Because complex social and political situations with far-reaching consequences increasingly call for swift administrative response from colleges and universities, the 10th Annual College and University Self-Study Institute held July 8-11, 1968 at the University of California, Berkeley, addressed itself to the following questions: What kind of situation will the administrator face if he follows the course of partisan involvement in issues? Of non-partisan detachment? How should an administrator respond to such situations? What guideline for action should he consider? What kinds of situations will he most likely face and what are their most likely consequences for internal and external relations? What may be the future role of higher education as a principal change agent in society?

Organized by the Center for Research and Development in Higher Education and the Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education, the conference was attended by 20 college presidents and about 80 staff members, deans and faculty representing 60 institutions. Alternative views on the conference topic were presented in major papers by T. R. McConnell, Harris Wofford, Roger Heyns, Algo Henderson, Eldon Johnson and Kenneth Boulding. A colloquium, bringing together a great diversity of viewpoints and experience, gave expression to the several schools of thought presently attempting to redefine the role of higher education in society. (JS)
CONFERENCE ON THE COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY AS AGENTS OF SOCIAL CHANGE
(Working Title: Conference on Higher Education)
July 8-11, 1968

October 1968

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
Office of Education
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Center for Research and Development in Higher Education
University of California, Berkeley

and

Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education
Boulder, Colorado

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PURPOSE OF THE CONFERENCE

Because complex social and political situations with far-reaching consequences are increasingly calling for swift administrative response from colleges and universities, the conference sought to provide an arena for discussion of a range of alternative courses.

Planned for presidents of institutions of higher education, members of their staff, department chairmen, key members of the faculty, and representatives of student organizations, the program addressed itself to the following questions:

What kind of situation will the administrator face if he follows the course of partisan involvement in issues? Of non-partisan detachment? How should an administrator respond to situations of this kind? What guideline should he consider for action? What are the kinds of situations he will most likely face and their likely consequences for external as well as internal relations? What may be the future role of higher education as a principal change agent in society?

THE PROGRAM OF THE CONFERENCE

The conference was held on the campus of the University of California at Berkeley from July 8 through July 11, 1968, and in addition to Center personnel, was attended by 20 college presidents and approximately 80 staff members, faculty, and deans, representing more than 60 institutions.

A background paper, Colleges and Universities as Agents of Social Change: An Introduction, was provided by Dr. T. R. McConnell, past director of the Center and currently on its staff as Research Educator. Taking the position that the university need not mount direct campaigns to effect
social change, Dr. McConnell maintained that the university works indirectly by making the results of scholarship and research freely available to individuals and organizations engaged in a wide variety of social, cultural, economic, and political activities.

Address by Harris L. Wofford, President, State University College, Westbury, New York. Agent of Whom?

In the first of the conference's five major speeches, Mr. Wofford asserted that it is dishonest and corrupting for universities to claim not to be agents of social change and that the more powerful the university, the more powerful an agent it is. "The federal government knows," he stated, "the State Department knows, the Pentagon knows, the CIA knows, our adversaries in the world know that American universities are and have been the agents for research and recruitment in support of America's present world policies and military efforts. Why shouldn't the American people know the facts on this?...The important thing is that we act in the faith that it is the Truth as a question that makes men free."

Address by Dr. Roger Heyns, Chancellor, University of California, Berkeley.

The University as an Instrument of Social Action.

Speaking on the second day, Dr. Heyns developed the idea that the university should not take a formal stand, through its governing board, executive head, departments, or faculties, on noneducational matters. He claimed that when the academic community uses the university as a base for political action, it turns the university into an important piece of political real estate, and encourages the struggle for its control by outside forces.
Address by Dr. Algo Henderson, Research Educator, Center for Research and Development in Higher Education, University of California, Berkeley.

Colleges and Universities as Agents of Social Change: Goals and Conflicts.

Also speaking on the second day, Dr. Henderson emphasized the necessity for a policy of academic freedom which would permit all individuals and groups within an institution to speak, write, or act in relation to social action, providing they make it clear they are not speaking for the institution. When the institution as such takes a position, as it sometimes should, this should be the result of a consensus of opinion. Viewed in historical perspective, Dr. Henderson commented, it seems clear that many presidents and deans are unnecessarily timid about taking clear cut positions on controversial social issues.

Address by Dr. Eldon Johnson, Vice President, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois. The Tightening Tension: The University's External Relations.

Dr. Johnson, speaking on the third day, assumed that the university has to retain its capacity to affect the course of society, but raised the issue of how to avoid incurring hostility from a society content with its course. He suggested this could be done by striking a balance between the needs of a responsive university and a tolerant society and developed seven guidelines or bounds not to be overstepped:

1. The university must not compromise its integrity.
2. The university must maintain a distinction between corporate and individual views and acts.
3. The university must be free to do whatever it takes to keep relevant in its age.
4. The university must not lose its identity.
5. The university must not lose its critical power.
6. The university must not seek legal power or the power to coerce.
7. The university must not deny its accountability.
Dialogue on Research and Development

The afternoon of the third day was devoted to a dialogue between members of the Center research staff and other conference participants on research and development in higher education. Dr. Ieland L. Medsker, director of the Center, presented an overview of the Center's programs and goals; Drs. Robert Wilson and Warren Martin described the research programs of their respective sections; and Drs. David Whittaker, Dale Tillery, Ernest Palola, and Ann Heiss outlined individual ongoing projects.

Wednesday Night Colloquium

Chaired by Dr. T. R. McConnell, the Colloquium participants were three institute faculty members (Eldon Johnson, Algo Henderson, and Kenneth Boulding) and three guests (Sir Peter Venebles, vice-chancellor of the University of Aston, Birmingham, England; Robert Ross, national director of the activist New University Conference and on the faculty of the University of Chicago; and Richard H. Peairs, associate secretary of the American Association of University Professors and director of its Western Regional Office).

Although the participants had agreed to focus on the central topic—the college and university as agents of social change—their personal interests and broad backgrounds brought a great diversity of viewpoints to that topic, and as a result the colloquium itself is a sensitive and informed expression of the several schools of thought which are attempting to redefine the role of higher education in society today.
Address by Dr. Kenneth E. Boulding, Professor of Economics, University of Colorado, Boulder. The University as an Economic and Social Unit.

As concluding speaker, on the final day of the conference, Dr. Boulding sounded the note that the university is an institution of increasing importance in society and that to some extent its climate of crisis can be related to its growth. He asserted that the kind of decision-making processes appropriate to small institutions are not appropriate to large ones. He warned that if the universities do not adapt themselves to the modern world they will rapidly run into new institutions which will provide them with stiff competition.
APPENDIX A

The Conference Schedule
COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY SELF STUDY INSTITUTE

PROGRAM SCHEDULE

MONDAY, JULY 8

1-3 p.m.  Patio buffet
1-6 p.m.  Registration
6:00 p.m.  Dinner
7:30 p.m. Harris L. Wofford, Speaker
8:30 p.m.  Questions
9:30 p.m.  Reception

TUESDAY, JULY 9

7:30 -
8:30 a.m.  Breakfast
9:00 a.m.  Roger Heyns, Speaker
10:30 a.m.  Coffee
11:00 a.m.  Questions
12:15 p.m.  Lunch
1:30 p.m.  Algo Henderson, Speaker
3:00 p.m.  Coffee
3:30 p.m.  Questions
4:30 p.m.  Adjourn
6:00 p.m.  Dinner
   Evening open
9:30 p.m.  Refreshments

WEDNESDAY, JULY 10

7:30 -
8:30 a.m.  Breakfast
9:00 a.m.  Eldon Johnson, Speaker
10:30 a.m.  Coffee
11:00 a.m.  Questions
12:15 p.m.  Lunch
1:30 p.m.  Dialogue with institute participants on current and needed research and development in higher education-- Members of the Research Staff - Center for Research and Development in Higher Education
3:00 p.m.  Coffee
3:30 p.m.  Dialogue continues
4:30 p.m.  Adjourn
6:00 p.m.  Dinner
7:30 p.m.  Colloquium - Institute Faculty.  T. R. McConnell presiding
9:30 p.m.  Refreshments

THURSDAY, JULY 11

7:30 -
8:30 a.m.  Breakfast
9:00 a.m.  Kenneth E. Boulding, Speaker
10:30 a.m.  Coffee
11:00 a.m.  Questions
APPENDIX B

Texts of the addresses
"The ivory tower" is an outmoded figure. In fact, neither the college nor the university has ever been completely isolated socially. The membrane separating the institution from its environment has always been a more or less permeable one. But the boundary between the university and its surroundings has become increasingly ill defined, and there is constant interchange between them. The relationship is now so intimate, in fact, that the university may be in danger of losing its essential character and of becoming the pawn in a bitter struggle for power among social, economic and political forces which would capture and use it to their own ends.

That the university has an obligation for public service is no longer in question. The points at issue are the ways in which it is appropriate for the university to serve society. The most controversial issue for discussion at this conference is whether the college or university should serve as an instrument of direct social action.

Academic cloister or social activist? In the report of a discussion by the trustees of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching on "The University at the Service of Society", two diametrically opposed positions with respect to the university as an agent of social change were identified. One extreme was stated as follows:

"... the university ... should abjure any conception of itself as an activist shaper of the larger society. It should not "bite off propositions" develop "positions", or be a "protagonist" for causes. It should stick to the pursuits of the academic cloister with which it has traditionally been concerned and carry them out to the best of its ability. All else in the end is illusory."
The opposite position was described in this wise:

"... among all institutions in the nation, the university has the greatest responsibility to be a shaper of the society. As such it has an obligation to identify social wrongs and take an aggressive lead in rectifying them. It must be engaged, activist, reformist ..."

"In this view, the university can best protect its position not by an attitude of aloofness from the great social issues of the day but by actively engaging in them. And this kind of activist role, far from detracting from the traditional functions of teaching and research, will actually strengthen them." 1/ 

At stake in the resolution of these two positions is the conception and maintenance of the university's essential purpose. Chancellor Roger Heyns has declared that the primary purpose of the university is intellectual --

"... intellectual pursuits and intellectual discourse are, above all others ... the values of a university." He went on to say that the function of the university is to develop new truth, not new ideologies, and that "... intellectual discourse is preferred over action generated in moments of passion." 2/ 

This does not mean, presumably, that the university should always look inward, that its teaching and research should be irrelevant to the social problems, dislocations, conflicts, and confusion of the world around it. President Samuel B. Gould of the State University of New York has asserted that, on the contrary, by its very nature the university must examine and question the status quo, comment freely on its shortcomings, and explore alternatives for social action. 3/ But it does not necessarily follow that the university qua university should mount a direct campaign to change the social order -- that it should march into the market place, into the ghetto, or into the governmental arena at the head of the political and social forces dedicated to social reform. The conservative position is that institutionally the university should make its impact on social conditions indirectly.

The institution works indirectly, first of all, by making the results of scholarship and research freely available to individuals and organizations engaged in a wide variety of social, cultural, economic and political activities. Second, the university will change society through individuals rather than through corporate
action. "Out from its citadel will go educated men and women with a passion to remake the world," said the Carnegie Foundation trustees. "From it will emanate ideas and knowledge that will be revolutionary in their impact. This will be public service in its truest form." 4/

The university: partisan or nonpartisan? Associated with the position that the university should serve society indirectly is the attitude that the institution itself should be nonpartisan on public issues. President Nathan M. Pusey of Harvard has declared that that university does not take political stands except on matters that affect its own well being. 5/

Perhaps no college or university in the United States has a more activist group of students and faculty than Antioch College. But this institution, too, recently asserted its corporate neutrality on social issues and social action. A committee composed of five students and five faculty members recently proposed "that Antioch College shall not take an institutional stand on the war in Vietnam and that we remind ourselves that the only proper institutional stands for the College are on issues scrupulously defined as educational." The committee said that it took this position, among other reasons, because it wished "to comply with the Antioch Civil Liberties Code in its clear intent: to free individual advocacy from any shadow of institutional orthodoxy and to prevent as skillfully as possible any identification of a partisan action with an institutional position."

The Antioch committee also argued that the public will profit more from divided academic counsel than from a single corporate voice. The committee declared that corporate nonpartisanship should contribute to the achievement and maintenance of "a genuine community of free individuals" in which "dissent is fostered, not nervously tolerated, and where controversy is creatively managed." 6/

The partisan university. In sharp contrast to the nonpartisan position taken at Antioch, the School of Social Welfare at Berkeley recently took a public stand
against the Vietnam War, the first faculty at Berkeley to take such a position. The faculty added its voice to that of the National Association of Social Workers, which had urged a halt in bombing, a cease-fire, and peace talks. The faculty resolution stated that "Our country's Vietnam policies give lie to the commitment to people implicit in our roles as social work educators. Our professional efforts are rendered futile and pitifully absurd by the tragedy of American and Vietnamese military casualties, the enormity and horror of the Vietnamese civilian casualties, and the demoralization of the American people." 7/

For a professional society to take a public stand on such an issue as the Vietnam war would seem to many to be a defensible action. Is it equally defensible for a university professional school to take an official position on what has become a political as well as a moral issue? Perhaps the crucial test of the appropriateness of such action is whether or not its effect will be to discourage or engender student and faculty dissent, to stimulate or to inhibit unprejudiced investigation of public issues and welfare problems, in a word, to enhance rather than to erode intellectual freedom in the University. If faculty members are to remain free to investigate any subject, and to express freely the results of their research and reflection, said Capen, one of the most uncompromising advocates of academic freedom in American higher education, the institution itself must remain neutral. "We ask immunity from interference", he wrote, "in order that we may single-mindedly perform these tasks which are vital to the welfare and progress of society. If society is to have faith in our loyalty to the cause of truth, it must never have occasion to suspect that that loyalty is divided." 8/

The university: passionate and involved. In any event, student activists are skeptical that an institution which is aloof and intellectual rather than committed and passionate will have a very serious impact on the country's festering sores that cry out for human compassion, righteous indignation, retribution, repudiation or destruction of the status quo, and forthright social reconstruction. Poverty,
discrimination, injustice, denial of freedom and human dignity, and immoral war fare, they say, demand action, not scholarly detachment. They assert that to change these conditions demands a crusade, not a trip to the library. They want to find the scholar in the city, not in his study.

Many students are suspicious of the aloof and nonpartisan intellect, which, they say, easily becomes the juiceless mind, a mind without esthetic awareness and emotional drive.² But, one might ask, does anyone really believe that it is necessary for intellectual processes to crowd out esthetic or humane sensibilities, or, on the other hand, for emotion to displace reason? Would it not be more appropriate to say that if education is to enable young people to cope with the problems which beset society, it should neither be devoid of passion nor sparing of intellect? Is not the problem we face that of submitting emotion to reason and of coupling intellectual solutions with feeling and commitment?

