The nature of the research activities of 56 projects was reviewed to find why useful new knowledge concerning employment and training problems was not resulting from the programs. Also analyzed was the utility of followup studies for gaining knowledge about the effectiveness of the projects. Both subjects of inquiry were considered against the background of the legislative and executive intent for the programs and the problems of research inherent in service-oriented, as opposed to research, agencies. Among the findings and recommendations were -- (1) Most of the projects did not attempt to test techniques or hypotheses pertaining to training and employment, (2) at most, only 9 of the 56 projects had established criteria by which to judge their success or failure, (3) the data produced by the projects documented quite clearly the kind of clientele served and the organizational problems involved in program implementation but were much less clear about what happened to the clientele during training and counseling, (4) most projects conceived of themselves as service-rendering agencies, (5) followup studies cannot be effectively used to evaluate the success and failure of the programs, (6) the general orientation and organizational roles of staff in service-oriented agencies limit their abilities to conduct meaningful research; and (7) if research knowledge is to be the product of a particular project, then research must have priority since both research and client needs cannot be efficiently serviced in one operation. (ET)
Chapter VIII

RESEARCH IN EXPERIMENTAL AND DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS FOR DISADVANTAGED YOUTH

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"Operation Retrieval" is itself a testimony to the inadequacy of the research conducted through the Experimental and Demonstration youth training programs. The previous chapters of this report have documented the kinds of new knowledge developed by the experimental and demonstration programs. But, this documentation should have flowed naturally and systematically from the projects themselves. In this chapter we shall examine the nature of the research activities of the projects in an effort to understand why this did not happen.

In a certain sense, the assessment of the E & D projects which will be made in this chapter is a little unfair. Despite the name, most of the projects were not established as research projects. This pioneering effort by the Labor Department had multiple objectives, among which were: to direct attention to groups customarily overlooked by established agencies; to lay the groundwork for changes in normal processes of moving persons into the labor market; and to develop new ways of dealing with employment and training problems. A key component of all of these objectives, however, was to be the knowledge generated by the projects. The solidity of the knowledge developed by the projects is, therefore, of prime importance in judging the projects. The focus of this chapter will, therefore, be upon the last of the objectives enumerated above, and less, if any, attention will be devoted to the other objectives of the programs.

Legislative Roots and Executive Implementation

Legislative authorization for the initial experimental and demonstration programs was imbedded in Title II of the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962.

"Whenever appropriate the Secretary shall provide a special program for the testing, counseling, and selection of youths sixteen years of age or older, for occupational training and further schooling."
Although Title II did provide for "follow-up studies to determine whether the programs provided meet the occupational training needs of the persons referred," it did not stress a research orientation. Rather, research on manpower problems was part of Title I of the Act. This is important for an understanding of the context of the early E & D projects. The Labor Department was to create special programs for unemployed youth and then see what effects these programs had. But, the legislative separation of research from the special programs tended to mute the development of systematic knowledge about the programs.

Responsibility and authority for the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 was lodged in the Manpower Administration. The research functions of the Act were, however, divided among three organizational heads: the Director of the Office of Manpower Automation and Training (OMAT); the Deputy Manpower Administrator for Program Operations; and the Administrator of the Bureau of Apprenticeship Training (BAT). A reading of Secretary's Order No. 4-63 makes it manifest that research would have a minuscule place in the lives of this triumvirate. Of the 103 responsibilities allocated to the trio, only twenty-one dealt with research or evaluation; and in no case was research more than one-third of the responsibilities given to any of these officials. Among the other duties assigned to them were such time consuming activities as: assisting communities in designing jobs for the unemployed; maintaining liaison with state apprenticeship and training agencies; and coordinating all of the Department's manpower program operations. Moreover, with one exception, none of the research responsibilities assigned to these officials provided guidelines for the kinds of research to be conducted under Title II.

1. Among other items, this portion of the Act called for an appraisal of "methods for promoting the most effective occupational utilization of and providing useful work experience and training opportunities for untrained and inexperienced youth."

2. Paragraph 4c(35) of Order No. 4-63 directs the Administrator of the Bureau of Employment Securities to maintain a reporting system which would include the number of persons trained; the number, types, and quality of training activities; the number of persons who secured full-time employment as a result of training; the nature of the employment secured; and the need for continuing training programs.
It was only after a period of trial and error that the inherent connection between the research of Title I and the E & D programs of Title II began to emerge. In 1964, the Manpower Administrator stated that:

"It is the objective of the research, experimental and demonstration projects to finance under Title II of the Act, novel approaches to improve techniques and to demonstrate the effectiveness of specialized methods in meeting the intractable employment and training problems of the 'hard core' unemployed as well as many other worker groups."  

A few months later, in summarizing the results of an OMAT training conference, the Staff Director of the House of Representatives Select Committee on Labor noted that many persons at the conference felt a need to distinguish between experimental projects and demonstration projects.

"Experimental projects ought to be used to test out ideas and to develop techniques. Clearly the analogy of a laboratory experiment was behind this thought. Then the Demonstration could follow to test whether the Experimental findings would work in a real-life service situation where the usual problems of numbers and bureaucracy would be found."  

Then, in 1965 Congress shifted the E & D programs from Title II to Title I of the MDTA. A clear distinction was thus drawn between regular training programs (Title II) and experimental, developmental, demonstration and pilot projects. Implied in the change was a mandate for the expansion of experimental and demonstration programs, and a greater emphasis upon their research aspects.


To meet this and other new responsibilities, the Office of Manpower, Automation and Training was supplanted by the Office of Manpower Policy Evaluation and Research. OMPER established within its structure an Office of Special Manpower Programs, which was given the responsibility for conducting four kinds of special manpower programs:

1. Program experimentation - a formally structured, systematic, experimental effort to develop new knowledge or to use existing knowledge in new applications;
2. Demonstration projects - operational activities undertaken to display the feasibility and/or desirability of promising ideas, techniques or programs with the objective of stimulating their adoption by regular programs;
3. Pilot projects - operating activities undertaken to pioneer in novel programs, or to develop sufficient acquaintance with a problem to permit formulation of a hypothesis for testing;
4. Developmental projects - non-operating activities undertaken to assemble, structure, or develop data, ideas and plans for experimental, demonstration or pilot projects.

