The attitudes of students and academic men are being shaped by changes in our national life. Faculty members have diverse loyalties but can be generally divided into cosmopolitans (who identify with an academic discipline), locals (who identify with an institution and its students), and "job-holders" (whose real interest lies outside discipline and institution). Although the US is more troubled, colleges are not necessarily in worse shape than they were 50 years ago when academicians earned a bare living and students were mindlessly rowdy and materialistic. Too, learning in the past was regarded as effeminate and unnecessary and it was not until World War II and after that academic talents were valued and states and local communities competed for funds for new colleges. As higher education became more popular, the outlook of whole neighborhoods was tipped in its favor, especially regarding education of its sons. The expansion of a flexible system of higher education created pressures and demands in other parts of society and a combination of forces converged to heighten the power of faculty and lesson that of students, administrators, trustees and local communities. Its rising power is now accompanied by a form of student power that is anti-collegiate and in some ways anti-academic, as well as an upsurge in doctrinaire conservatism among students. Uncommitted students can be rallied because of shared concerns over the war and draft. Recent domestic tensions have blinded us to the lessons of travel and study overseas, but a comparative perspective is essential for a broad understanding of our problems. (JS)
Address to Annual Meeting of Association of State Colleges and Universities, Statler Hilton Hotel, Washington, D. C. November 12, 1968

A CHANGING CAMPUS AND A CHANGING SOCIETY

David Riesman

In elections, as in student activism, the cumulative effect of relatively small shifts can be enormous, literally earthshaking. All of you must have read many articles on "new students," meaning the visible activists; and on some of your campuses you must almost have longed for some importation of such students as a sign that your campus has not been forsaken by modernity and that the world-wide student presence -- the presence of Paris and Columbia, of the universities of Mexico and of Tokyo, of Dakar and of Prague -- exists on your shores also. For it is my impression that many college administrators, contrary to the view of them held by faculty, students, and the media, like to live dangerously, just a little bit, although if the seasoning of life becomes the main dish, that's something else again. I have read somewhere that there were more than momentary disorders on something like 200 campuses during the previous academic year. Yet the institutions affected by any kind of student turbulence are probably less than 10 percent of the total, and a guess as to the number of students involved might be on the order of 300,000 out of a population of some six million.

This evening I would like to share with you some of my fragmentary understanding of the attitudes of academic men, of students toward these men,
and of the bearing on both of changes in our national life. It would be extremely interesting to know, in all the institutions represented here, what the salient identifications of your faculty members are. In the work of sociologists, a distinction has become common between the locals and the cosmopolitans. The cosmopolitans or the itinerants are those identified with an academic discipline. They define themselves first of all as historians or biologists, and indeed, within these broad specialties, with subspecialties. The colleagues that matter for them are those who share the same specialty, wherever they may be found, men with whom they are in touch through exchange of common reading, attendance at meetings, active correspondence, and sometimes through the students who move from one to the other. The locals are identified with the institution, with its particular fate, with its students. Their relation with students is less dependent upon the ability of the students to carry forward their particular specialty and more with other values they share with the students, such as a religious tie, or a regional one, or some other bond of particularity rather than universality. Likewise, the colleagues to whom they are bound are principally the men with whom they share loyalty to the institution, and only in lesser degree men who share loyalty to an academic guild.

