THE PRODUCT OF A CONFERENCE WHICH CONCENTRATED ON THE
ISSUES OF COMPENSATORY EDUCATION IN A CULTURAL CONTEXT, THE
ESSAYS IN THIS VOLUME DEAL WITH (1) THE SOCIAL-POLITICAL
ASPECTS OF COMPENSATORY EDUCATION, (2) RACIAL ISOLATION AND
COMPENSATORY EDUCATION, (3) THE FAMILY STRUCTURE IN LATIN
AMERICAN AND NEGRO AMERICAN COMMUNITIES, (4) SOCIAL DEVIANCE
AND POLITICAL MARGINALITY, AND (5) EDUCATION AND SOCIAL
CONTROL. THERE IS ALSO A REVIEW OF SELECTED BOOKS AND
ARTICLES RELATED TO THESE ISSUES. (LB)
This Monograph is one in a series published by the Southwest Educational Development Laboratory to expand the tolerances, sympathies and understandings of persons involved in the education of young people for successful encounter in the Twentieth Century world.
Education and Social Change

John B. Orr and Lydia Pulsipher

Editors

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EDUCATION AND THE INSTRUMENTS OF SOCIAL CHANGE

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FOREWORD

The Southwest Educational Development Laboratory is a new institution in the educational community, one of twenty regional educational laboratories in the United States dedicated to the tasks of broadening educational opportunity through research and development, innovation and demonstration, leadership and dissemination.

Serving the two-state region of Louisiana and Texas, the Southwest Educational Development Laboratory seeks solutions to voids and deficiencies in educational opportunities of boys and girls in the Southwest. In particular, its problem focus is intercultural education, which means education responsive to the problems created by the interaction of cultures.

The Laboratory has identified intercultural conflicts and deprivation as components of a significant educational void in the Southwest—a void made all the more serious by the fact that cultural diversity is also an important asset for the region.

This volume has been edited by John Orr and Lydia Pulsipher, who have been designing and conducting Studies in Intercultural-International Education within the Laboratory. John Orr has been head of the Department of Philosophy and Humanities at Texas A&M University, and Lydia Pulsipher is a Latin American Studies specialist. Studies in Intercultural-International Education is a program designed to provide interdisciplinary discussion on the most fundamental issues of the Laboratory’s problem focus. It is a program to provoke a constant evaluation of the goals and strategies of the Laboratory activities through consultation, research, and organization of intra-Laboratory events.

This volume represents the Laboratory’s interest in the cultural context of compensatory education. To implement this interest, the Laboratory sponsored a conference on “Education and Social Change” in Houston, Texas, May 5 and 6, 1967, and the essays and discussions here are the product of that conference. The essays by John Orr and Lydia Pulsipher served as advance study material for the conference, and the other papers were presented to the participants.
The papers are intended to be provocative, designed to raise important issues within the Laboratory's problem focus. If the papers draw disagreement, they have succeeded. These stimulating discussions about the educational enterprise should encourage educational innovations—products of agreements formed through intelligent debate. Because the development of intercultural programs is relatively new to the educational community, the Laboratory welcomes the possibility of fresh and lively discussion about innovation for planned change.

Edwin Hindsman
Executive Director
Southwest Educational Development Laboratory
PREFACE

This volume is more an event than an example of sustained logical argument. The event is an attempt within the program of the Southwest Educational Development Laboratory to bring educators and other specialists together to speak about broad issues in compensatory education — to provoke controversy, in the belief that controversy gives birth to fresh new vistas in the problem-solving process. In the essays that follow, there is a notable absence of discussion about programing, and that is by design. Interdisciplinary and inter-professional conversation usually proceeds in the hothouse atmosphere of developing programs, and the very atmosphere discourages reflection about fundamental issues. These are often dismissed as “interesting,” but too abstract and distant to consume a sizeable part of the agenda for persons whose interests are pragmatic. Thus, the present volume represents a remarkable effort on the part of the Laboratory, particularly because it also is working in the program hothouse.

The Laboratory’s assumption is that education is field-encompassing. That is, educational competence draws from the skills of many disciplines, for the simple reason that social policymaking — of which educational planning is a specie — never can be limited to the comfortable confines of any one specialization. While educators cannot possibly be practitioners in all the humanistic arts and sciences, they cannot afford to ignore the contribution of those who are practitioners. Indeed, the educator’s professionalism is established — at least in part — through his ability to bring together the work of many disciplines and to relate these to the educational process.

This volume is evidence both of the fruitfulness and the pain of interdisciplinary collaboration. It is innovative, iconoclastic, and constructively critical of traditional approaches to compensatory education. But it is also diffuse, its implications for programing not always clear.

The diffuse character of the volume is, in part, a product of the Laboratory’s desire to recruit a heterogeneous panel of consultants: a theologian, a philosopher, a sociologist, an author, an area studies specialist, a civil rights activist, and an anthropologist. Although each was assigned part of a well-articulated outline, each
was encouraged to speak freely and provocatively from his own experience. Thus, the Laboratory chose to sponsor an event in which the confusion of tongues became almost inevitable. To mix metaphors, it chose to sponsor an event in which each participant would be playing a different game. The expectation, subsequently confirmed, was that there would be “family resemblances” in the different games and that the variety would demonstrate the many sides of compensatory education.

In the simplistic view of interdisciplinary cooperation, the problem of describing any social situation is duly delivered to the social scientist, who then turns his data over to the philosopher for normative comments, who then delivers the package to the “operator,” whose task is decision-making. Each of the essays in this volume, however, demonstrates the inadequacy of this view. Each claims the right to develop its own description of the educational situation, although sometimes the descriptive foundation is only implicit. And the various descriptive comments do not always fit neatly together, as if the theologian’s job ends at some predetermined boundary where the sociologist’s begins. Thus, David Little speaks about compensatory education as an arena of moral decision, where the problem of unity and diversity looms large. Lawrence Goodwyn describes (“confront” may be a better word) the compensatory educator as a man who is alienated from himself and from his brother, and who fails in his attempt to establish communication across social cleavages. Irving Horowitz describes compensatory education in the context of social deviance, and Kenneth Marshall describes compensatory efforts as extensions of weak institutions who have not as yet been confronted by the fact of organized ghetto power. What is the best description? Is there a best? Is one any more objective than the other?

At first blush, it seems reasonable to think that the social scientist does a better job of describing the educational situation, in view of his highly sophisticated investigative procedures. It seems reasonable to think that he is the most objective—that he provides the most non-interested description of the social system. That view, however, cannot be defended, at least in its pristine form. It is true that the recent history of social science has been the struggle to recognize and to compensate for the influence of value judgments. According to one of our contributors, Irving Horowitz, “Social science in the twentieth century has matured
in a self-imposed ethical vacuum.” But it is also true that criticism of social science in the twentieth century has often been directed toward its astonishing naivete concerning metaphysical and ideological assumptions. One does not have to argue the rough-hewn doctrine that social science is essentially artistic and subjective in order to recognize these assumptions and to deny the virginity of social scientific documents. Scientific inquiries simply cannot be pursued without what James B. Conant calls “conceptual schemes,” implicit dogmas which are usually more potent for their being only implicit. Reinhold Niebuhr has ably argued that “any social theory . . . has some kinship with the procedures of a Rorschach test, which is more revealing about the state of the patient’s mind who takes it than about the inkspots which his imagination interprets in terms of various configurations.” The point is backed up by Alburey Castell’s The Self in Philosophy, which shows how metaphysical views of man and society affect the kind of data a social scientist will utilize and the conclusions he will draw.

There is little to be gained, though, by parading (and probably exaggerating) the dogmas of social science. Every attempt to develop meaningful communication must rest upon certain presuppositions which are more or less arbitrary, and we should not expect social science to be an exception. The issue is not whether the social scientist necessarily selects some aspects of social relatedness to write about; or whether the social scientist writes with bloodless detachment or not; or whether he can transcend his presuppositions. The issue rather concerns the grounds on which the social scientist recommends that his conclusions should be believed. In approaching social scientific material, the important thing is to discover the manner in which the researcher moves from data to conclusions, to discover the arguments which are utilized in order to justify the conclusions. These will bear various degrees of authority, measured in terms of the credibility which they can command. Thus, social scientific conclusions will range from simple generalizations about observation, through statistical analysis, to impressionistic statements, and each of these logically-disparate types will deserve different levels of affirmation.

When attention is drawn to the warrants which support various social scientific conclusions, a ground for comparing these with other forms of description is established. The situation in which
the compensatory educator works can and should be described from many perspectives, and these descriptions will inevitably carry different degrees of authority, because different kinds of warrants will be utilized in their defense. For example, David Little's description of compensatory education as the tension of unity and diversity makes its appeal to values that are widely shared in a pluralistic democratic society, and his conclusions are authoritative in so far as his perspective is shared. The educator who drafts policy on an appeal to Little's presentation will be appealing finally to a perspective-establishing doctrine of man and to a pluralistic image of the public interest. Lawrence Goodwyn's essay provides a remarkable case in point, also. Goodwyn's description of compensatory education as a place where alienation is perpetuated depends heavily upon the reader's insight into racial alienation. Thus, Goodwyn adopts the short story form, directed toward creating the very experience which will lend authority to his assertions.

What are the grounds upon which some judgments about the educational situation are more entitled to credence than others? The answer to this question divides critical thinkers into at least two groups: (1) Those who hold that the authority of a statement should be proportionate to the degree to which the statement approximates scientific explanation; and (2) those who argue that statements which describe human behavior are so complex or so unique that they require no reference at all to scientific methodologies. The one who has the most experience or the most wisdom about human relatedness is the one who can do the best job of describing (and even predicting) situations. For example, the participant in ghetto life may be a better interpreter of social deprivation for the compensatory educator than the supposedly more objective observer.

I do not believe, though, that the compensatory educator needs to drive himself to make sophisticated decisions as to the possibility of a scientific understanding of human behavior. In fact, the educator may gain a great deal in his refusal to limit himself to the most "credible" (by scientific standards) descriptions and in his willingness to expose himself to descriptions from a variety of perspectives — e.g. theological, artistic, socially activist. Social scientific studies, in their methodological self-consciousness, often seem to miss the feel of a particular experience, and scientific

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observation may be directed unintentionally to the phenomena that are most readily measurable. While there is little virtue in spawning interdisciplinary competition and overlap, there is much virtue in looking at a phenomenon from a number of perspectives, merely because the human experience of any object is pluralistic. That is, there is no one correct way of looking at any object. The fullest understanding is developed through the ability to view objects at the many levels and from the different perspectives that establish their identity for persons.

Perhaps the most striking thing about compensatory education today is just that: the incredible number of perspectives from which compensatory programs are viewed and evaluated in our society. It is not possible to establish boundaries around such programs, and to identify these as the private domain of educators. For example, compensatory education is an important spearhead in the national campaign against poverty and racial isolation, and educators, for all their sincerity and professional sacrifice, often find themselves subject to the devastating criticism of impatient activists. Likewise, compensatory programs are rapidly becoming floodlit arenas for working out relationships among federal, state, and local authorities in the control and financing of schools; and compensatory educators find that ideological conflicts about “the extension of federal control” become matters for everyday decision. To extend the list, compensatory programs quickly raise issues of racial and cultural identity, which in turn raise wails about middle class conformity, mass society, and social vitality. The compensatory educator who believes that he can keep his attention fixed solely on the strictly limited objective of measurable skills is one who is unmindful of the turbulence and ambiguity which in actuality provide the context for his work.

The compensatory educator’s use of consultants is always within situations where policies are on the block. His interests are practical — connected with the development of programs, curriculum, teacher training, home relationships, and so forth. He turns to the consultant to discover how Negro family patterns affect student motivations, how ghetto communities probably will react to bussing, how much and what kind of handicap segregation imposes upon students, whether self-motivation can be augmented and sustained over long periods among disadvantaged groups.
But the educator poses his problems always with an eye to the development of program. That is why his choice of consultants should always reflect the many-sided character of his pragmatic-political situation.

The important function of consultants will not be in their ability to advise the compensatory educator about his policy-making activity, but in their ability to usher him in perspectival spheres. The educator's normal impulse might be to look for conclusions that have practical import, but the real payoff in consultation comes as the educator's vision is widened. The consultant's arguments are probably more important than his conclusions, how he establishes his authority more important than his casual prescriptions. The purpose of consultation should be to deepen, broaden, and extend the educator's awareness of his environment and to provide him with the skills necessary to consider this environment critically. That, in brief, is the rationale for the essays which follow.

John B. Orr
Goals Of Compensatory Education
GOALS IN INTERCULTURAL EDUCATION

David Little

In a recent essay entitled, “The Goals of Integration,” Prof. Oscar Handlin, American historian of Harvard University, wrote:

“Whatever may happen in the more distant future, Negroes will not merge into the rest of the population in the next few decades. Those who desire to eliminate every difference so that all Americans will more nearly resemble each other, those who imagine that there is a mainstream into which every element in the society will be swept, are deceived about the character of the country in which they live. As long as common memories, experience and interests make the Negro a group, they will find it advantageous to organize and act as such. (Indeed) the deletion of all memory of antecedents, the severance of all ties to the past, and the liquidation of particularistic associations is not only unfeasible but undesirable.”

It is clear to me that, right or wrong, Handlin’s remarks summarize very effectively new attitudes towards intercultural and interracial relations that are abroad in the land. Quite obviously, Handlin expresses the fundamental spirit of the “Black Power” movement in this country, with its claims on behalf of black identity, and with its deep suspicion of the “mainstream” of white, middle-class American life—if, in fact, such a mainstream exists. But these attitudes are not simply manifestations of the “New Left.” I quoted Oscar Handlin, and not Stokely Carmichael, precisely to illustrate that point. Quite frequently, in liberal intellectual circles (at least where I come from), the person who puts in a word for integration is regarded with the sort of supercilious sneer normally reserved for defenders of United States policy in Vietnam.

Those who take Handlin’s line of argument are inadvertently focusing attention on a perplexing issue that is, it would seem to me, a perennial one for American citizens, whether we are talking about education, political life, housing patterns, or whatever. The issue is rather nicely summarized in our national motto, e pluribus unum, “from many, one.” That is to say, how much
“pluribus” and how much “unum” are we to recommend for our country? Or, a little more subtly, in what way ought we regard Americans as one, and in what way ought we regard them as plural?

At the risk of oversimplifying, we may say that in recent years the integrationists have represented an emphasis upon the oneness of Americans, regardless of racial or cultural divergences. On the other hand, those who follow Handlin have represented the pluralistic strain in the American tradition. They emphasize the differences which, they believe, characterize and enrich American life. The development of polar positions on this subject does not, of course, mean that the positions are mutually exclusive. As we shall see, each point of view shares something with the other. Yet neither is the apparent tension just a distinction without a difference. There are important issues at stake about which Americans must attempt to be clear.

With respect to education, which is our specific concern here, the tension between unity or commonness and diversity or pluralism manifests itself in sometimes contradictory policy recommendations. On the one side, there are many examples of a still vigorous defense of cultural and racial integration in American schools. Not only, it is argued, will desegregation on a wide scale improve the educational process itself, it will also have immeasurable benefits for the development of “democratic personalities,” or personalities that develop some inclusive appreciation for peoples and groups beyond the confines of their own immediate circle. Professor Philip Phenix, of Columbia Teachers’ College, makes such a case in his book, Education and the Common Good. “The method of progress from injustice toward justice in intergroup relations is through persistent efforts at desegregation in all phases of cultural life . . . While desegregation must proceed on many fronts simultaneously, in no segment of life is it more crucial than in education. Educational opportunity in a democracy should be the same for everyone, without regard to skin color, religious affiliation, national origin, or any other allegedly ‘racial’ factor. These superficial and accidental traits . . . are in themselves educationally irrelevant and should be so treated in the allocation and conduct of schooling.”

While Phenix does advocate that policies of desegregation in schools be carried out rationally and sensitively, he nevertheless
urges such policies with all deliberate speed. He would appear to be much less interested in preserving cultural pluralism, which he regards as "superficial and accidental," than in nurturing a common consciousness among all American students. As he says, "A major goal of democratic education should be to inspire loyalty to universal values which dissolve artificial divisions between persons and unite all in common service of the good." Here is "unum" with a vengeance.

On the other side, the pluralists have their ready responses. Here we may be allowed to quote at length several passages from Handlin's essay, since it is one of the most persuasive examples of the pluralist position, and since Handlin is to be taken seriously on the matter of cultural pluralism because of his status as the leading historian of American immigration movements. He states: "There is no evidence that racial balance itself improves the capacity of the underprivileged to learn; nor that the enforced contact of dissimilar children has significant educational advantages. There is abundant evidence that deprived children have distinctive needs that require the special attention of the school. Yet the drive for integration has obscured, and sometimes actually impede, the task of providing for those needs. Indeed the argument is now often being made that racial balance is desirable to meet the needs of the white children." Handlin advances the theory that racial and cultural diversification...rather than integration, is not only of greater benefit educationally, but also of much greater utility in perpetuating the goals of an open society. He calls, above all, for the awareness of a "group's identity" and "for a determination to deal with its own problems." He is not, of course, opposed to equal access to the general opportunities of the society, but he would incline, it seems, to emphasize the greater importance of relatively independent subsystems within the society. "The fact that the (American) pluralistic order (has taken) account of actual differences within the population made it possible to preserve the concept of equality. Not every man was equally qualified in terms of inherited capital, cultural traits, personality and intelligence to pursue equally the goals of success in American life. But the pursuit of happiness was not a single, unified scramble in which every individual sought the same prizes and in which only a few could be winners while the rest were doomed to frustration... The children of Irish or Italian parents did not count them-
selves failures if their lives did not follow a course identical with that of the children of the Yankee. They had their own criterion of achievement and their own sources of gratification. In short, according to Handlin, this pattern of cultural and ethnic pluralism minimized “conflict-provoking contacts.”

Consequently, Handlin, like the proponents of Black Power, is satisfied with a pluralistic, if not a segregated, educational system which can, in effect, meet the special needs and wishes of the independent cultural subsystems that make up America. He does not intend to coerce people to live in such a pattern if they do not choose to. At this point, of course, he would oppose legalized segregation. On the other hand, he is inclined to feel that most members of these cultural subsystems, including the Negroes, do wish to educate their children in relative isolation, and should be allowed to do so in good conscience. Indeed, on Handlin’s general thesis — and again he is close to the advocates of Black Power — it almost seems as if, for the sake of the common good, they should be encouraged to educate their children in relative isolation. Interestingly enough, Handlin is joined in this view not only by an apparently growing number of civil rights leaders, but also by some prominent Roman Catholic educators, albeit on somewhat different grounds.

With the two sides before us, what method can we — as educators and as American citizens — employ to go about settling the apparent conflict between the demands of integration and the demands of pluralism? The first maneuver that might occur to one is to locate those statements in the debate that are empirically testable and then consult the evidence. Handlin invites such a move, first, when he says that “there is no evidence that racial balance itself improves the capacity of the underprivileged (Negro) to learn,” and second, when he argues that the pluralistic pattern in America has made possible a general attitude of equality among the members of independent cultural and ethnic systems with their own particular prestige scales.

Concerning the first statement, several serious questions are raised by the publication of the 1967 Report by the Commission on Civil Rights, *Racial Isolation in the Public Schools.* In the light of the Report, it would be hard to say any longer that there is no evidence on this matter. On the basis of fairly impressive surveys
the Commission's conclusions are very important. "There is a relationship between the racial composition of schools and the achievement and attitudes of most Negro students, which exists when all other factors are taken into account. a) Disadvantaged Negro students in school with a majority of equally disadvantaged white students, achieve better than Negro students in school with a majority of equally disadvantaged Negro students. b) Differences are even greater when disadvantaged Negro students in school with a majority of disadvantaged Negro students are compared with similarly disadvantaged Negro students in school with a majority of white students." The report also argued that "Negroes in predominantly Negro schools tend to have lower educational aspirations... than Negro students with similar backgrounds attending majority-white schools." Finally, the Report did not put much stock in the capacity of purely compensatory programs to alter appreciably the plight of the Negro.

Several things must be said here. This data, like any, is open to further examination and verification. But what is important for our purposes is that at least some aspects of the larger problem are testable. Presumably, we may look for "hard" answers as to whether desegregation plans do improve educational performance or not. At the same time, we must be wary of exaggerating the importance of the Civil Rights Commission's Report in helping us solve the larger tension between "unum" and "pluribus." The Report does not consider all dimensions of intercultural education. It deals only with certain patterns of Negro-white relationship, patterns that are, in many respects, quite special. We will need a much wider range of studies so as to weigh the relative bearing of intercultural education among different groups' attitudes and achievement. My own intuition is that such studies, particularly among cultural groups of the same socio-economic status, would not conform very closely with the conclusions of the Report.

As to Handlin's second claim—that American pluralism generates a general attitude of equality among independent groups—the Report has some further relevance if, again, it is not finally conclusive with respect to our general problem. In a passage reminiscent of the famous clause on inferiority in Brown v. Board of Education, the Report states that "Negroes in predominantly Negro schools... more frequently express a sense of inability to influence their future by their own choices than Negro students

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with similar backgrounds attending majority-white schools.\textsuperscript{11} That sort of finding hardly confirms Handlin's blanket assertion regarding a sense of equivalence between different cultural groups. On the contrary, the Report documents the perpetuation of an "identity of inferiority" in Negro ghetto schools. If the Report may be believed, it is not at all clear in what way continued separation between Negroes and whites helps to maintain the "concept of equality."

A recent four-year study of suburban schools in New York casts further doubt on the validity of Handlin's argument.\textsuperscript{12} According to a report of the findings, "The child of the suburb . . . divides humanity into the black and the white, the Jew and the Christian, the rich and the poor . . . He is often conspicuously self-centered."\textsuperscript{14} There is, in other words, very little development of a "pluralistic consciousness," of an openness to and tolerance of other cultural patterns. The authors do note a relatively higher awareness of diversity in religious matters, but that is precisely because Protestants, Catholics and Jews have, to a degree, been "integrated" in the public schools. As the report puts it, "Though other races, other nationalities, other generations have a great deal to teach (the suburban children), there is little in their education, formal or otherwise, to familiarize them with the rich diversity of American life. In this sense, the children of suburbia are being short-changed."\textsuperscript{15} In short, it would seem that the suburban school, far from nurturing a spirit of equivalence and toleration, is nurturing an identity of superiority, exclusivism and self-centeredness. Now, again, these bits of evidence can hardly substantiate much of theory. But at least they give promise of getting at part of the problem of unity and diversity by means of empirical investigation.

However, illuminating as this material is, it has not really helped us to answer the deeper aspects of our problem: with respect to education, in what way ought we regard Americans as one, and in what way as plural? In trying to deal with this question, I want to suggest that we need a method of analysis that supplements the empirical maneuvers we have just discussed.

Let us begin by stating a proposition: the ethos and assumptions of the modern educational process indicate a source of unity in relation to which cultural diversity should be understood. It
cannot, I believe, be doubted that the process of education goes on in this country (and elsewhere, of course) in the general spirit of rational, scientific inquiry. Quite obviously, rational, scientific inquiry, in turn, could not proceed were it not for some common assumptions, shared among all those engaged in the enterprise. One indispensable assumption of particular interest to us is what Robert K. Merton refers to in his essay, “Science and Democratic Social Structure,”16 as “the imperative of universalism.” As Merton puts it: “Universalism finds immediate expression in the canon that truth claims, whatever their source, are to be subjected to pre-established, impersonal criteria: consonant with observation and with previously confirmed knowledge. The acceptance or rejection of claims entering the lists of science is not to depend on the personal or social attributes of their protagonist, his race, nationality, religion, class and personal qualities are as such irrelevant. Objectivity precludes particularism . . . (Or, as he puts it at another point) ethnocentrism is not compatible with universalism . . . ” As Merton rightly implies, once the imperative of universalism has genuinely been learned, there is, as it were, a loss of innocence so far as the absolute sanctity of inherited ethnic and cultural traditions goes. By becoming conscious of criteria that transcend and arbitrate the claims of particular traditions, members of different traditions become conscious at the same time of a common standard under which—as under the God of St. Paul—“the whole world may be held accountable.”

With respect to the educational process, then, Americans ought to be regarded as one under the common standards of objective, rational inquiry. In the light of the imperative of universalism the claims of particular ethnic, cultural, racial and religious traditions will, of necessity, be subjected to certain sorts of impartial tests. We are far from suggesting, as we shall make clear, that the canons of reason can finally adjudicate all of these claims, but we are suggesting that the literature, the imagery, the history; the truth assertions of these different traditions will no longer be able to authenticate themselves in all their particulars simply on their own say-so.18 The “scientific study” of scripture, or of folklore, or of ethnic customs, that is so much a part of the modern world is a manifestation of this fact. If individual groups are going to enter into the public education process at all, they will simply have to become aware of the imperative of universalism, which
transcends all particularism, and which is shared interculturally among all groups participating in the same process.

But it is one thing to understand formally the relevance of the imperative of universalism to the matter of intercultural unity in education. It is another to institutionalize this imperative in the educational process itself. As we have suggested, the canons of rationality introduce a certain capacity for objectivity, for distance, with respect to one's particular cultural tradition. Among other things, one becomes aware that his tradition is indeed particular — that there is a multitude of other cultural, ethnic and religious options. Yet, it is doubtful, I believe, that the full consequences of the imperative of universalism can be appreciated in an educational setting that does not actually confront a student with the particularity of his reference group. The acute problem identified in the suburban school study we mentioned earlier, was precisely a lack of awareness of cultural diversity. The white middle-class patterns and values were accepted without question as the superior normative pattern, for students were never, in any appreciable way, made conscious of, or exposed to, alternatives. Obviously, the suburban schools were training the children well in the arts and techniques of rational, scientific inquiry. At the same time these schools were not enabling the students to transcend, or get any distance on their reference group. The students were being trained to live with the white middle-class way pretty much on its own say-so.

What I am suggesting is this: it is likely that the imperative of universalism will be taken seriously in evaluating cultural traditions only when special efforts are made to enable students to live with cultural diversity. Only then will there be sufficient pressure to force members of different subsystems to transcend their own inherited patterns and confront consciously their own particularity. The Irish-American or the Italian-American, the Protestant or the Catholic is compelled to apply impersonal criteria, and not just sentimental criteria, to his history, to his attachments, when he identifies himself in relation to another ethnic or religious option. It is only then that he sees himself, quite literally, through the eyes of another. In such a situation he can no longer take his tradition uncritically. As we said, he loses his innocence. Yet is that not precisely the force of the imperative of universalism in an educational process? Seen in this way, unity and diversity appear to complement one another.
We are not arguing that the canons of rationality either should or need to "liquidate all particularistic associations"—to use Handlin's words. Even if that were desirable, which I certainly do not believe it is, it would not be possible. Whether one ought to be a Protestant or a Jew, whether he ought to be loyal to and identified with Italian or Negro or Mexican traditions are not questions that can finally be settled on purely rational, impersonal grounds. Although reason is by no means useless in such quiescence and emotional commitment that fall beyond the reach of rationality. What we are urging is that the process of answering these questions be consciously conceived as a matter of choice, of personal decision, of freedom, if you will, and not as a matter of inherited necessity over which one had absolutely no control. In both the case of the suburban child and the ghettoized Negro, what is missing is exactly the capacity for some transcendence over the reference-group and the opportunity to make a real choice as to whether one wants to identify with that tradition.

Now, to be sure, there is a danger of standardization in the kind of intercultural engagement we are describing. But standardization is a particular threat when the schools do not consciously and systematically expose students to the cultural, religious and ethnic diversities of this country. I am very doubtful that the American Negro is going to develop a very adequate identity off in some self-perpetuating ghetto. The same applies to the suburban child, the Jewish child, or the Mexican child. On the other hand not much will be accomplished if children from diverse backgrounds are physically lumped together in the same standard school without being taught to conceive of their diversities. According to the canons of impersonal criteria, they must learn in school to examine sensitively and consciously the differences among them. As a matter of course, they must come to know Negro history and identity, alongside the history and identity of the German-American and so on. They must come to know what the middle-class way means in relation to other class styles of life. And certainly they must study religious diversities. If they are taught in this sort of atmosphere, they shall be learning according to the full consequences of the imperative of universalism. Students of diverse backgrounds shall be working out the problem of cultural identity in relation to one another. What unifies them will at the same time require serious and conscious attention to their di-
versities. The demands of rationality do not abolish pluralism. On the contrary, they produce an awareness of it.

I hope I have made the meaning of my central proposition clear: The proposition was, you recall: the ethos and assumptions of the modern educational process indicate a source of unity in relation to which cultural diversity should be understood. By examining this notion we have attempted to go a few steps toward reconciling "unum" to "pluribus" in the sphere of education.

1When, in this paper, we speak of "intercultural education," we are using the difficult term "culture" more or less as Prof. Clyde Kluckhohn defines it: "the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values." ("Concept of Culture," Culture and Behavior (New York, 1964), 73. That is, we shall understand a "cultural subsystem" to be a group with a particular and significant self-identity or self-image that is maintained, in part, by a set of historically continuous ideas and values. Thus, on the American scene, we include religious, ethnic and racial groups under this broader notion of cultural subsystem, insofar as they each possess a significant self-identity which sets them apart. If this is vague usage, it is, I believe, necessarily that. For example, we may call the American Negroes a "cultural group" to the extent that they develop a distinctive body of ideas and values which identify what a Negro is vis à vis the rest of society. That contemporary Negroes seem bent on doing just this illustrates our point.

