US higher education offers a diversity of programs, electives and courses but requires student conformity to prescribed values which relate only to societal structures within the academic community. Institutions of higher education emphasize achievement-oriented social styles evolving from an accepted philosophy that stresses energy, compromise and pluralism as means to such goals as power, fame and wealth. The success of a student is based not only upon his academic achievement but also his adherence to these institutional social values. Today's society is challenging higher education to train experts in technological and electronic fields while youths seek new relationships between administration, faculty, education, society, and themselves. Current pressures are exposing the limitations of education's social function at a time when colleges and universities are experiencing some internal uncertainty. These combined forces might effect several changes on the campus, including (1) changes in organization and administration of colleges and universities, especially greater involvement of students in institutional governance and academic policy formulation, (2) interdisciplinary studies combined with field work, linking fields to each other and bringing the campus to the community, and (3) changes in student-faculty relationships, where students assume more responsibility for their education and are given opportunities to develop both intellectually and emotionally.
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EDUCATION AS INTERVENTION

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The concept of education as intervention—the intervention of society and its values by its educational institution in the life of a child—is usually considered relevant to elementary school training. Talcott Parsons has pointed out that it is in the classroom that children learn to internalize and implement the broad values of society, such as achievement and equality. The lower school is acknowledged as an active agent of socialization. However, the concept of education as intervention is seldom taken to be a philosophy appropriate for higher education. It counters the prevailing viewpoint that colleges and universities should be impartial settings for contending ideas without being, as institutions, contenders for any of them.

But this is the day when that which has been hidden shall be revealed and so, among many revelations, it is becoming manifest that the concept of education as intervention is operable in colleges and universities. Institutions of higher learning have had assumptions, values, and goals which, taken together, provided a standard by which youth were judged and to which they were expected to adhere. Indeed, it may be that education as intervention is too mild a phrase for what has actually occurred. Yeats depicts in one of his poems the intrusion of Zeus in the form of a swan on Leda, wife of Tyndareus, the king of Lacedaemon:

A sudden blow: the great wings beating still
Above the staggering girl, her thighs caressed
By the dark webs, her nape caught in his bill,
He holds her helpless breast upon his breast.

How can those terrified vague fingers push
The feathered glory from her loosening thighs?
And how can body, laid in that white rush,
But feel the strange heart beating where it lies?

A shudder in the loins engenders there
The broken wall, the burning roof and tower
And Agamemnon dead.

Being so caught up,
So mastered by the brute blood of the sire,
Did she put on his knowledge with his power
Before the indifferent beak could let her drop?

Yeat's question is our question: Before the institution of higher education lets go of its hold on the youth, what is the "knowledge" they put on along with its power for having been impregnated by this agent of socialization? Or, more directly, what are the values transmitted to youth by the intervention of colleges and universities?

The Bases for Distinctiveness

There is, first, the emphasis on cognitive rationality. The superiority of the communication of knowledge by rational processes has long been assumed by academics. Disciplined thinking was preferred to spirit and emotion. "Eschew enthusiasm," said the intellectuals enthusiastically. Approaching the emotions by the mind was definitely favored over coming to the mind by the emotions.

Colleges and universities have, to be sure, made a place for artists, musicians, and poets, but the ones most successful were essentially rationalists, especially those of the Robert Frost, common sense variety. Frost was the intellectual's anti-intellectual. No matter how crotchety
he became overinstitutionalized learning, he could always be expected to balance emotion with something like this:

We disparage reason
But all the time it's what we're most concerned with.
There's will as motor and there's will as brakes.
Reason is, I suppose, the steering gear.
The will as brakes can't stop the will as motor for very long. We're plainly made to go.
We're going anyway and may as well
Have some say as to where we're headed for;
Just as we will be talking anyway
And may as well throw in a little sense.

(A Masque of Reason)

Frost was what Yeats might call "a comfortable kind of old scarecrow."

He looked fierce at times but he shared the academic's commitment to order and rationality. He accepted the intellectual's goals: scholarly objectivity without running off into dogmatic absolutism, intellectual relativism without yielding to individual subjectivism.

A second emphasis of academe that shows that it is impossible to regard the institution as free of value judgments has been its class and caste orientation. Discrimination is still rampant in colleges and universities. Not only racial discrimination, though there is that. How startling in its candor, and how disagreeable to the national educational establishment, was that statement by administrators at Northwestern University confessing that Northwestern has "had in common with the white community in America, in greater or lesser degree, the racist attitudes that have prevailed historically in this society and which continue to constitute the most important social problem of our time."

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2 As reported in the San Francisco Sunday Examiner and Chronicle, May 5, 1968, p. 5.
Here was an acknowledgment that one of the more prestigious universities of the nation had not been unbiased on one of the central social issues of the time. The biases of academe illustrate how the institutions of higher learning, like elementary schools, offer education that constitutes intervention in the lives of youth.

