This paper summarizes this research, carried out in the summer and early fall of 1966. As part of a larger effort by the Commission, we examined school desegregation decisions in eight Northern and Western cities. The focus of our attention is on efforts to eliminate de facto school segregation. It was and is an unprecedented issue. The definition of de facto segregation has not been established (witness the expanded definition which derives from Hobson v. Hanson). It has aroused conflict in hundreds of communities around the country, yet the mechanisms of conflict resolution have not been developed. And, sadly, the results of positive action still await documentation by social scientists.

* The research reported here was financed through a contract with the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Mr. Morton Inger is co-author of the original study.
We have chosen to speak about desegregation rather than about integration. By desegregation we mean a deliberate change in school policy, such that children who formerly attended racially homogeneous schools now attend racially heterogeneous schools. By integration we mean desegregation coupled with other policies which tend to foster equal educational opportunity for all children.

In general, the policies of the school boards surveyed here have been limited to desegregation, and thus limited in the degree to which they foster full equality of educational opportunity.

We believe that there is no question about the good faith of the various school board members involved. In each case they made decisions, without real pressure from civil rights activists, which prompted opposition from some segments of the communities' Caucasian majorities. They also have adopted policies which have the potential partly to equalize educational opportunity. They have adopted or are adopting multi-ethnic textbooks and beginning to include the role of Negro historical and contemporary figures in regular social studies and history courses. They are making preliminary attempts to recruit Negro teachers and to place them in desegregated schools and are becoming cognizant of the potential for in-service teacher training.

However, what we observed in the eight cities was desegregation. Although they are becoming committed to integration, we have seen little evidence that the commitment has been realized. Nevertheless, the critical point is that in the eight cities which we studied a commitment was made. The purpose of this paper is to explore the manner in which the commitment was arrived at.
The eight cities were situated in four states. They range in size from 10,000 to 300,000 persons. They range in structure from urban centers to suburbs and self-contained small towns. Their economic bases are industrial, residential, and commercial. The political structures range from non-partisanship to relatively tight one-party control. An index of citizen participation in community decisions would range from low to high. Thus we have some confidence that these eight cities represent a fairly wide spectrum of American communities.

Although geographic location of decisions is important for an understanding of our findings, the political location also is crucial. The decision to desegregate is still a local decision, almost unaffected by other than local conditions. This is not to argue that other factors are totally absent; perhaps the most pervasive of these factors is the American ethos which positively values equality of opportunity. For communities to overtly and consciously deny opportunity to large segments of school age children requires a callousness difficult to sustain.

Access to information about other communities also is a factor. The precise extent to which such information played a role in determining action is conjecture. But we do know that any knowledgeable person in White Plains, New York, had to be looking over his shoulder at New Rochelle. Similarly, people in Teaneck, New Jersey, wanted to avoid having "another Englewood" with demonstrations, sit-ins, and general anxiety. Finally, the state and federal governments have been sources of influence as well. But in the main these influences have been intermittent, diffuse, and on occasion self-contradictory.
We saw, then, largely a process by which local citizens exercised local prerogatives.

Because the Constitution of the United States makes no explicit provision for maintaining a public school system, the responsibility for such provision has devolved to the individual states. In turn, they have delegated much of the responsibility to local school governing bodies. Local citizens make demands, and the schools respond. Although the schools have responded to demands on other levels as well, we believe it fair to say that the relationship between the schools and their local communities has been and continues to be more intense than that between the schools and any other organization.

The intensity of the relationship is not without cause. Local citizens have supported local schools on the basis of self-imposed taxes. They have depended on the schools to teach local norms and locally needed skills. They have expressed through the schools their concerns for the future of the community and their pride in it. As a result, school decisions are perceived as major community decisions. Conflicts over school decisions have been as numerous and intense as conflicts about any other phase of American life. Over time, however, the public school system has survived, grown, and improved.

School desegregation, as a local school decision, could prove to be a highly divisive issue, or it could become one over which entire communities express a commitment to genuine equality among citizens. My view is that the path a community takes is mainly a result of the efforts of the school board and the school superintendent.
The Decision Process

Community Response to School Board Indecision

School desegregation is widely feared by school administrators and school board members as a dangerously disruptive issue. The fears are based mainly on the educators' perceptions of how the white community will respond. Their perception is that the white community will be so aroused over desegregation that it will rebel against the school system in general, refuse to support needed bond issues, and (in the case of elected school boards) turn the incumbents out of office.

