The author presents a philosophy of education that is based on the concept that education should concentrate on developing the individual student rather than on imparting knowledge and skills. Education for individual development was described as a program consciously undertaken to promote an identity based on such qualities as flexibility, creativeness, openness to experience, and responsibility. Earlier concepts of the proper role of education were cited from literature to support the idea that the purpose of education should be the molding of men rather than the production of knowledge or the completion of units. The author argues that the planning of a total educational environment must be guided by a theory of the total personality as well as by social theory. Personality theory was seen as a means of connecting what happens in student activities with what happens in the classroom. It was expected to indicate what aspects of a person influence other parts, and how these aspects are affected by forces from the environment. The teacher's role was said to be, in part, to turn the students' scrutiny inward upon himself in search of the source of his beliefs to produce the self-knowledge that is prerequisite to development. The applications of this theory to the college environment are discussed in relation to curriculum, institutional bureaucracy, teaching and research, institutional purpose, college size, and experiments in better teaching. (AL)
NEW DIMENSIONS in Higher Education

EDUCATION FOR INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT
April, 1967

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NEW DIMENSIONS
IN HIGHER EDUCATION

EDUCATION FOR
INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT

by Nevitt Sanford

Everett H. Hopkins, Editor

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE

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Nevitt Sanford is Professor of Psychology and Education at Stanford University. In 1961 he founded its Institute for the Study of Human Problems where, as Director, he has led research on student development, alcoholism, and other topics extending beyond the interests of single academic departments.

Professor Sanford received the Ph.D. degree from Harvard in 1934, and his first book was *Physique, Personality and Scholarship* (1943). In 1940 he moved to the University of California, where he was Professor of Psychology from 1949 to 1961. He served as co-director of the Berkeley Public Opinion Study from 1945 to 1950 and was a senior author of *The Authoritarian Personality* (1950), the widely acclaimed study of potentially fascist individuals.

From 1952 to 1958 Professor Sanford directed the Mellon Foundation Study of Vassar College, an experience that led to the publication of *The American College* (1962), to its shorter version *College and Character* (1964), and to further study of student development at Stanford University and the University of California at Berkeley. In *Self and Society* (1966), Sanford elaborates a theory for the guidance of individual development in institutions as diverse as the family, the school, and the mental hospital, and in his most recent book, *Where Colleges Fail* (1967), he argues that colleges fail wherever they treat the student as less than a person; that learning depends on the whole personality, not merely on an abstracted intelligence that can be dealt with neatly by itself; and that colleges will improve only as they are guided by a theory of how students actually develop.

Professor Sanford has been a practicing psychoanalyst and has served on the Board of Directors of the American Psychological Association and as President of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>About the Author</td>
<td>iiii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreword</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highlights</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Aims of Education</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Theory of Education</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Through Challenge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Knowledge: Prerequisite to Development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Some Applications of Educational Theory</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Educational Environment: The Curriculum</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Educational Environment: Other Features</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Recovery of Purpose</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohesive Living Arrangements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiments in Better Teaching</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aspects of Individual Development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence of Thinking</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education for Creativity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education for Social Responsibility</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Footnotes</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annotated Bibliography</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reactions</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FOREWORD

(If and when this manuscript is published for general distribution, the Editor will gladly prepare an appropriate Foreword for the wider audience.)
In this monograph the author maintains that the primary aim of education is not so much the accumulation of knowledge or the development of specific skills as it is the development of students as individuals. This view is a restatement in contemporary terms of the Greek conception of education as paideia, the shaping of character in accordance with an ideal of human personality. In this philosophy of education, two elements are persistent: the notion that there is an ideal of mature manhood toward which students are guided, and the belief that students are educated to be able to realize these ideals, or values, through association with teachers.

A search of the earlier literature on the history and philosophy of education reveals little support—until a few decades ago—for the author's concept of personality, although there is ample support in the earlier writings for the view that education should be directed to the whole person and that various features of the educational environment may contribute to the person's total development.

The author's task here was to indicate a way in which the individual might be analyzed, and to describe a theory concerning the ways in which different aspects of the individual develop through interaction with his environment.

1. Today's college student needs preparation for a world in which he must play a variety of roles and even adopt new occupational roles, perhaps several times during his life; an impersonal world in which he must nonetheless manage to remain an individual and assert his individuality.

2. What the college teaches and how well it does it are far more important than how much it teaches—explosions in knowledge notwithstanding. Educational history may well be made by the first college that reduces the amount of material offered in its curriculum in order to give the faculty time to reach the students.

3. The planning of a total educational environment must be guided by a theory of the total personality as well as by social theory. Personality theory will enable us to connect what happens in residence halls or on the playing fields with what happens in the classroom. Social theory will suggest how we may arrange the social environment so that it will effectively influence those parts of the personality that determine change in the whole.
4. The benefits gained from learning depend on the extent of the student's involvement with it, and the extent to which the teaching is directed toward practical training or toward the broad treatment of general subjects and imaginative goals. Practical knowledge is the source of society's technology--its means for sustaining life and well-being--while imaginative knowledge is the source of its culture.

5. Involvement with ideas is radically different from the students' usual orientation to grades. If academic learning is defined by the student as doing his duty, or acquiring the material benefits of good grades, a major barrier is put in the way of real learning.

6. Education should encourage independence of thinking, creativity, and social responsibility; but it is not likely to accomplish these objectives until a basic change takes place in our system for rewarding students. Furthermore, if a college is to encourage these purposes, it must (as a minimum) run its own affairs according to values known to and worthy of emulation by its students. There should be no reluctance to state the social purposes for which it expects its students to take responsibility.
I. AIMS OF EDUCATION

In The American College I called for public criticism of our colleges as a stimulus to educational reform. The attacks made by the public in reaction to student activism, however, were not what I had in mind. It is depressing enough that statements made by politicians or irate letters written to editors reveal a punitive attitude toward students who will not stay "in their place"; more disturbing is the fact that these statements and letters are testimony of the extremely narrow concept of education that prevails in our society. "Getting an education" appears to be a matter of acquiring units of information; how much one acquires is in direct proportion to the number of hours spent in the classroom. There is rarely any suggestion that education might improve the individual, that it might broaden his horizons, liberate him from dogma, from prejudice, or from internal conflict that limits his humanity. Seldom does any member of the general public state that education ought to help a student find himself; or that education consists of a total experience embracing not only courses and examinations, but opportunities for students to try new styles of life,
to learn from each other, or to form their beliefs through involvement in controversial issues.

It is ironical that leading citizens should accept this notion of education as a purely academic thing; they have nothing to gain by doing so, and this limited notion contradicts many of their own values. Ask a state legislator, for example, what he got out of college. The chances are that, perhaps after joking that he could hardly get into college today (thus implicitly recognizing that standards of admission have become more rigidly academic), he will recall a relationship, or at least an encounter, with a particular professor; an experience with a friend that taught him something important about life; or participation in the student protests of his day. Ask a parent what he hopes college will do for his son or daughter, and he will quickly come to thinking about admirable qualities of character: the ability to think for oneself, to have a sense of values, to act responsibly, to enjoy life. A parent may hope that his child will "get something more out of life" than he did, or that he will be a better man.

Why people have kept silent about these things remains a mystery—unless they believe they stand alone, or that education should be left to the experts. Let us hope it is not because people believe that what is done in our colleges is irrelevant to human purpose. In any case, although these vital, human aims of education have a wide public, this
public has not prosecuted them effectively. It has been left to the stu-
dents—the best and most articulate ones—to protest that what they were
getting in colleges did not meet these ideals. Colleges and universi-
ties have needed to be reminded firmly that the central place in their
activities rightfully belongs to the student. When I say that the develop-
ment of students as individuals, and not the accumulation of knowledge,
is the primary aim of education, I believe that I am largely restating in
contemporary terms the philosophy of democratic and humanistic educa-
tion that is characteristic of Western civilization. In this philosophy
of education, two elements are persistent: the notion that there is an
ideal of mature manhood toward which students are guided, and the
belief that students are educated to be able to realize these ideals, or
values, through association with teachers. I might remark that Emerson
made much the same complaint I am making when he wrote, in the mid-
nineteenth century:

We teach boys to be such men as we are. We do not teach
them to aspire to be all they can. We do not give them a
training as if we believed in their noble nature . . . . We
exercise their understanding to the apprehension and compar-
is of some facts, to a skill in numbers, in words; we aim
to make accountants, attorneys, engineers; but not to make
able, earnest, great-hearted men. The great object of Edu-
cation should be commensurate with the object of life. It
should be a moral one; to teach self-trust; to inspire the
youthful man with an interest in himself; with a curiosity
touching his own nature; to acquaint him with the resources
of his mind . . . .

Without claiming to trace the changes in Greek educational
philosophy from the Homeric ideals of aristocratic education through the later, democratic education of the city-state, we may observe that the Greeks conceived education, paideia, to be the shaping of Greek character in accordance with an ideal of human personality. The curriculum—which at different points in history and in the philosophies of different men stressed music, gymnastics, mathematics, logic, or oratory—was made to serve this end. When Plato in The Republic recommended a course of study for political rulers, he was not giving graduate training in political science or public administration; he prescribed mathematics because the habits of thought it developed would enable his rulers to have a conception of truth necessary to the act of governing. Moreover, he was not simply "producing a governing class" in the sense that we might think of it today. Instead, he was enabling these men to express their political selves; the political self being, to the Greeks, an inalienable aspect of the human being. Only by participating in the polis, not by defying the state, could the Greeks realize the human attribute of freedom. Thus, in this complicated way, did paideia, or education, make possible the fullest development of man.

The classical scholar Werner Jaeger notes that Plato, speaking of education, "used the physical metaphor of moulding character" (italics Jaeger's). He continues:

The German word Bildung clearly indicates the essence of education in the Greek . . . Platonic sense; for it covers the
artist's act of plastic formation as well as the guiding pattern present to his imagination . . . Throughout history, whenever this conception reappears, it is always inherited from the Greeks; and it always reappears when man abandons the idea of training the young like animals to perform certain definite external duties, and recollects the true essence of education.

In an analysis of the "Telemachia," that part of The Odyssey dealing with a crisis in the life of Odysseus' son Telemachus, Jaeger raises issues that make clear the connection between the Greek idea of education and the ideals of development and teaching that were just mentioned.

At first, Telemachus is only a youth, helpless before the arrogant suitors of his mother. He watches their insolent conduct with resignation, and without the strength to make an independent decision to end it; a mild and incompetent young man, whose innate nobility makes it impossible for him even to oppose the men who are ruining his home, far less to justify his rights with violent action . . . .

In Book I of the Odyssey Athena herself, when in the guise of Mentor she gives advice to Telemachus, expressly describes her advice as education. Her speech serves to bring Telemachus' resolution to maturity.3

Although he fails in his attempt to oppose the suitors publicly in the assembly and demand help in searching for his father, he decides "to start secretly on that hazardous journey which is to make him a man at last." This resolution and this journey are the Telemachou paideia, the schooling of Telemachus. On this journey, Athena, "the goddess who in Homeric belief inspired men to fortunate adventures," accompanies Telemachus in the disguise of an old friend, Mentor.
Mentor watches every step his pupil takes, and . . . instructs him in the forms of courtly behavior, when he finds himself in novel and difficult situations. He teaches him how to address old noblemen like Nestor and Menelaus, and how to make his request of them in such a way as to ensure its success.  