Most dichotomies break down in individual instances, and this one is no exception. Consider the increasingly unionized faculties of the California state colleges, a number of which are represented here tonight. With what entities do these collective bargainers identify? Do they identify with the state college as such against its great rival for state funds, namely the branches of the University of California? To what extent are they identified with a particular state college and its local mission, and to what extent with biology, history, sociology? Do they have a cosmopolitan identity with the
state colleges of New York, or a geographically localized one in opposition to Chancellor Dumke and the Trustees on Imperial Boulevard in Los Angeles? Or consider the faculty of a distinguished Ivy League university like Princeton. Many of these men are world-renowned in their disciplines, and are evidently cosmopolitans in that sense and in the more common meaning of the term. Yet they may also have a certain loyalty to Princeton: if they have tenure they are not likely to be using Princeton as a springboard to go somewhere else. Their mentality is not that of itinerants. They are truly home-guard cosmopolitans. Furthermore, in work that the sociologist Joseph Gusfield and I have been doing, we have found a number of men, and a very considerable number of women, who identify neither with the discipline nor with the institution. We have called them "job-holders": they are people who are earning a living by teaching in a college or university, but their real interest is something else, such as raising a family, putting their husbands through the Ph.D., or doing work in the arts on the side; or rather, the job is what is the side, although it may take a great deal of time and be done with conscientiousness. Our society is much less nepotistic than it once was. We do not make a man like Nathaniel Hawthorne a consul in a foreign post to give him a living, and few people enter religious orders now as a way to subsidize contemplation or writing. Teaching has become the most common form of patronage for people whose real interest lies elsewhere, and it is perhaps the form of patronage most suited to a society where corruption is greatly diminished and patronage is frowned upon.

Indeed, academic man is no longer to be patronized. Those men who have visibility in their discipline beyond their institution cannot be exploited by virtue of their loyalty to that institution. As already suggested,
this is clearly the case at a place like Princeton, where a professor of Classics is likely to be paid almost as much as a professor of Physics and where neither is likely to be asked in a crude way, by a tyrannical department chairman, "What have you done lately to advertise our department?" However, as some of you have occasion to know every day, in many fields a man with a doctorate is a scarce resource even if he is not visible as a scholar. The accrediting agencies and the ambitions of departments and institutions see to that.

It was not so long ago that academic men constituted an oppressed minority. There prevails a great deal of romanticism about the old-fashioned liberal arts college where a few scholars met in a leisurely way with each other and with students, where neither commercial values nor the mass media intruded, and where serenity prevailed. Student, faculty, and popular critics of contemporary higher education feel that they must paint the present situation as a fall from an earlier state of grace in order to justify their criticisms. I do not see why it is necessary to indulge in such mythology, no matter how critical one is.

The United States is almost certainly a more troubled country today than it was on Armistice Day in 1918. Yet it does not follow that we are worse off, but rather that we are more powerful in a more desperately armed world, and that we have higher expectations for equality and justice. I believe that we expect more of our educational institutions today: they are better than they were, in quality as well as quantity, but this only makes their customers more dissatisfied. In the old-fashioned college, faculty members earned a bare, if genteel, living -- and subsidized the students. Before the rise of organized athletics, the students responded by rowdyism, far more mindless and even more
violent than present-day student riots. Only a tiny proportion of the population had the sometimes doubtful benefit of post-secondary education, and neither the great robber barons nor the radicals who attacked them were likely to have attended college. Great pulpit orators had some influence, and a few college presidents belonged to this species, but most lived a life of quiet desperation, trying to make ends meet and to stave off creditors; and, as you know, ever so many institutions failed.

Even in the period of the 1920's, when I was attending college, some of this feeling of deprivation survived. Faculty members were apt wryly to compare their mortgaged homes to the lavish fraternity houses, and their pinched lives to the materialistic but glamorous collegians who came to college at parental expense to make contacts, in the pleasantest possible way, that would be useful on Wall Street, State Street, or Main Street. No one who has heard George Kennan describe the loneliness of Princeton in this period, as experienced by a reflective student, should look back in sorrow.

During all this time, the most influential faculty continued to feel that America was anti-intellectual and Philistine. As Richard Hofstadter has pointed out in his book *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life*, one expression of the prevailing attitude was evident in many churchmen who thought clever people were unlikely to be good people, an outlook which we see in secular fundamentalist form in George Wallace's jeers against pseudo-intellectuals, by which he means an intellectual you disagree with.