Most of the activities of the E & D projects looked at in this chapter from a research standpoint antedate the 1965 MERA Amendments, and the resulting clarification of the Labor Department's research program. Nevertheless, there are lessons to be learned from that period which are relevant to the current research structure of the Department. These lessons pertain to the requirements for relevant data collection, the inherent tensions in the researcher-practitioner relationship, and the utilization of research knowledge.

Research Within the Demonstration Projects

Most of the directors of the experimental and demonstration projects regarded their programs as service-rendering. They felt that the Department of Labor placed low priority on research and the development of new knowledge. As a result, most project executives "were unable to explain in what respects their

5. Ibid., p. 19.
programs were experimental or what they were demonstrating. This is not to say that many program administrators did not make statements about what they were trying to do. But, any connection between these statements and the structure and operation of a program were tenuous at best. This can readily be seen in an examination of:

the logical imperatives for demonstrating what the projects asserted they were demonstrating; the kinds of data collected by the projects; and the staffing of the projects.

Logical Imperatives

About sixteen of the fifty-six projects reviewed did not state what they were demonstrating. A description of what they were attempting makes it clear that they were providing a service.

"This demonstration program provides training to disadvantaged, unemployed youth in the landscape industry for which there is presently no systematic training, to convert laborers for whom there is little employment need into technicians, and to provide additional services as needed to ultimate placement."

- Neighborhood Commons

"The program now being prepared will demonstrate selection, testing, counseling, training, job development, job placement, and follow-up of unemployment youth lacking adequate skills to obtain jobs in the Detroit labor market."

- Mayor's Youth Employment Project, Detroit

Projects with goals like the above had no hypotheses to test, no techniques or structures to try out. They focused directly upon getting youth into a particular kind of job, or any job at all. At best, they were demonstrating that unemployed youth could, somehow, be employed.

Similar to projects with no demonstration goals were about eleven projects whose goals were dominated by slogans.

"This program will demonstrate that individuals with a variety of problems, which create difficulties in their abilities to profit from conventional programs, can be trained and placed where job opportunities are available."
- Northern Michigan University

There is no way to test an objective like this. It is an affirmation of belief. Although it serves to keep a staff working diligently, it provides no sense of what techniques or methods are to be used. If the particular project fails, this does not show that disadvantaged youth cannot be trained. And, if the project succeeds, no one is quite sure why. A variant of the alogan hypothesis is the following:

"That the school setting can be effectively used for the counseling, retraining, placement, and post-placement counseling of disadvantaged out-of-school unemployed youth."
- N. Y. City Board of Education

"That experienced workmen can train disadvantaged youth in specific skills."
- Mayor's Commission for Youth, Syracuse

These statements are also affirmations of belief. If the projects do not succeed, no one would conclude that the school setting cannot be used for counseling, or that workmen cannot train disadvantaged youth. And, if the projects succeed, all that has been demonstrated is that schools or experienced workmen are no barrier to upgrading the skills of disadvantaged youth, a point hardly worth demonstrating.

Most of the goals of the demonstration projects were of the following type:

"To demonstrate the techniques through which rural youth can be trained for and integrated into urban employment."
- Lane County

"To demonstrate techniques for identifying the necessary educational, vocational, and social counseling and other appropriate therapeutic services that should be provided to solve the problems of trainees in a residential setting."
- Pinellas County

"To develop techniques that will strengthen the family base of neighborhood through raising morale and employment skills."
- Action Housing, Pittsburgh
These kinds of goals beg the question of a demonstration. Testing them calls for a program of research which none of the demonstration projects were in a position to mount. The design of research for testing these ideas calls for a series of carefully matched comparison groups with each group subjected to different techniques. In addition, the specific techniques to be tested must be identified. With one exception, the demonstration projects were not structured this way. Developing or demonstrating techniques became trying whatever staff could think of until something that "worked" was found - or staff ran out of ideas - or the project ran out of money. Evidence as to what worked and did not work, especially the latter, was scanty, since under the service-rendering orientation of the projects the successes and failures among the clientele were lumped together in progress reports.

This problem is aptly described in one report.

"The fact that we are service - and not research oriented means that our entire operation is geared toward getting a service to a member of the target population and not toward recording in a statistical way our every activity. We recognize, however, that it is important that we show what we do (and what we have not been able to do)."  

Later in this same report we find that

"The statistical data in this report are designed to show some of what has happened to each youth referred to us since March of 1965. It does not show all of our activity. It shows only those activities in which a youth became successfully engaged and does not reflect the number of referrals to external or internal services."


8. Ibid., p. 10, italics in original.
"Successful engagement" of a client as the core of statistical reporting distorts, in a fundamental way, what went on in a project. One does not know what techniques failed, nor how many times a technique failed as opposed to succeeded. Furthermore, the fact that after several attempts a youth has finally been successfully engaged may tell us more about the operation of chance than about the "successful" technique. Under such circumstances, it is impossible to demonstrate the techniques through which hard core youth can be motivated or trained.

Mobilization for Youth experiment in work program methodology was the only project structured to test different training techniques. Youth in this project were assigned to one of eight different training situations. The eight situations represented a particular combination of vocational assessment, work site, and education as shown in the chart below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Vocational Assessment</th>
<th>Work Site</th>
<th>Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Intake worker</td>
<td>Job Slot</td>
<td>Regular day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Intake worker</td>
<td>Job Slot</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Intake worker</td>
<td>Work Crew</td>
<td>Regular day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Intake worker</td>
<td>Work Crew</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Work Sample</td>
<td>Job Slot</td>
<td>Regular day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Work sample</td>
<td>Job Slot</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Work sample</td>
<td>Work Crew</td>
<td>Regular day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Work sample</td>
<td>Work Crew</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The random assignment of trainees to one of these situations, plus a sizable number of trainees makes it possible for Mobilization for Youth to say something about: the effects of vocational assessment made by a worker as opposed to that derived from work samples; to tell something about the efficacy of training in work crews as opposed to training in regular job slots; and also to compare education carried out as part of the regular work day with the absence of education. Furthermore, the design of the project will permit an assessment of whether one of these techniques works better with another one of the techniques. Assuming that the clientele and staff of Mobilization are no better and no worse than those of other projects and services, the results of the demonstration project will provide information of general use to manpower efforts.
About seven of the projects, especially those conducted by agencies with ongoing sheltered workshop programs, focused some of their attention upon the impact of the E & D project on their regular operations. An example is the following:

"What problems would arise from integrating this young group in an environment geared toward the needs of physically or emotionally handicapped people?"

