NEW ANALYTICAL INSIGHTS INTO THE FOREIGN LANGUAGE BEING TAUGHT CAN BE HELPFUL TO THE LANGUAGE TEACHER. TWO SUCH CONCEPTS, "ENATION" AND "AGNATION," ARE PRESENTED IN H.A. GLEASON'S "LINGUISTICS AND ENGLISH GRAMMAR." "ENATION" IS THE GRAMMATICAL RELATIONSHIP OF TWO SENTENCES WHICH HAVE THE SAME GRAMMATICAL STRUCTURE BUT ARE UNRELATED IN MEANING. ONE CAN BE CONVERTED INTO THE OTHER BY THE PROCESS OF SUBSTITUTION. TEACHING STUDENTS TO APPLY THIS PROCESS IS THE BASIS FOR SUBSTITUTION DRILLS. OTHER SENTENCES HAVE BOTH SEMANTIC AND GRAMMATICAL RELATIONSHIPS, SUCH AS A SENTENCE IN THE ACTIVE VOICE WHICH CAN BE CONVERTED TO THE PASSIVE VOICE AND VICE VERSA. THE TWO-WAY RELATIONSHIP OF THESE SENTENCES IS "AGNATION," AND STUDENTS CAN BE TAUGHT TO CONVERT THEM INTO CORRESPONDING "AGNATE" SENTENCES THROUGH TRANSFORMATION DRILLS. USING THESE CONCEPTS TO EXPLAIN DIRECT AND REFLEXIVE OBJECTS IN GERMAN IS ONLY ONE EXAMPLE BY WHICH TEACHERS CAN HELP STUDENTS HAVE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF GRAMMAR. THIS ARTICLE WAS PUBLISHED IN THE "FLORIDA FL REPORTER," VOLUME 4, NUMBER 3, SPRING 1966. (AM)
"ENATION" AND "AGNATION"
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In a stimulating new book on Linguistics and English Grammar (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965), H. A. Gleason, Jr., has once again shown us how skilled he is at organizing complicated materials, presenting them in an easily understandable form, and providing us with valuable new insights into language. It is of course true that in one sense no grammarian, however skilled he may be, can ever reveal anything essentially "new" about a language. All of us have a marvelous intuitive knowledge of at least one language in the sense that we can say and understand an endless number of sentences, including sentences which we have never heard before. And those of us who are foreign language teachers know two or more languages in this important way. In another sense, however, the grammarian can indeed tell us much that is "new." Though he cannot add to our intuitive knowledge, he can increase our analytical knowledge by revealing some of the things which lie behind our intuitions. Analytical knowledge of this sort is precisely what the foreign language teacher needs; without it he is merely another speaker of the language—and no better qualified to teach it than is any other speaker.

Among the many analytical concepts which Gleason presents in this new book, there are two which seem particularly important for foreign language teachers. They are presented in Chapter 9, "Relation and Process," and are concerned with two types of grammatical relationship which, intuitively, we all "feel" to exist between certain pairs of forms.

Having isolated these two relationships, Gleason cannot resist the temptation to invent labels for them: he calls them enation and agnation. The long-suffering foreign language teacher may well groan at having to learn two more technical linguistic terms. The terms themselves are of course unimportant; perhaps they will never be used again, or perhaps they will someday be as familiar as terms like indicative and subjunctive. Whatever their fate, the concepts which they refer to are highly useful in sharpening our analytical knowledge of language, and hence highly useful to foreign language teachers.

Gleason begins his presentation of these two concepts by asking his readers to consider the following four English sentences:

1. The dog bit the man.
2. The dog seemed rather unpleasant.
3. The cat ate the canary.
4. The man was bitten by the dog.

We all feel intuitively that sentence (1) is related in some way to each of the other three, though the relationships seem to be rather different in each case. We need to examine these relationships and see just where the differences lie.

Gleason describes the relationship between (1) and (2) as one of "compatibility in meaning." That is to say, we can easily imagine someone telling about a dog, saying that "the dog seemed rather unpleasant," and then going on to relate that "the dog bit the man." To this extent the two sentences are indeed compatible in meaning: there is a semantic relationship between them. On the other hand, the relationship seems to have nothing whatever to do with grammar, but to lie only in the realm of meaning. Here, mercifully, we are spared the necessity of having to invent some new grammatical term.