Surely all institutions today are committed to protect the rights of students and faculty members as individuals, or the right of voluntary associations of students or faculty members freely to engage in legal social action. But if universities qua universities become partisan and contentious, they may lose their intellectual freedom and their very great degree of self-government, together with the ability to protect the rights and freedoms of their individual members. Dr. Buell G. Gallagher has been quoted as having said that "Wherever men of conscience and good will are confronted by the organized efforts of contentious and angry partisanship -- the search for truth is in grave danger. And within the groves of Academe this means that no man is safe or secure. It means the end of academic freedom and the beginning of the reign of unreason."¹²

Possible consequences of politicizing the university. If colleges and universities identify themselves with particular political causes, no matter how just they may be, may they not find themselves also politicized in wholly unexpected
and intellectually disastrous ways? "If their political role is allowed to escalate," Lepawsky asked, "how can their members dissuade the body politic within the greater society from scrutinizing their supposedly intellectual conduct and from throwing into the balance the political counterweight of other groups or interests who claim to be threatened by the academicians?"

Conservative or right-wing political groups, though now relatively quiet, may come to power in the university and, observed Lepawsky, "take active steps toward changing the political complexion of the academic establishment. If they did not, it would be one of the most remarkable cases of political abstinence in history." Universities may be especially vulnerable to external political forces. Enraged citizens or an angry legislature may inflict serious damage on a public institution by determined efforts to curb intellectual inquiry, free expression, and open advocacy.

Universities already engaged: for whom? The perceptive observer might declare that it is purely academic to ask whether the universities should be engaged in social action; they are in fact already heavily involved in countless ways. Two examples may suffice to make the point.

Through their experiment stations and extension divisions, the Land-Grant colleges and universities over the years have assumed direct responsibility for improving agricultural production and for reshaping the agricultural economy. They are now immersed in the process of revolutionizing agricultural technology. The University of California has developed a new strain of tough-skinned tomatoes and invented the machinery to harvest them. In doing so, the University contributed to the loss of many jobs for the already disadvantaged farm laborers in the great central valley of California. Should the University accept any responsibility for retraining workers for other jobs or helping them transfer to other industries?
Two writers in the *New Republic* recently reported that the University of California has applied for a patent on a machine that may make it possible within five years to harvest mechanically most of the wine grapes grown in the State. Farm operators may profit enormously since it was said that labor costs, which now run about $20 an acre, might drop to as little as $5. The article declared that the machine model recently licensed by the University for commercial production will harvest both sides of a row of vines simultaneously, at the rate of two acres an hour, using two men to replace seventy. Thousands of laborers will be displaced. Does the University have an obligation to concern itself with the human beings who are displaced by the harvester it invented?

One might also ask whether it is any more inappropriate for student or faculty organizations, or the University itself, to act in the cause of peace than for the Livermore laboratory, under the joint auspices of the University of California and the Atomic Energy Commission, to engage in research and development in nuclear warfare? Or to ask whether it is any longer inappropriate for the corporate university to assist the victims of social or economic injustice to organize social, economic, or political efforts to redress the deprivation and discrimination under which they suffer?

The urban-grant university. The latter question is bound to arise if the urban-grant university espoused by Dr. Clark Kerr materializes. Kerr has proposed that the nation and the states should establish 67 urban-grant universities to stand beside its 67 Land-Grant universities. This institution, as he conceives it, would help rebuild and run the cities. It would send out faculty members and students to show the people how to operate better urban schools, welfare and social agencies, police departments, and hospitals. The medical school would be at least as much involved in the health of the city as the Land-Grant university was with the health of the farmers' livestock. Members of the university community would become the chief planners of the structural, cultural and human architecture of the city.
The urban-grant university, said Kerr, would almost certainly face a great deal of external opposition. "There will be those, for example," he said, "who will view with apprehension the potential political alliance of the students and the ghetto dwellers. Others will fear the potential involvement of the university in partisan urban politics. . . . And so, for this university to work effectively, there will have to be a considerable amount of public understanding -- especially understanding of the distinction between service based on applications of knowledge and positions taken because of partisan politics. Beyond that, the institution will need an excellent system of buffers, and this is particularly a challenge to the trustees. . . . We must bridge the gulf between the intellectual community and the surrounding society . . . The urban-grant university can provide such a bridge and if the greater participation will result in greater controversy, we must be prepared to accept it and to deal with it." But how to deal with it he did not say.13/

The quasi-university service agency. Kerr has suggested that the urban-grant university might organize for community service by establishing agencies corresponding to agricultural experiment stations and agricultural extension divisions. But because an institution serving the urban community will touch many more sensitive individual and social nerve endings than the Land-Grant university did, it may be desirable for the former to devise a new agency less directly and intimately a part of the institution than the agricultural agencies. Perhaps the prototype may be found in the quasi-nongovernmental organization, the advantages and disadvantages of which were recently discussed by the president of the Carnegie Corporation of New York.14/

A new quasi-university organization should be funded from many sources, including federal and state governments, foundations, individuals, voluntary associations, city governments, colleges and universities, and corporations. It
should be possible for faculty members to move back and forth between the agency and the educational institutions which surround it. Participation in the activities of the organization should not only enable scholars and researchers to bring their special knowledge and competence to bear on urban affairs, but to identify problems for study and investigation. "The availability of a real laboratory rather than an abstract one, of an actual problem rather than a theoretical one, makes the university a more vigorous institution," said the Carnegie Foundation trustees.15/

The quasi-university organization would not only provide the scholar with an opportunity for applied and basic investigation as well as social action; it would also leave him free to retire into the "inner" university for periods of reflection, teaching, and intensive research. This kind of sanctuary even the urban-grant university cannot afford to lose.

But if the university should, at times, and for some of its members, offer a haven, it should be a cloister with windows on the world. And most of the time its faculty and students will be trying to devise ways of making a better society.

In this regard Gardner finds the university seriously deficient. His criticism amounts to an indictment:

"... Generally speaking, when one moves from the arena of scientific and technical problems to those problems involving change in human institutions, one cannot say that the universities are a significant intellectual base for the main attack. In fact, a good many university people whose field should give them a legitimate interest in these matters barely understand what the relevant problems are. Many are debating policy alternatives left behind five years ago. Few are planning the kind of research that would sharpen policy alternatives." 16/

The test for involvement. If Gardner is right, the university is in constant danger of being both irrelevant and obsolete. But how deeply can it be engaged without compromising its primary intellectual purpose, without losing its intellectual freedom, without becoming the pawn of any special interest group except the interest of a free society? The problems of commitment and involvement
which arise when the university becomes directly embroiled in the inevitably sensitive and controversial processes of social change may not only shake its conscience, but challenge its integrity. Is there a touchstone by which the university's essential character, its unsurrenderable value, and the conditions and limits of its implication in social reform can be tested? I think there is. I suggest that it is the maintenance of intellectual freedom. If individual freedom of students and faculty is lost, the university is destroyed. If the intellectually free university disappears, the free society will likewise perish.
THE TIGHTENING TENSION

A dynamic tension between the university and its environment is normal, but the current face-off between university and public is cause for concern. The trend is even ominous. Society is becoming more avaricious and demanding in its consumption of university services. The university is becoming more willing to put down its walls, to be where the action is, to criticize public policy, and even to risk confusing power with influence. This mutual interpenetration creates more points of friction and more promise of conflict.

The central issue is not new. Whether the freedom enjoyed within the campus can be extended outside the campus bothered universities centuries ago. Social criticism and public service as university functions have been growing for almost a century. Catering to clients as well as to students and serving as the arm of government have respectable land-grant university traditions. Whether freedom of action extends as far as freedom of thought, and whether professors enjoy the same latitude off the campus as on, have long troubled the academic waters. When is a campus a legitimate sanctuary and when a revolutionary cell? When does sponsored research seduce the university? How far should the university be the agent of government? When can the university countenance the disobeying of the law? Is neutrality really an endorsement of a rotten society? All or most of these questions were current before contemporary students added their flamboyant provocation. Whether these youth are the "new fascisti," nihilists, or genuine agents of change, they evoke images of what is inside the walls, ready to spill out on an innocent society when the university talks of its extramural mission. Political forays, disruption, violence, and other direct actionism from universities in Europe and Latin America have etched the image more deeply.

But the underlying issue persists: How can the university retain the freedom it requires from a society it criticizes? How can it retain its competence and its capacity to affect the course of society without incurring hostility from a society content with its course? There is where the crunch comes. The sleeping issue is now
The university exists on the sufferance of the state. As Karl Jaspers has said: "Its existence is dependent on political considerations. It can only live where and as the state desires . . . Society wants the university because it feels that the pure service of truth somewhere within its orbit serves its own interests." But the service of God is offensive to the devil. The pursuit of truth inevitably leads to controversy about both the truth and its consequences. Hence it is not surprising to note that Professor Walter P. Metzger, historian of academic freedom, concludes that it takes great vision for "any society, interested in the immediate goals of solidarity and self-preservation," to subsidize free criticism and inquiry. The accommodation which persists in our universities is "one of the remarkable achievements of man," although "one cannot but be appalled at the slender thread by which it hangs."

In this precarious balance, society has come to adopt some pragmatic tolerances. It is accustomed to extension activities, to service bureaus, to contractual relations with government, and to overseas assistance. The pre-Civil War college related only modestly to the limited professional life of that time and not at all to science, technology, business, and agriculture. In contrast, higher education today is actively serving these, plus government itself, on a host of fronts, and with public acceptance. But the "slender thread" begins to appear when unorthodox or politically sensitive activities are attempted, even under these tolerances—activities such as university implementation of the U. S. Department of Agriculture's social policies, dispensing of contraceptives in the university medical clinics, service overseas for the CIA, leadership training for civil rights workers, or urban renewal assistance. The slender thread is further attenuated when faculty and students resort, as some are now advocating, to a host of direct action measures to challenge "the establishment," to appeal to "the higher law" of conscience, and to dramatize social ills thought to be too extreme to wait upon persuasion. Indeed the object has sometimes become precisely that of straining the tolerances of society; and that can easily be done by anti-war stances, formally adopted manifestos for social reform, preferential graduate admissions of draft resisters, occupation and obstruction of public buildings, insistence on fixed
quotas for the employment of minority groups, defiance of the police, memorializing for "pot" and "pill," aiding Cuba, making alliances with the black nationalists, and doing much else which anyone can add from his own home experience. These are the shouts and sharp blows of the Karate Age, as someone has called it, perhaps unwittingly to contrast it to the whimperings of the so-called Aspirin Age of two decades ago.

What are the stakes in this new confrontation? What is placed in jeopardy? Most obviously, the freedom of the university itself from outside interference. Prior to that, society's acceptance of the university as an objective intellectual force, possessed of integrity and competent to be a social critic. Most directly at stake is the survival of the activist role the university community professes; but more importantly, at stake is the university's moderate and necessary participative social role which is required for maintaining relevance in what it teaches, what it investigates, and what it extends to the outside world. The hard-to-defend jeopardizes the defensible. At stake is the whole interconnecting apparatus between the university and society, the apparatus through which meaningful communication takes place, balance is attained, accommodation is achieved, and mutual dependence is acknowledged.

Who is affected? Who gets involved? Who produces the consequences? Four audiences or potential respondents may be identified: the external academic world, the mass media, the general public, and the government.

The external academic community consists of the lower educational institutions, other universities and their faculties, professional societies, and accrediting bodies. This is such an "in" group, so sympathetic and understanding that it would rarely present any consequences or sanctions. An exception might arise from one of the professional societies which takes its cue from its practitioners and feels possessive about the educational production of the members' new colleagues and competitors. Accrediting bodies, unlike the general public, would probably regard extreme institutional activism as an acceptable additive unless it patently threatened to disrupt and despoil the teaching and research functions. Extreme university activism might alienate counsellors in high
schools and junior colleges, with enrollment effects; but, generally speaking, the fellow educators would be hard to alienate and, hence, are not a source of major concern.

The next audience, the mass media, is a vital concern. Its impact is great. It goes about its professional job, as it sees it, paying little or no attention to the consequences, but leaving that to the public in the way that science leaves its capacity for evil as well as good. Virtually every opportunity the university has to reach the general public, as distinguished from selected groups like the alumni, is through the mass media. This includes what the university itself supplies, what reporters dig up, or what unexpectedly explodes into newsworthiness, however much the explosion might have been engineered precisely to capture headlines. Since the nature of news—except that concerning the political, social, business, athletic and entertainment elites—is that which is aberrant, unusual, extreme, or unrepeatable, social activism on the part of the university, or its faculty or students, is likely to get unusual coverage. Such activism produces adversary relations, on which journalism thrives. The approach usually is, What is the score? Who is winning?

Paradoxically, the university is also a communications institution. Its success depends on the free flow of ideas in the scholarly community, and among scholars outside, with only minor spill-over to the general public. However, the trend toward more activism and more direct outside involvement inevitably puts the university into the arena covered by mass communications rather than by scholarly discourse. So the university will become increasingly subject to the major limitation of the mass media: the necessary presentation of selective evidence. Complex problems, which activist positions usually represent, inevitably suffer when stripped to simplistic interpretations, overcompression, or one-facet coverage. Likewise, the university which is tied to the complex problems also suffers as the reading or listening public makes up its mind on the basis of inadequate perception. Getting the facts is no doubt a scrupulously-held journalistic objective, but space dictates selectivity and readership dictates appeal to the mass. Ample examples show how the ripple can be made a tide,
the amusing made menacing, the minority made a majority, the conscientious made unconscionable, and the compromise made a capitulation.

When to these natural news limitations of the mass media are added the editorial policies of commentators and publishers—policies based on their own news coverage plus their personal predilections—the university must seriously reckon with this pervasive prism, yielding both color and heat, which stands between it and its other publics. No conceivable crisis of activism can escape the influence of public scrutiny via press, radio and television. No one has. No one will. This is the price an activist university must be prepared to pay. It may win journalistic allies or enemies, but it will not be ignored.

Another maker of consequences is the general public—all readers and listeners of the mass media, including the alumni, the benefactors, the consumers (such as extension clients, contractors, and parents of students), and those who are uninterested and unaffected until some university act or policy welds them into some new pro- or anti-university "public." This is the most potent university audience, in one sense, but it is also an object of much democratic folklore. It makes public opinion. It helps evaluate what ought to become public policy. It dictates to government. But it cannot rise above the sources of its information, which for the individual reader or listener is not only selective but largely monopolized. It is subject, as Walter Lippmann used to say, to the pictures in the head—not only the accumulated encrustation of values and prejudices through which all supposed fact is screened but also the pictures which are newly being built by the persistent impact of the news media. In this context, the university is what the public thinks it is. Fact is not as important as the perception of fact, unless one can find some independent way to appeal to fact, to make it real again.

Within "the public" are subordinate publics, some closely allied to the university and with which it may have special ways of maintaining the liaison—such as alumni publications, special releases to select lists, offices concentrated on benefacti and communications with the professional groups standing behind the university's
professional schools. But the more important question is what makes a "public" for the university. Such a group has to arise out of a perceived interest--maybe a threat, maybe a cause to join--which is keenly enough felt to inspire action. This public-generating capacity exists in unusual degree in activist programs. This is where the patriotic groups are galvanized into action, the interest groups become defensive, the power-threaten retaliate, the neighborhood reacts to the intruding university, the outraged religious sects are heard from, and the forgotten group is inspired to shout. It is only a step from the birth of such publics to their appeal to public action through public officers, for punishment or for favor.