In that institution which emphasizes more than any other in society the need for human judgments based on impartial objectivity, faculty often judge students on the basis of their deference to authority, their courtesy, cleanliness, and wittiness. The student who is irreverent, brash, impatient and marked by individualistic, variant attitudes and actions jeopardizes himself no matter how good his ideas. Research shows that teachers favor students with values similar to their own. Where diversity is praised, those who are likeminded prevail. At the institution in which critical thinking supposedly receives highest priority, people succeed as much by personality and social compatibility as by theoretical conceptualizations. What Edgar Friedenberg said about youth in elementary and secondary schools is equally true for college-age youth, that is, that their success in school will depend on their desire to succeed in society just as their success in society will depend on how well they do in school.

One consequence of the typical intellectual's emphasis on a certain social style is that it separates him from the disadvantaged people he is committed by his liberal social philosophy to help. The situation is caricatured by the university president who wanted militant blacks to begin negotiations in his office with sherry and cigars. The language, tactics and objectives of the revolutionary offend the aristocratic ethos
of most faculty and administrators. This is why the typical academic is, like Thomas Jefferson, "a democrat at a distance." He cannot stand to be around intellectual and social clods. But the day has come when the clods are resisting the plow. As the black militants put it, "the house niggers are being replaced by the field niggers." If the occupants of the House of Intellect are now going to open their doors to, say, a 4 percent ghetto enrollment, they had better realize that their staid old club will never be the same again. There are consequences in such decisions for the character of the institution.

Another undergirding assumption of higher education is what radical students call the philosophy of "corporate liberalism." It has been a cornerstone of our achievement-oriented society, a philosophy emphasizing power, fame, and wealth as desirable human ends, with energy, compromise, and pluralism as appropriate means to such ends. Institutions of higher education have given essentially uncritical acceptance to these values, values emanating not from the so-called Protestant ethic, but from an American orthodoxy—a national orthodoxy to which secularists, Christians, and Jews have contributed. One consequence has been, as critics from Veblen to Hutchins to Gardner have pointed out, that norms of quantification have been used to measure the success of students who were confined within an essentially bureaucratic structure.  

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3 Thorstein Veblen, The Higher Learning in America, 1918 (reissued), "Men dilate on the high necessity of a business like organization and control of the university, its equipment, personnel and routine. What it has in mind in this insistence on an efficient system is that these corporations of learning shall set their affairs in order after the pattern of a well-conducted business concern. In this view the university is conceived as a business house dealing in merchantable knowledge, placed under the governing hand of a captain of erudition, whose office is to turn the means in hand to account in the largest feasible output."
and sanctions, the departmental organization of learning, professional specializations, and the distribution of power within the institution have followed an industrial model and the values of the power elite. 4

The way institutions affected individuals in the past was emphasized in the writings of John Dewey, yet, he did not sense the extent to which his own were influenced by the vigorous and expanding industrial democracy of his day. Ideas in Dewey's book, Democracy and Education, were based on social emphases of the times - pragmatism and progressivism. But the way the rules of the game were structured to favor the power elite and the assertive individual were not emphasized. We can see now that magnanimity is easy for the affluent, that pluralism is fine for those strong enough to define and control the options. But what have we, in turn, failed to see?

The diversity of American education, is, I suppose, its chief claim to fame. How then dare one liken the relationship of student and school to the rape of Leda by Zeus? Especially in higher education, with its diversity of programs and sponsorship, its elective system and countless course options? At the University of California, 10,000 courses are available for 96,000 students. And in that same state, in addition to nine campuses of the University, there are 16 state colleges and 85 junior colleges. Can there be any question about freedom or choice and program diversity? Yes, because what we have offered is diversity in form, structure, or organization, not diversity in values. Education is intervention because the values emphasized in this amazing range of

4Another and opposing perspective is found in Talcott Parson's preliminary report of his research project entitled, "The Academic Profession." Parsons finds the associational model, rather than the bureaucratic one, most applicable to higher education.
institutions are strikingly similar. They are, for the most part, the values of corporate liberalism, middle-class morality, aristocratic social manners, and cognitive rationality, plus others. And one is not free to follow alternative priorities without disastrous results.

During 1967 and 1968 in a Center research project called the Institutional Character study, we sought to determine how administrators, faculty, and entering students at 11 colleges and universities defined institutional character, or, in other words, what they thought to be their institution's integrative values. We hypothesized that institutional distinctiveness would be associated with one or more of three foci of concern--the philosophy of education that gave the institution its ideological stance, the conventional criteria of excellence by which individuals and programs are measured, or, at a time of radical social change, by innovation and experimentation.

Now, with data in and analyzed, we have concluded that the overwhelming majority of persons in all three of those interest groups define and measure institutional character in terms of what we came to call the Standard - in terms of criteria that were never meant to become other than means to ends but have become ends in themselves. They define the distinctiveness of their college or university by conventional criteria of excellence--SAT scores, the progress of students through the departmental structure, and their transfer into the best graduate or professional programs; faculty are measured by guild standing--degrees, publications, professional mobility, and matters of this sort; administrators are likely to measure success according to their ability to implement the achievement of the aforementioned emphases. There is, in
essence, a national standard that has emerged out of the departmental structure of the institution of higher learning that now acts as the norm to which both individuals and institutions are beholden, a standard by which institutional character is determined and judged.

