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One part of this review of research contains summaries of studies offering sociogenic or psychogenic explanations for the behavior of members of different social classes. The former position, which deemphasizes the importance of child rearing practices in the socialization process, maintains that the adult personality modal to a particular class is made up of behaviors necessary for performing the role of a member of that class; in contrast, the latter position posits that class differences in child rearing practices produce modal personality characteristics which have a constraining influence on other behavior. Another section includes reviews of studies of social class differences in child rearing practices of families in Chicago, Boston, Detroit, and Eugene (Oregon). Also reviewed are studies which stress the continuing nature of socialization through the adult years as part of a life cycle and place less emphasis on childhood socialization. These studies explain social class differences by either a social-economic-ecological, a genetic, or a developmental interpretation. Developmentalists attempt to understand the effects of the sociological variable of social class membership in terms of the psychological variable of personal development level. (EF)
SOCIAL CLASS AND
THE SOCIALIZATION PROCESS
A REVIEW OF RESEARCH

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The literature pertaining to social class differences in socialization within our own society has much in common with the cross-cultural literature dealing with societies spread throughout the world. Much of it is based upon descriptive accounts of widely varying adequacy. These reports have given rise to stereotyped views of the behavior of each class and have fostered a modal-man approach to social class membership. Thumbnail sketches of what a lower-class or middle-class person "is like" are a familiar part of this literature; see, for example, Cavan's (1964) sketch of each of six classes from upper-upper down to lower-lower.

As in much cross-cultural writing on modal personality of societies, the word-pictures employed to describe a social class personality inevitably tend to emphasize the homogeneity of behavior within a class and the heterogeneity across classes. Because it is irrelevant to the main purpose, little effort is ordinarily given to discussions of variability within a class or of similarities across classes. In discussing the class personality profiles that have been drawn, Clausen and Williams (1963) have pointed out that while they are largely unsubstantiated, they have resulted "in some remarkably tenacious and persistent stereotypes."

The readiness of so many writers to treat social class differences in this way is somewhat surprising in light of the very vagueness of the social class concept. A modal-man approach and emphasis on inter-group
variation have a certain plausibility when applied to discrete societies of clearly defined membership and distinguishable from other groups in many obvious ways. They have much less initial plausibility when applied to subgroups of one society, subgroups of uncertain membership with much interaction and mobility, and sharing some common core of history and values.

Objection to conceptualizing social classes as discrete groups, each with its own subculture, has frequently been argued at a theoretical level (see R. Brown, 1965, chapter 3; Cavan, 1964). Objections have also been based on methodological considerations—the lack, for example, of any means of dependably sorting people into classes the way they can be sorted into societies. (See L. Hoffman and Lippett [1960] and D. Miller and Swanson [1960] in addition to Brown and Cavan for discussions of the measurement problem involved in social class categorization.) It is somewhat reassuring to learn that 19 indices of socioeconomic class membership that have been used are highly correlated, enough to justify speaking, for some purposes, of a single dimension (Kahl & Davis, 1955). On the other hand, they are not identical, and the magnitude of the relationship between social class membership and particular attitudes and behavior depends upon the choice of social class index. Regardless of how accurately or consistently a position along a social class dimension is measured, there remains the question of whether this dimension should be divided into discrete classes. Certainly there are cultural differences associated with status within every United States community, and attention is called to them by some of the indices used for social class—occupation, for example, and the specific occupational distinction of white-collar versus blue-collar. But to think that cultural variation is found only
among discrete groups and not among levels on a continuously varying dimension, is itself an over-simplification which results from the origin of the culture concept in the ethnography of discrete societies. In dealing with socioeconomic variation, the advantage may sometimes lie with one or another grosser classification, sometimes with a finer measurement. For example, McGrade (1966) recently found that dividing blue- and white-collar workers into four groups rather than two yielded a better understanding of relationships between socioeconomic status and the effectiveness of social reinforcers. Miller and Swanson (1958), on the other hand, found that a finer breakdown of the occupational variable did not enhance the magnitude of relationships they discovered between socioeconomic status and child-rearing practices.

A flexible conception of socioeconomic status which allows it to be treated as either a continuous dimension or a set of categories holds the greatest promise of advancing our understanding. We may expect distinctive values from each treatment. Regarding status as a continuous dimension facilitates our relating it to other important dimensions. Breaking it into categories, on the other hand, seems especially valuable in calling attention to distinctive implications of variations in social status which are somewhat independent of the main dimension; an example in Miller and Swanson's account, described later in this paper, of entrepreneurial versus bureaucratic integration settings.

Resemblance between intra-societal and inter-societal studies is also found in the problems of interpretation to which they give rise. Both are by their nature correlational rather than experimental and share the difficulties implied by this fact. Barry (in press) has pointed out that
two main types of interpretations have been employed to explain the cross-cultural findings, the sociogenic and the psychogenic. This is also true of the social class findings. Sociogenic explanations have explained the adult personality modal to a class as being behavior necessary to successful performance of the role of class member, and child-training practices, if considered at all, as one expression of that modal personality. Psychogenic explanations of social class differences, as in the case of cross-cultural differences, have relied heavily upon the importance of child-rearing practices as producing modal personality characteristics which then have a constraining influence on other behavior. (See Gold [1958] for an interesting example in which the sociogenic and psychogenic interpretations are pitted against each other in an effort to explain social class differences in aggression.) The psychogenic approach asserts that parents in a particular socioeconomic class employ particular child-rearing practices which have a number of resultants in the child's personality, which in turn determines the adult behaviors encountered in that class. The studies encountered in support of this thesis are quite varied. All too rare are studies in which class has been related to child-rearing practices which in turn have been related to later behavior of the individuals who had actually been subjected to these practices. (See M. Hoffman [1966], D. Miller and Swanson [1960] and R. Sears et al. [1957] for examples of this approach.)

Many scholars have been content to investigate class differences in child rearing, assuming that these differences would affect later behavior. Others have examined class differences in children's behavior and attributed
them without evidence to assumed differences in child-rearing practices. L. Hoffman and Lippett (1960) have correctly pointed out that studies of the latter type "often involve the theoretical weakness that the breadth of the jump leaves open many possible alternative explanations for any empirical relationships obtained" (p. 950).

We thus see that many of the social class studies are vulnerable to problems parallel to those that prevent confident interpretation of the cross-cultural studies. Again, however, the findings themselves are of the utmost interest to the student of socialization, and they form an important body of evidence that must be encompassed by any comprehensive theory of socialization.