A controversy over the school system that arouses the hostility of the public can generate "excessive" attention over the school system, drawing to the issue people who are normally uninterested in school affairs and ordinarily willing to let the educators have a free hand. There is ample evidence that controversy over school desegregation also attracts people who have grudges against the school system because of a belief that the schools are spending too much money and getting too few results in general.

Educators have seen and heard of these disruptive controversies. Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Oakland, and Buffalo are vivid examples of cities whose school systems are believed to have been hurt in general by a public fight over desegregation. No realistic educator would willingly subject his school system to the strains experienced in these cities. Boycotts, emotional name-calling, petitions -- these are anathema to the school administrator. Like any administrator, he prefers "to get on with his work". (Lawsuits, too, are time-consuming and disruptive but are much preferred to the other forms of opposition. To a large extent the lawsuit can be turned over to the attorneys.)
Since the controversies arise in great part from white objections to and fears of school desegregation, it would be well to make them explicit. The most consistent opposition comes from ethnic minorities -- chiefly Italian, Irish, and Polish, and occasionally Jewish -- who feel themselves in some kind of competition with Negroes. The brunt of the opposition comes from those who have only recently emerged from the ghetto. For these people their homes and their neighborhoods are both the physical manifestation and the symbolic representation of a life-long ambition. Their neighborhoods frequently adjoin the Negro ghetto. Consequently they see school desegregation as a dual threat. Since their status depends to a large extent on their real and perceived separation from the ghetto, a desegregation plan which erases the separation lowers it. Perhaps a typical response is, "I worked hard to get where I am and I'll be damned if I'll allow it to be taken away". Secondly, and this is especially true for desegregation plans involving adjoining schools, desegregation raises for these whites the specter of a residential invasion and the consequent loss of the neighborhood as a racially homogeneous unit.

For whites higher up on the social scale, desegregation is feared for the perceived effect it might have of dragging down the achievement level of their children. For these whites, desegregation also is feared because it means that their children will have to associate with lower social class children whose behavior deviates from middle-class norms.

There are other, more generalized fears: among the middle and upper-middle class whites there is a general dislike of controversy and conflict (which are viewed as lower class phenomena) and consequently
of anything that brings about controversy. When school desegregation is the outgrowth of a militant civil rights movement which creates public controversy, these white people are disturbed. Further, among the middle-to-lower class whites the civil rights movement and the demands for integration are seen as threats to the political power which they -- particularly the working class ethnic minorities -- have built up over the years. Understandably, many good school superintendents and board members think an issue that arouses such fears is too dangerous to handle.

Because the decision to desegregate is located in school boards and administrations, and because of the conditions under which the issue was broached, some of the key actors shall be described. Typically the question of desegregation was brought to a board of education. The impetus first lay outside the local school governing body, with a state official, as in New York, or with a representative of civil rights group. In either case the issue was brought to an essentially naive board of education.

The school board members represented in this study came to the school board by various routes. But however they become school board members, they bring to their task their own feelings about how a school system should be run, their own attitudes about the school's clients, and a general willingness to devote a great deal of time and energy. Beyond that, they bring perceptions of what the citizens of the community desire. They generally do not bring an understanding of the educational process or of their duties as school board members. If school boards make policy, it is accepted by many educational writers that superintendents teach school boards the boundaries of the policy-making role.
For purposes of description, the model school board member in the cities we studied was a Caucasian male engaged in a professional or managerial occupation; he had no previous experience with educational policy-making and was attracted to the schools by his wish to improve education. He was asked to be a candidate for or to accept an appointment to the school board, has lived in his community for several years and enjoys the life there, and has children in the public school. He speaks of his school board membership as a civic duty, takes his job seriously, and has no desire to use his position as a base for personal political ambition. Finally, he says he wants to provide the best possible education for the children of the community.

In many respects such a group of men is ideal for governing a school system. They are able to comprehend most educational questions; they understand the necessity to recruit able superintendents and are willing to offer high salaries to such men, and they are accustomed to dealing with policy matters.

