage role.

First, the role forsakes initiative in leadership, especially in state-wide planning and in meeting changes effectively. Proposals from institutions overlook many state-wide conditions and generally reflect an egocentric attitude, placing the particular institution at the center of developments. Such proposals frequently do not depart from traditional practices or policies of the individual colleges. The coordinating agency in the broker role may then have available only compromises which result in “half measures” rather than a viable state-wide policy promoting the total interests of higher education. Philip Selznick, a noted scholar on large-scale organization, wrote disparagingly of this avoidance of leadership:

> In particular, if a leadership acts as if it had no creative role in the formulation of ends, when in fact the situation demands such a role, it will fail, leaving a history of uncontrolled, opportunistic adaptation behind it.\(^7\)

Second, the brokerage approach encourages only the strongest forces to seek rapprochement while ignoring those too weak politically to be a threat. The result is dominance by one or more of the most powerful institutions, generally the leading state university, and possible continuance of conditions which the coordinating agency was created to rectify. As Victor Thompson has written of this type of coordination:

> What appears to be a frank, open, rational, group problem-solving process is very often actually a bargaining or political process. The outcome is likely to be determined by power, even though on the surface it seems to be a result of rational analysis.\(^8\)

Third, since dominant institutions try to maintain their position and their autonomy, a safe approach to all major change becomes the prevailing attitude. The leaders in effect say:

> Unless we, the center of learning and the leading university, undertake this function (new campus, building program, or study) it will not be done well, and it is likely to threaten the very integrity of this outstanding center of excellence.

*Status quo* becomes the order of the day.
The brokerage method thus underplays any leadership role for the coordinating board, a condition, incidentally, looked upon with great favor by the dominant universities. Needless to say, some existing coordinating agencies, either for lack of vigor or to save their lives, use the compromise method almost exclusively. It is, of course, more prevalent in voluntary organizations but has acceptance in some legally established agencies as well. Such agencies pose little or no direct threat to the aspirations or autonomy of any institution, but their passive role may well fail to protect the weaker institutions from the strong and in a real sense abrogate their responsibility to the public.

Victor Thompson summarizes the brokerage method of coordination as follows:

Coordination through group identification is coordination based upon the common conscience, upon similarities of psychic content, and consequently, extend far enough to include all activities which need to be coordinated. The interdependencies arising from specialization extend much further than the face-to-face working group. The reliance upon group solidarity, therefore, is regressive—one might say a measure of desperation. It should be noted, furthermore, that to the extent that group identifications cannot be perfectly manipulated, their promotion involves some loss of control and is therefore self-defeating from the standpoint of the promoters.

The process is self-defeating and discredits the agency charged with coordination. On great issues of higher educational expansion and development, the stakes of the leading institutions are of such importance that compromise becomes intolerable. Rather, the theme becomes "every man for himself" and its corollary lex talionis. Because of acquiescence in the brokerage method, the coordinating agency lacks the will, knowledge, and leadership essential for advancing the public interest in times of crisis. When this point is reached, only the governor and legislature, the last resort in harmonizing all state policy, have power and prestige enough to settle such disputes. Failure by a formal coordinating agency to recommend a sound policy promoting the best interests of higher education encourages the legislature to reconstitute the agency and revitalize its powers.

Coordinating Agency as Leader

The other mode of coordination, increasingly sought by governors and legislatures, is one which provides leadership in planning.
for all major aspects of higher education development. Such agencies are not expected to be mere mediators among the universities. They are expected to assert the kind of positive leadership that James A. Perkins recently espoused for university presidents.

This second mode of operation, as previously asserted, depends heavily upon the composition of the board or council. Those agencies with a clear majority of citizen members not directly connected with the governance or administration of public colleges or universities tend to exercise vigorously the new leadership role anticipated by the legislature and governor. The attitudes of such citizen boards usually contrast substantially with those agencies inclined to the brokerage mode.

The effective citizen agency looks upon the entire province of higher education as its responsibility. It gains knowledge and detailed facts and figures throughout the state about all post-secondary school institutions, small or large, public or non-public, junior college or advanced graduate. It strives for universal high quality while opening opportunities for all potential students, rich or poor. It seeks equity for each institution whether politically weak or strong. It aims at positive goals in the orderly development of the state's collegiate system and exercises negative controls only when infringement on master plan objectives or the rights of other institutions impend.

