This is a report on a conference on "Students and Politics" held at the University of Puerto Rico in San Juan from March 27-31, 1967. The purpose of the conference was to bring together scholars from various countries who have been doing research on the nature and causal background of university student participation in politics. Some 36 papers were presented at the conference. A list of participants and the papers presented is attached as an appendix. The various sessions of the conference were set up to discuss different regions. The following represents an effort to integrate the conclusions drawn from the papers and the discussion.
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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STUDENT ACTIVISM

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Introduction

This is a report on a conference on "Students and Politics" held at the University of Puerto Rico in San Juan from March 27 to 31, 1967. The purpose of the conference was to bring together scholars from various countries who have been doing research on the nature and causal background of university student participation in politics. Thirty-six papers were presented at the conference. A list of the participants and the papers presented is attached as an appendix. The various sessions of the conference were set up to discuss different regions. The following represents an effort to integrate the conclusions drawn from the papers and the discussion.
Research on Students and Politics

The scope of the conference on "Students and Politics" reflects the considerable increase in interest in the topic around the world. The fact that 52 scholars from many countries attended the meeting attests to the scientific, as well as political interest in the topic. Ten years ago, hardly anyone devoted himself to this subject. Today, there are literally hundreds analyzing student political movements, behavior, and attitudes. In another five years, there should be a large shelf of books dealing with the political role of students.

It is interesting to speculate on the reasons for the previous lack of interest. It certainly does not reflect the fact that students did not play an important role in the past. In fact, some of the papers presented to this conference highlight the considerable historic role of students. Students were a key element in the revolutions of 1848 in Germany and Austria, and the "Professors' Parliament," which almost succeeded in toppling several monarchs, was stimulated by student activism. In Czarist Russia, students also spearheaded various revolutionary movements. The university campus was a major center of revolutionary activity. The Revolution of 1905 had a strong student component. Students were active in other East European countries during the 19th century. In all these countries, where education was limited to a small proportion of the population, students were often the carriers of modern ideas of liberty socialism, industrialization, and equality of opportunity.

The important role of students in the movements for national independence in the developing areas also goes back a half-century or more. In Imperial China,
students caused the government much difficulty. On the one hand, they were a
key element in the Chinese effort at modernization, while on the other, the
students spread republican and radical ideas throughout the society. In the
19th century, thousands of Chinese students studied abroad and returned with
innovative ideologies. Students helped overthrow the dynasty in 1911, and
were thereafter one of the elements in China continually pushing the country
toward modernization and radical ideologies. In other Asian and African
countries, students were often a key element in anti-colonial struggles.
Particularly important were the "returned students"—those individuals who
had lived and studied abroad, mostly in Europe, and who returned with ideas
of modernization and Marxism, socialism and struggle. International student
meetings were held as early as the 1920's, and men such as Nehru of India, Hatta
of Indonesia, and others were profoundly influenced by these student organizations
and movements. Thus, it is evident that student activism and the importance of
students in politics long antedates the current interest in the subject.

The relative lack of attention paid to the rather major role played by
students in reform and radical movements in the past is a product of at least
three factors:

1) Student movements are quite transitory in character and have left
fewer records than adult organizations.

2) The history of revolutionary movements and events have generally been written by men who are sympathetic to the movements from an historical point of view. To stress the role of youth and students, as contrasted with
forces such as social classes, or religious tendencies, would seem in a sense to under-emphasize the seriousness and significance of the happenings. It would turn them into "children's crusades."

3) The Marxist theory of social change has had a considerable influence on interpretations of revolutions and social movements. From the Marxist perspective, intellectuals and students are not significant independent social forces. Rather they have been viewed as vacillating, unreliable, "petty-bourgeois elements," who tend to shift with the prevailing ideological winds. Although students have played a major role in supporting various Communist movements at different times, the party tended in the past to deprecate their role.

As John Israel points out in his book, *Student Nationalism in China 1927-1937*, the Chinese C. P. during the 1930's sought to get student Communists to cease being students; it encouraged them to go out and organize workers and peasants, a task they were ill-fit to do. Student Communists were most competent to recruit on campus, to help provoke massive student demonstrations against university and national political authorities. By the mid-forties, the Chinese Communists had learned their lesson, and were able to mobilize the students against Chiang Kai Chek. In recent years, the Chinese Communists have pointed to student participation as a major element in every revolutionary movement.

The greater willingness to recognize the political role of students is in part a result of the awareness by many on the left that other social forces on which they had counted for support, particularly the working class, are not always available. Thus C. Wright Mills, among many, pointed to the
fact that the organized workers of the developed countries of Europe and America have become a conservative force. Trade unions and labor-based parties are part of the institutional system of representation and collective bargaining. As such, they are not concerned with policies and programs which may upset the political pattern. The orthodox (pro-Russian) Communist Parties in many countries have also become part of the regular system of representation and no longer advocate the use of extra-legal and extra-parliamentary tactics. In Latin America, they oppose the guerilla tactics fostered by Castroites and Maoists.

Mills saw in the intellectuals and students a major potential mass base for new revolutionary movements. In a sense, the new focus of concern by radicals on students is not a result of greater student activism today than in the past, but rather of the fact that they have remained a source of new radical leadership and mass support, while the other elements of society have not. Thus there is more attention focussed on the American student movement of the 1960's than occurred during the 1930's, although the earlier movement was larger both in absolute and proportionate terms. The fact, however, that radical organizations and the press are currently more concerned with student politics should provide a greater stimulus for campus activism. And in the U.S., much of Latin America, and elsewhere, student movements today constitute a major radical force. They, in turn, seek support from "unorganized" and hence, potentially available elements, the Negroes and the "poor" in the U.S., the peasants in parts of Latin America and Asia.

But beyond the emergence of an intellectual concern with the politics of students, well publicized events of the past decade have illustrated the significance of student politics. Student demonstrations and movements played a considerable role in the overthrow of Perón in Argentina in 1955, in the downfall of Pérez Jiménez in Venezuela in 1958; in provoking the successful resistance to Diem in
in Vietnam in 1963, in the massive riots against the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in Japan in 1960 which prevented President Eisenhower from visiting the country and forced the resignation of the Kishi government, in the anti-Sukarno movement in Indonesia in 1966, in the October demonstrations for greater freedom in Poland in 1956, in the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, and in accentuating opposition during the "Hundred Flowers" campaign in China in 1957.

It is important to note, however, as Byung Hun Oh points out in his paper on Korea, that although students can be catalysts for political action, they can seldom bring a revolutionary movement to fruition. In Korea, students began the movement which succeeded in toppling the Rhee government in 1960, but they relied on popular pressure and on the army to bring their movement success. Similarly, in Turkey, students were the catalyst for a movement, strongly supported by the military, which succeeded in toppling the Menderes government in 1960.

Although much of the recent writing on student politics has focused on leftist activist groups, it is also important to analyze the strength and activities of traditional and conservative ones as well. Opinion data for various countries assembled by Glaucio Soares indicate that the left-wing students are in a minority, often a very small minority, even in countries in which leftist demonstrations have made international headlines.

In most countries, the vast majority of students are apolitical and tend to endorse the moderate or even conservative parties. It is necessary to distinguish between the fact that university campuses provide a significant proportion of the future radical leadership, as well as the mass base for anti-government demonstrations, from the fact that most students are not involved in such activities. In some nations, all political tendencies draw their future leaders from those who were active in
campus politics. In Great Britain and in Chile, to take two very disparate countries and university systems, all parties are active on the major campuses, and many of the adult party leaders are men who had been officers of the university branches of their parties.

In the United States, today, the largest campus political groups are the Young Democrats and Young Republicans, which have a total combined membership of under 250,000 members as contrasted to 6,000 members of the new left Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). A recent (1967) U.S. survey of American college students reports that a majority favor the Republicans for the 1968 Presidential election. Four national surveys conducted during 1965 and 1966 found that from two-thirds to three-quarters of American students support the Vietnamese war.

In Puerto Rico, two studies of opinion among students at the University in 1956 and 1964, reported by Arthur Liebman, indicate that more students favored the conservative Statehood Party (30 and 26 percent) than did the most "leftist" of the three major parties, the Independence Party (23 and 24 per cent), while the largest group (47.5 per cent) backed the governing Popular Democrats. More significant perhaps than the party choices is the fact that in a campus-wide referendum held in March 1965, over two-thirds of those voting on the issue of student political rights favored the proposal that student political activities "should be regulated" and that "demonstrations, pickets and public meetings on the campus that disturb scholarly activities or are contrary to the norms of the institution are prohibited." Less than one-third favored the alternative that "the freedom of expression, association and assembly that are in the Constitution are guaranteed to students on the campus."
These reports are a useful corrective to the journalistic as well as scholarly preoccupation with those students and those attitudes which are in favor of leftist social change. The relationship of university students to politics is as complicated and variegated as that of adults. Students range widely in their opinions and involvements. Campus organizations which concern themselves directly or indirectly with political matters also differ considerably. Any effort, therefore, to analyze the nature of student political behavior must begin with some sort of typology or classification of alternative possibilities of student behavior, as well as of the varying types of organizations. The conference papers and discussion suggest two such typologies as particularly worthwhile. On the behavioral level, Richard Peterson has formulated a useful typology (extending that of Martin Trow and Burton Clark) of eight types of students which is drawn from an examination of questionnaire studies involving responses by over 90,000 students at some 200 American colleges and universities during the past four years. These are:

1. **Vocationalists**: These are students who view their education primarily in instrumental terms, as a means of securing a good position and status. They
tend to score low on measures of cultural sophistication, social conscience, and liberalism. They are also low in interest and involvement in politics. Concentrated in professional schools such as engineering, agriculture, and teachers' colleges, they are pre-dominantly from lower socio-economic backgrounds, and are very upwardly oriented.