2Daedalus (Winter, 1966), 284, 276.
4Ibid., 187.
5Handlin, op. cit., p. 281.
6Ibid., 275, 6.
7Ibid., see 271.
9Ibid., I, 204.
10Ibid., I, 204.
11See, esp. 206ff. I may add from personal conversation with Dr. Alexander Plante, of the Connecticut State Department of Education, that the experimental suburban bussing plan in Hartford, Connecticut—"Project Concern"—is very much confirming the conclusions of the Commission on Civil Rights.
12Ibid., I, 204.
14Ibid., 99.
15Ibid., 99.

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Among other things, cultural traditions develop interpretations of historical events that enhance their image—in short, that make them "look good." Rational historical inquiry poses a threat to the tendency of all cultural groups to sentimentalize their past. The recent flurry of antagonism among some Italian groups toward the discovery of the Vinland Map, and the fact that a Scandanavian, rather than an Italian, was the first European to reach American shores, is an illustration of the tension between cultural loyalty and historical accuracy.

COMPENSATORY EDUCATION: A POLITICAL MODEL

John Orr and Lydia Pulsipher

What follows is rhetoric. It is discourse at that level which troubles the soul with its abstraction, groans with arbitrariness, and offends the sense of those who like to proceed cautiously. But rhetoric is justified. It is the tool of troubled spirits who want to provoke argument in order to clarify the dimensions in which decisions are made.

The subject is compensatory education for disadvantaged children, and the intent is to develop a model against which the success of compensatory programs can be measured. We are fully aware that we are stumbling into that never-never land of discussion about goals in education, a land where the sun never sets except amidst the fogs and the bogs. What constitutes the improvement of education for any group is a flammable issue that never seems to be resolved. Whether public schools should or should not teach a certain system of values; whether and how they should develop the social, emotional, intellectual dimensions of persons; whether students should be encouraged to resist the status quo—these are questions which continue to bring conflict and which reveal the ambiguity of fundamental goals. In the realm of goals, "Whirl is King, having driven out Zeus."

But the need is plainly to be unpragmatic in developing a model for compensatory education, because ambiguity concerning goals opens the frightening possibility that compensatory programs will be shaped according to unexamined guidelines. The educational community cannot blithely assume that it knows how to
spot "improved" education, and that the main problem of the compensatory program is getting enough money and technicians to work in adapting materials, stimulating pupils, involving parents, and training teachers. Toward what ends? Why?

Experimental muddling-through is an approach appropriate to situations where there is a broad harmony of interests and where decisions can be made within a consensus concerning the measures of progress. It is the policy-making approach of a society that has witnessed "the end of ideology." But pragmatism is not entirely appropriate to compensatory education, because to raise the problem of compensatory education is to bare a host of issues which probe pulsating nerves and which revive classical ideological debates. Here there is no broad harmony of interests, nor is there consensus concerning goals. Sensitive persons cannot speak about compensatory education without dealing in matters of cultural relativity, the autonomy of school districts, the assimilation of minorities, civil rights, social and economic mobility, the Protestant Ethic, freedom, equality, paternalism, political strength and weakness. These are issues that shatter consensus.

To avoid facing the philosophical crises of compensatory education is to embrace a "technical rationalism"—that faddish dogmatism which holds that the right value choices are obvious, and that the hard work can be farmed out to technicians, whose job is to develop procedures, means, programs, and various species of gadgetry—necessary for achieving commonly agreed upon goals. It is the dogmatism that wants to race through discussions about principles, because these appear abstract and irrelevant to the real problems. Technical rationalism constitutes a prime heresy of bureaucracy; and this heresy may well be the major communicative barrier between many educators and persons concerned about broad social change (persons, who, to say the least, are very concerned about principles of action). Technical rationalism is always escapism, but it is particularly destructive where the experimentalism of existing institutions has failed to remedy large social abuses.

A Political Model

The model we are proposing for compensatory education is unashamedly political, in spite of the fact that a good bit of effort has legitimately been spent in protecting education from the firey pits of political boondoggling. Other models can and should be de-
veloped, and we make no presumptuous claims about the exclusiveness of the political model—only the claim that political dimensions have been tragically absent in literature about compensatory programs.

Other reasons for a political model are more basic. (1) Education is political in the classical sense. Its directions are established by elected officials. It is serviced by state bureaucracy, responsive to political decision-makers. It is financed by taxation; and its workers—from top to bottom—are government employees. If there is a compensatory job to be done, that job has been created through the failure of political institutions. Remedies will be initiated politically (there is no other way), and these will involve new and different allocations of funds, talent, and capital (all being “political” properties, in some sense of the word). Likewise, barriers to the effective development of compensatory programs are political—pressures of the budget, limited personnel and facilities, barefaced prejudice, priority choices. (2) The political model for compensatory education is appropriate if only because education is a social process. Whenever people interact, problems of social order (that is, “political” problems) arise, and people are involved in wins and losses. To ask that education be politically neutral is to ask that it be non-social, and thus to look for what can never be. (3) The political model allows for evaluation of compensatory education in the most general terms. The problems of disadvantaged communities are massive, and it is literally impossible to conceive of these as a whole. Reformers inevitably separate an element from the whole, then speak about it in categories which the mind can handle. Simplifying procedures are necessary, but it is important that the synthesizing effort never be surrendered. A political model allows for this effort in a useful way.

**Political Goals for Compensatory Education**

Politically, the only defensible goal for compensatory education is the extension of freedom—maximizing the number of significant choices which persons can realize. At the very core of democratic society is an implicit pledge to nurture the conditions of liberty, because shared liberty is a presupposition of the democratic community. Democratic society, which builds upon diversity, finds its deepest vitality in the affirmation of personality, and this affirmation implies a correlate commitment to individual liberty.
Stated in another way, the broad goal of compensatory education is to get power to the weak, power being defined as the ability to implement one’s choices, weakness being defined as impotence in the face of forces that make for poverty, limited choice, and limited hope. Being disadvantaged in an industrial society is, by definition, being part of a community that has not been effective in economic, political, and social interactions. Compensatory education is the process of granting the power which educational systems can grant in order to make persons more effective in realizing their life choices (recognizing that educational agencies cannot grant all the power necessary for this transformation). This power has to do with self-image, the awareness of a range of options, the development of attitudes, resources, and skills for job mobility and social mobility, the understanding of inter-relationships in one’s world, and the knowledge of how people make themselves felt politically.

Undergirding this political concept of compensatory success is an assumption about the assimilationist problem, and this ought to be aired. We are assuming that it is not the province of educators to decide whether they should enhance or underemphasize cultural identity, preserve or attack cultural value differences, encourage or discourage universal middle-classism. Educators should not have to be committed either to an assimilationist ideal or to the cultural relativist position simply because politically they have no right to enforce such a commitment on other persons. Governmental officials do not enforce private moral decisions; their concern is to protect the environment in which moral decision-making can proceed with as much individual initiative as possible. The task of educators is to provide an educational environment within which persons are enlightened concerning life possibilities and within which individuals are encouraged to decide concerning matters of self-identity. It is true that to some extent education cannot avoid being a process wherein relationships and experiences shape self-images—schools do function to acculturate and socialize the citizenry. But a program which refuses to decide on the assimilationist issue will be different from one that embodies convictions on the matter. The difference will be evidenced especially in the way cultural history is taught, the manner in which students are identified in relation to cultural groups, the manner in which conflicting value systems are discussed, the extent to which
value is placed upon mobility, and the character of that which is celebrated. 8

The assimilationist problem is most difficult to resolve. Choices rest upon issues over which Western philosophers have long agonized. And the choices are complicated by contact with a host of questionable intellectual fads: the panning of middle-class conformity; the depreciation of mass, urbanized society into which the minorities are supposedly being assimilated; the elevating of minority cultures as a last hope for stagnating Western culture; the rhapsodizing over diversity; and the liberal celebration of ghetto vitality. The political model suggests that there is little to be served in quarreling over the irresolvable, and that the best solution is to withhold judgment. Positively stated, the political model is pluralistic, but not in the sense that equates pluralism with relativism. It is rather the pluralism suggested by John Stuart Mill, which finds in the pluralistic search for truth a proper degree of humility about the limits of knowledge and the risks of ethical prescription. It is a pluralism that provides the appropriate setting for an encouragement of freedom.

There are important qualifications, however, to this “decision not to decide.” To the extent that cultural identity is the product of social, political, and economic weakness, compensatory education may indeed be assimilationist in character. It may well be that certain traits associated with minority culture are the traits of poverty or are traits whose origins are to be found in the institutions of slavery. If such be the case, rhapsodizing about cultural diversity becomes a thinly disguised defense of paternalism, or worse. The wisdom of the compensatory educator will be to discern those elements of cultural identity which arise from weakness and to separate these from elements which represent a defensible cultural configuration—admittedly a wisdom usually reserved for the gods.

Likewise, compensatory education will be assimilationist in preparing students for mobility in urban institutions. Reading, writing, calculating, and problem solving are skills that have an economic value, and their enhancement provides for a wide range of economic movement. In teaching the classical skills and in measuring these, schools are culture bound. Thus, James Coleman’s Equality of Educational Opportunity was constrained to report,
(These achievement tests) are not, nor are they intended to be "culture free." Quite the reverse: they are culture bound. What they measure are the skills which are among the most important in our society for getting a good job and moving up to a better one, and for full participation in an increasingly technical world. Consequently, a pupil's test results at the end of public school provide a good measure of the range of opportunities open to him as he finishes school—a wide range of choice of jobs or colleges if these skills are very high; a very narrow range that includes only the most menial jobs if these skills are very low.

Extending freedom might possibly be assimilationist, by definition, particularly in a society where the maintenance of cultural identity has so little economic advantage.

"Extending freedom" is a goal, however, which can easily become a slogan devoid of substance. And the political model for compensatory education can only become useful when it is spelled out in terms directly related to educational situations. This is the task to be accomplished now: to suggest ways in which compensatory success can be measured as an instrument of freedom. Three levels of compensatory success will be suggested: (1) improvement of measurable skills; (2) "maximum feasible participation of the poor"; and (3) activities in illumining the political world of the disadvantaged.

(1) **Upgrading Skills**

Upgrading skills is a political happening of the first order—a significant extension of freedom. To a significant degree compensatory success can be measured in the most obvious of possible ways, through the use of standardized achievement tests. Good compensatory education will raise the measurable performance on examinations administered to students from the total community.

The sharpening of teaching and learning, the heightening of self-confidence and motivation, and the extension of horizons represent a significant transfer of power; and urban society depends heavily upon this transfer to initiate its youth into the complex skills required for urban effectiveness. The simple premise of compensatory education is that culturally disadvantaged youngsters must be given a saturation of services to compensate for the multiple impoverishment they suffer. They do not arrive on the formal educational scene with the skills or motivation necessary for optimal learning, and they must be surrounded with an educational environment designed for remedial support. Compensatory educa-
tion is based on the assumption that the most important cause of educational disadvantage is the poverty of the child, the limitations of his environment, and the snowballing character of educational handicap.

Thus, the typical package of compensatory programming evolves generally as a combination of approaches to the multi-faceted disadvantage of the child. The various approaches are ably characterized by the Civil Rights Commission's report on Racial Isolation in the Schools:

One approach—remedial instruction—is to give more intensive attention to students in academic difficulty. Remedial techniques usually include reduction of the number of students per teacher, provision of extra help to students during and after school, counseling, and use of special teaching materials designed to improve basic skills. Many of these techniques have been used in schools for years and currently are employed in suburban as well as inner-city schools.

Another approach—cultural enrichment—expands activities which schools traditionally have offered to students. Cultural enrichment programs attempt to broaden the horizons of poor children by giving them access to activities which ordinarily might be beyond their reach, such as field trips and visits to museums, concerts, other schools, and colleges. Such programs also commonly are found in middle class schools where they operate to supplement the normal cultural experiences of the pupils.

A third element of many compensatory education programs involves efforts to overcome attitudes which inhibit learning. Many educators have recognized that lack of self-esteem is a major cause of academic failure. A number of compensatory programs attempt to improve self-esteem (through the study of Negro history, for example) and to raise confidence by providing successful academic experiences and recognition. Some programs try to raise the expectations of both students and teachers to overcome negative and defeatist attitudes.

A fourth approach to compensatory education, incorporating many elements of the other approaches, is preschool education. This approach seeks to provide disadvantaged children with training in verbal skills and with cultural enrichment activities before they enter the primary grades. Although the importance of preschool education long has been recognized, such projects recently have become widespread with the support of funds from the Office of Economic Opportunity's Head Start program.10

Although educators are relatively new to the whole enterprise of compensation for cultural deprivation, much progress has already been made. A number of projects have been developed—such as Higher Horizons in New York City, Baltimore Public Schools' Early School Admission Project, and Samuel Shepard's
work in St. Louis—and these have already begun to funnel information about the compensatory experience into educational literature.

It is important, however, that compensatory skills continue to be developed in the light of politically realistic sensitivities. The writings of Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans Morgenthau, and George Kennan ought to be high on the list of required reading for educational innovators, precisely because compensatory education has to do with establishing new balances of power among portions of the American population. Political realists risk the appearance of cynicism. But there is primal wisdom in their reminder that redistributions of power are always potentially explosive, and that redistributors of power easily deceive themselves concerning their own benevolence and neutrality. Political questions ought to be asked about the mix of elements that characterize compensatory programs: Who is granting power, and why? Which forms of power are being given, and more important, which are being denied? What are the expectations that are shaping programs? Are skills being granted that are most relevant for effective mobility within urban institutions?

The most haunting issues that surround efforts to upgrade skills have to do with their implicit theory of social change. Compensatory educators are fully aware of the environmental character of their problem, and compensatory literature is replete with references to political, economic, and social forces that perpetuate deprivation and exclusion.\(^{11}\) Compensatory education, however, seems to be developing in the United States as a self-help phenomenon, its mechanism for social change being the renovation of individuals through the heightening of skills and motivation. A few projects like Higher Horizons relate themselves to politically activist associations, like Haryou-Act and thus deal with “structural” reforms, but these are the exception rather than the rule.\(^{12}\) The impression which compensatory literature gives is that collective activism is ignored, and that compensatory education is committed to a gradualism in social reform (at least with regard to the schools’ involvement).

The possibility that individualistic gradualism will shape the ethos of compensatory education may well be the greatest danger that this commendable movement in American education faces. Individualistic gradualism is safe politically (particularly in areas
where deprivation is the most pronounced), and it is acceptable ideologically to the majorities who are most heavily represented on school boards. Nevertheless, individualistic gradualism violates the most penetrating insights into the way social change occurs and into the mechanisms by which minority groups are in fact affecting their own collective destinies.

(2) *Maximum Feasible Participation of the Poor*

There is a carefully nurtured tradition in our society that measures justice in terms of the procedures followed. The substance of decisions and contracts may be less important in the final analysis than the conditions under which these decisions and contracts are contrived. Thus, the particular conditions imposed by a labor-management contract will probably be accepted by a union’s membership if it can be satisfied that representatives bargained within a balance of power. A judicial decision will often be accepted as just if “due process” is observed by the judge.

The political model for compensatory education suggests that educators might profitably consider the “due process” theme in American politics—to consider whether compensatory education ought systematically to seek the “maximum feasible participation of the poor” within its planning. Perhaps the context in which educational reform occurs is as important as the development of teaching-learning skills. The trouble with disadvantaged communities is that they have been ineffective in shaping their own social destinies; and they have not had the successes which spawn high social expectations. Compensatory educational programs offer an invaluable opportunity to provide a laboratory for the exercise of initiative among those whom the programs serve. The best compensatory program will be the one that carves a planning-advisory role for the disadvantaged community, that moves beyond the enlistment of parents to cooperate with the schools in furthering education for which the schools have been the sole designers.

The very need for compensatory education represents, in part, a failure of professional educational agencies, and one should not overlook the possibility that some of that failure derives from those agencies’ very perception of educational disadvantage. As Bertrand Russell jokingly remarked, there is no such thing as “immaculate perception”—only perception that is affected by the values, biases, and life history of the observer. For this reason, “maxi-
mum feasible participation of the poor" is far from an academic exercise—an artificial device to stimulate artificial involvement. Planning for compensatory education needs the sensitive interpretation of issues from the perspective of the disadvantaged, and the disadvantaged can provide an important sounding board for projected plans.

One homely illustration may suffice to buttress the point. At a recent meeting of anti-poverty workers and academicians in Houston, the problem of teaching Negro history in compensatory education was raised. Surprisingly, there was little agreement as to the desirability of this practice. One person, a white academician, believed that emphasizing the history of Negroes in America would only serve to remind students of their slavery background, ("Negro history is a pretty meagre thread"). Another believed that emphasizing Negro history would perpetuate an unhealthy race consciousness. Still others believed that Negro history should be paramount in compensatory education, as a means of instilling pride in students' obvious cultural identity. For the purpose of this essay, however, the interest of this discussion centers on the fact of disagreement. At many points in compensatory education, decisions are made that are analogous to that concerning the teaching of Negro history. These decisions are fundamentally value choices, and they ought to be made in consultation with the families of those whose self-identities are involved. Whether and how to teach Negro history is not merely a technical decision for a neutral planner. Likewise, the whole problem of identifying goals for compensatory education is laden with choices that the technician is simply not capable of making responsibly.

Needless to say, "maximum feasible participation of the poor" is risky business. In an analogous case, participation of the poor on anti-poverty boards has proved to be an invaluable addition to community action planning. But few would deny that the involvement of ghetto representatives in community action has been troubled. Their presence has effected a major shift of power away from city hall, and city hall has often reacted in a manner befitting the politically threatened. Whether the shift of power has been too threatening is a question still to be answered, yet the lesson learned from the war on poverty has been clear: public institutions cannot long use public funds in ways that hurt public officials. A few flashy victories may be won (e.g., impoverished
people finally believing that they can spend funds to affect their own collective destiny), but undoubtedly funds will sooner or later be cut off.

That is why educators dealing with compensatory education need the wisdom of Job in involving the disadvantaged. The prizes to be won are far too valuable to suggest neglecting the effort. But involvement will have to be judicious. It probably will have to be represented as “advisory,” in order to maintain the reality of school board authority, delegated at points to educational professionals. Still it may be that compensatory education should give rise to a new image of educational professionalism—one that emphasizes mediation abilities, bringing the voice of the disadvantaged into consideration at the point of compensatory strategy-making.

(3) Community Action

Occasionally in the literature of compensatory education, one feels that he has wandered into the classroom of the venerable Puritan divine, Richard Baxter. Before him emerge shapes and forms and admonitions appropriate to the so-called Protestant Ethic—a work-oriented value system, buttressed by the vision of rewards for labors well done. Work is the sign of salvation, and successful minority professionals provide a panel of patron saints who have demonstrated that “it can be done.”

A solid case can be made for using the Protestant Ethic as one more rifle in the arsenal of compensatory weapons, particularly in light of the need for heightened motivation and for identification with inspiring personalities. It is necessary, however, to exercise caution with “work, work, work ethics.” Urban society is beginning to discover that preoccupation with work leads to disability in handling leisure; and in fact, Protestant denominations are revising their ethical stance with regard to the value of work. More seriously, the Protestant Ethic under-emphasizes the need for collective action to meet collective problems. Institutions are improved by individuals, but also through the activity of groups. To dwell upon the need for individual initiative is to make the gift of liberty paltry, because many human ends are achieved only through the vigorous work of associations. Effective participation in social change is always through groups and sub-communities.

Compensatory education can hardly afford to ignore the political, economic, and social pressures that play upon the impoverished,
maintain the ghettos, and, in turn, perpetuate the need for compensatory education. The frightening prospect, however, is that the closer programs move toward dealing realistically with these pressures, the more subject they become to opposition. Thus the political dilemma of compensatory education: In their effort to compensate for various forms of disadvantage, the schools cannot sponsor marches against the local school board, nor can they organize boycotts against the commerce of power structure barons. Their refusal to do so is not a failure of nerve, but is merely the expected behavior of institutions utilizing public funds (and wanting to have those funds replenished via the action of school boards and power structures). The school cannot avoid being an establishment, and so, by definition, cannot help but reflect the power balance achieved in particular communities. It is part of a complex of inter-related establishments—often branded as the Establishment by minorities who are alienated from politically effective neighbors. But the school is also an equality-giving establishment, formally similar to other governmental agencies. As courts deal in the trade of granting equal justice and due process, at least in their better moments, the schools in their better moments grant self-images and skills which encourage relative equality in self-determination and ability to affect one's environment.

We believe there is a range of activity that public schools can encourage which takes seriously the social character of deprivation, but which nevertheless remains within the classical function of public education. It is in the exploration of this range that the greatest hopes for maturation in compensatory education are to be found: we want to argue that public schools have always assumed responsibility for teaching citizenship—"civics"—and that in the context of compensatory education, this "civics" task is vastly expanded.

Public school civics is necessarily rationalistic. It must be based on something like Plato's maxim that knowledge is virtue—that creative citizenship is served through illuminating one's political environment, and through training in the skills necessary for political effectiveness. Plato, of course, concluded that virtue could not be taught, but this conclusion did not shatter his belief that philosopher kings needed a sophisticated education in the ideals and skills of republic-building. For Plato, the key concept was illumination. His educational system was directed toward illumina-
tion of what was already present: putting the searchlight on man's environment in the conviction that self-awareness was a form of liberation into political effectiveness.

Needless to say, the political environment within the ghetto is vastly different from that in which the majorities live. But compensatory civics ought to be directed toward the same end as that which informs civics in the middle class school: illumination of the political environment in which students actually operate. In the course of their formal education, compensatory students should become knowledgeable about their legal and political rights, the agencies which serve the ghetto, alternative techniques to effect social change, organizations who purport to represent their interests. Middle class schools as a matter of course speak about pressure groups, voting, and letters to Congressmen: the tools of effective citizenship. Compensatory civics ought merely to provide some level of discussing the same thing for another kind of political world, where different organizations, techniques and issues have assumed importance.

Civics skills are as important as job skills within the disadvantaged community, and education about community action ought to be one of these areas—like vocational training—where the total disadvantaged community becomes the student body. Democratic society depends for its justice upon a relative balance of power, and it is in the interest of the democratic ideal that disadvantaged persons should learn how they can maneuver within the policies and procedures of urban institutions. Thus, there is a case to be made for Civics Extension—developing civics instruction along lines suggested by experience with agricultural extension: civics consultants, community civics instructors, organizers of civics seminar-workshops. Several activities suggest themselves as being well within the scope of public education: (1) illumination about community agencies, services, and institutions; (2) education concerning skills by which communities are improved or by which persons may operate more effectively within the community (e.g., community organization, consumer skills, financial procedures, home buying procedures); (3) illumination concerning the major issues which affect the poor and which are being considered at various levels of government. One could also imagine a compensatory civics teacher attempting to enlighten school boards, service clubs, and
“power structures” concerning issues within a community’s minority population.

Compensatory civics ought to take as its working principle the “strangeness” of the disadvantaged political world. The illuminating civics function of public education may not best be carried by teachers, who live in one social-political environment, but who teach persons from another. Just as the county extension agent makes a special effort to be aware of his client’s mental set and way of life (even to the point of cultivating a rural accent and “country manners”), a compensatory civics consultant probably should seek to blend in with those he is trying to help. He would depend heavily upon various persons and agencies within his community, and he would see his function primarily as one of a liaison between community educational resources and persons in need of these educational services.

Conclusion

The political model for compensatory education does not relate to several issues that are pressing and important. It avoids problems of nationally legislated guidelines, segregation versus integration, school board autonomy, and educational strategies. Its intent is quite limited: to suggest a framework within which goals can be discussed. The assumption has been that some symbol is needed which can provide a coherence for the multi-faceted structure of compensatory education. And the image of education as politics seems particularly useful for this purpose. The image draws attention to the political character of the schools, and thus places the matter of compensatory programing within the larger context of society’s growing concern for civil justice.

FOOTNOTES

COMPENSATORY EDUCATION: A POLITICAL MODEL

5Saul Alinsky, address at University of Texas, March, 1967. Alinsky’s definition of poverty is “lack of power—inability to control one’s future.”

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6Hickerson, chapter 4.
7Hickerson, p. 51-60.
8Hickerson, p. 58.
13Clark, chapter 5. Also, Hickerson, chapter 5.
The Context Of Educational Reform
FAMILY STRUCTURE IN THE LATIN AMERICAN AND NEGRO AMERICAN COMMUNITIES

Munro S. Edmonson

There is lively and growing awareness in American educational circles of the importance of culture in the process of general public education. To a considerable extent, this is because we have come to realize the ways in which cultural diversity impedes education. It is important therefore to underline the fact that education itself is a cultural process and to understand its relation to other cultural processes with which it coexists. For culture is in the last analysis communication, and any form of communication among men is an instance of it.

I agree with Dr. Little that the educational process is primarily a rational enterprise. It essays to draw each of us out of the parochialism and particularity of his own tradition of discourse and to place us in firmer and broader contact with the great traditions of all mankind and with one another. It is inimical to the prejudices and blind spots of individual cultural experience and by the same token is dedicated to the diffusion of the language all men share by virtue of being human—the language of reason.

Inevitably in this context the existence of strong local, tribal or national cultures is an educational problem. For if our sensitivity to the widest intellectual horizons that human potential opens to us is the essence of education, our deep and intensive involvement in time and place, in the traditions of our own immediate societies and the loyalties of our own intimate contexts, directs our attention and our energies to less catholic goals, less ecumenical aspirations and less rational concerns. The ethnic cultures to which as humans we so profoundly “belong” root us to attitudes and values which all men do not share, perhaps cannot share. From the standpoint of general human culture, ethnicity is irrational. It is nonetheless a powerful and real counterforce to the expansive impact of educational rationality.

A belief, even a faith, in human reason has been an axiom of modern thought at least since the 18th century. Nonetheless, it is one of the most profound conclusions of 20th century science that human beings are not only rational animals. We are also, all of...
the time and in highly predictable and systematic ways, wildly irrational animals. Much of the effort of modern social and behavioral science, indeed has gone into the exploration of this fact and its consequences.

One general conclusion may be drawn which is relevant for our present purposes. Reason and unreason are markedly different in communicative terms. Rationality is highly contagious. Even a casual contact between two human beings may be quite sufficient to communicate a rational proposition, while irrational ones can be conveyed only through prolonged and intensive contact. A new conclusion about some aspect of nuclear energy can be passed from one scientist at an international conference to another who does not even share his language with a minimum of confusion or difficulty. By contrast even the rudiments of American political philosophy have proved virtually incommunicable despite an extensive missionary effort. It seems clear that if we could reduce the human communication network to the minimal contacts necessary to sustain rational discourse, the aims of education would be vastly furthered. But we cannot. All human beings participate with their fellows in societies more intimate and more intensive than those of international science, and it is in these local societies that they build and maintain their most deeply held attitudes and values. It is when we attempt to share these cultural ideas despite intense differences of experience that we typically fail to communicate at all.

We may contrast, then, two very general forms of cultural communication which have markedly different consequences for us. One, I should like to call hypothesis; the other is metaphor. Both involve relational statements, but in a hypothesis the relation is logical and empirical; in a metaphor it is analogical and traditional. An hypothesis is a statement about something which is, so to speak, really “out there.” It can be proved, or, if it is a bad hypothesis, disproved, by the evidence of our senses about the world they contact. A metaphor cannot in this sense be tested at all. It asserts a relationship which is cultural, not environmental, and its validity rests in the fact that it communicates, not in its objectivity. If I assert that the object before me is a table or a battleship, I may be right or wrong, but the matter can be investigated. If I assert that it is a crouching jaguar, investigation becomes unnecessary and irrelevant. Hypotheses are thus the mini-
mal units of the larger structure we may call science; metaphors are organized into the larger structures we call myths. It is intrinsic to their nature that science is one and myths are many.

Both hypothesis and metaphor are automatically communicable among men, and both are communicated all the time. Because of the ambiguities of human judgment, any statement I may make to you will convey both scientific and mythical information. Try as I may to purify and rationalize it, I shall inevitably include some proportion of metaphoric statement if I am to speak to you at all. The particularities of metaphor are built into the very language we speak. Our tribal metaphors are inherent in our grammar. At base, then, metaphor is the central problem of intercultural communication.

Paradoxically, it is the defining characteristic of metaphor that it is hard to communicate. While relatively loose contact between people suffices to guarantee easy transmission of scientific information, only special circumstances, special channels, are sufficient to guarantee the creation and perpetuation of myths. We do not share metaphors because of superficial and casual contact with each other; we share them because of—and through—a profound and intensive sharing of intimate experience. It is in the nature of man to live in groups so constituted as to guarantee this kind of sharing of experience. We all communicate with at least some other people in the profound, enduring and intensive way that generates metaphors and builds them into myths.

Our general sociability guarantees our capacity for science, our ability to communicate symbolically. But it goes much farther. We communicate with each other far more than, for environmentally adaptive purposes, we need to. And thus we share metaphors: attitudes, values and symbols to which the universe is indifferent but which matter fundamentally to us. And these cultural assumptions which we share only with some other men make up our more intimate and more intensive cultural identity. We are not only men; we are men of particular cultures.

The pattern of values and of style imprinted on us by the particularity of our experience, we share by virtue of particular institutional experiences capable of sustaining intensive communication. Generally speaking this means we share culture in this intimate way with people brought up in the same family structure.
No other experience that we have as humans is usually as prolonged, as intimate or as intensive as our training within families. An organized system of family life is thus capable of transmitting itself from generation to generation, and along with it are transmitted attitudes and ideas of enormous subtlety, but of enormous vitality. Such ideas may be perpetuated in this fashion for virtually indefinite periods of time. In considering problems of intercultural education, it is clear that differences in family tradition are close to the heart of the matter.

