The author outlines the socio-cultural and language problems of three main types of developing nations. The first type, the "new developing nations," (sub-Saharan and East Africa) have little to draw upon in terms of a usable socio-cultural or political past. The language problems reflect emphasis on political integration, for which purposes Western languages are adopted. Successful language policy in these new nations leads to bilingualism and monolingualism. The second type, the "old developing nations," (North Africa, the Near East, and South-East Asia) have the problem of creating the new out of the old and the hallowed. Their classical standard languages usually differ substantially from the current vernaculars of the masses. The tendency is to import a Western language in toto for modernization. A suggested compromise is to use Western loan words or translation loans for lexical expansion. (This is resisted by classicists.) The "intermediate" or third type, (India and Pakistan) have strong links with great traditions and have all of the difficulties of the first two types. Like the "new" nations, they may require the more permanent utilization of a Western language for the purposes of political and economic modernization and national integration. Like the "old" nations, they may require the development and modernization of one or more indigenous traditional languages for local and regional socio-cultural modernization and integration. (AMM)
National Languages and Languages of Wider Communication in the Developing Nations

Contribution by Joshua A. Fishman, Yeshiva University, New York.

1. Paper: 'Language Problems and Types of Political and Socio-Cultural Integration' (an adapted version of this paper was delivered at the Conference).

2. 'National Languages and Languages of Wider Communication in the Developing Nations' - summary analysis.

3. Outline of forthcoming publication: 'Language Problems of Developing Nations'.
LANGUAGE PROBLEMS AND TYPES OF POLITICAL AND SOCIO-CULTURAL INTEGRATION:

A Conceptual Postscript

Joshua A. Fishman

Yeshiva University

All nations face the task of finding or defining a usable past in such a way as to contribute to a more viable future. Some developing nations already have attained a substantial degree of consensus and must now struggle with its assets and debits insofar as modern purposes and problems are concerned. Other developing nations have as yet achieved no such consensus and must also create a past out of their present rather than merely seek to fashion a better future out of their past. There are difficulties to be faced and language involvements to be pondered in both connections.

The New Developing Nations

The problems of the literally "new nation" are easily recognizable. Its urgent need to attain greater national integration can draw upon precious little, either in terms of a usable socio-cultural past or in terms of a usable political past, in relation to its current territorial limits. The recent past is particularly useless to the "new nation". If it is to avoid a federational compromise with national integration (or even greater fractionization) it must pursue both that unification that derives from modern technology and modern life styles as well as that which derives from current (or from far distant) supra-regional myths and symbols. Unfortunately, the resources needed for either (let alone both) of these pursuits are substantial and most frequently lacking. The procedures arrived at have usually and quickly focused upon a Western language and a Western trained elite as most congruent with the needs of current national efficiency and current national mythology, since the available past is both relatively divisive and archaic (the latter, in the sense that the Little Traditions of essentially "new nations" are inevitably even less integrative at the national level than are the pre-industrial Great Traditions of "old developing nations"). From the point of view of participation in the nation, regional and local languages are recognized for transitional or short term purposes only, rather than for more long range integrative purposes—cultural or political. The transition from tradition to modernity and from localized ethnicity to larger scale nationalism (and no nation is entirely at one end or the other of these two interrelated continua) will require the acquisition of a foreign tongue, with all of the additional guilt and incongruity, insight and contrast, that is always required when the foreign must be transmuted into the "own". It is out of the long term process of living with and transmuting a modern foreign technology and a modern foreign language (and the modern foreign life style to which both are anchored) that the future socio-cultural integration of the "new nation" will come.

P.T.O.
The language problems of the ethnically fragmented "new nation" reflect its relatively greater emphasis on political integration and on the efficient nationism on which it initially depends. Language selection is a relatively short-lived problem * since the linguistic tie to technological and political modernity is usually unambiguous. Problems of language development, codification and acceptance are also minimal as long as these processes are seen as emanating justifiably and primarily from the "metropolitan country". The entire panoply of language institutes and language associations is lacking (at least until such time as indigenous norms arise and find favor in the eyes of a newly rising elite). While some attention may be given to the pedagogic demands of initial literacy (or transitional literacy) for young people, and to terminal literacy for old people, in as few local vernaculars or contact languages as is immediately unavoidable, the lion's share of literacy effort and resources is placed at the disposal of spreading the adopted Western tongue of current political (and, it is hoped, of ultimate socio-cultural) integration. When fully implemented these efforts include the preparation of teaching and learning materials that take into explicit account the linguistic repertoires of the prospective students and, therefore, the contrastive learning difficulties that they can be expected to face in the realms of phonology, lexicon, grammar-syntax and meaning systems. In order to accomplish this goal it may be necessary to provide detailed accounts of the structures of particular languages where these have not hitherto received analytic attention. Such efforts should not be confused with language development per se although they can be altered and expanded in that direction, given proper socio-cultural and political redirection.