"The core of the poet's charming narrative is, and is intended to be."

Jaeger says, "the problem of converting the young son of Odysseus into a thoughtful man whose high purposes shall be crowned with noble achievement." Interpreting this epic in modern terms, we should see that the duty of the teacher is not only to impart technical know-how, but to occupy himself with the values this information will serve.

At the 1966 meeting of the American Council on Education, William Arrowsmith, professor of classics at the University of Texas, recalled this ancient purpose:

Let me say immediately that I am concerned here with only one kind of teaching, and I am eager to talk about it because it is the kind of teaching with which this meeting is apparently least concerned. I mean the ancient, crucial, high art of teaching, the kind of teaching which alone can claim to be educational, an essential element in all noble human culture, and hence a task of infinitely more importance than research scholarship.

The teacher . . . will have no function or honor worthy of the name until we are prepared to make the purpose of education what it always was--the molding of men rather than the production of knowledge.  

Professor Arrowsmith calls attention to the role that can be filled only by the teacher, that of exemplar. It is a measure of how far we
have fallen from this ideal that some students, warned since high
school that they should pursue learning solely from an interest in the
subject matter for its own sake, feel uneasy when they find themselves
working especially hard for a teacher whom they like or enjoy. We need
educators, Arrowsmith says:

by which I mean Socratic teachers, visible embodiments of
the realized humanity of our aspirations, intelligence, skill,
scholarship; men ripened or ripening into realization, as
Socrates at the close of the Symposium comes to be, and
therefore embodies, personally guarantees, his own defini-
tion of love . . . . It is possible for a student to go from
kindergarten to graduate school without ever encountering a
man—a man who might for the first time give him the only
profound motivation for learning, the hope of becoming a
better man. 6

Today's college student needs preparation for a world in which he
must play a variety of roles and even adopt new occupational roles, per-
haps several times during his life; an impersonal world in which he must
nonetheless manage to remain an individual and assert his individuality;
a world with an awesome potential for either Utopia or disaster. How
can the college possibly teach this student all that he must know?

The truth, of course, is that it cannot. What the college teaches
and how well are far more important, I believe, than how much it teaches—
exploded in knowledge notwithstanding. It is time for us to act on the
knowledge that education is not a matter of how much content has been
poured into the student, and that educational growth is not a one-to-one
correspondence with lectures attended. Dramatic changes can begin in a moment, under the right circumstances, regardless of the amount of material covered. Most often these circumstances will involve a personal encounter between the student and an admired faculty member. Educational history may well be made by the first college that reduces the amount of material offered in its curriculum in order to give the faculty time to reach their students.

The time has come for us to control our zeal for imparting knowledge and skills, and to concentrate our efforts on developing the individual student. This is not a new idea in education—certainly not to liberal educators—but in recent years it has too frequently been neglected in favor of professional training, which makes products of the college acceptable to the graduate schools and to industry. The colleges themselves must take the lead in showing that the well-developed individual is, in the long run, the really promising candidate.

By education for individual development, I mean a program consciously undertaken to promote an identity based on such qualities as flexibility, creativity, openness to experience, and responsibility. Although these qualities depend in part on early experiences, college can develop them further and in new ways, as shown by our research at Vassar College a few years ago and by subsequent studies at other institutions.
Part of this development is of course intellectual and cognitive. Beyond the specific "subject matter," we can help students to acquire such general skills as the ability to analyze and to synthesize, to handle data, to see relationships and infer meanings, to judge evidence, and to generalize—skills essential to a variety of work-roles and life-roles. In fact I would like to see these skills taught more broadly, even to people whose work requirements are not going to be very difficult.

Intellect, however, must be considered as part of the personality, which by definition includes everything that an individual has learned. Facts and principles pertaining to the "real" world of natural science and practical affairs are retained by a student to the extent that they become integral to his purposes. The cultural heritage transmitted through humanistic studies becomes a major source of symbols and images that the individual uses in expressing emotional needs and relieving inner conflicts, through imagination, vicarious living, and participation in collective myths and fantasies. This is a major difference between an educated person and an uneducated one. The delinquent boy, to take a dramatic example, is one who simply has no intellectual resources that would permit him to deal with his problems in his imagination. Physical activity or sensation are the only modes available to him for satisfying his needs.

If general education consists of what remains after the content of
courses is forgotten, teachers should use whatever material they believe will best develop such qualities in their students as analytical power and sensitivity to feelings. Entering students, impatient to take their places in the world of work, often undervalue a general curriculum, especially when, as in community colleges, many students already have jobs and arrive with a strong orientation toward vocational improvement. These students will need help to understand that education is as much a preparation for the enjoyment of life as a vocational apprenticeship, and that what they do in the world of work can lead to wider intellectual interests. From retail selling, for example, one might move on to sociology or psychology.

Intellectual subjects, in turn, can be used to illuminate such practical issues as sexual morality, vocational choice, and social cooperation. It is curious how unprepared for life the graduates of our colleges are. For example, nearly half of the senior women we have studied still believe in a double standard of sexual morality—a sign that education had failed to connect with the real problems of students today. Similarly, Beardslee and O'Dowd found that students were choosing their occupations on the basis of imagined life styles, not on the basis of what work the occupation demands—a subject they knew little about. In the sphere of social cooperation, students are capable of similar naivete. Seeking a revision of parietal rules, students at a well-known eastern college
formed a committee but were unable to function because individuals refused to accept the majority decisions. They wanted total freedom, which to them meant the absence of any rules whatsoever.

The college that would educate students for the world of tomorrow must plan to use all of its resources for this purpose. The curriculum, methods of teaching, the organization of teacher-student relationships, living arrangements, extracurricular activities, activities of the college president and his assistants—all should be studied anew, with attention to how they may contribute to individual development. The planning of a total educational environment must be guided by a theory of the total personality as well as by social theory. Personality theory will enable us to connect what happens in residence halls or on the playing fields with what happens in the classroom; it will indicate what parts or aspects of the person influence other parts, and how these influential parts may be affected by forces from the environment. Social theory will suggest how we may arrange the social environment so that it will effectively influence those parts of the personality that determine change in the whole.
II. THEORY OF EDUCATION

Personality is an inferred organization of processes within the individual. What are the processes of personality and how are they organized? One approach to answering these questions that has proved useful in the past conceives of the personality as comprising three major systems: a system of primitive impulses and feelings; a system of inhibiting or punishing forces that have been automatically taken over from the social environment--the primitive conscience; and a system that controls and adapts and integrates in accordance with the demands of reality--the ego. The inner life of the person consists largely in conflicts and alliances among these systems, and it is to patterns of their interaction that we may largely attribute observable traits of personality. Impulses are particularly likely to be in conflict with the demands of conscience, the internal moral authority; and the ego has the special task of finding, for impulses, modes of gratification that are acceptable to conscience and in keeping with the requirements of reality. Anxiety, doubt, guilt, or behavior that is restricted or peculiar attend the ego's failures; satisfaction and joy attend its successes.
A high level of development in personality is characterized most essentially by complexity and by wholeness. There is a high degree of differentiation in the developed personality, a large number of different parts or features having different and specialized functions; there is also a high degree of integration, a state of affairs in which communication among parts is great enough so that different parts may, without losing their essential identity, become organized into larger whoies in order to serve the larger purposes of the person. In the highly developed person there is a rich and varied impulse life—feelings and emotions having become differentiated and civilized; conscience has been broadened and refined, and it is enlightened and individualized, operating in accord with the individual's best thought and judgment; the processes by which the person judges events and manages actions are strong and flexible, being adaptively responsive to the multitudinous aspects of the environment, and at the same time in close enough touch with the deeper sources of emotion and will so that there is freedom of imagination and an enduring capacity to be fully alive. This highly developed structure underlies the individual's sense of direction, his freedom of thought and action, and his capacity to carry out commitments to others and to himself. But the structure is not fixed once and for all. The highly developed individual is always open to new experience and capable of further learning; his stability is fundamental in the sense that he can go on developing while remaining essentially himself.
A student develops when confronted with challenges that require new kinds of adaptive responses and when he is freed from the necessity of maintaining unconscious defensive devices. These occurrences result in the enlargement and further differentiation of the systems of the personality, and they set the stage for integration on higher levels. This process does not distinguish the student from other people. Everybody has unconscious motives and mechanisms and a repertory of coping devices that he hopes will be adequate to the challenges of life, and everybody can develop further when the necessary conditions are present.

Development Through Challenge

According to the prevailing functionalist point of view in psychology, a person strives to reduce tension, and, when unbalanced by tension, will change in order to restore equilibrium. This state of equilibrium is not identical with the state that existed before the tension-inducing stimulus arrived. After each successful striving, the organism is changed. The personality has new ways of coping with the environment--new images of what it needs and new patterns of action. From this formulation it follows that an expanding personality not only fails to regain its earlier stable states, but also opens itself to new kinds of tension. A more complex personality thus has greater possibilities for frustration and conflict, but for growth as well. These possibilities are not always exercised; adolescents and adults do not change as readily as children precisely
because they have a greater repertory of behavior. Unless they are presented with sufficient challenge, they will react as they have in the past. It is only when old patterns of behavior are insufficient to reduce tension that a change will occur—hence the importance of challenge in the right degree.

A student entering college has a wide array of adaptive mechanisms and ways of ordering experience that have served him well in the past and maintain his stability in the present. If he is eager for new experiences, he is often eager not so much for change in himself as for the chance to test the powers he already has, to prove to himself his competence and strength. When confronted with challenging situations, he naturally calls into play first his well-tried responses. When they are finally replaced, his natural inclination is to try to make the new structure do for all future contingencies—and so on. The teacher ought to keep challenging this structure in the interest of growth, but this task is made difficult by the "prematurity" of many college students who feel they already know what they want to be and how they want to live.

This view of development contradicts the belief that all we have to do is protect adolescents from sources of tension and let them grow up naturally—a view applied indiscriminately to college students more by parents and some psychiatrists than by educators. No college would think of applying this method in the realm of intellect, but many adopt
this *laisser-aller* attitude with regard to broader individual development. The two spheres are not in fact separated, and they cannot be treated so.

In understanding how challenges cause people to mature, one ought to keep in mind that people develop in phases or stages. They remain in one phase for a time before passing on to another marked by greater expansion and complexity of personality but bearing some dynamic relationship to the processes of the prior stage. The fact that men develop step by step implies the concept of their readiness to move from one step to the next; and the fact that different people show similar changes at different ages leads one to consider the importance of *individual rates of development*. Both concepts should inform any thought about challenge in the college years.

The idea of readiness underlies many of our commonsense practices in child training and education. We suppose that a particular experience, such as going to school or going away from home for a time, will be good for a young person because he is ready for it. If some ordinarily salutary set of events, such as going abroad or getting married, proves to be disappointing, we are quick to think of explanations in terms of the individual's unreadiness. Actually, our knowledge about readiness leaves much to be desired. What predisposes a personality to rally in response to a challenge and come through it changed for the better? Erikson's discussion
of life crisis offers some light on this point. In his outline of the stages of ego development, the attainment characteristic of each stage is thought to be a precondition for progress to a higher stage. For example, a young person can establish a suitable ego identity only after attaining adequate independence from his parents, and only after his identity is established can he lose himself in a relationship of genuine intimacy.