Intra-Societal Variation in Behavior

We shall content ourselves with a brief review of those studies that have provided evidence of social class differences in general attitudes and behavior, and of the theoretically important studies dealing with social class differences in child rearing. As would be expected, social class has a number of economic and sociological correlates. Cavan (1964) reviews, for instance, American class variation in ethnic background, religious affiliation, house dwelling, type of neighborhood and amount of education. She also reviews the extensive evidence of class variation in family structure and roles. For example: (1) The middle-class family tends to be more stable than the lower-class family, and to be nuclear rather than extended; (2) Security of husband's employment varies with social class, as does the likelihood that the wife will not need to be employed; (3) In high-status groups, husbands have been found to make more decisions than the wife; in the middle-status (roughly middle-class) group, a high degree of equality between husband and wife was found, and
in the low-status group, the wife was found to be more dominant than in either the high- or middle-status groups (Blood & Wolfe, 1960; Olsen, 1960). Probably related to these characteristics is the finding, with psychological measurement techniques, of greater marital satisfaction in middle-class than in lower-class women (Blood & Wolfe, 1960).

Considerable evidence has now been presented that there are class differences on such broad dimensions of behavior as quality of family relationships, patterns of affection and authority, conceptions of parenthood on the part of parents, perception of parents on the part of children, parents' expectations for the child, general expressive styles and modal reactions to stress. (See comprehensive reviews of this literature by Clausen and Williams [1963] and D. Miller and Swanson [1960].)

In a widely noted study of social class and parental values, Kohn (1959b) found that parents of all social classes shared certain values, that is, they thought their children should be honest, happy, considerate, obedient and dependable. However, Kohn also found differences in parental values related to the parents' socioeconomic class. Middle-class parents were found to emphasize such internalized standards of conduct as honesty and self-control, consideration and curiosity. Working-class parents emphasized qualities that assure respectability, such as obedience, neatness and cleanliness.

Working-class mothers have been found to see their role as emphasizing direct responsibility for immediately eliciting specific behavioral conformities from their children, whereas middle-class mothers focus rather on the child's growth, development, affection and satisfaction (Duvall, 1946). Middle-class parents have been found to have more acceptant, egalitarian
relationships with their children and to be more accessible to the child
than the parents in the working class (Maas, 1951). Although the working-
class father has been found to be less available and accessible to the
child than the middle-class father (Bronfenbrenner, 1961), working-class
mothers have been found to expect their husbands to be more directive
and to play a larger role in the imposition of constraints (Kohn & Carroll,
1960). Boys from the middle-class have been found to perceive their
parents as more competent, emotionally secure, accepting, and interested
in their child's performance than do lower-class boys, with these class
differences being greater for the perception of the father than of the
mother (Rosen, 1964).

Findings of this sort are not confined to children's relations with
their parents. Milner (1951) found that lower-class children were more
likely than middle-class children to perceive adults in general as pre-
dominantly hostile. In studying retarded children drawn from the lowest
segment of the lower socioeconomic class, Shellenberger and Zigler (1961)
found that these children were characterized by an atypically high degree
of wariness of adults and inferred that this wariness was due to social
class experiences rather than to retardation per se.

Social class differences in children's general approach to problems
or "styles" of life have also been found. Alper, Blane and Abrams (1955)
hypothesized that middle-class as compared to lower-class children would
be more fearful of getting dirty while engaged in a finger-painting test.
This hypothesis was generated from the view of Davis and Havighurst (1946)
that middle-class as compared to lower-class children are subjected to
earlier and more consistent influences which cause the child to be "orderly,
conscientious, responsible, and tame" and from Erlenmeyer's (1947) conclusion that middle-class children are "more anxious as a result of these pressures." (The findings of R. Sears et al. [1957] that middle-class mothers are more permissive in their child rearing than lower-class mothers would generate a prediction opposite to that of Alper et al.) As predicted, the middle-class children showed a lower tolerance for getting dirty, for staying dirty and for the products they produced while dirty. Somewhat related to this is the finding that among both children and adults of the middle as compared to the lower class one encounters a greater readiness to experience guilt (D. Miller & Swanson, 1960; Zigler & Phillips, 1960). As Clausen and Williams (1963) have pointed out, studies of this type (A. Davis, 1944; Green, 1946) have given rise to a view which attributes "better adjustment" to the working-class child, who is seen as free of the excessive guilt, repressed hostility and driving anxiety of his middle-class counterpart. Clausen and Williams have noted that contrary to this view, several studies measuring aspects of personality which seem relevant find "better adjustment" in middle-class children (Burchinal, Gardner & Hawkes, 1958; Sewell & Haller, 1956).

Miller and Swanson (1960) have presented some evidence that child-rearing practices in different socioeconomic classes give rise to differences in selection of defense mechanisms. For instance, middle-class children were found to more readily employ repression as a defense, whereas denial was more characteristic of the lower-class child. Miller and Swanson and their students (1956, 1958, 1960) have also demonstrated class differences in broad expressive styles independent of type of defense. The most noteworthy of these is the tendency toward conceptual expression in the middle class and motor expression in the lower class.
Somewhat related to this conceptual-motoric dichotomy are the class differences that have been found in the expression of aggression. Adults of the lower class have often been found to vent their hostility in overt acts of aggression against others, where those of higher status are more likely to turn their hostility inward, expressing it in self-deprecatory attitudes and suicide (Gold, 1958; A. Henry & Short, 1954; Zigler & Phillips, 1960). Among children, McKee and Leader (1955) found lower-class as compared to middle-class children to be both more competitive (defined by acts aimed at excelling or asserting one's own superiority) and aggressive (defined by acts intended to injure another child). A. Davis (1943) has also found aggression to be more apparent among the lower socioeconomic group. Even in fantasy, according to the evidence of Miller and Swanson and their students, the lower-class child tends to be more aggressive than his middle-class counterpart (Miller & Swanson, 1956, 1960). However, findings on class and aggression have not been completely consistent. Maas (1954), for example, did not find that lower-class adolescent boys were consistently more aggressive than middle-class boys, and Body (1955) found more aggressive behavior in a middle-class than in a lower-class nursery school.