Further, in its plan of operation, administrators and other experts, drawn from all types of colleges and universities, civic organizations, business, and government, become involved in agency study and policy-making procedures. These people provide technical knowledge for solution of immediate and long-range problems. More important perhaps, they become the principal means of intercommunication between the general public and the state coordinating structure.

Through such widespread citizen participation in formulation of policy, the agency may itself create an influential constituency. Contacts, which this constituency has with other local and state organizations and their leaders, foster exchanges of knowledge, views and argument which are reflected ultimately in coordinating policy. Faculty members, too, enter the dialogue as important independent spokesmen for higher education. Unlike many college
administrators, faculty members generally commit their professional expertise without strong bias toward the more parochial aspirations and objectives of their institutions.

Policy developed in this manner, in contrast with the brokerage method, first considers the broad public interest while directly involving the leadership of colleges and universities whose destinies are at stake. The parties most likely to be disaffected in this process are presidents and board members of the largest state universities who, because of their own power, look with more favor upon the confrontation and compromise method so characteristic of their voluntary coordinating councils.

**Implications for Institutional Autonomy**

We find throughout the United States an increase in power for the coordinating agencies. Some powers granted were formerly exercised by the legislature, others by the governing boards of institutions, and still others, such as state-wide planning, are new in concept. Theoretically, subordination of colleges and universities to a coordinating board is an impairment of institutional autonomy. But the degree of that impairment must be viewed in comparison to the actual, not the theoretical, autonomy which formerly existed. Impairments by the legislature and the governor were not unknown and some limitations on freedom of action certainly resulted from the unlimited political and financial competition of institutions with each other, particularly in legislative halls.

Again, the relative merits and benefits to be gained from living in a lawfully ordered society must be considered as against the freedom of unregulated competition. The real issue is over the degree to which coordination infringes on institutional freedom essential to the advancement of knowledge, the exploration of ideas, and the critical assessment of society itself.

College and university administrators sometimes propose that higher education should be a self-governing fourth branch of government entirely independent of legislative and executive controls. Others take a less extreme view but express alarm at the kinds of powers now exercised by the state either directly by state executive and legislative arms or indirectly by a coordinating agency.
Too often, however, the self-government advocates have a proclivity to press for freedom only for their own institutions, especially for material goals such as additional funds or additional campuses. If life among educational institutions has not been "nasty, brutish, and short" as Hobbes stated in another context, it has been highly competitive, with the strong gaining the lion's share, and the weak the lamb's. As Ivan Hinderaker recently stated, "All men are not inherently evil, but in any competitive situation there are likely to be some who will stoop to whatever will get by."11

Voluntary coordination among state-supported institutions has succeeded only for short periods of time because the leading state university could be magnanimous without threat to its dominant position. However, once weak colleges gain in strength, they ungratefully descend upon their benevolent big brother, thus ending voluntary coordination. This creates conditions necessitating formal coordination and regulation.

A second difficulty with this conception of autonomy is the lack of differentiation between that which is substantive and that which is procedural. Modern society, with its multitude of laws, regulations, and controls, provides in a positive way for more diversity and freedom of choice and action than at any previous time in history. Freedom without law is far more restrictive than freedom within societal law. By asserting certain controls and rules in the interest of orderly, rational, and equitable development, all the colleges and universities in the state system stand to benefit. The procedural rules established and the practices engaged in by coordinating agencies seldom touch upon the day-to-day decisions or affect adversely the substantive educational and research functions of an institution.

Those leaders of universities which are the most powerful financially and politically may resent even procedural impediments in their path to "manifest destiny." Leaders of smaller institutions aspiring to create by replication "The" prestigious state university resent controls which curb that possibility. Coordinating agencies become unpopular with some institutions when they terminate the oligopoly type of competition which is called "unfair" in the business world, even though these "cease and desist" coordinating
practices also tend to remove higher education from the partisan and pressure-group politics of the state.