Readiness in itself, though, is not a sufficient cause of development: the personality does not just unfold automatically according to a plan of nature. What the state of readiness means, essentially, is that the individual is now open to new kinds of stimuli and prepared to deal with them in an adaptive way.

In a simple society, young people will move through these stages of development on a fairly standard timetable, starting a new thing at a prescribed age; a complex, nontribal society shows greater individual variation in rates of development. Most college seniors, for example, are concerned primarily with establishing a place in adult society, with vocational and marriage plans; but many will have settled these questions earlier and will have been marking time, while many others will still be struggling to gain control over impulses, to overcome their dependence upon their parents, to perceive reality accurately, or even to establish
basic trust. These individual differences may be understood in terms of varying degrees of readiness and in the timing of challenging stimuli.

If, with Erikson, we conceive of a succession of attainments each of which is necessary to later development, we have to deal with the possibility that an individual may be delayed or "fixated" at any one of these stages. What often happens is that the stimulus situation--the "crisis," in Erikson's sense--which might have led to adaptation on a higher developmental level, was actually too upsetting and evoked a defensive reaction based on unconscious mechanisms that prevent an adaptive resolution of the crisis.

The question of optimal rate of development is highly complex. It is not simply a matter of pushing youngsters over a series of hurdles as expeditiously as possible. Our culture, on the contrary, generally favors a long period in which the child and the youth are encouraged to develop before taking up adult responsibilities. It is commonly assumed that, within vaguely defined limits, the longer the period of preparation the richer and more productive the adult life will be. We place a great value on four years of college because we assume that the readiness for experience built up in the college years will make all future events more meaningful and will increase the likelihood that they will be met in ways that expand and develop the personality. We have little solid information...
about this. It is not hard to find college students whose life supports this assumption; but there are also cases of college years that were wasted or that constituted failures at preparation for life, just as there are people who “found themselves” only long after college and attained extraordinary heights of development.

It is well to emphasize the distinction between arrests of development due to unconscious defensive reactions and failure to develop because of lack of challenge. Psychotherapeutic help may be needed in the first case, but the college may postpone intervention as long as the conscious ego is continuing to expand through ordinary educational experiences. In the latter case, the college has a duty to act at once. Surely we can afford to be deliberate about introducing young people to the major challenges of adult life, but there would be no advantage in this course unless the time gained by postponement were filled with experiences that develop the personality.

In our culture, adolescence is not an orderly process, accomplished by definite rites de passage; it might more accurately be called a time of disorganization of the personality. Challenged by internal chemical changes and external social novelties, the adolescent is virtually lifted out of the culture that has been “ordinary” for him; he is no longer the tractable, pleasant schoolboy he was during later childhood, and to his parents he may seem unrecognizable or foreign. The remarkable thing
is that after adolescence he will "re-enter" the culture in some way of life that parents will acknowledge to be related to theirs. What happens during adolescence has a strong effect on the precise way he does re-enter society. Adolescence is a time when great changes can be effected; the young person, in some degree, is given a chance to repair whatever ravages, small or large, childhood may have worked on him. He can escape the image of himself that he formed when a child; he can find a new way of relating to authority figures; or he can establish a new competence in his work. These changes are not discontinuous with his past; they will certainly bear some relation to his life history. But the point to be emphasized here is that adolescence is a time particularly rich in possibilities for change. (Our personalities are not determined absolutely and forever from a very early age, as popularized Freudian theory has led so many to believe.) Many students come to college already "knowing" Freud and never realizing how much they can change. They are usually delighted to be told how much living they have ahead of them, and they often undertake a serious lot of reading to choose the best direction for change!

Though a student's ability to change may be liberated or enhanced simply by informing him that the possibility exists, this practice is hardly sufficient as a college policy. Because young people are at a developmental stage concerned with the problems of identity and self-esteem, they are not yet ready to direct their own development.
Self-Knowledge: Prerequisite to Development

The teacher’s role is not only to provide external challenges to proffered opinions, but to turn the student’s scrutiny inward upon himself in search of the sources of his beliefs. For example, he ought to be made to think in classes in history, politics, anthropology, economics, and sociology of how his character has been shaped by Western culture, by his social class, and by his hometown. A teacher of literature may insist that his students understand fictional characters before judging them; this requires a student’s ego to identify, at least for the purposes of understanding, with personalities quite alien to his own. In short, he will be required to develop a measure of tolerance. Some psychology courses, as well as courses in literature, can encourage the beginnings of insight into unconscious forces. Education is not psychotherapy, of course, and intellectualization is one of the commonest of defenses used by college students; but students can often achieve a measure of helpful self-understanding simply through using information brought to their attention in class or in reading.

Although college is not a therapeutic community, the education it offers ought to be concerned with unconscious processes, both because they may hinder learning, and because an appreciation of the unconscious dynamics affecting our lives is part of the way we in the twentieth century should fulfill the first Socratic principle of wisdom, to know ourselves.
This kind of self-knowledge is essential if the student is to respond to challenge in the best way.

Unconscious processes can block learning whenever they prevent a person from having a given experience or when inhibiting mechanisms offer themselves so readily that new adaptive responses have no chance to be tried. These barriers to learning frustrate many students: the girl who cannot learn economics because she cannot seriously entertain any ideas that might threaten her special relationship with her father; the boy who cannot work in any subject because he fears that his achievement would give away his desire to get the better of his father; or the numerous students so taken up with the problems of sexual morality or sexual accomplishment that they can hardly devote attention to anything else.

It is no wonder that some psychiatrists, familiar with unconscious processes and their enormous implications for the students' future, have considered that the most important step in the development of the entering student is making these processes conscious, thus permitting the ordinary educational procedures to do their work. I do not suggest that all or even most students should have psychotherapy, but it has been cogently argued by Lawrence Kubie that educators must find some way to lead students to that "self-knowledge in depth" that is sometimes attained in the consulting room. In his view, the college ought to take the chance to reduce the
number of graduates who cut off their chances for fulfillment and who injure not only themselves but other people as well. Moreover, the college ought not to be satisfied with a system of higher education that permits its graduates to put skills and knowledge into the service of unconsciously determined and socially destructive ideologies.

But there are other uses of self-knowledge, apart from those concerned with unblocking learning or repairing the damaged personality. In the theory of development presented here, development occurs "in the presence of" readiness and challenge. The personality is not entirely dominated by unconscious processes, but is open in part to modification through experience. Knowing the potency of unconscious processes, the college teacher is completely justified in devoting himself to the expansion of that part of the student's personality that is not dominated by them. The assumption is that as the consciously determined parts of the personality expand and develop, the unconsciously determined parts will shrink in relative importance. We must learn to recognize those students whose unconscious processes can determine the whole course of their educational experience and will yield only to special therapeutic procedures; but in other students unconscious processes may be expected to wither on the vine as the conscious ego expands.

The ego expands in part through the normal processes of maturation.
When a girl has a baby of her own, for example, she can often understand her mother in a way she never did before. Her new role brings a new conception of herself and of her mother, so that the relationship between the two women is changed. The girl is able to see and respond to her mother more as she really is and less on the basis of imagery acquired in childhood. Changes like this may reduce the need for repression of images or thoughts even as they require a cognitive reorganization of the interpersonal world.

Education can sometimes hasten these changes, and it can also make available experiences that have the power to change but that would not be offered as part of the normal process of growing up in a given subculture. As in the example noted above, in which the student may be required to understand a fictional character in a deep, personal way, these experiences often come to us through literature. In learning to appreciate A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, or The Immoralist, or Man's Fate, a student extends his human sympathies—or, in our terms, he both expands his impulse life and satisfies it through imagination. His unrepressed id has become richer and fuller, and his ego has become more successful at gratifying impulses in acceptable ways. Thus, what may have been an unconscious impulse striving for gratification has become a part of that synthesis of personality achieved by a strong ego mediating the sometimes conflicting demands of impulses and reality.
Freud described this relation between impulses and the imagination in his analysis of what he termed "the primary process." It was his notion that when an infant does not have a need gratified immediately—as happens most of the time—he quiets the drive-tension he feels by conjuring up an image of the thing he needs for gratification. This generation of images becomes in itself gratifying, and this fantasy is the source of later poetry, art, or other acts of creation. As he grows, the child obtains some mastery of the symbols of his culture and thus becomes able to participate in collective fantasies and to extend his range by learning what others have dreamed of. The power of reading and the process of education make this extension much greater than is possible in the relatively straightforward enculturation that takes place in simpler societies.

Through the imagination, the individual may expand and release his impulse life without jeopardizing the integration of his personality. By making the cultural world available to the child and teaching him symbols and how to use them, we enable him to perform all kinds of psychological functions that would be impossible if he were restricted to transactions with concrete things. Only in this way can adults remain civilized while gratifying the infantile needs that are still very much with them and which demand satisfaction.
III. SOME APPLICATIONS OF EDUCATIONAL THEORY

In applying such a theory to educational problems, we may proceed in two ways. One is to examine different features of the college environment and ask with respect to each what it contributes to individual development and how it might contribute more. The other is to focus on some aspect of individual development and ask how it might be favored or hampered by experiences in college.

The Educational Environment: The Curriculum

To consider the educational environment, we may look first at the developmental influence of the curriculum, which is that environment's central feature. Those of us who have been professionally concerned with personality development, or, more particularly, with trying to overcome the effects of past failures in development, have to be very explicit about the place of academic learning in our scheme of things. Otherwise—perhaps even so—we will be accused of trying to substitute mental health for educational goals, of trying to turn educational institutions into therapeutic communities, or of otherwise subverting the intellectual activities of institutions. Paul Braisted has stated the issue sharply:
Recent discussion of the education of college students, in both professional and popular writing, is based on two largely unrelated assumptions. One reflects the concern of scholars and teachers with the acquisition of knowledge, methods of instruction, training and research. The other reflects the psychologist's preoccupation with the emotional aspects of personality. The first largely ignores the tremendous effect individual differences among students have on the way their studies are assimilated and used in their development. The second obscures the intellectual component of growth, largely ignoring the influence of the curriculum and pays attention principally to personal relationships and activities outside the classroom.

This statement describes very well the polarization of opinion that occurred when a group of educators gathered at Vassar, in the winter of 1962, to discuss The American College. Although we tried in that book to give the curriculum its due, we evidently had not gone far enough, or been clear enough, or induced enough people actually to read the book. Something of a climax of the conference was reached when the president of a prominent women's college rose to denounce our supposed clinical preoccupations and said, "My husband always said that psychologists' children turn out worse than anybody else's."

We had argued that what students studied was crucially important but that in order for a topic of study to contribute to individual development it had to seem meaningful to the student and that the first task of the teacher was to make subject matter "come alive."