Usually, some combination of psychogenic and sociogenic explanations have been advanced to account for the relationships discovered between social class status and overt aggression. A popular psychogenic explanation is that class differences in child rearing give rise to the differences in aggression. Sociogenic explanations have referred to the differing degree to which aggression threatens social relations as structured in various class groups.
Social class differences have also been found in research on achievement, independence and conformity. Rosen (1956) found that for the middle-class as compared to the working-class child there is more emphasis on independence in early childhood, higher expectations associated with school performance, a greater belief in the availability of success, and a greater willingness to pursue those activities that make achievement possible. A greater degree of internalization of achievement striving among middle-class as compared with working-class high-school students has been found in two related experiments (M. Hoffman, Mitsos & Protz, 1958). Thompson (1959) has inferred that there should be more conformity in middle- than in lower-class adolescents; he does so on the basis of putting together Mussen and Kagan's (1958) finding of conformity positively related to punitive and restrictive child rearing and Psathas' (1957) evidence that this type of child rearing characterizes the middle rather than the lower class. Somewhat against the plausibility of this inference, however, is Tuma and Livson's (1960) finding that among middle-class boys greater conformity is found in those of lower status, not those of higher status.

In view of the importance of the intellectual in determining the ultimate level of social and personal adjustment, students of socialization should be especially interested in the repeated finding that middle-class children average higher than lower-class children on most general tests of intelligence as well as classroom indices of school achievement. This finding raises a particularly thorny issue about relationships between class and behavior. It is probably safe to assume that both
the individual's class position and his intellectual level are important determinants of his general behavior. But since these two are substantially correlated with each other we usually have no way of knowing how much of the apparent dependence of any variable upon one of them should more properly be ascribed to the other. Where data are gathered to provide this information, we sometimes see things in a new light. Miller and Swanson (1960), for instance, give us such information about the relationship between class and several other variables, showing that the relationship is sometimes markedly altered when intelligence is controlled. This issue has often been avoided by simply conceptualizing intelligence as almost exclusively determined by environment, and in particular by environmental factors associated with class membership. An equally defensible position (and this is to say that neither extreme is defensible) is that intelligence is almost exclusively determined by genetic factors, and it is the intelligence of the individual and his ancestors (especially his parents) which determines his social class rather than social class determining his intelligence. (The reader should be aware that the intelligence issue is one of the most troublesome in psychology, and he is referred to H. Jones [1954], Tuddenham [1962] and Zigler [1966a] for reviews of evidence and more complete discussions of theoretical problems.)

Thus far it is the former of these two extreme positions that has been more associated with research, and we may distinguish two versions of this extreme environmentalism associated with different kinds of research. The two positions vary in the kind of explanation offered for the very substantial empirical relation between social class and intelligence test
scores. One position assumes that the average level of intellectual functioning probably does not differ from one class to another and that the observed relation is an artifact of measurement, a product of the unfairness of intelligence tests for lower-class populations (A. Davis, 1954; Eells, Davis, Havighurst, Herrick & Tyler, 1951; Haggard, 1954; Isaacs, 1962). An obvious example is provided by information items such as appear on many intelligence tests. They tend to refer to realms of information to which middle and upper-class children have been much more exposed than have the lower-class. But research shows much less obvious kinds of unfairness. Evidence is now available that the lower-class child's intelligence tends to be underestimated by our standard intelligence tests (cf. Zigler, 1966b). It is extremely unlikely, however, that all the social class variation in test performance is due to test defects and non-cognitive differences.

The simple idea of a "culture-fair" test is illusory. Cattell (1965) correctly pointed out the error of Eells et al. (1951) in rejecting from an intelligence test any items differentiating between social classes; a culture-fair intelligence test must not only avoid discriminating against the lower class, but must also be a fairly good measure of something akin to Spearman's (general intelligence). It makes no sense to construct tests which, in the process of partialing out culture, also partial out intelligence. Where "culture-fair" tests have been constructed and applied, however, performance on them has been found to be significantly related to social class membership. MacArthur and Elley (1963) found that the culture-fair intelligence measure correlated with social status about +.22 to +.24 compared with +.30 to +.34 for traditional intelligence tests.
A quite different environmentalist position is that there are real class differences in intellectual functioning and that these are produced by class differences in environment. The environmental events that have been postulated to explain these differences vary from the very general and sociogenic on the one hand to the specific and psychogenic or cognitive on the other; for example, broad class attitudes towards intelligence and education (e.g., Toby, 1963), general child-rearing practices which favor one cognitive style rather than another (e.g., Witkin et al., 1962), specific types of class-related interpersonal communications which result in specific deficits in intellectual functioning (e.g., B. Bernstein, 1961; Hess & Shipman, 1965). Studies associated with this last and most specific example are especially promising and appear to fulfill H. Jones' plea (1954) that we move on from the assertion that the environment influences general intellectual development to the investigation of how particular events impinging on the child influence particular cognitive processes in him.

Intra-Societal Differences in Child Rearing

Differences in behavior associated with social class membership are now well-documented. There is little agreement, however, on exactly why such differences should exist. As noted above, these social class differences are often explained as resulting from child-rearing practices of the different social classes. This explanation generates the expectation that clear differences among the classes in child-rearing practices would be empirically demonstrable. Although some reviewers (e.g., Cavan, 1964) have been able to abstract from a number of studies certain general differences in child rearing associated with social class membership, the student of socialization is doomed to disappointment if he expects to encounter a great
deal of clarity concerning the relationship between social class and child-rearing practices. The contradictory and inconsistent nature of the findings in this area were recently emphasized by Clausen and Williams (1963). These reviewers argued that much of this inconsistency was due to the focus on specific infant and child care practices, often taken out of context, and that greater agreement is to be found when attention is shifted from the more specific, and perhaps more fleeting, to certain more general and enduring dimensions such as quality of family relationships and patterns of affection and authority. Even on these latter dimensions, however, agreement is nowhere as great as would have been expected. For instance, Green (1946), taking a rather broad-gauged approach toward middle-class values, goals and child-rearing practices, came to the conclusion that they are such as should produce an anxiety-ridden, if not imminently neurotic, child. But the conclusion does not necessarily fit the facts; Sewell and Haller (1956, 1959), employing an equally broad-gauged approach, concluded that lower-class children are more anxious than middle-class children, although for reasons other than those advanced by Green to explain the anxieties of the middle-class child.

An early and well-known study of social class and child training is that conducted in Chicago by Davis and Havighurst (1946). These investigators examined class differences in many practices, including those associated with feeding and weaning, toilet training, aggression control, household chores and techniques of discipline. Davis and Havighurst found that lower-class as compared to middle-class children were breast fed more frequently, were weaned later, were more often fed on demand, were started on toilet training later and were expected to begin helping in the home.
at a later age. Middle-class as compared to lower-class children were less severely punished for soiling after toilet training had begun and were more frequently permitted to "fight each other so long as they do not hurt each other badly." Middle-class mothers as compared to lower-class mothers were found to mention reward or praise more frequently as a means for getting children to obey. A general conclusion was that the child-rearing practices of the middle class were oriented around restraint and self-discipline, whereas those of the lower class were more permissive.