Sentences (1) and (3) are related in quite a different way: they have the same grammatical structure. Any grammatical description we give to the one (such as "subject + "verb" + "direct object") will also apply to the other. On the other hand, the relationship between them seems to have nothing to do with meaning (except grammatical meaning), but to lie only in the realm of grammar. In all other respects they are semantically quite different: dog vs. cat, bite vs. eat, man vs. canary.

Because sentences (1) and (3) are related grammatically in a very intimate way, any self-respecting grammarian immediately wants to have a term to express this type of relationship. Gleason dubs it "enation" (from Latin enatus 'related on the mother's side,' literally 'born out of') and can then say that sentence (1) is enate to sentence (3), and vice versa. He symbolizes this type of relationship by using the identity sign:

The dog bit the man. = The cat ate the canary.

He then goes on to say: "If two sentences are enate, this implies that there is a manipulation which a grammarian or a speaker can apply to alter one into the other. This is substitution. Between (1) and (3), three substitutions are involved: cat substitutes for dog, eat for bite, and canary for man." Teaching our students to apply this "manipulation" is of course highly important. This is what we aim to do in the type of pattern drill called "substitution drill"; and it is precisely the concept of enation which underlies all such drills.

In comparing sentences (1) and (2), we found a semantic relationship ("compatibility in meaning"; both can occur close to one another in the same discourse) but no grammatical relationship. In comparing (1) and (3), we found a grammatical relationship ("enation": one can be converted to the other by the simple process of substitution) but no semantic relationship. When we now compare sentences (1) and (4) we find both a semantic and a grammatical relationship. The semantic relationship is—almost—one of identity: the two sentences mean essentially the same thing; the only difference in meaning is grammatical (active v. passive) rather than semantic in
the usual sense of that term. The grammatical relationship is somewhat more subtle: it is the fact that any active sentence like (1) can be converted into a corresponding passive sentence, namely (4); and that any passive sentence like (4) can be converted into a corresponding active sentence, namely (1). That is to say, there is again a manipulation which a grammarian, a speaker, or a learner can apply to alter one sentence into the other.

The process involved in converting sentence (1) to sentence (4) has recently come to be called "transformation," and a passive sentence such as (4) has been called a "transform" of the underlying active sentence (1). This relationship is customarily symbolized by a double-headed arrow:

\[ \text{The dog bit the man.} \Rightarrow \text{The man was bitten by the dog.} \]

Such a treatment makes it appear as if the relationship between sentences like these were a one-way affair: always from active to passive. Gleason, however, wishes to emphasize the two-way nature of the relationship: not only can we go from active to passive, but also from passive back to active. He calls this two-way relationship "agnation" (from Latin agnatus 'related on the father's side,' literally 'born to') and symbolizes it with a double-headed, double-shafted arrow:

\[ \text{The man was bitten by the dog.} \Rightarrow \text{The dog bit the man.} \]

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ments; sentences (6b) and (6b) are the agnate specific questions (that is, questions containing question words). But the relationships between the agnate sentences are in each case quite different. Corresponding to the accusative expression den ganzen Text of (5) there is in (6b) an accusative interrogative pronoun, namely was; but corresponding to the accusative expression den ganzen Tag of (6) there is in (6b) an interrogative adverbial phrase, namely wie lange. Here we have another answer to our question: to qualify as a "direct object," the accusative expression of a statement must correspond to the accusative interrogative pronoun of the agnate specific question.

A second example of agnation is the following:

Sie haben den ganzen Tag gesungen. 'They sang the whole day.' (5)

ζ Ξ Der ganzen Text wurde (von ihnen) gesungen. 'The whole text was sung (by them).' (5c)

Sie haben den ganzen Tag gesungen. 'They sang the whole day.' (6)

ζ Ξ Den ganzen Tag wurde (von ihnen) gesungen. 'The whole day there was singing (by them).' (6c)

Sentences (5) and (6) are active; sentences (5c) and (6c) are the agnate passive sentences. But the relationships between the agnate sentences are again quite different. The accusative expression den ganzen Text of (5) corresponds to the nominative expression (the subject) of (5c); whereas the accusative expression den ganzen Tag of (6) remains unchanged in (6c). Here we have still a third answer to our question: to qualify as a "direct object," the accusative expression of an active sentence must correspond to the nominative expression (the subject) of the agnate passive sentence.