Initial popularity, however, is not as true a test of whether coordinating agencies interfere unduly with valued autonomy as is the prevailing attitude of college and university administrators after the agency has been in operation for several legislative sessions. Seldom, if ever, have university administrators attempted to abolish a formal coordinating agency. They have little desire to return to unpredictable legislative lobbying and pressure tactics, whatever nostalgia may arise for such activities when attempting to gain a dramatic expansion unlikely to be provided in a state-wide master plan.

**Master Plans: Effectiveness of Non-Educators**

This discussion, which may seem to some unduly cynical or perhaps extreme, points up the reasons why the new type of coordinating agency, devoted to master plan implementation in the public interest, is proving more successful in the legislative halls and executive offices than are other coordinating structures or modes of operation. The techniques of involving many prominent citizens, outstanding college and university administrators, and experts from all walks of life, result in plans for legislative action which carry a receptiveness unlikely to be associated with plans developed out of negotiated compromises. In addition, the legislature is less likely to attack or amend the real substance of such a plan, whereas plans based upon a bundle of compromises invite legislators to renegotiate the agreements.

**Federal Programs and Implications for Coordination**

The second great trend toward more cooperation and coordination in higher education finds its matrix in the national capitol rather than that of the state. Federal grant programs not only encourage new activities; they also tend to strengthen coordination at the state level.

One of the new axioms of state administration is that if you wish to give permanence to an agency, assign to it administration of a federal program. If the axiom proves true, some coordinating agencies now have built-in longevity. They also seem to have acquired new means for drawing non-public institutions more closely into coordinating studies and plans.
Title I of the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963 provides grants to colleges and universities for construction of academic facilities. For administration at the state level, it requires an "agency which is broadly representative of the public and of institutions of higher education." Generally, the governor designated the existing coordinating agency if it was constituted of public members as well as representatives of institutions. If not, citizens were added to membership or a new agency was created to meet this requirement.

Subsequently, the Higher Education Act of 1965 made the same "broadly representative" requirement in the administration of Titles I, IV, and VI. These provide grants, respectively, for community services and continuing education, scholarships and loans, and for certain instructional equipment. The U.S. Office of Education requested the governors to appoint, if possible, the same agency for the new Title VI as for the 1963 Facilities Act. Only a few governors have failed to comply. In most cases, in states where the board was properly constituted, Titles I and IV of the 1965 Act were also assigned to the existing coordinating agency.

Throughout the country, these titles and others, such as the Vocational-Technical Education Act and the Technical Services Act, are now administered by a variety of state agencies, and only a minority of states have as many as three or four of them centered in the legally constituted coordinating board. Nevertheless, the eventual designation of the coordinating board to supervise most of the programs, which are clearly higher educational and which require an agency broadly representative of the public and the colleges, seems almost a certainty. This will be especially true if the agency membership and mode of operation concentrate on, and actively reflect, the public interest.

The Three Pressures for Synthesis

Three developing conditions provide support to the idea of placing federal programs under a coordinating agency.

First, the number of federal programs and the diversity of state agencies administering them will eventually require coordination. Some federal acts already call for close coordination with previously authorized federal programs and for auditing and validation of data from colleges and universities. All collegiate institutions are
accustomed to working with a plethora of agencies, private, federal, and state, yet few agencies have asked to audit books and accounts or to make on-campus checks of data as required by the new federal acts. Institutions themselves will demand a consolidation of such activities in order to limit the number of different on-campus reviews and of the number of agencies with which to deal.

Second, the states and particularly the governors, who designate the state agencies for administration of federal programs, are finding that many have considerable potential for overlap with each other and with those of state origin. Consequently, federal requirements to coordinate may well be matched by state demands for similar action. The more dispersed the administration of these programs, the greater will be the demand for consolidation, especially as each expands in scope and funding. Some governors have already anticipated coordinative needs by designating one or two agencies to administer most of the new programs, and the state coordinating board usually has received the major assignments.

Third, and most important, state governments will become aware that federal programs administered through several different agencies do not efficiently support implementation of a state master plan for higher education. In fact, the agencies, even if not working at cross purposes to the plan, will usually have independent goals in mind. As conflicts occur among goals, state coordinating boards will request the governor to reassign or coordinate federal activities in a manner to produce maximum attainment of master plan objectives. Several boards have already suggested this policy to governors and have received sympathetic responses.