This conclusion was challenged by the findings of a study conducted some nine years later in the Boston area (Maccoby & Gibbs, 1954; R. Sears et al., 1957). No differences in feeding and weaning practices were found between the two social classes. Middle-class as compared to lower-class parents were found to complete bowel training later, to be less severe in their toilet training procedures and to be more permissive of their children's aggression when this aggression was directed toward other children or toward themselves. Among disciplinary techniques, scolding statements suggesting withdrawal of love were more frequent in the middle class, while physical punishment and deprivation of privileges were more common in the lower class. Middle-class parents were found to be more permissive of the child's sexual behavior, and the relationship between father and child was found to be warmer in the middle- than in the lower-class home. The authors concluded that middle-class parents were generally more permissive, gentler and warmer toward their children than were working-class parents. In attempting to explain the inconsistency between their Boston study and the Chicago study, Sears et al. asserted that the Chicago data could also be interpreted as showing greater permissiveness on the part of the middle-as compared to the lower-class mother if the behavioral consequences of
each particular child-rearing practice were fully considered. In another comparison of the Chicago and Boston studies, Havighurst and Davis (1955) concluded that the disagreements between the two studies were substantial and important. They suggested that the inconsistencies may have been due to inadequacies in the sampling procedures in both studies, and to changes in child-rearing ideology between 1943 and 1952.

In an effort to resolve the disagreement between the Chicago and Boston studies, Littman, Moore and Pierce-Jones (1957) examined the child-rearing practices of middle- and lower-class parents in Eugene, Oregon. Consistent with the Boston but inconsistent with the Chicago findings, were the Eugene data indicating no class differences associated with feeding and weaning practices. Also consistent with the Boston study were the findings that father-child relations were better in the middle than in the lower class, and that the middle-class parents were more permissive in regard to the child's sexual behavior. However, in other child-rearing practices, the Eugene study supported neither the Chicago nor Boston study, indicating instead a much greater similarity in child-rearing practices in the two social classes. For example, in the Eugene study, no significant class differences were found in toilet training, aggression control or techniques of discipline. The single indication in the Eugene study that middle-class homes may be more demanding than lower-class homes was the finding that middle-class mothers more frequently complained that household duties required of their children were not carried out. In a thoughtful discussion of the findings of the Chicago, Boston and Eugene studies taken in toto, Littman et al. (1957) point out that a relatively small percentage of findings are statistically significant and that of the significant findings, many are inconsistent from one study
to another; they conclude that there are probably no general or profound differences among classes in socialization practices.

In another effort to resolve the discrepancy between the Chicago and Boston studies, M. White (1957) compared the child-rearing practices of lower- and middle-class mothers living in the suburban area south of San Francisco, California. She found that middle-class as compared with lower-class mothers were less severe in toilet training, permitted more aggression against the parents, were more responsive to the baby's crying, less often carried through when they told a child to do something, reported more thumb-sucking and less nail-biting, and more often mentioned experts, other mothers and friends as their sources of ideas on child rearing. This led White to conclude that her study showed more agreement with the Boston study than with the Chicago study, which was conducted a decade earlier than the Boston study. White suggested that the discrepancies between her findings and the Chicago study were due to changes in child-rearing practices that had occurred in the time lapse between the two studies. The White study showed no vast class differences in the child-rearing practices, and the extent to which it supports the Boston study is doubtful. Of the 17 variables on which White compared the findings of the Chicago, Boston and California studies, there were 14 on which no significant differences between the classes were found in the California study. Of the three variables on which significant class differences were found in the California study, one finding—that middle-class parents reported more thumb-sucking—was in agreement with the Chicago study. The finding that working-class mothers were more severe in toilet training was in agreement with both the Chicago and Boston studies (but in disagreement
with the Eugene study). Furthermore, the California study disagreed with
the Boston study in that the California study found no social class differences
related to how much the mother keeps track of the child, permission for
aggression against other children or punishment for aggression against
parents. It thus appears that the bulk of the agreement between the
California and Boston studies consists of finding that the social classes
do not differ on a sizable number of child-rearing practices. Rather than
supporting the conclusions of either the Chicago or Boston studies, then,
the California study lends further credence to the Littman et al. conclusion
that class differences in child rearing are less than would be expected
from either the Chicago or Boston study. (Since the important theoretical
issue in this matter is not social class differences in child-rearing per
se, but rather such differences as the antecedents of later differences in
behavior encountered in the two social classes, it is of interest to note
that White found no significant class differences in such actual behaviors
of the children as dependence behavior reported by the mother, performance
on the Draw-a-Man test, the ability to delay gratification, aggression in
doll-play, or in personality ratings made on the children.)

Another important investigation of child-rearing differences between
middle and lower class was the large-scale study conducted in Detroit by
Miller and Swanson (1958). In this, as well as in a later investigation
(1960), Miller and Swanson advanced the interesting argument that a
variety of changes in our society, including those in immigration patterns,
ratio of urban to rural dwellers and the general nature and complexity of
our economic institutions have changed the meaning of social class member-
ship. As a result of such changes, social class membership no longer
Implicates any underlying set of values, attitudes, goals and life styles. Homogeneity, they argue, is found instead in what they call an "integration setting" which cuts across social class lines. Thus, to Miller and Swanson, child-rearing practices are not directed so much toward inculcating values and behavior germane to the social class as toward developing a personality consonant with success in the family's particular integration setting.

As we noted earlier, two types of integration setting have been conceptualized by Miller and Swanson--the entrepreneurial and the bureaucratic. Membership in the entrepreneurial setting is characterized by involvement in an economic organization having the following features: small size, a simple division of labor, a relatively small capitalization and provision for income mobility through risk-taking and competition. The social situations encountered in such a setting are referred to by Miller and Swanson as "individuated" since they tend to isolate people from one another and from the controlling influence of shared cultural norms. According to Miller and Swanson, "Children reared in individuated and entrepreneurial homes will be encouraged to be highly rational, to exercise great self-control, to be self-reliant, and to assume an active, manipulative stance toward their environment" (p. 57). They classified a family as entrepreneurial if the husband met any one of the following characteristics: (a) was self-employed, (b) gained at least half his income in the form of profits, fees or commissions, or (c) worked in an organization having only two levels of supervision. These criteria alone would exclude most of those members of the lower class who seemed to Miller and Swanson to share the entrepreneurial orientation; they therefore added a fourth criterion, that
a family would be considered entrepreneurial if either wife or husband were born on a farm or outside the United States.