More important, probably, in the general American culture, and related to this anti-intellectual outlook, has been the association of school with womenfolk, and of escape from school with masculinity. Huck Finn lighting out for the Territory is a symbol of the older America that is still, in part, with us.
Girls seldom have reading blocks in school; boys often do. May this not reflect the fact that boys are taught in the elementary years by women, and of course they are mostly raised in the early years by their mothers; and also, in a culture that values masculine prowess and self-reliance, don't many feel the need to assert independence from school routines? If we can get more athletic men teaching English or the arts in elementary schools, and more attractive feminine women teaching the natural sciences and engineering in colleges and universities, we may begin to undo the somewhat arbitrary linkages that have associated attitudes toward school and toward school subjects with one's sexual identity. And in the United States, since we are a democracy, one is not granted one's identity at birth, even one's sexual identity: it has to be achieved socially, like any other status. Indeed, at the university level, women must often prove that they are not brilliant and clever if they are to be thought properly feminine, while at that level men can come into their own and be fairly free, if they have not lost their minds and their courage as a result of having to prove their manliness at earlier points.

All this gets tied up with questions as to the supposed impracticality of learning and of learned men, a view that was easy to maintain when such men were underpaid and when college presidents could hire and fire them, rather than, as often at present, the other way around.

A dramatic break in the position of academic men came with the second World War. Earlier wars had been fought with the benefit of the Corps of Engineers and other graduates of West Point and Annapolis, but World War II was the first to which academic scientists made decisive contributions. Radar in England, the atomic bomb in this country, later the DEW line, were contributions principally of academic scientists. Social scientists played a part, too, in studies of military morale, in analyses of the national character of enemies.
and allies, and in research on propaganda.

The industrial spinoff from defense also became clear after the war. Robert McNamara, a former Harvard Business School professor, went to the Ford Motor Company with a group of his military colleagues. MIT scientists founded small companies along Route 128 around Boston. In fact, large business began to cultivate the academy as never before, and corporations began to take an interest in the educational level of the communities from which they recruited manpower or where their employees lived. The altered position of the university is illustrated by the remark a Dupont official made to me several years ago, namely that the university was unbeatable competition for Dupont: the universities could take their best chemists or chemical engineers away from them almost at will. Large companies like Dupont try to compete by making their laboratories as academic as possible, and allowing a certain amount of justified bootlegging of private research on company time, 'like the private garden plots of a Soviet collective farmer.

More significant, though harder to document, is the infiltration of large, managerial business by academic styles of thought. These businessmen no longer regard culture as something to be left as occupational therapy for their wives, even though some may still regard membership on a Board of Trustees of a college as requiring no different talents from membership on the board of a local symphony or art museum. (In contrast, the owners of small business, although often extremely rich, have been much less influenced by academic styles of thought.)

Another great legacy of the second World War was the G.I. Bill of Rights, which not only floated many previously anemic colleges which astonishingly managed to find room for the wave of students, but also forced them to adjust
to their maturity. They doomed the collegiate in many places. The G.I.'s had seen San Francisco and Biarritz, Tokyo and Houston. The G.I. Bill allowed them to carry their tuition money anywhere and thus to begin to break down the geographic insularity which had previously protected colleges -- a protection now again provided by the high tuitions imposed on out-of-state students and the quota on such students in many public institutions. State and local competition to put a public college in every sizable community or area exploded after the second World War -- one reason that many of the institutions assembled here broadened their scope and greatly enlarged their facilities.

Something new has happened when a high school begins to have so many of its students headed toward college as to tip the whole neighborhood toward college. In a study of Berkeley high schools a few years ago, Alan Wilson demonstrated that a high school senior of working-class origin in a middle-class high school where almost everybody went on to college would himself be likely to plan on college, even if people of the same aptitudes and family backgrounds as himself, in a predominantly working-class high school, would not attend college. And conversely, to show how democratic our society is, or how peer-oriented young people are, a young man of middle-class family background in a working-class high school would be less likely to plan on college than others like him in a prevailingly middle-class environment. Increasingly, of course, as more and more parents have attended college, the pressures on schools for college preparatory programs increase, the parents of working-class origin begin to believe that their own children can only get ahead by attending college, and they will tell the interviewer that a man now has to go to college if he is to make it in our society. Thus, more and more neighborhoods get tipped in that direction, so that college attendance has a cumulative quality, much as high school attendance did in the period before the second World War.
All this, as one goes down in the scale of socio-economic status, is more true of young men than of young women, except among Negroes, where the situation is reversed. Among whites, barring the higher strata, a girl's education is not thought to matter so much as a boy's, even though in high school she is likely to do better, as we have already noticed. A girl is not sent away so far or kept in college so long, nor is as much money spent on her for tuition if the family has not ample means for all children. One consequence for many of the colleges and universities which are members of the ASCU is that you sometimes have very bright commuter girls who are academically and often socially superior to the men in the same institution, and, as happens at all levels of the academic enterprise, who find themselves going slumming when they go out with boys they meet at school; either that, or they sit at home waiting for callers.