Evidence indicates all three of these tendencies toward greater coordination are gaining momentum at this moment.

Concern in Non-Coordinated Areas

A consequence not yet mentioned is that states without legally established coordinating agencies now have boards or commissions to administer one or more federal programs relating to colleges and universities. In some states these agencies, not initially constituted for state-wide coordinative purposes, have been given additional higher educational tasks to perform for the state. As
centralization of federal programs and state assignments come about, the agency may in practice take the form of a regularly established coordinating board. This back-door approach may be used by governors in states where it has been difficult to obtain the full benefits of formal coordination. If one considers that such agencies must, under federal law, be composed of members representing both the public and colleges, the agencies have the potential of becoming a “public interest” coordinating board.

These trends have already caused concern, if not alarm, among certain university administrators and their national associations. The land-grant colleges and universities have traditionally dealt directly with the federal government. This practice provides a great deal of independence from state legislative and executive control and the recent attempt of the President to reduce certain “land-grant” funds in favor of the new grant programs administered through the state understandably aroused the concern of these university administrators. So much so that Congress restored the funds in the appropriations bill. Similarly, the American Council on Education, which has been generally favorable to state planning and coordination, now appears to be opposed to further strengthening the state’s role with federal funds.

The philosophy of “creative federalism” as expressed by the President and other spokesmen for the national government, may be even more frustrating to collegiate administrators. The new attitude is for fewer federal “strings” to be attached to money awarded the states and for fewer programs to be administered directly from Washington. Administration of Title I of the Higher Education Act of 1965 is an excellent example of allowing the state to determine what problems will be attacked and what means will be used in finding solutions. With continued and mounting pressures from virtually all major state sources for more federal funds and fewer restrictions on their expenditure, “creative federalism” will gain support despite the efforts of the Land-Grant Association and the American Council on Education to obtain more federal funds granted directly to the universities, thus bypassing any state agency.

Coordination and the Non-Public Colleges and Universities

As a result of state-wide master planning and of federal grant legislation which applies to non-public as well as public colleges
and universities, non-public institutions are being drawn into the coordination process at an accelerated rate. Thus, the capitol and the non-public campuses achieve closer and closer relationships.

Constitutional Barriers to Including Non-Public Schools

The constitutions of most states (Pennsylvania, Maryland, and New York being noteworthy exceptions) prevent any controls or financial aids, direct or indirect, for non-public colleges, particularly those with a church affiliation. This historical situation has not changed substantially in recent years, but neither has it barred state surveys and master plans from increasingly involving the non-public institutions with the public on a voluntary and cooperative basis. They have become an integral participant in studies of students, faculties, programs, and facilities and sometimes indirectly gain from the final plans.

One substantial gain has been provision for tuition scholarships which may be used either in public or non-public colleges. States with these popular scholarship programs periodically increase the total money available as well as maximum amounts awarded individual students. It is not unusual for two-thirds or more of the total funds to go to students attending non-public colleges. Such scholarship programs, of course, have no restrictive state controls incident upon institutions.

Non-public colleges also benefit from other master plan actions. Plans for expansion of programs and campuses of the public system of colleges consider as fully as possible the contributions already being made by non-public institutions. Sites of new public junior colleges and senior institutions are selected with an eye to protecting non-public colleges, particularly if such colleges are not highly restrictive because of tuition costs, admission standards, or church affiliation. Non-public professional schools (medical, dental, engineering, and architectural), invariably become integral units in the analyses of need to expand programs in public institutions.

Federal Non-Differentiation Between Schools

In addition to the indirect aids provided the non-public colleges, some federal programs now require that no differentiation be made between public and non-public institutions in approving grant applications. With this partnership in federal programs, the
state agencies involved have as much contact with many non-public institutions as with those in the public system. Despite the federal intent to treat all institutions alike regardless of who controls them, state agencies are in a position, through selection and weighing of priority criteria, to favor almost any type or size of institution. For example, by such activity on the part of the coordinating agency in one state, two-thirds of the funds available for senior institutions under the Higher Education Facilities Act have been awarded to non-public institutions. Other states, of course, have heavily weighed the criteria most helpful to the public, or to the small, or to the large institutions as the case may be. The more sophisticated the state administrators of federal programs, the more they are able to serve by indirect means certain groups of institutions as against others.