This then brings us to the last and most potent maker of consequences: government. Whether public or private, this is where the university meets its greatest potential enemy, as it may likewise be a potential benefactor. Government can change the rules of the game or call for a new game. Its restraint is what makes the university possible: its not doing what it clearly could do. Therefore, the university which wants to participate in matters the government also cares about, the great public policy questions, will have to take the government very much into account--government as an ally, as a supporter, as a protector; or as a score-evener, as an enemy, as an intruder, as a seducer. The university will have to measure its moderation/aggression scale alongside the government's tolerance/retribution scale. This means local, state, and national governments, and the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. All levels and all branches have recently demonstrated their capacity to embarrass, to restrain, and to punish higher education if the provocation is deemed sufficient.

Having looked at three particularly potent university "publics," we should now ask, What consequences can these makers of consequences produce?

The mass media can obviously help manufacture all the other publics; but they can also themselves oppose bond issues, create "mass protests," seek governmental intervention, distort the university (and student and faculty) image, and create the smoke by which gullible people know there is fire. It would be a great disservice to the
mass media to impute the worst motives to all; but, regrettably, one can find examples of editor-politician combinations which have attempted to whipsaw universities into complete ideological subjugation, first by driving professors back into their temple and then by cleansing the temple. This aggression breeds its own retribution, indeed among other mass media, but often after the damage has become almost irreparable.

The general public, with its innumerable voluntary associations, has many ways of producing consequences the university must reckon with. Withholding money is one potent weapon. Colleges can withstand it in theory and often do, with great flourish. They can even withstand it in practice, if it is not too much! However, activist programs which have brought faculty and students into vigorous defiance of the law have demonstrated that there is no accredited college or university in America so liberal in its orientation that the alumni and other benefactors will accept such defiance without verbal and financial retaliation. The provocation may have to be great, and the college officials may defend the policies or programs, but the hard fact of inevitable consequences has to be weighed in the balance—consequences which say, "There are bounds, and we think you are skirting or exceeding them." Parents of students or potential students have the same options and sometimes exercise them.

The most powerful public influence lies in another direction—in its capacity to influence government and to create new public policy. Every legislator has his political antennae up, and even judges and police chiefs follow the papers and the election returns. They are all helped by the interest groups who memorialize the public officials, write letters, buttonhole, and threaten. These range from the Daughters of the American Revolution to the Maoist factions, and from the National Association of Manufacturers to the Audubon Society. If the university wants to follow a tough line, the general public can be noisy but largely impotent, until it begins to speak through government.

Government has a whole arsenal of weapons, from threat to overkill. Here is where that modicum of truth in the ancient opposition to federal aid comes home to haunt us: as government has become a larger benefactor, it has gained larger capacity to
injure by withdrawing its favors. Ironically, that argument was usually made by those who would have been least likely to incur public disfavor by policy disagreement. While the federal government has great and growing power to damage by withdrawal of its support, it has no ready means of singling out particular institutions. It can set standards and deny favors to those who fall short, but it has no direct appropriating capacity to retaliate as a state legislature has, and sometimes uses, over its state institutions. The power of enforcing standards as a condition of financial support is currently illustrated by federal legislative amendments to bar funds to faculty and student who have been convicted of rioting on or off campus or who have willfully violated a lawful campus rule or regulation. The prohibitions could be extended to cover many other publicly offensive actions. An angry government, particularly a state government vis-a-vis a state institution, has a wide range of fiscal restraints and harrassments it can employ against the offending university, if the stakes are high enough.

Other governmental devices are police action; investigations, substantive or audit; legislative changes by statutes and by riders; admonitions in committee hearings or reports; hortatory resolutions; and formal public statements, executive or legislative. Not to be overlooked is another vast area: the intrusion of the courts into university affairs on the initiative of both private citizens and public officials. The litigious era has now hit higher education. The net effect has clearly been restrictive on the institution; and whether the university is contemplating an activist course or reacting to one in progress, it can no longer overlook how its actions may appear in the courts. Indeed the judicial bodies, or any other of these external publics, have great capacity to agitate what might be called "the public mix," creating compounded and reinforced effects, to the serious detriment of the university. For example, the Fayette County Grand Jury in Kentucky recently put three publics on the back of "the persons in authority at the university" by asking the Board of Trustees to "develop ... an attitude more compatible with the desires of the alumni and general public."

So we come back to the troublesome question: How can the university continue to push society toward adaptation without suffering crippling reprisal against its
freedom to push? The university has the intellectual power. The public, through government, has the legal power. How can the latter be moved by the former?

Perhaps the answer is: not at all without risks and without occasional deadlocks. Some way must be found short of surrender by either party. Society can surely find a rational ordering of its critical needs for both legal compulsion and intellectual power. Since some kind of balance will be required, opinion will inevitably enter into the striking of such balance. Burdened with that admitted subjectivity, certain guidelines, certain bounds not to be overstepped, may be suggested as a means of provoking thought as to where the balance should be and how attained.

First and foremost, the university must not compromise its integrity. That is its most prized possession. Integrity sustains its claim to a role as social critic, to an outreach function, to a mediating capacity, to the public sharing of its competence, to entitlement to teach youth and to do research. It is also the most potent of weapons against the state or any other outside group in case of controversy. The university cannot afford to undermine the public's view of it as the objective searcher after truth. University professors of medicine, education, home economics, social work, nursing, and business could surely work directly in the ghettos and on ghetto problems without jeopardizing this principle. The same cannot be said for working abroad for the CIA under cover until exposed by independent sources of information. Integrity does not inhere in the problem but in the methods by which the problem is attacked; therefore, integrity does not dictate that kind of "neutrality" which really takes sides with the status quo.

Second, the university must maintain a distinction between corporate and individual views and acts. The institution is both a corporation and a collection of persons. For individual administrators, professors, and students, the university can and should vigorously defend their freedom, both on and off campus, in customary ways so far as these can be made to apply. For relief from the strain and over-extension which comes from action-centered rather than thought-centered activities of "university persons" or from public-policy, decision-making involvement rather than
classroom discussion, the academic community knows no way but negotiation, consideration of alternatives, appeal to mutually acceptable principles, and hoped-for agreement. If and when individuals choose to take the law into their own hands, they will have to be left to its mercies. The university cannot be a sanctuary against the law. Indeed, institutional adherence to the law might be listed as a separate guideline. It is a boundary whose perimeters, particularly on the distinction between dissent and civil disobedience, have been cogently explicated recently by Chief Justice-Designate Abe Fortas, the Solicitor General of the United States, and the President of the American Bar Association, with essential agreement. As a corporation, the university should eschew corporate positions on public policy except where its own educational interests are involved. It should otherwise neither have nor take any corporate stance simply for the sake of changing public policy. This restraint is wise because the university cannot commit, and should not coerce, its individual members. Finally, the university as a corporate body should make clear that it vigorously defends the freedom of inquiry which must be accorded to the members of the academic community and also the full exercise of that freedom, but that the institution dissociates itself from the content of such expressions and actions.

Third, the university must be free to do whatever it takes to keep relevant in its age. This legitimizes the outward thrust which may cause external reprisal. Feedback from the action line is a clue to relevance. In an age of rapid change, involvement is an essential laboratory for the behavioral sciences; and direct participation may be the best way to lock professors and students onto what is relevant in their age. Despite our marvels of communication, our social environment is filled with cultures, subcultures, and varying life styles totally foreign to both professors and students unless the ivory tower is left behind. Instructional, research, and extension programs which bring the university into better congruence with the critical problems of life are changes the university should welcome and risks the public must endure. Furthermore, this kind of relevance gives the universities grassroots where none existed before and in place of many now being torn up.
Fourth, the university must not lose its identity. It is fitted for some things and not for others. It has contemporary competitors unknown a few years ago—the knowledge industry, think tanks, private corporate contractors for both education and public services, and professional bodies with educational missions. Therefore the university will have to work out a new division of labor; but that is not to say its function will shrink. The mix will be different. Selection of options will have to be made, but probably among more options. The university cannot be all things to all people; therefore, it has to decide what things it wants to be to what people. The preservation of identity means choices but not a withdrawal from the world. It means commitment where it counts and where the need and the university's competence can be fitted together. This leaves plenty of room for innovation. While institutional identity must indeed be preserved, the admonition is not to retrench but to reassess, to establish certainty, clarity, and manageability.

Fifth, the university must not lose its critical capacity. It cannot become beholden. It cannot let itself be used. It cannot be an uncritical instrument for someone else's good. It can be a servant but not a slave. It can even become the agent of the government for particular, mutually agreeable purposes, but it should preserve the autonomy of shared responsibility in this particular and sacrifice none of its freedom of criticism in all other relations with the same cooperator. Obviously it can be seduced by its sources of income, but this is again, within wide and crucial limits, a matter of remedy by determination and forceful assertion. The desire to effect change cannot be sustained on any basis short of the exercise of the critical competence which inheres in the specialists and the custodians of knowledge who make up the faculty.

Sixth, the university must not seek power—intellectual power, the power of knowledge, yes; but not legal power or the capacity to coerce. That is the weapon of the state, of those who govern. The university may influence, advise, consult, aid in policy making, serve as either agent or critic of government, and, above all, seek understanding; but when it seeks power itself, it abandons its claim to immunity from
power. It should aspire to be on tap but not on top. Furthermore, to twist Lord Acton's phrase, power corrupts and academic power corrupts academically.

Finally, the university must not deny its accountability. It may be self-governing and self-regenerating, but it is self-deceiving if it denies that it owes its existence to society, with ultimate accountability to some representation of interest broader than the strictly academic. The university, like the citizen, is not a complete free agent. It is suspended between freedom and control, through that accountability which suits its peculiar social mission. Such accountability may run to the state, or it may run to a self-perpetuating private corporation, probably both through "trustees," the ones who literally hold a trust. The strings may not be felt, the reins may be loose but they are always there—as vague as "the demands of the age" or as explicit as a dictator's edict. The degree of activism and direct social and political involvement which will be tolerated cannot be assessed without the university's realization that the must be an ultimate bearing of the burden of defense if accountability presses the question. If the public is not to intrude into the university, what is the university's reciprocal obligation? What merits the restraint? Here again is the tightening tension The challenge is to contain it, and to direct it constructively.

If these guidelines seem imprecise and unsatisfying, that in itself is a commentary on the current nature of university activism. It has moved from helping farmers with crops, teaching courses off campus, and doing what the government wants under contract to challenging established social and economic values, asserting moral positions, reordering human relations, and, in some extremes, seeking power and using physical force. It has moved from areas of consensus to areas of controversy. It has moved from operation under public policy to action to reshape public policy, from subordination to superordination. The extremes in such human conflict are easy to rule out, but striking the balance in the middle is indeed a tribulation. The guidelines he suggested are standards for judgment, like reasonableness as a standard of law. They are imprecise because of the subject with which they deal. Yet the line between "the permissible and the forbidden" is "reasonably clear," to use the words of Justice Forte.
"Procedure," he goes on to say, "is the bone structure of a democratic society, and the quality of procedural standards which meet general acceptance—the quality of what is tolerable and permissible and acceptable conduct—determines the durability of the society and the survival possibilities of freedom within the society." In these troubled matters, there is no escape from judgment, accommodation, and responsibility: the most ancient of rules for two men who aspire to stand on the same ground without violence.

So, despite some of the current campus excesses, it is premature to despair. Someone has said that hope is at least as reasonable as despair. In fact, within bounds, progress can be wrung out of conflict. Creative tension can be harnessed to educational objectives.

As John Stuart Mill said a century ago, with some unintended corroboration of the activist thesis today, observation is also a way to truth, along with reasoning. Furthermore, he said, education is fresh "to those who come to it with a fresh mind."

If looking aggressively for activism, the university community might well combine this freshness of mind with the ceaseless public promotion of the idea that the free university is indispensable and that, if restrained, it would be immeasurably less useful even to those who seek the restraint. In a sense, this is the overriding activist role the university should unhesitatingly embrace: it should busy itself in so relating to, and so serving, the public—through understanding rather than power—that a majority will concede the essential conditions of such service. In this role, the university trustees have the special task of vindicating their special trust—serving as a buffer and interpreter between the university and the public. Under these conditions, one would hope to see, as a stabilizing but adaptive influence in an agitated age, the collaboration of a responsible university and a tolerant society. It takes both.

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Eldon L. Johnson, Vice President
University of Illinois
Tenth Annual College and University Self-Study Institute
University of California at Berkeley
Agent of Whom?

Talk to the Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education Institute on "College and University as Agents of Social Change."

by Harris Wofford, Jr.

When the council of our college first talked with me, one astute member asked in effect what Chancellor Heyns and I are now asked to debate, except he put it in more personal terms: "Will you spend all your time sounding off on controversial issues?" He gave civil rights as his example but his question was really the larger one: Is it necessary and proper for a college president, or anyone representing the college, or in some cases even the college itself, to take public stands on public issues? Should the college try to change society or stick to the business of education?

Obviously I replied that I would not spend all of my time on such issues because of the demanding job they were giving me but added that if I were in their shoes I would worry more about someone who wouldn't spend any of his time that way, either because he didn't have anything to say or because he was afraid to say anything. A Peace Corps Volunteer had goaded me: "If you become a college president, you will never say anything, sign anything or do anything political or controversial." It seemed to me that the council of a college should want a president who would disprove that charge.
Isn't it the business of education to lead children up to manhood - to lead adolescent subjects into full citizenship? Silence, cowardice, emptiness or nihilism at the core of the Academy would be a source of corruption of the young and of society at large; the opposite of what education in citizenship should be.

This personal preface is not to suggest that what is good for a college president is necessarily good for the college, but it is a short answer to the general question: Should a college or a university see itself as -- and act as -- an agent of social change?

Yevtushenko tells us it is man's fate to shuttle back and forth between the City of Yes and the City of No. But I am glad that Chancellor Heyns and I have each been assigned one side of the proposition that colleges and universities should be agents of social change, and that mine is the City of Yes. Though there are many complicated things to say it is good to find us standing on these strong two and three letter words, very short and simple words that you do not hear often enough in the academic world.
Mine is an easier side of the argument because we will probably all agree that there are some occasions involving great political and social issues, when we would all expect institutions of higher education to take sides as deeply and directly engaged agents for or against particular social changes. At least we regularly expect this of colleges and universities other than our own. As to Nazi Germany, would we not agree that the Academy there had a duty to resist with all of its individual and collective power Hitler's laws and acts against Jews from the first forms of civil discrimination to the "final solution"? Do we not agree that universities as universities, even at the risk of their extermination, had this duty to seek to change the course of Nazi terror -- that universities in Mussolini's Italy had a duty as universities to resist the Fascist oath?

Do we not believe that the Academy in Greece today -- as in ancient Athens -- should be an agent seeking to restore the conditions of public freedom? Do we not hope that universities in Eastern Europe will with courage and political skill, continue to press for the liberalization of their Communist states? Do we not hope that this is happening in the Soviet Union and behind the scenes even in China?