2. **Professionalists:** These resemble the vocationalists, but differ in that they come from privileged family backgrounds and have often attended the best high-schools. They aspire to the same social position as their families, are well-endowed intellectually, and attended the best schools. Their political outlook is middle-of-the road to conservative, but they do not participate much in political activity.

3. **Collegiates:** The commitment of this group is to popularity, play, and sex. They are often of middle-class backgrounds and tend to be conformist, extroverted, and other-directed. The collegiates also lean toward the conservative end in their attitudes, but politics, in the sense of adult partisanship and real issues, is not very relevant to them.

4. **Ritualists:** Students in this category seem to lack any kind of strong drive or commitment. They are generally from lower socio-economic backgrounds and are of less than average academic aptitude. They were swept into college by parents seeking
higher status for their children. Lacking aptitude and motivation, they often drop out within a year or two. Their lack of drive carries over to the political arena.

5. **Academics**: The fundamental commitment of this group is to scholarly achievement within the broad framework of a specific field. They tend to come from well-educated broadly middle-class family backgrounds. They are somewhat left-of-center in their political orientations, but they remain sympathizers or spectators, rather than activists.

6. **Intellectuals**: Christopher Jencks and David Riesman have distinguished the intellectuals from the academics. They are oriented toward ideas irrespective of curriculum. While the prototype academic is a scientist, the prototype intellectual is a philosopher, or perhaps an historian. They tend to come from highly individualistic middle and upper-class families. Their politics are liberal, often considerably to the left of center, but except in periods of severe crisis, they are unemotional, about politics and are resistant to membership in formal political groups.

7. **Activists**: Similar to the intellectuals in background, they have acquired a basic commitment to personal involvement in political or social action. They generally are high in academic aptitude and tend to concentrate in the humanities and social sciences. The chief differentiating trait between them and the intellectuals is that they are more emotional and more likely to exhibit rage.

8. **Hippies**: This group of alienated students resembles the intellectuals and the activists in various background traits. They are, however, basically pessimistic about the society and its prospects. This pessimism carries over to politics, and they, therefore, retreat into a hedonistic subculture, playing no political role.

Although all of these types do not exist everywhere, it seems clear from reading the literature on students in various countries, that many of them can be found outside of the United States. And any effort to understand the politics of the
student body must be directed toward specifying the alternative patterns of student behavior, not simply that of the activists, who are almost everywhere, a relatively small minority.

A focus on the different types of students does not mean, of course, any reduction in our primary concern with student activism. Clearly the more activist groups, often because they are minorities, are the ones which are most responsible for initiating major social changes. The passive majority, precisely because it is passive, is often politically unimportant, even though it represents majority opinion. Concern with the processes of social change, either within the university itself, or in the society at large, requires us to study the active agents of change, in this case those groups that are active in the political process. But at the same time, it is clear that any analysis of the role of students and universities that is concerned with the effect of students and intellectuals in political life must report on and analyze the apolitical, as well as the more conservative, moderate, or right-wing students and their organizations, in the past as well as the present.

It is also necessary to distinguish, as Michiya Shimbori and Frank Pinner point out, between the "political interests" of student leaders and the "practical interests" of student bodies. Those who become prominent through their role in political activity have an inherent need to exasperate any issues which may heighten politics on campus. The very presence, therefore, of people who are so concerned and who have access to many who agree with their basic political values, may mean that events and issues which are of relatively little concern to most students will seemingly result in demonstrations and other forms of activism.

Concern with the role of student leaders in affecting the character of student action must be related to a typology of politically relevant student organizations. Clearly, most student organizations in most countries are either not interested in
politics or are supporters of the status quo. The following classification has been suggested by discussions among the participants, through extending one presented by Frank Pinner:

1. **Corporate** - Organizations like the German Korporationen or the American fraternities, which though not explicitly political, tend to bring together students who are conservative or apolitical. They sometimes take on a political role during crisis periods seeking to oppose activist demonstrations.

2. **Status-quo** - Groups like the Young Democrats and Young Republicans in the United States, the Young Communist Leagues in the communist countries, i.e., student and youth affiliates of the major system supporting political parties, are most often the largest campus political associations. They seek to win support for their adult organizations and serve an important function in recruiting and training prospective leaders for the general political life of the nation.

3. **Syndicalist** - Organizations which take on a trade-union function seeking to foster student demands on issues such as tuition, accommodations, bursaries, and educational concerns have become increasingly prevalent in Europe. The French National Union of Students has sometimes perceived itself in this role.

4. **Issue** - There are many examples of single issue organizations which sometimes are supported by the vast majority of students. The Berkeley Free Speech Movement is typical of many which have been formed over issues of campus political rights. The Waseda agitation against a tuition increase which brought the university to a halt for many months is another instance of a single-issue cause. Another type of single-issue movements are those concerned with a given national political problem such as Negro rights, or the Algerian or Vietnam wars.
Ideological - Much of the writing on student politics has been concerned with student organizations which advocate a broad spectrum of changes in the larger society derivative from a given ideological perspective. Such groups may vary from reformist ones such as the Young People's Socialist League in the United States or some of the University Reform movements in Latin America which seek to accomplish their objectives within the established democratic political structure to revolutionary ones such as the American or German SDS's (Students for a Democratic Society and the German Socialist Students), or the All India Students Federation.

The relative strength of these different types vary from country to country and from time to time. One of our tasks is to seek to specify the conditions which are related to such variations, as well as to analyze the sources of support for each. It is clear, however, that except in periods of great national tension and political instability, the revolutionary movements are usually quite small. It is also important to note that the different groups constitute alternatives to each other. Thus university systems which include strong corporate or status-quo organizations are less likely also to have major ideological groupings. Membership in any organization satisfies psychological needs for belonging and identity, thus making it more difficult for new groups to recruit.

The image of student politics as activist and extremist is linked to the fact that opinions as to the place of politics in the university are inherently related to feelings about the larger society. Those who believe that drastic changes are necessary, that major evils exist, or that the basic verities are under attack, will feel that students and faculty ought to be deeply involved in politics. Conversely, moderate conservatives and liberals, the usual "centrist" majority are more likely to accept the formula of President Benitez that a university is a "house of study" rather than a "house of politics." On the whole,
conservatives as believers in the status-quo will be even less active politically than liberals or moderate leftists. Glaucio Soares demonstrates this point in tracing the relationship between ideology and conceptions of student politics with Brazilian data which indicate a very low level of political concern among conservative students and an extremely high one among the leftists. Conservative students not only are not interested in politics, but many of them "perceive student politics as an undue interference with their studies." The leftists, on the other hand, feel that they have a duty to be politically engaged and that the university as an institution should be an agency of modernization and radical change. As Soares puts it, conservatives argue that the political and academic roles should be compartmentalized, while leftists seek to integrate the two. This means, of course, that under current conditions in most countries, the student left will mobilize a much greater proportion of its potential strength for politics than will the moderates or the right.

Most of the recent writing on student activism not only suffers from a failure to describe and analyze the sources of apolitical reactions, but tends to ignore the phenomenon of rightist activism. This gap flows in part from the fact that most of the scholars concerned with student politics are themselves sympathetic with liberal or leftist politics, and view rightist activity with distaste. A more important factor affecting the concentration of scholarly activity is the fact that much of the current interest is by social scientists concerned with contemporary behavioral studies; there is as yet little writing by historians. Although many students are conservatives, there has been little rightist campus activism since the 1930's. As a result, there is not much published concerning the considerable amount of extreme rightist, neofascist, or outright fascist activity among youth groups and student groups in different parts of the world which occurred
during the 1920's and 1930's in much of Europe. While the German and Austrian students were on the left during much of the nineteenth century, many turned to rightist nationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Antisemitism and extreme nationalism were characteristic of many of the more politically sophisticated German fraternities, and it must be remembered that Nazism had a strong appeal in the universities in the 1930's. French fascism, strong during the interwar period, also received considerable support from university students. Rightist strength was also evident in other countries. Many of the active student groups of the 1930's in Latin America had strong fascist views, due mainly to the influence from Spain and Italy, while German Nazi influence was strong in some Arab movements. In the colonial areas, nationalist movements often looked with favor on Hitler and Mussolini because of their opposition to the imperialist powers of Western Europe. Although ideological issues were confused, university students tended to accept some aspects of fascist ideology, particularly the stress on militant nationalism and race pride, and the concern with militaristic thinking. In India, such nationalist leaders as Subhas Chandra Bose visited Nazi Germany and Japan repeatedly and obtained some assistance in the struggle against the British.