The Drawbacks to Private Institutions

The serving of institutions with federal dollars also has its drawbacks. The experience with administration of the Higher Education Facilities Act across the country indicates need to make on-campus checks and audits of data which are used to establish project priorities among the applicants. Some states already make such checks and others, on the verge of doing so, will no doubt include them at the time the state agencies verify institutional data and conduct financial audits as required under Title I of the Higher Education Act of 1965.

Without a doubt, these verification procedures will be resented by administrators of non-public colleges in the states where relationships between the state and the colleges have been remote. Even public college administrators who endure many audits may not look with favor on still more. Nevertheless, it is axiomatic in the American democratic system that tax funds must be expended only for the purposes designated by the appropriating body. To ascertain such compliance, verifications and audits are essential. To reassert a point made previously, it would seem probable that in order to limit the number of different state agencies having such intimate relationships with institutions, those in the non-public segment, as well as the public, will be seeking centralization of the federal grant programs in a single state agency, probably the state coordinating board for higher education.
As a result of state master plan involvement and the federal grant programs, many leaders of non-public colleges and universities have already developed cooperative and friendly relationships with the staffs of coordinating agencies.

Just as the coordinating board stands in liaison between the public college and the state, so too, does it increasingly serve this function for the non-public institution in relation to both the state and the public colleges. And in this social process another force with political power is added to the coordinative system of balanced tensions.

**Coordination: Its Promises and Risks**

The purpose of this paper has been to describe recent trends in state coordination of higher education. Particular emphasis was placed on the political leadership role of coordinating agencies and on the influence of federal grant programs in strengthening that role with respect to both public and non-public colleges and universities. The paper sought to describe a model coordinating agency in composition, power, and mode of operation, knowing the while that models are seldom produced in fact and that even the best of real agencies sincerely devoted to the indefinable "public interest" may at times poorly plan, overplan, or commit blunders in political leadership. The author is fully aware that confidence of the public and of college administrators, governors, and legislators may be a fickle asset when an agency finds itself in a political crisis, whether from errors in judgment or honest attempts to achieve objectives unacceptable to those with greater power. Yet, the long-range interests of higher education must be promoted through political leadership whatever the attendant risks to the coordinating agency or to the persons engaged in the role.

Lastly, the author is under no illusion that coordination provides a final panacea for higher education any more than higher education is the panacea for all ills of the society, but both have promise and evidence of achieving certain highly desirable goals if positive and imaginative leadership is asserted.


9Op cit., p. 186.


See Section III in the back of this book for annotated bibliography of related materials.
Precis
Politics and Current Patterns in Coordinating Higher Education

One of the most influential factors leading to the strengthening of the states' role in higher education is the coordinating agency which acts in liaison between both the state and national capitols and the higher education institutions.

The fifty states continue to experiment with three different types of coordinating systems: The voluntary council, consisting of public college and university presidents and board members; the single governing-coordinating board for all state supported institutions of higher education; and a board super-imposed over the governing boards of individual institutions or systems. The trend is toward the third mentioned board composed of citizens who do not directly administer or govern any public institution.

The general movement toward creation of coordinating boards of citizen members with substantial powers has been accelerated by three trends now better understood and better identified than previously. Simply stated they are:

1. The coordinating agencies are exercising more and more political leadership in formulating and advocating policies for development and expansion of higher education.

2. More and more federal grant programs for higher education are being state oriented rather than institution oriented.

3. The non-public colleges and universities are becoming more involved in public policy-making and coordination for all colleges and universities.

The confidence of the public and of college administrators, governors, and legislators may be a fickle asset when an agency finds itself in a political crisis, whether from errors in judgment or honest attempts to achieve objectives unacceptable to those with greater power. Yet, the long-range interests of higher education must be promoted through political leadership whatever the attendant risks to the coordinating agency or to the persons engaged in the role.
Section III
Politics and Current Patterns in Coordinating Higher Education


"The Compact for Education, one of the most exciting innovations in this interesting period in American education, offers a valuable opportunity for strengthening the states and for developing a productive relationship among the three levels of government in solving the problems of education. It is important that the specific purpose of the compact be clearly understood... it would be foolish to assert that such a far reaching development is without its risks...."