It is well to remember that the family is not necessarily the only institution which can function in this fashion. Although we seem at times to believe otherwise, there is in fact nothing inherently sacred about the family. The impact of the family upon ethnic culture is very important, but it is important because of its communicative, not its moral properties. If we encounter cases in which the family does not possess these properties, we may have to look for other facts of social participation, other orienting social institutions, to understand the traditions of particular groups. It is, however, rather generally true of all societies that family life is sufficiently intensive and organized to be the major factor in cultural identity. And it is in the family, therefore, that one finds perpetuated the basic values of a culture.

This phrasing of the matter may help to clarify how we can generalize about cultural groups in the face of their obvious diversity. People, even people of the same culture, are not alike, and it is jarring to our common sense to hear statements about how all Americans or all Russians or all Latin Americans or all Negroes may be expected to behave. From the foregoing discussion, it will be apparent that the sense of such statements — the only sense they can have — is that all Americans are alike to the degree that all Americans are trained alike. The primary agency of training for this purpose is family life. Hence there are as many different types of Americans as there are different types of family in the United States. How many this is, is a matter for empirical description.

It is my task here to summarize the relation of such family experience of Latin Americans and Negroes in the United States to the enterprise of education — and by implication to the family experience of the dominant Anglo-Saxon minority upon which the national educational system is based. Although it may seem
trite, let us begin with a very general look at the Anglo-Saxon ethnic tradition.

The general conception of family in English speaking countries is strikingly like that in the other ethnic traditions of northwestern Europe — Germany, Scandinavia and the Netherlands. One's family, or anciently, his kindred, includes all the people who are related to one through blood or marriage, traced bilaterally and equally through both sexes to an indefinite degree. These relatives are felt to be measurably "close" or "distant," and marriage between close relatives is forbidden. In many but not all American states first cousins are too close to be marriageable. The closest relatives are those of the isolated nuclear family, and although this grouping is peculiarly adapted to the high mobility and small apartments of modern America, it is an ancient Anglo-Saxon form. The effect of this system is atomistic and egalitarian. Once he is adult and married, each individual has a unique family, only a part of which is the same as the family of even his closest relatives. In social terms he is completely individualized. And the principle which governs relations among individuals is that of equality. Children inherit property equally, and justice demands that they should do so.

It will be apparent, I think, that the values expressed in this structure are peculiarly and profoundly Anglo-Saxon. They are the axioms of our national cultural existence and the unexamined premises of our identity as a people. They are, in fact, the principles which, we have tried so hard and generally so fruitlessly to export to the other cultures of the world as "American democracy." It is small wonder that our peculiar blend of individualism and equality has proved so mystifying and elusive even to our friends abroad. It simply does not correspond to their experience, however deeply it is woven into ours.

In comparing this dimension of our national experience with Latin American values, it is perhaps important to deal first with Latin American diversity. Latin America is a huge area — bigger than the United States and much more varied both culturally and politically. Some scholars challenge the usefulness of talking about Latin America at all, while others calmly continue to pour forth books about it as though it were a single entity. In a sense both are right. The area has both unity and diversity. But for our purposes it is necessary to insist that in family organization
Latin America is importantly unitary. The style of family found in Spanish, Portuguese, or even, in part, in French America is fundamentally derived from the traditions of Mediterranean Europe, and its major features are shared by the peoples who today speak variant versions of vulgarized Latin. It presents a marked contrast to the northern European family. Because of its relevance to the United States, I shall deal here principally with the Spanish American family.

At first glance the Spanish *familia* appears to be completely cognate with the English *family*. Both terms may be applied, for example, to an indefinitely extended group of bilaterally traced blood relatives. Fully half the meaning of the Spanish word, however, has no English counterpart. Spanish relatives by marriage are emphatically outside the *familia* while in-laws in English are vaguely and ambiguously considered kin. And although the Spanish family includes relatives on both sides, it refers primarily to patrilineal inheritance of surnames. In Spanish the patrilineage is vitally important.

It is quite possible that the kinship system of the aboriginal Iberians of Spain was generally similar to the Germanic and Slavic patterns of European kinship. Such northern tendencies in the basic culture of Spain were certainly furthered by the Visigothic invasions of the early centuries A.D. But Spain has been throughout its history a crossroads between Europe and Africa, and the influences of the Mediterranean on Spanish life are deeply imprinted upon the Spanish family. Other parts of Europe from Italy to Norway have felt in various degrees the impact of Mediterranean and Middle Eastern culture, but Spain has been subject to intensive exposure to these influences. Phoenician, Carthaginian and Greek trading stations, the Roman conquest which gave Spain its language, and above all seven centuries of occupation by the North African Moors have repeatedly reinforced Spain's non-European kinship ideas, and impressed upon it a marked commitment to non-European values. There is more than metaphor to the Spanish adage that "Africa begins at the Pyrenees."

At the time of the discovery of the New World Spain was very far from being a culturally unified nation. It spoke no less than six different languages besides Spanish (Catalan, Galician, Basque, Arabic, Hebrew and Ladino). Even within the Spanish speaking kingdoms the customs and laws of Castile and Leon
differed significantly from those of Extremadura or Andalusia. Even today, the peasantry of Castile maintains family traditions closely similar to those of England, while Andalusia, which contributed disproportionately to the early settlement of the New World, has long maintained the patriarchal and hierarchical traditions of the Middle East. Both modes of organization are represented in the New World in various mixtures.

Even in the ancient world these conflicting tendencies can be clearly traced, the upper classes taking on the patrilineal structure, and the lower classes maintaining the bilateral system. In ancient Greece, the basic bilaterality was overlaid by the phratries of the great families. In Rome the plebian families were bilateral but the gentes of the patricians were patrilineages. So it was also in medieval Europe, where the nobility were organized in patrilineal great families, while the peasants often lacked even patrilineal surnames. In northern Europe the Mediterranean traditions were superficial and restricted, and have virtually disappeared in modern times. In Spain, too, the patrilineage is an aristocratic tradition, but the militarism of centuries of warfare converted most of the Spanish population into petty aristocrats—hidalgos—and the Spanish commitment to lineage was correspondingly general and profound.

The fundamental difference between bilateral and patrilineal patterns of kinship—between the lineage and the kindred—may be illustrated in relation to marriage. The bilateral system isolates the individual so that he is free to choose a mate on an individual basis; the lineage system makes him a representative of his corporate family and his marriage becomes a matter for careful negotiation between sovereign lineages. Equal inheritance of property tends to eliminate that consideration from marriage choice in a bilateral system; primogeniture and entail underline the importance of clear property settlements in a patrilineage. Clearly a lineage system cannot be made to work at all without a definite system of authority, and all lineage systems involve very explicit rules of precedence. To be older is to be senior; to be younger is to be junior, and hence every person has an unequivocal rank in society, depending upon the rank of his lineage and his own rank within it. Although this might appear to settle the matter, this aspect of the system is in fact its greatest problem, because it means that whatever my position in society, I have
everything to gain by doing in the chap ahead of me — usually my older brother. Nor is this merely a theoretical problem. When the king of Yemen died a few years ago leaving seventeen sons, a battle royal broke out which ended a year later with sixteen of them dead. The survivor was of course the new king.

Two methods have been invented for controlling the instability of lineage systems with regard to succession. One is age grading and the other is bride price. In the first method, one takes all the young men of a society off to the bush, scares the wits out of them with horror tales and mutilation, and swears them to eternal blood brotherhood. The Mau Mau of Kenya is a well known example of the technique. Although breaking such an oath is attended by horrendous supernatural consequences, its success in controlling the cupidity of younger brothers is unfortunately limited. Accordingly, it is often combined with method number two.

Introduction of a high bride price means that a young man cannot get married without going deeply into debt to all of his nearer relatives just for the down payment. Naturally his relatives will take a lively interest in his well-being until the debt is paid. Furthermore, since he cannot marry a close relative, he spends years paying off his father-in-law in some distant lineage, and that gentleman and his kin will have a similarly tender concern for their new son-in-law's success. A generation or so of this sort of thing and most of the lineages in a society will be linked together by lines of credit and fiscal expectations, which will convert them into the staunchest supporters of the status quo, and of the sacred ranking system it represents. In this fashion, a lineage system may achieve considerable stability.

I have digressed to point out the workings of an integrated lineage system, not because Spain landed on these solutions but because it didn't. The mixture of two contradictory systems of family organization provides Spaniards and Latin Americans with two modes of reaction, two attitudes, towards their relatives and consequently towards other people, and both are found elaborately worked out in the pattern of society in Spain and in the New World. No resolution of the conflict between the two has ever been worked out, and Hispanic institutions reflect the temporary triumph of one or the other modality at particular places and times. The result is volatile and unstable, and characteristically Hispanic.
The dominance of hierarchically ordered patriarchal institutions in Latin life is too well known to require detailed description. The authoritarian organization of the Spanish Catholic church, the man-on-horseback system of politics, the hacienda form of economic administration, the pattern of deference in address, the habit of arrogance in personal manner; the attitude of machismo in relation to women — all reflect the strong emphasis on lineal organization in Latin American life.

The importance of egalitarian institutions in Spain has tended to be overlooked, especially by American scholars, in favor of these many instances of dramatic cultural difference. Equality is nonetheless strong in Spain and just as Spanish as the tendency to rank. The religious fraternity or confradia was an important egalitarian society in sixteenth century Spain. The autonomous corporate pueblo or village organization and the democratic municipio or city government have a similar emphasis. The Mesta, a sheepherder's union of Spain, was an autonomous entity of sufficient power to challenge even the authority of the king.

The significance of these tendencies in Spanish family life and Spanish culture lies in the fact that they do not result in a blend or compromise. Both sets of attitudes are present in full degree. Nor is it that some individuals are aristocrats and some democrats: all Spaniards are both. Anyone who grows up in the Spanish family will have the experience of subordination and superordination — but he will also experience the solidarity that knows no rank. The fact is beautifully expressed in the Spanish use of familiar address, which may subtly convey status difference or intimacy, and sometimes both at once. Spanish culture recognizes no resolution of the contradiction, and Spanish ethics leaves the matter open. Much of the drama of the Hispanic style can be traced to this.

By way of illustration, the university life of Latin America springs to mind. On the one hand the principle of authority is greatly stressed. Exaggerated deference is expressed by students towards professors, and the authority of a rector greatly exceeds that of any North American university president. At the same time the corporate power of the student body is overwhelming and rests firmly on the principle of companerismo or buddy-ism. One owes extreme loyalty to his fellow students. When the two principles clash, the results are dramatic and unpredictable. In
one instance in my experience, the student organization demanded the resignation of a North American professor. The administration and the rector opposed the demand. After a dramatic confrontation between the rector and the students, the former declared that if the students refused to yield the college would be closed. Then — and this is the astounding part — the matter was put to a vote! The school was kept open by a two vote margin.

Recent data from Latin America suggest that there may be significantly divergent patterns in the Latin American family, particularly in the burgeoning slums of the great cities. Even in these contexts, however, or in such peripheral instances as Puerto Rican Manhattan or Mexican Los Angeles, much of the style of the traditional Spanish pattern remains recognizably the same. Even where it is weakened by poverty or acculturation, the Spanish family is a powerful and encompassing institution, and the attitudes and values it conveys are inescapable facts of modern cultural life.

By contrast with the Anglo-Americans or Spanish American family, the Negro American family is an entirely American institution, shaped by the pressures of slavery in the American tropics and sub-tropics adjacent to the Caribbean Sea. This unique historical background has had two primary consequences, one specific and one general. The specific impact of slavery throughout the American tropics has been the weakening of the role of the male within the family. The general impact has been to weaken the family itself, leaving it open to a great diversity of influences which a more established tradition might well have withstood unchanged. The major features of the Negro family, then, are that it is matriarchal and that it is variable. The paradox is more apparent than real.

American slavery was an emasculating institution for the slaves. To a degree in all of the areas in which it was rooted, but to a very high degree in the United States, it subjected the Negro woman to sexual exploitation without legal protection. It made her a mother without allowing her to be a wife. The paternity of the Negro man was limited to a stud function, sometimes quite literally. The stability of the slave family was thus largely restricted to the exercise of motherhood by Negro women. The consequences of this system are widely represented today in the Negro populations of the New World in the dominating role of
women in family life, a fact widely documented in various countries long before the Moynihan report.

Strictly speaking, the matriarchal family as it is found among lower class Negroes is not a family at all; it is a kind of self-perpetuating women's club. It has little or no place in it for males, either as husbands or as sons, and it rests on the ideology that men are utterly unreliable and undesirable. "Men are dogs" is a common adage, and the attitude it expresses is real. Growing up in a matriarchal family prepares neither boys nor girls for the adjustments of stable or enduring marriage — boys because they have been rejected in their maleness as children, girls because they have been systematically trained to mistrust anything in pants.

The pattern of identification perpetuated by this structure is not an ethnic pattern; it is a sexual one. Growing up in such an environment does not provide a core area of basic security against which out groups can be measured. Instead it leaves the individual highly susceptible to other influences outside the family as sources of his basic attitudes and values. This is particularly obvious in the case of the male. Born to a matriarchal family and rejected by it as early as his fifth or sixth year, the little boy must necessarily seek his security in the street gang outside. His rejection of femininity and female domination is explicit and cultivated. In later life, only the strongest masculine symbols will activate his identification — the army, the police, the gang. His attitude towards women will be tough and unforgiving, repeating the pattern of his background in irresponsible exploitation of women on every available occasion.

The patterns of attitudes and values we are tracing are stably maintained primarily because they matter to people. Among the many ideas and influences which shape any individual's values only a few gain the kind of salience and importance that causes them to be reproduced in generation after generation of people. The values typically associated with family life constitute the fundamental pattern of ethnocentrism in a particular group, and such values are maintained precisely because they embody a rejection of the available alternatives. To see the world through Spanish eyes means to see it familistically with the peculiar blend of Spanish arrogance, humility and democracy. And it means to hate and fear the attitudes which threaten these values — such
as the fuzzy and enveloping corporate individualism of the United States. To grow up in a matriarchal family is to live in a greatly sexualized universe, in which weakness is despised and feared and only sexual solidarity is real.

The weakness of the Negro matriarchy renders it incapable of resisting alternative ideas of organization. Thus, although matriarchy is a deeply rooted idea in New World Negro cultures, it is a long way from being the only idea. Recent studies of the Caribbean islands have documented an extraordinary range of variation in the Negro family, and studies elsewhere, in South America and the United States, suggest that the whole concept of the Negro family needs to be challenged. Even within our own country, the influences that bear on Negro life are extraordinarily varied, and although satisfactory studies are not available, it is clear that there are several different kinds of family traditions among Negroes.

The data available on rural southern Negroes in the United States not only do not justify the supposition that they are matriarchal, but actually suggest the opposite: that strongly patriarchal values and patriarchally organized families may in fact be the rule rather than the exception. The same form can be found in some parts of the Caribbean. While this suggestion is not adequately documented, and in any case does not alter the clearly documented importance of matriarchy in the urban lower class, it is a good illustration of the variations to which the Negro family is subject. Even in the cities, there are other values which often replace those of matriarchy in particular segments of Negro society. The claims of class are sometimes so important as to take precedence even over family. The importance of marriage overwhelms the attitudes of matriarchy in a whole large segment of the upper lower class.

Negro America is in a state of internal revolution at least as important to its future as the civil rights movement. The shallowness of its historical roots and the variety of the influences that play upon it make it far more open to change and reorganization than is White America. And the suggestion is strong that it is in fact changing. Far better information is needed about what is really going on in the American Negro family, but it is safe to say that in any event Negro life is more importantly shaped
by non-family institutions than is the life of Anglo or Latin Americans.

The contrast among the cultures we have been describing is neatly expressed by the peoples themselves in such forms as popular song. The Anglo-Americans are obsessed with a cottage small beside a waterfall — with the strong implication that a marriage license hangs on the wall. The Latin-Americans are troubled by illicit love and the ungrateful women who are to be punished by God for betrayal and abandonment of hapless males. — Negro-Americans are haunted by an interminable battle of the sexes in which “I ain’t gonna give you none of my jelly roll.” These images evoke with pathos but also with precision the profound differences in experience from which they spring.

The educational system of the United States has grown up on the premise that our population is, or is about to be, or would like to be Anglo-Saxon. The sunny maneuverings of Dick and Jane, like much else in our schools, makes no contact with or impact upon the large numbers of our children for whom the premise is false. Our cultural diversity does in fact impede education, and as is our ethnic wont we Anglo-Saxons are determined to do something about it. But the matter is not so simple. To understand cultural causation is necessarily to control it, whatever the experience of our ethnic ancestors may have been. However, the cultural adjustments going on in this country will take place whether we understand them or not. It is clearly desirable that we should understand them as fully as possible.

**RACIAL ISOLATION AND COMPENSATORY EDUCATION**

John Orr and Lydia Pulsipher

“Segregation” is rapidly becoming a major educational issue in the United States. According to Neil Sullivan, Superintendent of the Berkeley Public Schools, the traditional view of educators has been that schools “should provide the curriculum for whatever students happened to show up.” But that view, although still held by a vocal minority, has become an anachronism. Educators have found themselves forced to make decisions about the racial composition of schools, whether or not they have felt themselves responsible for segregation-integration decisions.

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The most dramatic reason for educational interest in segregation has been the 1954 Brown decision, which struck down as unconstitutional the practice of school segregation imposed or permitted by state law. After 1954, a number of court cases, both in the South and North, have established that school segregation need not be complete in order to be unconstitutional. Thus, the only major issue yet to be resolved by the Supreme Court has been whether or not adventitious school segregation is forbidden.

Even apart from these legal pressures, however, educators are acknowledging that day to day administrative decisions almost inevitably involve questions affecting the racial composition of schools. School officials obviously are not capable of making significant changes in residential segregation patterns. But they do affect the location of new school facilities, transfer policies, boundaries of attendance areas, methods of relieving overcrowded schools, and bussing practices. These decisions, sometimes represented as neutral administrative practices, offer school officials wide latitude for extending or reducing segregationist practices in the schools. And school officials have had to accept much of the responsibility for perpetuating the extreme, ghetto character of American educational organization.

The 1967 Report of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 
*Racial Isolation in the Public Schools*, offers one more argument why public school administrators cannot and should not avoid movement toward reduction of school segregation. This report is an important contribution to the literature concerning education for the disadvantaged, if only because it attempts — almost in Don Quixote fashion — to refute the widely-held notion that compensatory education is the best way to deal with disadvantaged minority children. Its point can be stated briefly: compensatory education apart from racial integration, can raise academic and economic aspiration. Thus, the United States Civil Rights Commission attempts to put the integration-segregation issue into the context of discussion about professional educational effectiveness. Integration provides an efficient approach to developing skills; and on that ground alone, steps should be taken by professional educators (and legislators) to reduce racial isolation in the schools.

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To support its thesis, the Commission deals in four areas of measurement:

(1) Performance on achievement tests. It finds that Negro children in predominantly white schools usually score higher on achievement tests than children in majority-Negro schools, even when the children in majority-Negro schools are receiving compensatory education. Negro children in schools that are majority-Negro often do no better than children who are totally segregated. There is evidence that the enhancement of achievement resulting from integration is most positive for children who have had an extended experience in the multi- or bi-racial school.

(2) Economic Opportunity. Negro adults who have attended integrated schools tend to have higher incomes and tend to hold more white collar jobs than those who have attended segregated schools. The Commission believes that this difference can be traced to contrasts in achievement levels and to the fact that association with middle class whites tends to heighten both aspiration and security in bi-racial economic situations.

(3) Attitude. Experience in segregated schools tends to encourage attitudes that make both whites and Negroes prefer relationships that are segregated. The Commission believes that these attitudes carry over into the adult life and serve to maintain and intensify broad forms of racial isolation.

(4) Higher Education. Utilizing figures from the Office of Education survey in 1966, Equality of Educational Opportunity, the Commission claims that Negro students are less likely to have definite plans to attend college. They are more likely to be enrolled in high schools which send a relatively small proportion of their graduates into college; and segregated Negro schools are more likely to have high drop-out rates. According to the Commission, the causes of this situation are many and complex, but a primary cause is the climate of opinion concerning higher education that develops in the schools. A student who associates with others who expect to go to college is more likely to have higher expectations than if most of his classmates do not value higher education.

Racial Isolation in the Public Schools carefully avoids saying that compensatory education in the segregated Negro school is either wasteful or useless. Students are obviously affected by
the quality of education they receive, and the Commission claims that elements of school quality can be measured in terms of those factors which educators generally identify with "good schools." These include small classes, highly qualified and motivated teachers, well-developed curricula, and adequate facilities (particularly for languages and the sciences). The Commission does claim, however, that the segregated Negro school cannot provide one of the most important ingredients in a quality education: the presence of a highly motivated peer group which both aspires to high performances and expects to succeed. While integration is not a panacea for Negro educational success, and while the problems of suddenly putting the races together may be massive, the Commission claims the integration route is far more likely to be effective than others. The best compensatory education will take place in the integrated setting. To support its point, Racial Isolation in the Public Schools quotes Samuel Shepard, who has developed an extensive compensatory program in the St. Louis schools:

Although many Negro students are in racially isolated schools, their principals, teachers, and parents will have to do their very best to help them learn. But there is no question that this effort with Negro students in integrated schools would achieve far more. I have long held that my own eight-year-old son is being cheated because he attends a segregated school.

In proposing remedies for the disadvantages imposed by the segregated schools, the Commission predictably recommends various methods of reducing racial isolation. It speaks about the practice of "pairing," creating central schools, bussing, closing segregated schools, altering attendance areas, avoiding racial isolation in integrated schools. It strongly recommends consideration of magnet schools (schools offering part-time enrichment programs), education complexes (broadening attendance areas by grouping existing schools and consolidating their attendance zones), and particularly educational parks (new centralized facilities to expand attendance areas and to provide for alliances of specialized skills). The most important legislative prescription is that Congress should establish a uniform standard providing for the elimination of racial isolation in the schools. The Commission clearly favors the formula adopted in Massachusetts and New York, defining as racially imbalanced schools in which Negro pupils constitute more than fifty percent of the total enrollment.
Beneath these recommendations are two assumptions that deserve careful attention: (1) that desegregation should be combined with a general program of educational improvement for the total community. The Commission's report effectively argues that it is not enough simply to mix youngsters. Mixing races constitutes enormous problems when not presented as part of a more universal program of improvement. (2) The solution to racial isolation must involve the whole community. De facto segregation is a community-wide problem, and its solution should not rest upon a limited number of schools or neighborhoods.

The greatest impact of Racial Isolation in the Public Schools, however, is in its caution about compensatory programs that are divorced from integration programs. Needless to say, the Commission's conclusions are disturbing, if only because compensatory reformers often have only limited control over the forces that make for racial isolation. Compensatory education has appeared to be a happy solution to a terribly knotty problem: a resolution of the tension between the segregationist and the liberal reformer. If the Commission's observations are accurate, there now is need to rethink the character of the compensatory programs which are presently consuming so much creative energy and so many luscious federal dollars.

Racial Isolation in the Public Schools is currently being questioned in some quarters as to the accuracy of its observations, the major issue being whether the Commission's conclusions were pre-determined and whether he report's statistical information was limited to that which would support the desired conclusions. Of course, foregone conclusions are not necessarily wrong. Procedural arbitrariness may simply be the sign that conclusions are self-evident. Nevertheless, there does seem to be need for professional evaluation of the Commission's research procedures.

Assuming the accuracy and integrity of the report, compensatory educators now need to reconsider the political dimensions of their task, and especially to rework their concept of the range of activity which compensatory professionalism requires. Professionalism carries the duty of interpreting for policy-makers those elements that contribute to teaching and learning in the disadvantaged community, and thus compensatory educators should be responsible for interpreting effects of segregation and integration.
on their own professional effectiveness. Professionalism, therefore, carries educators into a realm that is highly-charged politically, and venturing into this realm will always involve a risk.

I am not suggesting that *Racial Isolation in the Public Schools* should lead to an "either-or-stance" — either integration or no compensatory action. The very heart of politics is the ability to compromise, and compensatory education in the United States may well have to proceed for a long time within a relatively segregationist context. But compromise is not the same as giving up the struggle. In spite of the humanitarian willingness to work with disadvantaged children in less than optimal situations, educators busily should be preparing the graphs and charts and control groups which will demonstrate the direction that compensatory development should take.

Whether or not such a professional demonstration would have much effect on the variety of school board which actively resists integration is problematic. Perhaps compensatory effectiveness through integration must ultimately be nurtured by federal or state legislation, or by the offering of tempting federal grants (although experience with Title I breeds cynicism even here). What is at issue, though, is the stance that the sensitive educator should take — even in the midst of defeats. The Commission's report is correct in its claim that educators have no business improving elements in disadvantaged segregated schools, unless they are also making patently clear that the effort is less than optimal. Compensatory education in segregated schools should not be represented as a program in order to lead ultimately to integration (that is a form of the old, and hopefully discarded gradualist game). It ought to be represented as a remedial program, which unfortunately cannot provide a key element: an inter-racial, highly motivated peer group with expectations of final economic success.

For larger, regional compensatory projects, *Racial Isolation in the Public Schools* suggests that sustained attention should be given to the encouragement of integration as well as more traditional forms of compensatory education. If regional projects choose to work actively within segregated situations, the decision should represent a deliberative conclusion, because the demonstration-effect should optimally derive from integrated models. If segregation is accepted as a political reality, the regional proj-
ect should at least apply itself to the collection of local data, and should attempt to establish comparison demonstration groups within integrated situations.

**SOCIOPOLITICAL RELATIONS IN INTERCULTURAL CONTACT**

Lawrence Goodwyn

At the outset, may I alert you: the form of this presentation violates established procedures. The bulk of this paper consists not of a formal presentation of facts or ideas, but rather of a long and sometimes impressionistic short story. By way of explanation, and apology, may I say that whatever educational insights may be revealed by inspecting an intense inter-racial relationship, these insights are elusive and rather difficult to translate into terms having clear meaning. The separation of the Negro and white races in America has been a long one, and the psychological costs to both have been high. None of us has been exempted. Intercultural education — one of the principal instruments of purification — is in itself impure, not only in method but in the day to day conduct of the students and teachers involved. The forms of these impurities — which perhaps can be characterized as the sum of all the individual racist tendencies we carry in our respective personalities — are substantially unknown to us. So, I have elected to tell a story that focuses on these tendencies as they appear in two imaginary Texans, one white and one black, in the hope that such a story is not irrelevant to the educational challenge the Southwest Educational Development Laboratory ultimately will have to confront.

Two words are my salutation. Just as Franklin Roosevelt used to say two words of salutation, "my friends" and Harry Truman used to say "fellow Americans" so I have a salutation: Fellow Racists.

At the outset, I would like you to participate with me in an experiment. I'd like to ask you your opinion of the way the United States Congress has responded in two celebrated disciplinary cases: the way the House of Representatives handled Adam Clayton Powell and the way the United States Senate is handling the case
against Senator Thomas Dodd. I ask you to go over in your mind what you would say about these two cases. To help you in your effort, let me suggest that you look at the person on your immediate right and imagine you were responding to him... imagine you were giving him your opinion. All right, have you got something formulated, at least a general outline or an instant reaction? Then, I ask you now to do one more thing — to pick out any other person in this room who is of a different color — just one person. Now, imagine you were responding on the matter of these two Congressional disciplinary cases to this second person. Now then, is your response exactly the same? Or have you now decided to add a little explanatory preface... or perhaps alter the order of your emphasis?

If you can honestly say you would say exactly the same thing, with precisely the same emphasis, it means, among other things, that you have so conducted yourself that you have complete confidence that both your white acquaintance and your Negro acquaintance will take your meaning in the same way — that is to say, the way you intend it to be taken.

If you can say this, you are, in my opinion, a truly remarkable person. I will say, in my opinion, that you are unprecedented in the field of "intercultural" relations. You are a world-beater.

I would also advise you to go to the bar and have a drink, or do something else constructive, because you are manifestly wasting your time here — there is nothing I can say to you as you are way ahead of me.

Let's dechlorinate the topic. It's too general, too distant — it smells sweetly academic. Let's take the chlorophyll out. Instead of "Socio-Political Relations in Intercultural Contact," let the topic read: "Tribal Wars Among People Who Express Themselves Politically." Let a sub-title be added: "The Uncovering and Articulation of Pain, My Own and the Other Fellow's." Why pain? Is pain related to politics, and politics to education, and education to pain? Yes. At the center of the idea of learning is the possibility of meditation, of reflection, of a tranquil environment where a dialogue can take place between teacher and pupil. At the opposite end of the spectrum is pain, a place where frustration, rage, sometimes inarticulate rage, make the learning process all but impossible. To surrender to pain is to lose one's hu-
manity. To conquer pain — by admitting it, dredging it up, looking at it, (however fearfully, but looking at it), is to know the full measure of one's humanity.

There is a folk belief loose in the world that to know a person better is to understand him better. I would think this is true only on the condition that the parties involved share enough attitudes and experiences to approach one another on a relatively open-and-above-board basis. If this condition is not present, to know a person better is quite likely to result in your getting angry with him, or at least, not liking or being uncomfortable around him.

I know a number of people, who think they know a great deal about people of the "other" race, who are kidding themselves, massively. I specifically wish to deal our Negro colleagues in on this piece of pain, too. The lack of knowledge is by no means a one-way street.