But such a school board experiences some disadvantages, particularly with respect to school integration. Because the board members do not concern themselves with the everyday functioning of the school system, it is possible that they do not know as much about the systems which they govern as would be desirable in view of their roles as decision makers. Since they are busy men it is inconceivable that they could read and analyze all the important information which school systems collect. It is conceivable that when the issue of segregation was first presented the board members did not know its extent in their schools. We believe this to have happened in Syracuse, for example.
A second, and we think very serious disadvantage facing such a board is that in their normal business and social interactions they are unlikely to have come into contact with Negroes who might be considered social class equals. In addition, it is unlikely that they will have had first hand experience with poverty in any form, let alone Negro ghetto poverty. Although they seemed able to comprehend poverty as an abstraction, we found that at first they were genuinely ignorant of the conditions in which some of the Negro children lived.

The forty or so men and women we have described were ultimately responsible for decisions to desegregate and many of them will be responsible for decisions to integrate. The obvious question is, "Why did these school board members act when school board members in other cities have hesitated or refused to act?"

One possibility is that they were put under extreme pressure by advocates of integration and acted to avoid open and prolonged conflict. This argument is not credible in light of the fact that only in Englewood and Syracuse was there any semblance of active sustained civil rights pressure.

A second possibility is that they believed that the whole community wanted integration. Again, the argument can be discredited in view of their efforts to present the plans in ways such that the community would be unable to express its hostility. It is unlikely that the school board members were unaware of the probable hostility of large segments of the white community.

A third alternative is that these forty persons believed that desegregation was morally right and educationally desirable and that they acted on these beliefs. We were able to ask school board members.
how they felt about several questions involving desegregation. While their responses might be termed moderately liberal with respect to civil rights issues in general, they were overwhelmingly committed to school desegregation. For example, 90 percent of them believed that schools could overcome some of the deprivations caused by poverty backgrounds; 85 percent of them believed that Negro children would learn more in an integrated school than in a segregated school. If we remember that when the study was conducted, unlike today, the volume of supporting evidence for this position was quite small, their belief was more a statement of faith than of fact.

The school board members were not alone in their beliefs. Their superintendents shared this view. Every superintendent expressed the conviction that integration was a proper and important goal for the public schools. Englewood's superintendent, Mark Shedd (now superintendent of the Philadelphia public schools), said he favored integration because it was educationally sound and because it was profoundly valuable socially. Teaneck's superintendent, Harvey Scribner, believes for educational reasons that every school should represent the ethnic, economic, racial and social makeup of America, not just Teaneck.

Although each of these cities achieved some measure of desegregation, the process of decision differed. In some the process was halting and open to participation by many members of the community. In others the process was sure and was treated as a normal educational matter, well within the boundaries of standard school board consideration and not open to public discussion. In view of what are believed to be prevailing white attitudes toward integration, the white response to the decision in these eight communities is interesting. In four of
the cities there was either no conflict or else the opposition took forms -- such as lawsuits -- which helped to legitimate the school system's plan. In the other four cities there was open conflict (in varying amounts), but the school system in all but Englewood was able to retain control of the situation. In all eight the community ultimately accepted the school plan.

The differences among the eight cities can be seen as differences in the ways the school systems presented the plans. The eight cities range from Englewood, where first the school officials and then the city administration asked all the citizens to vote on whether to integrate, to White Plains, where the school administration worked skillfully to keep the issue from ever going to the public. It always is difficult to categorize cities because of the many variables, but it is relatively easy to place these eight on a continuum of open community conflict and noise about the plan. From high to low; Englewood with sit-ins and demonstrations; Berkeley, with a recall election and heated public meetings; Teaneck, with a neighborhood school election slate and heated public meetings; to Rochester and White Plains which had virtually no public controversy.

If we construct another continuum, admittedly more difficult, to represent the way the issue was presented to the public, we see an almost perfect correspondence in city positions. The city with the greatest noise and the most difficulty in obtaining community acceptance -- Englewood -- was the city in which the school and city officials went to the greatest pains in asking the public for its advice and opinion. The city with the greatest ease in obtaining community
acceptance -- White Plains -- made the least effort to get widespread approval. Instead, the White Plains school officials skillfully co-opted the leading community organizations and made it appear that the integration plan had the support of the community. As Superintendent Johnson explained to us, "Who would ask for a show of hands on a moral issue?"