The current complaint, then, that there is no basis for community in the modern college or university is so much specious nonsense. We hear that there are no shared values that provide the basis for community. And remember, such talk has not become prominent just since Columbia, or even Berkeley. The death of community theory was the basis for much of Clark Kerr’s thesis about the multiversity—a thesis widely hailed in 1963. But our contention is that it is mistaken to say that there have been no shared values. There have been fundamental values, core emphases, preconceptions, or basic commitments that have made possible the program diversity that has enamored us while encouraging a value conformity that is now our chief threat.

To say that the institution of higher education has tacit assumptions that provide the basis for both standards and community is not to speak approvingly of those values, nor, indeed, is it meant to suggest that what has been is likely to remain. On the contrary, it is precisely because the basis for community has now shown itself to be too limited and limiting that it is under justifiable attack. And, in my opinion, the attack will succeed in effecting substantive change.

The Likelihood of Change

It is a commonplace that changes in education come at a rate far slower than changes elsewhere in society. Innovations in medical science, for example, proceed from research to development to general dissemination.
in three to five years while innovations in education take 30 to 50 years. But such talk does not take into account one crucial variable. In the past, changes in education have come slowly because educators have been living under what may be called the assurance of adequacy, under the confidence that what they were doing and, albeit to a lesser degree, the way they were doing it, was trustworthy - at least, adequate to the need. They have been living under the arrogance of adequacy.

Now, however, their confidence is badly shaken, though not yet shattered. The greatest weakness in the new book by Jencks and Riesman, *The Academic Revolution*, is the attitude of inevitability that permeates the authors' thesis that professionalism in higher education has triumphed and its citadel is the graduate school. These able writers not only describe this situation but seem to accept it as a condition from which there is no appeal. They suffer from the social scientist's malady, the disposition to think of the future as current conditions and present trends extended forward. They need the correctives of the historian and the poet--the former to enrich the sociologist's short-term comparative analyses with deep historical probes, especially those across cultural epochs, and the latter to remind them of the impact of prophets and seers whose visions transcend the present and may transfigure reality. Jencks and Riesman, however, while they assume the survival of the system, do represent a growing body of educators who know that now, as never before, the basic values of that system are under attack and can no longer be assumed as good. The academic revolution of the last 50 years may have become a counter-revolutionary movement.
With complacency swept away by Berkeley and Columbia--numerous observers have noted that administrators today can talk of nothing but "the student problem"--and with confidence in established ways of doing thing shaken by a variety of developments, there is emerging an opportunity for innovation that has no parallel in the past, if innovation is defined as new means to established ends, rather than experimentation, defined as new means to new or open ends. In innovation, so defined, the basic values of the system are assumed to be sound, while in experimentation, so defined, those values are deemed inadequate and subject to change. While most educators are not ready to experiment, most are ready to admit that students under the present system have too often been passive rather than active learners, that subject matter in the curriculum has usually been inert, not vital, static not active, at best formal, at worst irrelevant. They also recognize now that higher education has been professionally functional but socially dysfunctional. Its technocratic orientation has belied its claims to value diversity, while the emphasis on quantitative criteria--with pressures for grades, credits, awards--has had negative qualitative consequences. Gone, therefore, is the old arrogance of adequacy. Education is finally joining modern physics in seeing a world where things do not happen precisely according to law, or which is compact, governed by strict causality, and tightly organized. The old deterministic world of education seems ready to give over to one of contingency, organic incompleteness and probability.

While institutional anxiety stemming from a recognition of failures are internal prods to changes in higher education, there are also external developments that affect prospects for changes on campus. Most
alterations in education, viewed historically, have been initiated outside the institution and have literally forced their way into the structure. Today, this same thing is beginning to happen, although now external pressures for change are assisted by internal uncertainty.

What are those pressures from the outside that are promoting change? There is, for one thing, the technological-electronic transformation of society. It will affect education. Colleges and universities more and more will train the experts required or risk having the corporations move into education and the information transferral business and take over the training of the personnel they want. IBM and General Electric are already showing the way. Because universities do not want to lose their virtual monopoly in training the experts of society, they may be expected to change to satisfy this demand. It will be a change in degree, but changes in degree have a way of becoming changes in kind—as the Marxists have always insisted.

Another external influence, however, presses for change in an opposite direction. I refer to the new youth movement. The radicals and revolutionaries of this force in contemporary life are indebted to the university. Governor Reagan pointed out that the Telegraph Avenue troubles in Berkeley were caused by activists, many of whom had come out of the university and were still clinging to the edges of that institution, a contention that greatly troubled Cal officials who were trying to disassociate the troublemakers from the university. Yet, the Governor was expressing a more classical understanding of the nature of the university than that held by the administrators. They were trying to wish the university out of the action, to morally emasculate it, while the
Governor was, perhaps unwittingly, pointing out that the university is a center of criticism and ferment and a radical community.