Families not classified as entrepreneurial were classified as bureaucratic and thought of as being typically involved in an economic setting characterized by substantially capitalized large organizations employing many kinds of specialists. For the bureaucratic family, income is in the form of wages or salary, and mobility comes through specialized training rather than through success in taking risks. These families are viewed as being involved in a welfare bureaucracy in which the organization provides support in meeting their personal crises and offers continuity of employment and income despite fluctuations in the business cycle. According to Miller and Swanson, "Children reared in welfare-bureaucratic homes will be encouraged to be accommodative, to allow their impulses some spontaneous expression, and to seek direction from the organizational programs in which they participate" (p. 58).

Miller and Swanson examined child-rearing practices as a function of both social class and integration setting. A surprisingly small number of differences in child rearing were found to be associated with either social class or integration setting. Miller and Swanson then looked at differences between groups defined by both class and integration setting, e.g., entrepreneurial middle vs. bureaucratic lowers, and related these differences to the findings of the Chicago and Boston studies. Although their findings were generally quite disparate from those of the Chicago study, they concluded that comparisons between the entrepreneurial middle class and the lower class of either integration setting tended to
resemble the Chicago findings; comparisons between bureaucratic middles and entrepreneurial lowers showed some resemblance to the Boston findings. In both instances, however, a great deal of the resemblance pertained to variables on which the finding was of no difference. Miller and Swanson, then, do present some limited evidence indicating that integration setting influences child-rearing practices and that considering integration setting may reduce somewhat the disagreement found among studies of child-rearing practices and social class. The evidence is not, however, sufficient to justify taking serious issue with the negative conclusion of Littman et al. (1957) about important general differences among classes in socialization practices.

Some investigators of social class differences have concentrated on broad dimensions of child rearing, e.g., restrictive vs. permissive, rather than on specific infant and child care practices. Thus, Klatskin, Jackson and Wilkin (1956) found some interesting trends in child-rearing styles associated with social class membership, although generally not statistically significant. Upper-middle-class mothers showed more optimal child-rearing practices (neither too rigid nor overpermissive) related to feeding, sleeping, toileting, etc., than did either lower-middle-class or upper-lower-class mothers. Lower-middle-class mothers were the most likely to have rigid practices. What most characterized upper-lower-class mothers was that they showed no consistent pattern, but varied in optimal, rigid or overpermissive behavior from one aspect of training to another.

A number of studies employing some combination of the broad-gauged and specific approaches have indicated that the middle-class parent is generally
more permissive than the lower-class parent. Klatskin (1952), while finding no class differences in permissiveness in regard to feeding, nor in the degree to which fathers participated in child care, did find more leniency among the upper-middle-class group than in the lower-middle or upper-lower in toilet training, type of discipline imposed on the child and disapproval of the child's behavior. Elder (1962) also found that lower-class parents were more autocratic and authoritarian than middle-class parents. The finding that lower-class mothers used more forceful and punitive methods of discipline than middle-class mothers (Bayley & Schaefer, 1960) is consistent with the findings of certain studies noted above (R. Sears et al., 1957; M. White, 1957).

However, whether one chooses to look at specific practices or broad dimensions, the assertion that middle-class parents are more permissive than lower-class parents needs some qualification. For instance, Psathas (1957) obtained evidence that lower-class parents were more permissive with their adolescent children than were middle-class parents, who more closely supervised the activities of their adolescent sons and daughters. Kohn (1959a), who studied a large group of working- and middle-class parents of fifth grade children, found similar amounts and types of punishment in the two social classes. (He did find, however, that working-class parents punished the child on the basis of the consequences of the child's disobedience, whereas middle-class parents punished on the basis of their perceptions of the child's intent.) It thus appears that even on broad dimensions of child rearing, findings about social class and child rearing are far from consistent. Indeed, the very meaningfulness of such broad dimensions as "permissiveness" has been questioned by Kohn (1959a), and the conceptual difficulties which inhere in abstracting such broad dimensions from
particular child-rearing practices have been cogently discussed by Littman et al. (1957).

Inconsistencies among studies have sometimes been attributed to the general inadequacy of the survey technique upon which they have depended. The parent interview has very uncertain validity as an indicator of actual child-rearing practices. Although there is evidence that the interview technique may sometimes provide accurate information concerning child-rearing practices (e.g., Klatskin, 1952), a growing body of evidence on the social desirability factor in subjective reports (Christie & Lindauer, 1963; Edwards, 1957; Marlowe & Crowne, 1961; Taylor, 1961) suggests that some of the supposed class differences in child rearing, as well as some of the inconsistencies across studies, may actually relate to variations in the parents' sensitivity to what constitutes a socially desirable statement about child rearing.

Inconsistencies have also been attributed to the fact that various studies are based on data collected at different times. Variations in findings do indeed seem likely to reflect, in part, real changes in practice occurring differently at different class levels. That the advice experts give to parents on how to raise their children has changed over the years has been documented by Stendler (1950) and Wolfenstein (1953). Bronfenbrenner (1958) reanalyzed some of the studies of social class and child-rearing practices we have described, and demonstrated, particularly for the middle class, a high degree of correspondence between child-rearing practices reported and expert advice prevailing at the time. Thus, Bronfenbrenner managed to reduce the inconsistency among studies.

In view of the significance of the time variable and the possibly contaminating effect of the interview technique, a recent study by Waters
and Crandall (1964) on social class and maternal behavior is of special importance. Employing home visit data collected at the Fels Institute on Children between three and five years old, they examined the relationship between nine types of observed maternal behavior and social class membership at three periods: 1940, 1950 and 1960. No significant relationships were found between social class and nurturant maternal behavior, defined by the variables of babying and protectiveness, at any of the three times. Social class was also found to bear little relation to affectionate maternal behavior, defined by the variables of affectionateness and direction of criticism (approval); the only significant relationship found with these two variables was that in 1940 maternal approval was positively correlated with social status. Maternal coerciveness, defined by the variables of coerciveness of suggestions and severity of penalties, was found to be somewhat more associated with socioeconomic class. In the 1960 sample, both variables were found to be negatively correlated with social status, coerciveness being higher in the lower class. The maternal behavior variable most consistently related to socioeconomic class was found to be restrictiveness of regulations; at all three time periods, the lower the family status, the more a mother tended to impose restrictive regulations on her child's behavior. The variables of clarity of policy and accelerational attempt were found to be positively related to social class in 1940 but not in the two subsequent time periods. Altogether, of the 27 correlations (nine variables at three time periods), nine were significant, and in no instance did a significant result at one period reverse a significant result of another period. In comparing their results with
those of earlier investigations, Waters and Crandall noted differences in the nature of their sample, and also pointed out that their results tend to disagree with those of studies employing the interview technique but to agree with those of other studies employing direct observation.