The transitional nature of the language efforts and language goals of the essentially "new nations" (i.e., of nations whose political frontiers are quite recent and/or quite unrelated to the socio-cultural (dis)unity of their populaces, none of which boasts a widely accepted and indigenized Great Tradition) is both a result of and a contributor to the transitional nature of the sociolinguistic goals of these nations. Just as language shift toward the adopted Western tongue is the overt or covert goal of nation-oriented language policy so socio-cultural shift toward technologically based modernity (urban, industrial and post-ethnic at its base) is the goal of nation-oriented social policy. Just as bilingualism (which inevitably obtains as populations add the language of government, school and modern technology to their initial language(s) of home, immediate region and indigenous tradition) is expected to be transitional (rather than stable and diglossic) i.e., it is expected to be "bilingualism en route to monolingualism" in the new generations, so biculturism (the combination of traditional and modern behaviors in food, dress, religion, amusements, etc.) is also expected to be transitional. The model of the "new national" is primarily that of his "metropolitan"

* This will not always tend to be the case in those few "new nations" whose socio-cultural integration is substantial as a result of the presence of large numbers (or proportions) of speakers of a particular native or contact language. This factor may counterbalance ethnic diversity and lead to developments more akin to those of the "old developing societies", discussed below.
counterparts, with obvious differences only in terms of nation-loyalty, and with less obviously meaningful differences in terms of long-distant primordial, or still to be evolved supra-national myths and symbols (Negritude, Pan Africanism, etc.).

The intellectuals of the essentially "new nations" carry the scars of great personal and societal discontinuity but they do not (by and large) carry the burden of creating and rationalizing a new synthesis of old and new. Having broken with the past (or, having been separated from it, as the case may be) they may literally be among the most modern and most pan-Western in sentiment and in life style on the face of the globe. Their more ordinary compatriots may show greater transitional pangs and "imperfections" but, in general, their traditional patterns cannot be ideologized by them to serve at the national level. Barring brief episodes of revitalization (reactions to the dislocation of so much for so many) the essentially "new nations" must be viewed as having embarked on the creation of a new socio-cultural-political order rather than on the adaptation or modernization of an old one that still commands widespread loyalty and admiration.

The Old Developing Nations

Far different, in all of these respects, is the situation of those developing nations that constitute old socio-cultural entities as well as old polities. Their pasts are very much with them and part of them today. Their great religions provide direction for the daily lives of millions, for they are not primarily belief systems (as is the case for Western Christendom ever since it distinguished between the sacred and the secular, on the one hand, and between being a Christian and being a national on the other but, rather, systems that are inextricably interwoven with the cultural, economic and political existence of their adherents. Their ancient literatures and legal codes command admiration, study and obedience to this very day, representing as they do some of the very pinnacles of human groping toward a definition of the good and the worthwhile. Their great heroes and leaders of the past cannot be dismissed today and their national borders have been hallowed by centuries of common practice, common sacrifice and general recognition. The problem of such newly developing societies is not that of achieving or even maintaining socio-cultural or political integration, but, rather, of modernizing the integration already attained on the basis of untold centuries. As hard as it may be to create the new out of almost nothing, it may be harder yet to create it out of the old and the hallowed.