The youth movement is, then, an external force for change. But what the youth do in the city affect students on campus. And the educational enterprise as established is finally dependent on the goodwill of youth. Power is in the eyes of the beholder, that is an insight emphasized by students radicals. They see that the institution of learning, by its very nature as a humanistically oriented entity, has no authenticity apart from the students' acceptance of it. If students refuse to agree to the tutelary relationship which has been the backbone of faculty-student contacts, the American university as traditionally conceived fails. And it is not only the learning process that requires student goodwill. Another fact of life is that 90 percent of the educational institutions of this country are not financially strong enough to scorn student opinion—their financial survival depends on student support. They don't have the inexhaustible supply of applicants for admission presumed by the cry, "be done with the dissidents and make room for those who really want to go to college." Most colleges, as a matter of fiscal necessity, have to be reconciled to their student clientele even more than to their general constituency.

The new youth movement is a force for change for yet another reason: This society worships youth. There are countless illustrations to show that what the elders denounce in the young today they seek to emulate tomorrow. Let there be no doubt about it, the youth have power. They have the strength of numbers, they have financial leverage, they have social appeal. Parents, politicians, professors, all want to succeed.
with youth, finally, because the young are the embodiment of our culture's success or failure.

If our thesis is correct that colleges and universities have had, despite their surface blandness and lame liberalism, concealed but definite normative values that are now being exposed and challenged from inside and outside the institution with an intensity sufficient to effect change, then what changes may we expect to see? Here are three:

**Institutional Governance**

There will be change in institutional governance, especially in the direction of greater involvement for students in the formulation of institutional policies. As a result of the turbulence on campuses in the last few years, all sorts of adjustments, accommodations, and innovations in governance are emerging. The general pattern is to add student representatives to administrative committees but to keep them off academic policy bodies. In the non-academic areas, particularly those having to do with the personal and social life of students, the move is toward giving students complete control or at least majority representation on appropriate committees, with the chief administrator holding veto power.

Clearly the sticking point, the point beyond which students are not welcome, is academic policy formulation. There, faculty say, "professional judgments for the professionals." But the faculty position is romantic regression because it assumes, first, general agreement among professionals about a body of knowledge that taken together can be called liberal education. There is no such agreement. Graduation requirements at most institutions are a set of compromises and trade-offs that have
little intrinsic logic and are usually the result of various extrinsic pressures. Second, the "professional judgments for the professionals" argument assumes agreement as to who constitute the professionals qualified to make curriculum decisions. Again, there is no agreement. This is why the modern university is a cluster of disciplinary enclaves, departments, and schools, with each professor free through a process of exhaustion to develop his own form of academic privatism and with accommodations worked out at the point where programs clash.

Another assumption of that agreement to keep students from participating in making academic policy decisions is that students are transitory vis-à-vis the institution and without contributory competency. As a matter of fact, students bear the name of the institution from which they graduate in a way most faculty never will and, additionally, faculty mobility being what it is today, students may well be around the place longer and feel more loyalty to it, especially toward the institution's integrative value system, than do faculty with tight disciplinary loyalties but loose institutional loyalties. And as for having an expertise, if the college is a center of learning, as we say, then what is heard in the classroom is as important as what is said, and no one is a better authority on that than students. Likewise, at a time when the shift is away from thinking mainly about the institution's impact on students and toward thinking more about the impact of the students on institutions, it is obvious that the students themselves must be drawn into such deliberations.

What is called for, it seems to me, is radical innovation in governance which challenges the institution's members to examine their shared
assumptions, values, and goals, that is, to decide jointly the basis for their school's standards and community, and then to establish community governance—with administrators, faculty, students, and representatives from the public or constituency, all participating in the formulation of policy. The essence of today's model of leadership for industry is collaboration, not competition, with the governance structure decentralized, horizontal, adaptable. Status is not assigned to positions so much as it is associated with specific accomplishments. Higher education will, I think, be forced to break with its outdated, hierarchical, aristocratic administrative structure and consider new flexible models. Change in governance is coming.

The greatest fear among academics with regard to student participation in governance is that students will not understand the essential nature of the institution of higher education and, given their eagerness for reform, may "throw the baby out with the bath water." To this concern, two things should be said: It is likely that, given the chance, students will want to ask a legitimate prior question—"Is the baby alive?" There is need for a critical examination of both the forms and practices of the institution—particularly as they affect personalities. What has survival value? But even greater is the need to examine goals and purposes. We have had them all right, but they have been largely unexamined. Some of them, like the concept of in loco parentis, are probably dead; others, like in status pupillari, probably need revision or clarification, while still others, the quest for veritas, are very much alive. But the point is that we are in the soup together—students, faculty, and administrators—and no one group can claim to be the key ingredient.
The other thing to be said, is response to the concern about protecting the nature of the institution, is that a college of consequence is one where the character of the place is evident but the atmosphere is sufficiently open to encourage students and faculty who know where the school stands to either identify with that position or battle to change it. They should be free to promote change to the point where the essential character of the institution is threatened. It is the responsibility of the community of faculty, students, administrators to decide when that point has been reached and whether it shall be passed. If the community decides that the time has come for the institution to fly under a new banner, then, they accept changes. If they conclude that the old ways are the best ways, then advocates of revolutionary change must be restrained or removed.