- Vocational Advisory Service and Altro Workshops, New York

The basic concern which generated these types of inquiries was whether the techniques developed for the physically, emotionally or mentally handicapped could be successfully applied to disadvantaged youth. An important aspect of this attempt was whether these two groups of clientele could be mixed in a single setting without causing disruptions to the training and production routine. By and large, goals of this type could be tested within the framework of the E & D projects. There existed norms of interaction and production which could be used as a reference point; and knowledge about the time that training took and the levels of skill which the techniques produced was available. Essentially, projects of this type were discovering whether methods which were appropriate for one kind of clientele could be extended to another.

A fourth and final type of statement which appeared in the goals of about seven projects is exemplified by the following:

"The project is attempting to demonstrate that (1) a thorough psycho-social diagnosis is basic to the rehabilitation of the 'hard core' youth, and (2) that basic education, training, casework treatment focused toward developing motivation, and an opportunity for full-time employment are essential in reversing the trend from chronic dependency to self support."

- PEPSY, Cincinnati

Terms like "is basic" or "is essential" imply that without the items specified in the statement no change will occur. Testing this kind of assertion calls for an experimental and control group design. Yet, only one of the E & D projects made use of such a design. The service function of the projects precluded such an
approach. For example, the PEPSY project, whose goals have just been cited, virtually abandoned psychiatric examinations in seven months because the examination "greatly limited the number of clients accepted into the ... program." The one project which employed a control group was conducted by the Center for Community Studies of Temple University. This project sought to determine whether the speech patterns of late adolescent girls, who were receiving secretarial training, could be altered to increase their employability. Unfortunately for this project, the quality of the secretarial training received by the girls in both the experimental and control groups was low. Consequently, there is doubt that many of the girls of either group will reach the minimum level of skill for employment. But, the project will still be able to tell something about the part played by improved speech patterns in the subsequent accomplishments of these girls.

Of prime importance in any demonstration project are unequivocal criteria by which to judge success and failure. These criteria are either: (1) empirically established norms of attainment and/or development, as in the workshop programs of Altro and the Jewish Educational and Vocational Services; (2) comparison groups, as in the Mobilization for Youth work program experiment; or (3) experimental and control groups, as in the Temple University project. At most, nine of the fifty-six E & D projects were in a position to adequately test the techniques they were supposed to be using.

Lacking one of these criteria, some projects attempted to demonstrate success by reporting the proportion of trainees who had been successfully placed. It is impossible to judge success from such a number, however. Many things affect placement statistics, most notably the state of the local labor market. Without a comparable group of youth who have not received the services of the project, it is impossible to tell whether the placement of eighty, fifty, or twenty percent of the trainees represents success for the project. Even a comparison of placement figures for the trainees group before and after receiving service is insufficient.
This comparison assumes that the before and after figures would have been the same without the services of the project -- a dubious assumption for most trainee groups.

The experimental and demonstration projects represented a significant departure in the thinking and programs of the Labor Department. As such, they were under strong pressure to justify very quickly their existence. It is to the credit of the E & D spirit that few of the projects reacted to this pressure by lapsing back into standard routine practices. Most projects, however, found themselves scrambling to do, and point to, something -- anything -- which could be labeled an accomplishment. In such a climate, it is not surprising to find little energy devoted to the difficult, tedious, and time-consuming research tasks of clearly specifying objectives; devising ways of measuring the attainment of these objectives; and designing a method which would produce valid, reliable and verifiable knowledge.

Data Collection

All of the E & D projects consisted of several components. The trainees went through a process in which different things happened at different stages on the way to being prepared for employment. In general, each trainee first went through an intake process to see if he qualified for the program. Next, some sort of evaluation or assessment of his potentials was made. This resulted in a decision as to where he would be placed in the program. Then came the heart of the program. The trainee received some specific skill training and/or work experience accompanied by one or another form of counseling. At the same time, he might also receive some basic education. Finally, the trainee was placed in a job with his progress sometimes followed up, and sometimes not. A sense of this process can be gleaned in the following excerpt from the Los Angeles Youth Opportunity Board employment program.

"The applicant was either referred by an agency, a person, or self-referred. He came to our attention by telephone or by appearing in person. The Intake Receptionist at this point determined whether or not the applicant was eligible according to age, residence, education, and employment for
admission to the Project. If the requirements are not met, the individual was scheduled for one intensive interview where an attempt is made to refer him to other available services.

If the applicant was eligible, an appointment was made for the next intake sessions which have taken place on Tuesday and Wednesday of each week. One out of every 10 individuals was seen in individual intake and the remainder in group intake. The group intake sessions were planned for two full (six hour) days. Involved in this process was collaborative group assessment of each individual's current status, future plans, and obstacles to be overcome. Participants received an orientation to the Project; and basic data on each individual was collected by the group counselor. Planning for vocational training and job placement began in these sessions resulting in action which moved the individuals to consider a variety of alternatives which might have helped alleviate their immediate problems and remove obstacles to training and employment. The counselor who conducted the Intake session had continuing responsibility for individuals in the group throughout their association with the Project.