Waters and Crandall report some consistent changes in maternal behavior. Regardless of social class, mothers became progressively less coercive between 1940 and 1960. Nurturant and affectionate behavior exhibited a curvilinear trend between 1940 and 1960; babying, protectiveness, affection and approval peaked in 1950, at the height of the "permissive era," were lower in 1940, and were lowest in 1960. Consistent with the Waters and Crandall finding of reduced coerciveness is the Klatskin et al. (1956) finding of greater permissiveness of mothers regardless of social class between approximately 1940 and 1950, though Klatskin et al. dealt with the first year of life instead of the fourth and fifth.

The discovery that there are trends in child-rearing practices that cut across social class membership does little to illuminate the central issue of class differences. To it, the principal contribution of the excellent study by Waters and Crandall is to suggest that we may have a very different understanding of class differences when we have better knowledge based on direct observation. For the present, a further point that we would emphasize along with Littman et al. (1957) is that even in those instances where a statistically significant relationship between social class and child-rearing practices has been found, the mean difference between populations has been so small, compared with the great overlap in the distributions and the large spread of each distribution, that the
discovered difference is often relatively trivial in predictive and explanatory power.

Other Interpretations of Intra-Societal Differences

In the explanation of adult behavior, elements in psychological thought so diverse as the Freudian and the Watsonian have stressed an influence of child training of a direct sort: punishment of aggression producing fear of being aggressive, indiscriminate punishment and rejection producing indiscriminate anxiety, etc. Our present knowledge of American child-rearing practices in relation to social class does not justify great confidence in considering such influences to be the major source of large and consistent variation among classes in adult behavior. Further research may possibly alter the position, but we cannot confidently predict that now. Child training may be less important in these ways than often supposed, or its most important influences in relation to social class may be of the more complicated kinds suggested by the developmental approach we will consider later.

However we define socialization, we are likely to regard it as a life-long process. An alternative to the special stress on childhood socialization is stress on this continuing nature of socialization or on its special importance at other portions of the life cycle. Such emphases are made by a number of writers who are in other respects quite different from one another. One of these is Erikson (1950); while continuing to regard the early years as especially important, he views the individual's behavior as the outcome of a series of conflicts or crises which occur throughout the life span and argues the need for equally
explicit attention to all periods. Social learning theorists (cf. Bandura & Walters, 1959) have emphasized the importance of "models" whose behavior is imitated. This approach suggests that in adulthood the behavior of models in the individual's present environment will be of prime importance. Instrumental learning theorists (cf. Bijou & Baer, 1961) have emphasized reinforcement contingencies as the ultimate determinant of the individual's social behavior. Within this framework, paramount importance would be given to the individual's relatively recent history of rewards and punishments accompanying the particular social behavior of interest. Finally, more sociological thinkers (cf. Brim & Wheeler, 1966), calling attention to the fact that socialization is a life-long process, have emphasized the continuing importance of it through adulthood; the individual never ceases to adopt new social roles, and most of the pertinent socialization occurs around the time of adoption rather than decades in advance.

Views which stress socialization in adulthood for the roles then assumed may, indeed, not be phrased in a psychogenic manner at all, but rather in a completely sociogenic manner. As Allport (1950, 1966) has put it, the approach tends to be one in which an individual's personality becomes an appendage to demography, with behavior being determined not so much by the integrated structure within the skin as by the person's assigned roles as a member of a group. It is not surprising that sociologists and anthropologists have a preference for explanations in terms of social forces external to the organism, whereas psychologically-oriented personality theorists have a preference for explanations in terms of internal
psychodynamics. The social class variable, by its very nature, is more conducive to the sociogenic than to the psychogenic approach. Such indices of class membership as amount of education, occupation and type of dwelling are not psychological in nature. Their direct reference is to the individual's social status in a broad sense, not to his psychological characteristics. It is for this very reason that a social class typology lends itself far better to a sociological than to a psychological analysis.

However, just as a psychological analysis of some variation in behavior is often unpalatable to a physiologist, so is a sociological analysis often unpalatable to a psychologist. Each discipline tends to prefer its own level of conceptual analysis, and there may be no differences among them in inherent validity.

When a psychologist is confronted with the evidence that a sociological variable, e.g., social class or particular dwelling zone within a city, is related to a psychological variable, e.g., particular forms of mental aberrations or disturbed behavior, he does not feel that he has "explained" the relationship until he reduces the sociological variable by conceptualizing it as a set of psychological events that could cause the behavior being explained. At a psychological level of analysis, social class membership or residence within a particular zone of a city cannot be viewed as the cause of a higher prevalence of a particular form of disturbed behavior. Instead, some social psychological concomitants of these sociological variables, such as particular forms of family interactions (cf. Myers & Roberts, 1959) or the individual's personal isolation (cf. Rose, 1955), are advanced as the psychological mechanisms that are actually mediating the relationship between social status variables and resultant psychological events.
An implication is that to the psychologist discovery of a relationship between social class membership and some particular behavior is in itself empty or meaningless, and he feels a real need to reduce social class to some psychologically more meaningful set of events. The discovered relationship between social class and behavior is likely to be neutral with respect to directing the psychologist to particular social psychological processes mediating the relationship. The possibilities clearly are myriad, and it would appear that the one that has captured the most interest is the hypothesis that class differences in adult behavior are mediated by class differences in child-rearing practices. But the reason for this seems to lie more in the history of psychology than in relationships established empirically.

Relationships established on the social level leave open a broad spectrum of possible interpretations ranging from the social-ecological on the one hand to the genetic on the other. The former extreme illustrates the tendency to seek psychological mediators for relationships first observed at a social level. Aberle (1961), Harry, Child and Bacon (1959) and D. Miller and Swanson (1960) have all presented social-ecological accounts of class differences and have suggested psychological interpretations, though the empirical context has been largely, except for Miller and Swanson, inter-societal variation rather than intra-societal. All these investigators are concerned with an economic influence on socialization and personality. Like Whiting they seek to escape the culture-socialization circularity by viewing the maintenance system as the prime mover, and in what might be called an implicit Marxist approach, they especially stress the economy. A society requires individuals capable of performing the necessary economic functions and will tend
to select socialization practices which will favor values and behavior contributing to that capability. Child rearing need not be viewed as the main cause of adult behavior. It may be viewed as simply one device which helps guarantee that individuals will have characteristics appropriate for the niche they will fill in the economy.