Several paragraphs back we observed that we intuitively "feel" that some types of accusative expressions are direct objects, and that other types of accusative expressions are not direct objects; and we asked what the grammatical facts might be which underlie these intuitive feelings. Now, after having examined various examples of enation and agnation, we can attempt an answer. In order to qualify as a "direct object," the accusative expression of an active statement must correspond (a) to an accusative pronoun in the enate active statement in which this type of semantically empty word is used; (b) to an accusative interrogative pronoun in the agnate specific question; and (c) to the subject in the agnate passive sentence. Any accusative expression which meets these three tests is precisely what we intuitively feel to be a "direct object."

To the question: "What is a direct object?" we have just given a grammatical answer, in terms of enation and agnation. Perhaps we should now ask: Is a grammatical answer the right kind of answer? Can we not instead give a semantic answer? Suppose a student asks us whether, in Sie haben den ganzen Tag gesungen, the accusative expression den ganzen Tag is a direct object. Could we not answer: "Obviously not. How can one sing a day? One can only 'sing a song' or something similar." A semantic answer of this sort is certainly more helpful in many cases. On the other hand, there are other cases in which only a grammatical answer is of much use.

Consider, first, a sentence such as the following:

Die Besprechung hat einen ganzen Tag gedauert. 'The discussion lasted a whole day.' (7)

What is the function of the accusative expression einen ganzen Tag? Here I must confess that my own personal intuitive "feel" is inadequate: without further testing, I could not say whether this is a direct object or not. A semantic answer is of little use: anything can "last a whole day" — and I still do not know whether einen ganzen Tag is or is not a direct object. As soon as I apply the three grammatical tests, however, the answer is quite obvious: (a) one cannot say Die Besprechung hat ihn gedauert 'The discussion lasted it'; (b) one cannot say Was hat die Besprechung gedauert? 'What did the discussion last?'; and (c) one cannot say Ein ganzer Tag wurde (von der Besprechung) gedauert 'A whole day was lasted (by the discussion).'

A sentence fails all three tests, and the accusative expression einen ganzen Tag can therefore not be a direct object. Instead, it is an adverbial expression of duration. The semantically "emptiest" substitute which one can use is again lange: (a) Das Besprechung hat lange gedauert. The agnate specific question again has the adverbial phrase wie lange: (b) Wie lange hat die Besprechung gedauert? And (c) there is no agnate passive sentence at all corresponding to this active sentence.

To show conclusively that the answer to our question must be grammatical rather than semantic, let us consider finally a test case in which a semantic answer is impossible because we do not know the meanings of some of the words involved. We can make up such a case by borrowing nonsense words from Christian Morgenstern's poem Grusellett, with English "translations" from Lewis Carroll's Jabberwocky:

Sie haben den ganzen Golz geplautert. 'They gimbled the whole wabe.'

ζ Ξ Sie haben ihn geplautert. 'They gimbled it.'

ζ Ξ Was haben sie geplautert? 'What did they gimbled?'

ζ Ξ Der ganze Gols wurde (von ihnen) geplautert. 'The whole wabe was gimbled (by them).'

Sentences (8) and (9) are to say the least unclear: there are no semantic clues whatever to tell us whether den ganzen Golz is or is not a direct object. But if we know that (8) is enate to (8a) and agnate to (8b) and (8c), then it is...
immediately clear that *den ganzen Golz* is a *direct object*. And if we know that (9) is enate to (9a) and agnate to (9b) and (9c), it is immediately clear that *den ganzen Golz* is not a direct object, but an adverbial expression of duration. In both cases a semantic answer to our question is quite impossible, but a grammatical answer is completely obvious.

In the preceding examples we have developed three grammatical tests for the intuitive concept “direct object”; and we have shown that any accusative expression which meets these three tests is precisely what we intuitively feel to be a “direct object.” Let us now refine our analysis by asking the converse of what we have found: Is it also true that any accusative expression which does not meet all three tests is not what we intuitively feel to be a “direct object”? In order to answer this more refined question, let us consider the following three sentences:

*Der Mann rasiert ihn. The man shaves him.*

(10)

*Der Mann rasiert sich. The man shaves himself.*

(11)

*Der Mann schämt sich. The man is ashamed of himself.*

(12)

What is the grammatical status of *ihn* in (10), of *sich* in (11), and of *sich* in (12)? Are they, or are they not, direct objects?