The mood of concerned students these days is radical, I believe, but not revolutionary. Thus, if students are participants in governance, we can predict that the values of the institution may be sharpened or redirected but they will not be tossed aside. The revolutionaries, those who would overthrow the system en toto, are at most 2 percent to 3 percent of the youth, campus and off campus elements combined. The marks of the revolutionary are, first, that he is committed to ideology to the point of forfeiting job and social station. He will suffer for the cause and he is willing for others to suffer too. The true revolutionary will oppose reforms within the established system because such make it harder for issues to be drawn. He knows that people get hurt in revolutions and that considerable injustice attends revolutionary change.
The great majority of the left radicals and student reformers are not of this character. They are not ideological to the point of sacrificing job and social position. They want, in fact, the realization of existing goals and offer to embody established values—as distinct from the distortions and compromises they see all around them.

It is instructive that the emphases of the student advocates of educational reform are very traditional ones, having to do with teaching, making education personal, cross-disciplinary learning, and humanizing the academic community. It is the avant garde faculty, the new darlings of the technostructure, those who are moving away from the campus and into various national affiliations, who have veered off into revisionism. Educational reform, therefore, if one cherishes the values of the liberal arts, might better be left to students than to faculty. Students are the guardians of those traditions. And, of course, precisely for these reasons students of the left radical can be co-opted by the system. That is why there is going to be all sorts of accommodations between students and the establishment in institutional governance. And the revolutionary will oppose this process of adjustment and point out that the heart of the enterprise—academic policy formulation—stands as a tree of life in the garden of eden bearing forbidden fruit. The revolutionary, in turn, will be denounced as a snake in the grass and all who follow him will be shut out. But here the parallel to the biblical myth ends, for the revolutionary will not go meekly out the gate wearing a fig leaf to cover his infamy. If Berkeley is a model, and it is, he will tear off such cover, stand naked, and be carried out kicking and screaming. And when things get rough, the conscience of campus liberals...
will be pricked, they will agitate for reform from within the gates, and additional changes in governance will be forthcoming.

One illustration of changes in the governance configurations of colleges and universities is at the University of California, Santa Cruz, where Philip Bell, provost of the fourth college to be developed there--Merrill College--has announced that students will participate fully in the formulation of policy. "The college expects to play a central role in the education of its students, but no set program will be required," Bell has stated, adding, "responsibility for judging what is of value will rest, first, with the student." However, Merrill College faculty will be members of the Santa Cruz division of the Academic Senate, University of California, and the Senate, as the place where academic curriculum decisions are made, has not seen fit to make students voting members.

Relational Learning

The second change in higher education that has been accelerated by challenges coming from within and without the institution in recent years is a move toward relational learning. Lewis Mumford is one of the philosophically inclined writers of the time who has been calling for contemporary society to be content with nothing less than a revolutionized culture. But he is talking about more than new structures of governance. He means a new vision of the whole, and a new vision of a self capable

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5Philip W. Bell, as reported in the San Francisco Sunday Examiner and Chronicle, July 28, 1963.
of understanding and cooperating with the whole. Mumford seeks "the whole man in a world culture." And so does Lancelot Law Whyte, physicist, writer, and lecturer. Whyte says, writing in the Saturday Review's "What I Have Learned" series:

Looking ahead, I think the best term for the coming period is global. This means associated with the totality of any system of entities, in contrast to separatist, which I define as concerned only with the separate parts of a system taken one by one, neglecting its global features. (Unitary man...uses global thought.) I assert that the age of separatist conceptions is over...from now on separatist principles and methods will achieve nothing that matters.

It is apparent at once that these two scholars are urging goals old and new--the concern for the whole man is as old as Hebraic and Hellenic cultures, while the concern for the world culture is new enough to seem impossible. Especially when we are confronted by resurgent nationalism and racialism in politics, plus disciplinary specialization and the fragmentation of knowledge in higher education. But, given nuclear weapons, modern communication and transportation, given the dissatisfaction on campus with the compartmentalization of learning and the fact that the greatest intellectual excitement is out on the borders of the disciplines with the new hybrids--astrophysics, mathematical economics, the sociology of education--the concept of the whole man in a world culture makes sense and the discernible effort in academe to achieve relational learning appears as a legitimate move in that direction.

In the late 19th century, under the lure of egalitarian thinking and the push of industrial democracy, the elective system swept American colleges

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and universities. By 1919, however, there came a reaction to unrestrained electivism. The reaction took one or another of several forms in general education—distribution requirements, subject-matter surveys, functional courses, prescribed curricula—and found its most persuasive expression in the Harvard Redbook—General Education in a Free Society (1945). (A member of the distinguished committee that produced that report said it was their concern "to dig a few deep wells in a few selected places.")

