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A study determined the extent of influence members of a city's business elite have on civil rights policy of the city's school system. The National Opinion Research Center interviewed the school superintendent, school board members, civil rights leaders, other political leaders, and members of the business elite in eight large cities. The study found that decisions on civil rights policy made by school board members were not directly influenced by outside civic or political elites but were based on the board members' personal attitudes. However, school board composition was found to be determined by the overall influence of the cities' civic elites and the strength of political parties. Civic elites are described not as hierarchical power structure but as a diffuse "class" having a common set of values. Although conflict between civic elites and political parties exists in each of the cities, civic elites have more influence over the selection of board members in those cities having strong political parties. The most important reason for this paradox is that a strong party serves as a barrier to prevent the leadership from being heavily influenced by public opinion. (JH)
EDUCATIONAL DECISION MAKING AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INFLUENCE IN CITIES

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EDUCATIONAL DECISION MAKING AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INFLUENCE IN CITIES

Robert L. Crain
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The question "Who has influence?" is a central one in the study of government of the local community. In the last decade, the question has often been asked in a more restrictive form: "How much influence do the business elite have?" Asked in this way, the question has provoked much argument which shows little sign of reaching a resolution. Part of the difficulty is conceptual; there have been many attempts to define influence, and much of the disagreement has resulted from writers using different meanings of the word or referring to different kinds of influence. In addition, there have been problems in collection of the needed data, problems both in the quality of the data collected and in the difficulty of obtaining comparative data from a number of cities.

This study attempts to answer the question "Who has influence?" by studying a single decision—the decision regarding meeting the demands of the civil rights movement made upon the school system—in a group of eight large cities. The study has the advantage that we will be able to consider both direct and indirect influences, measured both by "soft" qualitative data and "harder" quantitative measures of the distribution of power. The data were collected by the National Opinion Research Center in a study financed by the U.S. Office of Education. The principal sources of data are the interviews obtained by teams of two graduate students who
spent approximately ten man-days in each city interviewing the school superintendent, the school board members, civil rights leaders, other political leaders, and members of the business elite. In addition, the differences in the population and industrial composition of the cities were analyzed through the use of Census data. Both the advantages and the limitations of the techniques used should be obvious. The principal advantage is that we have a comparative study which can utilize concepts at various levels of abstraction ranging from the status level of the city, measured by the Census, down to the amount of influence exerted on a particular aspect of a particular decision as reported by our interviewers. The principal disadvantages are that we are limited to eight cities and that in many cases we must settle for impressionistic data where additional time spent in the community might produce more persuasive evidence.

Direct Influence

The decision regarding how to handle the racial issue in school policy making is entrusted to the local school board. One would assume that the school board would be subject to a great deal of influence from the civil rights movement, from political leaders, from the school staff, from the business elite, and from the citizens in general. The most surprising finding of our study is that this does not seem to be the case. The eight cities in our study vary greatly in their handling of the school integration issue. At one extreme we have Baltimore, which agreed over the course of a single summer to bus large numbers of Negro students into previously white schools, or Pittsburgh, which produced a provocative report entitled "Our Quest for Racial Equality," which, to the outside observer, reads more like it was written by the civil rights movement than
by the school board. At the other are cities which have refused to take the first step toward school integration or which, indeed, have refused even to recognize the validity of the principle of school integration. The variance among these eight cities is summarized by a rank ordering which we call "acquiescence." Acquiescence measures both the symbolic and the real action on the part of the school system to meet the demands of the civil rights movement. Put another way, the research staff attempted to rank the cities, using both data on the type of integration plans adopted, and the "style" of school board statements, according to the degree to which a typical civil rights leader would feel satisfied with the response of the school system if he were sent to the city to evaluate its behavior.

When we consider the differences in the way in which the issue was handled in each of these cities which might explain the differences in acquiescence, we find, rather surprisingly, that "influence" as such does not play a role. Even the level of activity of the civil rights movement does not seem to be correlated with acquiescence. An acquiescent city may be one which had very many demonstrations or one which had very few. In both acquiescent and non-acquiescent cities, mayors and other political leaders tend to remain silent when the issue arises, and in most cases none of the political leaders made any real effort to influence the decision. Finally, even when the school board members are obviously closely tied to the civic elite of the community, we know of no cases in which school board members went back to the civic leadership to check on a particular issue. As we said, these are very surprising findings. The evidence so far presented has been negative; that is to say, we were unable to find examples of direct influence. However, we have more persuasive,
positive evidence to make the same point. For we can show that the differences in levels of acquiescence can be attributed almost entirely to differences in the school board. This would mean that outside influence could not possibly affect the decision very much, since there would be little or no variance left to explain.