Do we not tell universities in Asia, Africa and Latin America to be responsible and active agents of the social revolutions necessary in most poor and newly developing nations? Do we not, through
our government programs and foundation aid, in fact almost bribe some foreign universities to undertake major programs concerned with sensitive domestic social and political issues such as land reform?

How then can we take the position that universities should engage in controversial matters and be avowed agents of social change everywhere in the world but in America?

It even gets closer home than this. Those who advise against universities as universities getting involved in such issues usually stand on even narrower ground. A Northern university president may not believe that his university should risk its public or political support by involving itself directly in matters of injustice or violence nearby, a police department run amuck or migrant workers on strike, but he is likely to believe that his counterpart in the South should risk his job and his institution by giving leadership on racial integration -- and vice versa.

In fact, I suspect that most of us would agree that there are some political and social issues of such vital importance to the university that the university -- even an American University -- would have to act as a university, whatever the consequences. If so, then the real questions are what those issues are, how they are determined, and how the university should act. What kind of agent of change should it be?

Let me return to these crucial questions by another route, Mine should also be an easier side of the argument because it can
be shown, I think, that any university at all worthy of that name is inevitably, whether it wants to be or not, whether it admits to being or not, an agent of social change. And if it is a powerful university it is probably a powerful agent of social change.

This is true because of the very nature of change in the modern world -- this new world ushered in by the industrial revolution, if not by the renaissance or indeed by the original Western dialectic of ancient Jews and Greeks. The world revolution of science and technology has education at its central generating source. Along with other corporations such as business firms and states, colleges and universities are the carriers of this now nearly universal revolution of modernization.

It takes about sixteen years to make a modern man -- sixteen years of formal education to turn an Ethiopian villager into a jet pilot, or a Nigerian bushman into a modern poet; sixteen years of education for an outcaste Hindu to become a nuclear physicist, for a whole generation of Russian peasants to become skilled industrial workers, for two hundred million young Chinese to learn the literacy, mathematics and new laws of a modernizing military state. Through education the secret has been let out that man need not be forever poor, that science and technology, economics and politics make it possible for the first time in human history for the benefits of civilization, such as they are, to be made available to the whole human race. To all men. That is the giant revolutionary fact of our time which education is making manifest.
If we look back over the history of modern civilization, we can see that universities have always been agents of change. Justice Brandeis called corporations the master instruments of civilization, and put educational corporations at the heart of our corporate life, as the great shakers and movers, the most fundamental agents of change. From the days of the educating monastic corporations of the middle ages, which were the change agents that began to modernize agriculture -- they were the first "land grant colleges" -- through the early medieval universities where "nation" was the name for a college of people from the same locality, through the great universities of the world today, our academic republics of learning have been models for -- if not sometimes the mothers of -- the larger republics of learning known as nation-states.

In this perspective, with the plot so clear, with colleges and universities cast as central characters in our politics, now as ever, for better and for worse, how can we hope to escape responsibility by saying, "There's nobody here but us chickens, boss!"? Some chickens!

Yet that is what so many voices in higher education seem to be saying. President Johnson's chief White House advisor on education and science not long ago in explaining his action in dropping from a White House committee a distinguished scholar -- who now happens to be on our faculty -- who had taken an active stand against the war in Vietnam, said that education is too important for us to let it get involved in political controversy. Isn't the opposite
closer to the truth? Politics is too important for it not to be at the center of education. Education is too political for it not to be involved in matters of great controversy.

The founder of the Hebrew University and later the first president of Israel, Dr. Chaim Weizmann tells in his book *Trial and Error* how he convinced General Allenby during World War I that the founding of Hebrew University was not a political act and therefore should not be subject to the war-time ban on politics. It was just an educational institution, he assured the British Commander. Years later, as he looked back on the power generated by the University and by the other educational institutions created in Palestine, Weizmann comments that, of course, it had been a political act. And I would add that what is true of the birth of a university should be true of its life and when necessary its death: it should in deep and direct ways recognize itself as — and act as — an agent of the most profound politics.

If this is true, then what is our problem? What is wrong with the university denying modestly, as Weizmann did, that it is not political, and then continuing in a quiet way its role as an agent of the profound politics of modernization, reform and freedom? Why ask for trouble? Why not stick to the business of education and get involved only in public controversies that clearly and directly affect education? Why encourage universities to get more openly in the middle of controversial public problems?
The first thing wrong with this our present official doctrine is that it is not true -- and untruth should be the last thing a university accepts. It is so untrue that even private profit-making corporations now feel it necessary to affirm that they do carry corporate responsibility for the common good. Few private corporations any longer dare to say that their concern is for themselves alone, that doing what is good for themselves is itself enough of a contribution to the common good. But universities still say this, and in doing so they demonstrate a self-centered closure that is the opposite of a truly open dialectic.

That is the second thing wrong with this approach: it is narrow and selfish, and therefore ultimately ridiculous. Isn't it ridiculous for a great university to consider questions of the justice of a war or national conscription to be beyond the pale of academia -- except insofar as or until its graduate students are in danger of being drafted? Yet that is what the conventional doctrine seems to say: a university is to be concerned about political issues only when they directly impinge on the efficient functioning of the university or the individual liberty of students and faculty. This is a long way from concern for the common good.

A third thing wrong with universities pretending not to be agents of social change is that it is a cover-up; it camouflages the fact that universities are such agents; and in their disavowal they may fool themselves as well as others. The Federal
Government knows, the State Department knows, the Pentagon knows, the CIA knows, our adversaries in the world know that American universities are and have been agents for research and recruitment in support of America's present world policies and military efforts. Why shouldn't the American people and the members of the university community know the facts on this? What is wrong is that those policies and efforts may themselves be wrong: they may be just what ought to be changed. At least the question of whether these policies and efforts should be supported, as they are now by most large universities, or opposed, should be a live one on every campus. And that debate should not be an extra-curricular or underground one, but one that engages the university as a whole.

It is no tribute to universities that the students have been the most active agents in raising these questions: that they have been like a giant Socrates in our midst come to ask us the hard questions we should have been asking them and asking ourselves. The Teach-Ins and many of the explosive student protests would not have had to come as they did if the Academy as a whole was teaching, and learning - criticizing, questioning and acting as it should.

So the official doctrine of political neutrality is wrong because it is corrupting and cowardly. It is the antithesis of the ancient original Socratic rule, to follow the question where it leads. It is part of the reason why the word "academic" has become synononomous with anemic, irrelevant and hypcritical. A doctrine that institutionalizes timidity at just the point where we need to be encouraged to have the courage of our convictions, is wrong.
Lastly, the doctrine is wrong because it leaves a vacuum for others to fill. It is an abdication of leadership. The passive university becomes subject to the invasions of others, to the demands that others thrust upon it. Knowing that the university is a powerful agent of change, many outside forces will try to capture it and make it their agent for their change.

Recently I heard the good governor of a big industrial state call upon universities to turn their full power to the crisis of our cities. He said he was tired of hearing John Hannah tell how when the farmers of Michigan discovered that their frozen strawberries were not red enough for the housewives, Michigan State University solved the problem and gave the farmers red strawberries. With matters of life and death facing the people of this country and the world -- racial rebellion, urban poverty, international wars -- the Governor in effect asked: "How can universities fiddle while Newark and Washington and Saigon and Hanoi burn? If our universities have been willing to take on so many relatively low technical problems, from red strawberries to better embalming, why are they not ready and able to turn their full powers to the great questions of war and peace and justice?"

I agree with the Governor, but I do not want to see this pressure on the universities coming largely from the outside, and I am afraid that unless our basic doctrine on this changes, we will respond to these pressures as we have with other forms of public service that our universities render: We will give public service in the service-station sense. We give governors and farmers and
embalming associations the service they ask for --which is not necessarily the service which they and our society need. And we do it as something above and beyond what we see as our true academic duty, we do it as an extra favor or for good profit, we do it in performance of that third competing obligation of a university.

I am skeptical of competing purposes, and especially third purposes. Instead I follow a contrary doctrine that holds to the one original purpose of the university, which you still find in most catalogs but not in many other operations of the university. "To pursue the truth in unlimited directions in the traditions of all universities" -- so reads the great purpose of the State University of New York in its official publications. "Truth is the hardest, most troublesome word you use," said one of our student planners at Old Westbury who complains that I have a tendency toward a medieval vocabulary. Let me add that he always also reinforces my instinct to stick with the hard troublesome words. The search for truth seems to me to include and serve all our many separate purposes. I use the word "truth", by the way, as a young Russian used it in 1957 when we were in a Moscow art gallery looking at a picture of Christ and Pontius Pilate entitled "What is the truth?" The young Russian said: "Five years ago I did not like that picture. I was 17, a young Communist and I knew the truth. Now I like it because I know the truth is a question."
What is the truth about the university as an agent of change? Let us look at the three key words in the proposition: "agent", "change", and "university". An agent has a principal he is responsible to, and change must have some criterion. Who or what is a university an agent of? What is our criterion for determining whether a particular change is good or bad?

A university is not the agent of the public, for it is often the public's opinion that most needs changing -- by criticism, by Socratic goading, by education. Nor is it the agent of trustees representing that public, let alone of presidents or administrators all of whom depend for their legitimacy on the consent of several other constituencies, especially the faculty and students. And it cannot be the agent of faculties, for their special domains need especially to be stretched into universals. Nor is it the agent of students. The university, of course, needs to pay attention to where students are at, as they would say, but it also needs to challenge each generation to go where it has not been, to go where it ought to go. This generation particularly needs to be encouraged to take the deep and disciplined intellectual trips their present travels seem to be neglecting.

My alma mater's Socratic oracle, Robert Hutchins, says that the University's purpose "is to fashion the mind of the age and not be fashioned by it." And his predecessor at Chicago, William Rainey Harper, said in 1905 that universities should not be "deaf to the cry of suffering humanity" or "exclusive and shut up within themselves."
but "the true university, of the future," should instead be "the prophetic interpreter of democracy, the prophet of her past, in all its vicissitudes; the prophet of her present, in all its complexity; the prophet of her future, in all its possibilities."

If a university to be a true university must above all be a prophet and through this prophetic mission fashion the mind of the age, then a university really has to see itself and be to the best of its ability, an agent of the truth. In the beginning of our universities, when God and truth were synonymous, this was clear enough. We are told that God is dead, and I certainly have not found him alive in any of the universities I have visited recently. Nor have I been to the mountaintop, at least not since leaving Ethiopia a few years ago; but yesterday I rode a horse on the foothills of Mount Diablo up behind Berkeley—the Devil always has something to do with Truth — and the beauty and euphoria of that perspective emboldens me to paraphrase Santayana: there is no God but his word is being incarnated all the time, and especially in the corporations that call themselves communities of learning. A more academic word for all this is the one my Russian friend used: Question. God and Truth are indeed the great question. Universities are agents of this great question — and must therefore do their best to be great questioners.

Let me come down from the heights to a more American version of this proposition. Let us settle for the Declaration's definition of the truths that are America's great questions. Our revolutionary
founders declared that the need and right of all men to govern themselves was self-evident. But for this prophecy to come to pass, the higher education of all citizens must become truly universal and good. That in itself calls for our colleges and universities to be massive and much better agents of change than they have ever been. And one of the changes most clearly required is that they change themselves and become much better models of a republic of learning than they are now. This new constitution-making within the academy, that will enable students as well as faculty to be citizens and not subjects, is one of the great social changes universities will need to give leadership in achieving.

Beyond the reforms needed in our own house, there are more than enough great public questions on which universities as universities need to throw light. The war in Vietnam, the racial crisis, urban development, the war on poverty, the matter of drugs relations with China and the other places we can't get passports to -- you name them.

If I have claimed that this side of the argument, in favor of open acceptance/a role as agents of change is easier than the negative, let me concede that the consequences are not at all easy. Following the question where it leads inevitably leads on some occasions into trouble. A university that as a university resisted Hitler would have lost its life as a university -- or would it?
High authority says we may need to lose our life to find it, and history tells us that ancient Athens was never more alive than when its buildings were captured and burned, and its people took to the sea, saying that their city was on ships. The great days of the early universities, Trevelyan tell us, were when universities were built of men alone.

If we accept responsibility for the university to speak and act on some issues affecting the whole body politic, we will of course have great difficulty deciding which issues and how to do it. But that is the kind of difficulty our minds and souls need to face. That is the kind of question, about the common good, that truth requires us to ask.

This spring many campus administrators were alarmed because students threatened to boycott classes, close down colleges and assemble the community for debate on the Vietnam War. The position taken on most campuses was that the university had to stick to its business, those classes. But I have also heard of the different response by President Howard Johnson of M.I.T., who said that the Vietnam War was an issue that warranted the full attention of the University, that he for one was ready to listen to anyone who had light to throw on the question and that he would sponsor such a major confrontation. The students asked him to open the meeting and he agreed. Thousands came and the argument went on for hours. The dispute had been raised to its older title a disputation. For days afterwards, I am told, Howard Johnson was greeted by students who told him that they never felt so proud to be a member of M.I.T. than on that day when the community
as a whole, led by its official spokesman, engaged itself in seeking the truth about the Vietnam War. This is but one example of how a university should seek the truth.

All this is of course easier to say when your governor is the Governor of New York and not the Governor of California. Following the truth as a question may not lead to larger appropriations for state universities. But the urgent is too often the enemy of the important, and undue prudence will not lead to good prophecy. The important thing is that we act in the faith that it is Truth as a question that makes men free.
Economists have been surprisingly tardy in recognizing that education is an "industry" which is a significant sector of the economy. It is now a little larger than agriculture as a proportion of the gross national product and the prospects are for its continued growth, partly because the sheer growth of the total stock of knowledge means that a larger proportion of real resources must be devoted to transmitting knowledge from one generation to the next and partly because being an unprogressive industry technologically its relative price keeps rising, like haircuts. In spite if this if one contrasts the number of agricultural economists with the number of educational economists, the disproportion of the effort is a beautiful testimony to social lag.

There is no generic name for a unit of economic organization. The word "firm" is usually restricted to profit-making organizations and there is no general word for non-profit or what might be called "not very profit-making" organizations such as universities, schools, hospitals, municipalities, and so on. Surprisingly little attention has been paid to this sector of the economy even though it is growing very rapidly all the time. Still less is there any general term for a unit of organization considered as an organizational behavior unit in the total network of social relationships.

In economics there is a quite elaborate theory of the firm based on the assumption of profit maximization. There is no corresponding theory of the non-profit organization, even though this occupies very much the same kind of position as the firm in the total social system. The only
non-profit organization which has received much attention from economists is the household or the family spending unit, but the problems involved in large scale non-profit organizations are quite different and cry for attention. The university may be taken as typical of this important class of organizations.

A good many elements in the theory of the firm can be applied directly to the NPO, as we might call the non-profit organization. In the first place, any organization has something like a balance sheet in the form of a position statement or state description of it at a moment of time. A physical balance sheet or general position statement consists of a simple list of physical assets and liabilities, including on the asset side cash, debts due, accounts receivable, inventories, buildings, land, and certain intangible but extremely important items which might be called reputation, good will, or morale, representing the capacity of the organization for continuing to function into the future as an organization. On the liability side we would have such things as accounts and other debts payable, and perhaps some items of negative good will representing disadvantageous personal relationships, personnel, traditions or reputations.