The president of Sarah Lawrence, Esther Raushenbush, in her book
The Student and His Studies, has performed the invaluable service of detailing how this last actually takes place. In 1962 and 1963 she visited several campuses in the United States talking to students "who had become involved, or engaged, in their intellectual life, so that it mattered seriously to them." She chose four students in particular and wrote detailed reports on their college years, drawing her material from conversations with the student, letters he wrote about his academic experiences, and papers he submitted for courses. Scott Hansen, for example, came to Harvard planning to study mathematics. His high school mathematics teacher had inspired remarkable achievement in all her students, and Scott was put into an advanced placement section. But in his freshman year he also chose to take a freshman seminar in social relations, which required that students register concurrently in a humanities course. "The most important thing about that seminar for Scott," Mrs. Raushenbush writes, "was that students' questions about important issues were treated as serious questions." By his sophomore year, Scott was majoring in social relations. An article appearing in the Harvard Crimson at the beginning of that year, "In Praise of Academic Abandon," urged the importance of a student's forgetting the demands of assignments and grades, and of reading widely, like a free man; Scott felt this statement described "my relation to college, and I was delighted to learn that there were others like me around."
His personal concerns found expression in academic and other work. The issues of personal freedom and authority were raised by readings on Jewish education; papers on Jack Kerouac and on Huckleberry Finn encouraged his thought about alienation and commitment. He read a great deal in politics and history; he studied conscientious objection; joined Tocsin, the campus disarmament group; went on the Washington Peace March; thought about capital punishment and became exercised over the execution of Caryl Chessman. He wrote this about his work in his social relations tutorial:

The first appearance of the political angle in my required work was the spring tutorial paper, on Hoover. Compare it to the fall term one on crime. I can see every difference in the world. Mainly, the emotional content permeating the crime paper has been drained from the latter one. It wasn't that I wasn't working on something personally important; rather, I'd shoved my personal conflicts enough to the side that I was concentrating on the objective situation, on Hoover and FDR as presidents.  

At another time, he commented:

The tutor thought the paper on alienation was too beautiful, too religious... too mystical... He advised that I read some Hemingway or Dostoyevski. I don't know how much this lecture affected me. I resented it so much that I put away the notes I'd scribbled during it and completely forgot about it. On the other hand, I have very definitely moved in the direction he advised then. This may be due merely to the passage of time.  

In his senior year, Scott petitioned to change his thesis topic from Freud to politics. His starting point was "the belief Orwell expressed in 1936, that socialism was the only possible effective enemy of fascism. Since
it actually turned out to be a Tory, not a socialist, Great Britain that waged war so well against the Axis, we may presume that believing as Orwell did could engender a good deal of wasted political effort. I would like to know more about this kind of error of judgment." Mrs. Raushenbush summarizes the importance of this sort of education with reference, as it happens, to another student who had been learning that "the important thing about one's relations to other men's ideas does not rest with knowing what they are, but what difference they make to the individual who discovers them." 

In interpreting this kind of study in terms of personality theory, we may ask what are the ways in which ideas "make a difference?" It was suggested above that they make a difference when they become related to--serve or threaten--the individual's purposes, and two major categories of purpose were distinguished: the practical and the imaginative. This distinction has been elaborated by Katz and Sanford:

We distinguish two main functions of the pursuit of knowledge, the practical and the imaginative functions. In its practical function knowledge acts in the service of survival and successful mastery of the environment. In this attempt at mastery it confronts two worlds: the outer world, comprising both natural and human society, and the inner world of impulses. The attempt to understand these inner and outer forces has always characterized the pursuit of knowledge . . . .

The other side of the intellectual pursuit has been an imaginative extension of the real world . . . which has served two quite different purposes: (1) that of an enrichment of reality by lifting the person beyond sensuous and practical immediacy, and (2) that of a withdrawal from reality . . . .
There is no clear distinction between the practical and the imaginative dimensions of knowledge. For imagination is required in the tasks of mastering reality. The fantasies of the prophet or the plans of the architect—even when they seem to defy gravity—have often become tomorrow's reality.\textsuperscript{15}

In a general way, practical knowledge is the source of a society's technology—it's means for sustaining life and material well-being—while imaginative knowledge is the source of its culture—it's "transmitted and created content and patterns of values, ideas, and other symbolic-meaningful systems."\textsuperscript{16} Individuals assimilate the technology and the culture of the society in which they grow up, but no two people do so in exactly the same way. Each time an individual learns something a person-technology or a person-culture interaction takes place, and the new content that is added to the individual's psychological household embodies something of what the society offered and something of what was already there in the person. Thus we may think of the knowledge that has been integrated with an individual's practical purposes—the satisfaction of all those needs that he shares with animals—as his technology; and we may think of the knowledge that has been integrated with his distinctively human needs—to find meaning, to resolve inner conflicts, to develop, to sustain, and express personality—as his culture.

College students acquire a great deal of their practical knowledge from each other. How to get along in the world, how to relate to each other, how to deal with the "system" of the institution or of the larger society—these
are common topics of discussion among students, who are likely to make sharp distinctions between this truly useful knowledge and what they are offered in the classroom. But courses that are directly related to a student's chosen vocation are, of course, seen as useful and the material offered in them is quickly learned and integrated with the individual's practical purposes. If knowledge can be tied to actual practice, as in laboratory work, it is acquired all the more rapidly. Students who begin to contemplate their future vocational roles become very much concerned with learning what they believe they need to know, and they are likely to rebel against learning what they see as not likely to be useful in their future work or what they can exclude from their intended specialty. Such students are likely to be regarded by their teachers as suitably motivated. More than this, commitment to a vocation (most of which, in our society, have to do with mastery of the natural and social environments) is a major basis for a student's sense of personal identity. What he knows, and how much, become essential features of his conception of his self.

What is learned for one purpose, even one so lowly as that of passing a course, may be somehow "stored" and later brought into the service of another purpose. Such stored knowledge must be conceived of as peripheral to the personality, but once it has found a place in a creative
construction it certainly becomes one's own; one becomes fully identified with it, and in that sense it is an aspect of the self.

Ideas need not have any relationship to a vocational commitment in order for a student to become fully involved with them. This is clearly shown in the case of Scott Hansen. It seems safe to say that his concern with the problem of freedom and authority has to do with his own conflict with authority. It appears that he would resolve this conflict by studying and writing about education and crime, alienation, commitment and conscientious objection, and by testing his ideas and beliefs in action, as in taking a position on the Chessman case. He is out to build a structure of values and beliefs that is supported by knowledge, consistent with his ideal self, and within which his personal conflict disappears or becomes insignificant. Excitement is generated as he makes discoveries that favor the success of his undertaking or as his developing scheme is threatened by facts or considerations that he had failed to take into account.

The involvement of students with academic content may often be explained on the basis that they have found a way to put this content into the service of their inner needs. But it must be noted that vast structures of knowledge and belief may be built up in the interests of needs that are infantile or defensive. Treatises have been written, for example, in support of antisemitism. We must be very careful, of
course, in suggesting to a student that his ideas may be questionable because of his bias, or that the social value of ideas depends upon their sources within the individual. There is no denying, however, that students concoct belief systems to suit their stage of development, and that a great deal of learning—and resistance to learning—will have the object of supporting such systems. These systems must be challenged if they are to evolve in the direction of greater logic, veridicality, and freedom from bias; and when they are effectively challenged, there is movement toward greater integration of personality.

Systems of knowledge, belief, and value may be regarded as extensions of the self and, as such, they have the same kind of role in personality functioning as do other aspects of the self. Note Scott Hansen's sensitivity to criticism of his paper on alienation. It was his paper, with his thoughts, that is to say, something of himself in it; so he first responded defensively. But note also that in time he assimilated the criticism and began to incorporate it within his scheme of things—a definite developmental advance. This young man also shows us the opposite side of this coin: in a freshman seminar he discovered that his own ideas had value and were appreciated, and he was so delighted with this boost to his self-esteem that he decided to change his major to the field represented by the appreciative professor. A more extreme, but of course very common, form of this same phenomenon is to be found in the
professor who identifies himself with his course, or his course with himself. One may say that changing a curriculum is tantamount to changing the personalities of the professors who teach it—a difficult undertaking.

In the examples given it appears that the student or scholar loves ideas or loves his work in the same way that he loves himself. This is somewhat different from the case in which an individual loves ideas or arrangements of ideas in the same way that he loves any other object or another person. This, in terms of psychoanalysis, is “object love.” The individual cares for the “object” as he does for himself, but he is not identified with it. Damage or threats to the object are not experienced as narcissistic wounds; rather they arouse anger and protectiveness, and loss of the object is an occasion for grief. When a young woman says she loves Dante, or Middle English, we are justified in regarding this as a true romance. Analysis might reveal that she has transferred to these objects some of the affection that was originally directed to other objects, but the fact remains that the affective relationship is something that exists right now, and that it offers many advantages to individual development.

Involvement with ideas, then, is radically different from the students' usual orientation to grades. Although knowledge acquired with grades in view may be stored and used for some larger purpose, we know that most
such knowledge is quickly forgotten. It seems safe to say, too, that if academic learning is defined by the student as doing his duty, or acquiring the material benefits of good grades, a major barrier is put in the way of that kind of engagement which can give him deep satisfaction and expand his personality.

What kind of curriculum will be most favorable to the kind of involvement of which we have been speaking? For one thing, it seems apparent that there are quite different ways of arriving at the same place. Once the student has acquired facility in expressing thought, there is no basis for saying that there are particular contents that he, like all students, must by all means learn. On the other hand, most freshmen are in a poor position to know what their interests are or what subject areas are likely to involve them. A required curriculum, at least in the beginning, is not to be ruled out, though it is to be hoped that students will have the opportunity to choose among such curricula. The traditional liberal arts, programs of multidisciplinary courses organized around great issues, courses of study with field work directed to contemporary social problems—these and other curricula, because of their richness, their inexhaustibility, have the capacity fully to engage students. For that matter, the same might be said of specialized studies within existing disciplines, as long as they bring the student into contact with concrete experiences that he is asked to conceptualize. We might even allow some students, of
appropriate bent, to begin with vocational studies, provided we watch for opportunities to connect their specific interests with more general ideas. In short, it is extremely difficult to predict what will capture a student's imagination; he should be exposed to a wide range of materials and ideas, and once he has become involved with ideas he should have the freedom to pursue his interest in his own way.

The Educational Environment: Other Features

When we stop to think about our colleges and universities, it is surprising how little their essential aspects are organized with their students in mind. Instead of learning from an adult whom he knows and admires, the student is dealt with by offices in charge of registration, counseling, teaching, and discipline, according to a model adapted from business and the military. Bureaucratization is often the result of bigness, but it is not a necessary result. The fault is rather that in responding to pressures—from government, from the proliferation of detailed knowledge and of courses from graduate technical education—teaching institutions have had their attention turned away from the undergraduate. As long as a university really cares about teaching those who come to learn, it will find ways to control the disorganizing effects of largeness. The University of Minnesota, for instance, had a very large enrollment, but a visitor can sense that its elements somehow pull together. Berkeley in 1940 had 20,000 students—nearly as many as today—but to those of
us who taught there, it did not seem too large; we felt that the univers-
ity was of one piece, that its leaders spoke for it as a whole, and that
everybody was somehow identified with the total enterprise. In evalu-
ating a college or university, then, we should avoid confusing size and
coherence. Each size has its own virtues. Certain styles of develop-
ment require the community of a small school; others thrive more readily
in the rich and diverse environment of a major university.