The simple fact is — and the evidence is extraordinarily abundant — that precious few Americans — North or South, Negro or white — have a genuinely viable, continuing relationship, on an honest and in-depth basis, with a single person of the opposite race. If two people have their defenses up when they relate to each other, not very much that is intellectually or emotionally meaningful is going to take place between them. It is in the nature of the American experience over 400 years of "intercultural" contact on this continent that, today, as people emerge into the early dawn of a new era, their defenses are still up. They are up by virtue of habit, if nothing else. They are also up for a number of other reasons, too — so that the other fellow can't get through to hurt you, intentionally or unintentionally ... because sometimes it is simply intelligent to have them up, in the light of past experience ... and because people are naturally a bit reluctant and fearful — timid, if you will — in unknown situations.

Let's look at the problem of establishing a viable human relationship as it really exists. Most white Americans know Negroes as employees ... as domestic servants, as the guy you go down to the employment commission to get when you want some yard work done, as the guy who delivers your car. It is massive illusion to think one is going to establish a truly honest and viable relationship with people one meets under such conditions. I don't
think anyone in this room nurses such pathetic illusions, but many white Americans do — probably a clear majority of the residents of this state do. But it is manifestly impossible. Negroes in such circumstances have their defenses up — way up. They are being underpaid for the hard work they are doing — they know they are being underpaid, they resent it mightily, and they resent the man most immediately responsible for their present bitterness, that is, the man whose rocks they are hauling around or whose ditch they are digging. They will play a role with this man and the alternatives for role-playing are many. They are not endless, be it stated — the relationship is still that of employer-with-the-police-on-his-side to the employee-with-nobody-but-himself — so the options open to the Negro employee are not endless. But generations of repression have bred a subtle skill at one-upmanship that has, in our time, become a highly developed talent — almost an art form. In consequence, though both parties may be functioning on something approaching the same intellectual level, their intelligences are not engaged, they are divergent. They are not communicating — at least one half of the twosome isn’t — he is fencing. Well, enough of this. Suffice it to say that the suburban kitchen, or the suburban garden, is not the happy place of genial conviviality for “intercultural relations” that white folklore would have it.

What else is open? Well, you might meet someone professionally. In the field of education, let us say. Here, relative equals are presumably meeting one another. But are they relatively equal? Each trails behind him heavy institutional baggage. If I am a Negro school principal and you are a white school board member with control of my purse strings, I believe I’ll forego the opportunity at honest intercultural relations in order to insure my future by a little judicious role-playing. I will be dignified (I am a prideful man) but I’m going to keep my head ducked. I will be as candid as the climate and the circumstances allow. In a totally free climate, I will be totally free. But, speaking as a Negro school principal, I must say that I have not yet encountered that totally free climate. I am looking; I am hopeful; but I have not yet found it. I have learned many things en route to my position as school principal, and one of them is to keep my hole card covered. And right now I am more interested in getting money for the science lab, or for some decent library books, than
I am in risking my neck on the altar of your sincerity. I can count books; sincerity is a bit harder to measure.

Let’s nudge a little closer. Instead of the relationship of school board member to school principal, let’s substitute a staff member to staff member relationship. Two men, one Negro, one white, both making $12,500 a year in identical jobs, either teaching or in administration. Their desks are side by side. They eat in the same cafeteria, perhaps even (though this is less probable) they drive home in the same car pool. Could they come to know each other in a truly intimate and human way? I think the answer is no; the chances are extremely remote in the middle of the 1960s. I think this will change — and perhaps relatively soon, as historical time is measured. But for reasons that I want to discuss now — in the context of socio-political relationships — I think the chances are negligible.

Each of these various hypothetical examples of inter-racial contact collapses, in the final analysis, because the underlying power relationships in which the two would-be friends must live is an unbalanced relationship. The power, whether he acknowledges it or not, whether he wants it or not, is on the side of the white person. To take our two identical staff members in the last example, they may sit side by side, but up front in the private office is the staff director, and that gentleman is white. The rules he is hired to administer are a carry-over from other days; they reflect old attitudes, either aggressively or passively, depending on the climate in which those rules were promulgated. Our Negro staff member (if he is presumed to be trying to act like a free man), must, to be honest with himself, lobby to get those rules liberalized. He will lose respect for his white colleague if the latter doesn’t support him in this endeavor. Let’s assume the white fellow decides to ride this particular Tiger. Let’s say the two men meet over a beer at the end of the day to plot strategy on just how they’ll make their next move against old fuzz-budget up there who is dangling all these rules. Imagine them, sitting there in that corner booth. Look at them for a moment. Let the tableau come into focus. They’re in a little bar — a long way off the beaten path that fuzz-budget travels on his way home. They’re having their beer, back there in the corner booth where they won’t be overheard if their conversation becomes animated. Just two old Texas boys talking over office politics, good old Sam White
who went to Austin High School and the University of Texas, masters at Texas, and Ph.D. at Columbia; and good old Henry Green who went to Phyliss Wheatley High School, and Texas Southern, masters at Texas Southern, and Ph.D. at Howard — or maybe, if he is young enough, Ph.D. at Texas.

Sam White and Henry Green, two “good ole boys” as we say in Texas, plotting against old fuzz-budget, who used to be a “good old boy” but who is now a high-ranking bureaucrat who has been kicked out of the good ole boy union. Old fuzz-budget doesn't get any hearty backslaps when he comes around Sam or Henry; since fuzz-budget got his promotion, both Sam and Henry play roles in his presence now. They may be rebels, but they're not damn fools. They nod and look intellectual, when he makes pronouncements; they offer a few cautious opinions, after checking the way the policy wind is blowing. They play the game.

But look at them, now, in that booth. They’re not playing any roles now. Look again. By God, they are playing roles! Sam White is shaking his head, while Henry talks earnestly. We slip into the next booth — they don’t notice — continue talking animatedly. We overhear. Sam is saying: “Henry, it won't wash, it's too much. Too soon. Why old fuzz-budget would have a heart attack if you laid all six of those proposals on his desk at the same time.” Henry interrupts: “Good, let him croak, fuzz-budget no. 2 is less of a fuzz-budget.” Sam again: “No, no, think a minute. We've got to prepare a little groundwork, bring the climate around to a favorable position.” Henry back to the attack: “Sam, you sound like some kind of moth-eaten gradualist. Man, we're talking about the way people live — a whole generation of kids going down the drain and you sit there talking about climate. Man, look around, the climate is awful. What I'm talking about is changing the climate. And fuzz-budget calls himself a liberal. God, save the black man from his liberal friends.” Henry drains his glass; the gesture is not done with flourish; it speaks contempt and dismissal.

Let's leave Sam and Henry there, still in “intercultural contact.” Sam's got his hand on Henry's arm, has pushed him back in his seat — has ordered two more steins of beer to be certain he's got another 15 minutes for rebuttal.

We know as we leave the friendly tavern that Sam has sev-
may be quite good husbands and quite good teachers or quite creative administrators — but I don't have too much hope for them as pioneers in the field of intercultural contact, for we could tell as we left them there in that booth that neither one really had any real insight into the agony, or the motivation, of the other; or if they did, they weren't saying anything about it, which is just as conclusive that nothing humanly meaningful is going on. Now, let's take Sam and Henry and place them in another setting. They no longer have those identical jobs. Let's take them out of that highly unusual and highly specialized situation and put them in something that is more likely, statistically. Henry Green is a waiter. He has 3½ years of college, but he is a waiter. That is statistically much more the fact than Henry as the $12,500 education executive. What with one little hustle and another, Henry makes $120 a week. He lives in a small, old house for which he pays too much rent; the living room is short on rugs, but long on records; there is a stereo, in the corner. Henry reads a lot; there are books around. Henry is this kind of a fellow; he could buy a rug, but such an action for him would constitute spending money to impress other people; Henry spends his money on books, scotch whiskey and records. Henry is trying to find out who Henry is. He is very lonely. He is quite cool toward almost all Negroes who are active in politics in his home town; it is a dislike tinged with understanding; Henry knows how power works, and he knows what Negro politicians have to put up with, he understands all right, but Henry is not making excuses for folks right now. In any case, he thinks the Negro politicians have been in the trenches too long — and during a long, bad era when the price of front-line duty was a high incidence of combat fatigue. He thinks the Negro politicians of his home town have been brain-washed — not only by The Man, but by themselves — that out of their many failures to achieve meaningful change, out of their general despair, they have seized on false hopes to shore up their own morale. They are ruined men, Henry thinks. He does not have contempt for them; he merely thinks they are dead. He calls them “our walking wounded.” But he has to watch them, because they are out to get him.

Henry is a threat to them because Henry is in politics, too. Once, a few years back, some white fellows began making political speeches that caught Henry's attention. It wasn't so much what he said — though that was part of it — but the fact of the matter
eral options. He can bounce off Henry’s last crack about “God save the black man from his liberal friends.” He can affect an injured countenance, tinged with righteous indignation, and say: “Henry, quit calling names, I’m not that kind of person and you know it.” This might have worked back in 1962, but a lot of intercultural contact has gone over the dam since then, and Henry probably won’t stand for it. If he does stand for it, Henry and Sam haven’t got much going for them — because in their own complicated way, they are still fencing, still playing roles. They haven’t — in short — inflicted enough pain on each other to have peeled off all the defensive layers that loom between them. Only when they have peeled and peeled, each layer coming off with great personal pain, pain to both parties, will they finally appear before one another completely stripped — that is, completely human, without labels. Henry, the militant Negro advocate, will have been peeled away to what he is — just Henry, an articulate man, trying to express himself coherently and yet be faithful in his own right to the authentic rage he feels; and Sam, the earnest young humanist will be peeled too, down to what he is — just Sam, a fellow who wants to do the right thing, who is appalled by the discovery of the personal sacrifices the right thing will impell himself, his wife, and his children to go through; a man who will consider making those sacrifices, and might, but probably won’t; a man who, even if he doesn’t do the “right thing,” will try to hold on to Henry (who by that time will have become symbol of Sam’s vanished self-respect).

Sam and Henry have a rocky future; it is not in the nature of Man to substitute another for his departed self-esteem; out of his own interior needs, Sam may well turn on Henry, in order to free himself of the psychological burden that Henry has come to represent. Henry, out of his rage at fuzz-budget, or his despair at the activities of the whole staff, might denounce Sam (after all, Sam is the only one he can really get close enough to to denounce). Or, Henry might try some other escape routes: he might have a wild affair, complicating only temporarily we hope, his marriage; or he might drown himself in professionalism, try to get some power through orderly promotion so he can make some changes himself later on; he may do that, though it is in the nature of such rationalizations that the possibilities of subsequent changes have been compromised enroute to the authoritative position that makes such changes possible. Sam and Henry
was he really didn't say anything that was too different. It was
the way he came on. For one thing, he was a great con man;
he hustled Negro votes with the same open-handed, back-slapping
glee that he hustled white votes. Henry kept his hole card cov-
ered, he kept his mouth shut and kept looking, but he gave the
politician a couple of points just on the grounds that his equal
hustle was a step in the right direction. At least it beat the old
dark-of-the-night-meeting in some back room, which event had
been standing political procedure around townever since black
people got the vote. Well, as I say, this politician hit town one
day and scheduled a noon luncheon with Negro leaders. Henry
was a recognized leader — (though, he himself knew he didn't
have any followers to lead, he knew that all one had to do to be
a Negro leader was to attend certain functions, make pronounce-
ments, get your name on a mailout during political season, make
your own mailout if you couldn't get on the standard one; Henry
had played the game, he paid his dues, he accepted the label of
leader, it didn't hurt and it might help later) and he went to
hear the "hustling White Man." Three things struck him about
The Hustler. First, the meeting was held in a nice white restau-
rant. A bit discreet, not on the mainstem, and in a private dining
room — but definitely not secret. The Fat cats saw The Hustler
go in and they saw all those black boys go in right behind him.
Henry watched The Hustler closely, to see how nervous he was.
He wasn't nervous; he was shaking hands. Pretty soon he'd
shaken all the hands but two, so Henry crossed the room, timing
his arrival so The Hustler would be through with the last or t
when Henry got there. The Hustler took his hand and looked at
him real hard (Henry could count on the fingers of one hand
the number of white people who had given him a frank, searching
look in his lifetime; all of them were policemen). The Hustler
did more than look, he repeated Henry's name, as if filing it
away in some cabinet of his mind. And he said: "I'd appreciate
your comments to me, either privately or publicly, about my
speech today."

In the speech, The Hustler said a few good things, said
them a little better than he'd said them in the pa-
pers. Henry discounted them totally. Henry's first rule
of politics was: closed door promises to black men don't mean
anything. If they don't say it out loud where all the whites

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could hear, they don't mean to follow through (why pay off on a burden you ain't carrying?) But right at the end, The Hustler shocked Henry. First he said he was broke. Then he said he had a telecast that night on the local station, and it cost $268.40. Then he said the Democratic Women's Club had promised him $50.00 but he wasn't going to let them off that cheap — when he got over there, he was going to shake them down for $100. He named a couple of other meetings he had that afternoon where he planned to put the arm on folks. Then he said the shocking thing. The Hustler said, "Fellow Texans, that leaves me $75.00 short. Gentlemen, this is no free lunch; this is a $75 lunch, plus the cost of the lunch which is $60.00 more. $135.00, Yankee money. Your money." He said a lot of other things, mostly promotional, but Henry had quit listening. He was figuring up what he'd spring for. He finally sprang for $10.00. The Hustler raised his eyebrows when he saw the number on the corner of the bill, and to tell the truth, Henry was a little surprised at himself. He had settled on $5.00 and at the last minute, on an impulse, he substituted the $10. In his mind, Henry spoke to the Hustler. "You've done four things I like. Number one, you haven't hidden me in some fish and chips place; number two, you looked at me; number three, you're trying to remember my name; number four, you're not doing the Kentucky Colonel bit, taking care of your darkies. Instead, you want our bread. Now, that ain't very much — in some ways, it sure isn't worth $10.00, but it's a start. You got a long way to go — you hustle people too hard — but maybe you'll learn. But next year, you got to do a hell of a lot better to get even $5.00." But Henry didn't say these things. He only thought them. It was too early to say what you thought out loud.

All he said out loud was: "Where's your headquarters, I'm gonna volunteer myself."

And that is how Henry met Sam White. Sam was one of a bunch of new young people that seemed to materialize out of nowhere to join The Hustler's campaign. The love affair of Sam and Henry was a slow thing. False starts. Awkward moments. But Sam listened . . . and when he disagreed, he said so. Sam was the first white man who had ever told Henry one of Henry's ideas stunk to high heaven. And then proved it. Henry abandoned the idea. Henry was the first man who ever told Sam he was a racist. After a long and heated argument, Sam surrendered. By
the time it was over, they had consumed a large amount of Schlitz beer and it was four o'clock in the morning in Sam's kitchen. The last thing that Sam said as Henry stumbled out the door was, "thank you, but no thanks. It cost me eleven cans of beer and all I got was a chewing out."

I can't remember what job Sam had. It was a pretty good one — he was solid middle class — seems to me he was a college professor, with tenure, or maybe a lawyer with some kind of plaintiff's practice . . . in any case, something out of the mainstream of the business world. He was a kind of semi-free man, you know what I mean. Nobody could get him in their gunsights with economic pressure. Only his ambition to get promoted, or make more money, could keep him reined in. But he was fairly free.

Henry thought to himself: This cat may go for a good long ride. I'm fixing to put him to the test. The testing went on for four or five years. It was, it developed, a two-way test. Sam was mean and arrogant and the more Henry pointed out how Sam thought like a racist, the meaner and more arrogant Sam got, in self-defense in the beginning, but actually, there was more to it than that. There were a number of things about Henry that Sam didn't like. In the first place, he flew off the handle too much. Sam learned how to ridicule him, turn Henry's far-out statements against him, tie him in knots. One night he told Henry: "Buddy, the way you talk, you didn't learn too much in that lousy college you went to." Henry nodded: "Why do you think I spend so much money on books? Think I like listening to your white ideas? When I ought to be coming up with my own?"

If this was a back-handed compliment (and it was) it did not give Sam much pleasure.

He said, wearily: "Brother, you come up with enough ideas of your own to keep my tongue hanging out."

And it was true. Henry's pain was such that it concentrated his mind wonderfully. He thought . . . and he studied . . . he studied how power worked in the white community. He saw the splits that were possible among the downtown businessmen and the real estate developers; he saw the splits possible in the labor movement, between the industrial union at the factory and the building trades; he saw the generational tensions among the
liberals... the old liberals and the young liberals (Huh! thought Henry, man they are all old. Even Sam). Henry studied... and he thought he was a little daylight in all these splits and potential splits. He came up with ideas. He talked them over with Sam. Sam told him why the first one wouldn't work. Henry wasn't so sure, but he let it pass. He came up with another one. Sam again said it wouldn't wash—pretty convincing this time... But that first idea... Henry thought about it and found a way to handle the problem Sam had raised.

Henry didn't go back to Sam with his revised idea. Sam was getting a little long on talk and a little short on performance. Henry was a results player.

And so it was that three mornings later—it was the day of the filing deadline in city council races, Sam White leisurely opened his morning paper... and almost fainted. There was Henry's picture on the front page. He had filed for Mayor.

Approximately thirty seconds later, Sam had Henry on the phone. All of the sentences started with What or Why or When... and most of them contained a few expletives of one kind or another, and all of them contained a measure of the wonder that suffused Sam's voice. When Sam finally ran down, Henry laughed and said—"You must have slept late, I expected to have to listen to all this stuff an hour ago."

"But Mayor! Good lord! It's a wonder you didn't file for Governor."

Henry laughed again: "It's an off year, Sam, can't run for Governor except in even-numbered years."

Sam was not amused; "Henry, what are you doing, anyway? Will you tell me that? Just what are you trying to do except commit political suicide and maybe bring down a few other good folks with you."

A note of irritation crept into Henry's voice. "White boy... (and then, Henry softened) Sam... Sam, there are some things that have to work themselves out at their own pace. Like water going down a hill. And like a man deciding how he's gonna get free." And that ended that.

Well, all things considered, it was a very complicated campaign. Sam was in very bad graces among all his political friends.
There were all their friends on a political ticket challenging the incumbents and in the case of one incumbent so strong they couldn't even find anybody to run against, they find Henry in the race. Henry as a running mate! Sam's friends were mad all right. They knew Sam and Henry had sprung this one on them.

Sam had a fight with his friends. He told them: "I didn't put Henry Green in this race. You guys are so buried in that magnolia and mint julep syndrome that you can't conceive of a Negro deciding anything on his own. Henry Green is a free man; you might as well get used to it because he's gonna be around here a long time, doing one thing and another."

But, Sam told himself that they were right — in one sense. It was madness — what Henry was doing. So Sam didn't see Henry and he didn't see his friends. He went fishing three straight weekends; he took his wife shopping; he took his wife to drive-in theatres; he took his wife bowling, even! He tried to keep busy and not think. He was very angry, but he couldn't seem to get it in focus. He was mad at his friends, and at Henry, and at himself.

Three times over the next three weeks, Henry almost called Sam. Hating himself for his weakness, hating himself for the weight of all his needs, for the advice he needed, for the questions he couldn't answer, for the organizational talent that he, himself, simply didn't have, never would have. Saying all these things to himself, Henry would edge up the phone to call Sam. I'm not going to do it, he would say. And, he didn't.

Gradually, one by one, the old time politicos, the "walking wounded," came by to offer Henry some help. They had already given him their advice — which was that he was a fool, and overly ambitious for himself instead of for the people; they had given him an earful of that. Henry reasoned with some, argued with others, got mad at one or two, then he had shut up and listened patiently. Now they came to help him meet the Man in politics. They had a few ideas — some of them helpful — but most of them not; they really are dead, Henry decided. But he was wrong. Ten days before the election, they were all Henry had. Something else should be said about the "walking wounded." In helping Henry, they knew they were digging their own graves. They had played the game of "Negro leader" since long before

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Henry was born. They knew that if Henry carried the Negro boxes against the Mayor, from that day forward, he would not only be a leader, he would be one of the top leaders. He might even be, in whitey's eyes. "The Leader." But they helped. Some of them. About half of them didn't. And of this latter group, a rather imposing number actively signed on the Mayor's bandwagon. As I say, they had been playing the game since long before Henry was born.

Henry kept his head about these defections, injurious as they were. He wasn't really running for Mayor. He was running to get himself known in the Negro community. Next year, in the county elections, Henry was going to run for county commissioner. Precinct 4. Sixty percent of the registered voters of precinct four were Negro voters.

"That's how dead the old leaders were," said Henry to his wife. "It's been that way for four years now and not one of these niggers had the sense to see it. And Sam White's not so full of life either. He didn't think of it, either," Henry said.

The next morning, nine days before the election, Sam White knocked on Henry Green's door. The subtleties in the looks the two men gave each other, I won't even attempt to describe. I can't. I wasn't there. You see, I'm a friend of Sam White's and I was one of those who was mad at both Henry and Sam for messing up our ticket. But Henry's wife, some months later, told me about it.

The first thing Sam said was: "You're broke, right? Right. Okay, we're going to have a beer party. We'll call it Guzzle for Green. Or maybe, Howl for Henry. We'll provide the beer. I've got a friend I can shake down for three kegs. We'll invite everybody in sight. We'll make a flyer up for an invitation. Today, get your high school kids over here at 3 this afternoon. We'll have the invites ready then. Got to hurry, only nine days before the whistle blows. If we get 200 people, we ought to loot them out of about $500, maybe $600. Most of them are broke students, you know. But we'll really clip the professors." Sam didn't realize it, but he was coming on pretty strong, like a plantation owner, like whitey.

"Now, Henry!" he said, (Henry was apparently no longer listening). "Henry?" "I'm listening, massa," said Henry. With
an absolutely deadpan face, their eyes clashed. Sam went on, then, but his voice was somehow softer now. "Henry. I'll get my wife to round up a passel of women to make up a huge mailing list — they'll address them, bring them over here. Your kids can stuff them and mail them. OK? Two hundred at five cents a crack — that's $10.00."

"You're not going to get 200 people with 200 letters," said Henry.

"That's right. You're right. Let's see, I'll get another $10 from somewhere else and bring it by. You make up a list too. Let's shake down the Toms. They through chewing you out?"

"They're through," allowed Henry.

"OK. Next thing. With this $500, we can rent the Negro YMCA, get a sound-truck and another bunch of flyers and have a big mass meeting three nights from now. Got to mobilize the Negro community. Then, get in there; you hit them with a good speech, tell them we're trying to get on television next Friday, night before the election. Tell them we need $268.00. Shake the faithful down, Henry, for the money. If you can't get it, you ought not to be running for mayor." Sam was sounding like a drill sergeant again.

Henry said three things.

He said, "$268.00? That's what the old Hustler had to have — that day, way back when this all began."

He also said: "Spend $500 on a rally in order to raise $268.00? That's politics?"

Sam waved his arms in disgust. "No, Henry, we spend the money to mobilize the Negro community — then we get enough back to have the T.V. too."

Then Henry said his third thing: "Sam, we're not going on television. I'm going on television."

At the party several nights later, they raised $450.00 from the 100 or so guests. Sam made a speech a bit tense, idealistic, and boring. One of the older Negro leaders made a better one; in fact he had folks laughing and unbuttoning their wallets. They had the rally, too, and they had the telecast. Henry was
a little nervous on camera, but his sincerity came through. Sam thought it was pretty effective.

At the end, finances were not the crushing problem they had been. For one thing, the little flurry of activity Sam and Henry had stirred up caught the attention of some people—not many, but those who were interested enough to watch closely—and they began to come by Henry’s house, volunteering to stuff envelopes, leaving a little money behind when they left.

On election eve, right after the telecast, Henry and Sam and a bunch of people went over to Henry’s house. The disease had hit Henry. Sam had seen it hit many people. It’s a politician’s disease and it always strikes right about the same time, the night before election. The disease was this: Henry began to think he was going to win. He thought over all the good things they had done, the things that worked. The other things receded from his mind for the moment. He said, musingly: “Wouldn’t old Mayor be shocked if I beat him?” He said a number of other things—Sam could see the disease take hold, grab its victim, carry him away on its flight of fancy like a man whose high fever had borne him into strange and unknown clouds. Sam felt uneasy at Henry’s performance, so he went back into the kitchen. When he came back, Henry was still up there somewhere, and people were listening, some quietly, and others, catching the virus, beginning to soar a little bit, too.

Suddenly, Sam heard himself talking. He was surprised to hear his voice sounding so angry. Later, when he thought about it, he was even more surprised at the passion that had animated his words. He said, “Henry, you ran a good campaign; it’s done some good things here in town; it’s been good for you; and good for the ‘walking wounded’; good for me; and for the people in this room. But, Henry, you’re gonna get clobbered tomorrow. This town is 80 percent white, Henry. You are not their idol. The hearts of women do not flutter when you walk by. They don’t even see you, Henry, when you walk by. The people here in this room” (and here is where Sam’s voice really began to take on a cutting edge) “the people in this room don’t see you either, Henry. They are putting you on. They are listening to your crazy ramblings, and they are nodding. They are proving how enlightened and civilized they are by not arguing with you, Henry. They are treating you like a nigger. They are not here

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for you, they are here for themselves — so they will like themselves a little better in the morning. They are frauds, Henry, and you are participating in their fraud."

Sam heard the words cascading out and — the instant finally came — he realized he had said unforgivable things. He was, in fact, stunned that he had said them out loud, where they would have life. He finished his last sentence — the word “fraud” was still vibrating around the room — and he walked out the door, got in his car and drove home. He was in despair. About what? . . . his friends? Henry? the south? Himself? He didn’t know.

The next day, election day, Henry got 20,000 votes. The Mayor got 40,000. Henry carried one box near the University and ran very close in one or two other all white precincts. He swept the Negro precincts. The daily paper, which was not for Henry, analyzed the election and said Henry Green had run a strong race. “Waiter Surprises” the headline read.

All this was some years ago, when Henry and Sam were young and in the twenties. Now they are old and in their early thirties. They still see each other fairly frequently, once a week, or once every two weeks — fairly frequently as friendships go. They have been through a lot, separately, each in his own way, and they have been through a few things together, too. There is a lot of blood on the carpet, for a lot of pain has been dredged up, brought to the surface, inspected — sometimes fearfully inspected — and, by this process, assimilated. These things that have seen the light of day are no longer active ingredients — the virus of fear and agony has been taken from them — they are passive pains, now. The pain remains for Henry, of course. But it is no longer hidden behind a hundred rationalizations, a thousand neurotic thought processes, a dozen flights of fancy. He has fewer of all three. But he has other things, now, too. Henry doesn’t know it, yet, but he is tired.

He lost his job at the plush private club when he ran for Mayor. No need to go into the details. They are not unusual, but they are not pleasant either. He lost his job at the downtown hotel dining room the following year when he ran for county commissioner. That was a bad time for Henry — he lost by a thousand votes, and four thousand Negroes hadn’t voted. “We’re the most unorganized folks I know,” Sam and Henry agreed.
In the course of all this, Henry's public image got rather scarred up. There are not too many places left where he can expect to get a job, even as a waiter. He pretends he doesn't, but he worries about money, about his wife working, about his own incompetencies. He never thinks about it, and Sam doesn't either, but Henry is living. He is, if not a whole man, then as close to a whole man as most of us get in our allotted time on this earth. His worries are authentic worries; his hopes and aspirations are authentic, too. His failures and his triumphs are not illusionary; they are real. Sometimes, he is very tired of being black, of carrying that old monkey on his back every hour of every day. He is tired of people being white, too. At such times, he wonders if there is a place on earth where people are really breathing, *breathing*. He is frightened some time when he looks at his nine year old boy. How can he spare him all this pain? There is no way. But, Henry decides, he is a good boy.

Sam is tired too. He knows he is a very different man from the one who, some years back, sat down at a table at the Hustler's headquarters and met a tense, brooding black man named Henry Green. For a while, Henry was Sam's eyes — pointing out to Sam the things that Sam's eyes didn't see. Some of this concerned the havoc that 400 years of the caste system has wrought here in America. Henry made Sam see all the casualties, see how the “walking wounded” walked, and all the rest too tired to give battle. But, more painful than this for Sam, Henry made Sam see into himself. Henry stripped Sam of all of his righteousness, of all the built-in levers of paternalism that Sam didn't know, until then, had been governed his approach to matters of race. What Sam saw in himself was not pretty.

Sam is not faint of heart. While he was being peeled, layer by layer, he fought back. For every racist thought process Henry uncovered in Sam, Sam matched him with one found in Henry. They duelled, they wrestled, they peeled. Finally, after three or four years, they had said it all. There were very few institutional defenses left for either one — just two Southern boys grappling with the legacies of history.

The nature of their friendship is a difficult thing to describe from the outside. Either Henry or Sam would probably know how to explain it better than I can. But I watched them pretty closely — after all, they were interesting to watch — and I know that
there was a time when one of the dominant things in their relationship was fear.

I’m sure there was a time when Sam became afraid of Henry. Afraid of what Henry might uncover that Sam didn’t even know he had. And Henry, too, knew fear. Sam is smart, articulate; he could lay Henry bare. Henry had reason to be afraid.

What I couldn’t understand for a long time was how their relationship could stand such abrasions. Why one or the other one didn’t just say: “No more. It is too painful. It is not worth it.”

Then one time I was over at Sam’s house when Henry dropped by in a foul mood. He was very aggressive. He baited Sam. He kinda made me mad, but Sam didn’t seem to mind. He didn’t “handle” Henry, if you know what I mean; he just kept probing at him to find out what was really eating him. But Henry wouldn’t say, and finally he made another cutting remark — I forget what it was, but it sounded pretty raw at the time — and Sam suddenly flared up. He just exploded. The words came out in short sharp sentences, like bursts from a tommy gun. “I don’t have to listen to this! I’m a free man! Who do you think you are! I’m not married to you! I can pull out of this circus! Anytime! I’m a free man! Any time I want, I can just go ‘poof’ and be gone!”