In making a state description the role of the existing personnel is of great importance. We need to distinguish between the role structure on the one hand, which consists of all the clearly recognizable positions in the organization, and the role occupants on the other. The role occupants may either under fulfil or over fulfil the role and hence may contribute positively or negatively to the good will items in the balance sheet. In some cases, such as professors with tenure the role occupants have a considerable degree of contractual permanency. In other cases, there may be a high turnover. In either case, an accurate state description would have to involve some kind of estimate of the value of the various
role occupants to the institution on the asset side, and some account of the obligations of the institution to the role occupants on the liability side.

An essential element in the state description is the inputs into and outputs out of the institution for some accounting period. An income account also has to include items of depreciation of the existing assets or conditions, such as the running down of buildings or equipment or (strictly) the decline in skills and reputation of the faculty members. The dynamics of an organization are closely related to its inputs, outputs and depreciations. Its processes may be divided fairly sharply into those which are subject to what I have called the "bathtub theorem" in which the relations of inputs, outputs, and stock is that of simple addition and subtraction. An input adds to the stock and an output subtracts from it, so that the net increase in the stock in any period is equal to the input minus the output, just like water running into and out of the bathtub. An excess of input over output raises the stock by exactly that amount. An excess of output over input lowers the stock similarly. This principle applies in exact form, for instance, to cash balances. The increase in a cash balance in a period is exactly equal to the difference between what has been paid into it and what has been paid out of it. In the case of other physical assets again the bathtub theorem applies if the increase in the stock of any particular asset is equal to the input minus the output. The output in this case, however, may include depreciation as a form of consumption. Input may be either production or purchase; output may be either consumption or sale.

When we come to the more subtle assets and liabilities involving reputation and good will, the relations between inputs, outputs and stock...
may be much more complex than the simple additive relationship. These might be called the informational variables and here even though there are clearly functional relationships between inputs, outputs and stock these relationships may be very complicated and do not follow simple principles of addition or subtraction. Thus, in the case of an individual an increase in his knowledge is not simply the result of an excess of input of information over its output. Information is not conserved as money stocks, and, as to a considerable degree, the physical capital are conserved. The university is particularly subject to this principle because of the fact that one of its major activities is teaching, which is a prize example of non-conservation. When the teacher teaches a successful class, the class knows more and so does he. There is no sense in which teaching results in a loss of information in the mind of the teacher and a corresponding gain in the mind of the student. Everybody gains together. Good will or benevolence and the closely related concepts of morale and reputation are also non-conserving quantities. A "good" administrator creates good will among the faculty which in turn makes it easier for him to be a good administrator. An abrasive person by contrast can easily create cumulative ill will and declining morale and reputation.

One of the problems of all organizations, profit-making as well as non-profit, is that accounting systems are designed primarily for those inputs and outputs which are subject to the law of conservation and are not adapted at all to deal with those elements in the organization which involve information and which do not obey the law of conservation. As a result all organizations tend to operate with a perverted information system, with good information about certain aspects of the organization and very poor information about other aspects which may be equally important from the point of view of the organization's success or survival. This means that while there is a clearly defined ritual in financial
accounting, the all-important informational accounts are never made explicit and one has to rely on the good sense and almost on a kind of unconscious skill on the part of administrators and others in keeping the non-financial accounts in good shape. A "good administrator" is precisely the man who is sensitive to the total state or condition of the institution and who, therefore, neither sacrifices the non-financial aspects to petty-fogging detail or accounting formalisms, nor does he neglect the necessity for making financial accounts balance in the long-run and for keeping the institution continually capable of meeting its financial obligations. The fuzziness of non-financial accounts introduces a bias into the decision-making process. This is a problem even in profit-making organizations where even though the financial accounts contain a large part of the measure of the success of the organization the non-financial aspects of the institution frequently determine its financial success or failure. Under these circumstances, a decision-maker in almost any organization is like a man with a telescope attached to one eye and a frosted glass over the other. He might be able to see something very well, but he would certainly not have binocular vision.

Any theory of the organization, whether profit or non-profit, must have some sort of abstract view of the process of decision-making. In the elementary theory of the firm information is supposed to be virtually perfect and costless and the decision-making process is simply based on profit maximization, that is, the firm is supposed to select those inputs and outputs at which the profit is at a maximum. Even in the case of the non-profit organization is is clearly inadequate from the start. Nevertheless, it is not easy to find a substitute for the maximization principle. We can, of course, restore the maximization principle formally for all organizations by supposing that what is maximized is utility. All this
really means, however, is that everybody does what he thinks is best at the time, which can hardly be denied but is a principle that does not necessarily have a great deal of content. Maximization theory, however, does have one virtue - it implies that all decision-making processes involve some kind of evaluation of the changes which are believed to result from a decision. The weakness of maximization theory is that it has prevented the development of the taxonomy of decisions simply because it assumes implicitly that all decisions are alike. In fact this may not be so. In a university, for instance, decisions about appointments and promotions may be made on very different principles from decisions about curriculum, decisions about fees, or about recognition of student organizations, or about the building of dormitories - the list could be extended almost indefinitely. Furthermore, the decision-making process always has to be studied in the light of its organizational setting. The authoritative legitimator of a decision in an organization may not correspond at all, for instance, to the "real" slot or level at which decisions are generally made. Every organization has a certain written or unwritten constitution which represents the generally accepted structure of authority. The points of authority may be a single role such as department chairman or dean; they may consist of a committee which has to make a collective decision; or they may consist of certain veto powers. No matter what the written constitution, every organization tends to have an informal constitution consisting of the people who control channels of communication or who are influential with the authoritative decision-makers. The larger the organization, the more important this informal constitution is likely to be, simply because the formal lines of communication lead to a progressive impoverishment of the information flows to the higher executives. A hierarchy is a set of wastebaskets designed to
sift out what each member of the hierarchy regards as the essential information which will go up to the next level. It may well be that the information which is really wanted at the top is sitting in the wastebasket somewhere in the seventh level of the hierarchy.

If large organizations are to operate successfully they must develop a good deal of redundancy and informal communication. These informal redundancies are often very hard to identify. Nevertheless, "knowing" the organization becomes one of the principal avenues of advancement in the hierarchy and this consists essentially in a sensitivity to who it is that really makes the decisions. These informal organizations are apt to be particularly important where the occupants of roles which are high in the hierarchy are incapable of handling the information overload which is always the penalty for authority. Under these circumstances the supposedly powerful members of the organization tend to rely on cronies and informal communications which may not be part of the formal organization network at all. One sees this principle operating most clearly in political organizations where the upper members of the hierarchy do not "rise" through the hierarchy but are imposed on it from without, as for instance, the President of the United States. In universities and also in corporations where promotion at least in the middle levels of the hierarchy is often made from within there tends to develop an "official family" within the administration who have a strong subculture among themselves and lively communications among themselves but not very good communication with the rest of the organization, either informally or formally. This situation can often cause a great deal of trouble as decisions are made in the light of increasingly imaginary images of what the situation is like. There is indeed an iron law of hierarchy, that hierarchy in itself tends to corrupt communication because there is always inadequate feedback
between superiors and subordinates, but also a man gets promoted to the hierarchy by pleasing his superiors. This is a skill which may make for euphoria but not necessarily for survival and it also leads to a progressive elimination, as people rise in the hierarchy, of the kind of capacity which is needed at the top where there are no superiors to please. This is perhaps why in universities and in many other organizations presidents and even deans are frequently brought in from outside.

A real taxonomy of decision is beyond the scope of this paper, but it may perhaps start with the fundamental distinction between what might be called maintenance decisions and creative or growth decisions. Maintenance decisions, as the name implies, are designed to maintain the institution as an open system. The office of admissions, the search for replacement of faculty and administrators, and the bulk of financial decisions fall into this category. The larger, the older, the more respectable the organization, the more likely it is to confine itself largely to maintenance decisions. The danger here is that maintenance may not be adapted to a changing environment and an institution which neglects the creative decision may find itself at a sharp competitive disadvantage in rapidly changing environments. Even in universities it is very hard to get recognition for the really creative decision-maker. He is often somebody who stands outside the regular respectable channels of academic and institutional life. This is the sort of man who opens up a new field, who creates a new department, or a new institute, or a new kind of activity such as extension, new fields of teaching, and so on.

The long-run success of an institution, and this is especially true of universities, depends in no small measure on the ability to tolerate and even to encourage people of this kind. Here again the capacity of an institution to recognize the intangible accounts is often the key to its success.
Coming down now to some of the special problems of universities, surprisingly little is really known about what it is that makes one institution thrive, grow, and become distinguished and another institution to languish in mediocrity or even decline towards extinction. Once a certain threshold has been reached indeed very few universities or even colleges actually decline towards extinction although this is by no means unknown in small colleges. From this point of view we might distinguish several classes of institutions. At the top there are those like Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Princeton which have such an enormous net worth of reputation and good will that they can afford to have three poor presidents in a row and still survive. They can stand an enormous amount of bad decision-making simply because they have such an enormous reserve of legitimacy. The sheer fact that this type of institution tends to attract able people and good decision-makers means that on considerations of probability they have a better chance of having good decision-makers than bad ones. The probability of their maintaining themselves as systems, therefore, is almost unity.

At the next level we have the state universities and private institutions of second rank who again are virtually indestructible as institutions but whose position in the list may rise and fall. Two good presidents and a bit of good luck will raise such an institution to first rank; two bad presidents in a row may push it down again. Below this level we have the well-established and successful colleges which again would have to have an uncommon run of bad luck to become extinct. Below this again are the vulnerable institutions; a bit of luck, a wealthy alumnus bringing in large endowments, a couple of good presidents in a row and so on and they may rise into the virtually indestructible category, or with some bad luck, a depression, and some poor administration they may decline into extinction.
A very interesting problem in the theory of the university which has not been very much studied is the problem of location. A university which is too isolated will find it hard to maintain a constant input of stimulating visitors and also the circulation of its faculty among other institutions and assignments. On the other hand, an institution which is too close to the center of things may find it hard to maintain its inner integrity because it is too distracted by easy access. This is perhaps why Washington has not produced a major university in this country and why one is almost tempted to describe the ideal situation for a major university as thirty miles from a major airport. These, however, are speculations without much evidence.

Especially at the level of second and third rank institutions, the random element is often very important. There are large numbers of people, for instance, who are capable of what might be called "maintenance operations" in the role of the president of a university. There are very few people who are capable of a creative operation in this role and for any particular institution it is largely a matter of luck whether they get a maintenance man or a creative man. Two creative presidents in a row and the university is either ruined or advanced into a higher rank. Like the selection of presidents of the United States, however, the process of selection of university presidents has a very strong random element in it.

A factor in the university situation which is receiving increasing attention today is a very remarkable change in the nature of the market for university services, which has two aspects - the increase in the proportion of income derived from research as opposed to teaching and the increase in the proportion of income which is derived from the federal government by contrast with either state or local government, private endowments or fees. There has been a shift also in the relative support
The problem of financial survival of the university is closely related to its function as an economic unit in society. The financial survival of any institution depends on its capacity to maintain an input of cash adequate to cover its cash outflow. In growing institutions indeed the input of cash should be slightly larger than its outflow to allow for growth in the total stock of liquid assets. An input of cash, however, corresponds to an output of something else and an outflow of cash to an input of something else. It is usually fairly clear what the outflow of cash creates in the way of inputs or something else for the outflow of cash is for the most part paid out in exchange for something; it purchases inputs in the way of supplies, equipment, buildings and the services of faculty and employees. The input of cash, however, is derived only in part from the exchange system, for instance, from student fees, medical fees, hospital charges, royalties, and payments for contract research. A large part of the cash input of any university is in what is called the "grants economy" and is derived either from appropriations from legislatures, either state or federal, which are in turn derived from the tax power, or they are derived from endowments, alumni contributions, private gifts, or foundation grants, all of which represent one-way transfers. The economic position of a university, therefore, is very deeply involved in the total grants economy and up to now we have not had very much study about this or theory about it. We can perhaps stretch the economist's concept of exchange and suppose that grants are made in response to some "product". The product in this case, however, is not a physical or exchangeable product, but it is a state of mind of those who have the power to make grants. Just what it is, however, that produces a willingness to make grants on the part of those who make them is often quite mysterious. I suspect indeed that the best theory
of the foundation is that it is a 90% random process. I am not sure that government is much better. One of the problems here is that the willingness to make grants is often quite unrelated to the performance of the grant-recipient. By contrast, one of the nice things about the exchange economy/that the institution which produces a saleable commodity has at least some control over what it produces, and hence its own decisions may effect its cash input. In the case of a grant-recipient, the grant often strikes, or does not strike, as the case may be, like lightning - the risk, however, being much less insurable.
which is given to different sections of the university. In the last twenty years, for instance, there has been a great increase in support of the natural sciences and of the medically related sciences. We are now seeing a similar rise in support of the social sciences, while the support of the humanities lags.

These changes in the market environment inevitably have profound impacts on the condition and on the decision-making processes of the whole institution. There is quite a strong case for a certain amount of viewing with alarm. How much alarm is appropriate is not easy to say. It is particularly hard to evaluate this change in the financial environment from the point of view of its impact on the intangibles, such things as loyalty to particular institutions, the willingness to perform roles which are not directly rewarded, and the relative role of the university itself and outside sources of funds and so on. Anxiety is at least being expressed that this change in the market environment is corrupting the integrity of the university as an institution. It is feared that the tradition, which goes back to the Middle Ages, of the university as an academic community with widely shared responsibility among the faculty for its decision making and a corresponding identification of the faculty with the institution itself and with its welfare, is giving way to the notion of the university as a convenient source of status, a kind of launching pad from which appeals can be made for outside funds.

It can be argued indeed that we should simply accept this phenomenon and adapt ourselves to it. What is significant is the total republic of the intellect, not any particular embodiment of this in a local university. In American universities, especially, the very political structure of the university as a corporation, usually governed by a self-perpetuating oligarchy or occasionally by an elected body of regents or trustees, has tended to
undermine the notion of faculty responsibility for the particular university
and its governance. The American university indeed has been described as
a benevolent tyranny checked and balanced by an active labor market, and
while this is a caricature the face is recognizable. The active labor
market, however, has one unfortunate consequence. It creates a pretty
sharp distinction within the university itself between the visible "cosmos"
who participate in the active labor market and who are therefore largely
independent of the particular institution which they condescend to grace
with their presences and the "locals" who are less visible and who do
all the work around the house. It is not surprising that under these
circumstances severe internal strains may appear.