From a sociological, functional point of view, such "rightist" behavior is quite similar to contemporary left-wing styles of politics. Rightist students were nationalistic, anti-authority, and concerned with the seeming inferiority of their nation within the world community. The subtleties of ideology were not meaningful to the rightist and Marxist rhetoric, which combined notions of racialism with ideas of "proletarian" and exploited nations. Styles of activism did not differ much, although the tone of the student movements was often different. Some analysis of the similarities and differences of rightist and leftist student politics is clearly relevant.

The increased awareness of the political role of students has led to a concern
with the sources of variations such as those categorized above. The papers presented at this conference represent a considerable conceptual advance in efforts at typologies. Frank Pinner, in his interesting paper dealing with various European countries suggests that student organizations may for analytical purposes be divided into two categories: transgressive groups, which are directed mainly against the authority structures of their societies, and traditional groups such as the youth groups of status-quo political parties, or the German Korporationen or American fraternities, which socialize their members into their role as conventional citizens of the society. This distinction is related to one which has been made concerning the role of the university itself. On the one hand, universities are centers of innovation where scholars are expected to challenge the traditional truths of their fields and receive the highest rewards for work which is sharply innovative, while on the other hand, universities are schools with faculties of teachers, thereby making the university part of the socialization process of their society, teaching skills and accepted values. These diverse functions of the university, which are emphasized by different groups within the larger society place the university in a chronic state of tension. Universities and sub-divisions within them vary in the extent to which they emphasize these functions. Many parts of the university, particularly the professional schools, are essentially concerned with a socialization function, training students in socially useful skills. The so-called liberal arts subjects, on the other hand, tend to value scholarly innovation and research competence more highly. It is not surprising, therefore, that transgressive student groups are much more likely to be found among liberal arts students than among those in professional schools such as engineering, education, or business, a pattern to be discussed in more detail later.

Universities may also be differentiated between those which are primarily schools or institutions of socialization and those which are centers of innovation. Here again, the research evidence indicates that transgressive student behavior is more
common within the good universities than the schools. This is most apparent in differentiating between religious linked institutions which foster continuity in tradition, and the secular universities. In Latin America and other countries, universities which are affiliated to religious bodies tend to have little student activism. In Japan, the United States, and other countries, the most important centers of scholarship also tend to be the strongholds of transgressive student movements.

It is possible to differentiate further among transgressive social movements: there are those concerned with changes in basic social values (ultimate ends or conceptions about basic social institutions) and others interested in affecting norms (means to attain agreed upon social values). This is a distinction of Neil Smelser’s which has been fruitfully employed in student movement analyses by Philip Altbach and Kenneth Walker. Michiya Shimbori suggests the existence of a cycle within many student organizations which grow out of a (normative) protest movement concerned with specific issues, e.g., student political rights, opposition to some given government policy, a demand for internal university reforms. These protests give rise to activist movements with a formal leadership. In their effort to institutionalize the movement, and to extend its scope to other campuses, the leaders begin to press for more extreme and ideological programs. However, this very effort to build a national ideological (value-oriented) movement often leads to an ultimate separation between the leaders and their followers, since the latter are primarily concerned with normative rather than value changes. Relatively few of those interested in free speech on campus, or in ending a military alliance, will take over a total ideological position. Consequently, periods of intense activism over specific issues are often followed by a sharp decline in activity, once the particular issue has declined in salience. The activist leaders usually fail in their efforts to build a broad based more ideological movement.
Thus what looked like a mass movement in its normative phase becomes a radical sect in its value-oriented stage. Many observers, however, often exaggerate the potential support for value or ideological protest by projecting the past strength and vigor of movements concerned with normative change to their more ideological radical successors.

The differences in sources of strength of the two types of movements are not only a function of cyclical changes such as these; the papers presented here suggest that movements concerned with value change are more prevalent and stronger in the underdeveloped countries than in the developed ones. This finding may be linked to analyses by Talcott Parsons, S. N. Eisenstadt, and Michio Nagai, concerning the relationship of education to value orientations. The first two have suggested the need to look at the magnitude of the differences between the values of the adult and youth generations in varying types of societies. They indicate that generational conflict is cleavages, at least in part caused by sharp value differences among generations, and that such particularly between the better educated (younger on the average) and the uneducated (older), are very great in modernizing societies and are relatively small in the developed societies.
Similarly, the difference between the values of the university and those of society is considerable in backward societies, and small in developed societies. Michio Nagai has discussed values which are inherent in the nature of the university. He argues, for example, that the university is basically universalistic even in societies which are not universalistic. It is inherently a meritocracy, even in very ascriptive social systems. It judges people, events, and research on the basis of objective achievement criteria in societies which are quite particularistic. It values freedom of inquiry and discussion, even in authoritarian societies. Thus, when we speak of a university anywhere in the world, whether it is in Tokyo, Accra, New York, San Juan, or any other place, we really have a similar model in mind, no matter how far reality may deviate from the model. The norm of academic freedom is basic to the idea of the university. Given Nagai’s assumptions we must examine the extent of the tension between university and society, and the pressures placed on higher education by society. The tensions will be great in authoritarian societies, and it will be considerable in emerging and developing nations, which are normally quite particularistic. It will be relatively small in the developed democratic societies. Faculty and students will reflect the depth of these tensions in their behavior. Consequently, one should expect value conflicts (differences about ends) between student movements and the society in emerging nations, as well as in
authoritarian nations, and more normative conflicts (issues involving means not ends) in developed societies. Education, particularly university education, is inherently a modernizing force, and hence it will engender a considerable degree of conflict with those who seek to maintain traditional values and institutions in underdeveloped countries. In the democratic developed states, the society more generally accepts the values of universalism, achievement, freedom, and so forth.

These distinctions help account for the varying emphases on ideology in various student movements. In general, it appears that ideological concerns have declined among student activists in advanced industrialized countries during the post-war period, as contrasted with the Depression, while they have remained important in many of the developing countries. In addition to various leftist ideologies, nationalism, involving a concern for modernizing and industrializing the societies, is particularly important in the latter. Even relatively non-leftist groupings such as the Philippine student movement and the militant KAMI organization of Indonesia are extremely nationalistic. The ideological concerns of student groups in the emerging nations reflect the fact that they are interested in value change in the larger society, that they are at odds with any forces which seem to be supportive of traditional values, or which stand in the way of rapid economic growth.

In the West, however, where the manifest tension between social values and the political concerns of students are much less, we find that even the relatively small radical student movements do not show a strong attachment to formal ideologies. Pragmatism and specific issue concerns characterize their
politics. This is even true in eastern Europe, perhaps because ideologies would be difficult to voice. Students, there, have been a key element in demanding liberalization in the name of the manifest societal socialist values, and have argued for a non-dogmatic approach to society and politics.

As Belden Fields points out, even the French Communist students have been in the forefront of revolt against the ideological commitments of the parent party. Scandinavian students, as Allardt and Tomassen indicate, have not been very much concerned with ideology and have instead campaigned for individual freedom---for lack of restrictions on styles of life, and an end to social regulations, particularly those related to sex. American students, too, despite the rise of the New Left and a strong movement against the Vietnam war, have been uninterested in the subtleties of ideological politics. Currently, the hippies have more attraction on the campus than do the sophisticated ideologists of the old left.
The political relations between the generations is also affected by a somewhat different generalization about the politics of youth. One may find in many countries some version of the maxim: "Anyone under 20, who is not a radical (socialist, communist, anarchist), does not have a heart; anyone over 40 who still is one, does not have a head." This statement is obviously meant to be a conservative one. It is important, however, to also call attention to the significance of its second part: this is the notion that it is normal, appropriate, and morally correct for young people to be radicals or revolutionaries. And many societies treat radical youth, particularly students, as if they believed this maxim. Students are permitted a degree to political freedom, even license to violate the norms and laws of society without being punished, or with less punishment than is generally meted out to others. Thus at Berkeley, those who surrounded a police car and held it captive for thirty hours were not arrested or otherwise sanctioned. Few American or foreign universities that have experienced student sit-ins, seizures of university buildings, have had those involved arrested. Even in authoritarian countries like Czarist Russia, Communist Poland, or Franco Spain, student oppositionists have been treated more lightly by the authorities than other organized opponents. Sentences against student revolutionaries are usually mild as compared to those given to non-students.
In effect, many societies encourage or permit students to be more rebellious than any other group. This tolerance is not only a product of some special view of students as a "juvenile" group who should be allowed to learn and not be held responsible for their actions, it also reflects the fact that university students are often the children of the "elite." The vast majority of the offspring of the governing and privileged strata go to university, in effect the elite finds it difficult to do what a Venezuelan governor recently did do, namely shoot their own children. In Cuba, the Batista regime was in part undermined by the fact that some of the young people with Castro in the mountains were the children of Cuban upper class families. Batista was under tremendous pressure from members of the Havana elite to quit because they wanted their children back from the mountains alive. In Viet Nam, Diem lost the backing of the army officers when he began to arrest university students, many of whom were children of the military. Juan Linz reports that in Spain in recent years many of the trials of student activists have involved at least one son of an important family. In this context, the Spanish courts have been faced by two conflicting forces: the particularism of the society which requires that an offender who belongs to a privileged family is treated lightly, and the universalism of the law which implies that all those who commit similar offenses be treated in the same way. Most of the punishments of Spanish
students have, therefore, been relatively mild. They are protected by having within their number, people related to those who run the society. Currently, on the American campus a similar process may be observed since the activist demonstrators at Berkeley and elsewhere have often turned out to include children of faculty.