Now, the general education movement has fizzled out but the concern it represented, if not the way it tried to meet it, has gained a wider loyalty. That concern is, in fact, one of three heavy pressures on curriculum planners today. Interest in the indivisibility of knowledge, in the wholeness of things, or the connectedness of events and ideas, ranks equal to the pressure of professionalism, with its attendant emphasis on specialization and graduate training, and equal to that third great pressure, the elective curriculum, with its choice of subject matter and its compatibility with the spirit of individual freedom that is so evident among the young today.

What we see now are new ways of satisfying that concern for the unitary dimension of education. At the University of Sussex in England efforts have been made to organize the University by Schools of Study—the School of African and Asian Studies, the School of English and American Studies, the School of Mathematical and Physical Sciences, the School of Social Studies. Thus, some are organized by themes and others by groupings of conventional disciplines, but in every case the idea is not, on the one hand, that disciplinary specialization should be scorned,
nor, on the other, that two subjects should be studied at once, but that the disciplines should be studied in relation to each other. A school's curriculum is a complex of interrelated and linked subjects. In this way the university can claim, as the puckish Michael Beloff reported it, "all disciplines cross-fertilized and mutually fecundated."  

But relational learning means more than studying academic topics in relation. It also means doing something about relating the theoretical and the practical. Therefore, in the curricula of Old Westbury College it is proposed that provision be made for students to get off campus and into field work situations. This is seen as an answer to campus claustrophobia as well as a way to make learning relevant by testing theory against social realities. At Old Westbury, the freshman in his first semester will follow three tracks. He will be in a seminar in the humanistic tradition, he will participate in two workshops featuring social science methodology and he will have a third of his time for independent study. During the second semester, freshman year, Westbury students will go into the New York City area to one of a dozen field centers—in Harlem, the Bronx, Newark—where they will live and work and learn from local "teachers." The sophomore year is to be spent back on campus, but with the curriculum built on and informed by the practical experience. 

Antioch and Berea and a few other places introduced this type of relational learning years ago, but it will be interesting to observe, now, when the idea is to be tested in at least 50 institutions, just how

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relevant some of the typical classroom work proves to be when applied in the field for its social utility.

A third dimension to relational learning, one on which considerable innovative effort is presently being expended, has to do with efforts to relate general education and specialization in the undergraduate curriculum. Daniel Bell, in his book *The Reforming of General Education*, articulates the two emphases of current thinking: He denies the dichotomy so often alleged between these approaches to learning. General education must be embodied in and exemplified through academic disciplines, and the context of specialism must be ever extended to make the ground of knowledge explicit. The common bond of the two, Bell argues, is conceptual inquiry. He writes:

...I reject the commonly made distinction between general education as dealing with broad relationships, and specialized instruction as presenting detailed material within an organized discipline. The relevant distinction, I feel, lies in the way a subject is introduced. When a subject is presented as received doctrine or fact, it becomes an aspect of specialization and technique. When it is introduced with an awareness of its contingency and the conceptual frame that guides its organization, the student can then proceed with the necessary self-consciousness that keeps his mind open to possibility and to reorientation. All knowledge, thus, is liberal (that is, it enlarges and liberates the mind) when it is committed to continuing inquiry.8

This emphasis on teaching modes of conceptualization, on process more than substance, and especially on the centrality of method, is what is meant by conceptual inquiry. It is basic to the curriculum design for Hampshire College and has been tested with considerable success for seven years at Florida Presbyterian and for "seventy time seven" years at Swarthmore.

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Although certain of the schools attempting some sort of innovation with relational learning do so within the departmental structure while others have abolished it, the attempt in all these efforts is to show, finally, that academics speak dialects of the same language and that what they communicate has meaning in today's world.

To talk about relational learning under these terms is to talk about ways of getting a job done. The third change coming in higher education through pressures internal and external to the institution itself will affect our understanding of what that job is. Colleges and universities have emphasized rational inquiry and the acquisition of information, that is, cognitive learning. Now, however, the institution is experiencing one of those recurring shifts in educational philosophy, one which goes away from the view that the function of the university is the accumulation and dissemination of knowledge to the view that the function of the university is to encourage individual growth. The university has long advocated "the education of the whole person." Now we are going to find out what that really means. And to do so we must experience this change, the change toward affective education.

Affective Education

Defining what is meant by affective education is as difficult as defining existentialism. This is so because, like existentialism, the emphasis in the affective domain is on mood and attitude more than form and structure.

The way to start the definition is to try to separate affective education from its cognitive counterpart. This can be done by referring to
the significant effort of Benjamin Bloom and his associates to set up a taxonomy of educational objectives, a classification of educational goals. Bloom divided his taxonomy into two domains—the cognitive and the affective.