In these days one cannot allow one of the strands in the composition
of the university to go unnoticed, that is, the students. Although there
are times these days when one gets almost a little nostalgic for apathy,
certainly this is a very remarkable student generation raised as it has
been from babyhood on Dr. Spock and TV. The great problem here is that
students occupy an uneasy status within the university; they are not
merely customers, although they do have somewhat the relationship to
the organization that customers have to Sears, Roebuck. Neither are
they quite members of the community, though they are perhaps closer to
this these days than to being mere customers. It is this intermediate
status between the customer and the member which makes the problem of
student unrest and dissatisfaction so hard to handle. Universities are
reluctant to admit students to full membership in the community with
decision-making rights simply because it is felt that they are not around
long enough. They do not have sufficient responsibility for the long-run
future. A university which would be parallel to a consumer's cooperative
in which the students are not only members but the owners and the ultimate
governing authority would be conceivable. This indeed could almost be called the "Legend of Bologna." Up to now at any rate this form of organization has not even gotten off the ground. Nobody really knows whether it could survive.

One does not have to go to this extreme, however, to recognize that there is increasing pressure these days for the recognition of students as members rather than as customers, and the universities have to respond to this in some way. One possibility at any rate is elected student representatives on the Board of Governors. Certainly what has passed for student government in the past is proving increasingly incapable of carrying the weight of the new demands. It has become apparent this year also that as legal and judicial organizations universities leave very much to be desired. This aspect of the university has functioned in the past partly because it has not been seriously challenged. When it is challenged, the universities find they have no repertoire to fall back on. In matters of student discipline there is no "graduated deterrence" - nothing between the slap on the wrist of admonition or probation and the blockbuster of suspension or expulsion. Perhaps universities are going to have to set up small jails under the heading perhaps of meditation chambers to provide suitably graduated deterrence for suitably graduated assaults. The disturbances of the last few years indeed raise very acutely the question of the judicial status of the university within the framework of the larger society. Is the campus part of the city it is in, or is it not? The medieval tradition of the university as a sanctuary still remains, but is perhaps becoming increasingly impractical.

As one looks into the future one sees the university as an institution of increasing importance in society, with great resilience and staying power, but also as an institution in some degree of continual crisis.
Part of this is a matter of sheer growth. The kind of decision-making processes which are appropriate in small institutions are not appropriate in large and the sheer lag of organization in universities tends to give them growth trauma. Part of this is conservation of tradition and the fact that most faculties, especially, see little reason for doing anything today that they did not do yesterday, which after all is the simplest decision-making rule even if it is not always successful. A very interesting question is whether universities increasingly are going to run into competition with other types of teaching and learning institutions. Corporations, for instance, are increasingly taking on functions of teaching, learning, and research which previously were regarded as somewhat the preserve of the university. Certainly if the universities do not adapt themselves to the modern world they will very rapidly run into new institutions which will provide them with stiff competition, which is good at least from the point of view of society. This is perhaps the most optimistic note on which to end.
I accepted the invitation to speak to this group on this topic in part because of the pressure such acceptance would bring upon me to put in writing what I have come to believe about this topic. In addition to welcoming the discipline that would be required, I looked forward to having those beliefs examined and challenged by other speakers, panelists and members of the audience.

I should begin by characterizing my position on the question of the relationship of the University to social, political, economic problems as essentially conservative. You should understand, however, that I speak from a campus which is characterized by a great deal of involvement in these problems. Thousands of our students, in connection with course work and outside classes, are teaching and tutoring children in poor communities, working in schools and social agencies. We offer courses which involve field work. Virtually all of our schools and colleges are involved with state and local government and many other social groups. In addition, our campus rules permit free discussion of all issues, and interest is not only lively but for many of our students this interest expresses itself in action and involvement. This state of affairs I approve of and defend.

Nevertheless, and indeed to protect this freedom, I do not believe that the university, formally as an institution, should take stands on non-educational matters. By formal official action I mean formal action through its governing board or executive heads. I have the same opinion about official actions on non-educational matters.
by departments and faculties. Because of the ambiguity of what constitutes official institutional action I would go further and state that the executive head must recognize that what he may believe are private acts often are interpreted as official positions. I would counsel great restraint in his own pronouncements and actions. To a lesser extent this applies to other officers and to a lesser extent still the faculty, but in all of these, the ambiguity is real enough that people in these categories should at least recognize the import of their acts or utterances.

In these past few sentences I refer particularly to official pronouncements, and I associate myself with the Antioch position quoted in Dr. McConnell's paper, "The only proper institutional stands ... are on issues scrupulously defined as educational."

With respect to action, to activity or programs, using the language of the questions posed by Dr. McConnell, I believe the university makes its contribution to social conditions indirectly -- "by making the results of its scholarship and research freely available" and through the free action of individuals rather than corporately. I believe it should be non-partisan.

And I take these positions for precisely the reasons given in support of them contained in the McConnell paper (although not necessarily by Dr. McConnell himself). As the Antioch group stated: The purpose of avoiding institutional positions is to free individual advocacy and choice, to preclude orthodoxy which inhibits dissent. The fundamental basis for freedom to learn and to teach has been that the position of individual faculty members and students does not reflect that of the institution as such. It is this independence that is jeopardized in many subtle ways if institutional neutrality is abridged. There is enough evidence on
our campus that even an informal consensus on the war has interfered with dissent; it may have influenced the nature of scholarship; certainly attempts have been made to influence the conduct of the classroom. This interference would be infinitely greater if there has been formal institutional commitment.

Joseph Shoben in "Toward Remedies for Restlessness: Issues in Student Unrest," says

"... Academic freedom, it must be recalled, has never applied to institutions; the doctrine of Lehrefreiheit, for example, confers no immunities upon the university except one; the right to clothe its faculty members in a special protective armor as they explore any trail that may lead to truth and wisdom. In contemporary terms, it is generally accurate to say that any tenured member of any faculty is entitled to espouse any position toward the war in Southeast Asia without fear of losing his job or suffering other reprisals from the college or university at which he teaches. Like most ideals, this one sometimes is dubiously honored in the breach rather than in the observance, but cases like that of Professor Genovese at Rutgers underscore the principle here. Our central point, however, is that the condition of the institution's making this essential gift of security to its professors is that it must itself remain neutral. In a very real sense, the only commitment to a social value -- in contrast to the academic values that guide the internal processes of scholarship, instruction, and the nature of its intra-institutional community life -- that a university makes as a university is its intransigent commitment to academic freedom. So long as it takes no corporate stands with respect to the major controversies that beset all dynamic cultures, it can insist on the peculiar freedom of individuals to investigate, to publish, and to debate which is the cornerstone of the academic enterprise. By this insistence, it maintains an open campus on which, at least in laudable theory, all ideas may compete for a hearing and minority points of view can be safely maintained."

My reading of our history here in California would lead me to turn another of Dr. McConnell's questions into a statement of fact: If colleges and universities identify themselves with particular political causes, they will find themselves politicized in wholly unexpected and disastrous ways.

If the academic community chooses to use the university as a base of political action, if it tries to identify the university with its causes, and mobilize the prestige and the resources of the university to goals which it
chooses, then it has made the university an important piece of political real
estate. And it will follow, inevitably, that others, outside the university, will
then regard its control and management as important for goals which they select.
Our best protection, for example, against that most dreaded intervention in
university autonomy -- the political test of fitness for membership in the student
body or faculty -- is in the final analysis avoided by carefully avoiding an internal
test -- which is what formal and informal orthodoxy really represent.

The best protection from intervention, for the preservation of autonomy,
lies in sensitivity to this risk and the practice of individual self-restraint.

Professor Richard Hofstader put this eloquently in a speech on the Berkeley
campus:

"The delicate thing about freedom is that while it requires restraints, it also requires that many of these restraints be self-imposed and not forced from outside. The delicate thing about the university is that it has a mixed character, that it is suspended between its position in the real world, with all its corruptions and evils and even cruelties, and the splendid world of our own imagination. The university does in fact perform certain mundane services to society -- and there are those who think it should aspire to do nothing else. It does in fact constitute a kind of free political forum -- and there are those who want to convert it primarily into a center of political action. But above these aspects of its existence stands its essential character as a center of free inquiry and criticism -- a thing not to be sacrificed for anything else. A university is not a service station. Nor is it a political society, nor a meeting place for political societies. It is, with all its limitations and failures, its fragile and compromised professors, its equivocal administrators, its tumultuous and self-righteous students, its classified research, its instruction that does not instruct, and all the other ills that institutional intellectual life is heir to, the best and most benign side of our society, insofar as that society aims to cherish the human mind. To realize its essential character, the university has to be dependent upon something less precarious than the momentary balance of forces in society; it has to pin its faith on something that is not hard-boiled or self-regarding; it has to call not merely upon critical intelligence but upon self-criticism and self-restraint. There is no group of professors or administrators, of taxpayers or alumni, or students, there is no class or interest in our society, that ought to consider itself exempt from bearing its costs and patiently enduring its conflicts and
trials; nor is there anyone who should want to do other than rally to its generous support."

I trust that in this audience we will not attempt to fool ourselves. Many efforts to get the university as an institution to identify with particular causes -- opposition to the war, for example -- have arisen not from great moral sensitivity but from the desire to align the university with a particular position -- a struggle for control of the university rather than a passion for morality.

With those not so calculating -- and there are some -- it represented a naive understanding of the pluralistic nature of the university and the essential part official neutrality plays in the freedom of us all.

The freedom that a university receives from external intervention on the part of the society that supports it is never absolute; it waxes and wanes, it is certainly not a divine right. The supporting society, whether public or private, is not required to grant absolute independence to its institutions of education.

As educators we should tell the supporting society and we do, that the greatest universities have traditionally been freest. And we should explain why this is so: because the untrammeled search for truth and its successful transmission -- through learning -- is most likely to be achieved with minimum constraints.

And we can and do tell the public why this in turn is true -- because of the nature of the process of discovery and the process of learning. But when we do this we appeal to society's wisdom and its maturity and its security. We are not appealing to a bill of rights.

While there may be an ideal amount of freedom a university should have, as a practical matter it is limited. How much freedom it has is determined
by the degree of enlightened understanding of the society and the restraint it exercises by its procedures for resource allocation (line item budgets are, for example, more restrictive than block grants), methods of selection and terms of office of Board members, and by restraints imposed by the university upon itself.

Academic freedom and all the attendant freedoms are, therefore, never guaranteed permanently. Whether they are granted or interfered with is an educational and a political process. We try to educate the supporting society on the need for freedom -- on educational grounds -- in order that we can perform our essential tasks more effectively and in so doing serve the society more effectively. The process of obtaining protection or for losing it, is very often political.

I think we can identify some of the conditions under which the threat to essential autonomy from external intervention increases. One is inexperience on the part of the supporting public. The Stony Brook drug raid is an illustration. Another is a high state of anxiety about change. This is an extremely short-hand way of describing our present condition in America generally. Another is intense value conflict in the society on a particular issue. Activities by universities in defense were acceptable, even applauded, during World War II and, now, with an unpopular war, they have become controversial. I specify these conditions, and I admit the list ought properly to play a significant role in determining the nature of the university's involvement in particular activities.

To summarize up to this point: My central position rests on my conception of a university as an intellectual community, dedicated to training and research. It is committed to the intellect and to the use of reason, to knowledge. I then
proceed to a consideration of the conditions under which these functions can best operate and finally then to a consideration of the effect on those necessary conditions of involvement in social affairs. I have indicated that institutional commitments can have the effect themselves under certain circumstances, of curtailing freedom and inviting external interference.

It should be obvious that we are dealing with matters of degree. And most of what I have said refers to statements of position.

But what about the obvious fact that the university is indeed involved in social affairs and has indeed made institutional commitments to programs? I would like to turn now to an examination of some of the types of involvements. I would suggest that out of careful examination of these, we can establish some of the criteria that must be met to guide the university in establishing (or terminating, for that matter) institutional commitments. We have, I submit, assembled a good deal of wisdom on this subject over the years, and it is worthwhile to make it explicit.

But before I turn to institutional commitments to programs, let me note some established institutional practices that facilitate interaction with the society that have been of tremendous usefulness to the society and to the university. Although accepted they are not without their risks and are not without their critics both inside and outside the university who would attempt to monitor them. I refer first to the advisory, consulting relationship. The university in recent years, through its pay practices, leave of absence policies and appointment policies has greatly increased the interaction between the society at large and individual members of the academic community. I believe that most of the federal programs in education, science, health, social welfare, conservation, for example,
have been primarily influenced by members of the university community, acting as private individuals but with the aid of institutional policies that permit and even encourage this kind of activity. It is important to observe first that the institutional practices and policies which made this easy are not coercive. Each faculty member has been free to choose to participate or not. Second, there are implicit or explicit educational considerations which are taken into account. It is expected particularly with respect to consulting relationships that the experiences contribute to personal growth and therefore educational effectiveness. The academic community must get a return. Leaves of absences are evaluated in terms of this effect on the teaching and research function of the university in addition to the external criterion of service in the public interest.

Another form of university participation, which involves university policy and practice, is individual grants and contract research. Here again the emphasis is on the relationship between the individual faculty member and the sponsor. Whether or not the research occurs is primarily a matter of whether the individual applies for the grant. But institutional policies and practices have enormously facilitated the frequency and ease of these transactions. Universities have set up offices to perform services for these contracts, provided space for most of them, created new categories of employees that these projects needed, and so on. This institutional posture of commitment can't be hidden under the rug. Nor should its value in making the university effective in social change be ignored. The university responsibility is there. Indeed, as far as the federal government is concerned, these grants are awarded to the University and the University is held responsible not only for fiscal matters but in a very real sense, for the quality of the work done. Here again there are, at least when we are at our best, educational considerations which determine what kind of grants are sought. They must provide
freedom for the investigator, permit publication of findings, contribute to the education of students, and the development of staff. Thus, for example, universities tend to discourage routinized application of research methods. They must also be in harmony with educational development goals of the institution.

I turn now to another form of participation involving institutional commitment: the establishment of units of the University structure that have a programmatic mission—the Radiation Laboratories here, the Lincoln Laboratories at M.I.T., Argonne Laboratories at the University of Chicago, and the Willow Run Laboratories at the University of Michigan are examples. Here the university by contractual arrangement undertakes to establish and maintain a research facility. Not all of these I have mentioned have the same relationships to the university involved or to the sponsor. These relationships have also altered during the years, but in general they have been characterized by a certain degree of separation from the other units of the University—in management and personnel policy. They might better be called university-affiliated units. These have begun with a public need for a particular kind of activity, and a requirement for the kind of personnel and environment that a university can provide. Again, the needs and requirements of the university have influenced whether the relationship is to be established and its nature, if the decision is affirmative. Usually, these facilities represent research tools that are beyond the capacity of the university to develop. In the days after the war, there was a disposition to establish these programmatic units in federal laboratories away from and separate from campuses. The NIH laboratories in Bethesda are illustrations. Many of us tried to turn this tide, believing that in many instances the educational functions, particularly graduate training and research, would be harmed if federal laboratories became the
discovery, it was necessary that these facilities be near and affiliated with universities. We also argued, I think successfully, that the research itself would be done better.

Over a period of time these relationships have been altered in the interests of further educational objectives: the free dissemination of research findings, active participation by faculty in the direction of the program, involvement of graduate students, and so on.

Another form of institutional commitment to programmatic research and training has involved institutes and centers in such fields as Mental Health, Social Research, Labor and Industrial Relations, Agriculture. Here again the university assumes some obligation over and above the commitment of specific individuals to carry on a particular effort. The same criteria apply, although the decisions are a little less controversial primarily because usually there is no specific partner or enduring co-sponsor.