Applicants ready for testing (at least 5th grade reading ability) were given the General Aptitude Test Battery on the following day at the Project Center. After involvement in continuing on-going counseling sessions, the counselee may have made one or more of the following choices depending on his state of readiness:

1. Immediate placement in full or part-time employment.
2. Referral to MTTA or other training programs, which may include basic skills training if necessary.
3. Involvement in one of the on-going special groups, focused on:
   - grooming
   - pre-employment preparation, including driver's education, employment interview participation, etc.
   - individual or group tutoring in basic skills
   - special individual or group sessions for those with special or unique problems or handicaps
4. Enrollment in high school, adult evening school, or junior college. (These referral resources work in close coordination with the Project. Follow-up counseling may continue while the youth continues his education)."
Data about the trainee - his progress, problems or activities - could have been collected at a number of points in the program: intake, assessment, training, work experience, counseling, education, or placement. Most of the projects collected information only at intake and when the youth left the program by being placed or dropping out. Many collected information during assessment, and practically none obtained data about training or counseling.

Not surprisingly, the service-rendering functions of the projects controlled the kinds of information gathered. Thus, the vast bulk of the data reported by the projects were service statistics - counts of the number of applicants accepted, the number of terminations and the reasons for terminations, the number of referrals made, and the number and type of placements made. These are the normal kinds of statistics kept by programs, and were habitual routines with most of the staff of the projects. Some of the projects produced statistical information of a more extensive nature, but these were logical extensions of the service statistics principle. For example, most projects reported the characteristics of their clientele more extensively than is customary. This was in response to pressures, both internal and external, to show that the program was reaching the hard core youth. Likewise, the reporting of test data (e.g. GATB, I.Q.) was conceived of in much the same way - to show that the project was servicing a segment of the community which was not handled by traditional employment services.

Missing from nearly all projects, however, was routine information on what happened to trainees during training and counseling (projects with several types of training, however, did report the number of youth receiving each type of training). Since one of the innovations of the demonstration projects was supposed to lie in the techniques and methods used, the absence of this kind of
information was a crucial oversight. Without it, it is impossible to tell much about the impact of the program upon the clientele. Given the data which the projects did collect, it was possible for them to tell what kinds of youth were attracted to the program and which ones were not. This is minimal information for assessing the impact of a program, yet, by virtue of collecting such data, the E & D projects were superior to most social service programs in knowing something about the results of their efforts.

It seems clear from an examination of the E & D reports that although service statistics are necessary, they are not sufficient for most demonstration projects. The relevance of statistics is determined by what the project is attempting to demonstrate. If the goal is to involve new kinds of clientele, or to place old kinds of clientele in new positions, then service statistics provide the key test of whether the demonstration is a success. But when the focus is upon the viability of some technique or method for increasing the employability of youth additional data are needed. Implicit in a demonstration of the latter type is the notion of change. Either the client is supposed to change his values, attitudes or skills; or a potential employer is supposed to change his criteria for acceptable employees; or both. Service statistics do not provide change data of this type, for the statistics tend to characterize the activity of staff, rather than clients.

This section has concentrated on the quantitative information produced by the E & D projects. In order to produce such data, a project must decide what items of information are relevant to its concerns, or its publics, and then establish an

10. In this writer's opinion, however, the major innovation of the E & D projects was not the techniques used, but the concerted effort to reach the unreachable. Implicitly, I think, the projects were judged, and judged themselves, by the extent to which they filled their service quotas with members of the target population. If this was accomplished, then any failure to successfully place the trainee was attributed to bureaucratic entanglements, or the gross deficiencies of the trainees themselves - not to the inadequacies of the techniques or methods used by the project.
appropriate collection and reporting system? Thus, quantitative data are good guides to these things which staff implicitly feels it must pay attention. The E & D projects also produced an impressive amount of qualitative information. This information tended to focus on either the motivations, circumstances or potentialities of the target population; or upon intra or inter-agency conflicts. From a research point of view, the qualitative data about clients is suspect, since it involves inferences about the subjective states of large numbers of persons who were observed relatively briefly in a rather restricted context. On the other hand, reports of the entanglements of the agency are situation focused, and are similar to participant observation in many respects although one may question the objectivity of the reports, the repetition from project to project of the same hang-ups and the same confusions is impressive documentation of the problems involved in mounting a sizable demonstration program.

In summary, the data produced by the demonstration projects document quite clearly the kind of clientele served by the projects and the organizational problems involved in program implementation. But, the projects are much less clear about what happened to the clientele once the program began servicing them.

Research Staffing of the Projects

All service rendering agencies resist the detailed record-keeping required for most research. Concerned with getting a job done, action personnel attach little importance to the tedious and time-consuming task of maintaining accurate and reliable records. Under strong pressure from a member of Congress, the E & D projects were precluded from spending much money on "research," and, hence, the staffing pattern of the projects took on the characteristics of the typical service-rendering agency.

In service agencies, record-keeping is assigned to one staff member who is responsible for producing counts of clients for periodic progress reports. In the E & D projects, this responsibility was usually given to an intake worker, a
counselor, or a tester. As is true of service agencies, the program statistics were used to show what a fine job the agency was doing, rather than to advance understanding of the impact of the program upon its clientele. For many of the projects, especially those serving large numbers of clients, the statistical counts are inconsistent. The attention of staff, including that of the person responsible for record-keeping, was upon rendering service, not making bookkeeping entries. As a result, the data collected tended to be unreliable. In short, the E & D projects, as a group, produced little systematic knowledge about the impact of their programs because almost no resources were expended in culling such knowledge.

In some instances, research was bootlegged into the projects. In one project (Pittsburgh) the project director conducted some research on a group counseling project. In another (Mayor's Youth Employment Project of Detroit), the project was thrown open to the research interests of a nearby university. The outstanding characteristic of these research efforts, and a few others like them, is their irrelevance to the basic strategies of the project. "Free-lance" research of this type reflects the interests of the researcher, and this seldom coincides with those of the action program. The program is simply a means through which the researcher is able to find appropriate subjects for his own research activities. Although the researcher makes his research findings available to the project, these findings customarily serve as window dressing since the research is not likely to be relevant to the concerns of the program's administrators.

In a few projects (notably NCCY and Goodwill Industries of Springfield), good use was apparently made of research consultants. In the NCCY case, research consultants from Howard University designed a data collection and processing system which the program staff seemed to find quite useful. In the Springfield case, heavy use was made of a Research Psychologist who participated in a weekly staff conference. What enabled these two projects to effectively use research consultants is not known, however.
Research on some of the projects was accomplished through a contract with a third party. The most common form of this kind of research was a follow-up study financed by OMAT. These studies will be examined in a later section.