Ironically, much of the power of student rebels is a function of their personal ties to the power elite. The extent to which student population will contain significant proportions of the children of the elite will vary directly with the proportionate size of the student population to the relevant age cohort. The smaller the number of students in relation to those of their age group, the larger the percentage who will be personally related to members of the upper strata. Thus, we should expect that in elitist (small) university systems students are more likely to influence elite actions than in those characterized by mass education. This does not mean, however, that students in elitist systems are more prone to engage in student activism. If anything, the reverse is true, since increased size produces other sources of tension within the university, to be discussed below.

Nations may also be differentiated by their varying conceptions of youth, i.e., whether countries have a positive, negative, or neutral image concerning the role of youth. The United States, for example, is very much a youth culture, in the sense that it stresses the truism that youth will inherit the world and are probably on the side of justice and progress as opposed to adults. Many adults thus feel they should encourage youth. Progress and social change are good, youth should be encouraged in their dis-
dian for the old, in their advocacy of progress and change. Older people consequently lack assurance when debating with youth. Nations vary considerably in their conception of youth in this respect. Revolutionary ideologies are generally very positive toward youth. Hence the vitality of revolutionary ideologies may be measured by the extent to which they still identify virtue with youth. One of the best single pieces of evidence that the American revolutionary tradition is still viable, is the prevalent belief in youth, which interestingly the Russians no longer have. It is significant that the Soviet Union has sharply modified the belief in youth, which existed immediately after the Revolution. Stalin eliminated the notion that the youth is right in its conflicts against the older people and his successors have not reinstated it. Mao Tse Tung, in his seventies, however, is attempting to emphasize the role of youth as the main source of support for a continuing revolutionary ideology.

Fascists also emphasized youth. Their anthem was Giovinezza, "Youth". Their identification of age with reaction and youth with progress was very similar to the conceptions advanced by many leftist youth movements today. Of course, authoritarian systems like Fascist Italy, or Communist Cuba and China, have not been interested in encouraging youth to be critical of the system; rather they have tried to use "youth" as a social base to support a supposedly "revolutionary" regime against conservative adults, and to inhibit adult opponents by impressing on them the idea that they represent an historic anachronism. A stress on the worth of youth politics in a democracy, however, may be an important source of encouragement to reform movements who secure support from students and other youth. Conversely, it may inhibit some adults who disagree from strongly resisting the proposals of activist students.
University systems will also vary considerably with respect to the normative prescriptions concerning their relationship to politics. Nagai has suggested that in the course of social differentiation which has characterized societies as they "modernize," universities have necessarily moved from a diffuse (integrated) relationship with the state and religion to a specific one. The growth of the scholarly and research function has required universities to separate themselves from the clergy and the politicians. The university must be free to find and teach what is scientifically "true," without concern about the reactions of religious, political, and other establishments. The norm of academic freedom assumes that these outside bodies will leave the university alone. Conversely, if the university insists on freedom from external interference, from being criticized or coerced by those not involved in scholarly pursuits, it must abstain as a university community from itself attacking others. The concept of a specific role, of differentiation, must work in both directions. Hence, those who seek to use the university as a political weapon against extra-mural forces weaken the university's defenses against interference.

The extent to which universities have differentiated themselves from society will, of course, differ. In our discussions, Nagai had pointed to the effect of the Confucian ethic on the political role of universities, faculty, and students, in a number of Oriental nations. Confucianism stresses the linkages between scholarship and the state. Chinese, Japanese, and Korean scholars were civil servants and supporters of the state, much like the relationship of religious scholars to the church in the West. In more recent times, universities, particularly state universities, were expected to be agents of state purposes. And Nagai concludes that the considerable involvement of students in the political life of these countries is to some extent linked to the continued strength of Confucian values.
Similarly in many developing countries in Latin America, Africa, and other parts of Asia, the national emphasis on economic development and modernization overrides the idea of the completely autonomous university. Various sections of the governing elite, as well as many faculty and students, believe that the university should serve the national interest of fostering development. They do not believe the nation can afford the "luxury" of supporting pure scholarship which is not related to development objectives, nor can students or faculty isolate themselves from active involvement in politics. These are, of course, highly debated issues in many of the countries. But in so far as the university is perceived as serving political objectives, it necessarily becomes a source of political stimulation.

The effort to separate the university from extra-mural influences has succeeded most in the developed countries of western Europe and the English-speaking world. But even there, the pattern of development has not been clear-cut. The university gradually freed itself from political and religious interference in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In recent decades, however, the growing role of the university as the key center of research and development for the public and even segments of the private sector, has necessarily involved it in-political controversy. Governments and scholars have broken down the barriers between politics and science by the use of academics as temporary government officials, on leave from the university, or as consultants. Scientists have not been able to escape taking responsibility for the social and political uses of their discoveries. Physicists and their students have had to take a position on the various controversies concerning the military uses of atomic energy. The scholarly conclusions of economists have affected national policy, and academic economists have been called on to take part in the debates on the subject. Sociologists and psychologists are involved as scholars in issues concerning race
relations, education, the culture of poverty, and other matters.

Seemingly, the process which brought about increased differentiation between the academy and other institutions has been reversed. The growing complexity of modern society has challenged the effort to segregate the university as an "ivory tower," primarily seeking to serve scholarly ends. Clark Kerr has elaborated on this reversal in his discussions of the contemporary university as a "multi-versity," as one which serves many different social purposes. And as the university in the West becomes a "multi-versity," we may expect to find it to be a continuing center of political agitation, as those who favor or disagree with given specific endeavors seek to use or attack the university.

The growing involvement of the western university as the research arm of the governing elite has led some critics to view it as a "tool" of the establishment. Universities, however, have generally remained as major sources of criticism, in spite of their growing ties to government. In France, where all universities are state controlled, faculty and students were in the forefront of the opposition to the Algerian war. In the United States, the multi-versities, those most involved in government supported research and consulting, have been the main source of academic opposition to various major trends which violate their basic values. During the McCarthy period, many of them stood firm in support of civil liberties. They have been the principal centers of support for the Negro struggle for equality. And most recently, the universities have been the most important source of protest against the Vietnam war.
The analysis of the differential role or status of intellectuals is also clearly relevant to a concern with student politics. The politics of the university is to some considerable degree affected by the social position and political values of the intellectuals. Much has been written on the assumed and presumed sources of intellectual "alienation" in many countries. Alienation as an empirical generalization certainly does not hold as a general comparative characterization over time and space. It is clear, as Raymond Aron has pointed out, that the position of the English intellectuals vis-à-vis power in the political establishment is different from that of the French intellectual. The English have been included in effective political life, the French are outside it. In the United States it is necessary to distinguish between the admiration and deference given to the academic expert, and the fear and contempt often voiced concerning the intellectual. Intellectuals have great power as experts, a fact which those uninvolved in expertise activities often fail to recognize. Conversely, there is no intellectual political community in the United States comparable to that in Britain. In many ways, the situation of the "non-expert" American intellectual is similar to that of the French, i.e., high status but little power, while the situation of the American academic "expert" is like that of the English, considerable status and power.

The Japanese case is an interesting one, since important changes have taken place in recent years. While a large proportion of the university community has been alienated from the government and society, and hold to a Marxist world view, an increasing number of intellectuals have been helping the government in Japan. Traditionally, although the governing elite in Japan consists mostly of graduates from Tokyo University, there has been sharp
conflict between the intellectuals and the ruling elite. As Japan moves increasingly toward an "expert" society somewhat on the model of the United States, the role of the intellectual seems to be changing. Similar changes may be taking place in other countries as well. The Indian Cabinet has a number of "non-party" experts holding such portfolios as planning, education, and family planning. Some governments in the Middle East have recently included prominent intellectuals in "technical" positions at high levels. Yet, it is impossible to discern a pattern in the developing areas because government-intellectual relationships, now often involve military-intellectual contacts. For every such country in which the intellectuals are playing a key role, as in the case of Indonesia and Ghana, where the military are aided by civilian "experts", there are other examples, such as Burma, Argentina, and Brazil, where the intellectuals are in sharp opposition to the military governments.