The author provides a listing of various types of cooperative arrangements including the institutions involved and persons to whom one may write for further information. Covers bi-lateral; city and area; state; regional; and national forms of cooperative projects. Includes selected references, appendices, and institutional and subject indexes.


This volume is comprised of five resource papers written as background for discussions at the Annual Meeting of the American Council on Education in 1964. The five topics deal in general with the conflicting concepts in higher education of "autonomy" and "interdependence." Topics covered include: "New Organizational Patterns in American Colleges and Universities"; "Consortia and Related Interinstitutional Arrangements in Higher Education"; "Interstate Cooperation and Coordination in Higher Education"; "National Organizations in Higher Education."


A general discussion of the need for a change toward equalization and coordination of our nation's public school programs. Although the book is primarily concerned with public schools at the elementary and secondary levels, it has some pertinent arguments about government and higher education. The consensus is that both local and
state reform are needed at the administration levels in order to eliminate the "geographical inequality of education," and "the uneconomical expenditure of funds."


The case of autonomy versus coordination as applied to long-range planning is presented. The evidence points to a split decision, with each a winner if it is willing to pay a price. But the cost of winning is high, for it involves restraint and sacrifice which means the subjugation of personal interests to the welfare of the total educational enterprise.


This book represents a concise and short summary of the requirements for an effective state-wide planning and coordination agency. Several states are used as guidelines in describing the operation and functions of state planning boards. The author feels such an independent agency is needed in order to bring together the common objectives of both the citizens and the institutions of higher learning.


The author traces the development of the Compact for Education from the introduction of the concept in Dr. Conant's *Shaping Educational Policy*, in 1964, through the early part of 1966. He concludes his remarks with a general assessment of the new organization.


In the author's words he has "struggled to explain and present favorably the principle of individual freedom of choice and of institutional autonomy in higher education ..." which to him are more important than centralized planning and administrative bureaucracy. Dr. Conant's book, *Shaping Educational Policy*, is heavily criticized on the grounds that Chambers feels diversity rather than unity "... is needed in a state's higher education policy, and at all costs our systems of higher education should steer away from any uniformity or regimentation of a bureaucratic nature."

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The author analyzes systems of non-compulsory planning and administering of state higher education in the hands of a formal agency. He asks some pointed questions as to the real benefit such
organizations actually provide. He feels that "neither at the state level nor at the national level do Americans want a rigidly structured 'European ministry of education' type of control of public colleges and universities." Special attention is given to the systems of higher education in California, Colorado, Indiana, Ohio, and Michigan.


Major concern is directed toward the recent trend of American higher education to turn to the federal government for advice and leadership. Conant feels that real bedrocks of higher education must be our state legislatures and trustees of private colleges and universities. Up to the present, however, few states have really effectively played a policy-determining role with the real objectives of the institution in mind. California and New York are cited as excellent examples of states which have adopted a system of a master plan in order to effectively plan and coordinate their systems of higher education.


This volume, as prepared for the Liaison Committee of the Regents of the University of California and the California State Board of Education, forms a comprehensive analysis and projection of the state needs in higher education for a fifteen-year period. Includes index, tables, and appendices.


The role of the state directors and supervisors of two-year colleges in coordinating these institutions in a state educational system is identified. Brief descriptions are included of the organization and scheme for operation and control of two-year institutions in sixteen states.


The author presents a brief overview and analysis of the coordinating committee for higher education in Wisconsin. Although the committee has created certain frictions within the state, the author feels that it has contributed significantly to the advancement of higher education.


Includes the papers and seminar reports from a workshop held at Catholic University in 1964. This volume broadly covers most areas of interinstitutional cooperation including the less publicized areas
of library cooperation, small college cooperation, religious cooperation, the role of the executive director, and cooperation among colleges for women. Selective bibliography and index.