Largeness and complexity of organization are very much with us, and
neither is an evil in itself. The problem is that as colleges and univer-
sities have become more complex, differentiation has outrun integration.
Traditional means of holding the university together are breaking down:
as higher education becomes available to a wider socioeconomic range,
the student body becomes less homogeneous; as dormitory capacity is
exceeded, fewer students live on campus. Contacts between students
and teachers grow less frequent, partly because of the very differentiating
forces which we would hope these contacts could mitigate. Leisure has
all but vanished under the pressure of demands for excellence, and stu-
dents lose the precious stretches of time they need to make good friends
and sort through the confusing diversity of college life. In the midst of
academic incoherence, we need to strengthen the forces of integration.
Many approaches are valuable.
Generalism. Many disintegrating forces arise from the way the search for knowledge is currently organized. The research problems that absorb the faculty member are difficult to connect with teaching; to advance in his discipline, the young professor is forced to specialize, leaving most of the larger questions to old men and undergraduates. The university may try to cajole its specialists to teach general education courses for at least a few hours each week. But it could also begin to reward not only the usual reports of "original research," but also the professors who cross disciplinary fences or who publish essays significant to undergraduates. One way of generalizing inquiry, at least in the social sciences, is through multidisciplinary research institutes, where problems such as alcoholism, human destructiveness, or the widespread disaffection of youth must be conceived of in terms of their human significance rather than as partial illustrations of pre-existing disciplines. These are problems that everybody can worry about and, to some extent, understand; and staff members have found that even freshmen are interested and able to take part in the research or field work.

The recovery of purpose. Instead of keeping a clear idea of what they exist to do, universities have sometimes acted as if their main purpose were to survive, and as if the key to survival were frenetic attendance to the interests of as many different groups as possible. They have apparently shown no interest in discovering factors that unite the parts
and departments of a university, and in fact there is little that does
unite them except the undergraduates—students so unsophisticated as
to presume upon more than a single department. By ignoring the demands
of undergraduate education, the university encourages the growth within
it of a not necessarily desirable subculture. By interviewing a large
sample of students at Vassar, Berkeley, and Stanford several times each
year during their college career, we learned that institutional coherence
and the strength of peer culture vary inversely. When faced with frag-
mentation among the adults, students turn more exclusively to each other;
but when shown a larger purpose, they know how to respond.

Cohesive living arrangements. The kind of student culture a college
wants brings up the question of its living arrangements. For a number of
years I have been advocating the division of universities into smaller
colleges, as is now being done at the new campus of the University of
California at Santa Cruz. Its plan calls for a group of colleges of no
more than about 700 students each, with some resident faculty within
a university that will include graduate divisions. Smaller colleges should
make it possible once again for professors and students to know each
other, and for the students to become better acquainted among themselves.

Experiments in better teaching. Some efforts are already being made
to improve teaching. The whole design of the Santa Cruz campus of the
University of California is an attempt to create a climate in which teachers
will become interested in students and in which they will be afforded an opportunity to really teach them. Berkeley, too, has at last been able to launch an experimental program. In this program five teachers are responsible for the first two years' education of 150 self-selected students, which is the same student-teacher ratio as in the undergraduate division as a whole. Directed by Professor Joseph Tussman of the philosophy department, this is a program without courses. The entire curriculum consists of the study of a series of crises in civilization, in ancient Greece, in seventeenth-century England, and in the present-day United States. Most of the teaching is in seminars and in conferences with individual students, with weekly meetings of the whole "college" for lectures or discussions. It was quite an achievement for Professor Tussman to convince the faculty at Berkeley that students in this experimental program would probably be able to compete in upper-division courses with those who had been exposed to elementary courses in a variety of disciplines.

As matters stand, valuable innovations usually have to be added on to the departmental structure. At Stanford, applying a gift which was to be used in any way that an ad hoc committee thought favorable to creativity, we introduced freshman seminars in the fall of 1965. Within a year this program was one of the most generally applauded features of Stanford education. But would departments sacrifice any of their offerings so
that one of its faculty could give a seminar? Hardly. At no university
is there anyone to tell the departments what to do. But we cannot expect
the faculty to teach everything they are supposed to teach for their depart-
ments and then in their spare time and out of the goodness of their hearts
give a freshman seminar.

Although a change in what a teacher is rewarded for is necessary to
sustain faculty interest in general education, teachers can be appealed
to on bases other than money and status. Some faculty members, for
example, can be induced to enter into discussion of their teaching—of
their experiences, problems, and relations with students—in such a way
as to become more aware of themselves and of the processes of students.
Joseph Katz and his colleagues¹⁷ have demonstrated this to be true.
They also have shown that research on students can be a vehicle for
developing this sort of concern about teaching and about students. All
the teachers responsible for sections of large elementary courses took
part in all phases of an inquiry designed to evaluate the course. It hardly
needs to be said that the courses improved before the evaluation was com-
pleted. This kind of involvement with students can be stimulated relatively
inexpensively on a large scale. Teachers who participate are not open
to the charge of behaving like therapists simply because they show some
interest in students; nor does this research interfere with the teacher's
conception of himself as a specialist in some discipline. Often it is
this interest that calls forth creativity in a student—he knows that a teacher cares about what he writes or thinks.

One idea we tried at Stanford might well be tried elsewhere. We have conducted one-week seminars on particular topics in which students were interested; often the seminars were concerned with just one book. The seminars were held at a camp in the country; living together, we were able to hold discussions for as long as we liked, and being away from the ordinary demands of the campus served further to intensify our concentration. After this week, students could write a paper (for extra credit) before the end of the quarter if they wished. There is actually no reason why the entire college year might not be conducted in this way. The quarter might begin, for example, with just one or two such seminars; during the remainder of the quarter, students could continue reading in the field and consult with the seminar leader, who would act somewhat as a tutor. With this uncomplicated kind of structure, students could easily arrange a seminar topic of their choice on relatively short notice, and they could let their course of study follow where their reading led them. I might also mention that with the students who attended our week-long retreat I have a special relationship; it is not overly close, but I know each as an individual, and none would hesitate to ask me for a letter of recommendation or for other help. Surely this is a return to the kind of helpful but not obtrusive relationship that used to prevail.
Aspects of Individual Development

As examples of our second approach to educational problems—asking what conditions and processes favor development in different aspects of the person—let us consider in turn independence of thinking, creativity, and social responsibility.

**Independence of thinking.** No one will deny the importance of independence of thinking as an educational goal. But how it can be achieved is not immediately obvious. It is not just a matter of immediately giving everybody complete independence. What is involved is a very subtle interplay of cognitive (or intellectual) processes on the one hand and emotional (or characterological) ones on the other.

To ask how we might achieve independence of thinking is to ask how we might overcome authoritarianism. At the very least it means that students will have to have the knowledge to resist dogma, they must have
practice in criticism, they must have the self-esteem and confidence that will permit them to stand in opposition to pressures of authority and of the immediate social group, and they must have the awareness of themselves that will free them from the deeper sources of their prejudice.

Thus, the development of independence is not just a matter of challenging students so that they are required to think. It is also a matter of making them more aware of themselves. Such a goal depends upon a general climate of freedom in the university, and it depends upon the presence of some models of independent thinking. It would be valuable if two members of the faculty could be present at the same time in a course or seminar so that they could argue and thus demonstrate to students that honest differences can be debated rationally.

Furthermore, our approach should depend upon the stage of the student's development. Most freshmen in most institutions are fairly authoritarian. If they are given the maximum of freedom immediately, they are driven into the arms of their peer culture, which is not very intellectual; or else they are forced to depend upon some authority because, by and large, most young people at this stage are not prepared to make up their own minds about many things. If we were to put freshmen into a highly cosmopolitan, liberated kind of environment, many would leave in the first year because of their need for some sort of regime to keep
some of their anxiety at more or less moderate levels.

All during the 1950's my colleagues and I talked mainly in terms of how to liberate students who needed to be liberated. Today we know from studies of activist students that in the large cosmopolitan universities many students are already liberated. When the members of the FSM in Berkeley have been compared with students at large, the FSM students turn out to be different from the rank-and-file in much the same way that seniors are different from freshmen.

This means that the educational task for students who are already liberated is rather different than for those who are still caught in authoritarianism. In the 1950's we were not called upon to think about ways in which to work with this kind of liberated, highly advanced student. Today we have to give a great deal of consideration to them. We may have to treat them more as colleagues, taking them into our confidence and letting them participate in decisions affecting them. I doubt if these students can be regarded as authorities on curriculum, but I would suggest that they have the right to know where they are being led and why.

**Education for Creativity**

It is my belief that education for creativity differs little from the sort of education for individual development that I am proposing. Granted that a musician or an artist might want to attend a special school, or that
a physicist would certainly want to follow a particular course of study. But insofar as these special studies concentrate on making a man proficient in his chosen work, these studies are actually training, not what I would call education. Such training intends to make its students more like one another—perhaps not so much so in music as in science and the professions, where students have to acquire not only a common language and common techniques but shared attitudes, values, and styles of work as well. Education—a word that I am using in its philosophical sense of "leading forth" man's potentialities—aims to encourage individuality, to develop the person as fully as possible, making him increasingly human and unafraid of diversity. This is a far broader proposition than simply teaching proficiency. There is, of course, some interaction between educational and training procedures. Many young people choosing their life work begin to define themselves in terms of their discipline, and this sometimes represents an advance in their individual development, since their definition supplies a much-needed sense of self. But, in general, there is a certain tension between training and education. Today most college teachers are interested in recruiting undergraduates into their discipline as early as possible and professionalizing them thoroughly. This preprofessional training, unless it is carried on in a way that today is exceptional, conflicts with education, and I favor its postponement until graduate school.
Training, in this strict sense, leads away from creativity precisely because it is concerned with teaching the facts that are accepted as relevant to a given discipline and the traditional procedures, or methods, that have advanced the discipline to its present point. The student eager to progress in his training must be eager to learn the received way of doing things; whereas creativity, almost by definition, requires novelty—a way of looking at things that "nobody ever thought of before." A creative act is often spoken of as the joining of two ideas that no one would have thought of joining; in The Act of Creation,\textsuperscript{18} his detailed and excellent study of creative behavior, Arthur Koestler has used the word "biso- ciation" to refer to this act of creative linking. MacKinnon\textsuperscript{19} has used the term creativity to describe a cluster of traits including flexibility of thinking, breadth of perspective, autonomy, self-awareness, openness to experience, breadth of interests, and freedom of impulse. When these traits are measured independently, they are found not only to go together but to differentiate highly creative and productive adults, as judged by their peers, from less creative ones.

If this is what we agree to call a creative disposition, then education for development certainly has a place in encouraging it. It might be interesting to cite the opinion of a creative artist, Ben Shahn, who said in the Charles Eliot Norton lectures at Harvard that he saw no divergence between the objectives of a literal education and the objectiveness
There are, roughly, about three conditions that seem to be basic in the artist's equipment: to be cultured, to be educated, and to be integrated...

I think we could safely say that perceptiveness is the outstanding quality of the cultured man or woman. Perceptiveness is an awareness of things and people, of their qualities. It is recognition of values, perhaps arising from long familiarity with things of value, with art and music and other creative things, or perhaps proceeding from an inborn sensitiveness of character...