The attitudes of intellectuals and of students towards the national status quo is not simply a function of their position within the society. More than any other groups, intellectuals tend to have an international reference group. To use Merton's distinction between "cosmopolitans" (oriented to outside groups for standards of comparison) and "locals" (concerned with the evaluations of the community within which one resides), intellectuals are clearly more likely to be cosmopolitans. As such, they will be aware of the shortcomings of their nation compared with the standards of the leading countries. The intellectuals and academics of the underdeveloped countries generally realize that they are at the summits of nations or uni-
versity systems which are considered "backward." This awareness heightens their desire to foster change within their own society and increases their resentment against local or foreign groups who seem to be inhibiting modernization. In effect, the lesser status of a nation in the international system of stratification tends to motivate the "cosmopolitans" within them to favor radical reform. This pattern is not only characteristic of contemporary underdeveloped nations, it was found among many European countries and eastern Europe in the nineteenth century regarded their countries in the past. Thus the intellectuals in central/and ruling classes as backward compared to France and Britain, and many of them supported radical political movements.

Intellectuals who are resentful of their society often stimulate rebellious "apprentice intellectuals," i.e., students. Faculty, critical in this way, will presumably communicate their attitudes directly to their students, and thus encourage and legitimate student radicalism. In many countries professors see themselves as a deprived stratum, one which is not given the rewards or working conditions appropriate to their role. This sense of resentment will, of course, vary both within nations and among them.

The direct impact of the attitudes of intellectuals and faculty on students should be differentiated from another factor: the nature of faculty-student relationships. For example, it is argued that where student-faculty contacts are inadequate, where faculty give little time to students, where they are relatively incompetent in their teaching, where they are authoritarian, students particularly in the better universities are more prone to rebel against the university and often against society as well. Student indiscipline in India has been linked with the low salaries, long hours, and bad working
conditions of the faculty, which result in inadequate teaching. The historic pattern of the "part-time" professor in Latin America, the professor who earns his living as a professional outside the university, is seemingly a crucial factor in the lack of commitment to scholarly endeavors and values by many students. The very bad faculty-student ratio of French universities, the low salaries of Japanese professors which require them to find other sources of remuneration, have all been cited as factors lowering the educational level of the institutions of higher education and encouraging protest movements. Some have explained student unrest in the United States in recent years as an expression of resentment against an increasingly research-oriented faculty which devotes little time to undergraduates.

The question of the direction of student politics is further affected by the overall political situation in specific countries. In Nkrumah's Ghana and Sukarno's Indonesia, for example, where the governments were operating with a leftist ideology, students tended to be anti-government and seemingly "conservative;" in countries where the government is perceived somehow as moderate or conservative, students are often thought of as leftist. In authoritarian societies, student politics usually revolves around the demand for more academic and political freedom inherent in the norms of the university, rather than over the social content of various issues. Mao Tse-tung's antagonism toward the intellectuals and the university is clearly related to the difficulties he has had with the university and the intellectuals. He now seeks support from the high school students rather than from those in
universities. The younger students seem to be more reliable than the older ones.

The effect of varying political climates on student politics is also evidenced in the paper by Clement Moore and Arlie Hochschild on North Africa. The environment of Morocco, for example, with its authoritarian system and entrenched traditional elite is much more conducive to opposition student movements than is that of Tunisia, which is a relatively open society in which university students have an opportunity to participate in the mechanisms of government. Interestingly enough, while the Tunisian student movement was organized prior to independence and participated in the struggle against the French, the Moroccan students remained unorganized until after independence, and have only functioned as an opposition to the government, and never as a nationalist force in society.

Student political patterns are also determined in part by variations in political institutions. As Robert Scott points out, the lack of political stability in much of Latin America has stimulated student activism, since the possibility of successful agitation has been substantial, and students have occasionally been able to exert political leverage on weak governments. In Scandinavia on the other hand, as Allardt and Tomasson indicate, the stability and legitimacy of the established political structures have discouraged student activism, and national politics is not generally seen as a legitimate domain of student concern. The same pattern can be seen in others of the politically stable nations.
Confrontation politics, discussed so tellingly by Clark Kerr, is characteristic of polities in which students, and other groups as well, lack legitimate channels of communication to authority. Where student political groups find themselves ignored by the adult power structure, it is not surprising that they turn to activist demonstrations. The existence of student militancy, in and of itself, however, does not necessarily indicate that such channels do not exist. Youth generally lack a long time perspective; they tend to become quickly frustrated if their demands are not met almost at once. Hence even in countries with reasonably good channels of political communication, students may turn to confrontation politics when their political idealism has been activated by a major moral issue. American students concerned with civil rights for Negroes or with ending the Vietnam war have not been satisfied with communicating with authority. And a lack of response has sometimes resulted in alienating students from the rules of the game of the democratic process. Whether such alienation becomes pervasive and long-term will be related, however, to the reality of the democratic institutions. Hence, in stable democracies, student unrest tends to be a temporary phenomenon.

The papers presented here which deal with more than one country point to the way in which the existence of differences between countries forces researchers to become more analytical than when they are thinking in a single nation context. When working on an individual country, one often fails to understand or student activities which aspects of the country are unique, and which are common to several places. One of the most important, if not the most important use of this kind of meeting concerning student movements in a comparative context is that it forces us to become aware of the complexity of the problems involved. The various papers suggest
many variables, which should be included in each national study. For example, it is clear that the definition of student varies greatly, that the size of the college cohort may differ enormously, that faculty-student relations are sharply different, that there are great variations in social origins of students, in numbers and size of schools, in curriculum content, in student dwellings, in university government, in extra-curricular activities, in the status of students, in their post-university opportunities, in the role of parties, etc.

When one speaks of university students in some African states, one is talking of a total student population of 3,000 to 5,000 while the United States has six million students, and Japan has well over half a million. In India, students enter universities when 15 years of age. In Sweden, entering students are normally at least 20 years old. The meaning of universities also varies greatly. Some countries include under the term university, "diploma mills," which have very loose requirements, as well as first-rate centers of teaching and scholarship.

The pressures on higher educational institutions to expand have been tremendous, but countries have varied greatly in responding to them. As Josef Silverstein points out, the military government of Burma has used severe repressive measures on the students in order to keep the university population limited. In other nations, notably the Philippines, Korea, India, the United States, and Japan, rapid educational expansion has caused substantial strains on the educational system, and may be a factor in
student unrest. In Ghana (2,700), Jamaica (3,000), Morocco (5,000), the numbers of students are still in the thousands. The effect of expansion has varied considerably within university systems. The arts faculties and law which rely on lectures and do not need laboratories seemingly may expand most rapidly. Classes are simply enlarged. Educational standards have fallen most rapidly in the liberal arts, as have elite occupational opportunities. While students in the sciences often are able to obtain remunerative jobs in expanding technological fields in many countries, there seems to be an oversupply of liberal arts graduates in some underdeveloped countries, thus leading to problems of educated unemployment and political unrest.

As in the case of a number of other relevant descriptive variables, there is no clear-cut simple relationship between size or rate of expansion of the student body and patterns of political behavior. As has been noted in various analyses, the emergence of massive student populations on one campus, or within given cities, particularly national capitals, has facilitated student activism since it makes it relatively easy to mobilize a visibly large protest demonstration. A small minority of the students in Buenos Aires, Mexico City, Berkeley, Calcutta, Tokyo, or Paris, can constitute an impressive protest in absolute numbers. In his paper on Venezuela, Orlando Albó noz, points to ways in which the creation of large University Cities in places like Caracas or Paris has increased the potential
as was indicated earlier, for mass student action. On the other hand, in nations in which there is only one university, and the student body is small and homogeneous, it may be possible for a small group of activists to have an impact on the ideological climate of the total national student body and on political events in society. It may be difficult for political leaders to ignore what seems to be the sentiment of their entire campus population and future elite. Thus Jean Ziegler points out that the very small number of Congolese student leaders who emerged after independence in 1960 had a major impact, not only on the shape of the student movement, but on Congolese politics generally. The growth of the student population, not only increases the size of the minority available for activist protest; it also means a more heterogeneous student body, one which may sustain competing campus political groupings.

Kinds of The differing support for higher education in various countries are also an important source of differentiation. While many countries have a completely state-financed university system, in many others, both in the developed and underdeveloped world, the universities are divided among public, private, and religious schools. In some cases, colleges are even run for private profit. Such differences permit substantial differences of quality among institutions. As Michiya Shimbori indicates in his conference paper,
the potential for political activity is greatly affected by the differential patterns of recruitment, as well as by varying systems of control, and relationship to the larger society. Religious linked universities not only tend to recruit from the most traditionalist sectors of society, but their administrations and faculty are more likely than those in secular universities to ban politics. In Japan, a private school, Nippon University, the largest one in the country, prohibits participation in the Zengakuren, the national student union. On the other hand, some other private universities like Waseda, which have a history of student activism, were originally established as a means of training a counter-elite to the governmental one which was educated in the University of Tokyo. In the Philippines, the extensive system of private colleges includes many which are "diploma mills" designed to get students, often from less-well-to-do families, through a nominal university education as quickly and easily as possible. As might be expected there is little student politics in these institutions. In the United States, schools which are subject to local community control, particularly in non-metropolitan areas, are generally under considerable pressure to prevent students from engaging in activity which would be offensive to the local elite.