Each school board member was given a short agree-disagree questionnaire, to tap his general attitudes toward economics, civil rights, civil liberties, and other issues. The four questions dealing with the civil rights movement were converted into a scale, and the school board in each city was assigned the median value on this civil rights scale administered to its members. The school boards vary considerably in this dimension, which we shall call simply "liberalism." When we plot liberalism of the school board against the acquiescence of the school system, we find the plot shown in Figure 1. There are two boards of the eight which regularly have contested elections for school board membership. The remaining six are either appointed boards or boards where elections are uncontested.

The two cities with contested school board elections score at the bottom on our acquiescence scale. In one of these two cities, our interviewers can argue persuasively that the same board members serving in an appointive office would have been much more acquiescent. In the other city, the mayor has violently disagreed with the way in which the school system has handled the civil rights issue, and it seems very likely that if this school board were appointed by the mayor or selected by a slating committee, the board might be quite different in its behavior.

In the remaining six boards, the story is very simple. The more liberal the school board, the more likely it is to meet the demands of the
civil rights movement. This, despite the fact that the attitude questions used in the questionnaire had nothing to do with school integration, and seemed to measure a stable attitude toward race relations. The rather disheartening conclusion from this is that the school board members, faced with one of the major decisions in the community, act in the same way that they would have acted had they had no previous experience in local politics. In other words, they are not socialized into new behavior when they join the school board, and they are not subjected to new constraints because of their school board membership.

This also means that, contrary to popular belief, school policy in this issue is made by the school board and not by the superintendent; but this does not concern us directly at this time. Our point is that the evidence here suggests that the other actors, both political and economic elites, do not exert a direct influence upon the school policy decision-making apparatus.

However, several writers have considered the kinds of indirect influence which might be important in local community decision-making. Peter Clark has discussed the ways in which leaders in authority positions might anticipate the wishes of other elites and act in accordance with them, even though no direct influence has been exerted. Robert Alford and others have talked about the exertion of influence over the long run establishing a set of values in the community which persons in authority accept for themselves. Closely related to this is the way in which the long-run processes in the community determine the kinds of persons who reach authority positions. Kent Jennings has noted in his re-study of Atlanta that of three decisions he analyzed, the civic elite was most active in the nomination of a candidate to replace Mayor Hartsfield. It seems obvious that if the civic elite
can select the kind of mayor they want they will not need to be involved in day-to-day decisions that he makes. This is essentially the case with the school system.

Our question can now be rephrased as "Why are some school boards more liberal than others?" It is not completely useless to say that the reason is that some school boards are made up of more liberal members than others. In Figure 2 we examine two characteristics of school board members aggregated for each of the eight boards. We see that there is a fairly strong negative correlation between the socioeconomic status of the school board members and the degree to which they have been active directly in partisan political activity. At one extreme, we have a school board made up almost entirely of businessmen, corporation lawyers, and other members of the civic elite. At the other extreme, we have a school board made up almost entirely of persons previously active in party politics. If we draw the appropriate regression line through this plot (in this case a slightly curved one), we are able to rank the eight cities on the degree to which they recruit their school board members from these two opposing camps. The ranking is indicated by the numbers shown on this plot. We can now ask, "What is the relationship between this and the liberalism of the school board?" This is shown in Figure 3. The Spearman rank-order correlation is a rather awesome .92. To summarize at this point, we have produced an almost unbelievable finding, since we have in these three figures presented an argument which says that in order to explain why one city chose to acquiesce to the civil rights movement and another did not, we do not need to concern ourselves with the behavior of the civil rights movement, with local political considerations, with the
attitude and behavior of the leading businessmen of the community, or with the actions of the mayor. Rather, we need only find out whether the school system has a reform board or a political board, since this will tell us whether the board members are liberal or conservative and that, in turn, will tell us whether the demands of the civil rights movement will be met or not. Obviously the story cannot be as simple as this, but there is nothing that we can do, given the nature of our data. To put it simply, we have exhausted most of the variance without using up our explanatory variables. This is, perhaps, more satisfying than using up one's explanatory variables and still having variance left, but it is problem, nevertheless.