We believe the lesson of these eight cities is clear. The more the public is asked for its opinion, the less the likelihood the public will easily accept the plan. One can pick cities from any points on the continua and find the argument supported. White Plains is especially satisfactory because community acceptance was won from a rebellious community which had just decided twice in the previous year that it thought the schools were spending too much money. Teaneck is another good example for despite the vitriolic conflict, the community quietly accepted the desegregation plan once it was put into effect; only when the board of education demonstrated uncertainty about its position was hostility prevalent.

At the risk of going beyond our data we offer a rationale for the relationship between community conflict and public participation in the decision. A school board is a governmental decision-making body. The job of a school board is to make school policy, and when it hesitates or refuses to do so -- by inviting the community to make decisions for it -- it has abdicated its legitimate responsibility.

By so doing a board of education creates a decision vacuum. This tends to be filled by competing interest groups all of whom want to convince the board that they fully represent the community. Typically the groups are polarized along racial lines, and typically they
demand exclusive representation. Such competition quickly evolves to a contest in which only extreme positions are represented. The conflict which emerges frightens most people away and becomes an issue between "those Negroes" and "us whites". Such a public controversy disturbs the foundations of the community and causes many whites to reject the whole disturbance, including the idea of integration which "caused" it.

Having thus deferred to the public, the school board is in the untenable position of being unable to define the particular position which it will take. Given the competing views, how is the board to decide what the "public" wants? Threats and noise do not constitute educational grounds for decision. When the board attempts to regain its responsibility to decide the issue it often is accused of tyranny and duplicity, accusations which render many boards immobile.

Response to School Board Decision

As several of the eight cities demonstrate, abdication of decision-making responsibility does not always occur. When it does not the issue and the response are changed.

School integration is an educational issue which can be treated in a variety of ways. At one extreme school integration is an encapsulated issue to be dealt with in a discreet time period and then forgotten as an issue. An obvious example occurs when a school system moves children around one year and then forgets about them. On the other end integration is seen to affect every educational decision a school board makes. The members of the boards of education we studied (at the time we studied them), were closer to the "encapsulated issue" end of the continuum. The school superintendents however, seemed to
see integration as an issue which is to be considered thoroughly and constantly. We believe that the superintendents in these eight cities played crucial roles in the decisions made by the boards. Committed as they were to integration, the school superintendents in these eight cities deliberately and carefully set about to accomplish the elimination of segregation. We are tempted to refer to the school superintendents as the prime movers in the decision to desegregate. However, Superintendent Wennerberg of Berkeley called himself an "enabler", which term probably is more accurate. The major difference between the two definitions of the role is that in the latter an actively sympathetic school board is implied. Without such a board, we believe it would have been almost impossible for the superintendents to have brought about change.

Regardless of the position of the school board, the superintendents were faced with some serious disadvantages in the desegregation decisions. Perhaps most serious was the lack of convincing evidence that integration is an educational good. During the time of decision for these school systems little was known about the effects of integration on achievement, not to mention the effects on attitudes and values. Berkeley made perhaps the best use of the available evidence, but even that took the form of testimonials from experts, with some limited use of data showing the correlations between segregation and low achievement. The lack of definitive evidence was used by the opponents of integration. The Council for Better Education of Syracuse, a group opposed to integration and committed to segregated compensatory education used quotations from Hubert Humphrey, Charles Silberman, Thomas Pettigrew, James Conant and the New Rochelle report of the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights to make its case before the Syracuse Board of Education.

In addition to a lack of evidence that integration is good, the school systems were faced with a lack of models of successful integration programs. The Princeton Plan was available but perceived as not adequate to deal with all desegregation problems. The idea of an education park had been proposed, but it is expensive and requires a complete realignment of the school system. Redrawing boundaries had been tried but found wanting in most instances. The closing of a school and the redistribution of children was available as a plan, but this necessitated transportation and available room in other schools. For these superintendents there was no single plan which appeared to be workable in generalized form. They were forced to modify existing plans or devise new ones to fit the special circumstances of their particular situations.

A third disadvantage which the superintendents faced was a lack of help from the graduate schools of education in the United States. There is a limited number of scholars who are devoting their skills to the solution of *de facto* segregation problems in American communities.