It would be illuminating if we could overhear the often unspoken conversation that goes on between parents and children, in all social strata, about attending college and where to go. Among working-class parents who have had no college education, a study done by the sociologist Joseph Kahl a number of years ago indicated some aspects of that conversation. He matched two samples of high school male seniors; matched them in terms of aptitude and family income, some of whom were going to college and some of whom were not. And to try to understand that decision, he talked both to the young men and to their fathers. Almost invariably, the fathers would say that they wanted their young people to go to college. But some would also say or mean something else: in effect, "Do you want to abandon me? Do you think I'm no good? Which do you want to be, a big shot, or a good guy?" Often such young men would decide that they didn't have the money or the talent or the interest to attend college. In other cases the father was genuinely eager for his son to attend college.
Perhaps the homemade provisions for study, rather than urging the children the agenda that I once heard called "honey dew" days: "Honey, do this. Honey, do that." "Help me shingle the roof" -- for a boy. "Give me a hand with the dishes" -- for a girl. Indeed, these family pressures are such that it is not surprising that many of the students at your institutions hold part-time jobs which handicap their academic work and are not absolutely essential financially but make sense humanly in the family context -- more sense than returning to the campus in the evening, if one is a commuter, for some extracurricular event, or going to the library to get out that recommended reading for which one will not be held on the exam.

At the same time, the opportunity for college students to earn money on the side and the opportunity for their parents, under conditions of plentiful employment, to earn steady money has allowed families greater leeway in releasing their children from full-time employment for at least part-time higher education. Labor unions have had the power to keep the young out of the well-paying, full-time labor force, while the draft has recently operated in a similar way to channel people toward college as a temporarily deferable occupation.

And, as I have already indicated, the colleges -- your colleges and universities -- have been there to meet the demand and to help create it. It has taken an astonishingly long time for members of the Federal Congress and for state assemblymen and senators to discover that higher education is the new Rivers and Harbors pork barrel for poor landlocked communities. But this discovery has been made; and for good reasons and not so good ones, states and areas compete to establish public colleges, so that each legislator will have at least one in his area -- this is in fact an old American story, as Daniel
Boorstin points out in his chapter, "The Booster College" in his volume _The Americans: The National Experience_. The city in which we are meeting was, until this year, the only major city without a multi-purpose public college. But this fall, with the establishment of Federal City College, it has, at long last, joined the United States.

The expansion of our colleges and their willingness to accommodate themselves to unanticipated students who turn up on their doorstep have always impressed me, but that impression was deepened when I spent an earlier sabbatical at the University of Sussex, one of the new British universities which regards itself as quite "American" in its interdisciplinary programs and its general effort to be flexible and responsive to new social imperatives. But at Sussex, as at every other British university, there are places assigned in advance in every field, and if a single additional student turns up who had not previously been arranged for, he is simply turned away. He must wait at least another year. There is no such thing as overacceptance at a British university; nothing like our flexibility and willingness to improvise, to have students in trailers, as Santa Cruz did in its first year -- or to announce courses and then go find the faculty who may turn up to teach them at the last minute.

Indeed, the fluidity of the American student population reflects that of the society. Only in the more traditional, often private, liberal arts colleges do students suppose that they will follow a regular four-year sequence in the same institution; only in such places are freshmen marked at entry as members of the Class of 1973 who will be ready for their 25th reunions in 1998. More commonly, students go one term and not another; they drop in and they drop out; they transfer casually and without a feeling of being downgraded
or upgraded on the basis of the time-honored liturgy of academic precedence. Bruce Eckland followed dropouts from the University of Illinois for ten years and found them eventually getting an A.B. somewhere. It may only be in such terms that we can explain the relative lack of hostility against academic institutions from those we term dropouts. While my Harvard colleague, Professor S. M. Lipset, has some evidence that John Birch Society members and other Right Wing fanatics are sometimes dropouts who resent the university which they were unable to complete, the little research we have on dropouts suggests that this kind of resentment is less common than one might suppose and that parents who have not finished college have not hindered their children from attending college; if anything, the contrary.