The language problems of the "old developing nations" are quite different from those of the "new developing nations". Their classical standard languages usually differ substantially from the current vernaculars of the masses that must be mobilized if national development and modernization are to be attained. In addition, these languages
themselves must be developed, to cope with Western technology and procedure, and simplified, to hasten widespread literacy and participation. The direction that language development must take is not unambiguous, however. Just as national integration can alternatively stress ethnic authenticity or modern efficiency so can language development proceed in either or both of these directions. The carriers of modern ideas and modern goals are themselves most likely to be Westernized or "Internationalized" in language and education. Their tendency may be to import a Western language en toto, if possible, for the purposes of modernity. Since the availability of a classical great tradition makes this much harder to do on a broad scale than is the case in the essentially "new nations" the obvious compromise is to use Western loan words or translation loans to attain lexical expansion. However, this too is resisted by the guardians of the classical tradition (writers, teachers, reciters, and priests) and a concerted effort is usually made to utilize traditional lexical and syntactic resources for conveying modern concepts. As a result, even the modern educated elites may encounter hardships in extracting precise and appropriate meanings from technical communications that have been rendered or rerendered in traditional garb.

Language institutes, language agencies, and language associations frequently adopt differing positions and proceed at differing rates with respect to the development (modernization) and the simplification (vernacularization) of the traditional language of education and government that every old-but-developing-national-society possesses. Whereas the "new nations" frequently employ indigenous languages for transitional purposes en route to (more) widespread adoption of a Western tongue, the "old developing nations" frequently recognize a Western language for transitional purposes en route to (more) widespread adoption of a modernized and simplified indigenous one. Whereas language politics is either a very early or a very ominous phenomenon in the "new nations" it can become a more common, class-related (rather than ethnically polarized) phenomenon in the "old developing nations". Whereas successful language policy in the "new nations" leads to bilingualism en route to monolingualism (i.e. bilingualism without diglossia) successful language policy in the "old developing nations" need aim at nothing more than rendering bilingual each successively monolingual generation. Thus, in the latter case, as each generation arrives at the modern school and in the modern work-arena with its home and neighborhood language variety (and, less commonly, with that variety as well as with the unmodernized classical variety obtained via traditional religious and educational exposure) its language repertoire is expanded by the addition of the modernized variety without any intended displacement. While interpenetration ("interference") and switching between varieties certainly occurs in the everyday speech of common folk and in the excited or intimate speech of even the more educated, the undeniably greater appropriateness of each variety for specific contexts and functions, and the availability of purity guardians for one or more of these varieties, safeguard their coexistence, barring excessively rapid and disruptive social change.
The stable and widespread coexistence of separate varieties (and even separate languages) in "old developing societies" that have not lost contact with their Great Traditions is indicative of the continued viability of those traditions in the very face of development and modernization. The model national is a bicultural rather than a metropolitan or international man. He participates in and contributes to national integration on both the authenticity and the efficiency levels and in both the traditional and modern veins. By combining in himself both the "old wisdom" and the "new skills" he can (in popular belief, at least) help defend the former and civilize (or humanize) the latter. Nevertheless, just as forces on the language front are not entirely in agreement with respect to questions of direction or degree so is the socio-cultural front marked by both extremes of traditionalism and modernity as well as by many intermediate and highly personalized positions as well. However, whether the coexistence between old and new is symbiotic or compartmentalized, evolving or static, political integration is rarely in danger from internal forces (as is, at times, the case in the essentially "new nations"), since the ethnic origins of all concerned provide an authentic unity that none will deny. As a result, old developing nations can withstand much greater political diversity and unrest as a result of socio-cultural change. The centripetal forces set in motion by many centuries of shared tradition more than counterbalance the centrifugal forces that are generated by the modernization and development process per se (as long as these are largely internally directed).

Intermediate Types

If many of the nations of sub-Saharan and East Africa are characterized by the lines of socio-cultural, political and language development ascribed, above, to the "new developing nations", and if some of the nations of North Africa, the Near East, and South-East Asia are characterized by the lines of socio-cultural, political and language development ascribed above, to the "old developing nations", there also remains a third category of developing nations (such as India and Pakistan) and that undeniably reveals characteristics of both camps. On the other hand their political boundaries are arbitrary from the point of view of perceived authenticity of socio-cultural integration. On the other hand several of their socio-cultural components have strong and uninterrupted links with truly Great Traditions (none of which has had any counterpart at the level of political integration during the past century or more). Countries with such intermediate characteristics seem to present the difficulties of both camps without benefiting from their counterbalancing advantages. The several Great Traditions militate against the development of a single socio-cultural authenticity at the national level, perhaps even more so than does the absence of any such Traditions in the truly "new nations". The political boundaries, however, have existed for an appreciable period or have come to represent such considerable political and economic efficiency as not to be easily dismissed. These cases seem to present the makings of federalism, a solution which may initially be resorted to frequently but
which may ultimately be as atypical for the developing nations as that of Switzerland, Belgium and Canada is for the more developed portion of the globe.