We shall now focus upon one aspect of community decision-making structure, the question why some school systems have reform school boards and some do not. It seems safe to call the ranking derived from the backgrounds of the school board members a measure of "reform." For example, of the eight school systems, only three have selected their present superintendent in the good government fashion of selecting a man who has previously served as a school superintendent in another city. These are the cities ranked 1, 2, and 4 on our "reform" scale. Furthermore, this measure of reform of the school board seems to coincide in a rough fashion with certain aspects of reform in other parts of the government. For example, the three school systems at the bottom of the ranking are in cities which have seen repeated charges of corruption leveled against the government. Conversely, the three cities at the top of this ranking are cities which have very strong business organizations which have been involved in many aspects of local decision-making.
It is not unreasonable that the basic difference between school boards is this single dimension of whether the board is made up of political persons or persons representing the civic elite. After all, the nominee to the school board must have some sort of qualifying credentials, and the most common are achievement in politics or achievement in civic affairs, service on citizens' committees and in the fund-raising campaigns which Rossi has called "non-destructive potlatches." There are other kinds of credentials--personal wealth, special skills, achievement in grass-roots organizations like the PTA or the ability to represent major interest groups such as labor unions or ethnic groups--but these appointments are in the minority on all of these boards. This suggests that the appropriate model for studying school board recruitment is one of conflict between the two most powerful groups in the city, the political party and the civic leadership. This is not a visible conflict, and indeed there are very few people whom we interviewed who would accept this definition of the situation. But we think that this conflict is simply a continuation of the pressures which divided these groups many years ago, when the industrial cities in the North developed professional politicians who could use ethnic and class conflict as a resource to compete with Yankee money. If the school board is appointed, the party wins in the conflict if the community concedes that it is only fair to reward faithful politicians with seats on the school board. The civic elite "wins" one round when the mayor decides that the minority party (Republican or Democrat) should be represented; the battle is won when even bipartisan appointments are considered taboo. This doesn't mean that the civic elite will be consulted on most appointments; but it may mean
that the most prestigious members of the school board are consulted about possible candidates to fill vacancies. If the school board is directly elected, the civic elite may play a much more direct role in organizing a "good government" slate. In one of the cities studied, a small group of businessmen drew up such a slate and now run virtually uncontested, and this is probably rather common, although we don't really know. So the question of why some cities have reform school boards is a way of asking the more general question, why have some cities been reformed by an active civic elite while others have not.

If we look for explanatory variables, we find one which is rather interesting and which requires that we think hard about the way in which the civic elite participate in local politics. Our respondents mentioned the problem of recruiting executives who have moved to the suburbs. In Figure 4, we plot the reform variable against the relative suburbanization of the high-income families in the city. The relative suburbanization of high-income families is in this case measured by taking the proportion of families making over $25,000 per year who live outside the central city and dividing it by the proportion of the total population which live outside the central city. Thus, for the city at the far left of the figure, this relationship is .8, meaning that the high-income families are slightly more likely to live in the central city than other people are. For the other seven cities, the relationship is above 1. When we examine the plot, we see that suburbanization is a fairly good predictor of reform. The correlation is .75, with two cities out of order. The bulk of the literature on the influence of elites and economic notables conceives of their influence as being based upon their institutional connections. It is
generally assumed that economic notables participate on behalf of the corporations that they represent or out of some notion of the economic self-interest that they have in the functioning of the city. The whole idea of power structure implies a rigid set of relationships between persons in some sort of hierarchical structure, which again suggests that the heads of the largest corporations are in some sense the board of directors of the local civic elite. But this does not jibe with our data very well. For example, the most influential member of the school board in one of our reform cities is the head of a very small corporation; yet we are convinced that he did not clear his decisions with any more influential persons. Even more disturbing from this point of view is the finding of George Sternlieb, that executives who live in the suburbs are much more likely to be active in the civic affairs of the city rather than the central city. This supports our finding that suburbanization tends to weaken the influence of the elites, but we cannot reconcile this with the structural model, which implies either that civic activity on the part of businessmen is designed to at least indirectly benefit their business or is in some other way a function of their corporate ties, which would not be affected by suburbanization.