This point of view is seen most clearly in the work of Miller and Swanson (1953, 1960), whose concept of the integration setting represents a particularly interesting effort to reduce the class concept to a psychologically more meaningful level. To Miller and Swanson, the American economic system has changed so that members of a single class may differ widely in the pressures their economic function exerts toward personality type. Whether a family is engaged in entrepreneurial or bureaucratic activities, as we have indicated earlier, is the difference these authors view as determining the socialization practices engaged in by the family. We thus see here an effort to mediate class differences in behavior by calling into play the economically-oriented concept of integration settings and by viewing socialization as directed towards producing individuals who have social psychological characteristics in keeping with their particular integration settings.

At the opposite end of some ecological-individualistic continuum of interpretations of social class variation in human behavior is the genetic point of view. In its immature stage, psychology tended to seek single causes of behavior. A genetic influence was then easy to dismiss because no one need go beyond his own daily experience to establish beyond question that behavioral differences are not solely of genetic origin. Continuing
neglect, when psychology is more mature, probably has other origins as well. With respect to possible genetic influences on social class differences, the egalitarian tradition of the United States has doubtless contributed to the absence of research and to the near-absence even of the discussion that might lead up to it.

Gottesman (1965) has recently published a valuable paper which helps fill this gap. He points out that social class differences are differences between populations rather than individuals and that whenever there is a sizable degree of reproductive isolation between populations, the relative frequencies with which the different forms of genes occur in their gene pools will differ. Basing his views on the clear fact of assortative mating within social classes and the evidence of definite genetic influence on some aspects of personality (See Vandenberg, 1965), Gottesman argues that some social class differences in behavior may rest partially on a genetic basis rather than on the wholly environmental basis often supposed. His view has probably been the one generally held among psychologists so far as intelligence is concerned, but he argues that it may properly apply to many other variables as well. Although the hypothesis is speculative, as Gottesman points out, it may well merit more attention than it has received to date.

that behavioral differences between the lower and middle classes are due to the differing developmental characteristics of individuals within the two classes. The argument here is that the developmental progression of individuals in the lower class is on the average slower and more limited than that of individuals in the middle class, and that differences in behavior between the classes from childhood on are due to the fact that comparisons are being made between groups of individuals who are of different average developmental levels. The developmental approach purposely has remained ambiguous in respect to the causes of differences in the rate of development and in the upper levels achieved. At the present time, these differences can be attributed to genetic factors, differences in environmental inputs, or, perhaps most reasonable, to some interaction between these two sets of factors.

In keeping with Piaget's thinking, the developmental approach to social class differences has emphasized the formal cognitive characteristics of the individual as a crucial mediating structure in the person's intercourse with his environment. If social classes differ greatly in the distribution of formal cognitive structure of developmental level of their members, we would expect to discover social class differences in behavior. Although differences in the rate of cognitive development associated with class membership are now well-documented, as noted above, their role in producing class differences in behavior has been largely ignored. Although to Piaget developmental level or stage is defined almost completely in terms of the formal cognitive processes manifested, American psychologists have tended to broaden the definition of developmental level to include a
wide array of social competence indices indicative of personal and social maturity, reflecting not only intelligence but a variety of personal styles, social values and psychological orientations that also appear capable of being ordered along a developmental continuum (cf. Phillips & Zigler, 1964; Zigler & Phillips, 1960, 1962). Within the developmental framework, it is not an individual's prestige, the general culture of the class sharing it, nor the various roles he occupies that are emphasized as direct determinants of behavior, but rather his internal psychological structure. The extremest version of this would stress, instead of the extremest sociogenic view of the individual's cognitive structure as entirely a product of class membership, a notion that the cognitive structure a person has attained is the sole determinant of his future class membership—is the sole determinant, that is, of what culture he will be comfortable with or will join in creating. The truth obviously lies somewhere between these two theoretical extremes, and presumably neither extreme has any adherents.

In the less extreme and more tenable form in which it is actually encountered, the developmental approach seems to be a legitimate attempt to understand some of the effects of the sociological variable of social class membership in terms of the psychological variable of personal developmental level. On an empirical level, it should be noted that each concept, i.e., social class and developmental level, can be separately and reliably defined. In instances where social class largely determines developmental level or vice versa, measures of the two would be highly correlated. The two would, no doubt, always retain sufficient independence to permit determining how much of the variance in any other variable can be attributed to one and
how much to the other. We know that relationships of a certain magnitude have been found between social class and particular behavioral variables. If the magnitude of these relationships is enhanced by substituting developmental level for social class, then the developmental interpretation of social class differences in behavior takes on some added credence. If the magnitude of the relationships is reduced, then the developmental argument is weakened. In tests of this sort, a uniform outcome is not to be expected for all variables. If such a program were carried out, we would probably discover that developmental level mediated some relationships between class and behavior but did not mediate others. The explanation for relationships not mediated by developmental level would then become the domain of a variety of other theoretical approaches alluded to above.

At a theoretical level the developmental approach has the advantage of allowing the utilization of a somewhat untidy but nevertheless broad body of research on developmental processes. This body of work places a number of restraints on developmentalists' efforts to explain social class differences and, of more importance, dictates the particular relationships that should be found between social class and certain behavior. Thus, the developmental approach is receptive to certain relationships but not to others. If, for example, members of the lower class are on the average characterized by a lower developmental level than members of the middle class, then the two classes should be distinguished on a variety of specific variables associated with developmental level. Several of the class differences in behavior noted earlier conform to this expectation. For instance, the greater
guilt, self-derogation and introprojectiveness up to and including suicide (A. Henry & Short, 1954; D. Miller & Swanson, 1960; Zigler & Phillips, 1960) found in individuals of the middle as compared to the lower class are predictable from developmental theorizing. As Phillips and Rabinovitch (1958) have pointed out, such "turning against the self" implies an introjection of social standards which is more characteristic of higher than of lower levels of development. Evidence that an increasing capacity for guilt accompanies increasing cognitive growth and development has been presented recently by Katz and Zigler (1967).