Because the *ihn* of (10) is already a substitute word (a pronoun), there is obviously no special substitute which can replace it. We must therefore apply test (a) in reverse and look for an enate sentence with a semantically full word. This is easily found: *Der Mann rasiert den Jungen* “The man shaves the boy,” or some such thing. Sentence (10) therefore passes the first of the three tests. It also passes the remaining two: (b) there is an agnate specific question, namely *Wen rasiert der Mann?* “Whom does the man shave?” and (c) there is an agnate passive statement, namely *Er wird (von dem Mann) rasiert* “He gets shaved (by the man).” Because it passes all three tests, the *ihn* of (10) is grammatically a perfectly normal direct object; and this agrees with our intuitive feeling.

What now of the two examples of *sich*, in (11) and (12)? First, we need to establish the fact that it is in each case an accusative, since in form it could also be a dative. We can show this by citing enate sentences with a first person singular pronoun. Enate to (11) is *Ich rasiere mich ‘I shave myself’*; and enate to (12) is *Ich schäme mich ‘I am ashamed of myself.’ The form *mich* is clearly an accusative (the dative would be *mir*); and so, therefore, is the *sich* of (11) and (12). (This is of course the traditional method of establishing the case of *sich*, namely by citing enate sentences in which the case of the pronoun is clear. That is to say, we have all used the concept of “enation” for years—without, perhaps, fully realizing what we were doing.)

Having established the fact that the *sich* of (11) is indeed an accusative, let us now try to apply the three tests. For test (a), is there a semantically full word which we can substitute for *sich*? The only possibility is *sich* itself, since *Manni* = *Manni 1* may be thought of as the “deep grammatical structure” which underlies sentence (11); but whenever a 3rd person direct object has the same referent as a 3rd person subject, it must appear in the shape *sich*. Let us now apply test (b): is there a specific question, agnate to (11), with an interrogative pronoun in the accusative? There is indeed such a specific question, namely *Wen rasiert der Mann?* “Whom does the man shaves?”; though if this question were actually asked, the answer would almost certainly be *Der Mann rasiert sich selbst* “The man shaves himself” (with himself stressed), and not simply sentence (11). What, finally, of test (c)? Is there a passive sentence agnate to *Der Mann rasiert sich. The man shaves himself”? The regular rules of passive transformation would produce some such thing as *Sich wird (von dem Mann) rasiert ‘Himself is shaved (by the man),’ which is totally impossible. The nearest we can come to an agnate passive sentence is *Der Mann wird von sich selbst rasiert ‘The man is shaved by himself.’ We can at least imagine such a sentence, though it is doubtful that it would ever be said.

After applying the three tests to sentence (11) we can conclude: the *sich* of this sentence is certainly not a “direct object” of the usual sort. It is of course what we intuitively call a “reflexive direct object”; and its unusual grammatical behavior, when the three tests are applied, reflects this very special status.

Let us consider, finally, the *sich* of sentence (12), applying the three tests this time in the order (c), (b), and (a). Test (c) is quite impossible: there is no agnate passive sentence *Sich wird (von dem Mann) geschämt —or whatever it would be. Test (b) is equally impossible: there is no agnate specific question *Wen schämt der Mann?* Only test (a) is partially applicable: we can imagine a theoretical “deep structure” sentence *Der Mann1 schämt den Mann1* (with Mann1 = Mann1), though as an actually occurring sentence this must be converted to *Der Mann schämt sich*. We can conclude: the *sich* of (12) shows traces of being a “direct object,” but it is even farther from a normal direct object than is the *sich* of (11). Looking at things in another way, we can say: the *sich* of (12) is a “reflexive direct object” to a higher degree than is the *sich* of (11).

How are we to account for the greater degree of “reflexiveness” that we have found in *schämt sich* as against *rasiert sich*? The answer lies in the nature of the verbs *schämen* and *rasierten*. A reflexive direct object is compulsory with *schämen*; it is merely optional with *rasierten*. If, in our test of enation, we remove the requirement of reflexiveness, we can say that *Der Mann rasiert sich ‘The man shaves himself’* is enate to such sentences as *Der Mann rasiert ihm ‘The man shaves him’*.
Deutsch: jemanden 'he worries about someone'

Cliffs: listed

Among the 270 most frequent verbs in German which take an obligatory hand, the number of transitive verbs semantically useful is the only limitations are semantically even if we want to; there simply are no sentences of the type Der Mann schämt ihn, or Der Mann schämt den Jungen. (For the equivalent of English "The man shames him/the boy," The man makes himself/the boy ashamed of himself," German uses the verb beschämen: Der Mann beschämt ihn/den Jungen.)