I mentioned earlier the obvious fact that if the high schools had not expanded enormously, there would not be the cadres ready to go on to college. But the expansion of high schools has had another consequence, namely, an enormous demand for college graduates to teach in secondary schools, and a great need for people to teach the teachers -- a kind of academic multiplier effect. Prosperity has meant, furthermore, that many corporations have been able to afford college graduates, whether or not anything they learned in college was relevant for what they would do in the company or whether the company might not teach it to them more economically than college could. It is a matter of prestige to have a receptionist who attended college. And by giving her a new job title, she may even be satisfied, or not aggressively dissatisfied, with her job. Furthermore, when the neighborhood becomes tipped in the direction of college, those who do not attend college begin to be psychologically deviant: a prospective employer may be right to fear that they lack the assiduity, the willingness to endure, and therefore, presumably, the willingness to learn rather than loaf on company time.
As if these pressures for the expansion of higher education were not enough, the Soviet Union provided an additional booster in 1958 in the form of Sputnik. There had developed before Sputnik a mood of self-criticism of American education at all levels. Why can't Johnny read? Why does he prefer football, fraternities, and frivolity to serious academic work? Why are our schools softer than those of the Swiss, the Russians, the Japanese? Sputnik contributed to a widening feeling that the country had gone soft in the international competition. I remember very well the founding of Oakland University as a branch of Michigan State in 1958, and the approval it gained for announcing that it was to be a no-nonsense college with none of the collegiate or playboy fun and no concessions to Big Ten self-indulgence.

All these forces converged to heighten the power of the faculty and to lessen the relative power of the students, the administration, the local community, or the trustees. The faculty were the gatekeepers of the new American meritocracy who decided how much further education a person could have, the level at which he was to be certified. A more just society accepted meritocracy as the alternative to favoritism, although the rich whose sons could not get into papa's college did so grudgingly, and the black and other disadvantaged minorities who could get into nobody's college are now increasingly objecting. Moreover, to the degree that we recognize the growing complexity of our society, we recognize the need for college-trained experts to advise if not to manage corporate and governmental affairs -- though here again there are many who begrudge the need for experts and who, with terrifying simplicity, insist that it is all a plot to take America away from its traditional course. Students in college may also sometimes believe that affairs are really simple if bad people didn't mess them up. But, more frequently, they turn to their professors in the hope of finding a meaning to their lives and an interpretation of the bewildering rate of
change. This demand, of course, distributes itself unevenly over the curriculum, being especially pronounced in sociology, the more clinical sides of psychology, existential philosophy, and sometimes political science. (The experimental colleges have gotten some of this intellectual or at times anti-intellectual traffic, and so have the campus ministries which in many institutions have been a source of intellectual vitality or political activism, or occasionally both together.) Students or pastors have found it hard to maintain an underground curriculum because faculty have been talented at coopting books or themes into the regular curriculum, and administrators have been inventive in finding room. Thus the quest of many students and of many adults for better understanding has benefited the position of those faculty who seem to offer it — often faculty who earlier suffered from neglect at the hands of more fully collegiate or vocational student bodies.

This dramatic rise in the relative position of faculty members did not make most of us happier, nor did it rob us of feelings of underprivilege and deprivation. So far as I am aware, no rising group behaves that way. It continues to cherish its minority status as a basis for further claims on the general culture. Furthermore, the victory of academic values has never been anything like total. A few institutions have been turned into an academic version of a Marine boot camp, where the teaching assistants are the noncoms, the deans are the field grade officers, and the senior faculty are the headquarters staff. Students may be proud to have survived, but seldom have formed enduring attachments to academic concerns. In the most academically selective institutions, those where three-quarters of the males go on to graduate or professional study, the faculty have sometimes been, until quite recently, cast in the role of models for a very large number of students for whom other models, such as ministers, businessmen, political leaders, accountants,
insurance men, and so on were scarcely visible. In fact, the decline in the status of the businessman, which began a good many years ago, was precipitated during the Depression and after the second World War among the better students. The non-profit sectors of society seemed to them somehow more pure. This now has changed among a small minority of students who appear to regard all occupations as equally corrupt, which is a gain to the degree that it reduces snobbery, and a loss to the degree that it reduces everything to a common level of despair and disparagement.