Attend a university if you possibly can. There is no content of knowledge that is not pertinent to the work you will want to do. But before you attend a university work at something for a while. Do anything. Get a job in a potato field; or work as a grease-monkey in an auto repair shop. But if you do work in a field do not fail to observe the look and the feel of earth and of all things that you handle—yes, even potatoes! Or, in the auto shop, the smell of oil and grease and burning rubber. Paint of course, but if you have to lay aside painting for a time, continue to draw. Listen well to all conversations and be instructed by them and take all seriousness seriously. Never look down upon anything or anyone as not worthy of notice. In college or out of college, read. And form opinions! Read Sophocles and Euripides and Dante and Proust. Read everything that you can find about art except the reviews. Read the Bible; read Hume; read Pogo. Read all kinds of poetry and know many poets and many artists. Go to an art school, or two, or three, or take art courses at night if necessary...

Look at pictures and more pictures. Look at every kind of visual symbol, every kind of emblem; do not spurn signboards or furniture drawings or this style of art or that style of art...

Talk and talk and sit at cafes, and listen to everything, to Brahms, to Brubeck, to the Italian hour on the radio. Listen to preachers in small town churches and in big city churches. Listen to politicians in New England town meetings and to rabble-rousers in Alabama. Even draw them...
Know all that you can about art, and by all means have opinions. Never be afraid to become embroiled in art or life or politics; never be afraid to learn to draw or paint better than you already do; and never be afraid to undertake any kind of art at all, however exalted or however common, but do it with distinction.

Anyone may observe that such an art education has no beginning and no end and that almost any other comparable set of experiences might be substituted for those mentioned, without loss. Such an education has, however, a certain structure which is dictated by the special needs of art.

Education itself might be looked upon as mainly the assimilation of experience. The content of education is naturally not confined to the limits of the college curriculum; all experience is its proper content. But the ideal of the liberal education is that such content be ordered and disciplined. It is not only content, but method too, the bridge to further content. I feel that this kind of discipline is a powerful factor in any kind of creative process; it affords the creative mind means for reaching into new fields of meaning and for interpreting them with some authority.

... the third item in our minimum program for the education of an artist: to be integrated ...

... integration implies involvement of the whole person, not just selected parts of him; integration, for instance, of kinds of knowledge (history comes to life in the art of any period); integration of knowledge with thinking—and that means holding opinions; and then integration within the whole personality—and that means holding some unified philosophical view, and attitude toward life. And then there must be the uniting of this personality, this view, with the creative capacities of the person so that his acts and his works and his thinking and his knowledge will be a unity. Such a state of being, curiously enough, invokes the word integrity in its basic sense: being unified, being integrated.

In their ideal of producing the person of integrity—the fully integrated person—colleges and universities are somewhat hampered by the very richness and diversity of the
knowledge content which they must communicate. Development of creative talents is allowed to wait upon the acquisition of knowledge. Opinion is allowed to wait upon authority. There may be certain fields in which this is a valid procedure, but it is not so in art. 20

Now that may sound somewhat perverse, to criticize the fact that creativity "is allowed to wait upon the acquisition of knowledge." We can't allow students to exercise their "creativity" before they know what they're talking about! But here is where standards of professionalism discourage students from doing what they can do at their young age and with their brief experience. Creativity is not something that a person "has" full-blown; a person's creativity grows only because he acts creatively, in whatever measure he can; and similarly, a person acquires the capacity to hold opinions only by holding opinions—even though in students they may seem primitive or partial. Any schooling that restricts these functions in the student and says in effect, "wait until you've learned all we have to teach you, then you can go ahead and think" practically ensures that it will not have thoughtful, creative students. This is unfortunately the way of most undergraduate specializing today, although Shahn's educational proposal shows that this need not be so, and that an education ordered by a professional goal that broadens rather than restricts is surely one of the most exciting educations imaginable.

It seems, then, that one of the first things we might do, practically speaking, is to encourage students to learn a great deal about many
subjects. At least we can make it so that life is not too difficult for students who seem to have genuine interest in many different things. Creative behavior seems to require that an individual have had diverse experiences to give him a wide assortment of images or traces of experiences that he can connect in original ways. Exactly what sort of diversity is necessary varies from field to field. Talent in music, art, mathematics, and natural sciences seems to display itself early in life, and people in these fields can be expressing themselves creatively by the time they are twenty. Students of literature, psychology, or other social sciences, however, seem fated to have to wait longer before they reach the peak of their creative efforts, perhaps because they require not only knowledge about human behavior, but a genuine acquaintance with humanity.

Premature specialization may harm not only the developing individual but the discipline in which he works. In the study of human life or society, precocity in the use of concepts and methods may easily serve as a substitute for experience and even as a defense against it, thus blocking creativity at its source. We can see this in psychology when, with the continuing "upgrading" of the undergraduate curriculum, an increasing proportion of entering graduate students arrive with a good grasp of certain methods and a conception of themselves as scientists, but with little background for judging the actual problems. They are then so occupied
with empirical busy work that they have little chance to acquire intro-
spective knowledge or a vital grasp of what motivates human behavior.
Psychology that is artificially uncomplicated becomes a narrow, mechanis-
tic discipline whose applications result in the manipulation of people.

Probably the fields that Pinner\textsuperscript{21} calls dissensual (that is, which the general public sees either as threatening or as useless), and which include the social sciences and the fine arts, are the fields that suffer most from premature or excessive book-learning. But scientists and mathematicians have devised curricula to identify talent in their specialties early in life, and it is conceivable that these fields, too, may be harmed by preciosity. One is tempted to say to the scientist that we will let him be dominant in the years through high school if he will allow our approach the ascendancy during the years of college. But, even better, we should set as our goal the intensification of human experience at all stages. Heist\textsuperscript{22} goes to considerable lengths to show us that there is a certain tenuousness about the identification of "creative" students. Even if these young people do have much in common and can be differentiated from their peers, there are probably many potentially creative young people in college who have not yet shown any signs of what they will be able to do later on. If we cannot be sure which people should have special attention in college, then the safest course is to see to it that everybody in the college receives as good as
we have to offer.

Education will not encourage creativity until a basic change takes place in our system for rewarding students. Esther Raushenbush remarks that there are "A" students who completely avoid deep involvement in their education. It will be recognized, in time, that what students need is not grades, but criticism of their work. It would not be surprising if in the next few years distinguished undergraduate institutions gave all their courses on a pass-fail basis. People complain that we must grade so that students can present a proper record to graduate schools and employers. But the answer to that is simple: let schools and employers test their candidates. This is not the job of the college.

We have no evidence that success in college, as measured by grades, is very highly correlated with success in life. At the University of California's Institute of Human Development, researchers currently are examining people now thirty-five and forty years old who were studied intensively during their early years. The unexpected is almost the rule. In numerous cases, extremely unpromising youngsters somehow found themselves later on—even as late as in their thirties—while in other cases, the stars of elementary and high school classes achieved very little or else were clear failures in life. Nevertheless, colleges are even more preoccupied than our schools with the purely academic.
The symptoms are overspecialization, overemphasis on grade-point averages, and the slogan of "raising standards," which is often a euphemism for increasing the burden of meaningless assignments. This attitude surely does not encourage experimentation and creativity.

In fact, the needs of the creative worker are seldom understood. Even university departments, schools, laboratories, or institutes do not always provide favorable environments for creative work. There are colleges in which a creative man's style and habits of work might easily cause him to be labeled deviant, with the result that he would receive little encouragement for what he wanted to do.

Life in the departments of leading universities today is likely to be highly competitive; in contrast, before World War II departments were usually human communities in which different professors had different roles—critic, teacher, housekeeper, benevolent supervisor of graduate students, writer of papers and books, innovator, and so forth. In these settings, people could give rein to their particular personality, expressing themselves in a way that gave everyone the opportunity for the creative freedom of which he was capable; and the two or three outstandingly creative people (all it really took to make a department famous) could rely on colleagues for various kinds of support. Today all department members are expected to be stars, or to have built into
them before they arrive everything needed to be productive. They are not supposed to have to rely on the conditions of work (which include the quality of colleagueship), although freedom from teaching duties is usually supposed to be a great benefit to faculty work. It seems to me that the earlier type of academic community was more favorable to creative endeavor.

I would like to return for a moment to thinking about an artist's creativity. There is a certain way in which choosing such an obvious model of creativity as artistic work helps us in our thinking. For one thing, we ought to be able to see clearly in the example of the artist that there is no place in his education for the spirit of competitiveness; this we might not see so well were we still thinking in terms of grading students and working in a department. A second advantage is that we readily allow to the artist styles of work that, when carried over into academic departments, do not seem so obviously beneficial. As Harold Taylor has said:

Few educators seem to understand that the same long and uninterupted stretches of time necessary to become deeply involved in an art are necessary if the student is to become deeply involved in any other form of learning--in the sciences, the humanities, in languages. . . . In the case of science students or students of literature similar allocations of time are necessary for laboratory work or unhurried reading, in the case of social science students for field trips and field work, with a minimum number of class meetings and a maximum amount of independent study and work by students in spontaneously formed groups. Once the notion is abolished that university
education has to be cut up into classroom units of fifty minutes fifteen times a week . . . with assignments to match, the process of learning can more easily seen to be something that goes on from morning until night, seven days a week, and all year round, in a variety of ways, only a few of which involve time spent in classrooms and educational institutions. The model of learning in the arts then becomes the model of learning for the entire curriculum. 25

Education for Social Responsibility

Though we put our hopes for higher education under the rubric of "individual development," we naturally assume that fully developed individuals will not be self-centered but will be concerned about the public welfare. How, in theory, do we arrive at this state? Through their interaction with their families, children develop the basis for social responsibility, the knowledge that they must act out of consideration for other people; and gross failures in social responsibility, such as marked selfishness or aggressive self-seeking, can always be traced to failures or distortions in the family's social relationships. Later, the child moves beyond the family, and, chiefly as a result of a struggle with his own antisocial impulses, he becomes more idealistic, striving for a kind of perfection and expecting much from other people. In the period just before college, the adolescent often likes to lose himself in a group; wishing to be fully accepted, he is uncritically loyal and indiscriminately hostile to out-groups that seem to threaten it. Ideas of right and wrong are often based on the thinking of the group or its leaders.
The adolescent likes to work hard in the interest of his group and be rewarded by it. This total devotion is an important stage in developing feelings of responsibility, but it is only a lower order of responsibility; it does not require much ego, or personal development, or even much education or intelligence. It is the kind of responsibility that we find in authoritarian families, athletic teams, combat groups, Komsomols, and in jingoistic nationalism. Nevertheless, group loyalty is the initial step toward being an effective member of a non-familial group. Someone who can go through this stage and then grow out of it will be less likely to fall into patterns of blind loyalty or the uncritical rejection of other groups. A youngster who misses this stage in high school ought to have a chance to enjoy the benefits of loyalty in college—in living groups or clubs. Even fraternities can be useful here; we all know students who get a lot out of fraternities during their first two years, and later tire of superficialities. Just as disturbing as the immature aspects of fraternities is the intellectual or aesthetic young boy who never played with rough fellows but came home instead to mother and his homework. When he arrives at college, this sort of boy usually rejects sports and other group activities, including everything that in our society has been a normal part of life among men, and lacks social feeling and skills to such a degree that he is truly alienated from the rest of society.