A last disadvantage facing the superintendent was a result of the political nature of the decision to desegregate. These superintendents had had little or no practice in the political art required to desegregate a school system. While they had certainly had practice in the political arts required for successful passage of bond referenda (this is a topic which receives constant discussion in graduate schools
of education), the issue of integration was the hottest issue in American education. We wish we could say that these disadvantages have been eliminated in the last year. However, a conference such as this alleviates some of them.

At the same time that there are disadvantages, the school superintendents had immense resources under their direct control. The superintendents of these eight cities made extremely effective use of these resources, and this ability constituted the key to the success of their plans.

The most basic of the resources is the superintendent's expertise in school matters. Superintendents have specialized training in education, are recognized as school leaders, and enjoy the respect of most citizens. When a school superintendent speaks, he speaks as the representative of a well organized profession with tight controls over membership, which profession is buttressed by American universities. His perceived professionalism is therefore a very powerful resource. He also has the ability to deplete a city's stock of educational and professionals by his own resignation. Superintendent Sullivan threatened to resign if the recall election was successful in Berkeley, after having been there only two months. Highly competent superintendents are not readily found and once found are subject to continued offers from other cities.

A second resource of a superintendent is the definition of his role. He is expected to spend full time dealing with school matters. Because he does, he can accumulate an enormous amount of information about a single organization, and he can use the information in his full-time effort to solve school problems. It is unlikely that a
competent superintendent with these two resources could not devise solutions to most school problems which would be acceptable to most citizens in the community.

But the superintendent has other important resources. He can recruit sympathetic staff members. Berkeley can choose teachers from nine times as many applicants as they have positions. Superintendent Scribner recruited the Negro principal of the Eugene Field School from the Englewood school system. Superintendent Goldberg of Rochester was able to recruit Dr. Elliott Shapiro of New York City for his proposed new urban elementary school.

In addition to recruitment of staff, the superintendent can realign his present staff to accomplish his aims. In Berkeley, Dr. Wennerberg completely realigned his central office staff to by-pass administrators who were not sympathetic to his aims. He can create new positions and remove responsibility from old positions.

Besides the realignment of staff, the superintendent can reward good ideas of staff members and can use their talents in new ways. In Syracuse, David Sine, the former director of research and the man who first advanced the idea of an education park for Syracuse, was given the responsibility of coordinating the development of plans for such a building program. In Berkeley the final plan was originally proposed by a teacher and was eventually given her name.

To supplement the ideas of his own staff, the superintendent can call on outside consultants. In White Plains, Greenburgh, Englewood, Syracuse, Berkeley, Teaneck, and Rochester, the use of outside consultants was prominent at some point in the decision process.
A seventh resource available to a superintendent is his ability to control the allocation of money. Even in school districts which must depend on some other government body for total budget approval, item approval is not necessary. Thus a superintendent has immense control over allocation of resources. This control allows him to emphasize certain programs and de-emphasize others, and his only risk is that he will be fired. But with a sympathetic school board that risk is low. The citizens of the community can control resource allocation only by electing a new school board or by suing for violation of their rights as citizens.

The last resource available to a superintendent is the public nature of the conflict over integration. In the broadest sense, the spotlight which is turned on a superintendent during the decision process makes him personally invulnerable. To be attacked by identifiable villians for their championship of integration guarantees their professional future. They need not be concerned about finding a new position. And if they succeed in desegregating a school system, the opportunities for advancement are even further increased.

One measure of the success of the superintendents in using their resources is that, except for Coatesville and Berkeley, no school board adopted a plan not originally proposed by the superintendent. Each superintendent used what resources he had as often as he could. In addition to those we have mentioned, the superintendents displayed a great deal of plain tenacity and even guile. As much as anything, perhaps, the last two qualities got them over the rough spots. Some of them told us about events which sounded similar to second-rate spy
movies. In Teaneck an anti-integrationist was reported to have said publicly to the superintendent, "I know you're not a communist, but you talk like one, you act like one, and you propose policies the communists favor". Stories or night phone call threats, opposition, and near-sabotage from within the central school office and the necessity for police protection of school board members abound.

Our discussion of the differences among the eight cities in this study should not be allowed to cloud over the important similarities which distinguish them from Boston, Buffalo, and Kansas City, for instance.