All of these devices have greatly increased the university's involvement in our social life. This involvement has been to the profit, by and large, of both the community and the university. Primarily educational considerations have determined whether they should exist and how they should function. Finally, we should not forget that these activities have always involved us in controversy with the external community in one way or another, at one time or another.

Examination of the effectiveness of group health care programs in Windsor, Canada, by the University of Michigan Public Health School, experimentation with fluoridation by the University of Michigan Dentistry School, studies of police in Oakland by the Center for the Study of Law and Society -- innumerable other
illustrations could be cited of some degree of public clamor over this sort of participation. These activities have been defended and protected by the general reputation of the university for objectivity, by the range of such activities governing many areas that the university engaged in; by the obvious relationship of these activities to the research function of the university and, finally, but not insignificantly, by the posture of the investigators themselves. They resolutely limited their roles to that of investigators and even though they had a right as citizens to do otherwise, they did not become political protagonists. The importance of these subtle differences in posture cannot be overestimated.

But what about training and service activities? Here where we must be reminded particularly that we are not dealing with an all or none phenomenon with whether or not the University should be involved, but rather to what degree. Since the areas of possible involvement are more controversial, the sensitivity becomes all the greater. But here again we are not without experience and wisdom that must come to our aid as we move, as we most certainly will, into new areas of involvement -- as, for example, in President Hitch's program of commitment to involving the University in the urban crisis.

Let's turn first to training programs. First of all, we must remember that even in such well established programs as law, medicine, architecture and public health, there is always a state of controversy between the faculty and the profession. Typically the profession and often the public at large are critical of the lack of so-called practical emphasis. Sometimes there has been criticism about the attitudes and values communicated by the school. We have learned that the educational program, content and pedagogical method, must be in the hands of the university faculty for better or for worse. Our faculties have learned that
there must be a reasonable fit between the program and the demands of the practicing profession, but the determination of that optimum fit is really theirs.

We have also had controversies over whether or not there should be a particular training program. Whether optometrists or morticians or labor leaders or journalists should be trained in universities has been the subject of considerable debate and uncertainty from time to time. In general, we have asked ourselves the following questions before deciding to go ahead:

1. Can anyone else do it better?
2. Is there a body of content, a discipline to be learned?
3. Does the program draw on as well as enrich other programs?

All, again, educational questions.

Since many institutions are beginning to experiment with courses and programs which involve field work (in part as a way of meeting the criticism of the lack of relevance of the educational experience on the part of students) and since these departures will inevitably involve academic units that have not had experience with this kind of training, it is worthwhile to examine what we have learned from our experiences in more established programs which involve field work, internships, etc., as part of the training. I remind you that we have had a great deal -- in medicine, dentistry, public health, social work, education.

Here are some of the lessons as I read them:

1. To obtain optimum results, the University must have a great deal of control of the field situation. The students must be geared into the agency to be sure that they aren't just additional manpower, or given routine assignments; real opportunities for learning must be provided. Close supervision is required, often requiring additional staff.
2. Nonetheless, by and large we have not found it worthwhile to operate the field agency ourselves. Universities have pretty much abandoned their own elementary and secondary laboratory schools, for example. We have greatly increased our use of regular hospitals for medical education as opposed to developing our own. I doubt whether even in our new medical schools we will ever again establish large general service hospitals. And even the ones we still operate are different, or ought to be, from general community hospitals operating under other auspices. Patients in university hospitals expect to be treated by students, they must expect to be subjects for research, and so on. The university hospitals are expected to limit referrals to those cases that contribute to education and research in contrast to taking everyone who needs health care. Private practice use of facilities is absent or limited.

Again these are matters of degree but the emphasis is clear: we are not in the business of operating social agencies. I could go on with this complicated topic, but I want to mention one little-noticed but very real objection to university-operated and run social agencies: the autonomy of the community itself may be compromised. We should be just as sensitive to the ability of the community to determine the kinds of services it wants, as we are to protecting our own freedom.

3. The practicum learning experience must be related to the on-campus learning. The relation between theory and practice is complicated, and great attention must be given to the complexities. The classroom learning must inform practice and vice versa. Mere uninterpreted experience is not enough.

4. The guiding concept for student behavior and experience is that he is a student -- not a general citizen, not another member of the troops and not an employee.
What about strictly service activities? By and large these haven't been many and properly so. And I think primarily because of the application of these criteria. We have not been and we should not be service stations. We have generally tried to select those service activities which were subject to our controls, those which met the requirements of the academy and which contributed to the educational functions.

I think it is important, as I list these considerations, to recognize that there are and ought to be individual differences among institutions. They differ in function, in student body, in the social climate in which they live and in countless other ways. A possible service activity might offer great opportunities for training to one institution and little to another. On the other hand, an institution may develop such a rarified atmosphere with respect to its surroundings that its well being becomes a matter of supreme indifference to the supporting community. Such a university may seize opportunity to serve in order to change this institutional posture that would not be selected somewhere else.

I mentioned earlier that one criterion for participation was: Can another institution do it as well or better? I want to expand on this idea briefly. There is a great deal of sentiment that the university should involve itself in all worthy causes, attack all important problems primarily because it has enormous resources and can do it. I believe this view has serious defects. Edward Levi recently put this very well in Chicago Today:

"...Universities are among the important institutions in our society, but there are other important institutions. You will recall de Tocqueville's description: 'Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions constantly form associations. They have not only commercial and manufacturing companies, in which all take part, but associations of a thousand other kinds, religious, moral, serious, futile, general or restricted, enormous or diminutive.' The fact there is an unmet need does not at all mean that a university is best
equipped to take it on. Even if it is, the added function may place such a burden upon an institution as to defeat its basic purposes. Even a welfare-indoctrinated society must make choices. It may be that new types of institutions are required; it does not follow that universities should become these new types. A university which claims to be all things to all people, or as many different groups wish it to be, is deceitful or foolish or both."

In summary, I have tried to suggest that the question of university participation in social affairs has arisen with new force primarily because of the war, race and poverty and also because of the pressure for new pedagogical programs. It is not a new question, however. Universities have some criteria that have served in the past and will continue to serve in the future. There is no question that the university has and will involve itself. Participation always involves risks. This doesn't mean that the University should not participate but rather that the degree of risk must be evaluated in terms of the gains for the essential functions of a university. Clarity about these essential purposes and clear assessment of the impact on them of any involvement will provide the greatest protection from unwarranted interference.

In spite of the fact that I believe our record here is not bad, I don't want to leave the impression that it is without blemish. Universities have accepted endowments for foolish purposes or scholarship funds with unwise social implications. We have not been as sensitive as we might to the need to change these relationships over time. But the criteria are clear and their application has by and large protected the autonomy of the university and the essential freedom of its members, faculty and students alike.
Colleges and Universities as Agents of Social Change: Goals and Conflicts

Algo D. Henderson

Colleges and universities are by their nature agents of social change. They may, however, be activist or exercise varying degrees of restraint on action. This is a position paper on this issue. I shall deal especially with internal matters including policy formation, organizing to secure consensus on goals, and some administrative skills for dealing with conflict.

In considering what the policy relating to social change should be, we must first get some historical perspective. We may note immediately that the problem centers on issues which at the time are controversial. That colleges and universities are agents of social change on a host of noncontroversial fronts is well known. A prime example was the initiation of the colleges of agriculture and mechanic arts. It was clear from the beginning that the purpose of this system of new programs was to transform agriculture and provide further momentum for the industrial revolution. As another example, the medical schools following the Flexner study in 1910 ceased to be appendages of the medical profession and became centers of leavening influence and health leadership throughout the profession. Illustrations such as the two just given could be multiplied, but no one questions the role of the college and university in these types of social change.

What is controversial at one period of history is not controversial at another. In retrospect, therefore, actions that were the subject of
heated controversy at the time became constructive contributions when viewed from a later time.

The controversies over religion are a prime example. The theory of evolution, barely a century old, was attacked unmercifully when first introduced into the curriculum. The theory sharply contradicted the accepted beliefs of men. Although the Scopes Monkey Trial occurred so recently that it still is within our memory, the apprehensions about the new theory have almost completely disappeared. Indeed, a move to revert to the teaching of a century ago would probably meet with a storm of disapproval.

When human slavery existed in the United States, certain colleges took courageous positions that slavery was a social evil and should be abolished. We still have racism with us, but we do not have slavery. In the light of the fast moving shifts in attitude toward the problem of the Negro in the United States, if slavery were still an issue, it would be unthinkable today for the colleges and universities to stand silently by.

Reflecting further upon the black-white issue, I am reminded of an informative article that appeared in _Ebony_ about fifteen years ago. It described the predicaments of the presidents of leading Negro colleges and universities. Quite apart from their personal views about the Negro problem in American society, they were locked in the vise of regulations imposed by their governing boards, most of the members of which were white. I wonder whether this helps to account for the authoritarianism of the typical Negro college president—for he depends for his tenure of office
upon executing the will of the board. It may also help explain the attitudes of Black Power students toward "the establishment." Of course, the social press existed for both white and Negro colleges. I recall a conversation with the president of a college operated by the Friends Society in the South. I asked how it happened that this Quaker college did not admit any Negro students--this was shortly before the 1954 court decision. He said that the board prevented him from doing so. The case would seem to be one where the board sacrificed the principles of the college in order to conform to the mores of the community. This is not a very pretty picture. It is encouraging that the Board of Trustees of Dillard University, a Negro university, is now searching for a new president among whose qualifications should be his potential for social leadership.

Let me describe an additional case on another social issue. About forty years ago, Dr. William Leiserson, an experienced arbitrator in the labor relations field and a professor of economics at Antioch College, was appointed by the Governor of Ohio as chairman of a commission to study unemployment insurance. Antioch at this time had vulnerability on two fronts: its endowment was less than $200,000 and so it had to depend heavily on annual contributions; and under its work-study program, large numbers of students were being placed among the businesses and industries of the Miami Valley of Ohio. The college received an avalanche of demands that the professor be fired, some of them accompanied by threats to boycott the student placement. After consultations between administrators and faculty, a consensus was reached that the professor
should be supported. Some time later, after the president of the college had become Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, then labeled as a socialistic adventure, the president of one of the largest manufacturing companies in the Miami Valley and a former member of the Board of Trustees of the college wrote to me demanding a change in the policy of social action. To reinforce his arguments he said that Horace Mann, the first president of the college would "turn over in his grave" if he knew what was happening at the institution. I took delight in reciting to the writer a number of the radical positions on such things as religious beliefs, slavery, and the education of women that had been taken by Mann when he was president of the college. An instance of Horace Mann's courage was demonstrated when he, being a Unitarian, but president of a then church-related college of another denomination, was persuaded to join the latter church. On the occasion when his new membership was announced to the congregation, Mann rose in his place, said that he had reservations about the doctrines of the church, and proceeded to recite them. This incident was still being discussed by the villagers a half century later. As for the unemployment insurance, needless-to-say a law was enacted by the State of Ohio, and within two decades the concept became almost universally accepted.

We can get additional perspective by considering student activism in the light of historical events. Daedalus, Winter, 1968, published a symposium based upon the papers given at a Conference on Students in Politics held in San Juan, Puerto Rico, March 27 - April 1, 1967. Much of the discussion was an assessment of student activism. In his summary of the
discussions, Professor Seymour M. Lipset states the following:

Students were a key element in the revolutions of 1848 in Germany and Austria, and student activism stimulated the 'Professors Parliament' which almost succeeded in toppling several monarchs. In Czarist Russia, students spearheaded various revolutionary movements, and the university campus was a major center of revolutionary activity. In the East European countries, where education was limited to a small proportion of the population, students were often the carriers of modern ideas of liberty, socialism, industrialization, and equality of opportunity. The important role of students in the movements for national independence in the developing areas also goes back a half century or more. In Imperial China, students were crucial to the Imperial effort at modernization, but at the same time spread republican and radical ideas throughout the society. Students helped overthrow the dynasty in 1911, and were thereafter one of the elements continually pushing China toward modernization and radical ideologies. In other Asia and African countries, students were often a central element in anti-colonial struggles.

Not all of the student fomented revolutions have been good as, for example, their participation in the Nazi movement in Germany where they were caught up in the tide of nationalistic fervor. But generally speaking, the movements that they have joined have been constructive, and the student activists who press for reforms today have some worthwhile things to say to us. On the subject of educational change, they are pointing out the deficiencies in the multiversity and the need again to personalize the experiences of the students. They are telling us that our value system is warped and that this warping is to some extent due to the persistent identification of liberal education with Western culture. Not only does this ignore several other great cultures of the world, but the indoctrination in Western culture leads to certain evil consequences—emphasis upon materialism, white supremacy and the glorification of war, and tolerance of great disparities between affluence and poverty. In
with respect to needed social change, they point to the enormous problems of the urban ghettos, to the domination of politics by the large corporations, and to the growing influence on government by the military. It seems to me that their demonstrations against the Vietnam war have helped to influence the American public to make a major shift in viewpoint. They identify the administration of the universities with the establishment and I think rightly so because the administration is at its top the executive arm of the governing board and governing boards typically are populated by older persons of wealth and business and professional standing. And, of course, their objection to Mickey Mouse student governments is understandable. I do not mean to endorse the methods of disruption being used by militant groups, but I feel that much of what they are saying should be listened to and ways sought to involve them in finding solutions to the problems.

As John K. Galbraith has recently said, whenever either government or industry wants anything really important to be done, they call upon the universities to loan their faculty. Obviously this occurred in the case of the development of atomic energy; and in the light of our topic, such activities of the universities as that of managing for the government its atomic laboratories is interesting. The reference to Galbraith, an economist, reminds us of the extent to which Keynesian economic theory as applied to governmental operations has replaced the supply and demand theories that characterized the century and a half preceding the Great Depression. Perhaps the colleges and universities have never officially adopted macroeconomics as a dogma for the institution to follow--I shall
presently argue against permitting any ideology to dominate a college or university—but the fact remains that departments of economics universally have adopted a new theory and the related statistical techniques. Business and financial leaders still shudder at some of the implications of the theory, but Presidents of the United States have repeatedly appointed professors who subscribe to it as chairman of the economic advisors.

It would be difficult to argue other than that society has gained tremendously from the scholarly theories that have been carried from the professors' laboratories into applications in government, industry, and the professions.

Perhaps I should get down to a more specific case of institutional activism. When Antioch College was being reorganized in the 1920's, it had the dual problem of launching an innovative educational program, described in its catalog as "revolutionary," and of reforming the environment of the institution in order to lessen the constricting forces that would bear upon it. The environment was distinctly provincial and reactionary. The aim was to create an environment that would be permissive of critical inquiry and encouraging to progressive action. The aim to reform the larger community was deliberately undertaken. Here only brief reference can be made to the numerous steps that were taken on such fronts as the political, the cultural, the economic, and the health.