There are still colleges to be found where undergraduates boast about how many bottles of beer they have consumed, or how many bourbon shots they have downed, even while elsewhere officials worry that the next student they meet may be a narcotics agent, and look wistfully back to the days when sin took less pharmacological shape. In contrast, in the arts and sciences colleges and engineering schools of the great state universities, making the grade becomes increasingly more important than making the team. In their newly-published book based on observations at the University of Kansas, Howard Becker, Blanche Geer, and Everett Hughes describe the way in which the fraternities have become, as it were, the shop stewards of the academic enterprise, encouraging their members to raise their grade point average by a cooperative effort, although not to raise it astronomically. The power of the faculty is recognized in such compromises even while that power is in marginal degree resisted.

Such resistance is more difficult in a commuter college where students have little chance to group together to decide how much effort the faculty is entitled to or how to beat the faculty at their own academic game. Here, as I have suggested before, it is often the family or the part-time job which competes with the curriculum and perhaps even more successfully with the
extracurriculum for the allegiance of students. Some commuter colleges are torn between the advantages of building dormitories to attract a wider range and perhaps somewhat more affluent student body, while recognizing the troubles that resident students can create who will not necessarily devote the time spared from commuting to reading more books.

Still, it seems fair to say that what we now find the country over is rising faculty power vis-a-vis student collegiate life, at the very time when there is developing a new form of student power which is anti-collegiate but also, in some ways, anti-academic. Around San Francisco State College, around Wayne State University, around the new University of Massachusetts in Boston, one can see developing small cadres of activist students who are academically highly capable, but who find reasons to reject the academic as irrelevant, conservative, or biased. In general such students tend to be clustered in metropolitan institutions with superior faculty. So, too, in many of the great state universities, one can find both the new activist and the old collegiate students; what is astonishing is that they have not fought it out more among themselves for control of the campus. And one can find Negro colleges, too, where, as happens generally in the South, athletic and collegiate values are strong, and fraternity and sorority life glorious and full-blown, and where, at the same time, a small cadre of black militants rejects both the collegiate and the academic, insisting, sometimes with the aid of white faculty radicals and sometimes in a mood of hostility to all whites, that the college become black, rejecting the goals of conventional success, whether in terms of Woodrow Wilson Fellowships or of entrepreneurial achievement.

However, I am inclined to think that there are more black militants on white campuses than on Negro college campuses. When there are enough black students on a white campus -- and it doesn't take very many -- to form an
Afro-American group or Black Students Union, there may develop a competition in militancy between white and black activists, as illustrated in a most dramatic way at Columbia and as one might also find in some of the New York State or California State Colleges represented here. But as administrators may also be discovering, the black students are ordinarily in search of concrete goals, such as living or meeting facilities, or special programs or courses in African or Afro-American Studies, whereas what the white students want is more indeterminate and therefore more difficult for institutions to cope with. The white student radical in America tends to be well off; he comes from a college-educated family and, as Kenneth Keniston observes in his book The Young Radicals, the student is often carrying out a mandate which he thinks his parents fudged or compromised -- a mandate to make America more equal, more just, less warlike, and in some vague way, more humane. But the tactics tend to be those borrowed from the civil rights movement, and they can escalate faster than the goals can, leading to a leap-frog between goals and tactics that baffle adults and many moderate students.