Only two of the E & D projects - Mobilization for Youth and Temple University - treated research as more than a necessary appendage to the program. It is noteworthy that these were also the only projects which developed explicit hypotheses for testing, and then went about testing them. This is more than coincidence. Both of these projects were controlled by researchers, and hence a research, rather than a service orientation, defined the roles of staff. The payoff in both these projects is whether or not the hypotheses guiding the program are proven or disproven; and not in the number of trainees who are subsequently placed in jobs.

Summary

Most of the experimental and demonstration projects conceived of themselves as service-rendering agencies. They were determined to show that the hard core youth normally ignored by the established employment services could be helped to obtain jobs. Project resources, accordingly, were allocated to serving a clientele, and nearly all of the projects failed to establish a reference point (e.g. control of comparison group) which would enable them to substantiate the effectiveness of the program. The drive to succeed had one further consequence, namely a failure to adhere to a pre-established plan or set of techniques. The guiding principle of most of the projects quickly became, "find out what the kids need, and then break your back getting it for them." There is thus little research supported knowledge of what strategies and techniques are effective in recruiting hard-core unemployed youth and then raising their work skills and habits.
Follow-Up Studies

During the three years from 1962 to 1965, OMAT funded twelve follow-up studies of E & D youth projects. Reports from nine of these were available, plus a follow-up study of the Detroit project conducted by Wayne State University. Unlike the experimental and demonstration projects themselves, these studies were exclusively concerned with research. Freed from the persistent demands of daily operating crises, the staff of these studies could, and did, concentrate upon acquiring and interpreting data. Yet, the utility of their findings were usually doubtful and of little help in developing knowledge about the effectiveness of the programs.\(^\text{11}\)

Follow-up studies were to "determine what changes took place in the trainee while he was in the program and to identify the program factors which caused the changes (or failed to)."\(^\text{12}\) Such studies are among the more difficult to do since they require identifying and then locating specific individuals. Older adolescents from deprived communities are, perhaps, the most mobile segment of society, and hence are extremely difficult to follow-up. It is therefore quite remarkable that the studies were able to locate and interview as many former trainees as they did. From eighty-two to one hundred percent of the former trainees were located by the eight studies reporting the success of their follow-up efforts; and from fifty-one to ninety-five percent of the trainees were actually interviewed. Trainees who were located but not interviewed were those in the Army, in prison, those who claimed not to have been in the program, and refusals.

\(^{11}\) As will be shown later in this section, follow-up studies are useful for identifying administrative inefficiencies, and a number of administrative changes were made as a result of some follow-up studies. But, this use of follow-up studies is not what was intended in the original MDTA legislation. Nor, is it mentioned in subsequent administrative orders implementing the legislation.

Basically, the follow-up studies focused on the current adjustment of the trainees. The prime criterion for assessing adjustment was whether the youth was currently working. In addition, most studies collected information on whether employment was related to training, the stability of employment, the trainees' opinions about the E & D project, and demographic data. Some of the follow-up studies also obtained information on the wages earned by the trainees, their aspirations for the future, their satisfactions with their current job, and the way in which the trainees obtained their jobs. Although the studies were usually able to report their findings in a statistical form, more often than not, the statistics were not particularly enlightening. There are two major reasons for this: (1) the nebulous objectives which guided the E & D projects; and (2) the time lag between the start of the project and its follow-up.

**Nebulous Objectives**

The fact that very few of the demonstration projects were structured to empirically test their ideas has already been discussed. The lack of such a structure is no hindrance to adequate follow-up studies, but clarity in the precise goals of a project is mandatory. Without clear goals, the relevance of the data produced by follow-up studies is in question. All of the E & D projects, in one way or another, sought to increase the employability of youth. But the phenomenon of employment has several facets, and the success or failure of a project depends upon which facet a program is addressing. An example from the Detroit follow-up study may make this point clearer.

The Detroit study points out that the jobs obtained by male trainees were overly concentrated in the operatives, service workers and laborers category.

"Whereas, almost half of the males received training in service occupations, a little over ten percent were employed in this field. Although none of the subjects were trained as operatives, forty percent were so employed. None were trained as laborers and almost one-fifth were trained in skilled work; yet almost
one-fourth were employed as laborers and only one subject worked at a skilled job."13

Obviously there was little continuity between the kind of training youth received and the kind of jobs they subsequently obtained. The simple question, however, is whether there should be any. If the project was training youth for specific occupations, then the project ought to be judged by the proportion of youth who obtained and held jobs for which they had been trained. But if the project sought to motivate youth to seek and hold employment, or to develop better work habits and attitudes, then whether a trainee held a job for which he had been trained is less relevant than whether he held a job at all. The goals and objectives of the program do not resolve this question; and the finding, though striking, has few implications for the goals and methods of the program.

In brief, follow-up data are useful when the results which will denote success of the program are specified before the follow-up begins. In the absence of a clear understanding of program goals, the follow-up results are threatening, irrelevant, or both.

**Time Lag**

None of the follow-up studies were funded or began at the same time as the demonstration project. From three to eighteen months elapsed between the start of the youth program and the start of its follow-up. Now, it may seem obvious that a follow-up study should not begin at the same time as its program. But, this is not the case. Follow-up studies are conducted to find out something about the influence of a program in the lives of its participants. The data for discerning this is not only that which pertains to the trainee after the program, but to him before and during it as well. The lag in starting the follow-up program meant that in many instances the research team was unable to link post-program status to anything that happened within the program. As one follow-up study reported,

"The research team did not have the opportunity to observe the work training, counseling, and other evaluative and training techniques utilized by the project. This prohibited the researchers from giving technical assistance in terms of the vital importance of recording and obtaining meaningful subject data."14

As a result of their inability to determine the quantity and quality of the data collected, these researchers found an "absence of any indication on the file record which would distinguish between those who merely applied for the program and those who received a full course of instruction."15 Under these circumstances, the best the follow-up study could do was to identify some of the characteristics of "successful" and "unsuccessful" trainees. But, it could not, with any degree of confidence, shed light on the strengths and weaknesses of the program it was examining.