The studies of different countries also illustrate the fact that "statistically significant" relationships found in one country need not hold up in others. For example, there are interesting variations concerning the effects of different disciplines on politics. These vary, however, in different countries. In Morocco, there is some variation between academic disciplines
and student political involvement, while in Tunisia, there are fewer differences along these lines. Disciplines tend to be identified with student activism and leftist ideas in some countries but not in others. For example, medicine has a leftist aura in various Latin countries in the Americas and Europe, but is traditionally quite conservative in most of northern Europe and the Anglophonic world. This difference seems to stem from the existence of an historic conflict between science, including medicine, and the Church as a power in the Catholic world, and the relative absence of this tension in the politics of most Protestant countries. The same factors may account for the fact that many of the natural science students in parts of Latin America seem to be among the more strongly activist leftists, while in most other countries, students in these disciplines are not generally involved in politics.

Economics is another field whose politics seem to vary. Part of the explanation is that in some countries, it includes students in the business school. Most people who are listed as majoring in economics in Argentina are, in fact, pre-accountancy students. Elsewhere, economics usually means majoring in the social science subject—economics. Latin America social science economics students tend to be much more on the left than those studying the business school version of economics. Where economics is taught as an extremely technical mathematically based subject, majors in the field are less radical than where it remains concerned with qualitative and historical institutional analysis. Thus, the same word is used with a different descriptive content. Similarly, in some countries "law" means a pre-professional discipline or a professional field as it does in the United States; in other places it connotes a kind of broad, general, social science or philosophical training.
The behavior of the law students consequently may vary considerably from country to country, not because the actual factors which affect people studying the certain kinds of things which are called law differ, but because of the different meaning of the term. When finding variations, one of the things to be careful of is the need to verify that the difference does not simply reflect a difference in terminology rather than a variation in actual content.

Differing traditions of political activism among various academic disciplines may also account for some variations in the nature of political involvement between them.

These differences show the need for analytic concepts with which to discern variations in the descriptive data which have been obtained. They may or may not be abstract. For example, regarding the question of faculties or subjects, one may differentiate between subjects which lead to explicit role models and those which involve diffuse objectives, e.g. subjects like the pre-professional ones have explicit role models while some of the humanities and social science subjects have diffuse post-graduate role expectations. These differences affect variations in the behavior of the students majoring in them.

Glaucio Soares has differentiated between students whose role image is that of the intellectual as against those who conceive of themselves as scientists or professionals. These images turn out to be highly predictive of political orientations. Those with an intellectual role identity are much more leftist and activist than those who identify as scientists or professionals. This difference is, of course, a subjective one. That is, in every discipline those who think of themselves as intellectuals rather than professionals are more politically activist. But it also works out objectively, in terms of the types
of disciplines. Those disciplines which are thought of as "intellectual," i.e., most of the
the humanities and social sciences, are more activist and leftist than those
which are oriented toward the professional or scientific world. Some specific
effects may illustrate this point. In Puerto Rico, almost all of the
supporters of the radical nationalist FUPI (pro-independence) movement have
been from the social sciences and have seen themselves primarily as
intellectuals, with strong ambitions toward writing and journalism. Studies
in Chile and Argentina have indicated similar patterns. Most of the activists
in the Indian and Indonesian student movements, particularly during the
nationalist periods, came from the liberal arts. In the United States, a number
of studies have shown that the activists in groups like the Students for a
and humanities Democratic Society tend to be in the social sciences, and to see themselves
as intellectuals rather than as professionals.

These variations in the political predilections of different disciplines suggest the possibility that differences in the political behavior of students in different universities or countries taken as a whole may be linked to variations in the fields in which they specialize. Certain schools primarily deal with liberal arts subjects, others, like the University of Moscow are essentially technological and science institutes. Most underdeveloped countries, particularly in Latin America, tend to be low in proportion of students enrolled in technical and vocational subjects; some, however, like Israel and Nigeria, are quite high. The communist countries rank highest in proportions of students engaged in vocational and professional training, a fact which may help account for the relative political passivity of their student bodies.
The political orientations of professors and their students do not necessarily vary in the same way. In some fields, there is a congruence---faculty and students are both relatively conservative. This is particularly true in professional schools such as engineering, education, or business. In other areas, both faculty and students tend to be relatively leftist, such as in mathematics or molecular biology. In still others, particularly in some of the social sciences, such as sociology or political science, and especially in the better universities, the students tend to be to the left of the faculty.

I do not want to enter into a further analysis of the sources of discipline variation here, except to comment that where discrepancies between faculty and student orientations exist, one often finds a difference between the conception of the subject on the student and faculty level. Thus, some of the social sciences are viewed by students as fields concerned with remedying "social problems." As scholarly disciplines, however, they are essentially concerned with the elaboration of knowledge within a scientifically rigorous conceptual frameworks and methodology. Since social scientists see crucial political questions as having complex causes and different solutions, they tend to refrain from endorsing simple solutions. Natural scientists or humanists, however, may take political positions without reference to their special roles as we scholars. Thus, have the interesting conflict between many social scientists and their students created by the fact that political concerns motivate many students to major in some of the social sciences, while the canons of scholarship press social scientists to refrain from taking public political positions.
which involve simplifying issues in areas in which they are scientifically competent.

It is important, in this connection, to remind ourselves of the other caveats presented to us and to politically motivated students by Max Weber in his brilliant lectures "Politics as a Vocation" and "Science as a Vocation." Weber argued that scholars must be exceedingly careful not to urge as scientifically valid truths research results which agree with their "party line." (He noted that every scholar has a 'party line,' whether he is conscious of it or not.) Social scientists should, in fact, be suspicious of findings which are congruent with their personal beliefs. Politically motivated students who hold to an "ethic of ultimate ends," which requires a total commitment to furthering politically desirable goals, will not understand or sympathize with Weber's insistence that introducing one's personal values into scientific analysis undermines the ability to understand the facts. Although accepting Weber's position often places social scientists in conflict with their best students, who see any reluctance to link faculty scholarly and political roles as cowardly, social scientists are obligated to always keep Weber's dictums in mind:

The primary task of a useful teacher is to teach his students to recognize "inconvenient" facts—I mean facts that are inconvenient for their party opinions. And for every party opinion there are facts that are extremely inconvenient, for my opinion no less than for others. I believe the teacher accomplishes more than a mere intellectual task if he compels his audience to accustom itself to the existence of such facts.

Influences derivative from university experiences are, of course, not the sole or even primary determinants of student political beliefs. Students
bring varying orientations with them which are often derivative from family perspectives. Most of the research findings agree that there is a high correlation between the politics of parents and their student offspring. Generational conflict, which occurs more in underdeveloped than developed countries, is a minority phenomenon. The impact of such extra-mural factors has been studied most frequently in analyses of the effect of social class origin on student attitudes. How does social origin affect political and other forms of behavior? There is no simple answer to this question. The high correlation between the political stance of students and their parents would imply that the children of poorer families should be more leftist than those of the more well-to-do, since socio-economic class and political choice are generally related in this way. Although research in various countries tends to validate the generalization, it does not apply this simply to student populations for a number of reasons. The students from relatively poor families tend to come from that minority within the lower strata which is strongly oriented toward upward mobility, and the values of the privileged. Hence, their parents are often among the more politically conservative of their class. Further, as Richard Peterson notes in his typology discussed earlier, upwardly mobile students who represent the first generation of their family attending university tend to be very vocationally oriented, that is, they and their parents see university attendance primarily as a way of obtaining a better job. Studies of the backgrounds of students in different subjects indicate that those from poor families are more likely to be found in fields which lead to professions such as engineering, veterinary medicine, dentistry, school teaching, and so on. These fields, as we have already noted,
are among the more politically apathetic and conservative. The strong concentration on careerist professional objectives plus the fact that many of the less well-to-do students must work their way through college also results in these students being less available for political or other extra-curricular activities than those from more privileged backgrounds. Further, as Frank Pinner notes: "For the student, intellectual positions frequently are means for acquiring autonomy (from their parents), and thus, many of the most radical Parisian students come from well situated families."

One of the interesting issues for comparative research is to examine the way in which attendance at university affects students from poor and left backgrounds as compared to those from well-to-do and conservative families. In Scandinavia, Allardt and Tomasson report that there is much more shifting by those of working-class origin from a Social-Democratic family orientation to a conservative one, than there is among students from conservative middle-class or higher background to left-wing parties. Conversely, recent American data suggest the reverse finding, that is, attendance at university is more likely to press well-to-do students to a position to the left of their parents, than it is to move those from less-privileged Democratic and liberal families to the right. Such findings should be subjected to more precise specification as to type of school attended and academic discipline studied. It is possible, for example, that the greater shift to liberalism among the more well-to-do in
the United States is related to the fact that they are more likely to attend the better universities, which characteristically have the most creative, intellectually oriented, and liberal faculties. Studies have indicated that conservative students on such campuses experience a political atmosphere hostile to their family political beliefs.