In the criticism of the university by the activist students, whether white or black, there are some themes strangely reminiscent of earlier American anti-academic attitudes. If the businessmen of an earlier epoch attacked the professors as impractical and unworldly men, student radicals today, and many professors, attack them for being irrelevant and uncommitted. The elder Henry Ford, in a famous remark, said that history is bunk. Many student radicals would agree, seeing history mainly as a source of cautionary tales warning them against provoking reaction. (I have myself written such tales.) Americans put up more readily with unserious student pranks and collegiate fun and games than with the present combination of the ribald and the solemn, the provocative and the righteous, the manipulative and the idealistic forms of behavior.
There is one group of student activists who have had relatively little attention of late, and that is the members of Right-Wing organizations such as the Young Americans for Freedom. I don't know how many of you have chapters of the YAF on your own campuses, but I have seen figures indicating that the membership is on the order of 20,000, considerably larger than the Students for a Democratic Society were until quite recently. These chapters played a not inconsiderable role in arousing enthusiasm for Barry Goldwater within the Republican Party in 1964, but I have not seen any indication that they are part of the entourage of George Wallace, whose great support from young men in their twenties comes principally from blue-collar workers and farmers without college education. The rise of the Young Americans for Freedom is a curious, backhanded tribute to the rise of academic influence. For, while these students sometimes refer to themselves as "conservatives," they are not conservative in the American grain, which means being rather unpolitical, not ideologically flamboyant. In an earlier collegiate era, a student from a conservative family could arrive on a college campus and expect to emerge uninfluenced by cosmopolitan currents of liberalism and radicalism. Ideas did not touch them all that much. There are still, of course, many campuses where this is so, but there are many others where parents think it's so, and it is not. (I have visited, for example, Southern Baptist colleges where young people have been sent by their parents, rather than having gone on their own steam, and have found, when they got there, the winds of radical theology and radical pacifism and racial equality blowing strong.) And I would think that on the state college and university campuses from which you come there is now a sufficiently heterogeneous faculty and student body to put pressure on political somnolence and cultural complacency. In a setting where the articulate campus spokesmen, both faculty and students, are liberal or radical, a
minority of students is apt to decide that conventional conservatism is an inadequate carapace of protection. They may start reading William Buckley, Jr.'s *National Review*; they almost certainly will have read Ayn Rand in high school; they will develop a much more doctrinal position than that of their parents and turn into radicals of the Right capable of matching forensic talents with the SDS or the elected Student Government liberals.

One can find universities today where non-conformist, radical student leaders have a large following among the more collegiate students. They are able to mobilize the latter because both cadres object to anything compulsory, whether it is dormitory hours for women or distribution requirements in the curriculum or physical education or ROTC. For, just as in the labor union movement of a generation or two ago, union leaders could espouse international or even Utopian values and yet appeal to a work force that wanted more money for less work, so also student radicals today can tap a constituency that does not share their harsh judgment of American society nor their vision -- usually an inchoate and barely formed vision -- of what might replace it.

One extramural constraint, namely the draft, binds these cadres together now and will almost certainly continue to do so with increasing intensity while the Viet-Nam war lasts. That war and its consequences for personal choice and student ethical dilemmas make me sympathetic with the students' solemnity and moral fervor which I have referred to. It is dreadfully hard on a young man to have to ask himself if he is a coward because he is not going to enlist and perhaps be sent to Viet-Nam; to ask himself if he is a coward because, as a Quaker, he has accepted a Conscientious Objector deferment rather than going to prison or to Canada. It is dreadfully hard on a young man to ask himself whether he is fond of a particular girl or thinks that an element in his decision to marry her and father a child may be a better chance for
deferment. And if he is attending medical school, is he there because he wants to help the sick, or because he wants to do research on the sick and would have gone into a Ph.D. program if he had not feared for his deferment? The situation that the country is in puts college students into these ethical dilemmas if they are at all sensitive, harasses them with the feeling that they are unduly privileged in an era when privilege is increasingly being rejected, and forces the omnipresent American question of masculinity on them in forms of often nearly impossible ambiguity.

Naturally, in what I said just now I have been talking about young men. Perhaps you will have noticed that most of the literature about students refers implicitly to young men -- young women get less attention from researchers. However, the issues of the draft that unsettle young men plainly do not leave their girlfriends unscathed. And the more general issue of privilege certainly does not leave them unscathed. The very desire of some of the more affluent young people of both sexes to identify with the deprived is a kind of paradoxical luxury, the luxury of being able to afford wearing blue jeans and looking sloppy -- and of course it is this often-unintended offensiveness which so infuriates the hard-working and struggling working class and lower middle-class when confronted by the privileged young who seem to scoff at their own privileges.