Colleges can capitalize on the desirable aspects of fraternities by
creating small living groups where fraternity could be practiced. Such
groups might be most successful if they were united not only by archi-
tecture, as in a small, older house or in the segmented dormitories now
being planned, but also by one or a few purposes. Rather than basing
their cohesion on a generalized conformity extending over many realms
of life (styles of dress, social manners, or thought), these groups could
choose to have in-house seminars on art, politics, adolescence, or any
topic of interest; and this could be done either on a rather formal basis,
with credit being given, or in the way of inviting speakers for coffee or
dinner, or holding art shows, or sponsoring poetry readings. Faculty
members could be in residence or could be associated with such groups.
Such an experiment was started at Stanford, where a total of 40 men and
women moved into a small, empty residence and pursued a common
interest in the developing countries. Incidentally, they also had the
opportunity to negotiate among themselves a set of social rules that
governed their particular situation.

Even small groups that did not have a particular study purpose would
have an advantage over fraternities in that they would comprise a diversity
of types. Students living in small groups often find themselves getting
to know people with whom they would hardly have spoken in the impersonal-
ity of a dormitory, either because the people seemed awesome or else were
too unobtrusive and retiring to appear interesting. In general, members
of these groups should be self-selecting, and the qualifications demanded of them (if a particular group is oversubscribed) should be, in a broad sense, the student's ability to contribute to, or to benefit from, the experience of the group. It is important for students to be accepted and valued on grounds other than achievement or brightness. Congeniality and enjoyment should be a vital part of these living-studying groups. They might be thought of as cultural and fun centers, where discriminating tastes are developed.

Living in such a study group cannot help but encourage students to think about the group's aims and its actual activities; they would also develop what we might call a sort of "working loyalty" whereby the group is not allowed to disintegrate, because of internal dissent, and whereby working disagreements are sustained among people who respect each other.

Beyond providing the conditions for responsible group living, if a college is to encourage social responsibility it must (as a minimum) run its own affairs according to values known to and worthy of emulation by its students. The extraordinary thing is how often this minimum requirement is lacking in colleges and universities today—perhaps especially in the universities. In these large institutions, students are seldom confronted with models of the responsibility we would like them to
develop. Where faculty members feel loyalty mainly to departments, and administrators are committed to keeping the system going, students rarely hear anything about the purpose of the institution as a whole. Their education itself is not invested with a clear purpose, nor are students told that they should seek one. Usually the message that they get is "better look out for yourself." Most of the appeals and demands are addressed to self-interest, and most of the promised rewards are put in terms of self-satisfaction through success in a vocation or profession.

Seldom are students told that they should prepare themselves to be leaders of a society that expects important things of them. Students have little chance even to feel that they are capable of giving anything to anybody else. In today's high-pressure system their aim is to survive, and if one is barely surviving, he will naturally have some difficulty in thinking of himself as a person who can lead others and give to others. Being in college, for most students, is capitulating to a kind of voluntary servitude, and it is quite a jump from that condition to one of socially responsible leadership.

In social responsibility, as in every other aspect of personality development, our goal is to expand both the intellect and the realm of motive and feeling and then to integrate the two in ego-controlled action.
To this end we try to mobilize the student's deeper needs and emotions in the interest of intellectual strivings, and at the same time we try to bring intellect to bear upon the issues he cares most deeply about. Once the student is aroused by social and political issues, he needs not only the support of a sympathetic group, but confidence in his own thought, judgment, and decision-making—a confidence born only of practice. Instead of trying to avoid controversial issues, a college ought to promote analysis of them, including such conflicts of campus life as a student-administration conflict about rules, or a clash between faculty and trustees over academic freedom. In our intellectual endeavors we should be passionate about intellectual matters, and intellectual about matters that have aroused passions.

We can pinpoint certain barriers to the taking of social responsibility. Many college students suffer not only from ignorance of the larger world, but also from a lack of opportunity to be of service. Fearful of appearing soft or unsophisticated, and required to compete successfully with others in finding ways to beat the system, they pass up the chances to be helpful, thus generating a good measure of self-contempt. College students whom we think of as "uncommitted" or "alienated" often seem to be in this situation, and they can even make a correct intellectual analysis of themselves and their trouble without its doing any good. Possibly the only cure for self-contempt is an
actual experience of being helpful, which often can best be obtained in some setting radically different from college. Although this experience should sooner or later be connected with the student's intellectual life, I avoid suggesting that the only way to educate people to social responsibility is to involve them in social action right now. We know too little about the relationships between the patterns of a student's college behavior and his future action. Vassar women who became leaders in the community were not, in general, campus leaders, nor were they particularly active on the social front as students. Also, as I indicated in the discussion of small living groups, politics is not the only field where students can exercise responsibility; indeed, it may be said that they have a more pressing duty to take responsibility for their college in working out reforms and trying to work with the administration.

I am reminded of the professor who tried to interest us in the issues of the 1920's in his course on contemporary Supreme Court cases. Although my friends and I did not take time to read many of the cases, our teacher somehow managed to convey to us the importance of his subject. We were impressed by the way he refused to give up on us, by his assumption that sooner or later we would have to be interested, and by his implied faith that we were, though still young and ignorant, the
best hope of the nation. Nowadays, of course, we dismiss from college people who will not prepare their cases. In my day we did not have to worry about that possibility, for we had been given to understand that society was depending on us to take up its tasks. In fact, as soon as I was through with matters that were really pressing in college, I began to read about politics and Supreme Court cases and I found them highly interesting. What occurs to me now is that this teacher should have used more concrete imagery to convey what the cases really meant. We did not have a clue about the meaning of labor relations; we had no reliable imagery of labor, much less its relations; and these were not spelled out for us since at that time the "realistic" school of Supreme Court interpretation had not yet taken hold. Lacking knowledge, we found the cases abstract and, aside from our persistent teacher, easy to ignore.

A moral of this story is that colleges, or some of their teachers or spokesmen, ought to state the social purposes for which we want students to take responsibility. This is where the contemporary student activists have had a role to play. They have made a real contribution in drawing attention to the lack of a clear statement from educators about what ends a college education is meant to serve.

Colleges can, in their academic life, require students to write papers
in the social sciences and in politics that recommend and defend a policy. In general, however, the development of full social responsibility requires experience in social action, or in actions helpful to other people. This could be had either while the student is enrolled in college or during planned absences from it. A young person needs this experience to test the adequacy of his judgment, to learn the limits of what he can do, and, above all, to feel the self-fulfillment that comes from being of service to others.
FOOTNOTES


4. Ibid., p. 29.


6. Ibid., p. 5.


9. Ibid., p. 6.

10. Ibid., p. 9.

11. Ibid., p. 25.


22. P. R. Heist, "Talented Transients in the College Context." In Heist, ed., op. cit.


ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY


   A review in two parts of Daniel Bell's The Reforming of General Education, James A. Perkins' The University in Transition, and Herbert Stroup's Bureaucracy in Higher Education. Aiken's position is that "our academic leaders are unprepared for the moral roles that have been thrust upon them." He criticizes Perkins' excessive attention to the demands of "public service." He finds that Bell analyzes the ideas behind general education (the ideas of liberty and civility), but does not discuss "the actual development of free and civil beings, capable of making up their own minds about . . . ideas of liberty and civility . . . ."


   A criticism of the present failures of teaching institutions. The author insists that teaching must constitute a personal act, and he indicates how this might be done.


   Some of the changes in undergraduate education discussed here are new working and living groups to overcome "depersonalization" in education; the abandonment of the false distinction between "breadth" and "depth" in learning; the establishment of contact with the off-campus world; new manners of learning; and new standards of excellence.

Baskin states that nothing surprises foreign educators so much as our colleges' practice of continuing to require a system of courses, units, and grades—a system that resembles high school practices. This paper reports in particular on experiments in independent learning carried out at Oberlin, Antioch, and Vanderbilt University; it also describes new programs at Monteith, Goddard, Bard, Wesleyan, and the new college (Hampshire College) sponsored by Amherst, Mount Holyoke, Smith, and the University of Massachusetts. Most of these programs seem concerned with reducing the amount of "teacher contact" or "teacher assistance"; they are designed with a view to accommodating more students. To that extent, their only relevance to the present paper is to show that learning, measured by what Baskin calls conventional ways, is not dependent on adhering to the course/grade/unit system we have now. There is no discussion of exactly how these colleges plan to prepare their students to work independently; and, as Raushenbush points out, independent study can fail badly if the student is unprepared. Nevertheless, Baskin's paper, especially in his discussion of Bard, Wesleyan, and Hampshire College, provides leads for those interested in new ways of learning.


An analysis of Berkeley student life, followed by recommendations for improvement in teaching and other aspects of college life. This is a document that takes account of what the situation will bear in terms of reform; it has perhaps already been helpful in creating a climate for change.


Birney cites research showing that various teaching methods—group dynamics, lectures, independent study—show no difference in their effect on grades, but a great difference in the satisfaction felt by students. He also discusses the effects of grading on study behavior.

A critical tasting of the flavors of several American colleges. This kind of description is helpful in seeing how the noncurricular aspects of college life affect student development.


Lawrence Kubie suggests four styles of creativity that may express themselves in scientific productivity. He also comments on the way the neurotic process distorts creativity, and points out how we may search out ways to protect the preconscious processes essential to creativity, while gaining by education the equally essential conscious symbolic processes. David Hawkins, in "The Informed Vision: An Essay on Science Education," adopts as a definition of the best kind of learning Dewey's comment (from *Art as Experience*) on what constitutes spontaneity in art: "complete absorption in subject matter that is fresh, the freshness of which holds and sustains emotion." Our account of science, Hawkins says, has omitted "the personal act" in favor of "the public process." He suggests how science may be taught so as not to stultify the personal act of creation.


In "Neglect of Students as a Historical Tradition," Frederick Rudolph notes that students have most often been the "most creative and imaginative force" for change in our colleges. William L. Kolb, in an article entitled "Changing the Collegiate Culture," asks "whether we wish to continue to identify intellectual excellence with this syndrome of the achievement drive and the demands of the knowledge industry." Lewis B. Mayhew discusses the impact of various educational environments. Frederick L. Gwynn believes that "the ineffectiveness of much college teaching may well be the major cause" of the present crisis in higher education. His comments are drawn from interviews with "teachers of high repute" and with students. Other articles deal with research on student characteristics, the curriculum, teaching, and student rights, political and otherwise.


Dewey cautions against forming philosophies of education merely by proceeding negatively, or by reaction against what has been traditional. He states that there is an organic connection between education and personal experience, but that this does not mean that all experiences are equally educational. Education, however, should continually open the person for further experience.

Besides this essay and his famous essay on "The American Scholar," this volume also includes aspects of Emerson's philosophy not concerned with education in the narrow sense of the word.


In Chapter 2, Erikson sets forth his view of the developmental stages of the life cycle.


A review of research relating to the interaction of personality and the college atmosphere, and of personality change in college.