Social science research on organizations has been concerned principally with intraorganizational phenomena. The relative neglect of interorganizational relations is surprising in view of the fact that all formal organizations are embedded in an environment of other organizations as well as in a complex of norms, values, and collectivities of the society at large. The phenomena and problems of interorganizational relations are part of the general class of boundary-relations problems confronting all types of social systems, including formal organizations.


The author in this work presents a comprehensive description of the existing patterns of coordination in higher education within states until 1957. Through a process of extensive personal interviewing of governors, college presidents, legislators, and state and university administrative officers, the author is able to present a valuable picture of the various coordinating agencies and boards throughout the United States. The book therefore attempts to enable legislators and educators to have a better understanding of what type of coordinating relationship within their state can best achieve a higher quality of higher education while not sacrificing such concepts as autonomy and freedom.


"Diversity continues to be cherished and encouraged by all, but today the unlimited freedom of a college or university to pursue a self-determined destiny is rapidly being curtailed among the public institutions and even has prospects of diminishing among the non-public ones. At the state level the new watchwords are cooperation and coordination, with institutional autonomy only within certain parameters. The classic condition of autonomy in higher education still prevails in only ten states. . . ."


The author suggests that financial requests for institutions of higher education be handled and controlled through a coordinating board
which then presents recommendations to the legislature. He contends that the legislative committees have not the time nor ability to handle the volumes of factual material that support requests, and are unable to truly differentiate between institutions.

Hanford, George H. "The Consortium Plan: New Hope for Weak Colleges," Saturday Review, Vol. XLVIII (January 16, 1965), pp. 52-3+. A new concept in education for the small, academically weak colleges and for the scores of high school seniors who have been turned down by the college of their choice. The Consortium Plan suggests a cooperation association of colleges having three characteristics: (1) interchangeable freshman and sophomore offerings at all participating institutions; (2) specialized upper division programs on each campus which would comprehend the full range of the liberal arts; (3) automatic transfer of credits within the association.

Illinois Board of Higher Education. A Master Plan for Higher Education in Illinois. Springfield, Illinois: Board of Higher Education, July, 1964. 72 pp. The plan is a comprehensive study of educational needs in public and non-public colleges and universities and other educational enterprises. It looks at questions such as: How should public colleges and universities be governed? What structure has to be provided for the most economical operation? To what extent is unified planning and coordination useful? To what extent should non-public institutions be involved in state-wide planning? Chapter 6 on financing and chapter 7 on organization and coordination are of special worth.

Jamrich, John X. "Interinstitutional Cooperation in Research and Instruction," College and University, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Fall, 1964), pp. 25-34. The author lists five factors: educational adequacy and effectiveness; economic considerations; factor of human resources; recent general upsurge in emphasis on research; and the present rapid trend into interinstitutional cooperative efforts. He lists what he believes to be the valid reasons for cooperation and indicates possible implications and consequences of interinstitutional compacts.


This work gives a detailed explanation of the Interstate Compact— its development, operation, and function. This rather new creature in public administration arose out of the concern for those areas of government which fall by default to the federal government if not occupied by the states. By remaining problem-oriented, and through effective cooperation on a regional level, these agencies have made significant contributions in such areas as education, natural resources, and specific public problems.

Litwak, Eugene and Lydia F. Hylton. "Interorganizational Analysis: A Hypothesis on Coordinating Agencies," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 6 (March, 1962), pp. 395-426. A theory of interorganizational coordination is presented based upon: (1) organizational interdependence, (2) level of organizational awareness, (3) standardization of organizational activities, and (4) number of organizations. The authors indicate a theory of limited conflict as opposed to traditional harmony theory.

Longenecker, Herbert E. "Some Implications of the Educational Compact Proposal for Higher Education," Educational Record, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Winter, 1966), pp. 106-112. "Given the present situation, and the widespread apprehension and outright dissent almost unanimously expressed by those in higher education who have carefully and thoughtfully examined the implications of the proposed compact, one course of prompt action now seems relevant: states not yet aligned with the compact should be discouraged from joining it..."


state organization. Includes an appendix on the “Allocation of Operating Funds by Boards for Higher Education” authored by A. J. Brumbaugh and Myron R. Blee.