The relationship between socio-economic status and the politics of students is also affected by the fact that the more-well-to-do parents are also among the better educated. This is particularly true among professionals. As was noted earlier, in most underdeveloped countries, increased education, particularly higher education, is associated with approval of modern as contrasted with traditional values, while in the developed societies, it is associated with belief in "non-economic liberalism," i.e., support for civil liberties for unpopular minorities, civil rights for minority ethnic and religious groups, internationalism, and so forth. These orientations are generally fostered by the more liberal or leftist campus groups. Someone who is conservative on economic class related matters, but liberal on non-economic ones, is likely to find that the latter issues are more salient sources of campus politics than the former. Students in the United States, for example, are much more concerned with civil rights for Negroes, or political rights on campus and in the larger society, than with the power of trade-unions, or the consequences of different systems of taxation on economic growth.

The various pressures which facilitate liberalism or leftism as the dominant form of campus politics do not mean that large numbers of the scions of the privileged will become leftist or politically active. Many of those who experience a tension between the political atmosphere of the university and
their family tradition, will seek to escape the choice, by abstaining from politics, by accepting the doctrine that school and politics do not mix. Most students from conservative backgrounds remain in this tradition. In some countries, where there is a visible difference in the dominant political orientation of universities, continuity in family political orientations may be facilitated by the process of conscious selection of universities because of their political reputations. In Latin America, conservative privileged families will often send their children to schools with a conservative or apolitical reputation, such as the Catholic or other private universities. Unfortunately, there is little reliable information on this subject. It would be interesting to know whether one of the reasons that Waseda University in Japan has a continuing tradition of student activism over many years is that leftist students are attracted to study there. Similarly, various commentators have suggested that liberals and leftists are attracted to American schools like Wisconsin, Berkeley, Reed, or Antioch, and that conservatives deliberately stay away, because they have reputations as centers of leftist activism.

Although we do not know enough about the extent to which political predispositions are reinforced by selection of universities, American research findings suggest that there is congruence between the characteristic political orientation of different disciplines and the political beliefs of entering students who plan to major in them, i.e., who have not yet been exposed to the subjects. Conservatives are more likely to plan to study engineering or
business; liberals are more interested in the humanities or social sciences. Such selection processes are not, of course, a consequence of individuals looking for a hospitable political environment, but rather would seem to reflect the extent to which varying political orientations influence students to opt for different career goals. Leftists, particularly from well-to-do and better educated families, are more inclined to favor academic fields concerned with social and political issues such as the social sciences, or to look forward to careers outside of the commercial business sectors, such as those of literary intellectuals, the arts, social work, scholarship, and public service.

The impact of the self-selection mechanisms working together with other political predisposing factors inherent in diverse university structures is illustrated by the fact that academic ecology, the social environment in which a student happens to find himself by virtue of his choice of university or academic field, tends to be more important in affecting his opinions than his class background. The faculty within which students are enrolled, seems more predictive of their political stance than class origins. In various Latin American countries, the differences among universities in their model political choice is greater than the social class variation within them. Martin Trow indicates that in the United States, schools and subcultures within various institutions with an "academic" or intellectual orientation are more likely to be associated with political activity than are those which are not so oriented.

But though the available data challenge the assumption of a simple
relationship between class origin and political choice among students, 
religious-cultural value backgrounds in many countries do continue to affect 
these strongly. Those who bring strong traditionalist values with them to 
universities are more likely to remain conservative and apolitical than others. 
This may be seen most strongly in the role of religion. In the Catholic 
countries of Latin America and Europe, practicing Catholic 
students are much more conservative than non-believers. Reported differences 
in family religious practices are highly predictive in this respect. Similar 
findings have been reported for India. In the United States, Catholics and 
evangelical Protestants are also among the most conservative groups in the 
university.

Minority-majority social status also seems more important than economic 
class background in affecting student propensity for action. In Germany and 
Austria, for example, it was students from minority groups (Jews and Slavs), 
and from the lower middle class, who spearheaded the revolutions of 1848. 
Students from minority ethnic backgrounds were active in the pre-revolutionary 
Russian student movement as well. Today in the United States, Britain, and 
Argentina, Jews contribute heavily to the membership and support of activist 
left groups.

The analysis of student politics in terms of any easy left-right schema 
is affected by the degree of homogeneity or lack thereof, of the student 
population being analyzed. In many of the developing countries, and in nations 
like Belgium and Canada, as well, there are often deep cleavages which prevent 
the sense of community among the students. Religious divisions, regional or 
linguistic cleavages, caste, racial, and tribal differences, often severely 
inhibit the growth of national student movements devoted to societal objectives,
or even to university reform. In a number of countries as George Bereday and Charles Rooks have pointed out, divergent student groupings based on such variations are locked in conflict. In India, students have taken to the streets because of religious or linguistic differences. In Indonesia as Harsja Bachtiar indicates in his paper, student organizations are often organized on the basis of religious or regional affiliation. Thus, in any consideration of student political activism, one must consider not only the ecology of the university campus, but also the composition of the student population and the way in which varying compositions may affect the potential support of different movements, and the possible cleavages within the campus.

Another important methodological difficulty which produces seemingly contradictory findings in different countries results from comparing groups of varying size. Studies differ with respect to whether they are dealing with the political behavior of small minorities or with that of the large minority. For example, analyses of the social characteristics of members of the Students for Democratic Society (SDS), the largest left activist group in the United States, or the conservative Young Americans for Freedom (YAF) are concerned with the behavior of a few thousand among six million students. They report that members of the SDS tend to come from families which are more professional occupationally, better-educated, and more well-to-do, than are those of the average American college or university student. A comparison of the backgrounds of delegates to the conventions of SDS and YAF indicates that the leftists are more well-to-do than the rightists. About a fifth of the latter are of working-class backgrounds, as contrasted with a mere five per cent of the former. These results suggest that being well-to-do is conducive to leftism among college students in the United States. But on the other hand, if one examines the full range of opinion within the entire
campus population, and divides students between conservatives and liberals, a different pattern emerges. Conservative and Republican students tend to come from somewhat more well-to-do homes than do liberals and Democrats. Thus we can say that the minority of active leftists are disproportionately well-to-do, but among the total population of well-to-do students, the majority are conservative. Similar methodological problems arise in efforts to compare a group like the French National Union of Students (UNEF), which at one point had over 100,000 members and was supported by the majority of students in France, with the American SDS, which has 6,000 members and claims another 20,000 supporters. In doing so, one is really comparing two different types of organizations, not simply programatically, but in terms of this characteristic of majority-minority status.

The same analytic difficulty is involved in evaluating the conclusion reached by various studies of American leftist activists which have reported that they get higher grades than the average student. Is this the relevant level of comparison? What about other activists? Most recently research has become available which compares leaders of SDS with those of YAF, and with student government members. These indicate that the left activists and the right activists resemble each other more in some respects than either resembles the student population as a whole. Thus, the finding that leftist-activists get higher grades and are brighter, turns out to be characteristic of rightist-activists, and also of those involved in campus student government. Except in those countries which have a tradition of "professional" student organizers, it
is generally true that student activists are among the academically able students, and that they usually come from middle or upper class backgrounds. Indeed, student leaders are often respected by their peers for their academic abilities as well as for their oratorical skills. In India prior to independence, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and other countries, research has indicated that student political activists are also academically well-qualified. In Latin America, it would seem, an alternative pattern exists, student leaders often do not get good grades, and see student politics as an alternative to scholastic work. This is increasingly the case in India as well, where student politics has often become an avenue of success for students who are otherwise unsuccessful in academic studies.

These general findings concerning student activists seem to be a special case of "Riesman's Law." David Riesman has suggested that if one wants to get anybody to do anything, one should find the busiest man in the room and ask him, and he will do it. This law seems applicable to "hon-professional" student activism, too. That is, the activists are not only busy in politics, but also seem to get better grades, and to be involved in other activities too. This is as true for the right-wing conservatives as for the leftists. Even the officers of college fraternities turn out to be relatively good students. The problem of what is the appropriate comparison is thus a critical one. It is easy to make errors by not really comparing analytically similar groups. Ignoring the question of whether one is dealing with a small minority and its characteristics, or with the characteristics of a total population, may produce seemingly contradictory findings.
which may be made
There is a final point concerning the kinds of variables and factors which one would want to consider and which many of the papers do look at in a comparative context, namely, differences in the way universities function. The variations in university systems are clearly relevant to determining the sources of differences in political activism. The varying demands which universities make on students affect the possibilities for political participation and the political climate on the campus. The type of examination system is a key factor in determining student political activism. In the American system, for example, students are required to take examinations at regular intervals, and they must maintain at least minimal academic standards to stay in school. They may take part in extra-curricular activities, political or other, but these are at the expense of their studies, and therefore, there are pressures against participation in these activities. In other systems, where examinations are not so important, or where they may conveniently be postponed, as in Latin America, such sanctions do not exist.