The inadequacy of the St. Louis data reflects, in part, the normal confusions of a new program and a new record-keeping system. But, as in the case of the Hunter's joint follow-up study, even well established record-keeping systems frequently turn out to be inadequate. In this follow-up study, the researchers were relying upon the statistical reporting procedures of the Employment Service for knowledge of what tended to youth in the program. At the time of the analysis, however, the research staff discovered that the Employment Service's data are "designed to describe the activities of staff, not the movement of clients from one social psychological state to another."16 As the researchers are careful to point out, the data collected by the San Francisco Employment Service are neither better nor worse than that collected by other employment offices. It is simply that the data are collected for administrative purposes, and these are not identical with research purposes.

15. Ibid., p. 8.
Without appropriate program data, follow-up studies cannot document success and failure, except in unusual circumstances. An example of the unusual circumstances is the follow-up study of the Lorton project. This study begins with the following paragraph:

"The Follow-Up team believes that the present MDT program at Lorton Youth Center failed to demonstrate that 'intensified counseling, vocational guidance and job development' had any significant effect on the enrolled trainees. It further believes that the present program failed to offer intensified counseling, vocational guidance, or job development." 17

The study then goes on to document this assertion by showing that the various elements of the proposed program either failed to come into existence or were staffed by unqualified personnel. The study also showed that the recidivism rate for trainees was higher than for comparable populations. The Lorton program was a program which had completely collapsed. This is the unusual circumstance which follow-up studies can adequately document. 18

But, when programs are not utter failures, follow-up studies are hard pressed to produce relevant data. As appendages to an ongoing program, and dependent upon it for information about what went on in the program, follow-up studies customarily must work with unbalanced data. The data are unbalanced because administrative records concentrate upon problems in the organization, not the routine things that are working well.


18. In commenting upon an earlier draft of this paper, one reviewer asserted that some projects had hidden agendas which were much more important than the manifest goals of the project. A project might be funded, for example, to demonstrate to institutional personnel that they could not operate an employment program without fundamental changes in staffing patterns; thus laying the basis for institutional change. Persons conducting follow-up studies should, of course, be informed of such hidden agendas so that their research can be made relevant to the real interests of the funder. Equally important, however, is the question of the efficacy of such roundabout techniques. It would seem that in the above example, a more obvious way of bringing about staffing changes would be a project which would show the success that follows when changes are made. Showing an institution that it has not successfully operated a new program is no evidence that the institution needs a new staffing pattern.
Summary

All of the follow-up studies financed by OMAT contain extensive documentation of the shortcomings of the programs. After reading them, one comes away with a sense of the pitifully inadequate techniques that were tried, the horrendous oversights of programmers, and the naiveté of administrators. Such an impression must be a distortion of the actual programs, but a distortion inherent in follow-up studies which are afterthoughts, and must, therefore, rely on the records and recollections of program staff and clientele. Follow-up studies thus cannot be used to evaluate the success and failures of a program. Nor can they be used "to determine what changes took place in the trainee" as OMAT intended, for they do not collect the all important "before" information which is necessary for documenting change. Yet, follow-up studies do have a use. They are, essentially, a retrospective look at the shortcomings of a program, and because of this are most effectively used to spot "bugs" in an ongoing program.19

The Problem of Research in an Action Agency

The production of verified knowledge is not something that automatically comes about as a by-product of other activities. Rather, conscious efforts must be devoted to its production or recognition. Action programs typically proceed on the basis of guesses and hunches about the nature of the clientele they are trying to serve, and the effectiveness of the resources at their command. Research, when it is employed by action agencies, is typically marginal to the main activities of the action program. This, in turn, means that a clearly defined way of producing useful research knowledge, and then using it, must be developed. The strategy for accomplishing this is far from worked out, but there is a growing body of understanding about the

barriers to the successful use of research in action endeavors. The barriers, in large part, spring from differences in the orientation of research and program staffs; and the resulting differences in the organizational roles they occupy.

Differences in Orientation

The practitioner seeks to provide a specified service to a specified clientele. The researcher does not. His goal, rather, is to add to the theoretical or methodological body of knowledge in the social science discipline from which he comes. The payoff for him is not in the number of clients successfully served; but in the number of worthy publications which emerge from his labors. These contributions are most likely to lie in new techniques for studying a problem; or in data which illuminate a basic social science principle.

On the day-to-day level, this difference in goals often means that the researcher eschews writing memoranda of use to the administrator of the program he is researching. And, instead, collects data or prepares reports of use to some future, and anonymous, program administrator; or of use to the researcher's colleagues.

Another way to regard this difference in outlook is to state that the researcher is not loyal to the action agency, but owes his allegiance to the social science discipline in which he received his training, and in which his professional advancement lies. It is not that the researcher is disloyal to the organization in which he does his research. But that he sees a "higher" loyalty than the program he is studying, and sets his priorities by that. Thus, the researcher may hold back on information of use to the practitioner because it may alter the development of the phenomenon he wishes to study. For example, a researcher may discover that the trainees in a youth employment program hold unrealistic expectation of what the program is going to accomplish. Instead of conveying this information to program staff, however, he may decide to keep it to himself, because he perceives an opportunity to study what happens when expectations are not fulfilled.

The researcher is, in the full sense of the term, a student. He is trying to learn something. As a consequence, he is likely to abhor making decisions about the practical meaning of his data. This he argues should be left to others who must bear the responsibility for those decisions. In short, the researcher is not an activist,
and is unimpressed with the practitioner's need to do something on the basis of whatever information happens to be available at the time. The researcher is perfectly content to say that he "does not know," and has no suggestions to offer. Worse yet, from a practitioner's point of view, he sometimes asserts that he has no interest in the things that are troubling the practitioner and consequently not only "does not know," but will never make the effort to find out.

When the researcher does venture into the decision-making realm, his suggestions are either abstract, or greatly colored by his desire to add to knowledge. His suggestions, therefore, are more likely to be focused upon adding to the storehouse of knowledge than upon more effectively serving the clientele. These are not always the same thing.