A particularly striking instance in which a social class-behavior relationship is consistent with developmental thought is Kohn's finding (1959a, 1959b) that working-class parents tend to respond to their children's transgressions in terms of the immediate consequences of the child's actions, whereas middle-class parents tend to respond in terms of the child's intent in acting as he does. As Kohn points out, this distinction is quite in keeping with the developmental distinction made in Piaget's (1962) discussion of moral realism.

Also consistent with the developmental interpretation of social class differences in behavior are the general findings that lower-class persons are somewhat more ready to resort to physical punishment, are more physicalistic in their choice of occupations, and engage in more acting-out up to and including homicide, whereas middle-class persons tend to be more obsessive and ideational (A. Henry & Short, 1954; D. Miller & Swanson, 1960; Phillips & Zigler, 1964; Zigler & Phillips, 1960). This contrast in life style corresponds closely to an important dimension in development, namely the
action-thought dimension. Developmental theorists of both psychoanalytic (A. Freud, 1952; Hartmann, 1952; Kris, 1950; Rapaport, 1951) and non-psychoanalytic persuasion (Lewin, 1936; Piaget, 1951; Werner, 1948) have suggested that primitive, developmentally early behavior is marked by immediate, direct and unmodulated response to external stimuli and internal need. In contrast, higher levels of maturation are characterized by the appearance of indirect, ideational, conceptual and symbolic or verbal response. The developmental action-thought dimension offers a clear alternative to the sociogenic interpretation which would view the greater acting-out of lower-class individuals as a direct product of their conformity to lower-class culture. According to developmental interpretation, both the individual's acting-out and the lower-class culture which encourages it would be viewed as reflecting the developmental characteristics of class members.

Similar disagreement between the external-sociogenic emphasis and the internal-developmental emphasis arisen in considering class differences in the incentive value of being correct—a motivational characteristic especially significant in the socialization process. Considerable evidence has now been presented either indicating or suggesting that middle-class children are more motivated to be correct for the sheer sake of correctness than are lower-class children (Cameron & Storm, 1965; A. Davis, 1944; Douvan, 1956; Ericson, 1947; Terrell, Durkin & Wiesley, 1959; Zigler & deLabry, 1962; Zigler & Kanzer, 1962). Zigler and Kanzer, for instance, studying seven-year-old children, found that the verbal reinforcers most effective with the lower class were those indicating personal praise ("good" and "fine"),
while the verbal reinforcers most effective with the middle class were those indicating their behavior was correct ("right" and "correct"). Two quite different interpretations can be applied to this finding. A somewhat sociogenic interpretation would be that "being right" is a value that is held in higher regard in the middle than the lower socioeconomic class, and therefore for the middle-class seven-year-olds, as compared to the lower-class seven-year-olds, "being right" has been more frequently associated with secondary and primary reinforcers.

An alternative explanation would employ the concept of a developmentally changing hierarchy of reinforcers. As has been suggested by Beller (1955), Gewirtz (1954) and Heathers (1955), the effectiveness of attention and praise as reinforcers diminishes with maturity, while the reinforcement inherent in the information that one is correct progressively increases in effectiveness. This shift is away from reinforcement by others and toward reinforcement by self and appears to be central to the child's progress from dependence to independence.

Though the child's social experience obviously remains relevant, this explanation does not attribute special importance to the type of reward customary in the child's environment; it stresses instead the child's cognitive ability—specifically, his ability to comprehend a verbal stimulus as a cue for self-reinforcement and to be able to administer this type of reinforcement. This ability requires that the child differentiate himself from others and comprehend that his success is a direct outgrowth of his own efforts; it also involves the maturity required by the rather complicated process of taking the self as an object that can either be rewarded (and hence feel proud) or punished (and hence feel ashamed or guilty),
Such a process is a far cry from that earlier period in life when the efficacy of a social reinforcer is probably dependent upon its close relationship to primary reinforcers, and a wide array of social stimuli influences behavior in a relatively undifferentiated hedonistic way involving little or no central mediation. At an earlier age the child might respond to the spoken word "good" as a reinforcer in some such direct way without the involvement of complex processes which might later make "good" and a variety of other words and gestures equivalent because of their common implications.

At this later age reinforcers which consist of praise (words such as "good" and "fine") would be conceptualized, in a developmental view, as conveying information to the child on how the speaker feels toward the responses the child has made. When the child is able to feel that powerful adults are pleased with him, he may anticipate further reward from them. At a later developmental level, however, the child becomes more liberated from concern with the feelings of social agents, and the task of obtaining primary reinforcers from them normally becomes less urgent. He becomes a more autonomous agent primarily interested in obtaining mastery over his world. The motive of effectiveness becomes central, and he becomes interested in the quality of his own performance. Here his concern is not limited to how social agents feel about him but is extended to how he feels about himself. How he feels about himself, moreover, is determined by the success he encounters in dealing with the continuous problems presented by the environment. What he is now interested in is whether he is doing things correctly, whether he is right. Thus, social agents
and the social reinforcers they dispense take on new meaning. At this stage the social reinforcer signifying successful coping by the child is the one he values most; the feelings of the social agent, though related, recede in importance.

When this reasoning is applied to the finding that seven-year-old middle-class children are more motivated to receive reinforcers indicating correctness than are seven-year-old lower-class children, it suggests that the latter children are developmentally lower than the former in not having made a transition in which reinforcers signifying correctness replace reinforcers signifying praise in the reinforcer hierarchy.

Related to this argument is the work of several investigators (A. Davis, 1941, 1943; Terrell et al., 1959; Zigler & deLabry, 1962) indicating that lower-class children are less influenced than middle-class children by abstract, symbolic rewards. This would obviously be expected if the lower-class child were indeed developmentally lower than the middle-class child of the same chronological age. Some recent studies (McGrade, 1966; Rosenhan & Greenwald, 1965) have failed to support the reinforcer-hierarchy interpretation of social class differences in preferences for particular classes of verbal reinforcers. Yet so many findings are consistent with this interpretation and with the more general developmental approach of which it is a part, that further investigation of their implications and validity is clearly called for.

None of the positions that we have examined—the specific child-training practices, the social-ecological-economic, the genetic, the developmental—appears capable of single-handedly explaining all of the behavioral correlates of social class membership. The positions probably
differ in the contribution each can make in isolation, and this depends on the general state of knowledge at the time. We think, for instance, that isolated emphasis on child-training practices out of context is probably of limited value, and that the lesson it can teach is, if anything, too well learned today. We think, too, that the developmental approach offers today some rather novel understanding even when considered in isolation. But we may be confident that with real interlocking of the various explanations a still better understanding will be attained.
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