Without dwelling further on the evidence for this point, we want to suggest that the civic elite can be described more accurately not as a structure of power but as a collection of individuals, each of whom has some resources and some contacts with other elites, who participate as individuals but who constitute a diffuse "class," in that they have a common set of values. Much has been written about the withdrawal of business elites from local politics, but little has been said about their re-entry
into decision making. Certainly the American city of the 1960's seems much more dependent upon the elite who are serving on school boards, urban renewal commissions, Urban League boards, and so forth, than they did three decades ago. This return of the businessmen to the city is not a return to the patterns of the 19th century. The business elite, it seems to us, have accepted the notion of a bifurcation between themselves and the political professionals. Holding high status in the business community is worth little in an election campaign. In addition, the growth of national corporations selling to national markets, the shut-off in population growth of the central city, and the reform of city purchasing practices mean that few members of the business elite will reap any direct personal benefit from participation in politics. These two factors, we think have led to the development of cooperation, rather than competition among the elite and to the growth of a common ideology and agreement on goals which permit the civic elite now to behave as a class. The key elements in this set of goals are 1) the acceptance of general economic development; any action which furthers economic development is valued by the elite, 2) a commitment to reform, 3) a commitment to the public welfare meaning both "amenities" and charity on both the individual and governmental levels, 4) a commitment to "keeping the peace" in the community.

These four goals--peace, prosperity, charity, and reform--constitute a common denominator around which the civic elite can agree. If the businessman moves beyond this framework, he may find that he has "become controversial." But within these limitations, he can expect the other members of the elite to give their endorsement to his actions.
Within this framework, we think the businessman participates not on behalf of his company but as an individual. The participation differs in degree but not in kind from the participation of his wife, or anyone else's wife, in PTA work or the League of Women Voters. He participates because the work is entertaining, because it brings him prestige and because of his desire to serve others. But beyond that, his participation furthers his class interests; he is helping to change the city into the kind of community which the members of his class, the civic elite, want. We do not need to postulate the existence of a power structure, for by argument the civic elite can remain merely a loose association of men who meet in the downtown clubs. If a man is invited to serve on the board of the Urban League he knows that his luncheon companions will generally approve. If he uses this position to begin some program of action, he will have the tacit support of the other members of the elite, unless of course he commits some blunder or wanders outside the common denominator of goals. In fact, his participation may quickly brand him as the "specialist" in this area, the man to see for advice. By participating, the businessmen receive status in the eyes of their colleagues and their participation forms a common bond which gives them opportunity for increased interaction. All of this makes the negative correlation of suburbanization with elite control of the school board more plausible. If in fact the civic elite is only a loose association of men who meet at lunch and on committees, then the conversation around the luncheon table will be heavily influenced by whether these are city dwellers who want to talk about city problems or suburbanites who let the conversation stray to other questions. In addition, many activities originate from one's place of residence, not from one's place of work.
Contributions to political parties, school activities, charities, residential conservation programs—all are examples of activities which might result from having one's doorbell rung at home rather than in the office.

Another implication of this model is that the resource which a member of the civic elite has which makes him valuable in civic affairs is probably not the control over economic resources; rather, it is his personal skill, personal wealth, and willingness to work, coupled with his general high prestige, which make his participation desirable.

The question remains why it is that the civic elite should be so successful in their fight to reform local government. It is certainly true that most cities in the United States could be classified as "reformed" as of now, and we have no case here of a city which has an active civic elite which still has a political school board. So apparently the civic elite usually succeed in reforms; and why this is so remains an open question. One likely argument is that we are dealing here with a simple exchange relationship, that the business elite can, by organizing, produce results which a city government cannot obtain for itself, and an informal and implicit change takes place, whereby the government agrees to appoint "good men" to certain governmental positions. In addition, we must remember that the control over appointments is worth very little to a mayor; he may be better off if he can escape responsibility for school policy. But that is hardly a complete answer.

By saying that the elite participate as a class rather than as a hierarchical power structure, we are suggesting that reform does not come about as the result of some back room concentration between the political
boss and the eldest member of the X family. Rather we are suggesting a gradual and continuous grinding away of individual elites participating, more or less as individuals, at many points in a governmental system and, through their continued participation, their continued gradual and individual influence upon political nominations. This question can be approached through a historical study of the school boards of these cities, and we can hope that the research of Thomas James will give us some answers here.