Finally, although abdicating the role of decision-maker, the researcher is frequently good at ex-post-facto explanations of what went wrong. Once the facts are in, the researcher usually does know; and his explanations frequently make it sound as if what did happen was inevitable. Of all of the strains between researchers and practitioners, this is perhaps the greatest - and the least discussed. The practitioner is usually defensive about not having a foresight comparable to the researcher's hindsight; while the latter feels that he has done a useful piece of analysis.

Differences in Organizational Role

It is clear that the researcher is not supposed to make a direct contribution to the immediate service of clients. But he is supposed to make a contribution. Just when and what kind of contribution is typically vague and uncertain. The absence of a direct service function means that the researcher's role is marginal to the central concerns of the operating agency. Although this is fine with both researcher and practitioner, two things follow from it that are of grave concern to the two. First, research is customarily defined as an expendable luxury. Second, research has to be fitted into some kind of role which has meaning for the day-to-day activities of the organization.
Service organizations are judged by how well they serve clients, and how little annoyance they cause others while doing so. Sometimes the latter is substituted for the former; but that is a subject which belongs elsewhere. There has yet to be an action agency with all of the resources it needs to do a specific job, hence all action agencies are constantly on the alert for additional resources, and for ways in which to make what is at its disposal more pertinent to its service task. In such a situation, the funds and personnel allocated to research are fair pickings for the resourceful program administrator who can divert - or pervert - them to his own ends. When re-allocations of money and personnel are necessary, research is an instant and prime target. When cutbacks are in order, the long-range and nebulous benefits of research are vulnerable to the short-run service exigencies.

The research response to this latent and sometimes overt threat is to erect barriers which make stealing its money and personnel relatively difficult. A favorite device is to construct or find a separate organization to do the research (e.g. a university), and to protect the funds flowing into the research organization by a long-term contract. The action agency, in effect, commits itself to supplying the research organization with a stipulated sum for a specified time period, regardless of what happens to the action agency. For its part, the research organization agrees to produce a product which the action agency feels will be of use in its efforts to serve clients.

Should an independent research organization not be feasible, researchers will try to protect their funds by getting long-term research commitments from the funding agency. Or, better yet, seek its own funds from a source other than that of the action agency. In both of these cases, the objective of the researcher is to build his own constituency which is committed to the support of research. To use that constituency as a bulwark against the inevitable plots of practitioners to utilize all available resources for service ends.

Whatever strategy researchers use to protect their enterprise against the forays of practitioners, one likely consequence is a further estrangement of
research and service. Each worries first about protecting his own domain, and secondly about mutual obligations and responsibilities.

Despite their differences, and despite the defenses each erects against the other, research and practice see a need for each other. At the very least research needs a setting in which to do research; and practice finds it prestigious to report that research is being conducted on its programs. Usually, the basis for cooperation is much broader than this. Because of the use that each sees for the other, some way of getting along together has to be found, and this customarily means defining a service relevant function for research that is meaningful to practitioners.

A complete catalogue of the kinds of service roles taken on by research is not available, but some sense of the variety and range of these roles can be discerned. One favorite of researchers is that of "historian" of the project or organization. Here the avowed purpose of research is to produce a detailed account of what went on so that other practitioners may learn from the experiences of the action agency. This role, unfortunately, usually breaks down. Practitioners are much more concerned with what is of use to them, than with what is of use to other practitioners. The researcher who attempts this role usually finds himself regurgitating what every practitioner in the organization knows; or attempting to develop something which is no longer of concern to the agency. The cooperation of practitioners, necessary to maintain the historian role, usually breaks down when the learning of other practitioners relates to the past blunders of the organization.

A role into which practitioners like to cast researchers is that of public relations. Here, the intent is to have research authenticate the good works of the organization through facts and figures which have research credibility. As noted before, however, researchers owe their loyalty to an academic discipline, not to the organization, and this role also tends to wither away. The role tends to crack when the researcher seems, from a practitioner's point of view, to give more prominence to the shortcomings and failures of the organization than to its
successes. On his part, the researcher is extremely wary of doing anything which seems to taint his scientific objectivity with program advocacy. His professional standing among his research colleagues would suffer tremendously should it be rumored that he was "merely" a front-man or apologist for the action organization.

Sometimes research is assigned the role of planning future programs. This assignment, on the face of it, seems sensible. Research knowledge and techniques are to be put to use in discovering the weaknesses in current activities, and then devising ways of eliminating those weaknesses. This role is a relatively new one, and abundant evidence on it is lacking. Several things do seem to happen, though. Since researchers are students, rather than activists, they do a creditable job of discerning the weaknesses in programs. But the development of ways of overcoming those weaknesses are usually beyond their professional competence. They are, however, adept at spotting weaknesses in proposed solutions for weaknesses. The tentative evidence seems to indicate that the researcher with a planning function assumes one of two other roles. Either the researcher becomes defined as the administration's spy, or as the organization's gadfly and critic. This latter role, of course, is not likely to win friends within the organization. The researcher in such a role is likely to find the cooperation he needs slowly disappearing, and along with it the information necessary to play the role of critic.

A fourth major role for research is that of compiling service statistics. Here the researcher's proclivity for numbers is seized upon, in an effort to make some sense of his activities. Since the researcher counts things, he might as well count things of relevance to program people. This turns out to be a viable role when: (1) the things practitioners need counted do not change; and (2) the researcher is not left to gather the basic data on his own. In the absence of the

21. Here the key phrase is "defined as" for all researchers abhor this role and will go to all lengths to avoid it. The stress on the confidentiality of sources of information; the reporting of statistics in a way to fuzz up who is being talked about; and the reluctance to provide information other than that in the final report are all devices intended to avoid the spy role. Researchers feel quite properly that to acquire this label spells doom not only for their own research, but also for that of their colleagues who might want to follow them.
first, the researcher rapidly concludes that practitioners don't know what they need counted, and will soon abandon this service. In the absence of the second, the necessary data for counting is not likely to be provided by practitioners since the request is likely to be viewed as stemming from research, and not from the line structure of the organization. In the situation where the action agency controls research, however, there is a tendency to limit research to this "social bookkeeping" role, with consequent dissatisfaction on the part of researchers about their inability to do meaningful research on the agency's program, problems, and policies.