And Henry, his voice grim as dull ebony, said: “That’s right, white boy, you can pull out anytime you want. That’s one option I haven’t got. You are sure right, man, you can just pull out. Yes, sir, you are a free man. And you’re a good man, too. Good!”

Henry was heading for the door then, and I have no idea what jumble of thoughts and emotions were going through Sam. He sat deep in his chair, dark and scowling. But just as Henry got to the door, Sam said in a low voice: “You are not a good man.”

And Henry stood there a second — it was just an instant — and then he said slowly, and not in an unfriendly way: “But I am a man, Sam. And I’m the only one you’ve got.” And the door closed and Henry was gone.

That was one-half of the story I got, as to why they stayed together. Several months later, I got the other half.
We were on a picnic in the park. The kids were flying kites and the wives were talking about school and Henry was frying the hamburgers on the outdoor grill, making jokes about being a house nigger and cooking for the white massas and, just to keep things in balance, telling horrifying stories about what headwaiters put in the soup of all customers they didn't like. Saying things like: "Man, I ain't never toted food in a place yet that was fit for a self-respecting black man to eat in. I've eaten in some good places, you know, on my end of town — but never toted food in any. Integration may give me ptoinaine. Oh, white massas, the land is bloody and full of guilt in the Southland."

Well, while Henry went back to the hamburgers, Sam and I looked at each other, and for a moment, our appetites faded perceptively.

In due course, we went on a talk about pro football and ways of ministers and a number of things. Had a good time.

At one point, Sam said with a sly smile: "If I was coaching a pro football team, I would NOT hire a Negro quarterback, either. Going to all those second-rate schools, and spitting in the citizen's soup. How you going to develop any perspective out of that background. Let 'em catch passes I say; let 'em run with the ball; but leave the signal calling to those of us who have a sense of proportion."

Well, after this thrust, Sam looked at Henry expectantly, waiting.

And Henry, eyes alive, said: "Yes, Sam. Yes, man. Tell it like it is. Maybe my boy can quarterback the Dallas Cowboys. But not old Henry. I can't even quarterback Henry."

And then, his voice really low and tense, Henry said: "Sam, you know, you're really not worth a damn as a man."

And Sam, very fast, said "I know, Henry; I know. But, I'm the only man you got." And they look at each other — just an instant — they looked and then Henry went back to frying hamburgers. But in that brief flicker . . . I know it was less than a full second — I had seen. I never felt so much like an outsider in my life. I don't really know what I was outside of, just that there was something there that I hadn't earned the right to fully comprehend.

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Maybe it was just their shared sense of survival. Or perhaps just their shared experiences, period. But I think it was more than this. I think they had done a pretty fair job of trying to free each other from the caste system. They had argued, they had said almost incredible things to each other, but neither one had — on any fundamental issue — apparently ever betrayed the other.

I have heard Sam defend Henry to Sam's white friends — to me, for example. And I have heard on the grapevine that Henry had once risked his whole reputation as militant by defending a white man — Sam — before a bunch of fire-breathing Negro students. I know that neither of these events helped the other guy. Sam doesn't have any political base in the Negro community and Henry sure doesn't in our group. So nobody was getting any help. In fact, the only result was that Sam and Henry were taking needless political risks, explaining the other to their friends. But then, they didn't do it for politics. They did it because of some interior need they each felt — and I'm not sure I know what that is.

But I do think I can make these generalizations. I think I had a chance in their unusual relationship — unusual for the South anyway — because they happened to come together as equals — they were both trying to help the Hustler win that election. In those early stages, when they began the first tentative efforts to communicate honestly — that is, when they first unintentionally began to insult one another slightly — they stayed together because each had his own motive — the advancement of a political idea. This got them over the first humps. Later on, as they began really to communicate, I think the experience itself took on a meaning to them. The words might have been rough — and the pain inflicted very real — but what they were really doing was enhancing each other — enlarging each other's horizons. They weren't imprisoned in some artificial caste system. They could become larger than it was. This is new in the South. It's new in America. And I think they knew it, and derived some kind of strength from this knowledge.

It was painful for Sam to learn — with certainty — that he thought in racist ways — but I think he eventually came to regard this as a small price to pay. He had lost his self-righteousness, but he had gained a new vision into the human condition.
It looked to me like he felt stronger as a person because of what he had learned from the agony Henry had put him through.

Sam is not very active in politics, now. At least that's what his friends think — that he has quit completely. But actually, I still see him with Henry, and they work together... and the things they do have a political purpose — at least they point toward an eventual political purpose. It's just that the old politics of Sam's friends no longer seem to mean much to him. I rather think Sam feels that there is not much difference between a white liberal and a white conservative, when it comes to the caste system. They both tend to have stumbling blocks about the matter — of course, they're different stumbling blocks. So, because Sam doesn't come to our political meetings any more — and it's a funny thing, but hardly any Negroes come either — anyway, I don't see Sam too much. But he seems to be in good shape.

And Henry, too, seemed somehow stronger. Yes, he was tired sometimes, but he no longer had this strange unfocused anger. He knew, now, that whitey put his pants on one leg at a time, just like he did. He knew whitey was ignorant, a worshipper of many, many false idols — just like black people were. Different forms of ignorance. Different kinds of idols. But the same fear of testing their own humanity was in members of both races. He knew white people were hung up, in all kinds of ways, including sexually, and he was able to admit to himself that Negroes were, too. He knew Negroes had the odds stacked against them (how well he knew) but he also knew that many wouldn't try, no matter what the odds. When all but the best had almost no chance, it was socially acceptable not to try.

Henry knew these folkways and their thought processes were a natural result of 400 years of racial emasculation. He blamed whitey. But the world didn't stop with this revelation. The shy didn't fall under the weight of this truth. Life went on. Henry knew, too, that part of the reason folks didn't try had nothing to do with the War. He knew it was just fear — simple human fear of failure. He learned this by watching Sam, who had his fears too, and who, under pressure, would show them. Henry's political stance now is the same as it has always been, like the other Henry in the Friendly Tavern, he doesn't want to analyze the existing climate, he wants to change it, before another generation of children go down the drain. But, Henry is more tolerant.
of the "walking wounded" now. A man focuses the scale of his alternatives in his youth. There weren't too many alternatives in the youths of the town. They found only a rather narrowly defined plot of ground to stand on. They're afraid to leave it, now — the price folks paid in their day for leaving it was sometimes the highest price a man could pay.

Henry knew, better than most, that the alternatives are not, yet, noticeably larger. A little more breathing room, but no breakthrough. Most people still didn't look at him, really look at him, when he talked. The country was littered with white people who thought they were for integration but whose day to day conduct reveals they are still in the grip of the caste system. Their eyes are still trained not to see. Their attitude on race has nothing to do with Negro rights. It has to do with preserving their own image of themselves as nice people.

Last night in bed, Henry's wife asked him: "What's with you and Sam?"

"What do you mean, what's with us, we ain't at each other if that's what you mean."

"No, no, Henry, I mean, well, do you like him?"

"Do I like him? No, not very much. He's too arrogant. He's funny, sometimes, but he comes on too strong."

Henry's wife, said, "But that's his personality. He's that way with everybody. He's an intense person."

"Yes, that's true. He's consistent. But you're trying to get me to say I like him. I don't, at least, not very much."

"Why do you see him, then?"

Henry thought about this a minute, then he said: Well, honey, Sam is not dead. He's not blind. He sees. And because he sees, he has a frame of reference in which to hear my words. I can reach him. My ideas are not just my own, locked in my mind. If they're good enough, they become Sam's too. You'd be surprised how many ideas of mine Sam's carrying around inside himself now."

"You think he knows it? Maybe, resents it?"
“Now, he don’t care whose ticket is on the idea. An idea has a life of its own.”

“Shoot,” said Henry’s wife, “when you say you like Sam because you can reach him, you’re just saying you like him because he gratifies your male ego. Shucks, honey, you don’t need Sam for that, you got me.”

“I know, honey. You, I don’t worry about. It’s all those other folks who make me nervous. They’re not seeing me yet and a pedestrian who can’t be seen is in danger of being run over.”

And so ends the imaginary saga of Sam and Henry. Why this fictional account? I have tried to suggest that the possibilities of honest inter-racial communications are, at this stage of our history, far narrower than is generally supposed in the absence of a conscious and self-willed candor. To a non-participant, such candor will at times appear to take unnecessarily brutal forms. An unfortunate, but relevant, fact. I ask you to agree that a flag of caution should be raised in the face of anyone’s presumptions as to how “well” he is doing in the field of “inter-cultural contact.” I doubt if two persons (whether teacher and pupil or, as in our story, two politicians) can engage in a meaningful interchange of ideas when one or both of them seriously misinterprets the shape of their relationship. As America undertakes as a matter of national policy the task of inter-racial education, we are all destined to indulge in such misinterpretations, but the scope of our illusions can perhaps be reduced if we are aware of the precise nature of our limitations. We have all lived under the caste system a long time.

I would suggest to you that Sam’s attempt to “know” Henry was seriously impeded by Sam’s own self-erected barrier of righteousness. Sam was an integrationist; he believed in what he was doing; it was almost impossible for him to grasp the fact that he behaved in racist ways. To believe sincerely in an abstraction such as brotherhood and to express that sincere belief in racist ways constituted a contradiction that, for a long time, Sam was unwilling to confront. But it is evident he couldn’t “know” Henry very well until he had confronted it. Henry, too, had to confront various legacies of the caste system: he was not as well-trained as Sam for an intellectual tug of war over their respective ideas; he knew he wasn’t; he knew it was not entirely his own fault; and he both resented this state of affairs and

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was defensive about it. Since these latter two responses tend to be contradictory, Henry, too, was somewhat dislocated in his approach to Sam.

Whether as writers, educators, or ordinary citizens participating in public affairs, our inter-racial relationships will be hazardous in the extreme. We need to believe otherwise, for the sake of our individual self-respect and, perhaps, for the sake of our moral; and this need will frequently induce us to accept appearances rather than realities. But I submit that we will remain artless amateurs in inter-cultural relations — and we will be failing our national educational goals — as long as we are unable to face unpleasant facts. We all know the educational assignment is a huge one; but most of us suspect the task is made larger because some other sector of the population is not as enlightened as we are. The unpleasant fact that confronted Sam and Henry — and which confronts us — is that our contest with racism begins with ourselves. You have demonstrated by the manner in which you have structured this conference that you are aware of the direction in which the problem lies. Encouraged by this, an outsider such as myself dares ask only one thing more: that, as you proceed along this path, you develop reassurance from your positive failures, candidly assessed, so that the penchant for self-deception that plagues us all may gradually lose influence in your professional endeavors. In so proceeding, you may well lead us all to a new plateau of common civility.
THE NEGRO FAMILY

John Orr and Lydia Pulsipher

Three years after its publication, Daniel Moynihan's report on the Negro family still stands as a watershed event. The so-called Moynihan controversy seems to have no end, and the issues that it raises are unimaginably extensive. In brief, Moynihan cautions against too facile an optimism in estimating what can be accomplished in civil rights. He believes that public officials have deceived themselves about the significance of civil rights legislation, and that even Negroes have been wrongly convinced that legislation can make a "very great difference" in their lives. The problem of Negro culture is far more pathological, Moynihan argues. At its heart is a deterioration of the Negro family. Although there are many elements to be dealt with (there is no "Negro problem"), at the center of the tangle is the weakness of the family structure. Any meaningful civil reform must take into account this pathology. To ignore it is to deal only superficially with extremely serious maladies.

Compensatory education, of course, is a kind of reform movement, initiated and administered by public officials. The shadow of Moynihan thus falls here, also. And the problems he raises should not be avoided. Can compensatory education be effective in any long term sense apart from a wider assault on family patterns in the Negro community? Can educators deal with a segment of the student's life, while the schools' contributions are counteracted elsewhere? More narrowly, can the schools (within their traditional roles) design programs that take into account the social context?

This essay does not intend to suggest answers but only to point out an extremely valuable source book concerning the Negro family. Jesse Bernard's Marriage and Family Among Negroes brings together classical works, and as such, describes more completely the situations to which Moynihan's more political tract points. The book deals only tangentially with the Negro and the schools, but it can contribute helpfully to any serious discussion about compensatory education that would take Negro family patterns into consideration.

In four heavily footnoted, well organized chapters, Bernard gives a statistical profile of the Negro family, placing it in his-

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There have been three discernable phases in the development of Negro marriage patterns. The first phase was carried out by predominantly rural southern freedmen and their children, who began the slow assimilation of the norm of the monogamic family characteristic of the white dominant culture. The second phase saw the development of Negro life in the urban setting with efforts to throw off the lingering plantation mentality of freedmen. The third phase, which Bernard calls the “self-emancipating generation,” is almost wholly urban and no longer primarily southern in origin. During this phase, 1940-60, the number of young Negro families headed by females (under age 45) increased 85.9%. This increase took place in the urban setting while in the rural setting the number of Negro female headed families declined. Although this increase in the number of female headed families since World War II can be partially explained by the high rate of nonwhite male unemployment in the urban setting, it is evident that the explanation is more complex, because the “number of separated women is many times the unemployed men they could be separated from.”

Bernard also observes a bifurcation in twentieth century Negro culture and has related this bifurcation to the development of distinctive Negro family patterns. Negro families may be divided into the “acculturated,” those who have assimilated the mores of white society (often to the point of over-devotion) and those who have only externally adapted to the demands of the dominant white society. It should be noted that this concept avoids the confusing mechanism of dividing Negro families along class lines.

Observers have long been confused by the fact that some Negro families of very low economic status demonstrate devotion to the family structure and accompanying mores of white society while other Negro families of great wealth exhibit a family structure and behavior which is comparable to that usually equated in white society with low economic status. Bernard explains that through history some Negro families (often descendants of pre-emancipator freedmen) have accepted the monogamic family structure and have struggled to copy what white society held up as the ideal for family life and behavior in general. These families, classified on pure social (not economic characteristics) are defined as acculturated, and they have historically been classified as upper class among Negroes themselves.
The other body of Negro families has only externally adapted to the dominant norm. For example, marriage is valued but infrequently practiced. For this group the ideal of monogamic marriage imposed too severe an imperative in view of the economic and social restrictions placed upon the emancipated Negro. The imperative enforced by the moralistic dominant society said in effect: “To be accepted, Negroes must conform to monogamic marriage. Conformity demands that sexual relations will not be entered into before marriage and marriage will not take place until the couple can support themselves and any children. Negroes will be allowed to occupy only certain low status, low paying, scarce jobs, so the chances that a couple will be able to support its family on a permanent basis is very small. Hence sexual relations among Negroes will be entered into by only limited numbers who conform to the above qualifications. Those who violate this code will be subject to disdain and exclusion.”

Conformity celibacy, or rejection were the only roads open to the Negro. Needless to say, many took the third road, attempting to ameliorate rejection by paying lip service to the monogamic ideal. They gave the appearance of having adapted to the mores of the majority while developing a family system consistent with their circumstances of economic uncertainty and low social station.

The fact that assimilated and externally adapted families may be found at all levels of economic well-being is explained in this way: the existence of institutionalized racial prejudice meant that the conforming family which obliged the white man by assimilating his set of mores did not receive any special recognition for this behavior. Conformity, or the lack of it, neither insured nor precluded economic success. The externally adapted came to value the conspicuous indications of prosperity. Prestige accrued to the one who appeared well off no matter what his method for achieving wealth. In time the norm of conspicuous consumption became so widespread that, as Bernard points out, even the Negro physician is revered more for his wealth than for his contribution to community health.

With the increase in employment opportunities for Negroes after World War II the number of Negro families with a middle class income increased. In white society the large middle class
absorbs and teaches to upwardly mobile white families the modes of middle class behavior and family life. However, the acculturated Negro middle class is very small and has been unable to exert any appreciable effect on the behavior of upwardly mobile and externally adapted Negro families. In addition, the acculturated middle class Negro has frequently viewed the "ill-behaved" new arrivals as threats to his own prestige.

This brief review will not develop a critique of Bernard's study, but two observations should not be neglected in any case: (1) The analysis of Negro family structure raises the problem of "models" within compensatory educational programs. Bernard suggests that education cannot be viewed in isolation from a student's participation in the wider Negro community. And this experience is one that often lacks models for imitation. In the matrifocal home, students will often fail to find a strong masculine image, one which is self-confident, and economically aspiring. The succession of male figures in the matrifocal, externally adapted home cannot encourage personal stability supportive of effective academic growth. Likewise, the acculturated Negro (who would prefer to live outside ghetto areas) is often preoccupied with guarding his children from what he regards as the destructive influence of the externally adapted. He builds islands in the ghetto. The very small acculturated population of the ghetto, already bearing great social burdens, thus cannot be expected to provide a sufficient social model within the segregated community. The student population in the ghetto school will usually reflect this absence of effective middle-class models, the problem of low motivation being the most obvious symptom. How motivation can be significantly heightened without an ample supply of motivated models in the peer group becomes a haunting question for the compensatory educator — a question that may point to the greatest burden of programs in segregated schools.

(2) Bernard points to a new phenomenon in the Negro community — a self-confident, activist, rights-oriented minority. As yet, it appears there has been little communication between this minority and the schools, and there has been little agreement as to whether and how this minority should be recognized. One of the major issues in developing compensatory curriculum is precisely this: as a public organization, how should the school relate to groups in the community that are attempting to represent the
well-being of citizens. Public institutions cannot formally ally themselves with private voluntary associations — a fact fundamental to democratic society — but the schools do need to tap the spirit of aspiration which the rights-oriented minority exhibits. The issue might well be one of the most important to be debated by compensatory educators.

SOCIAL DEVIANCE AND POLITICAL MARGINALITY:
TOWARD A REDefINITION OF THE RELATION BETWEEN SOCIOLOGY AND POLITICS

Irving Louis Horowitz and Martin Liebowitz

I

The study of social deviance within American sociology has traditionally been based on a welfare model relating delinquent behavior to the ameliorative potential of the instruments of social welfare. This model has sought to liberalize the agencies of law and order — the judiciary, police, and welfare agencies — by converting them from instruments of punitive action into instruments for corrective treatment. Illustrative of this is an interview schedule developed to ascertain the ideologies of community leaders concerning social problems. The interview presented them with only two possible ideological responses: a punitive ideology or a welfare ideology. From this underlying premise that there are only two possible responses to deviance stems the conventional tendency to evaluate the framework of deviant behavior in therapeutic rather than political terms.

The thrust of the welfare model, or at least of the human carriers of the model, has been manifestly liberal: to reduce the punitive treatment of deviants. The model has as its long-range goal the redefinition of the moral code in more humane terms. As its short-range goals, the model evaluates the superordinate role of the agencies that define deviance no less than the subordinate role of those defined as deviant. However, even at its best, the welfare model maintains a paternalistic and unequal relationship between the superordinate agencies and subordinate
deviants. Coser has recognized this problem in the welfare orientation to poverty. "In the very process of being helped and assisted, the poor are assigned to a special career that impairs their identity and becomes a stigma which marks their intercourse with others."  

Only in politics does American society afford the possibility of a relationship among equals, with the resolution of conflicts determined by the relative power of the groups involved, rather than by a priori considerations of inherited status. It is only in politics that deviants can attain the status of legitimate combatants in social conflict. However serviceable the welfare model has been in the past, however useful it has been resisting encroachments on the civil liberties of individuals charged with committing deviant acts, the social welfare model of deviance is no longer viable either on scientific or practical grounds. 

In the traditional welfare model, deviant behavior is treated as a social problem. This definition involves several important decisions about the nature of deviance. As Bernard has indicated, it involves the decision that deviance is a problem, which means that something should be done about it. "A basic decision is implicit in the very concept of social problems. The idea of a social problem does not arise until people feel that something should be done about human ills. The first question, then, about any specific situation — whether or not it is a social problem at all — is a problem of decision: Should we or should we not try to do something about the condition? If the answer is no, then there is, by definition, no social problem." 

Deviance is a public problem, according to this model. This means that public agencies should intervene to solve social problems. Further, deviance is treated as a social problem in contrast to a political issue, which means that decisions about solving the problems are relegated to an administrative policy arena rather than the political arena. More simply: deviance gets handled by experts instead of being argued about by masses. 

These decisions about the nature of deviance have only scant empirical justification. They do not derive from any intrinsic characteristics of deviance. Rather, they are value sentiments about the effects of deviance, and about how deviant behavior should be treated. Bernard has expressed this clearly. "Values
are inherent in the very concept of social problems. The conditions that are viewed as social problems are evaluated by the decision-maker as bad, as requiring change or reform. Something must be done about them. The reason for coming to the conclusion may be humanitarian, utilitarian, or functional. In any case, a system of values is always implicit, and usually quite explicit. In short, the value sentiments of the welfare model are derived from the liberal ethos which defined the American political system throughout the first half of the present century.

The decision to treat deviance as a social problem is itself a political decision. It represents the political ability of one group of decision-makers to impose its value sentiments upon decisions concerning deviance. The anomaly is that although the political decision has been to treat deviance as a non-political problem, deviance persists as a political problem. A comprehensive analysis of deviance must include political factors by determining which decision-makers define deviance as a social problem, and indicate why they consider deviance a problem. Lemert was almost alone among the sociologists of the past decade to contend that deviance does not pose an objectively serious problem. "In studying the problem-defining reactions of a community, it can be shown that public consciousness of 'problems' and aggregate moral reactions frequently center around forms of behavior which on closer analysis often prove to be of minor importance in the social system. Conversely, community members not infrequently ignore behavior which is a major disruptive influence on their lives. We are all too familiar with the way in which populations in various cities and states have been aroused to frenzied punitive action against sex offenders. Nevertheless, in these same areas the people as a whole often are indifferent toward crimes committed by businessmen or corporations — crimes which affect far more people and which may be far more serious over a period of time."

The decision about what constitutes a problem is not so simple as it appears. Becker, carrying forth the line of analysis presented by Lemert, has indicated that "it is harder in practice than it appears to be in theory to specify what is functional and what dysfunctional for a society or social group. The question of what the purpose or goal (function) of a group is, and, consequently, what things will help or hinder the achievement of that purpose, is very often a political question. Factions within the group dis-
agree and maneuver to have their own definition of the group's function accepted. The function of the group or organization, then, is decided in political conflict, not given in the nature of the organization. If this is true, then it is likewise true that the questions of what rules are to be enforced, what behavior regarded as deviant, and what people labeled as outsiders must also be regarded as political. In sum, the fundamentally political nature of these decisions is hidden beneath the non-political welfare model.

II

A study of deviance seeking to move beyond the traditional mold must recognize that the definition and treatment of a social problem is a political decision. The civic culture forms the context within which deviance occurs, and within which deviants live. More important, it prescribes both the conflicts that will occur between deviants and the non-deviant society, and the rules by which the conflicts will be resolved. Non-political analyses take the political climate as given, and ignore the constantly shifting political ethos which defines the study and treatment of deviant behavior. While non-political analysis focuses on the behavior of deviant individuals, political analysis would focus on how deviants are treated by the agencies of political control, and on the political processes which determine their treatments.

The operational fact about deviance is that it represents a conflict between at least two parties: superordinates who make and enforce rules and subordinates whose behavior violates those rules. Lemert has taken note of this conflict. "Their common concern is with social control and its consequences for deviance. This is a large turn away from older sociology which tended to rest heavily upon the idea that deviance leads to social control. I have come to believe that the reserve idea, i.e., social control leads to deviance, is equally tenable and the potentially richer premise for studying deviance in modern society." The conflict model of deviance implies that there are at least two alternative definitions of deviance as a social problem: deviant behavior itself, and the actions of rulemakers to prevent such behavior. The basic dynamics of this conflict occurs within the struggle of groups for legitimation, and constitutes an integral part of deviant behavior.
The potential use of a conflict model for the study of deviance has been ignored and a consensus welfare model has been employed because for the most part the decision-making involved in determining deviance has been one-sided. The superordinate parties who regulate deviances have acted to develop measures of control, but the subordinate parties, the deviants themselves, have not entered the political arena. This leads to a non-political treatment of deviance. As Becker duly records: "It is a situation in which, while conflict and tension exist in the hierarchy, the conflict has not become openly political. The conflicting segments or ranks are not organized for conflict; no one attempts to alter the shape of the hierarchy. While subordinates may complain about the treatment they receive from those above them, they do not propose to move from a position of inequality with them, or to reverse positions in the hierarchy. Thus, no one proposes that addicts should make and enforce laws for policemen, that patients should prescribe for doctors, or that adolescents should give orders to adults. We call this the apolitical case."8

In the past, although there has been some scattered opposition to asylums intellectually, there have been no political organizations of patients to eliminate or radically alter mental hospitals; of addicts to make drug use legal; or of criminals to abolish prisons. Synanon, a treatment center for drug addiction formed by addicts themselves, is one striking exception to this pattern (although it accepts the dominant society's definitions of mental health). Synanon is staffed completely by former addicts, with no professional therapists on the staff. It represents an insistence that deviants themselves are best able to define their own problems and to deal with those problems. Thus, Synanon challenges both the right and the competency of professional therapists to intervene in the lives of addicts. As Yablonsky indicates, this is a radical departure from the conventional welfare models. "Over the past fifty years, the treatment of social problems has been dropped into the professional lap and has been held onto tightly. The propaganda about the professional's exclusive right to treat social problems has reached its high mark. The professionals, the public, and even patients are firmly convinced that the only 'bona fide' treatments and 'cures' available come from 'legitimate professionals' with the right set of degrees."9

Even where deviant social movements like nudist colonies
have become powerful, they have avoided political participation as special interest groups. For instance, Synanon has acted politically only to preserve its right to exist autonomously, against zoning codes which would destroy it. However, the basis for such political organization now exists more widely, and such demands are increasingly being made. The politicalization of deviance is occurring — with the largest group of all, the homosexuals, pioneering the developing of organizational responses to harassment.

The political questions involved in a conflict model of deviance focus on the use of social control in society. What behavior is forbidden? How is this forbidden behavior controlled? What is the process by which it is both forbidden and controlled? At issue is a conflict between individual freedom and social restraint. Social disorder (anarchy) and authoritarian social control (leviathan) are the polar expressions involved in this conflict. The resolution of conflict represents a political decision about how much social disorder will be tolerated at the expense of how much social control. This choice is not confronted so long as deviance is relegated to the arena of administrative decision-making. For instance, public schools as they now exist are perceived as a repressive institution by many Negro youths, yet the political option of refusing to attend or of racially altering the schools does not exist. This problem is now being raised by Black Power advocates in the civil rights movements, who seek control by Negroes over the school systems in Negro ghettos.

Conventional wisdom about deviance is reinforced by a highly formalistic vision of the political system held by many social workers and sociological theorists. This view restricts politics to the formal juridical aspects of social life, such as the electoral process, and to the maintenance of a political party apparatus through procedural norms. In such a view, only behavior within the confines of the electoral process is defined as political in character.10

In its liberal form — the form most readily adopted by social pathologists — the majoritarian formulation of politics prevails. This is a framework limited to the political strategies available to majorities or to powerful minorities having access to elite groups.11 The strategies available to disenfranchised minorities are largely ignored and thus the politics of deviance also goes unexamined. The behavior of rule-makers and law enforcers is
treated as a policy decision rather than as a political phenomenon, while a needlessly severe distinction is made between law and politics. Analyses of political reality at the level of electoral results help foster this limited conception of politics. Consequently, the shared inheritance of sociology has placed the study of deviant behavior at one end of the spectrum and the study of political behavior at the other.

Conventional non-political responses on the part of sociology were possible largely because the political world itself has encouraged this kind of crisp differentiation between personal deviance and public dissent. Political deviance is a concept rarely invoked by politicians because the notion of politics itself implies the right of dissension. Lemert points out that this has not always been true for radical political deviants. There is a history of punitive response to political deviants in this country, involving repression of anarchists, communists, socialists, and labor organizers. This has spread at times to a persecution of liberal groups as well. What characterizes the “McCarthy Era” is not the hunt for radicals, but rather a broadening of the definition of radicals to include all sorts of mild dissenters. Only on rare occasions has political deviance been defined as a major social problem requiring severe repression. Thus, with the possible exception of anarchists, communists, and socialists (and sometimes even including these groups in the political spectrum normally defined as legitimate), there is no way of dealing with political life as a deviant area. The nature of American political pluralism itself promotes dissent, at least in the ideal version of the American political system. The onus of responsibility in the castigation of a political victim is upon the victimizer. Rights and guarantees are often marshaled on behalf of a widening of the political dialogue. Indeed, the definition of American democracy has often been in terms of minoritarian supports rather than majoritarian victories.

The area of deviance is not covered by the same set of norms governing minority political life. The source of responsibility for deviant behavior, whether it be drug addiction, homosexuality, alcoholism, or prostitution is not borne by the person making the charges but rather is absorbed by the victims of such charges. The widespread recognition of the juridical shakiness of the deviant’s position serves to privatize the deviant and embolden those who press for the legal prosecution of deviance. While the
right of dissent politically is guaranteed (within certain limits), the right to dissent socially is almost totally denied those without high social status.

One simple test might be the perceived reactions toward political radicalism in contrast to social deviance. If one is accused of being an anarchist there may actually accrue a certain "halo effect" to the person so charged. Perhaps a charge of naivete or ignorance might be made against the politically marginal man, but not a censorious response demanding non-political behavior.