In many countries, for example, it is possible to accurately predict cycles of student activism on the basis of examination schedules. In India, students do not generally study until a month before the annual examinations, and, therefore, during the year most students have a very substantial amount of free time. One can see a similar pattern in Japan where the timing of student political agitation is in part determined by university examinations. In Latin America many student leaders are able to maintain their status within the university for years by continually postponing their examinations, and instead devoting themselves full-time to political activity.
The relative differences in entrance requirements to a university: how difficult it is to get in, how stiff the competition is, may also affect political reactions. The Japanese and American patterns which now place great emphasis on getting into the best universities, and which, therefore, require high school students to work long hours under considerable psychic pressure, seem to have some clear effects on the way some behave after they are admitted to the university. Some observers have explained the fact that a great deal of Japanese and American student activism is the activity of lower classmen---freshmen and sophomores---reflects their reaction to being released from the pressures of entrance anxiety. Upper-classmen tend to be more liberal in their attitudes than lower division groups but give less time to politics. Presumably years of university attendance are associated both with greater liberalism and more concern with preparing for jobs or admission into good graduate schools. Turkish data, reported by the Rooses and Field in their conference paper, point to a consistent decline in those with an "activist" orientation from 41 per cent among first year students to 29 per cent among seniors. Conversely, the proportion with a "spectator" orientation towards politics (interested but not active) rose from 23 per cent among freshmen to 44 per cent among seniors. In accounting for these differences, they also suggest that first year students feel under less academic pressure than advanced ones and that the filtering out process means that those who remain in school have a more professional orientation.

Other efforts to account for the greater activism of lower classmen suggest that it reflects the fact that entrance into universities is
often a liberating one for entering students, who express their newly found freedom by engaging in various forms of "non-conformist" behavior. In general, regardless of class in school, students living away from home, either in dormitories or in private accommodations are more likely to participate in activist politics than those commuting from home.

It is significant to note, as Clark Kerr points out, that Berkeley data suggest that "new" students, regardless of class, i.e., whether freshmen, juniors, or graduate students, are more likely to be activists than students who had been in residence for some time. In other words, recent transfer students contribute disproportionately to the activist core. This raises the general question of the effect of the ease or difficulty of transferring from one campus to another. A campus is not always a community in which students remain for the entire period of their education, and in which they are gradually socialized into the community norms. Frank Pinner makes an interesting point in comparing the German and French experiences, when he suggests that one reason why young people, particularly students, join organizations or integrated collectivities, is that they have just left one, that is, new students often have left their families, left their home town and friends, and are consequently anxious, disoriented, lonely, and find in organizational life, particularly in movements which have a sense of commitment, of purpose, and of high intimacy, a kind of replacement of the family which they have just left. This factor, which would apply more to the new students than it would to older students, would also vary by country and university systems. It would depend in part, for example, on what proportion of students live at home or
close to home. As Pinner points out, this varies considerably in the German and French cases. The French are nearer their home by reason of French law which demands that students go to the university nearest their own locality. German students are not constrained in this way. There is also a related difference between France and Germany in the nature of their varying conceptions of family intimacy. Pinner suggests that German youth have a greater need for "affiliation" than youth in France or many other countries, because of insecurities engendered by ambivalence in family relationships, parental authoritarianism without strong affective support, and so on, as contrasted with close relationships in the French family. German ambivalence in the generational relationship leads to the expectation that the student will leave the family and that he will go to a school some distance away. He assumes that the "separation of the German student from the family is more traumatic than that of the French student."

These differences in the need for "affiliation" among the students supposedly result in a large proportion of the German student body joining the traditional and conservative Korporationen, usually in their first or second semester. Studies of members indicate that feelings of disorientation and loneliness during the period of transition from family to university are frequently cited as the main reasons for joining. French students, on the other hand, are much more individualistic, do not seemingly feel the need to form or join organizations with a strong sense of community. Their participation in political or other student organizations is more likely to involve a specific
single purpose relationship which can rise or fall quickly as the issue which
gave rise to involvement becomes more or less salient. German students,
Pinner argues, tend to have a diffuse set of links with the groups they
join and seek for a more intense relationship or, in the case of politics,
ideological justification. The largest German left political group today, the German
Socialist Student Organization (SDS), which broke with the Social Democratic
Party on ideological grounds some years ago, is one of the few major student
groups in the West which is oriented toward value change.

These varying efforts to account for the fact that new students are
more likely to join activist or integrated groupings, which point to factors in
the university educational system, problems of transition, and differences
in national family systems, indicate some of the difficulties which we face in
comparative studies designed to tease out casual relationships. On the other
hand, they point out the value of comparative research in enabling us to avoid
the national or single case fallacy. German scholars have interpreted the consider-
able strength of the revived Korporationen as a reflection of the desire of
German students to find good "connections" which will help them find a good
job after graduation. As Pinner points out, however, the desire for connect-
ions exist in other countries, such as France, as well, but it does not result
in the existence of equivalents of the Korporationen.

These are some of the kinds of issues which concern those interested in
the role of students in politics and higher education. As social scientists
we must analyze, not make moral or political judgments. As university faculty,
and citizens, of course, we are deeply interested and even involved in student politics. But our main concern at this conference is scholarly. The university is premised on the belief that "knowledge will make man free" and will increase his ability to control and better his environment. Since our current research interests are the role of students in politics, we are obligated to avoid using our special competencies and knowledge as weapons in on-going campus politics. To separate one's role as scholar and citizen is often terribly difficult. In this case, it is almost impossible.
Bibliography

Two bibliographies, one dealing with student activism outside of the United States, and the other with American behavior, were prepared for the conference by Philip Altbach, the co-investigator. Both of these are presented here.


Philip Altbach, *Student Politics and Higher Education in the United States: A Select Bibliography* (mimeographed)

Publications

A number of the papers presented at the Conference have been published in revised forms in two special issues of journals dealing with "Students and Politics." Five of the Latin American papers were published in the July 1967 issue of *Aportes* in Spanish. 15 papers were published in the Winter 1968 issue of the journal *Daedalus*. The table of contents of these two journals are presented below.

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Most of the articles which appeared in *Daedalus* plus a number of other papers which have not yet been published will also appear in a hard cover book that will be published in early 1969 by Houghton Mifflin. As a further outgrowth of the Conference William Hanna who took part in it is editing a book of articles on *African Students and Universities*, which will probably be published by Basic Books in 1969.
## Participants in Conference on Students and Politics

**San Juan, Puerto Rico, March 27-31, 1967**

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### Paper Titles

- Student Political Activism in Venezuela
- The World of Ideology: The Role of Ideas and the Legitimacy of Student Politics
- Student Political Activism in Latin America: General Observations Based on Studies in Peru and Mexico
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The Origins of the Russian Student Movement

Students and Politics in Scandinavia

The French Student Movement

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Indonesian Students and Politics

Students and Politics in Turkey

Students & Politics in Burma

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Students & Politics in Korea

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Summary of Conclusions
Drawn from Papers Presented to Conference on Students and Politics
San Juan, Puerto Rico - March 27 - 31, 1968

Many of the attempts to account for the revival of student activism during the 1960s have been specific to time and place. Germans point to current reactions against the Great Coalition; French and Italians argue that students are protesting the strains inherent in the failure of a traditional, almost feudal university structure to adapt to the needs of a rapidly expanding system; the Berkeley revolt in the U.S. was explained as a reaction to administrative measures which seemingly restricted the political rights of civil rights activists. We also give the widespread character of student activism, the special circumstances of the university system in certain countries, or the nature of the initiating event, can have been no more than aggravating factors. The sparks set fire to ready material.

A comparative view also challenges some of the explanations which suggest that the student revolt is largely a reaction to increased bureaucratisation, lack of student power, and the like. One university in Germany which has been the center of greatest activism, the Free University of Berlin, has had students represented on the Senate and other academic organs since it was formed in 1948. Similarly co-government in many Latin-American countries has not failed for a cooperative or institutionally responsible student movement. In the United States, many of the private small elite institutions have been strongholds of political activism, at times (e.g., Caltech), resistance to the central administration itself.

Essentially, the sources of political activism among students must be found in politics, in the factors associated with different types of politics. The explanation for more political activism at one time rather than another must also be found on a political level, in the sources of variations in political response.

Students, as a stratum, are more responsive to political trends, to changes in mood, to opportunities for action than almost any other group in the population, especially intellectuals. Although it may be argued that student activism is the result, rather than the cause of social discontent, it is important to recognize that once activated, student groups have played a major role in mobilising public opinion behind the causes and ideologies fostered by the Social unrest creates their disquiet, students and intellectuals have been in many ways the Vanguard of protest movements.

Historically, then, one should learn to expect a sharp increase in student activism in societies where, for a variety of reasons, accepted political and social values are being questioned, in times particularly where events are testing the viability of a regime, and where policy failures seem to question the legitimacy of social and economic arrangements and institutions. And observation shows that in societies where rapid change, instability, or weak legitimacy of political institutions is endemic, there is what looks like almost constant turmoil among students.

Much of the research on student activism is directed toward explaining why students as a group have played such an important role in politics. The studies point up both motivating factors, such as their endemic marginal status, the pressure on students to be idealistic, and facilitating factors such as the facts that students have fewer responsibilities than other groups, that they are more available for activity, that they are less committed to existing institutions, and that it is easiest to mobilise them. The researches also seek to specify the kinds of background factors which differentiate the minority of student activists from the moderate passive majority.