The most visible cadre of deprived Americans today for most college students who think about such matters are the blacks. However, the majority of poor in America are white. Many are old. Many are rural or live in run-out mining and mill towns. They are not ghettoized; they are not dramatically visible in the way that the Negroes and perhaps increasingly the Mexican-Americans are. Another group that tends to get lost from view is the steadily rising number of middle-class Negroes whose children are attending both the predominantly Negro and the predominantly integrated colleges.
In the new mythology of race, the Negro middle-class -- especially students, faculty members, and administrators -- is often caught between black militants with their white student allies and the stubborn white reactionaries. In this situation, some middle-class Negroes tend to identify or overidentify with the Negro proletariat out of precisely the same emotions of wanting to shed privileges and to share oppression that we find among some of the more affluent white undergraduates. I think, for example, of one extremely able and reflective Negro student at Harvard who said to me last spring that the previous summer he had avoided riots and trouble by going to Europe, but this summer he felt he had to share the lot of his brothers in the ghetto of which he had had no personal experience, and he was going to be on hand for whatever disasters might befall. Of course, in such attitudes there is an element of self-dramatization, but there is also a feeling of generosity toward the oppressed and of a wish to share what is considered to be the greater reality of hardship as against the lesser reality of indulgence.

One of the troubling side effects of the racial crisis within America, both for white and black students and for educators too, is that we have become so preoccupied with our domestic inventory of social attention (refugees from Czechoslovakia are only now beginning to arrive) that it is desperately important for young Americans to see something of students elsewhere in the world. Radical students often assume that, because the slogans are the same, the problems of students everywhere are the same. Most of you know how false that assumption is, how crowded and oppressed are the students in Italy, for example, or even in France, in Tokyo or Madras, in Mexico City or Manila.

Yet the colleges and universities in this Association, many of whom are struggling to increase their recruitment of minority American students, are nevertheless pretty much bound to a narrow geographic catch-basin. The
legislature is apt to fear the "foreigners" from New York State, or New Jersey, and will seldom provide funds to bring foreign students in numbers to the campus, let alone resources to keep them from being isolated in a foreign student colony. Some of the colleges in this association have had better luck with overseas programs for their own American students, terms doing Chinese studies in Hong Kong, or Spanish studies in Madrid. We all know that such foreign terms can have a PX quality without real involvement with the host culture in any serious way. We know the resistance to foreign language requirements which can unite some of the most self-indulgent students with some of the most vocal activists. What I am saying is that American self-awareness would be a mixed blessing if it led to a new insularity, and that it is hard for many of us to be polygamous about problems and to think about more than one at the same time. Therefore, it is just because there is now such an interest, although an uneven interest, in problems of the ghetto, that I want to emphasize the need for continuing attention to problems and possibilities, curiosities and discoveries, overseas.

As I write these lines, the Fulbright grants for travel and study, particularly in Western Europe, have either been entirely cut or severely curtailed, reflecting not only the deep budget cuts in so many programs, but also the vindictive hostility in the State Department toward Senator Fulbright himself. There are many colleges represented here which I know have had Fulbright scholars at them. Indeed, I would suppose that there are no colleges in this Association whose intellectual life has not been directly or indirectly influenced by non-American scholarship or travel abroad by American scholars. I hope we do not enter another era when non-American will be termed "un-American," for indeed, throughout our history, there has been nothing more American than our generosity toward the importation of people, inventions, and ideas. The
early mills of New England were often built by workmen who smuggled the plans out of Lancastershire factories, and what students sometimes like to call "the academic mills" have similarly benefited from the influx of non-American scholars.

At the present time the United States is less provincial than it has ever been, and we are almost overwhelmed by the immensity of our domestic problems. However, I do not think we can understand these in the absence of comparative perspective. In this respect, a college has the same duty that an individual does: to recognize roots in a particular time and turf, and at the same time to transcend both.