In the area of deviance, if there is a self-proclamation of drug addiction or alcoholism, the demand for therapeutic or punitive action comes very quickly. If one admits to being a drug addict, there is an attempt to remove the curse from everyday life so that at least the visibility of deviance is diminished.

This removal of the visibility rather than the source of deviance is reinforced by the paternalistic response to deviance. There are conditions and circumstances in a society in which the handling of a personal deviant by a judge or policeman may be benign or benevolent. A caretaker attitude may prevail which will not be afforded to the political deviant. There are quite a number of situations where there will be far more punitive response to political deviance than to personal deviance. This is a paradigmatic way of saying that social deviance and political participation are differentially responded to, at times favoring the former and at other times the latter, but most often to the detriment of deviants and marginals alike.

The line between the personal or social deviant and the political or public participant in minoritarian politics has dwindled. It is rapidly becoming an obsolete standard of measurement. This compels a reconsideration of the nature of social scientific definitions and responses to the entire range of social phenomena — ranging from deviance to politics.

The area of Negro struggles is a particularly fertile source for reevaluation of the relationship between deviance and politics. In former years there was a relatively clear distinction between an act of vandalism for personal gain and an act of organization for political gain. When the political life of Negro Americans was circumscribed by the NAACP, it was clear what political life entailed — normative behavior within the formal civic culture.
Similarly, it was clear how an act of personal deviance would be defined — as falling outside the civic culture.

The rise of civil disobedience as a strategy of mass action blurred this distinction. Civil disobedience is an act of personal deviance to attain political ends. Regardless of the political goals involved, civil disobedience does involve the clear violation of law. The treatment of civil disobedience in the courts has been marked by ambiguity. It is difficult to predict which acts of civil disobedience will be treated as political acts involving freedom of expression, and which acts will be treated as simple non-political violations of laws. Many law-enforcement officials see no distinction between civil disobedience and crime. Indeed, statements by business leaders and jurists on rising crime rates and the emergence of race riots have become commonplace views.

In the race riots of the sixties: Philadelphia, Chicago, Rochester, and Los Angeles (in contrast to riots of earlier decades in Detroit, New York, and East St. Louis), there has been a breakdown of the distinction between political acts and personal deviance. How does one classify a Negro who beats up a white and steals his money, in the name of Black Power? What classificatory scheme can be invoked here? Is this a matter of deviant behavior or of political freedom? Obviously, the ambiguity is an overriding consideration, so much so as to demand some kind of reformulation of the definitional structure within which social science operates.

There is a further ambiguity about the current racial situation which has been clearly labeled as personal deviance in earlier periods. The rapidly rising crime rates in the major urban areas reflect an increasing incidence of crime among Negroes. It is of decreasing sociological importance whether such “crime” is perceived as an act of politics or of deviance. The consequences are the same in either case: the cities are becoming increasingly unsafe for whites, and white-owned businesses are suffering increasing losses. Is this a condition of political conflict or a matter of deviance? The question is existentially meaningless, since the consequences remain the same.

The largest Negro gang in Chicago, The Blackstone Rangers, is both a clear example of the breakdown in the distinction between crime and marginal politics and a model which the politics of marginality is likely to follow. The Blackstone Rangers have
refused to ally themselves with civil rights organizations or welfare groups, recognizing that their interests clash in many important respects with those of less marginal organized groups. Rather, they choose to act as an autonomous unit, emphasizing both their marginality and their unique identity. Their major political conflict is with the police who are their most immediate and visible political opponents.

The strategies employed in this political conflict indicate the form which the new politics is likely to take. The Blackstone Rangers entered into negotiations with the Chicago police, agreeing to turn in their weapons if charges for carrying weapons would be dropped against their leaders and a rival gang would be disarmed. Negotiation of this sort is a major strategy of international politics which has seldom been used to resolve conflicts involving marginal domestic groups. Such negotiations involve the recognition of marginal groups as representing legitimate political interests. So far, the art of negotiation has not been adequately developed for dealing with such situations, just as it has not been adequately developed for dealing with unconventional conflicts internationally.

The problem posed by marginal groups like the Blackstone Rangers is not viewed as a political problem to be solved by political strategies. In the absence of acceptable political solutions by negotiation, escalation is likely to occur. When police violated the negotiated settlement, the Blackstone Rangers planned to file suit in the Federal Courts to prohibit what they considered harassment against them by the police. This is a new kind of political act by such a deviant group against a legitimated agency like the police. If the courts cannot solve the conflict in an acceptable manner, and if the police continue a pattern of harassment, the conflict could escalate further, possibly to the stage of limited unconventional warfare. What is clear is the need to develop political means of resolving conflicts involving marginal groups which recognize marginals as legitimate political interest groups. In the absence of acceptable political solutions, it is possible that some form of domestic military solutions will be sought, just as the failure of political solutions internationally often leads to military solutions.

This trend toward marginal politics reflects a rejection of conventional political styles which have proven unsuited to the
needs of marginal groups. The political problem is that the powerless are afforded two choices for political action: they can use legitimate means, to which they do not have access, and they will surely lose in the political conflict; or they can use ineffective illegitimate means, to which they have access, but which bring no basic structural change. The legitimate means of political action are intended for majorities or substantial minorities; they are not meant for marginal minorities. What is required is the development of political means which are both accessible to the powerless and which are effective. In the development of these new political styles, the distinction between political and deviant acts will disappear. Race riots afford some interesting insight into possible directions that political change might take, because of their differences both from legitimate politics and social deviance.

Race riots now have an ideological core, while many other aspects of collective behavior do not. They are avowedly political; they are organized and purposive. Typically, theft, assault, and homicide have none of these attributes. This leads us to suspect that organized unconventional warfare is a more useful analogue of race riots than conventional crime. Once perceived in this way, racial riots constitute a powerful if latent political weapon.

At present, a relatively small police force is able to effectively control a large city. But this is true only so long as police are accorded legitimacy, and not when conflict is defined totally in terms of power. Thus, during race riots, when people shoot at police, police are unable to effectively maintain control. For this reason, race riots constitute a major departure from established patterns between police and deviants. As such, they indicate the possibility of new forms which conflict might take and the new forms required for explaining the relation of politics to deviance.

The normal pattern of conflict between police and deviants is marked by a general populace which accords police legitimacy and which defines rioters as deviants rather than political revolutionaries. There is no organization of deviants to battle police, and there is no ideology which labels police as enemies to be attacked and destroyed. Police have legitimacy so long as deviants define them as people to be avoided but not attacked. In the permanent conflict situation between police and deviants, the police are able to make an organized collective effort, while the deviants traditionally respond only as unorganized individuals. At present,
it is an organizationally one-sided war. The emergence of a bi-
lateral conflict situation is likely to be the major development in
the link between politics and deviance.

There are several alternative forms that such conflict can
take. These can be described in terms of the level of ideology,
condition of organization, and the strategies which the police,
the deviants, and the general populace use in coping with each
other. These different modes of conflict might be programmed
as follows: on a minimax scale there could be de-escalation to the
English system, in which both Negro militants (or deviants in
general) and police agencies would avoid carrying firearms, and
at the other end there could be escalation to race riots, which are
sporadic and constitute a relatively unorganized set of events.
Beyond sporadic racial strife lies the possibility of sustained con-
ventional war. This is most closely approximated in American
history by the Indian wars and the Civil War. Presently, the uses
of unconventional warfare are coming into focus. The latter two
possibilities illustrate how deviance could spill over into insurrec-
tionary politics, given the peculiar racial division which now exists
in American society and the consistent exclusion of marginal
groups from political and social legitimacy.

At a lower threshold of conflict there have been attempts by
deviants to gain the protection of politically instituted civil lib-
erties. For instance, Timothy Leary is trying to gain politically
guaranteed freedom by creating a religion in which using LSD
and other psychedelic drugs is perceived as a religious ritual.
The access and use of such drugs would then be guaranteed as a
religious freedom. Similarly, opponents of the war in Vietnam
use existing constitutional guarantees of religious freedom by be-
coming conscientious objectors.

If we start from the opposite pole — namely minoritarian
politics — we find a similar set of ambiguities plaguing those
in search of precise boundary lines. An example is the behavioral
pattern of the left wing. Among the radical youth of the thirties
certain characteristics clearly emerged: a relatively strait-laced
"Puritan" ethos concerning sexual mores; a clear priority of poli-
tics over personal life — what might be called the ascetic purifi-
cation of self — and a concern for a relatively well defined ideolo-
gy, combined with encouragement for all to participate in the life
of the working classes. The radical Left of an earlier generation
shared with the dominant cultural milieu a distinct, even an intense, disaffiliation from deviant patterns. Indeed, the Old Left pointed to social deviance as representative of the moral degeneration of bourgeois society. The need for social revolution came about precisely because the existing social order was considered incapable of controlling social deviance. Thus, the demands of the traditional Left were not very different from establishmentarian demands with respect to social deviance.

This contrasts markedly with the position of the New Left on these conventional indicators of deviance. First, they exhibit substantial positive affect toward an extreme and libertarian ethos replacing Puritanism. Second, there is an identification with deviant forms stemming from a continued identification with the “beatnik” of the fifties. Indeed, there has been a considerable absorption of the Beat Generation of the fifties into the Activist Generation of the sixties. The ideology of the New Left, insofar as it has clear guidelines, is based on freedom from repression. It has both political and social components: freedom for the Negro from the effects of racial discrimination; freedom for the student from the constraints of university regulations; freedom for the young generation from the demands of their elders; and freedom of politically powerless groups from the growing power of the centralized State. In this sense, Freud feeds into the ideology of the New Left at least as much as Marx defined the ideology of the Old Left.

The traditional notion of a noble affiliation of radical youth with the working class has already dissolved in favor of a highly positive response to deviant and marginal groups in American society. There is a relative unconcern for the traditional “noble” groups engaged in the struggle. If there is a hero, it is the alienated man who understands what is wrong and seeks escape. Often, the escape takes the form of social deviance, which is certainly no worse than the forms of behavior which are traditionally defined as normal. The traditional hero has been joined by the anti-hero who never wins and attains heroic proportions by not losing. This anti-hero is defined by what he is against as much as by what he is for; he is for a world of his own, free from outside constraints, in which he is free to experiment and experience.

What this means in practice is that the line between Left-wing political behavior and deviant behavior has now been largely obli-
terated. Nowhere has this been more obvious than in the student protest at Berkeley, where it is impossible to separate the deviant student subculture from the substantive demands of the student revolt. Spence accurately describes the importance of this student movement. "This was the first successful student strike at a major university in the United States. But more important, this was the first significant white-collar rebellion of our time. These sons and daughters of the middle class demonstrated and walked the picket lines, not behind the moral banner of the oppressed Negro, but on the basis of their own grievances against a system that had deprived them of their rights of responsibility and self-expression." The students at Berkeley will likely develop an increasing sense of marginality as Governor Reagan mobilizes political power against them.

At this stage, Berkeley is a model of marginal politics. Mario Savio's statement of the goals and strategies of the student protest could serve as a perfect statement of the political style of marginality. "There is a time when the operation of the machines becomes so odious, makes you so sick at heart that you can't take part; you can't even tacitly take part, and you've got to put your bodies upon the levers, upon all the apparatus, and you've got to make it stop. And you've got to indicate to the people who run it, to the people who own it, that unless you're free, the machine will be prevented from running at all." It is in this ability to disrupt that the political power of marginal groups lies. Further, the willingness to disrupt rather than accept conditions as they now exist reflects the influence of deviance on politics.

Among members of the New Left, deviance has become an important form of draft evasion. The number of people who adopt the traditional political path by simply refusing to serve and going to jail as political prisoners is small compared to the number who adopt the deviant path, using mental illness, homosexuality, or drug addiction (whether these be real or feigned) to avoid serving. In effect, they are taking advantage of the prevailing attitudes toward deviants. However, this path would not be accessible without the merger of Leftist politics and social deviance.

The most important social characteristic of the New Left is its self-definition as a "swinging" group, or conversely, not being "square." This new definition of Leftism is also a central definition of the deviant subculture. So it is that Berkeley and Watts...
became the symbols of the twin arms of radical politics: the university campus and the Negro ghetto. Even in terms of social psychological definitions of friends and foes the line between the political Left and social deviance is now largely transcended. Thus, there is a deep distrust of formal politics and of the people who operate within the bureaucratic channels of the political apparatus. This definition of friends and foes is obvious at Berkeley, where many students feel that they cannot trust anyone over thirty.

The Right-wing movement in America also underlines this perspective. The Old Right was characterized by extreme antipathy for any kind of promiscuous behavior or overtly immoral behavior. The American Right viewed with alarm attacks upon law-enforcement officials. The Old Right perceived itself conventionally as a paragon of law enforcement. This is the core around which the Right-wing has traditionally been established. But a phenomenon such as the Minutemen reveals a spinoff from law-abiding to direct action approaches to politics. The Minutemen, for example, are encouraged to acquire possession of fully automatic weapons, even though many such weapons are forbidden to individuals by law. They are urged to join the National Rifle Association to become eligible for rifles and handguns at cost as well as free ammunition. The Minutemen Handbook contains lessons on such subjects as "Booby Traps," "Anti-Vehicular Mines," and "Incendiary Weapons Composition." The self-made saboteur is encouraged to improvise lethal weapons. Espionage and infiltration of established political groupings are also encouraged. A sub-unit is called the Minutemen Intelligence Organization, in possession of a fairly sophisticated organization, not unlike those of paramilitary units.15

Breakaway segments of the New Right, like their opposite numbers in the New Left, are concerned with redefining the relationship of the person to the legal code in very loose terms. The appeals to youth are in terms of training in weaponry rather than in law. When confronted by the law, the Minutemen dissolved their public leadership and created a new underground leadership. This phenomenon could be an extreme situation in American life, precisely because so many armed forces veterans may be attracted to such a combination of politics and deviance. A situation is arising where the line between the deviant act of gun-toting in an undisciplined way for personal and political ends, such as main-
taining law and order, is largely dissolved. Political conflict may become marked by opposing marginal political groups confronting each other in armed conflict, with the legitimated State agencies of power the enemy of both.

It a phenomenon such as the Hell's Angels is examined — with the Swastika, German helmet, or Iron Cross as its main symbols — the psychological characteristics of the Hell's Angels (from a descriptive point of view) differs but slightly from the description of its Left counterpart in pseudo-Maoist organizations. Without wishing to equate Maoists with Minutemen and Angels, it is clear that each of these groups is marginal and deviant with respect to the established political norms.

A marginal style of politics is developing which is adopted by groups of all "extreme" ideological beliefs. Marginals of both Left and the Right fear the growing centralized power of the Federal Government. This is another way of saying that consciously marginal groups of all political beliefs are opposed to the consolidation of power by the majority, and fear the use of that power against them. It is significant that both the Students for a Democratic Society and Young Americans for Freeddom oppose the draft because it represents a violation of individual freedom by the centralized government. The high amount of interaction between the deviant groups (in places such as Berkeley or Greenwich Village) is another indication that there is an idea in common between Left and Right deviant forms of behavior. This may be seen as another expression of the changing political character of American life, and of its movement toward a more violent style.

The clearest example of this movement toward violence, and one easily overlooked, is the reappearance of assassination as a political style and the inability to know whether Left, Right, or Deviant is spearheading this style. It is almost impossible to say whether the assassination of John F. Kennedy or Malcolm X was a deviant act or a political act. The phenomenon of ambiguity is of overriding magnitude, and it cannot help but have a profound effect on the future course of American social life. In one sense, it does not matter who was responsible for the assassinations: in any case, the consequences would be the same. It could be any of the three groups, which is a far more significant fact than know-
ing which of the three groups was actually responsible. The point is that no group took responsibility for the assassinations as overt political acts, but remained satisfied with the deaths themselves without linking the assassinations to ideological demands. Without taking into account this breakdown of the distinction between politics and deviance, the meaningfulness of either sociology or political science is seriously compromised.

Applied social science must take account of the new view of marginality in American life. There is a different image now of what has been traditionally called the Lumpenproletariat, or the non-working class. If there is any group which has emerged as the human carrier of the new breakdowns between political and private deviance, it has been this Lumpenproletariat group. The main political appeals are no longer to the established working class, and certainly not to the established middle classes, but rather to this vast horde of Lumpenproletariat. Lang and Lang point out, in their discussion of collective dynamics, that this is precisely the condition under which collective deviance is likely to occur. “Ordinarily the cleavages within a society are between clearly constituted social strata or between parties whose special interests seek recognition within a broader framework of order. But when the cleavages occur between constituted authority and those who do not accept it, or between those who personify social values and those who feel unable to share in them, one can refer to the condition as one of widespread and general alienation.” The ease with which Americans employ the language of nineteenth century Europe — of alienation and estrangement — indicates that the cleavages which last are deeper or at least different from the customary differences between deviance and politics.

We are confronted by the problem of the marginally employed rather than the marginally unemployed. The army of people involved in low salaries comprises a considerable part of both the radical and deviant cultures. The world of marginal employees is at the center of these “two cultures.” If the bureaucracy is the class which grew, disproportionate to all other classes in Western Europe, it is the rise of the marginally employed disproportionately to all other sectors which characterizes contemporary United States. This group, rather than disappearing and dissolving, or becoming as Marx would have it, a sort of social scum to be wiped out by revolution, grows ever larger. At a practical level
what is involved is the perception of a new and powerful intermediary class, the marginally employed, or the *Lumpenproletariat*, who perform vital roles in connection with the new authoritarian political codes, as well as setting the style and pace for a new libertarian morality.

The boundaries of American politics have been defined by the growing affluence which most accurately characterizes American social structure. At the same time that general affluence prevails, there is a significant minority of disaffected marginals. It is becoming increasingly clear that these marginals threaten the generally prevailing affluence, and indeed threaten to disrupt the entire system. Increasing crime rates are merely the first indicator of this situation. Race riots are a more serious indicator of the instability of the system. Miller and Rein point out the problem posed by the exclusion of marginals from an increasingly affluent society. "The issue is whether advanced industrial societies and sustained economic growth lead to greater equity in the distribution of advantages and privilege, or, alternatively, whether economic maturity leads to concentration (or reconcentration) of privilege in the hands of an enlarged but still limited elite, resulting in the growth of an underclass... The direction that social policy should take depends largely on how this question is answered."17

The policy response to this dilemma has been the welfare State: an attempt to "cool out" the marginal underclass and minimize the potential danger it poses. It is an attempt to avoid the consequences of a larger marginal underclass without making any basic structural changes. As Schatzman and Strauss contend, this has become a style of dealing with the problem by avoiding its political implications. "America pours its wealth into vast numbers of opportunity programs to achieve its goals and names almost any conceivable group, event, or thing a social problem if it can be seen as threatening the achievement of these goals. Hence its concern for the culturally deprived, the under-achievers, the school dropouts, the job displaced, the aged, the ill, the retarded, and mentally disturbed. This concern goes beyond that of the nineteenth century humanitarians who involved themselves with the under-privileged outgroups on moral grounds. Now all these aggregates are seen as special groups whose conditions are intolerable to society, if not actually threatening, in light of today's social and
economic requirements. Other categories, such as those containing addicts and homosexuals, have their special advocates bidding to add them to the list of those who should be helped. The student protest movement will probably result in still more being added. In one sense, American pragmatism is in full bloom, having converted most personal-social events into 'problem-solving' or clinical situations.48

The attempt to depoliticize a highly political problem has proved inadequate. The welfare solution has been unable to erase the consequences of a growing number of disaffected people. There is bound to emerge a political attempt to resolve the conflict. If this attempt is not initiated from above within the legitimate political apparatus, it will generate from below and take illegitimate political forms.

Relationships between personal and political deviance cuts both ways. One can just as well find an elderly woman walking around in a bikini with a Goldwater button, as a young man advocating Communism and believing that Christ saves. This would indicate that the exact connection between personal and political deviance is a slender thread marked by deep confusion. What is clear is that there is a tendency toward political response no matter what side of the formalistic political spectrum the alienated or marginal person might fall on. This world of marginality — everything from the graduate student on a fellowship to a retired widow on an insurance policy — is becoming the human carrier of political and social change. And the making of change is the classical role of the personal deviant.

The overlap of deviance and marginality is well captured in a current book on the Hell's Angels. "The Angels have given up hope that the world is going to change for them. They assume, on good evidence, that the people who run the social machinery have little use for outlaw motorcyclists, and they are reconciled to being losers. But instead of losing quietly, one by one, they have banded together with a mindless kind of loyalty and moved outside the framework, for good or ill. They may not have an answer; but at least they are still on their feet ... It is safe to say that no Hell's Angel has ever heard of Joe Hill or would know a Wobbly from a bushmaster, but there is something very similar about their attitudes. The Industrial Workers of the World had serious blueprints for society, while the Hell's Angels mean only to defy the social
machinery. There is no talk among the Angels of building a better world, yet their reactions to the world they live in are rooted in the same kind of anarchic, paralegal sense of conviction that brought the armed wrath of the Establishment down on the Wobblies. There is the same kind of suicidal loyalty, the same kind of in-group rituals and nicknames, and above all, the same feeling of constant warfare with an unjust world.”

Some sociologists like Miller and Cloward have already taken note of the new situation which has arisen. Cloward’s work in organizing welfare recipients is a particularly striking effort. The idea of organizing recipients of welfare is certainly an outrageous idea from the classical Capitalist and Socialist doctrines alike. This is the first time that a sociologist has worked as an organizer of welfare recipients. This enlargement of roles indicates that changes are occurring in what constitutes political life and social work. There are several other important directions that sociologists might follow: drug addicts might be organized to alter laws concerning drug use and the institutional treatment addicts receive; students might be organized to change the character of schools; and mental patients might be organized to change the way they are treated. In each of these cases, change would be initiated from below by members of marginal subordinate groups. This is in sharp contrast to the conventional elitist pattern of politics from above, with major decisions made by members of the prevailing majority. This is the primary distinction between the existing politics and the style of politics that is emerging.

The implicit exchange system which formerly existed between the very poor and the very rich in American society was simply: “don’t bother us and we won’t bother you.” In change for the poor not bothering the rich, the wealthy provided just enough money for the poor to live at Ricardian subsistence levels. This system has formed the basis of social work in American life, and continues to define the boundaries of the welfare system. The rich have only vaguely appreciated the magnitude of the poor’s potential power, and of their ability to disrupt the entire system. For their part, the poor only vaguely appreciate the power at the disposal of the rich.

This interchange system is now being threatened. The poor are gradually developing a great appreciation of their own power, at the same time that they have a greater appreciation of the
power held by the rich. For their part, the rich are becoming more aware of the power available to the poor, as seen in the generalized fear created by rising crime rates and race riots.

For the social sciences there is clearly a drawing together of sociology and politics, or at least a new connection between social problems and political action. The old division between the two can no longer be sustained. Theoretically, the new conditions throw into doubt the entire history of political science as an examination of the electoral situation and of social problems as a response to personal welfare. If we amplify a view of politics to entail all acts which are forms of pressure on the established social order, to make changes at the behest of deviant as well as orthodox interest groups, and if we redefine sociology to include the pressure of the deviant to redesign the social system so that he can be accepted by the general society on his own terms, then we will see that there is a common fusion, a common drive, and a common necessity, not only at the level of facts, but at the level of scientific interpretation.

The primary political problem of deviance can be framed as a Hobbesian dilemma. Hobbes, in his concern with the problem of social disorder, in which individuals warred with each other in pursuit of their individual interests, arrived at the creation of the State as a solution for the problem of disorder. The dilemma is that the creation of the State presents a problem of social control. The solution to the problem of chaos or anarchy is the Leviathan. But the Leviathan is the totalitarian State. Indeed, the totalitarian State is the perfect solution to the problem of disorder. The price of this solution is the termination of meaningful change. "The dilemma for those who consider social problems obstacles to be overcome is that any true overcoming of social problems implies a perfect social system. And this entails several goals: first, the total institutionalization of all people. Second, the thoroughgoing equilibrium between the parts of a system with respect to their functioning and the functioning of other sectors. Third, the elimination of social change as either a fact or value. Thus, the resolution of social problems from the point of view of the social system would signify the totalitarian resolution of social life."21

An extreme example of totalitarian tendencies in solutions to deviance is the suggestion by Glover. "If sufficient trouble were
taken pathological cases liable to commit murder could be de-
tected during early childhood; in other words, pathological mur-
der is potentially preventable . . . . 22 Glover does not discuss the
costs that would be involved in the elimination of pathological
murder. The plan he suggests would create a severe restriction
of individual freedom and a sizable increase in the power of the
centralized State.

The political problem posed by deviance is how to avoid the
problem of social disorder while at the same time avoiding the
problem of totalitarian social control. It is a dilemma precisely
because it is impossible to completely avoid both problems. Politici-
cal decisions about deviance must reflect judgments about the
relative dangers of these two problems, and must constitute a
weighing process.

When there is a consensus about proper behavior, the freedom
of those who violate the norms of proper behavior is likely to be
violated. The same danger of social control exists in the restraint
of homosexuality, drug addiction, and crime as for the restraint
of minoritarian political views. The alliance of these two large-
scale social movements may thus be seen as natural and mutually
beneficial. Thus a reformation in the American political style may
be looked forward to.

The connections between deviance and politics herein discussed
take place only at the time when a society in general does not
satisfactorily manage its affairs. For better or worse, a well-
ordered society is one that can distinguish between the response
to deviance and the response to politics. We can find antecedents
for the linkage of the two in “conflict societies.” In the nineties
in Russia, the whole Narodnik movement and the whole movement
toward personal liberation were directly linked. In the Germany
of the twenties the whole “underground” movement, aptly summed
up by the Brecht theater, by Nihilism, and by amoralistic response,
gave rise to political action movements both in Nazi and Bolshevik
forms. The linkage between the Beat Generation and the Radical
Student movements of the present generation reveal this same
pattern of connecting urgings for political revolution with de-
mands for personal liberation.

Linkages between deviant behavior and political behavior as
a prelude to revolutionary action or radical change in the society
are expressed by the examples given above. If this analysis is correct, if the fusion of politics and deviance is the herald of revolution or at least bespeaks of a high degree of disassociation and disorganization within the society, then one can expect radical change in the structure of American social and political life.

It is now impossible to take the attitude that what goes on in the personal life has no major political ramifications. American life has been resilient enough to forestall a "crisis" in marginality until now, which is a testimonial to the flexibility of the American system of political legitimation. But it might well be that the extent of deviance in the past was not sufficient to cause more than a ripple in the political system. The new crossover is that point at which deviant behavior at a personal level is large enough to encourage distinct dislocation in normal political functions; and in turn, that point at which the political system cannot contain the deviant expression of discontent. When you have such a crossover, then you have social revolution.

A political description of this condition would begin with the inability of American society to resolve political problems that are important to marginal people. Almost one-third of the potential voting population does not vote, and is therefore without even the most minimal political representation. When this disenfranchisement is coupled with the fact that these same people have important problems which cannot be managed by the present political system, a volatile situation emerges. New modes of politics involved illegitimate modes of resolving conflict. Since the correlation of deviance and political non-participation is high, by extension, personal disorganization and political illegitimacy also can be correlated.

Political styles are evolving that are not labeled as political behavior at present, much as race riots are not now generally labeled as political behavior. These new styles are characterized first, by a rejection of the legitimacy of the existing political system (the challenge to the rules by which the game is now played); second, by a rejection of compromise as a political style; and third, by a willingness to oppose established authority with illicit power in order to change not merely the rules but the game itself. Ends will attain a primacy over means, whereas a concern with the legitimacy of means has traditionally characterized American politics. Direct expressions of power might assume a more
important role than legitimate authority in resolving important conflicts.

The meaning of political legitimacy is itself subject to change to meet the demands of a society in which social deviants and political marginals have become more, rather than less, important to the structure of American society.

SOCIAL DEVIANCE AND POLITICAL MARGINALITY


4. Ibid., p. 215.


EDUCATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE

John B. Orr and Lydia Pulsipher

In recent years there has been a bourgeoning interest in disadvantaged children, and the relationship between deprivation and failure in school is being discussed with new vigor. While many different approaches are taken to describe the condition of those students who are not successful in school, nearly all observers see "environmental conditions as the cause which depresses the ability of these children to learn." The terms used to describe these conditions are numerous — socially neglected, socially rejected, socially deprived, culturally impoverished, culturally different, and externally adapted — and each seeks to refine the concept in a slightly different way.

Generally speaking, the culturally disadvantaged child is reared in a home of low economic status in a family which is either a good bit more matrifocal or patrifocal than the American norm. Because the family environment is not conducive to parent-child communication the child enters school with a low verbal ability,
visual and physical styles of learning, deficient perceptual skills and inability to follow verbal directions.\(^4\)

... Children are found who have almost never been talked to by adults. Because the child learns who and what he is by interacting with those around him, such children have little self-identity. Many are unable to state their names.