Has the above application of "enaction" and "agnation" in any way deepened our understanding of German grammar, as we hoped it would? In one sense it certainly has not done so: we already knew that the sentence Sie haben den ganzen Tag gesungen contains an adverbial expression of duration and not a direct object; that one cannot say Der Mann schämt den Jungen; and so on. Possibly, however, we now understand a little better the difference between optional and obligatory reflexive objects. Most German textbooks speak of "reflexive verbs" in somewhat too cavalier a fashion, making no distinction between such examples as sich freuen 'to be glad,' sich ärgern 'to be angry' (optionally reflexive) versus sich erkälten 'to catch cold,' sich entschliessen 'to make up one's mind' (obligatorily reflexive). The number of transitive verbs in German which can take an optional reflexive object is, practically speaking, unlimited; almost the only limitations are semantic ones. (That is to say, a reflexive sentence such as Der Mann besucht sich 'The man visits himself' is theoretically possible, and not in any sense ungrammatical; it is simply hard to see how such a sentence could be semantically useful.) On the other hand, the number of transitive verbs in German which take an obligatory reflexive object is quite limited. Among the 270 most frequent verbs listed in J. Alan Pfeffer, Grund- deutsch: Basic (Spoken) German Wort List, Grundstufe (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964), I find only one example: er sorgt (sich) um jemanden 'he worries about someone' (if the verb takes a direct object, it must be reflexive; but it can also be used without a direct object). There is also one verb with a compulsory reciprocal object: sie streiten (sich) 'they fight (with each other)'; and this verb, too, can be used without an object.

Let me return once again, in closing, to enation and agnation as matters of general linguistic theory. Though these two concepts are useful, they are also new—and they need considerable refining. In particular, we need to work out better methods of distinguishing between them. In the preceding discussion I have assumed that two sentences stand in a relationship of enation if, in the same grammatical slot, the one sentence shows a "semantically full form" (a "major vocabulary item") and the other sentence shows a "semantically empty form" (a pronoun or other substitute word):

The dog bites the man. \( \equiv \) The dog bites him. (13)

That is to say, I have assumed that the manipulation which one can apply to alter the one sentence into the other is simply substitution: the substitution of him for the man, and vice versa.

When we examine the use of substitute words a little more closely, however, it turns out that in English—and in many other languages—matters are a good deal more complicated than this. Consider the following examples from English, German, French, and Spanish:

The man gives the boy the money. He gives it to him. (14)

Der Mann gibt dem Jungen das Geld. Er gibt es ihm. (15)

L'homme donne l'argent au garçon. Il lui donne. (16)

El hombre (le) da el dinero al niño. Se lo da (a él). (17)

If we consider only the subjects of these pairs of sentences, the manipulation used in going from semantically full word to semantically empty word seems to be only a matter of substitution, and the relationship therefore one of enaction: in (14) the man \( \equiv \) he, in (15) der Mann \( \equiv \) er, in (16) l'homme \( \equiv \) il, and in (17) el hombre \( \equiv \) zero. The fact that we substitute to "zero" in this last example is a bit troublesome, but happens this is still part of the relationship of enation. When we now go on to look at the direct and indirect objects of these sentences, however, the manipulation seems clearly to be one of transformation, and the relationship therefore one of agnation: in (14) the boy the money \( \equiv \) it to him (with reversal of order and addition of to); in (15) dem Jungen das Geld \( \equiv \) es ihm (with reversal of order); In (16) l'argent au garçon \( \equiv \) le lui (with deletion of a and placement of both elements before the verb); and in (17) el dinero al niño \( \equiv \) se lo (with deletion of a, reversal of order, and placement of both elements before the verb). This suggests that, for all pairs of sentences which show semantically full and semantically empty forms in corresponding grammatical slots, we should assume in these four languages a manipulation of transformation and hence a relationship of agnation rather than of enation.

Gleason has done us a great favor in calling our attention to the relationships which he has dubbed "enaction" and "agnation." The two concepts are precisely the ones which underlie "substitution drills" and "transformation drills," respectively. We foreign language teachers can surely benefit from a deeper understanding of the grammatical concepts which lie behind two such important pedagogical devices. We can also use Gleason's presentation as our point of departure for probing further into the grammars of the languages which we teach, and thus gain still further understanding.