The cognitive domain begins with knowledge, defined as the recall of specifics and universals, the recall of methods and processes, or the recall of pattern, structure, or setting. The emphasis is on remembering, on bringing out of the mind knowledge stored there. This task is accomplished by intellectual abilities and skills, organized modes of operation, generalized techniques for dealing with materials and problems. Related steps up the cognitive ladder are comprehension, application (the use of abstractions in particular and concrete situations), analysis, synthesis, and, finally, evaluation.

The affective domain in Bloom's taxonomy, as set off from the cognitive, puts the emphasis on other abilities and attributes of the learner. The first level is "receiving" or "attending," that is, sensitizing the learner to the existence of "soft" phenomena and stimuli. Thus the effective domain is based on awareness, awareness served by the emotional, intuitive, noncognitive side of life. Beyond attending to subjective phenomena, the affective domain emphasizes the responding capability of man—his willingness, curiosity, and satisfaction in response.

Finally, as with the cognitive, in the affective domain there is attention to valuing, that is, the assigning of worth to a thing, phenomenon or behavior. And it is here that we may leave Bloom and his taxonomy and turn to certain conditions in higher education that have prompted the
valuing approach of affective education. There have been certain problems created by the traditional emphasis on cognitive rationality to which the noncognitive is a reaction.

There has been the tendency, in the name of order and discrete research, to tighten the range of inquiry and subjects under study to those manageable but lifeless topics which fill professional journals. And, worse, the men involved in such assignments often become as emotionally and intellectually constricted as their work. They become what Max Weber described as "specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart."

In the affective approach to learning what is valued is the sheer immensity of man, his complexity, variations, even his contradictions, and especially his spirit. You might say that in affective education the concern is more for man's juices than for his meat.

And why? Because evidence mounts that what students remember most from their formal education are not facts or subject matter, rather attitudes, value commitments exposed in critical incidents, styles, character traits; these are the lasting experiences. Matters of faith as much as fact, of emotion more than intellect. It is also true that colleges and universities have had comparatively little impact on student values. They change some students, if the institutions have character, but they do not change most. Surely one reason is that the values of youth at entrance to college are the result of numerous experiences--

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For more on Bloom's taxonomy, and for a fuller and better treatment of what has been sketched out in the preceding paragraphs, see Benjamin Bloom, et al, Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, Handbooks I and II, New York: David McKay Co., 1956 and 1964.
intellectual, emotional, academic, social, spiritual. Those values were first formed in a multidimensional setting, they cannot be successfully challenged in a setting that is one dimensional.¹⁰

Nor does it do, from the perspective of affective education, for faculty to act as priests set apart for a special function that denies them expression of the full range of human emotion. Faculty long ago put off the medieval toggery that once so effectively concealed their bodies and, perhaps, also cloaked their minds, but they have yet to reveal themselves to students as persons as well as professors. They have been captive to a role that made them appear other than human (though hardly divine).

Faculty armed with ex cathedra authority, and thus arrogating to themselves power over life and death for the trembling faithful, tend to substitute authoritarianism for authority. Authority represents, as Martin Duberman has pointed out, accumulated experience, technical skill, and spiritual insight. Authoritarianism represents their counterfeits:

Age masquerading as maturity, information as understanding, technique as originality. Authoritarianism is forced to demand the respect that authority draws naturally to itself. The former, like all demands, is likely to meet with hostility; the latter, like all authenticity, with emulation. Our universities--our schools at every level--are rife with authoritarianism, all but devoid of authority.¹¹

It is, therefore, nothing less than the removal of the superstructure


¹¹ Ibid., pp. 321-322.
of authoritarian control that is the goal of those who favor affective education. Under the old conditions, faculty-student relationships were tutelary. Students lived to please professors. In affective education, faith is placed in the student as a young adult who is willing to assume responsibility for his education and make full use of all the resources available to him, including his own and those of the faculty, including emotional as well as intellectual components of their relationship. And through all is the confidence that unstructured, informal education will not result in a lack of relevant standards and the rise of permissiveness leading to anarchy but, rather, will prove that persuasion works better than authoritarianism and that true authority has its own appeal, its own leverage, and works without coercion.

The affective education movement seeks to balance the intellectual with the emotional, hopefully, without loss to either. The challenge for the academic community in the next decade is to develop the affective side, the side that has been allowed to atrophy badly through disuse. When this has been done, we can demonstrate how many levels of the person can be educated simultaneously. Then we will truly have reason to claim to be educating the whole person.

Affective education programs are now springing up all over the country, some in departments and schools of accredited institutions of higher education, but more in the institutes, centers, and religious foundations that gather around major universities. One of the most promising innovations is to establish programs in affective education through a school's counseling center. A model or prototype for later establishment in the regular curriculum may be tested in this way. This
sort of change, along with the others mentioned earlier, is surely coming soon.