The local political machine was ousted from control of the village by mobilizing public support behind the dean of the college who was elected mayor. The cultural activities were the usual ones, but special effort was
made to involve community members as well as college students and faculty in music, art, and drama. Some small industries were started, at first largely for the purpose of training students under the work-study program. Later certain fruits of research done at the college were plowed into these and additional enterprises. At first the industries were sponsored and owned entirely by the college. The two largest ones were originally started in a small barn and in the basement of the science building, respectively. But after a number of years of development, they were set up as separate corporations and the majority stock interest sold to the employees and to persons in the community. As a result, the community has enjoyed full employment and currently some 25 millions of dollars of annual income. Among other moves were the elimination of the segregating rope at the local theatre, forcing a reform of the electric power rates, and transforming the medical services in the community. Some of these things took decades to accomplish. The changes in the community on almost every front have been enormous. Incidental dividends of the actions by the college have been an influx of other small industries and an immigration of intelligent and socially minded people.

Although my viewpoint toward policy formation and administrative backing for it should be clear by this time, let me summarize it briefly. The policy toward academic freedom should be one of complete support including the adoption of the usual procedures for hearing cases that may be in dispute. The policy of freedom should be to provide freedom to all individuals and to groups of individuals within the institution to speak, write, and act in
relation to social action providing that they make it as clear as they can that they are expressing the views of themselves or their particular group rather than speaking for the institution. When the institution as such takes a position on social issues, as it occasionally should, this should be the result of a consensus of opinion. This is because the position taken by the institution should be that of the majority of the persons and the groups that form the institution. If this were not the rule, the college would be pushed into speaking with the voice of a minority. Also it is the total group that must bear the risks. In order to avoid friction on this point, it is essential to have a mechanism by which the views of individuals and minority groups can become the subject of serious consideration and consensus of feelings by the total organization.

The folk culture and the super culture

The problems arising out of controversy are best understood if we fully appreciate the nature of the conflict. Kenneth Boulding has said that the tensions between the community and the institution develop because although the institution grows out of the folk culture, by its very nature it becomes a super culture. Dr. Boulding is on the program and hence available to explain the technical points, but I want to discuss the subject a bit.

Colleges and universities are initiated to meet the needs of the folk culture. Again using historical perspective we can see the reasoning of church groups and governmental units in the setting up of colleges and universities to supply religious leaders, teachers, professional services,
and research findings. An elementary case may perhaps best explain this mode of origin. Suomi College in the Upper Penninsula of Michigan was founded in the twentieth century by migrants from Finland who desired to accomplish a number of things: to preserve elements of Finnish culture, to give their particular church continuity, especially through providing educated ministers, and to assure their children an opportunity to assimilate American culture. The point of greatest relevance is that the community set up an agency for the purpose of gradually evolving a new culture, blending with it elements of the old. If all situations were as simple as this, there probably would be no conflict.

However, it is the nature of a college or university to become a super culture. The goal is to seek truth, not to perpetuate the status quo. It would, therefore, be inconsistent with the purposes of the college to indoctrinate with dogma, including the prevailing customs and conventions. The university comes to have a high responsibility to society not only to educate its youth, which as John Dewey pointed out means change and growth, but to disseminate the ideas and methodology that are the product of scholarly and research activity. The university’s responsibility is determined in part by the implementation of public policy but also in part by the individual responsibilities felt by forward looking faculty.

Thus a college or university cannot permit itself to be overwhelmed by the folk culture. It must grow into a super culture. But neither should it wrap the cloak of academic respectability around itself and withdraw behind the ivy walls. The basic problem is how to reconcile the two cultures
sufficiently to have a viable situation. Conflicts there will be, and there is no way to avoid them. The question is whether the institution will submerge itself in the folk culture thus attempting to be safe and secure or whether it will venture to fulfill its larger responsibility in spite of the conflict.

In this connection, I should like to make a number of points. One is that an institution becomes dynamic in relation to its policies respecting social change. Reed College, for example, was founded for the distinct purpose of supplying a cultural stimulation to the Portland area. The greatness of the University of Wisconsin arose from its development of the concept that the campus of the university was the state. Thus it made the welfare of the state a principal concern. Its founding of the Legislative Reference Bureau through which to endeavor to get better legislation and better wording of laws in the state is an example. I suggest that in both the Reed and Wisconsin cases, the high quality of intellectual effort done by faculty and students was in part the stimulation from this feeling of mission. The concept of mission was articulated by the educational leaders, but it also permeated the institution as a whole.

Secondly, educational leaders that have become historically significant figures are those who have provided fresh vision for their institutions related either to educational innovation or social advance. Those who merely navigate a safe course are doomed to obscurity. These respective courses of action mark the difference between leadership and management.

Third, the quality of the creative work by faculty and students is considerably enhanced by an involvement in significant issues, social,
scientific, or other.

Fourth, the professional reputation of the individual and of the institution depends upon the publication of scholarly interpretations and findings. The purpose of publishing should be to have an impact on the development of society and not merely to count in promotion in rank or salary increases.

As indicated earlier, I make a distinction between critical inquiry into controversial issues and, in contrast, the adoption of an ideology. The inhibiting effect in Soviet Russia of having adopted dogmas relating to economics and to genetics has been clear to the scholars of the world and, more recently, to the Russians themselves. Scholarly efforts should be free. The institution should not impose any "ism" upon its faculty and students. The college therefore needs to move with care and consensus when it adopts an institutional position and must preserve the freedom to dissent. I may add that this applies equally to radical new ideas and to the preservation of the status quo. All too often we do impose, through church controls, board resolutions, or presidential decrees, the beliefs and conventions of the folk culture.

I should like to add a thought on a very sensitive matter. The ecumenical spirit that prevails now among the three branches of Western religion hopefully will spread among all of the religions of the world. The people of the world must agree upon values and goals for mankind if we are to live together in peace. College youth are beginning seriously to question many of our most sacredly held values. These values should be
examined afresh, and the basis for doing so should be the experiences of cultures round the world. My point is, then, that within our colleges and universities we must apply the test of dogma versus critical inquiry to religious beliefs as well as in other areas.

Organization to gain consensus on goals

If a policy is pursued that supports academic freedom and also freedom of speech and action in the larger sense that I have been describing, it will be important to organize in a manner to reduce tensions and conflict to the minimum and to determine when institutional activism is warranted.

For this purpose, the test of a good organization is one that will assure sufficient intercommunication among the parties of interest to obtain reasonable consensus about goals and a willingness to incur the risks. This means participation in decision making respecting policies and programs. In my judgment, the dangers from these risks usually do not materialize; and if they do, they do not remain for long. The institution that makes constructive contributions toward social change will attract fresh support.

Colleges and universities today almost uniformly use the bureaucratic model of organization. The final decision making power rests in the highest executive subject to confirmations by the governing board. Communication is primarily downward in the form of directives. This is, of course, the legal structure, and I think it is unrealistic and undesirable to do away with the corporation as the central organizational structure. Certain adjustments within the structure can, however, be made. One is to secure as members of
the governing board persons who are more representative of the diversity of cultural, scientific, civic, and ethnic interests of the community and also persons who are representative of the academic interests. This, to put it baldly, would mean breaking the domination of the business oriented interests that now compose our boards.

Another adjustment lies in the realm of behavior. Institutions do not need to behave as though the authority were autocratic. Indeed, such behavior is not in tune with the academic goals, since a university is composed of professional men and women who are peers. For this purpose, a distinction can be made between policy and program formation in the determination of which there should be widespread representation and on the other hand the implementation of policy and program which requires a certain job pyramided administrative structure.

Another form of organization being advocated by some SDS students and AFT faculty would be to recognize administration, students, and faculty as discrete groups, each with its own interests and organization. Representatives of these groups then would negotiate agreements for the operation of the institution. I recognize that organized labor has had degrees of success in presenting its positions to management in this manner. In some instances the SDS and the AFT have succeeded in obtaining concessions from the administration. I shall dismiss this alternative somewhat abruptly, however, because I think it is antithetical to the essential nature of the institution. A college is a goal-seeking organization, and there needs to be a consensus among administration and faculty, and also students, concerning the goals.
The effort of the institution being intellectual, the organization needs to aspire to the highest level of excellence in student achievement and research findings. The process of negotiation and mediation tends to arrive at compromises that are at the lowest common denominator. Such armslength bargaining may produce better working conditions for the faculty or studying conditions for the students, but it will not elevate the general tone and quality of the institution.

There is a third alternative with special reference to the function of policy-program formation. Rensis Likert calls this the group participative form. Its characteristic is an involvement in decision making. Its implication for a college is that in policy-program formation the top administrator functions in the role of educational leader. As such he is a member of a circle rather than the director. Within the circle at the top level are representatives of administration, of faculty, and of students. In my opinion these representatives should be freely elected by the respective groups with only the president and the top academic officer being ex officio members. The faculty as the professional group should have the largest number of representatives, but the representation of all groups should be sufficient to provide a feeling of genuine participation. I assume the need to have a series of levels for decision making and that at each level there would be similar circles that were representative of the primary interest groups.

If the administrator sits at the table with the other representatives to provide leadership and, subject to the occasional need to use his legal authority, joins in the decision, he will be in a much stronger position
within the institution and be able to perform a superior service exterior to it. He will have been forced within the meeting to analyze the proposed action in a manner to gain mutuality of understanding and this leads to confidence. Because of his understanding of the faculty-student points of view and his own commitment within the group, he will be speaking to his board and to the public not just for himself but as spokesman for the institution. This is a highly important point because it has to do with his effectiveness in action and also his control over his own nervous tensions.

Group participative theory thus requires a reorganization of the membership of the board of trustees and of the policy-program forming councils within the institution. With this changed composition, the intercommunication should be greatly facilitated. Some presidents follow the policy of keeping board members far removed from the ongoing work of the institution. They do this with good intentions, namely to keep the board from interfering with the academic program. This policy may have worked at times in the past; but in the present day of newspaper and TV communication, this seems an unwise policy. Incidents occur on the campus that shock the board members. They are pressured by telephone and mail to clamp down on the institution. They get defensive and resent it. They have no understanding with which to be persuasive in explaining the actions of the institution.

If the personnel of the board cannot be reorganized, ways can be found to increase the communication between the academic group and the board. In my former role as president, I persuaded the board to reduce their attention to the physical problems of the campus in favor of meetings for an exchange
of views with representatives of the faculty and sometimes of the student body. Ordinarily these were preplanned occasions with official groups from within the institution preparing a discussion to present to the board with a follow-up interchange. No action was taken, but a spirit of fellowship was fostered and a degree of mutuality of understanding and of confidence ensued. I am certain that it placed the board members individually and as a group in better position to represent the institution in places where funds needed to be secured or the public needed to be better informed about the institution.

A final word about organization. Today both faculty and students demand larger participation in decision making. I happen to think both groups can make constructive contributions. Whether or not one agrees with this point of view, it may nevertheless pay to find orderly means of bringing them in on consultations because if the process is not an orderly one, it will occur as confrontations. I do not mean that disruptions and confrontations can be entirely eliminated. But the following of the militant groups can be reduced if the general run of students and faculty feel that they have genuine representation in decision making bodies and if there is feedback to them.

**Administrative skills in implementing policy relating to social action**

Administrative finesse in dealing with cases of tension and conflict probably comes with the acquisition of experience. I would not pretend to be able to tell you "how to do it." I will, however, state a few principles relating to administrative attitude and action which may commend themselves.
Two successful university presidents have described their techniques in books on administration. Harold Dodd stated that the wise administrator will do a large amount of conferring with his colleagues before making decisions or implementing action. Henry Wriston told how he would informally drop into offices throughout the campus. He made a habit of doing this before reading his morning mail, which suggests the relative importance he placed upon communicating with his professional colleagues as distinguished from becoming a slave to the mail and the telephone. I would commend both procedures, but would add that it is very important to keep in constant communication with the representatives of responsible groups. It is they who have the ability to bring pressure upon the administration and hence it is they who need most to understand the considerations that the administrator can bring to their attention. Furthermore, in this situation communication is more freely given because the individual in speaking for the group communicates more freely than if he were merely voicing an opinion of his own.

Part of the objective is to get feedback concerning administrative actions and administrative image. An administrator needs to be conscious of the image that he gives. Let me describe an example. Sometime ago I had occasion to discuss with a bearded student activist the qualifications of the president of the university in which he was a student. Because there had been some student-administration tensions on this campus, I described the professional qualifications this president had which I thought made him a leader of high potentiality. I referred to his grounding in the fundamentals of organization,
his understanding of social psychology, and his known ability to communicate with people. I said that given an adequate exchange of views and some time to permit organized bodies to take action, this president would provide the opportunity for achieving many of the ends being sought by the student activists. The answer of the student was very brief, "That is not the image that comes across." It seemed to the students that his communicative efforts were confined to issuing directives of the usual authoritarian type.

Jumping to another point, when an administration or an institution becomes the subject of attack, it is important to endeavor to counter with peer influence. It reminds me that in a recent case when a university president was asked by a militant group to prevent the Dow Chemical Company interviewers from coming onto the campus, he responded quietly, "OK, if the students want it that way, let's abandon employer interviews. It's a costly and time consuming activity for the university to help with student job placement, so why do it if the students don't want it." This seemed to me to shift the issue back to the students and to provide the opportunity for a larger voice to be heard. The advantage to the administrator in having an organization to assist him in determining policy is that he has organized support for his position. The presumption is that the organization represents the majority view on the campus. If this view is questioned, the matter can be reassessed.

When helping to conduct the study that led to the establishment of the State University of New York and other reforms in the state, Owen D. Young, chairman of the commission taught me a good technique. Invariably he would
put an opposition leader in a key position of responsibility, trusting that an examination of the issue and of the facts would soften or win him. This worked beautifully in several crucial situations. Note, however, the importance of confronting the objector with the necessity of examining the pros and cons of the issue.

Adequacy of communication is so much the key to all resolutions of conflict that it is important to realize that true communication diminishes as the conflict intensifies. According to the social psychologists, conflict occurs when differences about goals arise. As the views about goals widen, communication lessens. The lessening of communication causes the parties to intensify their disparate views. This in turn reduces effective communication still further. Thus a downward spiral of conflict is set in motion. The problem is to reverse the spiral and the method of reversing it is to increase the intercommunication about goals.

An administrator needs to work on his skills of communication. He needs to be articulate about the role of the college or university. When problems exist he needs to be able to examine them fully and communicate all facets to interested parties. This practice is the opposite of secrecy about problems.

I should like to say a word about administrative leadership. Many presidents and deans are unnecessarily timid about taking clear-cut positions on controversial social issues. Seemingly they become overwhelmed by the problems of the day and lose sight of the long-term goals of higher education. They in effect become the captain of a smooth sailing ship rather than the
leader of an expedition into the realms of knowledge, both stable and controversial. An institution that functions smoothly may grow in size but it will probably remain static and may decline in quality. Timidity breeds mediocrity. Faculty and students gain confidence in a leader who grasps fully his role of leadership.

I think this applies also to governing boards. Trustees admire an imaginative spokesman for the institution. They respect a man who has sufficient strength to combat them on their own grounds and because of superior knowledge about the nature of the problem involved wins their approval and support. Furthermore, as already said, the progressive creative institution attracts interest, and wins friends and fresh support.

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