Much of this inarticulateness can be attributed to fear, but not all. Many have a genuine inability to respond verbally. In their world, physical gestures, grunts, facial expressions, and tones of voice constitute the major means of communication. These, of course, are inadequate and greatly restrict the child's ability to learn.\(^5\)

Values are fostered which may be quite consistent with the particular sub-culture but not consistent with the demands of the dominant culture. For example, in the Mexican-American family of South Texas:

Acceptance and appreciation of things as they are constitute primary values... Because God, rather than man, is viewed as controlling events, the Latin lacks the future orientation of the Anglo and his passion for planning ahead. Many Mexican-Americans would consider it presumptive to try to plan for tomorrow because human beings are merely servants of God and it is He who plans the future. He is dedicated to living the moment to its fullest in the roles assigned to him by God.\(^6\)

Or, as in some segments of Negro culture, the values may have been drawn from the dominant culture and imposed on the sub-culture with the result that the values are inconsistent with the realities of life in the sub-culture and are therefore conformed to only very imperfectly.\(^7\) The differing opinions on the relative worth of education is offered as a case in point. In the poor Latin-American family formal education beyond a very low level is often considered unnecessary.\(^8\) Negroes on the other hand frequently express a desire to acquire an education, thus demonstrating overt acceptance of an important value of the dominant culture. However, they soon see that their circumstances make education a very difficult value to uphold, and one which will bring a Negro only limited rewards.\(^9\) Hence they pay it only lip service.\(^10\) In either case education is either discouraged or valued only insofar as it will lead to immediate and short range goals. When education is valued, there is usually little understanding of the perseverance and sacrifice needed to succeed.\(^11\)

The efforts of those who through compensatory education seek to alleviate the predicament of the culturally disadvantaged
child and to interrupt the cycle of disaffection through compensatory educational programs may be classified into four main categories: pupil motivation, teacher performance, curriculum development, and parental involvement.12

Those programs seeking to improve motivation have ranged from the very elementary which rely heavily on the Hawthorne effect — the belief that motivation can be stimulated by merely making the child feel important and wanted — to those very complex programs which also place initial emphasis upon making the child feel important but then proceed to a deliberate building of the student's skills, self-image, self-confidence, and eventual successful independence.13 Some of the complex programs also engage in moderate efforts to modify the present social system; they recognize that gains made in improving motivation will be lost if society still refuses to absorb these rehabilitated young people.14

For those programs which go beyond the Hawthorne effect to bring about improved motivation, there is a natural progression from efforts to stimulate pupil motivation to an interest in improving the attitudes and skills of teachers of the disadvantaged. As Carl Marburger has noted:

Improvement of schooling depends to a great extent upon effective teaching. Therefore we strive to modify the [teacher's perception] of culturally deprived children, their community, and their curriculum. We believe that teachers [in the light of their own experiential backgrounds] initially may perceive these three factors negatively. Thus appropriate changes must occur to bring about more understanding and more objective reactions to the different backgrounds of the children and the families and the neighborhoods from which they come.15

The teacher who has been made more aware of the cultural background and special needs of his students will demand innovative curriculum materials which make the student aware of his particular heritage and appeal to him in ways especially adapted to his low verbal ability, visual and physical styles of learning, and deficient perceptual skills.

We know that the disadvantaged child will be an even more disadvantaged adult if we are unsuccessful in helping him to master the basic academic skills and move on to mastery of the process of problem conceptualization analysis and synthesis.16

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Educators who concern themselves with the parents of culturally disadvantaged children reflect a shift from the conception of these parents as too shiftless, retarded or drunk to care about their children's future, to a more enlightened and complex conception. As Vontress has observed, "parents representative of this group try to provide for their brood but are powerless to overcome the negative forces operating against them. . . . They would like to be active in P.T.A. but their lack of time and opportunity deny them the possibility. Often their status in society results in a lack of appreciation of middle-class values, including education. Thus they feel little allegiance to the school and have little faith in what it can do for their children, since it has meant so little in their own lives." Some of the projects which seek to upgrade pupil motivation include as an integral part of their programs efforts to involve actively the parents in improving education for their children.

Despite careful delineation of these four focus areas in the education of the culturally deprived child, educational literature often has underemphasized the social brutality which spawns and perpetuates cultural deprivation. And educators have not often acknowledged that they may have a duty to help the disadvantaged develop skills which can eventually lead to a sharing in the control of the public schools.

Nathaniel Hickerson in his recent book Education for Alienation has begun to explain how the public school has become dominated by the politically articulate:

... history indicates that in all societies where public education developed, it served as a reflection of the existing social order. Close scrutiny of the systems of public education functioning in different societies today reveals a clear relationship between the social political framework upon which the society is built and the philosophical principles upon which its public education is formulated.

Often without intending to do so, teachers and curriculum developers tend to reflect the world of the middle class even when adapting curriculum to a particular cultural group. This is partly true because the disadvantaged have neither taken part nor shown an interest in the development of curriculum. In her study of social class and education, Patricia Sexton of New York University points out:
... upper income groups have usually been in control of school boards and thereby in control of what goes on in the schools... In addition there is the fact that very little pressure is applied to the schools by lower-income individuals or groups representing them while upper-income groups tend to have great influence in the schools and to be active in school affairs.22

The disadvantaged have had to depend upon the good will of their more fortunate brothers to identify and fulfill their need for relevant education.

To outgrow this dependency upon the affluent for relevant education, new attitudes toward total community life must be developed among the disadvantaged. But is it fair to ask that these new attitudes be developed through education? Might not this line of reasoning lead us in a circle, for we are asking the disadvantaged to become motivated by their admittedly inadequate education to adopt a more positive attitude toward that same education which is already ill-preparing them or passing them altogether.

Recently minority leaders have begun to challenge the admonition that only through education may one earn the right to political and social participation. While recognizing the value of education and social participation, they have sensed that this now widely accepted line of reasoning may very well serve to keep the poor in their place, especially when it is recognized that at present schools serve primarily the immediate needs, mental set and sunny futures of middle and upper class students. It would seem that the point these leaders have raised is well taken. For even the more progressive school systems, those which are sincerely trying to make education relevant to the needs of the disadvantaged, have frequently contented themselves with channeling disadvantaged children into ill-paid vocations in our society.23 For example, great pains are often taken to keep the middle class boy with limited intellectual ability from taking an industrial arts sequence, because his advisors are aware of the low economic and social status which accompanies a career in this field.24 Less often are the same pains taken to interest the more gifted minority youth in a professional career.24 The reason for this inequity lies, of course, in the self-perpetuating quality of socio-political power. Operated by the politically powerful, the school can easily slip into the position of primarily serving the interests of those who
control it, despite occasional attempts to make amends for obvious injustices.\textsuperscript{24}

Although work which has been done in the improvement of motivation, teacher performance, curriculum development, and parental involvement is clearly significant, reconsideration of this activity in the light of what I have called the political character of the public school may yield some profitable insights. Educational reform in behalf of the disadvantaged will stand a better chance of succeeding if the political factors are considered.

\textit{Motivation}:

In the past we have often used the excuse that the disadvantaged failed because they did not want to succeed.\textsuperscript{25} Failure was judged to be the result of individual shortcomings. Now, it is generally agreed that motivation is fostered most easily when the child can see a direct link between his present endeavors and his future success. But only very recently have we begun to make the disadvantaged child’s education more relevant to his future. And we still have not recognized what may be central to the motivation problem: the debilitating effects of institutionalized social and ethnic prejudice. We have indicated to the minority child through de facto or conscious segregation that he is inferior.\textsuperscript{26} Efforts to improve his motivation have sometimes consisted of urging him to become better prepared for a low-paying position.\textsuperscript{27} We have often set his sights too low, even encouraged him to train for jobs which are already obsolete. We have assigned the disadvantaged to a more prosperous, but still low, rung on the social ladder. As Harold Hodgkinson has observed, the economic position of a family is a most significant criterion for determining the kind of high school education a child may receive:

If you know the income and occupation of a student’s father, you can predict whether or not he will go to college almost as well as you could by using intelligence test scores . . . The school program is geared largely to the needs of those who come from good environments and are bound to be successful.\textsuperscript{28}

One wonders why this is so. Some answer that we must not foster unrealistic ambitions — that to do so would be cruel. Others say that by the time these children reach “higher horizons” type programs they are already so socially retarded that they are lucky if they can be rehabilitated for a steady job.\textsuperscript{29} Perhaps there is a deeper reason. These children come from a segment of
the population which exercises little or no political influence. The disadvantaged do not know the skills of socio-political pressure which the more fortunate use every day to achieve their ends. Those teachers, counselors and administrators who could shape the futures of the disadvantaged around brighter goals are sometimes reluctant to upset what they have come to believe is the "natural balance" of society. As employees of the politically articulate public and as members themselves of this group, school personnel are sometimes the protectors either consciously or unconsciously of the status quo. Those who would stand to benefit most from an upset of the status quo do not have the political power to instigate such a change.

Educators who are truly interested in stimulating motivation might look to the civil rights workers and farm labor organizers with respect. In the private sector, these are showing the disadvantaged how to have a hand in molding their own futures. If these activists succeed in their challenge of the power structure, there will be an automatic pay off in the increased interest in education generated by the realization that change can be wrought, that upward mobility is possible.

But the teacher has a dual role. Not only is he responsible to his employers, he is also responsible to his students. He must give them the skills with which they may make their way in society. As long as the teacher has only pupils who are members of the middle and upper classes, his dual roles are not in conflict. He can interpret society to the children giving them a fairly accurate picture of the society in which they will live. He can also teach them the skills which they will find useful tools as they take over the political power of their fathers. He may assume that their parents will initiate them into the more subtle forms of political pressure which are occasionally useful.

It is when the teacher encounters disadvantaged children that the dual role of the teacher becomes most intriguing, for he, in effect, must serve two masters. If he is to satisfy the socio-political needs of these children, he should teach them the skills needed to move effectively in their world. Recognizing that the parents of disadvantaged children are often politically naive, he would also owe them an initiation into the subtle uses of political power which middle class children have a chance to learn at home.
To clarify just how difficult it would be for a middle class teacher to approach issues of political power, let us take as an example the use of community services, specifically garbage collection. The teacher could tell a middle class student that if garbage collection is insufficient in his neighborhood, he should write or call the sanitation engineer in his community requesting improvement, hinting also that further action will be taken if his request is not satisfied. Were the teacher to be honest in giving equally useful tools to the disadvantaged student in the same predicament, he would first admit that this student will wield less political power. His threat of further action would likely not impress a city official. He might then teach him the skills of legitimate nuisance behavior revealing that when phone calls fail, picket lines in front of the official’s home may bring prompt action.

Curriculum Development:

The political considerations which influence curriculum development are equally interesting. Many different and often productive paths have been pursued in the search for a better curriculum. Dedicated educators have labored to make school a more rewarding experience for the culturally disadvantaged child. Nevertheless, a potentially dangerous situation should be recognized: educators in their rush to develop curriculum adapted to the culturally deprived child may neglect to help him develop the more sophisticated styles of learning and perceiving which he will ultimately need to function as a first class citizen. As Edmund Gordon has observed, “we must not be so consumed by our sympathy for these children or our concern with their social adjustment that we continue to neglect to prepare them as conceptually adequate participants in society’s mainstream, where they must meet mainstream standards.” There is little point in developing compensatory education if the ultimate and recognized goal is less than entrance into the social and economic middle class.

There are other problems in curriculum development. O. L. Davis in writing about the accomplishments of Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Act, 1965, cites the apparent reluctance or inability of teachers and school officials to develop creative educational projects for the disadvantaged. Despite vast sums of federal money, the projects were too often “more of the same” — remedial reading and traditional programs embellished with audiovisual aids. In addition, as Davis points out, there was little in-
terest in project evaluation. Thus educators tended to keep themselves from knowing if the projects were succeeding or failing, and avoided the soul searching which should have followed any indication that the projects were not meeting the needs of the disadvantaged child.

Near the end of his article, Davis describes a lack of prompt action and even lack of interest by school boards in giving permission for local districts to participate in Title I. One cannot miss the possibility of political implications here. Perhaps the school boards, sensing that threatening socio-political changes could be wrought by Title I, chose to drag their feet. The disadvantaged who were ignorant of Title I, were once again trapped by circular logic. They were denied the chance to gain political articulation through high quality education because they lacked the skills necessary for demanding quality education. They often had no way of pressuring school officials to use Title I funds as Congress intended — to increase significantly the quality of education for the disadvantaged.*

Parental Involvement:

Parent-Teacher Associations are based on the assumption that the two groups, meeting as equals, have something meaningful to say to each other. The school programs and the child's performance are explained to the parents. The parents in turn offer useful information to the teachers about their children. Problems of policy are discussed and school social events are planned. The most active parents are those from middle-class homes "whose goals and aspirations are compatible with those of the middle-class oriented schools."

Such useful contact between school and home is rarely the case with the disadvantaged. Frequently ghetto parents themselves left school as discouraged failures. Many such parents still value education for their children but are reluctant to confront the institution from which they themselves once failed. These parents "have come to associate schools with the 'they' in their lives, the people who somehow determine what happens to them."

It is unlikely that traditional groups such as the P.T.A. will succeed in attracting and holding the interest of ghetto parents until they expand their activities to community problems in general. Middle class parents are exposed to a variety of community improvement associations of which the P.T.A. is only one. They
are familiar and comfortable with the demands placed upon them in these groups. Furthermore they are personally aware of the success of these groups in achieving desired ends.

The parent from the disadvantaged segment of society is not familiar with group action and cannot easily see the connection between efforts to improve education and efforts to improve community life as a whole. Programs to improve parental involvement have not taken particularly bold steps to encourage parents to press for related reforms in society at large. Generally, the programs have taken a more individualistic stance emphasizing that with effort the individual student can transcend the drawbacks of the ghetto. The Banneker school project in St. Louis is a case in point. Sam Shepard, the originator of this project, began by graphically showing parents how poorly their children were performing in comparison with other children in the city. In addition, parents were shown what an education could mean in terms of increased earning power. The parents were then given a role in their child’s education by supervising homework, improving study facilities, encouraging prompt and regular attendance. Shepard also brought parents and students together for sessions which he terms, “success in the flesh.” Successful Negroes told how they managed to overcome an adverse environment. The sessions were closed by the statement: “You’ve seen here tonight what a Negro can do. We don’t have to live in a jungle all our lives and exist on relief. You . . . can be almost anything you want to be so long as you get an education, you’ve got the stuff.”

While Shepard claims more than moderate success in improving pupil motivation and parental involvement by appealing to individual initiative, one wonders if Shepard might not be too optimistic about the willingness of society to drop swiftly its long held racial prejudice and accept these striving students as he has promised. Would not Shepard and other workers be wise to couple their efforts to improve the individual initiative of parent and child with efforts to open the social system? It is admirable to get these long neglected parents involved in education but one must assume that the goal is to maintain this involvement on a self-sustaining basis from one generation to the next. Surely this goal would be more quickly achieved if the newly organized parents could sense that a commitment to school improvement must also be a commitment to community improvement.
EDUCATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE

2Clark, p. 180.
5Bernard, p. 143.
7Bernard, p. 33.
8Madsen, p. 68.
10Bernard, p. 185.
11Bernard, p. 185.
12Robert Hughley, Citation of Authoritative Writings and Practical Experiences in the Education of the Disadvantaged: Addendum to Proposed Program to Improve Education of Negro Pupils in Louisiana and Texas (Austin, Texas: Southwest Educational Development Laboratory, February, 1967).
15Clark, chapter 8; also, Barnes, p. 115.
21Hickerson, pp. 48-72.
26In an article on the problems of American higher education, Benjamin H. Baldwin, a journalism professor at Northwestern, was quoted as saying that one of the universities' major problems is that, "we have kids who are going to be lousy engineers but who would have been great mechanics. But Daddy can't let his son be a blue collar worker." Newsweek (April 3, 1967), p. 84.
27Hickerson, pp. 85-89.
35Gordon, op. cit.
37Vondracek, p. 78.
38Vondracek, p. 81.
40Frignana, p. 20.
41Frignana, p. 22.

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Education and the Instruments of Social Change
TECHNIQUES IN EFFECTING
SOCIAL CHANGE

Kenneth Marshall

Horatio Alger, the writer, died in 1899. And though we went from the Wright Brothers' airplane to astronauts, from rural electrification to robots during the years in between, the myth he created still prevails: all you need is a sprinkling of 'mother wit', some basic intelligence and some stick-to-itiveness and you can overcome gargantuan handicaps.

What started out as a nice motivational potboiler for the kiddies has become an a priori evaluation of human endeavor of the underprivileged and poor. If you have not succeeded, it is because you haven't tried hard enough.

The myth has not been updated much. To confront the apathetic inhabitants of hopelessly decayed ghetto slums or migrant farmers, whose five- and six-year-old children go to sleep hungry after a day's hard work, with socio-psychological claptrap that there must be something defective in their character — or perhaps some intrinsic failure on the part of their parents which forced them into their hopelessness, is as relevant and realistic as telling a boy born in the United States, regardless of color or religion, that he too can become a President of the United States.

Inevitably, some people, more learned and more charitable, recommend various forms of remediation to make it possible for the individual entrapped in hopelessness to seize and benefit from available opportunities. In short, these people insist that there are no basic flaws which will make them prone to become drop-outs, unwed mothers, chronic unemployables, narcotic addicts. These good people feel there is a simple panacea. Just develop some re-educational programs which will make the misfits and never-will-fits part of the mainstream of American life. That, of course, is a dream in the finest of Horatio Alger's tradition.

At a time when the national economy is booming, when in less than a decade, the gross national product has doubled, and is now more than seven hundred billion dollars a year; when unemployment has been reduced to something like 4% of the workforce; when the social welfare revolution — begun in the depres-
sion years with the passage of the Social Security Act and the Wagner Labor Act and completed in 1964-65 with the passage of Medicare and the Economic Opportunity Act, it is easy to understand why there are some who argue that all needed social changes have already been accomplished, that all we now require is the refinement and minor expansion of social welfare measures already on the books. A cursory review of some relevant facts, however, quickly makes clear some basic flaws in the argument of those denying the need for fundamental social changes. Consider the following:

Fact 1—Whereas the top 12 million families average $20,000 a year in income, our bottom 12 million families average $2,000 a year income or more than $1,000 below the official poverty level income of $3,100 for a family of four.

Fact 2—More than 11 million families live in slum housing, unable to afford the rents charged for decent apartments.

Fact 3—More than 60% of slum youths entering high school are destined to drop out before graduation.

Fact 4—More than 27% of Negro youths between the ages of 16 and 22 are out of school and out of work.

Fact 5—in most of our cities, the infant mortality rate in slum ghettos is more than double that of the rest of the city.

Fact 6—In a country enjoying the greatest prosperity that history has ever recorded, more than 40 million of its citizens are living in officially defined poverty.

Any consideration of techniques to effect social change can probably best begin with a review of the failure of the social welfare approaches to the problems of poverty and its consequences. One may summarize the impact and relevance of the American welfare system by stating that whereas more affluent Americans receive subsidies from their government, the poor must largely content themselves with services. The subsidies which are and have been available to the affluent are many and varied. They include: grants of land, mining rights, insured mortgages, free higher education, crop subsidies, tax write-offs on capital investments and oilwells, etc. On the other hand, through the public welfare or the poverty program, poor persons are decreed eligible for modest allowances but, to receive same, they must subject themselves to a variety of humiliating and degrading means tests, the administration of which usually costs more than half of the money appropriated for the program. Thus, while we may con-
cede that the dependent poor benefit disproportionately, from social welfare expenditures, it is necessary to remember that, by far, the major portion of these tax raised dollars go to non-poor persons for services rendered as social investigators, teachers, whose nine-months efforts of regular curriculum have left the ghetto youths in a condition requiring mediation. These same teachers then are hired for an additional ten week summer program, paid for by anti-poverty funds, to remediate their victims of nine months, mind you, with very questionable results. Also, the ordinary requirements of administration eat up a large portion of anti-poverty funds, office furniture, typewriters, filing cabinets, chairs, consumable program materials, paper, carbons, art supplies, projectors, etc., etc. There is an unending list of goods never produced in ghetto areas — which essentially means that the helpless poor have become the happy middleman between manufacturers, jobbers, retailers and a government-subsidy, labeled "anti-poverty funds." I can safely vouch that not one government agent in the Anti-Poverty Program's Inspector General's office queried one manufacturer of these standard goods on which at least 26% of all funds have been spent, as to the 'maximum feasible participation' of ghetto-dwellers on his labor force.

It always struck me as curious that nowhere among the very exacting specifications set down by the Office of Economic Opportunity was there a single reference made about the need to establish dealerships of these goods in the ghetto areas to be serviced. That way, at least a modicum of jobs and a modicum of dollars might have trickled into the community.

Amid the fan fare of the announcements about a total war against poverty, issued by the President in 1964, some poor people were deluded into thinking that the Economic Opportunity Act was intended to lift them out of poverty through creating good jobs, the building of public housing, fund allowances and other dignified ways of providing an income to those unable to work. Instead, the highly touted programs of the War Against Poverty turned out to be more of the same, namely: a cluster of welfare, training and educational services. And though the total amount of money appropriated for this so-called war amounted to less than one-fifth of one per cent of the gross product, more than half of this pittance was earmarked not for the poor, but for professional workers rendering these services. When one
further considers that it has not been established that completing a job training program will lead to a job, then the disenchantment of the poor with the anti-poverty programs is easily understood.

Not only are welfare services often irrelevant because they lead to no measurable improvement in the economic circumstances of their recipients, but these services, even when seen as successful, often seem to defeat their purposes by fostering and increasing a sense of dependency on the recipient’s part. Such programs as the Aid to Families of Dependent Children, rather than seeking to strengthen families and provide gainful employment for the fathers and for those mothers who desire to work, have usually insisted that the father must be entirely absent so that the family can be eligible for the meager benefits. I submit to you that this program bears no small part of the blame for the fact that in slum ghettos such as Harlem, Watts and Hough, more than half of the children are growing up in fatherless homes.

Considering the fact, now well established, that victims of the culture of poverty and particularly those herded into our many dark ghettos are, in the words of Kenneth Clark, “subject peoples — victims of greed, cruelty, insensitivity, guilt, and the fear of their masters,” Clark further notes that ghettos are “social, political, educational, and above all — economic colonies.” The most conspicuous consequences of chronic poverty are profound feelings of powerlessness on the part of its victims and an apathetic and indifferent set of responses to most social welfare attempts at ameliorating their condition. In forming all techniques and approaches toward social change then, there must be a concerted and thorough going attempt to stimulate the victims toward full involvement in remedial actions. In the words of the HARYOU document, “Youth in the Ghetto,”

Social action in its operational sense means and demands the stimulations of concern among individuals who share a common predicament—who are victims of long standing community problems and injustices, who can be induced not only to identify these problems but seek to determine the methods by which they can be resolved and who are able to develop and sustain the initiative for the type of collective action which, in fact, does resolve or ameliorate these problems.

The requirement of the “maximum feasible participation” by the poor in all phases of Community Action programs which is set forth in Title II of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 is
indicative of a recognition that the older social welfare approach involving doing things and rendering services to the poor has more often than not increased responses of despondency and apathy. The community action approach, on the other hand, is intended to empower the poor through making available to them, 1) facilities to bring about intelligent organization and 2) resources to achieve material improvement in their conditions. It is a fallacy to believe the community action, in stressing the primacy of the involvement of the poor, is an exclusively "self-help" or lifting one's own self by one's own bootstraps strategy. Hence, the dual emphasis on 1) facilities to achieve intelligent organization and 2) the availability of tangible and material resources. In many instances, these latter concrete and tangible resources will not be forthcoming from the powers-that-be unless there is first established an organized and demanding constituency.

In his recent review of the present status of what he calls "a grateful society," Professor Howard Zinn of Boston University points out that whereas many millions of persons, including businessmen, professionals, unionized working men, commercial farmers benefitted substantially from reform measures enacted during and subsequent to Roosevelt's "New Deal," he then adds, many millions more, share croppers, slum dwellers, Negroes, North and South, the unemployed still await a genuine "New Deal." The most significant difference between these two groups, Zinn finds, is that the one cluster did organize and the other did not. He comments:

The groups that did organize—the larger farm operators, the several million industrial workers who joined the CIO, improved their positions significantly. The aged with a push from the Townsend Movement got a bit of help, but many others—tenant farmers, the unemployed, service and domestic workers, (that is mostly Negroes)—were left behind.

The idea that the poor and disenfranchised must achieve power before their conditions can be substantially improved is not a new one. In suggesting that "humanitarianism can only go so far in the redistribution of privilege; self-interest must carry it further," Zinn quotes a statement made by Paul Douglas in 1933 when Douglas was a professor of Economics at the University of Chicago:

Along with the Rooseveltian program must go . . . the organization of those who are at present, weak and who need to acquire that which the
world respects, namely, power . . . unless these things are done, we are likely to find the prime benefits of Rooseveltian liberalism to be as illusory as were those of the Wilsonian era.

To achieve the belated organization of the poor in Central Harlem, the HARYOU proposal recommended the formation of a complex of local neighborhood boards. These were to be mass based organizations with a staff of professionals and selected neighborhood residents who would conduct a number of programs including information and referral services, health and welfare projects by stressing community research and community action and education. These latter projects would be geared especially toward achieving substantial changes in a variety of institutions responsible for the administration of public services including the Departments of Welfare, Police, Health and Hospitals, Sanitation, Youth Services, etc. Since this proposal was made in 1964, a number of community based neighborhood councils, area boards, and neighborhood service centers have been established in various areas around the country with funds from the Office of Economic Opportunity. These projects vary considerably in form of organization as well as in program content. At the risk of oversification, it is possible to speak of at least three distinctive model types of Neighborhood Action programs:

1) The multi-purpose Neighborhood Service Center,
2) The group action service organization, and
3) Mass based neighborhood boards.

The main emphasis of the first two types is more in the sphere of welfare services than on the organization of the poor people to achieve substantial institutional change. The first two stress the efficient organization and accessibility of a complex of relevant services and techniques of referring persons or groups to needed services. On the other hand, the basic purpose of the neighborhood board type of community action organization is the development of a mass based action and lobbying apparatus which, in the name of its many members, aspires to bring about fundamental changes in the public and private institutions that condition, shape, and influence the lives of the poor. The underlying assumption of such organization is that "political" strategies and actions are necessary for any substantial and far reaching improvement in the lot of the mass of poor people. The driving force is the power that stems from numbers united in a common cause.
and from the recruitment and development of responsible indigenous leadership.

Sad to say, whereas one can point to a number of fairly successful neighborhood action programs based on Models 1 and 2, there are, at present, few, if any, successful applications of Model 3. A brief exploration of some of the reasons for this can provide a hint as to the intractability of societal forces resisting change and the ease with which a social action emphasis can be distorted into a program of posturing and heady but futile protest. The discipline, know-how, and selfless dedication necessary for the mass organization of poor people are in short supply. Also, professional and middle class lay leadership have not demonstrated their support of indigenous leadership from low income communities. Unfortunately, self-seeking and self-appointed leaders of the poor sometimes emerge and claim paid staff positions in volunteer councils. Some of these persons are to be labeled “community action hustlers,” because they are more interested in personal income or in patronage powers than in achieving the very difficult goals of organization. These persons are, of course, not entirely to be blamed. From a certain point of view, namely that which comprehends the massive needs of the poor people for jobs, better housing, and more adequate public services, the so-called War Against Poverty is a propaganda war, a sham in which executives and expert consultants are operating at a higher level of the hustle than are opportunistic indigenous community leaders. One of the more subtle detrimental consequences of the War Against Poverty in ghetto communities stems from the fact that the widely broadcasted promises of this program raised hopes of a good job and a decent life.

When it developed that the local war on poverty could not produce jobs, but only a modest training stipend, and these mainly for young people, the most vocal and active members of the community sought and often found jobs in the CA program itself. As Headstart or as Public Health aides, this did not matter, but when these persons went forth as “Neighborhood Organizers,” “Community Stimulators,” etc., seeking to build Neighborhood Boards and stimulate community action, the reaction was frequently a variant of the cynical rejoinder, “Yeah, I go for the brother getting organized and everything — that’s cool; but tell me how I can cop one of these here poverty jobs like you got?”
In the absence of a program providing substantial capital investment for the development of jobs and tangible community improvement, a selfish scramble over the few available new jobs is to be expected; but it hardly creates the climate out of which efforts to organize volunteer groups for altruistic community actions can develop.

One of the central dilemmas in attempts to organize poor people for effective social action stems from the fact that these activists themselves can be cashed-in-on. Although we can agree that the poor, more than any other class of our people, must organize to achieve collective objectives, there is no question that activists among poor people are as oriented toward individualistic achievement as are members of more favored classes. The difference is that they are severely lacking in opportunities to seek and gain status and substantially increased incomes. If these opportunities are now presented in the form of community action programs, self-seeking, in the name of working for the good of the total community, is to be expected. It is becoming increasingly obvious that effective community action can only unfold in situations where, at the same time, substantial opportunities to earn a decent living are made available. The paradox, of course, is that these very opportunities may be the prime quest of the community action efforts. This seems to suggest that in situations of dire and extreme scarcity, attempts of the community action as herein defined are foredoomed since the very mechanics for its attainment will be distorted by the opportunistic actions of its alleged proponents. Perhaps an illustration will make clear the point being made here.

Presently, in the Harlem area of New York City, a number of local community activists along with and in the name of parents from a local school district, are negotiating with the Board of Education for more meaningful and substantial involvement of parents and community leaders in the running of the local schools. The new program of community-parent-faculty involvement in the running of the schools is creating a number of new jobs for persons in the community. To one who has wondered why the group of organizers, several of whom are experienced civil rights activists, have not been successful in mobilizing a large body of parents and other community members to support this struggle, there gradually comes the dawning awareness that the
small numbers of currently engaged activists have already divided up the jobs they hope their efforts will produce.

But it is now apparent that persons who are earning their living through socially active efforts are vulnerable in many respects. Moreover, it is apparent that these actions cannot unfold in a vacuum but must be part of a total program of economic, social and political development of the community in question. The idea that social action in itself can affect these developments is a variant of the "lifting one's ownself by one's own bootstraps" fallacy mentioned above.