In addition, we can learn something by contrasting the eight cities before us at the present point in time. Let us return again to Figure 2. As we said, the cities at the extremes are conceptually simple. At the far left we have three cities which are completely reformed. At the far right we have one city which is completely political. The four extreme cities have one common trait--they all have strong political parties. The four cities in positions 4, 5, 6, and 7 do not. One result of this is that in these four cities it is difficult to describe the typical school board member. Some members are appointed or elected because of their political credentials, others because of their civic credentials, others because of credentials which are too mysterious for us to understand. In contrast, the four strong-party systems tend, once we make allowances for the ethnic and PTA representatives which every board has, to have a consistent recruitment process which appears in the kind of school board member recruited.

If we now reclassify these eight cities according to this second consideration, we spread the cities on the regression line into the four-fold table of Figure 5. At the upper right-hand side we have the highly organized cities, with strong political parties and which consistently recruit non-political board members; at the upper left we have cities which have inconsistent recruitment images and which select a board mixed
between high-status persons and political activists; at the lower left, we have two school boards which select persons, again without a clear image, who are not particularly high status, whether they are in politics or out of it. Finally, in the fourth cell, we have the cities which are strictly political in their selection of board members. Six of the eight cities are identified by name in Figure 4. In the other cases, we have used pseudonyms at the request of persons in those cities. We noted earlier that the four cities on the left have in common weak political parties. It is not surprising that these are also the four cities with the highest average socioeconomic status. The two cities in what we will call the middle-class cell are both western cities with very high-status, well educated, and Protestant populations. Board members in these cities tend to be high status, but they also tend to be directly involved in partisan politics in some cases. When we contrast these with the three balance-of-power cities, we see that the school board members there are of equally high status but are generally not active in local politics as individuals. In addition, ethnic and religious balance is somewhat less important.

We must here make two comments about the typology. First, we are assuming stability. But in fact a city may have an unstable or transitional recruitment process which causes it to wind up in the wrong cell. Chicago, for example, is a strong-party city with an inconsistent policy, which probably means that the conflict between the party and the civic elite is still unresolved. In addition, cities with appointed boards will always look more consistent in their recruitment policy, and this complicates things.
But, with these caveats, we can say that the two main dimensions which account for school board composition are the overall influence of the civic elite, which seems to have its roots in, among other things, the extent to which elites have stayed in the city, and second, the strength of political parties. The civic elite cannot win "control" of the school board as easily if political parties are weak.

This leads to some intriguing speculations. First, we would argue on the basis of what we have said so far that the civic elite can wield influence in reforming a city and in the kinds of local decisions made only if it is not permitted direct participation in local politics. The civic elite can either participate as a non-political class, or it can participate as a group of politicized individuals. Therefore, one reforms a city by forcing the elite out of politics. The other finding, which is a corollary of this, is that the civic elite can wield influence only in working-class cities. Pittsburgh, Baltimore, and St. Louis are all three heavily working-class cities. More correctly, they are cities which have an upper class and a working class but no middle class. The same pattern holds across the bottom of the table. Buffalo and Bay City have higher status populations than Newark; the result is that they have weak political parties but are still not middle-class enough to replace working-class politics with middle-class politics. The result is a high level of political disorganization and a very low level of acquiescence to the civil rights movement.

How can it be that the existence of civic elite influence depends upon the existence of strong political parties, when we have earlier argued that it is the very conflict between these two institutions which
is basic to our understanding of these cities? One factor is that the strong political party serves as a barrier to prevent participation on the part of individual elites. Thereby, it encourages them to act in concert, as a class. But in addition, and probably more important, the existence of strong political parties serves as a barrier to prevent the more numerous middle class from participating directly, and therefore permits the heads of government to listen to the civic elite without having to worry about the attitude of the general public toward the appointments. The political party does not serve to articulate mass opinion up to the party's leadership, but instead as a barrier to prevent the leadership from being heavily influenced by public opinion. Finally, the existence of strong political parties means that politics is organized, which in turn means that if the civic elite wishes to exert influence, particularly in small and gradual bits, it can do so because there is a central point, the party leadership, upon which this influence can be brought to bear. If, on the other hand, politics is completely disorganized, then the exertion of pressure at one point in time tends not to have any particularly strong cumulative effect in terms of the mayors who will succeed the incumbent in office. This is even more true if the school board is elected. Bay City, for example, which has very weak political parties, has seen the school board reformed repeatedly, but each reform dies out again. In cities with stronger political parties, the school board tradition is expressed in the kind of men who are slated for office.