First, in all eight cities, the school officials believed that integration was a proper and important goal for the school system and communicated that belief to the community.

Secondly, despite the differences in the way the issue was presented to the public, an integration plan was actually put into effect in all eight cities.

Third, despite the fact that some of the eight cities experienced difficulties in getting community acceptance, all eight communities accepted the plans.

Finally, despite the fears that the school system would be hurt if the integration issue came up, i.e. all eight cities the public has not only accepted the desegregation plan but has, in addition, supported bond issues and re-elected the school board members who promulgated them.

We have called attention to two key elements of these success stories. (1) The school officials presented integration as a proper goal for the educational system, and in some of the cities as an educationally beneficial change. (2) In the cities where acceptance was won with the least conflict, the public was not asked for its opinion or advice or approval. But there is a further point which distinguishes these eight cities from the cities which have experienced turmoil over desegregation and have not desegregated.
In Chicago, Cleveland, Boston, Buffalo and many Southern cities, race relations consists of a battle between the civil rights organizations and whites who are opposed to integration; the result stirs up hatreds and fears. In these eight cities, by contrast, the school system adopted integration as its own goal, thereby giving it legitimacy. If a battle arose in these cities, it was between an accepted governmental body and a group of dissident citizens.

In Teaneck, as in Berkeley, the school board was not committed to a specific integration plan. Indeed, the Teaneck board did not agree on a plan until two nights before the meeting at which they formally adopted it. This uncertainty was known to the public, and it had the effect of opening up the issue and making it a public controversy. A campaign for the school board was fought out over the issue; and when word leaked out that the board had agreed on a plan, three city councilmen crashed an executive session of the board to protest the decision. At a public meeting the next night, 1400 people (estimated to be 3 to 1 against the plan) crowded into the meeting room, shouting and shaking their fists. After calling a five minute recess to collect themselves, the board members came back and adopted the plan by a vote of 7 to 2.

From that point on, any community response had to be to a governmental decision. Governmental decisions are legitimate; for many people, this is enough to settle the issue. Even for the committed opponents opposition is difficult. This was clearly the case in Teaneck, for the outburst at the school board meeting was the last open attack on the Teaneck school board. The opponents filed lawsuits (and lost) and conducted a vigorous election campaign a year
The legitimating effect of the governmental decision can be seen by comparing that election with the school board election which was held while the board was still making up its mind. In February of 1964, while the board was still uncertain, two proponents of the neighborhood school concept were elected to the board, while one incumbent who was known to be favoring the superintendent's integration plans squeaked past a third pro-neighborhood school candidate by only 21 votes. But in the election following the adoption of the integration plan, all three candidates favoring the board's integration plan defeated the three neighborhood school candidates by a 7 to 5 margin. Desegregation in these cities was achieved not by civil rights marches and boycotts, but by competent and accepted school officials acting in the name of educational values. Consequently, the actions taken by these school boards, though not exactly what the public would have wanted the boards to do if they had been asked for their opinion, were accepted by the public.

For those who might ask if what we have described is undemocratic, we can ask in turn why these communities accepted the plans. The answer must be that the people in these cities got what they wanted. Each of these cities has a representative democracy. If the school board is not elected, the man who appoints the board is. Democracy does not mean that all the people make all the decisions. The fundamental requirements of democracy are met if the people have opportunity to influence the decision makers, that is, if those who actually govern can be held accountable by the people. Actual day-to-day decisions are left to representatives of the people, who expect these representatives "to get on with it" without referring all the decisions
to them. In fact, democracy is served when the representative accepts responsibility for the decisions. President Truman's "The buck stops with me" made it simpler for the public to hold him accountable for his policies and programs. The people of the communities which experienced conflict wanted the same things the people in the other cities wanted: peace, progress, and prosperity. By dodging responsibility and asking the people how and whether to integrate, the officials of these cities failed to give their citizens what they wanted. The officials of these cities failed to give their citizens what they wanted. The officials in the other cities achieved desegregation, kept the peace, and have been able to get on with some other fundamental educational problems.

By way of a summary, we can hazard a prediction: If the school officials in a city will (1) move and act instead of studying and talking about it while waiting for the impetus to come from elsewhere and (2) treat integration as a routine educational matter and (3) proceed to implement the program without asking for a show of hands, the community will accept its integration plans.