The alternative to substantial inputs of facilities and resources which ease and make possible the social action efforts is to persist in imposed deprivations which are far more likely to lead to Watts or Hough type conflagrations than to concerted and intelligent organized action by the poor, which is again another way of saying that the poor by themselves cannot better their lot and, at best, can only make it difficult for the affluent to fully enjoy their privileged lives. An expression that gained some currency during the school desegregation struggles in New York City, which pitted civil rights forces against the parents and taxpayers organizations of lower middle class whites who were fighting to preserve their neighborhood schools, posited that: "We must congregate before we integrate." This insight stemmed from the fact that whereas white communities resisting school integration had developed previous to the conflict, civil rights forces were burdened with an atomized and unorganized mass community. The so-called Black Power movement which has alarmed and frightened so many, has as its main, its most positive thrust, the objective of achieving the internal self-development of the presently disorganized and demoralized black community. Its stress on the culture and the heritage of the Afro-American is intended to instill a kind of group pride and feeling of worth which are a necessary part of developmental efforts. It clearly recognizes in the life styles of ADC mothers, junkies, fighting gang boys, and street corner hustlers, selfdefeating adjustments to a life of rejection and deprivation. These adjustments are achieved at the cost of profound underlying feelings of worthlessness and powerlessness. The ideologies of the black power movement or the black Muslim movement serve to develop feelings of selfworth in the midst of a hostile world. It is obvious, however, that unless they lead to tangible
and responsible actions toward improving one's lot and that of one's group, that they are but another form of narcotics.

Unfortunately, some of the most effective techniques for dispelling feelings of powerlessness and unworthiness are sometimes viewed as crude and unduly hostile ideologies by members of the wider society. However, in the fact of the failure of other approaches, for example, the Non-Violent movement of Martin Luther King and of SNCC in its early days, it seems apparent that drastic ills require drastic remedies.

Equally as important as an ideology, redefining the status of the ghettoized poor, are organizations for the systematic recruitment, training, orientation, and indoctrination of leaders from among the poor. Aware that it was unrealistic to expect any significant proportion of ghetto residents, who had been subjected to the debilitating pattern of discrimination, to be able to engage in responsible and effective social action without some opportunity for training, the HARYOU document, *Youth in the Ghetto,* proposed the establishment of a Community Action Institute. There is an increasing awareness among civil rights workers, and others interested in social action, that there is a need for the development of far more sophisticated approaches in combatting forces resisting change than those such as picketing, sit-ins, and mass demonstrations which have proven so effective in their recent struggle for equality before the law. It is becoming increasingly apparent that offending institutions such as Boards of Education and Welfare Departments are relatively impervious to the more traditional civil rights types of protest. Outside the unreconstructed South, the majority of these institutions are no longer guilty of bald and brutal discriminatory practices. On the other hand, many of them are afflicted with bureaucratic dry-rot which is reflected in the inferior quality or irrelevance of many of their services. The leaders of the poor will have to acquire far more substantial knowledge of the internal workings of these institutions. In many instances, the improvements they seek in the services dispensed can only result from a basic reorganization and a basic change in the policy shaping values of these malfunctioning institutions. It is one thing to sponsor school boycotts to demand more effective teaching of ghetto children but it is quite another to acquire a thorough understanding of the need for far reaching changes in the structure of the boards of
education, in the recruitment and in-service training of teachers, in curricular activities, in the decentralizing of procedures which would be required to achieve the seemingly simple objectives of more effective education.

It would be unreasonable to expect that even the most effective community action institute could make technical experts out of indigenous community leaders. There is, therefore, a need for the establishment of applied research centers, which can serve the function of rendering technical services to organized groups of poor people as well as to other organizations seeking social change. I am fortunate enough to be associated with one such institute, The Metropolitan Applied Research Center of New York. This center, as is noted in its proposal is:

... an independently funded consortium of committed experts in the fields of social science, municipal, and public affairs and consumer interests who are brought together to monitor all areas of governmental services and programs in order to assure that the rights of the poor and the underprivileged in our cities are not ignored, that they are not short changed, and that their share in the economic and political benefits of the society is not lost or preempted by others and that their civil, legal, and constitutional rights are not ignored or disregarded because of their lack of power to protect themselves.

To conclude, five basic techniques for effecting social change have been sketched in this paper. No one of them in and of itself is likely to prove effective. Rather, there is required a coordinating and interrelating of the five:

1) There is required the systematic organization of the poor into politically astute movements and councils. These might include, but would not be limited to leagues of welfare recipients, tenant leagues, neighborhood councils, unemployed workers leagues, youth movements, peoples' boards of education.

2) There is a need for the development of the economic potential of the poor through the establishment of cooperatively owned commercial and community service corporations. These would include retail service and small industrial businesses, day care centers, credit unions, family camps, street academies, half-way houses, coffee shops, and cultural centers. These enterprises, while providing some jobs, would be organized primarily for the purposes of:
a) Providing funds from profits of the commercial enterprises for supporting partially or wholly the political and social action organizations suggested above;

b) Developing community service institutions which while "private" are eligible for public support;

c) Demonstrating more effective methods of rendering community services.

3) There is a need for the development of ideologies which, through redefining and reinterpreting the history of ghettoized groups, provide the motive force required for the arduous efforts of organizations and internal self-development.

4) There is the need for mechanisms to recruit and give systematic training, indoctrinating, and orientation to indigenous leaders of the poor.

5) There is the need for technically expert organizations which can systematically analyze the workings of public and private institutions which are presently either, intentionally or not, working against the fundamental interests of the poor and oppressed.

REVIEW OF SELECTED BOOKS AND ARTICLES

Lydia Pulsipher


One must challenge the common practice of locating the basis of intercultural education in the "common values of all men." Even a cursory knowledge of twentieth century anthropological research informs us that anthropologists have been unable to catalogue even a short list of precisely defined universal values.

The idea of the existence of universal values is at best an antique concept, dating back to the Age of Enlightenment when it was claimed that there was an essential invariant and simple human nature shared by all men. But modern anthropology has
shown that the notion of constant human nature is an illusion. Rather, it is impossible for man to exist unmodified by his particular culture. For this reason, to draw a line between what is natural, universal and constant in man and what is conventional, local and variable in man is to falsify the human situation.

If there is a basic unity of mankind other than the physiological (a possibility anthropologists have not discarded), this unity is not to be “discovered through a Baconian search for cultural universals.” One may posit, for example, that religion, marriage or property are empirical universals, but any effort to give these “universals” specific content destroys immediately their universality. If religion is defined as man’s fundamental orientation to reality, then when one looks at various religions one finds vastly different views of reality expressed. If “marriage” is considered universal one must account for the many different types of marriage extant. Even if we limit ourselves to marriage patterns in the New World since 1900, we are confronted with fitting into this “more limited universal” the differing husband-wife relationships of Latin-Americans, Indian-Americans, Anglo Americans, Negro-Americans, etc. Any semblance of universality must remain on a very abstract level.

Far from asking us in desperation to lose ourselves in a whirl of cultural relativism, Professor Geertz suggests that we view particular cultures “as sets of control mechanisms — plans, recipes, rules, instructions, what computer engineers call ‘programs’ for the governing of behavior.” He also suggests that man is “desperately dependent upon such extra-genetic control mechanisms for ordering his behavior. . . . Such reformulations of the concept of culture and its role in human life leads to a definition of man which stresses not the empirical commonalities in his behavior, but the mechanisms whereby his inherent capacities are reduced to the narrowness and specificity of his actual accomplishments.” Culture is not an ornament of human existence, “but an essential condition for it.” For without the control mechanisms of culture “man’s behavior would be ungovernable, a chaos of pointless acts and emotions.”


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Lyle Saunders views the practice of medicine as a social activity, for it involves interaction between two or more socially conditioned human beings. In addition, he sees medicine as a part of culture, an institution made up of a system of knowledge, beliefs, tradition, rituals, customs, symbols, attitudes and values. As such medicine is a unique institution in each culture. Operating from this enlightened frame of reference, Saunders has written a remarkable handbook for physicians who will be treating Spanish-speaking Americans.

In a nearly heroic effort to combat crippling ethnocentrism Saunders seeks to help the physician understand the degree to which his own beliefs and behavior are derived from his cultural experiences and to understand the variety of ways in which sub-cultural groups have devised ways of coping with certain events and conditions.

Because the book is such a well-written and sympathetic interpretation of the Spanish-speaking sub-culture in the Southwest, it is suggested as ideal reading for the teacher of Texans of Latin American heritage. It might even be informative for the prospective teacher who is himself of Mexican heritage. In fact, the book is so well adapted to use by teachers that very little editing would be necessary to reprint it for the specific use of educators.


This is a significant addition to the limited systematic literature on the Mexican American and should surely be useful to those who are engaged in educational efforts to improve the lot of these young people. Donald J. Bogue, in his analysis of census data, reports that Mexican Americans are the only ethnic group in which "a comparison of the characteristics of the first and second generation fails to show a substantial intergenerational rise in socio-economic status or appreciable increase in geographic mobility." This data, coupled with other information we have on Mexican Americans, leads to the conclusion that Mexican Americans are perhaps the most culturally conservative ethnic group in America today. Heller discusses various explanations for this phenomenon and covers a multitude of studies concerning the behavior of Mexican American youth. If for nothing else, this book
is valuable for the numerous synopses of the findings of these studies. The last chapter in the book deals with the Mexican American perception of opportunities. The findings are revealing, because they reaffirm the cultural conservatism of the parents. Most boys expressed the opinion that anyone could advance if he really wishes and tries hard. There is still a deep commitment to this individualism and a rejection of collective action. There is apparently little realization that Mexican Americans have profited indirectly from the Negro protest movement which has played such an important role in widening educational and job opportunities in general.


Lewis' research for this article was done in Tepoztlan, Morelos, Mexico, the site of Robert Redfield's renowned research in the 1920's. The findings will be quite useful for those seeking to illumine their efforts to tailor education for Mexican American children, for Lewis discusses some most interesting observations on the role of the mother and father in a Mexican family. That these observations were made deep in Mexico makes them no less useful to the student of Mexican social organization.


It is true that Texas has a personality unique in the United States, largely because of the confluence of Mexican and Anglo cultures. But however closely and amicably the two cultures exist, real understanding and appreciation of each other's differences has never developed. It is only very recently that the Anglos have begun to recognize the importance of familiarizing themselves with the very tenacious culture of the Mexican American. William Madsen, in his case study of Hidalgo County, Texas, gives a remarkably well constructed picture of what anthropologists call a "culturally conservative" group. As a side effect the reader also is able to sharpen his understanding of the Anglo American of South Texas.
Madsen makes many observations of Mexican American and Anglo attitudes which are especially illuminating for the educator, a very small sample of which is offered here:

(The Anglos) tend to regard the Mexican American as childlike, emotional, ignorant, and in need of paternalistic guidance. The American zeal for bettering people leads to the popular conclusion that the Latin should be educated and remade in the Anglo mold. At the same time employers do not want to educate the Latin to the point of losing their labor force.

A Latin school teacher observed:

The Anglo sees himself as the most important being that ever lived in our universe. To him the rest of humanity is somewhat backward. . . . He is appalled to find people on the face of the earth who are unable or unwilling to admit that the American way of life is the only way...

A Latin college student said:

My ancestors came from one of the most civilized nations in the world. I'm not going to forget what they taught me. I'm proud of being an American but I won't become a gringo. Now they're offering us equality. That's fine. I want to be equal before the law and have a chance to make money if I choose. But the Anglos are denying me the right to be myself. They want me to be like them. I want a chance to be a Mexican American and to be proud of that Mexican bit. The Anglos offer us equality but what happened to freedom?


Using an intriguing mixture of realism and idealism Proctor has written in advance the history of American Negro youth from 1960 to 1980. The starting point of 1960 is significant for this date the beginning of Negro youths' disenchantment with the traditional position of the Negro education establishment, which had stressed racial salvation through individual achievement. Each Negro youth was urged "to gain as much education, approval and mannerliness as he could and be prepared for the day when managers of government, business, and industry would give the nod." The Negro College Student in the early 1960's asked, "What good is a degree, if I don't have my freedom?"—a question which

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immediately raised further questions about the efficacy of the old emphasis on individual achievement and ambition and suggested another emphasis: group action to prick the conscience of white America and compel the broadening of opportunity so that in the future a college diploma for a Negro would be more than a worthless piece of paper. Of course this new emphasis — group action — was not new to America but as a widespread tactic for focusing attention on the plight of the Negro American it was the harbinger of the demonstrations, picket lines, marches, rent strikes, student strikes, sit-ins, and boycotts with which we are now so familiar.

The author is basically sympathetic with the new active stance of Negro young people. He uses optimism to indicate that if Americans are aware, intelligent, and concerned, by 1980 most of the present hair-raising racial issues will be settled. His seemingly unrealistic optimism is most effective, for without saying so the author hints that if Americans are anything but abundantly aware, intelligent, and concerned, chaos will ensue.


Although Negroes in America are improving their position in level of education, amount of income, and the holding of middle-class positions, there does not seem to be a slackening of dissatisfaction. If anything, discontent is spreading. This article is a sociological exploration of several hypotheses which seek to explain this situation. Two of the hypotheses discussed are: (1) “As a group experiences an improvement in its conditions of life it will also experience a rise in its level of desires.” (2) “As a group experiences an improvement in its conditions of life and simultaneously observes a second group experiencing a more rapid rate of improvement, it will become dissatisfied with its rate of improvement and rebel.”


Because of her important role in the lower class Negro family, the mother is in a prime position to influence the aspirations of
her children. Research has shown that there are sub-groups in the lower class and that the closer the mother's aspirations for her children are to the lower end of the lower class value range, the less likely is it that her children will be significantly influenced by outside influences reflecting more middle-class values.


Cleaver is a former Black Muslim and is currently the chairman of the Malcolm X Afro-American Society in the Bay Area in California. His comments on the Black Power movement could be of great help to the educator who is struggling to understand the many faceted Negro-American.

The educator may find the last few paragraphs of the article most useful in his thinking. Carmichael has made the point that one of the results of long discrimination has been that the white man has totally pre-empted the "right to define." Black Americans are the victims of white Americans' definitions. For example, white America has defined black as evil, Negroes are black, therefore, they are evil. Now the Negro must demand the right to make his own definitions. "When I say Black Power, I know exactly what I'm talking about. But the white man runs up to me and says, 'Black Power: that means violence, doesn't it?' I refuse to react to that. I know what I'm talking about, that's his problem, because black people understand me and that is who I'm talking to anyway."


One cannot criticize Millard for his concern over the fact that the Negro child receives an education which ignores his history and frowns on his culture. Nor can one fault him for recognizing that the Negro child is faced with some basic inconsistencies in life. He is taught democratic beliefs and values in school, but daily witness hypocrisy in the denial of these beliefs and values to those whose skin is dark. Nevertheless, Millard is guilty of some fuzzy thinking toward the end of his article which indicates a failure to carefully think through the question of cultural diversity. Because fuzzy thinking on this particular topic is widespread, and analysis of Millard's error may be of help.
Millard first states rather strongly in a variety of ways that society has an obligation to recognize and publicize the cultural heritage of the Negro — saying that Negro culture and all minority culture have much to contribute to a "pluralistic" America. However, when he comes to a discussion of the deficient social and economic opportunities available to the Negro today, Millard reveals that either he is not committed to his former affirmation of the present intrinsic value of Negro culture, or he reveals that he has fallen into just the pit he says we must avoid — looking down on Negro culture. I quote: "The Negro must be brought into the main current of social and economic opportunities along with a meaningful and equitable education experience so as to foster goals and incentives for closing the enormous educational and cultural gap," (italics mine).

Apparently even Mr. Millard is uncomfortable with his former almost unqualified defense of an ambiguous Negro culture. Now he suggests that Negro culture lags behind the dominant white culture and can be brought up to snuff only through increased social, economic and educational opportunities for the Negro.

It is difficult to say which position is better. While it might have been useful for some purposes to romanticize the Negro, and his culture, it is not helpful in developing special compensatory educational programs, for the romantic view is an incomplete one, and as such is not useful in coming to a true understanding of the predicament of the Negro in American society today. At the same time a more complete understanding of the pluses and minuses of the Negro heritage will make it difficult to sally forth to teach "The Proud History of the Negro in the New World."

If intelligent use in the educational process is to be made of Negro culture much must be learned about elements of this culture in order to determine those which are constructive and those which are destructive if the avowed goal is social and economic equality.

Pierson speaks of education as "the series of communications by means of which a cultural heritage is transmitted from an older to a younger generation — the entire round of human interaction which enables a culture to renew itself and to maintain its existence."

Brazil has the largest Negro population in the Americas, but in Brazil "Negro" means something quite different from its meaning in the United States. In Brazil the term is intimately wrapped in a complicated set of cultural characteristics so much so that a black-skinned man may be called white and a white-skinned man exhibiting requisite cultural characteristics will be known as Negro.

Pierson discusses cultural transmission between Brazilians known as "Africanos" placing special emphasis on the role played by the condombre or Africanesque religious cults and the priestesses who conduct the ceremonies and rituals.

In addition to the discussion of Africanisms this article includes a helpful analysis of differential formal education received by various racial types in Brazil of particular use to United States educators concerned with this issue.


The lower classes in American society are caught in a position between knowing what forms of success are desirable and what forms are possible for their particular strata. Contrary to popular belief individuals in the lower class are not necessarily content with their lot, lacking ambition to rise in social status.

What has often been termed the "live-for-today" attitude of the poor is actually in many cases an effort to cover the hopelessness and despair resulting from the knowledge of their class-bound horizons. The authors contradict the claim that the middle-class is more ambitious than the lower. Actually there is evidence that lower class individuals are intensely striving but they must travel significantly farther than middle-class individuals to achieve a given goal. In addition, reactions to failure differ from class to class. Because success is relatively accessible to the middle class the one who fails tends to blame personal shortcomings.
On the other hand failure in the lower class can be attributed to "the system."


The author convincingly makes the point that American public education inadvertently pushes nearly one third of our young people into the role of disgruntled apathetic misfits. Operating as an integral part of society, the public school has created or supported conditions which result in a general waste of talent and the loss of dignity for significant segments of the population.

While not attributing this situation to a conscious conspiracy, Hickerson observes that the wealthiest society on earth has come to accept poverty and unemployment as permanent fixtures, the meagerly funded War on Poverty notwithstanding. The schools "choose a selective group of citizens who will have the good fortune to finish school and obtain prestige jobs." They are for the most part children of those who themselves participate in American prosperity.

The rest are discouraged in a host of subtle ways from fulfilling their original potential, and are made to feel superfluous, even a burden. The steps in this alienation process begin early in the children's school careers when "they are classified as academically untalented because they bring with them few skills needed to be appraised as potentially able."1


Soon they are more thoroughly classified as deficient by culturally biased standardized tests; they are frequently placed under teachers unsympathetic with their patterns of behavior. Because of low reading ability they are given a slow moving, diluted, undemanding curriculum. Before long teachers with a strong middle-class bias launch a frontal attack on the lower-class child's self-esteem, and the way of life to which he is accustomed. The child must soon choose between the world of his father, mother, siblings, grandparents and friends or the world of his teacher. The author says that it is little wonder that the majority of these children resent the attack and deny the significance of those who launch it. This understandable defense reaction nevertheless re-
sults in tragedy for the children. who thus cut off their chance of joining the mainstream of American society.

Perhaps the most interesting theme developed by the author makes the point that lower class children are severely censured for doing openly what middle and upper class children do surreptitiously. These activities include the use of "vulgar" language, use of alcoholic beverages, indulgence in sexual relations, etc.

After developing for 90 pages his theme that American schools are producing just what society has asked for — children adapted to social inequality — Hickerson discusses what changes will be needed in American society before each child can be served in school as an individual uniquely capable and valuable in his own right. The author feels that the spirit of the land is changing — that people are developing an awareness of the plight of the poor. "In such a setting it is possible — rather, imperative — that our public schools read the signs and join the fight."


This book is recommended as being peripherally but significantly related to intercultural education, for the relationship between housing patterns and the development of the neighborhood public school is obvious. The editors have compiled seven studies on minority housing which give the reader a new understanding of the social, economic and political complexities involved in opening suitable housing to the growing surge of upwardly mobile minority groups. Of particular interest to the Laboratory staff will be "Minority Group Housing in Two Texas Cities" (San Antonio and Houston) by Jack Dodson, and "The Negro in New Orleans" by Forrest E. LaViolette.

For more sources on housing, see:


Alvin L. Schorr, Slums and Social Insecurity, Social Security Administration, Division of Research and Statistics. (no date).


Americans have not yet decided which is best — a monocultural or multicultural existence. To label one child culturally deprived is to attach more importance to one way of life as compared with another. If one wants to climb the social ladder, one is guided by the expectations of a particular (dominant) cultural group. The subject of cultural deprivation is touchy because deprivation may become inadvertently linked to a particular ethnic group or religion.

Deprivation is actually relative to many things — to the ingroup, to the out-group, to time and place, and to a particular situation. Glatt suggests that in seeking to overcome deprivation, one should first identify the social and cultural influences which affect individual development. After this has been done, the behaviors which result from particular influences can be identified. It will then be possible to determine the kind of growth that is needed to modify or overcome the cultural influences which tend to produce the kind of behavior which inhibits success as it is viewed by the dominant culture.

One must observe that implicit in this model is a trend toward a monocultural rather than multicultural society, for certain distinguishing features of a particular culture tend to put members of that culture at a disadvantage when they seek to compete with members of the dominant culture. To successfully compete, they must change their pattern of behavior and hence their cultural allegiances.


Talcott Parsons in his Toward a General Theory of Action, (p. 150) developed a now widely recognized theorem which pro-
sents a concept of man's essential motive. "What people want most is to be responded to, loved, approved, and esteemed. If . . . these needs can be adequately gratified, the most important single condition of stability of a social system will have been met."

In the past this theorem has been applied to the lower class behavior disorganization in the following way: The individual is concerned that he be esteemed by others, but for the lower class person many avenues to acquiring this esteem are closed. Thus, status frustration occurs. If the individual is aware that external forces (rather than his own shortcomings) have closed these avenues, deviant behavior will follow the frustration.

The authors feel that this is not an adequate explanation for deviant behavior in the lower classes today. They have proposed rather that deviant behavior in the lower class is linked to long-term economic deprivation. This theme is thoroughly and convincingly developed and culminates in a 15-step explanatory schema.


Having recognized that "many of our present practices in the system of education are in violation of the humanistic tradition . . . and are in conflict with the preservation of the dignity, worth and integrity of individual students," the authors pose questions, three of which are especially worthy of consideration.

1. Are texts prepared for the market or for the service of the students?

2. What attitudes, emotions and self-images are created in the individual by our evaluation procedures?

3. Are bureaucratic practices and procedures (including psychological testing and services) serving the individual?

The authors also ask, "How can we pluralize our (school) programs and activities?" It might be best to first ask: Should the school foster pluralization? Is this a realistic goal? Is it perhaps romantic to think that vast cultural variations can be tolerated in a society which must at the same time be cohesive?

Louis S. Levine, "Imposed Social Position: Assessment and Cur-

In this article Louis S. Levine, professor of psychology at San Francisco State College, discusses the question, “What might the education enterprise contribute to man’s becoming the best he can be?” This is certainly a staggering question and the answer might well have been naive and hopelessly broad, but Professor Levine leads us through a discussion “of the reciprocal relationship between conditions in a society and the individual’s opportunity to become the best he can be,” placing special emphasis on the interdependency of the democratic ideal and the ideal of personal development.

Educators are of necessity interested in the total process of personal development. Not to be overlooked is the psychological development: the bringing together of all facets of an individual’s life into a harmonious relationship. This integration is not merely a maintenance function but “is directed toward realizing all his potentialities” and as such is a life long process. The demands of an individual’s culture group tell him what is proper, permissible and desirable. The impetus to change and to develop comes from many sources outside as well as inside the individual, from culture, friends, parents, and teachers.

A developmental view of man can best be implemented in a society with laws, customs and institutions which promote the welfare and talents of all — a society which welcomes human diversity in appearance, belief, background, and custom. “The society that enables all its citizens to reach the highest order of development provides not only for the acquisition of all knowledge but also for its free and open dissemination.”

Levine then develops an “enlightened self-interest” theme suggesting that if the democratic ideal is to be approached the citizens must “understand the ideal and the fact that their self-interest is inextricably linked to its maintenance and extension.” Therefore in self-interest the citizen will act to reduce barriers to communication, for the dissemination of all knowledge, for the integrity and dignity of all man. “He will view with vested interest the social and political process whereby the democratic ideal is translated into the laws and customs of the land.”

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Just as man requires an open and democratic society for his full development, so the democratic society, in order to prosper, requires citizens of high psychological calibre. Education’s responsibility is to bring the performance level of both the individual and society closer to the ideal. In this connection Levine poses some relevant questions:

1. What do our schools contribute to man’s capacity to care for his fellow man... to act with gentleness towards those who differ in manner, belief or appearance?
2. Do our schools try to develop man’s capacity to conquer his fear of difference and intolerance of ambiguity?
3. What do our schools do to develop man’s potential to feel pain when another suffers, anger when another is treated unjustly?
4. Do our schools try to mobilize those special resources to avoid bigotry and prejudice?
5. What do schools do to develop youth’s potential to commit himself behaviorally to the ideology of democracy?

American society today, far from being the ideal democracy sketched earlier, is a society in which the phenomenon of “imposed social position” operates. The position in the group and the society of which the individual is a part is often defined for him and is a function of genetics (attributes, physical appearance), social class, or economic status of one’s parents. In the transactional relationship between the majority and the minority, in which relationship each group is shaped by the other, a social position is imposed on the minority and is then negatively responded to by the majority of the society. This situation is debilitating for the majority as well as the minority. In order to alter the conditions which determine imposed social position, we must answer certain questions:

1. Who imposes the limiting and restrictive social position?
2. What benefits accrue to the imposers?
3. How might they achieve these benefits without denying the rights of others?
4. What conditions reduce an individual to an unfavored social position?

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The transactional aspect of imposed social position necessitates an evaluation not only of the culturally deprived but of the “attitudes, values and behaviors of the culturally advantaged. . . . This frame of reference brings into clearer perspective the significance of attacking — through education and social action — the conditions which determine the imposition of negative social position of any segment of society.” (p. 50) The attack is not undertaken merely for the benefit of “the underprivileged;” . . . it is undertaken for the benefit of the total democratic society.

Might not educational programs concentrate on the minority-majority transactional relationship and seek to reduce restrictions to individual development caused by negatively imposed social position? In serving this function education would be seen as making a major contribution to the development of new social environments which will facilitate human development. “Within this context education and social action become closely intertwined.”

In the final portion of his paper, Changing the Educational Environment, Professor Levine makes two educated observations which will be of use to those who are seeking to modify American education. The first is that personal development is probably more susceptible to positive environmental influence than is generally supposed. Secondly, factual knowledge is not isomorphically related to behavior or belief does not equal behavior.

The second observation is the more carefully developed. Levine sights the discouraging results of a study on the commitments of American teenagers.¹ The study showed that high school students polled on questions paraphrased from the Bill of Rights showed a considerable lack of commitment to some of the basic beliefs comprising the “Democratic Ideal.” Levine believes that this unfortunate state of affairs exists because there is little effort to “tie together in a significant and meaningful fashion . . . principles which underlie constitutional representational government and specific behaviors in the lives of the students, . . . At present it appears that the schools’ failure to focus on the behaviors required to citizens in a viable democracy, while they give major attention to certain intellectual efforts, is producing people whose primary commitment is to a lack of commitment.”

In response to the realization that American youth have shown compassion and commitment in some cases, Levine develops a secondary school service-study program based on the models of the Peace Corps, Vista, and Friends Service Projects — programs which have successfully captured the commitment of so many young people. Space does not permit the inclusion of an abstract of this program, but it would make a significant contribution to efforts to reconstruct American education around the practice of democratic principles.


While written for a religious audience, this short article raises some important issues regarding the “participatory democracy” advocated by young militant idealistic leaders such as Julian Bond of Georgia. It is an interesting addition to the debate on parental involvement in reforming ghetto education. The author affirms the value of participatory democracy if, as a result, the inner city ghetto residents become “better organized, more self-confident, clearer about what they want.” However, he goes on to point out that in a pluralistic society, direct attack and radical social protest such as that advocated by Bond and Saul Alinsky, while often useful, is not always a necessity for justice. Pluralism implies that many different situations exist and at least in some cases more progress can be made toward social justice within the framework of the “old politics.”

Miller also points out that “participatory democrats often overestimate the degree of broad and continuing citizen interest in politics.” The “action” ideology is often framed in the heat of a civil rights campaign. “But citizens in the long tedium of more normal conditions have a way of turning to other things and letting politics or civil participation go.” This phenomenon, the author submits, is another reason for not writing off the “old politicians” and the Establishment.


The Keystones of Education Series is intended to encourage a meeting of the minds between professional educators and academic specialists, so as to enhance the “vitality, authority and inspiration required of educational concepts in this revolutionary
era.” If this book by David Goslin, a sociologist with the Russell Sage Foundation, is representative of works to come, this series will be an important addition to the educators’ library. Goslin examines nearly every issue which has puzzled those of us engaged in adapting the school to meet the needs of the Twentieth Century. A partial list is offered: the transmission of culture, allocation of individuals to positions in society, urbanization and suburbanization, the Negro revolution, political change in the community, nation and world, the role of the schools in producing change, cultural diversity and social change, the school as a means of social mobility.

This is not an exciting book to read but it is an informing one. The author is a careful researcher and a cautious writer — impassioned statements are few. The final chapter, “The Role of the School in an Emerging World Community” does not offer any particular new insight, but it is a well reasoned statement in support of a more global outlook in American education.
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