The author gives comprehensive coverage to the development and forms of the various state systems of coordination and cooperation in higher education. Areas covered include: Voluntary Systems; The Single Board; The Coordinating Board; Coordinated Planning; and Major Trends in Coordination. Includes select bibliography.


Discusses ways in which American colleges and universities can adapt to the “rising tide” of enrollment through state-wide coordination and cooperation. In suggesting such a plan, the diversity of the student and the various demands of our society must be accurately incorporated and represented. It is pointed out that coordination has a constructive role to play in providing both efficiently run schools and schools which optimize a state’s given resources.


As prepared for the Liaison Committee of the Regents of the University of California and the California State Board of Education, this volume supplemented and replaced the original study of the needs of higher education in the state completed in 1948. Included in this extensive state study are: The Needs for Higher Education in California as Measured by the Population to be Served; The Functions and Programs of Higher Education in California; The Government, Administration, and Coordination of Public Higher Education; The Present Physical Plants and Future Plants Needed; and California’s Ability to Support Higher Education.


This volume, published for the Institute of Higher Education, contains a broad coverage of cooperation in liberal arts colleges. Focusing on long-range planning, it includes articles by the editors, Paul L. Dressel, Algo D. Henderson, Walter E. Sindlinger, and others. Includes biographical sketches of the authors.


Is the junior college really a unique institution serving special functions which other institutions cannot serve effectively or do not serve
at all? This is the basic question Dr. Medsker addresses himself in this study of some seventy-six two-year institutions in fifteen states.


The author briefly describes different types of state coordination and coordinating bodies, but the primary concern is with the dimensions of coordination. The first is geographic coordination, termed horizontal due to its concern for providing equal educational opportunities across a state; the second is program coordination, termed vertical because it concerns itself with research and the pyramid of educational programs. Although effective coordination is not assured by a formal state organization, the author believes that more and more states are going to adopt some form of formal organization in the future.


The impression is conveyed that state planning for higher education is no bed of roses. It is not a field for the timorous, the anxious, the sensitive. But it is a field where much can be accomplished if all involved in public higher education will work together with intelligence, good will, and a sense of compromise. The alternative is a return to a jungle of political warfare in which reason is likely to play a small role and naked power will decide the issues.


A study of the challenge and response in the day-to-day relationships between public institutions of higher education and American state governments. The authors believe that the trend toward administrative centralization within the states has been a major factor in introducing greater stress into relations between public colleges and universities and state government.


An annotated bibliography of seventeen official state reports on higher education. The annotations include the major subjects covered in each report and a summary of the recommendations.


A plan is proposed for the structure of a system of higher education for the state. An estimate is made of the increased load to be carried by New Jersey public colleges and the state university for the years
1962-1970. A forecast is made of the investment in buildings, equipment, and other facilities New Jersey must make in order to provide for the predicted increase in enrollments to the fall of 1970.


Every four years the State Board of Regents must submit a comprehensive plan for the orderly development of higher education. This is their first plan. The report is an extensive document covering every aspect of education and the peculiar organization and relationship of New York public and private schools. Report deals at length with the state needs to both the state and the society. Part IV deals with the institution plans and the means of the master plan to achieve identity, unity, and excellence throughout the university.

The University of the State of New York. The State Education Department: Organization, Services, Functions. Albany, N. Y.: The University of the State of New York Press, August, 1962. A circular which describes the corporate power of the University of the State of New York and the Board of Regents. The functions and services of the State Education Department are listed. Contains a detailed organizational chart with a brief description of services available through each division of the State Education Department.


“Our system of higher education was organized largely in discrete units, with local boards, administrators, and faculties exercising considerable autonomy in the determination of their own means and ends. But the growing importance, expense, and interdependence of higher education institutions are forces exerting heavy pressures to change all this...”


This volume of essays is contributed by the nation’s leading educators and scholars; it is a comprehensive overview of American higher education today. Directed primarily at organization and direction, it covers: the changing environment of higher education; institutional modifications; the emergence of state systems; voluntary arrangements; interinstitutional and interstate agreements; unified approaches to national problems; national associations in higher education; and national policy for higher education: problems and prospects. Primary emphasis is toward the emergence of a stronger national higher educational policy.
SELECTED STATE SURVEYS