Of course, in order to perform an analysis like this with only eight cities, we have necessarily had to ignore the idiosyncratic details of each city's government. We have done so even in those cases where our
analysis is not completely satisfactory, as, for example, in St. Louis, where the elite is highly suburbanized and yet reform goes on. To return to school desegregation, we have already pointed out that the civic boards are more liberal, and hence more acquiescent to the civil rights movement. In addition, we have also found, not too surprisingly, that the higher the level of heterogeneity and internal conflict on the board, the less the acquiescence. This means that the boards with inconsistent recruitment processes will be less acquiescent. The data are rather persuasive on this point. Next to each of the eight cities in Figure 5 is written the ranking on acquiescence, from one (high) to eight (lowest) with a tie for first place. With one exception, cities on the right are ranked above those on the left; those on the top are above those on the bottom.

To finish our discussion at this abstract level, let us turn to the two Census characteristics which we believe are most directly related to these two dimensions of the political style of the school system. One is the suburbanization of the elite, the other is the general socioeconomic status of the city. In Figure 6, we have presented these two variables together and identified the eight cities again. Notice that the cities in the upper right, which have a low socioeconomic status but have an elite living in the central city, are the ones that should be most highly reformed and therefore the most acquiescent to the demands made by the civil rights movement. Conversely, at the upper left we have cities which are high status but whose elites have moved to the suburbs. It is these cities that we anticipate will be least acquiescent to the civil rights movement. If we draw a line from the lower right-hand corner to the upper left-hand corner, and place the eight cities on this line, we find a rank
order correlation of .89 between the combined effect of these two Census variables and the outcome of the school segregation decisions.

If we have here the beginnings of a description of the distribution of influence in the city, there are many questions left to be answered. One important point is that we have not yet considered ideological differences between elites in different cities. In the South, there are obvious cases of cities where the civic elite has simply taken a more conservative position on race, and this has greatly affected the city government. Similarly, it seems reasonable to expect that the civic elite will vary in other ideological dimensions. Second, while the suburbanization of the elite may be an excellent measure of their power in the large cities of the United States, it is hardly an appropriate measure for smaller cities where suburbanization is a much less common characteristic. And yet, we anticipate that in small cities we will also find differences between the power held by the civic elite, though as yet we have no idea why those differences, if they exist, occur. Finally, our model of the civic elite participation considers the strength of the political parties as an independent variable, but certainly the continued participation of the civic elite has an impact upon the strength of political parties, though we don't know what this impact is. When this is built into the theory, the theory will become much more complex, because of the natural feedback cycle we will set up inside it. But in summary, we think that even with this limited number of cities and with data which are restricted to a single issue and are, in some cases, quite impressionistic, we have arrived at some surprisingly high and, we think, reliable correlations.
FIGURE 1
LIBERALISM AND ACQUIESCENCE

High Acquiescence

Liberalism of Board

r = .65
FIGURE 2

PERCENTAGE OF BOARD MEMBERS OF HIGH OCCUPATIONAL STATUS AND
PERCENTAGE OF MEMBERS ACTIVE IN POLITICS

Per Cent of Board Members who are professional, large business, or corporation lawyers.

Percentage of Board Members who are politically active.
FIGURE 3
SOURCE OF RECRUITMENT OF SCHOOL BOARD MEMBERS AND BOARD LIBERALISM

High Liberalism

Low Liberalism

Civic Recruiment

Politic Recruiment

Source of Board Members

r = .92
FIGURE 4

SUBURBANIZATION OF ELITES
AND SCHOOL BOARD REFORM

Source of recruitment of Board Members

Civic

Political

Low

High

Suburbanization of high-income families

r = .75
Recruitment process is:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civic</th>
<th>Consistent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle Class Cities</td>
<td>&quot;Balance of Power&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>Cities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawndale*</td>
<td>Pittsburgh</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Baltimore</td>
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<td></td>
<td>St. Louis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Working Class Cities</td>
<td>&quot;Machine&quot;</td>
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<td>Newark</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bay City*</td>
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*Pseudonyms
FIGURE 6
ACQUIESCENCE AND TWO CENSUS VARIABLES

Acquiescence ranking given numerically in the Figure: 1 is most acquiescence.