Two volumes published together. The first deals with primary and secondary education as well as college and discusses the gap between generations and the way educational pressures disrupt the maturing, humanizing process of adolescence. In a chapter called "Two Simple Proposals," Goodman suggests (1) that colleges not admit students directly out of high school, but require instead two years spent in some maturing activity; and (2) that colleges abolish grading. In *The Community of Scholars,* Goodman describes his ideal university, modeled on the university communities of the middle ages. He ascribes the spoiling of this ideal to university administration and the pressures of mass society. He offers ideas for reform.


These papers were published in view of the fact that often "the work of the undergraduates seems more wide-ranging, more open to experience, and perhaps more original than that of graduate students." They illustrate how students may be encouraged to devise independent work with personal meaning within the framework of a course with fairly large enrollment. Other collections appear for other years as well.

A list, with bibliographical references, of the ideas having to do with both learning and administration that are being tried in old and new colleges alike.


Students nominated as creative by their peers and teachers obtained a characteristic profile of scores on the Omnibus Personality Inventory, being particularly high on Interest in Ideas, Estheticism, Complexity, and Autonomy. Using this test profile as an indicator of creativity, Heist found that in four colleges significantly more "non-creative" than "creative" students remained to graduate, that this tendency was stronger among women than among men, and that colleges differed markedly in the percentage of "creatives" in a graduating class.


A reflection on student mores and problems, and on the transformation of Swarthmore from a religious to an "intellectualized" modern secular college. Hunt has taught at Swarthmore for more than 30 years. He reports students' comments about their college experience, discusses the hampering of good work by emotional disturbance, and comments on the delicate balances to be made in forming an intellectual community.


A three-volume study of Greek character and of the Greek ideals of personality, including the educational ways in which these ideals were nurtured.


One of the first works applying psychological theory to educational practice. James defined "an uneducated person" as "one who is non-plussed by all but the most habitual situations"; conversely, James felt
The aim of education to be teaching a student in such a way that he would have "every possible sort of fit reaction on the circumstances into which he may find himself brought by the vicissitudes of life."


The author discusses how psychology may be taught with a view to individual development.


A review of the literature studying student activism and the personality characteristics of activists.


A four-year longitudinal study of entering students at Stanford and Berkeley. It is modeled upon the studies carried out at Vassar College by Sanford, Freedman, Webster, Brown, and Bushnell in the 1950's, but it is more theoretically oriented. Findings confirm the Vassar results on developmental changes in college. There are detailed accounts of what makes changes occur, as well as interesting observations on differences between students of the 1950's and those of the 1960's.


A wide-ranging discussion of creative behavior, this book is also a critique of what psychological theories have to say about inventive animal behavior and human intellectual activity, and a commentary on the creativity of certain great thinkers and discoverers.


The author argues from a psychoanalytic point of view that "self-knowledge in depth" should be a major educational goal, and he suggests
some ways in which techniques learned in the clinic may be adapted for use in educational institutions.


The author explains how personality may affect the way in which we hold ideas, and how one may be "dogmatic" even in holding a "middle of the road" position. The author believes that colleges have failed when their students do not hold opinions about the politics or science they have been studying. Specific books in different fields are recommended, which, with their varying philosophical points of view, will encourage a student to examine his own beliefs.


This study reviews much of the research on creativity at the Institute for Personality Assessment and Research of the University of California, Berkeley, and elsewhere. Highly creative architects and scientists are distinguished from less creative ones by their greater independence, self-awareness, integration of rational and nonrational aspects of themselves, and breadth of cultural interests. Creativity might be nurtured by a college environment that has structure but in which the individual is respected, which provides good models of creativity, offers broad experiences, and deliberately uses humanistic studies in order to free the imagination. Such an environment, of course, would be helpful to all college students.


Novelty is only one of the criteria that must define creativity; others are accurate adaptation to reality and the persistence involved in sustaining, evaluating, and fulfilling an idea. Independence and disregard for public approval are strong characteristics of creative people. "Creatives" admit to consciousness many thoughts or feelings that can and do upset other people. This open-minded quality may lead to disorder that has to be tolerated both by themselves and by others. Since intuitive perception and intuitive thinking are the creative person's preferred modes, learning
probably proceeds best when it takes the form of discovering unities within a great body of knowledge acquired in different ways. Creative people have a great predilection for the unfinished and the unorganized, on which they can exercise their love for theory and for aesthetic values.


A report on research into the psychological factors affecting learning, and a discussion of the way certain character types perform intellectual work.


A lecture read to the John Dewey Society, commenting on the work of William James, Freud, and Dewey as they throw light on problems of education. Murphy discusses passion as a means of learning (understanding by enthusiasm as well as by discrimination and rationality), and the necessity for freedom from unconscious inhibitions that prevent creative work.


This is a good place to read about problems of education and educational philosophy, as current books on education are reviewed. For example, Edgar Z. Friedenberg has reviewed Clark Kerr, *The Uses of the University*; John Gardner, *Self-Renewal*; Paul Goodman, *Compulsory Mis-Education*; and Kenneth Keniston, *The Uncommitted*. Christopher Jencks has reviewed Admiral H. G. Rickover's *American Education: A National Failure*. Sheldon Wolin and John Scharr have written articles on the Berkeley revolution, and Paul Goodman has also written "Thoughts on Berkeley."


Nietzsche examines the degeneration of philological study from an empathetic study of antiquity to a modern science. He remarks: "The advancement of science at the expense of man is one of the most punicious things in the world . . . science itself is finally shipwrecked: it has made progress, but has either no effect at all on life or else an immoral one."

33. Peterson, George E., *The New England College in the Age of the*
A historical study, tracing the adaptations that colleges were forced to make when the university model of education was introduced in the nineteenth century. Peterson's model shows the conflict between an education that focuses on various forms of intellectuality and liberal or developmental education.


In this paper Pinner defines his use of the terms "consensual" and "dissensual" disciplines.


Detailed studies of four students whose education "came alive" for them. These were not necessarily the brightest students, but those to whom education made a difference. There are quotations from students' papers, their comments about school and teachers, career plans, and topics about which they became concerned. The author discusses experimental teaching forms such as freshman seminars, Monteith College (Wayne State), New College (Hofstra); off-campus study (work periods, study, observation, or work abroad); and independent study.


Noting the difference in emphasis between John Henry Newman's The Idea of a University (1852) (in which he disparages universities that grant degrees merely on the basis of examinations passed) and Clark Kerr's The Uses of the University (1963), Ray proposes that the question that ought to be asked about any reform is whether it will increase or diminish attention to the student as an individual. He also comments on the failure of independent study programs that merely make students more and more adept at satisfying externally imposed standards.


Riesman discusses the difficulties of presenting the youth of an affluent society with challenges, especially in times when utopian thought is not much practiced.
Riesman favors presenting people with "creative discontinuities" in their formal education, rather than allowing the culture of high school or the suburb to be recreated in college. He shares "John Dewey's faith that education should put pressures on life, as well as vice versa"—in other words, that the tasks of education should not be restricted to preparing one for the future or even too closely to concentrating on what actually exists (for example, studying the current social or political situation). What he wants is not a "practical" education, but an education for making life more abundantly livable; and if a graduate is dissatisfied with his job, which seems "dull" after college, so much the better. Ideally, his education will help the graduate to resist our society's tendency (as Riesman says in "The Search for Challenge") not "to seek for a demanding job or to struggle politically for a world in which jobs are more...interesting...but to flee into...the utopianism of private life, of domesticity." This essay also discusses the educational results of the disappearance of the feminist attitude toward life and ways in which women can indulge in the luxury of getting an education not quite so bad as men's.


An examination, based on research, of the factors affecting rigidity or flexibility in thought and in the holding of beliefs.


A helpful work, since it includes not simply a description of the various developments in American education, but also an analysis of how change has been brought about.


This report is an enlightening description of the curriculum at St. John's, which has been called by some people the "Hundred Great Books Program." The writer of this report comments that "the notion of a 'list of a hundred great books' has transfixed reporters...few people seem aware of the many changes in this list during the years. These changes were anticipated and resulted from experience in using
the books within the classroom." In addition to these books, students must also study foreign languages, music, and mathematics, and do laboratory work in science as well. The college places great emphasis on the community it creates by requiring all students to follow the same curriculum (no electives are permitted) and by teaching all classes as seminars. As such, this is one curriculum that can be extremely helpful to development. The report also includes the results of a poll of St. John's alumni asking their retrospective view of their education and how it has served them.


Articles most relevant to the present paper deal with the college as an initiation rite; the developmental status of the entering freshman; procedures of experimental teaching; interpersonal relations in the classroom; the teacher as model; interpersonal relations among students as determining the campus morale; and numerous studies on student culture.


A critique of present teaching systems with suggested reforms, including a discussion of the integration of the personality during the college years and the role of continuing education after college.


Shahn's reflections on his own development as an artist and what he would recommend to students.


Papers written by students in this volume discuss American education from elementary school through the university. Some of the papers about the college experience include an analysis of the college as an institution that postpones entrance to the adult world. (See also Hagan.)

These essays were written by teachers in many fields of the arts and sciences at Sarah Lawrence. They write about some of the things they believe it is "important to teach young people, and . . . how we go about teaching them." Their work is based on the belief that "education, in order to have a meaning for the person who is receiving it, must be carried on in a way which can bring out the most that is in each person, and which puts the duties and rewards of learning squarely in the hands of the students."


Taylor believes that the university ought to stimulate artistic production, make its students sensitive critics of the arts, and give the arts such an influential place in the curriculum that they enliven the way everything else is taught and learned.


A discriminating collection of writings in educational philosophy.


An examination of the social role of education, which recognizes that "the first goal in education for democracy is the full, rounded, and continuing development of the person."


Of Whitehead's influence as a teacher, Felix Frankfurter said: "That our universities have grave shortcomings for the intellectual life of this nation is by now a commonplace. The chief source of their inadequacy is probably the curse of departmentalization. Among students, as well as among teachers, there has been a tendency to regard courses as something which exist in nature . . . . Professor Whitehead exerted powerful influence to break down . . . separation in the various departments of the university." In these essays, Whitehead anticipated, by his observation of the changes effected by university education, the
characteristic problems of education in the twentieth century. He referred to the misconceived practice of judging faculty by their published output. He saw that universities felt compelled always to increase their course offerings; and, in advising how to guard against "inert ideas," he said, "Do not teach too many subjects" and "what you teach, teach thoroughly." He referred to the ideal of what we now call the "integration" of personality in these words: "ideas which are not utilised are positively harmful. By utilising an idea, I mean relating it to that stream, compounded of sense perceptions, feelings, hopes, desires, and of mental activities... which forms our life." Finally, the theme of individual development as the goal of education has an antecedent in what Whitehead says is "the main idea" of this book: "students are alive, and the purpose of education is to stimulate and guide their self-development."
REATIONS

In order for this second series of "New Dimensions in Higher Education" to better serve the needs of colleges and universities throughout the nation, reader reaction is herewith being sought. In this instance, with respect to Education for Individual Development, the following questions are asked:

1. Can you suggest other completed research, the results of which would add significantly to this report?

2. What other aspects of this subject should be given the highest priority, in terms of further research?

3. What are the implications of this review for your own institution?

Kindly address reactions to:

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