The rival Great Traditions in the "intermediate type" developing nations do not permit an early bicultural adjustment to obtain between them. As a result neither a single indigenous national language nor a stable pattern of bilingualism with diglossia on the basis of indigenous languages alone seems to be feasible at a functional level. Nor does it seem probable that a Western language alone can be the basis for political or socio-cultural integration, as a sort of "sweet lemons" compromise, as it is in the new nations. Finally, it does not seem that a Western language can serve as a purely and avowedly transitional integrator, since the major problem facing the indigenous languages is not merely that of modernization or simplification for national purposes (both attainable goals) but, rather, that of the "unfair" politico-economic and socio-cultural advantage that may come from honorific status for any one (or more) indigenous language(s) at any foreseeable time whatsoever. Thus, the "intermediate type of solution to their language problems. Like the "new nations" they may require the more permanent utilization of a Western language for the purposes of political and economic modernization and national integration. Like the "old developing nations" they may require the development and modernization of (one or more) indigenous traditional languages for local and regional socio-cultural modernization and integration. The pretense may be made that one and only one indigenous language is the national tongue but, in actuality, the most common governmental language at the national level is a Western one, whereas the language of regional integration officially varies from one locality to the next. Thus, diglossia and biculturism (to the extent that either will become stabilized in the future) will long tend to involve a local Great Tradition language plus the Western ("auxiliary" or "working") language rather than two indigenous languages or varieties (one local and traditional, the other national and modern) as in countries of the "old developing nations" type.

It is in the case of the "intermediate type" developing countries that language problems may well be most intense and diversified, at least until the non-contending stage of federalism is reached. As in the case of the "new nations" there will be serious problems of spreading and improving mastery of a single Western language that can serve the immediate purposes of political and economic integration. As in the "old developing nations" there will be differences of opinion as to the rate and the extent of desired modernization of the languages of classical scholarship and Great Tradition. However, in addition to the foregoing there is also the danger of a strife-ridden "period of adjustment" in which various groups, primarily larger ones, strive to establish their tongue as "the" (or as "a") national language, while
other groups, primarily smaller ones, agitate to obtain for their tongue the perquisites of previously recognized local languages. These struggles are, on occasion, only minimally politicized, i.e., they are not always seen as subject to political bargaining and political compromise. It often takes considerable time until language claims, intertwined as they are with convictions concerning authenticity and primordial righteousness, can be rationalized, politicized and adjudicated. Once that stage is reached, and not before, the relatively stabilized Swiss Federational model (rather than the less stabilized Belgian or Canadian ones) can begin to serve as an appropriate beacon for developing nations of the "intermediate type". It is only then that the claims of national political and economic integration can receive separate attention, without seeming to threaten or to be threatened by the authenticity of local Great Traditions and their relative modernity or traditionalism.
### Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Cluster A</th>
<th>Cluster B</th>
<th>Cluster C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Prior socio-cultural integration</td>
<td>No integrating Great Tradition at the national level</td>
<td>One Great Tradition at the national level</td>
<td>Several Great Traditions seeking separate socio-polit. recognition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Selection of National Language</td>
<td>Governed by considerations of political integration: nationalism</td>
<td>Governed by considerations of authenticity: nationalism</td>
<td>Governed by need to compromise between polit.integ. and separate authenticities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Adoption of LWC</td>
<td>Yes, as permanent, national symbol</td>
<td>Often transitionally: for modern functions</td>
<td>Yeas, as unifying compromise (working lang: W)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Language Planning Concerns</td>
<td>Minor: exonormative standardization of LWC</td>
<td>Modernization of traditional lang. H or L?</td>
<td>Modernization of several traditional languages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Bilingualism Goals</td>
<td>Local, regional; transitional to LWC</td>
<td>National; transitional to indigenous monoling.</td>
<td>Regional biling. (H &amp; L, W &amp; N) &amp; national biling. (W &amp; N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Biculturism Goals</td>
<td>Transitional to modernity</td>
<td>Traditional plus modern spheres</td>
<td>Traditional plus modern spheres</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Joshua A. Fishman, Ph.D.
Yeshiva University
April 9, 1968