The Character of Leadership

Here, then, is our situation: Certain tacit assumptions of educators have in the past served as the integrative value system for the institution, the value system by which standards for that community were determined and applied. Cognitive rationality, middle class morality, an aristocratic style, and corporate liberalism with its corollaries of pluralism, tolerance, and individualism, have been featured. Now the substance as well as form, functions as well as structures, the practices and the meanings behind the practices are challenged, challenged by the technocratic age and by the new youth movement, by technological and humanistic considerations. The consequence will be changes in higher education as society continues its intervention in the schools even as the schools, as the agents of society, continue their intervention in the lives of the young. The educational institution is an agent of socialization but now, more than in the past, because of the times and the attitudes of the youth toward the urgencies of the times, that institution will become an agent of social change. As a reflection of new emphases and a changing balance of power, we will see change in governance, in the organization and administration of our colleges and universities. There will also be change toward relational learning, across disciplinary lines and by blending campus and society. And there will be change toward affective education, wherein the life of the spirit is raised to parity with the life of the mind. There will be no paucity of change.
The problem is of another sort. Under the influence of Einstein's theory, and Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy, and Gödel's proof that a system within itself cannot prove the theorems of that system, we have come to epistemological relativism. Also, the basis for ultimate authority has passed from God or nature or humanity, to society, and now to the solitary individual—ontologically, the basis for being has become the person himself. The problem is to determine what we have in common—now. And, to decide what if anything transcends the individual or, what shall be the basis for authority when men must choose not only an ethic of individual honesty but an ethic of social responsibility. The issue is not change, but the basic principles by which change shall be judged.

My personal view is that our culture lacks the character necessary to set a new hierarchy of values at a time when change is required. This is, as Pitirim Sorokin said, the late sensate culture, one where values are individual, yet concentrated on the sensate characteristics of man. Sorokin saw Western society going to its death—by suicide. Its muscles are flabby. It is a culture out of breath; with its heart, like its lungs, black. There is for such a culture no alternative to tolerance, pluralism, and continuing compromise. (This development makes academic the debate about changes that are "innovations," new means to established ends, or changes that are "experimentation," new means to new or open ends.) The first changes are certain to be in the form of innovations, trying to hold the new age to the values of the old. But that effort will fail because accommodations must continue under the logic of pluralism and tolerance until, finally, changes in degree will become changes in
kind. Then it will be too late to turn back from experimentation because a new age will have begun. Nor will people want to—a jaded sensate culture does not feel things that deeply.

I do not regard these developments with fear. Change is the law of life and changes are needed. New structures will be invented to serve new functions. Even now, as Sorokin foresaw, new ideational cultures are rising to contend with and perhaps to supercede the late sensate culture. Such a thing is bound to happen, said Émile Durkheim, the French sociologist, whenever people interact in ambiguous and fluid situations. Because the alternatives for behavior are increased beyond those ordinarily available, because circumstances have lifted people out of conventional arrangements, the possibility of new norms emerging are greatly enhanced.

The theists say, "God always has his people." The humanists say, "the people always have their gods." I don't know which emphasis is best, but one can draw from these rival perspectives the simple historical generalization that people and gods endure. The future, then, so long as there is for man a future, will likely contain something old and something new. And if that which is new in the ideology of the future is that ultimate authority is something beyond individual man—building on Goedel's proof, and claiming that a person, like a system, must go beyond himself to prove himself—then the new will be very old indeed.

While I lack confidence in all this teleological speculation, I am more confident about asserting that the time in which we find ourselves now is the best possible situation for the innovator. The environment most promising for innovation is one where the innovator's axiological
commitments are being tested in a setting of institutional ambiguity. There are a lot of traditional ambiguities in the educational process: the product or service has never been very tangible; the customers (students) have exerted limited influence on the sellers; institutional employees (faculty) have been dedicated to their specializations more than to their local employers; the decision-making process has been rather more diffused than in standard industrial situations; and even the goals of the enterprise have not been very clearly defined. To all of these long-standing sources of confusion must be added current severe attacks from within and without. The situation is ambiguous, and the ambiguous situation is the innovator's opportunity.

And what does he have to offer? I have suggested three areas of innovation that show promise now. In closing I will mention that an innovative organizational arrangement within which particular innovations may be tested is the cluster college concept or the federated college plan. In this way, by spinoffs from coteries of committed planners, new colleges or programs can be devised and tested under the protective umbrella of an established, accredited university without committing the total institution's resources or reputation. Thus, substantive diversity in programs and values may be introduced to give students options among which to choose and with which to contend. In this way, furthermore, the institution tests the perturbation theory of education, that faculty and students work best and grow most, not in a setting of tranquility, but in one characterized by growth through the tension of differences. The cluster college concept is, in sum, a conservative approach to radical reform.
Education is intervention--inevitably. The moment we elect to teach this not that, we are making value judgments. And when we proceed to call this, not that "important," we have introduced advocacy. We intervene with value-laden ideas into the lives of youth. In a time of dissatisfaction with what had been advocated, and yet when the future is uncertain and men are confused about priorities, the best we can do is to make provision for alternative models. In this way new options for the future can be developed by men whose basic hope is one of man's oldest---the hope that truth will prevail---by men with the courage to say, "Come, my friends, 'tis not too late to seek a newer world."