These four seem to be the major roles taken on by research, but there are others which have occurred. In at least one organization the preparation of next year's budget fell to the research staff. In several agencies, the research staff has functioned as a safety valve for personnel gripes and complaints. In others, it has assumed a kind of personnel counseling and psychiatric function. In still others it has become a core of speech-writers for top administrative personnel. And, it is not unknown for a one or two-man research staff to take on a kind of "helper's aide" function, running errands and carrying messages.

It must be stressed that the necessity to define a direct service function for research is a necessity felt by both practitioners and researchers. The former need to make the latter relevant to their world, and for their part, researchers find it difficult to consistently maintain an above the battle stance. Whatever role is taken on by research, the point is that it affects the kind of research that is ultimately produced; and hence the relevance of that research to agency operations and the development of knowledge.

Tensions and strain between researchers and practitioners are inevitable. The challenge is to structure a project so that these tensions do not disrupt the attainment of project goals; or to utilize the strains to enhance project goals. This is the subject of the next and final, section of this chapter.
Some Suggestions for Experimental and Demonstration Program Research

Currently, experimental and demonstration projects are divided by ONPER into four types: (1) developmental projects - intended to structure existing knowledge and ideas for translation into manpower programs and policies; (2) pilot projects - intended to develop new programs; (3) program experimentation - intended to rigorously test alternative program elements; and (4) demonstration projects - intended to show the feasibility of new programs and to stimulate their adoption by operating agencies. In line with the 1965 Amendments to the Manpower Development and Training Act, this new structure is intended to strengthen the research capacity of the Manpower Administration. What can be learned from the research experiences of the experimental and demonstration projects of 1962-65 that can be incorporated into this new structure?

First and foremost is the simple lesson that operating programs do not automatically produce much systematic research knowledge. The most useful data produced by operating programs pertain to the organizational problems of a new venture. This is a consequence of what program administrators are involved in, must analyze, and must understand. But, this kind of knowledge is quite different than the short or long-run effects the program is having upon its clientele. It seems clear from the E & D experience that when operating personnel are given research responsibilities, the latter receive scant attention. Personnel within operating programs are judged by their program contributions, and it is only natural for research to be given short shrift. If research knowledge is to be the product of a particular project, this must be made clear from the beginning, and staff responsibilities defined and evaluated according to their contribution to the development of knowledge. If research is the goal, then research must have priority. One cannot hope to efficiently service both research and client needs in one operation.
The four types of projects to be conducted by OMPER can be sequentially related to each other. On the basis of the organized knowledge produced by developmental efforts, pilot programs can attempt to devise new programs and techniques. These can then be subjected to rigorous testing through program experimentation, and once proved in the laboratory, can be adapted to ongoing operations through demonstration projects. It is to be expected that a programmatic idea will be shaped as it goes through this process, and may look quite different at the end than it did at the beginning. Also, all program innovations need not go through the whole cycle, but may start at any one of the four steps depending upon prior practice and/or research knowledge. Finally, the four types of projects differ in their goals and in the roles played by researchers and practitioners.

Developmental projects are, in the above conception, straight research activities. They are efforts to structure data and ideas, and as such must be controlled by researchers. Program staff would have a minimal role, serving as consultants, if needed, and perhaps as subjects. Since developmental research can be a never-ending process, some limit on it must be established. It is suggested that a maximum of three years be set for a single project, although most developmental efforts should take much less time. Developmental research should be funded on the basis of the priority needs of the Manpower Administration as described in the Brager Report. And the payoff in such projects is the creation of new knowledge, or the correction and amplification of old knowledge.

Pilot projects are tryouts of new program methods in old settings, or of old methods in new settings. They should resemble the E & D projects which were concerned about the impact of a program innovation upon their ongoing operations (see pp. 9-10). As such, they require the direction of an expert program person.

22. Program Research and Demonstration in the Manpower Administration, Manpower Administration, U. S. Department of Labor, June 15, 1965, pp. 7-10.
Research should assume a consultative role similar to that developed by Goodwill Industries of Springfield. As tryouts, pilot programs should not extend more than two years. Within that span of time it should be clear whether a specific program innovation holds promise or not. Like developmental projects, they should be funded according to the priority needs of the Manpower Administration. Their payoff, however, lies in the creation of promising program technology.

Program experimentation is a full-fledged research effort intended to verify the effectiveness of one or more program methods. The model for this kind of research is the current Mobilization for Youth project. The project would be run by a researcher, with a program person as operating head. These experiments should run from a minimum of two years up to a maximum of five years to allow ample opportunity for stable results to appear. The criteria for funding research of this type would be the likelihood of the research to contribute to the solution of national problems, and the soundness of the research design. The payoff in this effort is verified knowledge of the effectiveness of program elements. And, in turn, the implications of this knowledge for manpower policies.

Demonstration projects focus on feasibility questions, and, should therefore have practitioners in control. The research role would be to evaluate the outcome of the demonstration, or to conduct a follow-up study to spot deficiencies in the operations of the program. Whereas the research role in the first three types of research is largely that of program planning and development, demonstration projects call for a research role more like that of project historian with social bookkeeping responsibilities. The projects should run a minimum of three years and a maximum of five years. They would be funded only when the pool of knowledge about a program innovation indicated the likelihood of success. The criteria for evaluating the demonstration effort should be better service to clients. The standard for making this judgment must be clear, precise, and unequivocal.
One final point needs to be stressed. It is implicit in the time which should be allotted to each of the four types of research. A single idea which emerges in developmental research may take up to fifteen years to become firmly established in operating programs. Research is a precise and painstaking activity. It is therefore a long one. It cannot, by its very nature, produce quick answers to transitory or crisis problems. Research should, therefore, be concentrated on persistent problems which are amenable to long-term solutions. Although the fifteen year investment may seem unrealistic, it is certain to produce savings from the truncation of ineffectual or impractical programs and their replacement by effective ones. Systematic knowledge of effects not only improves programs, but also reduces the hidden harm of programs which promise much but deliver little.